WATER STRESS
Emerging Challenges of Global Water Scarcity
Edited by
Péter Kacziba and Viktor Glied
WATER STRESS
Emerging Challenges of Global Water Scarcity
Pécs, Hungary
2020
Published by University of Pécs / Faculty of Humanities
Department of Political Science and International Studies
Editors:
Dr. Péter Kacziba, PhD (University of Pécs, Hungary)
Dr. Viktor Glied, PhD (University of Pécs, Hungary)
Academic reviewer:
Dr. Attila Pánovics, PhD (University of Pécs, Hungary)
Cover photo: Dreamstime
ISBN 978-963-429-523-5
All rights reserved!
© Authors, 2020
© University of Pécs Faculty of Humanities, 2020
„A kötet megjelenését az Innovációs és Technológiai Minisztérium a
TUDFO/47138/2019-ITM számú támogatói döntése alapján a 2019. évi Felsőoktatási
Intézményi Kiválósági Program finanszírozta, a Pécsi Tudományegyetem 3.
tématerületi programja keretében.”
„The volume was financed by the Higher Education Institutional Excellence
Programme of the Ministry for Innovation and Technology in Hungary, within the
framework of the 3. thematic programme of the University of Pécs.
4
AUTHORS
Dr. Viktor Glied, PhD in political science, assistant professor at the University of Pécs,
Hungary. He is historian and political scientist, graduated from the University of Pécs.
His research interests cover ecopolicy, civil society, Hungarian and international
history in the 20th and 21st centuries and migration issues. He is the author and editor
of several academic books and studies.
Email: glied.viktor@pte.hu
Dr. Péter Kacziba, PhD is an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science
and International Studies, University of Pécs, Hungary. He studied history and holds
a PhD in political science. He is a lecturer of several university courses including
Theories of International Relations, Theories and Practices of International Conflict
Resolution and World History in the 20th century. His research interests focus on
conflicts and conflict resolutions in the Eastern Mediterranean region, as well as on
the network paradigm of International Relations.
Email: kacziba.peter@pte.hu
Dr. László Kákai, PhD in political science was born in Pécs in 1964. He graduated
from Eötvös Lorand University in Budapest with a degree in Sociology in 1994, and
from Political Science in 1995. He has been professor of Political Sciences at the
Department of Political Studies of the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Pécs.
In 2004, he took a PhD degree, and became the research leader of the Századvég Civil
Academy. Since 2003, he has been the president of the Pólusok Association of Social
Sciences. He is Head of the Department Political Science and International Studies
at the University of Pécs, and from 2012, president of the Community Environment
College of the National Cooperation Fund.
Email: kakai.laszlo@pte.hu
5
Dr. Norbert Pap is a geographer and historian, has been working for the University of
Pécs (UP) since 1998. In 2004, he was appointed to an associate professor and then,
in 2005 to a head of department of Political Geography, Development and Regional
Studies. Eight of his students have been awarded PhD degree so far. The results of
his research work were published in more than 350 publications, including 11 own
books, and more than 70 papers published in academic journals. He became the
Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2018 and was appointed to be full
professor of the UP. Chair of Political Geography Subcommittee of Human Geography
Committee, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
Email: pnorbert@gamma.ttk.pte.hu
Dr. Péter Reményi studied geography and history at the University of Pécs where he
graduated in 2002 and started his doctoral studies in the Doctorate School of Earth
Sciences at the same University. From 2005 he works at the Institute of Geography at
the University of Pécs, from 2019 as associate professor. His field of research covers
political geography, Balkan studies, state and nation building and border studies.
Deputy director of the Center for Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan Studies, editor
of Mediterranean and Balkan Forum, member of the Hungarian Geographical Society.
He is the author of more than 100 papers.
Email: remko@gamma.ttk.pte.hu
Dr. Melinda Szappanyos is an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science
and International Studies of University of Pécs, Faculty of Humanities. Obtained her
PhD in public international law, specialized in international protection of human
right to water. Teaches both public international and European law.
Email: szappanyos.melinda@pte.hu
Dr. Zoltán Vörös, PhD is an assistant professor at the University of Pécs, Department
of Political Science and International Studies. His research and teaching interests
are covering International Relations, Security Studies, Political Geography and
Geography of Elections.
Email: voros.zoltan@pte.hu
6
Table of contents
Viktor Glied
Emerging water issues in the 21st century
10
Melinda Szappanyos
Development of “water law” in the 21st century
under the aegis of the UN
33
Péter Kacziba
Hegemony or partnership?
Turkey’s regional water diplomacy and the case of Cyprus
51
Zoltán Vörös
The water crisis of China and its consequences on Southeast Asia
81
Péter Reményi
Border disputes and water conflicts in the Western Balkans
107
Norbert Pap
Geopolitics of rivers and seas in the Carpathian-Balkan region:
The Hungarian perspective
123
László Kákai
May David defeat Goliath again?
A handful of civils against a Multinational Company
145
Appendix
172
7
FOREWORD
A little bit more than ten years ago a book on water conflicts was published.
We authors thought, we felt that the upcoming decade brings more serious
ecological problems and various global challenges than ever before. And
unfortunately we were not mistaken. This book was finalised during a rather
difficult period. The sudden onset of the COVID-19 crisis has not only made
the work of authors and editors more challenging but also transformed our
living and working environment, changed the way of casual and academic
interactions, and generally, altered the way we think about certainty and
reality. The pandemic highlighted the fragility of our academic, social and
global system and brought back the uncertainty of previous centuries. The
crisis is a forecast and a sign of warning at the same time: our current course
of growth and the relative prosperity can only be sustained if we change our
habits and finally began to confront the challenges of the 21st century.
The coronavirus emergency also demonstrated what climate change could
cause in the medium and long run. Although in this case, the development of
an actual crisis situation is more extended, the potential consequences are
more significant and even more harmful. Emerging water challenges perfectly
demonstrate these possible climate change-related outcomes. Water scarcity
is already the source of many intrastate and interstate conflicts, the cause of
food shortages and a driving force of migration flows. Existing and emerging
water conflicts are slowly but steadily developing as existential threats that
affect nearly everyone. Some individuals, communities, regions and states
are already facing severe water scarcity. For them, the absence of water is
an existential risk. For others, increasing water stress is a factor that limit
development and threatens the maintenance of adequate living standards.
For them, unbalance between demand and supply is a source of misery that,
hinders the satisfaction of welfare needs. Although in different ways, waterabundant countries also need to face the emerging realities and sooner or later
have to share their water resources. Water scarcity in other areas is a moral
and security challenge for these hydro-hegemons, which they either help to
resolve or face the geopolitical and socioeconomic consequences caused by
massive influxes of climate refugees.
8
Causes and solutions of water stress involve various actors from individual
to global levels. Studies of this book examine different water prospects of
the global (Viktor Glied, Melinda Szappanyos), regional (Norbert Pap, Péter
Kacziba, Péter Reményi, Zoltán Vörös), and local levels (László Kákai), while
nearly all papers include the description of national-level water behaviours.
The studies analyse different fields and topics but, after all, discuss similar
dilemmas in many respects. As the reader will soon recognise, the water
question reaches far beyond the basic human need category. In the 21st
century, water is a crucial element of power that, despite legal rules and
regulations, functions as a geopolitical advantage or disadvantage. The power
factor of water resources hinders the development of effective international
cooperation and transforms water into a commodity that can only be
controlled by those who have political, military, and economic advantages.
The politicisation of water, a global trend which is apparent in all our studies,
intensify water stress and increase the possibility of a climate change crisis,
which may have larger effects than the current the COVID-19 emergency.
This rather pessimistic conclusion may still be changed. As a recent
headline published by The Economist put it, there is still a “chance to flatten
the climate curve”. Effective water policy and management, legal reform
and regional cooperation, all outlined in our studies, are good examples of
changing the course of events and establishing a more sustainable water
use and more equitable water share. Hopefully, our book will highlight the
necessity of these fundamental changes and help to spread the word that
the environmental moment provided by the COVID-19 lockdowns should be
seized.
The Editors
Pécs, May 2020
9
Water Stress
VIKTOR GLIED
EMERGING WATER ISSUES IN THE
21ST CENTURY1
1. The water crisis and its background
It almost sounds like a cliché: the 21st century is going to revolve around the
fight for freshwater. Plenty of forecasts are available to describe ominous
scenarios of the natural water circulation radically changing from 2030 to
2050, and most of the regions in the world crossing the threshold of being able
to make up for the water used and polluted by humans. The most concerning
issues – which are directly and indirectly responsible for the crisis – are
environmental degradation due to overpopulation and water scarcity (lack of
water). In 2020, 7.8 billion people live on the globe, and based on calculations
supported by the current trends, by 2050 the population is going to reach 10.5
billion.2 However, the volume of available and accessible freshwater is not
going to drastically increase, which means that unless (currently unavailable)
revolutionary technological developments take place, the same amount of
freshwater will have to be distributed to much more people.
When issues related to freshwater are analysed, it is important to highlight
that the assessment is not only concerned about the existence or lack of
freshwater, the systematic pollution of waters and the use of cross-border
surface (lakes, rivers) and underground waters, but all branches in which
the existence of water is of essential importance (Hohmann – Pánovics, 2019:
305). Therefore we shall emphasise food production, industrial production
and energy production, as well as all related sectors that use water.
Only 3 percent of the global water resources is freshwater, but most of this
is located on the poles, i.e. very hard to access. Surface waters comprise 1.2
1
2
This research project was supported by the European Union. EFOP-3.6.3VEKOP-16-2017-00007 – Young researchers from talented students – Fostering scientific
careers in higher education.
Worldometer: https://www.worldometers.info/world-population (Downloaded 10 04
2020).
10
Viktor Glied
percent of the total freshwater volume, while underground waters comprise
30.1%. According to estimates, the total volume of water resources on Earth
comprise 1386 million km3, but the distribution is extremely uneven, since
there are regions with an abundance of freshwater and there are – to an
increasing degree – regions with water scarcity or regions vulnerable from
the perspective of freshwater supply (Szappanyos, 2013: 11). Also, we should
really be focusing on renewable water resources instead of the existing
supply, when we are discussing the security of supply and the volume of
future reserves. So, if we consider the relationship between volumes and
consumption, we are getting a constant volume that is unevenly distributed
among different regions. The constant population growth presumes having
9-10 billion people by 2050 and 11-13 billion by 2100, thus the volume of
consumption is also constantly growing, affecting the public utility, industrial
and agricultural sectors, as well as energy production. We need water to live,
to manufacture products, to water plants and for animal husbandry, water
is needed to cool nuclear power plants, for transportation, and a specified
volume of water is necessary to operate hydroelectric power plants which
produce electricity. Considering the current consumption, the freshwater
resources would be enough for almost 20 billion people, but if we also take
into account the volume required for food production, this figure cannot
exceed 14-16 billion (Szilágyi, 2013: 15).
Mankind currently uses about 50% of the existing freshwater supply, and
this rate is expected to increase to 70% in a couple of decades, according to
forecasts. The main reason for that is the explosive population growth in
North, Central and East Africa, in the Middle East, in Central and South Asia, as
well as in countries of the Far East, causing a huge increase of water demand.
The population of Earth increases by almost 80 million annually. Since 1950,
the population of the world has tripled, and considering all demands, water
usage has increased sevenfold. Considering renewable water supply, annually
less than 1600 m3 of potable water is available per person. According to a
widely accepted notion, considering vital natural resources this is a volume
that is enough to provide for the population, but there are regions where this
rate does not reach 700, or in some places even 500 m3 (Guppy – Anderson,
2017). For the global water crisis to worsen, the reduction of the total volume
of precipitation on Earth is not even necessary, it is already enough if the
11
Water Stress
distribution changes and less gets to drier regions and more to the regions
already having abundant waters supplies (including seas and oceans). And
this is exactly what is happening, climate change gradually transforms our
weather systems in a way that the distribution of precipitation changes from
a state of balance toward extremities. For this reason, significant parts of
Africa, some regions of Central America, some parts of the Middle East and
Asia, as well as Southern Europe faces permanent water scarcity.
The water cycle means the continuous and natural circulation of water
throughout the hydrosphere, sustained by the gravity of the Earth. This cycle
provides the volume of natural precipitation and water infiltrated into the
ground, transpiration and evaporation and then condensation once again. It is
worth noting that a significant share of condensation happens above seas and
oceans, which would seem to be water “lost” at first, but clearly it is not lost,
because it is part of the natural process.
Table 1. Renewed freshwater and type of water scarcity
Renewed freshwater (annually)
Type of water scarcity
(m³ per year per person)
< 500
500-1000
1000-1700
> 1700
Permanent water scarcity
Chronic water scarcity
Temporary water scarcity
No water scarcity
Source: The author
The term “global water scarcity” has become a part of our everyday lives.
First of all, acclaimed researchers of this topic, like Peter H. Gleick (1993),
Vandana Shiva (2016), Lester R. Brown, Paul Erlich (1996), or Sandra Postel
(1996) have been giving warnings about the increasingly severe crisis, joining
the leaders of global organisations, but the issue of water is still not receiving
enough attention in political discourse and in the media. By the early 21st
century, voices warning of the negative impacts of climate change and
ecological catastrophes have finally broken through the wall of indifference.
There is nothing surprising in this statement, since almost everyone already
perceives the increasingly severe impacts of climate change. If nothing else, a
12
Viktor Glied
shift of seasons or the “unpredictability” of weather must have been noticed
by everyone. It is still a question how to integrate the water crisis into a widerange research that would be able to systematically organise different forms
of environmental problems, and develop models for the future.
Studies differentiate between three types of water crisis (Lall et al., 2018).
The first one has reviewed the options of accessing pure potable water. This
category includes the lack of infrastructure, the management of water supply
and the condition of the public water utility system. The second includes
different forms of water pollution, including surface and underground waters.
The third group evaluates problems caused by water scarcity, by monitoring
the consumption of natural resources and energy sources. Obviously, the
water crisis types are connected in many ways, they supplement each other
and mutually impact one another.
When examining the elements of the crisis, it is clear that most analyses
basically attribute the reasons of increasingly rapid water depletion to
overpopulation. The World Health Organisation, World Bank, Global Water
and the Global Water Challenge all agree with this. It is widely known that both
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)3 launched in 2000 and the World
Water Forum programme strived to survey how many people are affected by
water scarcity all over the world. The MDGs included halving the number of
people without safe access to potable water by 2015. Point 7 of the initiative
declared that in 1990 2.6 billion people had access to pure water, which would
be increased to 4.2 billion by 2015. Many of the mechanisms aiming to reach
the goals of the programme were included in supranational and national
environmental and development policy objectives. The overall intention was
to make tap water available to more people, and secondary/tertiary objectives
included efforts against polluted water and the deterioration of public water
utility systems, as well as reducing regional vulnerability.
Experts in the field of water crisis also agree that the solution requires the
joint existence of three conditions: (1) technological development OR available
technologies; (2) political willingness, government action, supported by the
contributions of civil society organisations and global/regional organisations;
(3) financial background. In many cases, neither of these conditions are
3
Millennium Development Goals: https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals (Downloaded 17
01 2020).
13
Water Stress
provided, but sometimes the lack of only one hinders development. In the
case of poor countries, weak financial background prevents infrastructural
development, and when the necessary investments are implemented from a
loan, the repayment of such a loan turns out to be problematic. Also, in many
cases, the creditor organisation or country requests guarantees, manifested
in opening up markets, liberalising certain sectors (public utilities,
telecommunication, IT, infrastructure development, construction works, etc.).
In the long term, water scarcity combined with other economic, social
or political issues almost always leads to conflict (Pandey, 2011: 161-165).
Acquiring, securing, alienating water resources, taking efforts to do so
can lead to international disputes and conflicts, and can also cause violent
incidents between countries in hostile relationships. Pollution can also
affect the water resources of other countries, while governments in a more
favourable water strategy position can reduce the allowed flow or impact
the quality thereof. Also, countries with more military potential can use
their water policy superiority to threaten, influence and coerce other people,
dependent on them. States upstream of a river can also use or pollute a
significant part of the water, putting downstream countries in a vulnerable
position. This makes cooperation unavoidable in water-related affairs. It is
clear that water can both be a source of conflicts and a factor contributing to
cooperation (Ligetvári, 2018: 17).
Permanent drought can encourage governments to increase irrigation and
take measures to control flooding. If the increase of water out-take from rivers
and lakes reaches a degree that already has a negative impact on ecological
balance and endangers water supply to countries and regions geographically
“downstream” of the surface source, the development of a conflict can be
taken for granted. Disputes arising on international level are typically paired
with food shortage and rapid demographic growth in regions already full of
historic, ethnic or religious conflicts (North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle
East, Central Asia, Central America). Experience shows that international
intervention (if a major power has interest in that) in many cases does not
aim to change the reasons of scarcity, but strives for a political arrangement,
and in many cases, as mentioned above, provides aid in exchange for the
liberalisation of local strategic sectors (energy, public utilities, processing/
manufacturing, construction, telecommunication) (Glied, 2009: 16-17).
14
Viktor Glied
The WEF Global Risk Report4 in 2020 categorised short-term risks
impacting the world into two groups. According to the position of the financial
sector, the deterioration of economic and commercial outlook is the biggest
threat, with internal political instability ranking second, and problems related
to the destruction of the environment only ranking third and fourth. To the
same questions, 88% of political decision-makers answered that resolving
environmental crisis was the most urgent challenge. What is more, 86% also
thought that challenges related to water are also among the most critical
issues affecting the future of humanity.
We are still full of questions. Many scientists – and also politicians – openly
doubt the existence of reasons of climate change attributable to human
activity (anthropogenic) or obvious correlations. There are climate-sceptics
who – following conviction or “external” pressure – try to deny or belittle
environmental destruction and climate change. At the same time, some
people forge reports, demolish their authenticity due to inaccuracies, or
simply overstate the significance of problems in order to draw attention to
challenges, claiming that these otherwise fail to break through the very high
stimulus thresholds. And since there are serious economic, social and political
conflicts in the background, it is not easy to find a solution (Kacziba, 2017:
117-119).
2. Limited freshwater resources:
conflicts and challenges
According to the data of the WHO, in 2018 only 71% of the population of Earth,
about 5.3-5.5 billion people had access to a secure source of potable water that
is free from contaminants. Almost 7 billion people have a freshwater source
(of any quality) near them that is accessible within 30 minutes, however 650700 million people have no secure access to permanent and pure freshwater,
while 140 million people can only consume untreated surface water. These
data could also be considered encouraging, but it is important to highlight
that approximately two billion people can only access unclean water that
4
The Global Risks Report 2020. World Economic Forum. Insight Report, 15th Edition.
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risk_Report_2020.pdf (Downloaded 13 04
2020).
15
Water Stress
is more or less polluted with excrement. Consuming polluted water causes
illnesses, such as acute diarrhoea, dysentery, typhoid or polio. For this reason,
annually about 800,000 people die all over the world and 300 million get ill
for shorter or longer periods.5 About 22% of the healthcare institutions of
developing countries do not have tap water, do not have sewage removal and
waste collection/treatment. These factors are also responsible for additional
illnesses, similarly to the complex problem groups of climate change, the
increasing vulnerability of water supplies, overconsumption, wasting and
pollution.
The consumption of polluted water affects tens of millions of people
in environmentally deprived regions of Africa and Asia. In addition to
hindering or entirely terminating community supply, water scarcity has
other consequences as well: agricultural yield reduces due to overirrigation,
extreme weather conditions (drought, floods) and natural disasters, because
growing areas gradually degrade, and residents cannot get basic nutrients in
the adequate quantities. Sooner or later, this is going to encourage hundreds
of thousands of people to seek better livelihoods elsewhere. While propensity
to adapt is missing in many cases, willingness is not enough either, since when
specific environmental conditions exist, the efficiency of measures taken to
reduce food shortage is very weak, and agricultural yield cannot be naturally
increased above a specific volume.
As Lester R. Brown clearly explains in his book titled Plan B4.0 (2009:
38-44), the depletion of freshwater will have a dramatic impact on agricultural
production, primarily in countries that fully deplete their vulnerable
underground water supplies. This includes Saudi Arabia and most of the states
on the southern side of the Arabian Peninsula, the northern part of China, as
well as the Great Plains and Midwest areas of the US. In Hebei Province in
China the level of underground water reservoirs is reduced by almost three
metres annually, and there are regions which dry out completely, because
they use 1000 m3 of water to produce 1 tonne of grain. If this trend continues,
soon 130 million Chinese citizens will have no access to adequate quantities
of food and the country will need to import even more. Similar processes are
seen in India as well, where 15% of the country’s food production and the lives
5
Drinking water, key facts. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/drinkingwater (Downloaded 03 02 2020).
16
Viktor Glied
of 175 million people depend on underground waters. We should also mention
Pakistan, Mexico, Egypt, South Africa, Sudan, Ethiopia and California where
the permanent or final shrinkage of water reserves is threatening.
Figure 1. Water stress by country, 2020
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Water_stress_2019_WRI.png
(Downloaded 03 04 2019)
Social demands contain the smaller share of global water consumption,
while the majority is comprised of the water used by the industry, and
especially agriculture. In the latter case it is quite typical that landowners
used to traditional agricultural methods, who are unable or unwilling to
innovate, overirrigate the land, cause soil salinization, thus reducing already
eroding productive land. During the next decades, environmental scarcity is
presumably going to result in five types of conflicts:
1. local conflicts which are caused by the deterioration of local resources;
2. ethnic and social conflicts caused by migration;
3. internal wars, uprisings, coups, independence efforts in larger areas;
4. international violent acts for the possession of raw materials;
5. global problems which accentuate the North-South or East-West conflicts,
or even the conflicts between civilisations (Homer-Dixon, 2013: 14).
17
Water Stress
The “usual” trend continued in the 2010s as well: the five major water
consuming countries where the daily consumption exceeded 300 litres/per
person included the USA, Australia, Italy, Japan and Mexico. In states like
Mozambique, Rwanda, Haiti, Ethiopia or Uganda this value is less than 15 litres
a day. To be more accurate: this is obviously not only caused by social demand,
since the production of 1 kg beef requires more than 14,500 litres, and the
manufacturing of a microchip requires (directly or indirectly) 16,000 litres
of water. According to the forecasts of the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations (FAO), IPCC and the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), with the current trends continuing, Australia, South
Africa, the Caribbean and the southwestern regions of South America, as well
as parts of the southwestern states of the US, such as California, New Mexico
and Texas will have to face more permanent and extreme droughts in the
next 50-100 years. The already polluted Chinese rivers and lakes dry out at an
increasingly rapid pace, and twenty lakes are simply expected to disappear
in the next decades. The 13.3 billion USD fund allocated by the government
for protecting the surface waters is only enough to slow down detrimental
processes, but unable to have them reversed. Countries in Central Asia face
a similar situation due to the overuse of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya
rivers, while Russia and Kazakhstan also face serious issues related to the
deterioration of water quality.6
Throughout Latin America, water scarcity is a serious problem in many
places, especially in Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru
where the disappearance of glaciers and the abundance of hydroelectric power
plants cause issues. Also, in many countries of Central America, permanent
drought and water scarcity have dramatic impacts on agricultural yield and
thus food prices. Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama
were all seriously affected by the consequences of the drought in 20082009 and another drought since 2015. But no one should think that Europe
is absolutely alright either. Since the early 2000s, water situation has been
gradually deteriorating in Western and Southern Europe. Catalonia and other
regions of Spain were also forced to purchase water from France, similarly to
6
Wegerich, Kai – Van Rooijen, Daniel – Soliev, Ilkhom – Mukhamedova, Nozilakhon: Water
Security in the Syr Darya Basin. Water 7(9) 2015, 4657-4684. https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/281282042_Water_Security_in_the_Syr_Darya_Basin
18
Viktor Glied
Cyprus which had to purchase from Greece, and Israel which purchased from
Turkey. In dry years, certain types of water restriction measures are often
introduced during the summer and the autumn in Southern Italy, Croatia,
Cyprus, Malta and Southern Spain.
In the early 2000s, major urban areas in California, then São Paolo and
Perth (Australia) were threatened by dramatic water scarcity, but what we
are currently seeing in Cape Town is unprecedented. South Africa has been
hit by severe draught since 2015, while the population of the city with fourmillion residents continues to rise sharply. The total shutdown of central
water public utility service was almost implemented in 2018 in Cape Town,
because the level of the water reservoirs around the area was so low that the
city council had to implement serious restrictions, affecting both industrial
and residential consumption. They ordered the closure of public pools,
fountains and mist sprays, and then at the end of January they announced that
in case the residents fail to adapt to the severe crisis, on 12 April (Day Zero)
they are closing water pipelines (with the exception of public institutions)
and setting up 200 public water distribution points, at which policemen will
distribute 25 litres of water to each person. Additionally, they started to drill
wells to supply groundwater to the system, and also began the construction
of desalination plants to produce potable water from the sea. The authorised
daily volume of 87 litres was reduced to 50 in February.7
The so-called Day Zero was pushed to June/July following the measures
taken, and then postponed to 2019, since the period from May to July has seen
more rain than expected, and water reservoirs could again be filled to 35
and then to 50 percent. The city council has adopted different levels of water
restriction, providing accurate data to residents about the current volumes,
total consumption, and also the allowed water consumption for each person.
This value is currently 105 litres of water per day.8
7
8
Cape Town Told to Cut Water Use or Face Losing Supply by 12 April, The Guardian, 24
January 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/24/cape-town-to-run-outof-water-by-12-april-amid-worst-drought-in-a-century (Downloaded 21 03 2020).
Water Dashboard, City of Cape Town, https://coct.co/water-dashboard (Downloaded
05 04 2020).
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Water Stress
2.1. Sustainable Development Goals and the 2018 IPCC report
According to forecasts, by 2030, 42% of the water usage on Earth is going
to take place in four countries (China, India, Brazil and South Africa), while
almost half of all countries in the world will have to face water scarcity. The
reports issued by the IPCC and other organisations steadfastly emphasise
– in addition to concrete recommendations on solutions and cross-border
cooperation – the importance of adaptation, as well as the improvement
of the following systems: (1) water management systems; (2) agriculture
and forestry; (3) protection capabilities of coasts, low-level regions; (4)
infrastructure development of industries using water; (5) improvement of
water cleansing systems (Wouters, 2010: 4-7).
According to calculations of the UN World Health Organization (WHO)
annually about 50 billion USD would be needed to slightly improve access to
freshwater and water quality. At the United Nations Sustainable Development
Summit in September 2015 in New York, leaders of the world committed to
creating a new development framework for the period up to 2030, which
they called Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). The 17 objective groups
approved unanimously by 193 countries set up a new global standard for
development. Goal 6 is named Clean Water and Sanitation and specifies the
following targets:
•
By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable
drinking water for all;
•
Achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all;
•
Improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping
and minimizing release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving
the proportion of untreated wastewater and substantially increasing
recycling and safe reuse globally;
•
Substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure
sustainable withdrawals and supply of freshwater to address water
scarcity and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from
water scarcity;
•
Implement integrated water resources management at all levels, including
through transboundary cooperation as appropriate;
20
•
Viktor Glied
By 2020, protect and restore water-related ecosystems, including
mountains, forests, wetlands, rivers, aquifers and lakes.9
This goal also highlights the protection of natural ecosystems, stating that
the restoration of balance can ensure balance in the other systems. The biggest
threat according to the statement is that 40% of the world’s grain production
can be endangered by water scarcity and the degradation of arable land. These
contribute to vulnerability and social injustices. Agriculture uses up 69% of
freshwater, while industry is responsible for 19% and human consumption is
only 12%. Therefore the member states agreed that first of all the agricultural
water use should be made more sustainable. By 2030, the programme is aiming
to improve access to water for a total of 3 billion people. But the targets also
include the importance of regular and thorough hand-washing, as well as the
construction of sewage systems, since almost 1 billion people are not using
toilets and defecate openly, and 90% of such people live in rural areas. It must
be emphasised that in total, 11% of the world’s countries are affected by water
stress, but in 22 countries this rate is over 70%. These regions include North
Africa, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and some of the areas in Sub-Saharan
Africa.10
The IPCC report on the effects of climate change (issued in October 2018)
paints a more worrying picture than ever before.11 According to the research
summary compiled in more than 2 years, a drastic, 50 percent cut of emissions
would keep the rate of mean temperature increase of the globe below 1.5
degrees Celsius between 2030 and 2052. In this case, different social and
economic systems would be able to adapt to the changing circumstances.
But a temperature rise of 2 degrees or more would have unimaginable
consequences. Already observed extreme weather phenomena, devastating
floods, permanent drought and record-high temperature waves would become
common. Coral reefs, ice caps can disappear completely, and the area of arable
9
10
11
A fenntartható fejlődési célok áttekintése [Overview – Sustainable Development Goals],
Budapest Water Summit, https://www.budapestwatersummit.hu/vilagtalalkozo/
attekintes/attekintes-a-fenntarthato-fejlodesi-celokrol-537 (Downloaded 01 01 2019).
Sustainable Development Goal 6. Synthesis Report on Water and Sanitation, 2018. 6 Clean
Water and Sanitation. United Nations. New York - Geneva, 2018.
IPCC Report 2018, https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf (Downloaded 02 01
2020).
21
Water Stress
land is also expected to drastically decrease. The disappearance of ice from
polar regions may be one of the most severe problem nodes. The melting of ice
in Greenland only can supply approximately 250 billion tonnes of freshwater
to the ocean, which is less dense than salty seawater, and thus it will gradually
increase the level of seas and oceans. By 2018, the area of the North Pole
covered by ice shrank to 4.46 million km2, and the summer ice areas were
reduced by the total of 40 percent. The loss of ice is not merely a consequence,
but also an accelerator of climate change: as ice cover disappears, ocean and
atmosphere streams can change, and the operation of the so-called oceanic
conveyor belt turns upside-down. The radical reduction of the ice cover is not
only observed at the poles, the glaciers of high mountains also move back. It is
quite clear that the melting at the poles impacts global processes.12
Several independent analysis models confirm that the melting of the
Greenland ice will contribute to a global sea level rise of 27 cm by 2100, and
ice in the Antarctica stores ten times more water than the Greenland ice, so
the increase can reach up to 45-50 cm. This can endanger coastal areas at a
lower level, and areas such as small islands in the Pacific Ocean, such as the
Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu, or the Maldives located in the Indian
Ocean. Around these islands, sea level increases by 1.2 cm annually, destroying
agricultural produce and gradually covering the infrastructure (Vallero,
2016). Protection could be provided by constructing dams and barriers, but
the governments cannot cover such costly investments. So the people living
in these areas have no other chance than to flee or acquire land from other
countries. The first officially recognised “climate refugee” group moved from
Tuvalu to New Zealand in 2005, but the state has seen continuous emigration
since then. The Maldives has already negotiated with Sri Lanka and India in
2009 about purchasing small lands, and after 2015 Kiribati took efforts to buy
land for its people in the Republic of Fiji (1500 km away), to no avail.13
The eastern and southern basin of the Mediterranean Sea is also home to
significant coastal areas, such as the Mediterranean zone at Morocco. Due
12
13
Bakó Gábor, Mi történhet, ha eltűnik a sarki jég? [What happens when ice caps melt?] ,
National Geographic, 11 December 2017, https://ng.hu/fold/2017/12/11/mi-tortenhet-haeltunik-a-sarki-jeg (Downloaded 23 11 2019).
Caramel, Laurence: Besieged by the rising tides of climate change, Kiribati buys land in
Fiji https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/01/kiribati-climate-changefiji-vanua-levu
22
Viktor Glied
to the rising sea levels, saltwater gradually enters the freshwater drainage
basins and the river systems, and in many places it also leaks into underground
waters. In the future, climate change is going to be the main contributor of
scarcity affecting surface waters in the Middle East and North Africa. Climate
change can increase water scarcity and tensions related to water in many
ways: the decreasing volume of precipitation and the increasing average
temperature both contribute to the increasing water demand of people,
animals, plants, the industry and agriculture. According to forecasts, climate
change will cause the biggest water shortages in Iraq, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Israel. In Tunisia, Algeria and Libya, social
and economic reasons cause the increase in water scarcity.
It is important to highlight that climate protection “catch-up” programmes
for developing countries would be essential to the developed world as well.
Assistance would not only be necessary for reasons of equity and humanity,
but also because of the need to establish and preserve stability and security
(Tarrósy, 2010: 14). According to some forecasts, Europe and the Western
world can be hit by a wave of millions of climate refugees in the next two
decades, which would have unforeseeable economic and social consequences,
especially considering how ineffectively the European Union handled the
migration crisis in 2014-2015.
2.2. Best practices or mere visions?
But to balance the aforementioned negative tones, let’s see some forwardthinking initiatives aiming to protect the rivers and the lakes, and to clean the
seas. For the purpose of protecting transnational water bases and resolving
arising conflicts, continuously operating committees and organisations set
up for cooperation have been present since the late 1980s. According to the
database created by the Oregon State University, containing a vast amount
of information, there are 263 international water supply bases all over the
world, covering 60 percent of the surface freshwater volume, and shared
by 148 countries. 33 countries have more than one drainage basin in their
territory, but there are states that are not sharing any surface waters with
other countries (e.g. Australia). Europe has the most cross-border drainage
basins (69), followed by Africa (59), Asia (57) and South America (38) (Wolf et
23
Water Stress
al., 2003). The rapid changes at the end of the 20th century and the worrying
problems related to water forced the states sharing surface waters to create
new types of cooperation, which mostly commenced their operations very
actively. Different kinds of committees and bodies were set up with the main
objective of peacefully resolving water-related issues. These include the joint
committees established with regard to the Nile and the Mekong river, which
perform extremely important and forward-thinking work, not only for the
diplomatic arrangement of water-sharing and water flow issues, but in many
other areas as well, from combating water pollution to raising awareness and
communicating with the relevant non-governmental organisations.
There are currently 507 known international conflicts related to freshwater,
covered by more than 1300 acts of cooperation (treaties, programmes,
projects, institutions, joint actions, etc.) and approximately 250 “freshwater”
treaties exist. These affect more than a hundred drainage basins and 2.8 billion
people. Many of them are so-called bilateral intergovernmental agreements,
and one-third is adopted with the participation of three or more states. It must
be noted however, than only eleven treaties exist with the participation of all
affected parties (stakeholders).14 The UN takes a significant role in operating
many of these cooperations, and it sometimes also mediates in disputed
issues. It should also be highlighted that interdependence and reciprocity are
increasingly perceivable in water-related issues, and nowadays such countries
also show willingness to cooperate which used to reject it or seemed unwilling
to do so. A rather good example is China, an upstream country of the Mekong
river (Vörös, 2020), which alone dominates water supplies, constructs dams
and reservoirs in its own parts, but by now it seems to be willing to listen(!)
to the requests and suggestions of downstream countries, and even seems
inclined to cooperate in certain issues.
In the early 21st century, we need even tighter international collaboration
than before to solve complex issues, argues the UN programme for
transnational water cooperation, which collects best practices according to
the relevant topics. Participant countries of the project continuously share
14
Baranyai, Gábor, Transboundary Water Cooperation in the European Union: a Hydro-Political
Gap Assessment, Water Quality Priority Area of the Danube Region Strategy, 30 June 2015,
https://vtk.uni-nke.hu/document/vtk-uni-nke-hu/transboundary-water-cooperationconf-by-danube-strat.original.pdf (Downloaded 11 05 2019).
24
Viktor Glied
knowledge with each other to ensure that good practices can be effectively
applied elsewhere. Just to give an example: such best practices include an
experimental database created for the Nile Basin, which tries to channel civil
society actors into regional cooperation, to ensure that up-to-date data can be
disclosed about the social and economic changes affecting water consumption.
Currently the water drainage system of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna
rivers is in one of the most critical states. This area of 5.08 million km2 is
the home to 700 million people, and the enormous drainage base is shared
by China, Bhutan, India and Bangladesh. Mutual distrust (and even hostile
relations) has been improving since 2013, and hopefully the dialogue initiative
related to the Brahmaputra river will enable concluding a series of treaties in
the next few years.15
It is important to also highlight a project which only partially affects rivers,
since its primary aim is to clean the oceans. According to estimates, 1.15-2.41
million tonnes of plastic are disposed of annually into seas and oceans from
the rivers, with extra volumes directly thrown into the seas. Since 1950,
approximately 5.5 billion tonnes of plastic have been disposed into the seas
and oceans (or to coastal areas) (Corbett, 2018). Most of this waste pile cannot
sink, and it flows on the surface, merged into one block by the streams, thus
creating huge waste islands. The biggest such waste pile is located in the
northern Pacific Ocean, between Hawaii and California. Its size can reach 1.6
million km2, but it is hard to find from the air, because the waste covers a
massive area, and it constantly cuts, breaks, and then reassembles. The “island’
was first discovered in 1988 and serious research began in 2008 to map the
phenomenon and to assess the impacts. The plastic pieces gradually dissolve
into tiny particles in the sunlight. These particles enter the food chain and
poison marine organisms, and have indirect effect on human health as well.
The most promising project so far to eliminate the waste islands was
launched in 2013, when a Dutch inventor, Boyan Slat developed the idea for The
Ocean Cleanup. The idea turned into reality in March 2018 when the clean-up
operations have begun. The objective of the 80-member team is to use a 600
m long plastic pipeline system to fence and “fish out” the plastic waste. The
part of this system floating on the water surface is similar to a boom barrier,
15
UN data: Good Practices in Transboundary Water Cooperation, UN-Water, http://www.ais.
unwater.org/ais/TPA_Transboundary/map/#showresults (Downloaded 24 02 2020).
25
Water Stress
while the part up to three metres deep in the water is a filter which catches
plastic waste, but allows marine organisms pass below. According to the
original design, the streams will slowly drift the waste toward the net, which
can be collected from a ship and transported on shore for recycling purposes.
This way, most of the island will be eliminated in ten years.16 The cleanup
programme launched in October 2018 has been suspended in January 2019
due to technical and design reasons.
3. Conclusion
Polluted rivers, water scarcity and lack of freshwater, climate change,
overpopulation, vulnerable regions and millions of forced migrants,
disappearing lakes, rising floods, deteriorating public utility services,
dramatic visions of conflicts and wars. These are the characteristics of the
“water issues” of the 21st century. The solution – or at least slowing or maybe
halting the negative processes – lies in the possibility of thorough international
cooperation which could operate much more efficiently than before. It is a
reason to be optimistic that many examples at different levels and depths of
actual cooperation exist between the affected parties.
However, meanwhile the Aral Sea in Central Asia (once the sixth largest
lake on Earth) and Lake Chad are simply drying out, Lake Urmia in Iran
has lost 60% of its original area, and lakes in Southern Australia are also
intensively shrinking. They share some circumstances, for example that all
lakes are found in generally dry regions. Still, their devastation was caused
by human intervention, accelerated by climate change. The waters of the most
polluted rivers in the world are not even visible due to the waste floating on
the surface, the colours of the Yellow River and the Yangtze in China cannot be
seen because of the chemicals spilt into them. Almost five hundred factories
are located on the banks of the Citarum River in Indonesia. Annually 300,000
tonnes of wastewater are spilt uncleaned into the Riachuelo River in Buenos
Aires, but the situation of the Mississippi is not much better, since its estuary
is practically a “dead zone” where no organism can survive. The series of
examples could be continued for long, but one thing is sure: if the current
16
Project website: https://www.theoceancleanup.com (Downloaded 13 04 2020).
26
Viktor Glied
trends continue, by 2050 more than 4 billion people will suffer from the lack
of freshwater.
One of the most important questions of the 21st century is whether humanity
will be able to resolve increasingly severe global environmental and social
problems, transform its thinking and behaviour to make the future more
sustainable and liveable. Will humanity be able to limit the negative processes
of globalisation, reduce global inequalities and change the economic model
relying on fossil energy sources and permanent growth? As the problems
related to water and the attempts to resolve them clearly show, 20th century
reflexes are unable to answer the extremely complex challenges of the 21st
century. New ways of thinking, openness, consciousness about water and
even deeper cooperation will be required to develop and implement new
approaches in Europe and all over the world.
It must be clearly stated, nowadays it is becoming a relevant question
whether potable freshwater will run out in the 21st century. What do we see
on the news in 2020? Country-sized forest and bush fires, cities choking on
smog, dozens of millions of people living among piles of waste, polluted rivers
and lakes, enormous waste islands floating on ocean and sea surfaces, animals
eating up plastic and dying, species disappearing in a rapidly increasing pace,
regions drying up and a new pandemic which solved the decade-long issue of
air pollution on a whim, causing dramatic economic and social impacts which
we are still unable to fully comprehend. But everyone knows that this is not
going to last forever. When the COVID-19 pandemic will be over, everything
will start over again. If we are unable to learn from our mistakes, new and
more severe problems will have to be faced. Most researchers agree that
climate change cannot be stopped, currently adaptation seems to be the only
viable measure. In order to resolve serious ecological challenges, the first
stage is typically recognising the problem, and finding intention and will to
find the solutions. Until this stage is not taken, and prominent politicians such
as Donald Trump or Jair Bolsonaro cannot recognise or consciously sweep
problems under the rug, a systematic change is almost impossible. Thus, we
are practically signing the death sentence for planet Earth and the billions of
people living on it.
Are these big words? Of course. Are you shaking your head, dear reader?
Please believe, we do not have any idea of how life on Earth will look like in
27
Water Stress
100 years, either. But we do know how it looked like a hundred years ago
and fifty years ago. It is clear that as the population continuously increases,
all our existing natural resources are distributed among more and more
hungry mouths. It is also clear that according to our current knowledge, the
volume of arable land and food that can be produced will not be increased.
Agricultural land erodes, dwindles, in many places, instead of food, speciality
crops and energy crops are produced in order to maintain other systems and
to have results which may contribute to slowing down climate change. We
irrigate and produce genetically modified plants to have the required amount
of food. Meanwhile, more and more dams are constructed on the rivers to
produce electricity, drastically decreasing water flow which has an impact
on both agriculture and plants/animals, also hindering the security of supply
to communities. A vicious circle which makes the dystopian works of sci-fi
writers come true, in which humanity seeks liveable worlds in other universes,
after destroying Earth. There is only one Earth, and when we cut down the
last tree and killed the last bee, polluted and drank up the last drop of water,
we will be able to be proud of our economic and technological achievements.
For an extremely short period. And then we are doomed...
28
Viktor Glied
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31
M ELINDA SZAPPANYOS
DEVELOPMENT OF “WATER LAW” IN THE
21ST CENTURY UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UN1
1. Introduction
Certain fields of international law gain importance, and thus, attention
periodically. Surely, international environment, politics, international relations
determine when these periods actually do come. But in the last few decades
a new factor appeared, which continuously pushes public international law
to develop in certain fields: climate change. Though the existence, extent and
effects of climate change are highly disputed, the connecting issue of water
crisis seems to be generally more accepted as a valid problem: “[A]s we enter
the twenty-first century a global water crisis is threatening the security,
stability and environmental sustainability of all nations [...]” (UN Water
Development Report 2003: XXII). As a consequence, one of the fields coming
to the forefront of public international law, getting continuous attention in the
last twenty years in particular, is “water law”.
From the beginning of the 21st century the Organization of the United
Nations (hereinafter UN) designated itself a “collective protector” of certain
values,2 including human dignity, freedom and respect for nature. The UN has
been true to this promise in terms of remarkable activity in one particular
field: water. After giving an operative definition for water law by making a
non-exhaustive list of the most important fields it covers, this paper attempts
to collect and briefly analyse some of their public international law related
developments under the aegis of the UN. We will focus on newly adopted sources
of public international law, mostly limited to international conventions; but
also covering some changes in soft law sources, and emerging tendencies in
1
2
This research project was supported by the European Union. EFOP-3.6.3VEKOP-16-2017-00007 – Young researchers from talented students – Fostering scientific
careers in higher education.
UN General Assembly: A/RES/55/2 United Nations Millennium Declaration, 18 September
2000. Points 2 and 6.
33
Water Stress
international monitoring if they represent important changes from the last
century. The intention is to give an overview of the developments of the last
20 years and predict the near future. Detailed analysis of all sources of water
law would be impossible, thus, in Chapter one the main logic of selection will
be explained.
2. “Water Law” and the subject of further analysis
2.1. Operative definition
“Water law” is a widely used, but hardly defined term. It is true for both
national legal systems and public international law. Traditionally, water law
refers to the collection of legal norms, which regulate one or more aspects
of water. Explained by the UN: “Law provides a set of enforceable rules. [...]
Water law sets the framework for stake-holders’ use of water resources and
responds to pressures from demographic, economic and social drivers” (UN
Water Development Report 2009: 49). This definition is too general to enable
us to identify the actual “uses” of this natural resource. It also does not help
that in all legal systems, including international, regional and national level,
the norms regulating water are fragmented (Szilágyi, 2018: 44). Of course, this
fragmentation seems logical, if we consider how important water as a natural
resource is, and how essential it is for every sphere of life, as Kofi Annan states
in the foreword of the first World Water Development Report in 2003: “[T]
he centrality of freshwater in our lives cannot be overestimated” (UN Water
Development Report 2003: XIX).
Still, at least an exemplificative list of main fields of “water law” should
be composed for the purpose of this paper, to enable us to select the sources
which made a difference in public international law in this century. We invoke
the help of the UN. Two program documents shall firstly be mentioned and
analysed: the United Nations Millennium Declaration3 and the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development.4 The UN General Assembly (hereinafter GA)
3
4
Ibid.
UN General Assembly: A/RES/70/1 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, 21 October 2015.
34
Melinda Szappanyos
resolution on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) mentions two topics
(on target level) closely related to water: Goal 7, target 10 intends to reduce the
number of people without access to drinking water and sanitation, while Goal
7, target 9 aims “to stop the unsustainable exploitation of water resources by
developing water management strategies.”5 By using a human rights-based
approach (Nelson, 2007), the goal of halving the population without access
to safe drinking water, together with and the emphasis put on the promotion
and protection of human rights, are usually considered as an important step
toward the recognition of the human right to water and sanitation (Meier et
al., 2013: 120).
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), prepared as a follow-up and continuation of the
MDGs, went further and established more concrete and numerous targets
related to water under Goal 6.6 From the detailed targets of this goal three
main fields seem to crystalize as room for international cooperation (also
identified as an individual target in Goal 6.a) in the form of law-making and
law enforcement: a) recognition, promotion and protection of the human
right to water and sanitation (also focusing on equality in the enjoyment of
this human right) (Goal 6.1 and 6.2), b) integrated water management (which
ensures effective use of water) (Goals 6.5 and 6.4), and c) environmental
protection of water resources (Goals 6.6. and 6.3). Using these three fields as
a basis for our analyses seems to be a safe bet. However, a crosscheck should
be conducted, especially, because since 2000, the adoption of MDGs, the UN
became indeed very active in global monitoring of the water situation, which
may have altered its focus.
The World Water Assessment Program of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (hereinafter WWAP), which is responsible,
among others, to prepare an “annual review providing an authoritative picture
of the state, use and management of the world’s freshwater resources”7 was
founded in 2000, exactly at the beginning of the time period this paper focuses
on. It started to produce World Water Development Reports within this time
5
6
7
UN GA: United Nations Millennium Declaration. Ibid. Point 23.
UN GA: Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
World Water Assessment Programme (UNESCO WWAP): About UNESCO WWAP.
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/water/wwap/about
(Downloaded 22 01 2020).
35
Water Stress
framework, with the first report published in 2003, and the latest in 2019.
Though the reports focus mainly on water policy, instead of legal issues, and
according to WWAP “policy and law [...] are fundamentally different”; they
also go “hand in hand”.8 Reports all bear titles, which put emphasis on certain
aspects of water issues. These titles do give a clue on the focus point of each
report we can use in our mission to double check if the main fields of water
law are similar to the ones determined by the MDGs and SDGs.9 Through
the analysis of the reports between 2003 and 2012 we find all three fields
mentioned and addressed, however, visibly water management gained most of
the attention. It is understandable, considering that the main goal of the WWAP
is “to equip water managers and key decision-makers with the information,
data, tools and skills necessary to enable them to effectively participate in the
development of policies”,10 and it “wants to influence leaders in government,
civil society and private sector”.11 Consequently, though it does not intend
to ignore international cooperation in the water sector, it primarily focuses
on national level.12 The 2014 report represents a “pivotal new direction for
the WWDR series”: reports became annual and thematic (UN World Water
Development Report 2014: viii). After the publication of the 5th report, the
themes became more various: more attention was given to human right to
water and sanitation (UN World Water Development Report 2019 bears the
title “Leaving no one Behind”, referring to equality in the protection of this
human right), and environmental protection (UN World Water Development
Report 2015 bears the title “Water for a sustainable world” and the 2017
report is titled “Wastewater: The Untapped Resources”; both of them address
the problems of pollution of water-related ecosystems).
Even though we did identify all three fields this paper intended to examine,
we should still make clear that water related issues are indeed closely related.
The documents without binding force adopted under the aegis of the UN
generally mention all three fields, putting emphasis on one of them. Since the
8
9
10
11
12
Ibid.
As a complementary tool, we can also use the table of contents (though these tend to follow
a general scheme) and executive summaries, introductions of these reports.
World Water Assessment Programme (UNESCO WWAP): About UNESCO WWAP.
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/water/wwap/about
(Downloaded 23 01 2020).
Ibid.
See also the programme objectives, which are addressed to national level key actors.
36
Melinda Szappanyos
setting up of UN Water, water related issues in terms of policy are handled
together or at least the activities are coordinated: “[O]ver 30 UN organizations
carry out water and sanitation programmes, reflecting the fact that water
issues run through all of the UN’s main focus areas”.13 Still, the focus of
international conventions, the main subject of analysis of this paper, are
usually more focused on one aspect of water, therefore we will also follow this
distinction in their examination.
2.2. Limitations on the scope of the paper
To summarize and, by giving an operative definition, refine the scope of this
paper based on the international documents analysed above: we intend to
identify and examine the public international law developments of water
law in the last 20 years. Under “water law” we understand the international
treaties dealing with water management, environmental protection of water
resources, and the human right to water and sanitation.
1) National legislation is not subject of this paper.
2) This paper will mainly focus on one source of public international
law: international treaties.14 International treaties born under the aegis of
the UN (especially on integrated water basins) will be considered as main
subject of the paper. However, this limitation should be limited in itself: some
improvements in these fields, which did not happen in a form of a treaty should
also be mentioned; therefore, relevant documents without binding force will
be analysed as well.
3) And another limitation: we will only analyse multilateral treaties and
leave out the bilateral ones from this examination. This latter limitation has
three main reasons. a) The length of the paper is limited, examination of all
bilateral treaties on water-related issues would be close to impossible. b) The
newest trend (or rather suggestion) in regulating water resources is integrated
management, thus experts of different disciplines suggest all riparian States
13
14
About United Nations Water: https://www.unwater.org/about-unwater/ (Downloaded 23
01 2020).
The sources of conventions: UN Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/ (Downloaded 23
01 2020); the treaties concluded under the aegis of the UN will be listed, but those worked
out by other organizations, conferences and only referred to the Secretary-General of the
UN as depository will not be taken into consideration.
37
Water Stress
to coordinate their actions over international rivers, water basins together
(Mizanur – Olli, 2004; Mizanur – Olli, 2005).15 c) Bilateral agreements are very
rare in human rights law and environmental protection of ecosystems, thus
bilateral treaty analysis could only extend to water management.
4) We focus on the 21st century, treaties concluded (and not only the ones
entered into force) after the year 2000 will be analysed in detail, but may be
mentioned if they serve as a basis for further developments.
3. THE LAST 20 YEARS
3.1. Water management
This part of the paper aims to collect international treaties of which the subject
matter is cooperation in water management. It does not seem necessary to
meticulously define “water management”, especially, because international
treaties dealing with only one or even a few aspects of water management
(e.g. risk management, shared use of water resources) are fairly rare and will
be listed here.
As we have already seen, water is in the centre of attention of the UN
from the beginning of the 21st century. Though water related issues were
discussed in the UN before (see for example the UN Conference on the Human
Environment in Stockholm in 197216 as one of the earliest actions taken by
the UN), the real engagement in water issues started with Agenda 21.17 The
efforts to handle issues related to water intensified further at the beginning
of our century,18 and gained the most international attention via the MDGs and
SDGs as comprehensive strategies for development.
15
16
17
18
However, according to Zawahri (2011) this piece of advice is ignored most of the time and
more bilateral than multilateral treaties are concluded.
UN GA: A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972. See Recommendations 9, 10, 27, 51 and 53.
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development:
United Nations Conference on Environment & Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14
June 1992.
World Summit on Sustainable Development: A/CONF.199/L.1 Draft plan of implementation
of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Johannesburg, South Africa 26 August 4 September 2002, 26 June 2002.
38
Melinda Szappanyos
In terms of water use and management the UN’s three biggest, legally
binding achievements are undoubtedly the 1992 Convention on the Protection
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes,19 the
Protocol on Water and Health attached to it,20 and the 1997 Convention on
the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International
Lakes (Glied, 2009: 8-9).21 Though the subject of this paper is examination
of the improvement of water law through international treaties, none of
these treaties are the product of our century, but serve as a basis for a few
developments to be mentioned.
•
In 2007, after the Entry into force of the Protocol on Water and Health
to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes, a Working Group on Water and
Health was set up as the body “responsible for the overall implementation
of the programme of work.”22 Three years later a Compliance Committee
was also established.23 There is also a Task Force on Target Setting and
Reporting working under the 2030 Agenda.
•
While the above-mentioned bodies cover only the Protocol, since 2012,
there is a compliance committee facilitating the implementation of the
1992 Helsinki Convention too (Lammers, 2014).
However, it seems that while some regions did continue to elaborate legal
rules for more and more effective water management considering the changing
environment, the UN did stop focusing on it. The 1997 Convention established
a framework and gave instruction on how to move on with cooperation at
19
20
21
22
23
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International
Lakes, Helsinki, 17 March 1992, Entry into force: 6 October 1996. The convention was
adopted under the UN Economic Commission for Europe and is open to signatures of its
Member states and those states who have consultative status (according to Article 23).
Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, London, 17 June 1999, Entry into
force: 4 August 2005.
UN GA: A/RES/51/229 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes. 21 May 1997. Entry into force: 17 August 2014.
UNECE: Working Group on Water and Health, http://www.unece.org/env/water/pwh_
bodies/wgwh.html (Downloaded 03 01 2020).
UN Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Europe: ECE/MP.WH/2/
Add.3, EUR/06/5069385/1/Add.3, Report of the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol
on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes on its first meeting, Add. Decision I/2. 3 July 2007.
39
Water Stress
lower level (either regionally or by bilateral agreements),24 establishing the
procedural obligation for cooperation besides substantive obligations for
States (Wouters – Leb, 2015). It seems that the UN, in terms of hard law,
simply forgot about water resources in the 21st century by “delegating” power
and responsibility to “watercourse States”. Even the entry into force of the
1997 Convention took almost two decades, (Rieu-Clarke – Loures, 2009) in
spite of the benefits it brought into international water law (Salman, 2007).
Some of these watercourse States have done remarkably well, even if the
path for effective water management was/is far from smooth: despite its
shortcomings, the innovative features and the importance of the European
Union’s achievements in this field are unquestionable (Kaika, 2010).
Though the UN seemingly ignored hard law making for water management,
we should still consider its activity, as mentioned above, on other fields related
to water: environmental protection and human rights.
3.2. Environmental protection
Opening the UN Treaty Collection’s “Environment” chapter,25 the 1997
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses appears again as a main treaty adopted under the UN, dealing
exclusively with one natural resource, water. However, it seems that the
UN’s activity was slightly more intensive in environmental protection in
the 21st century: several treaties were adopted to protect the environment.
Considering water protection by substantive rules, the picture is not quite
different than it was after the adoption of the 1997 Convention on the Law of
the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.26
But as for obligations of procedural nature: several treaties adopted under
the aegis of the UN aim to protect the environment by establishing procedural
24
25
26
UN GA: A/RES/51/229 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes. 21 May 1997. Entry into force: 17 August 2014. Arts. 3-4.
UN Treaty Collection: Chapter XXVII
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=27&subid=A&clang=_en (Downloaded 20
02 2020).
All three treaties mentioned in water management section are relevant for environmental
protection.
40
Melinda Szappanyos
rules for their State parties, for example obligation to register, or to provide
information:
•
Among multilateral treaties open for signature by all Member states of the
UN the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants27 aims to
protect human health by limiting or eliminating certain pollutants.
•
Though the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context28 is not the achievement of the 21st century, after
2000, a protocol was adopted to complement its rules: the Protocol on
Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context.29 According to this
treaty, the Parties are obliged to base their plans and programmes,
which are prepared for (among others) water management, on a strategic
environmental assessment.30
•
While the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation
in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters31 is
open for signature only for the members of the Economic Commission for
Europe,32 the protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers to the
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in DecisionMaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters33 is open for all
member states of the UN.34 The latter’s objective is “to enhance public
access to information through the establishment of coherent, integrated,
nationwide pollutant release and transfer registers (PRTRs) [...], which could
27
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Stockholm, 22 May 2001, Entry
into force: 17 May 2004.
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 25
February 1991, 10 September 1997.
Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Kiev, 21 May 2003, Entry into force: 11
July 2010.
Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Kiev, 21 May 2003, Entry into force: 11
July 2010. Article 4, Paragraph 2. Annex I, point 12. and Annex II, point 3. further specify
the programs require assessment.
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters, Aarhus, 25 June 1998, Entry into force: 30 October 2001.
Ibid. Art. 17.
Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers to the Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters, Kiev, 21 May 2003, Entry into force: 8 October 2009.
Ibid. Article 24.
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
41
Water Stress
facilitate public participation in environmental decision-making as well as
contribute to the prevention and reduction of pollution of the environment.”35
The protocol aims to protect all natural freshwater resources, and it puts
special emphasis on waste-water treatment and management. Here, we
also have to mention that even if an analysed international treaty has a
regional scope, the examination is necessary, since it was adopted under
the aegis of the UN and some of them do have global relevance, see for
example the Aarhus Convention (Morgera, 2005).36
•
Though not yet in force, the Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation
for Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents
on Transboundary Waters to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and to the
1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents37
will establish even more procedural obligations for the Parties.
3.3. Human Right to Water and Sanitation
Undoubtedly, the biggest evolution did happen in human rights. However,
as this analysis will show, this development is rather program-like and not
legally binding the most part. Though the original purpose of the paper is to
collect international treaties in water law, as mentioned above, the human
right to water and sanitation seems to be a remarkable exception. It does
not mean that the human right to water is a non-recognized human right.
Similarly, it is not true that the promotion and protection of this human right
has no source in a legally binding document. However, the development of this
particular human right happened “backwards” compared to the majority of
human rights. The carrier of the majority of human rights started in national
documents and elevated onto international level first with legally non-binding
35
36
37
Ibid. Article 1.
Another example is the 2018 Escazú Agreement which is considered to represent a
historical step of this subject matter, though not yet in force. Regional Agreement on Access
to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America
and the Caribbean, Escazú, 4 March 2018, not yet in force.
Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary
Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters to the 1992 Convention on the
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and to the
1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Kiev, 21 May 2003,
Not yet in force.
42
Melinda Szappanyos
documents to become enforceable via international conventions. All human
rights of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights38 can serve as examples.
The human right to water however, as explained later, was already protected
by several international conventions, before it became a focus of interest in the
UN as a program or a goal to be achieved. As the General Comment No. 15. of
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter CESCR)
explained: “Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Covenant specifies a number of rights
emanating from, and indispensable for, the realization of the right to an adequate
standard of living “including adequate food, clothing and housing”. The use of
the word “including” indicates that this catalogue of rights was not intended to
be exhaustive. The right to water clearly falls within the category of guarantees
essential for securing an adequate standard of living, particularly since it is one
of the most fundamental conditions for survival.”39 From this explanation it
follows that the human right to water exists, entitles, and therefore it should
be protected. Following the process of the CESCR, researchers pointed out
certain treaties as sources of a State obligation to protect the human right
to water (Szappanyos, 2013). However, the majority of these treaties did not
explicitly mention the human right to water, thus, the promotion and protection
of this human right needed help. The help came from within the UN in several
forms, all in the 21st century. We should list the above-mentioned documents
announcing MDGs and SDGs. In 2008 the Human Right Council (hereinafter
HRC) appointed a Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking
water and sanitation40 and renewed the mandate continuously since then.41
Disputably, one of the most important steps in the development of the human
right to water and sanitation was the UN GA resolution on the right to water
and sanitation in 2010, which explicitly recognized them as human rights.42
After this non-binding detour to clarify the international history of the
human right to water and sanitation, if we try to follow the original purpose
38
39
40
41
42
UN GA: A/RES/217A Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 8 December 1948.
CESCR: E/C.12/2002/11 General Comment No.15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of
the Covenant), 20 January 2003.
Human Rights Council: Resolution 7/22. Human rights and access to safe drinking water
and sanitation.
UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
WaterAndSanitation/
SRWater/Pages/SRWaterIndex.aspx (Downloaded 28 01 2020).
UN GA: A/Res/64/292 The human right to water and sanitation, 3 August 2010.
43
Water Stress
of this paper, we need to collect and analyse conventions, which protect
the human right to water implicitly or explicitly and were concluded after
2000. Based on the UN Treaty Collection’s human rights section, there is
only one convention, containing a list of human rights to be protected, to be
mentioned here: the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.43
This convention explicitly obliges States to ensure “access [...] to clean water
services.”44 If we compare this rule with the definition of the right to water
and sanitation given by the CESCR,45 it is obvious that the extent of the State
obligation in the Convention is more limited than in the General Comment
No.15. Still, an undebatable merit is the explicit obligation.
Several treaties were adopted, which do not list human rights to be
protected, but enable the more effective enforcement of already existing State
obligations. Thus, if the human right to water and sanitation is either explicitly
or implicitly included in the conventions, which are complimented by these
monitoring tools (in the legal form of optional protocols), its enforcement
becomes more efficient. The following optional protocols are attached to
conventions implicitly or explicitly protecting the right to water and sanitation:
•
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities:46 this international treaty establishes a communication
procedure for more effective monitoring of the rights protected by the
Convention, including the right to water.
•
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights:47 as the Covenant is identified as the primary sources of the
human right to water (GC No. 15.) this optional protocol institutionalizing
individual communications, inter-State communications and even inquiry
procedures, seems to be a big step toward effective enforcement of several
rights, including the right to water. However, it is worth mentioning that
currently it only has 24 Parties.48
43
UN GA: A/RES/61/106 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 13 December
2006
Ibid. Art. 28, Para. (2), point a).
CESCR: General Comment No.15, point 2.
UN GA: A/RES/61/106 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, 13 December 2006. Entry into force: 3 May 2008.
UN GA: A/RES/63/117 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. 10 December 2008. Entry into force: 5 May 2013.
UN Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-a&chapter=4&clang=_en (Downloaded 31 01 2020).
44
45
46
47
48
44
Melinda Szappanyos
•
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment:49 some typical
violations of the human right to water are related to circumstances and
punishments in prisons and detention centres (Szappanyos, 2013: 85).
The Protocol establishes a mandate for a Subcommittee on Prevention for
“regular visits [...] to places where people are deprived of their liberty, in
order to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment”, making monitoring more effective.50
•
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a
communications procedure:51 as the Convention on the Rights of the
Child52 explicitly recognized the right to water for children in Article 24,
the Optional protocols related to it should be examined. Neither Protocols
regulating children’s right under special circumstances53 add to Article 24
of the original convention, but the Optional Protocol of 2011 establishing
new monitoring tools, communication procedures, and inquiry procedure,
does in the sense of more effective enforcement.
4. The next few years: summary, prediction and
conclusion
From the collection of documents and their analysis above two observations
follow: a) the activity of the UN is quite hectic in regulating issues related to
water, b) though the activity manifested in public international hard law is
hectic, the UN seemed to consider water issues as a priority for the last 20
years.
49
50
51
52
53
UN GA: A/RES/57/199 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 9 January 2003. Entry into force:
22 June 2006.
Ibid. Article 1.
UN GA: A/RES/66/138 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a
communications procedure. 19 December 2011. Entry into force: 14 April 2014.
UN GA: A/RES/44/25 Convention on the Rights of the Child. 20 November 1989. Entry into
force: 2 September 1990.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children
in armed conflict, New York, 25 May 2000, Entry into force: 12 February 2002. Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution
and child pornography, New York, 25 May 2000, Entry into force: 18 January 2002.
45
Water Stress
4.1. Water management
The UN’s remarkable achievement in discussing, promoting effective water
management is unquestionable. Same is true for its intensive efforts to provide
policy tools for governments for developing their water management policy.
Though it seems that water management is in the forefront of UN thinking,
still, the responsibility to actually regulate water management is mainly left
for States. Since, according to studies, States prefer arranging the use of their
freshwater resources in bilateral treaties at the moment (Zawahri, 2011) it
is unlikely to change in the near future. In the last two decades, despite its
efforts to discuss and promote water issues, the UN did not attempt to replace
or improve its international convention on water management. We should
add: the late entry into force of the main convention adopted under the UN
might have discouraged the organization.
4.2. Environmental protection
The UN’s focus on environmental protection is twofold: a) it creates a list
of substances which are considered dangerous to human health and tries
to limit these in natural resources, including water; and b) it establishes
procedural obligations for States to register the use of such substances,
provide information on environmental protection, and to base their programs
related to natural resources, including water, on profound assessment. Based
on the analysis it seems that the UN is more active in the latter, at least what
concerns water issues. The conventions, which provide bases for the examined
protocols were all adopted at the end of the previous century; after 2000
the obligations were only concretized or slightly extended. Several treaties
deposited with the Secretary-General of the UN in the field of environmental
protection are not yet in force.
In international environmental law the “proliferation of procedural
obligations in treaty and other non-binding instruments” (Okowa, 1997:
276) is obvious from the end of the last century and it is a continuing trend.
Despite the imperfection of treaties establishing procedural obligations, “[A]
s independent legal duties, procedural obligations are likely to influence the
behaviour of even the most reluctant States” (Ibid., 335).
46
4.3. Human Right to Water and Sanitation
Melinda Szappanyos
In the 21st century, the UN’s dedication to the protection and promotion of
the human right to water seems to be exceedingly consistent. This activity
manifested in both program-like documents without legal binding force and
in international treaties. If we take a closer look to these latter, we may see
however the limited change they were able to bring into the recognition of
the human right to water and sanitation. In fact, the recognition of the right
to water and sanitation did not surpass political declaration level and the
list of implicit and/or explicit legally binding sources of this right was not
significantly extended (except for the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities) in the last two decades. The level of protection, the extent
of enforcement options however did change significantly. Several optional
protocols attached to implicit and explicit sources of the right to water now
allow individuals to turn to the respective human rights bodies under the
aegis of the UN with complaints on the violation of their human rights.
Based on the summary above, our prediction: all fields of water law will
continue to evolve, mostly because of the permanent environmental pressure.
Also, the UN will keep its focus on water-related issues. The end date of the
SDGs is 2030, the UN has already made the commitment to keep water issues in
focus at least until then. In terms of establishing or extending legal obligations
for States to cooperate in water management, protect water as a natural
resource, and protect the human right to water and sanitation however, the
trend seems to be different and less successful. Based on the experiences of
the last 20 years, it seems that States have only a program-like, political level of
common understanding on the importance of water, for example, the general
recognition of the right to water and sanitation in legally binding documents
is still missing and unlikely to come to life in the near future; cooperation in
water management is still the question of political negotiations and not guided
by the necessity to secure the preservation of water resources at all cost for
all mankind. Still, the means of enforcement are growing, which is indeed not
a development to be ignored or underestimated.
As for conclusion: climate change and a growing number of other problems
related to water resources will undoubtedly not let the UN “forget” about
“water law” in the 21st century, and beyond.
47
Water Stress
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Szappanyos, Melinda: Víz és Jog. A vízhez való jog érvényesíthetősége az ENSZ
keretében. Veszprém, 2013.
Szilágyi, János Ede (2018): Vízszemléletű kormányzás – vízpolitika – vízjog: kitekintéssel
a vízgazdáskodásra és a víztudományra. Miskolc, Miskolci Egyetemi Kiadó.
World Water Assessment Programme (2003): The United Nations World Water
Development Report 1, Water for people, water for life.
48
Melinda Szappanyos
World Water Assessment Programme (2009): The United Nations World Water
Development Report 2009, Water in a changing World.
World Water Assessment Programme (2014): The United Nations World Water
Development Report 2014, Water and Energy.
World Water Assessment Programme (2015): The United Nations UN World Water
Development Report 2015, Water for a sustainable world.
World Water Assessment Programme (2017): The United Nations UN World Water
Development Report 2017, Wastewater: The Untapped Resources.
World Water Assessment Programme (2019): The United Nations UN World Water
Development Report 2019, Leaving no one Behind.
Wouters, Patricia – Leb, Christina (2015): The Duty to Cooperate in International
Law – Examining the Contribution of the UN Water Conventions to Facilitating
Transboundary Water Cooperation In. Attila Tanzi et al. (eds.): The UNECE
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes – Its Contribution to International Water Cooperation. Leiden,
Boston, Brill Nijhoff, 285-295.
Zawahri, Neda A. (2011): Fragmented Governance of International Rivers: Negotiation
Bilateral versus Multilateral Treaties. International Studies Quarterly, 55., 853-858.
INTERNET SOURCES
UNECE: Working Group on Water and Health, http://www.unece.org/env/water/
pwh_bodies/wgwh.html (Downloaded 03 01 2020).
UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
Issues/WaterAndSanitation/SRWater/Pages/SRWaterIndex.aspx (Downloaded
28 01 2020).
UN Treaty Collection: Chapter XXVII https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.
aspx?id=27&subid=A&clang=_en (Downloaded 20 02 2020).
World Water Assessment Programme (UNESCO WWAP): About UNESCO WWAP.
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/water/wwap/
about/ (Downloaded 22 01 2020).
About
United
Nations
Water:
(Downloaded 23 01 2020).
https://www.unwater.org/about-unwater/
UNECE: Working Group on Water and Health, http://www.unece.org/env/water/
pwh_bodies/wgwh.html (Downloaded 03 01 2020).
49
PÉTER K ACZIBA
HEGEMONY OR PARTNERSHIP?
TURKEY’S REGIONAL WATER DIPLOMACY
AND THE CASE OF CYPRUS1
1. INTRODUCTION
The contemporary Eastern Mediterranean is undergoing significant
geopolitical paradigm shifts. Dynamics of armed conflicts, demographic
expansion, migration, environmental changes, hydrocarbon discoveries
and technological developments all pose enormous challenges in the region
(Florensa, 2018: 5). In addition to these more apparent tendencies, the region’s
security nexus is also troubled by the growing pressure of food and water
scarcities. As vital elements to human life, shortages of food and water have
significant impacts on regional relations and may escalate tensions between
countries, societies and domestic communities.
In a region heavily dependent on agricultural import, food supplies and
prices of foodstuffs have massive local and regional importance. Access to
food drives socioeconomic conditions, influences political attitudes, and
impacts electoral support and public morale. In extreme circumstances of
food scarcity, the effects may be more devastating and could fuel intrastate
tensions or interstate conflicts (Gibárti, 2019: 160-164). According to the
OECD, at the end of 2017, over 30 million people in the broader Middle East
needed assistance to satisfy their basic food needs (OECD, 2018: 87). Besides
armed conflicts and weather-related production shocks, the fragile situation
of regional food security was further complicated by decreasing production
rates and increasing demands (Glied, 2009). While elsewhere the demand
growth began to weaken in the past decade, the broader Middle East is still
among those regions where the increasing population drives up the level
1
This research project was supported by the European Union. EFOP-3.6.3VEKOP-16-2017-00007 – Young researchers from talented students – Fostering scientific
careers in higher education.
51
Water Stress
of food consumption. At the same time, except for few commodities, the
region’s agricultural import-dependence is slowly but steadily increasing
(OECD, 2018: 59-66). Consequently, medium and long-term food security will
be significantly shaped by external actors and will rest on recognizing the
necessity of sustainable production.
The development of sustainable food production is based on another
vital component of the security nexus: the level of access to water resources.
Regional prospects are not ideal in this case either. According to Allan (2002),
the Middle East and North Africa became water insecure around 1970, from
this period onwards the region faces the persistent challenge to provide
sufficient quantity of water for food production and consumption. As a result,
except for Turkey, Eastern Mediterranean countries are all subjected to a
higher or lower level of water scarcity, and they are also among the countries
with the highest level of water stress. Majority of the regional states are far
below the 500 m3 per capita per year threshold for absolute water scarcity,
while an average citizen in the region consumes about 1350 m3 water annually
(Keulertz – Allan, 2019: 157).
Figure 1. Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita (cubic meters)
Source: World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H2O.INTR.
PC?end=2015&start=2014 (Downloaded 24 02 2020).
The contradiction between available resources and per capita consumption
is further complicated by the growing population and the increasing water
demand. The total population of the seven Eastern Mediterranean countries
52
Péter Kacziba
(without Greece, Gaza Strip and the West Bank) grew by an average 345%
between 1960 and 2018 which has driven up the level of total water withdrawal
by an approximate average of 88% between 1970-2015.2 The increased level
of consumption significantly affected per capita resources which decreased
by a regional average of -69% between 1962 and 2014. Estimations show that
the decreasing trend will continue in the future. According to Droogers, water
supply in the broader region will shrink by 12%, while demand will increase
over 50% by 2050 (Droogers, 2012: 3101). Climate-related changes further
supplemented these demographic and economic effects. Even though the
average annual precipitation level has increased by 10% between the periods
of 1961-1990 and 1991-2016, the average annual temperature has climbed up
by 4% in the corresponding period. The increase was particularly detectable
between the months of May and October: in the past 25-30 years, the average
temperature of the broader summer season climbed up by 1°C.3
Figure 2. Population growth in the Eastern Mediterranean (1960–2018)
Source: World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?name_
desc=false (Downloaded 24 02 2020).
Although there is a clearly visible negative trend affecting the whole
region, water scarcity and water stress influence Eastern Mediterranean
actors differently. Limited and slowly decreasing freshwater resources are
2
3
World Bank: Annual freshwater withdrawals, total, 1970-2015, https://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/ER.H2O.FWTL.K3?end=2015&most_recent_value_desc=false&start=1970&
view=chart (Downloaded 22 02 2020).
World Bank: Climate Change Knowledge Portal, https://climateknowledgeportal.
worldbank.org/watershed/161/climate-data-historical (Downloaded 24 02 2020).
53
Water Stress
unevenly distributed in the region favouring mainly those who have larger
territory, continental climate zones, major river basins and/or financial means
to construct expensive hydrological facilities and technologies. According to
Zeitoun and Warner (2006), these so-called hydro-hegemons have dominant
roles in transboundary water settings and may shape water policies on the
national, basin, regional and global levels (Conker – Hussein, 2020: 105-106).
At the other end of water challenges, some states face very different outlooks.
These countries suffer from both domestic scarcity and water policies of
powerful neighbours, both determine not only the quantity of water but
political, economic and social struggles too. Negative trends such as water
stress, growing demand, increasing exploitation, and climbing temperature
impact these countries more than their powerful counterparts and cause a
higher level of socioeconomic difficulties (Engelke et al., 2017: 2). Hence, in
addition to geographic and environmental characteristics, asymmetric power
relations and economic capabilities also influence the hydrological conditions
of the region: countries with more immense geopolitical weight may play
a significant role in regional water dynamics, while smaller and weaker
states have limited opportunities to maintain domestic supplies, to follow
independent water strategies or find external resources.
The regional role of Turkey and Cyprus, and the relations between them,
seem to be perfect examples of such asymmetric hydrological constellations.
Although it suffers from negative trends such as population growth, increasing
demand or climate change, Turkey still enjoys a relatively favourable position
and could be labelled as one of the very few countries in the region that
still have sufficient water resources. Ankara has exploited these hegemonic
opportunities throughout the previous decades: constructed vast hydrological
projects, used its deterrence potential in water disputes and proposed
comprehensive plans to supply regional water stressed countries. Cyprus, on
the other hand, faces severe hydrological conditions such as limited supply
options, overexploited aquifers, seawater intrusion, and increasing seasonal
consumption by the growing agricultural and tourism sector.
Given the geographical proximity and relative water abundance, Turkey
would be an ideal option to ease water stress in Cyprus. Technological,
financial and water resources are all available to establish such cooperation,
which, of course, would not be able to provide water supply for the whole
54
Péter Kacziba
island, but could supplement existing capacities with significant import
potentials. Nevertheless, opposing views have emerged on the possibilities
of water cooperation: although Ankara has signalled that under certain
conditions it would be willing to supply water for both communities, Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have taken contrasting positions on the
potential outcomes. This paper seeks to analyse these controversial positions
and attempts to outline Turkey’s water strategies in Cyprus. It examines what
kind of hydrological power potential Turkey has in Cyprus and how hegemonic
strategies may exploit pressing water scarcity in the case of Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots. Besides determining characteristics of asymmetric power
relations, the study will also explore the dilemmas Cypriots face, and the
answers they provide when resisting water scarcity and external influence.
2. DOMESTIC CONDITIONS AND WATER DIPLOMACY
IN TURKEY
Turkey’s water policy is defined by the country’s strategic goals and interests.
In the domestic sphere, Ankara attempts to utilise water development
projects for reducing social and economic inequalities and increasing internal
energy production. These goals require the development of large hydrological
projects aiming to exploit natural resources. On one hand, the construction
of dams, irrigation networks, canals, pumping stations and hydroelectric
plants may help local economies, support agricultural production, diversify
energy production and consumption. On the other hand, the projects often
endanger the natural environment of river basins, destroy the habitats of
indigenous species, while construction sites transform the life and livelihood
of locals. Beyond the local impacts, these domestic development projects also
have international and regional implications. The effects and consequences
of these cases are controversial too. Turkey’s increasing ability to become a
regional water hub and export freshwater to neighbours can be considered as
a positive opportunity that could help to supply a drying region. In contrast,
the decrease of transboundary water flow may serve as a source of conflict
among regional actors and, thus, require the development of consensual water
diplomacy and transboundary hydrological cooperation.
55
Water Stress
Turkey’s domestic and regional hydrological strategies are based on
relatively rich water resources. Although Turkey is still far beyond the
globally significant water-rich countries, with its 26 hydrological basins and a
domestic lake surface of 10,400 km2, it enjoys a more comfortable position than
other countries in the region (Tigrek-Kibaroglu, 2011: 30-31). The privileged
position may be demonstrated by several examples. In 2014, for instance,
the country’s per capita renewable internal freshwater resources have
accumulated around 2932.2 m3 compare to the 91.2 m3 measured in Israel or
the 19.9 m3 calculated in Egypt.4 Rivers, lakes and reservoir capacities largely
contribute to these resource quantities. The two most important river basins
are Euphrates and Tigris, together account for 28.5% of Turkey’s national
surface flow (Tomanbay, 2000: 100). The country also has 120 natural and 579
artificial lakes while there are 681 dams, and about 10% of them is capable
of generating hydroelectricity (Ibid.). Water potential is supplemented by an
annual average of 592 mm perception which is lower than the global average
of 800 mm but cca. 63% greater than the average quantity of the broader5
Eastern Mediterranean region.6
Although resource capacities and potentials provide an advantageous
regional position, rapid demographic boost, growing agricultural and
industrial demands as well as negative effects of climate change all press
Turkey to increasingly exploit its water resources. For Turkey, the most
important water-related challenge is population growth generating higher
demand and exploitation. Between 1992-2017, the country’s population has
increased by 46% which eventually pushed the total water withdrawal up by
86%. Even though the intensity of population growth will slightly decrease, it
is expected that Turkey’s population will continue to rise in the short-run and
reach 90 million around 2027-2030.7 Beyond the natural birth rate, migration
and refugee influxes put additional pressure on water demand and increase
domestic supply need by the water withdrawal of at least 3.5 million persons.
4
5
6
7
World Bank: Renewable Internal Freshwater Resources per Capita, https://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H2O.INTR.PC?end=2014&locations=CY-TREG&start=1962+ (Downloaded 24 02 2020).
Including Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Libya.
FAO: Long-term average annual precipitation in depth (mm/year), 2013-2017, http://
www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/results.html (Downloaded 14 03 2020).
STATISTA: Turkey: Total population from 2014 to 2024, https://www.statista.com/
statistics/263753/total-population-of-turkey/ (Downloaded 24 03 2020).
56
Péter Kacziba
In addition to population growth, agriculture and energy production have
also significantly increased water consumption and demand. Between 1992
and 2017, the agricultural sector’s demand has increased by nearly 119%.
The rise of demand had an impact on surface and subsoil resources and has
required the construction of more than 9000 irrigation projects between
1950-2012.8 The related constructions of dams, canals and pumping stations
significantly altered natural water systems, but, at the same time, allowed the
Turkish farmers to irrigate about 13.5% of Turkey’s total agricultural land in
2014.9
Increase in population and agricultural production have also generated
a higher energy demand which is (and was) a major challenge for a country
that lacks significant quantities of energy resources. The growth is perfectly
demonstrated by the statistics of per capita electricity consumption that has
grown by 2984.3% between 1960 and 2014.10 Hydroelectricity production,
increasing from 1990 ktoe (1990) to 5138 ktoe (2018), became a crucial part
of the domestic energy sector, especially in those regions where dams and
hydroelectric developments allowed the Turkish state to exploit the natural
power of rivers.11
All in all, population growth, rising agricultural demand, growing
production of hydroelectricity as well as the consumption of additional
sectors have negatively influenced available resources: renewable internal
freshwater per capita resources of Turkey shrunk by 63% between 1960 and
2018, as indicated in Figure 1.
These examples mentioned above demonstrate the domestic need for
water-related development projects and explain the implementation of largescale programmes such as the Southern Anatolia project. Domestic projects,
however, have had regional implications as well. On the one hand, downstream
riparians of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers have long protested against the
8
9
10
11
Republic Of Turkey, The Ministry of Food Agriculture and Livestock: Agricultural
Water Use and Productivity in Turkey, http://www.comcec.org/en/wp-content/
uploads/2016/05/Turkey-3.pdf (Downloaded 12 03 2020).
World Bank: Agricultural irrigated land – Turkey, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
AG.LND.IRIG.AG.ZS?locations=TR&view=chart (Downloaded 10 03 2020).
World Bank: Electric power consumption –Turkey, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
EG.USE.ELEC.KH.PC?locations=TR&display=graph--%3E (Downloaded 10 03 2020).
IEA: Key energy statistics, 2018, Turkey, https://www.iea.org/countries/turkey#reports
(Downloaded 10 03 2020).
57
Water Stress
Turkish developments and argued that Turkey’s hydrological constructions
and irrigation projects dramatically decrease water flow to Syria and Iraq. On
the other hand, Turkey has begun to see these domestic projects as possibilities
to expand its regional influence and used them to gain strategic hydrological
position. The Southern Anatolia project is again a classic example to prove this
strategic goal. With its 22 dams, 19 hydropower plants and gigantic irrigation
networks, the project provided a strategic regional advantage to Turkey. It has
decreased Turkey’s energy dependence by creating large hydropower capacities;
expanded the efficiency of the country’s agricultural sector; and, maybe more
importantly, provided a massive infrastructure for Ankara to effectively control
and influence the water flow of the Euphrates and Tigris basins (Lechner,
2019: 41-42). The probable impacts of potentially possible water cut-offs were
perfectly demonstrated in 1990 when Turkey had decided to hold back the flow
of the Euphrates and filled up the 817 km2 large Ataturk dam.
To further expand its strategic positions, Turkey has also developed a
proactive water diplomacy which intends to promote Turkish-led water
development projects and various ways to export water from Turkey to the
Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries. The strategy attempts
to mimic the foreign policy of successful energy exporter states and tries to
utilise domestic water resources as vital tools for creating commercial and
political advantages. In case of success, the strategy would help to increase
Turkey’s regional significance, compensate for enduring energy weaknesses,
and expand the Turkish sphere of influences through the development of vital
links to water stressed neighbours.
The first large-scale water transfer project of the strategy was introduced
in 1986 during the premiership of Turgut Özal. The so-called Peace Pipeline
Project has proposed the transferring of approximately 10 million m3 water
per day from Southern Turkey to the Middle East countries and offered to
supply regional partners in Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Although the
construction costs were estimated to be relatively high, about $8 billion,
the proposed pipeline routes intended to involve major cities with vast
urbanization potentials such as Aleppo, Homs, Amman, Medina and Jeddah
(Rende, 2007: 172).
Beneficial or not, the proposal was rejected by the potential partners. Arab
states, despite the fact that they were already struggling with severe water
58
Péter Kacziba
shortages, have not seen the Turkish plan as a mutually beneficial commercial
partnership. Instead, they considered it as a possible way to increase Turkey’s
regional influence and generate dependent ties between Ankara and the
involved states. High construction costs had also reduced enthusiasm and
pushed regional hydrological investments towards desalination technology
that has proved to be a relatively cheaper and a more independent solution
(Gruen, 2007: 158-159).
Unlike the Peace Pipeline Project, the Manavgat Project, negotiated between
1994 and 2006, would have provided more diversified export opportunities,
this time to Israel. The project proposed three different export options: the
construction of an underwater pipeline from the Manavgat river to Ashkelon;
towing water bags filled with freshwater via ships; and the use of converted
oil tankers. After lengthy negotiations, Israel has decided to choose the last
option and agreed to import 50 million m3 water annually via tanker ships.
By 2006, Turkey had invested about $147 million in the project and developed
many of the necessary infrastructures including pipelines, storage tanks,
water treatment facilities and loading terminals (Ibid., 161-162). Despite
these investments, the Manavgat plan eventually had to share the fate of
the Peace Pipeline Project. In 2006, the Israeli side temporarily terminated
the agreement, arguing that transport by tanker ships would no longer be
financially feasible due to rising oil prices (Szwedo, 2019: 146-147).
Failure of the Peace Pipeline and Manavgat Projects demonstrates the
high level of regional suspicion towards Turkey. Unilateral hydrological
decisions, domestic development projects and water-related incidents have all
contributed to the evolution of this mistrust. It should be stated, however, that
Ankara’s regional water policy and behaviour cannot be labelled as aggressive.
Undoubtedly, the country has done its utmost to protect its national interests,
it has often side-lined the interests of lower riparians and has developed a
somewhat controversial water diplomacy. This water diplomacy, however,
is proactive rather than aggressive. As mentioned earlier, Turkey’s water
diplomacy attempts to mimic the strategies of powerful energy exporter
states. Nevertheless, Ankara was reluctant to copy the aggressive behaviour
of certain energy exporters and did not use its full-scale potentials to force
or compel potential regional partners. As the Peace Pipeline Project has
demonstrated: Turkey has certainly attempted to utilize its water resources,
59
Water Stress
but potential partners were able to reject the Turkish lobby and could say no
to the controversial proposals.
Rejections and denials by potential regional partners demonstrate the
limits of Turkish water diplomacy. Security situations, geopolitical and
sectarian fault lines as well as anti-Turkish sentiments all weaken Turkey’s
ability to lead regional water development projects. Ankara also needs to
face cooperative actions and policies of the Arab League which is suspicious
towards the Ankara led-development projects in the member states and, at
the same time, seeks to undermine potentials of Turkish-Israeli hydrological
cooperations (Gruen, 2007: 158). In this environment, the Turkish water
diplomacy needs to navigate between opposing interests, regional mistrust
and suspicion.
The ‘Peace Water Project’, connecting Turkey with North Cyprus with
a water pipeline, attempts to address and reduce these weaknesses. The
project, completed in 2015, wished to prove Turkey’s capability to handle
sophisticated technological challenges of construction and supply sufficient
volume of water for the whole island, including the southern part. The 107
km long pipeline from the Alaköprü Dam in Turkey to the Geçitköy Dam in
North Cyprus has developed advanced technologies to cross the 80 km
section of the Mediterranean Sea and now it is able to pump about 75 million
m3 water per year (Gungor, 2016: 1). The following sections of the study will
further describe details of the project; however, it is already important to
emphasize that the ‘Peace Water Project’ demonstrated the potential positive
outcomes as well as the risks of Turkish water diplomacy. First, the project
has proved that Turkey is able to construct the infrastructural background
of its water trade and could overcome the obstacles created by distance and
terrain. Secondly, the project has signalled regional potentials of the Turkish
water diplomacy which can gain further importance in the following decades
along with growing challenges of regional water scarcity. Thirdly, emerging
debates between Turkey and Northern Cyprus over management issues show
the possible political risks of water trade projects. In the long run, these
political risks could easily become existential threats to those who begin to
depend on Turkish water resources. Fourthly, vehement Turkish control over
Turkish Cypriot authorities will not reduce but increase regional suspicion
towards Ankara-led development projects and (self)torpedo the positive
60
Péter Kacziba
effects of technological successes. Consequently, the ‘Peace Water Project’
is an important pilot programme for potential regional water cooperation
and may even influence the future of Turkish water diplomacy. Beyond that,
however, the project largely impacts Cyprus and all of those geopolitical issues
that hinder the island’s reunification process. These geopolitical affairs are
further complicated by the construction of the pipeline that has generated a
vital water supply option for the drying island but, at the same time, increased
Turkey’s influence and deepened the mistrust between Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots. Thus, before explaining the details and outcomes of the
‘Peace Water’ pipeline project, the domestic situation in Cyprus should also
be summarized.
3. WATER SCARCITY AND LIMITED SUPPLY OPTIONS
IN CYPRUS
Both hydrological and geopolitical circumstances influence water strategies
in Cyprus. Unlike Turkey, Cyprus has experienced severe water shortages in
the previous decades and had to face one of the highest water stress level in
Europe. Scarcity was caused by limited resource and supply options, high level
of exploitation, effects of climate change and lack of island wide cooperation
(Sofroniou – Bishop, 2014: 2904-2905). As indicated in Figure 1, per capita
renewable internal freshwater resources had declined by 50% between 19622014, leaving about 677 m3 water for each citizen. The low rate is largely the
result of unsustainable withdrawal trends: with a water exploitation index
around 67% in 2017, Cyprus suffers from the overexploitation of groundand surface water resources.12 According to Sofroniou and Bishop, water
exploitation grew from 36.3 million m3 in 1991 to 44.8 million m3 in 1997, and
by 2005, to 73.3 million m3 (Ibid.). The dramatic rise was caused by several
factors including population growth, more extensive agriculture production,
higher household consumption and the massive boost in the tourism sector.
As Figure 2 outlines, the population of Cyprus increased by 108% between
12
Eurostat: Water Exploitation Index,
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/t2020_rd220/default/
table?lang=en (Downloaded 14 03 2020).
61
Water Stress
1960 and 2018, while the number13 of immigrants and temporary workers
have grown from 3230 in 1980 to 81,875 in 2019.14 Skyrocketing water
demand was also impacted by the tourist sector which, in the Southern part of
the island, hosted 348,530 tourists in 1980, 2,470,063 in 2005 and 3,976,777
in 2019.15 Besides the tourism sector, the regular seasonal summer peak of
water withdrawal is also determined by irrigation. As Figure 3 demonstrates,
the agriculture sector had by far the largest water demand between 1990 and
2017, and it was responsible for an average of 69% of total water use during
the indicated period.
Figure 3. Water withdrawal by sector in the Republic of Cyprus
Source: FAO, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/results.html
(Downloaded 24 04 2020).
The negative consequences of overexploitation were further exacerbated
by a significant decrease in rainfall, which is calculated to have decreased
by an average of 17% during the course of the 20th century (Shoukri –
Zachariadis, 2012: 22). Similar consequences of climate change will continue
to be a major concern in the future. According to the estimations of the World
Bank, the average temperature in Cyprus is assumed to increase by 3-4 °C
13
14
15
The stated numbers only apply to the Southern parts of the country.
CYSTAT: Movement of Travellers, 1980-2019, https://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/
statistics.nsf/services_71main_en/services_71main_en?OpenForm&sub=1&sel=2
(Downloaded 14 03 2020).
Ibid.
62
Péter Kacziba
by 2050.16 Heat wave duration will also extend in the near future, generating
extremely hot periods for more than four months per year, particularly in the
central areas of the island (Mason – Bryant, 2017: 13-14). Nonetheless, coastal
areas will not have much better prospects either. Deterioration of freshwater
quality through saltwater intrusion is already an acute challenge for many
coastal municipalities, but the potential rise of sea level will generate an
even more difficult, or nearly impossible, task to protect natural aquifers and
groundwater resources.
Although administrations both in Southern and Northern Cyprus have
developed various responses to address these contemporary and future
hazards, increasing evaporation and reducing supplies maintain fragile
water security in the island (Zachariadis, 2010: 780). Official responses
and reactions can be divided into two broader and interrelated categories:
water-saving measures and efforts to extend supply options. Both categories
intend to expand the volume of available water resources and aim to secure
that water requirements meet all the residential, agricultural, industrial and
environmental demands.
3.1. Water-saving measures
Water-saving measures have included significant efforts from construction
of dams, water treatment plants, and pumping stations to protect rivers,
rationalize irrigation quantities and change unsustainable habits. The dam
infrastructure is particularly well-developed in the government-controlled
areas where the number of water reservoirs reached 108 in 2019 with a storage
capacity of 331 million m3.17 Although ongoing development projects will
increase the already impressive storage capacity, the efficiency of reservoirs
largely depends on the amount of annual rainfall. Between 1987 and 2019, the
average annual volume of water recharge of dams was about 83.8 million m3.
This relatively low ratio was significantly influenced by the extreme figures
of four hydrological years: the volume of inflow dropped below 20 million m3
16
17
World Bank: Climate Change Knowledge Portal, Cyprus, https://climateknowledgeportal.
worldbank.org/country/cyprus (Downloaded 03 03 2020).
Water the Development Department, Republic of Cyprus, http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/
wdd/wdd.nsf/index_en/index_en?opendocument (Downloaded 14 03 2020).
63
Water Stress
in 1990-1991, 2007-2008, 2013-2014 and 2015-2016.18 By adapting to more
frequent droughts and drier seasons, Greek Cypriot authorities introduced
various water-saving measures aiming to store and save natural supplies
as well as limit the unsustainable use of water. Previously mentioned dams
increasingly attempt to collect and store water flows of seasonal rivers and
streams. Nevertheless, most of the natural output is mainly collected by the
66 aquifers of the island. Water management in the southern part of the island
struggles to protect and conserve these aquifers from seawater pollution and
irrigation activities. Overexploitation of resources is not only the problem of
drier years. Thus, Greek Cypriot authorities have adopted a series of measures
to manage and decrease the users’ demand. These measures have included
more dramatic tools such as restricting and rationing water supplies or
increasing the prices and tariffs for industrial and agricultural purposes but
have also applied softer means to change behavioural patterns of household
consumers and develop effective water-saving habits (Sofroniou – Bishop,
2014: 2917). These efforts have generated limited improvements as the per
capita water consumption is still 20-25% higher than basic water needs for
human subsistence would require. Thus, water management of the Republic
of Cyprus itself attempted to adopt sustainable habits and, besides other
rationalizing efforts, has begun to develop tertiary wastewater treatment
plants. As a result, recycled water is now used for the irrigation, livestock
cultivation and environmental purposes in the areas of Nicosia, Limassol,
Larnaca, Paphos and Paralimni.19
Water-saving measures in Northern Cyprus had to face similar challenges.
According to Mason and Bryant, uncontrolled exploitation, pollution, lack of
effective management and environmental changes all contributed to water
scarcity, which has also become a pressing issue in the north (Mason – Bryant,
2017: 5-7). In addition, the isolation of ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’
(hereinafter referred to as: TRNC) has also proved to be an important obstacle
as the lack of recognition diverted significant financial resources from vital but
costly constructions in the water management sector. Although Turkey and
more recently the European Union has provided funding for the development
of water-saving facilities, the unresolved status of Cyprus conflict continued
18
19
Ibid.
Ibid.
64
Péter Kacziba
to undermine the efficiency of water management. Currently, there are 41
dams in the north, these reservoirs stored about 20% of all water of resources
in 2016 (Elkiran et al., 2019: 3). Even though additional reservoirs would be
needed, statistics show that protection of natural groundwater resources
could produce more comprehensive results as about 90% of all water
resources are supplied through aquifers and natural groundwater networks
(Mason – Bryant, 2017: 6). According to Elkiran and Ergil, water balance
is significantly endangered by the overexploitation and pollution of three
main aquifers, out of which the Famagusta/Mağusa basin is not used due to
seawater contamination, the Kyrenia/Girne aquifer supplies water only to its
nearby region, while the Morphou/Güzelyurt basin is increasingly polluted
by saltwater and its surface water recharge is reduced by Greek Cypriot dam
construction activities (Elkiran – Ergil, 2005: 2-3).
As in the south, Turkish Cypriot water work authorities have also attempted
to address these deteriorating conditions. Water-saving measures have
included the construction of water purification plants in the three largest
municipalities, the development of a bicommunal wastewater treatment plant
in Nicosia, and three other medium-scale treatment facilities to treat sewage
water in Kyrenia/Girne, Famagusta/Mağusa and Morphou/Güzelyurt (Elkiran
et al., 2019: 3). Although these existing facilities save millions of m3 of water
per year, the water management of the other 25 cities remains problematic.
Perhaps an even more difficult task is to regulate the water withdrawal of
agriculture which sector accounted for 71% of all water demand in 2010 (Ibid.).
As Mason and Bryant demonstrated, the decentralized water management, the
politicization of municipal water governance, as well as the different pricing
and licensing policies at local level have significantly harmed water-saving
measures (Mason – Bryant, 2017: 8-9). Nevertheless, the introduction of
various modern irrigation techniques is a positive development and estimated
to save about 30 million m3 of water per year (Elkiran – Ergil, 2005: 5).
3.2. Efforts to extend supply options
In addition to large-scale water-saving measures, both administrations on the
island are seeking to supplement existing resources. Geographical features
greatly constrain the possibilities in this regard, as Cyprus, being an island,
65
Water Stress
has only limited options to involve external supply sources. As a result, several
conventional and unconventional solutions have been tested in previous
decades, trying to keep water balance through freshwater production or
import.
One of the most common unconventional options, based on resource
characteristics of the island, is the establishment of desalination plants. The
Republic of Cyprus is in a more advanced position in setting up desalination
plants: according to the Water Development Department, currently five larger
facilities operate in the southern part of the island. These plants, established
in Dhekelia, Limassol, Vassilikos, Larnaca and Paphos, produce a minimum
quantity of 32.8 million m3 freshwater per year.20 The statistics of the previous
years perfectly indicate the increasing role of desalinated water production:
14% of domestic water supply sources came from desalination plants in 2013
which rate has risen to 41% by 2014 and 45% in 2015 (Neocleous, 2017).
Although the use of these facilities is relatively costly, they provide a secure,
weather-independent supply option for both households and agricultural
consumption. On the other part of the island, Turkish Cypriots wish to exploit
these advantages too. In this case, however, legal and financial obstacles hinder
widespread developments of desalinization plants. Recently the European
Union has provided funding for the construction of desalinization facilities, but
territorial and legal uncertainties as well as lack of solvent demand significantly
decrease potential benefits of foreign investors or contractors. Prices also
restrain possible investments as desalinated water is estimated to cost about
$1/m3 compared to the $0.2/m3 price of treated water. These characteristics
create unfavourable conditions and significantly reduce the role of desalinated
water resources: in Northern Cyprus, desalinated water accounted for only
3.8% of the total water supply in 2016 (Elkiran et al., 2019: 3).
Due to the challenges mentioned above, the expensive and infrastructurebased local freshwater production was supplemented by various alternative
ideas. Some of these ideas proved useful, at least in the short run, while others
were unfeasible, especially in the long run. From the 1950s onwards, the
possibility of importing water to the island became an increasingly prominent
idea, although it encountered several geographic, political and economic
20
Ibid.
66
Péter Kacziba
difficulties. As in the case of contemporary offshore gas trade (Egeresi, 2019),
a partnership with Turkey would have proved to be the most efficient water
supply option, however, the escalation of the Cyprus conflict in 1960s prevented
the finalization of these plans. As a result, from this period onwards, the Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots took different paths: while the former sought
to import water from Greece, the latter called for cooperation with Turkey. In
the following decades, the agenda of sustainable import options was always
brought back by droughts and resulting water shortages when authorities on
both sides were pressured to come up with quick and effective solutions.
After 1974, the Turkish Cypriot authorities first began negotiations on water
import as part of the Turkish-Israeli Manavgat plan, as the broader aim of the
project was to extend the Turkish water export to other arid regions of the Eastern
Mediterranean, including Cyprus (Gürer –Ülger, 2007: 176). In 1997, Turkish and
Turkish Cypriot authorities signed a protocol for supplying water to Northern
Cyprus for a duration of ten years. As the Manavgat project did not yet have the
adequate infrastructure at this stage, an alternative solution was envisaged: a
Norwegian company named as Nordic Water Supply was contracted to carry
freshwater from Turkey to Northern Cyprus by using so-called flexible-barge
technology (Rende, 2007: 171). The technology used floating plastic balloons
(or towing bags) filled with freshwater to transfer water through the roughly
100 km long sea route between Anamur, Turkey and Kumkoy Coast, Northern
Cyprus. Compared to the prices of desalinated water ($1/m3), the water bag
import offered a more efficient supply cost with $0.2/m3, which is about the
same as the price of the treated water (Elkiran – Ergil, 2006: 5).
Nonetheless, the project was abandoned after four years of mixed results
as it could never meet the initial estimate of 7 million m3 annual supply
quantity (Elkiran et al., 2019: 3). Although the technology was able to transfer
about 4.1 million m3 of water to Northern Cyprus between 1998 and 2002,
it was eventually unable to complete the outlined 10-years long supply plan
due to persistent technical deficiencies (Szwedo, 2019: 147). The decision to
terminate the project was most likely also influenced by the fact that transport
via tanker vessels or pipelines was considered to be more efficient and, in the
light of Manavgat project, more important for the Turkish authorities (Bicak
– Jenkins, 2000). These preferences will culminate in the framework of the
‘Peace Water Project’, which we will discuss in the next section.
67
Water Stress
On the southern side of the island, water import became a pressing issue
in 2008 when, after four consecutive years of low rainfall and drought, water
shortage reached a critical level, particularly in some of the coastal areas such
as Limassol district. Beside introducing drastic water-saving measures and
raising water prices, the Greek Cypriot authorities had to find alternative
supply options for approximately 16 million m3 of freshwater (Martin, 2008).
After brief negotiations with Lebanon, Greece was selected to supply about
70% of the required quantity. In addition to the traditional alliance between
Nicosia and Athens, expertise and experience also played a role in the selection,
as Greece had already tested tanker and water bag techniques in response
to water shortages on the Greek islands. Given the short timeframe, in this
case, transport by tanker vessels proved to be a more appropriate logistical
technology, as the six ships involved in the transfer had to travel nearly 1000
km between Eleusis in Greece and Limassol in Cyprus. The supply operation
eventually delivered approximately 4.5 million m3 of water to Cyprus, 2.8 m3
in 2008 and 1.7 m3 in 2009. The transferred volume accounted for about 26%
of total supply sources in 2008 and 15% in 2009, although it was never able
to reach the initially proposed 16 million m3 quantity (WBL, 2010: 9, 22-23).
Consequently, the possibility of importing water, which did not prove to be
an efficient source of supply due to high costs and low importable quantities,
was removed from the agenda of the Greek Cypriot authorities. Although the
possibility of importing irrigation water from Lebanon again arose in the
early 2010s, it was soon replaced by policies focusing on local water-saving
and production.21
4. THE ‘PEACE WATER PROJECT’ AND
TRILATERAL WATER DYNAMICS
The previous section listed some of those water-saving and supplying
measures that have been implemented to ease water scarcity in Cyprus.
These efforts have achieved more comprehensive results in the southern
part of the country, as they produced more efficient and more independent
21
Financial Mirror (2013): Cyprus considers importing water from Lebanon, https://www.
financialmirror.com/2013/11/07/cyprus-considers-importing-water-from-lebanon/
(Downloaded 15 04 2020).
68
Péter Kacziba
solutions based on local resources and potentials. However, water scarcity as
a potential risk has not been eliminated in this case either: data on climate,
consumption and demand confirm further challenges in the mid- and long
run. Northern Cyprus will face even greater difficulties. In this case, efforts
intending to exploit local water resources and potentials were hindered by
legal, financial and, perhaps most importantly, political obstacles. These
political obstacles were not only caused by inter-communal disputes or lack of
recognition but Turkey’s strategic interests and water diplomacy too. Due to
its regional water strategy and role in the Cyprus conflict, Ankara was more
interested in a Turkish-led supply option than in developing local hydrological
infrastructure or constructing sustainable water facilities. This attitude
greatly influenced the construction project of ‘Peace Water’ pipeline which,
after its opening in 2015, formed a physical link between Turkey and Cyprus
and created a number of potential opportunities and threats.
Figure 4. Schematic diagram of the Peace Water Project
Source: DSI, http://www.dsi.gov.tr/haberler/2020/01/15/asrin-projesinde-meydana-gelen-ariza-tekni-k-sebeplerden-kaynaklanmi%C5%9Ftir
(Downloaded 24 04 2020).
‘The project of the century’, as the Turkish labelled the pipeline
construction, has a long history beginning somewhere around the 1950s when
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Water Stress
the Turkish Cypriots raised the possibility of importing water from Turkey.
The Turkish supply option as a potential solution to the North’s water scarcity
re-emerged several times during the decades after 1974 and, as we have seen
before, was partly realized in the late 1990s with the help of flexible-barge
technology. However, the Manavgat project intended to find a more durable
and efficient solution and, virtually since the 1990s, has been trying to
achieve the construction of a water pipeline connecting Southeast Anatolia
with Northern Cyprus. While the plan proposed several positive outcomes for
Turkey and (Northern) Cyprus, high costs, technical difficulties, potentially
high maintenance costs and selling prices as well as political considerations
have long delayed the approval of the project. The decision was finally made
in 2011, with the Turkish government pledging to build the $450 million
investment, an amount that eventually rose to $550 million by 2015 (Gungor,
2016: 3).
Previous concerns about the project seem reasonable given the
numbers and scales of the implementation plans. The project proposed the
construction of 480 km network of pipelines out of which the 107 km long
mainline connected the Alaköprü Dam in Anamur (Turkey) with the Geçitköy
Dam near Kyrenia (Cyprus). The most critical phase of the construction was
the offshore section, where the pipeline crosses the 80 km sea section at a
depth of mostly 250 meters. This section was particularly problematic for
several reasons: high undersea pressure, weather risks, seismic activities and
potential disturbance of marine traffic have all posed serious challenges to
the engineers. The adopted solution crossed the Mediterranean Sea by 160
high-density polyethylene pipelines, each 500 m long with a diameter of
1,600 mm, fixed to the seabed at the end and beginning of each pipe by steel
anchors (Figure 4, Ibid., 4). Besides the sea crossing, the construction involved
other challenging infrastructure developments including reservoirs, pumping
stations, storage tanks and transmission lines.
Given the technical difficulties, it is not surprising that the completion of
construction was delayed by one year, and the official opening was held only in
October 2015. The ‘Peace Water Project’ and the constructed infrastructure,
inaugurated in the presence of Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akıncı and
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has planned to provide 75 million m3 of water per
year for the next 30 years (Mason – Bryant, 2017: 15-16). The water supply
70
Péter Kacziba
attempts to serve both household and agricultural needs: about 37.76 million
m3 treated water per year is allocated for domestic needs and about 37.24
MCM untreated water per year is distributed for irrigation purposes. Besides
water supply, hydroelectricity with an installed capacity of 26 MW is also
produced by the project (Gungor, 2016: 3). Despite the official inauguration,
the construction continued during 2016 and developed further local
infrastructure in Northern Cyprus with an additional cost of approximately
$350 million (Mason – Bryant, 2017: 18).
The ‘Peace Water Project’ has been subject of criticisms from the outset, with
not only Greek Cypriots but also Turkish Cypriots questioning its necessity,
form of construction, commissioning and generally the controversial role
Turkey obtains with the pipeline. Ankara has tried to avoid these criticisms
from the beginning and adopted the rhetoric of previously proposed water
supply projects. First, Turkey has stressed the necessity of the project: in
the context of severe water scarcity in the island, it highlighted the vital
importance of the pipeline and disregarded domestic supply options. Secondly,
Ankara sought to equip the project with normative values. In this rhetoric,
the Turkish motherland once again rushed to the aid of Turkish Cypriots, and
despite the high costs, it helped them to battle water scarcity by constructing
an essential supply system. The name of the project, “Peace Water”, is also
quite informative and highlights potential Turkish ambitions to extend the
water supply to Greek Cypriots. According to the Turkish explanation, this
outcome would create vital water cooperation between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots and could eventually help to bring peace to the island (Ibid., 18).
Greek Cypriots, however, do not agree with these positive outlooks. For
them, since Turkey’s ‘Peace Operation’ in 1974, the term “peace” used by
Ankara has an entirely different connotation and refers to hegemony rather
than cooperation. Consequently, Nicosia responded with the usual rhetoric
and disputed the legality of the project. According to the Greek Cypriot
explanation, the pipeline project violates the principles of both international
and domestic laws. Referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) and the internationally recognized maritime boundaries,
Nicosia disputes the legality of the project and considers the installation of
underwater pipelines as unlawful acts. In the case of domestic law, they claim,
on the one hand, the illegitimacy of ‘TRNC’ and, on the other, the lack of consent
71
Water Stress
and permission of Greek Cypriot authorities (Savvides, 2016: 2-3). In addition
to legal issues, Nicosia also raises technical, security and political concerns.
In technical terms, the quality of transferred drinking water is questioned,
and it is assumed that the water is polluted during the relatively long transit
journey (Hacaoglu, 2013). Concerning security risks, it is feared that the
construction of the pipeline has created an additional dependent tie between
Turkey and Northern Cyprus, which Ankara may exploit through potential
threats of water cuts. Furthermore, allegations have been made about the
extent to which transmitters and sensors monitoring the operation and faults
of the pipeline are used for intelligence purposes, potentially for monitoring
shipping and naval activities in the area (Savvides, 2016: 3). Political concerns
are closely linked to the security risks and do not view the ‘Peace Water
Project’ as a potential option for conflict resolution, rather as another Turkish
attempt to dominate the island.
The Turkish Cypriot attitude is more complicated and, despite the close
relationship, does not clearly reflect Ankara’s rhetoric. In this context, the
necessity of the project was less challenged, but contradictions were caused
by several issues such as control, management, distribution and pricing. Two
interrelated factors fundamentally influenced these contradictions. Firstly,
Turkey did not consider Turkish Cypriots as equal partners, and secondly,
it has amended the already disadvantageous bilateral agreements several
times. Parameters of the unequal partnership were observed not only at the
political but also at the technical level with delegated Turkish officers of the
State Hydraulics Authority (DSI) holding considerably broader authority than
regular contractors (Ozdemir, 2019: 19). Unbalanced relations also left their
marks on the project-related agreements, which include various controversial
clauses. Perhaps the most disputable articles of the agreements proclaim that
ownership rights of developed infrastructures, and the land on which they are
located, have to be transferred to the Republic of Turkey which, in addition,
reserves the right to delegate management responsibilities to a private
company (Ibid., 15-26).
These clauses were particularly problematic for Turkish Cypriots for
several different reasons. First of all, Turkish ownership of land would
complicate legal disputes with Greek Cypriots and could further decrease
the chance to find common grounds in the intercommunal negotiations.
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Péter Kacziba
Secondly, the infrastructure ownership would allow Turkey to use Northern
Cyprus as a water transit area towards other potential regional partners and
could eventually lead to prosperous water business, but without involving or
compensating Turkish Cypriots (Ibid., 12). The third controversial issue has
been confronted around the time of the official opening when the Turkish
Cypriot leadership had to realize that not the ‘TRNC’ rather a private Turkish
company will be responsible for management duties. Although some members
of the leadership acknowledged inability to manage vast hydrological affairs,
authorities opposed the commercialization of the ‘Peace Water Project’ and
criticized the overwhelming Turkish role in the local distribution and pricing
(Ibid., 1-2). Fourthly, and lastly, the experience of the whole water supply
project has reinforced the sense that Ankara does not treat Turkish Cypriots
as equal partners or compatriots, but rather as a colony and colonial subjects
(Bryant, 2015: 3).
These diverse responses and contrasting ideas indicate that, instead of
bilateral affairs, trilateral water dynamics should be analysed in the case of
Turkey and Cyprus. In the shadow of the Cyprus conflict and its internal and
regional drivers, Ankara has developed very different relationships with Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and while it can apply its hegemonic water
strategy over the latter, it is not able to exploit hydrological advantages in the
case of the former. Greek Cypriots consider water supply proposals of Turkey
as security threats and hegemonic efforts to gain more substantial control over
the island. Nicosia is currently in a privileged position and can reject Ankara’s
hegemony through its membership position in the European Union. At the
same time, it also has a solid financial background to replace Turkish supply
options with local technological investments. Turkish Cypriots, on the other
hand, have no other options but to accept the Turkish water strategies and
follow the directives of Ankara. These directives, however, are double-edged
swords for Lefkoşa: they are undoubtedly helping to solve water scarcity in
the north, but, at the same time, cementing Ankara’s positions and forestalling
local water production efforts.
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5. CONCLUSION
This paper raised the question of whether Turkey’s hydrological role in Cyprus
can be interpreted as a hegemonic influence or a potential partnership.
The analysis reviewed the complexity of this subject and revealed possible
answers depending on whose side in the trilateral relations is examined. From
the Turkish perspective, water supply proposals may be labelled as potential
partnership proposals offered by Ankara in good faith and with the intention
of easing water scarcity. From the Greek Cypriot point of view, these Turkish
proposals serve no humanitarian purposes, rather seeking to preserve and
expand Turkey’s power potentials and hegemonic role in Cyprus. Perhaps
the most controversial answers are related to Turkish Cypriots. For them,
the motherland’s supply projects provide essential assistance and allow
authorities to deliver basic services. At the same time, Turkey’s overwhelming
role in providing essential support for Northern Cyprus creates a dependent,
patron-client relational model. Even though it provides vital assistance for
Turkish Cypriots in various fields, including water supply, the model is not
characterized by equality and mainly serves Ankara’s hegemonic purposes.
These different answers help to sketch the potentials and limits of
Turkey’s regional water diplomacy. As in any other commercial partnerships,
cooperation and a certain level of trust are fundamental factors in water
trade too. Proposals of the Turkish water diplomacy suffer from the lack of
these fundamental factors: Ankara’s regional foreign policy and hegemonic
behaviour produce a significant deficit of trust among regional actors,
distrust undermines the development of potential water cooperations and,
after all, continuously shatters Ankara’s water exporting dreams. In terms of
water diplomacy, Turkish-Greek Cypriot relations are characterised by these
patterns. Although water scarcity and lack of meaningful supply options
would create ideal conditions for the Turkish water export, the Cyprus
conflict and Greek Cypriot distrust towards Ankara undermine potential
cooperations. Experience of the ‘Peace Water Project’ further broadens the
gap between Nicosia and Ankara and demonstrates a controversial outlook
for other regional actors as well. On the one hand, it proves the technical
proficiency and feasibility of the Turkish water export proposals and provides
an example, maybe even an existing transit route, for future investments. On
74
Péter Kacziba
the other hand, the project also confirmed the suspicion that Turkey may use
water trade for hegemonic purposes and could exploit water links for creating
dependencies.
Consequently, results of the study indicate that even asymmetric water
settings require relatively fair partnerships: hegemons may construct large
infrastructural projects on their own, but they need cooperative partners
for establishing sustainable water markets. In the case of Turkey, these
fair partnerships would not require the revival of zero problems with the
neighbours’ policy but would need a better external image and a less conflictual
foreign policy that could support long term goals of regional water strategy.
Cyprus is a living example of such potentials, while it also demonstrates
how conflicts and political debates can override the importance of strategic
needs. Nevertheless, Turkey’s involvement in the island’s water situation is
more complex and cannot be merely described by Ankara’s strategic interests.
Given the rather negative hydrological outlook, Cypriots on both sides of the
divide have also vital interests to develop water cooperation with Turkey,
which is the closest country with large supply potentials and tested transport
infrastructure. These potentials could provide crucial sources in critical
situations, and not only for Turkish but for Greek Cypriots too.
75
Water Stress
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https://www.ekathimerini.com/156422/article/ekathimerini/business/mostchallenging-work-looms-for-longest-undersea-water-pipeline (Downloaded 20
04 2020).
78
International Energy Agency: Key energy statistics, 2018, Turkey,
Péter Kacziba
https://www.iea.org/countries/turkey#reports (Downloaded 03 10 2020).
Martin, Katie (2008): Cyprus forced to ship water from Greece. EDIE,
h t t p s :// w w w. e d i e . ne t /ne w s/ 3/C y p r u s -f or c e d-t o - s h ip -w a t e r-f r omGreece/14533/ (Downloaded 03 18 2020).
Neocleous, Nicos (2017): Cyprus Experience with Desalination and Water Reuse.
IDA World Congress 2017, Sao Paolo, Brazil, http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/WDD/
wdd.nsf/All/7AE347F4DDCD9255C225826B003EDA07/$file/SaoPaolo_2017.
pdf?OpenElement (Downloaded 18 03 2020).
Republic of Turkey, The Ministry of Food Agriculture and Livestock: Agricultural
Water Use and Productivity in Turkey, http://www.comcec.org/en/wp- content/
uploads/2016/05/Turkey-3.pdf (Downloaded 12 03 2020).
Savvides, Petros (2016): The semantics behind the ‘water of peace’: strengthening
the dependence of ‘TRNC’ on Anatolia. Eastern Mediterranean Policy Note, No.
3. Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia,
https://cceia.unic.ac.cy/wp-content/uploads/EMPN_3.pdf (Downloaded 01 04
2020).
STATISTA: Turkey: Total population from 2014 to 2024,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/263753/total-population-of-turkey/
(Downloaded 22 03 2020).
Water the Development Department, Republic of Cyprus,
http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/wdd/wdd.nsf/index_en/index_en?opendocument
(Downloaded 15 03 2020).
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https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/watershed/161/climate-datahistorical (Downloaded 24 02 2020).
World Bank: Databank, https://data.worldbank.org/ (Downloaded 29 03 2020).
79
Z OLTÁN VÖRÖS
THE WATER CRISIS OF CHINA AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES ON SOUTHEAST ASIA 1
Water spilled can never be retrieved.
A Chinese aphorism
1. INTRODUCTION
China, still the world’s most populated country with around 1.4 billion citizens,
keeps heading on a growth course towards becoming the largest economy in
the world. Though the recent COVID-19 coronavirus hit the Chinese economy
and 2020 is going to be a year of long time no see recession, since the global
trends are going to be similar, or even worse, because of the fact that China
was quite fast in recovering from the lockdown and restarting its economy,
the Chinese trends can and will continue in the upcoming years. Of course,
we can not see the long-term effects of the lockdown, but in the short-term,
it can affect the water crises, especially the international conflicts of China,
where water shortages and interruption in global transportation might force
them to use more hydroelectricity. Beside the actual situation, the country is
facing an environmental degradation for decades now, thousands of studies
and papers have already warned of the serious consequences of pollution and
overuse of the water resources and the unsustainable economic growth (Glied,
2015: 9). Still the most shocking example of environmental degradation and
the outcome of the nihilist focus on economic growth is the case of the Yellow
River, commonly known as “the cradle of Chinese civilization”2: it frequently
runs dry at the lower section. ”In 1994, it ran dry for 122 days along a 1801
2
This research project was supported by the European Union. EFOP-3.6.3VEKOP-16-2017-00007 – Young researchers from talented students – Fostering scientific
careers in higher education.
Yellow River Civilization – China’s Cradle and Early Capitals, China Highlights.
https://www.chinahighlights.com/yellowriver/civilization.htm (Downloaded 05 14 2020).
81
Water Stress
mile section in Shandong, not far from where it empties into the Yellow Sea. In
1996 it ran dry for 136 days. In 1997, for 226 days, denying water to 7.4 million
acres of farmland and producing a dry riverbed that stretched more than 372
miles.”3
So far, no reliable and sustainable cure has been found to address the
water related environmental problems in China and the proposed solutions
– partially – continue to focus on economic growth pushing regions, even
outside of the country into the water crisis.
2. CHINA’S WATER CHALLENGES
Mao Zedong, the leader of the Communist Party, who successfully defeated
the Kuomintang, established the People’s Republic of China in 1949 after the
bloody civil war, and started to follow the footsteps of Stalin’s path.4 Under
“Chinese communism” Chairman Mao established the party’s dominance and
his decisions considered neither the needs of hundreds of millions of people
nor environmental values. Nihilist procejts neglected the environment, the
flora and fauna of the rivers, failed dams and reservoirs further degraded
the ecosystems. The China we know today originates from these periods,
builds on those past decisions, but puts an incomparable pressure on the
environment, deriving from the pursue of economic growth. While China
became a regional power and the second biggest economy of the world, there
has been no or limited change in the protection of environmental values and
Beijing has refused to give up economic development, even as the leaders have
slowly recognized that environmental degradation will bring irreversible
changes in the not so distant future.
That realization of the threats on the other hand is important, because the
legitimacy of the party is originating from a new social contract they “signed”
with the society, especially critical after the Tiananmen Square massacre. This
compromise with the Chinese people is about a financial-economic growth,
3
4
Yellow River, Facts and Details. http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat15/sub103/item448.
html (Downloaded 03 20 2020).
In 1950 the countries signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual
Assistance, which defined the relation between the two sides, often ending up in Soviet
financial help. (Jordán – Tálas, 2005: 161-162). The cooperation ended in with a breakup in
1960.
82
Zoltán Vörös
where the Chinese Communist Party guarantees the increasing salaries and
per capita income in exchange for their less interest in political life – not just
creating an apolitical society, but also a pragmatic and pro-active party and
state. And that state, or one-party state is interested in pursuing further
economic growth, but because of the not so surprising complexities of the
economy (considering clean water and stable water flow for instance) they
also should keep in mind environmental challenges and consequences of the
degradation of ecosystems, which could undermine the economy. For years
now, China is facing a test where they have to save the environment, while
pursuing economic growth. Let’s see, how they can manage the water-related
issues under these circumstances.
2.1. Unequal distribution and overusage of water
According to the national, country-level data the amount of internal renewable
water resources5 in China is very high, ranking fifth after Brazil, Russia,
Canada and the United States (Table 1). At the same time, in the case of China
the picture is nuanced by a number of other factors, two of which, the size and
the distribution of the population, are decisive, not to mention the pollution of
factories and the increasing degree of aridity and desertification.
Table 1. Internal renewable water resources
(billion cubic meters per year), 2017
country
billion cubic meters per year
Brazil
5661
Russian Federation
4312
Canada
2850
USA
2818
China
2813
Source: Internal renewable water resources, World Atlas. https://knoema.com/
atlas/topics/Water/Internal-Renewable-Water-Resources/Internal-renewablewater-resources (Downloaded 20 03 2020).
5
Internal Renewable Water Resources (IRWR) can be defined as a long-term average annual
flow of rivers and recharge of aquifers generated from endogenous precipitation.
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Water Stress
China, with its 1.4 billion inhabitants is the most populous state on Earth,
so its annual renewable water supply is only around 2000 m3 per capita.
Compared to the severely water-scarce areas of North Africa and the Middle
East, where the per capita volume barely reaches 500 m3 (Figure 1), the country
is in a better position, yet water scarcity is a daily problem and an even more
serious shortage may develop in the coming years: the spatial distribution of
water and population, as well as economic centers, is far from consistent.
Figure 1. Internal renewable water resources
Legend: Red – 0-4 109 m3/year; Orange – 4-16 109 m3/year;
Yellow – 16-59 109 m3/year;
Light green – 59-200 109 m3/year; Green – 200-5700 109 m3/year
Source: Internal renewable water resources, World Atlas. https://knoema.com/
atlas/topics/Water/Internal-Renewable-Water-Resources/Internal-renewablewater-resources (Downloaded 20 03 2020).
84
Figure 2. The water basins of China
Zoltán Vörös
Legend: 1 = Songhua and Liao River Basin; 2 = Hai River Basin;
3 = Huai River Basin;
4 = Yellow River Basin; 5 = Yangtze River Basin; 6 = Pearl River Basin; 7 = Southeast River Basin;
8 = Southwest River Basin; 9 = Northwest River Basin.
Source: Yu, et al., 2018. (edited by the author).
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Water Stress
Table 2. Territorial distribution of water resources and population –
based on the water basins of China
Water
Basins
Total water
resources
(109 m3)
Total water
resources
(%)
Population
(106 inhabitants)
Population
(%)
Arable
Land
(%)***
GDP
(%)***
China
2540****
100
1366****
100
100
100
Songhua
and Liao
178
7
121
8.9
n.d.
n.d.
Hai
26
1
152
11.1
n.d.
n.d.
Huai
85
3.3
199
14.6
n.d.
n.d.
Yellow
54
2.1
119
8.7
n.d.
n.d.
Yangtze
1033
40.7
453
33.1
n.d.
n.d.
Pearl
410
16.1
187
13.7
n.d.
n.d.
Southeast
124
4.9
22
5,5
n.d.
n.d.
Southwest
501
19.7
80
1.6
n.d.
n.d.
Northwest
129
5.1
33
2.4
n.d.
n.d.
North*
472
18.6
624
45.7
64
44
South**
2068
81.4
742
54.3
36
56
*The water basins of Songhua and Liao, Hai, Huai, Yellow and Northwest rivers
** The water basins of Yangtze, Pearl, Southeast and Southwest rivers
***2010 data from Carmody, 2010
****Data and numbers used by Yu, et al., 2018.
Source: Own edition based on Yu, et al., 2018.
A very significant proportion of the population (45.7%) is located in the
north, while the region has limited water resources (18.6%) (Table 2). If we
consider that “Northern China […] contains 65% of China’s cultivated land and
produces roughly half of its grain and nearly all of its wheat and maize [and
that – the author] this region accounts for more than 45 percent of the nation’s
GDP” (FAO, 2008: 4), we can see how serious the disproportionality is. This
geographical problem is mainly felt in the basins of the Hai, Huai and Yellow
rivers6 hosting more than 35% of the population, while only possessing 6.4%
of the water resources. Meanwhile the southern river basins have the majority
of the resources, coupled with around 54-55% of the population and the GDP
offering a relatively better situation.
6
See lines 2-4 in Figure 2.
86
Zoltán Vörös
Disproportional distribution is just one issue regarding the water
resources, the country’s water productivity and the overuse of resources
further complicated and worsened the situation. Regarding productivity,
“Northern and Eastern [Definitely not the North Western ones – the author]
regions continue to be the most efficient. GDP/m3 consumed ranges from
4USD in the sparsely populated North Western provinces to almost 40USD
in Beijing” (Carmody, 2010: 23). China’s water productivity is low and China
still uses three times more water than the world average on goods produced
(Carmody, 2010: 25). One sector, which is definitely responsible for the low
productivity and the waste is the agriculture (Figure 3.). “Water productivity
in agriculture, which accounted for 65 percent of total water withdrawals, is
the lowest of all sectors [..] Only about 45 percent of water withdrawals for
agriculture are actually used by farmers on their crops” (Xie et al., 2008: xx).
Besides, many papers highlight the fact, that the water allocation system is
also inefficient, mainly because of lack of market consciousness of the country
(Ibid.; Carmody, 2010) and the subsidized water prices.7
Figure 3. Percentage of water use by sector, data from 2010
Legend: Numbers in brackets are for the location of River Basins on Figure 2.
Source: Carmody, 2010. (edited by the author).
7
”For example, the price of water for irrigation does not reflect the full cost of water supply,
including operation and maintenance costs plus overhaul and replacement costs of water
delivery systems. [..] In most irrigation districts, water fees are assessed on the basis of the size
of a household’s irrigated area, encouraging vast water waste by farmers” (Xie, et al., 2008: 36).
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Water Stress
In order to react on the disproportion distribution of water resources,
Beijing has developed a number of water diversion projects. Although such
projects have a long history as a sign of human response (Yevjevich, 2011:
343), “at the same time, interbasin water transfer is also one of the most
controversial water-resources-planning topics. The receiving region benefits
from the supply of additional water through such water transfers while the
donor region, by virtue of having water removed from it, sustains a reduction
to its water availability” (Zhang et al., 2015: 280).
Chinese water problems are further complicated by the climate, monsoons
affect the southern part of the country, which causes annual precipitation to
fall mainly between April and July threatening with floods and drier seasons
with less rainfall in the Northern provinces. “Over the past 100 years, interregional differences in precipitation have increased, with rainfall gradually
declining in North China at rates of 20-40 mm/decade, and rising in South
China at rates of 20-60 mm/decade” (Xie et al., 2008: 11). Besides climate, the
water problems of China are further heated by pollution.
2.2. Floods, droughts and water scarcity
China has been plagued by floods for millennia, with the middle and lower
reaches of major rivers being among the most affected territories. The
geographical and climatic characteristics of the country and their combined
effects have caused the largest floods in history to date in China, but recent
developments aimed at forecasting and preventing floods. Dams and
reservoirs are responsible for keeping the watercoursesunder control even
within rainy times and periods and a system of surface monitoring stations,
meteorological radars and satellite networks has now been set up that can
forecast floods by examining meteorological processes. These measures were
essential for Beijing to reach economic growth and strong human intervention
could improve the situtation (focusing much more on the environmental and
geographical characteristics and conditions, compared to the 1950s when
dams and reservoirs were built with Soviet help, completely disregarding
such considerations – in order to avoid further accidents like the collapse of
88
Zoltán Vörös
the Banqiao reservoir dam8). Floods are still there in the country in many
ways (urban floods, thanks to the rapid urbanization and industrialization
penetration of human activity into floodplains, flash floods created by heavy
rainfall, helped by extensive forest extractions and the floods of the main
rivers), buta re more and more under control.
Water scarcity, drought is another side of the highly variable rainfall,
climate and water resources in China. Frequent droughts simultaneously
with floods often happen just in different parts of the country, further
complicating the possible solutions for the water issues. Due to climate change
and desertification scarcity poses an even more serious challenge. Drought
periods, which have caused enormous damage, may be prolonged in the
future and their effects may be more severe, as the number of people affected
is huge. “It is estimated that between 15% and 20% of farmland is regularly
affected by drought” (Carmody, 2010: 57). One of the causes of the problem is
global climate change, not affecting only China, but it may have one of the most
serious and earliest consequences here. The Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau depends
on “glaciers melt and appear to be diminishing” (Gleick, 2008: 88). This is the
plateau, which “provides 25%of the water flowing down the Yangtze River,
49% of the flow of the Yellow River, and 15% of the flow of the Lancang River.
[…] The Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau used to host 36,000 glaciers covering an
area of 50,000 sq km, but their area has shrunk by 30 percent over the past
century” (Ibid.). This phenomenon will have an important consequence not
just on the water challenges of China, but on the Southeast Asian countries as
well, since Lancang, named Mekong after leaving China, is the main river of six
downstream countries.
Desertification also contributes to water scarcity and gains from it at the
same time, with serious consequences on the arableland area. ”Of a total of
3.32 million square kilometers of dryland, 2.64 million square kilometers, or
79%, is affected by desertification. In other words, 27.5% of China’s total land
area suffers from desertification” (Jiang, 2010: 13). During the desertification
process, the soil degrades in dry and semi-arid zones, its productivity decreases
8
”In 1975, after a period of rapid dam development [in the 1950s – the author], a perfect storm
of factors came together to topple Henan Province’s Banqiao Dam and kill an estimated
171,000 people.” The Forgotten Legacy of the Banqiao Dam Collapse, International Rivers.
https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/the-forgotten-legacy-of-the-banqiaodam-collapse-7821 (Downloaded 03 26 2020).
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Water Stress
due to human activities and/or persistent droughts and floods. According to
United Nations (UN), which redefined the concept several times in the 1990s
(Helldén, 2003: 95-96), desertification is the degradation of land resulting
from human activities, among other factors. (Ibid., 96). Jiang highlights, that
though degradation was there in Chinese historical times, during dynasties
and kingdoms as well, since the socialist period of China, since the establishent
of the People’s Republic, the “environmental degradation has accelerated”
(2010: 15).
Since the economic growth still was and is a priority in China, instead of
sustainable solutions (more controlled land-use in agriculture, controlled and
limited forest extraction, limited use of water for the agriculture and industry
by excluding leaking pipelines and introducing newer technologies), which
would have cost more money and possibly lower numbers in the GDP growth,
in many cases the actors, politicians on national, provincial and local level
preferred easier and simplier solutions – often further worsening the situation.
The nationwide response to water scarcity arrived in the face of a wide range
of projects, reservoirs, dams and the already mentioned water diversion
projects. In the next head, we are going to look into such projects, their threats
and how they can solve water scarcity and drought, but first we have to look
into further options and ways of providing the water for the agriculture,
industry and population. One of the ideas was to rely on groundwaters: “In
the North China Plain [covering the Hai, Huai and the lower sections of the
Yellow River Basin – the author], more than 60% of fresh water comes from
groundwater” (Feng et al., 2013: 2110). But this method was also without
control and was not sustainable, the water extraction further degraded
the ecosystem and the soil. The overexploitation of groundwater leads to
lowering water tables, exhausted groundwater reservoirs and catasthropic
subsidence (Xie et al., 2008: 2), and can ”further degrade the quality of deep
palaeowaters” (Currell et al., 2012: 4063). Furthermore, using groundwater in
an unsustainable way might be even more problematic “because it has a much
slower replenishment rate than surface water” (Carmody, 2010: 21), and the
depletion of groundwater resources can contribute to further water scarcity
through drying up rivers, lakes and wetlands.
According to World Bank studies, thanks to excessive groundwater usage,
these water sources are also polluted and as a consequence of overusage
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Zoltán Vörös
“deep groundwater tables have dropped by up to 90 meters, and shallow
groundwater tables by up to 50 meters” (Xie, et al., 2008: 18), causing
subsidence – observed in cities of Eastern China.
Case study: Yellow River
The Yellow River is a good example of both water scarcity and the overuse
of water resources. The Yellow is considered to be The River for the Chinese,
where the former inhabitants of the country first cultivated and irrigated the
lands, where they first made porcelain and mixed gunpowder. This was also
the region where the first imperial dynasties appeared and then disappeared
from the stage of history (Larmer, 2008: 109). It is the sixth longest river in the
world, second in the country after Yangtze, winding 5,464 km from Qinghai
Province all the way to the Bohai Sea – if it gets there. Since the 1990s there
have been multiple years when the riverbed dried up and the river did not reach
the sea, for 226 days in 1997,9 and for more than 250 days in 1998 (Zusman,
2000: 1). In October 2000 Xinhua reported that 2000 was the “first time in
ten consecutive years that no section of the river has zero flow.”10 Affected
by human interventions and climate change, the riverhas been in the center
of interest, not just because of its importance within the Chinese culture, but
because of such dramatic dry years. Li et al. tried to understand, what or who
is responsible for the dramatic decrease in the flow, and though admitted that,
especially in the 1990s, drought occurrence played an important role in the
reduction, human activities are the main causes of the flow reduction (Li et
al., 2018).
2.3. Pollution
Pollution is one of the most alarming issues of Chinese (and global) water
problems, threatening the lives of tens of millions of people, not to mention the
quality of the environment. Cleaning up toxicized surface and groundwater
is extremely difficult and costly– and for decades there were no regulations
9
10
Yellow River, Facts and Details. http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat15/sub103/item448.
html (Downloaded 03 20 2020).
Yellow River No Dry This Year. Xinhua News Agency. www.china.org.cn/english/2000/
Oct/3202.htm (Downloaded 03 26 2020).
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Water Stress
against polluting plants and factories in the country. The country started to
evaluate water quality in the 1980s and quickly developed standards, while
the Ministry of Ecology and Environment annually publishes the State of
Ecology & Environment Report with up to date pollution analyses.
China has established a water quality classification system based on the
pH and pollutant concentration of water, where Grades I-III still can be used
for human drinking water supply, while Grades IV-V can ony be used for
industrial or limited agricultural capacities.
•
Grade I – Mainly applicable to the source of water bodies and national
nature preserves.
•
Grade II – Mainly applicable to class A water source protection area for
centralized drinking water supply, sanctuaries for rare species of fish, and
spawning grounds for fish and shrimps.
•
Grade III – Mainly applicable to class B water source protection area for
centralized drinking water supply, sanctuaries for common species of fish,
and swimming zones.
•
Grade IV – Mainly applicable to water bodies for general industrial water
supply and recreational waters in which there is no direct human contact
with the water.
•
Grade V – Mainly applicable to water bodies for agricultural water supply
and for general landscape requirements.
•
Grade V+ - Essentially useless (Zhang, 2017; China’s Ministry of
Environmental Protection).
The latest report was published in the summer of 2019 by the Ministry
focusing on 2018 with some good news regarding the pollution. The surface
water quality improved at national level, still with regional disparities. As
China Water Risk, a private think-tank highlighted in their analysis, “overall
surface quality of [China’s] Main River Basins meeting Grades I-III rose to
74.3%, meeting the Water Ten target of 70%, but 5 Northern rivers still fail to
meet the target.”11 Water Ten plan was issued by China’s State Council in 2015
11
2018 State Of Ecology & Environment Report Review, China Water Risk. www.
chinawaterrisk.org/resources/analysis-reviews/2018-state-of-ecology-environmentreport-review (Downloaded 03 27 2020).
92
Zoltán Vörös
under the name ’Water Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan’ and its
goal was to coordinate different bodies of the state to reach 10 main measures
and altogether 238 specific actions by 2020. Among these, top objectives were
to “greatly reduce the percentage of badly polluted water bodies (over 70%
of water in 7 key rivers shall reach Grade III or above) and to improve the
quality of drinking water (over 93% of urban drinking water sources shall
reach Grade III or above).”12
Figure 4. Overall quality of the main river basins, China, 2018
Source: China Water Risk13, 2018 State of Ecology & Environment Report
From the figure above (Figure 4.) we can see that many out of the 7 main
rivers don’t meet the 2020 targets yet, though the report highlights that
the overall quality of these basins ”has gradually improved”.14 We can see
that Southern rivers are doing better than the Northern rivers, where only
the Yellow has real possibilities to reach the 70% target – but all in all the
improvement is already a good news.
On the other side, the quality of groundwater experienced a huge drop
(Figure 5.), ”the proportion of groundwater stations with “good” and
“excellent” quality fell drastically from 31.9% to 10.9%; while the proportion
12
13
14
New ‘Water Ten Plan’ to Safeguard China’s Waters, China Water Risk. www.chinawaterrisk.
org/notices/new-water-ten-plan-to-safeguard-chinas-waters (Downloaded 03 27 2020).
2018 State Of Ecology & Environment Report Review, China Water Risk. www.
chinawaterrisk.org/resources/analysis-reviews/2018-state-of-ecology-environmentreport-review/ (Downloaded 03 27 2020).
Ibid.
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Water Stress
of groundwater stations with “bad” and “very bad” quality rose from 66.8% to
86.2%.”15 China Water Risk suspects that the reason is connected to the rise
of monitoring stations, ”doubling from 5,100 to 10,168”,16 painting a shocking
picture of groundwater quality in China.
Figure 5. Overall groundwater quality, China, 2018
Source: China Water Risk17, 2018 State of Ecology & Environment Report
According to estimations “approximately 25 km3 of polluted water are held
back from consumption, contributing to unmet demand and groundwater
depletion” (Xie, 2008), and there are still reports coming out from China
that local governments are searching for alternatives rather than financing
cleanup or tackling the pollution (Ibid., 122), although the latter would be a
much more effective and sustainable way.
15
16
17
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
94
3. WATER DIVERSION PROJECTS AND DAMS
Zoltán Vörös
Water diversion is a term “used to describe the man-made conveyance of water
from one area to another where the water demand has exceeded, or soon will
exceed, supply” (Zhang et al., 2015: 280). As we have already discussed, water
diversion projects were introduced by Beijing to tackle drought and also the
unequal distribution of water resources. Such projects are controversial, in
many cases benefits could not reach the level of losses, but China actively
started to develop diversion methods and already during the 2008 Summer
Olympic Games Beijing received water from Hebei province (Buckley, 2008).
The biggest such initiative, the so-called South-to-North Water diversion
project was approved in 2002 with three separate routes: the Eastern moving
water from lower Yangtze through already existing centuries old canals and
new artificial sections, the Middle section transferring water from Han, and
a main tributary of Yangtze and the Western diverting water from the upper
Yangtze and further Western rivers. The Middle route began supplying water
at the end of 2014, the Eastern section supplied water already in 2013,18 but the
whole section is still not finished, while the Western stage is still in planning
phase because of the environmental concerns. Until the end of 2019, these two
existing routes “altogether diverted 29.4 billion cubic meters of water to arid
areas in the north, benefitting more than 120 million people.”19 But not only
this diversion project was constructed by China, by 2015 the country already
had 16,000 km in channels, reaching over half of the country’s provinces (Yu
et al., 2017: 721) and diverting water towards the territories facing water
scarcity and drought (Figure 6.).
As we can see, such projects can help water scarcity, but they can put
pressure on electricity consumption and create further ecological problems.
The main concern about such projects is pollution, how the transferred water
might become (further) polluted through the artificial canals, in many cases
concrete channels and the risk of overusing the water resources of the source
regions, causing further economic and environmental problems in those
regions as well.
18
19
Factbox: China’s south-to-north water diversion project, Xinhua. www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2019-12/11/c_138623052.htm (Downloaded 03 30 2020).
Ibid.
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Water Stress
Figure 6. Annual inter-basin water transfers in China across
nine major river basins as of 2015
Legend: The volume of transferred water here refers to the maximum annual
capacity of water diversion projects. Projects constructed as of 2015, projects
under construction as of 2015 and planned projects are all included.
Source: Yu, et al., 2018. (edited by the author).
Without addressing such concerns, the Vice-minister of Water Resources
announced a new extension for the Eastern route of the South-to-North Water
Diversion Project in November 2019, bound “to channel 490 million more m3
96
Zoltán Vörös
of water northbound to the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region annually”,20 so water
diversion projects are not over and the possible negative consequences are
also staying, questioning the sustainability of such projects.
In 2009, at the Copenhagen Climate Summit, China announced that
by 2020 it is going to reduce carbon intensity by 40% – mostly by using
hydropower.21 Traditional hydropower stations are highly criticised, since
they are “based on the assumption that future stream-flow patterns will
mirror those of the past”,22 which is no longer true thanks to climate change.
Also, more and more23 are criticising the whole concept of using water as a
renewable resource, not just because of climate change, but since “nearly all
dam reservoirs emit greenhouse gases, and some are as highly polluting as
fossil fuel plants.”24 Dams are usually being built because of hydroelectricity
or irrigation, flood control, water supply or other reasons, for example
navigation. Dams and reservoirs in China have two main goals: electricitiy
generation through hdyropower plants and gaining more control over the
rivers helping flood-control and navigability, but as a result of the Copenhagen
announcement, hydroelectricity became a top priority. According to the
International Hydropower Association, by 2018 Chinese hydropower sector
had a total capacity of 352 GW, over a quarter of the globe’s installed capacity25
and still hundreds of dams are under construction or are in planning phase.
China has the world’s largest potential hydropower resource26 and Western
provinces, especially Yunnan, the so-called hdyropower battery,27 are playing
an important role in hdyroelectricity generation. Already in 2000 the Western
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
China extends water diversion project to pump more water to Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei,
Xinhua. www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/28/c_138590736.htm (Downloaded 03 30
2020).
Climate Change & Hydro: Mutually Damming, China Water Risk. www.chinawaterrisk.org/
opinions/climate-change-and-hydro-mutually-damming/ (Downloaded 03 30 2020).
Ibid.
Hydroelectric Power Isn’t as Green as We Thought, Technology Review. https://www.
technologyreview.com/2016/09/29/157286/hydroelectric-power-isnt-as-green-as-wethought/ Downloaded 05 14 2020).
Ibid.
China statistics, International Hydropower Association. https://www.hydropower.org/
country-profiles/china (Downloaded 03 30 2020).
Hydropower boom in China and along Asia’s rivers outpaces regional electricity demand,
The Third Pole. https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2017/04/28/hydropower-boom-inchina-and-along-asias-rivers-outpaces-regional-electricity-demand/ (Downloaded 03 30
2020).
Ibid.
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Development Strategy of China highlighted the national goal, developing the
West and promoting the transfer of energy to the East (Habich, 2015: 58).
Because of this goal the construction of dozens of hydropower stations and
dams had started, for example on the Lancang-Mekong which also originates
from the Tibet Plateau and through Yunnan it crosses the border of China.
There are plans to have altogether 23 dams on Lancang (Xu – Pittock,
2018), the upstream and Chinese section of Mekong. Basist and Williams are
counting with 10 already operating dams (Basist – Williams, 2020: 11), but
Chellaney talks about 11 dams (Chellaney, 2019), the actual number is not
known yet, but for sure there are alredy at least 10 operating dams on the
upstream of Mekong, and a lot more under construction.
At the same time, besides the environmental concerns,28 hydropower has
further consequences in the case of international rivers, and Lancang-Mekong
is for example an international river: countries donwstream are going to face
negative outcomes, lack of water and sediments or missing water flow.
4. INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES ON SOUTHEAST ASIA
The dams and the reservoirs, the need for water and the need for energy
generated by water internationalized the water conflicts of China – although
its position as an upstream country provides a more comfortable position
for them in this regard. The water resources of both Kazakhstan on the
northwestern border and the countries of Southeast Asia depend on rivers
from China, but are unlikely and would not be able to take relevant diplomatic
or military action against Beijing. In this paper we are going to focus on the
latter region, including Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam
and the case of Lancang-Mekong. ”The Mekong is one of the most important
geostrategic areas of East and Southeast Asia. [..] The river is a source of water
and food for approximately 70 million people” (Kákai et al., 2019), The role of
China is crucial since the upstream section “provides as much as 70 percent of
the downstream water in the dry season” (Beech, 2020).
28
The Three Gorges dam on the Yangtze River is a great example of how such big investments
and projects can harm and destroy the environment and human habitats.
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Zoltán Vörös
A progressive cooperation, the so-called Mekong River Commission, has
been established, but only with four members. China (and Myanmar, the
upstream countries) decided to stay away from the cooperation, making it
an organization with important goals and aims, but with limited capacities
and capabilities. Lately its political and strategic importance has further
decreased but its members have made progress in a number of areas, such
as flood warning, and China has even joined the forecast in this regard,
possibly showing the only future relevancy of the organization. However,
a complex cooperative mechanism would be required as a result of the fact
that the already existing dams in China can seriously affect water flow.
Not really as a reaction, but in 2015 China created the Lancang-Mekong
Cooperation Mechanism (LMCM) as a strategic cooperation towards the
downstream states. The goals of this scheme do not really cover the riverrelated environmental and ecological concerns, but mostly focus on the
economic benefits and cooperation. China is interested in further pushing its
political and economic leverage, while the participating countries are hoping
for more money and investments arriving from the upstream country (Kákai
et al., 2019). Dominance and position can be highlighted successfully through
Chinese gunboats cruising down until the Thailand border on the Mekong:
“About every month, a few Chinese gunboats cruise down the Mekong River
through Myanmar and Laos from China’s Guanlei port. [..] Thai patrol boats sit
bobbing gently, watching” (Sullivan, 2018).
So, a mechanism dealing with water flow and environmental consequences
would be required unless dependency on China is without control. And
it seems China does not always play a fair game. According to Basist and
Williams, the record low water-level, and as Beech puts it “the worst drought
in living memory” (Beech, 2020) in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam is a
consequence of China using its dams and reservoirs to generate electricity and
to store water for the dry seasons (Basist – Williams, 2020: 5). China describes
this process as a regulatory one, where they utilize “these dams to regulate
downstream flow so that period of high and low flow would be more evenly
distributed. This also suits their need to distribute the energy production
across the annual cycle, allowing the generators to be used more equitably
throughout the year. The consequence of flow regulation is that water that
would normally flow during the wet season is released during the dry season”
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Water Stress
(Ibid., 4). Nonetheless, in 2019 the downstream countries suffered drought
and low levels of water in Mekong, while Basist and Williams, analyzing the
wetness index stated, “it is evident that there was above-average natural
flow originating from the Upper Mekong” (Ibid., 18). The five dams (Miaowei,
Huangdeng, Dahuaqiao, Lidi and Wunonglong) might answer where the extra
water is: “The five dams built since 2017 are compounding the alteration of
natural river flow as the reservoirs are filled” (Ibid.).
Of course we should not hide the possible positive consequences, if
functioning properly, as it was disclosed previously, reservoirs can help rainy
seasons by containing water, and dry seasons by releasing water. Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi already highlighted this fact on a LMCM meeting:
“China has overcome its own difficulty and increased water outflow from the
Lancang River to help Mekong countries mitigate the drought.”29
The fact that these countries are dependent on China in an economic way,
and also rely on the upstream country regarding the water flow is alarming,
a more extensive international cooperation would be required to control the
watercourses and the dam constructions, but since China refused to join the
Mekong River Commission and created the LMCM instead, focusing more on
the economic benefits, the downstream countries can only hope that Beijing
will always be ready to provide water flow for them.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS
China should give up prioritizing its economic growth and focus more on
sustainable growth and environmental issues, because these challenges
already can cost billions of dollars for China questioning future growth. “The
World Bank’s Cost of Pollution in China study estimated that the water crisis
is already costing China about 2.3 percent of GDP [..]. These estimates only
represent the tip of the iceberg. They do not include the cost of impacts for
which estimates are unavailable, such as the ecological impacts associated
with eutrophication and the drying up of lakes, wetlands, and rivers, and the
29
China says will help manage Mekong as report warns of dam danger, Reuters. https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-mekong-river/china-says-will-help-manage-mekong-as-reportwarns-of-dam-danger-idUSKBN20E20T (Downloaded 03 29 2020).
100
Zoltán Vörös
amenity loss from the extensive pollution in most of China’s water bodies.
Thus, total costs are undoubtedly higher” (Xie, 2008: xxi).
•
We could see that Beijing realized the water problems and attempted to
react, but further steps should be taken in order to successfully tackle
these challenges,
•
All water sources (surface or groundwater) should be managed in an
integrated way and controlled by centrally defined guidelines. We could
see in many cases that local, provincial level officials, decisionmakers
were looking for alternative resources instead of controlling or cleaning
up previously used ones,
•
Strict control of water usage, the abolishment of subsidies provided for
the companies and limited increase in water prices for the agriculture –
where the amount of wasted water should be regulated through penalties
and modernization,
•
Integrated management of tackling water-related challenges at national
level, to avoid situations where an alternative solution (like extensive
use of groundwater or reservoirs and dams) can further deteriorate the
situation,
•
Extensive water cooperation with downstream countries on
environmental, ecological and water flow issues, participation in
international bodies dealing with the authorization of further dams and
reservoirs on international rivers,
•
According to the previous recommendations, the UN should be more active
in tackling such regional water disputes and should develop and implement
a strategy on protecting the rights of the people and communities living
by and from international rivers.
6. CONCLUSION
While trying to collect recommendations for the country and the region, it
should be kept in mind that rural and poor population is subsidized for a reason,
agriculture is important because of food security and all are connected to the
decades-long (so far successful) fight against poverty. This is a key issue for
China since it is visible that the Party and the officials understood the meaning
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and the complexity of water challenges, but they are trying to navigate
between working solutions, keeping the power and the legitimacy and still
pushing for economic growth and poverty alleviation. Xie also highlighted
that China’s “central issue is how to reduce rural poverty and secure the
nation’s food supply while at the same time improving the efficiency of water
use” (2008: xxxii), and as we could see, the plans are not always better, often
are creating further issues, already reaching out to the neighboring countries
with their water issues, internationalizing the problem. And the situation will
not be better soon: according to forecasted climate change scenarios ”China
can expect an increase in both average temperature and precipitation in
the coming 50 to 100 years, compared to the reference period (1961-1990).
This will have significant impacts on hydrology and water resources [...]
[suggesting] that there will be more floods in the South and more drought
events in the North” (Wang – Zhang, 2011: 80-81).
Within such conditions, given the disproportional distribution of the
decreasing water resources, the pollution, waste and the huge population,
Beijing has to introduce a comprehensive reform never seen before while they
should acknowledge that downstream countries have the very same rights for
water flow as the upstream countries.
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105
R EMÉNYI PÉTER
BORDER DISPUTES AND WATER CONFLICTS
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS1
1. INTRODUCTION
Territoriality is a major characteristic of human beings. We like to have our
own confined territories at various scales from the individual (my room)
to the communal (our city). Territories per definitionem involve boundaries
of various sorts, since they are prerequisites of delimitation of areas, thus
territorialization. The current political order, based on territorial nation
states works similarly, territories confined with boundaries are the building
blocks of it, where theoretically every single point of the Earth’s land surface
(except the Antarctica) belongs to a state and only one state, divided by state
borders. In this system any deviation from the ruling principle is considered a
dispute, a situation which is problematic.
Furthermore one major source of power for political elites, ruling the
territorial nation states is territory itself (Newman, 2006: 91-92), thus no
states are happy to give up territories for other states. This leads in many
cases to the bitter and lingering nature (e.g. Israel, Cyprus) of border disputes
which can further deteriorate bilateral relations.
In the region of former Yugoslavia – due to the dissolution of the state –
several border disputes have remained even quarter of a century after the
conflict. Some of these are connected to bodies of waters as they play a special
role in border delimitation and since they weren’t fully addressed by the late
Yugoslav authorities. This non-regulation and the violent dissolution of the
state led to the lingering border disputes of the successor states of former
Yugoslavia. In this short paper we intend to collect the major border disputes
of the successors of former Yugoslavia linked to waters.
1
Péter Reményi’s work was supported by the Bolyai programme of the HAS and the ÚNKP19-4 New National Excellence Program of the Ministry for Innovation and Technology.
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Water Stress
2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BORDERS
Borders are inseparable parts of the Westphalian modern world order where
territorial nation states are the major players of the international arena. Their
territories are separated from each other by lines in the sand, called borders,
which therefore separate the areas of two adjacent states.
Borders are addressed in various ways in different disciplines
(international law, history, sociology, geography etc.) and in the last decades
several interdisciplinary approaches have also emerged. In the classical sense
borders are seen either as barriers, the outer layer of their states where they
confront the rest of the world, thus they are the first lines of defence. Borders
are also viewed as filters, with the help of which those in power can decide
who and what can enter or leave the state and who and what has to stay in or
out. A third approach sees the borders as interfaces or bridges, where states
meet, interact and cooperate.
In the last decade an increased interest can be seen towards borders
and border studies (e.g. O’Dowd 2002, Kolossov 2005, Newman 2006, Scott
2011, Laine 2016). This is due to several mutually reinforcing processes and
events. In the decades around the turn of the millennia globalization has been
gaining ground and we experienced a fast development in transportation and
communication technologies as well as new ideas of economic and cultural
globalization. It created the perception of a shrinking world where borders
were losing their importance. The fall of the Berlin wall and the iron curtain
led to the re-unification of Germany and Europe, and the general deepening
economic and political cooperation in the Western world resulted in
supranational institutionalized cooperations (EU, NAFTA etc.) where borders
has been deconstructed from above. The image of the ‘borderless world’ have
never been closer and clearer which fuelled increased interest of borders from
academics around the world.
In the meantime new borders have also emerged especially in Eastern Europe,
where synthetic “federal” states (Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) have
been split creating new nation states with a lot of new borders; again something
academics were eager to examine. The (re)birth of (new) borders created
borderlands, cross-cutting previously established territorial links of economy,
transportation, city networks etc., and resulted in modified spatial patterns of
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Péter Reményi
development. In some cases – in Europe especially in the former Yugoslavia – the
establishment of new borders did not go smoothly which fuelled inter alia the
involvement of academics in researching border issues (Reményi – Végh, 2006).
One can classify borders along multiple typologies. The genetic approach
focuses on the context of the genesis of borders, distinguishing antecedent,
subsequent and superimposed boundaries. A rather geographical approach
is the morphological division of borders, which investigates their position
to natural features (physiographic, anthropomorphic and geometrical
boundaries) (Anderson, 1999).
2.1. The relation of borders and waters
In the latter categorization a distinct type of borders are the ones connected
to waters, which include inland waters (rivers or lakes) and the open seas.
They both constitute relatively good markers of borders since they are well
visible and create a boundary like disruption in the space.
In the case of inland waters and especially of rivers the uniqueness of the
borders derive from the fact that since the border itself is linked to the body of
water and rivers are rather unstable physical features the borders can change
their position as a consequence of the change of the course of the flow. There
are several possibilities to link borders to rivers but all have the same effect in
some way: international borders can be either riverbanks, or median lines, but
most often (especially at navigable rivers) thalwegs, which is a line connecting
the deepest points of a valley/river, thus being the natural navigable channel
within a river (Whittemore, 1937: 446). A typical dispute emerges when a river
changes it is course through natural movement and therefore the location of
the boundary also changes. In cordial relations these changes can be adjusted
from time to time (as was in the case of Hungary–Slovakia at the 1999 and
2018 modifications), but tense relations can cause longstanding disputes.
Other type of water related borders are the maritime borders, the current
system of which was established by the UN in the Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS)2 in 1982 (with entry into force in 1994). This regulates
2
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
(Downloaded 04 08 2020).
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the maritime borders as well as the different maritime zones of each coastal
states. Usually these borders and zones are clearly defined, but conflicting
claims of sovereignty (e.g. the South China Sea) or the interpretation of the
Law of the Sea (maritime boundary of the two Koreas) can lead to territorial
and border disputes.
Bodies of water can play an indirect role in border disputes as well. In this
case the border does not run along waters, but access to the water (river or
sea) is the ultimate goal of the territorial dispute. In these situations corridorlike territorial features (e.g. Danzig, Leticia etc.) can be created which on one
hand can provide the access, but on the other these are territorial extremities
usually prone to geopolitical conflicts (Pap, 2001).
2.2. Border disputes
When neighbouring states are unable or unwilling to agree on their
international borders border disputes emerge. The major theoretical types
are positional, territorial, resource and functional disputes (Guo, 2018). In
positional disputes the exact line of the border is disputed, either because
the delimitation or its explanation in documents are not accurate enough or
because changes on the ground alter its relative position and the affected
countries disagree on the interpretation of the new situation (e.g. changing
courses of border rivers). One may call territorial disputes the ‘classical’
border disputes, where in the focus of the disagreement stands the debated
sovereignty over a territory. In these cases not the border itself is important
but the contested rule over a piece of land or sea. Resource based disputes
are centred around cross-border or border side resources, including but not
limited to minerals (e.g. oil fields), fresh water (Jordan, Nile…), fertile lands etc.
Again not the border itself is challenged but the use of resources affected by
the border. Finally functional border disputes are related to the functioning,
regulation and utilization of borders. Unilateral moves (closing the border,
introducing discriminative measures…) are typical triggers of functional
border disputes of neighbouring states.
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3. THE BORDER ISSUES OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
During the dissolution of Yugoslavia (in several waves from 1990 to 2008,
with still existing potential for further territorial fragmentation) territorial
sovereignty and therefore border issues has been in the centre of the debates
(Reményi – Végh, 2006). This is no surprise at all, since usually any state
disintegration involves the necessity of agreeing on the new territorial order,
thus on borders as well. One major reason from a geographical point of view,
why the dissolution triggered a series of armed conflicts over territorial
control can be found in the spatial configuration of former Yugoslavia (other
major factor being the political elites’ willingness and intentions to go to war
for territories and power).
Firstly, the spatiality of ethnic groups did not match the territorial
administrative structure of the state (Kocsis, 1993). Except Slovenes and their
republic all federal units were multi-ethnic and the largest ethnic groups has
lived in multiple republics and provinces, the Serbs (the largest group within
the state) being the most scattered throughout Yugoslavia, which was, to
some degree (Đilas, cited by Bataković, 1995: 32), an intentional move of Tito,
aiming to curb potential Serb hegemonic aspirations. Secondly, the road to the
dissolution was beset on all sides by growing ethnonationalism, which on one
hand can’t be perceived as something unusual in late socialist Europe during
the last years of communism, while on the other, it was fuelled from the top by
the national elites of each ethnonational groups (Juhász et al., 2003).
Thirdly, the borders of the federal units of Yugoslavia have been viewed only
as administrative lines and have not been addressed by the state bureaucracy
even when disputes among federal units arose. Tito even addressed internal
borders as just lines drawn in granite, not to divide but to connect the nations
of Yugoslavia (Bataković, 1995: 32). The exact moves, talks and debates
surrounding the (re)establishment of internal borders after World War II
are rather obscure (Režek, 2015), but Milovan Đilas, an influential politician
of the time had important role in it (Klemenčić – Schofield, 2001: 12). The
general rule (as agreed in 1945 by the Yugoslav communist leaders) was
to re-establish the 1878 Berlin Congress international lines (Spahić et al.,
2014), thus the historical approach was widely used, but not always and not
everywhere, since some of them have never been international borders before
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(e.g. the Danube between Croatian Baranja and Serbian Vojvodina). In some
cases ethnic principles (defining the boundaries of Macedonia or Syrmia) or
other strategic considerations (Bay of Kotor) have been used. Documents
addressing the whole issue are missing (if ever existed) and one can rely
only on indirect references. Various factors contributed to the creation of
internal borders prior to the 1946 constitution, including historical, ethnic
and administrative ones (Režek, 2015: 442).
Based on the above, it is no surprise that at the time of the dissolution of the
state one of the major issues was the definition of the international borders
of the newly emerging states. According to the Serbian position (which
have been kept throughout the conflict, especially in the case of Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina) the internal borders of the member republics
are merely administrative boundaries and not internationally recognized
borders, furthermore the last constitution provides the right of secession
to nations and not republics (people vs. territory), thus after the civil war
the principle of the right of ethnic self-determination should be the basis of
further territorial agreements, instead of the principle of the inviolability of
borders. In contrary, the Bosniak and Croat positions, referring also to the
last Yugoslav constitution, emphasized the international recognition of the
republics’ borders, the right of secession of the republics (and not the people),
and refused to agree on anything else but their secession with their existing
boundaries. During the clash of the two major positions reasonable and less
reasonable arguments have been articulated for and against both ambitions.
Apparently all parties tried to interpret the rules along their interests, but
at the end, based on the rulings of the Badinter Commission, the republics’
borders became the new international borders (Pellet, 1992; Radan, 1999;
Hoffmann 2007).
The use of the uti possidetis iuris principle seemingly simplified the
territorial consequences of the succession, but the ethnic tensions, which
constituted an important layer of the conflict,3 remained. Almost all former
member republics (except Slovenia) inherited smaller or larger ethnic tensions
3
We do not think that multiethnicity was the primary cause of the dissolution of the federal
state, but it did contribute to the nature of it, triggering a bloody territorial war marred by
large scale violence against civilians, mass displacement of people on ethnic basis, ethnic
cleansing, etc.
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in close connection to their new international borders. Therefore, instead
of solving one important problem of the region, it was simply bestowed one
administrative scale down from a federal level to the level of former republics
(now independent states) (Reményi – Végh, 2006).
The wars that broke out during the prolonged disintegration of Yugoslavia
(with the exception of the so-called Ten-Day War for Slovenia, which was a
last effort to save the federal Yugoslavia) were all fought to fit the ethnic and
administrative borders, and include as many members of the respective nation
as possible. Due to the fragmented, mosaic-like ethno-territorial patterns of
many regions of Yugoslavia, this resulted in displacement of ‘others’ from
territories under the rule of a given nation and the violent occupation of lands
under the control of other nations on ethnic claims.
After the series of brutal wars a US brokered peace deal ended the first stage
of the dissolution. The treaty, which was agreed in Dayton, Ohio and signed in
Paris in 1995, set the new territorial structure of the region including borders.
All independent countries inherited their pre-independence administrative
borders and a new, unique type of boundary was set up in Bosnia-Herzegovina
to divide the warring parties, creating the Federation of BiH and the Republic
of Srpska (Juhász et al., 2003). Later secessions also followed suit, both
Montenegro and (however not a settled issue so far) Kosovo declared their
independence within their former administrative borders.
3.1. Case studies
Following the dissolution, former internal administrative borders became
international, and the disagreements among them turned from domestic
disputes to international tensions. Due to the Yugoslav administration’s neglect
of internal borders, and it’s perception that they are only for administrative
reason, no one was prepared for managing them in an international
environment, which in some cases led to lingering border disputes among the
former member republics. In the following section we give a brief overview on
the ones connected to waters.
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3.1.1. The Gulf of Piran and the Slovenian exit to the sea
In the core of the maritime border dispute (the wider issue also involves
disputed land borders) is the lack of previous maritime border delimitation
between Slovenia and Croatia. The maritime boundaries of the north Adriatic
have been agreed in 1975 by Italy and Yugoslavia in the Treaty of Osimo, which
also divided the territory of the Free city of Trieste. The UNCLOS maritime
border system was also debated during the existence of Yugoslavia, signed and
ratified in 1982/1986 by the federation. This means that the Yugoslav–Italian
(external) maritime border was set, but internal maritime lines between
Croatia and Slovenia have never been properly established (Avbelj – Letnar
Černič, 2007: 4).
Slovenia’s short coastal strip (46 km) consists entirely of the parts of the
former Free city of Trieste and due to the shape of the gulf, following the
independence of Slovenia and Croatia, the former found itself stuck between
the maritime zones of Italy and Croatia. From 1995 the border dispute has
revolved around the Slovene demand of free access to the international waters
which were blocked by the territorial waters of Croatia and Italy. Slovenia
claimed the whole gulf or at least beyond the median line and a corridor to the
international waters.
On the other hand, Croatia insists on the median line and refuses providing
the corridor through the claimed territory. Both countries refer to different
parts of the UNCLOS agreement, and several rounds of talks have been
organized together with agreements (Drnovšek-Račan in 2001, Bled in 2007)
which have later been ratified only one party. Slovenia even used its veto
blocking Croatia’s EU accession to enforce its interests. The dispute seemed
to be ended by a binding rule of Permanent Court of Arbitration (in 2017,
favouring Slovenia), which was however refused by Croatia (Pavlic, 2017).
3.1.2. The Pelješac bridge and the Bosnian exit to the sea
Similar to the Slovenian coast, the Bosnian is also a narrow strip of land (21
km), a consequence of previous treaties, but in this case dating back to the late
17th, early 18th centuries (Treaties of Karlowitz 1699 and Passarowitz 1718).
Neum in the north, together with Sutorina in the south were established as
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buffer zones between Ragusa and the Venetian Republic. As border changes
continued in the region, Neum remained part of the territorial unit now called
Bosnia-Herzegovina and serves as the only access to the Adriatic for the
country after its independence (Bickl, 2019: 51).
The corridor of Neum therefore disrupts the land continuity of Croatia,
creating a sort of an exclave in Southern Dalmatia. The control of transit traffic
through the corridor is a potential leverage in the hands of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and the mere existence of it once Croatia joins the Schengen Area can create
unmanageable border situations. In the late 1990s negotiations have started
between the two states involving special transit rights for Croatian traffic
through the corridor and special commercial rights for Bosnian companies
in the Croatian port of Ploče (the largest port in the region, where the V/C
transport corridor ends, linking major Bosnian cities like Tuzla, Zenica,
Sarajevo and Mostar), also known as the Neum/Ploče agreement, but without
final consensus so far.
Since the early 1990s Croatia has had, at least theoretically, a plan to
solve the unfavourable situation unilaterally: constructing a bridge over the
Adriatic, linking mainland Croatia with its southern exclave, bypassing the
Neum strip. While the bridge is to be constructed over Croatian territorial
waters, Bosnia-Herzegovina opposes it for two reasons: it may hinder the
maritime traffic to and from the potential Neum port (if a commercial port
will be constructed here ever), and since the maritime boundaries between
the two states are not concluded yet (similar to the context of the Gulf of Piran
dispute), and the ownership of two small uninhabited islands (Mali Skolj and
Veliki Skolj) is still disputed (Papadopoulos, 2018). Furthermore, the history
of the bridge shows that such a large and expensive construction, perceived
by some as prestige investment, is hard to accomplish. In the last plans the
bridge will be high enough to let all vessels enter the Bay of Klek and even EU
financing can be involved (Pavlic, 2018).
3.1.3. Sutorina
Sutorina is located in Western Montenegro with a narrow coastal strip to
the Bay of Kotor. The municipality, together with Neum served as a buffer
zone between Ragusa and the Venetian Republic from 1699. From the Berlin
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Congress (1878) both areas became parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and while
Neum still belong to that country, Sutorina was transferred to Montenegro
in 1947 as part of a land swap between) the two socialist member republics
(however without direct written sources on the transfer (Spahić et al., 2014:
8-9). After its independence, Bosnia-Herzegovina started to dispute the
area until the 2015 Vienna Agreement, where it renounced claims on the
municipality. For Bosnia-Herzegovina, the small exit to the sea is more than
just a symbolic issue, knowing the disputes along its other narrow corridor at
Neum. This dispute is (was) clearly a territorial one, the sovereignty over the
municipality is debated, and not the position of the border itself.
3.1.4. The Prevlaka peninsula
Not far from the Sutorina area another disputed border is located. The
Prevlaka peninsula of Croatia is a narrow strip of land in front of the entrance
of the strategic Bay of Kotor of Montenegro. From the Treaty of Vienna (1815)
until World War I the Habsburgs, between the two world wars Yugoslavia
ruled both. During the establishment of the internal borders of Yugoslavia,
the Bay of Kotor was ceded to the Montenegrin republic of Yugoslavia while
the Prevlaka peninsula remained part of the Croatian republic, which meant
they were separated into different federal units of the same state. Tensions
arose following the secession of Croatia and the explanation behind have been
the same as with the Gulf of Piran dispute: the international border dispute of
successor states grew from the lack of proper definition of maritime boundaries
between the federal units . However, in the case of this dispute the stakes are
not as high, it does not practically block other countries’ access to the sea or
significant resources. The dispute is more symbolic, but it has not been solved
yet, though an agreement have been reached in 2002 (Pavlic, 2017).
3.1.5. The Danube
The most important fluvial border dispute in the region is the one between
Croatia and Serbia along the Danube. The core of the dispute is the disagreement
of the parties on where the actual border should run (a positional dispute).
The Croatian position insists on the borders set in the 19th century along the
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then current course of the river. Since then these borders have always been
used in lower territorial scales (municipal territories and cadastral mapping),
and also in military maps in socialist Yugoslavia (the 1:50.000 topographic
maps prepared by the Army Map Service of the US Army based on the 1964
Yugoslavian military maps show the same boundaries).
Due to hydro engineering and natural movements of the Danube, the river
does not follow the course it used to centuries ago, meanders have been cut
off and the river now flows a bit more to the west. The Serbian position is that
the international border should follow the actual thalweg, in simple the actual
course of the river. Their claim is based on the report of the Đilas commission
which defined the internal border to be run along the Danube in 1945.
Furthermore this would make life easier for all, in case the two states could
agree on exchanging territories which belong to them but are now cut off by
the new course. Two major obstacles can be identified here: firstly, from a
practical approach, the Croatian territories which are now on the eastern side
of the river are somewhat ten times larger than the Serbian territories west
of the river (1000 vs 10,000 ha) (Klemenčić – Schofield, 2001: 19). Secondly,
from an ideological approach, regardless of the size of territory it’s hardly
imaginable that Croatia who just fought a territorial defensive war 30 years
ago against Serbia would give up an inch of its territory.
This leaves the boundary issue along the Danube in a deadlock where even
strange border-related ventures show up. In 2015, on a small island which was
claimed by neither Serbia nor Croatia (being to the west of the main branch of
the river, so from a Serbian perspective it’s Croatia, but being east of the former
course, so from a Croatian perspective it’s Serbia), thus theoretically being a
terra nullius, a Czech politician proclaimed the new state of Liberland. From
our point the intentions and interests of the state-founder are of secondary
importance, but they clearly display how the disagreement on the border
between Serbia and Croatia can cause turbulences in international relations
even beyond the confines of the two neighbouring nations (Rossman, 2016).
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4. CONCLUSION
Border disputes following state dissolutions can be lingering issues, especially
if the dissolution takes shape in a series of bloody territorial civil wars like in
former Yugoslavia. The symbolic aspect of boundaries and territories in these
cases cannot be overestimated, nation buildings are usually at full swing in postconflict societies, identities are still under constructions and those constructing
them are overly sensitive. This makes any border adjustments difficult, but still,
the most troublesome cases are the ones which include objective advantages as
well besides the symbolic/spiritual ones, like access to resources.
Among the disputes of former Yugoslavia the most problematic ones are
those connected somehow to waters. On one hand because of their rational
advantages (access to seas, rivers as resources), while on the other because
these are either the boundaries which had been rarely if ever addressed in
details by authorities in former Yugoslavia, or because the modifications are
without proper explanation. Some lines, especially the maritime borders, have
never been set up, while others have been left unattended for decades (e.g. the
Danube), despite the changes in the natural environment around the boundary.
The unresolved border issues have far-reaching consequences on politics
as well. Long lasting disputes can be focus points of political mobilization
against other nations but at least issues that prevent the establishment of
cordial neighbourly relations in an unstable region which for its development
first of all needs stability. In the case of the countries of former Yugoslavia
Euro-Atlantic integration creates further complications. Border disputes are
not welcomed in the community and territorial extremities (like the Neum
corridor disrupting Croatian land continuity) are problems to be solved in
systems like the Schengen Area. In the new EU strategy towards the Western
Balkans (A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement
with the Western Balkans) it is explicitly stated that the EU cannot and will
not import bilateral border disputes, they have to be solved before a country
accedes (European Commission, 2018; Orlandic, 2019). Since EU accession
is by far the most important stabilization and development factor for the
Western Balkans currently on the horizon, unresolved border disputes seem
to be, as for now, unsurmountable obstacles of long-term stabilization of the
region. Or at least not in a European context, the signs of which are already
present in the region.
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O’Dowd, Liam (2002) The Changing Significance of European Borders. Regional &
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Režek, Mateja (2015): Jugoslovanski federalizem in medrepubliške meje v prvih letih
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GEOPOLITICS OF RIVERS AND SEAS IN THE
CARPATHIAN-BALKAN REGION:
THE HUNGARIAN PERSPECTIVE
1. INTRODUCTION
Writing about the geopolitics of high seas as a citizen of a land-locked country
in the middle of Europe is an astonishing opportunity to reflect on broader
contexts.
Considering the east-to-west waves of peoples between the 4th and 10th
century in the Eurasian region, Hungarians have been among the last to arrive
to the Carpathian Basin. Neither them, nor the populations cohabiting the
Basin and mixing with them had actual connections to the seas, their way of
life was and remained continental. Considering the most significant bodies
of water, only rivers played a major role in their lives. Till the 19th century,
society depended greatly on nature and was influenced by the precipitation/
drought, the volume of production and the sequence of floods.
Following the Turkish Wars in the 15-17th century, the modernisation of
the country was on the agenda, also making a sea exit more valuable. Roads
connecting Hungary with the Adriatic coast (primarily the town of Fiume/
Rijeka) had to be constructed through the limestone mountains of the Dinaric
Alps. It was very problematic to cross the dry limestone ranges in the summer
period. Charles III of Austria launched significant developments from 1725 in
the region, established the road through the Karst and also improved seaports.
At the same time, Rijeka (Fiume) became a free port. During the reign of
Maria Theresa, with a rescript issued in 1779, Rijeka was created “Separatum
corpus Sacrae regni Hungariae Coronae adnexum” (a separated body attached
to the Hungarian Crown), recognising the town’s direct relationship with the
Hungarian state.
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In the 19th century, the Adriatic gateway had become a practical and
symbolic place of Hungarian economic modernisation and overseas trade. In
the transportation concept of statesman and first Hungarian Minister of Public
Works and Transport István Széchenyi, it also played a prominent role, but the
ambitious plans only started to materialise following the Austro-Hungarian
Compromise of 1867.
The few decades from 1867 to 1918 were the golden years of Hungarian
maritime policy under the aegis of the Austrian imperial aims. The Adriatic
gateway was manifested in the development of the Fiume/Rijeka port and the
rapid growth of overseas trade. However, the romantic notion of Hungarian
coastline also played an important role in culture, arts and science. During the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, especially the town of Opatija (Abbázia) was an
important symbolic holiday location and became a popular tourist destination
of the politico-economic elite.
After World War I, the borders of Hungary fell far from the seas, but the
symbolic remote connection persisted through the Hungarian admiral uniform
of regent Miklós Horthy, or birthplace of communist general secretary János
Kádár in Rijeka.
Following the transition to democracy in 1989/1990 and especially
following the accession to the European Union in 2004, Hungarians started
to have an en masse experience of the seas. The Adriatic Sea has once again
become a somewhat “Hungarian” sea, but nowadays this notion is only
based on the half-million Hungarian tourists visiting the area annually, and
the thousands of holiday homes purchased near the beaches. In the last few
decades several Hungarian cabinets have taken efforts to develop Hungarian
maritime capacities, focusing primarily on the ports of Koper, Rijeka, Trieste
and Ploče (Pap, 2020: 46).
2. MARITIME POWER, LAND POWER AND
THE SITUATION OF HUNGARY
Hungary is situated very close to the regions where “maritime power thinking”
was born: the Balkan Peninsula. Also, according to some (minority) approaches,
it is also a part of this region (Carpathian-Balkan region). The concept of
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maritime power (and at the same time of land power) was born in the culture
of ancient Greece. They were the first to distinguish between thalassocracy (a
state whose power derives from sea supremacy) and tellurocracy (associated
with land) (Momigliano, 1944). The Minoan civilisation established on the
Aegean Islands was the first state to apply the term “sea power”. The artefacts
discovered first at the Knossos excavations and then at the archaeological
sites of other towns depict the life of maritime peoples.
Obviously, the existence of sea power also presumes the existence of
land power. One of the first major representatives of land power was the
Persian Empire fighting the Greeks, a classic continental state in Asia. The
Greco-Persian Wars in history symbolise the political and civilisation clashes
between Asia and Europe, as an antitype of the fights between the enlightened
West and the despotic Asian states, and also between democracy and tyranny.
The distinction between sea and land has continued during the millennia
that have passed since, repeatedly arising, but nowhere as dominantly as
in Anglo-American political thinking. The dimensions of this approach are
global, since first the British and then the Americans became able to use world
seas as the political domain of enforcing their interests, more than any other
power preceding them. However, it is interesting to see that they often reflect
on the original territory where the concept was born.
According to the approach tied to US naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan
(1890), the Mediterranean region plays a key role in controlling the strategic
waterways (Bosporus-Dardanelles in this case). According to the Heartland/
Rimland idea coined by Nicholas John Spykman, the place of conflict for the sea/
land antagonism is the East-Mediterranean region. Then, it played a central
role in the application of President Truman’s containment policy (based on
the ideas of Spykman) as one of the primary strategic objectives of the United
States, in order to protect Greece and Turkey, countering Soviet expansion. In
the “evil empire” concept professed by President Ronald Reagan, it is part of
the buffer zone between NATO and the Soviet satellite states. In Huntington’s
civilisation conflict theory, the Bosnian conflict is one of the key demonstrative
examples, where Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Bosniaks wage
war with their allies from the same civilisation identities (Huntington, 1996).
In American geopolitical visions dividing the world in a Manichaean fashion,
the Balkan Peninsula is often depicted as a region of suspicious dictatorships,
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which export terrorists, organised criminals or blind-faith nationalists to
disturb peace.
The abovementioned facts clearly show that Hungary as a neighbour
country is undisputedly connected to discourses about the nature of maritime
power.
3. LAND-LOCKED STATES AND SEA EXITS
AROUND HUNGARY
Altogether, 15 states are cut off from the sea in contemporary Europe, and their
sea access requires crossing the territories of other states. The distribution
of land-locked countries increases from the west to east. Their territorial
distribution, considering distance from the nearest sea is characteristic. It can
be concluded that out of the 15 states, 12 lie closer to the Mediterranean, one
(Luxembourg) to the Atlantic Ocean, and two (Belarus and the Czech Republic)
to the Baltic Sea. They do not share many common features, but they are all
relatively small countries with low population. Even when combined they give
a small, approximately 10% share of the continent.
In classic geopolitics, land-locked countries have been typically considered
buffer states, but we categorise them into three groups according to their
origins. The first group comprises microstates with origins in the Middle Ages,
or “remnant states” (Andorra, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Vatican City). The
second group comprises states that traditional political geography considers
buffer states (Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg and Hungary, as well as the
former Czechoslovakia). These include Switzerland, one of the most stable
elements of the European system of governments, in the belt separating the
southern Latin and the northern Germanic Europe. And this belt also includes
Luxembourg and Austria which are less typical in this manner. After the
Treaty of Trianon Hungary was created as a “cordon sanitaire” of the Middle
European (Mitteleuropa) buffer state zone. The third group comprises the
Central European states established in the new wave of state-formation in the
1990s, also supported by efforts of major powers to renew and strengthen the
buffer state zone. But these are mostly states established on an ethnic basis.
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Internal processes played the main role in their development, and then they
were granted recognition by major powers.
In the course of history, several different methods of accessing the sea have
evolved. In the Middle Ages, the use of navigable rivers leading to the seas was
considered to be granted by divine right (natural right). In reality, this was a
limited option. In the modern period, accessing the seas could be provided in
treaties and agreements. The internal transportation systems of Europe are
defined by two key rivers: the Rhine and the Danube. The Central Commission
for Navigation of the Rhine – one of the oldest multilateral bodies in Europe
– was created in the convention of the Congress of Vienna. Its main task was
duty is to solve issues related to free navigation. Its members initially included
some of the states along the river, while Belgium and the United Kingdom
joined after World War I. Originally navigation of the river was not free at all,
and it could only be reached in several stages, through several treaties. These
include the Mainz Convention of 1831 which ensured free navigation to states
along the river route, or the Mannheim Convention of 1868 regulating that
both the vessels of the states along the Rhine and other states are enabled to
freely navigate the river (Pap, 2001). However, some privileges (e.g. cabotage)
are still not authorised entirely.
Free navigation of the Danube developed similarly. In 1840, Austria and
Russia concluded a so-called Danube-navigation treaty to stipulate the
freedom of navigating the river. The same thing was set forth in the 1854
English-French and Austrian-Turkish treaties, and then the Treaty of Paris
(1856) concluded by major powers declared the Danube an international river
(Pap, 2001). They also established several organisations to oversee approved
formulas. Regardless of the principle of free navigation, transportation on the
Danube developed subject to the power relations of the major states. Defeated
countries of the wars were typically banned from the river commissions and
provisions were adopted to their detriment.
Therefore it is no wonder that states facing issues related to maritime
transportation considered actually occupying coastal areas as the safest
solution, in order to open a land exit to access the sea.
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Figure 1: Corridors in Europe
Source: Pap, 2001.
From a historical perspective, the most significant effort was conducted by
the Russian Empire which set out the objective of securing a free passage to a
warm sea. Till the 18th century, the Russian state was land-locked. Endeavours
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were started by Peter the Great to construct own ports for the Russian
Empire in the Baltic Sea and then the Black Sea, but with less than satisfactory
results. In addition to Russia, there are states in the Baltic and Black Sea
regions with exits to a closed, controlled and controllable closed sea. Based
on historical experiences, their opportunities to exit to the world seas must
be considered limited. Such countries include e.g. Bulgaria and Finland. The
heyday of disputes and efforts related to corridors was in the first half of the
20th century. At this time, the states of the extremely disintegrated European
continent were characterised by borders difficult to pass, high tariffs and a
tendency of autarchy. Nations were suspicious of each other and the wounds
of mutual damage were still fresh, which ultimately led to World War II.
Following World War II, the situation did not improve much during the
Cold War. As the iron curtain was drawn, Eastern Europe was even strictly
isolated from Szczecin to Trieste, compared to the previous period. Only
détente periods improved the situation, until the arms race was finally won
by the Western Allies, and the peoples of Central Europe changed their social/
economic systems and in many cases their states as well.
The state-building wave of the 1990s in Central Europe increased the
importance of corridors to the sea, primarily in the Mediterranean and the
Black Sea region. In the Balkans where new states were formed in the course
of acts of violence and wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the landlocked status was included in the themes of intergovernmental relations. The
Greek blockade of Macedonia in 1994 showed how serious advantages an own
sea exit can have. This can explain the efforts of Yugoslav successor states to
have their own seaports, and also to construct these ports and provide them
with the appropriate transportation background. Narrow sea access points
are available to Slovenia in Koper and Bosnia and Herzegovina in Neum. The
international legal status of the Piran Bay led to international tension between
Croatia and Slovenia. The Croatians strive to bypass the Neum corridor which
divides the territory of the Croatian state, by constructing new roads and a
bridge through the islands. The self-proclaimed Serb proto-states also wanted
to have their sea exits ensured. Serbia’s sea exit was lost in 2006, when
Montenegro left the state union.
In the wider region, the Balkans is not the only ones where controversial
situations have arisen. One of the new Eastern European states, Moldova has
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found itself in a peculiar situation. This state would have to ways of connecting
to the Black Sea. It can either implement a land exchange to access the sea,
or establish a waterway through the Danube, enabling it to receive seagoing
vessels in a port to be constructed on the Prut.
4. GEOPOLITICS OF WATER AND TERRAIN IN THE
CARPATHIAN-BALKAN REGION
Geographical conditions can significantly support or restrict the political
activities of communities within the society. In the Carpathian-Balkan region,
the horizontal and height fragmentation of the surface, the distribution
of resources, the characteristics of the internal water bodies and the sea
neighbourhood relations, as well as the lack of territorial closure from the east,
such (geo)political consequences may arise which fundamentally influence
the lives of the communities living here for centuries, and also affect their
future prospects.
Considering height fragmentation, mountainous and forest areas are
typical: 15% of the area is above the height of 1000 m. Compared to other
areas of Europe (only 6% above 1000 m), mountainous conditions are much
more definitive in this region. The role of river valleys is significant in settling
and political spatial organisation as well, demonstrated by the development of
the network of townships and towns, as well as the history and organisation
of the historical state system. A prevalent characteristic of the Balkans is the
connective/transit feature between Central/Western Europe and Asia. This
has had a major impact on the road network, flow of persons, goods and military
movements, in addition to the town network. The region has a secondary
connective importance between Central Europe and the Mediterranean, and a
tertiary importance in the East-West direction between the Black Sea and the
Ionian Sea. Not only settlement processes, but e.g. the flow of ideologies also
follows these directions.
Hungarians have had knowledge about and interest in this region since the
Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin in the 9th century. It has been
impacted several times from the south, and Hungarian-oriented states have
also had major impacts on the history of the region. Hungarians have achieved
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this while being culturally distinct, with a language, identity and cultural
background that were already distancing them from other peoples in the
region, which looked at them as foreign, with their origins back in Asia. Also
contributing to this, Hungarians are generally continental people residing on
the plains and on hillsides (with such identity), with only a single significant
exception: the Székelys (Szeklers). In the main directions of international
relations, Hungarian interest has been and is still present, since the Carpathian
Basin has played a pivotal role as an unavoidable transit area (Pap, 2020: 38).
5. THE BALKAN PENINSULA, NATURAL WATERS AND
THE APPROACH TO SPACES
The peninsula character is a defining aspect of the self-identity of peoples
living in the Carpathian-Balkan region. As a question of neighbourhood, the
Balkans (and the space of the Balkans) has not only become a question for
Hungary and Hungarians, but also for the ancestors of Slovenes, Croats and
sometimes Austrians. It has also become an important direction for orientation
for Romanians and Romania, but in their case the question of inclusion is
more emphasised than in the case of other northern border peoples. Due to
heritage of the Ottoman past and Orthodoxy, the Balkans will always mean
a similar content and quality for the Romanians, although the country is also
closely linked to both Central and Eastern Europe. Austrians have an actual
neighbourhood connection, while their economic (and sometimes political)
interests also linked them to the region. In the case of Slovenes, belonging to
the group of South Slavic languages, the shared Yugoslav history in the 20th
century and their business interests form the basis for the connection. For
Croats, in addition to the South Slavic language and the Yugoslav history, their
municipal territory deeply extends into the area of the Balkan Peninsula also
(Pap, 2020).
Regarding the question of where the northern border of the Balkan
Peninsula lies, there is no agreement, but maybe a geography-based consensus
is not even possible to reach. If we compare it to the two other major peninsulas
in Southern-Europe, those have high-rising, almost wall-like mountain ranges
at their northern ends (Pyrenees, Alps). In the case of the Iberian Peninsula
the political (state borders unchanged for 400 years), while in the case of the
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Apennine Peninsula the cultural (Latin-Germanic) borders have become the
reasons of clear divisibility. In the case of the Balkans, natural factors, border
marks found in nature are less dramatic in their appearance, the cultural space
is intertwined and political borders have changed in a very variable manner
during the last 200 years. The comparison clearly identifies disadvantages
in the case of the Balkans. Researchers have come up with many definitions
to the northern border of the Balkans, the latest in 2020 (Pap, 2020: 39).
However, these disputes about “borders” clearly direct our focus on the many
possible approaches of the region and some of its key geographical elements.
The main underlying question of geography related to the Balkans is
whether there is such thing as the “Balkan Peninsula”? Many researchers in
the French field of geography suggest that the southern part of the area we are
examining is the Greek Peninsula, while north of it lies the “Danube Europe”,
or at least the space and territory of a major geographical misunderstanding
(Derruau, 1958; Blanc, 1965). This distinction plays a key role in the
geographical approach of the region, not only in the present, when a large
European experiment/project has been launched in the Danube Strategy. This
was also the case in the 19th century, when peoples liberated from Ottoman
rule linked the relationships along the Danube to modernisation, opening to
the West and Europe. Greece,1 the “most Balkan” state in the geographical
sense, has “escaped” from the Balkans following the outbreak of the Cold
War, when it joined the Western, European and Atlantic structures. Thus, the
South Balkans “slipped” to the north, into the southern areas of the former
Yugoslavia and Albania. These examples show that in the Balkans, borders,
geographical nomenclature, spatial community identity, and in the end, the
identities built upon all these have a key role even today.
Unsurprisingly, it is the consequence of a geographical mistake. In the 18th
century, not long after the first great geographical space theory (the landscape
1
The social/religious character, approach to its neighbours and political culture of Greece
is not particularly different from its northern neighbours. At the same time, it successfully
established a European image as the motherland of ancient Greek culture, democracy and
the Olympics movement. It was successful in having these recognised at the mass level,
as a significant tourist destination, using the infrastructure constructed using European
transfers. And with economic successes in the 20th century, it was able to have a good
position to participate in the re-integration of the Balkans as the most developed neighbour,
as a key investor and a stable democracy. In this positive process, the financial crisis of
2008 and then the crisis of the Eurozone was a major breaking point.
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Norbert Pap
theory) was born, Europe was divided into large “objective” geographical units
based on physical features. Beforehand, the usual space management described
and managed distinct areas based on their political identity, but the political
frameworks were changing and this caused obvious problems in establishing a
scientifically appropriate spatial nomenclature. German geographers played a
decisive role in defining large European territorial units, even though they often
lacked field experiences. Through the work of Gatterer in 1775 (Gatterer, 1775)
the name Pyrenean Peninsula was born,2 and then using a similar methodology,
the area south of the Alps (on the present Apennine Peninsula), and thirdly the
area named after Haemus in the ancient era (called by Bulgarians Stara Planina)
were also treated as distinct units. Finally Zeune (Zeune, 1808), another German
geographer called the first the Alpine Peninsula, while the other the Balkan
Peninsula (replacing Haemus with its Turkish name, “Balkans” which means
“forest mountain”). Suggesting the actual lack of geographical information
about the Ottoman Empire, and based on common map depictions in the 18th
century, it was generally thought that the Balkan Mountains spread all along
the northern part of the peninsula in east-west direction. In the 19th century
it was obvious that this presumption had been false, but the use of the name
carried on, while the more established Alpine Peninsula name is not used and
the Pyrenean Peninsula name is less used nowadays.
It also had other names, such as Slavic Greece, and Ritter called the area
spanning from the Danube to the Peloponnese the Greek Peninsula, but these
name variants did not gain ground. The term Southeast Europe, which also
reflects the German geographic approach and geopolitical content, is still in
use, although with significant changes as to its content and a different scope
(covering more than the actual peninsula).
It is safe to say that the name of the region is not based on its physical
properties, it is a social construct, however the efforts to describe a range
of cultural, civilisation and political phenomena with physical features still
persists. Balkans is the most commonly prevailing category in people’s minds,
but it still suggests the notions that refer to Asian features in the Southeast
European region (Pap, 2007). Some interpret the Balkans as a geopolitical
crossroad with changing contents, which does not only exist in people’s
2
Johann Christoph Gatterer (1727-1799) German historian, geographer, professor at the
University of Göttingen.
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minds (Prevelakis, 2007). The author of this paper accepts the view that the
Balkans and a “Balkan identity” cannot be interpreted without Europe and a
“European identity”. In many ways, this region means everything contrary to
Europe and European values, and in reality these are the greatest challenges
it has to face nowadays.
We may come to ask the question: is the Balkans as a territorial framework
the foundation of any kind of regional (Balkan) identity? Compared to the
other South European peninsulas, opposite-direction processes have led
to different answers. Following the storms of the Migration Period, large
state frameworks have been created during the centuries that followed in
both Italy and the Iberian Peninsula (Italy and Spain), in addition to some
remaining territories which did not integrate into these3. Loyalty to the states
has resulted in peninsula identities.
However, the Balkans was put on a different track. The Ottoman Empire
had unified the Balkans for centuries, and after it collapsed, the region
disintegrated in an extreme way several times. Integrative forces are weak
and the regional identity is lacking, because there is no content that would
be based on positive past experiences and an attractive vision. Considering
the supranational identities, the Yugoslav identity lives on somewhat (in the
form of Yugo-nostalgia), but it is only relevant in some parts of the Western
Balkans. In the case of the Vlachs, sharing the “Balkan identity” the most, no
national awakening has been happening, and therefore they failed to develop
a regional common identity. The Turks are the keenest on treating the Balkans
(the peninsula) as one, all other local actors find it a community uncomfortable
to handle, due to the conflict-laden relationships. The Balkans is a category
with no real positive message for associating with it, and therefore it is quite
problematic to find such identities.
Also, examining other borders of the Balkan Peninsula can lead to
lessons learned. The other borders are maritime borders, and therefore the
boundaries are less like to cause dramatic issues, but it is interesting to note
that the approach of the peninsula is very different in certain coastal areas.
The Hellenic world of the southern areas is an organic and essential part of
the Balkans, but due to different reasons (including the key role of ancient
3
The Vatican and San Marino in the Apennine Peninsula; Portugal and Andorra in the Iberian
Peninsula.
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Norbert Pap
Greek culture in European history, early accession to NATO and the EU in
1952 and 1981 respectively, a more intensive experience of a Mediterranean
lifestyle compared to other similar areas of the peninsula), people living in the
Greek areas also consider themselves part of the Mediterranean, as much as
the Balkans. Additionally, the links of some Greek islands to the Middle East are
also not lesser than to the Balkans/Europe. Greece has acted as a “European”
state for decades, first as a member of the Atlantic community, and since the
1980s as an acclaimed member of the European community. This country with
an increasingly modern reputation, progressing with the integration seemed to
have left its past behind for good, when the Olympic Games were taking place in
Athens. However, in the country that had accumulated an unsustainable amount
of debt, the financial crisis of 2008 has led to consequences that basically “pushed
it back” to the group of problematic Balkan countries. Also, the migrant/refugee
crisis has shed a light on the general transit country nature of states in the
region, as well as the relative geographical unity of the whole peninsula. This
led to the beginning of another deep-dive process of the “Balkans”.
Figure 2: Possible northern borders of the Balkans
Edited by Norbert Pap, based on several geography works,
especially the paper by Sándor Konkoly (Konkoly, 2006).
Graphic design: Csaba Heitmár
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Table 1: Possible northern borders of the Balkans
Order of boundaries from North to South
1.
Danube – Drava line
2.
Trieste – Odessa line
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Danube – Sava – Gulf of Trieste
Danube – Sava – Soča
Danube – Sava – Ljubljana – Gorica line
peninsula bordered by latitude 46°
Sava – Kupa – Gulf of Trieste
Danube Delta – Istria Peninsula line
Southern Carpathians ridge
Danube – Sava line
line of the Danube
ridges of the Dinarides
Danube – Sava – Una line
ridge of the Balkan Mountains
Balkan Mountains – Sar Planina –
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
Kosovo Polje – Dinarides
Thermaic Gulf – Black Drin valley
Thermaic Gulf – Bay of Vlorë
The Balkans is a problem, not an area,
therefore it has no boundaries
There is only a Greek Peninsula
Boundary name
Györffy, I.,
traditional theoretical boundary with no
identifiable first representative
Lóczy, L.; Cholnoky, J.
J. Cvijić
G. Ricchieri
H. Renier
Mendöl, T.; Lóczy, L.
Kogutowitz K.
Lóczy, L.; Cholnoky, J.; Mendöl, T.; Szabó, P. Z.
Havass, R.
Tóth, Z.; Hézser, A.
Hézser, A.; Morgenstern, H.; A. Zeune
Tóth, Z.
A. Zeune, Morgenstern, H.
Morgenstern, H.
Cholnoky, J.
Mendöl, T.
Blanc, A.
Derrau, M.
Source: Pap, 2020, Konkoly, 2006.
Different authors were clearly uncertain, while they were trying to define
a northern border for the Balkans using geographical elements. The original,
classic solution was finding which mountain range closed the peninsula to
the north. In addition to the Balkan Mountains (Stara Planina), the Southern
Carpathians to the north were also considered a possible boundary, as well as
the Julian Alps mountain range in the north-western corner of the peninsula or
some ridges of the Dinarides. However, in many areas, vast plains are located
between the mountains, and soon the rivers running on the plains and at the
foot of the mountains were highlighted as geographical elements applicable
as regional boundaries. There are several rivers and neither of them is a
significant barrier, on the contrary, they have a linking character. Therefore
selecting the rivers bordering the Balkans from the north is quite arbitrary.
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Norbert Pap
The Danube and the Sava are the most frequently mentioned ones as
peninsula boundaries, but the Drava, Soča, Una, Kupa and Drin rivers are also
used. This uncertainty and the weak nature of the arguments for the boundaries
contributed to the rise of alternative solutions to the classic boundaries.
There are some authors who state that the peninsula simply comprises the
Greek Peninsula, and something else lies north of that, for example Danubian
Europe (Pap, 2020: 40). This gave rise to boundaries between gulfs and bays,
spanning from the Thermaic Gulf to a bay on the west coast (Bay of Vlorë) or
a river estuary (Black Drin valley).
Another possible boundary leaves the details unclear, but draws “lines”
and bands from the northern Adriatic to the area of the Black Sea. These
include the relevant section of latitude 46°, the Trieste-Odessa line or the Istria
Peninsula-Danube Delta line. In addition to the above, composite solutions also
occur, such as the Danube-Sava-Ljubljana-Gorica line which combines natural
phenomena with towns.
In summary, we can conclude that there is no legitimate and widely
accepted northern border of the Balkans. Everyone is free to define his own
North Balkans (or the northern border thereof) by naming an appropriate
river section, mountain ridge or land protrusion (peninsula or bay) of his
choice, or a significant town.
Each of the Adriatic, Ionian, Mediterranean, Aegean and Black Seas have
their own internal characteristics. The populations of ports and seaside towns
of the Balkans have established close relationships with the people living on the
opposite coasts of these narrow seas, and for millennia have been mixing with
other people living in these spaces. Croats have also settled in Molise in Italy.
In Southern Italy, Albanians and Greeks established settlements centuries
ago. Italians have settled in Istria and on the Dalmatian and Montenegrin
costs. Greeks migrated to Asia Minor and the Pontus region as well, as well as
to several points of the Black Sea coast where they have formed communities
for millennia in some places. Tatars, Turks, and even Lipovans live in Dobruja.
In the spatial approach of these areas, the seas are the regional horizon.
Table 2 is a statistical overview of the Balkans coastlines, islands and
the maritime character of the states. Based on the data, the Balkans is
characterised by great extremities. In addition to Greece and Croatia, the two
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explicitly maritime states, we also find three land-locked countries. There is
also a range of other states possessing important ports, coasts of strategic
importance and significant ports (Albania, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bulgaria
and Romania). Bosnia and Herzegovina is an interesting exception, since
it formally does have a coast, but lacks any notable sea port and maritime
capacity. Turkey is missing from the table, because its interest in the Balkan
coasts only covers a very small area, but it is extremely important. Istanbul is
by far the most important city and port of the region.
Table 2: Maritime nature of states in the Balkans4
Country
Slovenia
Croatia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Macedonia
Serbia
Montenegro
Kosovo
Greece
Bulgaria
Romania
Albania
Length of coast, km
46.6
5835.3*
10.0
102.0
13676
378.0
193.5
380.0
Area of islands
Coastline per the
area of 10 000 km2 (% of country area)
(km)
23.0
1030.9
5.8
2.0
72.4
0.1
1036.0
16.6
34.1
81.2
132.0
-
including islands
Edited by Pap based on Erdősi, 2005.
In the geographical spaces discussed here, several supranational, sub
regional cooperation forms and bodies have been developed (Alps-Adriatic,
Central European Initiative5, Adriatic-Ionian cooperation, Black Sea Economic
Cooperation /Figure 3/, Union for the Mediterranean).
4
5
Turkey could not be considered in this table, because its data would have greatly distorted
the outlook.
Originally Pentagonale, then Hexagonale etc.
138
Figure 3: Adriatic and Ionian Sea region (2014)
Norbert Pap
Source: European Comission
In the northern part of the area, not a sea, but a large river, the Danube
is the basis for the link. The space of the Danube (also treated recently by
the European Union as a preferred space) is one of the main macroregional
planning and cooperation frameworks which can also become absolutely
definitive from the Hungarian perspective as well. The Danube is a community
of space with a positive message. For peoples of the Balkans, it symbolises
the relationship with the Central European space, European modernisation,
freedom and development. In 2011, the European Union adopted the Danube
Strategy during the Hungarian EU Presidency, which bears more than symbolic
importance (Figure 4).
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Figure 4: The Danube regional cooperation and planning area
Source: European Commission
The proximity of the sea influences the spatial approach of all states. Thus,
in the geographic approach of the Balkans, distance to (the nearest) seas is an
extremely important question. Access to the sea was and still is an important
geopolitical issue to small and large states. Because of this, corridors/
landbridges have led to geopolitical conflicts and intergovernmental disputes
to be solved. In the Adriatic region, Koper and Piran for the Slovenes, Neum
for the communities in Bosnia, Montenegro, and especially the region of
Bar for the Serbs, in former historic periods Trieste for Austria, Rijeka (and
partially Constanta in Romania) for Hungary were equal with access to the
sea and participation in global economic/trade relationships. For Bulgarians,
Alexandroupolis was the opportunity to access the Aegean Sea in two
historical periods (1914-1918 and 1940-1944).
The number and area of islands in the Balkans region is very high. Two
major states with fragmented territories are located on the peninsula: Croatia
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Norbert Pap
along the eastern Adriatic coast with 1180 islands and Greece in the Ionian
Sea and the Aegean Sea with approx. 1400 islands and many reefs. Many of
these are uninhabited and even cause problems for state integration (regular
ferry, boat and air traffic is required to connect the islands to the state and
international relations). Some islands and archipelagos share traditions of
independent statehood (Rhodes, Crete, Ionian Islands) which also left a mark
on the identity of the local population.
Islands and “functional islands”6 (Prevelakis, 2007) represent distinct,
isolated space types. Although the sea provides “infinite” transportation
possibilities, due to their actual poverty, island life means isolation instead of
freedom to many of them.
Contrary to the attributes of being on a peninsula, there are still states in
the Balkans and in Southeast Europe which face significant challenges due to
their distance from the sea or being enclosed on land. These include firstly
Kosovo,7 and up until 2019 also Macedonia8 which struggle with a significant
lack of international legitimacy, or Serbia9 which was born as a “land-locked”
state and obtained territories on multiple instances to develop into a state
with a long coastline. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbs lost their coast
in the 1990s. Being enclosed on land is also a problem for Hungary, since it has
lost its coast in 1918 and has thus become a land-locked state.
In addition to lying on the coast, mountains also play a significant role in
the regional divisions of the Balkans (Braudel, 1996; Mendöl, 1948; Prevelakis,
6
7
8
9
Prevelakis calls certain internal, isolated mountain areas using this specific terminology.
Kosovo became independent in 2008. Since its intergovernmental relationships with
Serbia and Macedonia remained problematic, a highway was constructed on the PristinaPrizren-Durrës route to establish a vital transportation route for the new small state in
the Balkans, to ensure that the country’s mineral resources can be loaded onto ships in
Albanian territory.
Macedonia became independent in 1991 in the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic.
Some parts of the historical Macedonia have remained outside of the borders of the new
state, therefore Bulgaria (Pirini Macedonia) and Greece (Aegean Macedonia) welcomed the
new state with ambivalent/hostile feelings. Greece disputed Macedonia’s authority to use
the name, and in order to enforce its claim it put the new state under blockade when it
closed the Thessaloniki port. Regarding the use of the name, an international law dispute
commenced which is still ongoing today.
Serbia was reborn in the 19th century as a “land-locked” state in the Šumadia region and
some adjacent territories. Being enclosed into the interior of the peninsula became an
element of consciousness and subject of frustration to many Serbs when Austria-Hungary
enforced a commercial blockade against them from 1906 to 1911 (after occupying Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar).
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2007). The Dinaric Alps, the Balkan Mountains or the Rhodope Mountains
are the fields of lifestyles different from those of the coast and the plains
(transhumant herders, monasteries, historical bandits, and smuggling in the
present), and up until recently, the fields of characteristic political behaviours
(communities organised on family relations, tribal community forms,
warlords). All in all, mountain territories are suitable for the development of
the so-called internal peripheries.
The areas of plains are smaller than hills and mountains (Podunavlje,
Posavina, Maritsa valley), but their social, economic and political role is also
bigger. These are the location for higher concentration of population, the
biggest cities, and the largest processing industry centres. These territories
are the most similar to a consolidated type of cultural landscape.
Thus, in the spatial approach of the Balkans region, distance from the
sea, fragmentation of the archipelago, divisions based on altitude, extents of
valleys and plains, the waters of the Danube, and its plains in the north play
major roles. In addition to regional divisions, an observer for Hungary must
also consider – that the quite different geographic approach characterises
different areas of the peninsula. From a Hungarian viewpoint, the northern
part of the Balkans is the “soft lower body” of the historical Hungary, a space
for Hungarian economic and political expansion efforts. Efforts of Hungarian
“imperialism” used to focus on this region once. Nowadays Hungarian
corporations (MOL, OTP, Telekom, Trigránit, etc.) see it as a field of expansion
and it is also one of the key destinations of tourism from Hungary. Following
the order of the distribution of assets, Hungarian interest also focuses on
the coasts and some river valleys (in addition to the regions populated by
a significant Hungarian minority). The regional impact affecting Hungary
is aligned into the system of transatlantic processes with an Asian (Middle
East) and African or Mediterranean background. These flow spaces follow the
main transportation routes, primarily the route along the Danube, as well as
the former military road from Istanbul towards north and the Vardar-Morava
axis. The 2015 refugee/migration crisis is not the first occurrence to prove
the importance of this.
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Budapest.
Derruau, Max (1958): Précis de Géomorphologie. Masson, Paris.
Erdősi, Ferenc (2005): A Balkán közlekedésének főbb földrajzi jellemzői. Balkán
Füzetek, No. 3.
Gatterer, Johann Christoph (1775): Landkarten von Gatterer zum Gebrauch seiner
geographischen Vorlesungen, Göttingen.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1996): The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking the World
Order. Simon&Schuster, New York.
J. Nagy, László (1996): A Mediterráneum a XX. században. JATEPress, Szeged.
Konkoly, Sándor (2006): A Balkán határai kapcsán. In: Pap N. (szerk.): A Balatontól az
Adriáig. Lomart Kiadó, PTE Kelet-Mediterrán és Balkán Tanulmányok Központja,
Pécs, 75-85.
Kuruc, Andor (1982): Tengerek földrajza. Műszaki Kiadó, Budapest.
Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1890): The Influence of Seapower upon History, 1660-1783.
www.gutenberg.org (Downloaded 25 05 2020).
Mendöl, Tibor (1948): A Balkán földrajza. Balkán Intézet, Balkán Könyvek, Budapest,
110 p.
Momigliano, Arnaldo (1944): Sea-Power in Greek Thought. The Classical Review, May
1944.
Pap, Norbert (1999): Korridorok Köztes-Európában. Földrajzi Közlemények 123/47.
évfolyam, 3-4. szám, 180-190.
Pap, Norbert (2001): Törésvonalak Dél-Európában. PTE TTK Földrajzi Intézet KeletMediterrán és Balkán Tanulmányok Központja, Pécs.
Pap, Norbert (2003): Political geography of Southern Europe. – Geografski Vestnik,
Volume 75, Issue 2, 101-109.
Pap, Norbert (2006): A délnyugati korridor és jelentősége Magyarország életében.
– In: Pap, Norbert (szerk.): A Balatontól az Adriáig. Lomart Kiadó – PTE TTK KeletMediterrán és Balkán Tanulmányok Központja, Pécs, 9-32.
Pap, Norbert (szerk.) (2006): A Balatontól az Adriáig. Lomart Kiadó, PTE TTK KeletMediterrán és Balkán Tanulmányok Központja, Pécs.
Pap, Norbert (2007): A Balkán „kis” politikai földrajza. Balkán Füzetek, No. 5.
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Pap, Norbert (2013): Hungary, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Publikon Kiadó,
Pécs.
Pap, Norbert – Végh, Andor – Reményi, Péter (2012): Corridors in the Western Balkans
and the Hungarian exit to the sea. – Revista Romana de Geografie Politica, Volume
14, Issue 2, pp. 176-188.
Pap, Norbert (2020): Kapcsolati terek és helyek – Magyarország és a Balkán. PTE
KMBTK, Pécs.
Prevelakis, Georges (2007): A Balkán. Kultúra és geopolitika. Imedias Kiadó,
Kozármisleny.
Spykman, Nicholas John (1944): The geography of peace. Brace and Company, New
York.
Szabó P. Z. 1943: A Balkánfélsziget földrajzi erővonalai és Magyarország. In: Temesy
Gy. (szerk.): Földrajzi Zsebkönyv, Magyar Földrajzi Társaság, Budapest, pp. 142-150.
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Berlin.
144
L ÁSZLÓ K ÁKAI
MAY DAVID DEFEAT GOLIATH AGAIN?1
A HANDFUL OF CIVILS AGAINST
A MULTINATIONAL COMPANY
1. Introduction
The world of civil organizations2 has been investigated in several books and
studies. Some of these systemized the theories on the civil sector and the
characteristics of their operation and economy in a schoolbook manner (Bartal,
2005; Kuti, 1998; Czike – Kuti, 1999; Harsányi – Széman, 1999; Bocz, 2009;
Csegény – Kákai, 2001; Kákai, 2004; 2019). No doubt, plenty of papers have
been written; however, most of these are meta-theoric works of monographic
ambitions that have not really been useful for the stakeholders of this topical
world since they had been written about them but not with them and for them,
and did not offer knowledge useful for them (Kákai, 2009: 5). It is difficult to
find today – without the danger of replication – an area that is “unexplored” in
terms of the analysers’ attention. However, we know little of the best practice,
toolkits and opportunities applied by the civic players in conflict situations.
This study undertakes to speak about what has been omitted or has been
talked about little: the stakeholders and their everyday “fights”, failures and
successes. The paper introduces the members of the NGOs and their activities
in a different way and from a different point of view. Furthermore, the study
focuses on the participation of civil stakeholders in conflicts going on in their
environs. To put it more exact, by means of two real cases, I examine the
specific chances of civil stakeholders. What opportunities and circumstances
determine the outcome, so the success or the failure of a specific case? What
toolkits are available to have a certain decision changed, modified or even
1
2
This research project was supported by the European Union. EFOP-3.6.3VEKOP-16-2017-00007 – Young researchers from talented students – Fostering scientific
careers in higher education.
NGOs
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finally withdrawn?3 How is it possible that despite the unequal distribution of
resources civilians sometimes win?
2. Development of environmental NGOs in Hungary
The “green” movements were not born as advocacy organizations but as
social movements, which was an absolutely new phenomenon after World
War II (Boda – Scheiring, 2006: 43). The exploitation of the environment has
become gradually more and more visible since the 1960s,4 together with the
international events of the millennium (e.g. Seattle,5 Genoa or Prague), made
the green and alternative movements well-known for the global public, too.
The impacts of this process slowly spilled over to Hungary, as well.6
It is a general objective of the green movements that the environment
must be preserved in its original state. One of the most significant aims of
environmental NGOs is to involve ecological issues in everyday life. In some
cases it is enough to show the fact that there is a problem: for example, the
issue of clearing away some pollution; however, there are more complex cases
when organizations reveal background information needed to make average
people understand the casual relations. In addition, in some cases these
movements call upon decision makers that political change – for example, a
new resolution – is necessary or to amend an act.
3
4
5
6
To demonstrate this, I will present two cases that also represent two different frameworks
of protest action. One of them actually provided as the base of a movement, while in the
other one, individuals left alone searched the solution to settle their affair. Thus the first
one is basically a social movement by which I mean that “they strive to achieve the social
change aimed by the movement by using and mobilizing available resources” (Mikecz, 2010:
116). The other case is rather a NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) phenomenon that sets out
from the point that although citizens accept that a plant considered “dangerous” to their
lives and safety must be built but they deny to let this happen in their own environment
(Glied, 2016: 87).
It became clearer and clearer that the excessive exploitation of the natural environment
would endanger the renewal of the energy resources and finally the basic conditions of
sustainable development (Selján, 2009: 19).
About the impacts of this on the green movement see Gábor Scheiring’s study (Scheiring,
2008).
Besides technocratic and political environmental care, globalization critical organizations
attributing the roots of environmental problems to the system of global distribution and
economic control appeared in Hungary, as well (Mikecz, 2016: 62).
146
2.1. “Moves” taking shape before the transition
László Kákai
Hungarian “green” movement appeared in the middle of the 1980s when
amongst the growing socio-economic and then political crisis moreover because
of the narrowing of individual life strategies, new forms of searching the way
out were formed (Szabó, 1993: 54). The self-organizing groups awakening
beside the “pseudo-movements” embedded in the cracking monolithic power
structure (Szabó, 1993: 48) were not only apt to stand for issues considered
“soft” at that time (ecology, international peace etc.) but to express discontent
with the communist Kádár regime, too, without attacking directly the base
of the monolithic system (Mikecz, 2016: 71). The Danube Circle, which was
formed during the protest against the planned Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Dam
Project, became the emblematic symbol of the “action-focused” period.7
The primary aim of the Danube Circle was to inform people on the damages
the dam system would cause, therefore, they kept the public updated about
the developments in the time of censorship and silence kept by the media.
Finally, in October 1989 the Parliament decided to suspend the building of the
Nagymaros hydroelectric power plant, and then, in lack of an agreement with
the Czechoslovakian partner, the Hungarian party exited the international
contract unilaterally (Nagy, 2014: 65).8 The protest against the plant and
dam system planned to be located on the common Slovakian-Hungarian
border was unprecedented in the course of the Hungarian history so far; the
opposition powers used the movement as a base of building themselves and
made political advantage of the demonstrations. According to experts, the
enhancement of the Hungarian green movements can be connected to these
processes definitely.9 It is part of the follow-up of the movement that the way
of the organizations having acted together as the Nagymaros-committee in
7
8
9
The Danube Circle finally became an important political movement of the whole
democratic transition. At the peak of mobilization, 40 thousand people protested against
the construction of the dam (Mikecz, 2016: 60).
Although the judgement of the ICJ declared in 1997 condemned both parties, it commissioned
them to agree, so the negotiations have been, with shorter or longer brakes, going on until
today, and no final result has been achieved. As the conflict became an interstate conflict
after 1990, it did not any more allow the organization of a wide-range and comprehensive
political or environmental protest (Gergely, 2009: 164).
Faragó Tibor (2013): A hazai környezetügy az elmúlt negyedszázadban. Az Országgyűlés
Fenntartható Fejlődés Bizottsága, http://real.mtak.hu/62438/1/Kornyezet25ev_OGy_u.
pdf (Downloaded 29 04 2020).
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1988, diverged after the transition. Those who remained the members of the
Danube movement were tired out in the period of constraint-activities when,
as a kind of state administration clerks, they had to be present in the work of
various committees continuously (Fleischer, 1992: 12).
2.2. Changes after 1990. Expanding or shrinking space?
The “golden era” of environmental NGOs was the period just before the
transition when social support and environmental cases reflected the protest
of the society against the current power and economic structure (Szirmai,
1999). After the democratic transition, the main field of political and public
activity was political parties, so the social organizations and movements
suffered a loss in their importance, and several of their leaders trickled over to
the political parties (Pickvance – Gábor, 2001: 110). The other fact enforcing
change was the technocratic nature of environmental affairs stirred up by
the European cooperation. This way, the number of the coherent ecological
conflicts of national importance decreased, and they were replaced by local
protests, which brought into the limelight the think-tank organizations doing
mainly expert work (e.g. the Humanist Movement (1991), Protect the Future!
(2000), Green Youth (2001), the domestic subsidiary of ATTAC (2002) or
Greenpeace Hungary (2002)10 in the highly institutionalized sector.
According to Anna Vári (1994), after the transition, there were only few
environmental organizations that enjoyed the trust of the stakeholders and
were also able to mediate between them. Thus the professional environmental
NGOs were able to join the various “green” initiatives subsequently at the best
(Lányi, 2000).
In most cases, environmental conflicts emerge because of the collision of
the stakeholders’ interests, therefore, it is worth exploring who the parties
of the conflicts are and what kind of interests motivate them. The first level
of managing environmental conflicts is the investigation of the stakeholders
of the given environmental issue and the exploration of their interests and
expectations connecting to the given case as well as of their social and power
background (Szirmai, 1996). The key players of local environmental conflicts
10
Most of them concentrated at the capital and rarely appeared in local affairs.
148
László Kákai
change according to the nature and complexity of the problems. Since the local
societies are of similar structures according to the settlement types, we have
good reasons to presume that the stakeholders of the conflicts are more or
less alike in certain areas. This way, in cases of environmental conflicts we
might think that we always meet the same pros and cons in relation to the
various affairs (Szíjártó, 1998).
As the state was driven back, the organizations who had weak supporter
bases, insufficient financial resources and in many cases non-professional
management found themselves face to face with the companies of considerable
means employing professional marketing and communication experts and
the local governments and public administrations depending on the tax and
employment policy of the companies. Owing to this, in certain cases, values
difficult to quantify came up against well-articulated and legal interests
that were further strengthened by the informal isolation of people and
organizations,11 the manipulative and distorted information transmitted by
the media and the bureaucracy of the new democracy (Gergely, 2009). Amongst
the power relations of the stakeholders of conflicts (citizens vs. investing
company, state or municipality) the imbalance of relations is quite general.
Depending on the nature of the specific case, some stakeholders (citizens or
organizations) fight for their own “backyard”; in some cases they get engaged
into fights with agencies and companies to protect the sustainability of their
home built during a life or their environment (Fülöp, 2018: 20). One example
of this was the mayor of Szalánta who campaigned against the construction
of a waste incinerator and was able to organize a comprehensive regional
movement (the inhabitants of Villány, Siklós and Harkány) obstructing the
investment,12 and then convinced the decision makers to stand up against the
implementation of this construction. The result was that no waste incinerator
was built in Garé.13
11
12
13
Although besides governmental, municipal and business investors connecting to
environmental issues, those concerned (residents, civilians etc.), who can take apart in the
decision making process having an impact on them and can use legal means to vindicate
their rights, appear (Glied, 2016: 83), as well, as indicated in the examples, the regulations
can be evaded since the authorities or the investors do not address anyone; those who want
to take part, must be proactive (Fülöp, 2018: 19).
He searched for supporters and legal experts who were experienced in such affairs and
were far enough to avoid potential retribution or revenge.
At the end of the there-and-back legal processes the mayor won. But several similar cases
happened around the millenary, e.g. refuse utilization investments were obstructed in Apc
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In the reverse example, it is the investor who attacks the criticizing party.
The base for this is not provided by the investment itself but the offence against
the investor’s reputation (or discrediting).14 Whatever is the object of the suit
in terms of an environmental affair, it is difficult to prevent the question of
the probable impacts of the given investment (e.g. environmental and health
damages, causing loss in value or spoiling the landscape etc.), which, of course,
must be proved in each case.15 These cases shed light on the complexity of
the problem, on the imperfection of the limits of expressing opinions16 on one
hand and the lack of independent institutions on the other.17
3. The Zengő Case
In 1995, after the Balkan war, the Hungarian Parliament passed a resolution
about the modernization of the Hungarian antiaircraft systems. According to
the resolution, a military radar station was to be built in Bánkút (Northern
Hungary) and one on the Zengő-hill. Finally, the two planned radar stations
14
15
16
17
(protest of the population of Zagyvaszántó), in Monok (protest of the wine producers of
Tokaj), in Komló (protest of Hosszúhetény and other settlements) and in Vekerd (protest of
the neighbouring Zsáka) (Fülöp, 2018: 18).
They reason that the investment has not been implemented because of discrediting, and
so claim compensation for their earlier expenditures from the concerned individual or
organization. The outcome of such a suit is always unsure because in case the investor
loses, they will pay the legal costs at most but in case the individual or the organization
does, they may face total financial breakdown (impact analyses, acquiring permissions,
wages etc.) (Gergely, 2009: 166).
One example of this is the suit initiated in relation to the Auchan’s investment in
Budaörs, which was at first lost by the president of the Clean Air Action Group (Levegő
Munkacsoport), but finally, owing to the decision of the Budapest Court of Appeal, he won.
But we could also refer to the case of the Viresol Ltd. in Visonta (according to the Directorate
of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Disaster Management, unclarified refuse water of high
organic matter concentration is regularly/permanently emitted from the premises of the
Viresol Ltd. to the Özse-valley stream through which the sewage gets into the Özse-valley
reservoir) who appealed to the court against the Átlátszó news portal in 2019 on the very
same grounds. Source: Bodoky Tamás (2019): Perrel fenyegeti az Átlátszót a Mátrai Erőmű
ügyében Mészáros Lőrinc keményítőgyára,
https://blog.atlatszo.hu/2019/11/perrel-fenyegeti-az-atlatszot-a-matrai-eromu-ugyebenmeszaros-lorinc-kemenyitogyara/ (Downloaded 10 04 2020).
In case it is too narrow, it can prevent the assessment of the environmental risks of certain
investments; in case it is too wide, investments useful for a bigger community could be
obstructed, as well.
This is important because they have the official opportunity to involve independent
experts and place the aspects of the population into the foreground as a result of which the
environmental impacts of an investment could really be measured.
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László Kákai
became three since the NATO took up the decision18 and contributed to the
development. Therefore, after Hungary has joined the NATO in 1999, one of
the new radar stations was deployed in Békéscsaba at their cost. The other site
was Bánkút where construction was implemented in perfect trim. The third
venue would have been the Zengő, near Pécs that is the 5th largest Hungarian
town. By 2003, a protest movement was organized from local civils.
The Civilians for the Zengő Movement rose objections against the works in
the very moment of the publication of the plans. The reason for this was the
possible extinction of the protected flora living in the building area. That part
of the Zengő belongs to the Eastern Mecsek landscape protection area, and
plenty of indigenous and protected plants can be found here; they would have
probably been eradicated by the construction.
The peak of the protest was the “battle of Zengő”. The case caused a great
stir not only in the media but changed the political communication of the
currently governing Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), as well, compelling the
socialist-liberal Ferenc Gyurcsány-cabinet to back off.
To balk the works, the civils scratched the signing paint off the bark of
the trees, so the woodcutters did not know which trees they could touch and
which they must not. Afterwards the civils were attended by the activists of
Greenpeace and other NGOs, with the assistance of László Sólyom, the former
President of the Republic (Pánovics, 2014: 224).
The news arrived by the end of the “battle”: the Ministry of National
Defence withdrew the permission of the contractor company to cut the
trees. As indicated, the Zengő-incident exerted a considerable impact on
political life, as well. The rivals of the MSZP, and even the Alliance of Free
Democrats (SZDSZ) that was a member of the coalition, took sides with the
civil movement. However, the motivation of their support was not the will to
protect the natural values of Hungary; they only found a new possibility to
criticize the politics of the Gyurcsány government.
However, the delight of the NGOs did not last very long. On 23rd of November
in 2005, Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány announced that the construction
18
According to the decision, the NATO would locate five new radars of minimal radiation in
the region; three of these were to be built in Hungary and two others in the Czech Republic.
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would not be stopped, only the venue would be replaced.19 The decision
choosing the Tubes was likely to have instantaneous political reasons instead
of careful professional considerations. Moreover, it meant a political risk:
while at the Zengő the government had to face about 10 thousand worrying
residents, nearby Pécs this number was more than 160 thousand.20
3.1. Tubes... the alternative?
The movement against the building of the radar station started at the end
of 2005 and became stronger by the beginning of 2006; the activities of the
NGOs were going on in parallel with the oppositions’ activities. The first big
civil event was the open university organized by the Association of Union for
Pécs, while a politician of the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz) organized
a protest meeting on the Tubes. The Zengő seemed to be a consensual site
until the end of 2003; after the scandal had erupted, Fidesz obstructed the
government in each possible instance also because the civic circles, that
formed the hinterland of Fidesz and were difficult to keep under control,
joined the protest. Thus the biggest opposition party backstabbed the
construction at local level, while their national experts were keeping deep
silence. In November 2005, the local representative group of Fidesz still voted
for the pronouncement of the “health care forest” located at the hill top into a
military area. Organized anti-radar communication started only in the second
half of 2006 when the MSZP’s local group realized that they actually did not
want a military radar station above the city, either.
After several meetings and discussions, the Civilians for the Mecsek
Movement (CMM) was established officially in 2006. The choice for this name
was backed by two reasons. On one hand, they wished to pay their respect
to the Civilians for the Zengő Movement, and they included the name of the
Mecsek to show that they would deny having the radar station located back
to the Zengő.
19
20
The Big-Tubes had already appeared earlier as a B-plan but the Láng-committee examining
the alternative of the Zengő omitted it from the list of the possible sites together with the
Jakab Mountain nearby Pécs for demographic and environmental reasons in advance.
Katalin Soltész, Parliament’s Library, Media review: Locator on the Tubes? February 2007,
1-9, https://www.parlament.hu/biz38/korb/dok/tubes.pdf (Downloaded 18 04 2020).
152
László Kákai
The first public appearance of the Movement took place short after its
establishment. In January, the Ministry of National Defence held an open
forum at the city hall in Istenkút (a suburb district of Pécs). It was here that
the residents first declared their denial since the plan had been issued in the
winter of 2005. CMM also attended the event, and as a consequence, there was
a rapid growth in the number of their members, and they gained publicity, as
well.
As their first public action, the CMM canvassed signatures to have a
referendum declared in Pécs. They wanted to get the municipality of Pécs to
organize a public hearing about the radar station planned to be built on the
Tubes. Not long after the closure of the collection of signatures, a piece of news
exploded in the city: the municipality of Pécs in fact had already decided on
the Tubes case.
Meanwhile, the CMM had collected more than 8000 signatures, which was
numerous enough to make the mayor declare the public hearing using his
authority.
It was a very unfortunate event that brought a favourable political
development for the CMM. The mayor of Pécs suffered a car accident and he
lapsed into coma. The coming municipality elections caused a great stir in the
public life of Pécs. Together with the Association for the Istenkút Community,
the CMM wanted to have a referendum declared, enforcing local politicians
by this to accept the civil will. However, this action was late. By the time the
initiation was judged and the sheets with the signature validated, the greatest
part of the campaigns had already been over. Generally, the parties’ reaction
to the Tubes issue was that they would stand for the result gained at the
referendum.
The canvass put a big burden on the movement, and for a long time it
seemed impossible to collect the signatures of 10 percent of the residents
of Pécs. The situation changed in the last phase of the collection when many
anonymous activists joined the process. Finally, the 19 thousand signatures
needed to have the referendum declared were collected. After validating the
signatures, the notary announced the referendum to be held in March 2007.
The main deficiency in relation to the campaign was, of course, the lack
of financial resources. The CMM gained only moderate private donations
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to finance their campaign, which was almost unnoticeable. Moreover, the
municipality was not very active in promoting the initiation. The movement
did the most of what they could with the limited resources. They disseminated
posters and stickers all over the city and organized residents’ fora and some
concerts, as well. Since neither the Ministry of National Defence, nor the parties
of Pécs joined the campaign, media attention avoided them, too, and so few
people were informed. As a result, the referendum was unfortunately invalid.
Only 32 percent of the citizens voted instead of the 50 percent necessary to
reach the validity threshold.21 Although more than 94 percent of the voters
said no to the construction of the radar station, the government was not
legally obliged to take the result of the referendum into consideration.
After the local referendum, the Ministry of Defence thought that each of the
obstacles were removed and the building plans could be accepted since the
abstention of the population from the referendum meant they had accepted
the radar station. The next scandal started with the encryption of the plans:
the NGOs wanted to see the architectural plans but the Ministry of Defence,
referring to their being a state secret, refused to allow them.22
The media paid some attention to the issue of the radar station again,
however, opinions were determined by political affiliation. The opposition put
the socialists under fire, claiming a prohibition of change in relation to the
area concerned; however, this was denied by the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition. The
opposition groups took side of the civilians again, while the political elite being
close to the government were belittling the referendum and the civil initiative.
At the beginning of June, the coalition leading the city ultimately refused the
opposition’s proposal. Meanwhile, the preparation of the construction was
going on undisturbed. In June 2007, the Ministry of Defence was given the
legally binding building permit. The civils started collecting signatures again,
and sent a declaration of 4000 flat owners of Pécs that in case the radar station
was built, they would bring a suit against the Hungarian State for the loss of
21
22
The 32 percent was far below the validity threshold since in the case of a local referendum,
the participation of 50 percent of the entitled population plus one person is the necessary
minimum, however, the 38 700 votes against the locator exceeded the number of the votes
gained by László Toller, the most popular mayor of the city after the transition, at the peak
of its popularity in the autumn of 2002.
Origo (2017): A tubesi lokátor titkosítását bírálják civil szervezetek, https://.origo.hu/
itthon/20070423titkositottak.html (Downloaded 20 04 2020).
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László Kákai
value of their properties.23 The change in the state of art was well indicated by
the first open confrontation between the socialist leaders of the city and the
Ministry of Defence: despite the stressful request of Minister Imre Szekeres,
the general assembly made an unanimous decision about the modification of
the Building Regulations of Pécs, declaring that the radar station could only
be built beside the thermal plant, on an absolutely flat area.24 Subsequent
to this, the NGOs, with the support of the inhabitants of Pécs and now the
municipality, appealed the building permit of the radar station. Despite
this fact, the Minister made the permit absolute as a reaction to which the
inhabitants of Pécs brought a lawsuit to court.
30 March 2008 was an important day for the whole civil movement. On this
day, within the frames of the 18th National Meeting of Hungarian Environmental
NGOs, which was held in Pécs this time, 39 organizations officially joined the
Civilians for the Mecsek Movement and its objectives. They also asked the
official organs of Hungary to take the aspects of the people and the nature
into consideration during the legal processes.
The lawsuit was going on for years and the final result was only born in
2010. On 17 March 2010 the Supreme Court annulled the contentious building
permit in its judgment.25 The politicians did not take much interest in the fact
that for reason of the lack of a valid construction plan the immediate beginning
of the construction was unlawful. During the following weeks, the Ministry of
Defence approved their intention to start the works as soon as possible.
As the verification procedure of the judgement lasted until March that year,
the Ministry of Defence could not start the construction before the upcoming
elections. Meanwhile, Zsolt Páva became the mayor of Pécs whose programme
had long been including the obstruction of the building of the radar station,
and so the chances that the plans could be implemented declined further. Also,
the international environment changed in that the NATO did not insist on the
site near Pécs, experts should have accepted any other venue meeting the
23
24
25
The judgment announced in the almost parallelly running case of the transformer station
played a considerable role in this.
Katalin Soltész (2007): Parliament’s Library, Media review: Locator on the Tubes? (Lokátor
állomás a Tubesen?), February 2007, 10-19, https://www.parlament.hu/biz38/korb/dok/
tubes.pdf (Downloaded 09 03 2020).
Peták Péter (2012): Állampolgári mozgalom egy NATO-radar építése ellen. Összefoglaló a
pécsi Tubes-ügyről. Parola, 2. szám, www.kka.hu/_Kozossegi_Adattar/PAROLAAR.NSF/cim
sz/764A78BED1052693C1257A0600502EDF?OpenDocument (Downloaded 21 04 2020).
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strategic and geographic requirements, thus NATO referent Robert Pszczel
suggested to discuss the site issue again.26
The Civilians for the Mecsek Movement, who had been fighting against the
investment in Pécs, acknowledged contently the fact that, after the energetic
insistence of the socialist governments of the preceding cycles, the Ministry
of National Defence terminated the building authority procedure of the radar
station planned to be built on the Tubes, and so ceased from the construction.
Taking the heritage of the Civilians for The Zengő Movement, they achieved
that the radar station could not be built anywhere in the Mecsek Mountains.
They also succeeded in having the political and civil groups as supporters
who had formerly been neutral or hostile about the activists’ work. The most
important rationales of the greens were based on environmental protection
and safety of the inhabitants of Pécs.
However, the Civilians for the Mecsek Movement could not celebrate their
victory unclouded. Finally, the two sides within the movement mentioned
above turned against each other.
At last, the Ministry of Defence found the proper venue on the Medina hill
in Tolna County. In the case of Medina, no counter reasons worded by the civil
side prevailed since there was a radar station that had been operating on the
chosen venue since the Soviet occupation, it was not on an area under natural
protection and its possible attack would not endanger the civil lives of a whole
quarter.27 For a period of four years, the Ministry of Defence provided HUF
100 million support in total for the development of the receiving settlement.
Thus, the village with 800 inhabitants that had an annual budget of HUF 130
million, received HUF 25 million per year. The settlement used this support
(compensation) mainly for infrastructural development. For example, they
replaced the doors and windows of the school, reconstructed the surgery and
later they renovated the village centre, developed their green areas, the rain
drain system and many other things.28
26
27
28
Hetek (2010): Tubes or not Tubes. Váratlan fejlemény a pécsi „NATO-radar” ügyében, www.
hetek.hu/hatter/201001/tubes_or_not_tubes (Downloaded 21 04 2020).
Palotás Péter (2016): Idén tíz esztendeje, hogy a pécsiek megnyerték a Tubesért folytatott
küzdelmet. Pécsi Újság, https://www.pecsiujsag.hu/helyi-hireink/iden-tiz-esztendejehogy-a-pecsiek-megnyertek-a-tubesert-folytatott-kuzdelmet (Downloaded 21 03 2020).
Civilhetes (2015): Súlyos érvágás volt az országnak a Fidesz pálfordulása, https://
civilhetes.net/sulyos-ervagas-volt-az-orszagnak-a-fidesz-palfordulasa (Downloaded 21
03 2020).
156
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László Kákai
4.1. The mysterious construction
Residents of a street in the greenbelt29 of a city with county rights in Hungary
recognized that there was an investment requiring enormous earthwork
getting started behind their houses, on the territory of a company interested
in catering trade.
When one of the residents raised questions, the representative of the
contractor company did not provide any information but, saying it was
harassment, called the police; thus, instead of getting answers to his questions,
the flat owner became the resident of the police lockup for some hours.
Despite secrecy, it turned out that the estate was not any more in the
possession of the company in catering industry, and that the investment was
in fact the construction of a strong current station meant to provide electricity
for the given part of the city.
Interestingly, the building of the neighbouring subdivision, advertised
as an estate with a beautiful panorama, had been permitted by the local
government, not telling the investor the fact that the “panorama” would soon
mean a transformer station. Supposedly, the creation of the station had been
included in the urban development plan years before, however, financial
means had not been available.
Because of the total lack of adequate information, the supposed health
damaging impacts of high voltage and the arrogance of the investor urged the
owners of 40-50 properties to proceed at the responsible authorities to make
the details of the investment clear.
First, the tenants were groping in the dark concerning both the person of
the investor and the authority issuing the permission. Finally, they succeeded
in exploring that the investor was a multinational electricity provider
company, and that consultations with the responsible authorities had already
been conducted, and the building permit was legally binding.
29
Most of the family and row houses of the neighbourhood were built in the 1970s, and a
subdivision was built the year before the investment.
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The concerned residents were shocked and ultimately resentful and
started to collect signatures in order to have the building operations stopped;
however, they did not succeed.
During the upcoming period, their discussions were mainly dominated by
their fears from the health destroying impacts of the station. Some of them
were in total despair in terms of the future. Others were considering moving
elsewhere.
4.2. In the labyrinth of bureaucracy
To calm down arisen tempers, the electricity provider organized a local forum
– which had a rather tense atmosphere – where the representatives of the
company tried to soothe the tenants, proclaiming that the station was safe,
not noisy, not dangerous for health and fitted into the environment. In its
response to the tenants’ question why the investment was not built on another
state, further from the living belt, the investor enumerated only profitability
reasons. In terms of the loss in the value of the concerned properties, one of
the managers present at the forum declared that they wished to negotiate
about the proved harms with the owners one by one.
Their conduct was cynical and contemptuous, originating in their economic
superiority, and they lacked empathy. One of the clearest indicators of this
was perhaps the statement that they would build the station by the end of the
year, “by hook or by crook”.
But to dissolve the residents’ bitter feelings, the provider summoned a
visitation on the premises. Local authorities were unable to give satisfying
responses to the questions put here in terms of health destroying effects
and the fact that the permitting resolution was not handed. As for the
compensation, they had a stand point differing from the one before, saying
that as a result of the fence embracing the building, it would not affect the
value of the neighbouring estates. The representative of the investor said they
would not boggle at legal proceeding, either, in case it was necessary.
One reason for the unusually rapid legal enforcement of the building
permission was that the electricity provider had six months to implement the
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building process of the transformer station for reason of the changes in the
regulations made by the European Union.
It was also a remarkable circumstance that to help to begin the constructing
process as soon as possible, the permitting authority made its resolution
practically out of turn. The local government, as the permitting supervisor
authority, also helped this process by resigning their right of appeal –
contrary to their former practice. The right of appeal with the help of which,
they could have prevented the implementation of a building project of this
volume in a living belt to protect the interests of the property owners. For
some inexplicable reasons, the municipality did not keep it important to do so.
Disapproving this behaviour, the owners wrote a severe-tone letter to
the current mayor. The mayor strived to calm the residents saying that the
investment would be implemented observing the building regulations and
referred to the unfounded fears from health damage; however, with regard
to the question why a democratically elected body disregarded the interests
of the citizens living in its territory in a case of such a volume, he remained
“elegantly” silent.
The residents tried to lobby at a local politician but his standpoint was not
very promising for them. He argued that as this was an investment of public
interest and public interest is prior to private interest, there was not much
to do about this case. To protect their rights, the property owners searched
for other fora. They appealed to the supervision of town clerks and the public
prosecutor but came up against walls everywhere. They were not given
real answers and help anywhere. To achieve the termination of the building
process, they addressed the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, domestic
and international environmental organizations and print and electronic
media.
There was no result. Residents were left alone, without any help. The
mystery surrounding the investment was deepened by the concerned
authorities’ “winking” at each other. Since the property owners did not get the
legally binding building permission, they had to acquire it in an informal way.
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4.3. Party or not / Retail client or not?
The authority issuing the permission later explained why they had not sent
the resolution to the owners by saying that they were not direct neighbours of
the structure, they were not retail clients and so the obligation of delivery did
not exist with regard to them.
It is worth mentioning the definition of the client concept: Party means any
natural or legal person or any organisation whose rights or lawful interests
are directly affected by the case.
The arrogance of the authority is well indicated by the stand point according
to which the “neighbour” (and so the party) is the stream flowing between the
owners’ estates and the planned transformer station, and that the authority
cannot be expected to search for party for themselves.
What is striking, in addition to the cynical manner, is the – perhaps
– intentional misunderstanding of the relevant legal regulation: as for a
multinational company, a conduct of shifting between the various forms
of regulations in order to enforce their interests for the expected profit is
explicable, however, as for the public administration system, whose approach
is expected to be objective and impartial, and cannot divert from the
understanding of the regulation accepted by judicial practice, it is inexplicable
to bring a company in position. The non-delivery of the resolution, based on
the very peculiar explanation of the notion of neighbour/retail client, divested
the owners of the possibility of appealing, therefore, using the possibilities
assured by law, they addressed the inspection authority of the permitting
office to enforce their rights.
Referring to the absence of the violation of any rights by the permitting
authority proceeding at the first degree, the inspection body refused their
appeal.
At this point, the bothered owners referred to the court in order to have
their retail client status verified and the resolution permitting the building
process overruled. In their lawsuit, they presented that the structure had a
negative impact on their life quality and health as well as considerably reduced
the value of their properties. The depreciation declared in the written opinion
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László Kákai
of the real estate expert they had engaged concerned the legal interest that
they considered to be the base for their retail client status.
In addition the noise and sound effects, the disappearance of tranquillity
and the disturbing radio frequency effect attending the operation of the
transformer station were all circumstances that the permitting authority
should have taken into account. They hoped they could make the building
process halt, however, despite the demonstration, the construction was
carried on rapidly. The station had been built and put into operation before
the court declared the retail client status of the property owners.
By “forcing” the stakeholders to the court, the permitting authority – doing
the investor electricity provider a favour – played stonewalling, and succeeded
in achieving its aim. It was in vain that the court declared in its judgment –
almost two years after the building operations were finished – that by reason
of violating the relevant regulations the station was practically built without
permission, there was no hope to have it demolished.
The piquancy of the case is that the transformer station is still operating –
with a post-construction permit that was issued three years after the station
had been put into operation, but without a permission of operation. Through
the glasses of reality, this fact is a clear sign of the defencelessness of the
residents who have won the suit. The court declared their retail client status
in vain, it was no use to them.
While the authority demolished a garage built without permission, in the
case they did not insist on the reconstruction of the original state. The opinion
of the authority after losing at the court did not change regarding the owners:
making themselves independent of the legal regulations. This kind of “I’ll do
what I want” conduct and the neglect of the court’s judgement.
By this time, the affair showed up already in the local media; however, the
articles did not go beyond presenting basic facts.
4.4. Being chased to the court
The owners of the flats of decreased value were at a crossroads: they either
accepted that there would be no consequence of the construction at all or
initiated a compensation suit with regard to the value loss of their properties.
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Some of them were very resolute for the lawsuit, others thought it was
impossible to win against a multinational.
Also, initiating a suit contained serious financial risks. If they lost, it was
possible they would have to pay millions for the law costs. Considering the
possible outcomes, and to prevent expensive legal proceedings, the concerned
owners offered an accord – for approximately one third of the amount later
judged for them – for the electricity provider, which refused it with an “usual”
condescending tone. Thus there was no other way for the residents than
bringing the case before the court.
Their legal representation was undertaken by a lawyer’s office with solid
professional experiences, which seemed satisfying for most of the owners.
However, some of them did not dare to join because they did not believe that
it was possible to win such a suit. Formerly, there had been no compensation
suit of this volume and content pursued in Hungary. By this decision, the case
was raised to a higher level.
With regard to the nature of the affair, the defendant multinational company
and the amount of the compensation, even national media took notice of the
suit and later were also present at each trial at the court.
The 36 plaintiffs indicated their claims individually and in the amount of
3-10 percent of the value of their properties, which was, of course, debated by
the electricity provider. As a result of the building of the station the panorama
of the earlier woody and bushy area as well as the hick town/relaxing nature
of the environment considerably changed and deteriorated.
The station can still be totally seen from the neighbouring flats, and the
evening lights are extremely disturbing. As each of the lamp posts is equipped
with lightning rods, they attract close thunderbolts.
The so far pleasant panorama has changed in the case of each property,
and when there is a stormy weather, there are increased sound effects that
arouse fear in the residents. It is also a fact that people in general strong health
destroying effects and electromagnetic radiation in relation to the operation
of transformer stations, and these presumptions raise frights in the potential
buyers of these properties, which have considerable negative effects on their
market value.
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László Kákai
The electricity provider questioned the legal base of the claims, as well,
referring to the opinion that during the construction process they proceeded
as expectable in the given situation, complied with the relevant regulations
and so they were not accountable for the damages taking place. Based on
the experts’ opinion, more than three years after the investment had been
finished, the court declared that the electricity provider was obliged to pay for
the damage in relation to the properties. The electricity provider, also to gain
more time, appealed against the first instance judgement.
The appeal court worded, for the first time in its practice, the notion of
unnecessary disturbance, and stated that reference to the optimization of
economic interest proclaimed so loudly by the electricity provider at the forum
organized by the company could not lead to exemption from responsibility. To
be so, it should be proved that the station was possible to be built exclusively
on this estate. The electricity provider did not offer such a proof.
4.5. The precedent judgement
The loser electricity provider, taking advantage of the possibility of remedy,
appealed against this judgement at the Supreme Court (now the Curia in
Hungary). Here, they absolutely did not want to leave anything to chance, so
they engaged an acknowledged lawyer’s office with international experiences
to represent them at the court. Probably, in this phase of the affair, the investor
understood that their former condescending behaviour was not expedient any
more.
The lawyer’s office used all means at the trial to have the suit refused: in
their very detailed submission they contested each tiny details of each element,
and tried to chase the residents into discussing the health damaging effects
of the transformation station despite the fact that they had never referred to
that in their applications.
The Supreme Court did not entertain this reasoning and approved the
former decisions. The judgement was a precedent one since this was the first
time in its settled case-law that the Court defined the notion of unnecessary
disturbance. Namely, the fact that the establishment of the transformer station
serves public interest does not imply that in case it is built in an inhabited
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area, the owners of the neighbouring estates are bound to endure all the
disturbing circumstances connecting to the construction. The legal basis of
the compensation, i.e. the obligation of the defendant to pay compensation, was
clearly declared by the court – five years after the investment was completed.
At this point, even “scoop-hunting” commercial televisions reported on the
case, thus the property owners and their legal representatives were placed
in the focus of public attention. They were interviewed by the media, and the
news reporters even asked to be let in their homes to shoot some B-rolls.
Besides the definition of the “terminus technicus” of unnecessary
disturbance, this suit was of a precedent value also because the Court accepted
the reasoning that the public opinion about the health destroying effects of the
transformer as an object is an influential factor in the reduction of the market
price of the properties. Similar decision had already been made in relation to
a mobile relay station, but not to a transformer station. The judgement of the
Supreme Court was not only precedential as it was but had further impacts, as
well: it provided a legal basis for the locator case, too. As indicated in Chapter
3, the former government was planning to locate a radar station on the hill
around this city. A group of local citizens initiated a movement against the
military project, and within the frames of this movement they applied to the
court asking a declaration that building the locator would violate the right of
physical and mental health of about 4 thousand property owners.
The precedential judgment of the transformer case was warmly welcomed
by the speaker of the movement, as well, and he said that it might be significant
during the examination of the value loss of approximately HUF ten billion
caused by the military radar.
Finally, the military locator was not built – probably because of the danger
of the horrible amounts of possible compensation to be paid. In the light of
the facts, it is not an overstatement to say that a handful of citizens “saved” –
although not on purpose – the city from a military locator. Subsequent to the
enforcement of the intermediate judgement, the court was only to determine
the amount of the compensation to be paid for the aggrieved owners.
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4.6. A never-ending story?
With regard to the fact that the appointed real estate expert stated a loss of
value three times as much as the private expert, in this phase of the procedure,
the owners raised the amount of the compensation they claimed.
Raising their claim was very risky because in case they had forfeited the
suit, they would have been fined by incredibly high legal costs; however, they
were all resolute and decided to go on. The trial was open to the press and had
a tense atmosphere. Many of the residents demonstrated their commitment
by attending the trial.
Five and a half years after the construction of the transformer the firstdegree county court ordered – that the raised claims must be paid; however,
the electricity provider, obviously playing for time, appealed again. The appeal
was based on the opinion that the triple difference between the opinions of the
private expert and the appointed expert cannot give ground for a judgement.
The decision of the appeal court, which accepted the application of the
electricity provider and ordered the lower court to conduct a new process,
was an unexpected turn in the case. The totally worn out owners hoped that
the affair would be closed after a procedure of nearly seven years, but they
were mistaken. Some of them queried the principle of legal certainty, others
queried the competences of the judges.
The appeal court made this decision because the court assessed the
difference between the two experts as flagrant, and also stated that the 30
percent loss of value proposed by the appointed expert was not compatible
with domestic judicial practice, which had never declared a loss in the value
exceeding 20 percent, not even in the case of cell towers.
The council of the acting court could have written history with a brave
decision but – for unknown reasons – they did not dare to make it. In this
case they could have saved years for the plaintiffs, but they approved the firstdegree judgement, and they created a never-ending story.
One of the claimants, who had legal qualifications, was one of the initiators
of the suit and did plenty of work concerning both the process and providing
mental help for the owners, helped them get over the dead point. This phase
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of the suit was really risky for them, so he had to convince the owners one by
one about the necessity of going on. Finally, each owner undertook to keep on.
In the repeated process, the lower court appointed a third expert who
approved the raised amount of the residents’ claim. The judgement on
the compensation of a record amount was adopted seven years after the
transformer station was built and set into operation without permission.
Displaying a legally correct conduct, the defendant paid the compensation for
the owners in full.
4.7. The successful end of the story and the “encore”
In the repeated process the lower court appointed a third expert who
approved the raised amount claimed by the residents. The judgement declared
a compensation of a record amount seven years after the construction and
the start of the operation of the transformer lacking permission. However, the
winner owners did not stop here.
Mainly for professional reasons, the plaintiffs’ legal representatives
applied to the European Court of Human Rights because of the conduct of the
Hungarian State extremely prolonging the suit.
The court accepted the appeal and obliged the Hungarian State to pay a
symbolic amount of compensation.
5. Conclusions
Both cases imply interesting lessons. Besides the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros dam,
the story of the Zengő-Tubes radar station case was another very important
environmental issue of political history in Hungary. In this case, in addition
to environmental issues, democracy and rule-of-law state aspects appeared
amongst the elements of the conflicts, as well, so there was a relatively wide
supporter base established in the background. The nature of the affair, i.e.
that it was about a military investment of the government that had direct
international impacts, assured the nation-wide publicity and importance of the
case (Mikecz, 2016: 124). It is not a marginal circumstance, either, that those
joining the protest could express their reservations against current politics or
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László Kákai
the government’s decision, as well.30 We can surely consider it a great success
of the initiators that the radar station was not built. However, the issue of the
transformer station must be treated as a very different case. It reflects another
area of local issues, which is much more about services and investments. In this
case, the interests of a smaller group (with clear local borders) were violated
while the investment was useful for the bigger community. It was impossible
to build local or national movement or supporter basis to be the background
for this issue. The political thread to be represented against the system was
also absolutely missing. The stakeholders were practically left alone. They
had to put together the base from the sea of legal regulations31 that they could
later vindicate via the system of judicial institutions.
The decisive factor in the transformer case was basically the proactivity
of the residents by which they succeeded to act against the measures of the
company, the local government and the public administration endangering
their interests and life quality directly. The lack of the movement is reflected
in the fact that despite the owners winning the suit, the disputed investment
was built.
In my opinion, the key aspect is how it is possible to make the decision
makers understand the complexity of environmental policy and the
investments affecting the natural environment and how the population and
the NGOs can be prepared, strengthened and made proactive so that they
can become useful and really relevant participants of the decision making
processes (Kákai et al. 2019).
30
31
Thus the movement was able to build on an extended social basis where the interests of
those really engaged for environmental care and those protesting against the “secret”
decisions of state power intertwined.
Client right, unnecessary disturbance, loss in value etc.
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Társadalomkutatás, X. évf. 2-3. szám. 28-47.
http://real.mtak.hu/4419/6/CAPACI92.pdf (Downloaded 21 03 2020).
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Water Stress
Fülöp, Sándor (2018): Környezetjog – környezeti konfliktusok. NKE, Budapest,
https://vtk.uni-nke.hu/document/vtk-uni-nke-hu/K%C3%B6rnyezetjog.pdf
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Újság, 2019. március 21.
https://www.pecsiujsag.hu/helyi-hireink/iden-tiz-esztendeje-hogy-a-pecsiekmegnyertek-a-tubesert-folytatott-kuzdelmet (Downloaded 21 03 2020).
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2020).
170
DATA AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX
1. Total internal renewable water resources per capita (m3/inhab/year)
1992
1997
2002
2007
2012
2017
Albania
3372
2565
2145
1771
1536
1327
Algeria
8300
8697
8625
8896
9212
9181
Andorra
413.9
376.4
351.6
328
299.5
272.3
Angola
5 359
4 906
4 505
3 817
3 829
4 101
Antigua and Barbuda
11413
9808
8422
7048
5897
4969
Argentina
759.9
668.9
602.8
569.1
537.3
509.8
Armenia
8676
8149
7707
7305
6936
6596
Australia
1992
2189
2261
2339
2380
2341
Austria
28137
26641
25263
23488
21558
20123
Azerbaijan
7023
6847
6762
6617
6457
6297
Bahamas
1086
1024
980.4
930.2
875.9
825.7
Bahrain
2631
2439
2264
2045
1882
1770
Bangladesh
7.647
6.724
5.441
3.861
3.077
2.679
Barbados
944.1
847.8
768.7
713.6
674.3
637.6
Belarus
305.1
299.7
294.7
289.6
284.1
280
Belgium
3327
3375
3467
3565
3590
3591
Belize
1198
1177
1158
1122
1083
1050
Benin
78538
68863
58200
51139
45322
40726
Bhutan
1932
1640
1412
1218
1059
921.6
Bolivia
15317
7
38559
13357
5
35075
11353
7
32147
10358
6
29642
96582
Bosnia and Herzegovina
17873
9
42555
Botswana
8375
9462
9401
9406
9731
10123
Brazil
1648
1465
1348
1254
1149
1047
Brunei Darussalam
36626
33788
31424
29635
28226
27049
Bulgaria
31022
27244
24503
22673
21266
19827
Burkina Faso
2420
2557
2670
2775
2873
2964
Burundi
1345
1172
1017
877.1
754.3
651.3
Cabo Verde
1777
1646
1492
1267
1079
926
27461
Cambodia
835.4
734.9
663.6
616.8
583.7
549
Cameroon
12534
10676
9545
8818
8161
7535
Canada
22000
19273
16972
14841
12949
11349
Central African Republic
95308
90993
86311
81660
77818
Chad
10040
9
45543
40091
36080
32975
31403
30264
Chile
2363
2002
1666
1392
1181
1007
China
64736
60225
56644
53662
51127
49017
Colombia
2285
2185
2118
2058
2001
1952
Comoros
60322
55505
51597
48338
45754
43717
Congo
2750
2390
2107
1870
1658
1474
Cook Islands
86147
74949
65160
55835
47917
42197
Côte d'Ivoire
34695
30682
27812
25864
24280
23033
Croatia
5838
4975
4424
4026
3587
3163
Cuba
7965
8319
8576
8643
8774
9000
Cyprus
3552
3461
3398
3372
3349
3319
Czechia
974.3
875.2
798.4
733.1
687.2
661
1272
1283
1270
1242
1238
Costa Rica
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea
Democratic Republic of the Congo
3200
3000
2871
2768
2696
2628
Denmark
24099
20534
18059
15406
13047
11065
Djibouti
1160
1137
1117
1097
1 069
1046
Dominica
487.7
453.9
402
370.6
340.4
313.5
Dominican Republic
2818
2827
2865
2819
2776
2706
Ecuador
3146
2879
2661
2473
2314
2183
Egypt
41323
37099
33843
31144
28690
26611
El Salvador
16.66
15.12
13.78
12.57
11.39
10.25
Equatorial Guinea
2894
2729
2631
2569
2512
2451
Eritrea
57130
47741
39016
31352
25024
20505
885.8
774.6
674.2
613.9
552.4
Estonia
Eswatini
8356
9014
9190
9457
9592
9702
Ethiopia
2914
2629
2442
2320
2115
1931
2001
1731
1506
1320
1162
Faroe Islands
Fiji
Finland
38348
36007
35001
34200
32681
31530
France
21209
20769
20526
20196
19767
19374
Gabon
3478
3404
3321
3228
3143
3078
Gambia
14360
8
2660
12673
9
2288
11014
1
1949
93341
80988
Georgia
16318
4
3062
1665
1428
Germany
10972
11909
12569
13238
14150
14859
Ghana
1337
1313
1311
1315
1320
1303
Greece
1959
1721
1521
1335
1177
1051
Grenada
5550
5291
5171
5096
5098
5197
Guatemala
2058
1978
1959
1931
1896
1855
Guinea
11247
10029
8944
7971
7151
6456
Guinea-Bissau
33437
27105
24735
22383
20034
17771
Guyana
15052
13559
12365
11065
9768
8598
Haiti
32214
9
1761
31689
7
1604
32052
1
1473
32223
6
1361
32001
1
1264
30980
8
1185
Hungary
17275
15037
13210
11762
10658
9785
Iceland
579.2
582
590.1
598.6
607.9
617.2
India
Indonesia
65334
4
1596
62339
6
1450
59586
4
1327
55701
2
1226
52227
3
1145
50746
3
1080
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
10753
9954
9282
8666
8112
7648
Iraq
2206
2049
1890
1784
1681
1583
Ireland
1907
1637
1411
1240
1074
919.7
Israel
13653
13200
12324
11141
10475
10290
Italy
156
133.2
120.2
108.3
97.42
90.12
Jamaica
3191
3191
3157
3077
3055
3074
Japan
4389
4182
4015
3899
3809
3744
Jordan
3431
3388
3362
3346
3348
3373
Kazakhstan
171.9
141.1
129
110.1
85.32
70.29
Kenya
3904
4130
4260
4062
3803
3535
Kiribati
829.2
714.9
623.2
543.5
474.3
416.5
Holy See
Honduras
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
0
0
0
0
0
0
Lao People's Democratic Republic
10986
10397
9804
9428
8747
8094
Latvia
42292
37651
34637
32000
29680
27763
Lebanon
6466
6906
7264
7704
8199
8687
Lesotho
1701
1552
1362
1175
976.4
789.2
Liberia
3137
2890
2750
2639
2502
2342
Libya
98863
84818
65295
56931
47824
42265
Liechtenstein
150.5
17.05
126.6
117.3
112.9
109.8
Luxembourg
4192
4318
4488
4742
5091
5349
Madagascar
2351
2311
2254
2107
1878
1714
Malawi
27396
23488
20101
17341
15080
13179
Malaysia
1659
1555
1343
1166
1003
866.7
Maldives
30505
26895
23968
21783
19883
18341
Mali
127
113.5
101.9
89.26
77.68
68.76
Malta
6766
5932
5155
4387
3748
3236
Marshall Islands
136.3
130.4
125.8
123.1
120
117.2
Mauritius
186.8
161.8
139.2
120.7
104.4
90.5
Mexico
2540
2384
2289
2229
2196
2175
Micronesia (Federated States of)
4604
4204
3919
3657
3385
3167
15508
14897
14239
13426
12367
11313
Mozambique
1124
1042
982.7
928.7
870
811.4
Myanmar
7128
6006
5240
4520
3906
3381
Namibia
24046
22604
21277
20398
19672
18793
Nauru
4069
3502
3140
2962
2721
2431
10023
8852
8068
7561
7168
6763
Lithuania
Mauritania
Monaco
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
725.3
702.7
682.8
666.4
655.2
645.7
Nicaragua
93349
87154
82513
77250
73187
69486
Niger
36066
32630
30201
28287
26578
25121
Nigeria
409.4
343.8
286.7
238.6
197.4
163
Niue
2205
1947
1718
1509
1321
1158
Norway
2715
2700
2635
2615
2604
2592
Oman
88982
86425
84030
80932
76217
72008
Pakistan
706
622.2
599.8
525.7
404
302
Palau
483.5
426.1
380.2
343
309.1
279.2
Panama
355.1
282.8
240.3
216.4
189.1
165
Papua New Guinea
53028
47863
43379
39548
36205
33325
Paraguay
15538
3
23494
13664
3
21238
12085
1
19611
10779
2
18341
97079
Peru
17658
7
26393
Philippines
72173
66097
61689
58000
54412
51018
Poland
7361
6556
5888
5364
4945
4565
Portugal
1403
1391
1393
1398
1399
1404
Puerto Rico
3796
3713
3638
3575
3591
3679
Qatar
1979
1895
1870
1896
1920
1938
Republic of Korea
113
104.8
86.73
47.06
26.54
21.22
Republic of Moldova
1479
1404
1351
1322
1298
1272
Romania
370.3
378.1
387.8
392.3
397.6
399.9
Russian Federation
1813
1872
1939
2015
2101
2154
Rwanda
29073
29181
29698
30122
30065
29947
Saint Kitts and Nevis
1417
1457
1113
1006
880.5
778.2
Saint Lucia
580.3
547.3
514.6
482.1
456.4
433.7
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
2114
1985
1877
1793
1716
1678
Samoa
925.9
925.9
925.1
917.4
914.9
909.9
18350
16629
15045
13366
11919
10671
North Macedonia
Palestine
17178
San Marino
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
138.1
123
109.6
95.04
82.51
72.86
Serbia
3213
2805
2481
2173
1883
1628
920.3
938.6
956.3
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
36943
37166
32278
26600
23648
21172
Slovakia
188.1
164.4
145.2
126.8
113.8
105.1
2337
2333
2334
2326
2313
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
9307
9391
9391
9270
9063
8976
Somalia
11766
3
737.4
10268
8
627.4
90688
81052
73123
South Africa
13545
5
801.2
543.5
470.1
407
South Sudan
1138
1026
952.7
898
845.3
789.9
2403
2067
Spain
Sri Lanka
2814
2771
2649
2450
2373
2399
Sudan
2976
2858
2770
2665
2585
2529
111.1
98.69
Suriname
Sweden
Switzerland
23415
3
19685
21710
5
19281
20496
9
19168
19423
2
18662
18432
3
17923
17571
9
17254
Syrian Arab Republic
5928
5697
5577
5344
5030
4766
Tajikistan
540.8
469.9
417.4
363.3
349.2
390.4
Thailand
11532
10694
9842
8873
7937
7114
Timor-Leste
3882
3689
3504
3391
3309
3252
Togo
10200
9421
8893
7714
7100
6339
Tokelau
2895
2536
2190
1918
1677
1475
Tunisia
3104
3045
3005
2934
2861
2805
Turkey
487.6
447
425.3
407.4
385.3
363.8
Turkmenistan
4072
3760
3485
3262
3044
2811
Tuvalu
360.3
322.6
304.8
288.5
266.7
244
Ukraine
2091
1784
1516
1275
1074
909.9
United Arab Emirates
1072
1098
1148
1188
1215
1246
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Uganda
United Kingdom
71.87
55.56
42.77
24.82
16.85
15.96
United Republic of Tanzania
2522
2485
2443
2361
2257
2191
United States of America
3086
2655
2326
2004
1711
1466
Uruguay
10946
10355
9802
9375
8994
8685
Uzbekistan
29223
28187
27704
27605
27142
26671
Vanuatu
762
689
64.3
598.7
553.1
512
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
64433
57143
51546
45455
40404
36206
Viet Nam
38704
34833
31682
29070
26929
25174
Yemen
5053
4640
4385
4184
3973
3762
Zambia
157.6
128
111
96.54
84.3
74.34
Zimbabwe
9489
8296
7212
6302
5456
4692
Source: FAO AQUASTAT,
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/results.html
(Downloaded 25 05 2020).
2. Total water withdrawal (Billion m3/year)
19881992
19931997
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
1.2
(1990)
4.5
(1990)
19982002
20.28
(2000)
1.838
(2000)
5.723
(2001)
20032007
20082012
20132017
8.425
(2012)
10.46
(2017)
0.0115
(2012)
37.78
(2011)
2.941
(2012)
16.02
(2012)
3.492
(2010)
11.97
(2012)
2.866
(2017)
16.55
(2017)
1.311
(2006)
Andorra
Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
0.6405
(2000)
0.005
(1990)
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
3.807
(1990)
16.2
(1992)
28.58
(1995)
2.925
(1995)
22.19
(1996)
3.644
(1997)
12.51
(1997)
1.733
(2002)
21.7
(2001)
3.668
(2002)
10.07
(2002)
0.7058
(2005)
0.0084
(2005)
2.858
(2007)
18.76
(2005)
12.27
(2007)
12.78
(2017)
Bahamas
Bahrain
0.239
(1990)
0.3574
(2003)
Bangladesh
Barbados
0.4344
(2016)
35.87
(2009)
0.081
(1996)
0.081
(2005)
Belarus
1.98
(1995)
7.69
(1997)
Belgium
Belize
Benin
1.837
(2000)
6.738
(2002)
0.101
(2000)
0.13
(2001)
1.706
(2005)
6.217
(2007)
Bhutan
1.548
(2010)
6.017
(2012)
1.397
(2017)
3.994
(2015)
0.338
(2009)
2.088
(2009)
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
0.113
(1992)
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
0.076
(1991)
7.494
(1990)
0.376
(1992)
0.1434
(1995)
54.87
(1996)
0.092
(1994)
0.194
(2000)
58.07
(2006)
6.589
(2002)
0.7157
(2001)
0.288
(2000)
0.022
(2001)
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
0.4
(1992)
45.09
(1991)
5.715
(2012)
5.659
(2017)
38.8
(2009)
35.6
(2017)
603.3
(2012)
11.77
(2009)
598.1
(2015)
2.339
(2012)
3.194
(2015)
1.162
(2014)
0.715
(2017)
0.9664
(2000)
42.21
(1996)
0.0662
(2000)
0.8492
(2002)
Chad
China
0.193
(2017)
65.68
(2017)
2.184
(2006)
Central African Republic
Chile
6.202
(2007)
0.818
(2005)
0.1943
(2012)
74.83
(2010)
20.29
(1992)
500
(1990)
525.4
(1993)
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
549.8
(2000)
7.746
(2000)
0.01
(1999)
0.046
(2002)
41.32
(2007)
0.0725
(2005)
0.8796
(2005)
35.43
(2006)
571.3
(2007)
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Côte d'Ivoire
Croatia
1.1
(1990)
1.232
(1994)
1.409
(2000)
0.5735
(2002)
1.549
(2005)
0.6693
(2012)
Cuba
Cyprus
0.226
(1990)
Czechia
Democratic People's
Republic of Korea
Democratic Republic of
the Congo
Denmark
1.261
(1990)
5.211
(1995)
0.211
(1993)
2.493
(1997)
0.9325
(1997)
Djibouti
Dominica
0.0166
(1996)
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
58.87
(1995)
0.729
(1992)
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
2.63
(1992)
1.358
(1995)
Eswatini
Ethiopia
0.2102
(2002)
1.908
(2002)
0.5841
(2000)
0.6679
(2002)
0.019
(2000)
0.0166
(2000)
4.865
(2000)
9.369
(2000)
68.3
(2000)
1.376
(2000)
0.0174
(2000)
0.4134
(2000)
1.413
(2002)
1.042
(2000)
5.558
(2002)
4.937
(2007)
0.2166
(2007)
1.969
(2007)
8.658
(2005)
0.6836
(2005)
0.5708
(2007)
0.0166
(2004)
5.47
(2005)
9.918
(2005)
0.2558
(2012)
1.841
(2012)
6.959
(2013)
0.311
(2017)
1.63
(2017)
0.7285
(2012)
0.7411
(2016)
0.02
(2010)
7.156
(2010)
72.3
(2012)
77.5
(2017)
1.631
(2012)
1.785
(2017)
2.118
(2005)
0.582
(2004)
1.834
(2007)
7.861
(2005)
10.55
(2016)
Faroe Islands
Fiji
Finland
France
2.347
(1990)
39.22
(1992)
2.586
(1995)
30.34
(1997)
Gabon
Gambia
0.0817
(2000)
2.328
(1999)
32.37
(2002)
0.1203
(2000)
0.0905
(2000)
Georgia
Germany
46.27
(1991)
45.2
(1995)
8.038
(1992)
8.695
(1997)
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
39.15
(2001)
0.982
(2000)
9.259
(2002)
0.0849
(2005)
6.562
(2006)
31.41
(2007)
0.1391
(2005)
28.06
(2012)
26.44
(2016)
1.813
(2005)
32.3
(2007)
1.823
(2009)
33.04
(2010)
24.44
(2016)
9.63
(2007)
0.01
(2005)
9.935
(2012)
11.24
(2016)
0.0141
(2014)
Guatemala
3.324
(2006)
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
0.0166
(1991)
1.46
(1992)
0.9799
(1991)
0.175
(1996)
0.5533
(2001)
0.175
(2000)
1.64
(2000)
1.445
(2010)
1.45
(2009)
1.285
(1995)
Holy See
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran (Islamic Republic
of)
Iraq
7.137
(1992)
0.167
(1992)
500
(1990)
74.34
(1990)
42.8
(1990)
Ireland
Israel
1.804
(1990)
6.01
(1996)
83
(1995)
54.4
(1995)
1.176
(1994)
1.812
(1995)
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
91.4
(1992)
0.984
(1992)
Kazakhstan
Kenya
0.928
(1993)
89.23
(1997)
5.72
(2002)
0.165
(2002)
610.4
(2000)
113.3
(2000)
89.7
(2001)
66
(2000)
1.831
(2002)
45.41
(2000)
33.67
(1995)
84.65
(2002)
0.803
(2002)
22.27
(2002)
0.538
(1994)
10.09
(1994)
0.9132
(2002)
10.08
(2000)
0.418
(1995)
1.293
(1994)
0.2563
(2002)
1.433
(2000)
0.0438
(2000)
2.049
(1990)
1.607
(2003)
5.584
(2007)
0.165
(2004)
5.051
(2012)
0.2943
(2012)
761
(2010)
4.501
(2017)
0.26
(2016)
222.6
(2016)
93.3
(2004)
38.55
(2016)
0.73
(2007)
1.954
(2004)
0.812
(2007)
82.98
(2007)
0.932
(2007)
22.81
(2007)
2.32
(2003)
0.757
(2009)
1.919
(2010)
53.75
(2009)
81.45
(2009)
0.849
(2012)
21.39
(2012)
3.218
(2010)
2.304
(2017)
34.19
(2015)
1.354
(2016)
1.044
(2016)
24.45
(2017)
4.032
(2016)
Kiribati
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Lao People's Democratic
Republic
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
8.007
(2006)
3.493
(2005)
0.2182
(2007)
1.31
(2005)
0.2602
(2012)
0.1811
(2017)
1.84
(2015)
Liberia
Libya
4.76
(1990)
4.6
(1994)
0.1308
(2000)
4.326
(2000)
4.869
(2005)
5.83
(2012)
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
4.352
(1995)
0.0565
(1995)
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
10.12
(1990)
0.936
(1994)
5.488
(1996)
2.768
(2001)
0.0605
(1999)
13.37
(2000)
1.325
(2002)
2.269
(2007)
0.0445
(2012)
0.259
(2017)
0.0456
(2017)
13.56
(2006)
1.357
(2005)
Maldives
0.0059
(2009)
Mali
0.056
(1995)
0.0538
(2002)
5.186
(2006)
0.0557
(2007)
0.566
(1990)
0.615
(1995)
1.601
(2000)
0.61
(2000)
72.6
(2002)
1.35
(2005)
0.63
(2007)
78.95
(2007)
0.0067
(1990)
0.006
(1997)
0.428
(1993)
0.0058
(2002)
0.0055
(2007)
0.54
(2006)
11.04
(1992)
0.605
(1990)
11.26
(1995)
0.249
(1991)
0.273
(1995)
14.82
(2002)
0.8842
(2001)
33.23
(2000)
0.288
(2002)
Malta
0.0401
(2012)
0.0638
(2017)
0.582
(2012)
82.73
(2012)
0.616
(2017)
87.84
(2017)
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia (Federated
States of)
Monaco
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
0.005
(2009)
0.551(20
09)
0.1609
(2010)
10.43
(2010)
0.4624
(2016)
1.473
(2015)
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
7.983
(1991)
6.507
(1996)
9.562
(2000)
8.914
(2002)
3.14
(1999)
1.388
(2001)
9.497
(2006)
10.95
(2007)
4.908
(2006)
10.72
(2012)
5.201
(2010)
1.545
(2011)
16.08
(2016)
Niger
0.5(1988
)
Nigeria
10.31
(2000)
0.9836
(2005)
11.57
(2005)
1.751
(2017)
12.47
(2010)
Niue
North Macedonia
1.555
(1996)
2.42
(1996)
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
1.223
(1991)
155.6
(1991)
0.6332
(2002)
2.399
(2002)
1.36
(2000)
172.6
(2000)
0.5512
(2007)
3.026
(2007)
1.321
(2003)
0.279
(2001)
0.418
(2005)
0.5235
(2017)
1.872
(2013)
183.5
(2009)
Palau
Palestine
Panama
Papua New Guinea
0.2714
(2000)
0.49
(2000)
Paraguay
Poland
Portugal
Puerto Rico
13.39
(1992)
8.6
(1991)
4.21
(1990)
Qatar
Republic of Korea
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation
20.57
(1990)
1.963
(1992)
20.41
(1990)
12.8
(1997)
0.2849
(1994)
25.44
(1997)
12.46
(1997)
77.1
(1994)
Rwanda
11.73
(2002)
11.14
(1998)
3.881
(2000)
0.2939
(2000)
29.16
(2002)
9.222
(2002)
66.2
(2001)
0.15
(2000)
81.5
(2007)
12.03
(2007)
9.151
(2007)
4.162
(2005)
0.436
(2007)
29.2
(2005)
1.065
(2007)
6.884
(2007)
Saint Kitts and Nevis
San Marino
16.1
(2016)
92.75
(2017)
10.08
(2017)
4.153
(2010)
6.482
(2012)
3.275
(2015)
0.9126
(2016)
0.84
(2017)
6.773
(2017)
64.41
(2017)
0.0156
(2012)
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
Samoa
2.413
(2012)
13.66
(2009)
84.25
(2012)
11.48
(2012)
0.3921
(2005)
Peru
Philippines
1.037
(2010)
0.3752
(2017)
1.211
(2016)
0.0429
(2007)
0.01
(1995)
0.0085
(2013)
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
0.007
(1993)
17.02
(1992)
Senegal
20.88
(2012)
3.958
(2007)
0.0137
(2005)
0.2122
(2005)
4.403
(2012)
5.377
(2017)
0.6653
(2012)
0.9281
(2012)
0.6594
(2017)
0.5563
(2017)
0.9314
(2017)
2.221
(2002)
Serbia
Seychelles
23.67
(2006)
0.0409
(2016)
23.35
(2017)
0.0119
(1989)
Sierra Leone
0.1889
(2000)
Singapore
Slovakia
1.31
(1997)
Slovenia
1.094
(2002)
0.8992
(2002)
0.688
(2007)
0.9349
(2007)
3.29
(2000)
12.79
(2000)
3.298
(2003)
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
13.31
(1990)
12.9
(1995)
19.38
(2017)
South Sudan
Spain
Sri Lanka
36.9
(1991)
9.769
(1990)
34.6
(1997)
35.94
(2002)
13.01
(2000)
35.57
(2007)
12.95
(2005)
Sudan
Switzerland
31.22
(2016)
26.93
(2011)
Suriname
Sweden
0.658
(2011)
36.64
(2012)
2.973
(1992)
2.695
(1992)
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan
2.711
(1997)
2.559
(1997)
14.43
(1997)
11.87
(1994)
0.67
(2000)
2.676
(2002)
2.518
(2002)
16.36
(2002)
11.96
(2000)
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
0.6159
(2006)
2.63
(2007)
2.689
(2010)
2.005
(2012)
2.375
(2015)
16.76
(2005)
11.49
(2006)
57.31
(2007)
1.172
(2004)
0.169
(2002)
Tokelau
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
3.075
(1990)
0.297
(1997)
2.857
(1995)
0.314
(2000)
2.85
(2001)
0.345
(2005)
0.3832
(2011)
3.305
(2011)
4.875
(2017)
Turkey
31.6
(1992)
Turkmenistan
23.78
(1994)
37.78
(2002)
24.91
(2000)
35.99
(2006)
27.95
(2004)
50.51
(2012)
58.79
(2017)
0.637
(2009)
14.85
(2010)
9.18
(2017)
8.214
(2012)
8.42
(2016)
485.6
(2010)
444.3
(2015)
Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukraine
26
(1992)
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United Republic of
Tanzania
United States of America
12.05
(1990)
2.108
(1995)
12.12
(1995)
559.3
(1990)
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
58.05
(1994)
0.3174
(2002)
18.28
(2000)
2.904
(2000)
15.81
(2002)
5.184
(2002)
559.3
(2000)
3.66
(2000)
60.58
(2001)
15.08
(2005)
3.998
(2005)
8.513
(2007)
562.4
(2005)
56
(2005)
58.9
(2017)
Vanuatu
Venezuela (Bolivarian
Republic of)
Viet Nam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
9.064
(2000)
2.932
(1990)
1.747
(1992)
1.706
(1994)
3.4
(2000)
1.572
(2002)
4.205
(2002)
22.63
(2007)
82.03
(2005)
3.565
(2005)
3.57
(2007)
Source: FAO AQUASTAT,
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/results.html
(Downloaded 25 05 2020).
3.339
(2017)