What Was "Close Reading"?: A Century of Method in Literary Studies

:KDW:DV´&ORVH5HDGLQJµ"$&HQWXU\RI0HWKRGLQ/LWHUDU\6WXGLHV %DUEDUD+HUUQVWHLQ6PLWK 0LQQHVRWD5HYLHZ,VVXH 1HZ6HULHV SS $UWLFOH 3XEOLVKHGE\'XNH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV )RUDGGLWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKLVDUWLFOH KWWSVPXVHMKXHGXDUWLFOH Access provided by Duke University Libraries (17 Oct 2016 19:49 GMT) Barbara Herrnstein Smith What Was “Close Reading”? A Century of Method in Literary Studies his article originated as a talk to a group of young digital humanities scholars seeking to learn about the history of methods in the humanities.1 I am not a historian by profession and it is not my usual role, but I attempt here to mobilize my sixty years in and around the literary academy to address a double question: how did “close reading” igure in Anglo-American literary studies over the course of the past century, and how does it igure now in the discourses of the digital humanities? At the end, I ofer some general relections on methods, past and possibly future, in literary studies. A Parade Close reading, it has been said, is the “primary methodology” of literary studies ( Jockers 2013, 6). hat is true in a sense, but the term methodology suggests something more coherent, circumscribed, and speciically research focused than has been the case here. Reading individual texts with attention to their linguistic features and rhetorical operations is very diferent, of course, from subjecting large bodies of digitized materials to the sorts of computational processes now wittily (and mischievously) called “distant reading.” But the term close reading has been used to name some very diverse activities: from a New Critic unraveling Shakespearian puns in the 1930s to a Marxist scholar exposing the political unconscious of Victorian novels in the 1980s or, today, a irst-grader “analyzing” a book by Dr. Seuss in accord with the directives of the American national Common Core Curriculum. If not quite a methodology, however, the practices of close reading have certainly been a persistent feature of Anglo-American literary studies. Indeed, their ongoing performance may be the one constant in a ield notorious for its succession of new “approaches.” he parade is familiar from textbook rubrics: the old historical philology followed by the New Criticism, structuralism, reader-response criticism, New Historicism, feminist criticism, deconstruction, cultural studies, ideology critique, and so forth, with many others in between. Almost any parade becomes comical when it goes on long minnesota review 87 (2016) DOI 10.1215/00265667-3630844 © 2016 Virginia Tech 57 58 the minnesota review enough, and the succession of approaches in literary studies has been seen as showing the futility of all of them. here is good reason to reject that view, as I shall suggest below. But the point I want to stress here is that, for all the shifts they relect, every one of the approaches just named —from the New Criticism, and indeed from the old historical philology, through deconstruction, to ideology critique — involved reading individual texts closely. he texts varied from presumed literary masterpieces to works of popular culture and documents of manifest oppression; the discourses that directed their examination varied from Christian humanism to structuralist linguistics to queer theory; and the spirit in which they were examined varied from the appreciative to the disinterested to the deeply suspicious. Nevertheless, throughout the twentieth century, whatever the mood, motive, or materials, if one was teaching literature or doing literary criticism in the Anglo-American literary academy, one was likely to be reading at least some individual texts closely. If, as seems to be the case, the practices of close reading have operated in literary studies not as one method among others but as virtually deinitive of the ield, then how are we to understand a method whose advocates deine it in opposition to —and, indeed, as superseding — precisely those practices? Depending on one’s perspective, the ascendance of “distant reading” can be seen as marking the dissolution of literary studies, at least as a humanities discipline (see, for example, Kirsch 2014), or as the proper elevation of the ield into computational posthumanism. In arguments defending either of these two opposed views, invocations of “close reading” — celebratory or derogatory —are a recurrent ploy. I consider some of these invocations below. First, however, a bit of history will be instructive. A Close Look at Close Reading he term close reading refers not only to an activity with regard to texts but also to a type of text itself: a technically informed, ine-grained analysis of some piece of writing, usually in connection with some broader question of interest. The practice has multiple ancestors, including classical rhetorical analysis, biblical exegesis, and legal interpretation, and it also has some cousins, such as iconology and psychoanalysis. All of these would have been familiar to the small group of accomplished British dons and poets whose eforts to reform literary study in the 1920s and 1930s came to be called “the New Criticism” and whose critical essays served as models for the practices that came to be called “close reading.” Herrnstein Smith 59 In its time, the New Criticism was young, cool, and radical. I. A. Richards was a beginning instructor at Cambridge University when he assigned the classroom exercises in poetry reading that led to his inluential book Practical Criticism, published in 1929. William Empson, a student of Richards, was twenty-three when he wrote Seven Types of Ambiguity (1947), which became a paradigm of virtuoso close reading for several generations. T. S. Eliot’s Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism, published in 1920, excoriated dull scholarship from a position of conident connoisseurship and set the standard for high-toned literary discriminations. he views and practices of this group were introduced to American readers in the 1930s by the southern poet and critic John Crowe Ransom, and they were taken up with particular enthusiasm by two of his students, Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, originally at Vanderbilt, later at Yale. Brooks and Warren’s coauthored textbook, Understanding Poetry, irst published in 1938, was immensely inluential. By the time a second edition appeared in 1950, it was being assigned in more than 250 colleges and universities in the United States (Davis 2011). Its chapter titles —“Structure,” “Tension,” “Irony,” “Imagery,” “Rhythm,” “Tone” — are the familiar obsessions of New Critical close readings, and its large collection of examples and “texts for further study” weighed heavily in the academic canon for decades afterward: Shakespeare’s sonnets, Keats’s odes, works by Browning, Tennyson, and Gerard Manley Hopkins, and modernist works by, among others, Ezra Pound, Elizabeth Bishop, and William Carlos Williams. he New Criticism was promoted as a corrective for the pedantries of early twentieth-century literary scholarship. But the practices of close reading themselves were promoted as a speciically pedagogical remedy for what were seen as the inadequacies of college students: young men (almost exclusively —we are speaking of the 1920s and 1930s) who, in Brooks’s words, “actually approached Keats’s Ode to a Nightingale in the same spirit and with the same expectations with which they approached an editorial in the local county newspaper or an advertisement in the current Sears, Roebuck catalogue” (1979, 593).2 Indeed, the popularity and persistence of those practices have often been attributed, not altogether unjustly, to their handiness for teachers. Some forty years after the publication of Understanding Poetry, Hugh Kenner, a learned critic of modernist poetry, remarked: “he curious thing is how a classroom strategy could come to mistake itself for a critical discipline” (1976, 36; cited by Brooks 1995, 84). 60 the minnesota review Kenner was being snide, of course, but the association of close reading with pedagogy —as distinct from learned criticism —persisted through much of the century. To return to the history: Before the New Criticism, in the irst quarter of the century, the study of literature consisted largely of the production, transmission, and acquisition of facts about sets of texts. What one established as a scholar, imparted as a teacher, and learned as a student were commonly the names of historically important authors and some basic facts about their lives; the titles, publication dates, and sources —especially classical —of their major works; relations of inluence among them; and the readily observable features that distinguished forms, styles, and genres (the medieval romance, the Petrarchan sonnet, the Jacobean drama, and so forth). One could say that, before the New Criticism, literary study was “distant reading” with a vengeance. With the work of the New Critics, it moved increasingly from illing library shelves with scholarly editions and literary histories to studying and describing how individual texts produced the efects that gave them historical importance or current interest. Against the historians and philologists, who treated literary texts as dusty achievements, the New Critics stressed literature as art.3 A poem, wrote Ransom, is a “living object” (1937, 601). As poets and wordsmiths themselves, they were interested in the craft of text making. As men of letters (Cambridge, Vanderbilt, Yale) and, in increasing numbers since the 1960s, literary women (the earliest included poet Josephine Miles at Berkeley), they were appreciators of aesthetic efects. hough close reading is often described as a method of interpretation, the New Critics — certainly the irst generation of them —were concerned less with establishing the meaning of a text than with understanding its operative machinery. Indeed, a New Critical “reading” was something like an exercise in reverse engineering: the examination of an artifact to see how it was made and how it worked. he aims and spirit of the New Criticism are well represented in an inaugural piece by Ransom, published in 1937, titled “Criticism, Inc.” He explains the title: “Professors of literature are learned but not critical men. . . . Nevertheless it is from the professors of literature . . . that I should hope eventually for the erection of intelligent standards of criticism. It is their business. . . . Perhaps I use a distasteful igure, but I have the idea that what we need is Criticism, Inc., or Criticism, Ltd” (587–88). he “igure” or metaphor —literary studies Herrnstein Smith 61 as a business —would have been “distasteful” because literary academics understood that art and letters were remote from commerce. hat shared understanding, and the shared antagonism to Big Business and Big Industry, created a bond and otherwise strange fellowship between the conservative southern poets and the left-wing New York intellectuals who, in the 1940s and 1950s, were the major advocates and practitioners of the New Criticism in the United States. Ransom, referring in the essay to the relation between historical scholarship and criticism, is clear about which should be up front and on top: “Behind appreciation . . . is historical scholarship. It is indispensable. But it is instrumental and cannot be the end itself. In this respect historical studies have the same standing as linguistic studies [that is, philology]: language and history are aids” (595). He also makes explicit the New Critics’ pedagogical mission: “he students of the future must be permitted to study literature, and not merely about literature. But I think this is what the good students have always wanted to do. he wonder is that they have allowed themselves so long to be denied” (588). Only toward the end of the essay does Ransom say what the new forms of literary study would consist in, and then in just a few phrases: “hey would be technical studies of poetry[;] for instance, [in a particular poem] . . . if they treated its metric; its inversions . . . ; its tropes; its ictions, or inventions by which it secures ‘aesthetic distance’ . . . ; or any other devices, on the general understanding that any systematic usage which does not hold good for prose is a poetic device” (600). his is followed by a bit of New Critical mystery mongering: he critic should regard the poem as nothing short of a desperate ontological or metaphysical manoeuvre. . . . [he] poem celebrates the object which is real, individual, and qualitatively ininite. [he critic] knows that his practical interests will reduce this living object to a mere utility, and that his sciences will disintegrate it for their convenience into their respective abstracts. he poet wishes to defend his object’s existence against its enemies, and the critic wishes to know what he is doing, and how. (601) As I said: rather like reverse engineering. It was often recalled that Ransom, like Richards before him, had summoned criticism to be more “scientiic,” but his meaning and aim were often misunderstood. Here is the passage: 62 the minnesota review Criticism must become more scientiic, or precise and systematic, and this means that it must be developed by the collective and sustained efort of learned persons —which means that its proper seat is in the universities. . . . It will never be a very exact science, or even a nearly exact one. But neither will psychology, if that term continues to refer to psychic rather than physical phenomena; nor will sociology . . . ; nor even will economics. It does not matter whether we call them sciences or just systematic studies. . . .he[y] . . . have immeasurably improved in understanding since they were taken over by the universities, and the same career looks possible for criticism. (Ransom 1937, 587–88) As I think is clear, Ransom was not seeking to make literary criticism scientiic in the positivist sense of the era. What he sought, rather, was to move it from the margins of the ield to the center and to claim for its practitioners a form of technical expertise that elevated its status from an occasional pursuit to a duly accredited and properly housed academic program. If that sounds like what promoters of the digital humanities are seeking today, both for themselves and for the practices of “distant reading,” then it is very much to the point here, with all the historical ironies that doubling involves. Other doublings and ironies are apparent in the hostile reactions that greeted the New Criticism. Such reactions came, as Ransom anticipated, from “the present incumbents of the professorial chairs,” who, he wrote derisively, “spend a lifetime in compiling the data of literature and yet rarely or never commit to a literary judgment” (587). A notable counter-polemic appeared in 1949 in the pages of PMLA. Its author was Douglas Bush, an eminent Shakespeare scholar at Harvard. Its self-consciously conservative title was “he New Criticism: Some Old-Fashioned Queries.” Bush writes: “he new criticism, the ofspring of Mr. Richards and Mr. Eliot, has carried the marks of a mixed heredity. . . . [heir] close reading of poetry has braced the laccid sinews of this generation of readers and has had some highly beneicial efects upon teaching and writing. . . . But . . . a scholar-historian may not be disposed to grant all its claims and assumptions” (13). he grudging concessions and sense of strained dignity are familiar in the responses of upstaged eminences. By the late 1940s the hold of the old historicism had been efectively shaken, the literary academy was an increasingly lively place, and Bush could speak ruefully but accurately of the New Critics’ “tone of conscious superiority” (14). After chiding Ransom and others for gafes relecting their supposed igno- Herrnstein Smith 63 rance of history, he goes on to charge them with leaving ordinary readers out in the cold: “he common reader might go so far as to think that poetry deals with life. . . . However valuable the processes and results of the new criticism, for some readers its preoccupation with technique, its aloof intellectuality, its fear of emotion and action, its avoidance of moral values, . . . all this suggests the dangers of a timid aestheticism” (20). Bush concludes his essay with a bit of tableturning: the charge —or, rather, countercharge —of scientism: “Since poetry does after all deal with experience, the most fastidious critics have to touch on it[;] yet they may give the impression that they are looking, not at human beings, but at specimens mounted on slides. Indeed, though the critics have censured scholarship for aping science, their own aims and methods seem much more deserving of the charge” (20). Much of this is quaint but also, I think, remarkably recognizable. Virtually the same set of general claims and charges were rehearsed throughout the century, irrespective of the methods at issue and, indeed, irrespective of which side was being taken, revolutionary or counterrevolutionary. hirty or forty years later, the same resentful tones would be heard from the New Critics themselves, no longer young, or cool, or radical and now upstaged by deconstruction and what they called “high theory.” Ransom’s reference to the vested interests of incumbent professors; the charge of elitism in Bush’s invocation of “the common reader”; the exchanged charges of hyper-formalism (or “aestheticism”) and scientism: these would all recur in the “theory wars” of the 1970s and 1980s, in the “canon wars” of the 1980s and 1990s, and, like much else in both these essays, in current polemics around the digital humanities. It looks like a pattern. It may even be a law of history. It is time to turn to Franco Moretti and the twenty-irst century. Close Reading on the Screen of the Digital Humanities It was Moretti, of course, who broached the idea that literary studies would beneit from a turn away from close reading to a new set of practices that could be called “distant reading.” he key passage appears in an essay titled “Conjectures on World Literature,” originally published in 2000: he trouble with close reading (in all of its incarnations, from the new criticism to deconstruction) is that it necessarily depends on an extremely small canon. . . . And if you want to look beyond the canon . . . close reading will not do it. It’s not 64 the minnesota review designed to do it, it’s designed to do the opposite. At bottom, it’s a theological exercise —very solemn treatment of very few texts taken very seriously —whereas what we really need is a little pact with the devil: we know how to read texts, now let’s learn how not to read them. Distant reading: where distance, let me repeat it, is a condition of knowledge: it allows you to focus on units that are much smaller or much larger than the text: devices, themes, tropes — or genres and systems. And if, between the very small and the very large, the text itself disappears, well, it is one of those cases when one can justiiably say, Less is more. If we want to understand the system in its entirety, we must accept losing something. We always pay a price for theoretical knowledge: reality is ininitely rich; concepts are abstract, are poor. But it’s precisely this “poverty” that makes it possible to handle them, and therefore to know. his is why less is actually more. (Moretti 2000, 57–58) he rhetoric is neat; the argument is bold; and several strong themes and claims echo in current arguments promoting the digital humanities. One is the theme of scale: the association of “close reading” with a few small things. Another is knowledge: the summons to literary critics and scholars to dare “to know,” to produce more abstract, theoretical, and comprehensive knowledge. A third, the most consequential in institutional terms, is less is more: the suggestion that, for literary studies to operate as a ield of genuine knowledge production, scholars must sacriice something: their interest in “the text itself” and the centrality of close reading to their practices. he themes of scale and less-is-more are sounded, less playfully, in an article by Matthew Wilkens titled “Canons, Close Reading, and the Evolution of Method” (2011). Wilkens sees literary canons as a product of the practices of close reading and also as something like a moral problem — a matter of injustice to the excluded — as well as a methodological one. He writes: “What little we do read is deeply nonrepresentative of the full ield of literary and cultural production, as critics of our existing canons have rightly observed for decades. . . . So canons . . . are an enormous problem, one that follows from our single working method as literary scholars—that is, from the need to perform always and only close reading as a means of cultural analysis” (251). His solution is clear: “We need to do less close reading and more of anything and everything else that might help us extract information from and about texts as indicators of Herrnstein Smith 65 larger cultural issues” (251). After describing a computational study and the beneits of algorithmic methods, Wilkens concludes: “his [i.e., the turn to such methods] will hurt, but it will also result in categorically better, more broadly based, more inclusive, and inally more useful humanities scholarship” (257). he words are earnest, but the argument is dubious. Close reading is by no means the only working method of literary scholars. Moreover, while literary canons — that is, the works most widely celebrated and referenced in the culture, most regularly assigned in literature classes, and most frequently discussed in professional journals — commonly relect, among other things, the tastes and interests of the professiorate, they are not determined by the reading practices of scholars. Most signiicantly, the mere existence of a literary canon places no limit on the number, the type, or the cultural status of the texts available for study, whether as cultural indicators or as anything else. here are also the simple facts of the matter. As literary studies have been pursued under the auspices of structuralism, semiotics, New Historicism, deconstruction, feminism, critical race theory, postcolonial criticism, and queer theory, the types and cultural status of the texts examined by literary scholars and read closely in their classrooms have continuously expanded. hose “texts” now include writings of every form and provenance, whether currently admired or reviled and whether currently read or unread; and they can in principle (and often do in fact) include any inscription, or image, or artifact whatsoever. Wilkens suggests that less close reading of individual texts and more computational studies of large bodies of texts will somehow address the other “problem of the canon,” by which he presumably means the past snubbing of popular writings and of works by women and members of minority groups. But if the ofense is that many worthy or interesting texts remain unread because of past biases, then what is wanted, surely, is to have those texts read, not just counted. Wilkens seeks to promote research methods that he sees as undervalued in literary studies. he aim is commendable but his arguments do not serve it well. he themes of scale and knowledge in Moretti’s piece also recur in a recent book by Matthew Jockers titled Macroanalysis: Digital Methods and Literary History (2013). Jockers is explicit in associating desirable epistemic aims with the aims of science and proper research methods with the methods used by scientists. “he goal of science,” he writes (he adds “we hope”), “is to develop the best possible explanation for some phenomenon. his is done via a careful and exhaustive 66 the minnesota review gathering of evidence. . . . Literary studies should strive for a similar goal” (5–6). Like science, he continues, literary studies should seek the best methods available for gathering evidence and, again like science, should welcome big data and scale its methods accordingly. It was Jockers’s description of close reading as a “methodology” that I cited earlier. Here is the passage I was quoting: “he study of literature relies upon careful observation, the sustained, concentrated reading of text. his, our primary methodology, is ‘close reading.’ Science has a methodological advantage in the use of experimentation. Experimentation ofers a method through which competing observations and conclusions may be tested and ruled out. . . . We are highly invested in interpretations, and it is very diicult to ‘rule out’ an interpretation” (6). Granting the value of literary interpretation in some regards, Jockers continues: “But interpretation is fueled by observation, and as a method of evidence gathering, observation . . . is lawed. Despite all their eforts to repress them, researchers will have irrepressible biases. . . . Observation is lawed in the same way that generalization from the speciic is lawed: . . . the selection of the sample is always something less than perfect, and so the observed results are likewise imperfect” (6–7). Jockers believes that big data is solving these problems in the sciences. He writes: “Big data are fundamentally altering the way that much science and social science get done. . . . [M]any areas of research are no longer dependent upon controlled, artiicial experiments or upon observations derived from data sampling” (7). And, he argues, big data should change the game in literary studies as well: Back in the 1990s, gathering literary evidence meant reading books, noting “things” (a phallic symbol here, a biblical reference there, a stylistic lourish, an allusion, and so on) and then interpreting: making sense and arguments out of those observations. Today, in the age of digital libraries and large-scale bookdigitization projects, the nature of the “evidence” available to us has changed, radically. . . . [M]assive digital corpora ofer us unprecedented access to the literary record and invite, even demand, a new type of evidence gathering and meaning making. he literary scholar of the twenty-irst century can no longer be content with anecdotal evidence, with a few random “things” gathered from a few, even “representative,” texts. . . . Like it or not, today’s literary-historical scholar can no longer risk being just a close reader: the sheer quantity of available data makes the traditional practice of close reading untenable as an exhaustive or deinitive method of evidence gathering. (8–9) Herrnstein Smith 67 here is much to query here, about Jockers’s view of science as well as of literary studies, but I will focus on a few central points. First, gathering evidence for claims is not a good way to describe research in most scientiic ields, and generating interpretations by reading books and noting things randomly and foolishly is a singularly bad way to describe what literary scholars did in the 1990s or at any other time. More signiicantly here, close reading never igured in literary studies as a “deinitive,” much less “exhaustive,” way to gather evidence. In the case of a critical study focused on the thought, style, or achievement of one or more particular authors, the close reading of texts written by those authors would have to be central to any claims made. But even there, and certainly where broader historical or cultural claims are involved, it would be remarkable for a literary scholar not to consult and invoke other documents and other types of data. he digital library is exceedingly handy for accessing such materials, but scholars’ shelves have not been otherwise empty up to now. Jockers is saying that literary historians “can no longer risk being” something that they never have been: that is, “ just close readers.” Second, the fact that some way of doing things is now possible does not make it necessary, as in Jockers’s term “demand.” Where big data is pertinent and computational processing would be useful, literary scholars should take advantage of both. But there is no research imperative built into the size of some potential data set. New methods enable new questions to be posed and old answers to be sharpened or corrected. But in any ield of knowledge production, signiicant questions come out of ongoing interests and problems, not usually just methods as such. Digital libraries and powerful search engines have already become research tools for most literary scholars. hose who are still in a cave on these matters are well advised to become familiar with such resources and with the types of projects they enable. It is understandable that those already working on such projects would want to urge others to explore such resources as possible avenues to interesting new research for themselves. But Jockers seems to be urging or cautioning more than that in his “like it or not” address to his colleagues. What people in literary studies are apt to hear him saying is that the existence of those “massive digital corpora” has made their current way of doing things inappropriate, impractical, and “untenable” and that they should be doing instead what he does. A third point is important here. Jockers suggests that computational methods and big data allow researchers to avoid or mitigate the subjectivity and bias built into human observation and also what he calls the “law” of generalizing from less than exhaustive data 68 the minnesota review sets. But the idea or ideal of objective observation, like that of complete data sets (in efect, inspecting every swan before concluding anything about the color of swans), has been efectively challenged by a century of empirical and theoretical work in the history, sociology, and philosophy of science. Jockers is not alone among contemporary literary scholars in his enthusiasm for, but rather old-fashioned view of, “science.” (he persistent singular suggests a dubious conception of these heterogeneous practices as something programmatic and monolithic.) For all the talk of “paradigm shifts” among digital humanists, literary Darwinists, and advocates of cognitive cultural studies, the notion of science to which they appeal tends to be fundamentally pre-Kuhnian (see Smith 2016). My allusion is, of course, to homas Kuhn, whose account of paradigm shifts in the history of chemistry and physics challenged simple progressivist views of how the natural sciences develop (Kuhn 1962). Even more pertinent here, however, is Paul Feyerabend’s once scandalous, now celebrated, volume, published in 1975, titled Against Method. To the central question posed by philosophers of science —what method leads scientists to new discoveries and successful theories? —the prevailing answer was Karl Popper’s “conjectures and refutations,” or the so-called hypothetico-deductive method (Popper 1962).4 Feyerabend’s answer was, [A]nything goes! Contrary to outraged misreading of his argument, he was saying not that scientists are capricious but that they are inventive, resourceful, and opportunistic (his examples included Galileo, Newton, and Einstein). Feyerabend’s major point in Against Method is that there are no rules for success in science: that is, no speciiable, generalizable way to make discoveries or to produce persuasive, useable theories. he trouble with telling literary scholars to be “like scientists” in their methods is not that it is scientistic (though it is that as well) but that it tells them nothing in particular. Jockers’s worries over the methods used in literary studies are largely misplaced. he fact that a critic’s interpretation is based in part on his or her observations as an individual reader does not compromise the interest or usefulness of that interpretation. he same is true of a scholar’s historical account or theoretical claim. Of course that individuality — and inevitable, but not necessarily pernicious, bias —leaves the interpretation, claim, or account open to dispute by other readers or scholars. At the same time, however, the grounding in personal observation and experience opens the possibility of shareable insights and of connection to shareable experiences, Herrnstein Smith 69 which —largely, if not wholly —is what motivates our interest in a literary interpretation as such. And, along with connections to broader intellectual issues and other concerns, that grounding and that attendant possibility — of shareable insights and of connection to shareable experiences — are also what sustain the value of much historical and theoretical research in the humanities as such. here is a long story to tell —longer than proper to claim space for here — about the diferences of epistemic aim, achievement, and value in the humanities and the sciences.5 But it is clear, I think, that a central question here is whether scholarly and critical methods in literary studies are properly assessed by reference to research methods in a ield like geology —the speciic science that Jockers invokes in an opening anecdote as having led, during a dinner conversation with a representative scientist, to his embarrassment at being unable to defend the ways in which research was done in his own ield. More use of big data or computer algorithms by literary scholars will not solve the methodological problems that Jockers sees in literary studies. he problems, if that is what they are, are built into standard scholarly practice in the ield, the legacy of classical humanistic practices reinforced by various contemporary approaches. he only way to end the embarrassment at what literary critics and literary historians do would be to persuade them to do something else instead, something more like social science research. hat seems, in fact, to be what Moretti proposes in the name of “distant reading” and what Wilkens, Jockers, and others are promoting in the name of “digital humanities”: not, perhaps, to cease doing traditional literary study altogether but to start doing less of it and to do more research in which the data consist of large numbers of texts and the questions asked and answered are independent of the interest —literary or otherwise —of any of those texts. Less is more: perhaps. Moretti calls the exchange he proposes — less close reading for more genuine knowledge —“a little pact with the devil.” Pacts with the devil, even what look like little ones, deserve scrutiny. Famously, one ends up getting less than one bargained for and losing more than one thought. Moretti is right to describe close reading as “a theological exercise”; not, however, in the sense, as he suggests, of the reverential examination of a text but in the sense of an expansive commentary on one. In literary studies, a close reading, whether in a classroom or a journal article, is typically the occasion for more general observations and often for quite wide-ranging relections. hey may be observations about the style or genre of the text at hand, or about its 70 the minnesota review author, or relections on the era in which it was written. But they are often observations and relections —more or less subtle, more or less original — about related human circumstances and experiences. And even when not especially subtle or original, they can afford some insight into, and a sense of connection with, the circumstances and experiences of people who are otherwise remote. Contrary to charges raised across the years, the practices promoted by the New Criticism did not require that readers “forget history” or “ignore the outside world.” Full-dress close readings, now as ever, can be showy or strained. hey can also be dim, thin, derivative, or pedestrian and, when motivated by a history of injury, sulky or venomous. But now as ever, they can ofer those who hear or read them potentially illuminating engagements with regions of language, thought, and experience not otherwise commonly encountered. “Close reading” makes a neat contrast to “distant reading,” but not a pertinent one for promoting the value of computational methods for literary studies. My inal example here is a pair of short passages in a recent coauthored book titled Digital_Humanities. Referring to the tools necessary “to thoughtfully and meaningfully sift through, analyze, visualize, map and evaluate the deluge of data . . . the digital age has unleashed,” the authors write: “One way of navigating this process is through distant reading: a form of analysis that focuses on larger units. It is a term that is speciically arrayed against the deep hermeneutics of extracting meaning from a text through ever-closer, microscopic readings” (Burdick et al. 2012, 39). A page later, they amplify this: “Close reading has its roots in the philological traditions of the humanities, but for more than a generation has often been equated with deep hermeneutics and exegesis, techniques in which interpretations are ‘excavated’ from a text through ever-closer readings of textual evidence, references, word choices, semantics, and registers” (40). Both descriptions are awkwardly phrased, perhaps relecting ideas inserted at various times by each of the ive authors who collaborated in its production. But especially notable, I think, is the oddness of some of the language used to describe the activities associated with close reading. We generally speak of inferring or identifying meanings and of ofering or suggesting interpretations, not of “extracting” or “excavating” them like teeth, oil, or corpses. Also odd are the phrases “ever-closer” and “ever-closer, microscopic.” Close reading often involves attention to features such as word choice or, in connection with rhyme or alliteration, individual sounds or letters. But there is nothing like a microscope lens being Herrnstein Smith 71 focused “ever-closer,” as if obsessively or maniacally. Like the rather violent “extract” or the creepy “excavate,”6 such language makes the practices so described sound distinctly unpleasant, rather unnatural, and certainly very alien. More significantly here and contrary to the contrast being drawn, attention to microfeatures does not distinguish the practices of close reading from those of distant reading or the digital humanities. We recall Moretti’s inaugural description: “Distant reading . . . allows you to focus on units that are much smaller or much larger than the text: devices, themes, tropes —or genres and systems” (emphasis added). And in fact, the tagging and counting of very small textual units igures centrally in many digital humanities projects, including studies by Moretti himself. For example, in an article titled “Style, Inc. Relections on Seven housand Titles (British Novels, 1740–1850)” (2009), Moretti displays the results of a study correlating the length, grammatical structure, and other features of those seven thousand titles with the number of novels published in each decade. He goes on to note historical trends in the occurrence of those features, including, in the later decades, when increasing numbers of novels looded the market, the use of the indeinite article (a) versus the deinite article (the). his diferential usage, he suggests, as in the titles A Mummer’s Wife versus he Inidel Father, signaled to prospective consumers that a particular novel ofered, respectively, either a progressive or a conservative point of view on social developments. Moretti elaborates the suggestion with considerable subtlety (noting, for example, that a is unrestricted and leaves the future open, whereas the is restricted and grammatically oriented to the past) and teases out the connotations of other microfeatures of those titles in an analysis that might have left Empson gasping with admiration. Of course, Moretti’s interpretation of the data he has gathered can be challenged. His account of the implications of a and the is based at least in part on his subjective observations, here as a practiced reader and writer of the English language, and diferent explanations of the historical trends he identiies could be and have been ofered.7 What is signiicant for the present argument is, irst, that that would be true, mutatis mutandis, of the interpretation of the results of a study in any ield, whatever the size of the data and however rigorous the computations: that is, the grounding of the interpretation in the inevitably limited observations of an individual human being. But, second, as I noted above, that kind of grounding is also what makes an interpretation potentially compelling and 72 the minnesota review gives it interest for, and appropriability by, fellow human beings. You could see it as an exchange: less putative (and, I would say, spurious) objectivity for more actual interest and usefulness. A pretty good bargain, I think. he law of literary history that Moretti discovers (or corroborates or illustrates) in the Critical Inquiry article is that stylistic features of literary texts —titles, in this case —relect market forces. Hence the “Inc.” in his own title, “Style, Inc.,” which recalls the title of John Crowe Ransom’s essay, “Criticism, Inc.,” and may involve a glancing allusion. Ransom, we remember, was suggesting that criticism is the proper “business” of literary studies, and he noted that his readers might ind the term “distasteful.” Contrary to the old genteel-humanist view of art and letters as deinitively remote from commerce, Moretti is suggesting that literature is a business like everything else. He means it provocatively, but his Critical Inquiry readers are not likely to ind the association of art or letters with the market either distasteful or surprising. It has been some years —nearly a century —since literary studies was the “solemn treatment of very few texts.” A Look Back and Ahead If you live a long time, you accumulate a lot of data. I ofer here some general observations on method in literary studies. As I noted above, the succession of “approaches” in the ield over the past century is not, in my view, a sign of futility or failure. What it relects, rather, is a history of ongoing eforts by literary scholars to make their teaching and research responsive to developments within and beyond the academy, eforts that have been joined —and sometimes undercut —by the operation of dynamics that are general and recurrent enough to be called laws of history, at least of academic history. One such law is Everybody always overdoes everything. Professional pressures —inspiration energized by competition —push scholars into exhibiting the methods and virtues most conspicuously valued at the moment, and these tend be escalated and intensiied to the point of exhaustion of the material, absurdity of the method, or pathology of the virtue.8 A second law or set of forces, giving weight to perennial calls for reform or revolution, is the existence of chronic tensions between fundamental but opposed impulses and styles: for example, in literary studies, between populism and elitism, moralism —including political moralism — and formalism, and subjectivism and positivism. A third law follows from the interaction of the irst two: Everybody complains of being misrepresented and caricatured, and everybody is misrepresented and caricatured. Bush complained of the New Critics’ Herrnstein Smith 73 “cavalier” dismissal of historical scholarship;9 and Ransom’s treatment of it was pretty glib. he developments to which scholars were responding during the twentieth century were quite signiicant. Literary study was one thing when a small number of Christian men were teaching the professionally aspiring sons of fellow professionals. It became another when members of an expanding professoriate were teaching students from middle- and working-class families or, later, when a sizeable number of faculty were women and a sizeable number of their students were from racial and ethnic minorities. And the ield is yet another thing now, when faculty and students are more likely to encounter texts on screens than anywhere else, and everyone is scrambling for positions, funding, and status in a shrinking quarter of the academy. Over the course of the century, in literary studies as in other fields, the responses to changing institutional conditions and to broader changes, including intellectual developments, commonly led not to revolutionary overturns but to shifts of relative dominance, and there were always extensive residues of prior practices. he ield was never “taken over” by the New Criticism or by any other single movement, and it remained —not unhappily, I think —eclectic. he parade in the street was noisy and colorful, but up in the libraries, historians continued to write literary history, editors continued to produce editions of literary works, and, in both libraries and classrooms, almost everybody read at least some texts more or less closely. Some changes of practice in literary studies proposed by advocates of the digital humanities would be revolutionary, and the developments they observe and cite as requiring these changes —from the technological to the neurological —are, in their eyes, no less so.10 Talk of “seismic” and “tectonic” shifts is pervasive. Clearly, though, the interest and utility of close reading do not vanish in the face of digital libraries or ubiquitous computation. On the contrary, in the century upon us, where channels of communication are not only increasingly computerized but also increasingly corporatized and where texts of all kinds are turned to manipulative ends with digitally multiplied efectiveness, the ability and disposition to read texts attentively, one by one (in addition, of course, to digital sophistication), is likely to be an advantage. hat textual ability and disposition also remains more generally crucial. he hope of receiving such reading is what keeps most of us — scholars and critics as well as poets and novelists —writing, and the actual, even if only occasional, fulillment of that hope is what keeps much textual production, literary and other, going. It is a practice that we all have a stake in preserving. 74 the minnesota review Notes 1. he talk was delivered at the Heyman Center, Columbia University, for a Digital Humanities Workshop series titled “On Method.” 2. Brooks continues: “In this matter the textbooks that had been put in their hands were almost useless. he authors had something to say about the poet’s life and the circumstances of his composition of the poem under study. . . . But the typical commentary did not provide an induction to this poem — or into poetry generally. he dollop of impressionistic criticism with which the commentary usually concluded certainly did not supply the need” (593). 3. Although they rebelled against the dominance of biographical scholarship, they did not, as is sometimes said, “banish the author.” As would be clear from any page of criticism by Empson, Eliot, or Ransom, authors were very much in evidence, but as artists, not as mere historical igures or biographical subjects. 4. he echoes of Popper in Moretti’s title (“Conjectures on World Literature”) and in Jockers’s concern with literary interpretations that cannot be refuted are not accidental. Popper’s inluence, direct or indirect, is evident throughout both their arguments. 5. For the longer story, see Smith 2006, 108–29; and Smith 2016. 6. heir quote marks on the latter term are not explained. 7. See Trumpener 2009. Moretti replies in the same issue of the journal. 8. In an instructive chapter in a volume of he Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, Wallace Martin notes that, by the 1950s, the New Critics themselves worried about the “proliferation of over-ingenious interpretations” and that some people felt that “New Criticism had dwindled into a pointless routine” (2000, 316). Martin adds: “Yet it is worth recalling that scholars had registered the same objection to scholarship in the 1920s; driven by the conventions of the disciplines to make a ‘contribution to knowledge’, writers [it was said] proposed ‘preposterous interpretations.’” “Admittedly,” he comments, “there had been a change in the provenance of interpretative activity. Instead of asserting that Bottom [in A Midsummer Night’s Dream] was James VI, the modern exegete would discover an archetype or a paradox” (316). 9. “Cavalier” is the term Bush uses in a rather strained set of puns (1949, 17). 10. For an arresting follow-us-or-die set of views, see Saklofske, Clements, and Cunningham 2012. he authors write: Taking a wait-and-see attitude that cautiously preserves the status quo is akin to choosing an unnecessary slow death over the possibility of an innovative cure. In an era of budget crises, enrolment uncertainty, and an increasing lack of connections between university-level career preparation and professional practice, it would be foolish to ignore an opportunity to reinvent [the humanities] and reconsider existing paradigms and practices. Digital humanities represents an already-established movement away from the doom-inviting stasis of the secondhand conservatism of universities that know the Net Generation has come, and yet decline to build the education system Net Geners both want and need. (329) Works Cited Brooks, Cleanth. 1979. “he New Criticism.” Sewanee Review, no. 87: 592–607. ———. 1995. Community, Religion, and Literature: Essays. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Herrnstein Smith 75 Brooks, Cleanth, and Robert Penn Warren. 1960. Understanding Poetry. New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston. Burdick, Anne, et al. 2012. Digital_Humanities. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bush, Douglas. 1949. “he New Criticism: Some Old-Fashioned Queries.” PMLA 64, supp., pt. 2: 13–21. Davis, Garrick. 2011. “he Well-Wrought Textbook.” Humanities 32, no. 4: 22–25. Eliot, T. S. 1920. he Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism. London: Methuen. Empson, William. 1947. Seven Types of Ambiguity. New York: New Directions. Feyerabend, Paul. 1975. Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist heory of Knowledge. London: Verso. Jockers, Matthew. 2013. Macroanalysis: Digital Methods and Literary History. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Kenner, Hugh. 1976. “he Pedagogue as Critic.” In he New Criticism and After, edited by homas Daniel Young. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press; 36–55. Kirsch, Adam. 2014. “Technology Is Taking Over English Departments: he False Promise of Digital Humanities.” New Republic, May 2, newrepublic.com /article/117428/limits-digital-humanities-adam-kirsch. Kuhn, homas S. 1962. he Structure of Scientiic Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Martin, Wallace. 2000. “Criticism and the Academy.” In Modernism and the New Criticism, edited by A. Walton Litz, Louis Menand, and Lawrence Rainey, 267–321. Vol. 7 of he Cambridge History of Literary Criticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Moretti, Franco. 2000. “Conjectures on World Literature.” New Left Review, no. 1: 54–68. ———. 2009. “Style, Inc. Relections on Seven housand Titles (British Novels, 1740–1850).” Critical Inquiry 36, no. 1: 134–58. Popper, Karl R. 1962. Conjectures and Refutations: he Growth of Scientiic Knowledge. New York: Basic. Ransom, John Crowe. 1937. “Criticism, Inc.” Virginia Quarterly Review, no. 13: 586–603. Richards, I. A. 1929. Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgment. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. Saklofske, Jon, Estelle Clements, and Richard Cunningham. 2012. “hey Have Come, Why Won’t We Build It? On the Digital Future of the Humanities.” In Digital Humanities Pedagogy: Practices, Principles, and Politics, edited by Brett D. Hirsch, 311–30. Cambridge: Open Book. Smith, Barbara Herrnstein. 2006. Scandalous Knowledge: Science, Truth, and the Human. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. ———. 2016. “Scientizing the Humanities: Shifts, Collisions, Negotiations.” Common Knowledge 22, no. 3: 353–72. Trumpener, Kate. 2009. “Paratext and Genre System: A Response to Franco Moretti.” Critical Inquiry 36, no. 1: 159–71. Wilkens, Matthew. 2011. “Canons, Close Reading, and the Evolution of Method.” In Debates in the Digital Humanities, edited by Matthew K. Gold, 249–58. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.