Promesse et fiction chez David Hume

Some scholars have recently found commonalities between Hume's motivational psychology and Kantian understandings of reason and obligation. Although this trend corrects certain misreadings of Hume, it goes too far in other respects. This essay argues that we can understand Hume's explanation of the artificial virtue of justice in a way that avoids such mistakes. I begin by considering Stephen Darwall's argument that features of Hume's account of justice reveal an inadequacy in the empirical naturalist tradition and underlying commitments to the proto-Kantian tradition. I argue that a broader understanding of Hume's ethics and reinterpreting crucial passages dissolve Darwall's 'puzzles' about Humean justice. I defend Hume against the charge of inconsistency by suggesting an alternative interpretation of his theory of the will and his arguments about the justice's development as a virtue. Finally, I argue that Hume's theory of the will can consistently account for motives to Humean justice, properly understood.

Hume studies, 2011

insan & toplum , 2019

In this study, Hume’s theory of justice is examined critically with respect to morality, politics, and society. In addition to that, Hume’s account of justice is questioned owing to the free rider problem. First, the relationship between morality and justice is investigated. Although Hume takes sympathy seriously in his early works, he does not take sympathy to be a sure foundation in his later works. Then, circumstances of justice are explained to find exact place and necessity of the virtue of justice. With the way of deconstruction, Hume shows the cases that the virtue of justice is needed. Justice is largely concerned with the environment and dispositions of persons. Next, the artificial character of justice will be explained. Then, Hume’s laws of justice will be given and assessed: stability of property, exchange of property by agreement, and performance of promises. It is argued that Hume’s laws of justice mostly relate to economic justice. The chief drive that causes individuals to act justly is disciplined self-interest. Self-interest should be organized for public utility. Laws of justice are created by human conventions. The primary sources of the investigation are: Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, [1739] 1978; An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, [1751] 1998 and Political Essays, 1994.

Philosophy Research Archives, 1988

Grant that Hume is a contractarian. Justice then arises from more basic features of humans and their circumstances. Among these more basic features from which justice arises Hume includes (in addition to self-interest narrowly construed) the widely held passions of benevolence and sympathy. But it is mysterious why he included them in his contractarian theory for the derivation of justice does not need them and may even be weaker with them included. This paper suggests that Hume's philosophy of mind, in particular his account of the imagination, forced him to include benevolence and sympathy along with self-interest as the passions on which justice is based.

This paper aims to answer the question whether justice is an artifical virtue or not. Then why justice is created will be given by regarding the view of David Hume. Then, human nature will be explained to undersnad the meaning of justice. This essay will cumulatively address whether justice derives from human nature or not.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2006

The Philosophical Review, 2011

does (58), another question arises. In places Baier takes pains to distinguish the approved motive of justice from certain other sentiments: (a) the sense of duty, (b) the personal commitment to a policy of conforming to the rules of property and promise (for the good of all), and (c) the concern for others. It is not so clear, however, that the sense of equity can be sharply differentiated from all of these. Part 2 usefully collects related articles, allowing us to see the seeds from which Baier's current views have sprung and the ways she has changed her mind. (Chapter 10's connection to part 1 is more tangential than the others.) There is a bit of repetition between old and new. For its philosophical reflections on promises, trust, rights, and private property as well as its interpretations of Hume and clever use of his History, this is a thought-provoking book.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1993

1 Đăng ký học: 0962 60 8801 -04 6260 3948 Địa chỉ: Số 18 Trần Đại Nghĩa -Q Hai Bà Trưng -Hà nội 1 Read the passage carefully and choose the correct answer.

Annual of the British School at Athens, 1988