The Nyayamukha and udghatitajna

Offprint from Journal of Indian Philosophy Volume 45, No. 2, April 2017, pp. 281-311 ISSN 0022-1791 DOI 10.1007/s10781-016-9309-8 (Published online: November 2016) Yasutaka Muroya The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña Springer Author's personal copy J Indian Philos (2016) 45:281–311 DOI 10.1007/s10781-016-9309-8 The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña Yasutaka Muroya1 Published online: 21 November 2016 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016 Abstract The Nyāyamukha by Dignāga, considered the founder of the Buddhist epistemological school, is known to have been studied intensively by East Asian Buddhists and scholars through Xuanzang’s Chinese translation. However, Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary on Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya offers a clue that helps to better understand the religio-philosophical and historical position of the Nyāyamukha in South and East Asia. The eighth-century commentator describes the Nyāyamukha as a work for highly intelligent persons (udghaṭitajña) and contrasts it to Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya. He also preserves fragments of the Nyāyamukha’s final verse, which served as the basis for a Sanskrit reconstruction of the verse, published in 2005. The present paper first examines the historical implications of Jinendrabuddhi’s interest in the Nyāyamukha and then discusses the hitherto accepted and yet problematic interpretation of its final verse. An analysis of relevant materials will include East Asian Buddhist sources in Chinese to seek evidence related to Jinendrabuddhi’s text. A detailed examination of hermeneutic aspects will lead us to reinterpreting the poison simile, “intellect-poison” (dhīviṣa or huiduyao 慧毒藥), as well as a discussion of how this term was used by Vasubandhu. This will show that it is possible that the Sanskrit reconstruction should be modified slightly. Keywords Dignāga · Nyāyamukha · Pramāṇasamuccaya · Jinendrabuddhi · Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā · Xuanzang · udghaṭitajña · udghaṭitadhīviṣa Dedicated to Professor Masaaki Hattori. & Yasutaka Muroya yasutaka.muroya@oeaw.ac.at 1 Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Hollandstraße 11–13, 1020 Vienna, Austria 123 Author's personal copy 282 Y. Muroya Introduction Historically, Dignāga’s (ca. 480–540 CE) two major works of logic followed quite different paths. The Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS), his magnum opus, stimulated the establishment of a new school of Buddhist logic and epistemology, a school that gained a series of major intellectual followers, including Īśvarasena (6th century) and Dharmakı̄rti (6th?–7th c.) as well as many other commentator-philosophers in South Asia and Tibet. The influence in South Asia of the Nyāyamukha (NMu), Dignāga’s earlier work on logic, seems to have been much more limited. In contrast, Chinese Buddhism during the Tang Dynasty was decisively influenced by Xuanzang’s 玄奘 (602–664) translation of the NMu (the Yinming zhengli men lun ben 因明正理門論本, Taishō 1628),1 as well as by his Chinese translation entitled Yinming ruzhengli lun 因明入正理論 (Taishō 1630; NPC) of the Nyāyapraveśa(ka) (NP) by Śaṅkarasvāmin (ca. 6th c.), an alleged disciple of Dignāga. Xuanzang’s introduction of Dignāga’s logic to Tang China may have been a decisive moment for the tradition of yinming 因明, the science of logic and reasoning, which at the time was expanding in East Asia. The NMu spawned quite a number of commentaries during the Tang Dynasty, although only one, by the Chinese monk Shentai 神泰, has survived, albeit incompletely.2 The keen interest in the text in East Asia is reflected in the many commentaries composed on it outside China. Of the NMu commentaries composed by Japanese Buddhist monks during the Heian period (794–1185/1192) and the Edo period (1603–1868), there are still a number extant.3 And the list of related works written in classical Chinese becomes still longer if the East Asian commentaries on the NPC that occasionally cite glosses on the NMu are taken into account. This transcultural dissemination of the NMu was clearly the result of Xuanzang’s deliberate selection of the NMu and the NP for translation. Their dissemination was then supported by his disciple Kuiji 窺基 (632– 682). Nonetheless, the phenomenal impact of Xuanzang’s choice on the intellectual history of Buddhist East Asia does not inevitably mean that the allegedly earlier work of Dignāga had little relevance in India or Tibet. A very small number of textual remnants from, or allusions to, “lost” Indian commentaries show that there 1 Frankenhauser (1996, pp. 127–129) critically reviews the controversy on the dating of Xuanzang’s NMu translation, concluding that it was completed in the 6th year of the Yonghui 永徽 era (= 655 CE; cf. also van der Kuijp and McKeown 2013, Introduction, p. lxv) and not in the 23rd year of the Zhenguan 貞 観 era (= 649; cf. Ui 1965, pp. 508–510). A thorough philological assessment of Yijing’s 義浄 (635–713) translation of the NMu (the Yinming zhengli men lun 因明正理門論, Taishō 1629) has not yet been undertaken; cf. Funayama (2002, p. 27, n. 19). To an extraordinary extent, Yijing’s translation is identical to that of Xuanzang, despite the former also containing clearly secondary or additional phrases; cf. Ui (1965, pp. 511–512). Yijing’s translation is not taken into account in this paper. 2 The Limenlun shu ji 理門論述記 (Taishō 1839), of which only part of the first chapter is preserved. 3 On a commentary on the NMu written by the Heian-period Japanese monk Shamon Shū 沙門宗, see Moro (2015), who has rediscovered this significant commentary and is currently preparing its edition; cf. also n. 69 below. On the NMu commentaries of the Edo period, see Takemura (1986, pp. 164–196). 123 Author's personal copy The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña 283 were also Indian intellectuals who engaged themselves with the NMu.4 As known through the critique of the Madhyamaka philosopher Candrakı̄rti (6th–7th c.) and the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara (6th c.), there were Buddhist and Brahmanical authors who criticized Dignāga’s theories as presented in the NMu.5 Why did Xuanzang select and translate only the NMu and the NP as representatives of Indian Buddhist logic? There have been attempts to answer to this question, answers that are not necessarily baseless or speculative. Relevant to the present paper is the observation offered by Frankenhauser, who assumes that “Xuanzang regarded the yinming as a supplement, among others, to the Yujiashi di lun” (i.e., Yogācārabhūmi), a work that requires “knowledge of methodology and terminology for the method of argumentation.” Xuanzang thus had the “separation of epistemology from the formal-logical content of the yinming” in mind, and for this reason the PS, a larger part of which contains “uniquely epistemological and language-theoretic reflections,” “remained untranslated.”6 Erich Frauwallner (1898–1974) has described the historical-philosophical implications of the differences between the NMu and the PS with regard to their contents, materials, structure and theories. The NMu, which consists of two major parts, the treatment of proof (sādhana) and refutation (dūṣaṇa), can be regarded as a revision (“Neubearbeitung”) of Vasubandhu’s (4th–5th c.) Vādavidhi.7 Frauwallner seems to have considered the Vādavidhi to have been the first work to establish this basic structure, which the NMu then adopted.8 In contrast, the main object of the PS is epistemology, namely, the means of valid cognition such as perception and 4 On the lost commentaries on the NMu by Dharmapāla (ca. 530–561), Mang po len pa’i bu (*Bāhuleya?) and others, see Tillemans (1990, pp. 8–12; 1994, p. 3; and 2000, p. 42, n. 156) and van der Kuijp and McKeown (2013, Introduction, p. lxvi, n. 2). For evidence of Dharmapāla’s “commentary on the NMu,” Tillemans (1990) refers to Huili’s 慧立 mention of Yinming 因明 in the list of Dharmapāla’s (達磨波羅) compositions that appears in the biography of Xuanzang (Datang daciensi sanzang fashi zhuan 大唐大慈恩寺三藏法師傳, Taishō 2053, T50, p. 241c23–24: 又釋廣百論唯識論及因明數十部; cf. Tillemans 1990, p. 12, n. 30); cf. also Frauwallner (1961, p. 139, n. 44 = Kl. Schr. p. 861, n. 44). In the English translation of Huili’s biography, Beal (1914, p. 139) identifies the “work” on logic as “Niyâyadvâra-târaka-śâstra,” a title taken from the so-called “Nanjio Catalogue” (nos. 1223 and 1224). Cf. also Beal (1906, vol. II, p. 218 and n. 89). 5 On Candrakı̄rti’s critique, see MacDonald (2015, esp., vol. II, pp. 136–137, n. 272 on NMu k. 2). On Uddyotakara’s criticism, see Okazaki (2005, pp. 224–226 on NMu k. 1), and Steinkellner (2013, vol. II, pp. 287–288, n. 605), indicating a “hitherto undiscovered quote from the NMu in secondary usage.” 6 See Frankenhauser (1996, p. 129), who draws on Shen Jianying’s 沈剣英 view. For a summary of Takemura’s (1986, p. 31) observations, see Moriyama (2014, pp. 121–122, n. 3). In catalogues for translated literature, it is recorded that the PS was translated into Chinese by Yijing in 711; see Katsura (2014, pp. 101–102, n. 2), with a further note on the PS, about which “Xuanzang’s disciples seem to have been well informed;” cf. also Ui (1965, p. 507). 7 Frauwallner (1959, p. 92 = Kl. Schr. p. 768): “Ja, Inhalt und Gliederung des Stoffes decken sich so weit, daß man das Nyāyamukham geradezu eine Neubearbeitung des Vādavidhiḥ nennen könnte.” Cf. also Eltschinger (2014, pp. 157–158). 8 Frauwallner (1959, p. 92 = Kl. Schr. p. 768): “Und das ist bezeichnend. Denn nach allem, was wir wissen, war diese Gliederung des Stoffes das Werk Vasubandhu’s und wurde von ihm in seinen Werken zum erstenmal durchgeführt”; Frauwallner (1957, e.g., p. 110 = Kl. Schr. p. 722): “Nun haben wir gesehen, daß diese Neugliederung des Stoffes auf Vasubandhus selbst zurückgeht.” 123 Author's personal copy 284 Y. Muroya inference.9 From a biographical point of view, according to Frauwallner, the NMu characterizes the beginning of Dignāga’s activity as logician (“Beginn seiner Tätigkeit als Logiker”), while the PS is seen as his oeuvre’s culmination (“Ende seines Schaffens”).10 Contrary to the wide philosophical interest in the PS in India and Tibet, there is little information about how the NMu was read and transmitted there. Such information would give us hints about the historical position of the NMu in India. In this regard, from the material that has survived, Jinendrabuddhi’s (8th c.) mention of the NMu in his commentary Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (PST) is exceptional; his ˙ characterization and treatment provide information that is rare. In particular, Jinendrabuddhi focuses on the final verse of the NMu, analyzing it in connection to the differences between the NMu and the PS. How then did Jinendrabuddhi perceive the NMu and differentiate it from the PS? This paper will first examine the relevant passages from the first chapter of the PST and subsequently discuss the Sanskrit ˙ reconstruction of the NMu’s concluding verse as has been presented by Shōryū Katsura. Jinendrabuddhi’s Comparison of the NMu and the PS In certain aspects, Jinendrabuddhi’s comparison of the NMu and the PS is different from the characterization of Frauwallner. The comparison is made at the beginning of the commentary, or more precisely, on the occasion of interpreting the famous benedictory stanza of the PS (= PS 1.1, Vamśastha meter), and in reference to the ˙ expression “my theories/views scattered [in many treatises]” (svamatāt … 11 viprasṛtāt). Here, as Dignāga already states in his auto-commentary, the socalled Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (PSV), svamata (“my theories/views”) in the stanza refers, or alludes, to treatises (prakaraṇa) such as the NMu.12 Interestingly, Jinendrabuddhi does not understand *viprasṛta-svamata in the way that modern scholarship has presupposed it so far. 9 Frauwallner (1959, p. 96 = Kl. Schr. p. 772): “Wie wir bereits gesagt haben, ist der Pramāṇasamuccayaḥ ein Werk ganz anderer Art, als das Nyāyamukham. In ihm handelt es sich nicht um Beweis und Widerlegung, das heißt, um Dialektik. Sein Gegenstand sind vielmehr die Mittel richtiger Erkenntnis, Wahrnehmung und Schlußfolgerung, also die Erkenntnislehre.” 10 Frauwallner (1959, p. 92 = Kl. Schr. p. 768): “Der Pramāṇasamuccayaḥ, der der späteren Schule die Bahn weist, steht am Ende seines Schaffens, während das Nyāyamukham, das sich noch eng an seinen Vorgänger Vasubandhu anschließt, den Beginn seiner Tätigkeit als Logiker bezeichnet.” 11 For this rendering of the phrases from PS 1.1 (pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣine praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine | pramāṇasiddhyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasṛtād ihaikataḥ ||), see, e.g., Hattori (1968, p. 73, n. 1.1; 1991, p. 154), Steinkellner (1982, p. 7), Inami (1992: p. 71, n. 10), Kellner (2004, p. 148), Balcerowicz (2008, p. 61), Katsura (2012, p. 43), Ono (2012, p. 161) and Pecchia (2015, p. 53); the most recent version by Pecchia is: “Saluting Him, who is a means of valid cognition, who seeks the benefit of all living beings, who is the teacher, the sugata, the protector, I shall, for the purpose of establishing the means of valid cognition, compose the (Pramāna-)samuccaya, uniting here under one ˙ and religious treatment of PS 1.1 by head my theories scattered (in many treatises).” On the philosophical Dharmakı̄rti and his followers, see Pecchia (2015). 12 PS 1, p. 1,10–11 (the usage of italicization for the retranslated text follows PS 1, Introduction, p. VII): … svaprakaranebhyo nyāyamukhādibhyaḥ …; cf. also PST 1, p. 4,7–8: svamataṃ nyāyamukhādi. ˙ ˙ 123 Author's personal copy The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña 285 First, Jinendrabuddhi does not adopt the sense of ‘origin’ or ‘source’ for the ablative of svamatāt and/or viprasṛtāt, which are normally construed syntactically with “uniting” (samuccaya) (svamatāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasṛtād “I shall compose the PS, uniting here under one head my theories scattered [in many treatises]”). He interprets the ablative in the sense of the reason or cause (hetāv iyaṃ pañcamī)13: “by reason of my scattered views” or “on the basis of my dispersed thoughts.” Moreover he does not understand viprasṛta as ‘scattered,’ as the Tibetan version sna tshogs ’thor rnams (“the variously scattered [treatises]”) of the PSV suggests.14 He ingeniously appeals to exegetical technique by dissecting the term into several parts and rendering the word prasṛta of viprasṛta (vigataṃ prasṛtam ‘destitute of prasṛta’) in two ways.15 The first meaning derived from this dissection is ‘spreading’ (prasaraṇa) and ‘extension’ (vistara), and the second is ‘excellent understanding’ (*prakṛṣṭa-avagama) and ‘excellent, thorough knowledge’ (*prakṛṣṭa-parijñāna).16 Accordingly, Jinendrabuddhi deduces two interpretations for viprasṛta: on one hand, “because my theories have been free from extension,” and on the other, “because my theories have been free from excellent understanding.” To put it another way, Dignāga’s earlier treatises such as the NMu are not comprehensive; they are rather compact (saṅkṣipta) and merely provide directions or hints (diṅmātra). And those who require detailed teachings do not gain excellent understanding about the means of valid cognition from such treatises.17 With regard to the second interpretation, Jinendrabuddhi exemplifies what is missing in the NMu and other treatises, namely, the reference to a rule of exception (apavāda) regarding the definition of perception (pratyakṣalakṣaṇa) in order to exclude, for instance, cognitions such as a “double moon, etc.” (dvicandrādi).18 The NMu’s omission or lack of mentioning this causes an undesirable consequence, because the NMu’s definition of pseudo-perceptions (pratyakṣābhāsa) allows the 13 PST 1, p. 4,5; cf. also Steinkellner (1980, p. 102). ˙ PSV (K) P93b5 = PSV (V) P13a7, D14b2 (in: Hattori 1968, p. 174,11 and p. 175,11). Being presumably faithful to the word order of the original, the Tibetan translations syntactically separate the two words svamatāt and viprasṛtāt, namely, by construing svamatāt with samuccayaḥ (rang gi gzhung kun las btus te “after collecting from all [my] own work[s]”) and viprasṛtāt with ihaikataḥ kariṣyate (sna tshogs ’thor rnams ’dir gcig bya “the variously scattered [works] will be united here”). 14 15 On the exegetical technique that Jinendrabuddhi adduces as tantra (“having many functions simultaneously”), āvṛtti (“repetition”), and anekaśakti (“the faculty of [denoting] multiple [meanings of a word]”) according to Kataoka’s renderings, see Kataoka (2007, pp. 21–22, n. 27 on PST 1, p. 4,5–6). On the technical usage of tantra in ritual and linguistic contexts, see Freschi and Pontillo˙(2013). 16 PST 1, p. 4,6–7: prasṛtaṃ prasaraṇaṃ vistara iti yāvat. punas tantreṇāvṛtter anekaśakter vāsyaivāyam aparo ˙’rthaḥ. sarve gatyarthā jñānārthā iti sṛtam avagamaḥ parijñānam. prakṛṣṭaṃ sṛtaṃ prasṛtam. vigataṃ prasṛtaṃ yataḥ, tad viprasṛtam. 17 PST 1, p. 20,7–8: mukhaṃ hi dvāraṃ diṅmātradarśanaṃ saṅkṣiptam. na ca tena vistarapratipādyānāṃ ˙ bhavati; cf. also PST 1, p. 4,10: vigatavistaraṃ ca saṅkṣiptam. vyutpattir ˙ 18 PST 1, p. 4,7–10: svamataṃ nyāyamukhādi vigataprakṛṣṭa*pramāṇavyutpattikam. tathā hi tatra ˙ pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham ity asya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasya nāpavādaḥ kṛtaḥ. tataś ca dvicandrādijñānasyāpi pratyakṣatāprasaṅgaḥ. (v.l.: * °prakṛṣṭa°] Ms. [cf. Kataoka 2007, p. 22, n. 28]; °prasṛta° ed.). 123 Author's personal copy 286 Y. Muroya consciousness of a double moon to be a valid cognition. In the PS, according to Jinendrabuddhi, however, the specific mention of sataimira (“non-cognition or ignorance”), a word added in the definition of pseudo-perceptions, demarcates this kind of “false appearance of perception” as a “mental construction resulting from a defective sense faculty” (Chu 2004, pp. 142–143), and operates as a rule of exception regarding the definition of perception as kalpanāpoḍha (“free from conceptual construction”).19 Jinendrabuddhi’s two ways of interpreting prasṛta are based on two aspects of the NMu and the PS: (1) quantity and (2) quality. The latter refers to how detailed the two texts are when compared to each other. At a different level these two aspects are concerned with (a) the disposition and abilities of those who study them and (b) their effectiveness in establishing the means of valid cognition (pramāṇasiddhi). The following passage from the PST explains the NMu with regard to (a): ˙ And these [treatises such as the NMu] are free from extension (vigatavistara), i.e., concise (saṅkṣipta). Only such a person as [can] understand through a condensed statement (udghaṭitajña), i.e., a person who is able to deduce the unmentioned meaning/content even by the indication/knowledge of mere direction (diṅmātradarśana), attains perfect knowledge (vyutpatti) through such [treatises], but not the other [type of persons]. To explain [this] more precisely, the first half [line] of the stanza exactly there [in the NMu], beginning with “this [treatise, as the] mere gate (mukhamātra) of the proper ways concerning the real object (sadarthanīti),”20 implies that this [treatise] is composed for the sake of supporting only a person with brilliant intelligence (sudhī) who has a taste for conciseness (saṅkṣiptaruci).21 For Jinendrabuddhi, the NMu’s conciseness or lack of extensive explanation is not inevitably negative. The suitable audience for any text is determined by its compositional style and how condensed its contents are. Who forms the audience is also related to the learners’ inclinations and requirements. Jinendrabuddhi describes the relevant audience for the NMu with regard to two aspects. On one hand, persons suitable for reading the NMu possess high intellectual abilities and are called udghaṭitajña, a term known in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit with the possible literal meaning “knowing [by] what becomes open/what is revealed.” It is often translated 19 On Dignāga’s and Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation of the pseudo-perception and sataimira in PS 1.7 cd–8ab, see PST 1, pp. 61,9–64,15, esp., p. 64,8 (… sataimiram ity etad apavādapadam …). For a ˙ detailed study on sataimira and a clear analysis of Dharmakı̄rti’s influence on Jinendrabuddhi, see Chu (2004). 20 On the nītiśāstra (“treatise of the proper ways in epistemology and logic”) as a denotation of the PS used by Jinendrabuddhi, as well as the meaning of nīti assumed “to be a quasi-synonym of nyāya,” see PST 1, Introduction, p. xliii, n. 69. ˙ 21 PST 1, p. 4,10–13: vigatavistaraṃ ca tat saṅkṣiptam. tena ya evodghaṭitajño diṅmātradarśanenāpy ˙ abhyūhitum arthaṃ samarthaḥ, tasyaiva vyutpattir bhavati, netarasya. tathā hi tatraiva anuktam mukhamātram idaṃ sadarthanīter ityādeḥ ślokasya pūrvārdhena sudhiya eva saṅkṣiptarucer upakārāyedaṃ kṛtam iti sūcitam. 123 Author's personal copy The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña 287 as “understanding [by] a condensed statement.”22 On the other hand, their inclinations are characterized as saṅkṣiptaruci, “one who has the taste for a concise statement.” Jinendrabuddhi claims that this specific characteristic of the NMu is illustrated in the first hemistich of the final verse of the NMu, and the opposite type of person is excluded from the target audience by its second hemistich: By contrast, it is [implied] by the second half [line of the final verse of the NMu] beginning with “erroneous paths” that through this [treatise] there is no support of other [types of] persons [than those who understand by condensed statements]. Because the [following] meaning is understood [from the second half line]: inasmuch as slow-minded persons (mandadhī) who are deluded by the speculative reasoning of outsiders need to be explained at length/in detail (vistareṇa), how could they partake of the true meaning [of the teaching] after dismissing erroneous paths [by studying the NMu]? [Such persons would] never (naiva) [partake of the true meaning through the NMu].23 When Jinendrabuddhi refers to these common persons as slow-minded (mandadhī), he seems to presuppose a dichotomy in intellectual aptitude. Some, but not all, persons are endowed with the intellectual swiftness that is supposedly fitting for the NMu. Jinendrabuddhi clearly represents the position that the brevity of the NMu would never enable common persons to attain a complete knowledge of the means of valid cognition, and that its author Dignāga has spelled out who can study the work. How then can the “slow-minded” be supported, if the NMu cannot do this? Jinendrabuddhi clarifies that this is the purpose of Dignāga’s composing the PS, contrasting its role with that of the NMu from the viewpoint of (b) mentioned above. 22 For the latter rendering, see Edgerton’s BHSD, pp. 129–130, s.v. udghaṭita-jña (see n. 74 below). The Pāli equivalent of udghaṭitajña is ugghaṭitaññu; see CPD, vol. II, pp. 343–344, s.v. ugghaṭita-ññu: “m(fn). [BHS udghaṭita-jña], lit. he who understands what becomes (at once) clear to him (sa. udghaṭate, intr., to become open, to become clear or known), i.e. one who understands at the first hearing of the mere text, of a condensed statement, without needing detailed explanations (opp. vipañcita-ññu, understanding after detailed treatment).” Cone (2001, p. 396) renders under the same term “[BHS udghaṭitajña; cf S. udghāṭitajña], understanding what is revealed; understanding what is (merely) unveiled, taught briefly; of very swift understanding,” while she registers two verbal adjectives (pp), ugghaṭita “[S. udghaṭita], unlocked, unveiled; revealed” and ugghāṭita “[S. udghāṭita], opened; revealed,” as derived from the causative “ugghāṭeti (and ugghaṭeti)” (\ ugghaṭati); see however a remark in CPD, vol. II, p. 343, s.v. ugghaṭita: “in Nett[i-pakaraṇa] and c[ommen]t[arie].s erroneously taken as pp. of a caus. ugghaṭeti q.v.), revealed, (merely) taught (in brief without explanations).” As for Tibetan translations of udghaṭitajña, which corresponds to mgo smos pas go ba in the PST (T) (P4a2, D3b1), one could adduce (1) the same ˙ (“to easily perceive the meaning from a slight rendering with mgo smos pas go ba in TED, p. 285 movement of the head” [= cung zad lab pa tsam kyis go ba]) and in NTSD, vol. 2, p. 675 (referring to the gloss by Yaśomitra), (1’) mgo smos pas go pa in BHSD, pp. 129–130 (“understanding by mention of chief points” as rendered by Edgerton, who refers to Mahāvyutpatti no. 2384), (2) mo (!) smos pas go ba in TSD, p. 1848 (see also p. 219, s.v. kha phye; cf. n. 70), and (3) mgo glengs pas shes pa in YBhū Index, p. 1095, s.v. 略開智 (cf. also Skilling 2002, p. 98 on Prthivı̄bandhu’s Pañcaskandhabhāṣya). ˙ 23 PST 1, pp. 4,13–5,2: kusṛtīr ityādinā tūttarārdhena netareṣām anenānugraho bhavatīti. tīrthyatarka˙ mandadhiyo vistareṇa pratipādyāḥ kusṛtīr apavidhya katham arthatattvabhājaḥ syuḥ, naivety bhramitā arthagateḥ; cf. n. 78. On the implication of the “outsider,” “non-Buddhist” and “allodoxy” (tīrthika, tīrthya, paravāda), see Eltschinger (2014, p. 12, n. 38 and p. 36, n. 3). On vistareṇa ‘at length,’ see Harrison (2007, p. 226, n. 49), who prefers rendering this with ‘at length’ rather than ‘in detail’ and the like. 123 Author's personal copy 288 Y. Muroya Thus in this manner, because [Dignāga’s] own theories [presented in the NMu and other places] are of this kind (i.e., short/abridged), perfect knowledge about the means of cognition is not effected for all [persons] by this [kind of treatise]. Therefore, for the reason that [his] own theories are concise (saṅkṣipta) [and therein] the excellent mastery (prakṛṣṭavyutpatti) about the means of cognition has not been offered, [he] shall compose the Pramāṇasamuccaya, which is accompanied by general rules, exceptions and extensions, and is excellent at providing perfect knowledge about the means of cognition even (api) for the benefit of slow-minded persons (mandadhī), who have a taste for an extensive statement (vistararuci).24 Jinendrabuddhi describes the PS as the work that contains general as well as exceptional rules, with extensive and full details. Furthermore, the PS is intended to teach even slow-minded persons (mandadhī), who prefer extensive explanations (vistararuci). These features enable or help them to attain perfect knowledge about the means of valid cognition, and thus attribute excellence in mastery to the PS. It is worth noting that Jinendrabuddhi’s comparison presupposes two structural layers. One is the framework of sudhī (= udghaṭitajña) versus mandadhī marking abilities and intelligence, and the other is that of saṅkṣiptaruci versus vistararuci marking taste. Characterization of learners or bodhisattvas is found widely in Buddhist literature. Such references have been exhaustively collected by Peter Skilling, who has shown that there are twofold, threefold and even fourfold typologies: udghaṭitajña (“a person who understands a brief instruction”), vipañcitajña (“a person who understands an expanded instruction”), neya (“a person to be guided”) and pada[ṃ]parama (“a person who does not go beyond words”).25 The combination of the two referred to by Jinendrabuddhi is similar to a passage in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh). There, the following question is raised: why are there three different teachings about the Abhidharmic factors, such as the five aggregates (skandha), twelve sense spheres (āyatana) and eighteen elements (dhātu), despite the fact that these three categories presuppose the same groups of factors?26 Vasubandhu answers that there are three teachings due to the three types of persons to be instructed (vineya) in terms of their 24 PST 1, p. 5,8–11: tad evam evaṃvidhaṃ yataḥ svamatam, na tena sarveṣāṃ pramāṇavyutpattiḥ kṛtā. tasmāt˙ svamatāt saṅkṣiptād akṛtaprakṛṣṭapramāṇavyutpatter hetor mandadhiyām api vistararucīnām upakārāya sotsargaḥ sāpavādaḥ savistaraḥ *prakṛṣṭaḥ pramāṇavyutpattaye pramāṇasamuccayaḥ kariṣyate. (v.l.: prakṛṣṭaḥ] ed. [Ms B]; prakṛṣṭa° em. by Kataoka 2007, p. 27, n. 33). 25 Translations by Skilling (2002, e.g., p. 99). 26 AKBh, p. 14,8 on Abhidharmakośa (AK) 1.20cd: kimarthaṃ bhagavān skandhādimukhena trividhāṃ deśanām ārabhate? Translation by La Vallée Poussin (1923–1931, vol. I, p. 39): “Pourquoi Bhagavat a-til donné cette triple description des dharmas, comme skandhas, āyatanas et dhātus?” (Pruden 1988–1990, vol. I, p. 80: “Why did the Blessed One give skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus as the triple designation of the dharmas?”). 123 Author's personal copy The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña 289 delusions (moha), sense faculties (indriya) and taste (ruci).27 Accordingly, the Abhidharma master refers to the three types of sense faculties, namely, those that are sharp, moderate and slow (tīkṣṇamadhyamṛdvindriyatvāt), and the three types of taste in terms of the length of texts, namely, those that are concise, middle and extensive (saṅkṣiptamadhyavistaragrantharucitvāt).28 As for the classification in terms of sense faculties, Yaśomitra (ca. 6th? c.), the commentator on the AKBh, provides a threefold criterion that is of immediate relevance to the present paper, namely, udghaṭitajña, vipañcitajña and padaparama.29 Regarding Jinendrabuddhi’s use of the concept classifying two types of persons, Sthiramati’s (6th c.) introduction to Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka may be of interest. To explain Vasubandhu’s intentions in composing such a short treatise, Sthiramati introduces a criticism or censure: the characteristics of factors (dharmalakṣaṇa) have already been ascertained in the Yogācārabhūmi and other places, and therefore a further ascertainment (nirdhāraṇa) with regard to the same issue is pointless. But Sthiramati justifies this in terms of the type of persons who are to be instructed (vineya), namely, those who understand teachings through condensed statements (udghaṭitajña). Such persons are able to comprehend implied specific and individual meanings and contents (viśeṣa) completely (niravaśeṣa) through the indication of mere direction (diṅmātreṇa). Such persons regard concise explanations (saṅkṣepokta) more highly than extensive and detailed ones (vistarokta). Hence, the short treatise of Vasubandhu serves to support (anugraha) people who find more pleasure in concise explanations (saṅkṣiptarucisattva).30 It is noteworthy that the combination of the two categories and types 27 AKBh, p. 14,8–9: āha. vineyānāṃ “mohendriyarucitraidhāt tisraḥ skandhādideśanāḥ” (AK 1.20cd). Translation by La Vallée Poussin (1923–1931, vol. I, p. 40): “Enseignement des skandhas, etc., parce que l’erreur, la faculté, le goût sont triples.” (Pruden 1988–1990, vol. I, p. 80: “The teachings of the skandhas, etc., because error, faculty, joy are threefold.”). 28 AKBh, p. 14,11–12: indriyāṇy api trividhāni, tīkṣṇamadhyamṛdvindriyatvāt. rucir api tridhā, saṅkṣiptamadhyavistaragrantharucitvāt. Translation by La Vallée Poussin (1923–1931, vol. I, p. 40): “2. Les facultés morales (ii. 3 c–d), la faculté de connaissance spéculative (prajñendriya, ii. 24 d) sont de trois catégories, aiguës, moyennes, émoussées. 3. Le goût (ruci, adhimoksa) est triple : les premiers ˙ s’appliquent à ce qui est dit sommairement ; les deuxièmes à ce qui est dit normalement ; les troisièmes à ce qui est dit tout au long (vistı̄rna).” (Pruden 1988–1990, vol. I, p. 80: “2. The moral faculties (ii.3c–d), ˙ the faculty of speculative consciousness (prajñendriya, ii.24d), are of three categories, sharp, mediocre, dull. 3. Joy is threefold: the first category of persons apply themselves to that which is said in brief; the second to that which is said normally; the third to that which is said at great length.”). 29 AKVy, p. 47,33–34: indriyāṇy apīti. vistaraḥ – trividhaḥ pudgalas tīkṣṇamadhyamṛdvindriyatvāt. atha vā trividhaḥ pudgalaḥ – udghaṭitajño vipañcitajñaḥ padaparama iti. See La Vallée Poussin (1923–1931, vol. I, p. 40, n. 2 [Pruden 1988–1990, vol. I, p. 141, n. 107]), who refers to the “three types of hearers” as udghaṭitajña, a[!]vipañcitajña, and padaṃparama.]). For a passage closely related to Vasubandhu’s and Yaśomitra’s description, see *Abhidharma-Mahāvibhāṣā (Apidamo da piposha lun 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙 論, Taishō 1545), T27, p. 367a3–8: 復次世尊所化有三種根.謂鈍中利.爲鈍根者説十八界.爲中根者 説十二處.爲利根者説五蘊.復次世尊所化有三種智.一者開智 (*udghaṭitajña). 二者説智 (*vipañcitajña). 三者引智 (*neya or *padaparama?). 爲開智者説五蘊.爲説智者説十二處.爲引智者説十八界. 30 Cf. PSkVi, p. 1,5–8: nanu ca yogācārabhūmyādiṣu śāstreṣu dharmalakṣaṇaṃ nirdhāritam eveti punas tannirdhāraṇāya yatnavaiyarthyam. na vaiyarthyam udghaṭitajñavineyārthitvāt. udghaṭitajñā hi diṅmātreṇa tatsambhavino viśeṣān niravaśeṣān avaboddhuṃ samarthā iti saṅkṣepoktam eva bahu manyante, na vistaroktam. ataś ca saṅkṣiptarucisattvānugrahāyedaṃ prakaraṇam ārabdham iti. 123 Author's personal copy 290 Y. Muroya of persons—udghaṭitajña and saṅkṣiptaruci—is adopted by both Sthiramati and Jinendrabuddhi. Along the same lines, Haribhadra (ca. 8th c.), the commentator on the Abhisamayālaṅkāra, explains the role of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā (Aṣṭasahasrikā in the edition) in Prajñāpāramitā literature. The “Eight-thousand Sūtra” is preached to bring about the benefit (hitodaya) of sharp-minded persons (sattva) with a taste for brevity, and composed in the form of a summary of all of the contents (sarvārthopasaṃhāra) found in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā (Pañcaviṃśatisahasrikā in the edition), which is in turn a compendium of all the contents (sarvārthasaṅgraha) of the Śatasāhasrikā (Śatasahasrikā in the edition).31 To testify to his understanding, Haribhadra quotes the seventh verse from Dignāga’s Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthasaṅgraha, also called Prajñāpāramitāsaṅgrahakārikā, where the term “abridgement of the text” (granthasaṅkṣepa) is used: ittham aṣṭasahasrīyam anyūnārthair yathoditaiḥ | granthasaṅkṣepa iṣṭo ’tra ta evārthā yathoditāḥ ||32 In this manner, this Aṣṭasahasrī is not destitute of such meanings/contents that are expounded [in the Śatasāhasrikā]. Here [in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā] the abridgement of the text is desired. The meanings/contents are exactly the same as expounded [in the Śatasāhasrikā]. Masaaki Hattori, in his translation and elucidation of Dignāga’s short treatise, remarks that the difference in length of the various Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, such as the Śatasāhasrikā, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, does not lie in a difference between their ideas and contents.33 Rather, because those who are to be instructed are different in their abilities, such as excellent or dull, different varieties of Sūtras have been composed in order to instruct and confer a benefit on all kinds of persons. It comes as no surprise that this background implied by Dignāga mirrors the common practice of employing a Sūtra according to the requirements at hand. Haribhadra’s exposition clearly demonstrates the various target groups, which include those who have various types of religious-social engagement or who are busy with their enterprises. It is possible to assume that Jinendrabuddhi was aware of this differentiated application and familiar with a traditional way the NMu and the PS were used for teaching. 31 AAĀ, pp. 11,26–12,1: padaparamavistararucisattvānugrahārthaṃ deśitāryaśatasa(!)hasrikā. sarvārthasaṃgraheṇa madhyarucivipañcitajñasattvānukampayāryapañcaviṃśatisa(!)hasrikā deśitā. tasyāś ca sarvārthopasaṃhāreṇodghaṭitajñasaṃkṣiptarucisattvahitodayenāryāṣṭasa(!)hasrikā bhāṣiteti. An English translation is found in Sparham (2006, p. 182): “Others say that the Lord demonstrated the Noble One Hundred Thousand to bring benefit to those beings who are devoted to words and delight in an extensively worked-out rendition, demonstrated the Noble Twenty-five Thousand, through gathering all the topics together, out of affection for those beings who delight in middle-sized [renditions] and understand from selective elaboration, and taught the Noble Eight Thousand, through condensing its topics, to produce benefit for beings who are captured by headings and delight in brief explanation.” 32 Haribhadra quotes Dignāga’s verse twice; see AAĀ, p. 12,7–8 and p. 27,24–25. For Frauwallner’s critical edition of the relevant passage in the Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthasaṅgraha, see Frauwallner (1959, p. 141,1–2 = Kl. Schr. p. 817,1–2); cf. also Tucci (1947, p. 56, v. 7). For a (free) English and a Japanese translation, see Tucci (1947, pp. 59–60) and Hattori (1961, p. 124; cf. 1968, p. 3, n. 17 and p. 7, n. 40). 33 Hattori (1961, p. 124). 123 Author's personal copy The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña 291 If the mention of “concise” (saṅkṣipta) or “sharp-minded” (udghaṭitajña) serves as an index for indicating the purpose of a work and who will use it, then the last of the reconstructed concluding verses of the PS might be analyzed from this perspective (conventions for PS citations: upright roman script is used for words known from the PST, italics for all text retranslated from the two Tibetan ˙ translations): pramānarāśer gunadosavistaraprakāśanād yac chubham atra sañcitam | ˙ ˙ ˙ tad astu lokasya vimoksajanmayor gunāgunajñasya krtāntaśāntaye ||34 (PS ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 6.25) (Jagatı̄-Vamśastha) ˙ Let the good [that I have] accumulated in this [work] by making clear the details about the good qualities of [our] means of valid cognition and the faults of [the outsiders’] means of cognition lead to the cessation of death of people who know the advantage of liberation and the disadvantage of [re]birth. Dignāga’s use of the expression “making clear the details” or “illumination of the details” (vistaraprakāśana) complies with Jinendrabuddhi’s description of the PS as a work for the slow-minded (mandadhī), who have the taste for detailed teaching (vistararuci). When Dignāga speaks about his own “good” (śubha) and its application for the cessation of the sufferings of all people, he seems to present himself as a true Mahāyānist who devotes himself to the aim of helping others overcome their fate of transmigration. Already in the introductory part of the first chapter, Jinendrabuddhi mentions Dignāga as one of those who have accumulated the equipment of merit (upacitapuṇyasambhāra).35 Thus, the PS may have been utilized for a broader scope of objectives and a wider range of readers than the NMu. The Final Verse of the NMu As briefly described above, Jinendrabuddhi gives his first interpretation of prasṛta and the concept of compositional “conciseness” in the final verse of the NMu. 34 The reconstruction of the stanza is based on the Sanskrit manuscript (“B”) of the PST (Ms B, ff. ˙ yi yon tan 259b6–260a3) as well as the Tibetan versions of the PSV: PSV (K), P177a4–5: tshad ma’i kha skyon ni rnam rgyas pa // rab tu gsal byar byas las ’dir ni dge ba gang bsags pa // des ni rmongs pa’i skye bo yon tan med la yon tan du // shes pa’i ’jig rten zhi ba’i mtha’ ni byed par shog //; PSV (V), P93a7, D85b4–5: tshad ma'i phung po skyon dang yon tan rgyas pa ru // rab gsal byas las ’di ru dge ba ci bsags des // skye bar bskye bar yon tan yod min shes pa yi // grub mtha’ zhi zhing ’gro la rnam thar ster bar shog //. A reconstruction of the sixth chapter of the PSV on sophistic rejoinders (jāti) is in preparation by the editors (Prof. Motoi Ono, Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe and the present author) of the critical edition of the sixth chapter of the PST. As regards the b-pāda, Jinendrabuddhi is silent about *atra (K: ’dir; V: ’di ru) ˙ found in the Tibetan versions of the PSV; see PST Ms B, f. 260a1: yac chubhaṃ kuśalaṃ sañcitam ˙ upārjitaṃ mayā. 35 Cf. PST 1, p. 8,1–2: tadgauravāc copacitapuṇyasambhārāṇāṃ prakaraṇodgrahaṇāya pravṛttānām na ˙ vighnāya vināyakāḥ prabhavanti. “Furthermore, [obstructive] leaders are not able to obstruct those who have accumulated the equipment of merit and taken the action of composing a treatise due to the respect for the [Blessed One].” For a Japanese translation, see Kataoka (2007, p. 31 and n. 38 on the concept of vināyaka). In his famous travelogue Xiyuji (T51, p. 930b22: 陳那菩薩福智悠遠,深達聖旨.), Xuanzang, in his turn, states that Dignāga’s “merit and wisdom are so extensive, understanding to the bottom the sacred well” (Beal 1906, vol. II, p. 219); see also Zenju’s Myōtō shō (T68, p. 207b6–7) for its quotation (cf. Watanabe 1982, p. 18). 123 Author's personal copy 292 Y. Muroya Through the Sanskrit reconstruction from the Chinese translation, we can access Dignāga’s original wording with a certain amount of certainty. However, the issue is rather convoluted. I would like to call attention to methodological and text-critical problems of the current version of the Sanskrit reconstruction and, at the end, suggest a slight modification. The reconstruction has taken recourse to “original linguistic materials” that are in part specified as a quote by Jinendrabuddhi and in part embedded in his paraphrases without any markers.36 At the same time, the reconstruction relies on Xuanzang’s translation; indeed, there is no other testimony available. However, the Chinese version by Xuanzang demands an in-depth philological and hermeneutic examination. With a view to understanding Xuanzang’s translation, mention should be made of doctrinal discourses that are mostly available in the Chinese and Japanese Buddhist traditions, passages authored by Xuanzang’s direct disciples as well as his scholarly descendants. It is possible that their philosophical viewpoints and the phrases they use reflect “lectures,” or oral information, given by Xuanzang on the NMu, though such lectures as a whole have not been transmitted and thus their contents cannot be determined with certainty. In the present paper it will be shown that there is nevertheless a certain amount of relevant material in Chinese that is worth taking into consideration. Furthermore, biographies of Xuanzang state that he studied logic with several Buddhist monks and Brahmins during his travels in South Asia and, in particular, he studied the NMu under the guidance of the venerable *Vinı̄taprabha (Diaofuguang 調伏光, or Piniduobolapo 毘膩多鉢臘婆) in *Cı̄nabhukti (Zhinapudi 至那僕底).37 It thus is no wonder that Xuanzang’s translation would reflect such studies. In addition to an examination of the Chinese materials, Jinendrabuddhi’s notable mention of the final stanza of the NMu will also be scrutinized, together with Kei Kataoka’s reliable Japanese translation with elaborate annotations. In the following, the Sanskrit reconstruction is reproduced together with the translations of the Chinese version by Sadajirō Sugiura (English), Giuseppe Tucci (English), Shōryū Katsura (Japanese) and Shen Jianying (modern Chinese), as well as the translation from the Sanskrit by Kataoka (Japanese). The reason for including several modern translations lies in their different ways of interpreting the motif “poison” found therein (underlining by author, Y.M.). 爲開智人慧毒藥 諸有外量所迷者 啓38斯妙義正理門 令越邪途契眞義39 (NMu k. 29 = T32, p. 6a5–6) 36 On Steinkellner’s terminology with “original linguistic materials” and differentiation of “reconstruction” (or “restoration, reconstitution”) from “retranslation,” see Steinkellner (2005, Introduction, p. iv). 37 On Xuanzang’s teachers for his study of logic, see Tejima (1927, esp. pp. 714 and 718) and Frankenhauser (1996, pp. 109–116, esp. p. 110 on *Vinı̄taprabha). For the Chinese phonetic transliteration with 毘膩多鉢臘婆 as given in Huili’s Sanzang fashi zhuan, see T50, p. 232a26–27; see also n. 4 above. 38 The “Palace Edition,” as well as the Sung, Yuan and Ming editions, reads po 破 ‘to break, split’ (obviously a secondary modification due to the similarity of the two characters) in place of qi 啓 ‘to open, begin, inform.’ 39 For Hakuju Ui’s kundoku, the Japanese reading of a Chinese text, see Ui (1965, p. 692; transcribed by Y.M.): 〔頌ニ曰ク〕智人ノ慧毒藥ヲ開カンガ爲ニ 斯ノ妙義ノ正理門ヲ啓キタリ. 諸有ノ外ノ量ニ迷フ 所ノ者ヲシテ 邪途ヲ越エテ真義ニ契ハシメン. Concerning the three characters 開, 智 and 人, which 123 Author's personal copy The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña 293 mukhamātram idam sadarthanı̄teh krtam udghatitajñadhı̄visaghnam | ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ kusrtı̄r apavidhya tı̄rthyatarkabhramitāh katham arthatattvabhājah || ˙ ˙ ˙ (Mātrāsamaka)40 Sugiura: As an antidote to intellectual poison, / this Gate of the supreme Nyāya is opened. / Let all outside wanderers come from the / false doctrines to the Truth.41 Tucci: In order to let the mind of the intelligent man get rid of the poisonous herbs [of a wrong logic], and to open that door of logic of an agreeable meaning, which has been obstructed by the pramānas of the heretics, I make ˙ them overstep wrong path and be in accordance with the real meaning (of logic).42 Katsura: In order to remove the poison of wisdom from wise persons, [I; Y. M.] open this significant “gate to the correct logic” and cause those who are deluded by the logic of other schools to get beyond wrong path and meet them with the truth/reality.43 Shen: In order for the wise to be able to thoroughly understand and to open the gate of wisdom, [I; Y.M.] have thus composed this Nyāyamukha to elucidate exquisite meaning and principle. As regards those who are deluded by the heretical doctrines about the means of cognition, (the present treatise) can/ should make these [persons; Y.M.] get beyond wrong path and connect to the true meaning.44 Kataoka (from the Sanskrit reconstruction): This (the present book) is merely the gate of the instruction of correct contents, and was composed as an antidote for the intellect of [wise] men who understand by mere hint. If [they; Footnote 39 continued are underlined, Ui separates 開 from 智人, and construes 開 (‘to open’) with 慧毒藥. It is unclear how Ui interpreted 開, but his syntactical analysis is already found in, and probably influenced by, the Edo-period Buddhist monk Hōun’s 寶雲 kundoku reading of the text in his commentary on the NMu, the Inmyō shōrimonron shinsho (ISS) 因明正理門論新疏, vol. 4, fol. 41b6-7; cf. Takemura (1986, p. 191) on this commentary published originally in 1845, or the second year of the Kōka 弘化 era. Hōun, reproducing the first line of the text with the variation as underlined below, appears to understand the expression at issue as “to open 開 the gate 門 of intellect-poison”: 為(!)開智人慧毒門啓此妙義正理門; cf. also n. 59. On this problem, see also nn. 42, 54 and 68. 40 PST 1, Introduction, p. xlvii, n. 77 = Katsura (2014, p. 102, n. 3). The verse’s meter is identified as ˙ Mātrāsamaka (4 pādas with, respectively, 16 morae, or syllabic instants) therein, but it might be also understood as Tristubh called Vimalā (4 pādas with, respectively, 11 syllables). ˙˙ 41 Sugiura (1900, p. 74), probably as the first translation into a European language. 42 Tucci (1930, p. 72). Tucci appears to render kai 開 in the sequence of kaizhiren 開智人 as a verb in the sense of “to get rid of, remove,” as Katsura (1987; cf. n. 43 below) probably does. Cf., however, MCED, no. 3204 for kai: ‘To open. To explain. To state. To begin. To found.’ See also nn. 39, 54 and 68. 43 For the original Japanese, see Katsura (1987, p. 65): 賢き人々から知恵の毒薬を取り除くために, この意義深い「正しい論理への門」を開き, 他学派の論理に迷う人々をして間違った道を乗り 越え, 真実に出会わしめる. 44 Shen (2007, p. 243): 为了智者能深入解悟而开启智慧之门, / 故著此《正理门论》以阐发精妙之 义理. / 对于为诸外道之量论所迷惑的人来说, / (本论)可使之越过邪途而契合于真义; cf. n. 81 below. I am indebted to Dr. Junjie Chu for answering my questions about the Chinese translation. See also Zheng (2008, p. 329) for a rather free Chinese paraphrase. 123 Author's personal copy 294 Y. Muroya Y.M.] were deluded by the speculation of outsiders, how would [they; Y.M.] discard erroneous paths and partake of the truth of things?45 My renderings of the Japanese and Chinese translations must remain in part tentative due to their syntactic and semantic vagueness. The main difference between the above translations is the relevance of and implications given to the motif of poison. With the exception of Hakuju Ui’s understanding and the interpretations by Shen and Zheng, all hold that the speculative reasoning (tarka) of outsiders, or “allodoxy” (tīrthya), is equated to poison, and the NMu is an antidote or counteracting measure. As mentioned, Kataoka’s translation is the only one relying on the Sanskrit reconstruction. He explains that Dignāga composed the NMu as a simple and useful method for detoxifying in order for wise men, when challenged to a debate, to keep themselves safe from being “bitten” by a contestant as by a poisonous snake. To put it in another way, Dignāga provided this means for detoxification so that wise men would not be deluded by the speculative reasoning or logic of non-Buddhists. Although it is a different text by a different author, the interpretation of the same motif in Vasubandhu’s AKBh reveals an incompatibility with the dominant interpretation of the NMu. In the final verse of its ninth chapter, the poison motif is used to signify the intellectual brightness of persons who are guided by the treatise. It might be questioned whether we can apply the interpretation of poison in the AKBh to the NMu, and indeed whether there are rhetorical and conceptual parallels between them. The similarity, though, of the NMu’s final verse to the AKBh has been, historically speaking, noticed by modern scholars. As far I know, however, its relevance for interpreting the NMu has not been sufficiently taken into account, with the exception of Ui and Kataoka. The text of the AKBh is given below, together with the two Chinese versions (one by Paramārtha [真諦, 499–569] and the other by Xuanzang) and their translations in modern languages (selected): iti diṅmātram evedam upadiṣṭaṃ sumedhasām | vraṇadeśo viṣasyeva svasāmarthya*visarpiṇaḥ ||46 Paramārtha’s version: 如此已顯正義方 爲開智人智毒門 願彼捨離外邪 執 爲自及他得實義47 Xuanzang’s version: 於此方隅已略説 爲開智者慧毒門 庶各隨己力堪 能 遍悟所知成勝業48 Stcherbatsky (from the Tibetan version and the AKVy): Of this deep doctrine for the learned / I made a short exposure, / By their schooled mind they will pervade / The whole with strength unfettered. / Like poison are they, these 45 For the original Japanese, see Kataoka (2007, p. 24, n. 30): これ(本書)は正しい内容の教え導きの 門に過ぎず, 示唆だけで悟る[賢]者の知性の毒消しとして作られた. 外道の思弁に惑わされれば, どうして邪道を捨てて, 物事の真実を分かち持とうか. 46 AKBh, p. 478,21–22 = AKBh (Lee), p. 168,10–11 (v.l.: °visarpiṇaḥ] AKBh [v.l.: G, Y], Lee; °visarpaṇa[ḥ] AKBh). 47 Apidamo jushe shi lun 阿毘達磨倶舍釋論 (Taishō 1559), T29, p. 310c16–17. I would like to thank Prof. Tōru Funayama for discussing the Chinese translations with me. 48 Apidamo jushe lun 阿毘達磨倶舍論 (Taishō 1558), T29, p. 159b13–14. 123 Author's personal copy The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña 295 learned men: / One only spot it enters, / And then pervades by its own force / All limbs without exception.49 Stcherbatsky (“Litterally”): I have exposed this little bit for the very learned, like a spot of poison of a wound it will diffuse by its own force. (Yaç.: there is an analogy between poison and learned men, since both proceed by their own capacity).50 Stcherbatsky (from Xuanzang’s version): Now of this (Doctrine deep) rectangular, / I made a short exposure, which intends / To open in wise men a (little) gate, (a wound), / Through which might enter wisdom poisonlike. // O might you all according to your strength’s capacity / Become enlightened in all that may be known, / So that you might perform exalted deed / (On all three paths that lead to Peace Eternal.) La Vallée Poussin (mainly from the Chinese): Dans ce livre on n’en trouvera qu’une indication sommaire, à l’usage des hommes intelligents: le poison, une fois dans la blessure, s’insinue partout par sa propre force.51 Murakami: The above mentioned, this is only a mere part (direction-corner 方隅) [of the doctrine], and [it is] shown towards wise men. [It is,] for instance, like the wound for the poison spreading [throughout the whole body] by its own capacity.52 This concluding stanza clearly indicates that Vasubandhu holds his AKBh (or AKBh 9) to be the “mere direction” of his whole doctrinal system, and that it is directed towards sharp-witted persons.53 The poison simile used therein equates poison (viṣa) to sharp-witted persons (sumedhas-, kaizhiren 開智人 in Paramārtha’s version, or kaizhizhe 開智者 in Xuanzang’s version54) and the site of a wound (vraṇadeśa) to the treatise. In the Chinese versions by Paramārtha and Xuanzang there is no mention of the site of a wound; instead, their translations appear to read “gate” (men 門) as the equivalent of vraṇadeśa. The commentator on the AKBh, Yaśomitra, glosses the poison motif as follows: 49 Stcherbatsky (1919, p. 950). 50 Stcherbatsky (1919, p. 958, n. 56). 51 La Vallée Poussin (1923–1931, vol. V, p. 301 and n. 3 with his reconstruction from the AKVy: iti digmātram evedam upadiṣṭaṃ sumedhasām / vraṇadeśe viṣasyaiva svasāmarthyavisarpiṇaḥ //); for a problematic English translation with the addition of misleading phrases from the neutral French translation, see Pruden (1988–1990, vol. IV, p. 1355): “In this book one will find but a summary indication for the use of intelligent persons: but poison (of belief in soul), once within a wound, will spread itself everywhere by its own force.” 52 Murakami (1993, p. 132), as one of modern Japanese translations; cf. also Kataoka (2007, p. 24, n. 30). 53 As noted by Horiuchi, it is worth mentioning that Vasubandhu appears to use a similar set of characterization of the Vyākhyāyukti in its final stanza, namely, “a small bit or portion” (Tib. shan, Skt. *leśa) and “for wise persons” (Tib. blo dang ldan rnams la, Skt. *sumedhasām). On the interpretation of the final stanza, see Horiuchi (2008, pp. 1128–1129 and 1130, n. 5). 54 The identification of sumedhas- with kaizhiren or kaizhizhe is based on AKBh Index, vol. I, p. 403 (s.v. sumedhas-) and SCJD, p. 1486 (s.v. su-medhas). It is also supported by Zenju’s corresponding phrase (今 此一部爲開智人; see nn. 67 and 68 below). However, Stcherbatsky’s translation of 爲開智者慧毒門 from Xuanzang’s version (“which intends / To open in wise men a (little) gate, (a wound), / Through which might enter wisdom poison-like”) obviously separates kai 開 from zhizhe 智者, regarding the former as a verb; cf. also nn. 29, 39, 42 and 68. 123 Author's personal copy 296 Y. Muroya [It is] as if a spot of wound is brought about by a certain [physician] for a [patient who requires a therapy] when he (i.e. the physician) thinks that the poison exceedingly spreads throughout all the major and minor parts of the body by its own capacity after reaching the spot of the wound. How indeed does this [poison] spread [throughout the body]? In this manner, sharp-witted persons occupy the place of poison, because they [can] expand (or: develop) by [their] own [brilliant] faculty [of understanding it] (sumedhasaḥ svasāmarthyavisarpitvād viṣasthānīyāḥ). Hence this treatise is taught by me for the sake of sharp-witted persons, i.e., persons who understand by a condensed statement (udghaṭitajña), persons with insight (prājña).55 Yaśomitra’s interpretation demonstrates that a wound is intentionally created (vraṇadeśaḥ kṛtaḥ) to make the poison spread throughout the body, a measure that will be interpreted in the context of counteracting and healing with the help of poison. It becomes also clear that the poison motif refers to those highly intelligent persons who can understand the treatise clearly. Furthermore, Yaśomitra paraphrases the term sumedhas with udghaṭitajña, as Jinendrabuddhi similarly does (cf. PST 1, p. 4,10 udghaṭitajña and p. 4,12 sudhī). Another commentary, by ˙ Pūrnavardhana, on the ninth chapter of the AKBh, extant only in a Tibetan ˙ translation, follows Yaśomitra’s above gloss literally.56 It is Ui who shares this interpretation of poison when he glosses the concluding verse of the NMu. The intellect-poison is identical to the so-called intellect-poison-gate, and means that, if one studies [Buddhist logic; Y.M.] a little and attains knowledge of logic by this treatise, it becomes the beginning for his intellect expanding so much as to spread throughout his body, just like the case in which poison spreads throughout his body in a comprehensive manner if [someone; Y.M.] applies poison [to a wound; Y.M.] by injuring his body slightly. \…[ The Nyāyamukha is composed in order to get [intelligent persons; Y.M.] to connect to the truth [and] wonderful/great meaning by correcting the misunderstandings [of those who are; Y.M.] mistaken and deluded by the means of cognition (liang 量) [as held] by outsiders, namely, [their; Y.M.] science of reasons[, i. e.,; Y.M.] inference.57 55 AKVy, p. 722,17–20: yathā viṣaṃ svasāmarthyād vraṇadeśaṃ prāpya sarveṣv aṅgapratyaṅgeṣv atyantaṃ visarpatīti matvā kenacit tasya vraṇadeśaḥ kṛtaḥ. kathaṃ nāmedaṃ visarpatīti. evaṃ sumedhasaḥ svasāmarthyavisarpitvād viṣasthānīyāḥ. ity atas teṣāṃ sumedhasām udghaṭitajñānāṃ prājñānām idam upadiṣṭaṃ mayā. I am uncertain about the function of the expression kathaṃ nāmedaṃ visarpatīti. 56 See Pūrnavardhana’s *Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī (Peking, Ōtani 5594; Derge, Tōhoku 4093), P Nyu 390b2–4, D ˙ Chu 321b4–6. 57 Ui (1965, p. 692): 慧毒薬は所謂慧毒門と同じで, 少しく身を傷けて毒薬を塗れば, 毒が身に遍 満すると同じく, 此論によつて少しく研究して因明に於て慧を得れば其慧が身に遍満する程に 増大する端緒となることをいふのである. … 外道が量, 即ち比量因明, に迷うて誤つて居る誤解 を訂して真実妙義に契當せしむる為に正理門論が造られたのである. 123 Author's personal copy The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña 297 Ui’s interpretation presupposes a structural similarity between the NMu and the AKBh. He describes the “intellect-poison” (huiduyao 慧毒藥) of the NMu as being equivalent to the “intellect-poison-gate” (Paramārtha’s zhidu-men 智毒門; Xuanzang’s huidu-men 慧毒門) of the AKBh; the poison is compared to the correct understanding of logic, a tiny wound made on the body to the treatise, and the poison’s spreading throughout the body to the spreading and increasing of understanding. Although Ui does not specify the source he has used for his account of the intellect-poison and its association with a therapeutic measure,58 it is likely that he is in fact freely paraphrasing a gloss found in a commentary on the NMu composed by the Japanese monk Hōun 寶雲 (1791–1847) of the Edo period, who said59: “Just as one injures [someone’s] body slightly and applies a bit of poison [to it], [and] the toxic vapor (duqi 毒氣) immediately spreads in his body in a comprehensive manner, so this author of the treatise (= Dignāga) now wishes to apply the intellect-poison (慧毒藥) to the body of intellectual persons, and to cause [it] to immediately spread [there] in a comprehensive manner.” It is noteworthy that Hōun’s gloss, and the reference to the intellect-poison in the AKBh, seems traceable back to quite similar formulations by two Chinese Buddhist authors of the Tang Dynasty: Xuanzang’s disciple Puguang 普光 and Yuanhui 圓暉.60 In particular, Puguang is known as one of the yinming scholars who studied the NMu with Xuanzang and wrote a commentary thereupon (or prepared glosses from Xuanzang’s lectures). The now lost commentary was called Da yinming lun ji 大 因明論記 (completed presumably in 652 CE).61 Ui may also have consulted (one of) the Japanese commentaries on the AK/AKBh. A therapeutic measure of injuring a tiny part of the body and applying toxic material to it reminds us of a phrase from the Carakasaṃhitā (CS) which says that “poison destroys poison” (viṣaṃ viṣaghnam),62 and another from Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī (RĀ), which describes the Buddhist teaching as a healing act: “Just as physicians state that one should destroy poison by poison as well” (viṣeṇāpi viṣaṃ 58 Hōun’s commentary is explicitly mentioned by Ui in another context; cf. Ui (1965, p. 508), where it is noted that he once accessed the commentary and then prepared notes from it. 59 The gloss in Hōun’s ISS runs as follows (vol. IV, fol. 41b8–9): 如身少破, 著少毒藥, 須臾毒氣遍満 身中, 今此論主欲慧毒藥塗智人身, 令立遍満…; cf. also n. 39. Hōun’s gloss appears to be cited by the Japanese Buddhist monk Gesshu月珠 (1795–1856) in his commentary Inmyō shōrimonron giyō 因明正理 門論義要 on the NMu (fol. 59b8–9) when he mentions it with “The New [Commentary] says” (新云). I am grateful to Professor Shigeki Moro, who discovered this hitherto unknown commentary (completed in the second year of the Kaei 嘉永 era, or 1849 CE), for sending me the copy of his private exemplar. Cf. also Zheng (2008, pp. 329–330). 60 See Jushelun ji 倶舍論記 by Puguang (Taishō 1821), T41, p. 452a27–b3 ≈ Jushelun-son shu 倶舍論 頌疏 by Yuanhui (Taishō 1823), T41, p. 814b27–c1 and p. 981c9–12. 61 See the record (T55, p. 1143a23) by the Japanese monk Zōshun 藏俊 (1104–1180) in the list of the commentaries on the NMu in his catalogue of the Hossō works, Chūshin hossōshū shōsho 注進法相宗章 疏 (Taishō 2181, completed in 1176 CE), also called Hossōshū shōsho mokuroku 法相宗章疏目録; cf. Takemura (1986, pp. 42–43). 62 CS, Sūtra, 26.69ab: viṣaṃ viṣaghnam uktaṃ yat prabhāvas tatra kāraṇam. Translation by Yano (1988, p. 185): “Poison is said to destroy poison, but it is because there is a cause called prabhāva” (original in Japanese). 123 Author's personal copy 298 Y. Muroya hanyād yathaivoktaṃ cikitsakaiḥ |).63 In Āyurvedic literature, applying poison as antidotal drug is treated as part of toxicology (viṣatantra or agadatantra), or what the CS calls viṣagaravairodhikapraśamana (“healing on poison, factitious poison, and disorder due to incongruent combination of foods,” as rendered by Yano; “treatment of intoxications” as translated by Meulenbeld), one of the eight branches (aṅga) of Āyurveda.64 Hōun’s interpretation of “poison” with special reference to the NMu is corroborated in as early as eighth-century Japan. It is Zenju 善珠 (723–797), the Japanese scholar-monk of the Hossō (法相) or East Asian Yogācāra, who elaborately expounds on the concept of “poison” in the NMu in his Inmyōron sho myōtō shō 因明論疏明燈鈔 (Taishō 2270). This is a commentary on Kuiji’s Yinming ru zhengli lun shu 因明入正理論疏 (Taishō 1840, “Commentary on the NPC”), or the so-called Yinming dashu 因明大疏 (“Great Commentary on Logic”). In the context of discussing legends about Dignāga,65 Zenju describes the specific target group of Dignāga’s composition of the NMu and its relation to the concluding verse. His gloss is concerned with the different expressions used by Kuiji and his master Xuanzang in relation to the “Bodhisattva” Dignāga’s “emission of heavenly light” (fang shenguang 放神光). Kuiji uses the expression “brightly illuminating the responsive capacity” (T44, p. 91c17: zhao zhu jigan 照燭機感), whereas Xuanzang presents it as “brightly illuminating the deeply dark” (T51, p. 930b23: zhao zhu youmei 照燭幽昧) in his travelogue “Great Tang Record of the Western Regions” (Datang xiyu ji 大唐西域記, Taishō 2087).66 With regard to the difference between these expressions, Zenju introduces two “explanations” that can be regarded as textual fragments from an (unknown and now lost) earlier commentary or 63 RĀ 4.72, p. 120 = Bao xing wang zheng lun 寶行王正論 (Taishō 1656, translation by Paramārtha), T32, p. 502a3: 合毒爲治毒 如醫方所説. 64 On the eight branches, see Yano (1988, p. 234 on CS, Sūtra, 30.28) and his introduction (pp. xx–xxi), where mention is also made of Yijing’s same list of eight subjects recorded in his famous travelogue, A Record of Buddhist Practices Sent Home from the Southern Sea (Nanhai jigui neifa zhuan 南海寄歸内法 傳, Taishō 2125), T54, p. 223b28–223c2: 言八醫者, 一論所有諸瘡, 二論針刺首疾, 三論身患, 四論鬼 瘴, 五論惡掲陀(*agada)藥, 六論童子病, 七論長年方, 八論足身力. See also Meulenbeld (1999–2002, vol. IA, p. 26). I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Tsutomu Yamashita for this relevant information and these bibliographical references. According to him, toxicology is described in the CS (Cikitsā, chapter 23, esp. 23.4–8 on the origin of viṣa, 23.17 on how poison can destroy poison, and 23.24, etc., on its attributes), Suśrutasaṃhitā (Kalpa, chapters 2–8), Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasaṃhitā (Uttara, chapters 35–38), Aṣṭāṅgasaṅgraha (Uttara, chapters 40–48) and so forth. See also toxicological treatises such as the Kāśyapasaṃhitā (cf. Meulenbeld 1999–2002, vol. IIA, pp. 518–519) and the Tantrasārasaṅgraha by Nārāyana (cf. Meulenbeld 1999–2002, vol. IIA, pp. 456–458). On the living ˙ Keralite Vaidyas, see Yamashita and Manohar (2007–2008, p. 52 and tradition of toxicology among the n. 29). 65 On legends about Dignāga, see van der Kuijp and McKeown (2013, Introduction, chapter IB, pp. lxiv– lxix). 66 T51, p. 930b23: 菩薩乃放大光明照燭幽昧. For an English translation, see Beal (1906, vol. II, p. 219): “Then the Bôdhisattva caused a bright light to shine and illumine the dark places (of the world).” 123 Author's personal copy The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña 299 commentaries on Kuiji’s “Great Commentary” (or, less probably, on Dignāga’s NMu). The following passage presents the first “explanation.”67 There are two explanations that have been transmitted. According to one [explanation], the responsive capacity (機感) of persons to be instructed is called the deeply dark. This treatise [of logic, i.e., the NMu] is composed in order to make the [persons with] deeply dark capacity (幽昧機) comprehend (開悟) [a teaching]. [Persons] to be instructed mean [persons with] intelligence for learning the teaching. There are three types of such [intelligence]. The first [type] is [the person with] a superior grade of intelligence (上品智), called [the person with] open-intelligence (開智). This means that [he] learns teaching by summary and extensively comprehends (悟) the meaning of the teaching, as [the case in which] an ordinary poison flows throughout the body. The second [type] is [the person with] a moderate grade of intelligence (中品 智), called knee-intelligence (膝智). [This means that] when [he] sits and learns [the teaching], [then he] understands (領解) [it], but when [he] stands up, [he] immediately forgets [it], as [the case in which] when a thing is placed on [someone’s] knees (or: lap), [and when he] stands up, [then the thing] falls down. The third [type] is [the person with] an inferior grade of intelligence (下 品智), called [the person with] gourd-intelligence (瓠智). [This means that even] if [he] learns lots of teachings, [he] does not gain anything at all. This is as [the case in which] a gourd is placed in the sea, but there is no place [for the sea water] to enter [it]. Now this single work [of logic] is [composed] for persons with open-intelligence (開智人). Therefore, the following theory is set forth in the stanza of the Limen [i.e., the NMu]: For the sake of the intellectpoison of persons with open-intelligence (according to Watanabe: In order to open the intellect-poison of wise men; or: to give the intellect-poison to persons with open-intelligence), the gate of correct principle (正理) with profound meanings has been opened. Now the Bodhisattva Dignāga thus emitted the heavenly light and brightly illuminated the capacity of the persons to be instructed, who should comprehend the correct principle of the science of reasons. Consequently, there is no difference between the meaning of “illuminating [persons with] responsive capacity” and that “illuminating the deeply dark.”68 67 T68, p. 208c1–c11: 相傳二解. 一云, 所爲機感即名幽昧. 爲開悟幽昧機故, 作此論. 所爲謂聞法智. 有其三種. 一上品智. 名爲開智. 謂略聞法廣悟法義, 如世毒藥遍流於身. 二中品智. 名爲膝(a)智. 坐聞 領(b)解, 起即忘失, 如物膝上起便墮落. 三下品智. 名爲瓠智. 雖聞多法都無所獲, 如瓠置海水無入處. 今此一部爲開智人. 故『理門』頌中作如此説. 爲開智人惠毒藥啓斯妙義正理門. 今陳那菩薩乃放 神光,照燭可悟因明正理所爲機感. 故照機感與照幽昧, 其旨無違. (v.l.: (a) 膝] Watanabe; 勝 ed. – (b) 領] Watanabe; 預 ed.). Shōkō Watanabe, who translated the work into the classical Japanese, consulted “two old manuscripts” other than the Taishō edition; thus his silent emendations can be based on evidence from the manuscripts. 68 For the Japanese translation of the passage quoted, see Watanabe (1982, vol. I, p. [27] = 21). As noted in the above translation in reference to the final verse of the NMu, Watanabe explicitly chooses to read kai 開 in the phrase kaizhiren 開智人as a verb, just like Ui’s translation; cf. also nn. 39, 42 and 54 above. My rendering is based on Zenju’s manner of reading the phrase as a whole to designate intelligent persons, as shown in 今此一部爲開智人. 123 Author's personal copy 300 Y. Muroya The interpretation cited by Zenju illustrates three types of learners or persons to be guided. One of them is characterized by a superior grade of intelligence (shanpin zhi 上品智); persons endowed with such intelligence are called persons with openintelligence (kaizhiren 開智人). They learn the teaching by summarizing and then comprehend (wu 悟) the meaning of the teachings deeply in the same way that ordinary poison flows throughout the body (略聞法廣悟法義. 如世毒藥遍流於身). For an anonymous commentator mentioned by Zenju, by no means does the motif of poison have negative implications; it rather describes the intelligence of swiftminded persons in the manner known from Yaśomitra’s account (see n. 55). Their special abilities also remind us of similar expositions of the udghaṭitajña by Sthiramati and Jinendrabuddhi, as mentioned above (see nn. 21 and 30). Of historical significance is the fact that the interpretation mentioned by Zenju is closely related to a textual fragment from a lost commentary on the NMu written by Xuanzang’s Korean disciple, Wŏnch’ŭk 圓測 (613–696).69 An examination of this relationship, however, would require an independent study. In my opinion, it is highly likely that Jinendrabuddhi was aware of the poison motif in the positive sense adopted by Zenju and Hōun, as well as the hermeneutic similarity of the motif used in the NMu and the AKBh. The interpretation of an anonymous adversary referred to by Jinendrabuddhi appears to presuppose brilliant intelligence as equivalent to poison that has a quick effect. However, this textual fragment, most probably from a lost commentary on the NMu or the PS, is entangled in text-critical questions, as have been addressed by Kataoka. Before entering this complex of issues, I will present the text together with Kataoka’s Japanese translation (in my rendering into English) and my own translation. PST 1, p. 5,3–5: ye tūdghaṭitadhīviṣayama āśaṃsārthaṃb vyācakṣate—kathaṃ ˙ nāmodghaṭitadhīviṣāḥc kumārgam apāsya tīrthyatarkabhramitā bhūyāsur arthatattvabhāja iti, teṣāṃ tad ayuktam.70 69 I am indebted to Professor Shigeki Moro for this valuable information. According to him, the interpretation mentioned by Zenju can be traced to a lost commentary on the NMu by Wŏnch’ŭk/ Woncheuk of Silla 新羅 Kingdom, also known as Yuance of Ximing si 西明寺in Chinese. Wŏnch’ŭk’s original text appears to constitute a part of his gloss on the final verse of the NMu, and is included in a fragmentary manuscript of the Inmyō shōrimonron chū 因明正理門論注, a hitherto unpublished commentary on the NMu by a presumably ninth-century Japanese monk named Shamon Shū 沙門宗 (probably identical to Enshū 円宗 [†883] of Gangōji Temple 元興寺); cf. Moro (2015, p. 141); see n. 3 above. The manuscript (dated the fifth year of the Kanpyō 寛平 era, or 893 CE), kept in the Shōgozō repository of the Shōsōin Treasure House, is in fact found on the backside of the manuscript of the Hokke ryakushō 法華略抄 (Shōgozō ms. no. 1916: Dai-5-rui, Kō-shu shakyō no. 57); cf. Sugimoto (1985, p. 37, no. 23), and Moro (2015, p. 139). A brief look at this portion of the manuscript indicates that the fragment from Wŏnch’ŭk’s commentary presents the same idea as found in the quotation by Zenju, but differs in structure and phraseology. Because Zenju’s source is directly related to the interpretation of Kuiji’s “Great Commentary,” it is possible that Wŏnch’ŭk’s idea was shared and modified by an unknown commentator on Kuiji’s work, if the source does not stem from Wŏnch’ŭk’s lost work itself. 70 v.l.: a °dhīviṣayam] ed. (= Ms B); °jñānām em. by Kataoka. – b āśaṃsārthaṃ] em. (by the editors of PST 1), Kataoka; āṇaṃsārthaṃ Ms B – c °dhīviṣāḥ] ed. (= Ms B); °jñāḥ em. by Kataoka. PST (T) P4a5–6, ˙ D3b4–5: gang rnams ni blo kha bye ba’i yul la smon pa’i don du smra bar byed de / blo kha˙ bye ba’i dug can mu stegs pa’i rtog ges ’khrul par [P; pas D] byas pa rnams lam ngan pa dang bral nas ci ltar gyur du zin kyang don gyi de kho na nyid la brten [D; bstan P] par gyur cig ce’o // de rnams kyi de ni mi rigs te /. For gyur du zin kyang as a Tibetan equivalent of nāma, see TSD, p. 372, s.v. (with a reference to the Mahāvyutpatti (ed. Ryōzaburō Sakaki), no. 5440: gyur du zin kyang, or chug kyang). 123 Author's personal copy The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña 301 Kataoka: On the other hand, some interpret [this second line of the verse] as that which means expectation [that such a case may happen] with regard to [wise] persons who comprehend merely by giving a hint (udghaṭitajñānām āśaṃsārtham [in his version]): If [wise] persons who comprehend merely by giving a hint (udghaṭitajñāḥ [in his version]) were deluded by the logic of outsiders, how in the world would they abandon the wrong course and partake of the truth of things? Their [interpretation] like this is absurd.71 My translation: But [there are certain commentators] who explain [that the verse is one which has] the sense of a wish/hope (āśaṃsārtha) whose scope (viṣaya) is directed toward “intelligent [persons who understand] through a condensed statement” (udghaṭitadhī) [in the following manner]: “How indeed might intelligent [persons who understand] through a condensed statement, like poison, [but who are] deluded by the speculative reasoning of outsiders, [please] partake of the true meaning [of the teaching] after having abandoned the wrong path?”72 [But] this [explanation] of these [commentators] is unsuitable. The two translation versions above are based on different sources and thus result in different interpretations as well as a different syntactical outcome. Mine is based on the text of the critical edition. Kataoka’s version contains two original emendations that he has made after careful philological considerations (their detailed treatment is beyond the scope of the present paper). A key idea in the passage is represented by the expression udghaṭitadhī, which I translate as “intelligent [persons who understand] through a condensed statement,” taking udghaṭita to be a technical term (see nn. 22 and 74). However, one could also read this compound as “[persons with] an intellect that has opened [itself],” as can be deduced from the Tibetan rendering of the PST, namely, blo kha bye ba’i dug can ˙ … rnams (“those [persons] who have the poison of an opened mind”), which corresponds to udghaṭitadhīviṣāḥ. Footnote 70 continued The problematic phrases found in the Sanskrit codex unicus of the PST are udghaṭitadhīviṣayam ˙ yul la smon pa’i don du āśaṃsārthaṃ. The Tibetan translation renders these phrases as blo kha bye ba’i (*udghaṭitadhīviṣaya [= loc. sg.] āśaṃsārtham); see also Kataoka (2007, p. 25, n. 31): *udghāṭitadhīviṣayam āśaṃsārthaṃ. From this translation, one could also interpret the portion as “[who explain] the object/scope of [the expression] ‘intelligent [persons who understand] through a condensed statement’ in the sense of a wish/hope.” For a Tibetan equivalent of udghāṭita (or utpāṭita), see, e.g., TSD, p. 219 (s.v. kha phye; cf. n. 22) and NTSD, vol. 1, p. 310 (s.v. kha phye ba). I thank Dr. Horst Lasic and Dr. Ritsu Akahane for discussing the Tibetan translation of the PST with me. ˙ 71 Kataoka (2007, pp. 25–26): いっぽう, 或る者達は[この詩節後半を], 示唆しただけで悟る[賢き] 者達について[そういうことがあるかもしれないという]期待を意味するものとして(udghatitajñā˙ nām āśamsārtham)解釈する. 示唆しただけで悟る[賢き]者達が(udghatitajñāh), 外道の論理に惑わさ ˙ ˙ ˙ れるならば, いったいどうして邪道を捨てて, 物事の真実を分かち持つ者となろうか, と, 彼らの そのような[解釈]はおかしい. 72 I am uncertain whether one might render katham (NMu) or kathaṃ nāma (PST) in a different manner ˙ (e.g., in the sense of than as a particle of interrogation, analogically taking into account the case of kaccid kāmapravedana; cf. PW, vol. II, p. 47, s.v. kad mit cit), especially when it is combined with an optative or imperative; on kaccid in this specific usage as translated with dang ling 當令 or ruhe dang ling 如何當令 in Chinese, see Schmithausen (2007, pp. 814–815, n. 52). 123 Author's personal copy 302 Y. Muroya This understanding is not shared by Kataoka. His emendations are related to two points. One is the reading of udghaṭitadhīviṣa and the other is the interpretation of the motif of poison (viṣa). At the first occurrence of the compound in question, Kataoka corrects udghaṭitadhīviṣayam (acc. sg.) to udghaṭṭitadhīviṣāṇām (gen. pl., called by Kataoka “em. 1”) and to udghaṭitajñānām (gen. pl., called by Kataoka “em. 2”). In the second case, he corrects udghaṭitadhīviṣāḥ to udghaṭṭitadhīviṣāḥ (Kataoka “em. 1”) and to udghaṭitajñāḥ (Kataoka “em. 2”).73 His above translation is based on the second emendations, respectively. Kataoka’s emendations have two major consequences. It is possible to avoid the compound udghaṭitadhī known from the PST manuscript and instead keep the established form udghaṭitajña.74 ˙ Furthermore, the assumption of either the new expression *udghaṭṭitadhīviṣa (“em. 1”) or the adoption of the common udghaṭitajña (“em. 2”) by removing viṣa keeps his interpretation coherent with the dominant scholarly interpretation of the concluding verse of the NMu, as shown above. Here, he assumes that the context is describing “wise persons of/for whom the poison of intellect is counteracted.”75 To reach his first emendation, he appeals to the verbal root √ghaṭṭ (‘rub’), not √ghaṭ (‘strive’), and the noun udghaṭṭana (‘striking against’ [MW], ‘blowing’ [dageki 打 撃 according to Kataoka’s Japanese]) to derive the meaning “a person of/for whom the poison of intellect is struck.”76 His philological analysis presupposes “a certain confusion” in the process of the manuscript transmission before the time of the Tibetan translation (2007, 26, n. 31), and he thus employs various Sanskrit words to attain the sense of “counteracting the poison.” If one were to assume the scenario of a lost but better exemplar, Kataoka’s suggestion would remain possible. According to Kataoka, the interpretation opposed by Jinendrabuddhi shows that the NMu is regarded as an antidote against poison (viṣaghna from pāda b), whereby those who can learn a teaching by means of a hint (udghaṭitajña from pāda b) are not deluded by non-Buddhist logic. This interpretation supposedly complies with Dignāga’s “original intention,” namely, that if such wise persons were deluded by 73 For the first emendation, see Kataoka (2007, pp. 25–26, n. 31), and for the second, see op. cit., p. 26, n. 32. 74 See however an independent entry in Apte, p. 306, s.v. udghaṭitaṃ ‘A hint’; see also, in spite of its attestation in Pāli and with the contextual restriction of its occurrence in the “definitions and explanations”, CPD, vol. II, p. 343, s.v. ugghaṭita ‘revealed, (merely) taught (in brief explanations)’ with example [ugghaṭita]-matte yeva (*udghaṭitamātra eva “as soon as it is revealed”) from the Puggalapaññatti-aṭṭhakathā (see also Skilling 2002, pp. 95–96 and n. 9); cf. MW, p. 187, s.v. udghaṭita ‘unlocked’ based on Kumārasambhava 7.53 (udghaṭitāpidhāne). The word udghaṭitajña as used by Jinendrabuddhi (and a number of Buddhist authors) is obviously not accepted as a primary legitimate word form in common Sanskrit lexicons; see PW, vol. I, p. 924 (cf. also vol. II, p. 871, s.v. √ghaṭ with ud-, referring to udghaṭita as metrically “guaranteed” form), as well as Apte, p. 306 (s.v. udghāṭita) and MW, p. 187 (s.v. ud-ghāṭita), which recognize only udghāṭitajña ‘(das Offenbargewordene kennend) klug, weise’ and ‘wise, intelligent,’ when compounded with jña, as derived from the causative udghāṭayati, but not our udghaṭitajña. In contrast, Edgerton (BHSD, pp. 129–130) registers only udghaṭitajña, but not udghāṭitajña. See also n. 22 above. 75 Kataoka (2007, p. 25, n. 31). 76 Following this line of presupposing the verb √ghaṭṭ, Kataoka (2007, p. 26, n. 31) introduces other textual possibilities, such as udghaṭṭitadhīviṣāṇāśaṃsārthaṃ or udghaṭṭitadhīviṣāṇānām āśaṃsārthaṃ in the anticipation of “those whose horns of intellect are well-polished or well-honed,” emendations to which Dr. Tōru Tomabechi has contributed. 123 Author's personal copy The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña 303 non-Buddhist logic and unable to find any countermeasure, then they would not be able to understand the true meaning.77 In contrast, as Kataoka rightly points out, Jinendrabuddhi holds the subject of the second hemistich to be the slow-minded (mandadhī), to the effect that the NMu has not been composed for the purpose of bringing about benefits to such persons. Jinendrabuddhi, rejecting the interpretation of his opponents, inserts syuḥ with the function of potential or possibility (katham arthatattvabhājaḥ syuḥ “how could they partake of the true meaning?”) and interprets the interrogative katham as denoting the impossibility (asambhava) of the slow-minded to access the true meaning revealed in the NMu (cf. also n. 23).78 Yet, Kataoka does not qualify Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation for its plausibility on the ground that there is no need to mention the slow-minded in the context. Why Jinendrabuddhi suggests an implausible solution is not mentioned. With regard to Jinendrabuddhi’s anonymous opponents (“ye … iti teṣām”), who paraphrase the second hemistich of the final verse of the NMu (pādas c–d: kusrtı̄r ˙ apavidhya tı̄rthyatarkabhramitāh katham arthatattvabhājah ||), some remarks are ˙ ˙ needed. Let me first turn to the hermeneutic value of the precative bhūyāsuḥ (P., 3rd. pl.). The PST gives us an intriguing clue. Jinendrabuddhi summarizes the ˙ opponents’ view as denoting a “wish, hope” (āśaṃsā), directed towards sharpwitted persons.79 Here, the Tibetan translator, Dpang Blo gros brtan pa (1276– 134280), renders the precative bhūyāsuḥ with the imperative indicator cig (in brten par gyur cig ce). This rendering conforms to Speijer’s (1886, § 346) explanation that the precative or benedictive “mood is restricted to benedictions, and even there it has a concurrent idiom: the imperative.” The interpretation presented by Jinendrabuddhi’s opponents is not an isolated occurrence, and in fact appears to find an echo in modern scholarship. For example, the Chinese auxiliary verb ling 令 (‘to command, tell, cause’) in Xuanzang’s version of the NMu, forming prima facie the causative, was understood by Ui to imply the cohortative or benedictive force (the Japanese auxiliary verb mu む [= nんdue to euphonic change] in the sense of desire or intention): “[The treatise; Y.M.] shall make [them] connect” (kanawashimen 契ハシメン).81 The idea of benediction and desire presented by Jinendrabuddhi’s adversary finds a further link in the wider context. It can be observed that Paramārtha and Xuanzang express the idea of “benediction” (Paramārtha’s yuan 願 and Xuanzang’s shu 庶) in their translations of the final verse of AKBh 9, despite the fact that in the Sanskrit 77 Kataoka (2007, p. 24, n. 30). 78 PST 1, p. 5,1-2: tīrthyatarkabhramitā mandadhiyo vistareṇa pratipādyāḥ kusṛtīr apavidhya katham ˙ arthatattvabhājaḥ syuḥ, naivety arthagateḥ. kathaṃśabdena hy atrāsambhavo dyotyate. 79 Cf. Aṣṭādhyāyī 3.3.173: āśiṣi liṅloṭau (according to Speijer 1886, p. 269, § 346) while Kataoka (2007, p. 25, n. 31) refers to Aṣṭādhyāyī 3.3.134: āśaṃsāvacane liṅ. Cf. also Aṣṭādhyāyī 3.4.116: liṅ āśiṣi. 80 Cf., e.g., Verhagen (1994, pp. 88–90). 81 Shen (2007, p. 243), as well as Zheng (2008, p. 329), seems to render ling as denoting the optative: “(the present treatise) can/should make these [persons; Y.M.] get beyond the wrong path and connect to the true meaning;” see also n. 44 above. Sugiura (1900) takes ling as the (hortative or cohortative) imperative in addition to its original causative: “Let all outside wanderers come from the false doctrines to the Truth;” cf. n. 41 above. Other modern translators understand ling as merely denoting the causative, as mentioned above. 123 Author's personal copy 304 Y. Muroya text neither such verbal element nor a predicate denoting invocation is clearly found (vraṇadeśo viṣasyeva svasāmarthyavisarpiṇaḥ ||). What seems problematic is that Paramārtha’s and Xuanzang’s versions deviate from the Sanskrit original. Paramārtha’s version (T29, p. 310c17): 願彼捨離外邪執 爲自及他得實義 (my translation: May they [i.e., kaizhiren 開智人, *sumedhas] dismiss the erroneous attachment of outsiders and attain the true meaning for both [their] own and others’ sake.) Xuanzang’s version (T29, p. 159b14): 庶各隨己力堪能 遍悟所知成勝業 (translation by Stcherbatsky: O might you all according to your strength’s capacity / Become enlightened in all that may be known, / So that you might perform exalted deed / (On all three paths that lead to Peace Eternal.) With the exception of Xuanzang’s “according to your strength’s capacity,” which corresponds to the d-pāda svasāmarthyavisarpiṇaḥ, for the other parts of his translation and, still more conspicuously, for Paramārtha’s entire line, no correspondence can be traced in the Sanskrit original. Unless their deviating translations were their own free modification, it is possible to suspect that the Sanskrit text they were using was not the same as the currently known version. However, there is no additional evidence for this suspicion. Paramārtha’s version reminds us of the final verse of the NMu. Namely, “to dismiss the erroneous attachment of outsiders” (sheli wai xiezhi 捨離外邪執) and “to attain the true meaning” (de shiyi 得實義) in Paramārtha’s version can be regarded as parallel, though not strictly so, to kusṛtīr apavidhya (“after dismissing erroneous paths”; Xuanzang’s yue xietu 越邪途) and arthatattvabhājaḥ (“partake of the true meaning”; Xuanzang’s qi zhenyi 契真義), respectively. Dignāga’s expression apavidhya is also found in one of the last verses of AKBh 9 as tīrthyānāṃ matam apavidhya “after dismissing the theory of outsiders” (Paramārtha: she wai zhi 捨外執; Xuanzang: she…zhu wai zhi 捨…諸外執). This similarity of ideas and expressions is probably not a coincidence. Would it be too speculative to conceive this as indicating Dignāga’s intention to stylize the NMu as a work of apologetics along the lines of the last chapter of the AKBh, which systematically disproves the existence of a soul?82 A further similarity between Paramārtha’s version of the AKBh and the NMu is that Paramārtha holds the subject of the line to be “those/they” (bi 彼), namely referring to the sumedhas (“highly intelligent person[s]”) in the first hemistich. This fits in the idea of Jinendrabuddhi’s anonymous opponents, providing that my understanding of udghaṭitadhīviṣa is accepted. On the contrary, Jinendrabuddhi’s position is to take the subject of the second hemistich as mandadhī (“slow-minded persons”), which in effect seems unique among the sources known to me. Needless to say, an interpretation of the final verse(s) of the AKBh should not be mingled unconditionally with that of the NMu. However, it may be admitted that there are certain similarities and connections between them through Xuanzang’s “interpretation” and the expressions he uses. It is 82 That Dignāga was familiar with the final three verses of AKBh, p. 478,13–22 (= AKBh [Lee], p. 168,2–11) is doubtless, since these are included in his summary of the AKBh, the so-called Marma[pra]dīpa (Peking, Ōtani 5596, vol. 118; Derge, Tōhoku 4095); cf. P Thu 286a3–6 = D Nyu 214a4–6. On this work, see, e.g., Hattori (1968, p. 8 and n. 43). 123 Author's personal copy The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña 305 also worth recollecting that the second to last verse of the AKBh is attributed to “Ācārya Dignāga” by Dharmendra in his *Tattvasārasaṅgraha as well as by (some) Bhavya in the Madhyamaka-Ratnapradīpa.83 Let us now look at Xuanzang’s use of huiduyao 慧毒藥 in the final verse of the NMu and its corresponding dhīviṣaghna in the Sanskrit reconstruction. It has been demonstrated above that Zenju and Wŏnch’ŭk, as well as modern interpreters, admit that there are positive implications in the poison motif, with it denoting the high intellectual capacities of persons to be guided. Their interpretation, to which I also subscribe, justifies taking the Chinese huiduyao (“intellect-poison”) as an equivalent of dhīviṣa, but not in the meaning “medicine against the poison of/in intelligence” as previous scholarship has assumed.84 This enables us to understand the compound udghaṭitadhīviṣa in the following way as well: “he who has the intellect [of understanding] by a condensed statement, like the poison [that spreads throughout the body through the small site of a wound].” Then, in effect, udghaṭitadhī is synonymous with udghaṭitajña. The expression dhīviṣa is indisputably recorded in the codex unicus of the PST and its Tibetan translation, and this evidence can be ˙ given weight through Yaśomitra’s gloss, as mentioned above. If one takes dhīviṣa as identical to Xuanzang’s huiduyao 慧毒藥, however, a part of the Sanskrit reconstruction needs to be modified. This corresponds exactly to the part where the reconstruction is italicized (-dhı̄visaghnam) in the b-pāda. I would ˙ suggest revising the reconstruction here with dhīviṣāṇām (or dhīviṣasya). The genitive plural (or sg.), instead of the nominative singular, as indicated in the current version of the reconstruction, would denote the target group to be instructed by the treatise, as in the final verse of the AKBh (sumedhasām “for sharp-witted persons”). In the Chinese version of the NMu, as well as the two Chinese versions of the AKBh, this genitive corresponds to wei 爲, which is explained by Yaśomitra and Pūrnavardhana as signifying the sense of “being for the benefit of him/them” ˙ (tādarthya).85 It appears that Jinendrabuddhi was aware of this genitive and its denotation when he paraphrases the first hemistich of the final verse of the NMu as “for the support of the sharp-witted person (sg.) only” (PST 1, p. 4,12–13: sudhiya ˙ eva … upakārāya). 83 In the *Tattvasārasaṅgraha (Peking, Ōtani 4534, vol. 81; Derge, Tōhoku 3711), the verse in question is marked with de yang slob dpon phyogs kyi glang po’i zhal snga nas kyis … zhes bshad pa dang /; cf. P Nu 97b7–8 = D Tsu 88b5–6. In the Ratnapradīpa (Peking, Ōtani 5254, vol. 95; Derge, Tōhoku 3854), the verse in question is marked with slob dpon phyogs kyi glang pos kyang … zhes gsungs so //; cf. P Tsha 343a3–5 = D Tsha 272b5. On the attribution of this verse to Dignāga, see Lindtner (1982, pp. 187–188), where he remarks that “[a]s a mere hypothesis – nothing more – I would suggest that Dignāga (whose study of Abhidharmakośabhāsya is attested by his Marmadı̄pa) subsequently added the final three verses, ˙ much in the same way as he composed his Miśrakastotra.” On the controversy about the authorship of the Ratnapradīpa, see Yamaguchi (1975, pp. 54–57) and Tillemans (2000, pp. xiii–xiv, n. 2). 84 The AKBh Index (vol. I, p. 336) records du 毒 for the lemma viṣa- (Tib. dug), whereas the record of the compound viṣavat (Tib. dug bzhin du) testifies to two other versions, namely, edu 惡毒 (as in Paramārtha’s version) and duyao 毒藥 (as in Xuanzang’s version), the latter of which is relevant to the NMu. The index of the Yogācārabhūmi (YBhū Index, p. 785) records both du and duyao for viṣa (Tib. dug). 85 AKVy, p. 722,15: tādarthye ṣaṣṭhī. For Pūrnavardhana’s gloss, see P Nyu 390b2, D Chu 321b4: de’i ˙ don gyi drug pa’o; cf. n. 56. 123 Author's personal copy 306 Y. Muroya Another factor that is unclear with regard to the Chinese versions of the final verse of the AKBh remains to be addressed. In the Sanskrit original, the words in question, sumedhasām and vraṇadeśo viṣasya, appear in pādas b and c, respectively. But in the Chinese versions, these phrases are directly connected to the second unit as 爲開智人智毒門 (Paramārtha’s version) and 爲開智者慧毒門 (Xuanzang’s version). It may be certain that sumedhasām (gen. pl.) corresponds to wei kaizhiren (爲開智人) and wei kaizhizhe (爲開智者). But, then, it follows that vraṇadeśo viṣasya (“[as] the site of a wound [is related] to the poison”) corresponds to zhidumen (智毒門) and huidu-men (慧毒門). This identification is also suggested by the AKBh Index,86 where the characters zhi (“wisdom, knowledge, cleverness, prudence”; cf. MCED, no. 933) and hui (“clever, intellectual, wise, quick-witted”; cf. MCED, no. 2333) are placed in brackets, probably to indicate irregularity/ ambiguity. This indication is rightly made, inasmuch as there is no commonly known equivalent denoting the mentioned words in the Sanskrit original.87 In other words, to render viṣa with zhidu or huidu, as well as vraṇa with men, is not common.88 It is possible that Xuanzang, who translated both the AKBh and the NMu, was aware of the close relationship in ideas between the verses of these two works, and interpreted the viṣa of the AKBh by applying the sense of the NMu, while obviously following (or being inspired by), most interestingly, the translation of the AKBh by Paramārtha, who appears to have been aware of the expression in the NMu.89 Another potential problem in reconstructing the final verse of the NMu is that the compounding of the two words udghaṭitajña and dhīviṣa is not supported by the PST, but can only be substantiated through Xuanzang’s Chinese translation. The ˙ PST testifies either to udghaṭitajña embedded in Jinendrabuddhi’s gloss or to ˙ udghaṭitadhīviṣa in the fragment, but not to our *udghaṭitajña-dhīviṣa as a whole. A possibility that the condensed or elliptical form udghaṭitadhīviṣa was rendered by Xuanzang as equivalent to our *udghaṭitajña-dhīviṣa could not be ruled out, if we restricted ourselves to the original linguistic materials known in the text of the PST ˙ manuscript as has been transmitted. To reconstruct a version of the final verse based on the PST’s udghaṭitadhīviṣa may require future work. ˙ Consequently, the above considerations allow me to suggest a corresponding modification of the final verse (cf. n. 40) in the following two versions (italicization for a hypothetical text): mukhamātram idam sadarthanı̄teh krtam udghatitajñadhı̄visāṇām | ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ kusrtı̄r apavidhya tı̄rthyatarkabhramitā katham arthatattvabhājah || (Mātrāsa˙ ˙ maka [or: Tristubh-Vimalā]) ˙˙ 86 Tib. dug la rma yi phyogs; see AKBh Index, vol. I, p. 336, s.v. viṣa. 87 For zhi 智, see AKBh Index, vol. II, p. 332: abhijñā-, upalabdhi-, jñāna-, prajñā-, pratyaya-, buddhi-, etc.; for hui 慧, see AKBh Index, vol. II, p. 47: jñāna-, darśana-, dhī-, prajñā-, buddhi-, mati-, etc. 88 See, for example, Wogihara’s SCJD, p. 1253, s.v. viṣa (2); and p. 1301, s.v. vraṇa. 89 Kaidō 快道 (1751–1810), a Japanese scholar-monk of the Edo period and the author of more than ten works on Buddhist logic or inmyō (cf. Takemura 1986, pp. 178–182), holds that the last two stanzas of Paramārtha’s version of the AKBh is an interpolation of the glosses made by a later commentator or commentators; cf. his Abidatsuma kusharon hōgi 阿毘達磨倶舍論法義 (Taishō 2251), T64, p. 439a26– 29. I am indebted to Professor Funayama for this observation. 123 Author's personal copy The Nyāyamukha and udghaṭitajña 307 Translation: This [treatise, as the] mere gate of the proper ways concerning the real object[,] is composed for [the sake of intelligent] persons with intellectpoison who understand through condensed statements. How indeed might persons deluded by the speculative reasoning of outsiders [please] partake of the true meaning [of the teaching] after having rejected erroneous paths? or, as Professor Harunaga Isaacson has suggested, using a different meter90: mukhamātram idam sadarthanı̄teh krtam atrodghatitajñadhı̄visāṇām | ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ kusrtı̄r apavidhya tı̄rthyatarkabhramitā ye katham arthatattvabhājah || (Aupac˙ ˙ chandasika–Mālabhārinı̄) ˙ Acknowledgements Work on this paper was supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) in the context of the FWF Project P27863-G24, as well as by the JSPS Grant-in-Aid Research Project 15H03155. I am very grateful to Prof. Shōryū Katsura for encouraging its publication and supporting my work on the jāti-section of the NMu through the JSPS Grant-in-Aid Research Project 24520058, and to Prof. Motoi Ono and Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe for their editorial collaboration and the innumerable detailed discussions we have had on the sixth chapter of the PS and the PST. Most sincere thanks are due to Prof. Ernst Steinkellner, Prof. Diwakar N. Acharya and Prof. Harunaga ˙Isaacson, who read this paper and offered invaluable suggestions and comments. Special thanks are due to Ms. Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek, who corrected my English. However, responsibility for the text remains entirely with me. References AAĀ = Abhisamayālaṃkār’ālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā (Commentary on Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā) by Haribhadra, ed. U. Wogihara. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1932–1935. AK & AKBh = Abhidharm-Koshabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, ed. P. Pradhan. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967. AKBh Index = Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (P. Pradhan Edition), 阿毘達磨倶舎論索引, ed. A. Hirakawa, et al. 3 vols. Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan, 1973–1978. AKBh (Lee) = Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu. Chapter IX: Ātmavādapratiṣedha, ed. J.Ch. Lee. Tokyo: Sankibo Press, 2005. AKVy = Sphuṭârthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, the Work of Yaśomitra, ed. U. Wogihara. 3rd reprint, Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1989. Apte = The Practical Sanskrit–English Dictionary, ed. V.Sh. Apte. Reprint of the rev. and enlarged ed., Poona 1957, Kyoto: Rinsen Book, 1978. Balcerowicz, P. (2008). Some remarks on the opening sections in Jaina epistemological treatises. In W. Slaje (Ed.), Śāstrārambha. Inquiries into the preamble in Sanskrit (pp. 25–81). Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. 90 I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to Prof. Isaacson, who kindly discussed the problems of the final verse of the NMu with me and suggested this version at the workshop on the sixth chapter of the PS and the PST organized by Prof. Motoi Ono at the University of Tsukuba from 14 to 18 March 2016. He also noted that the˙ relative pronoun “ye might allow both the interpretation of the commentators criticized by Jinendrabuddhi and that of Jinendrabuddhi himself” and we “would have to supply a te (yattador nityasambandhāt)” (personal communication dated 17 March 2016). On the meter mentioned, see, e.g., Apte, Appendix A, p. 12 and p. 28 under “III varṇavṛttaḥ – ardhasamacatuṣpadī” (also for the term Vasantamālikā, among other names for this meter), as well as p. 12 and pp. 30–31 under “VI mātrāvṛttaḥ – catuṣpadī.” Prof. Isaacson also mentioned the name Śiśulı̄lā. For this, see Jñānaśrı̄mitra’s Vṛttamālāstuti, v. 130 (in the ardhasamavṛtta section); cf. 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