Digest

328. Petitioner was charged with Frustrated Homicide(Criminal Case No. 94-5036), Homicide(Criminal Case No. 94-5038), Violation of Section 261(Q) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 (Criminal Case No. 24-392), and Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Criminal Case No. 94-5037). Presiding Judge Alumbres issued an Order dismissing the criminal cases Nos. 94-5036 and 94-5037 by reason of the failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The order also stated that Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5038 and 24392 should be set for further trial. Petitioner filed a Motion for Correction of Clerical Error, alleging that in the dispositive portion of the Order, Criminal Case No. 94-5038 should have been dismissed instead of Criminal Case No. 94-5037, which should have been the case set for further trial.  Respondent judge denied the motion, holding that the alleged error was substantial in nature which affected the very merit of the case. On appeal, the CA directed petitioner to implead the People of the Philippines as respondent. CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to comply with the resolution. Did the CA commit serious and reversible error in dismissing the petition on the ground of a technicality? Yes. The Rules of Court also provides that rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Thus, in several cases, the Court has ruled against the dismissal of petitions or appeals based solely on technicalities especially when there was subsequent substantial compliance with the formal requirements. This Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for petitioners/plaintiffs failure to comply. In this case, the Court of Appeals should have granted petitioners motion for reconsideration and given due course to the petition in view of petitioners subsequent compliance by filing an Amended Petition, impleading the People of the Philippines as respondent. Technicalities may be set aside when the strict and rigid application of the rules will frustrate rather than promote justice. (Judelio Cobarrubias v. People of the Philippines, The Honorable Court of Appeals Special Former Second Division, And Hon. Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Acting Judge of the Regional Trial Court Of Las Pias City, Branch 255, G.R. No. 160610, August 14, 2009) 329. Gonzalez and Buenaflor were charged with the murder of Delgado and frustrated murder of Pesico. The investigating Prosecutor conducted the preliminary investigation and thereafter dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. The acting secretary of Justice reversed the finding of the Investigating Prosecutor. The CA affirmed the existence of probable cause. In a motion for reconsideration, it ordered that the Informations charging the accused with murder and less serious physical injuries be quashed and dismissed. The Solicitor General did not appeal the appellate courts Amended Decision which reversed her Resolutions when she was Acting Secretary of Justice.  Thus, the Court declared the case closed and terminated. Does the non-filing of the Solgen of a petition within the reglementary period before this Court rendered the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals final and executory? Yes. Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that the Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.  The law clearly requires the Office of the Solicitor General to represent the Government in the Supreme Court in all criminal proceedings before this CourtWe have ruled in a number of cases that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. However, jurisprudence lays down two exceptions where a private complainant or offended party in a criminal case may file a petition directly with this Court. The two exceptions are: (1) when there is denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party,[70] and (2) when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court. These two exceptions do not apply in this case.  We reiterate that it is only the Solicitor General who may bring or defend actions on behalf of the State in all criminal proceedings before the appellate courts. Hence, the Solicitor Generals non-filing of a petition within the reglementary period before this Court rendered the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals final and executory with respect to the criminal aspect of the case. The Solicitor General cannot trifle with court proceedings by refusing to file a petition for review only to subsequently, after the lapse of the reglementary period and finality of the Amended Decision, file a comment. (Heirs Of Federico C. Delgado And Annalisa Pesico - Versus - Luisito Q. Gonzalez And Antonio T. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 184337, August 7, 2009)    330. Respondent Duca was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification by the MCTC. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MCTC. On appeal, the CA acquitted Duca of the crime charged, without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor General to file his comment. Did the CA gravely abused its discretion and had acted without jurisdiction when it resolved the appeal without giving the People of the Philippines through the office of the solicitor general the opportunity to be heard thereon? Yes. The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides, viz.: SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. x x x It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines and as such, should have been given the opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People. The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard. The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the DUCA without giving the Solicitor General the chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition filed before the CA. The said decision is, therefore, a nullity. (People of The Philippines versus Arturo F. Duca, G.R. No. 171175, October 30, 2009)   331. Appellants William Tiu and Edgardo De Paz were charged of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Tupil, the prosecution witness has a history of framing up suspects and giving false testimony. Appellants claim that the buy-bust operation never took place and they depicted an elaborate frame-up perpetrated by the police. The appellants presented disinterested witnesses who had no personal or business relationship with them. Both the appellants were found guilty of the crime charged by the RTC. Did the RTC err in not acquitting the accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt? Yes. By the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. For this reason, the Court must be extra vigilant in trying drug cases. While the Court concedes that a single, trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to convict an accused, it does not hold true in this case. Tupil’s credibility has been seriously eroded by the fact that, in another drug-related criminal case, he was found to have framed-up the accused therein for illegal sale of shabu. The decision in that case, speaks volumes of the character of Tupil and his co-narcotics agents. In criminal cases, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Court finds that the guilt of appellants herein has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, as measured by the required moral certainty for conviction. While there has been no strong proof that appellants were indeed framed-up, in criminal cases the overriding consideration is not whether the Court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Considering the shady credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and the evidence presented by appellants, the constitutional presumption of innocence has not been overcome. (People Of The Philippines vs. William Tiu Y Liu And Edgardo De Paz Y Danao, G.R. No. 142885, October 22, 2003) 332. Angelito Tan was accused of selling and possessing illegal drugs. He insists that he was framed, but the police officers who nabbed him claim that he was arrested in flagrante delicto during a legitimate buy-bust operation. The record is in bereft of any showing that there was a specific time and place agreed upon when and where the delivery was to be made. No phone calls were made by the poseur-buyer to the accused as proven by the absence of a telephone in the polices office.The accused-appellant was examined for traces of ultra-violet powder only after ten hours from the time he allegedly handled the dusted buy-bust money. The trial court convicted the accused of the crime charged. Did the trial court err in ruling that the state was able to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt? Yes. The conveniently dovetailing accounts of the prosecution eyewitnesses, all of them police officers of the buy-bust unit, with regard to the material facts of how the crime was allegedly committed engenders doubt as to their credibility. Identical features in the testimony of witnesses cannot but generate the suspicion that the material circumstances testified to by them were integral parts of a well thought-out and prefabricated story. The dubiousness of the claimed buy-bust operation is further underscored by the irregularities in the procedure undertaken by the arresting officers. There can be no denying that a buy-bust operation has been considered as an effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction. However, by the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. Thus, courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. Needless to state, the lower court should have exercised the utmost diligence and prudence in deliberating upon accused-appellants guilt. It should have given more serious consideration to the pros and cons of the evidence offered by both defense and the State and many loose ends should have been settled by the trial court in determining the merits of the case. (People Of The Philippines Vs. Angelito Tan Y Nubla, G.R. No.129376, May 29, 2002) 333.   The Investigating State Prosecutor found probable cause to indict the petitioner for the crime of murder. Two Informations for murder were filed with the RTC, which then issued warrants of arrest on the same day. Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Suspend the Implementation of the Warrant of Arrest, Pursuant to Department Circular No. 70 of the DOJ arguing that all the accused in the said criminal cases had filed a timely petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and, pursuant to said circular, the implementation of the warrant of arrest against petitioner should be suspended and/or recalled pending resolution of the said petition for review. Does a pending resolution of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice concerning a finding of probable cause suspend the proceedings in the trial court, including the implementation of a warrant of arrest? No. It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged is the function of the investigating prosecutor. The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.  The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of probable cause is exclusive; thus, the consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable cause, a function that is executive in nature. To defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge. (Enrique V. Viudez II vs The Court Of Appeals And Hon. Basilio R. Gabo, Jr., G.R. No. 152889, June 5, 2009) 334. An Information was filed charging the accused of kidnapping with rape. Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of guilty with the assistance of a counsel. The lower court thereupon conducted a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of appellants plea, and despite repeated questions and just as repeated answers showing that the accused understood his plea and its consequences, the trial court still ordered the prosecution to, as it did, present evidence. RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged noting that AAAs detailed account of her ordeal is a manifestation of her honesty and forthrightness. Did the trial court err in convicting the accused on the basis of an improvident plea of guilt? No. that there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a searching inquiry, nevertheless came up with the following guidelines: 1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. 2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. 3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty. 4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. 5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment 6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter. 7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details. There is thus no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a searching inquiry. As long as the voluntary intent of the accused and his full comprehension of the consequences of his plea are ascertained, as was done in the present case, the accused’ plea of guilt is sustained. (People Of The Philippines -Versus- Renato Talusan Y Panganiban, G.R. No. 179187, July 14, 2009) 335. An Information charging Panuncio of falsification was filed. The trial court set the arraignment, and she entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, pre-trial and the trial of the case ensued. The RTC found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of a public document under Articles 171 and 172 of the RPC. Panuncio argues that the Information was defective because it did not specifically mention the provision that she violated. Should Panuncio’s contention be sustained? No. Panuncio failed to raise the issue of the defective information before the trial court through a motion for bill of particulars or a motion to quash the information. Her failure to object to the allegation in the information before she entered her plea of not guilty amounted to a waiver of the defect in the information. Objections as to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. (Rosario S. Panuncio - versus - People Of The Philippines, G.R. No. 165678, July 17, 2009) 336. An Information was filed charging Lim with violation of PD No. 1612. Lim moved for a reinvestigation of his case. Pending the reinvestigation of Lim’s case, Co filed a complaint against Lim before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for the violation of PD 1612. In a Review Resolution, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila reaffirmed its findings of probable cause against Lim and recommended the prosecution of Go. The Acting Secretary of the DOJ issued a Resolution reversing the Review Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. The RTC dismissed the criminal complaints. Was the order of dismissing the criminal cases for the sole reason that the department of justice ordered the withdrawal of the corresponding informations, and without making an independent assessment and finding of evidence, valid? No. Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of its duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor, which the court may order the latter to produce before the court; or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor. The failure of the trial court judge to independently evaluate and assess the merits of the case against the accused violates the complainant’s right to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Withdraw Informations anew. In this case, the dismissal of the case was based upon considerations other than the judges own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the respondents. Thus, the trial judge improperly relinquished the discretion that he was bound to exercise, and the Orders dismissing the cases are invalid for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. (Liezl Co - versus - Harold Lim Y Go And Avelino Uy Go, G.R. Nos. 164669-70, October 30, 2009) 337. Accused was charged with homicide. Upon being arraigned, he entered a plea of guilty. At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. On the basis of such testimony, the court acquitted the accused. Did the trial court err in acquitting the accused of the offense charged despite the latter's plea of guilty when arraigned? Yes. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. (People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563). In this case, the defendant was only allowed to testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the proper course should have been for the court a quo to take defendant's plea anew and then proceed with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. (The People of The Philippines Vs. Aurelio Balisacan, G.R. No. L-26376, August 31, 1966)  338. Accused was charged with homicide. Upon being arraigned, he entered a plea of guilty. At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. On the basis of such testimony, the court acquitted the accused. Did the trial court err in acquitting the accused of the offense charged despite the latter's plea of guilty when arraigned? Yes. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. (People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563). In this case, the defendant was only allowed to testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the proper course should have been for the court a quo to take defendant's plea anew and then proceed with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. (The People of The Philippines Vs. Aurelio Balisacan, G.R. No. L-26376, August 31, 1966)  339. The petitioner was charged before the CFI with the crime of illegal possession of firearm. The prosecution filed an amended information. The amended information alleges the additional fact that the petitioner carried with him the firearm and ammunition. When the petitioner was arraigned, the information read to him was not the amended information, but the original one. The CFI found the petitioner guilty of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. Was the conviction erroneous for lack of arraignment upon the amended information? Yes. There is no question that the petitioner was not actually arraigned under the amended information of January 25,1951. We believe that he had not waived his right thereto, in view of the fact that his counsel twice called the attention of the trial court to the omission, and this reminder amounted to an objection. As arraignment was mandatory, the petitioner having the constitutional right to be informed of the charge against him, his conviction — which would be only under the second information — suffers from a reversible defect. It is not correct to state that petitioner's felonious possession under Republic Act No. 482 could be established by proper evidence even under the original information, for the simple reason that the original information was superseded by the amended information. The case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law. (Daniel Cabangangan Vs Roberto Concepcion, Arsenio P. Dizon, And Dionisio De Leon, G.R. No. L-6353, May 26, 1954)             340. After the prosecution had rested its case it was discovered that the two defendants had not yet been arraigned. The two accused were then arraigned and it was upon this arraignment that Atienza entered his plea of guilty. The trial court declared all the proceedings up to the arraignment as null and void. The fiscal moved to reproduce the evidence already submitted and said that he would be glad to present again all his witnesses. The court said that it was unnecessary and decreed reproduced all the evidence already submitted. Counsel of the appellant said that he had no objection. Did the trial court err in arraigning the defendants after the prosecution had rested its case and in considering the evidence? No. The error, if any, is non-prejudicial. The interests of the appellant have not suffered thereby. His counsel entered into trial without any objection on the ground that his client had not yet been arraigned. Said counsel cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution. When the fiscal offered to reproduce all his evidence by presenting again his witnesses, instead of accepting said offer, he agreed or rather did not object to having that same evidence for the government declared by the court as reproduced. We hold that this error or irregularity has not prejudiced the right or interests of the appellant, and considering that appellant's counsel had full opportunity of cross-examining all the witnesses who took the witness stand for the government and that furthermore he agreed to the reproduction of the evidence for the prosecution, the error or defect had been substantially or fully cured. (The People Of The Philippines Vs. Benito Atienza And Julian Closa, G.R. No. L-3001, June 17, 1950) 341. The accused were charged in two (2) separate informations with the crimes of Robbery in Band with Less Serious Physical Injuries and Robbery in Band with Homicide. The arraignment of the accused was done after the cases had been submitted for decision. Was the appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him violated? No. While the arraignment of the appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for decision, the error is non-prejudicial and has been fully cured. Counsel for the appellant entered into trial without objecting that his client, the appellant herein, had not yet been arraigned. Said counsel had also the full opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution. Then, when the cases were being retried after the appellant had been arraigned, appellant's counsel filed a joint manifestation with the prosecution, adopting all proceedings had previous to the arraignment of the appellant. 13 There was, therefore, no violation of the appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. (People Of The Philippines Vs.Demetrio Cabale, Florencio Daniel, Benito Terante @ "Bodoy", And Bonifacio Cualteros, G.R. Nos. 73249-50 May 8, 1990) 342. Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. He was arraigned with the assistance of a counsel. The records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The judge did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his interrogation Appellant pleaded guilty. The trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death. Was the conviction of the trial court proper? No. First. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed to follow section (1) (a) — of Rule 116 on arraignment which provides that the accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information has been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information. The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect known to him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. It implements the constitutional right of an appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Section 3 provides that when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. In this case, the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of conducting a "searching inquiry." A cursory examination of the questions of the trial court to establish the voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilt will show their utter insufficiency. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to death. We stress that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. (People Of The Philippines Vs. Arnel Alicando Y Briones, G.R. No. 11748, December 12, 1995) 343. On the basis of a "buy-bust" operation, Ramos was arrested and charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 6245, Art. II, Sec. 4). Upon arraignment, appellant Ramos pleaded "not guilty." Ramos denies any "buy-bust" operation, claiming that the marijuana leaves were planted evidence, that he was arrested because of a heated argument with the restaurant owner. The prosecution established the "buy-bust" operation through the testimonies of the arresting officers. After trial, the court found the accused guilty of the crime charged. Did the court err in ruling that the accused is guilty of the crime charged? No. The prosecution was able to establish the "buy-bust" operation through the testimonies of the arresting officers who, as rightly pointed out by the Solicitor General, are entitled to full faith and credence as they are presumed to have acted in the regular performance of official duty. The defense did not present Dr. Melvin Garcia, the restaurant owner, or Boyet Corpuz the alleged companion of Ramos at the restaurant/beerhouse to corroborate Ramos' contention that he was arrested because of a heated argument he had with Dr. Garcia. Neither did he present Danilo Martin whom Ramos had stated on cross-examination, to be the owner of the mini-component allegedly confiscated by the arresting officers. The absence of these corroborative witnesses leads Us to conclude that the defense version was simply a concoction devoid of any credibility. The fact that government witnesses made the purchase of marijuana do not make them accomplices, for their only purpose is to secure evidence to convict the violator. Their testimonies stand on the same footing as that of any other witnesses in the case. Moreover, the Solicitor General has pointed out that the arresting officers were not shown to have had any ulterior motive to falsely accuse Ramos with a serious offense, but that they were simply bent on apprehending violators of the law. The presumption has always been that NARCOM agents are performing their functions when they conduct buy-bust operations and entrap and arrest violators. The conviction of accused Ramos is therefore in order. (The People Of The Philippines vs.Benjamin Ramos, Jr. Y Yabut, G.R. No. 88301, October 28, 1991) 344. Galvez and Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93. Before petitioners could be arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex parte Motion to Withdraw Informations in said cases.  This motion was granted and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court.  On the same day, four new informations against the petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of PD 1866 and illegal possession of firearms were filed. These were raffled to the sala of Judge Pornillos. Prior to the arraignment before Judge Pornillos, a motion for reconsideration was granted , ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93. Is the withdrawal of the original informations proper? Under which set of informations petitioners should be tried: (a) the first set of informations for homicide and frustrated homicide in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, or (b) the subsequent informations for murder, frustrated murder, and illegal possession of firearms in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93? In any event, we are inclined to uphold the propriety of the withdrawal of the original informations, there having been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court in granting the motion and, more importantly, in consideration of the fact that the motion to withdraw was filed and granted before herein petitioners were arraigned, hence before they were placed in jeopardy. Thus, even if a substitution was made at such stage, petitioners cannot validly claim double jeopardy, which is precisely the evil sought to be prevented under the rule on substitution, for the simple reason that no first jeopardy had as yet attached. All these go to show, therefore, that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 did not amount to an acquittal of herein petitioners. Consequently, the same did not immediately become final, hence petitioners could still file a motion for the reconsideration thereof. Moreover, such dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. Since jeopardy had not yet attached, herein petitioners were not prejudiced by the filing of the new informations even though the order of dismissal in the prior case had not yet become final. Neither did it affect the jurisdiction of the court in the subsequent case. Consequently, we hold that although the offenses charged under the three new informations necessarily include those charged under the original informations, the substitution of informations was not a fatal error. A contrary ruling, to paraphrase from our former pronouncements, would sacrifice substantial justice for formal nuances on the altar of procedural technicalities. Furthermore, petitioner's right to speedy trial was never violated since the new informations were filed immediately after the motion to withdraw the original informations was granted. In conclusion, considering that Branch 10 of the same trial court handling Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93 legally acquired jurisdiction over the new informations which we have likewise declared valid, petitioners may be prosecuted thereunder. (Honorato Galvez And Godofredo Diego Vs.Court Of Appeals (17th Division), First Asst. Provincial Prosecutor. Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio Of Pasig, Rizal; The People Of The Philippines; And Pnp P/Sr. Supt. Ricardo F. De Leon, Camp Commander And Head Of The Pnp Custodial Group, Camp Crame, Cubao, Quezon City, G.R. No. 114046, October 24, 1994)