Bróderes in arms: Gangs and the
socialization of violence in Nicaragua
Journal of Peace Research
2017, Vol. 54(5) 648–660
ª The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0022343317714299
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr
Dennis Rodgers
University of Amsterdam
Abstract
Drawing on longitudinal ethnographic research that has been ongoing since 1996, this article explores the way that
gangs socialize individuals into violent norms and practices in Nicaragua. It shows how different types of gang
violence can be related to distinct socialization processes and mechanisms, tracing how these dynamically articulate
individual agency, group dynamics and contextual circumstances, albeit in ways that change over time. As such, the
article highlights how gang socialization is not only a variable multilayered process, but also a very volatile one, which
suggests that the socialization of violence and its consequences are not necessarily enduring.
Keywords
gangs, Nicaragua, socialization, violence
Introduction
Youth gangs are one of a small number of truly global
social phenomena, present across time and space in
almost every society on the planet (see Hazen & Rodgers, 2014). Although significant variation can be
observed between different contexts, a universal feature
of gangs is their intimate association with violence. At
the same time, as Stretesky & Pogrebin (2007: 85) have
remarked, ‘few studies have examined how violent norms
are transmitted in street gangs’. Most of the scholarly
literature generally tends to assume that youth who join
gangs are either violent by nature or due to factors associated with their social environment, or else that they will
be institutionally ‘socialized’ into diverse practices of violence by the gang. As Checkel (2017) points out in the
introduction to this special issue, however, socialization
– that is to say, the means through which individual
actors adopt particular norms, rules, and practices associated with membership of a given group – is neither
obvious nor predetermined, and may be underpinned by
a range of different processes and mechanisms.
Understanding how these operate and interact is obviously critical for coherent violence reduction and peacebuilding. Drawing on longitudinal ethnographic
research carried out in the poor neighbourhood barrio
Luis Fanor Hernández,1 in Managua, the capital city of
Nicaragua, this article therefore explores how local gang
members have assimilated and put into practice a range
of different forms of violence over the past quarter century, unpacking the way these processes have changed
over time, and highlighting how socialization is a fundamentally multilayered and contingent process. It begins
by situating gangs and their violence within the Central
American and Nicaraguan contexts. It subsequently
offers an overview of theories of gang socialization,
before arguing for a tripartite approach focusing on the
variable configuration of individual agency, group
dynamics and contextual circumstances. This is then
empirically illustrated in relation to a range of distinct
forms of violence associated with different iterations of
the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang, before a conclusion offers some general reflections and an agenda for
future research.
1
This name is a pseudonym, as are all the names of places and
individuals mentioned in this article.
Corresponding author:
d.w.rodgers@uva.nl
Rodgers
Gangs in Central America and Nicaragua
Although gangs are a global phenomenon, nowhere are
they currently more the focus of attention than in contemporary Central America, where they are widely
reported to be among the most important actors in a
landscape of criminal brutality characterized by levels
of violence that often surpass those that afflicted the
region during the revolutionary wars and conflicts of
the 1970s and 1980s (see Kruijt & Koonings, 1999).
At the same time, estimates of the total proportion of
contemporary regional violence attributable to gangs
vary wildly from 10% to 60% (UNODC, 2007: 64),
while the criminal activities with which they are associated range from localized forms of petty delinquency
such as theft, muggings and extortion, to more largescale organized criminality including migrant trafficking, kidnapping and drug trafficking. This uncertainty
is further fuelled by the fact that Central American
gangs have been the focus of a steady stream of highly
sensationalist publications over the past decade, for
example speculating that gangs constitute ‘a new urban
insurgency’ (Manwaring, 2005).
As Hagedorn (2008) has remarked, ‘branding gangs a
“national security threat” [ . . . ] is consistent with a[n]
[ . . . ] attitude that divides the world into good and evil’,
thereby establishing the basis for highly distorted interpretations. For example, there exists significant diversity
both between gangs and between countries within the
region. Certainly, a critical distinction must be made
between pandillas, on the one hand, and maras, on the
other. Maras are a phenomenon with transnational roots,
linked to the refugee flows from Central America to the
USA in the 1980s and the subsequent deportation of
refugee youth exposed to US gang culture in the 1990s
(see Valdez, 2011). Pandillas, on the other hand, are
more localized, home-grown gangs that are the direct
inheritors of the youth gangs that have long been a historic feature of Central American societies. Maras are
generally associated with much more intense and spectacular forms of violence than pandillas, partly because
they are less embedded within their local institutional
context than the latter, and are therefore less rulebound and constrained (see Rodgers & Baird, 2015:
479–483).2
2
Having said this, the mara phenomenon is not simply a foreign
importation by deportees, but has evolved and grown in response to
domestic factors and conditions, with the majority of mareros no
longer deportees, and mara gang culture more of a hybrid
649
Pandillas are only significantly visible in Nicaragua,
having been almost completely supplanted by maras in
El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala during the postCold War period;3 this is one reason why Nicaragua
suffers less violence than the latter three countries.4 At
the same time, even if they are less violent than maras,
pandillas remain a major source of insecurity in Nicaragua. Certainly, this is something that has been highlighted by numerous ethnographic investigations over
the past two decades (see e.g. Núñez, 1996; Rocha,
2007, 2013; Rodgers, 2000, 2006, 2007a,b, 2014,
2015, 2016; Weegels, 2017), as well as opinion polls.
A 1999 survey conducted by the Nicaraguan NGO Ética
y Transparencia, for example, found that 50% of respondents identified gangs as the principal threat to their
personal security (Cajina, 2000: 177). More than a
decade later, the 2011 Citizen Security Perception Survey carried out by the Managua-based Institute for Strategic Studies and Public Policy found that almost 60% of
respondents considered gangs the most important security threat in Nicaragua (Orozco, 2012: 8).
Pandillas are not a new feature of Nicaraguan society,
and can be traced back to the 1940s and 1950s, when the
country urbanized on a large scale. These first gangs were
spontaneous groups of youths that emerged organically
in urban slums and squatter settlements, and only lasted
so long as the specific peer group underpinning them
stayed together. Gangs subsequently declined during the
1970s as a consequence of the intensification of the longstanding Sandinista revolutionary struggle against the
Somoza dictatorship, and disappeared almost completely
following the triumph of the revolution in 1979 due to
the introduction of universal military service – the age of
conscription being 16 – and also because of the grassroots organization that was a hallmark of Sandinismo,
including youth work brigades and extensive local
combining elements of US and local gang culture (Demoscopı́a,
2007: 49).
3
Nicaragua has no maras because its migration patterns are different
from the latter three countries (see Rocha, 2008, for details).
4
Indeed, if Nicaragua’s official homicide statistics are to be believed,
the country is one of the safest – if not the safest – countries in
Central America. While there is no doubt that Nicaragua is less
violent than El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, there is also no
question that official Nicaraguan police crime statistics are hugely
flawed and politically manipulated, and their extremely low levels
do not accurately reflect the country’s security panorama (see
Rodgers & Rocha, 2013: 49). See also Bateson (2017) for a
discussion of the enabling environment for militias created by postconflict violence and crime in Guatemala, a situation which has some
parallels with Nicaragua.
650
neighbourhood watches. Gangs, however, began to reemerge during the late 1980s due to the war-fuelled
erosion of the Sandinista welfare state, declining levels
of local organization, the decreasing legitimacy of the
revolutionary regime and increasing numbers of youths
deserting their military service (Lancaster, 1992: 132).
These new gangs principally involved groups of young
men5 who had been conscripted together and who
joined forces in order to protect their families and friends
from the rising crime and insecurity, thereby displaying
something of a vigilante ethos. Following regime change
in 1990, gangs began to proliferate exponentially as a
result of peace and mass demobilization, becoming a
ubiquitous feature of poor urban neighbourhoods in the
country’s major cities (see e.g. Núñez, 1996; Rodgers,
2000). By the mid-1990s, a full-blown gang culture had
institutionalized, with gang members engaged in a wide
range of petty delinquency, while rival gangs collectively
fought each other for territorial control. These conflicts
principally revolved around protecting local neighbourhood inhabitants from rival gangs; due to their fixed
nature and their adherence to processes of regular escalation, they provided a measure of predictability within an
otherwise chaotic and highly insecure broader social context. In that sense, the original vigilante ethos of the first
postwar generation persisted, despite individual turnover
due to gang members ‘maturing out’ between the ages of
19 and 22 (Rocha, 2000a,b; Rodgers, 2006, 2007a).
Gangs changed radically around the turn of the century, however. In particular, they shifted from offering
localized forms of protection and social order to being
much more parochial, predatory and feared organizations. This shift was largely linked to the spread of
cocaine in Nicaragua. The drug began to move through
the country in substantial quantities from 1999
onwards,6 and its consumption in the form of crack
rapidly became a major element of gang culture.
Although gang members in the early and mid-1990s
consumed drugs, cocaine was practically unknown at
that time and they mainly smoked marijuana or sniffed
glue. Unlike the latter, crack makes its users extremely
aggressive, violent and unpredictable; its consumption
thus led to a rise in spontaneous, random attacks by
addicted gang members looking to obtain money for
their next fix. Contrary to the past, gang members
began to actively target local residents, generating a
5
Although female gang members are not completely unknown in
Nicaragua, they are not the norm (see Rodgers, 2006: 286).
6
On the reasons for this timing, see Rodgers (2006: 278–279).
journal of PEACE RESEARCH 54(5)
widespread and tangibly heightened sense of fear in
urban neighbourhoods in Managua and other Nicaraguan cities, from around 2000 onwards. In other words,
crack consumption fundamentally changed the nature of
the relationship between gangs and their local communities (Rocha, 2007).
In some neighbourhoods, gang members integrated
into the emergent Nicaraguan drug economy as street
dealers, further increasing insecurity in those areas. For
the most part, dealers worked independently, selling irregularly on street corners in their neighbourhood and
sourcing their crack cocaine from one of a small number
of neighbourhoods in the city, where it was initially
distributed by individual distributors on a rather ad hoc
basis (see Rodgers, 2016). These were often ex-gang
members who drew on their historical links to their local
gang to enrol current members as their security apparatus. In these neighbourhoods, gang activities shifted
from community protection to ensuring the proper functioning of the drug economy, which they achieved by
imposing local regimes of terror that went beyond the
more diffuse crack consumption-related violence. To
reduce the risk of denunciation, gang members fostered
a climate of fear by repeatedly threatening and committing arbitrary acts of violence against local community
inhabitants (Rodgers, 2006, 2007b; Rocha, 2007).
From the beginning of the 21st century – but most
visibly around 2005 – the number of gangs in Nicaraguan
cities began to decline (Rocha, 2007). The trend was
attributable partly to the atomizing effect of crack consumption (see Rodgers, 2006), and partly to the emergence of more professional drug-dealing groups, often
referred to as cartelitos (little cartels). These groups generally involved individuals from several different neighbourhoods, and even different parts of Nicaragua, and brutally
repressed local gangs to prevent them from challenging
them (Rodgers, 2015). This violence reached a peak
around 2009–10, after which it eased up significantly as
cartelitos began to either fall apart due to internecine fighting or were taken over by rivals. Those that remained
began to reduce their involvement in local drug dealing
and refocused on drug trafficking, which has much higher
profit margins. Instead of dominating local communities,
cartelito members began to minimize their visibility,
which led to improvements in local security in the urban
neighbourhoods where they had previously operated.
While drug dealing continues to be widespread in Nicaraguan cities, it has become much smaller in scale, disorganized and more individualized. Gangs, for their part,
continue to be a feature of many poor urban neighbourhoods in present-day Nicaragua, but not to the same
Rodgers
degree as during the 1990s and the early years of the
following decade (see Rodgers & Rocha, 2013: 58–59).
Theorizing gang socialization
Broadly speaking, there exist three major approaches to
explaining gang violence within the scholarly literature.
The first sees it as linked to the individual personality
traits of gang members. This encompasses approaches
that see gang members as psychopaths – see Yablonsky
(1963), for example – to more nuanced analyses that
consider them to be representative of specific psychosocial personalities, such as ‘defiant individualism’
(Sánchez Jankowski, 1991; see also Bernard, 1990). This
conception of gang violence is rather self-serving, and no
investigation has convincingly shown that gang members
consistently display any particular personality type (see
Covey, 2003; Curry, Decker & Pyrooz, 2014: 38–42;
Klein & Maxson, 2006). Moreover, for every gang member who might plausibly be categorized as a psychopath
or a ‘defiant individual’, there are generally at least an
equal if not a greater number of non-gang members
displaying the same personality type within any given
context (as well as gang members who are not ‘defiant
individualists’). Having said this, while violence cannot
be said to be an innate trait of gang members, numerous
studies have highlighted the importance that specific
individuals can have in relation to the socialization of
violence within a gang, whether as influential leaders
(Whyte, 1943; Decker & van Winkle, 1996), or as providers of specialized expertise (Keiser, 1969; Rodgers,
2016), although as Fischer (1975) points out, individuals by themselves do not make a gang, and there clearly
needs to be a demographic ‘critical mass’.
The second major way in which gang violence has
been understood within the scholarly literature is as a
corollary of group dynamics. This makes sense from a
socialization perspective considering that at its most basic
it involves a process whereby an individual is assimilated
into a collective. The gang group is in other words a
source of socialization, shaping members’ sense of self
and identity, including the internalization of specific
norms and practices. The question, however, is how this
actually takes place beyond simply joining the gang. In
his foundational study of early 20th-century Chicago
gangs, Thrasher (1927: 29–30) famously argued that
their violence was the result of ‘spontaneous play-groups’
acquiring ‘group-consciousness’ through ‘opposition’ to
‘a rival or an enemy’, a process that effectively amounts
to the institutionalization of gang dynamics through
conflict. Such an assertion has been widely repeated by
651
gang scholars in numerous contexts over the years – see
Suttles (1968), Lepoutre (1997), or Jensen (2008), for
instance – yet Thrasher’s observation arguably applies to
any competitive sports team, and he never explains what
it is about ‘opposition’ that institutionalizes gangs as
violent organizations. The notion of ‘spontaneous’ group
formation is moreover similarly glossed over, except to
the extent that Thrasher relates gang formation to race
and ethnicity, effectively suggesting that they emerge
based on pre-existing group dynamics.
The third major approach to explaining gang violence
is contextually. Certainly, there exists a long tradition
associating gangs with ‘social disorganization’ (Thrasher,
1927), or in other words, as social consequences of poverty and marginality. This correlation derives from an
epistemological conception that sees youth socialization
as normally occurring via a range of ‘primary’ social
institutions such as families and schools, which when
absent or deficient (due to poverty and marginality), are
replaced organically by more ‘secondary’ – and frequently dysfunctional – local social institutions such as
gangs. According to Vigil (1988, 2002), however, gangs
provide their members with a form of ‘street socialization’ that has been particularly well described by Anderson (1999) in his famous study of the ‘code of the streets’
characteristic of poor inner-city black neighbourhoods in
Philadelphia. Due to the pervasive scarcity and increased
competition resulting from poverty and discrimination
in these communities, Anderson (1999: 32–33) argues
that ‘an oppositional culture’ based on ‘the use of violence’ emerges, ‘at the heart of [which] is the issue of
respect – loosely defined as being treated “right” or being
granted one’s “props” (or proper due) or the deference
one deserves’. This most evidently shapes interactions on
the streets and other public spaces in poor neighbourhoods, and as one of the major social institutions physically occupying the streets in such contexts, gangs
effectively come to crystallize a heightened expression
of this ‘code’, which their members adopt as their principal way of being.
While there is no doubt that gangs are generally
street-based organizations, and that they can be linked
to broader structural processes such as poverty and marginalization, generally invoking contextual factors to
account for their violence fails to explain why only a
minority of youth – generally less than 10% within any
given context (Vigil, 1988: 422) – ever join a gang and
become regularly involved in violence. Contextual circumstances by their very nature impact on all those living within a given context; indeed, Anderson’s (1999)
study of the ‘code of the street’ repeatedly illustrates that
journal of PEACE RESEARCH 54(5)
652
it is a way of acting that is not specific to gangs. To this
extent, the idea of ‘street socialization’ can be said to
implicitly associate violence with gang membership in
a rather singular manner. While the notion that material
circumstances might lead to processes of socialization of
particular norms and practices is by no means unreasonable, these will clearly be mediated by other factors,
including most obviously more individual and groupbased forms of socialization. Having said this, there
clearly also exists something of a feedback mechanism
here; as Ayling (2011) has pointed out, gangs are generally highly volatile social institutions, and their internal
dynamics are particularly susceptible to changing contextual factors (see also Sánchez Jankowski, 2003).
Ultimately, what these different ideas about gang
socialization arguably implicitly highlight is that socialization must be conceived as a multifaceted process rather
than a singular event, and that it can potentially involve a
range of different factors, including in particular individual agency, group dynamics and contextual circumstances. These can, however, clearly play out in
variable ways; there are, for example, differences between
the effects of pre-existing, institutionalized and organic
group dynamics, while different types of contextual constraints impact on individual and endogenous group
logics in a similarly mutable manner. At the same time,
the existing scholarly literature also suggests that such
patterns are likely to be highly variable across time and
space – meaning that trying to determine whether one
factor is more important than another is very likely a
fruitless exercise – and what is perhaps most important
and interesting to understand instead is how and why
individual agency, group dynamics and contextual circumstances connect and articulate together in order to
produce specific socialization configurations, practices
and outcomes.
In other words, it is not only important to identify
how different forms of socialization can be associated
with distinct forms of violence, but also how different
iterations of individual agency, group dynamics and
contextual circumstances can combine with each other
in order to produce particular outcomes. It is critical
that this is unpacked to understand whether there exist
socialization configurations that lead to more or less –
as well as more durable or more volatile – patterns of
violence. The next section of this article therefore draws
on the empirical example of the evolution of a specific
gang in a poor Managua neighbourhood called barrio
Luis Fanor Hernández to explore how such a tripartite
and interconnected conception of socialization might
allow for a better understanding of the dynamics of
gang violence.7 More specifically, it seeks to trace the
changing patterns of violence associated with different
temporal iterations of the local gang, and relate their
socialization to distinct configurations of individual
agency, group dynamics and contextual circumstances.
It aims to identify how these different elements connected to each other, as well as chart the way their
relationship transformed over time, focusing on three
specific issues, namely whether the connection between
different forms of socialization is systemic or contingent, whether any form or socialization configuration
is more durable than another, and finally, whether the
form of violence being socialized makes a difference in
the process of socialization.
Gang socialization in barrio Luis Fanor
Hernández
Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández is a poor urban neighbourhood located in southeast Managua, the capital city of
Nicaragua. The locality was originally founded as an
illegal squatter community by rural-urban migrants in
the early 1960s, one of many such informal settlements
that mushroomed on the edge of Managua at that time.
Due to its inhabitants’ extreme poverty, the settlement
was initially known as La Sobrevivencia (Survival), but
was completely rebuilt during the early 1980s as a beneficiary of the revolutionary Sandinista state’s housing
development programme, and renamed barrio Luis
Fanor Hernández (after a local ‘martyr of the Revolution’), although socio-economically it remained in the
lowest quartile of Managua neighbourhoods. The settlement has always been infamous for its high levels of
criminality, but became extremely notorious in the early
1990s due to the emergence of a very brutal local gang.
This bad reputation has persisted into the present,
although the gang has changed significantly over the past
two decades, even disappearing completely for a few
years during the latter half of the 2000s.
The evolution of the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández
gang since 1990 has largely corresponded to the broader
evolution of Nicaraguan gangs described above, and can
be divided into five phases, each associated with different
forms of violence and different socialization mechanisms,
as summarized in Table I. Due to space considerations,
rather than offering a systematic chronological overview
of different phases, this section moves between specific
examples of distinct forms of socialization, tracing how
7
For an overview of methods and data collection, see this article’s
Online appendix available at: https://www.prio.org/JPR/Datasets/.
Rodgers
653
Table I. Gang evolution in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández
Historical
gang phase
Period
Emergent
1989–92
Size of
the gang Type of violence associated with the gang
14
Vigilantism; knowledgeable use of firearms
c. 100a Ritualized intergang warfare; variable use of
firearms
Drug dealing 1999–2005 18–20 Instrumental violence to support local drug
economy; knowledgeable use of firearms
Pacification 2006–11
N/A N/A
Revival
2012–
12
Spontaneous intergang conflicts;
unknowledgeable use of firearms
Golden era
1993–98
Key socialization mechanisms
General contextual factors; pre-existing
group dynamics
Local contextual factors; institutionalized
group dynamics; individual agency
Activity-related contextual factors;
individual agency
N/A
Organic group dynamics
a
The element of imprecision regarding this figure is due to the fact that the gang included both ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ members during this
phase, and the composition of the peripheral group was very fluid.
they interrelated to each other, how they changed over
time, and what consequences this change had for the
institutionalization of violence in the gang. It should
be noted that the socio-economic background of gang
members has generally not changed significantly across
these five different phases (see Rodgers, 2014), and nor
has their gender, as all barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang
members since 1990 have been young men, with one
exception.8 On the other hand, the gang’s structure has
evolved over time, both in terms of its size and organization, insofar as it has been hierarchical and stratified as
well as egalitarian and amorphous at different points in
time. Both the spread and median age of members have
8
The gang’s gender bias can be at least partly associated with the fact
that being a gang member involves behaviour patterns that revolve
around activities associated with machista ‘ideals of manhood’, such as
‘taking risk [or] displaying bravado in the face of danger’ (Lancaster,
1992: 195), and therefore inherently challenge Nicaraguan ideals of
womanhood, which are associated with ‘subordination’ and ‘domestic
roles, especially mothering’ (Montoya, 2003: 63). To this extent,
being a gang member represents the enactment of an exaggerated
form of ‘hyper-masculinity’. At the same time, relations between
men and women, and notions of what it is to properly be a man or
a woman, are defined not just ideologically but also through social
practices. Female gang members are not unknown in Nicaragua, and
the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang had a female gang member
known as la Gata (the Cat) during the early 1990s. Although she was
originally associated with the gang as a gang member’s girlfriend, la
Gata rapidly came to be considered a fully fledged member of the
gang in her own right. Her ‘femininity’ was very obviously
downplayed whenever gang members talked about her, however, as
they invariably described her as having been extremely ‘violent’,
‘barbaric’, or ‘fearless’, qualities that fundamentally reflect the
machismo-inspired ideal of what a gang member should be. To this
extent, she was arguably ‘masculinized’, something that further points
to the absence of female roles within the gang, and implicitly suggests
that la Gata was something of an exception.
also fluctuated across phases, with spread ranging from 7
to 26 years of age, while the median has varied between
15 and 24 years of age.
The different phases of the gang’s evolution, and in
particular its changing patterns of violence, can clearly be
related to distinct processes and mechanisms of gang
socialization encompassing individual agency, different
types of group dynamics and varyingly influential contextual factors, as Table I highlights. For example, the
vigilante violence of the first post-1990 iteration of the
barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang was clearly directly
connected to the fact that most of its members were
demobilized Sandinista Popular Army conscripts. The
core of the gang was a group of eight youths aged
between 18 and 20 years old who were demobilized
more or less simultaneously in 1989. They began to hang
out together on a neighbourhood street corner, along
with four slightly older youths aged between 20 and
23 years old, three of whom had also been conscripts,
as well as two younger individuals aged respectively nine
and ten years old who gravitated to the group for idiosyncratic reasons (see Rodgers, 2016). This group was
quickly labelled a ‘pandilla’, both by its members and
inhabitants of barrio Luis Fanor Hernández more generally, particular once the members of the group began to
engage regularly in a range of violent activities. Most of
the time these involved beating up individuals who had
robbed, attacked or threatened the friends or family of
gang members, something that happened frequently in
the post-war context of heightened flux and uncertainty
that characterized Nicaragua in the early 1990s.
The impulse for this particular pattern of violence was
clearly related to the ex-conscript nature of gang members. Certainly, all the members of the gang from this
period whom I interviewed systematically highlighted
654
three basic reasons for forming a gang and acting as they
did, all of which were directly related to their ideological
experiences as conscripts. Firstly, the change of regime in
1990 had led to an abrupt reduction of their social status.
Their role as conscripts ‘defending the nation’ and ‘the
Revolution’ had previously been held in very high esteem
in their community, and forming a gang and being violent had offered them a means of reaffirming their status
vis-à-vis a wider society that seemed to forget them very
rapidly in the post-conflict period. Secondly, becoming
gang members had been a way for them to recapture
some of the adrenaline-charged energy of war, while also
reconstituting a comradeship and solidarity reminiscent
of their wartime experiences as conscripts. But perhaps
most importantly, they saw becoming gang members as a
natural continuation of their previous role as soldiers.
The early 1990s had been highly uncertain times,
marked by political polarization, violence and spiralling
insecurity, and these youths felt they could better ‘serve’
their families and friends by joining a gang than attempting to ‘protect’ them as individuals (see Rodgers, 2006:
283–284). From a socialization perspective, then, the
first generation of post-conflict barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang members had clearly been collectively ‘presocialized’ into their distinct pattern of violence due to
the group’s experience of conscription as well as, more
indirectly, general contextual factors in the form of their
general experience of Sandinista revolutionary ideology.
This highlights very well the interrelation between group
dynamics and contextual circumstances, which also
included more contingent ones in the form of the local
ambient chronic insecurity.
From 1992 onwards, however, the ex-conscript members of the first postwar iteration of the barrio Luis Fanor
Hernández gang began to ‘mature out’ of the gang.9
They were replaced by new members who had no military background or significant experiences of Sandinismo, and moreover after 1994 no direct link to the
first generation of ex-conscript barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang members. Yet, the vigilante norms and
practices of previous gang members continued to influence new members due to a transformation in the way
that contextual factors such as Sandinista revolutionary
9
Gang membership has generally been found to be a finite social role
all over the world (see Covey, 2003; Hazen & Rodgers, 2014).
Certainly, barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang members from all
epochs have often told me that ‘there is no such thing as an old
gang member’, and ‘maturing out’ is considered the natural course
of things, although the age at which this happens has varied in the
neighbourhood over time.
journal of PEACE RESEARCH 54(5)
ideology were internalized by gang members. Rather
than being based on gang members’ ideological experience of ‘defending the Nation’ and ‘the Revolution’, the
barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang’s vigilante impulse
became linked to a local contextual sense of belonging
to the neighbourhood, as became clear during a conversation I had one morning in October 1996 with a gang
member called Julio. I came across him as he was cleaning up graffiti from the 1980s, which extolled the virtues
of the Sandinista youth organization; a person or persons
unknown had crudely painted it over in bright red – the
colours of the anti-Sandinista Constitutionalist Liberal
Party – the night before. As Julio angrily berated the
‘hijos de la setenta mil putas’ (‘sons of seventy thousand
whores’) who had done this, I initially assumed that this
was an exemplification of his Sandinista sympathies, but
it quickly became apparent that he saw this act of vandalism less as an attack on Sandinismo and more as a
desecration of a material manifestation of barrio Luis
Fanor Hernández’s identity:
Those jodidos [assholes] don’t respect anything in the
neighbourhood, Dennis, nothing! OK, so they don’t
like Sandinismo, that’s how it is, I don’t like their politics
either, but this is more than just a Sandinista pinta
[graffiti], it’s a part of the neighbourhood history. Our
history, bróder! It’s something that belongs to the community, to all of us; it shows us who we are, where we
come from, how Sandinismo built our houses and made
us into a community. It shows what the neighbourhood
is, and people should therefore respect it, whatever their
political opinions.
This particular discourse clearly highlights how Julio’s
putative Sandinista sympathies actually derived from a
sense of territorial identity rather than politics. In
broader sociological terms, this can be linked to the
shrinking of the collective social imaginary in postrevolutionary Nicaragua that Núñez (1996) has
described as involving an ontological shift ‘from the
nation to the neighbourhood’. In relation to gang socialization, however, what this allowed for was a continuation of the conscript-derived vigilante ethos of the first
iteration of the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang, albeit
in a transformed manner. Rather than deriving from
general ideological considerations, this became linked
to a specific form of local territoriality. This process of
territorialization also affected the violent practices of the
gang in a more practical way. While the first gang’s
vigilante violence had been rather ad hoc in nature, and
principally aimed against individuals perceived as
threatening, the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang’s
Rodgers
mid-1990s iteration displayed more territorial dynamics.
Its violence now revolved around semi-ritualized forms
of gang warfare that rigidly obeyed a number of precise
rules and practices and involved either attacking or protecting a neighbourhood to engage enemy gangs, with
fighting generally specifically focused either on harming
or limiting damage to both neighbourhood infrastructure and inhabitants, while injuring or killing symbolically important enemy gang members (for more details
see Rodgers, 2006).
Gang warfare was in and of itself clearly constitutive
of both the gang group and individual gang members, as
the latter were collectively socialized through combat,
learning to fight for and with each other, as well as from
each other, with younger gang members in particular
learning from the actions of older ones. This meant
that rather than deriving from a ‘pre-socialized’ group
sharing a life trajectory of conscription, the gang’s violence became institutionalized into the group’s
dynamics, and it was not necessary for new members
to have shared prior experiences in the same way that
the first wave of conscript-gang members had. To this
extent, gang violence responded to a different socialization configuration, one that still combined group
dynamics – but newly institutionalized rather than
pre-existing – and contextual circumstances – but
purely local rather than ideological.
At the same time, the gang’s violent practices also
owed much to the fact that the two younger members
of the first iteration of the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández
gang had remained as members of its second incarnation.
In particular, Milton and Bismarck played an active role
in facilitating the practical transmission of certain types
of violent practices that were directly linked to the conscript experiences of the first postwar generation of
barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang members, including
more specifically those concerning the use of firearms.
Guns have of course long been associated with gangs; as
Arendt (1969: 4) famously pointed out, violence
‘always needs implements’. The use of firearms, however, requires specialized knowledge; guns are by no
means intuitive, as a former gang member called Jorge
highlighted during the course of an interview in 2012,
when he recounted the first time that he had tried to use
a gun in the early 1990s:
I was 13–14 years old [ . . . ] The gun was my father’s,
he’d brought it back from military service after the war.
He kept it locked in a drawer, but whenever he’d get
drunk, he’d take it out, and wave it at the neighbours,
pretending to shoot them. One day, I broke into the
655
drawer and took the gun, you know, to go and mug
somebody. I’d been hanging around with the gang, you
see, and the day before one of them got a really nice pair
of Nike shoes by pulling a gun on some rich kid, and I
thought ‘why don’t I get myself some nice shoes too’,
and so went to the Colonia Las Condes with the gun to
find somebody to hold up. It didn’t go as planned,
though, as the guy I tried to rob refused to give up his
shoes. When I tried to shoot him, nothing happened,
because the safety catch was on! I was so dumb, I didn’t
know that guns had safety catches then, and so I just
dropped the gun and ran away, because he was much
bigger than me. I can laugh about it now, but I was
scared shitless [ . . . ] You know what the worse thing
was, though? I lost the gun, and so my father really beat
me up afterwards [ . . . ]
The first generation of gang members in barrio Luis
Fanor Hernández either obtained their specialized
knowledge about guns directly, during their military service, or they were taught by a gang member who had
done military service. As Bismarck, for example, who had
no military experience, put it in an interview in 2012:
‘We were taught how to use firearms by the gang members who had done their military service [ . . . ] They
showed us how to load guns, how to shoot them, how
to strip and clean them.’ Although the ex-conscript
members of the first barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang
had all matured out by the mid-1990s, the fact that
Bismarck and Milton continued on as gang members
meant that they acted as bridges for the transmission
of this specialized knowledge, along with more general
notions about fighting, actively socializing the new generation of gang members into practices of violence, as the
following extract from the 4 December 1996 entry in my
field diary illustrates well:
Today I was interviewing Milton when he suddenly
interrupted our conversation to summon over Chucki,
who was passing by. ‘Oye Chucki,’ he shouted, ‘venivé, I
want to show you something.’ Chucki duly sauntered
up to us, only to be knocked hard to the ground when
Milton sucker-punched him in the balls. Writhing in
pain, Chucki screamed ‘why the fuck did you do that,
hijuéputa?’, to which Milton coolly replied, ‘because
you’ve got to learn, maje, you’re new to the gang and
you don’t know anything yet.’ He then turned to me,
and said, ‘ves, Dennis, that’s how you teach the young
ones. They’ve got to learn how to take it and to be
prepared for anything. Otherwise they don’t last long.
That’s how I learnt after I joined the gang, from the
older bróderes (brothers) – they taught me how to fight,
656
how to defend myself, all that kind of stuff [ . . . ] Now
that I’m one of the older guys and I know what I’m
doing, it’s my job to teach the new guys [ . . . ]
Although this kind of behaviour obviously also played
a role in confirming gang hierarchy, it constituted an
individualized form of socialization into violence, dependent on the acts of specific actors. At the same time,
although such processes of socialization continued across
successive generations of gang members, they were
clearly more volatile than either group dynamics or contextual circumstances. For example, as the temporal distance from the generation that had had professional or
near-professional training increased, there was something of a ‘Chinese whispers’10 effect with regards to
firearms use. This became acute after Milton and Bismarck both ‘retired’ from the gang, respectively in 1997
and 1999, which meant that knowledge about guns in
the late 1990s began to be acquired third or fourth hand
by new gang members. This affected its quality, as was
apparent from the way that the number of gang members
suffering accidents involving firearms soared in the late
1990s compared to the early 1990s and mid-1990s.
Indeed, in an interview in 2002, Bismarck explicitly
linked the rising number of accidents to weapons becoming increasingly defective due to lack of care, as well as
the fact that gang members did not always understand
how to use their weapons, often unintentionally shooting themselves or others. ‘Gang members nowadays
don’t take proper care of their weapons, so they’re breaking down all the time, sometimes even blowing up in
their face,’ he told me, before then going on to discuss
the case of a young gang member who had recently shot
himself in the foot:
He had no idea what he was doing. He’d got this
pistol, and thought that made him a poderoso (big
man), but you know, you’ve got to know how to use
a gun to be able to do something with it. He shot
himself because he put it in his belt without the security turned on [ . . . ] The problem was that he hadn’t
had proper training, because there’s nobody left in the
gang who really knows, and so he’d only half understood things, or hadn’t been told properly, and that’s
why he shot himself.
10
‘Chinese whispers’ is a game where a message is whispered from
one person to another in a group, until the last player then announces
the message to the entire group. Errors typically accumulate in the
retellings of the message, and the version announced by the last player
generally differs significantly from its original utterance.
journal of PEACE RESEARCH 54(5)
Partly because of this, the levels and intensity of the
barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang’s violence declined
during the late 1990s, pointing to the contingent importance of individual agency in gang socialization. This was
also evident in the fact that there was a renewal of gang
member knowledge about firearms in barrio Luis Fanor
Hernández in the early 2000s, due to an ex-gang member from the mid-1990s called Jhon, who spent five years
in the Nicaraguan Army. He had joined the neighbourhood gang in 1994 at the age of 13 but was sent to the
Army by his family in 1997 because they could ‘no
longer cope with him’ and hoped that it would ‘educate
him’, as his mother Doña Aurora put it in an interview in
2007. After he returned to the neighbourhood in 2002,
Jhon re-joined the gang and his expertise in weapons
critically transformed the levels of gang member knowledge about guns, as he explained during the course of an
interview in 2012:
[The Army is] where I learnt to use firearms, the AK-47,
the sniper rifle, the RPG – which is a rocket-launcher –
all kinds of weapons! I had classes, it was like school, and
they taught us to shoot, to strip and clean our weapons,
and there were also exams. I can strip and re-assemble
any kind of weapon – I know everything, I tell you! The
basic weapon in the Army was the AK-47, but because I
could shoot really well, I became a sniper, and so used a
special rifle. I went and trained in Martinique and
Marie-Galante, they’re French islands, and I trained
with the French Army and also the Venezuelan Army
[ . . . ] All of this helped me when I came back to the
neighbourhood afterwards [ . . . ] During my service I’d
come back every 15 days, and whenever I came, all the
bróderes would say, ‘bring me a gun, mon, bring me an
AK’, but I’d just say to them, ‘oye maje, do you know
how to use a gun?’ I’d tell them that I wasn’t going to
bring anything if they didn’t know how to take care of
their guns, if they couldn’t strip and re-assemble them. I
told them that they needed to learn all of this, and so
they asked me to teach them. So after a while, I brought
back an AK-47 and taught them all, in groups of five
[ . . . ] You see, an AK-47 isn’t complicated, but there’s a
specific order you have to follow to strip it in order to be
able to clean it. The first thing you do is release the
magazine catch, then you remove the magazine, then
you cock the rifle, and – then – you take off the receiver
cover and the recoil mechanism [ . . . ] Then you remove
the bolt carrier and then the bolt, and then you release
the catch on the right side of the rear sight, and take off
the hand guard, and then all that’s left is the skeleton,
which you clean. Afterwards, to re-assemble it, you just
put everything back together in the reverse order.
Rodgers
Between 2002 and 2005, the barrio Luis Fanor
Hernández gang became one of the most feared gangs
in the southeast of Managua due to its effective deployment of firearms because of Jhon’s training, highlighting
how a gang’s trajectory of violence can change for very
contingent – and individual – reasons. At the same time,
other factors also affected the gang’s violence during this
period. These were linked to the development of a local
drug economy in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, which
emerged in 1999–2000. This initially began very much
in an ad hoc manner, centred on a single individual who
was a former gang member from the early 1990s, and
who rapidly recruited current gang members to act as his
street dealers. The gang also acted collectively as the
nascent drug economy’s security apparatus, enforcing
contracts and guarding drug shipments whenever they
entered or left the neighbourhood, as well as engaging in
a campaign of predatory terror to intimidate local inhabitants, arbitrarily threatening, beating and intimidating
to prevent denunciations, and to ensure that drug dealing in the neighbourhood could occur unimpeded (see
Rodgers, 2006, 2007b,c). This transformation in the
gang’s patterns of violence was directly linked to the
gang’s involvement in the drugs trade, which constituted
an activity-linked contextual factor that socialized gang
members into a more violent and entrepreneurial way of
being (see Rodgers, 2015).
These contextual circumstances, however, changed
quite rapidly due to the evolution of drug dealing in
barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, and more specifically its
professionalization. By 2005, the local drug economy
was being run by a cartelito which sought to suppress
the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang, as a potential
rival for the local monopoly over violence. In 2006, after
a series of confrontations that left several gang members
critically injured and one dead – executed ‘as a warning
to the others’, as a member of the cartelito called Mayuyu
put it in an interview in 2012 – the gang effectively
ceased to exist as a collective unit in barrio Luis Fanor
Hernández. Former and wannabe gang members were
actively ‘de-socialized’ from becoming involved in violence by cartelito enforcers who would regularly patrol
the neighbourhood and intimidate them.
From 2009 onwards, the cartelito reduced its involvement in local drug-dealing activities, refocusing
instead on drug trafficking, which opened up a space
for a barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang ‘revival’, as the
cartelito no longer sought to dominate the neighbourhood but rather aimed to be invisible instead. By mid2012, a group of a dozen 14–15-year olds had organically come together, regularly hanging out on local
657
street corners, effectively (re)occupying the sociospatial
vacuum left by the cartelito’s withdrawal. This group’s
patterns of violence were much more ad hoc and circumstantial, but rapidly became regular. In July 2012,
for example, the new gang attacked a local rival gang in
a nearby neighbourhood with machetes and a homemade handgun in a manner reminiscent of the gangs in
the mid-1990s. Although they were repelled, with several individuals being injured – one due to the handgun
exploding in his hand when he tried to shoot it – this
event led to the beginning of a perception in barrio Luis
Fanor Hernández that ‘the gang is back’, as an inhabitant called Doña Yolanda put it.
Interviews with members of this new gang, however,
suggested that the motivation for attacking the other
neighbourhood’s gang had been one individual seeking
revenge for a personal slight rather than any territorial
impulse, and when I tried to explain something of the
neighbourhood gang history to one of the new gang
members called Ronnie, he rapidly cut me off, saying
‘who gives a shit about what those old guys did?’ To this
extent, the new gang’s violence was arguably underpinned by a different form of socialization to the past.
More specifically, it seemed to be related to the organic
emergence of a tight-knit peer group and associated adolescent practices, and can be said to have represented yet
another different iteration of socialization into violence
through group dynamics. The patterns of violence that
this more organic form of group socialization led to were
clearly much less durable than those based on the preexisting group dynamics of the early 1990s or the more
institutionalized ones of the mid-1990s, since when
I returned to barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in 2014, the
new gang had dissipated after several of the youth
involved found regular employment and were no longer
able to hang out with the group. This was also the case in
2016, although the lack of a new gang seemed to be
largely due to increased police repression, a contextual
factor that was clearly structurally equivalent to the
cartelito’s crushing of the gang in 2006. At the same
time, new forms of virtually organized collective violence
were also in the process of emerging, although their
dynamics seemed to relate first and foremost to a changing local sexual political economy rather than any form
of group socialization (see Rodgers, 2017).
Conclusion
This article has sought to explore the various ways in
which gang members in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, a
poor urban neighbourhood in Managua, the capital city
journal of PEACE RESEARCH 54(5)
658
of Nicaragua, have assimilated norms and practices of
violence over the past two decades. It has shown how
different types of violence can be related to distinct
forms of socialization, and traces how some of these
changed over time, often for very contingent reasons,
but also how there existed continuities and connections
between different forms of socialization and violence.
At the same time, distinctions could clearly be made
between types of socialization based on specific forms of
individual agency, others derived from collective group
dynamics, while yet others related to broader, more
contextual factors. This is important because there is
a sense in which socialization processes are often considered rather monolithically. This is certainly the case
of gang socialization, which is often viewed as a singular
event rather than a process (see e.g. Vigil, 2002; Melde
& Esbensen, 2011). The material presented above on
the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang suggests instead
that socialization – as Checkel (2017) argues in his
introduction to this special issue – is a multilayered
process that articulates together different mechanisms
and process of socialization in a contingent and constantly evolving manner.
The evolutionary trajectory of the barrio Luis Fanor
Hernández gang also illustrates how different gang member generations since 1990 dynamically experienced different configurations of socialization where individual
agency, group dynamics and contextual factors interrelated in variable ways. While the latter two forms of
socialization can be broken down into different iterations, with the distinction between pre-existing and
institutionalized group dynamics or general, local and
activity-related contextual factors both important to consider, it is striking how all tend to be systemic in their
logic. This is in stark contrast with individual agency,
which emerges as a highly contingent mechanism for
socialization. At the same time, the latter often emerges
as a socializing ‘bridge’ between different phases of the
gang’s evolution, and as the means through which the
most extreme forms of violence are transmitted. Having
said this, it is striking how the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang’s trajectory highlights that none of these
different socialization configurations institutionalized for
more than a single phase. To a certain extent, this can be
related to the specific nature of some of the practices of
violence being socialized, including for example in relation to the knowledgeable use of firearms, which requires
specific and accurate information that clearly need to be
regularly re-asserted first hand across generations. In relation to contextual factors, it can also be argued that these
either fostered the internalization of unsustainable norms
– for example in the form of a shrinking social imaginary
and individual entrepreneurial dynamics linked to drug
dealing – or critical disjunctures in the local political
economy – as exemplified by the rise of the cartelito. It
is less clear why group dynamics do not necessarily institutionalize, except possibly in relation to demographic
considerations of ‘critical mass’, although their sensibility
to contextual factors is clearly a major element in
explaining their volatility.
Understanding how and why socialization processes
wax and wane, and why their effects are so volatile, is
obviously a critical endeavour. In order to truly understand this issue, however, we arguably need a new
research agenda, one which moves away from an organizational focus on gangs towards a closer study of the
longitudinal individual life trajectories of gang members.
Getting to grips with gang socialization arguably requires
not just focusing on the processes and mechanisms
through which norms and practices of violence are transmitted to individuals, but also a sense of how they shape
their lives in the long term, including after they leave the
gang. Indeed, the latter inevitably highlights the inherent
volatility of socialization, as most youth who join a gang
will eventually leave it through ‘natural desistance processes’ (Decker and Pyrooz, 2011: 16), and consequently
generally resort less to violence (Rodgers & Jensen,
2015). How and why this takes place is not well understood, however. Does desistance signal a transformation
in the way individuals absorb and process norms and
practices related to violence? If this is the case, then does
it indicate that socialization is primarily a group rather
than an individual process, and dissipates once an individual leaves the group, or does it suggest that socialization is in fact not important in explaining violence and
that other factors – such as rational choice and individual
cost–benefit calculations (see Weinstein, 2007; Gates,
2017) – need to be taken into account? Or does it simply
indicate the limits of socialization, suggesting for example that it is a time-bound process? Only by answering
these sorts of questions can we open up the possibility for
truly sustainable forms of violence reduction and
peacebuilding.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to participants at the first Socialization and
Organized Political Violence workshop held at Simon
Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada, 12–14 September 2013, including especially Jeff Checkel and Liz
Cooper, as well as to three anonymous reviewers, for
useful and constructive comments.
Rodgers
References
Anderson, Elijah (1999) Code of the Street: Decency, Violence,
and the Moral Life of the Inner City. New York: WW Norton.
Arendt, Hannah (1969) On Violence. New York: Harcourt
Brace.
Ayling, Julie (2011) Gang change and evolutionary theory.
Crime, Law and Social Change 56(1): 1–26.
Bateson, Regina (2017) The socialization of civilians and militia members in the Guatemalan civil war. Journal of Peace
Research 54(5): 634–647.
Bernard, Thomas (1990) Angry aggression among the ‘Truly
Disadvantaged’. Criminology 28(1): 73–96.
Cajina, Roberto (2000) Nicaragua: De la Seguridad del Estado
a la Inseguridad Ciudadana [From state security to citizen
insecurity]. In: Andrés Serbin & Diego Ferreyra (eds)
Gobernabilidad Democrática y Seguridad Ciudadana en Centroamérica: El caso de Nicaragua [Democratic Governance
and Citizen Security in Central America: The Case of
Nicaragua]. Managua: CRIES.
Checkel, Jeffrey T (2017) Socialization and violence: Introduction and framework. Journal of Peace Research 54(5):
592–605.
Covey, Herbert (2003) Street Gangs Throughout the World.
Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.
Curry, G. David; Scott Decker & David Pyrooz (2014) Confronting Gangs: Crime and Community, 3rd edition.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Decker, Scott & David Pyrooz (2011) Leaving the gang: Logging off and moving on. Paper commissioned by Google
Ideas and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFP) (http://
www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/SAVE_
paper_Decker_Pyrooz.pdf).
Decker, Scott & Barrik van Winkle (1996) Life in the Gang:
Family, Friends, and Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Demoscopı́a (2007) Maras y Pandillas, Comunidad y Policı́a en
Centroamérica [Gangs, Community, and Police in Central
America]. San José: Demoscopı́a.
Fischer, Claude (1975) Toward a subcultural theory of urbanism. American Journal of Sociology 80(6): 1319–1330.
Gates, Scott G (2017) Membership matters: Coerced recruits
and rebel allegiance. Journal of Peace Research 54(5):
674–686.
Hagedorn, John (2008) A World of Gangs: Armed Young Men
and Gangsta Culture. Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press.
Hazen, Jennifer & Dennis Rodgers, eds (2014) Global Gangs:
Street Violence across the World. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press
Jensen, Steffen (2008) Gangs, Politics and Dignity in Cape
Town. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Keiser, R Lincoln (1969) The Vice Lords: Warriors of the Streets.
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Klein, Malcolm & Cheryl Maxson (2006) Street Gang Patterns
and Policies. New York: Oxford University Press.
659
Kruijt, Dirk & Kees Koonings (1999) Societies of Fear: The
Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America.
London: Zed.
Lancaster, Roger (1992) Life Is Hard: Machismo, Danger, and
the Intimacy of Power in Nicaragua. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.
Lepoutre, David (1997) Cœur de Banlieue: Codes, Rites et
Langages [The Heart of the Suburbs: Codes, Rituals, and
Language]. Paris: Odile Jacob.
Manwaring, Max (2005) Street Gangs: The New Urban
Insurgency. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College.
Melde, Chris & Finn-Aage Esbensen (2011) Gang membership as
a turning point in the life course. Criminology 49(2): 513–552.
Montoya, Rosario (2003) House, street, collective: Revolutionary geographies and gender transformation in Nicaragua,
1979–99. Latin American Research Review 38(2): 61–93.
Núñez, Juan Carlos (1996) De la Ciudad al Barrio: Redes y
Tejidos Urbanos en Guatemala, El Salvador y Nicaragua
[From city to neighborhood: Urban networks and fabric
in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua]. Guatemala
City: Universidad Rafael Landı́var.
Orozco, Roberto (2012) IV Encuesta sobre Percepción de la
Seguridad Ciudadana [IV survey on citizen security
perceptions]. Managua: IEEPP.
Rocha, José Luis (2000a) Pandilleros: La mano que empuña el
mortero [Youth Gang Members: The Hand that Rocks the
Mortar Launcher]. Envı́o 216: 17–25.
Rocha, José Luis (2000b) Pandillas: Una cárcel cultural [Youth
Gangs: A Cultural Prison]. Envı́o 219: 13–22.
Rocha, José Luis (2007) Lanzando piedras, fumando ‘piedras’:
Evolución de las pandillas en Nicaragua 1997–2006
[Throwing stones, smoking ‘stones’: The evolution of
gangs in Nicaragua 1997–2006]. Cuaderno de Investigación No. 23. Managua: UCA.
Rocha, José-Luis (2008) La Mara 19 tras las huellas de las
pandillas polı́ticas [The Mara 19 behind the traces of
political gangs]. Envı́o 321: 26–31.
Rocha, José-Luis (2013) Violencia Juvenil y Orden Social en el
Reparto Schick: Juventud Marginada y Relación con el Estado
[Youth violence and social order in the Reparto Schick:
Marginalized youth and their relations with the state].
Inter-American Development Bank discussion paper no.
IDB-DP-308. Washington, DC: IADB (http://publica
tions.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/5772/IDBDP-308_Violencia_Juvenil_y_Orden_Social_en_el_
Reparto_Schick.pdf).
Rodgers, Dennis (2000) Living in the shadow of death: Violence, Pandillas, and social disintegration in contemporary
urban Nicaragua. Unpublished PhD thesis. Department of
Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge.
Rodgers, Dennis (2006) Living in the shadow of death: Gangs,
violence, and social order in urban Nicaragua, 1996–2002.
Journal of Latin American Studies 38(2): 267–292.
Rodgers, Dennis (2007a) Joining the gang and becoming a
broder: The violence of ethnography in contemporary
660
Nicaragua. Bulletin of Latin American Research 26(4):
444–461.
Rodgers, Dennis (2007b) When vigilantes turn bad: Gangs,
violence, and social change in urban Nicaragua. In: David
Pratten & Atreyee Sen (eds) Global Vigilantes. London:
Hurst, 349–370.
Rodgers, Dennis (2007c) Managua. In: Kees Koonings &
Dirk Kruijt (eds) Fractured Cities: Social Exclusion, Urban
Violence and Contested Spaces in Latin America. London:
Zed, 71–85.
Rodgers, Dennis (2014) After the gang: Pathways of
de-socialization from violence in Nicaragua. Paper presented to the 2nd ‘Socialization and Organized Political
Violence’ workshop, Yale University, 17–18 October.
Rodgers, Dennis (2015) The moral economy of murder:
Violence, death, and social order in gangland Nicaragua.
In: Javier Auyero, Philippe Bourgois & Nancy ScheperHughes (eds) Violence at the Urban Margins. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 21–40.
Rodgers, Dennis (2016) Critique of urban violence: Bismarckian transformations in contemporary Nicaragua. Theory,
Culture, and Society 33(7–8): 85–109.
Rodgers, Dennis (2017) Temporality and epistemological disjuncture: The perils, pitfalls, and possibilities of longitudinal ethnographic research. Paper presented to the
‘Longitudinal Ethnography of Violence’ workshop, Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement (NSCR), Amsterdam, 22–23 June.
Rodgers, Dennis & Adam Baird (2015) Understanding gangs
in contemporary Latin America. In: Scott Decker & David
Pyrooz (eds) Handbook of Gangs and Gang Responses.
New York: Wiley.
Rodgers, Dennis & Steffen Jensen (2015) The problem with
templates: Learning from organic gang-related violence
reduction. Stability: International Journal of Security and
Development 4(1): 1–16.
Rodgers, Dennis & José Luis Rocha (2013) Turning points:
Gang evolution in Nicaragua. Small Arms Survey Yearbook
2013: Everyday Dangers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 46–73.
Sánchez Jankowski, Martı́n (1991) Islands in the Street: Gangs
and American Urban Society. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press.
journal of PEACE RESEARCH 54(5)
Sánchez Jankowski, Martı́n (2003) Gangs and social change.
Theoretical Criminology 7(2): 191–216.
Stretesky, Paul & Mark Pogrebin (2007) Gang-related gun
violence: Socialization, identity, and self. Journal of
Contemporary Ethnography 36(1): 85–114.
Suttles, Gerald (1968) The Social Order of the Slum: Ethnicity
and Territory in the Inner City. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Thrasher, Frederick (1927) The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs
in Chicago. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime)
(2007) Crime and Development in Central America: Caught
in the Crossfire. Vienna: United Nations (https://www.
unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Central-americastudy-en.pdf).
Valdez, Al (2011) The origins of Southern California Latino
gangs. In: Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert & Elizabeth
Skinner (eds) Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central
America. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Vigil, James Diego (1988) Barrio Gangs: Street Life and Identity in Southern California. Austin, TX: University of Texas
Press.
Vigil, James Diego (2002) A Rainbow of Gangs: Street Cultures
in the Mega-City. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Weegels, Julienne (2017) Tracing the Nicaraguan prisoner:
Moving between marginality, violence, and change.
Unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Anthropology,
University of Amsterdam.
Weinstein, Jeremy (2007) Inside Rebellion: The Politics of
Insurgent Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Whyte, William Foote (1943) Street Corner Society: The
Structure of an Italian Slum. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Yablonsky, Lewis (1963) The Violent Gang. New York:
Macmillan.
DENNIS RODGERS, b. 1973, PhD in Social
Anthropology (University of Cambridge, 2000); Professor of
International Development Studies, University of
Amsterdam (2016– ); various visiting or associated academic
positions in the UK, Switzerland, and India; most recent
book: Global Gangs (University of Minnesota Press, 2014).