Anderson's Guerrillas

Raquepo, Veronica Festin, Aegina Joy Donila, Karen Joy University of the Philippines Manila October 2012 ANDERSON GUERRILLAS I. Table of Events WHAT WHEN WHERE WHO WHY HOW Governor Vinzons December Bicol Region Governor To recapture the Vinzons reinforced rallied the scattered 1941 Wenceslao Q. provincial capital the scattered PHILIPPINES’ DEFENSE CAMPAIGN (DEC. 8, 1941 – MAY 6, 1942) USAFFE remnants Vinzons remnants with civilian volunteers, established radio contact with the USAFFE headquarters and prepared offensive operations Almost successful 27 January Pampanga Lt. Col. Claude A. plan to attack the 1942 side of Mt. Thorpe, with Zambales and set up Pinatubo Capts. Ralph headquarters in McGuire and Dave Pampa-ga side of Mt. Milles, Lts. Robert Pinatubo and were B. Lapham and later on joined by Charles Cushing, Barber’s group enemy from the rear To attack the enemy They sneaked out to several American soldiers, and ten Filipinos Landing of The group would commando team as 27 March, part of launching 1942 Balayan, Col. Narciso Batangas Manzano and his strike at the rear of team the Japanese artillery guerrilla warfare To attack the enemy proceed overland to (failed due to a positions before firing Japanese war at Corregidor vessel’s interception) PHILIPPINE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT (MAY 6, 1942 – OCTOBER, 1944) First General Order 15 May 1942 Luzon Lt. Col. Claude A. To unite all Guerrilla Thorpe issued his first Thorpe forces in Luzon General Order San Luis area Captain Barker, To absorb the Barker, Bernard and in Pampanga Captain Bernard organization into the Pettitt travelled to the HUKBALAHAP and Anderson, 2nd Lt. USAFFE guerrillas Central Plains of Captain Barker Bert E. Pettitt; assuming command of all the Guerrilla Forces in Luzon Conference between June 1942 Luzon HUKBALAHAP representatives – Juan Feleo, Casto Alejandrino, Sampang, Armando Castillo, Luis Taruc Organization of July 1942 Highlands of Anderson and To convince the Anderson travelled to squadrons of Biak-na-Bato, some of the town’s people to create San Miguel and guerrillas San Miguel leading groups that would be persuaded the personalities – of assistance during leading personalities Cabo Chan, Jose the war of the area; the group Maniquez, expanded their efforts Evangelistam to nearby Tayabas Gonzales, province Hernandez, etc. Activation of the 29th Guerrilla Squadron 3 July 1942 East Central Barker, Jaime H. To participate in the Barker officially Luzon Area Manzano war activated the 29th Guerrilla Squadron even though it was already active two months back Report to Thorpe 4 July 1942 Zambales Barker To report the results Barker went back to of his contacts with Zambales, left behind other guerrilla groups Anderson ad Pettitt to organize additional units Three Sorties / 11 July 1942 Raid San Isidro, 29th Guerrilla To rid the area of Some of them Nueva Ecija Squadron weapons / to disguised as confiscate weapons Japanese soldiers, others as farmers and established a checkpoint on the highway near Gapan Offensive initiation 1 September by the Japanese to 1942 Near Bantug Japanese soldiers, To relieve the area of Some 1500 enemy 29th Guerrilla Guerrilla force troops attacked the the 29th Guerrilla Squadron Squadron members Thorpe’s Capture by the Enemy October 1942 29th’s position Santa Juliana, Thorpe, Japanese Thorpe was betrayed Three of his trusted Tarlac soldiers by three of his men men betrayed Thorpe probably because they disliked him 29th Guerrilla October to Along 29th Guerrilla To harass the enemy They destroyed as Squadron’s attacks November 1942 Bongabong- Squadron and somehow many bridges as Laur-Dingalan members weaken them possible. highway Formation of the April 23, 1943 – Anderson’s December 1943 Anderson assigned Mauban Bernard Anderson Guerrilla Anderson was Capt. Domingo Reyes impressed by the as commanding loyalty of the people officer for Mauban, and temporarily gave Capt. Primo Algaga up on his trip to for Lucena, major Australia Nonito Alonso for Tayabas and Lucban, and Capt. Domiciano Ramiro for Pagbilao. Arrival of Col. Jay D. Vanderpool and Major George Miller (with a demolition group, a signal group, and a November 2, Rizal, Tayabas 1944 – Rizal boundary Col. Jay D. Vanderpool And Major George Miller To coordinate guerrilla activities between warring guerrilla units on Luzon. Vanderpool set up his headquarters with the HUNTERS ROTC in Rizal while Miller located himself with the Marking’s guerrillas weather group) in the TayabasRizal Boundary Anderson deployed troops in Infanta,  Operations of the First Anderson Battalion during the liberation campaign  Filipinos The lie low order January 1945 issued by GHQ – December SWPA was lifted 1945 and the general East coast of Luzon Anderson’s instructions of Guerrillas GHQ, SWPA could be summarized in liberated the three words : country combat, sabotage, and intelligence Dingalan Area and Polillo Island; Enemy garrisons were subjected to continuous air bombardment; 7000 civilians were transported from Polillo to Infanta; Attacks were initiated on Infanta, Palanan (Isabela), Casiguran and Mauban II. Events Thorpe’s Attempt in Uniting all Guerrilla Forces in Luzon Isolated USAFFE units in Northern Luzon had been in contact with Gen. MacArthur’s headquarters. These units were instructed to conduct full-scale warfare behind enemy lines. These attempts were done before Bataan and Corregidor passed into history. The spirit of resistance was made known all over Luzon. While fighting was going on in Bataan, Gen. MacArthur thought of launching guerrilla warfare and soon, plans were made for the landing of a commando team under Col. Narciso Manzano at Balayan, Batangas. This team left Cabcaban, Bataan on 27 March, 1942 but was interrupted by a Japanese war vessel which forced them to return. Another plan almost succeeded in attacking the enemy from the rear. On 27 January, 1942, Lt. Col. Claude A. Thorpe, with Capts. Ralph McGuire and Dave Milles, Lts. Robert B. Lapham and Charles Cushing, several American soldiers, and ten Filipinos sneaked out to Zambales and set up headquarters on the Pampanga side of Mt. Pinatubo. Soon, they were joined by another group under Major L. E. Barber. While these parties were still organizing their guerrilla units, Bataan fell. During the surrender of Corregidor, Thorpe issued orders to disband the units but fortunately, most of the members decided to take part on the war. Officers and enlisted men who managed to escape from Bataan found their way to various points in Luzon and reached Thorpe’s headquarters. Among them were Capts. Joseph R. Barker II and Bernard L. Anderson and Lts. Edwin P. Ramsey and Bert E. Pettitt. Thorpe was induced to reorganize his unit and on 15 May, 1942, he issued his first General Order wherein he assumed command of all the Guerrilla Forces in Luzon. Luzon was then divided into four major military areas with squadron as the smallest unit (equivalent to 125 men). The areas with their commanding officers were: North Luzon Area (consisting of the areas north of Pangasinan, Tayabas and Nueva Ecija) – Major Ralph Praeger South Central Luzon Area – Capt. Jack Spies East Central Luzon Area (consisting of the areas between North Luzon and South Central Luzon Areas including Manila, and bounded on the East by Tayabas and on the West by Zambales) – Capt. Joseph R. Barker II West Central Luzon Area (consisting of Zambales and Bataan provinces) – Captain Ralph McGuire The selection of commanding officers was a mistake committed by Thorpe. Only Praeger and Barker proved to be a splendid, professional soldier and were appreciated and loved by the Filipinos they worked with. The other two deemed themselves of higher priority than the Filipinos and were very high-handed in dealing with their comrades. Another mistake was Thorpe’s attitude which was lack of interest in the resistance movement. Barker turned out to be the moving-spirit of the movement. In October 1942, while in Tarlac, Thorpe was betrayed by three of his men and he was caught by the Japanese and his execution followed afterwards. Even Barker was captured by the enemies in early 1943 which was considered as the greatest blow to the movement. The loss of Barker resulted to the division of the USAFFE Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces to move in various independent operating groups. Organization of Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces / Contact with other Units When Capt. Barker proceeded to the Central Plains of Luzon to organize guerrillas, he brought with him Capt. Bernard L. Anderson and Lt. Bert E. Pettitt. Their first contact was with the Hukbalahaps who refused to be under or included in Barker’s organization though they promised optimal cooperation. The three proceeded to Manalili where Capt. Barker came across a guerrilla group of 300 USAFFE personnel under Capt. Jaime H. Manzano. They were the established 29th Guerrilla Squadron designated as the combat team for East Central Luzon Area. Barker officially activated them on 3 July, 1942 though they had been working for two months already. Before leaving, Barker ordered the 29ths to raid all municipalities and confiscate all weapons. The 29ths raided San Ildefonso on 3 September and San Isidro, Nueva Ecija on 11 July. However, on the first day of September that year, the Japanese initiated an offensive against them and 29ths were greatly outnumbered so they withdrew to the mountains of Sta. Rose and established headquarters at Tabuating, Nueva Ecija. Here, they received orders from Anderson to harass the enemy along the Bongabong-Laur-Dingalan highway and to destroy as many bridges as possible. From October to November, they did so with success but in the process, incurred casualties due to malaria. Finally, in December, Anderson ordered them to his units for recuperation and reorganization. Formation of Anderson Guerrillas The tragedy of Capt. Barker’s capture by the enemy resulted to Anderson’s assuming command of the USAFFE Luzon Guerrilla Forces by virtue of his seniority. The responsibility left behind by Barker came to the hands of Anderson in February 1943. Soon enough, Anderson realized that it is impractical to pursue a unified command due to lack of communication, and he only found himself in control only of the guerrilla forces in Bulacan and part of Manila. Lts. Lapham and Ramsey recognized his authority and turned over their commands to him. However, contact was not permanent and was not established and they remained as independent commands. Anderson designated Capt. Manzano as his Executive Officer and Lt. Pettitt as his adjustant. On 23 February, 1943, the Japanese attacked Anderson’s camp but he was able to withdraw into the interior with his men all thanks to he heroism of the men under Capt. Manuel Cabo Chan. Anderson moved to the Angat Iron Mines where he was contacted by Alberto Guerrero who offered his unit operating in Dingalon-Sabani area in Nueva Ecija, and Pedro Viudez who was given command of new units in the San Ildefonso Sector. Guerrerro was designated as commanding officer of some 400 troops in his area. In this period, the Japanese were very active in the Anggat Area and they succeeded in capturing 500 guerrillas. Because of the gravity of the situation, provisions for one week supply were gathered and accompanied by Capt. Manzao, Lt. Pettitt and Sgts. Joyo and Gono. Anderson left for the east coast of Luzon hoping to proceed to Australia by hopping from island to island. The group left the Angat Iron Mines on 19 March, 1943 and stayed at Redor’s headquarters for 2 days. Anderson still persisted with the idea of going to Australia. After procuring guides, he then headed for Mauban, reaching Luya-luya by sailboat on 8 April, 1943. While staying at Roman Almera’s house, he was contacted by Capt. Domingo A. Reyes who urged him to organize guerrillas in that area with claims of loyalty by the people. Impressed with the picture presented by Reyes, Anderson agreed and temporarily gave up going to Australia. Anderson assigned Reyes as commanding officer for Mauban, Capt. Primo Algaga for Lucena, Major Nonito Alonso for Tayabas and Lucban, amd Capt. Domiciano Ramiro for Pagbilao. The people’s response to the movement was extraordinary. Anderson was able to re-establish contacts with Manila units in no time. He also succeeded in launching liaison with the guerrilla leaders in Sorsogon and Bicol Area and the leaders of the ROTC, PQOG and Hukbalahap. Representatives of guerrilla groups reported to Anderson and new units were activated. A Southern Nueva Ecija Sector was formed and subdivided into the San Isidro, Sta. Rosa, and Cabanatuan Sectors. On 7 August 1943, a unit in Batangas was activated under the command of Major Nicasio Mascenon. On 1 November 1943, Lt. Ramsey was assigned by Anderson as the Commanding Officer of the Pangasinan-Tarlac area. The constabulary troops in Nueva Ecija under Col. Godofredo Monsod asked to join Anderson’s guerrillas on 4 December, 1943. On 21 December, 1943, Capt. Alejo Santos was assigned to the Bulacan Military Army as Commanding Officer with Lt. Pedro Viudez as his Chief of Staff. BMA claimed to have 20 000 members. By the end of 1943, Anderson had a considerable force that was effective in assisting any liberation force that the Allies may send to the country. Contacts with Australia and a mysterious CIO-12 In November 1943, Lt. Edgardo del Castillo reported that he had contacted a person claiming to be a representative of Gen. MacArthur. This person was allegedly an intelligence operative called CIO-12 with the mission of coordinating the intelligence network of the various units operating in Manila. Since he claimed to have contact with GHQ, SWPA, Anderson was elated thinking that he had finally set up contact with Gen. MacArthur. He exchanged communications with CIO-12 who seemed to have a good knowledge of the guerrilla affairs in the Philippines. CIO-12 readily sent funds and supplies on several occasions when Anderson would ask for aids. What impressed Anderson was a tabloid written by CIO-12 that attacked the Japanese vehemently. Anderson was convinced that CIO-12 was of good intention and he even had occasional meetings with him. This proved to be disastrous when CIO-12 was captured by the Japanese and tortured for information. CIO-12 broke down and gave information about the guerrillas which led to the suffering of many people. Until the end of 1943, Anderson had no contact with GHQ, SWPA. His organization of about 15 000 combat troops and 40 000 civilian home-guards, though valuable in terms of intelligence unit, was pretty much useless since they don’t have enough equipment. Since weapons and equipment were in short supply, the best place to obtain needed materials was from the enemy so men from the guerrilla bands worked for the Japanese and would steal radio and generator parts, piece by piece. They would then reassemble these pieces in the mountains. Their first objective was to contact Allied Forces. They used a generator fuelled with coconut oil and Anderson was able to send out his first message to be received in Australia. However, the Allies did not believe him and assumed it was just the Japanese playing tricks on them. Anderson used his most foul words to convince the Allies that he was not the enemy but they did not believe him still. On 13 February 1944, Col. Wendell W. Fertig’s liaison officer Capt. Antonio Montalvan arrived at Anderson’s headquarters and arrangement was made for Anderson to send representatives at Fertig’s headquarters. He sent a group composed of Lts. Schoffer and Pettitt and Sgt. Maruo Prieto in April 1944 and the group left for Mindanao. While waiting for his representatives’ return, Anderson received “lie-low” orders of Gen. MacArthur through Lt. Antonio C. L. Bello who arrived from Fertig’s headquarters. The message served as guidance for Anderson’s troops to concentrate on intelligence gathering and operations. No combat was to be executed except for defense and for the combat troops to act as security guards. Trainings will be continued and procurement of food supply was also given priority. Anderson learned about the radio station set up by an Allied Intelligence Bureau team under Lt. Robert Stahl in the Bondoc Peninsula and he dispatched post haste couriers to Bondoc with messages for GHQ, SWPA, and Col. Fertig in April 1944. At long last, communication and contact was established with Australia. This was made easier when Anderson received a trans-receiver radio set in May 1944 from Lt. Col. Jurado in Mindanao. About this time, an AIB team from Australia arrived and established themselves at Anderson’s headquarters. The radio sets brought by the two AIB groups gave Anderson all the equipment needed for communication and contact with GHQ, SWPA. Once radio contact was established, the Allies started delivering supplies and materials to Anderson’s camp by submarine, surfacing off deserted beaches for the guerrillas to obtain and pick up weapons, food and medicine. The Guerrillas are Unleashed Under the control of Gen. MacArthur, guerrilla organizations were considered independent. The bigger units include Anderson’s Command. Anderson was in charge of commanding guerrilla units in Tayabas, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, Manila, Nueva Ecija and the Bicols as of 1 January 1945. The BMA, although considered as an independent entity continued receiving orders from Anderson. Anderson’s guerrillas in Tayabas and Laguna were commanded by Lt. Antonio C. L. Bello; Capt. Conrado Limjaco in Batangas, Major Antonio Brosas in Rizal; four separate Manila units were under Capts. A. E. Francia, Jr., Rufino Antonio, Armando Flores and one jointly commanded by Capts. Edgar Bond, Agustin Patricio; and Amado V. Hernandez and Capt. Conrado Ileto in Nueva Ecija. Bulacan remained under Alejo Santos’ command. On January 3, 1945, the long-awaited orders for armed conflict against the enemy were given. The guerrillas have now been unleashed. Sabotage was to be carried out extensively on every possible target except places specified by GHQ, SWPA. On January 5, 1945, three rifle companies with elements of Heavy Weapons company proceeded to Infanta to engage the enemy. These companies were under Capt. Romeo M. Maghirang’s command. Under Capt. Alvin J. Farretta’s command, two rifle companies with elements of Heavy Weapons proceeded from Prueba Point to the Dingalan Area. Reconnaisance troops sailed to Polillo Island under the command of Lt. Francisco Asis; a company of combat troops under Lt. Paterno Abcede operated at Mauban; and a combat company was assigned on Alabat Island under the command of Capt. Eliseo Lemi. On January 6, reports from different units to Anderson designated that the guerrilla machine had started to move at full steam. Major Barros reported the destruction of railroad tracks and bridges in the Bicol area. Lt. Hope destroyed highway bridges along the Candelaria-Lucena highway. On Polillo, Lt. Asiss had attacked and enemy signal station. In Lucena, Capt. Primo B. Alzaga had, with the help of US bombers, destroyed 4 enemr transports. In Dingalan, Capt. Farreta had laid mines which blew up bridges. On January 9, instructions were received from Gen. MacArthur about the passing of command of Anderson’s Guerrilas from GHQ, SWPA to the US Sixth Army with Gen. Walter Reneger as the commander. Upon radio contact with the Sixth Army, Anderson’s headquarters and headquarters’ troops were officialy attached to the Sixth Army. The headquarters troops were activated as the First Anderson Battalion with 2 227 officers and men. Other units under Anderson were attached to the US Army elements. Units in Tayabas and outside of the First Anderson Battalion were attached to the 1st Cavalry Division; unit in Laguna operated with the Alamo Scouts; those in Batangas were attached to the 112th Regimental Combat Team; and units in Manila and Rizal were attached to the 37th Infantry Division. The First Anderson Battalion was composed of the original men of the 29th Guerrilla Squadron. It was a combination of USAFFE and trained reservists, ifficered by combat veterans. The battalion commander was Lt. Col. Jaime Manzano and his executive officer was Major Felix Flores, a Bataan veteran. Although designated as a battalion, it actually consisted of 7 rifle companies, a Heavy Weapons company, two Military Police Companies, one Medical Company, one Signal Company, one Engineer Company, one Motor Transport Company and one Ordinance Section. Heavily equipped with weapons, this battalion had an attached 105-mm artillery battery. Companies A and B and elements of the Heavy Weapons Company under the commands of Capts. Isaac Ortiz and Fruto T. Olivera respectively were assigned to the Infanta area. The disposition of troops was effected on Compliance to orders of the Sixth Army headquarters. Company C under Lt. Paterno Abcede was assigned in Mauban and its vicinity. Company D which was under Capt. Eliseo Lemi continued their operations on Alabat Island. Company E under Capt. Pedro Alvaran was assigned to Laur-Dingalan area. Company F under Capt. Inocencio de Guzman was sent to the Bongabong-Sabana area. Company R under Capt. Ponciano Redor was assigned to cover the Agos Area in Infanta. An all-out assault against the Japanese garrison at Infanta was decided on 31 January 1945. When the three days of continuous shelling, troops of the First Anderson Battalion crossed the Agos River, while a special team led by Manzano and Maghirang crept up the enemy building. This resulted to the complete annihilation of the entire garrison. Meanwhile, Companies E and F were reducing Japanese garrisons ar Laur, Bongabong, Sabai and Dingalan. Not a single Japanese had been left alive. In February 1945, orders on liberating Polillo Island were given by the Sixth Army headquarters. Troops in the Infanta area had to be withdrawn which allowed the re-occupation of the Japanese. On February 10, the entire First Anderson Batallion except Companies A, E and F embarked on all type of boats for the Polillo operations. Hook Bay was the selected point of landing, roughly 15 miles from Solanga Point across Polillo channel. On February 19, the town in Hook Bay was promptly occupied and liberated. The units led by Manzano proceeded to the town of Bordeos on the east coast the next day. Before the dawn of the next morning, hand to hand combat ensued but the Filipinos had to withdraw due to heavy casualties. The attack was resumed the next day by Capt. Maghirang and in the end; the Filipinos had outfought the much vaunted suicide fighters of Japan. February 24, the island of Polillo was officially liberated. Anderson’s Guerrillas in the Liberation Campaign Company D successfully occupied Alabat Island. An airfield was immediately constructed and by March 1945, C-47s were landing there. Company C under Lt. Abcede occupied the town of Mauban. From March to April 1945, enemy garrisons along Tayabas coast were continuously subjected to air bombardment. In late March, Company A was landed at Salanga Point and the Japanese troops immediately moved north to Dingalan. The Japanese were surrounded by the enemies. On April 15, 1945, the attack on Infanta was was initiated by the landing troops under Capt. Bello at DInahican Point. A week later, Lt. Manzano landed with additional troops at Abiawin. Meanwhile, the 7th Cavalry Regiment or the US army had been pushing against strong enemy opposition from Tigiuan Point. It was a race for Infanta between US army and First Anderson Battalion. On April 25, 1945, the Filipino guerrillas held surprise assaults from two directions and seized the town of Infanta and the Port of Misua. The 7th Cavalry moved into Infanta five hours after the place had been liberated by the Filipinos. Mopping-up operations that followed the capture of Infanta lasted up to June 30, 1945. During this time, the First Anderson Battalion accounted for 1623 enemy death in action and 770 prisoners. On July 21, 1945, two companies led by Capt. Ortiz and Lt. Schoffer landed at Tuno, five miles from Bambanan where reports of Japanese force holding position came from. The next morning, the enemy tried to escape westward but ran into Filipino troops who mowed them down. By 2 in the afternoon, the enemy battalion was wiped out. On the same month, a similar event was conducted at Casiguran. The enemy was annihilated between Dibetand Debutunan Point. On 22nd of July, another two companies left Infanta for Salanga Point to drive out the enemy troops who dug in at the former submarine base of Anderson. After a naval bombardment, the troops advanced north and south. Not one enemy escaped destruction. 500 Japanese dead bodies were left rotting in the jungles. On the 29th of July, Capt. Ortiz and Lt. Schoffer led a company at Lagyang-Bayan between Mauban and Infanta. The enemy decided to flee than to fight. Before the end of the month, another amphibious operation was conducted on Fuga Island in the Batanes Group. For the conduct of such operations, the First Anderson Battalion was cited by Maj. Gen. William B. Chase and Brigadier General Robert Soule of the US 38th Division. By the time the entire operations ended, the First Anderson Battalion had inflicted on the enemy 4 891 killed and had taken 2 953 prisoners. The battalion, on the other hand, lost 112 killed and 3 missing in action and suffered 348 wounded. Elements of Anderson’s Guerrillas remained in Infanta up until December 1945. On December 15, the First Anderson Battalion was activated into the 1st Infantry Battalion, Separate (PA) (Composite) and a platoon was inducted in the Malacañang Palace Guard Battalion. III. Way of Life The members of the Anderson Guerrillas were Filipinos and Americans, with the Americans who served as the head in most cases since they were more knowledgeable in terms of strategic movement in warfare. The Filipinos still had vague ideas on the most effective way of fighting and the help given by these foreigners were very much appreciated. In the years of the Japanese invasion in the Philippines, Filipinos teamed with their other brothers and formed guerrillas. With the help of the Americans, they were able to defeat the antagonists. The strength and bravery of the Filipinos coupled with the techniques by the Americans resulted to the victory of the Philippines against the Japanese. Bernard Anderson, even before he became a part of the guerrillas, has had his fair share of poor experiences. With a companion, he escaped into the mountains when the order to surrender was given. They hid in the jungle and wandered around all the while starving and thirsty until they discovered a hidden mountain camp of Filipinos. These Filipinos took care of them and shared everything they had with them. Several other American officers and men escaped from Bataan and guerrilla groups began to form throughout the 40 000 square mile island. When Anderson became in-charge of the guerrilla units left behind by Barker, he was appointed with the tasks a leader had to persist on. Probably the greatest drawback to the members of this guerrilla was that they had communication devices at a later time. Had they established an earlier and stable radio contact with the GHW, SPWA, they could have had better conditions in those years. The members of the Anderson Guerrilla had to make do with what they have. The units under the command of Anderson showed remarkable talent in the pursuit of intelligence or information. But since there was no contact between Anderson’s headquarters and GHQ, SWPA, they were clearly lacking in equipment and supplies. Filipinos worked for the Japanese, hiding their identities as part of guerrilla groups for protection. On the process, they steal parts of radio equipment and generators, only to re-assemble them back in their hideouts in an attempt of recreating ways for communication and contact. For the first time, Anderson was able to contact the Allies through a generator fuelled with coconut oil. The Allies, however, did not believe that it was Anderson and were under the impression that the Japanese were just fooling them. Anderson had to use his best foul language to coerce them into believing that he was not Japanese but this ended in vain. Only when tools for radio contact were given and provided to Anderson’s headquarters had they finally established contact with the GHQ, SWPA. With this, they were able to gather supplies and ammunitions from them. Submarines sent their basic needs and warfare needs. Unfortunately, there was a time when their supplies became insufficient. With the members of the units and some thousand of injured people they had to take care of, food became one of their major problems. Even when they contacted the Allies, they garnered unfavourable response since it was also difficult for the Allies to bring them their needs when the Japanese came at an advantage. All they had to do was wait and endure their pain until provisions will be available to them again. Upon establishing contact with the GHW, SWPA, they had to await orders from Gen. MacArthur regarding their moves and actions in the war. The first one was for them to “lie low”. At this phase, they had to gather more intelligence while giving more focus on food storage and warfare practices. The second was for them to destroy targets as assigned. With this, they fought with all their might, killing and driving away the cruel Japanese. Amphibious operations were done, leaving no Japanese alive in whichever town they had to liberate. In the end, the Anderson Guerrillas contributed to the most number of enemies killed and injured. Sources: (2012, April 18). Retrieved August 23, 2012, from Reedsburg History: http://reedsburghistory.blogspot.com/2012/04/bernard-landerson.html A. C. Lantin-Bello, A. E. (1999). The Story of thr Anderson Guerrillas. Manila: Veterans Federation of the Philippines. Baclagon, C. U. (1966). The Philippine Resistance Movement Against Japan. Quezon City: Munoz Press. Generoso Salazar, F. R. (1995). Manila, Bicolandia and the Tagalog Provinces. Manila: University of the Philippines Press. Nuval, L. Q. Pass in Review. Willoughby, C. A. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines: 1941 - 1945.