Narcissism

Freud and the Psychoanalytic Tradition

Freud's first discussion of narcissism occurs in his 1910 essay on Leonardo da Vinci, but from that point on the topic remains a central concern throughout his work, most famously in the 1914 essay "On Narcissism". At the heart of Freud's account of narcissism is his distinction between "primary" and "secondary" narcissism. Primary narcissism, as Freud understands it, is a natural developmental stage experienced by all normal human subjects. It is "an original libidinal cathexis of the ego" (1914/1957: 75); or in other words, a process by which the emerging sexual drives take the ego as their object. In primary narcissism, the subject "behaves as though he were in love with himself" (1913/1953: 89). In young children, this form of narcissism manifests itself in grandiosity -"an overestimation of the power of their wishes and mental acts" (1914/1957: 75) -and egoism (see EGOISM). The child regards himself (and, Freud notes, is often regarded by his parents) as "the centre and core of creation -'His Majesty the Baby'" (1914/1957: 91).

As a developmental stage, Freud regards primary narcissism as a natural and perfectly healthy state that is gradually left behind as the child develops the capacity to direct his libido toward external objects. Freud notes, however, that a human being "remains to some extent narcissistic even after he has found external objects for his libido" (1913/1953: 89). One way in which this occurs is through what Freud calls "narcissistic object-choice" (1914/1957: 88). In certain cases, subjects whose libido appears to be drawn toward external objects are in fact "plainly seeking themselves as a love-object" (1914/1957: 88). Notoriously, Freud's central examples of this phenomenon are "perverts and homosexuals" (1914/1957: 88), but he also regards parents' "overvaluation" of their offspring in the same way: "The child shall fulfill those wishful dreams of the parents which they never carried out -the boy shall become a great man and a hero in his father's place, and the girl shall marry a prince as a tardy compensation for her mother" (1914/1957: 91). Even parental love -widely regarded as the purest and most selfless form of love -thus turns out to be "nothing but the parents' narcissism born again" (1914/1957: 91).

Aside from narcissistic object-choice, the other principal way in which narcissism returns in adult life is through what is commonly called "secondary narcissism". Whereas in primary narcissism the subject has not yet fully developed the capacity to direct his libido to other objects, in secondary narcissism the libido is "withdrawn from the external world" and "directed to the ego" (1914/1957: 75). Secondary narcissism is marked by "psychological withdrawal of interest in and love of others, increased emotional investment in oneself manifested by heightened introspection and self-regarding behavior, and regression to infantile modalities of thought and behavior, especially the overvaluation of one's needs, attributes (e.g. power or brilliance), and accomplishments" (Wallwork 1991: 152). This form of narcissism is probably that which tracks most closely the contemporary usage of the term. It is worth noting, however, that on Freud's view secondary narcissism is not necessarily pathological. As a basic kind of defense mechanism, the occasional retreat from the external world may in fact contribute to psychological health. (Freud connects it to the need for sleep and compares it to an amoeba withdrawing its protrusions back into itself for protection (1917/1963: 417).) Indeed, Freud goes so far as to ponder, "what makes it necessary at all for our mental life to pass beyond the limits of narcissism and to attach the libido to objects" (1914/1957: 85). His answer is that although "a strong egoism is a protection against falling ill, […] in the last resort we must begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in consequence of frustration, we are unable to love" (1914/1957:85).

Since Freud, psychoanalysts have continued to develop, modify, and critique his account of narcissism. An important thread running through these discussions is the idea that narcissism may be a defense mechanism caused as much by a lack of self-love or self-esteem as an overabundance of it (Kernberg 1970). Although psychoanalysts have generally agreed on the importance of distinguishing between healthy and pathological (or "malignant") narcissism (Fromm 1964), two of the major figures in 20 th century psychoanalysis -Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernbergfamously disagreed on whether the role of the analyst was to empathize with or to confront the patient's (pathological) narcissism in order to help her to move beyond it (Lunbeck 2014).

Narcissism, Self-Esteem, and Self-Love in Philosophy

If we accept the view of Freud and much of the subsequent psychoanalytical tradition that not all forms of narcissism are necessarily pathological, how are we to distinguish between good and bad forms of self-love? Philosophers who have taken up this question can be divided very roughly into two camps. First, there are those who have held that the right kind of self-love is that which is directed at the right part of the self. In book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle acknowledges that, "people criticize those who like themselves most, and call them by the derogatory term 'self-lovers'" (2000: 1168a). According to the popular view, selflove and love for others are mutually exclusive. The good person "acts for the sake of his friend, neglecting his own interest" (2000: 1168a). Aristotle is clear that he regards this popular view as mistaken. Although it is true that there is a form of self-love that inhibits our capacity to act well, only those who "assign themselves the larger share of money, honors, and bodily pleasures" are properly considered as self-lovers in this sense (2000: 1168b). There is another kind of self-lover, however, who "assigns to himself what is noblest and best of all, and gratifies the most authoritative element within himself" -in other words, his reason (1168b) (see RATIONALITY; REASON AND PASSION). This kind of self-lover "will help himself as well as others by doing noble acts" (2000: 1169a). Since he is devoted only to what is noble, he will be willing to sacrifice his money or even lay down his life for his friends if virtue demands it (2000: 1169a). To the extent that this is what self-love truly requires, Aristotle argues, all of us "ought to be self-lovers" (2000: 1169b). On Aristotle's view, then, the right kind of self-love is not merely compatible with living a good life; it is both necessary and foundational to such a life. Although he does not take up the question of self-love in such explicit terms, Plato (see PLATO) has been read as taking a similar view. The philosopher and psychoanalyst Jonathan Lear has remarked that the goal of the just person on Plato's account might be described as "the narcissistic contentment of intrapsychic harmony" (Lear 1993: 137). For both Plato and Aristotle, attending to the internal constitution of one's own soul -in other words, the practice of the right kind of narcissism -is the definitive concern of the just person.

Within contemporary analytical philosophy, the most prominent defender of selflove as a necessary component of the good life is Harry Frankfurt. For Frankfurt, genuine self-love is a significant achievement requiring wholehearted commitment to what one cares about. Although the details of their views are different, Frankfurt is in agreement with Aristotle concerning the foundational role of self-love for the good life. On Frankfurt's view, the volitional unity achieved through self-love is a necessary condition of loving anything else (Frankfurt 2006).

Historically, the main competitor to the Aristotelian view of self-love arises out of the Christian tradition. For St. Augustine, self-love is at the root of the problem of sin. "The primal destruction of man," he writes, "was self-love" (O'Donovan 1980: 96). The difficulty for Augustine, as for much of the Christian tradition, is that the Biblical commandment to love one's neighbor as oneself seems to imply that there must be some form of self-love that is not only acceptable but perhaps even necessary for salvation. Augustine's solution to this problem is very different from Aristotle's, however. Rather than distinguishing the good and bad forms of self-love in virtue of the part of the self to which they are directed, Augustine distinguishes them in virtue of the relation of the self to an external object -i.e. God. "Shall I tell you how you are to love yourself?" he asks. "This is your self-love: to love God with the whole of yourself!" (O'Donovan 1980: 39). In a sense, Augustine is turning Aristotle's view on its head. Rather than having the right kind of self-love function as the essential prerequisite for love of others, Augustine makes love of an external object -in this case God -the essential prerequisite for coming into the right kind of relation with oneself.

Philosophers in both the continental and the analytical traditions have advanced various different versions of the Augustinian position. For Emmanuel Levinas (see LEVINAS, EMMANUEL), much of the history of western philosophy is defined by what he calls "narcissism, or the primacy of the same" (Levinas 1987: 49). In order to overcome this fundamental narcissism, Levinas argues that we must be open to the "epiphany" of an "absolutely exterior being" -i.e. the Other (Levinas 1987: 54). Like Augustine, Levinas holds that we cannot come into the right relation with ourselves until we break free of narcissism and direct our attention to that which is radically external to the self. In a somewhat similar vein, Iris Murdoch identifies the chief "enemy" in moral life as the "fat relentless ego" (Murdoch 2001b: 51), arguing that this enemy can only be overcome by love -"the extremely difficult realization that something other than oneself is real" (Murdoch 1998: 215). For Murdoch, loving attention to the reality of the other is the only thing that will enable me to see past the illusions and fantasies created by the self. Indeed, Murdoch is suspicious of the idea of any healthy form of narcissism, arguing that the "self is such a dazzling object that if one looks there one may see nothing else" (Murdoch 2001a: 30).

Beyond the "Dear Self"?

Murdoch's concern about the deceptive nature of self-love picks up on another central thread in philosophical discussions of self-love -i.e. the question of whether it is even possible to be motivated in a way that is entirely free of narcissism (see MOTIVATION, MORAL). Like Augustine, Levinas, and Murdoch, Immanuel Kant regards self-love as a major obstacle to morality. Kant's concerns, however, are not only practical but also epistemic. Even when we are confronted with instances of great sacrifice that we feel sure must have been motivated by duty (see DUTY AND OBLIGATION), "it cannot be inferred with certainty that the real determining cause of the will was not actually a covert impulse of self-love" (2012: 4:407). For Kant, one of the most dangerous aspects of "the dear self" is its ability to convince us that we are acting from duty when really we are motivated by much baser concerns (see SELF-DECEPTION). Faced with the deep and pervasive nature of narcissistic motivation, some philosophers have questioned whether it is possible or even desirable to be rid of it. In his inheritance of Freud's account of narcissism, Jacques Lacan takes the concept in a much more radical direction, arguing that the ego itself is created in an act of "narcissistic suicidal aggression" (Lacan 2006: 187). Jacques Derrida holds that the very idea of trying to avoid narcissism is a mistake; instead, we should be attempting to cultivate a "more welcoming, hospitable narcissism, one that is much more open to the experience of the other as other" (Derrida 1987: 199). For both Lacan and Derrida, narcissism of one form or another is unavoidable -an essential aspect of being human.

Ever since Freud took as one of his central examples the narcissism (as he saw it) of beautiful women (1914/1957: 88-89), the concept of narcissism has had an unavoidably gendered resonance. In The Speculum of the Other Woman (1985), Luce Irigaray criticizes the phallocentric nature of Freud and Lacan's accounts, whilst contemporary feminist philosophers have characterized feminine narcissism as both alienating (Bartky 1982) and potentially empowering (Garry 1982). The range of different attitudes toward narcissism is as broad as the range of different moral theories, suggesting that Derrida may have been right to insist that we should not speak of "narcissism" in the singular at all, but rather of a plurality of "narcissisms" (1987: 199).