Thomas Hobbes and International Relations

TRADITIONAL THEORETICAL APPROACHES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS David Pataraia Jus Press © David Pataraia 2017 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy, transmission or translation of this publication may be made without written permission First published 2017 by Jus Press Jus Press is the academic imprint of Non-entrepreneurial (non-commercial) legal person Jus Press Library of Congress Control Number: 2017908799 ISBN-13: 978-0-9990865-0-6 ISBN-10: 0-9990865-0-2 Printed in the United States of America by CreateSpace Available from Amazon.com, CreateSpace.com, and other retail outlets Translated by Giorgi Murghvashvili Proofreaders: Dr. Trevor Cartledge (Introduction and Chapter I), Dr. Giorgi Nakashidze (Chapters II, III, IV) Technical editor: Tamaz Chkhaidze This book represents the translation of one part of the book: International Relations: Discipline and Theory / David Pataraia, published in 2015, and is a revised English edition The three most prominent theories in International Relations have long been analyzed and discussed. These theories represent the three pillars on which the theoretical foundation of this scientific discipline was built. Of course, theories can be observed and are developed beyond these three traditions; however, realism, liberalism and idealism retain their honorable position on the pedestal of the International Relations theory. II. Thomas Hobbes 1588 – 1679 41 42 “So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death... And from hence it is that kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by laws, or abroad by wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of fame from new conquest; in others, of ease and sensual pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art or other ability of the mind.” Thomas Hobbes 55 Leviathan or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil (First published in 1651), draws a fully-fledged picture of Thomas Hobbes’s view on the political philosophy. This work provides Hobbes’s complete and complex vision of individual–world–state relations and draws the finalized model of his epistemological and ontological visions in this realm. Thomas Hobbes selected as a title of the book for the word “leviathan”, which itself was an object of endless scientific discussions in mythological and theological scientific studies. The only consensus that remains beyond doubt is the biblical origin of the word, where “leviathan” denotes the image of the 55 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XI, pp. 52-53. 43 immense sea creature.56 Scientific discussions have also been concentrated on the underlying reasons for selecting “leviathan” to denote a state in his work. Therefore, scientific research has been duly focused on the analysis of the multiple perceptions of “leviathan”, definitions provided by him, as well as the gravure placed on the titular page of the first English publication of the book, which pictures a gigantic human not a sea creature. The man from the gravure is not a common individual but a sovereign with a scepter in his hands. The sovereign himself is being composed of innumerous number of small men. In his right hand, he holds a sword and crosier in the left hand. The sovereign is placed behind the mountains, and overlooks a town on the gravure. Down under the right hand of the sovereign, the symbols of secular power for example, citadel, cannon and crown are placed, while under the left hand the symbols of ecclesiastical power e.g. church, episcopal cap and synod/ecclesiastical gathering can be observed. 56 “As a symbol of a political entity, the leviathan is, on the other hand, not just any "corpus” or just any kind of beast. It is an image from the Hebrew Bible, one garbed during the course of many centuries in mythical, theological and cabbalistic meanings. In the Book of Job, Chapters 40 and 41, it is depicted as the strongest and most tremendous sea monster. Portrayed in vivid detail beside him is a land animal, the behemoth.”, “How do the monsters, leviathan and behemoth, relate to each other in Hobbes' theory? That the leviathan signifies the state and the behemoth represents revolution has obviously not been derived by Hobbes from mythical speculations. Yet it is no accident that for the seventeenth-century Englishman the sea animal becomes the symbol of a peacemaking order, for the leviathan, “the huge whale”, was not an animal alien to the imagination of the English people. In essence, however, both the peace-enforcing function of the state and the revolutionary, anarchistic force of the state of nature are comparable elementary forces. According to Hobbes, the quintessential nature of the state of nature, or the behemoth, is none other than civil war, which can only be prevented by the overarching might of the state, or the leviathan.”, Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the state theory of Thomas Hobbes: meaning and failure of a political symbol, foreword and introduction by George Schwab; translated by George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein, Greenwood Press, 1996, pp. 6, 21. Scholars also point to the different appearance of “leviathan” in the Jewish and Christian traditions and the Jewish and Greek bibles. 44 The Gravure on the Title Page of Leviathan 45 Thomas Hobbes himself provides the definition of “leviathan” three times in the book. First, in the introduction, he writes that “For by art is created that great “Leviathan” called a “Commonwealth”,57or “State” (in Latin, “Civitas”), which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the “sovereignty” is an artificial “soul”, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the “magistrates” and other “officers” of judicature and execution, artificial “joints”; “reward” and “punishment”, by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty, every joint and member is moved to perform his duty, are the “nerves”, that do the same in the body natural; the “wealth” and “riches” of all the particular members are the “strength”; salus populi, “the people’s safety”, its “business”; “counsellors”, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the “memory”; “equity” and “laws”, an artificial “reason” and “will”; “concord”, “health”; “sedition”, “sickness”; and “civil war”, “death”. Lastly, the “pacts” and “covenants”, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that “fiat”, or the “Let us make man”, pronounced by God in the Creation.”58 Accordingly, in the introduction of the book, Thomas Hobbes presents leviathan as a gigantic human, and further (in chapter XVII) also as a mortal 57 Separate attention should be paid to Thomas Hobbes’s selection of the term “Commonwealth” for expressing the essence of a state. This English word signifies a state, a community, etc. But if we break it up it is comprised of the words common and wealth, which in itself is indicative of the meaning that the author attaches to a state, as a virtue/good. Therefore, commonwealth is the first selection in this book for expressing the essence of a state. In its turn, this choice for “Commonwealth” was not spared of criticism during his era from the supporters of traditional absolute monarchy (the divine and the natural power of kings/Crown) who managed to find the sources for the “state for the people/popular state” or principles for human equality within the confines of hobbesian “Commonwealth”. More that, some authors linked this term with the Latin term – res publica. That is the reason some encouraged Thomas Hobbes take out the term from the book (e.g. Robert Filmer (1588–1653) in his work – Observations concerning the Original and Various Forms of Government (1652), as de- scribed, viz. 1st. Upon Aristotles Politiques. 2d. Mr. Hobbs's Leviathan. 3d. Mr. Milton against Salmatius. 4th. Hugo Grotius, de Jure Bello. 5th. Mr. Hunton's Treatise of Monarchy, or the Nature of a limited or mixed Monarchy, to which is added the Power of Kings. With directions for Obedience to Government in Dangerous and Doubtful Times. [Together with:] Patriarcha: or the Natural Power of Kings. Published: London: Printed for R.R.C. and are to be Sold by Samuel Keble and Daniel Brown [Patriarcha:] Printed for Ric. Chiswell, Matthew Gillyflower and William Henchman,1680 & 1696). 58 Thomas Hobbes, cited, Introduction, p. 11. 46 god, when he says that “this is the generation of that great “Leviathan”, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that “mortal god”, to whom we owe, under the “immortal God”, our peace and defence.”59 Finally, in the other part of the book, he identifies additional reasons behind the comparison between a state (governor) and leviathan, when he says that “Hitherto I have set forth the nature of man, whose pride and other passions have compelled him to submit himself to government; together with the great power of his governor, whom I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one-and-fortieth of Job; where God, having set forth the great power of Leviathan, calleth him king of the proud. “There is nothing”, saith he, “on earth to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid. He seeth every high thing below him; and is king of all the children of pride.”60 Meanwhile, by linking the provided definitions with each other, we will be able to detect the underlying motivation for selecting “leviathan” for the title, as well as the primary image framing the substance of the book. However, additional analysis upon the subject will be provided below. Setting the task to account on the notion of nature and importance of a state, the point of reference for Thomas Hobbes, is the bodily realities/characteristics, however, on the other hand, he places and analyzes a human being in this reality; this is the way he selects to apprehend/study the human nature which ultimately presents itself a path leading to his notion of a state. On this path, he provides the autonomous and systemic description of many foundational/core notions. For example:  Sense – “Which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of man’s body, and by diversity of working produceth diversity of appearances. The original of them all is that which we call sense, (for there is no conception in a man’s mind which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense). The rest are derived from that original.” 61 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XVII, p. 84. “But because he is mortal, and subject to decay, as all other earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, though not on earth, that he should stand in fear of, and whose laws he ought to obey; I shall in the next following chapters speak of his diseases and the causes of his mortality, and of what laws of nature he is bound to obey.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXVIII, pp. 146-147. 61 Thomas Hobbes, cited, I, p. 15. 59 60 47  Imagination – “For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it the Latins call imagination.”62  Memory – “But when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory. So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse considerations hath diverse names.”63  Experience – “Much memory, or memory of many things, is called experience.”64  Speech – “But the most noble and profitable invention of all other was that of “speech”, consisting of “names” or “appellations”, and their connection.”65  Reason – “By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, born with us; nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is; but attained by industry: first in apt imposing of names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connection of one of them to another”66  Science – “The signs of science are some certain and infallible; some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the science of anything can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another: uncertain, when only some particular events answer to his pretence ...”67 In providing an epistemological model, Thomas Hobbes As an empiricist builds his system in the space between the object–sense–imagination– experience–reason, since, as Hobbes argues “we conceive has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts, a man can have no thought representing anything not subject to sense.”68 Therefore, in this way he underlines the boundaries for human knowledge, since everything imagined by a human Thomas Hobbes, cited, II, pp. 16-17. Thomas Hobbes, cited, II, p. 17. 64 Thomas Hobbes, cited, II, p. 17. 65 Thomas Hobbes, cited, IV, p. 22. 66 Thomas Hobbes, cited, V, p. 29. 67 Thomas Hobbes, cited, V, p. 30. 68 “as I said before, we conceive has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts, a man can have no thought representing anything not subject to sense.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, III, p. 22. 62 63 48 is finite; therefore, as humans, we are in no possession of an idea, or a notion about an object that might be called infinite. A human is impossible to possess the ability to imagine by reason ideas of infinite size, speed, time, power and might. When we say that something is infinite, we only confess that we have no ability to imagine the finite borders of a given object and therefore, we are only in possession of our imagination on our inability to comprehend. In the same manner, “the name of God is used, not to make us conceive Him (for He is incomprehensible, and His greatness and power are unconceivable), but that we may honour Him.” For Thomas Hobbes, reality is a matter that can be conceived of only in some place. He subsequently argues that “No man therefore can conceive anything, but he must conceive it in some place; and endued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts.”69 Therefore, matter existing in reality is either a natural body or an artificial body (e.g. a state). Therefore, Hobbes’ understanding is materialistic. On the path to his notion/conception of a state, Thomas Hobbes complexly interlinks a bodily reality, previously discussed and multiplicity of other notions to which he manages to find autonomous definitions within the confines of his system; for example, the conceptions like Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, Worthiness, etc. and, in this way, this work turns into some kind of a personal glossary, at the same time representing a complexly interlinked whole in his system. This leads him to the notion of the Natural Condition of the Mankind, thus the road from the state of nature towards a state is being articulated. Still, what is the state of nature and the essence of a human in the state of nature for Hobbes? The answer to this question, first and foremost, for him hangs on two pillars, that is – freedom and equality. Analyzing freedom in general (not solely the human freedom), for Thomas Hobbes this notion signifies the non-existence of barriers or opposition. Opposition in its turn is defined as an external impediment to motion. Hereby, he proceeds that freedom defined in this way, can be applied no less to irrational 69 “No man therefore can conceive anything, but he must conceive it in some place; and endued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that anything is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have or can be incident to sense, but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit, without any signification at all, from deceived philosophers and deceived, or deceiving Schoolmen.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, III, p. 22. 49 and inanimate creatures than to rational.70 Therefore, he links the notion of freedom only with bodily; since, on the one hand, only bodies have the ability for movement, and, on the other hand, only a thing that is capable of movement can come across the opposition, therefore, only body can come across the opposition. Thereby, he accentuates the mechanical and materialistic nature of freedom. Extending his definition of freedom to the human beings, Thomas Hobbes considers a freeman to be one, “which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to.”71 Consequently, Hobbes argues that liberty, or freedom is the existence in the absence of external impediments; these “impediments may oft take away part of a man’s power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left him according as his judgement and reason shall dictate to him.”72 Thus, according to the wider definition of freedom by Thomas Hobbes, and its application to a human, an emphasis is being put on external impediments. However, it does not mean that there are no rational internal factors for human freedom. For example, his concept of the natural law provides us with the same rational structure/framework. However, since he deducts the natural laws from the human nature (these laws are the general laws discovered by reason and its obligatory power lives internally in a human- in one’s own consciousness) and the divine origins, they are not barriers or impediments, but a part of the human will. Therefore, they are not a check on freedom, but make its constituent part; consequently, in his opinion, in the state of nature, humans are free to do whatever they want to in accordance with the constituent part of their will and this freedom might be constrained only with the external impediments. Meanwhile, the second major characteristic of the state of nature for him is the physical, as well as mental equality of the human beings (“equal in the faculties of body and mind”). It follows, that the nature has created human beings to be equal, gifted with equal abilities. Though, in reality some might be more intelligent or strong, however, even the physically weak a person, has enough power to kill a stronger human being with a secret machination or by confederacy with others; on the other hand, the intellectual capabilities “Liberty, or “freedom”, signifieth properly the absence of opposition; by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion; and may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate creatures than to rational.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXI, p. 100. 71 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXI, p. 100. 72 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIV, p. 66. 70 50 suggest even more equality between the human beings with some exceptions: “setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general and infallible rules, called science, which very few have and but in few things, as being not a native faculty born with us, nor attained, as prudence”.73 The equality between the human beings generates the lack of trust among them, conditioned by the equality in capabilities or the chances that gives birth to the equality of hopes for reaching the desired ends. Specifically, for that reason, if two human beings wish for the same thing, which cannot be in the possession of both together, they will turn into enemies. The path to the desired end, which lies primarily in the desire for “conservation, and sometimes their delectation only”, ends in the endeavor to destroy or subdue one another. Consequently, each and every human being faces the same threat.74 The result of this distrust is “the war of all against all”. Thus, the state of war is also conditioned by the human manners,75 from which Thomas Hobbes singles out a perpetual and restless desire of power after power as well the “competition of riches, honour, command, or other power inclineth to contention, enmity, and war, because the way of one competitor to the attaining of his desire is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other.”76 In sum, Thomas Hobbes finds the three principal causes of quarrel in the human nature: 1) competition; 2) diffidence; 3) glory.77 “The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIII, p. 63. “From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore, if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only) endeavour to destroy or subdue one another.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIII, p. 63. 75 In this context, for Hobbes manners do not depict etiquette or general norms of behavior but the very human characteristics linked with their desire for peace and living in societal unity: “those qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XI, p. 52. 76 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XI, p. 53. 77 “So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIII, p. 64. 73 74 51 their name.” Consequently, “during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man,”78 since war is not only the act of fighting, but the tract of time when the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known. Thus, one of the principal characteristics of this concept – the war of all against all – is that nothing can be unjust. Such notions like right and wrong, justice and injustice have no application there, since, when there is no common power, no law (law guaranteed by the state government), injustice cannot exist. The war values only two cardinal virtues – force and fraud. Thomas Hobbes does not argue that the mankind has experienced as a common developmental stage a historically universal existence in the state of nature described by him, however, he is certain that some societies existed in the same state of nature in his age. To give more weight to his arguments, he brings the example of the savage tribes in America, whose manner of existence, in his opinion, was brutish. In addition, he argues that the state of the human existence in the state of nature can easily be observed during a civil war; by observing the human existence without a fear for the common power and the degeneration of the lives of people accustomed to live under the peaceful government.79 But, the state of nature drawn by Thomas Hobbes is a rather complex construct, which should not simply be understood as a human against every other human; there is a more complex insight attached to this construct. In this context, the human aspiration for security in the state of nature is of utmost important. As-yet, in the Manners chapter (XI: Of the Difference of Manners), Hobbes observes the desire of ease and sensual delight, the fear of death and wounds, the desire of knowledge and arts of peace, etc. in the human nature. He concludes that the state of war cannot bring peace to a human; and, security under such condition depends only on one’s own strength and own invention; which, in their turn, are very constrained and a conditional state. Hobbes argues that “In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no 78 79 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIII, p. 64. “It may peradventure be thought there was never such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places where they live so now.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIII, p. 65. 52 society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”80 In sum, according to Hobbes, the human passions, which drive them towards peace is “fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them.” Thus, Thomas Hobbes’ complex picture of the state of nature is characterized with two primary dimensions: on the one hand, with war between the humans and on the other hand, with the human aspiration for security stemming from the state of war. The second dimension leads him to come up with construct of the natural law. Herein, he offers an important differentiation between the right of nature (jus naturale) and the law of nature (lex naturalis)81. The former denotes “the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto”,82 and the latter means “a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.”83 Consequently, the natural right denotes the liberty of action, while the law (laws) places liberty in frames, in such a way turning it into an obligation. In that way, if the right of nature is present in the first dimension of the state of nature (and alongside other reasons also pushes a human to the state of war), the law (laws) of nature, being an offspring of rationality is linked with the security dimension as an obligatory, general rule, creating the specificobligatory normative part for the state of nature. The specific-obligatory insight of the laws of nature, first and foremost consists in its influence on the conscience, consequently, “the laws of nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place”. Therefore, since these laws only oblige desire and endeavour, in his opinion, they are easy to be observed. On the other hand, “in foro externo”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIII, p. 64. In this context, Hobbes employes two alternative insights: the law of nature and natural laws. Thus, in this context law can only be employed only in a sense that for Hobbes law as a fully-fledged source of justice is only established after the formation of a state. In its turn, the “natural laws” is a specific category; it is a characteristic, quality and Hobbes considers these laws to be a frame of the moral philosophy. 82 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIV, pp. 65-66. 83 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIV, p. 66. 80 81 53 these laws do not always require to be implemented.84 Since, if the laws are not observed proportionally, that is, in a given time and place is only observed by some and not all, then the life and security of those observing the law will be defenseless and in this way, will come into conflict with the law of nature or the priorities for the self-defense and preservation of one’s life. Therefore, under such conditions, these laws do not oblige in foro externo, “which everyone hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely”.85 Herein, Thomas Hobbes proves that “the science of them is the true and only moral philosophy”. Since, in his words the moral philosophy is “the science of what is good and evil”; and, until humans exist in the state of nature, the measure to good and evil is one’s private appetite. Therefore, Hobbes suggests all men agree that peace is virtue/good, and, therefore, moral virtues are the following means leading to peace: justice; gratitude; modesty; equity; mercy and the rest of the laws of nature.86 In parallel, Thomas Hobbes emphasizes another aspect of the laws of nature, namely, “for natural laws, being eternal and universal, are all divine.”87 Still, what is the substance of the laws of nature? Hobbes first develops nineteen laws and subsequently adds the final one in the conclusive chapter of his book (“To the Laws of Nature declared in the fifteenth Chapter, I would have this added: that every man is bound by nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in war the authority by which he is himself protected in time of peace.”).88 I will direct the attention of the reader to the first three laws which are central for his notion of the law of nature. The first and the fundamental law of nature is basically observed from two primary perspectives; the first perspective speaks of the right of nature (“The right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto”) and the second perspective – of the law of nature in itself Thomas Hobbes, cited, XV, p. 78. Thomas Hobbes, cited, XVII, p. 82. 86 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XV, p. 78. 87 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXVI, p. 132. 88 Thomas Hobbes, cited, A Review and Conclusion, p. 316. 84 85 54 (lex naturalis), which is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason.89 Therefore, since the state of nature is the war of all men against all men, everyone follows the dictate of one’s own right of nature and there is nothing that is prohibited to preserve one’s life in a struggle against the enemies; consequently, everyone has the right to do anything, including the right to encroach on the bodies of the others (“a right to one another’s body”). And therefore, as long as the right of nature of every man to anything endures, no security to anyone might exist of living out the time, at least not as much as the nature ordinarily allows men to live. And consequently, it is a precept, or a general rule of the reason that “every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope for obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war”. The first branch of the rule contains the first and fundamental law of nature, that is “to seek peace and follow it”; and, the second law is “the sum of the right of nature, which is: by all means we can to defend ourselves”.90 The second law is derived from the first law and is reminding a famous formula from the New Testament: quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris (“Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them.”). According to Thomas Hobbes, this law should be stated in the following way: “that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself.”91 Since, as long as the human hold their right to do whatever pleases them, they are at war with each other. So, as long as the men as a whole do not lay down their right, there is no reason from anyone to dispose of their rights, since without it one stays defenseless against robbers, not dispose oneself for peace. In parallel, analyzing the act of voluntary concession of right, he underlines that any right can be laid aside by simply renouncing or transferring it to another (person). A simple renouncement act suggests that one does not care who benefits from that decision. A transfer of right takes place when its bene“For though they that speak of this subject use to confound jus and lex, “right” and “law”, yet they ought to be distinguished, because “right” consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas “law” determineth and bindeth to one of them: so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty, which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIV, p. 66. 90 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIV, p. 66. 91 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIV, p. 66. 89 55 fit is predestined for certain person or persons. If a human renounces one’s own right or transfers it to someone, then one should not hinder the possibility the transferred right be fully exercised and should not renounce a decision that was already made. Hereby, Hobbes further clarifies that when one renounces or transfers a right to someone, one does it for some corresponding rights or some other benefit. For, it is a voluntary act and the voluntary act of every men aims to get “some good to himself”. Therefore, there exist some rights which a man cannot make it known by any signs or words, why one wants to transfer or abandon the right. Of them all, a man cannot renounce a right to resist attackers willing by force to take away his life, since it is not understandable what corresponding benefit can one expect in exchange for such a voluntary act of giving up one’s right. On the whole, Thomas Hobbes links the rationale for transferring the right with the notion of a contract, opening the door for the third law of nature, which he argues consists in men performing their covenants made. The third law of nature partly corresponds with the key principle of modern domestic and international law – “agreements are to be kept” (Latin – pacta sunt servanda). However, for Thomas Hobbes, this law has even a larger application, since according to his approach, the construct of state and law are built essentially on the agreement (here, law primarily denotes the body of rules executed by the state not the law of nature to which the third rule itself belongs and the origins of which lie in another source). Moreover, the third rule of nature, is the original of justice, since if the contract is not concluded, that is some of the right of nature are not renounced by a man, no injustice can possibly exist. Consequently, the foundation of justice, in sum, is created by law (The law executed by the state) and since the latter for Hobbes is drawn on the renouncement or the transfer of the right of nature, the third law of nature, consequently is the one, which leads towards justice. However, for Thomas Hobbes, the third law in itself is not autonomously enough for founding law and justice, and that is the main reason he brings the notion of “actually just” in this context. In his opinion, though the third law of nature and the covenants followed upon with this rule opens up the path to justice, “But because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not performance on either part..., are invalid, though the original of justice be the making of covenants, yet injustice actually there can be none till the cause of 56 such fear be taken away.”92 Consequently, justice cannot be founded till a coercive power comes into existence, which for Hobbes is primarily embodied in a state (commonwealth); “Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature …, if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men”.93 Therefore, Hobbes perceives the notion of the “law (laws) of nature” as very specific conception, not a literally (word for word) the law (or laws). In sum, in Thomas Hobbes’ conception, men create a state, since in the state of nature there self-preservance and security cannot be guaranteed because man are primarily directed by passion and the laws of nature and they exist in the miserable condition. The laws of nature like “justice”, “equity”, “modesty”, “mercy”, without a coercive power is in conflict with the natural passions of a man which direct them towards “partiality”, “pride”, “revenge” and the like. Without a sword, these laws are simply words having no means for guaranteeing the security of the human beings. Thomas Hobbes links the founding act of the state with the formation of a common power. In his opinion, the only way to create a common power, which will have the power to defend man from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them, and allow to feed/nourish them by their own labour or the fruits of earth and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength to one men or the assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by the plurality of voices, onto one will/a single voice. This means that men should appoint one man or the assembly of men in their name to act, and each should name oneself author or owner of the actions (men or assembly of men) taken in the name of defense of the common peace or security. With that act, they should subject their private wills to his will, private judgement to his judgement. This act is more than a consent or unity: it is the real unification unto a single person, when every man enters into agreement with every other. Thus, the delegation of power in this model can only be realized as the unification into a single person, when every person confers on a single man or the assembly the right of rule over themselves, but only with a condition “that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner.”94 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XV, p. 72. Thomas Hobbes, cited, XVII, p. 82. 94 “I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XVII, p. 84. 92 93 57 Thus, “the Commonwealth... is: one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence.”95 The one who embodies that person is called a sovereign, that is one with a sovereign power, and all others are his subjects. On the whole, the key to the essence of state for Hobbes lies in the notion of “sovereign”, and the substance of the commonwealth consists in him, since “the Commonwealth is no person, nor has capacity to do anything but by the representative, that is, the sovereign”96, and “the sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion to the Commonwealth”.97 However, still, how a sovereign power is being acquired? Thomas Hobbes provides two alternative ways to answer the question: 1) By natural force, “as when a man maketh his children to submit themselves, and their children, to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse” (Dominion Paternal), or when enemies are subordinated with the means of war, and giving them their lives on that condition (Dominion Despotical); 2) By voluntary covenant, when man voluntarily subject themselves to obey the will of a single man or the assembly of several men. Thomas Hobbes argues that the first case is an example of a foundation of commonwealth by acquisition; while the second case embodies a foundation of political commonwealth, or foundation of commonwealth by Institution. Theoretical differentiation between the foundation of the commonwealth by institution or by acquisition do not suggest that in the history of a given state these models for acquiring a sovereign power have taken place in a pure form. From the theoretical perspective, every act of state formation is being originally carried out in accordance with either the model of acquisition or the model of institution; however, these models might intersect at some later stage of development. Consider, for example, a despotic domination established by the sovereign and the state over a given people (model of acquisition); however, the sovereign power of this sovereign and state was previously constituted as such, therefore, the original founding act might have been either – acquisition or institution. Thus, other versions for linking the models might also be identified, which, in sum suggest additional complexity visible in his approach. Thomas Hobbes, cited, XVII, p. 84. Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXVI, p. 124. 97 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXIX, p. 152. 95 96 58 Analyzing the insight of the model of institution of a state by voluntary covenant (so to say a founding covenant), it should be noted that this model is a product of theoretical generalization/imagination and autonomously represents a complex theoretical construct. Discussing the nature of this agreement, Thomas Hobbes underlines its existence in the space between the humans (future subjects) and, in this context, in the relations between subjects and a sovereign, he argues that one who is turned into a sovereigns given the right to represent people by the covenant made up by the people themselves and without entering into an agreement with sovereign, therefore, the sovereign cannot breach the agreement (since the sovereign is not a party to the agreement). Consequently, none of the subjects of a sovereign, on the premise of the nonfulfillment of obligations by the sovereign, have the right to free themselves from being the subjects of a sovereign. He who becomes a sovereign, does not conclude a preliminary covenant with his subjects, since in such a case, a sovereign as a separate side would have to conclude a covenant with every subject individually, or with every subject as a whole. (1) A sovereign cannot enter into an agreement with the subjects as a whole, since during the state formation they do not yet constitute a whole; and, (2) if a sovereign concludes the number of agreements that equals the number of human beings in his realm, then those agreements will be void after one embraces the sovereign power; and, since, every act which is found by the subjects to violate the agreement, correspondingly, belongs to this subject, on an individual level, and to all other subjects too; so, those acts of the sovereign are made, at the same time, in the name of any particular subject.98 Thus, the opinion which suggests that sovereign earns his power, is conditionally based on the prior agreement with the subjects, flows from the misunderstanding of a simple truth – that, as such, it is senseless the sovereign power was awarded by the prior agreement. The idea that every sovereign receives its sovereign power based on the conditional prior agreement, flows from the misunderstanding that “covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the public sword; that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of 98 “if he make so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants after he hath the sovereignty are void; because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof is the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the person, and by the right of every one of them in particular.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XVIII, p. 85. 59 men, that hath the sovereignty.”99 Though, for Hobbes, voluntary covenant between the people is the basis for founding a state based on institution, and delegation of the power to a sovereign is the most important precondition in this case, however, in relation to a sovereign, a contract is just words and breath and nothing else. Concerning the model of the state formation, based on the acquisition, Thomas Hobbes puts a special emphasis on fear, since in this case the sovereign power is acquired by force. This means that human beings accept every action of a man or an assembly, under whose power their life or freedom exists, because of the threat of death or bonds. Thus, he gives us the further explanation that “this kind of dominion, or sovereignty, differeth from sovereignty by institution only in this, that men who choose their sovereign do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute: but in this case, they subject themselves to him they are afraid of. In both cases, they do it for fear.”100 In addition, even in case of the acquisition of a state, some kind of a model for the foundational covenant for the sovereign power is underlined; since, according to the hint made by Hobbes: “every man is supposed to promise obedience to him in whose power it is to save or destroy him.”101 Accordingly, in case of the acquisition, for example, the conquest or the victory in war, right of dominion is not itself defined by the victory, but by the own covenant of the defeated, which declares subjection to a winner. However, even this covenant does not fully suggest the act of acquisition, without the will of a sovereign being expressed, “and then only is his life in security, and his service due, when the victor hath trusted him with his corporal liberty.”102 In this context, Hobbes offers another version of the contract, which he calls the “covenant of obedience” and based on which, a future subject is to recognize a winner in a war, as the sovereign. Therefore, even the model of acquisition leads him to the institute of a covenant; however, this covenant differs from the covenant in the institutional model, which, on the one hand, denotes the process of subjection with the use of force and on the other hand, stemming from this, it is not Thomas Hobbes, cited, XVIII, p. 85. Thomas Hobbes, cited, XX, p. 95. 101 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XX, p. 96. 102 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XX, p. 97. 99 100 60 concluded between the future subjects, but is made up in a space, between the future subjects and a sovereign.103 At the same time, in the conception of Thomas Hobbes’, no matter how many different forms of state formation can be there, the figure of sovereign remains still very important. He clarifies that even in the case of acquisition, the rights of the sovereign power and its ends are the same as in the case of institutional model, being undivided, inaccessible, and absolute. Therefore, without the consent of the sovereign, his power cannot be transferred; the sovereign cannot be accused by the subjects in any of the violations or be punished by them; he is a sovereign legislator and a judge; he decides the questions of war and peace, etc. 104 Meanwhile, Hobbes views the sovereign not only as a secular leader, but also as ecclesiastical. He devotes a significant part of his book to provide the proof to this thesis, where he engages in the systemic analysis of many religious books and comes up with arguments (by reviewing the canonical texts), which are rather different from the mainstream Christian interpretations.105 Concerning the state, he declares the Christian state to simultaneously be/represent a church106, since there is no such universal church, to which all the Christians should obey. Christians are under the sovereignty of different states and they cannot obey the orders of other rulers besides the one they are subjects to. Therefore, in his conclusion, “a Church, such a one as is capable to command, to judge, absolve, condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with a civil Commonwealth consisting of Christian men; and is called a civil state, for that the subjects of it are men; and a Church, for that the subjects thereof are Christians.”107 “every subject in a Commonwealth hath covenanted to obey the civil law; either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common representative, or with the representative itself one by one when, subdued by the sword, they promise obedience that they may receive life”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXVI, p. 124 104 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XX, pp. 95-96. 105 For example: immortality, hell, salvation, etc. Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXXVIII. 106 “I define a Church to be: a company of men professing Christian religion, united in the person of one sovereign; at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXXIX, p. 211. 107 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXXIX, p. 212. 103 61 By virtue of the above, the sovereigns of Christian states comprise both the political and ecclesiastical power,108 performing the role of the supreme pastor based directly on the authority conferred on them by the divine power that is “in God’s right, or jure divino”.109 In total, he argues that after the Era of the Jesus Christ (after the disciples of Christ), the Christian faith relied on the reputation of a spiritual leader and the authority of a sovereign. While, during his era, only the Sovereigns were left with the right to speak in the name of the god (he also extends this right to those who god spoke to supernaturally).110 However, one thing should be noticed: the Hobbesian way of linking the sovereign with the divine right of rule, was rather different from the authors of his era, for whom the point of departure was the divine order, while both the state and the sovereign were the integral parts in the divine order; while, his argument reorients the emphasis towards a state and a sovereign. Therefore, the primary point for him in this relationship is that the supreme power that a state and its sovereign as the one with the earthly supreme power should not be hindered by anyone or anything, suggesting that the state and its sovereign powers are independently the most important supreme good. Moreover, his argument which states that the sovereign derives its powers from god, also do not follow the mainstream interpretations of that era. He derives it from his conception of a human nature, which stands on the pillars of freedom and equality, and in parallel, from the complex and specific nature of the covenant, this itself results in the reorientation of the emphasis in the preconditions for constituting the sovereign power also in this context.111 “From this consolidation of the right politic and ecclesiastic in Christian sovereigns, it is evident they have all manner of power over their subjects that can be given to man for the government of men’s external actions, both in policy and religion”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XLII, p. 248. 109 “But the king, and every other sovereign, executeth his office of supreme pastor by immediate authority from God, that is to say, in God’s right, or jure divino.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XLII, p. 245. 110 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XLIII, p. 265. 111 For Example, Robert Filmer in his arguably the most famous book – Patriarcha, or The Natural Power of Kings (published in 1680, after his death), offers the traditional perspective on the sources of the royal power (divine and natural right), arguing that the source of it consists in the natural right of father and biblical Adam was the first King on whom the right to rule was given directly from God. Filmer derives his theory for the natural (and divine) power by adapting the idea that the divine right of rule is following the legacy of Adam. Therefore, he argues, neither are humans naturally equal, nor free. 108 62 Concerning the kinds of commonwealth by the forms of their government, Hobbes remarks that the difference between the states consists in the difference between the sovereigns (those who execute sovereign power) and identifies three types based on these criteria: monarchy, democracy and aristocracy,112 depending whether a sovereign is embodied in a single person or an assembly. Therefore, if the supreme power is embodied in a single person then a state is a monarchy; if it is represented by the general assembly of subjects then it is a democracy; aristocracy, where it is in an assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from the rest.113 Engaging in the comparative analysis of the kinds of commonwealth and discussing them in relation to their primary task of founding peace and guaranteeing the security of their subjects, he singles out monarchy among these kinds of state as the form most able to deliver the those goods. For example, Hobbes argues that in a monarchy private interest coincides with that of public,114 since in his opinion, no king can be rich when his subjects are poor, etc. Thus, it should be noted, that for Thomas Hobbes, the stability or integrity of the State is the priority higher than the identification (or choosing) of the better form of government. That is why he argues that once one of the kinds of commonwealth is being established, it is necessary that this government be accepted or supported as the best possible form of government; since, the ac- Hobbes lists the kinds of commonwealth on in relation with the model institution concerning state formation (Chapter 19), however, herein he argues that there is no other kind of government besides the ones in his list. 113 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIX, pp. 89, 92. 114 “Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIX, p. 90. 112 63 tions to overthrow the existing form of government115 are the actions against the rules of nature and the divine positive law.116 The laws are being passed within the confines of a state. However, in his opinion, there are rules which oblige subjects not directly to a state, but as the members of a state. Since, the particular laws should be known only to professionals, or those who study laws of a given state, while everyone else should know the civil law. It is clearly visibly in this part of the book, that Hobbes offers an independent differentiation between the civil law and the certain laws of different states; on the other hand, he adds, that the ancient law of Rome was called “civil” because of being derived from the word “civitas”, which can be defined as a state. Its application were preserved in those states which were the subjects of the old Roman Empire and named it the civil law to distinguish it from the rest of their civil laws.117 Thus, here the civil law is quite distinguished from the understanding, which is operated by the jurists today, comprising the law of state in total, not being limited to its part (nowadays the civil law); on the other hand, for Hobbes, civil law highlights a specific understanding as the product of generalization (e.g. a comparison with the Roman civil law). Consequently, on the whole, Thomas Hobbes needs this differentiation, since he is interested in the law in general, not from the perspective of laws in a given country; in its turn, he needs to make a comparison between this “And of the three sorts, which is the best is not to be disputed where any one of them is already established; but the present ought always to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best, because it is against both the law of nature and the divine positive law to do anything tending to the subversion thereof.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XLII, p. 249. 116 For Thomas Hobbes, the positive law depicts those laws which have not always existed and have been transformed into laws only depending on the will of a sovereign. In its turn, he divides positive law into two parts: some are human, some divine. The one part of the divine laws is eternal and is as well natural law. The other part is not worldwide, since, according to his arguments, they are neither eternal nor universal and as such, are not directed at the whole of mankind, but towards certain peoples and persons; the divine law (being the perception of a god) are declared as laws by those to whom the god gifts such a right (he includes among them sovereigns as well). Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXVI, p. 132. 117 “The ancient law of Rome was called their civil law, from the word civitas, which signifies a Commonwealth: and those countries which, having been under the Roman Empire and governed by that law, retain still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the civil law to distinguish it from the rest of their own civil laws.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXVI, p. 123. 115 64 law in general with the law (laws) of nature; therefore, in this work, the idea of the civil law is pictured as a generalizing and unifying concepts. And, in this context, every law does not represent an advice, but the order of a person, whose power to make others follow his orders is being recognized by the addressees of the order. In the idea of the civil law, the notion of civic is added (more precisely civitatis) which describes the subject (persona civitatis) responsible for giving out an order. In sum, Hobbes argues, “Civil law is to every subject those rules which the Commonwealth hath commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of for the distinction of right and wrong; that is to say, of that is contrary and what is not contrary to the rule.”118 The Hobbesian connection between the law of nature and civil law is an especially telling one. This part of his work is specific for delivering a more informed picture on his laws of nature and the state of nature. First, he remarks, that the law of nature and the civil law contain each other reciprocally and have equal extent. Then he clarifies the substance of the laws of nature and implies “not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and to obedience”. In its turn, for Hobbes “law, properly, is the word of him that by right hath command over others.”119 Thus, the laws of nature are transformed into actually laws by the state. Consequently, the law of nature will turn into a state order, and will parallelly be a civil law. On the other hand, the civil laws derive from the dictates of nature. Since, justice or the fulfillment of the covenants and giving to every man his own, is transferred to us by law of nature. In its turn, the obedience to civil law is part of the law of nature. Consequently, civil and natural law are not different kinds, but different parts of law, of which the former, being written is called civil, while the latter, an unwritten law, is called natural and a very complex relation of intersection between them exists. Therefore, the natural 118 119 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXVI, p. 123. Thomas Hobbes, cited, XV, pp. 78-79. in another context, Thomas Hobbes links the laws in a direct sense only with those norms that are instituted by the Commonwealth: “none can make laws but the Commonwealth, because our subjection is to the Commonwealth only; and that commands are to be signified by sufficient signs, because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXVI, p. 123. 65 right (jus naturale) is being constrained by both, civil and natural law (though with differing scale of success).120 From Human to State, according to Thomas Hobbes Commonwealth Sovereign Forceful way of The way of The way of acquisition of power Acquisition Institution Dominion Despotical Covenant Forceful way of War of all against all acquisition of power Law of Nature Domionion Paternal State of Nature Freedom Peace – Pursuit of Security Equality Human Let us now get back to a previously outlined question why Thomas Hobbes, in order to denote a state/commonwealth selected for the word – leviathan in this work. As being mentioned previously, he offers the image of le- 120 “Civil and natural law are not different kinds, but different parts of law; whereof one part, being written, is called civil the other unwritten, natural.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXVI, p. 124. 66 viathan in several forms, namely: 1) an artificial gigantic man; 2) a sovereign with a crown; 3) a king of all the children of pride; 4) a mortal god; 5) a huge biblical creature. Meanwhile, in each and every model of comparison there is a possibility to observe some key points of his political philosophy. 1. A comparison of a state with a gigantic but still with a human being, consists in a clear indication on its bodily nature, though, artificial, but still bodily. Since, for Thomas Hobbes, only bodily can be studied/comprehended, and a state can be comprehended in as much as it consists of a body. To account on a bodily nature of a state, Hobbes imagines different parts of a body of state comparing it with different parts of a human body. Therefore, in this context, he concentrates his choice on a human, not on any other creature, or for example, an image of a biblical sea creature. This can be interpreted, on the one hand, as a suggestion that a state is similar to the human nature; and, that, concentration only on the bodily, and ignoring spirituality or rationality will not provide the full picture of a state; on the other hand, in the context of apprehension, and for the purpose of comparing the organs of a state, with that of a mysterious, mythical image of a colossal sea creature, would have been much more difficult. Therefore, though he picks up the image of leviathan from the bible, in figurative comparison he employs the image of a gigantic human; 2. Meanwhile, this gigantic human portrayed on the title page of the book, is not a simple, huge sized mortal, but a sovereign with a crown on his head; the author, points out in here that the spirit of state/commonwealth is a sovereign, that confers life and motion on him. Since a state is neither a person, nor has the ability for action without its own representative, or without a sovereign. This sovereign is constructed by innumerous small man, which serves as an indication from the author to the ways of forming a leviathan by the people (subjects) themselves (the way of institution) or by the people (subjects) and a sovereign (the way of acquisition) before the sovereign power is established. Meanwhile, on the gravure the sovereign holds a sword in his right hand, and in the left hand a crozier. These holdings 67 should indicate the materialization of both of secular and ecclesiastical power. 3. On the faces of a king of all the children of pride, there is a possibility to observe that by forming the state, people refuse the pride awarded by the equality and freedom in the state of nature. In such an understanding, a state is a suppressor of pride in all its subjects not some of them. Suppression of pride, is a path leading to peace and security and therefore, to selfsurvival. Hobbesian rational basics of a human, with the help of laws of nature, and therefore, with the help of a divine hand selects a way leading to the king of pride. 4. However, leviathan is bigger than a human. He is fearless and looks from anything tall from above and to express its greatness, comparison with a human is not be enough. Therefore, we should not forget about the point of departure for Hobbes in this context; namely, that leviathan (as a symbol of political unity) firstly denotes the image of the enormous biblical sea creature (not simply a body or an animal), to which there was no comparison and in this sense, he is a god, but a mortal god. In this way, the author points to the power of a state, on the other hand, adorning it with a crown of good. Since, a comparison of a state with a god should describe it, being virtue. Therefore, for Hobbes, a state is the immeasurable virtue in itself, while a perfect state represents the crown of the socio-political practice. After we are through with representing the complex conception of leviathan by Thomas Hobbes, we can direct our attention to his vision of international relations and international law, which are not the main subjects for the author in this work. Hobbes, however, touches upon the important topics in these directions in a natural way and represents some interesting suggestions/considerations. First of all, for him the kings and other holders of the sovereign power, due to their independence, live in the condition of continual jealousies with each other and alike gladiators threaten each other with their looks and weapons; the castles, that are erected on the borders, their garrisons, artillery and the spies sent 68 in their neighbors represents “a posture of war”. Therefore, Hobbes transfers the state of nature to international relations, however, also points to some specific conditions in this context, remarking that the sovereign takes care industry of their subjects, which serves as a check and consequently, international relations do not end up in such a misery which the human liberty in the state of nature is accompanied with. 121 Analyzing the responsibilities of a sovereign, he specifically argues on his rights in the questions of war and peace. He argues, that the sovereign power has the competence to declare a war and take the measure for securing the peace with other nations and commonwealths, meaning the sovereign has the right to decide what is best for the common good in a given situation for the state, how many people should be mobilized, the weaponry needed and funds necessary. Herewith, Hobbes remarks that in reality, the guarantee for defending every nation is its armed forces, while the force of an army consists in its unification under the common command, which is the sovereign.122 In the chapter “on manners”, he outlines the human inclination for the power on the top, remarking that the kings, though they have enormous power, do not spare their efforts to maintain it: inside the country – with the help of laws, and in international relations – with the help of war.123 Discussing the obligations of a sovereign, Thomas Hobbes again touches upon the question of the International Relations emphasizing those obligations between the sovereigns are determined by the law, which is commonly called the law of nations. Herein, he remarks, that “the law of nations and the law of nature is the same thing.” Therefore, for guaranteeing the security of their subjects every sovereign has the same rights, what every human has in the state of 121 122 123 “yet in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XIII, p. 65. “For the power by which the people are to be defended consisteth in their armies, and the strength of an army in the union of their strength under one command; which command the sovereign instituted”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XVIII, p. 87. “and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of fame from new conquest; in others, of ease and sensual pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art or other ability of the mind.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XI, p. 53. 69 nature. Therefore, the laws of nature extend to sovereigns, as well as to states in international relations. Herein, Hobbes employs the notion of “conscience”, and suggests that “there being no court of natural justice, but in the conscience only, where not man, but God reigneth; whose laws, such of them as oblige all mankind, in respect of God, as he is the Author of nature, are natural; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of kings, are laws.”124 Speaking of the liberty, Thomas Hobbes argues that only the states, because of living like the humans in the state of nature are afforded with the absolute liberty. He emphasizes, that whenever humans leave the state of nature and become the subjects of a state or the sovereign power, that is when humans lose and states acquire absolute freedom to act in accordance with their judgement and for their benefit only. Therefore, states are under the perpetual threat of war and preparation and upon the confines of battle, clear illustration being perpetually armed frontiers and cannons pointed at their neighbors. 125 Therefore, we can make the following generalizations on the Hobbesian approach to international relations: 1. States and sovereigns exist in the conditions of mutual continual jealousies and threats in international relations; Thus, the thirst for power of the sovereigns leads them to wars against each other; 2. The interstate obligations are being defined by the law of nations (international law), which at the same time is the law of nature; 3. Implementation of the law of nations, and therefore, the laws of nature in international relations depend on the conscience of the sovereigns; 4. The laws of nature in international relations is the same as for the humans in the state of nature; 5. Conditions in international relations are different from state of nature between the humans, since the sovereigns take care of the industry of their subjects, which is an additional constraining factor. 124 125 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXX, p. 161. “every Commonwealth, not every man, has an absolute liberty to do what it shall judge, that is to say, what that man or assembly that representeth it shall judge, most conducing to their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of a perpetual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their frontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbours round about.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXI, p. 102. 70 The Complex Idea of Law, according to Thomas Hobbes “Law” of Nations Sovereign Power Written Positive law “Law” of Nature Eternal Unwritten Civil Law Divine “Law” Certain Laws of Different States Divine Positive Law Shortly and precisely, these are the basic ideas that could be derived from his work concerning international relations, other opinions primarily being the generalizations of different authors (sometimes correct, sometimes incorrect) based on their own interpretations of his ideas. Moreover, sometimes the scientific research into this work comes up with a diametrically different scientific results (however, according to the mainstream view, Thomas Hobbes is widely accepted as one of the founders of the realist tradition). It seems that the complexity of the Hobbes’ political philosophy and some foundational notions of his work feeds misunderstandings, for example: beginning with the foundational covenant for the sovereign power and continuing with his conceptions on a sovereign and a state, to a complex connection with the law of nature, the divine law, the law of nations and the positive law; and finishing with the non-homogenous picture of the state of nature. For additional exam71 ple, when we speak of the state of nature, this conception cannot be reduced to a simple understanding of the war of all against all. Hobbes for example, singles out separately a human inclination for striving for a security (and the desire of ease and sensual delight, the fear of death and wounds, the desire of knowledge and arts of peace, etc). In this context, he develops the laws of nature and though, they are not the laws in the full meaning of this word, however, they have their presence in his perception on the state of nature and serve as the natural-moral checks on the natural right (natural liberty) of man. Therefore, if we extend this picture to the interstate relations, on the one hand, we might come up with many of the key postulates of the realist tradition (and indeed, he is widely accepted to be one of the founders of the realist tradition): in international relation states exist in the conditions of continuous mutual jealousies and seeking of power resulting in the perpetual posture of war and the only guarantee for defending the people is the armed forces; wars are the result of human (sovereign) inclination for power and though, international law creates legal framework for international relations, however, there is no effective system for its implementation (Hobbes bases it on the conscience of sovereigns) etc. Moreover, some resemblance can also be discovered in the terminologies employed, when for example Hobbes sums up his conception; he uses the term “anarchy”. He argues that the state of nature is “anarchy and the condition of war”.126 Since, in international relations states exist in the state of nature, it logically follows that they exist in anarchy and the condition of perpetual threat of war. However, one thing should additionally be emphasized, that the “term” anarchy is not used often and as such, is not dominant in his work. On the other hand, analyzing the Hobbesian conception of the international relation, we also come across a model conditioned by rationalism, the model of a rational human being, but still international relations colored with the moral philosophy (doctrine on the natural laws), differentiation between interstate space from that of conditions in the state of nature (consider for example the care of the sovereign for the industry of their subjects), and two of the driving dimensions of international relations: on the one hand, the condition of war, and, on the other hand, inclination for security (and the desire of ease and sensual delight, the fear of death and wounds, the desire of knowledge and arts of peace, etc), with ensuing analytical results. 126 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXXI, p. 162. 72 However, in order to provide the complete picture of Thomas Hobbes’ views in political philosophy, analysis should be extended further. Separate aspects of discussion being the relation between his doctrine and political liberalism. Some authors even credit Hobbes as the co-founder of liberalism. However, Thomas Hobbes is definitely not a founder, he can accurately be described as one of the predecessors of liberalism or the author, whose ideas paved the path for the eventual birth of liberalism, in many respects. This argument is supported by many of his fundamental conceptions, for example: 1. In the conception of the foundational covenant in the institutional model (the way of Institution) of a state formation; 2. In the ideas concerning the obligations of a sovereign, the freedom of subjects; 3. ideas on the human nature; this list can further be extended. 1. it is true, that for Thomas Hobbes the foundational covenant concluded by the way of institution for the sovereign power exists only in the space in between the humans, and it, as the source of obedience (obligations) of the sovereign power does not exist in itself at the moment of its conclusion; though, to some degree, Hobbes also links the sovereign with the divine authority for the integrity, indivisibility, earthly supremacy, and overall, for the priority of strengthening the sovereign power, however, his arguments on the origins of the state and the sovereign power formation differ significantly from the dominant interpretations prevalent during his and previous eras. In this work, special emphasis is put on the covenant between the humans and their complex relationship with the sovereign. 2. In parallel, though, Thomas Hobbes argues that the subjects do not have the right to change the form of the government, protest or discuss the orders of a sovereign or punish him,127 however, Hobbes still assigns some obligations towards his subjects for the sovereign, for example: the need to guarantee the security for his subjects, founding of the rules/laws, organizing taxation on equal basis, etc.128 Subjects in their turn, are not fully disposed of rights. Speaking of the liberty of the sub- 127 128 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XVIII. “To equal justice appertaineth also the equal imposition of taxes; the equality whereof dependeth not on the equality of riches, but on the equality of the debt that every man oweth to the Commonwealth for his defence.”, Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXX, p. 157. 73 jects, Hobbes’ main argument is built around the following principle: – everything that is not prohibited or regulated by the sovereign is allowed; meaning that the subject has the freedom there the sovereign does not make his will known. Moreover, subjects have the right to defend their lives, the right to disobey any order promulgating the selfinjuries (“covenants not to defend a man’s own body are void”, “If the sovereign command a man, though justly condemned, to kill, wound, or maim himself; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the liberty to disobey.”), etc.129 3. moreover, by declaring freedom and equality the basic pillars of the human nature in his political philosophy, he undermines the aristocratic-hierarchical system of his era and the middle ages as well the doctrine of the divine or natural right of rule, for which inequality between the humans was declared central/natural. Therefore, even from this perspective, he develops a philosophy which differs significantly from the mainstream approaches prevalent in his era. Consequently, even from the preselected angles outlined here, he in some sense knocks on the door of liberalism without opening it. But he did not try to pass over the threshold on the road that would lead to liberalism. 129 Thomas Hobbes, cited, XXI. 74