Management & Marketing (2009) Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 111-126.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST’S MANAGEMENT WITHIN
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
Cristian MARZAVAN, Tănase STAMULE
Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest
Abstract. The recent financial crisis triggered by the spectacular drop of the prices of
financial instruments backed by subprime loans brought back into spotlight the role played by
the credit rating agencies (CRAs) in the structured finance field. Their importance grew
exponentially along with financial globalization and received a substantial support from the
Basel Committee II whose newest regulations regarding the risks involved by certain financial
assets were tied to ratings issued by specialized institutions. Throughout the time, the
regulators took appropriate measures to ensure that the problems raised by the rating activity
are avoided – loose competition, lack of transparency, potential conflicts of interest and
rating-depending regulation.
This paper tried to identify the main conflicts of interest which arise in the rating
issuance activity and to outline the means that generate the potential incentives to exploit those
conflicts; an important weight was put on the „reputational capital” theory which implies the
fact that under the right circumstances, a reputation mechanism that works properly will deter
low quality ratings.
It tried to follow the correlation between the evolution of the legal framework and the
impact on ratings quality, looking to identify remedies in order to avoid and remove conflicts
of interest for this specific domain. Based on empirical evidence, the influence of conflicts on
market informational flow was put under scrutiny and the long term implications on financial
market environment were assessed.
Keywords: conflicts of interest, credit rating agencies, information asymmetry, SarbanesOxley Act, subprime crisis.
1. Introduction
Recent corporate scandals and dramatic falls of stock prices intensified
investors’ worries and put pressure on regulators regarding the potential conflicts of
interest within the credit rating agencies who, instead of providing market with
accurate information, it had interest to deceive or hide them for their own personal
gain.
Conflicts of interest take place at the moment when a financial services
provider or an agent within the firm use the information he has access to for its own
personal interest. The experience gained by the rating activity along with the capacity
of collecting and using the information provided by clients, gives CRAs a competitive
advantage in the process of ratings issuance and offers them a special status in creating
an informational flow in financial markets.
Management & Marketing
Lately, conflicts of interest were put under scrutiny because a decrease in
informational flow in financial markets leads to a distortion of its perception and
jeopardize the process of channeling financial flows to the most appropriate
investment opportunities; conflicts of interest also raise ethical issues for those
involved in this process. They generate incentives for financial services providers and
its employees to hide or provide false information thus hurting their own clients.
Ratings play an important role in pricing debt instruments and assess if a
specific issue is suitable to be part of a certain type of portfolio. Changes in ratings
began to be used more and more as triggers in financial contracts, thus a lower rating
can imply the need new collateral, an interest rate adjustment and even the termination
of a contract. Policymakers use ratings as a method to determine the quality of
institutional investors’ portfolios by assessing their risk exposure and capital
requirements. Companies structure their debt so that they can achieve a certain rating;
for this purpose, some even create special investment vehicles so that they can lower
the cost of capital.
2. Content
Alongside with financial system globalization in the last decades, the
importance of ratings met a new demand. Ratings are grades given by specialized
agencies which assess the creditworthiness of a company or a government and
measures its capacity to meet payments. It can assess debt for various tenors with a
range starting from the best quality (rating AAA) and finishing with the worst (rating
D). At the beginning, rating agencies’ task was to assess the debt of companies which
wanted to raise capital by issuing bonds on capital markets. These ratings’ main goal
was to differentiate the financial risk embedded by those issues thus allowing
companies with sound financial record to keep a low cost of its debt. Further in time,
CRAs’ assessments became more sophisticated covering insurance companies,
warrants and mutual funds.
During the financial crisis in 1997-1998, CRAs were blamed because they
weren’t able to identify in proper time the deterioration of banks’ balance sheets and
furthermore because they were too much in a hurry to lower the ratings of the
countries involved, thus multiplying the initial problems (Herrero, Gyntelberg, Tesei,
2008). Enron demise in December 2001 was the one that brought for the first time into
spotlight the activity of CRAs; Enron enjoyed investment grade rating until four days
before it declared bankruptcy. Its business strategy and financial structures, especially
the out-of-balance-sheet investment vehicles, were focused only on maintaining a high
rating (Mishkin, Stanley, 2006). US Congress Committee in charge with investigating
Enron bankruptcy concluded that CRAs showed „… a disappointing lack of
involvement in assessing and managing company’ risks…”
As a consequence, US government passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act which
mandated US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue The Role and
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Conflicts of interest’s management within credit rating agencies
Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets. This
report has two parts:
The first part identifies the potential sources of conflicts of interest within
CRAs (SEC, 2003);
The second part proposes possible remedies for those conflicts (SEC,
2003).
The conclusions of the report were the fundament for the further regulations
within the rating activity and tried to answer the following questions:
Should CRAs make public more information regarding the fundaments
their decisions or the creditworthiness of the companies rated?
Should improved procedures be put in place in order to prevent and
eliminate potential conflicts of interest?
Should ratings be taken into consideration when issuing new regulation?
Should the current regulations regarding CRAs be changed?
CRAs play an important role in decreasing information asymmetry on the
capital markets. These asymmetries take place due to the fact that potential investors
lack the information or the capacity to asses properly the creditworthiness of the
issuers. The issuers know all the details about the financial instruments they want to
sell but they don’t want to share them with the potential investors.
CRAs act as delegate monitors for the investors; some of their main
advantages are as following:
They can allocate more resources than individual investors and they have
the expertise in assessing the creditworthiness of the issuers;
They have access to information which are not available to the general
public;
If they are perceived as independent their ratings will have a bigger
influence on the market.
If CRAs are used by a bigger number of investors, they can avoid a part of the
costs involved by multiplying the information. If each individual investor will be
capable of performing the proper analysis, it will be a waste of resources from the
social standpoint. Companies are willing to share confidential information with CRAs
based on the assumption that the last ones, taking into account the fact that they don’t
own shares of that respective company will use the information only to set up the
proper rating for the company, rating which will be available for all the market
participants at the same time. The lack of direct financial involvement makes CRAs’
reports more valuable and a good reputation is a premise for an independent and
correct assessment of the soundness of a financial institution.
Before 1970, CRAs revenues were exclusively obtained from the
subscriptions of those willing to acquire data regarding companies’ ratings. In 1970’s,
main CRAs began asking for fees from those who wanted their issues to be rated. The
answer to the question if there are real conflicts of interest in this way of conducting
business can be found in the information asymmetry problem. Technological changes,
like the possibility of making photocopies at a very low cost, made relatively easy
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Management & Marketing
information distribution. Market participants were capable of acquiring information
regarding various ratings without having to pay for it; “free-rider” problem became a
widespread issue. Following these facts, CRAs weren’t able to get the same amount of
revenues from selling the information regarding the ratings they issued; the solution of
the problem was to ask issuers to pay for the ratings, a business model that still stands
nowadays.
CRAs were always perceived as an important tool in the hand of investors;
ratings were used by investors as methods of evaluating the soundness of financial
instruments they were interested in. The debtors, so-called blue-chips, are the potential
beneficiaries of a functional rating system; as long as information asymmetry exists,
the blue-chips debtors will face problems in certifying the quality of their liabilities
and will be forced to pay a premium to the investors to compensate for the uncertainty
that dominates this issue. An independent and reliable assessment will allow this
quality to be certified thus lowering the cost of financing. There might be an incentive
for the issuers of medium quality instruments not to put that much weight on the rating
process; once a high quality issue has been rated, all the issuers whose instruments fall
below this category will not be interested in having them rated. The regulators, as part
of the oversight of financial intermediaries, have taken action to ensure that the rating
process works properly. They want to monitor financial intermediaries so that:
The risks taken by the last ones are properly assessed, managed and
disseminated;
There is sufficient capital to cover the risks and protect certain classes of
investors (e.g. savings accounts owners).
A rating has the advantage of being the simplest modality of an independent
assessment of financial creditworthiness. This advantage will be useless if the
information acquired will not be trusted when:
CRAs will duplicate information obtained from other sources;
Their assessment will be biased;
The confidence in these assessments will come due to a special status
given by regulators, thus hurting CRAs’ independence.
When assessing the creditworthiness of a company, information asymmetry
implies the fact that both issuer and investor have a common interest in rating that
specific issue. Even though only issuers pay for this service, at the moment when it
benefits from a standardized rating, the investors are willing to accept a lower yield;
thus the issuers can use the difference to pay for the services provided by the rating
agencies.
Even though the above mentioned arguments explain how rating agencies did
manage to replace the business model based on subscriptions with the one based
solely on fees paid by issuers, they cannot explain with accuracy the following
evidences:
Why the main agencies (Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s) keep rating
almost all issues outstanding irrespective to whether they were made on a
contract basis or free of charge;
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Conflicts of interest’s management within credit rating agencies
Why almost 98% of the issuers whose issues were rated paid for this
service1 (Crocket, Harris, Mishkin, White, 2003).
A reasonable explanation could be that issuers are afraid that lack of fees will
imply a lower rating. SEC reported that series of cases where CRAs were charged for
using their privileged position in their relationship with certain issuers in order to
determine the latter to pay for rating services; in the end, there were no convictions in
this respect. Even in the absence of this kind of behavior from CRAs there are some
other reasons that made issuers pay for ratings; we mention here the case when a
company has knowledge of some information that favors its future issues but is not
capable or unwilling to make it public. When this information is sent to a rating
agency, the last one will have a positive feedback by issuing a favorable rating,
without sharing that confidential information with the market. The companies which
pay for ratings will have access to future similar services and, by supplying additional
information, will positively influence further ratings.
Another aspect worth mentioning is the legal framework set up by the
policymakers regarding CRAs activity and the certifications an agency will have to
obtain in order to activate within this field. Even though at the very beginning there
were no formal regulations regarding rating process, once the market developed a new
type of risk evolved: rating shopping. In 1975 SEC introduced the “nationally
recognized statistical rating” concept; the fact that some agencies got this recognition
influenced the competitive structure of the industry. At this moment there are only
three agencies descending from those established a century ago; this degree of
concentration is a reflection of the benefits of economies of scale and scope and it
reflects industry’ access barriers.
Just because at this moment ratings are heavily used and the issuers are
willing to pay to use them doesn’t necessary imply the fact that CRAs bring new value
by offering these services. Market practices and regulatory oversight can generate a
high demand for ratings but this is independent of the effective value of the ratings. In
analyzing CRAs contributions some other methods of assessing the quality of the
ratings should be used; one of them could be rating accuracy. A rating is a method
which assesses the probability that an entity will meet its payment obligations and the
correlation between ratings and historical default probabilities represents one of the
main methods of assessment. Evidence (Federal Deposit Insurance Company Working
Papers Series, 2002) suggests the fact that, in spite of cases like Enron, there is a close
connection between ratings and default probabilities. As we can see in the table below,
default probabilities are inverse correlated with ratings (the higher the rating, the lower
the risk of default):
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Table 1
Correlation between ratings and default probabilities
S&P’s
rating
AAA
AA+
AA
AAA+
A
ABBB+
BBB
BBBBB+
BB
BBB+
B
B-
Historical default
probability between
1981–1999 (%)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.02
0.05
0.03
0.13
0.22
0.29
0.57
0.89
1.14
2.66
8.46
10.19
Default probability
rate in 2000 (%)
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.07
0.09
0.13
0.18
0.31
0.53
0.93
1.57
2.64
4.46
7.52
Source: Brand, Bahar, 1999, p. 15; Wyman & Company, 2000, p. 29.
In spite of these evidences, the above correlations cannot assess the value of
the information provided by CRAs:
In the first place, these correlations don’t show how much ratings add
value on top of some other indicators of credit quality (e.g. interest rate
spreads or analysts’ research). Some analysis show the fact that their value
added can be even smaller taking into account the fact that few
professionals are involved in rating process (at Moody’s, an analyst is in
charge with no less that 35 issues) (Partnoy, 1999);
In the second place, while the rating is a reflection of default risk at a
certain moment in time, the correlation between ratings and default
probabilities can change over time thus making rating more and more
inaccurate. If a rating should assess default probability, their correlation
should be stable.
A sound proof that the market values ratings can be found in the way it reacts
to rating changes. If ratings offer additional information to that already existed in the
market and reflected in the actual capital market prices, is to be expected that market
will act accordingly to changes in ratings; as we can see in the below table, ratings are
not even distributed for changes in ratings (Jorion, Zhang, 2006):
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Conflicts of interest’s management within credit rating agencies
Tabel 2
Ratings distribution
Rating
category
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total
Rating decrease
Starting from
No.
AAA and AA
46
A
182
BBB
238
BB
155
B
388
Below B
186
1.195
%
3.85
15.23
19.92
12.97
32.47
15.56
100.00
Rating increase
Starting from
No.
A
BBB
BB
B
Below B
38
74
97
125
27
361
%
10.53
20.50
26.87
34.63
7.48
100.00
In the case of rating decrease, 15.56% of the sample is rated below B; similar,
the percentage is 7.48% for rating increase. In fact, for more accuracy, the comparison
should be made between a decrease of a certain category and an increase of the next
inferior one. For example, taking into consideration a decrease from B to CCC, the
equivalent is from CCC to B and the respective percentages are 32.47% for decrease
and 7.48% for increase.
Another problem which arises is that of the reciprocal influence between
rating change and the quality of an issue; a rating decrease doesn’t necessary means a
lowering in the creditworthiness of an issue but it may for sure be a cause a future
increase in the cost of debt for the respective company. We have to take into account
that in last years ratings were used as covenants in some issues and a change in rating
can lead to a change in the underlying contract; these triggers played an important role
in the bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom. A rating decrease will lead to a
worsening perspective on the creditworthiness of a company more than a gloomier
forecast will do after being identified by the rating agency and disseminate to the
market.
A powerful example regarding ratings influence is the one from 1982, when
Moody’s tripled the number of outstanding rating categories adding „+” and „-” as
suffixes to its existent ratings (Liu, Seyyed, Smith, 2003). Even though falling into
one of the new categories didn’t mean an effective change in creditworthiness of the
respective issues, the market perceived the change as a flow of new information in the
market. This perception determined price fluctuation on capital markets which stands
a strong proof that market values ratings.
Potential conflicts of interest in rating industry are created by the fact that
there are several end users of ratings whose interests can diverge on the short run.
Investors are interested in unbiased assessments of new issues while issuers are
interested in favorable ratings that will allow them to get a cheaper cost of financing.
Regulators are interested in:
A stable correlation between ratings and default probabilities;
Avoiding moral hazard;
Promoting a competitive environment.
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Rating agencies, as profit focused entities, have their own interest in
maximizing profits and market share, which creates itself a potential conflict of
interest. As mentioned previously, the business model based on fees represents a
conflict of interest; CRAs could be susceptible of according favorable ratings in quest
for new sources of income. Taking into account that the majority of bond issues are
rated and disseminated to the market even if issuers didn’t ask or pay for it, the
following question is raised: for what do issuers think they pay fees? Only the idea of
a charging a fee in exchange for favorable rating would jeopardize CRAs activity by
hurting their reputation.
There is a low probability that a conflict of interest will show up that
obviously to the market, like we can see in the following example (Butler, Rodgers,
2003). In 1992 Jefferson County - Colorado School District case draw public attention
regarding potential conflicts of interest within rating agencies. In October that year
Jefferson County hired Standard & Poor’s to rate its new bond issue; the rating given
was AA. At the same time, Moody’s gave an A2 unsolicited rating, rating which was
far lower than that given by Standard & Poor’s. As a consequence, Jefferson County
brought Moody’s in court, claiming that the last one issued an unsolicited report
containing an inferior rating following the fact that their services weren’t demanded.
Jefferson County asked for charges amounting $770.000, the equivalent of the
additional cost of financing of the respective issue. Moody’s rejected all charges
claiming that according to the Fifth Amendment has the right to freely express its
opinion even though this might affect the business of a company. SEC initiated an
inquiry to verify if Moody’s action was strictly addressed to Jefferson County or was a
common practice within the agency. One of the measures taken by SEC, following an
investigation of the US Department of Justice, was that CRAs were forced to make
public whether the ratings were solicited or not.
We can identify two mechanisms that can generate conflicts of interest:
The first one is tied to analysts compensations; they are paid in respect
with the volume of ratings they issue thus being stimulated to rate as
many issues as possible which can lead to a lax attitude regarding rating
process;
The second one is tied to the bias analysts have when rating an issue
after the financial stimulus has disappear. Within an experiment (Butler,
Rodgers, 2003), an agent was involved in a transaction as a supporter of
one part and then placed in a position where it didn’t have direct
financial involvement and asked to judge objectively. The evidence
showed that the agents tend to adopt o position favorable for the part
they initially worked for.
Another potential source of conflicts is that CRAs started providing auxiliary
services like debt structuring, services whose main goal is to lower the cost of
financing; these services are similar to those provided by audit firms. CRAs began
experimenting this field as a result of the increase demand from companies looking to
structure its debt so it can achieve a higher rating. If CRAs are paid for these kinds of
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Conflicts of interest’s management within credit rating agencies
services and at the same time they are rating providers, they will be put in the situation
of evaluating their own work.
A conflict of interest can be found in the weight put by the existing legislation
on ratings seen as standardized methods of evaluating creditworthiness of a company.
In the race for the best rating, issuers are tempted to choose the agency that offers then
the highest one (White, 2004, p. 8). For agencies, the weight put on ratings as
benchmarks for financial contracts shows their importance and recognize the value of
their work. On the other hand, using ratings as contracts covenants can imply too
much importance given to this kind of assessment, putting their accuracy and
efficiency on the second plan.
The degree of concentration of the industry is a possible source of conflicts. In
US for example, there are few agencies recognized by the supervisory forum
(Vincentelli, 2007, p. 16) and, out of those, two have a significant market share:
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s Investor Service. The combination between the
economy of scale and regulatory requirements is in favor of the oligopoly created by
these two agencies and represents a barrier hard to overcome by competitors.
Scarce competition has double effect in the industry:
On one side, it reduces conflicts of interest because the agencies, by
lacking competition, will be less under the presure of gaining market
share; aditional clients are to come if agency’s reputation remains intact;
On the other side, as long as they have a strong position within the
industry, agencies might not have the strongest incentives to provide
clients with the best services. They could allocate less resources in the
rating process (calitative and quantitative) than their fees will worth.
Agencies’ profit margin is very big (almost 50% in Moody’s case) which
allow us to see a gap between the services provided and fees paid for it.
The recent global financial crisis which started in the middle of 2007 had its
roots in the US subprime crisis and threatened the financial stability of the main
investment bank in US (e.g. Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs etc),
of some European banks (e.g. Fortis, ABN Amro etc), of the biggest insurance
company (e.g. AIG) and to a series of financial institutions whose main field was
providing mortgages (e.g. Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac, Northern Rock etc.), thus starting
a spiral of negative expectations followed by a dramatic fall of stock exchange indices.
The subprime loans were the product of the demand for financing from people
with bad loan record and carried a higher interest rate than the average loans; the
higher interest rate charged is a reflection of the higher default probability. The
outstanding volume of the subprime loans was estimated to $1.300 billion. In 2007,
the subprime loans amounted roughly 6.8% of the mortgage market (the percentage
was 10% between 2001 – 2003 and 18% – 21% between 2004 – 2006)
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subprime_mortgage_crisis). Only between October 2007
– March 2008 CRAs downgraded a series of mortgage back securities whose value
was around $1,9 billion as seen in the graph below.
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Management & Marketing
mld. $
Scaderile ratingurilor
instrumentelor
Decreases
in ratings ce aveau
caofsuport
creditele
ipotecare
mortgage backed
securities
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
841
739
237
85
Q3 07
Q4 07
Q1 08
Q2 08
Trimestrul
Quarter
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_rating_agencies_and_the_subprime_crisis, Accessed
on April 12, 2009
Figure 1. Decreases in ratings of mortgage backed securities
Until July 2008, Standard & Poor’s downgraded 902 tranches of financial
instruments and collateralized debt obligations backed by American mortgages which
originally carried AAA rating; following this action, for 466 out of those instruments,
the new rating attached was a speculative one.
A study issued by Fitch showed that 97% of debt structures defaults were
among companies with US background (Mason, Rosner, 2007). The outstanding
volume of US mortgages owned by persons with bad loan record grew from $35
billion in 1994 to $625 billion in 2005. The brokerage fees of the companies that
structured, sold and traded these instruments were huge, thus implying that rating
agencies took their part of the profit. For example, Moody’s revenues grew from $159
million in 2000 to $705 million in 2006, most of the part due to debt structuring
services (McLean, 2007).
The hearings of the oversight committee of the rating agencies revealed that
the top managers of the main agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch –
earned bonuses in 2008 of around $80 million while the ratings issued by the
companies they lead deceived investors whose wealth was reduced by billions of
USD. The value of the mortgage backed securities with AAA rating, considered to be
the safest one, drop with 70% between January 2007 and December 2008 (London
Summit, 2009).
Confidential reports analyzed by the Waxman Committee and made public
during the hearings of the oversight committee of rating agencies indicate that
agencies’ executive members were aware all the time of the precarious value of the
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Conflicts of interest’s management within credit rating agencies
ratings issued. An internal email from an employee of a rating agency stated that “…it
could be structured by cows and we would rate it” and „…let's hope we are all
wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters” (Pelosi, 2008).
Investment banks that securitized these high-risk carrying loans looked for
solutions to get rid of them out of their balance sheets and the most appropriate
investors found were pension funds and insurance companies; one drawback of the
deal is that the last ones could only invest in instruments which carry an investment
grade rating. To meet this requirement, a series of mortgage backed securities were
created, their success depending only on the rating they carried. CRAs role became
crucial in this process and they got more involved taking into account that they were
charging fees from issuers to get their issues rated.
CRAs role wasn’t a passive one and limited in expressing only an opinion on
the creditworthiness of an issuer. According to them (Lacroix, 2007), their role was an
iterative and interactive one and consisted in informing issuers on the requirements
needed to achieve the desired ratings for their issues and, on a broad measure, the
recommendation of a debt structuring that help issuers in getting the desired rating. In
other words, CRAs helped issuers to obtain ratings that will allow them to sell the
instruments to unadvised institutional investors.
„These fears can be justified only in a market where there are an important
number of players which will lead to a more relaxed approach towards rating process
in order to attract customers. As long as there are strict defined criteria of authorizing
and regulating CRAs and a proper monitoring from specialized institutions, we
believe that an objective assessment can be ensured to reach a higher professional
standard. Thus it is less likely to believe that big international companies, like Coface,
will risk their reputations by issuing ratings unrelated to the real creditworthiness of a
debtor” was Coface answer, the only CRA with a subsidiary in Romania, to the fears
of European Union regarding the efficiency of the rating agencies’ business model
based on fees (Vasilache, 2008).
In November 2008 the European Commission approved the reform which
stated that all CRAs that activate on European territory will be forced to adopt
Brussels’ regulatory requirements. Alongside with the obligation of disseminating the
methodologies, models and hypothesis assumed when assessing the creditworthiness
of a debt, the agencies will also be under the supervision of a series of monitors
appointed by the European Commission. CRAs will have to prove that there are no
conflicts of interest involved when performing a rating process and to make public
which are the first 20 clients ranked by the amount of fees paid. The new directive will
also ban CRAs in providing consultancy services, thus Europe making the first step
without waiting for Washington’s one. “The new regulations were made in such a way
so that they can insure high quality ratings which will be conflicts of interest free”
European Committee stated while raising subjectivism charges on agencies like
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch.
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„Rating agencies will need authorizations if they want to operate on EU
territory; the existing regulations, voluntarily accepted by companies, are insufficient.
I want Europe to be pioneer in the field. These rules are necessary for reestablishing
market confidence towards rating process” said EU Competition commissioner
Charles McCreevy, in a statement where it added that each of the 27 EU members will
assign an authority to implement this regulation (Gow, 2008). Under the new rules,
agencies will be made responsible for their publicly released opinions and could face
EU sanctions when unprofessional behavior in the rating process is proven; in order to
become a law, the proposal needs European Parliament vote.
In the local market these issues were handled by the National Securities
Commission who issued a series of instructions which, in conformity with the
Commissions’ Act no. 297/2004 regarding capital markets establishes the criteria
rating agencies have to meet in order to be able to assess financial creditworthiness
and to rate financial instruments or issuers on the Romanian capital markets (Official
Monitor no. 515, 2007):
Quality and integrity of the rating process;
Rating agencies’ independence and conflicts of interest avoidance;
CRAs’ responsibility towards investors and issuers;
Creation of a code of conduct in the field;
Shareholders’ independence and moral integrity;
Rating decision fundaments and its organizational structure.
A series of names in the financial environment like Wilbur Ross, recognized
as a rescuer of bankrupt companies, consider that short sellers played an important
role in the current financial crisis, but the big part of the blame lay on rating agencies’
shoulders which rated companies’ stocks and their credit default swaps (Chasan,
Ablan, 2008); as those ratings are public information, he even questions the reason of
CRAs’ existence. At the moment when investors sell short a stock and its price falls,
CRAs will assume that is something fundamental in the movement and will have to
include this information in the rating process. This downgrading leads to a series of
events whose finality is that financial institutions and companies will have to pay
more for raising additional capital which can lead in the end to their demise.
The conflict of interest that arises from the fact that issuers pay for ratings is
even stronger as they are the main beneficiaries of the ratings and not the investors.
Recent studies (Bolton, Freixas, Shapiro, 2008, p. 2) tried to issue a series of proposals
for eliminating conflicts of interest within the field but results weren’t conclusive:
A bigger number of agencies will intensify competition but will offer
more opportunities for issuers shopping for better ratings;
Advance payment of rating services will raise chances of a fair rating but
will not stop investors to shop for ratings;
Switching to the model of ratings being paid by investors – as in US
before 1970 – will raise “free-rider” problem.
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Conflicts of interest’s management within credit rating agencies
Financial Stability Forum report issued in March 2009 (London Summit,
2009), as a foreword of G20 Summit held in London same year in April, proposed a
series of solutions regarding rating activity:
Enhancing oversight on CRAs’ activity in order to prevent conflicts of
interest;
A more strict internal regulation within CRAs to insure that the
methodologies used in the rating process are viable;
Separation between rating activities and other business lines within CRAs
(i.e. consultancy on debt structuring);
Restricting any link between managers’ compensations and their
department performance;
Dissemination of the information that constitutes the fundament of the
rating process.
3. Conclusions
Practice shows the fact that even though conflicts of interest exists, they
are hard to exploit; market can offer incentive for agencies to limit their actions
that can create conflicts but can also reduce the value of their services when
there is evidence of conflicts. As a reply, financial services providers issue
internal regulations to reduce the incentives to exploit conflicts, trying to
minimize reputational risk.
One of the factors that contributed to blaming CRAs as the main drivers
of the actual financial crisis was the conflict of interest through which the
agencies, who were supposed to disseminate to the general public trustful
information, had interest in hiding or distorting the reality for their own
personal gain. The methods used for assessing the risks embedded by the new
financial structures issued by companies left room for arguments and induced a
suspicion regarding the methodology used in the rating process.
Where conflicts were evident and perceived accordingly by the market,
their exploitation will imply a reputational risk for the respective company
whose demand for its services will decrease, thus its profitability. On the long
run, losing its reputation represents a risk big enough for the company to try to
avoid but on the short run this fact depends only on company’s transparency
and its internal compensational structure. This fact can be found within CRAs
that charge issuers fees for ratings; on short term, CRAs have the incentive to
increase its customer base by giving them better ratings, thus helping the last
ones to finance cheaper on capital markets. This business approach will lead
inevitably to a loss in reputation making CRAs services less valuable.
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Management & Marketing
Another issue brought into spotlight by the recent financial crisis is that
of the compensation mechanism of the personnel involved. Compensational
structure within a company, if not properly assessed, will lead not only to
conflicts of interest but to firm failure.
As a conclusion of this paper and its underlying evidences, a series of
recommendations can be made regarding control and elimination of conflicts of
interest:
Enhancing transparency towards the potential conflicts of interest
within rating agencies;
Issuing codes of conduct within agencies in cooperation with
regulators;
Enhance oversight of the activities that show evidence of exploiting
conflicts of interest.
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