Soviet Commanders

Soviet Commanders 1 1/126 Soviet Commanders 2 La Esquina de la Historia Atenas Editores Asociados 1998-2017 www.thegermanarmy.org Tittle: Soviet Commanders © Atenas Editores Asociados 1998-2017 © Gustavo Urueña A More information: http://www.thegermanarmy.org First Published: January 2017 We include aditional notes and text to clarify original and reproduce original text as it in original book All right reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmited in any form or by any mens, electronic, mechanical, photocopyng or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the autor or publisher. Design: Atenas Editores Asociados 1998-2017 © Atenas Editores Asociados 1998-2017 The Editors welcome all comments and observations: 1939europa@gmail.com 2/126 Soviet Commanders 3 This is an editorial project of Athens Editors Asociated based on 20 years of studies and works related to EconomyPolitics, GeoPolitics, Social Sciences and the development of Military Science from its beginnings with the Battle of Cannas where under Anibal took place The first blitzkriegstyle confrontation to its use in the Desert Storm Campaign and all the political, economic, and military consequences these events have had on the development of Humanity. The Editor of the same came to the conclusion that to locate in the context of any era of History is necessary to have read about the political, economic and military events of the time under study, in order to draw the appropriate conclusions, thus, if we want to locate ourselves in the history of Greece, Egypt, Russia, Germany, Colombia at any time, we can not judge those events under the magnifying glass of the context of the XXI Century, because that will only give us a distorted view of why events happened as they did. The editor © www.thegermanarmy.org © Atenas Editores Asociados 1998-2017 © https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_1?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=gustavo+uruena+a 3/126 Soviet Commanders 4 4/126 Soviet Commanders 5 Marshall of the Soviet Union Georgy ..................................9 Konstantinovich Zhukov .....................................................9 Marschall of the Soviet Union Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko ..........................................................................23 Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos ............................................. 26 Dmitry Pavlov ................................................................... 29 Marshall the Soviet Union Andrey I. Yeremenko .............33 Marshall of the Soviet Union Ivan Stepanovich Konev ....37 Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov ..................................................53 Annexes .............................................................................57 Soviet Scorched-Earth Warfare: Facts And Consequences .. 57 Russia and Germany .........................................................87 Molotov Ribbentrop Pact............................................... 110 Bibliography .................................................................... 119 Index ................................................................................ 125 5/126 Soviet Commanders 6 6/126 Soviet Commanders 7 7/126 Soviet Commanders 8 8/126 Soviet Commanders 9 Marshall of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov Dates: 1 December [O.S. 19 November] 1896 18 June 1974 A Soviet career officer in the Red Army who, in the course of World War II, played a pivotal role in leading the Red Army drive through much of Eastern Europe to liberate the Soviet Union and other nations from the occupation of the Axis Powers and ultimately, to conquer the capital of Germany itself, Berlin. He is the most decorated general officer in the history of the Soviet Union and Russia. Amongst many notable generals in World War II, G. K. Zhukov was placed at the top in the respect of number and scale of victories 1 and his talent in operational and strategic command was recognized by many people. 2 Many famous military leaders in the world such as Bernard Law Montgomery, Dwight David Eisenhower and Jean de Lattre de Tassigny had already recognized Zhukov's great contributions in many important victories in the Second World War. His combat achievements became valuable heritages in humanity's military knowledge, exerted great influence on both the Soviet and the whole world's military theory. 3 Dwight D. Eisenhower. "Crusade in Europe" (1948), p. 285. A. I. Sethi. Marshal Zhukov - The Great Strategician. New Dehli. 1988, p. 12. 3 Marshall of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov 1 2 9/126 Soviet Commanders 10 Born into a poverty-stricken peasant family in Strelkovka, Maloyaroslavsky Uyezd, Kaluga Governorate (now merged into the town of Zhukov in Zhukovsky District of Kaluga Oblast in modern-day Russia), Zhukov was apprenticed to work as a furrier in Moscow. In 1915, he was conscripted into the Army of the Russian Empire, where he served first in the 106th Reserve Cavalry Regiment (then called the 10th Dragoon Novgorod Regiment).4 During World War I, Chaney, Otto Preston (1996). Zhukov - Revised Edition. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press 4 10/126 Soviet Commanders 50 der. A tense moment followed as the whole room waited for Stalin to rip the epaulette from Rokossovsky's shoulder; instead, Stalin said "Your confidence speaks for your sound judgement," and ordered the attack to go forward according to Rokossovsky's plan. The battle was successful and Rokossovsky's reputation was assured. After crushing German Army Group Centre in Belarus, Rokossovsky's armies reached the east bank of the Vistula opposite Warsaw by mid-1944. For these victories he gained the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Stalin once said: "I have no Suvorov, but Rokossovsky is my Bagration." While Rokossovsky's forces stood stalled on the Vistula, the Warsaw Uprising (August - October, 1944) broke out in the city, led by the Polish Home Army (AK) on the orders of the Polish government in exile in London. Rokossovsky did not order reinforcement to the insurgents. Soviet assistance was limited to airdrops. There has been much speculation about Rokossovsky's personal views on this decision. He would always maintain that, with his communications badly stretched and enemy pressure against his northern flank mounting, committing forces to Warsaw would have been disastrous. In November 1944, Rokossovsky was transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front, which advanced into East Prussia and then across northern Poland to the mouth of the Oder at Stettin (now Szczecin). At the end of April he linked up with British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's forces in northern Germany while the forces of Zhukov and Ivan Koniev captured Berlin. It has been speculated, without evidence, that he was not allowed to capture Berlin because he was Polish; this is according to Antony Beevor, author of the book Berlin: The Downfall 1945. Postwar As one of the most prominent Soviet military commanders of the Second World War, Rokossovsky was present at the Victory Parade in Red Square in Moscow in 1945, riding on a black stallion next to Marshal Georgy Zhukov. After the end of the war Rokossovsky remained in command of Soviet forces in Poland (Northern Group of Forces). In October 1949, with the establishment of a fully Communist government under Boles
aw Bierut in Poland, Rokossovsky, on Stalin's orders, became the Polish Minister of National 50/126 Soviet Commanders 51 Defense, with the additional title of Marshal of Poland. Together with Rokossovsky, several thousand Soviet officers were put in charge of almost all Polish military units, either as commanding officers or as their advisors. In 1952 he became Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland. Although Rokossovsky was nominally Polish, he had not lived in Poland for 35 years, and most Poles regarded him as a Russian and Soviet emissary in the country. As Rokossovsky himself bitterly put it: "In Russia, they say I'm a Pole, in Poland they call me Russian". Rokossovsky took part in the suppression of the Polish independence movement and stalinization and sovietization of Poland in general and the Polish Army in particular. As the superior commander of the Polish Army, he introduced various ways of suppression of anti-Soviet activity. Among the most notorious were the labour battalions of the army, to which all able-bodied men found socially or politically insecure or guilty of having their families abroad were drafted. It is estimated that roughly 200,000 men were forced to work in labour camps in hazardous conditions, often in quarries, coal and uranium mines, and 1,000 died in their first days of "labour", while tens of thousands became crippled. Other groups targeted by the repressions were former soldiers of the pre-war Polish Army and wartime Home Army. In June 1956 during Pozna protests against poverty of working class, and Soviet occupation of Poland, Rokossovsky approved the order to send military units against protesters. As a result of the action of over 10,000 soldiers and 360 tanks, at least 74 civilians were killed. When Communist reformers under Wadysaw Gomuka tried to come to power in Poland in 1956, Rokossovsky went to Moscov and tried to convince Nikita Khrushchev to use force against the Polish state. After Gomuka managed to negotiate with the Soviets, Rokossovsky left Poland. He returned to the Soviet Union, which restored his Soviet ranks and honours; and in July 1957, following the removal from office of Defence Minister Zhukov, Nikita Khrushchev appointed him Deputy Minister of Defence and Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. In 1958 he became chief inspector of the Ministry of Defence, a post he held until his retirement in April 1962. 51/126 Soviet Commanders 52 He died in August 1968, aged 71. His ashes were buried in the Kremlin Wall Necropolis on Red Square. 52/126 Soviet Commanders 53 Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov Dates: February 12, 1900  March 18, 1982 Born into a peasant family in the village of Serebryanye Prudy in the Tula region south of Moscow, he was the eighth of twelve children and the fifth of eight sons. Chuikov and all his brothers became soldiers and fought in the Russian Civil War. At the age of twelve, he left school and his family home to earn his living in a factory in St. Petersburg, turning out spurs for cavalry officers. 53/126 Soviet Commanders 54 The Russian Revolution and Civil War During the turmoil of the Russian Revolution of 1917, Chuikov became unemployed. Later the same year, an older brother arranged for Chuikov to be recruited into the Red Guards. The year after, in 1918, he joined the Red Army. In October 1918, Chuikov saw active service when he was sent to the Southern Front as a deputy company commander to fight against the White Army. In the spring of 1919, he became commander of the 40th Regiment (later renamed the 43rd), part of the 5th Army under Tukhachevsky facing the White Army at Kolchak in Siberia. 19 Chuikov's record of service during the Civil War was distinguished. In the fighting from 1919 to 1920 he received two awards of the Order of the Red Banner for bravery and heroism. He was wounded four timesone, in Poland in 1920, left a fragment in his left arm that could not be operated on. It led to partial paralysis and caused him to lose temporary use of his arm. Chuikov carried this war wound for the rest of his life, and it eventually led to septicaemia breaking out in 1981, causing a nine-month illness and finally his death. He left his regiment in 1921 to continue his studies at the Frunze Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1925. Second World War Chuikov commanded the 4th Army in the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939. He commanded the 9th Army in the Russo-Finnish War of 1940. His army was defeated by the Finns at Suomussalmi and Raate Road. He was then sent to China as an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. In May 1942, the USSR recalled him. According to Chuikov's memoirs, his recall was due to Nationalist China claiming that the USSR was providing military aid as part of an attempt to draw the USSR into the Second Sino-Japanese War. Stalingrad On returning to Moscow, Chuikov was placed in command of the 64th Army (later 7th Guards), on the west bank of the Don River. The 64th Army took part in the fighting withdrawal to Stalingrad, and shortly before the Battle of 19 Lieutenant General Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov (prior to 1943) 54/126 Soviet Commanders 55 Stalingrad itself began, Chuikov was made commanding general of the more important 62nd Army, which was to hold Stalingrad itself, with the 64th on its southern flank. It was at Stalingrad that Chuikov developed the important tactic of hugging the enemy, by which under-armed Soviet soldiers kept the German army so close to them as to minimize the superior firepower enjoyed by the Wehrmacht. Chuikov had witnessed firsthand the blitzkrieg tactics the Nazis had used to sweep across the Russian steppe, so he used the Germans' carpet-bombing of the city to draw panzer units into the rubble and chaos, where their progress was impeded. Here they could be destroyed with Molotov cocktails and Russian artillery operating at close range. This tactic also rendered the German Luftwaffe ineffective, since Stuka dive-bombers could not attack Red Army positions without endangering their own forces. 20 After the victory at Stalingrad, the 62nd Army was redesignated the Soviet 8th Guards Army. Chuikov then commanded the 8th Guards as part of 1st Belorussian Front and led its advance through Poland, finally heading the Soviet offensive which conquered Berlin in April/May 1945. 21 Chuikov's advance through Poland was characterized by massive advances across difficult terrain (on several occasions, the 8th Guards Army advanced over 40 miles in a single day). On May 1, 1945, Chuikov, who commanded his army operating in central Berlin, was the first Allied officer to learn about Adolf Hitler's suicide, being informed by General Hans Krebs who had come to Chuikov's headquarters under a white flag. He accepted the surrender of Berlin's forces from General Helmuth Weidling. Chuikov appeared in the documentary film Berlin (1945), directed by Yuli Raizman. Later life After the war, Chuikov stayed in Germany, later serving as Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany from 1949 until 1953, when he was made the Commanding General of the Kiev Military District. While serving at that post, on March 11, 1955 he was promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union. From 1960 to 1964, he was Craig, William (1973). Enemy at the Gates: the Battle for Stalingrad. New York: Penguin Books 21 Beevor, Antony (1998). Stalingrad. New York: Viking 20 55/126 Soviet Commanders 56 the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Army's Ground Forces. He also served as the Chief of the Civil Defense from 1961 until his retirement in 1972. From 1961 until his death, he was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He was a major consultant for the design of the Stalingrad battle memorial on Mamayev Kurgan, and was buried there after his death at the age of 82. 56/126 Soviet Commanders 57 Annexes Soviet Scorched-Earth Warfare: Facts And Consequences The Soviet scorched-earth policy has many facets: Military, economic, and so on. In The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry I touched only on those which are of importance in connection with the demographic changes of Eastern European Jewry. Here I want to emphasize the economic side of a little-known portion of the Second World War. However, in order to present the whole picture I must refer to portions of the subject which have already been covered in The Dissolution. Space allows only the most important references to those findings, and anybody who wishes to know more about this is advised to check The Dissolution. The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of 23 August 1939 provided for the following territorial divisions: Estonia and Latvia would fall into the Soviet sphere of interest while Lithuania would fall into the German. From Lithuania the line of demarcation would run toward East Prussia, from there along the Narew, Vistula, and San rivers toward the Carpathian mountains (Map 1). /1 After the Polish defeat, the Soviet government immediately exerted heavy pressure on Germany for a revision of the treaty. In order to maintain peace, Hitler agreed in the second treaty, the so-called Border and Friendship Agreement of 28 September 1939, that Germany would relinquish its interest in most of Lithuania in exchange for the area between the Vistula and the Bug rivers with a population of about 3.5 million, including more than 300,000 Jews. /2 This area had been occupied by the Soviets for only a few days, but the Red Army had taken the area's food supplies and livestock with it as it departed. As a result the Germans actually had to bring in large quantities of food to forestall starvation in this agricultural area. /3 This episode should have been a lesson to Germany. It was not. While Germany was engaged in the Western Campaign from 10 May until 24 June, 1940, the Soviet Union occupied the entirety of Lithuania between 16 and 22 June following the ultimatum of 15 June - that is, including even that portion which was to remain within the German sphere of interest according to the treaty. This occupation cons- 57/126 Soviet Commanders 58 tituted not only a gross violation of the two Soviet-German treaties but also of the Soviet-Lithuanian Treaty of Mutual Assistance (10 October 1939). The German government was neither consulted nor informed of this Soviet action as required under the treaty provisions. /4 The northern Bukovina region of Rumania, which was outside the agreedupon Soviet sphere of interest, was similarly appropriated by the Soviets, although in this case the Soviets pressured Germany into giving its "consent" within an ultimative time period of 24 hours before occupation (Map 2). I mention these developments only because they demonstrate the determination with which Russia removed German strategic advantages while improving her own. They also show that Germany had no definite military objectives against the Soviet Union because otherwise it is inconceivable that she would have tolerated Soviet usurpation of the strategically invaluable Lithuanian gateway to Leningrad and Moscow. Scorched Earth Faced with a massive build-up of Soviet military strength across the line of demarcation, concerned by the Soviet breach of the so-called Hitler-Stalin Pact and forewarned by new and enormous Soviet demands for geographic concessions in Europe, Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. The Soviets immediately began to execute German prisoners-of-war right after capture or a short interrogation. Even seriously wounded soldiers were not spared. Numerous high level orders to this effect are on record. The West German Military History Research Institute (Militaergeschichtliche Forschungsamt), which is not known for its pro-German bias, puts the percentage of captured German soldiers who died while in Soviet captivity in the years 1941-1942 at 90-95 percent. /5a Within days after hostilities began, the Kremlin's Central Committee issued orders to the effect that only scorched earth be left to the enemy. Everything of value was ordered to be destroyed, regardless of the needs of the civilian population left behind. For this purpose special demolition battalions were sent into action. The above-mentioned Military Research Institute commented further: "From the very beginning of the war Stalin and the leadership of the Soviet Union indicated through these measures that as far as they 58/126 Soviet Commanders 59 were concerned the armed conflict with Germany was of an entirely different character than the historical 'European national wars'." /5b The measures taken by the Soviet Union between 1940 and 1942 aimed not only at furthering the Soviet war effort, but also at harming the German enemy even at the cost of huge losses of life among Soviet civilians. The Soviet scorched-earth strategy included the deportation of millions of men, women and children; the resettlement and reestablishment of thousands of factories; the withdrawal of almost the entire railway rolling stock; the-annihilation of raw material depots; the removal of most of the agricultural machinery, cattle and grain stocks; the systematic destruction, burning and blowing up of the immovable infrastructure, inventories of all kinds, factory buildings, mines, residential areas, public buildings, public records, and even cultural monuments; and the intentional starvation of the civilian population which remained behind to face German occupation. It was basically a policy which unscrupulously used the civilian population as a strategic pawn. The extent and timing of this policy action is confirmed by so many sources that no real difference of opinion exists in this regard. What is strange is how scantily it has been covered so far in the scholarly literature. Until now, this policy has not been analyzed to the extent it deserves with an eye to identifying the party responsible for the conflict, nor to appreciating the German difficulties in prosecuting a war along established civilized lines, nor to assessing the claims of German brutality in Russia, nor to sizing up the numerical potential of the alleged German genocide of Soviet Jews, or indeed, of the Soviet Slavs. Long before the outbreak of the German-Soviet conflict, Stalin had begun to prepare for a future war in Europe when he began to develop heavy industry in the Urals and Western Siberia starting with the first Five-Year Plan which commenced in 1928. His plans were for the long run. In the early 1930s he had already announced his determination to overtake the most advanced industrialized countries with respect to industrial and military capacity not later than 1941 /6 -- the year when, according to numerous admissions of Soviet leaders, including Stalin's son, the Red Army would strike Germany late that summer. /7 With the help of thousands of engineers and experts from 59/126 Soviet Commanders 60 Europe and North America, the core of the Soviet armaments industry was established in the region where Europe meets Asia. Millions of Soviet citizens were also mercilessly sacrificed in the drive to attain Soviet military supremacy. The Ural industrial region was covered with a farflung network of power lines and electric-power generation plants. In 1940, this rather underpopulated area, with just four percent of the Soviet population, produced 4 billion kWh of electricity, and the existing capacity allowed for a great expansion. /8 By comparison, the Soviet territory later occupied by Germany - the so-called Occupied Eastern Territories - produced no more than 10 billion kWh before the war even though it accounted for about 40 percent of the Soviet population. In other words, on a per capita basis the electric power output of the Urals region was four times larger. In preparation for the coming conflict, substitute factory building shells were raised all across the southern Urals and western Siberia for the purpose of accepting the machinery from the territory the German enemy might threaten during the anticipated hostilities. A railroad network far out of proportion to the needs of this thinly populated area was vigorously expanded right up to the outbreak of war. /9 As soon as the Germans crossed the frontier, the Soviets put their Plan of Economic Mobilization into action. This plan incorporated the possibility that the enemy might succeed in occupying large sections of the country - as had happened during the First World War. For this reason detailed plans specified the locations to which the dismantled factories should be transported and the successive steps in which the removal was to take place. The interrelationships between the individual enterprises and their dependence on one another were painstakingly taken into account. /10 The carefully executed plan included the removal and evacuation of equipment and people 8-10 days before the retreat of the Red Army, followed by 24 hours of extensive destruction by special demolition squads just prior to the retreat. If necessary, the Soviet troops would put up last-ditch resistance to provide sufficient time for their demolition squads to complete their tasks. Destination addresses found by the surprised Germans pointed practically always in the direction of the Ural industrial region, specifically to the area encompassed by 60/126 Soviet Commanders 125 Index Marshall of the Soviet Union Georgy ..................................9 Konstantinovich Zhukov .....................................................9 Peacetime service until Khalkhin Gol....................... 11 Before World War II ................................................. 13 Bessarabia campaign ................................................ 13 Pre-war military exercises ........................................ 14 Controversy about a plan for war with Germany ..... 15 Post war service under Stalin ................................... 16 Reasons for Zhukov's rises and falls under Stalin.... 19 Retirement ................................................................ 21 Marschall of the Soviet Union Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko ..........................................................................23 The Russian Civil War and the 1930s.......................23 World War II............................................................ 24 Postwar .....................................................................25 Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos ............................................. 26 World War II.............................................................27 Dmitry Pavlov ................................................................... 29 Military career.......................................................... 29 Downfall................................................................... 30 Marshall of the Soviet Union Andrey Ivanovich Yeremenko 33 Draft and early service ..............................................33 World War II.............................................................33 After the war ............................................................ 36 Marshall of the Soviet Union Ivan Stepanovich Konev ....37 World War II.............................................................37 Post-war career ........................................................ 40 Konstantin Rokossovsky .............................................. 42 Early military career ................................................ 43 Great Purge, trial, torture and rehabilitation...........45 World War II............................................................ 46 Postwar .................................................................... 50 Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov ..................................................53 The Russian Revolution and Civil War ....................54 Second World War....................................................54 Stalingrad..................................................................54 Later life ....................................................................55 Annexes .............................................................................57 Soviet Scorched-Earth Warfare: Facts And Consequences .. 57 Scorched Earth ............................................................. 58 125/126 Soviet Commanders 126 The Economic Breakdown in the Occupied Eastern Territories......................................................................... 63 Notes............................................................................. 84 Russia and Germany .........................................................87 Notes............................................................................109 MolotovRibbentrop Pact............................................... 110 Background ..................................................................111 Beginning of SovietGerman secret talks .................. 114 August negotiations .................................................... 114 The secret protocol...................................................... 115 Modifying the secret protocols.................................... 118 Bibliography .................................................................... 119 Index ................................................................................ 125 126/126