Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC and the
Shanghai Organization
Saghar Nikpour*
*Corresponding author, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Economics, Faculty of
Management and Economics, Shahid Bahonar university of kerman, Kerman, Iran.
(Email: saghar.nikpour@gmail.com)
Mojtaba bahmani
Assistant Prof., Department of Economics, Faculty of Management and Economics,
Shahid Bahonar university of kerman, Kerman, Iran. (Email: mbahmani@uk.ac.ir)
sayyed Abdolmajid Jalaee
Prof., Department of Economics, Faculty of Management and Economics, Shahid
Bahonar university of kerman, Kerman, Iran. (Emai: jalaee@uk.ac.ir)
Mehdi Nejati
Assistant Prof. of Economics, Faculty of Management and Economics, Shahid
Bahonar university of kerman, Kerman, Iran. (Email: mehdi.nejati@gmail.com)
Abstract
This article investigates the financial convergence between Iran, OPEC & the
Shanghai Organization trade groups, of which Iran is a member. The analysis
covers the period of 2005 to 2017.In order to examine the convergence
dynamics of these financial markets; we have employed the Philips and Sul
(2007) methodology, which uses a nonlinear time-varying factor model. This
paper provides a comprehensive picture of the financial systems within Iran
and its convergence clubs by testing the convergence of their money market
with domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP), deposit and
lending interest rate, real interest rate, and capital market with Stocks traded,
total value (% of GDP). The empirical findings show that money and stock
markets of OPEC and the Shanghai group do not form a homogenous
convergence club. Results show that Iran has convergence with some countries
in OPEC and the Shanghai group in money and stock markets, which can be
Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC
79
explained by their similar economic indicators in both markets. Furthermore,
the convergence speed between Iran and the Shanghai countries is higher than
that of Iran and OPEC countries, which proves that joint trade agreements are
stronger reasons for convergence than the oil factor. Iran should implement
further structural reforms in order to achieve greater financial convergence
with its joined groups.
JEL classification: G15, G21, C32, C33
Keywords: Stock Markets, Banking Sector, Opec and The Shanghai
Organization, Panel Convergence Methodology
DOI: 10.22034/ijf.2019.199622.1059
© Iran Finance Association
Introduction
Financial integration is the process through which financial markets of two or
more countries or regions become more connected with each other. This
process can take many forms, including cross-border capital flows (for
example, firms raising funds on capital markets cross-border), foreign
participation in domestic markets (for example, a parent bank’s ability to set up
a subsidiary abroad), sharing of information and practices among financial
institutions, or unification of market infrastructures (IMF 2014). It can also
have a regional or global dimension, depending on whether a country’s
financial market is more closely connected to neighboring countries or to
global financial centers/institutions. From a theoretical point of view,
integration may be signaled by the convergence of the asset prices with the
same characteristics law of one price (Eyraud, Singh& Sutton 2017)
Financial or economic integration aims to globalize and draw countries
closer to each other. Therefore, forming trade and economic groups, by
discarding economic, commercial, and legal barriers, expanding financial and
trade relations, and creating common interests among countries, provides the
bases for closeness and therefore financial and economic convergence.
Nowadays, countries are making efforts to approach other countries through
different treaties, aiming to benefit from convergences and integrations. Iran,
which is among these countries, aims at benefiting from the advantages of
forming economic and trade alliances as well as expanding its international
connections, has been planning to become a member of different groups such
80
Iranian Journal of Finance, 2018, Vol. 2, No. 4
as OPEC and the Shanghai group in the recent decade. The most important
goals of OPEC, consisting of 14 countries, are coordinating and integrating oil
policies of the member countries and identifying the best way of providing
them with their separate or common interests (OPEC bulletin 2017). The
Shanghai group, consisting of 8 member countries, is one of the prominent
groups in the world which aims to achieve military integration and expansion
of economic and trade relations (Shanghai Economic Prospect 2017).
Considering the fact that having commonalities, such as oil revenues and
trade and even military relations, can provide the basis for convergence
between countries, this study focuses on assessing financial integration
between Iran and members of the Shanghai and OPEC groups, comparing the
integration speed of Iran in these groups, and finally deciding which
association (oil or trade) is a better ground for integration.
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 is a review of literature,
section 3 is a review of the economic conditions of the OPEC and Shanghai
members, section 4 focuses on the convergence methodology developed by PS
(2007), Section 5 describes the datasets, Section 6 reports the results, and
finally, the last section discusses the conclusions.
Literature Review
The majority of studies testing the convergence hypothesis have used beta
convergence, sigma convergence, unit root tests, integration analysis or panel
unit root tests with a stochastic trend. However, the previous literature has also
identified a number of drawbacks in these approaches. Islam (2003) stated that
beta and sigma convergence are more suitable for growth models, and other
authors have indicated some difficulties related to their testing, in particular to
generating inconclusive and biased results (Durlauf and Quah, 1999; Bernard
and Durlauf, 1996). Concerning unit root tests and co-integration analysis,
Apergis et al. (2014) pointed out that these fail to establish convergence when
multiple steady-state equilibria occur in the sample data. Finally, panel unit
root tests with a stochastic trend are appropriate for testing convergence, but
they are very dependent on data homogeneity. Considering these issues, Färe et
al. (2006) recommend examining convergence using cluster analysis.
Therefore, we will use the methodology proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007;
hereafter PS) to test the convergence of financial markets within CEE, using a
non-linear, time-varying coefficient factor model. Rughoo and Sarantis (2012),
Apergis et al. (2014) Ananchotikul and Zoli (2015), and Li et al. (2018) have
emphasized a number of advantages of PS methodology. First, this approach
Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC
81
does not require specific assumptions concerning the stationary of the
variables, allowing testing and estimation of the convergence in the sample,
and revealing the formed convergence clubs. Second, the model allows the
estimation of the long-run equilibrium in a heterogeneous panel, including the
history of a country in transition dynamics. Third, this algorithm enables the
illustration of the transition path for each country, specifically, the behavior of
a data series in relation to the panel average, which provides valuable
information on individual behavior in the panel.
Benefits of a lack of financial convergence include a reduction in
transaction costs, a more efficient allocation of resources, and risk sharing or
decrease of market volatility (Prasad et al., 2003; Baele et al., 2004) will lessen
the advantages offered by EU membership. Furthermore, divergence in the
financial markets could result in a decrease in foreign investments. The PS
(2007) methodology has been used to study convergence in different areas of
financial markets. Apergis et al. (2011) investigated equity market convergence
in 17 developed countries. Their findings revealed that international equity
markets do not form a homogeneous convergence club, but rather a dichotomy.
Apergis et al. (2014) tested convergence for 42 equity markets and showed that
37 equity markets form a unified convergence club. The volatility of stock
prices also suggests more evidence of convergence than stock prices.
Caporale et al. (2014) analyzed the convergence in stock returns on both
sectors and individual industries within sectors in five European countries
(Germany, France, the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK) as well as the US,
over the period of 1973-2008. In terms of sectoral indices, their results revealed
convergence in the middle of the sample period, followed by divergence, and
indicated four convergence clubs. According to their findings, the convergence
process had not been influenced by EU policies. Rughoo and Sarantis (2012)
analyzed convergence for deposit and lending rates for non-financial
corporations between 2003 and 2011 in the EU15. Their findings indicated
deposit and lending rate convergence until 2007; however, after 2008, due to
the financial crisis, they suggested the convergence hypothesis should be
rejected. A similar result was obtained by Rughoo and Sarantis (2014) for
deposit and lending rates to the household sector for the same sample period in
the EU15. Other studies also employed the PS methodology to test real GDP
and income per capita convergence (Fritsche and Kuzin, 2011; Bartkowska and
Riedl, 2012; Monfort et al., 2013; Borsi and Metiu, 2014) and price level
convergence (Fritsche and Kuzin, 2011; Fischer, 2012) in the EU. Despite its
benefits, the PS (2007) methodology has been rarely used for testing
convergence in financial markets.
82
Iranian Journal of Finance, 2018, Vol. 2, No. 4
Econometric methodology: Convergence and cluster tests
The log t convergence test
The econometric approach proposed by PS (2007) uses a nonlinear timevarying factor model and provides the framework for modeling the transitional
dynamics as well as the long run behavior. Assuming that we have panel data
for a variable Xit where i=1, …, N and t=1, …, T, N and T being the number of
units and the sample size respectively, a simple linear factor model can be
formulated as follows:
X it = δi μt + εit
(1)
Where µt and it εit are unobservable components. PS (2007) reformulated
Equation 1, allowing for time variation in the loading coefficients. They
allowed δi to have a random component, which absorbs εit. The new model has
the following representation
X it =δi μt
(2)
PS (2007) separated the common factors from idiosyncratic components, as
follows:
=
+ait
(3)
Where
represents systematic components and ait stands for transitory
components. Equation 3 is transformed to the form of Equation 2, as follows:
X it = (git + ait / μt) μt = δit μt
for every i and t
(4)
Where µt is a single common component and δit is a time-varying idiosyncratic
element, which measures the economic distance between the common trend, µt
and Xit. To test whether the components of δit are converging, PS (2007)
defines the transition coefficient as:
=
∑
∑
(5)
The relative transition parameter
measures δit in relation to the panel
average at time t and describes the transition path for country i compared to the
panel average. Therefore,
measures country i’s relative departure from the
common steady-state growth trend, µt. The transition curve average for all
countries is equal to one for each set of data at any time. Consequently,
convergence among all countries is achieved when hit approaches 1, for every i,
Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC
83
as t approaches ∞. In the case of convergence within the clubs, the transition
paths narrow to different steady state equilibria, which can be above or below
the cross-section average of one.
PS (2007) proposed the log t regression to test the null hypothesis of
convergence. However, it should be noted that PS (2007) defines two notions
of convergence: in rates or relative convergence, (i.e. the studied variable has
the same rate of change and the same value across the cross-sectional units).
For relative convergence, the null hypothesis is formulated as follows:
δ and α ≥ 0 against the alternative : ≠ δ for all i or α < 0
For absolute converge, the null hypothesis is:
: δ =δ and a ³ 1
As we can notice, the difference between the two concepts of convergence is
given by the value of α. When μt follows either a nonstationary or a trendstationary process, PS (2007) showed that it diverges at
(t) rate as t
approaches infinity.
Hence, if δit converges at a faster rate than
(t) to the constant δ (i.e. when α³
(t)
1), there is convergence in levels. If δit converges at a slower rate than
to the constant δ (i.e. when 0 < α > 1), the relative convergence holds. In order
to estimate the log t test, first, a measure for the cross-sectional variance
ratio is computed:
= ∑
(6)
Second, the following OLS regression is performed:
For t = [rT], [rT] + 1… T with some r > 0; L(t) = log (t + 1) and, where is the
estimate of α in 0 H. The test statistic is normally distributed, and at the 5%
level, the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected. PS (2007) recommendes
starting the regression at some point t = [rT], with some r > 0. Based on their
simulations, PS (2007) have suggested r = 0.30 when T is small or moderate
(for example, T£ 50), and r = 0.20 when T is large (for example, T³ 100). By
employing the conventional t -statistic b t, the null hypothesis of convergence
is rejected if b t < -1.65. The rejection of full convergence does not imply the
absence of convergence in the subgroups of the panel, and therefore, PS (2007)
have proposed a club-clustering algorithm to classify units in convergent
clusters. The procedure is flexible and allows all possible configurations:
overall convergence, overall divergence, converging subgroups, and diverging
units.
84
Iranian Journal of Finance, 2018, Vol. 2, No. 4
Clustering algorithm
The algorithm, based on log t regressions, consists of four steps, which
are briefly described below:
Step 1: Last observation ordering. Order the N units in the panel
according to the last observation
.
Step 2: Core group formation. Select the core members in the panel by
calculating the log t regression for the k highest members with 2£ k £ N and
calculate the convergence t -statistic, ̂
. The core group size is chosen by
.
maximizing ̂
subject to min ̂
Step 3: Sieve individuals for club membership. Once the core group is
formed, each remaining unit is added separately to the core group, and the log t
is run. Include the new unit if the associated
bt > c, with c being a critical value (c³ 0). Repeat this procedure for the
remaining units and form the first convergence club.
Step 4: Stopping rule. Form a second group for all units outside the
convergence club. Run the log t regression for this set of units, and if
convergence is detected within this new cluster, a second club is formed. If it is
not, steps 1, 2 and 3 are repeated on the remaining units. If no subgroups can
be found, then these units display a divergent behavior.
3. Overview of some of the OPEC & Shanghai economic indicators
Graph 1. GDP growth- OPEC
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
-100
-50
Congo
0
50
Libya
Source: World Bank
100
Kuwait
150
85
Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC
Graph 2. GDP growth- Shanghai
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
-10
-5
0
Kyrgyz
5
10
Afghanistan
15
Uzbekistan
20
25
Tajikestan
Source: World Bank
As presented in graphs 1 and 2, both groups consist of countries which
are varying in terms of GDP (Countries with a high per capita income such as
China and Qatar, and those with low per capita income such as Guinea).
Moreover, GDP growth fluctuations are observed during the study, and almost
all of the countries lack a stable growth. These fluctuations are more evident in
OPEC countries. Furthermore, compared with OPEC countries, Shanghai
countries have higher per capita incomes. Iran is also facing many fluctuations
in GDP growth
Graph 3. Monetary freedom OPEC organization
100
80
60
40
20
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Iran,Islamic Rep
Kuwait
Qatar
Gabon
Arabia Saudi
Venezuela
Algeria
Angola
Nigeria
United Arab Emirates
Ecuador
Libya
86
Iranian Journal of Finance, 2018, Vol. 2, No. 4
Graph 4. Monetary freedom- Shanghai organization
800
600
400
200
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Belarus
China
India
Iran,Islamic Rep
Kazakhstan
Mongolia
Pakistan
Russia
Tajikestan
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyz
Source: Heritage Institute (Foundation)
Graphs 3 and 4 represent the monetary freedom index in OPEC and the
Shanghai countries. Assessment of this variable reveals that, compared with the
Shanghai countries, OPEC countries have closer correspondence regarding this
variable, and that they have faced a decline in monetary freedom during the
study period. Iran has also been facing the decline of its monetary freedom
index from 2005 in such a way that it has degraded from the rank of 60th in
2005 to 55th.
Graph 5. Financial freedom—OPEC organization
80
60
40
20
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Iran,Islamic Rep
Kuwait
Arabia Saudi
Venezuela
Nigeria
United Arab Emirates
87
Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC
Graph 6. Financial freedom Shanghai organization
80
60
40
20
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Belarus
Iran,Islamic Rep
Pakistan
China
Kazakhstan
Russia
India
Mongolia
Tajikestan
Source: Heritage Institute (Foundation)
As demonstrated, based on the data from Heritage Institute, the monetary
freedom index is on a similar level in the Shanghai and OPEC countries, and
Iran has the lowest rank (10) among these countries.
Graph 7. Net Capital Out flow-OPEC organization (% of GD)
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
-4
Iran,Islamic Rep
Nigeria
Libya
Iraq
Algeria
Qatar
Venezuela
United Arab Emirates
Congo
88
Iranian Journal of Finance, 2018, Vol. 2, No. 4
Graph 8. Net Capital Out flow-Shanghai organization (% of GDP)
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
-20%
Afghanestan
India
kyrgyz Republic
Russia
Belarus
Iran,Islamic Rep
Mongolia
China
Kazakhstan
Pakistan
Source: World Bank
Graph 9. Net Capital Inflow-OPEC organization (% of GDP)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Iran,Islamic Rep
Iraq
Venezuela
Nigeria
Algeria
United Arab Emirates
Libya
Qatar
Congo
Ecuador
Gabon
Angola
89
Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC
Graph 10. Net Capital Inflow-Shanghai organization (% of GDP)
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
-20%
-40%
Belarus
China
India
Iran,Islamic Rep
Kazakhstan
Mongolia
Russia
Pakistan
Tajikestan
Afghanestan
kyrgyz Republic
Uzbekistan
Source: World Bank
Based on the graphs above (7 to 10), which represent the capital inflow
and out flow in the Shanghai and OPEC countries, capital out flow has faced
more fluctuations in the OPEC group, which can be due to the economic and
political risks in the Middle East. Furthermore, capital inflow has been lower in
OPEC countries and followed a somewhat more stable trend.
Therefore, analysis of significant real variables in the Shanghai and
OPEC countries’ economies shows that on average, the Shanghai countries
have more correspondence, and that they are more homogeneous in terms of
real indices.
Data
We included 14 countries from OPEC such as Qatar Indonesia, Libya, United
Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Angola, Equatorial Guinea
and Congo. The SCO comprises eight member states, namely the Republic
of India, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, the
Kyrgyz Republic, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the
Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan.
90
Iranian Journal of Finance, 2018, Vol. 2, No. 4
In order to detect the presence of convergence and co-movements in the
financial markets, we employed different series of data between 2005 and
2017. More specifically, we used World Bank yearly data for domestic credit
to private sector1,2Lending interest rate (%), Deposit interest rate (%), Stocks
traded, total value (% of GDP) to analyze financial convergence in money and
capital market between Iran and OPEC- Shanghai groups.
We included 14 countries from OPEC such as Qatar Indonesia, Libya,
United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Angola, Equatorial
Guinea and Congo. The SCO comprises eight member states, namely the
Republic of India, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China,
the Kyrgyz Republic, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Russian Federation,
the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan.
In order to detect the presence of convergence and co-movements in the
financial markets, we employed different series of data between 2005 and
2017. More specifically, we used World Bank yearly data for domestic credit
to private sector3,4Lending interest rate (%), Deposit interest rate (%), Stocks
traded, total value (% of GDP) to analyze financial convergence in money and
capital market between Iran and OPEC- Shanghai groups.
Empirical results
Table 1 presents the results of the club clustering tests for financial markets
within
OPEC and table 2 shows the result of the Shanghai estimation. We must
first emphasize that the null hypothesis of convergence in the whole sample is
rejected at the 5% level for all the analyzed indicators and the t-statistic of is
below the critical value of -1.65 in all cases. Given the absence of convergence,
we applied the PS methodology to test if different countries converge to
multiple steady-state equilibrium.
1 Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by financial
corporations, such as through loans, purchases of no equity securities, and trade credits and other
accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries, these claims include
credit to public enterprises.
2 Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator.
91
Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC
It should be noted that the values provide important information on the
speed of convergence. Thus, the higher the value of ̂ , the higher the rate of
convergence. At the same time, the value of ̂ allows us to distinguish between
different degrees of convergence. 0< ̂ 2, this implies convergence in rates
(i.e. relative convergence), while ̂ ≥2 indicates convergence in levels (i.e.
absolute convergence)
Table1. Convergence club classification for OPEC financial markets
Club
countries
tb
b^
-0/33
2/20
2/33
2/20
-5/95
5/20
-5/55
-5/62
-2/22
Money market
Domestic credit to private
sector by banks (% of GDP)
Club1
Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya,
Nigeria, Ecuador, Venezuela RB, Indonesia, Iran
Islamic Rep, Saudi Arabia
Not convergent Group 2
Emirate, Kuwait
Iran Islamic Rep Venezuela RB
-59/59
2/55
-52/32
-25/25
-2/30
Club2
Iraq ,Nigeria
-2/95
-2/22
Club3
Equatorial, Indonesia
0/52
2/66
Club4
Guinea, Gabon, Libya,
-2/09
-2/20
Club5
Kuwait ,Qatar ,Algeria
0/25
0/25
Club1+ Club2
4
-525/52
-0/32
Club2+ Club3
4
-559/53
-5/26
Club3+ Club4
5
-05/25
-2/65
Club4+ Club5
6
-53/53
-5/32
-05/25
-5/99
Lending interest rate (%)
Club1
Not convergent Group 2
Deposit interest rate (%)
Club1
Iran Islamic Rep, Iraq, Nigeria
Algeria Indonesia Kuwait. Qatar Venezuela RB
Stock market
Stocks traded, total value (%
of GDP)
Club1
Iran Islamic Rep, Saudi Arabia, Emirate
-2/25
-2/22
Not convergent Group 2
Nigeria, Qatar
-56/32
-3/30
Note: The null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at the 5% level if tb <
1.65
92
Iranian Journal of Finance, 2018, Vol. 2, No. 4
Table 2. Convergence club classification for Shanghai financial markets
Club
countries
tb
b^
-62/52
-5/03
Money market
Domestic credit to private sector
by banks (% of GDP)
Club1
India, Mongolia, Russian Federation
Club2
Iran, Islamic Rep, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan
3
5
/55
/25
5
2
/56
/55
China
Not convergent Group 3
-035/05
-5/95
Club1 + Club2
-00/60
-2/55
Club2 + Group3
-29/26
-5/02
Lending interest rate (%)
-93/53
-5/03
Club1
Belarus, Iran Islamic Rep, Mongolia,
Tajikistan
5/96
1/7
Not convergent Group 2
Pakistan, China, India
-026/55
-5/32
-5/92
-56/56
Belarus, Iran Islamic Rep
-3/59
5/95
Club2
Pakistan,Tajikistan
-0/09
-2/59
Club3
China Kyrgyz Republic
-2/53
-2/02
Deposit interest rate (%)
Club1
Club1+ Club2
4
Club2+ Club3
4
-0
/93
-00
/22
-5/25
-06/02
-32/55
-0/95
Stock market
Stocks traded, total value (%
of GDP)
Club1
Iran Islamic Rep, Russian Federation
3/55
5/32
Not convergent Group 2
China ,India , Kyrgyz Republic Pakistan
-55/56
-0/55
Note: The null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at the 5% level if tb <
1.65
Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC
93
Convergence of money markets in OPEC & the Shanghai organizations
Domestic credit to the private sector by banks actually demonstrates the
banking sector depth. The banking sector can ensure efficient allocation of
resources by transferring deposits they have collected to the necessary sectors
of an economy. Credit is “one of the most critical mechanisms we have for
allocating resources” (Cecchetti and Schoenholtz, 2011). Therefore, analyzing
this variable between countries helps us determine the banking sector depth.
The core group for Domestic credit to private sector by banks in OPEC
includes only Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Ecuador, the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and
Saudi Arabia. In Shanghai, Iran has convergence with India, Mongolia, and the
Russian Federation. As the value of b^ is 48/1 in the shanghai organization, the
speed of convergence in Iran’s integrated club in the Shanghai group is higher
than that of OPEC (0.02) for domestic credit to private sector by bank.
As mentioned before, the domestic credit to private sector by banks
variable demonstrates the depth and share of money market in the economy.
Analyzing the results reveals that countries which are in a convergent group in
terms of lending and depositing interest rates, are also convergent in this
variable, which shows the similarity between their infrastructures and banking
sector depth.
As seen in table 1, estimated results for lending and deposit interest rates
show that Iran has convergence with Venezuela RB in deposit interest rate and
with Iraq and Nigeria in lending interest rate. Furthermore, these countries
(Iran, Venezuela RB, Iraq & Nigeria) have a potential to connect with each
other and create a convergence club in deposit interest rate. In the Shanghai
group (table2), the core club includes Iran, Belarus, Mongolia, and Tajikistan,
among which Iran has convergence with Tajikistan, Belarus, and Mongolia in
lending interest rate and with Belarus in deposit interest rate.
Based on tables 1 and 2, and a comparison of convergence speeds
between Iran and OPEC, and the Shanghai group, it is evident that the
convergence speed in the money market between Iran and countries convergent
with it is higher in the Shanghai group.
In order to analyze and justify convergence between countries, we need to
assess their trade and financial relations first.
94
Iranian Journal of Finance, 2018, Vol. 2, No. 4
Table 11. Iran & Nigeria trade value
Table 12. Iran & Iraq trade value
25,000
8,000,000
20,000
6,000,000
15,000
Import
Export
Import
Export
Source: Trade map
Table 13. Iran & Venezuela trade value
Table 14. Iran & Blarus trade value
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
150000
100000
50000
0
Import
Export
Export
imort
Source: Trade map
Table 15. Iran & Tajikistan trade value
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
Table 16. Iran & Mongolia trade value
15000
10000
5000
0
Export
import
Export
Source: Trade map
import
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2008
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
0
2010
0
2009
2,000,000
2008
5,000
2009
4,000,000
10,000
Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC
95
As evident in the tables related to trade value between Iran and other
countries in the convergence club (tables 11 to 17), trade relations, which are
the perquisites of convergence, exist between these countries.
In order to analyze the necessary conditions, we need to analyze the
money market and the significant variables in this market. In this section, in
order to analyze the behavior of the selected variable and their progression
trend, we have employed the Hodrick and Prescott filter introduced for the first
time in 2002, which is one of the best ways of separating the long-run trend
and behavior of a variable (Hodrick and Prescott, 1980). The results of the HP
filter are evident in tables 17 to 24 for each variable and for OPEC and the
Shanghai group.5
The proportionality of money distribution with the real sector variables
demonstrates proper executive policies as well as consistency between
different monetary parties such as the central bank, commercial banks,
depositors, and loan recipients (Hossein Bazmohammadi, 2013). In case of
incontinency between these parties and inefficient policies, money distribution
growth will be accompanied by inflation. Therefore, the inflation variable
reflects the effectiveness of the banking system and monetary policies in an
economy.
Therefore, inflation is analyzed in the OPEC and Shanghai group in tables
17 and 18. On the other hand, real interest and bank interest rate spreads are
other tools for measuring banking system efficiency (Charles Morris, 1998).
Real interest rate is defined as the subtraction of the expected inflation rate
from nominal interest rate (real interest rate = nominal interest rate – inflation
rate) which shows the real value of money. The effect of inflation on nominal
interest rate is introduced in the Fisher effect. Negative real interest rate in
consecutive years is an evidence of financial repression. The issue of financial
repression was introduced by Mckinnon and Shaw in 1973. This hypothesis
claims that factors such as defining highest and lowest bank interest rate,
government ownership in banks or credit institutions, imposing restrictions on
financial transactions between countries, setting restrictive rules and
regulations, and creating closer association between governments and banks
lead to financial repression (Maraseli and Darvishi, 2008). In communities
facing financial repression, people constantly request loans and wait in lines for
receiving loans which will not be used for production but for consumption and
commerce, and this is why investment rate is low in these countries. Financial
5
The data are extracted form the World Bank.
96
Iranian Journal of Finance, 2018, Vol. 2, No. 4
repression in developing countries, especially those with an economy
dependent on natural factors revenues, is more evident (Rezaei et al. 2015). In
addition to real interest rate, bank interest rate spread reflects the financial
system efficiency. Spread rate is defined as the difference between the loan
interest rate that a bank charges and deposition interest rate that a bank pays,
and negative real interest rate and Bank Interest rate spread fluctuations
demonstrate problems in banking systems.
Table 17. Inflation, consumer prices (annual%)-OPEC
Table 18. Inflation, consumer prices (annual%)-Shanghai
60
100
80
40
40
20
20
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
60
-20
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
0
-40
-20
-40
Nigeria
Iraq
Venezuela RB
Iran, Islamic Rep
Belarus
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Table 19. Broad Money (%GDP)-OPEC
Table 20. Broad Money (%GDP) -Shanghai
15
15
10
10
5
5
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
-5
-10
-5
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
0
0
-10
-15
Nigeria
Iraq
Belarus
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Venezuela RB
Iran, Islamic Rep
Mongolia
Tajikistan
Based on the discussion of the importance of the money distribution
variable and its connection with the general price level growth, the graphs
above show that money distribution growth is evident in countries convergent
with Iran, and as these economies are also facing inflation, we can conclude
97
Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC
that money distribution growth has encountered inflation in these countries,
which shows weaknesses in executive policies devised by financial institutions
to preserve the money value.
Table 21. Real Interest Rate (%) –OPEC
Table 22. Real Interest Rate (%) -Shanghai
30
60
20
40
10
20
-20
-30
-40
-60
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2005
-20
-10
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
0
0
Nigeria
Iraq
Venezuela RB
Iran, Islamic Rep
-40
#REF!
Table 23. Interest rate spread (%)-OPEC
#REF!
#REF!
#REF!
Table 24. Interest rate spread (%)-Shanghai
8
6
6
4
4
2
2
0
-2
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
0
-2
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
8
-4
-4
-6
Nigeria
Iraq
Belarus
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Venezuela RB
Iran, Islamic Rep
Mongolia
Tajikistan
On the other hand, based on graphs 21 and 22, which represent real
interest rates, countries convergent with Iran in both OPEC and the Shanghai
group face fluctuations in real interest rate, and financial repression is evident
in them. Moreover, bank interest rate spread fluctuations, too, show the
inefficiency of the monetary sector in the economy of these countries.
Convergence of stocks markets in OPEC & the Shanghai organizations
Analyses of stocks traded, total value (% of GDP) in OPEC countries show that
Iran, Saudi Arabia, & Emirates form an integrated group, and in the Shanghai
organization, Iran has convergence with Russia.
98
Iranian Journal of Finance, 2018, Vol. 2, No. 4
The comparison of the convergence speed in the two groups shows that
Iran’s stock market enjoys a higher convergence in the Shanghai group.
In order to show the reason for this convergence, we should primarily
consider their trade value as a necessary condition of convergence and then the
degree of oil dependency in these economies and the relationship between their
stock market and oil price.
Table 29. Iran & Saudi Arabia trade value
Table 30. Iran & UAE trade value
500,000
20,000,000
400,000
15,000,000
300,000
10,000,000
200,000
Import
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
0
2010
0
2009
5,000,000
2008
100,000
Export
Import
Export
Table 31. Iran & Russia trade value
2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
0
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Import
export
Source: Trade map
As demonstrated, trade and financial relations are necessary conditions
for convergence in this group of countries. Moreover, the GDP of these
countries is significantly dependent on oil revenues (graph 33), which means
that different markets in these countries such as capital market are dependent
on the oil market. Graph 32 represents oil prices from 2005 to 2017, and we
can observe the changes in the ratio of stocks traded. In fact, the ratio of stocks
traded to GDP in capital markets of the convergent countries is dependent on
oil price.
99
Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC
Table 32. Oil Price
Table 33. The ratio of net oil revenue to GDP
120
The ratio of net oil revenue to
GDP
100
80
Russia
60
Arabia
Saudia
40
20
UAE
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
0
Iran
0
oil price
Source: World Bank
10
20
30
Source: tradingeconomics.com
In order to analyze the behavior of stocks traded variable, we extracted
the required data from the World Bank website and assessed them using the HP
filter.
Table 34. Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP)-OPEC
Table 35. Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP)-Shanghai
15
20
10
5
United Arab Emirates
-20
Russia
-5
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2016
2015
2014
2013
Saudi Arabia
2012
2011
2009
Iran
2008
2007
2006
2005
0
2010
0
-10
-15
russia
iran
As represented in graph 34 and 35, the value of traded stocks in
convergent countries of the two OPEC and the Shanghai group have had a
consistent behavior with the behavior of oil price change. Moreover, based on
the degree of dependency between economy and capital market, the
dependency degree is higher and effectivity lags are reduced.
40
100
Iranian Journal of Finance, 2018, Vol. 2, No. 4
Conclusion
1-Understanding financial convergence is of major importance for countries’
policymakers. This paper is aimed at investigating the convergence of financial
markets in OPEC & the Shanghai Organization between 2005 and 2017. In
order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the convergence in the regions, we
investigated the money and capital markets. We applied a club clustering
algorithm which uses a non-linear single-factor model with common and
idiosyncratic components and has an endogenous technological progress,
which differs across countries and over time (Phillips and Sul, 2007). The
empirical results of this study revealed that the convergence hypothesis for
financial markets in OPEC & the Shanghai Organization is rejected for all
countries in the panel. The advantage of the employed methodology is that it
allows the formation of convergence clubs in which diverse countries converge
to different steady-state equilibria.
2-The clustering results show that Iran has formed convergence clubs
with Venezuela, Nigeria, and Iraq in OPEC groups, and with Belarus,
Mongolia, and Tajikistan in the Shanghai group, in money market and in
lending and deposit interest rates. Furthermore, the domestic credit to private
sector by banks (% of GDP) variable shows the similarity of money market
depths in convergent countries, in such a way that all countries convergent with
Iran are in one group regarding interest rate.
Analysis of real variables and money market for justifying the
convergence proves that:
Iran had trade relations with all convergent countries, which of course had
different values. Moreover, they also had proper political relations.
Iran is convergent with the group of countries, which are middle-ranking
in terms of the monetary and financial freedom index, do not enjoy a consistent
and stable economic growth and are facing fluctuations in their GDP growth.
Moreover, they are facing capital outflow, which can result from political and
economic risk in these countries.
a) Countries convergent with Iran, are not in an ideal position in terms of
banking system efficiency indices (real interest and bank interest rate spreads)
and are facing financial repression and bank interest rate spread fluctuation.
Moreover, these countries are facing money distribution growth and inflation,
which shows that their monetary policies are not applied properly, and liquidity
and general price level stability goals have not been realized.
Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC
101
3-The results of the analysis of the stocks traded, total value (%GDP),
variable shows that Iran is convergent with Saudi Arabia and Emirates in the
OPEC group, and with Russia in the Shanghai group.
a) The analysis of the capital market of Iran and the convergent countries
in both groups shows that Iran has trade relations with all of them. However,
these relations have been unsteady due to their political status. Moreover, oil
revenues commonality among these countries and dependence of their
economies on these revenues have created the ground for convergence in
capital markets in such a way that their capital markets are not exceptions.
Furthermore, trade value in this market is dependent on oil price fluctuations.
4-Considering the fact that the speed of Iran’s convergence
with the Shanghai countries is higher, we can state that although
the commonality of oil revenues is a factor causing convergence, it
could not create the perquisites for faster convergence, and
forming trade groups for trade expansion is a more significant
reason for initiation and expansion of financial convergence
between countries.
It is clear that financial convergence is a gradual process that
requires time to become complete. In order to continue this
process, policymakers should adopt measures that will increase
financial transparency, improve corporate governance, and
strengthen the regulatory framework.
Our findings have important implications both for
policymakers and investors. The existence of a highly fragmented
financial market with high structural and institutional differences
suggests the need for measures that will increase financial
convergence between OPEC & the Shanghai Organization owing
to rich higher economic growth in both religions. There are at least
three key channels of transmission to growth. First, integration
may stimulate capital accumulation through financial deepening in
the host country. If capital is brought from outside, competition
among financial institutions can be enhanced, particularly when
the domestic financial sector contains few institutions and
maintains high spreads between borrowing and lending rates; and
economies of scale can be exploited by pooling larger amounts of
savings. Second better resource allocation and importation of
technology and knowledge may create opportunities for efficiency
gains, and boost productivity, which is another source of growth.
102
Iranian Journal of Finance, 2018, Vol. 2, No. 4
Third, financial integration can also promote growth indirectly by
exposing policy decisions and corporate actions to greater financial
market scrutiny. Furthermore regional financial integration can
bring a number of additional benefits for both the home and host
countries:
Cross-border financial activity (bank and nonbank) both
follows and can be followed by cross-border trade, and thus could
help foster wider regional economic integration.
Regional banks (robustly supervised with sufficient high
quality capital to support their cross border operations) and
regional markets may have a better understanding of regional
needs than global institutions. They may be able to provide
expertise particularly suited to the host country, such as in the area
of improving financial inclusion. The importance of commodity
exports across the region is also fertile ground for transplanting
expertise in trade and industrial credit.
Regional integration can also alleviate the pressure on
domestic markets arising from the significant growth of the nonbank financial sector (particularly pension funds) in recent years.
Almost most of OPEC & the Shanghai Organization
countries currently face the urgent need to improve their physical
infrastructure. However, upgrades to logistics and transport
infrastructure typically require sizeable investments, necessitating
deep and well-developed financial markets. Moreover, the
cooperation and coordination among financial authorities in these
regions should be strengthened.
Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC
103
Reference
Arnold, I.J., van Ewijk, S.E. (2014). A state space approach to measuring the
impact of sovereign and credit risk on interest rate convergence in the euro area. J. Int.
Money Finance 49 (B), 340–357.
Afonso, A., Furceri, D., Gomes, P. (2012). Sovereign credit ratings and financial
markets linkages: application to European data. J. Int. Money Finance 31 (3), 606–
638.
Baele, L., Ferrando, A., Hördahl, P., Krylova, E., Monnet, C. (2004). Measuring
financial integration in the euro area. ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 14. European
Central Bank.
Bartkowska, M., Riedl, A. (2012). Regional convergence clubs in Europe:
identification and conditioning factors. Econ. Modell. 29 (1), 22–31.
Baumöhl, E. (2014). Risk-return convergence in CEE stock markets: structural
breaks and market volatility. Finance aúver-Czech J. Econ. Finance 64 (5), 352–373.
Bernard, A.B., Durlauf, S.N. (1996). Interpreting tests of the convergence
hypothesis. J. Econom. 71 (1), 161–173. Borsi, M.T., Metiu, N., 2015. The evolution
of economic convergence in the European Union. Empir. Econ. 48, 657–681.
Buch, C.M., Pierdzioch, C. (2005). The integration of imperfect financial
markets: implications for business cycle volatility. J. Policy Model. 27 (7), 789–804.
Byström, H., 2005. Credit default swaps and equity prices: the iTraxx CDS
index market. Working Papers No. 24. Lund University.
Caporale, G.M., Erdogan, B., Kuzin, V. (2015). Testing stock market
convergence: a non-linear factor approach. Empirica 42, 481–498. De Jong, R.,
Sakarya, N., 2016. The econometrics of the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Rev. Econ. Stat.
98, 310–317.
Cecchetti, S. G., & Schoenholtz, K. L. (2011). (The 3rd Edition) New York, NY:
McGraw-Hill Education, ISBN 978-0-07-122068-2, 673.
Charles Morris, 1998. The Law of Financial Services Groups.Oxford university
Press.
Durlauf, S.N., Quah, D.T. (1999). The new empirics of economic growth. In:
Taylor, J.B., Woodford, M. (Eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1A. Elsevier
Science, North-Holland. J. Bank. Finance 34, 856–870.
Luc Eyraud, Diva Singh, and Bennett Sutton (2017). Benefits of Global and
Regional Financial Integration in Latin America.IMF working paper.WP/17/1.
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Margaritis, D. (2006). Productivity growth and
convergence in the European Union. J. Product. Anal. 25 (1-2), 111–141.
104
Iranian Journal of Finance, 2018, Vol. 2, No. 4
Fernández de Guevara, J., Maudos, J., Pérez, F. (2007). Integration and
competition in the European financial markets. J. Int. Money Finance 26 (1), 26–45.
Fischer, C., 2012. Price convergence in the EMU? Evidence from micro data.
Eur. Econ. Rev. 56 (4), 757–776.
Fritsche, U., Kuzin, V. (2011). Analysing convergence in Europe using the nonlinear single factor model. Empir. Econ. 41 (2), 343–369.
Fung, M.K. (2009). Financial development and economic growth: convergence
or divergence? J. Int. Money Finance 28 (1), 56–67.
Robert J. HOdrick Edward C. Prescott Postwar (1997-1980) U.S. Business
Cycles: An Empirical Investigation Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 29,
No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 1-16 Published by: Blackwell Publishing
IMF – International Monetary Fund (2014). Republic of Slovenia, January 2014.
IMF Country Report no. 14/11.
Islam, N. (2003). What have we learnt from the convergence debate? J. Econ.
Surv. 17 (3), 309–362. M. NiÛoi, M.M. Pochea / Economic Systems 40 (2016) 323–
334 333.
Lyócsa, Š., Baumöhl, E. (2015). Similarity of emerging markets returns under
changing market conditions: markets in the ASEAN-4, Latin America Middle East
and BRICS. Econ. Syst. 39 (2), 253–268.
Monfort, M., Cuestas, J.C., Ordóñez, J. (2013). Real convergence in Europe: a
cluster analysis. Econ. Modell. 33, 689–694. OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2013. OECD Economic Surveys Slovenia, April 2013.
Mckinnon and Shaw (1973). Finance and Growth: A Survey of the Theoretical
and Empirical Literature. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2004-039/2.
Opec bulletin 2017.JMMCheld in St Petersburg.
Phillips, P.C., Sul, D. (2007). Transition modeling and econometric convergence
tests. Econometrica 75 (6), 1771–1855.
Prasad, E., Rogoff, K., Wei, S.-J., Kose, M.A. (2003). The effects of financial
globalization on developing countries: some empirical evidence. IMF Occasional
Paper No. 220. International Monetary Fund.
Pungulescu, C. (2013). Measuring financial market integration in the European
Union: EU15 vs. new member states. Emerg. Markets Rev. 17, 106–124.
Ravn, M., Uhlig, H. (2002). On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the
frequency of observations. Rev. Econ. Stat. 84, 371–376.
Rughoo, A., Sarantis, N. (2012). Integration in European retail banking:
evidence from savings and lending rates to non-financial corporations. J. Int. Finan.
Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC
105
Markets Inst. Money 22 (5), 1307–1327.
Rughoo, A., Sarantis, N. (2014). The global financial crisis and integration in
European retail banking. J. Bank. Finance 40, 28–41.
Bibliographic information of this paper for citing:
Nikpour, Saghar; bahmani, Mojtaba; Jalaee, sayyed Abdolmajid & Nejati, Mehdi
(2018). Financial Integration between Iran, OPEC and the Shanghai Organization.
Iranian Journal of Finance, 2(4), 78-105.
Copyright © 2018, Saghar Nikpour, Mojtaba bahmani, sayyed
Abdolmajid Jalaee and Mehdi Nejati