Is Thailand Accommodating China?
Mark S Cogan2019, Southeast Asian Social Science Review
The growth of larger powers can alter the security of smaller states, who become more dependent on alliances and partnerships. As Stephen Walt (1985) notes, weaker states can do little to affect the overall outcome and must carefully choose the winning side. Realism is said to explain much about the behavior of lesser states, but this runs afoul in Southeast Asia. This paper explores small state options amid the rise of a larger power through the lens of the Thailand-China bilateral relationship. In the coup-dominated era of Thai politics, China's presence and steady policy of non-interference provides much-needed relief. However, Thailand's foreign policy is less effective at balancing and accommodates on issues of national security to satisfy Chinese interests. Yet on some issues of economic importance, Bangkok has resisted Chinese pressure. The paper details a case for selective accommodation with China through four case studies; recent infrastructure and development projects, military ties, the expulsion of ethnic Uighur Muslims back to China and the deportation of Hong Kong democracy activist Joshua Wong.
Southeast Asian Social Science Review Vol. Mark
4, No. 2,
pp. 24-47, ISSN 0128-0406, e-ISSN 2550-2298
S.2019,
Cogan
24
Is Thailand Accommodating China?
Mark S. Cogan
College of Foreign Studies
Kansai Gaidai University, Hirakata
Osaka 573-1195, Japan
Email: mscogan@kansaigaidai.ac.jp
AbStrAct
The growth of larger powers can alter the security of smaller states, who
become more dependent on alliances and partnerships. As Stephen Walt
(1985) notes, weaker states can do little to affect the overall outcome and
must carefully choose the winning side. Realism is said to explain much
about the behavior of lesser states, but this runs afoul in Southeast Asia. This
paper explores small state options amid the rise of a larger power through
the lens of the Thailand-China bilateral relationship. In the coup-dominated
era of Thai politics, China’s presence and steady policy of non-interference
provides much-needed relief. However, Thailand’s foreign policy is less
effective at balancing and accommodates on issues of national security
to satisfy Chinese interests. Yet on some issues of economic importance,
Bangkok has resisted Chinese pressure. The paper details a case for selective
accommodation with China through four case studies; recent infrastructure
and development projects, military ties, the expulsion of ethnic Uighur
Muslims back to China and the deportation of Hong Kong democracy
activist Joshua Wong.
Key words: accommodation, bandwagoning, Thailand, China, foreign policy
Is Thailand Accommodating China?
25
Introduction and Theory
Randall Schweller (1994: 73) asked, “Do states ally often with the
weaker or with the stronger side in a conflict?” Written as a response
to emerging balancing theory as elaborated by Stephen Walt (1985),
the question has launched a kind of international relations cottage
industry. However, what is less elucidated is what becomes of smaller
states? Small powers in Southeast Asia have taken a number of steps
to acclimate to the rise of China, employing a number of strategies
that have been the subject of much debate (Waltz 1979, 2000; Walt
1985; Schweller 1994; Ross 2006; Murphy 2010; Busbarat 2016).
China’s rise to status and stature in the international community
have some states rattled, while others like Cambodia have welcomed
Beijing. Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia have plenty to
fear over a major competitor in their backyard, and have taken steps
to counter China’s presence. Thailand’s behavior has been the least
predictable—partly because it has a complicated relationship, not only
with China, but its long-time strategic benefactor, the United States.
China’s relationship with Bangkok improved after the May 2014
ouster of the Yingluck Shinawatra government by the Thai military.
While the coup d’état provoked widespread condemnation from the
West, China stayed mostly silent. China’s foreign ministry, reacting
to the news of the coup the following morning, called on “all sides
to exercise restraint, increase dialogue and restore order as soon as
possible” (Storey 2015: 14).
The options for small states like Thailand exploring challenges to
the rise of a would-be hegemonic power are limited. These choices,
include balancing, bandwagoning, hedging, or accommodation.
Kenneth Waltz (1979: 127) suggests that while their options are
limited, small states balance, “if they are free to choose, [by flocking]
to the weaker side.” Small states do not engage in the kind of
maneuvering seen prior to conventional interstate conflicts. Rather,
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such as the formation of economic partnerships with a rival, engage
in multilateral diplomacy within international organizations, and
delay progress on previously established partnerships. According to
26
Mark S. Cogan
Walt (1985), states balance not only against power, but also against
threat. Lesser states bandwagon with larger or emerging powers,
adding their limited capabilities under their umbrella. In contrast,
Schweller (1994: 74) notes that the goals of the two strategies
are different, as balancing is an act of self-preservation and the
protection of values possessed, while bandwagoning is motivated
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themselves with the dominant state to “secure a share in the spoils
of victory” (Murphy 2010: 5). The behavior of a number of ASEAN
countries lends some credibility to these assumptions. Cambodia
and Lao PDR have bandwagoned with China, partly because of the
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legitimacy. While this apparent for some, it is not for others.
Secondary state behavior, according to Ross (2006: 358) is
sensitive to the capabilities of powers in their immediate vicinity
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power can fundamentally affect the security of a small state, the latter
will accommodate rather than balance the dominant or rising power.
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“Bandwagoning involves unequal exchange; the vulnerable state
makes asymmetrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts
a subordinate role... Bandwagoning is an accommodation to pressure
(either latent or manifest)... Most important of all, bandwagoning
suggests a willingness to support or tolerate illegitimate actions by
the dominant ally.” In the past, Thailand has accommodated the rise
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were not actions that would have compromised Bangkok’s ultimate
position, rather it resulted in only a minor diplomatic scuffle with
Washington (Roy 2005).
Ross (2006: 363) refrains from using the word bandwagoning,
as it suggests an “either/all alignment, in which cooperation with a
threatening power precludes any cooperation with its great power
rival.” There are some problems with the term accommodation as
it is presently used. For example, Ross contends that the economic
dependence of a secondary state on a rising power is not sufficient
Is Thailand Accommodating China?
27
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course, this assumes that in the cold international system, the rising
power is not interested in preserving the status quo. Considering the
cultural ties, geographic proximity and economic interdependence of
Southeast Asian states, this seems less credible.
In the Thai context, Bangkok pursues multiple strategies across
sectors of foreign policy. It accommodates Beijing in areas where
national security could be compromised, such as that of the bombing
of the Erawan Shrine in 2015, as well as where security interests are
aligned. Further, Thailand is not a “weak” state. It employs a selective
form of accommodation, as Thailand’s maneuvers with China are
often subtle. Further, to suggest that Thailand is facing a hypothetical
choice between China and the United States appears unrealistic.
Accommodation with China, like that of hedging strategies, would
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between one of the following options, balance, bandwagon, hedge
or accommodate. Instead, though we see Thailand adopt a hybrid
strategy that varies according to the issue. This is an important
distinction because it illustrates the complexity of choices facing
smaller actors (as opposed to theoretical choices). If this coping
strategy is found to be true, it demonstrates the strategies that weaker
countries like Thailand adopt in the face of a potential hegemonic
power.
For the purposes of this paper, I will examine what is unclear,
namely the foreign policy direction of the most recent Thai military
government. Are they balancing or accommodating China? For
example, Busbarat (2016: 235) reviewed Thai foreign policy and
argued that China has given Thailand’s so-called “flexible” diplomacy
some challenges. The old Thai policy of maintaining equilibrium
has not been as effective as in the past. Thailand’s foreign policy, is
sensitive both to internal and external environments. I would draw
some distinction here, that Thailand is less effective at balancing and
applies accommodation, meaning it is willing to defer as well engage
in self-preservation on issues of national security to satisfy Chinese
interests. However, on issues of economic importance, Bangkok has
28
Mark S. Cogan
resisted Chinese pressure. The paper details these arguments through
four case studies; recent infrastructure and development projects,
the expulsion of ethnic Uighur Muslims back to China and the
deportation of Hong Kong democracy activist Joshua Wong.
Accommodation
Accommodation is the product of a number of variables, as foreign
policy is always the product of both external and internal factors.
Accommodation is not capitulation. It is the sum of actions of
both sides that, contribute to stability, however short term. It
is not appeasement in the sense that national security goals are
compromised in the face of strength or because of a perception of an
external threat. Scholars have debated the sources of accommodation,
arriving at different conclusions. Robert Ross (2016: 392) suggests
that a state’s vulnerability and proximity to China’s military power is
the primary consideration that determines if a secondary state moves
toward accommodation or balancing. Arguments can be made to the
contrary. While Thailand is close geographically, it hardly sees China
as a military threat. Despite a freezing of bilateral ties after the 2014
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overthrowing a democratically elected government, U.S.-Thai military
cooperation remains active (Cogan 2018).
Domestic concerns play a role in accommodation policies.
Thailand’s lurch toward Beijing after the 2014 coup d’etat signaled to
some that Thailand was becoming overcome by the influence or the
“orbit” of China. For example, a newspaper recently ran a cartoon
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on his stomach, highlighting perceived close commercial ties with
China. Thailand was also quick to demonstrate that had control
over the Uighur Muslim crisis by pushing back on Beijing’s initial
attempts to pressure them into returning over 100 refugees. However,
foreign pressure has pushed Thailand to pivot to China in ways it did
not immediately expect. The rise of China has increased Bangkok’s
desire to accommodate Beijing. Southeast Asian countries are
constantly making adjustments to accommodate China, with some
Is Thailand Accommodating China?
29
such as Cambodia bandwagoning with China rather than balancing
against it. Cambodia accommodates the rise of China because it
has very little choice but to do so. Phnom Penh has isolated itself
from the West through an authoritarian crackdown, while China
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foreign direct investment in infrastructure that Cambodia has failed
to achieve via the West. Thailand however, accommodates China’s
rise because short-term economic conditions and a deteriorating
relationship with the United States have forced it to do so. Soft
balancing against China is an appropriate strategy when a state has
the ability to resist the rise of a foreign power and accommodation is
a tactic used when there are limited tangible options beyond limited
balancing. Thailand appears to meet both criteria. Further, Thailand
does not appear to be soft balancing because there are few visible
signs. Strategies that previously existed, such as those involving the
military are relatively neutral. Diplomacy between Thailand and the
United States has improved, marginally, and there are few signs that
Thailand has sought increased ties to the United States, rather only to
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Administration.
Thai-style foreign policy
Thailand, like many small states, recognizes its limited power within
the international system. It has, regardless of changing structural
circumstances, prioritized security and maintained relationships
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UIF SFBMJTU USVUI UIBU iUIF GBUFT PG BMM UIF TUBUFT BOE PG BMM UIF ĕSNT
in a system are affected much more by the acts and interactions
of the major ones than of the minor ones” (Waltz 1986: 73).
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omnidirectional approach to foreign policy. Kislenko (2002: 537)
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approach, akin to bamboo “bending with the wind”, adapting in order
to survive. Routinely throughout Thai history, foreign policy has been
dictated by a dedication to a unique brand of pragmatism, as well as
30
Mark S. Cogan
accommodation, convenience and balancing—all instinctive state
behaviors aimed at the preservation of Thai security and sovereignty.
With respect to China and the United States, Thailand demonstrates
considerable skill in managing complex structural changes, adapting
bilateral relations with both hegemonic powers as well as with its
Southeast Asian neighbors.
A few examples of this Thai omnidirectionality are particularly
noteworthy. Prior to the Second World War, Thai strongman Phibun
Songkram forged strong links with Japan in hopes of keeping
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the Allied and Axis powers, but this strategy failed when Paris
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Phongpaichit 2014: 134). Thailand, under Phibun vacillated between
outright support for Japan and trying to convince Britain to issue an
ultimatum to Japan, warning them of the consequences of invading
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nationalist elements to Thailand’s leadership, and a movement away
from British and French influences pushed those elements toward
Imperial Japan (Christian and Ike 1942: 205). Thailand’s nationalism
influenced decisions to reacquire parts of French Cambodia and
when the Japanese intervened and ceded the territory to Thailand,
Phibun became indebted to Japan (Baker and Phongpaichit 2014:
134). It was these territorial claims that Phibun had accommodated
Japan by showing willingness to allow their army to enter Thailand
largely untouched, but Phibun backed off when the mediation did not
go far enough in Thailand’s favor (Swan 1987: 271). Thailand further
acquiesced to Japan when he was left no choice but to sign an alliance
with the Japanese, which later lead to a declaration of war against the
British and the United States.
Renewed relations with China began with the reunification
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conventional strategy of reliance on the United States for development
and military aid. Thailand’s attempt at renewed diplomatic relations
with Vietnam were tempered after Hanoi demanded the complete
American withdrawal of forces from Thailand. Bangkok valued its
Southeast Asian neighbors at a much higher short-term value than its
Is Thailand Accommodating China?
31
weary relationship with Washington, therefore meeting Vietnamese
demands was a convenient and expedient step toward improving
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full advantage of declining U.S.-Thai relations after the Mayaguez
Incident, where American troops staged a rescue of a container
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the permission of the Thai government. This was an easy decision
for Kukrit, who was able to keep domestic political promises in
overseeing the withdrawal of American forces from Thai soil, appease
the demands of the Vietnamese, while warming to the prospect of
improved relations with Beijing. In efforts to avoid confrontation with
Vietnam, improved diplomatic ties with China were aimed at limiting
Hanoi’s regional influence. Survival through pragmatism is the only
known constant.
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massacre and the subsequent royalist coup d’etat, was brought to
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backyard. Fears about ideological conflict became reality when
Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978. Thailand quickly moved to
form a closer relationship with China. Having a convenient partner
in Beijing, who was adamantly opposed to the Soviet-backed
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, Thailand was willing to let
relations erode with the United States in the pursuit of short-term
security. The repercussions of a deteriorating “special relationship”
(Fineman, 1997) with the Americans could have been severe.
Thailand had received more than $650 million in economic aid from
Washington between 1950 and 1975 and an additional $940 million
for defense and security. Thailand, in the decade prior to 1975 was
the second largest recipient of U.S. aid next to Vietnam (Kislenko
2004: 1). As negative sentiments ebbed and security realities changed,
Thailand’s military government positioned itself once again between
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the United States. In the mid-1980s, Thai foreign policy moved to
prioritize relationships that would best promote its national security
interests, increase its influence in ASEAN, and attach greater
importance to economic and social development. Regardless of the
32
Mark S. Cogan
strain of the Vietnam crisis, Thailand’s security relationship with the
United States remained largely unharmed, as military partnerships
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pragmatism further extended when Chatichai moved swiftly to reengage with Hanoi after their eventual withdrawal from Cambodia.
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Chatichai said that “rapprochement with Vietnam [would be] one
of [his] top priorities” and (controversially) that “Indochina must
be transformed from a war zone to a peace zone” (Innes-Brown and
Valencia 1993: 334).
china-thai relations
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between Thailand and China is frequently referred to as a traditional
friendship, that dates back to the mid-13th Century, when the
Kingdom of Sukhothai had tributary relations with the Mongol Yuan
dynasty (Chambers 2005: 602). In the hierarchical relationships
between China and the tributary states of Southeast Asia, Thailand
and China were mutually dependent, with each valuing the
relationship and status of the other. China saw the ancient Kingdom
of Siam as essential to its southern borders. However, as the Chinese
state decayed in the mid-19th centuries, so too did Thai relations.
The Chulalongkorn-era monarchy instead pursued a more intimate
relationship with the emerging American power. While state relations
fluctuated, the Chinese have been migrating to China for hundreds of
years, with many Thai people sharing a common ancestry with China,
particularly in the North (Skinner 1957; Bun and Kiong 1993). By
one estimate, the half of Bangkok’s population was ethnic Chinese
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in the late 1970s, Sino-Thai relations “evolved from contention to
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Communism on their doorstep and burned by American cooperation,
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wanted to deny Vietnam the last vestige of control in the region,
and prevent it from gaining a further foothold. Bangkok, vulnerable
Is Thailand Accommodating China?
33
to communism, provided plenty of opportunities for ideological
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Economic reforms in China prompted a boom in bilateral trade,
which grew from US$25 million in 1975 to US$475 million by 1992
8*54EBUB #Z $IJOBIBECFDPNFTJHOJĕDBOUMZMBSHFS
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countries. By 2013 China had passed Japan as Thailand’s top trading
partner. By 2015, trade with Thailand was at US$56 billion or almost
16 percent of Thailand’s foreign trade (Busbarat 2016: 239). China’s
growing economic and military power only serve as reminder to
that Beijing is now a very convenient partner, but also that the
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since the junta’s leaning, with the partnership exceeding all other
ASEAN countries. US$26.5 billion in Thai goods were exported to
China and US$38 billion in Chinese goods exported to Thailand in
2015. Thailand and China have boosted bilateral relations, resulting
in rapid foreign direct investment flow into Thailand. China now is
the second largest investor in Thailand after Japan (Busbarat 2016).
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2016). Rearranging priorities vis-a-vis China has some negative
consequences for Thailand. Thailand has experienced changes in
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rivalry. Rather that relationship with Beijing has followed a pattern
that began before the May 2014 coup, one based on growing military
and economic ties.
The Cases of Uighur Muslims and Joshua Wong
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willingness to acquiesce to Beijing, despite the short-term domestic
consequences. In March 2014, two months prior to the military
coup d’état, Thai police detained 235 ethnic Uighurs from a human
trafficking camp in the southern Thai province of Songkhla and taken
34
Mark S. Cogan
to a nearby detention center. Uighur Muslims comprise a persecuted
ethnic minority group from China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region, who have fled to escape government persecution on the
practice of Islam, which includes fasting during the holy month of
Ramadan, and wearing the veil. Wearing beards or apparel featuring
the Islamic crescent has also been banned across Xinjiang, and
some have been punished for worshipping openly or downloading
unauthorized religious material (Matta 2015). Thailand has been a
crossing point for Uighurs, Rohingya and other minority groups in
the region, who have sought refuge in Southeast Asia, then moving on
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have entry to Uighurs from Xinjiang (Page and Peker 2015).
Fearing deportation to China, the group told Thai immigration
BVUIPSJUJFT UIFZ XFSF GSPN 5VSLFZ Reuters, March 14, 2014).
Pressure on Bangkok came from multiple fronts. Beijing increased
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back China. The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) urged
Thailand to use caution, suggesting that a decision on the status of
group members be made in consideration with international law
and relevant obligations. In July 2015, the Thai military government
deported 109 Uighurs, partially at the request of China. International
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Thailand to close its Embassy after violent clashes erupted in Istanbul
and Ankara. The United States and the United Nations immediately
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Commissioner for Protection calling Thailand’s decision “a flagrant
violation of international law” (Lefevre and Dikmen 2015: published
online).
Some have argued that it is because Thailand has very little reason
to allow them to stay (Schiavenza 2015). Days after the Uighur return
to China, Prayut told reporters, “Do you want us to keep them for
ages until they have children for three generations?” Conflicting
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PSHBOJ[BUJPOTFYQPTFćBJMBOETWVMOFSBCJMJUJFTUPQSFTTVSFGSPN(SFBU
Powers. For Thailand, the appeasement of Beijing likely caused shortterm damage to internal security, as a bomb exploded at the Erawan
Is Thailand Accommodating China?
35
Shrine in central Bangkok, which killed 20 people and injured more
than 120. After the bombing, Prayut called the attack “the worst ever”
on Thailand (Jenkins 2015). Closed circuit cameras surrounding the
Shrine had not been working and Thai authorities badly mismanaged
the early investigation, missing forensic clues and locking up suspects
without any reason (Kurlantzick 2016: 5). It was also alleged that the
Thai government tried to move attention away from an earlier attack
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insurgents could have conducted an operation in Hua Hin could
have serious legitimacy concerns for the military-led government.
The government had in the past put the blame on groups linked to
exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, partly for internal
propaganda use (Kotani 2016).
Yusufu Meerailee and Adem Karadag, two Chinese nationals from
Xinjiang were accused by the Thai authorities of being handlers for
the Uighurs seeking asylum. Prior to the Erawan bombing, Thailand
had a gained some praise for accommodating scores of refugees
and displaced persons from Myanmar, the presence of Chinese
diplomatic pressure evaporated Bangkok’s credibility. Attempting to
alleviate international criticism and the dispelling the appearance
of acceding to Beijing, deputy Thai spokesman Colonel Weerachon
Sukhondhapatipak claimed the deportations were in line with
“international agreement and international law” and that Bangkok
determined the nationality of each of the migrants before their
departure to China (Lefevre and Hariraksapitak 2015: published
online). Thailand noted that it rejected a request by the Chinese to
return all Uighur persons being held in detention camps. As Colonel
Weerachon Sukhondhapatipak, deputy Thai government spokesman
said, “It is not like all of a sudden China asks for Uighurs and we just
give them back. China asked for all Uighur Muslims in Thailand to be
sent back but we said we could not do it” (Lefevre and Hariraksapitak
2015: published online). Prior to 2014, there was an indication
that Thailand would not accommodate Chinese interests without
compromising some of its national interests (Murphy 2010: 17).
This appears to no longer be the case. Thailand is willing to tolerate
illegitimate actions and internal threats to its own internal security in
36
Mark S. Cogan
favor of policy decisions that accommodate Beijing. In the realm of
accommodation, Thailand has “flocked” to the side of Beijing, which
gives it more autocratic space.
While the massacre of student protesters at Thammasat University
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national trauma and a source of anxiety for the ruling junta, the
2016 arrest of Hong Kong Umbrella Movement organizer Joshua
Wong raised questions about China’s growing influence. Shortly after
arrival at Suvarnabhumi Airport in Bangkok. Wong was scheduled
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6: Chula looks to the future”, commemorating the 40th anniversary
of the massacre of 46 Thai students by the military. Upon arrival
in Bangkok, Wong spent more than 12 hours in detention and his
passport was seized. Netiwit Chotipatpaisal, a Thai student activist
from Chulalongkorn University told news agencies that Thai police
had informed him of a written request by the Chinese government
about Wong, and that there was an “order” to detain and deport
Wong upon his arrival. Amid some confusion surrounding Wong’s
detention and eventual deportation, The Nation quoted Colonel
Pruthipong Prayoonsiri, deputy commander of the Suvarnabhumi
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the cooperation of the junta in refusing entry to Wong. Speaking to
journalists, Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha said the matter
was “China’s issue,” adding that Thailand was “aware that Mr. Wong
had been active in resistance movements against other foreign
governments, and that if such actions were taken within Thailand,
they could eventually affect Thailand’s relations with other nations”
(Shih 2016). The Bangkok Post reported that Thai officials barred him
from making negative comments about the Chinese government or
the circumstances surrounding his detention (Yeung and Ng 2016).
Freedom House, a democracy barometer, issued a condemnation,
“The government of Thailand should be ashamed of denying Joshua
Wong entry due to his peaceful democracy activism. If Thailand’s
decision was based on pressure from the Chinese government, Thai
authorities are responsible for helping the Chinese Communist Party
FYQBOE JUT SFQSFTTJPO BCSPBEw 'SFFEPN )PVTF 0DUPCFS
Is Thailand Accommodating China?
37
The government claimed that the move to deport Wong was not
related to freedom of speech, but the result of several factors that
are under the purview of the Immigration Bureau (Chanwanpen
and Audjarint 2016). In remarks to journalists, Prayut noted that
i<$IJOFTF> 0ďDJBMT IBWF SFRVFTUFE UP UBLF IJN CBDL *UT $IJOFTF
officials’ business. Don’t get involved too much. They are all Chinese
people no matter Hong Kong or mainland China” (“Hong Kong
Protest Leader’s Deportation” 2016). A deputy commander of airport
police, Colonel Pruthipong Prayoonsiri, told The Nation that China
had sent a request “to seek cooperation to deny” Wong’s entrance into
Thailand. Pruthipong told the journalist that the Immigration Bureau
then blacklisted Wong and held him in preparation for deportation
(Wu and Satrusayang 2016).
Thailand’s military junta has a recent history of compliance with
security demands from Chinese authorities, beginning with the return
of more than 100 Uighur refugees in 2015; the unexplained status of
Li Xun, who applied for asylum in Bangkok, but disappeared while
traveling to Lao PDR; as well as well as the kidnapping and removal
of a Hong Kong book publisher from the Southern city of Pattaya.
The junta has been willing to bow to Chinese demands in other cases.
5XP $IJOFTF EJTTJEFOUT +JBOH :FGFJ BOE %POH (VBOHQJOH IBE ĘFE
to Thailand with their families after being jailed by the Communist
government over political criticisms. The deportation had angered
the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) who had given them
refugee status. The government denied it knew the dissidents had that
status (Belford & Lefevre 2015). The Joshua Wong incident suggests
that Thailand has been willing to punish or isolate those who irritate
Beijing. The close relationship or accommodation of Chinese interests
has been a rising concern for the West. The Wall Street Journal called
Thailand China’s “enforcer” (Wall Street Journal 2016) partly because
of Bangkok’s perceived lack of compassion in denying asylum requests
for the sake of expediting delayed rail and infrastructure investments
(PO[BMF[ 0OUIFPUIFSIBOE POFDBONBLFBDBTFUIBUUIF
Thammasat University anniversary was potentially threatening to
the junta, and officials feared that Wong’s appearance could trigger
another popular uprising similar to that of 1973 and 1976 that
38
Mark S. Cogan
collapsed prior military governments. This sentiment was reflective
of Prayut at the time, who noted, “Now is the time when Thailand
is moving towards democracy, and if [Wong] says that we’re not a
democracy, then it’s not the right time. What will happen? People will
follow” (Cochrane 2016: published online).
Defense and Security Ties
When the 2014 coup upended Thailand’s democracy, it also reset
bilateral relations with the United States. The Americans denounced
the Army’s incursion into domestic affairs calling Yingluck’s
SFNPWBMiEJTBQQPJOUJOHwBOEiVOKVTUJĕFEw $PHBO ćF6OJUFE
States suspended $3.5 million in Foreign Military Financing and
*OUFSOBUJPOBM.JMJUBSZ&EVDBUJPOBOE5SBJOJOHQSPHSBNTUPćBJMBOE
and cancelled joint military cooperation exercises. Thailand and the
6OJUFE 4UBUFT TDBMFE EPXO UIF BOOVBM $PCSB (PME NVMUJOBUJPOBM
exercise in February 2015, with a reduction of 20 percent of U.S.
forces. Chinese military cooperation grew with Blue Strike in May
2016, where 1,000 Thai and Chinese military personnel participated
in exercises in amphibious training, disaster relief, and counterUFSSPSJTN ESJMMT $IJOFTF .JOJTUFS PG %FGFODF (FOFSBM $IBOH
8BORVBOWJTJUFEćBJ%FGFODF.JOJTUFS(FOFSBM1SBXJU8POHTVXBO
in Bangkok in 2015 with the announcement that China would
“help Thailand increase protection of its own country and advise
on technology to increase Thailand’s national security” (Nanuam
and Jikkham 2015: published online). Thailand engaged Beijing as a
tactical counter to American interference, and proclaimed that “China
will not intervene in Thailand’s politics but will give political support
and help maintain relationships at all levels. This is China’s policy”
(Lefevre 2015: published online).
The Royal Thai Army had announced in February 2016 that it
QMBOOFE UP QVSDIBTF NPEFSO NBJO CBUUMF UBOLT .#5T UP SFQMBDF
their aging American-made armor. With sanctions from the United
States complicating an already expensive option to buy newer
American equipment, Thailand intended to purchase 49 UkrainianNBEF 5 0QMPU5 .#5T GPS NJMMJPO EPMMBST )PXFWFS EVF
Is Thailand Accommodating China?
39
UP MFOHUIZ EFMBZT BGUFS SFDFJWJOH KVTU PG UIF 5T #BOHLPL
declined future orders. Thailand eventually decided on the Chinese
/03*/$0NBEF 75 BęFS B WJTJU GSPN 3PZBM ćBJ "SNZ (FOFSBM
Thirachai Nakwanich. Thailand also announced that China would be
NBLJOH UIF DPVOUSZT ĕSTU TVCNBSJOFT BęFS DPNQFUJOH PČFST GSPN
4PVUI,PSFBBOE(FSNBOZ$IJOB4IJQCVJMEJOH*OEVTUSZ$PSQPSBUJPO
$4*$ XJMM CVJME POF 45 EJFTFMFMFDUSJD TVCNBSJOF B WBSJBOU PG
UIF 1-" /BWZT 5ZQF # PS :VBO DMBTT XIJDI JT FYQFDUFE UP CF
delivered by 2023. (Zhen 2018) Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan
also raised a proposal to build a joint military facility to manufacture
and repair armaments purchased from China in Thailand during a
2016 meeting with his Chinese counterpart Chang Wanquan. The
facility would also manufacture small arms and drones and be based
in the northeastern province of Khon Kaen or along the eastern
TFBCPBSEPGUIF(VMGPGćBJMBOE 1BSBNFTXBSBO
Economic ties
According to the World Bank, the Thai economy grew at less than
1 percent for 2014 and at less than 3 percent for 2015. For 2019,
growth will hover around 3.3 percent, much lower than neighbors
Myanmar, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam. Southeast Asian
countries are increasingly dependent on Chinese financing and
development assistance—Thailand to the former and Cambodia to
the latter—support that does not come with Western democratization
or human rights pressures. For the autocratic Thai junta, Chinese
TVQQPSU QSPWJEFT EPNFTUJD MFHJUJNBDZ UIBU JU DBOOPU ĕOE BOZXIFSF
else. Thai officials, desperate for that legitimacy, staked their claims
to anticipation of Chinese investment. Finance Minister Apisak
5BOUJWPSBXPOHTBJEUIBUićBJMBOEBOUJDJQBUFTNPSFJOWFTUNFOUGSPN
China as a number of enterprises there have expressed interest in
various areas,” particularly from the China Investment Corporation
(CIC), a sovereign wealth fund, which The Nation noted expressed
strong interest in investing in the Thailand Infrastructure Fund,
established to raise capital from both individual investors and
JOTUJUVUJPOBM JOWFTUPST JO PSEFS UP ĕOBODF JOGSBTUSVDUVSF QSPKFDUT
40
Mark S. Cogan
across the country (The Nation, February 1, 2016).
In December 2014, Thailand and China signed a memorandum
of understanding (MoU) on railway co-operation through the
4USBUFHJD 'SBNFXPSL GPS %FWFMPQNFOU PG ćBJMBOET 5SBOTQPSUBUJPO
Infrastructure, 2015–2022 (Hewison 2017) with promises that the
construction of a railway that would “fuel economic development of
Thailand [and] neighboring countries” (Hewison 2017: 7). The Thai
junta, through Article 44 authority which allows them to approve
NFBTVSFT iGPS UIF TBLF PG SFGPSNT JO BOZ ĕFMEw USJFE UP TQFFE UIF
approval of the construction of the US$5.2 billion Thai-Chinese
railway that links the Northeastern province of Nakhon Ratchasima
to the border with Lao PDR. Use of Article 44 by the junta allowed
Thailand to get around a Thai law that states that all foreign engineers
on a project need to pass an examination to work in the country,
particularly for projects over US$150 million.
The regime also used Article 44 to speed up projects along the
Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), where the government aims
to expand the number of industrial zones in the petrochemical,
automotive, and electronics sectors. However the rail project did
eventually ran into major difficulties. Prayut cancelled his “fast train
to nowhere” in March 2016 after negotiations stalled on cost, interest
rates, development rights, and the number of stations along the
800-kilometer line (Crispin 2018). In an alleged retaliation, Prayut
was not invited to the Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing in May
0UIFSBOBMZTUTDMBJNFEUIBUUIFTIVOXBTSFMBUFEUP1SFTJEFOU
%POBME 5SVNQT JOWJUBUJPO UP UIF 8IJUF )PVTF TVHHFTUJOH #FJKJOH
did not want to be “second choice in Thailand’s diplomatic games”
(Busbarat 2017: pulished online). Eager to keep his “achievement”
legitimacy (Bangkok Post, 22 December 2017), Prayut announced
UIFĕOBODJOHPGBTIPSUFSQBTTFOHFSMJOFMJOLJOH#BOHLPLUP/BLPSO
Ratchasima.
However, the disagreement between China and Thailand pales to
the broader agreement on an array of development and infrastructure
projects. A part of dual MoUs, Thailand and China also agreed on a
QVSDIBTF PG BHSJDVMUVSBM QSPEVDUT OBNFMZ B TJHOJĕDBOU RVBOUJUZ PG
rubber from Thailand. China would buy approximately 2 million
Is Thailand Accommodating China?
41
tons of rice and 200,000 tons of rubber from Thailand (Parameswaran
2014). The Diplomat described the MoU as an “agreement [that]
would give the Thai government a much-needed place to offload the
country’s rubber and rice stockpiles, and it is being advertised by
#FJKJOH BT B HSBOE HFTUVSF PG $IJOFTF CFOFĕDFODFw ćF %JQMPNBU
20 December 2014) The MoU was a part of the commemoration
of 40 years of bilateral ties between the two countries. Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang said “only China has such a big market and a
huge purchasing power which could consume the big agricultural
production of rice, rubber and others of Thailand” (Parameswaran,
5IF $PNNFSDF .JOJTUSZ BMTP TJHOFE B NFNPSBOEVN PG
understanding to sell 1 million tons of rice to a Chinese stateowned food conglomerate, while the Rubber Authority of Thailand
is in charge of the rubber agreement. However, as of January 2018,
China has only imported 40,000 tons of rubber and just under
400,000 tons of rice under the MoU signed in 2015 (Arunmas 2015).
Prayut was quick to note the threat to his legitimacy, noting that
two Chinese tire makers had “shown interest in investing in rubber
compound processing projects in Thailand” (Hewison 2018). The
gambit failed and the government was forced to resort to subsidies
UPCBJMPVUSVCCFSNBLFST0GMBUF ćBJMBOEIBTCFHVOUPQVMMCBDL
on investment opportunities with China, partly due to “debt trap”
DPODFSOT 5IBJMBOET *OEVTUSZ .JOJTUFS 6UUBNB 4BWBOBZBOB UPME
the Nikkei Review that, “we are careful not only in the respect
to China but for any kind of major investment that would take
QMBDF JO ćBJMBOE UIBU XPVME JOWPMWF IVHF ĕOBODJOHw 0OP BOE
Phoonphongphiphat 2018: pulished online). Thailand in 2016, opted
UPQBTTPOMPBOBSSBOHFNFOUTUPĕOBODFBSBJMXBZQSPKFDUDPOOFDUJOH
ćBJMBOE UP -BPT ĕOBODJOH UIF QSPKFDU UISPVHI B QVCMJDQSJWBUF
partnership. Thailand appears to be accommodating China for the
sake of economic growth, the desire for trade and tourism reciprocity,
and the recognition of Beijing’s permanent presence in the region.
Thailand is under the same pressure that neighboring states face, but
without the same economic obligations that Cambodia, Lao PDR,
and Myanmar have.
42
Mark S. Cogan
conclusion
5IFPSFUJDBM BQQSPBDIFT IBWF EJGGJDVMUZ FYQMBJOJOH UIF CBMBODJOH
bandwagoning and accommodation postures in Southeast Asia, and
Thailand is a strong contributor to that argument. Theory suggests
that in the face of threats or posturing by rising powers, small states
like Thailand have two broad strategic options: to stay relatively
neutral and focus on cooperative schemes or to develop various
hedging strategies. Balancing is a possibility if the rising power is
in close geographical proximity or it is accompanied by a harmful
intent. Thailand is neither completely balancing or bandwagoning
with China. There is no sign that Thailand has dramatically increased
its supply of weapons from either China or the United States. It has
agreed to purchase weapons from both countries, including a recent
purchase of 37 1126-Stryker armoured cars from the United States
under the Foreign Military Sales programme. It suggests instead that
Thailand truly “bends with the wind” in its foreign policy, as it is
perfectly willing to buy arms from China during strained relations
XJUIUIF"NFSJDBOTEVSJOHUIFOPSNESJWFO0CBNB"ENJOJTUSBUJPO
while just months later be willing to reopen diplomatic and arms
TBMFT EJTDVTTJPOT XJUI UIF NPSF QSBHNBUJD 5SVNQ "ENJOJTUSBUJPO
Washington seems willing to open arms sales to Thailand after the
March 2019 elections, which reopened Bangkok to U.S. loans and
grants for arms purchases or for international military education
and training. The broader conclusion, based on the aforementioned
case studies is that Thailand engages in a hybrid strategy with regard
to the rise of China and its long-standing “special relationship”
with the United States. However, it is willing to engage in a form
of accommodation when it is either vulnerable to external pressure
or the consequences of the accommodating action are of minor
consideration to Bangkok’s long-term interests. It is also willing to
acquiesce to Beijing on matters of internal security and immigration
policy in the cases of the Uighur Muslims and Joshua Wong. Here, a
form of selective accommodation was used.
Theory suggests that small states will choose to align with the
HSPXJOHQPXFSSBUIFSUIBOCBMBODJOHBHBJOTUJUCFDBVTFJUDBOQSPĕU
Is Thailand Accommodating China?
43
by the subordination. Bandwagoning rather than balancing is a
more viable option, which also minimizes security risks. Thailand’s
economic policy with regard to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
CFHBOBTBOFDPOPNJDFYDIBOHFPGNVUVBMCFOFĕU OBNFMZJODSFBTFE
infrastructure capacity. Domestic political concerns however,
forced Bangkok to put a check on their accommodation to Chinese
economic interests. Thailand had to balance the need for domestic
political legitimacy with the perception that Beijing was pushing
ćBJMBOEJOUPBDPSOFSPOSBJMĕOBODJOH*O#BOHLPLTDBTF UIFSFJT
some evidence of economic pragmatism at work, where it sought to
NBYJNJ[F FDPOPNJD CFOFĕUT UISPVHI EJSFDU DPPQFSBUJPO %FTQJUF
some minor strains between China and Thailand, both sides are
willing to continue projects of major importance. Thailand is an early
supporter of the Chinese BRI and has been relatively patient in the
navigation of much-delayed negotiations which began in 2015. While
concern has been devoted to Beijing’s toxic “debt trap” diplomacy,
Thailand has had little resistance to China’s larger goal of expanding
its influence in the region and present a larger economic challenge
UPUIF8FTU#FDBVTFPGUIFSFDJQSPDBMCFOFĕUTB#3*EFBMXJUI$IJOB
brings, Thailand is willing to accommodate Beijing’s desires.
Theoretical considerations suggest that small states because they
are facing a greater number of security challenges are limited in
choice. As a result, they are much more vulnerable to external factors
when compared to their larger counterparts. Thailand, however is
neither a small state or a middle power. Because of its alliances with
both China and the United States, it is something else entirely. A
flexible foreign policy allows Thailand to engage in multiple strategies
at once, which increase its chances at survival without the increased
security risk. Clearly, historical context, geography, capacity, and
external linkages influence the extent of Thailand’s “bending” policy,
but multiple strategies, including forms of selective accommodation
remain the norm.
44
Mark S. Cogan
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