Globalization and terrorism

European Journal of Political Economy 27 (2011) S152–S161 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect European Journal of Political Economy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ejpe Globalization and terrorism Ekkart Zimmermann ⁎ Dresden University of Technology, Chair in Macrosociology, Mommsenstr. 13, D-01062 Dresden, Germany a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 3 January 2011 Received in revised form 15 September 2011 Accepted 20 September 2011 Available online 4 October 2011 JEL classification: D74 a b s t r a c t This paper has multiple objectives. I set out linkages of a causal model to portray how globalization influences international terrorist strategies. I also point to methodological and theoretical shortcomings in the literature with respect to the levels of disaggregation at which issues are analyzed, and I evaluate the opportunity–cost argument for assessing international terrorism. The paper and conclusions present perspectives on developments of terrorism in the context of globalization, including the relationship of terror to immigration. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Globalization Terrorism Methodology Opportunity costs Immigration Public spending 1. Introduction Globalization changes the opportunity costs of market participants. I propose that this affects terrorism, at least in the long-run. In this paper, I offer observations on literature on globalization and terrorism, coupled with critical remarks. I set out a list of factors that potentially mediate the relationships between globalization and terrorism. Partial explanations are thereby brought together in a wider causal scenario. 1 I also address the existence of methodological and theoretical shortcomings in the literature. There is need for identifying the correct level of analysis in theoretical language and measurement and in the giving of policy advice. Shortcomings are identified in definition, data collection, coding and analysis. The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes globalization and terrorism and some of its variants. Section 3 presents descriptive data on the distribution of international terrorism and points to shortcomings of the datasets. In Section 4 the literature is summarized and tied to a model of linkages between globalization and terrorism. Section 5 addresses the issue of levels of theoretical and empirical analysis. Section 6 presents a summary and conclusions. 2. Globalization and terrorism Globalization is defined as an extension and intensification in the exchange of goods, persons, and ideas (Held et al., 1999). Terrorism is a deed on the basis of asymmetric information about the place, time and the number of victims of an attack. Terrorism ⁎ Tel.: + 49 351 463 34284; fax: + 49 351 463 37085. E-mail address: EkkartZimmermann@t-online.de. 1 The terror attacks in Norway on July 22, 2011 exemplify resistance to Muslim immigration as an antipathy partly due to Islamic international terrorism. Yet, the victims of this attack included both native youngsters and the Norwegian government, which illustrates the complexity of the links between a globalized world and terror. 0176-2680/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.09.003 E. Zimmermann / European Journal of Political Economy 27 (2011) S152–S161 S153 consists of fear-inducing violent attacks on civilians to influence political decisions or the polity as such (Zimmermann, 2009). Relating to globalization, we can ask whether international terrorism has increased through trade, mobility of people, and through the spreading of ideas. The most recent wave of globalization began with the opening up of China to the world market from 1978 on and the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989–91. One could analyze the consequences of globalization for different forms of terrorism, namely ideological, ethno-separatist, religious–cultural, or single issue terrorism. My focus is on international terrorism, defined as terrorism with victims located in a different country or citizens of a different country than that in which terrorists originate (Zimmermann, 1983, p. 346). At least since the days of Black September in 1970, international terrorism to a large extent is that of radical Islam (Frisch and Inbar, 2008). For example, Sunni Muslim extremists were identified with some one-half of all terror attacks in 2009. Some 90 groups were associated with these attacks. According to open source reports, the Taliban claimed credit for the largest number of attacks and caused the highest number of fatalities. Al-Shabaab was the second deadliest group, followed by al-Qa'ida in Iraq as the third deadliest group (Source: U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, 2009, p. 9).2 3. Descriptive data on international terrorism In the most extensive data sources (US National Counterterrorism Center, 2008; Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2004; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism; Global Terrorism Data Base, 2009), there are strongly divergent definitions of terrorism. National and international acts of terrorism as well as different types of terrorism are insufficiently or not at all distinguished. Often ethnocentric definitions are applied. The Counterterrorism Center does not report many terrorist attacks involving non-state groups in Africa and elsewhere, because US-American citizens are not involved (Human Security Brief, 2007, p. 2). Further, one has to reckon with undetected cases and difficulties in attributing specific events. The data indicate a trend of a global decline in terror since 2001, both in the number of attacks and in the number of victims (cf. Krieger and Meierrieks, 2009; 2011), even though not a decline for every distinct year.3 One encounters both insufficient delimitations of the concept of political terrorism and inconsistent coding of the material once a definition has been decided on. In Iraq, in the central US-data sources, attacks during the civil war have been counted as terrorist attacks just as attacks resulting from ethnic tribal warfare. If one takes out partially overlapping forms of conflict, international terrorism in the Near East is dramatically reduced. Krueger (2006) identifies the comparative analysis of data sources and data coding as one of the most important areas for progress in comparative research on terrorism.4 Rather than blaming a globalized world for increased terrorism, there is a drastic decline, despite occasional aberrations, in the number of victims and the number of international terrorist attacks in the developed world, and a relocation and increase in attacks and number of victims in the Near East and South Asia.5Krieger and Meierrieks (2009) report studies that show a negative relationship between economic development and terrorism.6 Yet there are also studies in which this relationship is less strong or does not at all exist. Similar results emerge when the influence of income inequality on terrorism is analyzed. Such analyses call for more particular attention to deviant cases and, in particular, for greater precision in the definition of different types of political terrorism (Zimmermann, 2009), and for more discerning data collection. Given an unclear situation with respect to definitions, to reporting about terrorist attacks, and to data collection and coding, and consequent inadequacies in analysis, terrorist researchers have not agreed about whether terrorism achieves terrorists' goals (Pape, 2003, 2005; Abrahms, 2007). 2 These figures include events of domestic terrorism and international terrorism. See Enders et al. (2011) for a method to separate transnational from domestic terrorist incidents, which occur about eight times more often. 3 In Iraq terrorism substantially declined after 2006, because the Sunni militias turned against Al Qaeda and formed a union with the reinforced Allied Forces. Al Qaeda had planned to provoke a conflict between Sunnis and Shiites. Yet, it was not able to protect the Sunnis afterwards. The situation in Afghanistan after the failure of institutionalization of a central monopoly of violence included cultivation of drugs and presence of the Taliban. Efforts at the military annihilation of the Al Qaeda leadership were without far-reaching effect, even after the killing of Bin-Laden in May 2011. Iraq and Afghanistan are countries with many overlapping forms of conflict such as international terrorism, anti-colonial terrorism, interreligious or intercultural terrorism, and the multitude of terrorist events that result from the collapse of the state monopoly of violence and the fighting for power on the part of terrorist groups. 4 The number of deaths in terrorist acts is a more robust indicator and thus more suited for comparative analysis. Yet, concentrating on only this indicator omits the degree of general insecurity caused by an accumulation of attacks. In more recent work of Gassebner and Luechinger (2011), three types of dependent variables are employed for macro-comparative stock-taking, namely the number of victims of international terrorism, the location of countries where it occurs, and the country from which the perpetrators come. 5 Low-income countries Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, India, Thailand, Russia, Columbia, Sudan, Philippines, Algeria, Sri Lanka, Iran and Yemen led the world in 2009 in the number of terrorist attacks. These countries occupy the first 15 ranks (US National Counterterrorism Center, 2009 Report on Terrorism). In terms of numbers of victims divided by respective population figures in millions, Somalia leads (158), followed by Iraq (122), Afghanistan (98), Pakistan (26), the Democratic Republic of Congo (20), Colombia (7), Sudan, Sri Lanka and Thailand (6 each), then followed by Algeria (4), Philippines and Yemen (3 each), Russia and Iran (2 each), and India (0.6). If one concentrates on countries with a high trading sector (up to 50% of the GNP), i.e., Germany, Switzerland, and other European countries, or on countries with the highest export/import share of GNP (50% and more) such as Belgium, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary or Ireland, a strong negative relationship between globalization and international terrorism emerges. Yet, important control variables are not considered that could simultaneously affect the terms of trade and the amount of terrorism. Also the role of political and economic institutions, of freedom rights and judicial order has to be specified in detail. 6 One also has to consider the endogeneity of economic growth and terrorism: ceteris paribus countries with limited growth show a higher degree of international terrorism. Reversely, political terrorism in itself contributes to lower economic growth. S154 E. Zimmermann / European Journal of Political Economy 27 (2011) S152–S161 4. A heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization and terrorism My aim is not comprehensiveness in reviewing the literature nor further econometric specification, but guidance in specifying potential linkages between globalization and terrorism. If one believes that increased globalization over the last thirty years has increased international terrorism due to increased contact rates, this should be revealed in time series analyses in a clear discontinuity (displaced regression line), in an accelerated rate of terrorist acts and the number of victims (increased slope of the regression line), or in both. Theoretically one could also argue that the international division of labor increases opportunity costs for terrorist groups, countries, and regions (Kurrild-Klitgaard et al., 2006). Scarce resources are destroyed by violent attacks, and public security and infrastructure is endangered. Thus the support of a larger population is withheld. Moreover, (foreign) investors would be deterred. With an increased exchange of goods, one should expect fewer terrorist activities, since other alternatives become available in rationally assessing costs and rewards. Yet, terrorists do not have in mind the advantages of international trade and the division of labor but rather have political goals. Opportunity costs increase with education and other resources and suggest a decline in readiness for terrorist activities as individuals become more successful elsewhere. The contrary position is the so-called productivity argument (Benmelech and Berrebi, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita, 2005) that it is the very same resources that could be used for terrorist attacks, as the example of the highly-educated perpetrators in the September 11, 2001 attacks demonstrates. Consistent with the opportunity-cost argument, more terrorist acts occur in regions not strongly integrated into the recent waves of globalization. In those areas, international interest exists only for regions with easily exploitable raw materials. That argument can be treated as a sub-case of the opportunity-cost argument. The syndrome of failed states with a collapsed state monopoly of violence is the predominant example: Unprotected frontiers, looting groups often consisting of cheap child armies, and the international reception of stolen raw materials such as diamonds and other easily movable goods predominate in many parts of Black Africa. For this, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have developed a rational choice theory of greed to explain the mixed forms of civil wars, guerrilla elements and terrorist attacks, and provide an explanation that differs from the usual deprivation-oriented explanations. The latter emphasize deprivation, losses in the past and present, and deficits in legitimacy, as mobilizing sources for terrorism. In peacefully prospering Botswana as a contrasting example, raw materials need ongoing foreign investment and are used by tribal authorities who feel responsible for the whole nation rather than for their own group. The empirical evidence showing a declining trend of terrorist acts is by and large in line with the opportunity–cost argument. Krieger and Meierrieks (2009; 2011) find that international terrorism arises in underdeveloped countries but victims are in more developed states (Bird et al., 2008; Blomberg and Hess, 2008a, 2008b; Krueger and Laitin, 2008). In underdeveloped societies, conditions of relative deprivation and inequality and the absence of alternatives are said to facilitate the recruitment of terrorists to attack developed societies and to undercut global developments (Schneider and Hofer, 2008). A curvilinear relationship between globalization and (international) terrorism is not to be ruled out. As a polity opens up to globalization, the prevailing economy and political system comes under additional stress. Protestors gain access to better means of organizing themselves. In short, there is a high probability that the system weakens and protestors become stronger. Once that transitional phase is passed, the benefits of globalization become predominant and the opportunity–cost argument should predominate. Most of the empirical evidence is more in line with such a curvilinear hypothesis than a linear negative relationship between globalization and terrorism. Kirchgässner (2010, p. 331) proposes, as others before him, that trust and moral behavior are needed for markets and democratic political order to function. The question arises whether globalization by its economic impact might endanger “the increased steering of social relations via (monetary) prices, might undermine the moral foundations necessary for the well-functioning market economic order.” Markets and market-based liberal democracies could come under strain, with globalization making capital owners more independent of their own state and less interested in their democratic societies, and more interested in investing in fast-growing authoritarian capitalist regimes, so drawing away financial and moral resources from their own democratic societies. On the other hand, one could argue that globalization puts a premium on long-term moral behavior, keeping defection in check. The rise of the compliance scenario for multinational corporations and government institutions is a clear indicator. Globalization could encourage a decline of moral behavior or rather foster it, even in shorter time perspective. Yet, globalization need not only increase the opportunity costs of action, making terrorism more costly. On the contrary, for some groups, globalization increases the incentives and opportunities for terrorism and facilitates the organization, financing, and persistence of terrorist strategies. Frequently the degree of economic and social inequality and polarization within countries is increased and there are losers who have stagnating or declining incomes. Also, with globalization, a foreign and “corrupt” culture can enter a country, with new minorities created who do not share in the benefits of the division of labor and who support terrorism. Globalization increases international mobility of refugees and also terrorists. Militant terrorist groups can receive financial assets from supporters (governments, the diaspora and political sympathizers) and can disseminate their information and propaganda. Relationships between political and criminal networks develop, with further opportunities to transport people, material and money across borders.7 Systems of underground banking have eliminated boundaries between political and economic criminal behavior (drugs, arms trading etc.) in the Balkans, the Caucasus region, in Colombia and other South American countries and in Afghanistan. The leaders of terrorist groups block attempts at peaceful settlement because 7 See for example Di Tommaso et al. (2009) on human trafficking. E. Zimmermann / European Journal of Political Economy 27 (2011) S152–S161 S155 their own criminal economic interests point elsewhere. Judicial institutions are insufficient to control the economy. All this increases the opportunities for international terrorism (Gurr, 2005). My illustrated causal model makes these links explicit and incorporates additional considerations, while leaving out other minor links. Antecedent (exogenous) variables have been omitted. This also holds for feedback effects. Other elements have been omitted to keep the figure readable.8 The dependent variable “persistence of international terrorist strategies” is influenced by incentives (path 1), and opportunities for international terrorism (2). The exogenous variable “globalization” can be divided into economic and financial effects, and into social, cultural and political effects.9 One of the major effects of globalization is the shift in relative prices and markets (3) leading to constraints for national governments and to a weakening of the state (4). Globalization directly increases economic and social inequality, i.e. the societal polarization within countries (5). Also it does so indirectly, via a weakened state that can no longer protect economically disadvantaged groups against global economic challenges (6). In the “middle axis” of the diagram, globalization promotes new (information) technologies (7) leading to a further weakening of state power of control (8). These new information technologies foster the decentralization of terrorist groups, who may emulate other terrorist groups or work by a system of “franchising” under a distant command (9), which also contributes to a weakening of the state (10). Such a decentralized organizational structure furthers the links to political–criminal networks (11), who also benefit from enlarged means of funding deviant behavior (12), again being an impact of globalization (13). Through the internet in particular, globalization has eased communication and facilitated terror. Reduced transaction costs facilitate coordination and make travel and immigration easier. The ease of travel and money transfers, on top of the traditional hawala system, the blurring of the narcotics–weapons–drugs cartels with terrorist groups, the sheer amount of free-floating capital and the ransom money on the part of economic and political oligarchs in Arab countries, have contributed to the persistence of international terrorist groups and the replenishing of their resources. Important is the spreading of terrorist propaganda by modern means of mass communication. Terrorist videos produced by “charismatic” leaders reach a world-wide audience and result in indoctrination and possibly recruitment. Indulging in such “hate worlds” most likely has a lasting effect on alienated juveniles. The “franchising” model of the Al Qaeda network in part rests on similar structural conditions. The internet acts as the oxygen for a worldview, terrorism in this instance. Rohner and Frey (2007) speak of joint interests of media and terrorists. The usual attention and transport function of the media has dramatically increased. On the other hand, impressions from the media often lead to magnified interpretations of the real support of international terrorist organizations. Also, with Tullock (1974), one has to consider that the most radical organization with its brutality influences the cost– calculation of potential bystanders in its own favor. If one shows sympathy for a milder organization, one cannot be assured of not succumbing to the more rigorous one. The media again have a strong reinforcement effect here. International terror need not be centrally directed. Rather terrorists seem to be aware of actions that they can take to further the collective aim. Incentives and means to succeed spread. As with many other implications of globalization, it is a background and indirect force, though extremely powerful. Other factors, often of a local nature, have to be present to turn the global “switch” on. In other instances the very same information is “zapped” away without nourishing international terrorism. Borrowing from research on social movements and political parties, there are “terrorist families” learning from each other and generating their own offspring. There is also a direct effect from globalization to the growth of politico-criminal networks (14), which increase the opportunities for international terrorist strategies (15). External state or group support greatly contributes to opportunities for such terrorist activities (16). Note that increasing economic and social inequality is crucial in this model, both through effects on incentives (17) and opportunities for international terrorism (18). Turning to the upper half of the model, globalization contributes to the spreading of foreign “corrupt” cultures, (19) having an effect on incentives for international terrorism (20). Globalization also leads to value changes, either directly (21) or, indirectly, via new information technologies such as the internet, digital cameras and mobile phones (22). Value changes are also induced through the spreading of foreign “corrupt” cultures (23). One special instance of value change is the occurrence and spreading of supreme values (24; see Section 5), which strongly increases the incentives for international terrorism (25). The final block of variables deals with immigration of foreign workers (26). Two basic forces are working here, the push effect of driving unemployed or underemployed people to other countries and the pull effect for (qualified) workers elsewhere. Such immigration creates new minorities (27) and contributes to values changes (28). New minorities can contribute to the weakening of the state (path 29). They may increase the incentives for international terrorism (30) and contribute to increasing economic and social inequality (31). The issue of new immigrating or recently immigrated minorities as providing harbors for international terrorist groups merits closer scrutiny. Muslim immigration into OECD countries is the shibboleth. Two basic positions can be distinguished: one is the optimistic view of successful integration and sufficient assimilation strengthening the economy and achievement ethic of the immigration country. Migrants are according to this position over-conformist, willing to accept unwanted jobs for low pay, and 8 Since I focus on linkages between globalization and the persistence of international terrorist, variables such as economic growth or counter-terrorist policies (and other constraints) are left out. Of course, they have a marked effect on the dependent variable, just as variables like ethno-cultural composition, geographical location or contested state boundaries. Including them would distract from the argumentation pursued here. 9 Here only one political effect is addressed, the weakening of the state. Some authors (e.g., Savun and Phillips, 2009) differentiate between economic globalization which has a negative effect on international political terrorism, and political globalization implying stronger foreign political involvement in domestic issues. This could also make democracies attract more international political terrorism. S156 E. Zimmermann / European Journal of Political Economy 27 (2011) S152–S161 are envisioned as socially upgrading themselves or at least their children. This is a normative picture of rational choice of new immigrants, who benefit from public spending and eventual access to political participation. Another view notes empirical absence of integration and a rising unqualified proletariat (lumpenproletariat) that, apart from lacking educational and training skills, affirms the “supreme values” of Islam. 10 To understand the potential mobilization of such groups for international terrorism, the theory of status inconsistency is relevant. In particular, leaders of groups with a low ascribed ethnic and religious status, coupled with high individual education and thus a clear achievement, do not successfully integrate into society. Huntington (1968, p. 53–56) emphasizes economic growth and individual upward social mobility to buy off burdens on the economy and the political system. Both channels increase the capabilities of the system and thus contribute to peaceful development. If both are blocked, political participation most likely is to be through non-institutionalized means. A strong and differentiated political party system can be helpful in channeling such challenges but may require decades of successful political development. Increasing the educational skills or demanding higher ones from migrants may be a better guarantee for successful adaptation. Given that terrorism is the voluntary act of small groups, it is no guarantee. This argument could easily feed back into xenophobic attitudes. Survey results (Eurobarometer; Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005 seq.; Fischer, 2011) show an uneven picture. Muslim international terrorism has raised general wariness regarding that population group and further such immigrants in OECD countries. Yet, overall the population is much more differentiating in its opinion, if adequately addressed in surveys (Kuper and Dombey, 2007). 5. Levels of theoretical and empirical analysis and potential inferences There are four levels of analysis to be pursued in a controlled manner if there should indeed be an influence of globalization: the global level, that of the nation-state, the level of terrorist groups and organizations, and the individual level. (i). If one limits the analysis to the global level and considers globalization as an auto-regressive process, the data show that September 11, 2001 is a limit and outlier for the number of victims of international terrorism. 11 The decline thereafter in the number of events and victims of international terrorism in the Western world is due to the security measures of the West, the undercutting of further major successes of Al Qaeda and inner-Islamic dissent created through Al Qaeda (Human Security Brief, 2007, p. 15–21). This does not imply that the insight of Tilly (1978) is a safe prediction, namely that when speaking of mobilization one also has to name its costs and the costs of demobilization following suit. Irrespective of whether acting directly guided by Al Qaeda or in a loose network, whether instigated by Al Qaeda or entirely autonomous in its origin, motivation and justification, the opportunity costs for internationally active terrorist groups have drastically increased. In several Islamic states, support on the part of the population has declined (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2007). The sympathy for terrorists under the Muslim population in Iraq, in Egypt and Algeria has declined whereas the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan must be considered unclear. (ii). Disaggregation of the terrorist events of the last 30 years at the national level reveals a trend for victims of international terrorism in countries that are less integrated into the globalized economy. This has to do with the syndrome of low economic and state efficiency, which is related to endemic corruption and state participation in illegality. 12 There are also inter-cultural tensions and the tensions of political illegitimacy. Increased population density and insufficient capabilities for surveillance of violent dissident groups also appear to be influences. 13 (iii). If one wants to demonstrate the immediate impact of globalization on groups speaking out for international terrorism — such as Al Qaeda, less the Taliban, or Shiite and Sunni terror groups in the Near East — one has to rely on pamphlets and resolutions, and documents in the internet. The stated goal of Al Qaeda is the liberation of the holy sites of Islam from Western, particular U.S. influence, the indigenous use of natural resources, and in the last instance the worldwide fight against “unbelievers.” The Taliban seek to drive out colonial intruders, apart from reintroducing the sharia. They want to attack intruders who, at the same time, are unbelievers. Yet, their impetus is locally limited in contrast to Al Qaeda. The same applies to the Shiite and Sunni terrorism. 10 See Bisin et al. (2008), and Aleksynska (2011) on cultural adaption and civic participation of immigrants in Europe. For a disadvantageous scenario for the consequences for European society of immigration, see Azarnert (2010). 11 A single terrorist act in whatever form with similar impact is never of course to be ruled out entirely. 12 See Abed and Gupta (2002) on state ineffectiveness and governance. Some countries involved in terror have natural-resource wealth, which also affects the efficiency of government. Bornhorst et al. (2009) show that governments in countries with natural-resource wealth reduce the effectiveness of domestic taxation. Becker et al. (2009) provide evidence on regional corruption contagion. On endemic corruption, see for example Kahana and Qijun (2010). Farzanegan (2009) describes the ostensibly state-sanctioned illegal international trade in the case of Iran. 13 For 2009, 41.9% of the deadly victims are reported for South Asia (6269 out of 14,971), followed by the Near East (27%), Africa (21.6%), the “Western Hemisphere” (2.5%) and Europe and Eurasia (2.5%). Within two years, South Asia took the first rank from the Near East. Suicide attacks were causing 21.2% of all the deaths, armed attacks and bombings each about twice as much. In the number of deaths Iraq leads with 24.4% (3654), followed by Afghanistan (18.6%), Pakistan (17.8%), Somalia (9.6%), the Democratic Republic of Congo (9%), and India (4.4%). Compared to 2007, the decline in Iraq is noteworthy, also in India, just as much as the large increase for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Quoting the National Counterterrorism Center (2009, p. 9): “Approximately 11,000 terrorist attacks occurred in 83 countries during 2009, resulting in over 58,000 victims, including nearly 15,000 fatalities. Attacks decreased by about 6% in 2009 and deaths by about 5%. This marks the second consecutive year for declines of both attacks and fatalities. Unlike the preceding four years where the Near East witnessed the greatest number of attacks, the largest number of reported terrorist attacks in 2009 occurred in South Asia, which also had, for the second consecutive year, the greatest number of fatalities. Together, South Asia and the Near East were the locations for almost two-thirds of the 234 high-casualty attacks (those that killed 10 or more people) in 2009”. The authors of the 2009 Report on Terrorism warn against such comparisons between countries and even overtime for a single country. Data problems and coding experiences make for a continuous learning process here. E. Zimmermann / European Journal of Political Economy 27 (2011) S152–S161 S157 In describing the supreme-value approach to terrorism, Bernholz (2004) proposes that “an important cause of the number of terrorist acts is income” (p. 330), which is in line with the relative deprivation rather than absolute deprivation argument as a supply factor for terrorists. Bernholz (p. 329) suggests as defensive measures “making the targets less vulnerable” through decentralization and other means, reducing media coverage of terrorist acts, stronger controlling terrorist instruments, and efforts “to change preferences and to reduce capabilities to win converts to the ideology.” He includes “military preemption of terror or its prevention by intelligence and police actions” and the more long-term perspective of teaching children “values of tolerance and self-improvement rather than supreme values that demand sacrifice of oneself and the lives of others” (p. 333). Bernholz indicates how Islamic terror is based on supreme values. There are no opportunity costs because supreme values are to be obeyed, with no alternative available. Consequently, perpetrators adhering to supreme values cannot be deterred (Wintrobe, 2006; Murawiec, 2008). In terms of Weber's distinction, deterrence can only be directed against purposive rational actions where the goal is not to be achieved at any price (value-rational action) but with rational calculation. Ex post costs of a suicide attack are irrelevant for supreme-value perpetrators. In other respects, deterrence might be relevant. Potential perpetrators could come to the conclusion that a suicide attack would not change much. For the state as a protective counter-force, the question is whether to spend more on prevention, which in a pure supreme-value case may be useless, or to rely on reducing the damage after an attack. The group level is probably the most relevant in understanding the dynamics of political terrorism. (iv) There are substantial data problems in analyzing the motivation of individual terrorists (dark figures, individuals often acting by order of organizations as primarily in case of suicide attacks: cf. Pape, 2005; Berman and Laitin, 2007; Murawiec, 2008). One can only warn against assuming a direct influence of globalization on individual perpetrators and their motivation. Numerous factors have to be added to avoid fallacious conclusions. The search for structural determinants overlooks that, even with the most favorable conditions for terrorism, there are countries without such behavior. The macro-analysis at the level of the state level takes account of the structural framework and indirectly also the frame for actions of terrorist groups and their leaders. Yet, they themselves make their own decisions. The search for a 1:1-transformation of structural factors into terrorist activities cannot be (entirely) successful. Also, terrorists can be expected to make errors in the calculations of structural givens. Sometimes the structures are favorable and terrorist groups act. Sometimes they are not, and terrorist groups still act. Also there are many situations in which favorable structures, i.e. limited constraints, are present and terrorist groups, nevertheless, prefer not to act or miss an opportunity. Notwithstanding supreme values, terrorism is and remains a voluntary act. Therefore the search for structural determination is easily misleading. Structures just as much as organizational resources belong to the supply factors. Individual reactions must be considered as demand (Frey, 2004). Structural factors are only necessary conditions. They do not guarantee the incidence of terrorist acts. There are many more impoverished people in the world who question the legitimacy of their system, are in command of some organizational resources, and still refrain from terrorist actions. In one sentence, the factors of globalization have not reached that many individuals. Of those who are affected by dramatic economic, social, and political changes, only a marginal fraction under very specific conditions turns to terrorist organizations. These are often involved in long-term within-state cultural and religious fights so that pure acts of international terrorism make only for a fraction of all forms of political terrorism. One should not be misled: pictures of dramatic resentment against actors of globalization do not strongly correlate with actual international terrorism (but see also Enders et al., 2011). Surveys show that the populations in many Islamic states per se are not anti-Western or anti-American (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2007) and not against the activities of multinational corporations in their own country. In general, these latter companies pay more than indigenous enterprises and often provide infrastructure (Bhagwati, 2007). Anger is often directed against rent-seeking indigenous corrupt elites, who are frequently involved with Western actors, against institutional deficiencies, and absence of democratization and opportunities for political participation (Blomberg and Hess, 2008b). If one were to subtract the component of international terrorism, there would remain much domestic discontent. As is shown by this exposition on the need to differentiate the four levels in the analysis of terrorism, quite different theoretical and empirical assessments are the focus of analysis. Often additional information is foregone that is provided from including other levels in the analysis. Focusing for example on the individual level only allows statements such as “persons with attributes {a, b, c} have been the perpetrators of terrorist acts {d, e, f}.” Yet, such a strategy reveals nothing about the tactics and strategies of groups, about the (necessary) organizational skills of terrorists, of their infighting with other groups, and their central position or marginalization in such processes. It would also reveal no information on the state. To what extent is the state functioning? Is there a political and/or economic crisis and whom in particular has it affected? What is the situation and policy of the neighbor-states like? For what reasons did circumstances come about that furthered the acting of terrorist groups or kept them back? The logic in such multi-level explanations is always the same: introduce the higher level of analysis as a control variable and see whether the relationships at the lower level are changed, i.e. make a difference. If they do, the higher level has an effect. If analyses at the individual level of terrorist perpetrators change once a group level is systematically introduced, it is clear that such differences need to be taken into account. If there are no differences, the group-level of analysis is without any relevance in the analysis of terrorism. Suicide terrorism is a key example. At first sight, it looks as if suicide terrorism occurs only at the individual level and therefore is to be analyzed accordingly. There are some cases like this, but the more fruitful analyses of suicide terrorism occur at the group level. Most suicide terrorists are influenced or hired by terrorist groups, who decide on the preparation and the action. For terrorist groups, suicide terrorism is a tactical device that can be turned on and off. On other occasions, arson or bombs that do not cost the lives of the perpetrators may be tactically indicated. S158 E. Zimmermann / European Journal of Political Economy 27 (2011) S152–S161 spreading of foreign “corrupt” cultures 20 23 value changes 28 21 supreme values 27 incentives for international terrorism 30 new minorities 26 shifts in relative prices and market relations 1 17 29 31 4 3 new technologies, IT 7 globalization 8 weakening the state 9 decentralized terror groups via franchising 13 25 22 immigration 19 24 14 funding for terror 6 5 10 economic and social in equality (polarization) 11 12 politico-criminal networks 18 15 support by external state/ group persistence of international terrorist strategies 2 opportunities for international terrorism 16 Fig. 1. A heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization and international terrorism. Incidentally, the coding note that the suicide attacker must have died in the attack (National Counterterrorism Center, 2009, p. 5) addresses another crucial methodological issue that has gone largely unnoted, namely sampling on the dependent variable. Of course, by definition a suicide attacker should have died. Yet, this misses the cases where this was not the case. This would increase the number of cases and enlighten the understanding of the circumstances and causes of such actions. 14 Invoking the theory of “supreme values” at the individual level may tell us about the readiness of individuals to supply the ranks of suicide terrorists. It would, however, leave out the strategic and tactical considerations of and the rivalry between terrorist and other political groups. The same logic applies if terrorist groups are analyzed against the background of the states (and other macro characteristics) in which they operate: if the state level of analysis does not make a difference in the particular research question, the theoretical inference could remain at the group level. Using such matching logic does not imply that controlled factors do not have an effect. They only would have no differential effect, which is crucial in more specified analysis. When there is such an effect at the higher level of analysis, the situation can become even more intricate. 15 Here a direct additive effect at the higher level of analysis may be observed or even interactive effects. The latter would indicate, for example, that terrorist groups act only at a specific state of the economy. This is different from a situation in which the introduction of economic factors would show an increase or decline in the number of terrorist incidents carried out by specific terrorist groups. Multi-level explanations16 are theoretically richer and offer a more thorough understanding of terrorism. This becomes immediately clear when broadening the analysis from individual terrorists or terrorist acts as unit of analyses and brings groups into focus. Strategic and tactical elements of terrorist behavior are seemingly most adequately understood at the level of group analysis. This holds for two basic insights: one is that terrorist groups are usually composed of “strong” individuals, often highly authoritarian leaders, and “weak” ones providing followers and seeking for guidance.17 The other facet is not within-group analysis, but rather the between-groups perspective. Counting single terrorist incidents and adding them entirely misses this crucial over-time perspective. 14 Similarly, when running analyses with macro-variables, one needs to include the countries with similar/dissimilar macro-background variables but with no occurrences of terrorism. 15 One could also start from the highest level of analysis and use lower levels of analysis as controls. Since the social and economic sciences want to explain human behavior the “upward” procedure is more appropriate. 16 There are not only the fallacies in transcending the measurement level in the theoretical arguments used, be it one level up or down. Often “analysts” go beyond more than one level. A typical example of theoretical “causal” inference reads: the Islamic world (excepting the oil-rich states and a few other states) largely is falling behind other regions of the world so that it is “no wonder” that the negative outcomes of global comparisons nourish terrorism on the individual level. The other fallacious interpretation usually reads: because of individual terrorists in countries x (mostly acting for local reasons) global changes occur, as if there were no other actors and structural factors/impediments at the various levels. All this has policy implications. 17 In the context of the RAF analyses, see Baeyer-Katte von et al. (1982). E. Zimmermann / European Journal of Political Economy 27 (2011) S152–S161 S159 Within this context, the notion of an opening or closing political opportunity structure becomes relevant. It introduces a level of analysis beyond that of groups. The concept of the political opportunity structure was introduced into research on social movements. It makes clear why, with political opportunities opening up (a macro-level argument), some groups will succeed and others will fail. Looking at the causal model in Fig. 1 from a rational-choice and opportunity–cost perspective (cf. also Wintrobe 2003; Freytag, 2009), paths 1, 2, 12, and 20 subscribe to the rational choice logic, and paths 11, 15–18, 23, 25, and 30 underline the more specific opportunity–cost logic in understanding causal linkages between globalization and international terrorism. Looking at the different levels of analysis, paths no. 1, 2, 17, and 18 address behavior at the micro level; paths 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 27, 28, and 30 focus on the meso or group level again specifying behavioral activities; and paths 3–8, 13, 14, 19, and 20–26 are located at the macro level. One always will have to reckon with the small number effects reducing the prospects for solid statistical multivariate analyses. Yet, on the theoretical level and with “theoretically-inspired” description, many further insights are to be gained from this multilevel-type of analysis.18 Terrorist individuals are embedded in and directed by groups, at least in the vast majority of cases. They might occur in rich regions in one state and in poor regions in another state, where either state could be at any level of economic development. Researchers should be aware of the many virulent fallacies in the social sciences, for example, either falling into the trap of individual fallacies (making uncorroborated inferences from individuals to aggregates) or succumbing to the aggregate fallacy (making unjustified inferences from aggregates to individuals). Many more such fallacies arise whenever the level of theoretical inference differs from that of empirical measurement.19 6. Summary and conclusions Numerous conclusions emerge from my analysis: First, findings and theoretical arguments per saldo do not demonstrate a positive relationship between globalization and terrorism. Trends indicate a decline of transnational terrorist acts since the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, the intricate data situation being strongly influenced by the two statistical outliers, Iraq and Afghanistan (Human Security Brief, 2007). In the view provided by a more differentiated analysis, globalization can be understood as a background factor for international terrorism. One cannot even approximately find a relationship between increasing globalization after World War II, occasional (small) economic setbacks, and political international terrorism (cf. Li and Schaub, 2004 for the period of 1975–97). Globalization offers opportunities for comparison. It provides new means of ideological competition and access to new financial resources and weapons for terrorists (cf. Costigan and Gold, 2007). Yet, other than those terrorists influenced by the objectives of global jihad, new political terrorism is a reaction to local circumstances, although these may be affected by global developments in a manifold manner. Second, the advice is to raise the general level of economic development and to provide more attractive activities than terrorism. One should, however, expect no linear progress. The diagnosis of Huntington (1968) remains relevant: political institutionalization allows for orderly and legitimate political participation, which at the same time channels and reduces the discontent of large population groups. In the absence of such an institutionalization, it is not the poor countries that are the problem. Rather, it is poor populations that want to become rich, with all the problems of social and economic inequality, state inefficiency and endemic corruption. More likely than a linear negative relationship between economic development and terrorist incidents is a curvilinear relationship, which has been mostly neglected in previous research. As the transition to modernity begins, the institutions of the state still may be too weak or in effect nonexistent (the state failure syndrome), while new protest groups gain access to means for strengthening their violent protests. There is a similar logic when a mid-level developed state changes its political structure, in particular from authoritarian rule to a more democracy. The J-curve phenomenon of short-time decline and better long-term prospects points to a similar imbalance between former “stable” rule and the turmoil of change between new and old elites and respective political and economic institutions. The “economic” logic of opportunity costs is much stronger provided that economic opportunities are present, than predominance and persistence of religious-fanaticism tied to fighting off foreign “intruders”. The latter argument is a strong one and often invoked. Yet, there seem to be stronger answers and alternatives. Third, I make a conditioned prediction with two key variables that have to be closely monitored: one is the educational progress and language skills of new immigration groups; the other is the degree of fair-hiring and renting practices, in general requiring close supervision and sanctioning of discriminating policies. The first factor would increase the capabilities of the new migrants on their own; the second factor would not bloc demand for such qualifications once they are achieved. Western liberal market societies by comparison with other socio-economic systems in the world offer by far the most opportunities for individual progress. There is a clear want for such avenues with this type of society. Notwithstanding numerous “radical” survey results (Fischer, 2011), there is a strong pull of the values of Western society, with the anger and irritations that arise about the freedom of opinion in other respects. That pull is so strong that family procreation patterns adapt relatively quickly, with the fear of unqualified masses adhering to a radical religion simply a myth, provided that upward mobility channels are kept open. Thus, internal societal openness is only the reverse image of external open markets that promote the division of labor and sharing of products and ideas. 18 19 For a simple multi-level model of terrorism, see Zimmermann (2009). A review of the vast portions of the present comparative literature, a task beyond the scope of the article, will provide numerous instances of these gaps. S160 E. Zimmermann / European Journal of Political Economy 27 (2011) S152–S161 Fourth, selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) provides a key instrument in assessing the antagonists and their strategies in terror-prone regimes and elsewhere. In autocratic regimes, rulers emerge out of a very small selectorate, i.e. the group that has a saying in selecting rulers. What follows from this small selectorate is the creation and accumulation of private goods, usually on the part of a highly authoritarian government (“kleptocracy”) without the legitimacy of the population at large. The vital elements that make for democratic regimes and thus a much wider selectorate (in this case “electorate”) are lacking. This regime transformation from authoritarian rule to non-authoritarian forms of rule is at issue in the revolutionary efforts at the Southern and Eastern rim of the Mediterranean. Revolutions are outcomes and not to be mixed up with more frequent revolutionary challenges. Regime outcomes are anything but clear. Yet, the issues of free elections and public goods provision are dominant. For a number of reasons, terrorist incidents might, however, increase during such challenges and the long transition phase. Past stability, though coupled with harsh repression, may be gone. The number of political challengers operating in crumbling old and unfinished new institutions has vastly increased. Political institutionalization, i.e. a differentiated and flexible party system (Huntington, 1968), is at issue. In short-term perspective one might have to reckon with more terrorist incidents. In the long-run, however, if more economic development and political freedom come about, I would speculate that the prospects for political terrorism will decline (Zimmermann, 2011). Fifth, there is need to address all four levels in the analysis of international terrorism: the global, state, group, and individual levels, with the group level being the most relevant for understanding the dynamics of terrorist organizations. I have indicated where theoretical conclusions are not justified by the level of measurement. In other instances, additional levels of explanation were simply left out, such levels embedding the causal explanation into more substantial multi-level theorizing. Finally, there is in my view a need to distinguish between various forms of political terrorism (Zimmermann, 2009), with international political terrorism often being a hybrid of some of these forms. This has consequences for both successful theory development and for government reactions, which should differ in response to ethno-culturally driven terrorism, usually based on a broader oppositional base than for example ideological terrorism. 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