PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS
ONLINE JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
Editor: Marco Sgarbi
Volume XI – Issue 2 – 2019
ISSN 2036-4989
Special Issue:
The Sophistic Renaissance: Authors, Texts, Interpretations
Guest Editor:
Teodoro Katinis
ARTICLES
Enhancing the Research on Sophistry in the Renaissance
Teodoro Katinis .................................................................................................................. 58
Peri Theôn: The Renaissance Confronts the Gods
Eric MacPhail..................................................................................................................... 63
Marsilio Ficino’s Commentary on Plato’s Gorgias
Leo Catana........................................................................................................................... 68
Rhetoric’s Demiurgy: from Synesius of Cyrene to Marsilio Ficino and Pico della
Mirandola
Marco Munarini ................................................................................................................. 76
Observations on the Reception of the Ancient Greek Sophists and the Use of the Term
Sophist in the Renaissance
Marc van der Poel ............................................................................................................... 86
Atticism and Antagonism: How Remarkable Was It to Study the Sophists in
Renaissance Venice?
Stefano Gulizia.................................................................................................................... 94
From Wit to Shit: Notes for an “Emotional” Lexicon of Sophistry during the
Renaissance
Jorge Ledo......................................................................................................................... 103
Hercules, Silenus and the Fly: Lucian’s Rhetorical Paradoxes in Erasmus’ Ethics
Elisa Bacchi ...................................................................................................................... 120
philosophicalreadings.org
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.2555151
PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS
ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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EDITOR
Marco Sgarbi
Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia
ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Eva Del Soldato
University of Pennsylvania
ASSISTANT EDITOR
Valerio Rocco Lozano
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
ASSISTANT EDITOR
Matteo Cosci
Università degli Studi di Padova
REVIEW EDITOR
Laura Anna Macor
Università degli Studi di Firenze
EDITORIAL BOARD
Alessio Cotugno, Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia
Raphael Ebgi, Freie Universität Berlin
Paolo Maffezioli, Università di Torino
Eugenio Refini, The Johns Hopkins University
Andrea Sangiacomo, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Alberto Vanzo, University of Warwick
Francesco Verde, Università “La Sapienza” di Roma
Antonio Vernacotola, Università di Padova
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Francesco Berto, University of St Andrews
Gianluca Briguglia, Université de Strasbourg
Laura Boella, Università Statale di Milano
Elio Franzini, Università Statale di Milano
Alessandro Ghisalberti, Università Cattolica di Milano
Piergiorgio Grassi, Università di Urbino
Seung-Kee Lee, Drew University
Sandro Mancini, Università di Palermo
Massimo Marassi, Università Cattolica di Milano
Pier Marrone, Università di Trieste
Roberto Mordacci, Università San Raffaele di Milano
Ugo Perone, Università del Piemonte Orientale
Riccardo Pozzo, Università degli Studi di Verona
José Manuel Sevilla Fernández, Universidad de Sevilla
Hercules, Silenus and the Fly: Lucian’s Rhetorical Paradoxes
in Erasmus’ Ethics
Elisa Bacchi
Abstract: Starting from the fierce conflict between Desiderius Erasmus and Martin Luther, my contribution
aims to show the rhetorical genesis of Erasmus’ reflection
on ethics. Specifically, I will focus on the fact that some
of the most significant and recurrent metaphors in Erasmus’ moral and theological meditation (e.g. Hercules, Silenus and the fly) trace their roots back to the work of
Lucian of Samosata. Against this background, it will be
possible to investigate the fundamental role of the
Lucianic attitude in defining some key-concepts of Erasmus’ thought, such as the rhetorical concepts of festivitas
and persona. Moreover, I will demonstrate how these
concepts become the starting point of Erasmus’ silenic
moral, modelled on the sophistic ability to transform relations and proportions between things by using words.
whose figure are the Sileni Alcibiadis, originated in the
sophistic aesthetics of the rhetorician from Samosata
To do this it will be necessary to understand the key
role played by Lucian during the first years of Erasmus’
rhetorical education. In this period the Latin translation of
the Greek sophist became a training ground in language
and life that accompanied the humanist from Rotterdam
and his friend Thomas More for a decade, and laid the
groundwork of Erasmus’ pedagogy.
With this contribution, therefore, following the approach of Eric MacPhail (2006; 2011), I propose to outline a first stage in the history of Erasmus’ reception of
late ancient sophistry.
2. Hercules at the crossroads
Keywords: Desiderius Erasmus, Martin Luther, Lucian
of Samosata, Rhetoric, Festivitas, Ethics.
1. Introduction
For a long time critics have underestimated the influence
of Lucian of Samosata’s work on the pedagogical, rhetorical, moral and theological thought of Desiderius Erasmus. Critical studies on Erasmus and on Lucian’s Renaissance legacy often devote one or more chapters to the relationship between the humanist from Rotterdam and the
rhetorician from Samosata, but, just as often, their analysis is reduced to a thematic catalogue where recurring
characters and situations are listed without taking into account any deeper intellectual accord.1
The only work by Erasmus on which there exist exhaustive scholarly accounts of the formal and substantial
influence exerted by Lucian is the Moriae Encomium.
This work, however, despite its symbolic value, is frequently considered either as merely a playful digression
in Erasmus’ workshop or as a serious labour, in which the
Lucianic sophistic brilliance is no more than a disguise.2
Against this background, the objective of my contribution is to show how Lucian’s rhetorical experimentations
became the centre of Erasmus’ moral and theological reflection, based on the concepts of exercise and contextual
knowledge. First, I shall focus on the importance of
Lucian’s legacy in understanding the dispute on free will
between Erasmus and Martin Luther. Secondly, I shall
shed light on the fact that the whole of Erasmus’ ethics,
University of Pisa; Ghent University
Pisa, Italy; Gent, Belgium
email: elisa.bacchi@gmail.com
There is an image that, more than any other, both unites
and divides the work of Desiderius Erasmus and the work
of Martin Luther: the image of Hercules.3
To show how the discussion about the value of rhetorical art constitutes the focus of the conflict between Luther and Erasmus, nothing is more effective than an investigation of the different ethical and gnoseological approaches that established their different characterisation
of Hercules.
Ulrich Von Hutten was the first, after the Leipzig debate (1519), to connect Luther with the figure of Hercules
Germanicus, which had become the emblem of the new
German power, thanks to the authority of the emperor
Maximilian I and the propaganda of the humanist Conrad
Celtis4. This representation of Luther as a wild and warlike destroyer of the papal heresy, in the name of the new
prosperity of the German nation, was the basis of an engraving by Hans Holbein the Younger (1522), in which a
brawny Luther, covered with the lion skin and gripping
the club of Hercules, shows his vigour by breaking up
scholastic philosophers and curial enemies.5
One year later, Holbein painted a portrait of Erasmus
(1523) in which the Dutch humanist is represented as a
man quietly sitting at his desk and resting his hands on a
bound volume, whose top edge exhibits the words
ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΟΙ ΠΟΝΟΙ (i.e. Herculei labores).6
The ironic counterpoint between the two images is
evident: by turning the challenges of Hercules into a tireless research within the changing universe of speech,
Erasmus’ corpusculum vitreum7 is opposed to the violent
and aggressive physicality of Luther’s Herculean labours.
Philosophical Readings XI.2 (2019), pp. 120-130.
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.2554134
LUCIAN’S RHETORICAL PARADOXES IN ERASMUS’ ETHICS
The harena, where the Herculean gladiator from Rotterdam fights, is, explicitly, that of the cultum Musarum
(CWE 10, 438; Allen V, 590).
This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that, in the
portrait painted by Holbein, the volume Erasmus is touching is a copy of his Adagia, at the centre of which is the
proverb Herculei labores. Within the texture of the Adagia, this maxim constitutes a real mise en abyme of Erasmus’ method of working: it shows his effort to fight the
Hydra which stands for the mobility of literary sources
and to bring some partial order into the changeable field
of proverbial meanings.8
Following Plutarch’s De genio Socratis, Erasmus’
Hercules is he who learned the alphabet under the guidance of the ever-changing Proteus and handed it down to
the Greeks9, or rather, he is, following the description
given by Lucian of Samosata, the Hercules Gallicus who
replaced the emblems of physical strength with the emblems of protean rhetorical power. It is no coincidence
that Erasmus was the first Latin translator of Lucian's
Herakles: he created a vivid portrait of the new Hercules
senex, which became, in turn, the protagonist of many
iconographic and literary “rewrites” as the symbol of vis
eloquentiae:10
That old Heracles of theirs drags after him a great crowd of men
who are all tethered by the ears! His leashes are delicate chains
fashioned of gold and amber, resembling the prettiest of necklaces. Yet, though led by bonds so weak, the men do not think of
escaping, as they easily could, and they do not pull back at all or
brace their feet and lean in the opposite direction to that in
which he is leading them. In fact, they follow cheerfully and
joyously, applauding their leader and all pressing him close and
keeping the leashes slack in their desire to overtake him; apparently they would be offended if they were let loose! But let me
tell you without delay what seemed to me the strangest thing of
all. Since the painter had no place to which he could attach the
ends of the chains, as the god's right hand already held the club
and his left the bow, he pierced the tip of his tongue and represented him drawing the men by that means! Moreover, he has
his face turned toward his captives, and is smiling [...].In general, we consider that the real Heracles was a wise man who
achieved everything by eloquence and applied persuasion as his
principal force. His arrows represent words, I suppose, keen,
sure and swift, which make their wounds in souls. (Luc. Herc.,
tr. Harmon, I, 65-67)11
In this context, starting from the adage Herculei labores,
in which Erasmus shows himself engaged in the work of
organizing and reorganizing ancient literary tradition, the
Herculean labours prove to be an education in the elusive
luxuriance of the persuasive speech.
The Lucianic origin of Erasmus’ Hercules-orator well
illustrates the mediating role that Lucian’s work played in
the defining process of Erasmus’ idea of rhetoric as a
playful and contextual cognitive instrument. In accusing
Erasmus of using words like an equivocal and ambiguous
mask, which imprisons the interlocutor in the meshes of
paradox,12 Luther was actually railing against this mocking and evasive Hercules-Proteus of Lucianic ancestry.
Against this background, the Hercules Gallicus engraving by Albrecht Dürer (1498) would have been fully
appreciated by Luther:13 the German painter represented
the Hercules Gallicus as a vacillating Hercules at the
crossroads, his guilty hesitancy staged by details such as
121
his helmet, which bears the cock of the loquacious Mercury, the proof that he is an able rhetorician – “trepidat in
morem galli” (CWE 33, 88; ASD II/3, 146).
3. A Lucianic training: mask, representation, exercise
Before turning back to the conflict that, with regard to
Lucian’s rhetoric, set Erasmus and Luther against each
other, it will be useful to consider the key role that the
special sophistic aptitude of Lucian had on Erasmus’ intellectual biography from its very beginning.
It seems impossible to deal with the relevance of
Lucian's influence on the definition of Erasmus’ rhetorical
paradigm without focusing on the intellectual partnership
and the sincere friendship that, thanks to the rhetorician of
Samosata, bonded Erasmus and Thomas More. Between
1505 and 1506,14 Erasmus and More’s translation of
Lucian’s works15 was not only a test of their knowledge
of Greek language and literature, but also, and especially,
a workshop for the construction of a joint educational project and a shared view regarding the role of rhetorical
practice.
In the eyes of Erasmus and More, what made Lucian
especially suitable in teaching the elements of Greek, so
much so that he was regarded as an essential pedagogical
tool,16 was the quality that can be defined as the festivitas17 of the rhetorician from Samosata. On the one hand,
this concept of rhetorical origin, crucial for Erasmus’
pedagogical and theological elaboration, is concerned
with a sociable and cheerful, refined and graceful kind of
laugh. Indeed, the pleasantness of festivitas results mainly
from expertise in the use of language and from the skill in
playing with a specific cultural tradition, by translating
and betraying its topoi.18 On the other hand, the festive
approach reveals a more comic than tragic theatrical tendency, towards changing voice and character (persona),
according to the needs of representation19 (“And this dialogue is sure to be no less pleasant than profitable, if the
reader only observe the appropriate way in which its
characters are treated”; Dedication of Toxaris, sive
Amicitia’ translation to Richard Foxe, CWE 2, 103;20
“This dialogue of Lucian [...] is a most skilful performance, in that the drawing of so many and such different
characters is so wonderfully lifelike”; Dedication of Convivium, sive Lapithae’s translation to Johann Huttich,
CWE 4, 28221). Therefore, the festivitas is a cultivated
comicality (festivissima doctrina and doctissima festivitas) and Lucian’s nugae litteratae are made up of allusions, in which the mask has an essential role because of
its quality of indirect and oblique enunciation. The impression of lightness communicated to Erasmus and More
by Lucian’s festivitas has little to do with the idea of idle
and intellectually weak literary practice.22 This agreeableness seems rather to be the result of a never-ending exploration of meanings where each mask is an exercitium
and truth takes the form of a representation. The pedagogical importance of Lucian’s work, therefore, concerns
laughter not only, and not so much, as a rhetorical device
to capture a child’s attention. Laughter is above all the
focal point of a perspective in which rhetorical fiction has
the quality of an intertextual structure to be explored and
changed, starting from the contexts in which it is used. It
ELISA BACCHI
is not by chance that Erasmus and More identify the main
peculiarity of the Lucianic laugh with the multiplicity of
characters and situations: their topical quality becomes
the means through which the work of the rhetorician from
Samosata is assembled and disassembled, and forms the
perfect base to receive innumerable variations, in the form
of rhetorical exercises. Thus Lucian’s moral usefulness,
which is repeatedly emphasized by Erasmus and More,23
is consistent with the fact that his work seems to be a
mechanism for generating text and an inexhaustible container of sources, i.e. a real palestra ingeniorum. According to Erasmus, Lucian’s laughter is the most appropriate
instrument to guide pupils towards moral seriousness because it is the denial of every peremptory and dogmatic
point of view and, therefore, the image of a joyful pietas
(“true religion ought to be the most cheerful thing in the
world”; De recta pronuntiatione, CWE 26, 38524). By
teaching the relativity of communicative situations and
the variability of temperaments, the laughter resulting
from the art of rhetoric comes to resemble the most sincere content of Christian morality, based on tolerance and
loving persuasion.
In Erasmus and More’s translations, the ever-present
epigraph of Lucian’s work is Horace’ advice to miscere
utile dulci and to coniungere voluptatem cum utilitate.25
In this context, it should be clarified that laughter is the
medium between pleasure and usefulness because it transforms every representation into a kind of partial composition related to the concept of rhetorical exercitium. This
means that, in Erasmus and More’s pedagogical approach,
the ability to produce an effect on the mind has greater
weight than absolute adherence to a worthless and useless
truth. In a rhetorical exercitium the three meanings of
ludus (game, play and school) overlap.
However, the art of persuading that Erasmus learned
from Lucian is a paradoxical tool, which needs at the
same time to be heeded and unpacked: it is precisely
through the festivitas that it reveals its nature as artifice.
In this context, it will be interesting to note that the works
of Lucian that Erasmus chose to translate are, for the most
part, rhetorical exercises in declamation (Abdicatus; Toxaris sive Amicitia; Tyrannicida) or texts where Lucian
ironically condemns superstition as harmful gullibility,
where the level of representation blends with the level of
truth (Alexander seu Pseudomantis; De sacrificiis; De
luctu; De astrologia). Reading Lucian means learning to
recognize the fabula as a space of possibilities and as a
fiction that serves as an antidote to superstition. This kind
of Lucianism is especially evident in the group of Colloquia26 where Erasmus looks at trickery as a real pharmakon, i.e. as a fabula staged with wit and irony to reveal
the stupid stagnation of credulity with its ineptitude in decoding representations.
If one shifts the focus specifically onto Erasmus’
pedagogical thought, the preceptor-rhetorician he envisaged, through the filter of Lucian, is not only someone
who teaches by ridiculae fabulae. He is a true comedian
who chooses Lucian’s rhetorical skill as a lifestyle: in this
comic activity of mimesis he goes so far as to play the
role of his pupil and to take his weaknesses and his doubt
as the cornerstone of all possible knowledge:
I prefer a teacher who is of an age when his vigour is in its
prime, an age which does not repel his pupils and allows him to
assume any role. In guiding the intellectual development of his
students, the instructor should abide by the same principles that
are followed by parents and nurses in promoting physical
growth. (De pueris instituendis, CWE 26, 334-335)27
It is no coincidence if, in the dialogue Puerpera (CWE,
39, 590-618; ASD I/3, 453-469), the two characters bear
the descriptive names of Fabulla and Eutrapelo. By conversing about the most appropriate way to take care of a
child’s physical and intellectual education, they mark out
an educational space where fabula and iocus become the
real protagonists. Indeed, the perfect pedagogue is one
who has the rhetorical ability to play with representations
and who is able to educate his pupil to make a constant
hermeneutic effort. This training allows the pupil not only
to be a passive spectator of the educational fabula, but
also to enter into the fabula as a protagonist, through the
mimetic game. The preceptor’s rhetorical skill lies in
making the speech an instrument that functions as a pathway for the imagination28. This means that Erasmus’ preceptor does not teach through a prescriptive moralism or
an unreflective persuasion. On the contrary, he suggests
an educational opportunity that the pupil may develop at
his pleasure. Therefore, according to Erasmus, education
is a beneficent deception: it is a playful fiction (“Moreover, I’m not sure anything is learned better than what is
learned as a game. To confer a benefit through a trick is
surely deception of the most innocent sort”; De utilitate
colloquiorum, CWE 40, 109829), which suspends the
categories of true and false (“Nor is truth always the opposite of falsehood” Ecclesiastes, CWE 68, 69130).
At this point, to go back to the relationship established
between Erasmus and More under the banner of Lucian, it
is not surprising that in his letter to Ulrich Von Hutten of
July 1519 Erasmus superimposed the image of the rhetorician from Samosata onto the lively portrait of his English friend and fellow scholar:
The affection [...] that you feel for that gifted man Thomas
More, fired of course as you are by reading his books, which
you rightly call as brilliant as they are scholarly – all this, believe me my dear Hutten, you share with many of us [...] His
expression shows the sort of men he is, always friendly and
cheerful, with something of the air of one who smiles easily, and
(to speak frankly) disposed to be merry rather than serious or
solemn, but without a hint of the fool or the buffoon [...]. His
language is remarkably clear and precise, without a trace of
hurry and hesitation. (CWE 7, 16-18) 31
More not only displays immense culture, outstanding eloquence and a great disposition to laugh, but he is also able
to change his role depending on the context without abandoning his convivial levity. This iocunditas makes him
look like the perfect Lucianic rhetorician and preceptor:
In society he shows such rare courtesy and sweetness of disposition that there is no man so melancholy by nature that More
does not enliven him, no disaster so great that he does not dissipate its unpleasantness. From boyhood he has taken such pleasure in jesting that he might seem born for it [...]. In his youth he
both wrote brief comedies and acted in them. Any remark with
more wit in it than ordinary always gave him pleasure, even if
directed against himself; such is his delight in witty sayings that
122
LUCIAN’S RHETORICAL PARADOXES IN ERASMUS’ ETHICS
betray a lively mind. Hence his trying his hand as a young man
at epigrams, and his special devotion to Lucian; in fact it was he
(yes, he can make the camel dance) who persuaded me to write
my Moriae Encomium.
In fact there is nothing in human life to which he cannot look for
entertainment, even in most serious moments. If he has to do
with educated and intelligent people, he enjoys their gifts; if
they are ignorant and stupid, he is amused by their absurdity.
(CWE 7, 18-19)32
Significantly, the classic comedy and the particular sophistic aptitude of Lucian seem to be the literary instruments
through which More formed his own character. Thus, it is
obvious that he became the promoter of Erasmus’ Moriae
Encomium.
4. Muscarum Achilles
After this brief survey of Erasmus’ Lucianic training, we
can now focus on his discussion with Luther, in which his
Lucianic identity became the symbol of a fundamental
gnoseological opposition.
When, in September 1524, Erasmus published his own
Diatriba de libero arbitrio, he chose to view the entire
work in the light of a disproportion: the decision to discuss with Luther one of the foundations of the theology of
the German Hercules put Erasmus – Hercules senex and
homuncio pygmaeus - in the position of a miserable fly
faced with the majesty of the elephant of Wittenberg
(“Does Erasmus dare to take on Luther as a fly might an
elephant?”; CWE 76, 6 33).
The apparent inanity of this confrontation was destined, however, for a potential reversal, whose paradoxical nature originates in the rhetorical universe of Lucian.
Indeed, in the immense workshop of the Adagia there is a
brief comment on the proverbial saying Elephantum ex
musca facis, through which Erasmus makes the comical
outcome of this identity exchange explicit by referring to
Lucian’s Muscae encomium:
Έλέφας ἐκμυίας ποιεῑς, You make an elephant out of a fly,
that is, you use big words about little things and exaggerate
them. Lucian in his Panegyric on the Fly: «There is much more
that I could say, but I will stop there, for fear of seeming, as the
proverb has it, to make an elephant out of a fly. (CWE 32, 219)34
The way in which Lucian’s paradoxical encomium works
is concisely rendered by Erasmus’ quotation. The lack of
correspondence between words and things creates a
parodic effect, which changes the nature of words and
things themselves through a sophistic process: the fly
transmutes into an elephant by a skilful patchworking of
the fragments of the elephant’s epic wisdom onto the
laughable little body of the annoying insect.
The ambiguity of the fly-elephant couple occurs once
again, when it is observed that in Lucian’s Muscae Encomium the fly gets the better of the elephant because of its
small size: “So strong is the fly that when she bites she
wounds the skin of the ox and the horse as well as that of
man. She even torments the elephant by entering his
wrinkles and lancing him with her proboscis as far as its
length allows” (Luc. Musc. Enc., tr. Harmon, I, 89). The
123
elephant’s trunk is of no avail against the fly - this is its
ironic nemesis.
To draw a genealogy sub specie muscae – i.e. under
the sign of sophistic reversibility – of Erasmus’ interest in
Lucian’s work, it will be useful to turn our attention to the
rewriting of Lucian’s encomium made by Leon Battista
Alberti between 1441 and 1443, as a reply to Guarino
Veronese’s translation of the Muscae Encomium.35
In the context of Alberti's rewriting, the results of the
contest between fly and elephant become even clearer:
“posterity handed down in literary monuments that the
elephant saw himself defeated by the fly” (Musca, 50:
“elephantum a musca prostratum se posteritas vidisse litterarum monumentis tradidit”). Furthermore, Alberti’s
Musca has a particular interest because it shows how the
paradoxical praise responds to a real philosophical programme, which is able to give new value to res domesticae et familiares. In his Musca, Alberti rejects the human
folly of investigating the forms of reality a conspectus
abditae et in obscuro retrusae, thereby re-evaluating
those things which are for the most part in medium expositae et cognitu perfaciles (45-46). Therefore, if the
reading of Lucian’s eulogy can cheer up Alberti and cure
him of the inconvenience of fever by means of laughter
(45), then this depends on the fact that the tiny praised
animal is the bearer of a kind of knowledge that is able to
deconstruct the seriousness of knotty philosophical speculation, through the levity of play. This playful approach
questions every established value. In the first proem of
the Momus, Alberti distinguishes those who wear the
static mask of sternness (severitatis persona), from those
who attain seriousness through the changeability of festivitas (6-7). As we have seen, this festive quality is connected to the ability to combine and vary different sources
because “nothing is said which has not previously been
said” (Momus, 4-5: “nihil dictum quin prius dictum”).
The humble fly, minutus animans, hardly to be taken seriously, dresses itself up in epic words and philosophical
virtues, which take the form of a parodic exercise.
Fully in keeping with this spirit, Erasmus took the
identity of the buzzing insect and moved the discussion
on free will from the systematic ground of the tractatus36
to the rhetorical ground of the diatribe,37 whose literary
form deals more with the rhetorical exercise of the disputatio in utramque partem than with the Cynic-Stoic dialogic tradition. Erasmus’ diatribe is characterized by the
assumption of the concept of decorum personae as an expression of an unsystematic philosophy, which is structured on the basis of contextual needs. Therefore, Erasmus’ decisive rejection of Luther’s pervicacia asserendi
plays a central role in the first part of De libero arbitrio
because this rejection leads Erasmus to investigate the
rhetorical field of the probable and plausible:
Now for my part I was well aware how poorly suited I was for
this wrestling-match – indeed there is hardly a man less practised in the art than I, for I have always preferred sporting in the
spacious plains of the Muses to engaging in swordplay at close
quarters. And I take so little pleasure in assertions that I will
gladly seek refuge in Scepticism [...], and so I will act as disputant, not as a judge; as inquirer, not as dogmatist; ready to learn
from anyone, if any truer or more reliable arguments can be put
forward. (CWE 76, 7-8)38
ELISA BACCHI
It is clear that the most appropriate context for Erasmus’
reflection is that of the ludus, of play, and the exercise of
fictio: what is dubious, what is difficult to discern in the
labyrinth of the Scriptures cannot take the form of peremptory assertion, but it may be explored through the
practice of fiction:
What you affirm, I wish; what you say you know, I desire to
learn; nor is it enough for me that you firmly assert this – I demand the certitude which you profess to have [...] For it often
happens that when someone comes out of the dark, he does not
see anything even in full sunlight unless he has focused his eyes
for a while, and some things we do not see immediately through
the darkness, but as we focus our eyes what was doubtful before
gradually begins to be clear to us, and the same thing happens
when things are far away from us. But out of courtesy I pretended that the interpretations on both sides were ambiguous so
that on a level playing field you might show something that
would incline towards your side those of us who were vacillating in the middle. (Hyperaspites, CWE 76, 226-227)39
Against this background, the letter that Erasmus wrote to
John Extin in November 1499, about twenty years before
the explosion of the Lutheran issue, is very significant. By
relating the degeneration of a convivial discussion into a
battle inter pocula, i.e. a kind of Lucianic antisymposium, Erasmus represents himself as a poet-orator
in the midst of an assembly of theologians: he is able to
take the banquet, which is corrupted by the harshness of
controversy, back to a relaxed, cheerful and sociable
mood through the narration of a festiva fabella:
In the end, since the discussion had gone on rather long and had
become too serious and too rigorous to suit a dinner party, I decided to play my part, that is, the part of the poet, with the object of getting rid of this contentious argument and introducing
some gaiety into the meal. (CWE 1, 230)40
To return to the discussion on free will, Luther recognized
and was severely critical of the sophistic and Lucianic
disposition of Erasmus, who was able to transform things
through words. According to Erasmus, the interchangeability of roles in the competition between fly and elephant shed a playful light on the whole diatribe; according to Luther, however, Erasmus’ art of transmutation
took the form of a diabolic rhetorical fucus, of Odysseus’
malicious flexiloquus (On the Bondage of the Will, tr. H.
Cole, 3-4; De servo arbitrio, WA 18, 601-602): Erasmus’
festivitas was decisively banned (On the Bondage of the
Will, 8; WA, 18, 603), together with Lucian’s laugh:
For, by so doing, you only evince that you hug in your heart a
Lucian, or some other of the swinish tribe of Epicureans;
who, because he does not believe there is a God himself , secretly laughs at all those who believe and confess it. (On the
Bondage of the Will, 12)41
What shall I say here, Erasmus? To me, you breathe out nothing
but Lucian, and draw in the gorging surfeit of Epicurus. (On the
Bondage of the Will, 17)42
Furthermore, Luther did not leave any space for the
possibilities of fiction, so relevant to Erasmus in the field
of theological education:
And moreover [I would shew you] what is it to run against divine things and truths, when, in mere compliance with others
and against our conscience, we assume a strange character and
act upon a strange stage. It is neither a game nor a jest, to undertake to teach the sacred truths and godliness: for it is very easy
here to meet with the fall which James speaks of, “He that offended in one point is guilty of all”. For when we begin to be, in
the least degree, disposed to trifle, and not to hold the sacred
truths in due reverence, we are soon involved in impieties, and
overwhelmed with blasphemies: as it has happened to you here,
Erasmus. (On the Bondage of the Will, 34)43
Nugae and sacrae litterae should on no account be mixed
(On the Bondage of the Will, 107; WA 18, 661): the inconceivable contaminations that systematically appear in
Erasmus’ works seemed to Luther closer to the fictional
inventions of Lucian’s Vera Historia than to serious theological engagement (“To teach, then, a something which
is neither described by one word within the scriptures, nor
evidenced by one fact without the scriptures, is that,
which does not belong to the doctrines of Christians, but
to the very fables of Lucian”; On the Bondage of the Will,
10744). Thus, in the centre of his De servo arbitrio, Luther
redeployed the image of Erasmus as a fly and portrayed
the humanist from Rotterdam as leading a ridiculous army
of insects and fighting against an impressive and solemn
rank of fully armed men : “it is just thus, that the human
dreams of the Diatribe are drawn up in battle against the
hosts of the words of God! ” (On the Bondage of the
Will, 165).45 In this context the military virtues of the fly,
ironically commended by Alberti (Musca, 47-49), prove
to be only as a grotesque shadow and a poor substitute for
the stern decorum of a warrior: according to Luther, the
human comedy of the diatribe is clearly at variance with
the tragic epic of Christianity. It was for this reason that,
in a letter of 1524, Luther attempted to discourage Erasmus’ stance against the Protestant reformation by referring to his own theological battle as a real tragoedia,
whose harshness did not suit the intelligence of the homo
loquax: Erasmus should have remained simply a spectator
of the Lutheran tragic drama (“I beg you [...] to be no
more than a spectator of this trouble in which we are engaged”; CWE 10, 24646). Erasmus’ reply was immediate
and, by turning what Luther considers the imbecilitas of
the man of letters into a judgment parameter, he insisted
on the need to take part in the tragoedia lutherana in
order to dissipate its tragic result (“let me not be a spectator and watch the tragedy unfold- I only hope it does not
have a tragic ending!” CWE 10, 25547).
At this point, it should be borne in mind that the muscarum Achilles (On the Bondage of the Will, 165; WA 18,
688) mask, which exploits the meaning potential of
laughable realities, is not a novelty in Erasmus’ repertoire. In the Prolegomena to the Adagia, the proverbial
form is compared to those minutissima animantia which
reveal the expertise of nature more than the mighty elephant because of the functionality of their anatomical
structure (“And, as Pliny says, the miracle of nature is
greater in the most minute creatures [...] than in the elephant, if only one looks closely; and so, in the domain of
literature, it is sometimes the smallest things which have
the greatest intellectual value”; CWE 31, 1448). According
to Erasmus, smallness, nugacitas, and a witty and lively
mind are one and the same. They have an essential rela124
LUCIAN’S RHETORICAL PARADOXES IN ERASMUS’ ETHICS
tionship with the universe of rhetorical exercise (Apophthegmata, CWE 37, 15-16; ASD IV/4, 45) and with the
stutter of human speech (Ratio seu methodus, LB V, 124),
whose fate it is to acquire meaning only through reformulation and shift in perspective. It is no coincidence that, in
the discussion with Guillaume Budé which started in
1516, Erasmus focused on the definition of a poetics of
leptologemata. While according to Budé, Erasmus’ eloquence should find more appropriate tones and subjects to
display its grandeur, the humanist from Rotterdam insisted on the nugatory nature of his light philosophy
(CWE 4, 102-107; Allen II, 362-366), which could adapt
itself to the world stage (CWE 4, 228-236; Allen II, 463469).
Moriae Encomium is the best example of Erasmus’
paradoxical approach. Here, the aptitude of the tetrica
philosophia for dealing with serious things in a light and
foolish manner (i.e. in specular terms, for changing trifles
into serious things) is opposed to the aptitude of the morosophus in dealing with trivial things as such. In short,
the most pleasant and useful thing is to achieve seria by
means of nugae.49 Therefore, while the supercilious philosophers reveal their silliness behind the appearance of
graveness, Folly’s companions recognizes the festiva,
lepida et iucunda surface of reality as the place for the
production of meaning. Once again, the acknowledgement of the nugacitas of nugae leads to the paradoxical
reversibility of the fly-elephant’s rhetoric.
5. Alcibiades’ Sileni
There is another image in Erasmus’ work that certainly
can be juxtaposed with the fly-elephant couple: the image
of the scarab, which is described in the fabula that comments on the adage Scarabaeus aquilam quaerit (CWE
35, 178-214; ASD II/6, 395-424). Most of this fabella is
taken up by the development of two epideictic compositions: the first consists of the condemnation of the
eagle’s ferocity and arrogance, which is compared to the
rapacity of contemporary tyrants; the second consists of
the paradoxical praise of the hidden qualities of the humble scarab, which turn into symbols of divinity. The condemnation of the eagle affords an opportunity to stage a
satirical tirade against the violence of power and to paint
the portrait of the ideal sovereign; the praise for the scarab, on the other hand, is characterized by the ironic transformation of the scarab’s faults into physical, moral and
intellectual qualities. In short, in Erasmus’ definition, the
scarab is a true Alcibiades’ Silenus50 in whom a risible
surface and rich inwardness coexist.
Against this background, it will be useful to go back
to the point in Erasmus’ Adagia where the proverbial
phrase Sileni Alcibiadis is first mentioned. This will enable us to better understand the nature of Erasmus’ apologue, which shows the poor scarab defeating the eagle,
and to investigate more closely the peculiar qualities of
this scarab-Silenus.
The commentary of the adage Sileni Alcibiadis is one
of the most extended in the whole corpus of Chiliades
Adagiorum and develops into a sort of politicaltheological essay where Erasmus condemns social hypocrisies and their inauspicious consequences. However, for
125
my argument, the most interesting aspect of Alcibiades’
Silenus is his first description, which sheds light on the
paradoxical relationship between amusing surface and
serious inwardness, and between the playful artifice of the
outward form and the numinous essence:
The Sileni are said to have been a kind of small figure of carved
wood, so made that they could be divided and opened. Thus,
though when closed they looked like a caricature of a hideous
flute-player, when opened they suddenly displayed a deity, so
that this humorous surprise made the carver’s skill all the more
admirable. Furthermore, the subject of these images was drawn
from the well-known comic figure of Silenus, Bacchus’ tutor
and the court buffoon of the gods of poetry. (CWE 34, 262)51
First of all, in following Erasmus’ approach, it should not
be forgotten that the metaphor of Silenus originates in
Plato’s Symposium. Here Alcibiades, who is completely
drunk, paradoxically praises an atopos Socrates, whose
real nature can be understood only through the ridiculous
medium of the image (Smp. 215a-222b).52 The paradox of
the discrepancy between Socrates’ superficial foolery and
his inner qualities is the result of the ambiguous speech of
the drunk Alcibiades, whom Socrates himself describes as
someone who lacks the ability to see properly (Smp.
219a). The portrait of Socrates that emerges from what
Alcibiades says is that of a man who deceives and disguises himself while upsetting roles and identities and
whose irony displays the attitude of the sophist. The
contradictory identity of Socrates can be understood only
through the dislocated perspective of the drunk and blind
Alcibiades: by confusing Socrates with Eros-sophist
(Smp. 203d), he is compelled to hold onto a man in whom
comedy and tragedy coexist (Smp. 223d).
In his commentary to the adage Sileni Alcibiadis,
Erasmus fully exploited this substantial ambivalence of
the Silenus metaphor, and insisted on Socrates’ ridiculous
appearance, his zany behaviour, his inclination to play
and trick, as well as on his open staging of a weak form of
knowledge:
Anyone who had valued him skin-deep (as they say) would not
have given twopence for him. With his peasant face, glaring like
a bull, and his snub nose always sniffling, he might have been
taken for some blockheaded country bumpkin. The care of his
person was neglected, his language simple and homely and
smacking of common folk; for his talk was all of carters and
cobblers, of fullers and smiths [...]. Last but not least, that unbroken flow of humour gave him the air of a buffoon. While that
was a period when the ambition to advertise one’s own cleverness reached manic heights among the foolish [...], Socrates was
alone in declaring that there was only one thing he knew, which
was that he knew nothing [...]. Small wonder then, though the
world of those days was full of professional wits, if this buffoon
was the only man declared wise by the oracle, and he who knew
nothing was judged to know more than those who boasted there
was nothing they did not know – was in fact judged to know
more than the rest for that very reason, that he alone of them all
said he knew nothing. (CWE 34, 262-263)53
Therefore, the comic mask is part of Socrates as his sublime soul or, better, the comic appearance seems to be the
very foundation of his inner virtues. It is not by chance
that Socrates’ silenic comedy is opposed to the tragedy of
praeposteri Sileni, who are not able to recognize the the-
ELISA BACCHI
atrical quality of their splendours and honours and who
confuse this golden surface with their individual substance:
A goodly number of men reproduce Silenus inside-out. Anyone
who looked thoroughly into the driving force of things and their
true nature would find none so far removed from real wisdom as
those whose honorific title, learned bonnets, resplendent belts,
and bejewelled rings advertise wisdom in perfection. So true is
this that you may not seldom find more real and native wisdom
in one single ordinary man [...], than in many of our pompous
theologians. (CWE 34, 265-266)54
At this point, according to Erasmus’ reappraisal of Alcibiades’ perspective, it is clear that any opportunity to
grasp a truth must necessarily pass through the surface of
the comic mask, which creates the condition for all investigation of truth: Erasmus’ silenic approach does not consist in the mere unveiling of a more substantial reality55,
but in the acknowledgement of the theatrical nature of
every persona. The nature of Erasmus’ paradox does not
lie in the overturning of appearance, but in the aporia of
coexistence56. Silenus’ comicality is related to the ability
to recognize the contextual existence of each mask (persona); the tragedy of the inverted Silenus consists in
wearing the mask as a skin.
Once again, examining Erasmus’ work in the light of
Lucian’s paradoxes can be profitable: through the mediation of Lucian, Erasmus seems to fully exploit the potential sophistic aptitude of Alcibiades’ speech. The image of
Silenus that Lucian outlined in his Bacchus constitutes an
intermediate step between the Silenus of Alcibiades and
that of Erasmus. Lucian, with Alcibiades’ Socrates in
mind, used the image of Silenus to justify the comic
quality of his writings. He states that Bacchus’ pedagogue
is able to produce his best speeches, and his most ornate
and wise utterances when his inebriation and drollery
reach their acme. In the same way Lucian’s work, which
is a hybrid of philosophical dialogue and comedy,
achieves its most significant results when it makes explicit use of the device of laughter (Luc. Bacch, tr. Harmon, I, 56-59). In this context the laughable appearance
of Lucian’s work becomes the real mediator and the focal
point of every hermeneutical activity.
Against this background, it is not by chance that the
image of Alcibiades’ Silenus became the emblem of the
literary structure of Erasmus’ Moriae Encomium and the
metaphor of the exegetical process required for its interpretation (CWE 27, 102-103; ASD IV/3, 104). As a matter of fact, the Silenic approach excludes a simplified allegorical reading and exploits the playful nature of the
rhetorical principles of decorum and aptum.
Now that the qualities of the figure of Sileni Alcibiadis
have been clarified, we can return to the Silenic image of
the scarab. Our first impression is that the ability of the
tiny despised animal to humiliate artfully the haughty
eagle makes the humble insect next of kin to the fly,
whose graceful levity is set against the massive structure
of the elephant. On closer examination, however, the
reader is disoriented by the fact that the praise of the scarab takes on an increasingly satirical tone: through the
exaltation of its skill as a warrior, Erasmus ridicules military prowess and glory57 and, through the scarab’s mys-
terious sanctification, he makes fun of superstition58.
Erasmus’ portrait of the scarab shows a small animal of
shabby appearance, which is full of vainglory and greedy
for power:
Now the beetle was not a little pleased by the very fact that
someone existed who, first, was willing to owe his life to him
and believed that such a great thing was in his power; and who,
second, found his hole [...] suitable as a place in which to hide
for safety, like a sacred altar or the king’s statue. (CWE 35,
207)59
He was also tickled by a certain alluring hope that, if the act
succeeded and the eagle were overthrown, he might himself take
power. (CWE 35, 209)60
Erasmus’ scarab is sure of its honour and authority (“personal dignity is no slight matter to anyone”; CWE 35,
20861), and when this insignificant beast is offended by
the eagle he begins to harbour a destructive hatred and to
engage in such a cruel and malicious deception (“And so
he pondered all sorts of arts and trick. It was no common
punishment but extermination and “total destruction” he
contemplated”; CWE 35, 20862). Therefore, the smallness
of the scarab is at variance with the joyful and playful aptitude of the fly. Indeed, the scarab statically takes on the
identity of a revealed allegory and, by forgetting and rejecting its comic mask and its laughable appearance, it
does not look much different from the eagle in terms of its
rapacity and thirst for glory.63 Thus, the Silenus-scarab
turns into a tragic mask, into an inverted Silenus, which is
unable to exploit the potential meaning of its ludic persona and which projects outwards its own ridiculous
gravity: taking a mysterium too seriously and effacing the
comical ambages of its surface means eschewing the fiction that produces truth and being content with a fictitious
truth.
6. Conclusion
The materials analysed in this overview allow us to affirm
that some of the best-known and recurring metaphors in
Erasmus’ work (Hercules, Silenus and the fly) originated
in the paradoxes of Lucian.
In this article I have attempted not only to trace the
genealogy of Erasmus’ ethics, by emphasizing the way in
which its constitutive metaphors are rooted in Lucian’s
work, but also to show that what is most serious and deep
in Erasmus’ theological perspective (i.e the tolerance of
pietas) is founded in the sophistic aptitude of Lucian’s
laughter and in his ability to test and experiment with the
contingencies of every context.
From this point of view, the Lucianism of Erasmus is
no longer the playful dressing up of a more substantial
moral commitment but becomes the rhetorical aesthetics
which fostered the growth of his ethics.
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Notes
1
See, among others, Lauvergnat-Gagnière, Marsh and Geri.
See, for example, M. A. Screech. For my purpose, the approach to the
Moriae Encomium of Margolin 1983 and Fumaroli is more significant
because of its focus on the rhetorical and sophistic nature of the paradoxes of Folly.
3
For the plurality of values of the recurrent image of Hercules in Erasmus’ work see Margolin 1996.
4
For Hercules Germanicus’s identification with Arminius, the hero of
the battle of the Teutoburg forest, see McDonald and Leitch.
5
For the ascription of the engraving to Hans Holbein the Younger and
for its anti-Lutheran interpretation see Burckhardt-Werthemann and
Burckhardt-Biedermann.
6
On the value of Erasmus’ portrait by Holbein see, in particular, among
others, Heckscher.
7
For an exhaustive exploration of the theme of physical weakness in
Erasmus’ epistolary see Vanden Branden.
8
Cf. CWE 34, 175-176: “Some people, I perceive, are of a disposition to
measure books by their size, rather than by the learning they contain,
and think a thing finished only if nothing can be added to it and much is
superfluous, nothing adequate that is not greatly overdone, and fullness
never achieved except where everything is repeated ad nauseam. Among
this gentry, someone will say that there are points to which I might have
given fuller and richer treatment [...] Who, I ask you to begin with, is so
arrogant that he dare maintain such a thing? So unfair as to demand that
in this literary kind work no passage shall ever be passed over? Suppose
you have read everything, made notes of everything, have everything
ready at hand: is it all, in this vast medley of materials, instantly available, just what you needed and where you needed it? Then think what
tedious pedantry it would have been to collect from every quarter all that
could in any way have been adapted to enrichment of a proverb!” (ASD
II/5, 33: “Nam quosdam hoc animo esse video ut libros mole, non
eruditione metiantur et id demum absolutum existiment, ubi nihil
adiungi possit, supersint pleraque; quibus nihil satis nisi quod impendio
nimium, atque ibi denique copiam esse iudicant, cum ad satietatem
ubique dicuntur omnia. Horum igitur quispiam dicet quaedam a me
copiosius locupletiusque tractari potuisse […]. Quis tam iniquus ut
exigat in huiusmodi scripti genere ne quis omnino praetereatur locus? Ut
nihil non legeris, nihil non annotaris, nihil non apparaveris, itane statim
in tam immensa rerum turba succurrit quod oportuit quoque oportuit
loco? Deinde quae tandem futura fuerat ista molesta diligentia
2
ELISA BACCHI
undecunque conquirere quicquid quocunque modo poterat ad proverbii
locupletationem accomodari?”).
9
See Grassi, 150-153 about the relationship between Hercules and Proteus and, in general, about Hercules as protagonist of the humanization
of the natural world through speech.
10
For the literary and iconographic fortune of the image of Hercules
Gallicus after Erasmus’ translation see Hallowell 1962, Hallowell 1966
and, more recently, Carlini.
11
ASD, I/1, 591-592: “siquidem Hercules ille senex ingentem admodum
hominum multitudinem trahit, omnibus ab aure revinctis, porro vincula
catenulae tenues auro electrove confectae pulcherrimis istis monilibus
adsimiles. Atqui quum vinculis usqueadeo fragilibus ducantur, tamen
neque de fugiendo cogitant, quum alioqui commode possint, neque
prorsus obnituntur, aut pedibus adversus trahentem obtendunt, sese
resupinantes: verum alacres ac laeti sequuntur, ducentem admirantes,
ultro festinantes omnes, et laxatis funiculis etiam antevertere studentes,
perinde quasi graviter laturi, si solverentur vinculis. Ne illud quidem
pigebit referre, quod mihi videbatur omnium absurdissimum: etenim
quum non inveniret pictor unde catenularum summas ansas necteret,
videlicet dextera iam clavam, laeva arcum tenente, summam dei linguam
perterebravit, atque ex hac religatis catenulis eos trahi fecit. Ipse
nimirum ad eos qui ducebantur, vultum et oculos convertebat, arridens
[...]. Quin de eodem hanc in summa habemus opinionem, ut quicquid
egit, id oratione fecundiaque confecisse putemus, utpote virum
sapientem, ac persuadendo pleraque sibi subegisse. Iam tela illius
nimirum rationes sunt acutae, missiles, citae atque animam sauciantes”.
12
Cf. The Table Talk, or Familiar Discourse of Martin Luther, tr.
Hazlitt, 283: “[Erasmus is] a mere Momus, making his mows and mocks
at everything and everybody, at God and man, at papist and protestant,
but all the while using such shuffling and double-meaning terms, that no
one can lay hold of him to any effectual purpose” (D. Martin Luthers
Werke. Tischreden, I, 811, 390: “Erasmus verus est Momus. Omnia ridet
ac ludit, totam religionem ac Christum, atque ut hoc melius praestet,
dies noctesque excogitat vocabula amphibola et ambigua[...]. Omnia
eius scripta quolibet trahi possunt, itaque neque a nobis, nec a papisti
deprehendi potest, nisi prius ademeris illi amphibologiam”), and cf. D.
Martin Luthers Werke. Briefwechsel, VII, 2093, 36: “Our king of ambiguity sits upon his ambiguous throne and destroys us, stupid Christians,
with a double destruction. First, it is his will, and it is a great pleasure to
him, to offend us by his ambiguous words [...] And next, when he sees
that we are offended, and have run against his insidious figures of
speech, and begin to exclaim against him, he then begin to triumph and
rejoice that the desired prey has been caught in his snares” (“At noster
rex amphibolus sedet in throno amphibologiae securus, et duplici
contritione conterit nos stupidos christianos. Primo vult, et magna
voluptas est, ambiguis suis dictis nos offendere […]. Deinde, ubi sensit
nos offensos et impegisse in insidiosas figuras et clamare contra eum, ibi
serio triumphat et gaudet incidisse in suos casses praedam petitam”).
13
About the mockery of the image of Hercules Gallicus in Dürer's engraving see Wind.
14
Erasmus carried on his translation of the works of Lucian until 1514,
constantly adding new material to the subsequent editions of Lucian’s
translations. The ten translated texts (four by More and six by Erasmus)
of the first edition of 1506 became the thirty-six translations of the 1514
edition.
15
On this see Thompson, Delcourt, Rummel, 49-70 and Geri, 166-177.
16
The role of Lucian in Erasmus’ pedagogical project is clarified in De
ratione studii, CWE 24, 669: “For a true ability to speak correctly is best
fostered both by conversing and consorting with those who speak correctly and by the habitual reading of the best stylists. Among the latter
the first to be imbibed should be those whose diction, apart from its refinement, will also entice learners by a certain charm of subject-matter.
In this category I would assign first place to Lucian” (ASD I/2, 115:
“Nam vera emendate loquendi facultas optime paratur, cum ex castigate
loquentium colloquio convictuque, tum ex eloquentium auctorum
assidua lectione, e quibus ii primum sunt imbibendi, quorum oratio,
praeterquam quod est castigatissima, argumenti quoque illecebra aliqua
discentibus blandiatur. Quo quidem in genere primas tribuerim
Luciano”).
17
For a definition of the humanistic concept of festivitas see Dresden.
18
Cf, De copia, CWE 24, 634: “Stories which are invented to raise a
laugh are the more entertaining the further they are from truth [...] and
can also win the ears of the educated by learned allusions. To this type
belong Lucian’s True History and Apuleius’ Golden Ass which he
copied from Lucian’s example, further the Icaromenippus and lots of
other things by Lucian; also nearly all the plots of Old Comedy, which
delight us not by presenting a picture of real life, but by allusion and
hidden meaning” (ASD I/6, 257: “Porro, quae risus causa finguntur, quo
longius absunt a vero, hoc magis demulcent animos […] et eruditis
allusionibus doctas etiam auras capere possint. Quo de genere sunt
Luciani Verae narrationes, et ad huius exemplum effictus Asinus
Apulei; praeterea Icaromenippus, et reliqua Luciani pleraque. Item
argumenta ferme omnia veteris comoediae, quae non imagine veri sed
allusionibus et allegoriis delectant”). For the characterization of
Lucian’s work as an exercise of topical assemblage (cultural mimesis)
see Bompaire.
19
Cf. the chapter Exercitatio et imitatio of the De conscribendis epistolis, CWE 25, 25 (ASD I/2, 233) in which Erasmus regards Lucian as a
rhetorician especially well-versed in the genre of declamation because
of his ability to assume the fictitious identity of historical and mythological characters. For the relationship between the concept of festivitas
and the mimetic ability see Lecointe, 441-445.
20
ASD I/1, 423: “Neque minus tamen iucundus quam frugifer futurus
est, si quis modo decorum observet, quod in personis situm est.”
21
Ibid. 603: “Luciani dialogus […] plurimum habeat artis ob decorum
mire servatum in personis tam multis tamque diversis”.
22
Too often critics have pinned these disparaging labels on the work of
Lucian, by accepting as a fact the opposition between rhetorical form
and philosophical content.
23
Cf. CWE 2, 114 “It is a dialogue by Lucian; and there is hardly any of
them that is more useful or pleasant to read”; 116: “it secretes a juice of
sovereign potency for health; [...] whether you look for pleasure or edification there is no comedy, or satire, that challenges comparison with
his dialogues”; 122: “So you will, I hope, read him with a certain
amount of profit – but also with a vast degree of pleasure” (ASD I/1,
488: “Is est Luciani dialogus quo vix alius lectu vel utilior vel
iucundior”; 470: “succo praesentaneo salubrem et efficacem. [...] Nulla
comoedia, nulla satyra cum huius dialogis conferri debeat, seu
voluptatem spectes”; 449: “Eum igitur leges (uti spero) non modo cum
fructu aliquo, verum etiam summa cum voluptate”); Cf. “Translations of
Lucian”. The Complete Works of St Thomas More III/1, 5: “Whether this
dialogue is more amusing or more instructive is hard to say” (“dialogus
nescio certe lepidior ne, an utilior”).
24
ASD I/4, 28: “vera pietate nihil est hilarius.”
25
Cf. CWE 2, 116: “as Horace has written He who mingles use with
pleasure/ Every prize doth bear away. [...] By his mixture of fun and
earnest, gaiety and accurate observation, he so effectively portrays the
manners [...] of men” (ASD I/1, 470-471: “Omne tulit punctum, (ut
scripsit Flaccus) qui miscuit utile dulci […]. Sic seria nugis, nugas seriis
miscet; sic ridens vera dicit, vera dicendo ridet; sic homines mores [...]
depingit”); Cf. “Translations of Lucian”. The Complete Works of St
Thomas More III/1, 3: “ If, most learned Sir, there was ever anyone who
fulfilled the Horatian maxim and combined delight with instruction, I
think Lucian certainly ranked among the foremost in this respect” (“Si
quisquam fuit unquam vir doctissime, qui Horatianum praeceptum
impleverit, voluptatemque cum utilitate coniunxerit, hoc ego certe
Lucianum in primis puto praestitisse”).
26
Cf. CWE 39 (ASD I/3), Exorcismus sive Spectrum, 531-544 (417423); Alcumistica, 545-556 (424-429); Hippoplanus, 557-561 (430432); ΠΤΩΟΛΟΓΙΑ, 562-570 (433-437).
27
ASD I/2, 65: “Optarim aetatem virentem, a qua non abhorreat puer, et
quam non pigeat quamvis personam sumere. Hic idem aget in formando
ingenio quod parentes et nutrices facere solent in fingendo corpore”.
28
Cf. De pueris instituendis, CWE 26, 341: “Nausea, after all, often
arises from pure imagination [...]. Do we not see small boys constantly
on the go all day, incredibly active, yet not experiencing any weariness?
The great Milo would soon tire if he attempted to keep up a similar pace.
Why are children like this? The reason is that play and childhood go
naturally together, and that children think of their activity as play rather
than exertion. The fact is that whenever we feel dissatisfied about something it is largely due to our imagination, which is often responsible for
creating such a mood even when there is nothing wrong. [...] it is then
the teacher’s task to prevent these feelings from taking hold and to give
the course of study the appearance of a game” (ASD, I/2, p. 73:
“Nonnunquam enim horrorem adfert sola imaginatio […]. An non
videmus pueros tenerellos mira agilitate totum cursitare diem, nec
sentire lassitudinem? Idem si faciat Milo, fatigaretur. Quid in causa?
Quia lusus aetati cognatus est, et lusum imaginantur, non laborem. Est
autem in re quavis maxima molestiae pars imaginatio, quae mali sensum
adfert interdum, etiam ubi nihil est mali. Proinde […] praeceptoris […]
partes erunt, eandem multis rationibus excludere studioque lusus
personam inducere”).
29
ASD I/3, 742: “Et haud scio an quicquam discitur felicius, quam quod
in ludendo discitur. Est hoc nimirum sanctissimum fallendi genus, per
imposturam dare beneficium”.
128
LUCIAN’S RHETORICAL PARADOXES IN ERASMUS’ ETHICS
30
ASD V/4, 442: “nec vero semper opponitur falsum”. For Erasmus’
concept of truth as human research see Margolin 1969, 45-69.
31
Allen IV, 13-15: “Quod Tomae Mori ingenium sic deamas […]
nimirum scriptis illius inflammatus, quibus, ut vere scribis, nihil esse
potest neque doctius neque festivius, istuc, crede mihi, clarissime
Huttene, tibi cum multis commune est […]. Vultus ingenio respondet,
gratam et amicam festivitatem semper prae se ferens, ac nonnihil ad
ridentis habitum compositus; atque, ut ingenue dicam, appositior ad
iucunditatem quam ad gravitatem aut dignitatem, etiamsi longissime
abest ab ineptia scurrilitateque […]. Lingua mire explanata
articulataque, nihil habens nec praeceps nec haesitans.”
32
Ibid. 16: “In convictu tam rara comitas ac morum suavitas, ut nemo
tam tristi sit ingenio quem non exhilaret, nulla res tam atrox cuius
taedium non discutiat. Iam inde a puero sic iocis est delectatus ut ad hos
natus videri possit […]. Adolescens comoediolas et scripsit et egit. Si
quod dictum esset salsius, etiam in ipsum tortum, tamen amabat;
usqueadeo gaudet salibus argutis et ingenium redolentibus. Unde et
epigrammatis lusit iuvenis, et Luciano cum primis est delectatus; quin et
mihi ut Morias Encomium scriberem, hoc est camelus saltarem, fuit
auctor. Nihil autem in rebus humanis obvium est unde ille non venetur
voluptatem, etiam in rebus maxime seriis: Si cum eruditis et cordatis res
est, delectatur ingenio; si cum indoctis ac stultis, fruitur illorum stulticia.
Nec offenditur morionibus, mira dexteritate ad omnium affectus sese
accomodans.”
33
LB IX, 1215: “Erasmus audet cum Luthero congredi, hoc est, cum
elephanto musca?”. On the importance of this incipit of De libero
arbitrio in the work setting see Boyle, 1-4.
34
ASD II/2, 388: “Έλέφα ςἐκ µυίας ποιεῑς, id est «Elephantum ex
muscafacis», id est res exiguas verbis attollis atque amplificas. Lucianus
in Muscae encomio: Πολλαδ' ἔτι ἔχων εἰπεῑν καταπαύσω τὸν λόγον, µὴ
καὶ δόξο κατὰ τὴν παροιµίαν ὲλέφαντα ἐκ µυίας ποιεῑν, id est “Multa
adhuc commemorare possem, sed finem dicendi faciam, ne videar et
ipse iuxtatritumproverbium ex musca elephantum facere.”
35
On the translations of Lucian by Guarino and, in general, on Lucian’s
legacy in the Renaissance see Mattioli and Marsh.
36
Luther’s Tractatus de libertate Christiana discusses exactly of the
issue of free will.
37
On the formal features of the literary genre of the diatriba and the
gnoseological consequences of Erasmus’ choice see Boyle, 5-42.
38
LB IX, 1215-1216: “certe vix alius quisquam minus exercitatus, ut qui
semper arcano quodam natura e sensu abhorruerim a pugnis: eoque
semper habui prius in liberioribus Musarum campis ludere, quam ferro
comminus congredi. Et adeo non delector assertionibus, ut facile in
Scepticorum sententiam pedibus discessurus sim […], eoque
disputatorem agam, non iudicem: inquisitorem, non dogmatisten,
paratus a quocunque discere, si quid adferatur rectius aut compertius”.
39
LB X, 1304: “Quod tu affirmas, ego opto, quod tu dicis te scire, ego
discere cupio, nec mihi satis est hoc asseverari abs te, certitudinem
efflagito quam tu profiteris […]. Fit enim frequenter, ut qui a tenebris
prodeunt, nihil videant in media luce Solis, nisi aliquandiu intenderint
oculos, et per tenebras quaedam non statim videmus, sed intendentibus
oculis paulatim incipient nobis esse paecipua,quae prius erant ambigua:
quod idem accidit in rebus quae procul absunt a nobis. Sed ita civilitatis
causa finxi, interpretationem utriusque partis esse ambiguam, ut rebus
aequatis, ostenderes aliquidquod nos in medio vacillantes in tuam
partem inclinaret”.
40
Allen, I, 269: “Tandem cum et longius processisset disputatio, et esset
quam ut convivio conveniret gravior et severior, tum ego meis, hoc est
poetae, partibus functurus, ut et eam contentionem discuterem et
festiviore fabella prandium exhilararem”.
41
WA 18, 605: “Nam hoc consilio aliud nihil facis, quam quod signficas
te in corde, Lucianum aut aliumquendam de grege Epicuri porcum alere,
qui cum ipse nihil credat esse Deum, rideat occulte omnes qui credunt et
confitentur”.
42
Ivi, 609: “Quid hic dicam Erasme? Totus Lucianus spiras, et inhalas
mihi grandem Epicuri crapulam”.
43
Ibid. 620: “Deinde [ostendo], quid sit in divinas res et literas
impingere, dum aliorum obsequio, personam sumimus et invita
conscientia alienae scenae servimus. Non est ludus neque iocus, sacras
literas et pietatem docere, facillime enim hic contingit lapsus ille, de quo
Iacobus dicit, Qui offendit in uno, fit omnium reus. Ita fit enim, ut cum
modicum videamur velle nugari, nec satis reverenter sacras literas
habemus, mox impietatibus involvamur, blasphemiisque immergamur,
sicut hic tibi contigit Erasme.”
44
Ibid. 661: “Docere igitur aliquid, quod intra scripturas non est ullo
verbo praescriptum et extra scripturas non est ullo facto monstratum,
hoc non pertinet ad dogmata Christianorum, sed ad narrationes veras
Luciani.”
129
45
Ibid. 688: “Sic pugnan thumana Diatribes somnia adversus divinorum
verborum agmina.”
46
Allen V, 447: “spectator tantum sit tragoediae nostrae.”
47
Ibid. 452: “non licet esset spectatorem istius tragoedie, que utinam
non habeat tragicum exitum!”
48
ASD, II/1, 60: “Et ut auctore Plinio in minutissimis animantibus […]
maius est naturae miraculum quam in elephanto, siquis modo proprius
contempletur, itidem in re litteraria nonnumquam plurimum habent
ingenii, quae minima sunt.”
49
Cf. CWE 27, 84: “trifling may lead to something more serious” (ASD
IV/3, 68: “nugae seria ducant”). It is particularly interesting to note that
this statement originates in Horace’s Ars Poetica, where it takes on a
completely different meaning from that of Erasmus. “Hae nugae seria
ducent”, according to Horace, means that even the smallest negligence
in style can lead to a disastrous outcome in the finished work. For his
part, Erasmus has fun juxtaposing nugae as little mistakes in the field of
grammatical propriety and nugae as poetic games, by superimposing the
seriousness of the consequences of a poorly finished literary work on the
seriousness of thought content. Cf. Gordon, 54.
50
Cf. CWE 35, 200: “But in truth, if anyone will open up this Silenus
and look more closely at this despised creature, in its own setting as it
were, he will see it has so many uncommon gifts that, all things well
considered, he will almost prefer to be a scarab rather than an eagle”
(ASD II/6, 413: “Verum si quis hunc explicit Silenum et contemptum
hoc animalculum proprius ac veluti domi contempletur, tam multas in eo
dotes haud vulgares animadvertet, ut omnibus diligenter pensitatis
propemodum scarabeum se malit esse quam aquilam”).
51
ASD, II/5, p. 160: “Aiunt enim Silenos imagunculas quaspiam fuisse
sectiles et ita factas, ut diduci et explicari possent, et quae clausae
ridiculam ac monstrosam tibicinis speciem habebant, apertae subito
numen ostendebant, ut artem scalptoris gratiorem iocosus faceret error.
Porro statuarum argumentum sumptum est a ridiculo illo Sileno, Bacchi
paedagogo numinumque poeticorum morione.”
52
About the possibility to read Plato’s Symposium as a game with the
sophistic literary genre of paradoxical praise, see Dandrey, 15-17.
53
ASD II/5, 160-162: “Quem si de summa, quod dici solet, cute quis
aestimasset non emisset asse. Facies erat rusticana, taurinus aspectus,
nares simiae muccoque plenae. Sannionem quempiam bardum ac
stupidum dixisses. Cultus neglectus, sermo simplex ac plebeius et
humilis, ut qui semper aurigas, cerdones, fullones et fabros haberet in
ore […]. Denique iocus ille perpetuus nonnullam habebat morionis
speciem. Cum ea tempestate ad insaniam usque ferveret inter stultos
profitendi sapientiam ambitio […] solus hic hoc unum scire se dictitabat
quod nihil scire […]. Proinde non iniuria, cum id tempestatis plena
sophis essent omnia, solus hic morio sapiens oraculo pronuntiatus est et
plus iudicatus est scire qui nihil sciebat quam hi, qui nihil nescire se
praedicabant, imo ob id ipsum iudicatus est plus caeteris scire, quod
unus omnium nihil sciret.”
54
Ibid. 166: “Bona pars hominum praeposterum Silenum exprimunt. Si
quis rerum vim ac naturam penitus introspiciat, reperiet nullos a vera
sapientia longius abesse quam istos, qui magnificis titulis, qui sapientibu
spileis, qui splendidis cingulis, qui gemmatis anuli absolutam profitentur
sapientiam. Adeo ut non raro plus verae germanaeque sapientiae
deprehendas in uno quopiam homuncione […] quam in multis
theologorum tragicis personis.”
55
Too often critics have insisted on the truth value of the silenic overturning and they have applied, in a short-sighted way, a dualistic conception deduced from Enchiridion militis christiani. They have not
taken into account Erasmus’ reflection on the hermeneutic value of mask
(persona) and fiction (fabula). Against this background, the development of the playful aspects of Erasmus’ theology in Gordon is of great
interest, though Gordon’s work tends to erase the rhetorical context of
Erasmus’ reflection on ludus. Indeed, he accepts the thesis of Screech,
which considers Erasmus’ irony in the univocal perspective of mystical
ecstasy. For a critique of the reduction of the Praise of Folly to unidimensional mystical ecstasy see Margolin 1983, who focuses on the fact
that Erasmus’ Praise of Folly belongs to the aesthetic category of iocoseria.
56
About the meaning of the Greek word paradoxa see Ivi, 27: “Mais
pourquoi réduire le sens de la préposition grecque para a celui d’une
opposition? Elle signifie tout aussi “à côte”, ou “contre”, mais à la
condition de donner à ce mot le même sens qu’au premier”. Cf. Pavloskis, 108-111, who has explicitly shed light on the paradoxical nature of
Erasmian Silenus where the opposites coexist and where everything is a
mask of its contrary, so that the very concept of identity disappears: it is
impossible to perceive the real nature of anything at all.
57
Cf. CWE 35, 203-204: “In ancient times it was given first place
among sacred images and in sacred rites as the most apt symbol of the
ELISA BACCHI
eminent warrior [...]. There too, not like “blue pimpernel among vegetables” as the proverb says, but among sacred images, was the scarab,
carved on a seal [...]. This too is in Plutarch, in case anyone thinks I
have made it up, as some ignorant theologians sometimes contrive allegories. But some uninformed person will ask, “What has a beetle to do
with a military general?” In fact they have many points in common. In
the first place you can see that the beetle is covered with gleaming armour and no part of its body is not carefully protected by scales and
plates; Mars does not seem to be better armed when Homer equips him
in his fullest panoply. Then there is its aggressive approach with terrifying, unnerving thrum and truly warlike voice. For what is harsher than
the blare of trumpets, what is more vulgar than the roll of drums? The
sound of trumpets, which delights kings so much nowadays, was intolerable to the Busiritae of old, because it seemed to them like the braying of an ass, and the ass was one of the things that nation considered
detestable [...]. What, I ask, could be more apt for a strong leader? Indeed it is also fitting, as Plutarch also reports, that they use those dainty
balls I have described to give birth to, nurture, feed, and bring up their
offspring; their birthplace is their food. Do not think this esoteric aptness
is easy for me to explain” (ASD II/6, 415-416: “antiquitus inter sacras
imagines et in vatum mysteriis cum primis habitus est scarabeus, egregii
bellatori saptissimum symbolum […]. Aderat non corchorus inter olera,
quod proverbio dicunt, sed inter sacras imagines scarabeus sigillo
insculptus […]. Nam hoc quoque Plutarchus indicat, ne quis sic a me
confictum existimet, quemadmodum allegorias aliquoties comminisci
solent in docti theologi. At dixerit imperitior aliquis: “Quid scarabeo
cum duce belli?” Permulta sane congruunt. Principio vides, vt totus
armis luceat scarabeus nullaque pars corporis sit non diligenter crustis ac
laminis communita, vt non melius armatus videatur Mauors Homericus,
cum illum maxime sua instruit panoplia. Adde nunc militarem assultum
cum horrendo ac Panico bombo cantuque vere militari. Quid enim in
suavius classicorum sonitu? Quid ἀµουσότερον tympanorum strepitu?
Nam tubarum vocem, qua nunc reges tantopere delectantur, olim
Busiritae non ferebant, quod asino rudenti videatur adsimilis. At ei genti
inter abominanda habebatur asinus […]. Quin et illud ad rem apte
quadrat, vt idem indicat Plutarchus, quod in delicatis illis pilis, de quibus
dictum est, foetus suos aedunt, fouent, alunt, educant, nec alius est locus
nascendi quam cibi. Verum hoc mysterii mihi non facile sit
interpretari”).
58
Cf. CWE 35, 205: “I mean “that formidable type” of scarab that is
carved on an emerald, for as the proverb says “you can’t carve a Mercury out of any and every wood”; the scarab does not consider every
gem worthy of itself, but if carved on the emerald, the brightest of all
gems, and hung from the neck as I said (but only with the hair of an ape
or at least a swallow’s feathers), it affords an immediate remedy against
all poisons” (ASD II/6, 417: “Siquidem όδεινὸςἐκεῖνος scarabeus,
smaragdo gemmae insculptus, nec enim e quovis lingo fingitur
Mercurius iuxta proverbium, nec quamvis gemmam se dignatur
scarabeus, sed smaragdo gemmarum omnium nitidissima expressus, ut
dixi, si de collo suspendatur, at non nisi cynocephali capillis aut certe
plumis hirundinis, adversus omnia veneficia adfert remedium”).
59
ASD II/6, 418: “nonnihil placebat scarabeus, quod extitisset, qui ipsi
suam vitam debere vellet quique rem tantam a se praestari posse
crederet, denique cui suum antrum […] idoneum videretur, ad quod
salutis causa velut ad sacram aram aut principis statuam confugeret.”
60
Ibid. 420: “Titillabat et blanda quaedam spes, si facinus successisset,
futurum ut profligata aquila ipse regno potiretur.”
61
Ibid. 419: “nulli sua levis est auctoritas.”
62
Ibid. 420: “Omnes igitur artes, omnes dolos in pectus advocat. Nec
vulgare molitur poenam, internecionem ac plane πανολεθρίαν in animo
volvit.”
63
About it, see the significant conclusion of the adage (CWE 35, 214):
“There are some little men, of the meanest sort but malicious nevertheless, no less black than scarab, no less evil-smelling, no less meanspirited, but by their obstinately malicious spirit (since they can do no
good to any mortals) they often make trouble for great men. Their
blackness is terrifying, their noise is disturbing, their stench is an annoyance; they fly round and round, they cannot be shaken off, they wait in
ambush. It is preferable by far sometimes to contend with powerful men
than to provoke these beetles whom one may even be ashamed to beat.
You cannot shake them off nor fight with them without coming away
defiled” (ASD II/6, 424: “Sunt enim homunculi quidam, infimae quidem
sortis, sed tamen malitiosi, non minus atri quam scarabei neque minus
putidi neque minus abiecti, qui tamen pertinaci quadam ingenii malitia,
cum nulli omnino mortalium prodesse possint, magnis etiam
saepenumero viris facessant negocium. Territant nigrore, obstrepunt
stridore, obturbant foetore, circumvolitant, haerent, insidiantur, ut non
paulo satius sit cum magnis aliquando viris simultatem suscipere quam
hos lacessere scarabeos, quos pudeat etiam vicisse quosque nec excutere
possis neque conflictari cum illis queas, nisi discedas contaminatior”).
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