Space, Time and Consciousness: An Enquiry into Duration

My contribution to Bergsonian studies consists in extracting Bergson’s theory of time from his three main texts, Time and Free Will (TFW), Matter and Memory (MM) and Creative Evolution (CE), with references to his other works, The Creative Mind (CM), Duration and Simultaneity (DS), Mind-Energy (ME), The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (TSMR), An Introduction to Metaphysics (Introduction). This extraction, as well as offering a concise exposition of this theory, also reveals its incomplete and fragmentary nature, and the remainder of this study consists in an attempt to fill in the gaps and respond to questions which arise along the way. At that stage the debt is owed to those commentators who focus on specific Bergsonian issues. For example, my analysis and further development of heterogeneity was inspired by Čapek, and the discussion of discontinuity would not be complete without references to Bachelard. It is possible to read Bergson in different ways. One can dismiss his philosophy as Russell does for his refutation of rationality and space; one can expect Bergsonism to be a complete and finished theory which should be able to resolve all sorts of philosophical questions; or one can take on board the Bergsonian idea that to exist means to change and, whilst analysing what Bergson explicitly said, allow his philosophy to evolve by working out what he would have said, and what else can be said. I take the latter approach, and the main aim of this project is to indicate a possible way in which the theory of duration can develop further. I find the biggest attraction of Bergson is in his attempt to grasp the nature of time and show a way of treating time as metaphysical reality, overcoming difficulties humbly admitted to by St. Augustine. But Bergson’s theory of duration is not a completed, finalized theory. Firstly, it is not put forward in a systematic way and needs to be extrapolated from his more general discourse; secondly, it contains inconsistencies and gaps; and thirdly, it does not address some obvious issues. Moreover, some of Bergson’s claims are too strong and need to be examined carefully. In the expository chapters (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), I examine Bergson’s theory of time, which can be called a theory of duration, from his major texts, Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution. In each book Bergson introduces duration anew, as if disregarding claims made in previous texts; thus each time duration is given a different, sometimes seemingly opposite, meaning. However, where an unsympathetic critic would see inconsistencies, I see phases of conceptual development of the idea of duration. This being said, Bergson’s phases are not linked in a satisfactory way. A key strategy of this study, therefore, will be to fill gaps, raise further questions, and develop new arguments. I move from duration as a psychological process in Time and Free Will to duration as the universal movement in Creative Evolution, via the intermediate proposal in Matter and Memory that duration is a general principle of being. Duration in Bergson turns out to be an all-embracing concept, itself equivalent to the idea of being. Indeed, can we find in Bergson anything which is not duration? Spatial objects, one may suggest, reading Time and Free Will. But as readers of Matter and Memory, we have to accept duration of matter and duration within matter. In Creative Evolution everything non-durational is reduced to an illusion, and from this position we can equate ‘duration’ and ‘being’. The main aspect in which the idea of duration differs from the idea of being is that duration already entails a characteristic of being as moving which, according to Bergson, is its necessary feature. What the term ‘duration’ achieves is to weld motion onto being and demonstrate that being cannot be regarded in any other way than as being in motion, the being that has history. Also, it emphasizes the omnipresence of motion and change, so that even in those cases when we struggle to find and define substance, such as in music or thought, we still find change and motion. I take on board Bergson’s idea that duration is heterogeneous. The idea of heterogeneity emerges when Bergson analyses psychological continuity. Elements of such continuity (emotions, sensations) are not clear-cut, even though we commonly distinguish one emotion or sensation from another. This division, I agree with Bergson, is artificial and done for convenience, as in reality one state of consciousness flows into another and ultimately there is just the unity of the conscious process corresponding to the life of a concrete person. But this idea of heterogeneity entails a paradox. Although its elements are inseparable, they are different and diverse, so on the one hand Bergson wants us to accept that we cannot individualize them as if they were autonomous units, but on the other hand he does not allow them to be merged into a homogenized stream. In Chapter 5 I attempt to resolve this paradox by claiming that the identity of elements within duration, not given ostensibly, is nevertheless manifested through their unique effects on the world. Bergson says very little about the structure of heterogeneity, and later in Chapter 5 I analyse its composition on a general metaphysical level. In Chapter 6 I address time as such and, in particular, Bergson’s claim that time must be understood exclusively in qualitative terms. I argue that temporal ordering, pastness and futurity cannot be reduced to qualities, and that time cannot be understood without relations. Also, I dispute Bergson’s attempt to consider time in separation from space, as there is no purely temporal reality totally free from spatial features. Chapter 7 marks a transition from duration as a general metaphysical term to its concrete manifestations. Concrete examples of duration, given by Bergson, include psychological and biological processes, movement of a physical body and, as an all-embracing duration that includes all worldly processes, the universe. I propose the duration of a concrete human being as such an all-embracing duration, because a human self involves all layers of being, from minerals to mind, which can acknowledge any worldly phenomena and account for them in an epistemic process. Of course, if the universe could be said to contain all worldly processes, the self merely represents them. In Chapter 8 I look at epistemic processes and begin to analyse the perception of one’s own selfhood in self-consciousness. According to Bergson, an epistemological act is defined either by its analytical or intuitive component, but I contest his opposition of intuition and intellect and present the epistemological act as a three-fold process of primary (pre-conceptual) intuition, intellectual rationalization and secondary (post-conceptual) intuition. I emphasize that the perception of one’s self, acquired in this way, gives a picture of an all-embracing unity of human existence, from various manifestations of matter and life to the complexities of mind. Bergson presents duration as an uncontroversial and harmonious continuity, but Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrate that, inevitably, duration entails discontinuity in various senses. In Chapter 9 I suggest a view on reality which reinstates its continuity. I suggest that when we observe continuity from the past to the present, in actual fact we remain in the present, retaining knowledge of the consecutive events. This knowledge interferes with our view of the past and prevents us from seeing it as a fresh present with an indefinite future. On the other hand, if we look backwards into the past, we can get a sense of continuity, moving from the latest and more complex to the earlier and less complex, without making different temporal periods overlap and interfere with one another. The book has been reviewed by Colby Dickinson, The Heythrop Journal Volume 55, Issue 4, pages 719–720, July 2014. See the review here: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/heyj.2014.55.issue-4/issuetoc

Abstract: The thesis of this paper is simple: There is no time without consciousness. Immanuel Kant’s statement that “…Neither coexistence nor succession would be perceived by us, if the representation of time did not exist as a foundation, a priori (Hsieh, 2004, p. 1).” is nonsensical when compared with Bergson’s empirical description of duration, which posits that consciousness is absolutely necessary for time to exist (Canales, 2015). Drawing from Bergson and his contemporaries this paper articulates the theories and science behind the differences between measured time and lived duration while opening a dialogue with more recent scientific studies that may support the Bergsonian philosophical premises.

In this essay I propose a series of hypotheses aimed at reconstructing the sources and constraints that provoked the "discovery of duration" allegedly made by Henri Bergson (1859-1941) during the 1880s and detailed in his doctoral dissertation Time and Free Will (1889). I relate this work to a long spiritualist tradition that Bergson was inheriting and was forced to adapt to the philosophical field of the 1880s, when that field was traversed by tensions and conflicts related to the emergence of the epistemology of mathematics, of physiological psychology and psychometrics which were debating the nature of the category of time and space.

My contribution to Bergsonian studies consists in extracting Bergson’s theory of time from his three main texts, Time and Free Will (TFW), Matter and Memory (MM) and Creative Evolution (CE), with references to his other works, The Creative Mind (CM), Duration and Simultaneity (DS), Mind-Energy (ME), The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (TSMR), An Introduction to Metaphysics (Introduction). This extraction, as well as offering a concise exposition of this theory, also reveals its incomplete and fragmentary nature, and the remainder of this study consists in an attempt to fill in the gaps and respond to questions which arise along the way. I find the biggest attraction of Bergson is in his attempt to grasp the nature of time and show a way of treating time as metaphysical reality, overcoming difficulties humbly admitted to by St. Augustine. But Bergson’s theory of duration is not a completed, finalized theory. Firstly, it is not put forward in a systematic way and needs to be extrapolated from his more general discourse; secondly, it contains inconsistencies and gaps; and thirdly, it does not address some obvious issues. Moreover, some of Bergson’s claims are too strong and need to be examined carefully. In the expository chapters (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), I examine Bergson’s theory of time, which can be called a theory of duration, from his major texts, Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution. In each book Bergson introduces duration anew as if disregarding claims made in previous texts; thus each time duration is given a different, sometimes seemingly opposite, meaning. However, where an unsympathetic critic would see inconsistencies, I see phases of conceptual development of the idea of duration. This being said, Bergson’s phases are not linked in a satisfactory way. A key strategy of this study, therefore, will be to fill gaps, raise further questions, and develop new arguments. I move from duration as a psychological process in Time and Free Will to duration as the universal movement in Creative Evolution, via the intermediate proposal in Matter and Memory that duration is a general principle of being. Duration in Bergson turns out to be an all-embracing concept, itself equivalent to the idea of being. Indeed, can we find in Bergson anything which is not duration? Spatial objects, one may suggest, reading Time and Free Will. But as readers of Matter and Memory, we have to accept duration of matter and duration within matter. In Creative Evolution, everything non-durational is reduced to an illusion, and from this position, we can equate ‘duration’ and ‘being’. The main aspect in which the idea of duration differs from the idea of being is that duration already entails a characteristic of being as moving which, according to Bergson, is its necessary feature. What the term ‘duration’ achieves is to weld motion onto being and demonstrate that being cannot be regarded in any other way than as being in motion, the being that has a history. Also, it emphasizes the omnipresence of motion and change, so that even in those cases when we struggle to find and define substance, such as in music or thought, we still find change and motion. I take on board Bergson’s idea that duration is heterogeneous. The idea of heterogeneity emerges when Bergson analyses psychological continuity. Elements of such continuity (emotions, sensations) are not clear-cut, even though we commonly distinguish one emotion or sensation from another. This division, I agree with Bergson, is artificial and done for convenience, as in reality one state of consciousness flows into another and ultimately there is just the unity of the conscious process corresponding to the life of a concrete person. However, this idea of heterogeneity entails a paradox. Although its elements are inseparable, they are different and diverse, so, on the one hand, Bergson wants us to accept that we cannot individualize them as if they were autonomous units, but on the other hand he does not allow them to be merged into a homogenized stream. In Chapter 5, I attempt to resolve this paradox by claiming that the identity of elements within duration, not given ostensibly, is nevertheless manifested through their unique effects on the world. Bergson says very little about the structure of heterogeneity, and later in Chapter 5, I analyse its composition on a general metaphysical level. In Chapter 6, I address time as such and, in particular, Bergson’s claim that time must be understood exclusively in qualitative terms. I argue that temporal ordering, pastness and futurity cannot be reduced to qualities, and that time cannot be understood without relations. Also, I dispute Bergson’s attempt to consider time in separation from space, as there is no purely temporal reality totally free from spatial features. Chapter 7 marks a transition from duration as a general metaphysical term to its concrete manifestations. Concrete examples of duration, given by Bergson, include psychological and biological processes, movement of a physical body and, as an all-embracing duration that includes all worldly processes, the universe. I propose the duration of a concrete human being as such an all-embracing duration because a human self involves all layers of being, from minerals to mind, which can acknowledge any worldly phenomena and account for them in an epistemic process. Of course, if the universe could be said to contain all worldly processes, the self merely represents them. In Chapter 8, I look at epistemic processes and begin to analyse the perception of one’s own selfhood in self-consciousness. According to Bergson, an epistemological act is defined either by its analytical or intuitive component, but I contest his opposition of intuition and intellect and present the epistemological act as a three-fold process of primary (pre-conceptual) intuition, intellectual rationalization and secondary (post-conceptual) intuition. I emphasize that the perception of one’s self, acquired in this way, gives a picture of an all-embracing unity of human existence, from various manifestations of matter and life to the complexities of mind. Bergson presents duration as an uncontroversial and harmonious continuity, but Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrate that, inevitably, duration entails discontinuity in various senses. In Chapter 9, I suggest a view on reality, which reinstates its continuity. I suggest that when we observe continuity from the past to the present, in actual fact we remain in the present, retaining knowledge of the consecutive events. This knowledge interferes with our view of the past and prevents us from seeing it as a fresh present with an indefinite future. On the other hand, if we look backwards into the past, we can get a sense of continuity, moving from the latest and more complex to the earlier and less complex, without making different temporal periods overlap and interfere with one another.

Pli: Warwick Journal of Philosophy, 2018

sets the foundation for a philosophy that will help frame fundamental shifts in thought in not one, but two new centuries. In it, he launches a convincing attack on Kantian notions of free will, arguing that -The problem of freedom has thus been sprung from a misunderstanding‖ 2 of the very concepts which have been used to define the problem in the first place. His examination of consciousness challenges how inner states were defined and understood. 3 Yet, the book is probably best known for its redefinition of the relations between time and space, particularly for the concept of durée which upends the privileged position that had been accorded to space in both philosophical and scientific renderings of reality. 4 TFW launched Bergson into the public eye, durée entered the vernacular of the day, and at the height of his popularity, some would say notoriety, his lectures were standing room only and his advice was sought by statesmen as well as scholars. 5 Concepts which

Consciousness is that omnipotent source of energy behind the Prime Creator, the progenitor of our consciousness and the chief architect of our programs of reality that affords our life experiences. And, the way that consciousness freely-flows in the cosmos is through the advent of time by which the light of consciousness is projected upon us. It is explicated that one can distinguish between two aspects of time: the 'primary' or 'non-local' time that is responsible for creating the myriad dimensions of consciousness. In this respect, there is a constancy to the primary aspect of time that pins us to anchor our consciousness within a congealed domain of light that we refer to as a space-time dimension. And, by virtue of the fact that time is synonymous with rotating or torsionally vibrating about a fixed point, the SOURCE of our consciousness, we constantly gravitate towards the SOURCE. Moreover, we are privy to surf the confines of this space-time dimension to which we have anchored our consciousness, a process that is referred to as 'teleportation.' We are also free to partake in vibrational conscious perturbation about such a mean position as our anchored space-time dimension by sequentially jumping into a myriad of parallel dimensions experiencing diverse sojourns of life through a process referred to as 'time travel,' which epitomizes a 'secondary' or 'local' aspect of time. It is explicated, herein, that although we experience myriad of lifetimes simultaneously by constantly and sequentially

A close reading of Time and Free Will, The Immediate Givens of Consciousness

2003

This paper describes a new theory of consciousness based on previous work by C.D. Broad, H.H. Price, Andrei Linde and others. This hypothesis states that the Universe consists of three fundamental entities -space-time, matter and consciousness, each with their own degrees of freedom. The paper pays particular attention to three areas that impact on this theory: (1) the demonstration by neuroscience and psychophysics that we do not perceive the world as it actually is but as the brain computes it most probably to be; (2) the need to delineate between phenomenal space-time and physical space-time. Recent theories in physics that suggest that the Universe has more than three spatial dimensions are relevant here; (3) the role of consciousness in the block Universe described by Special Relativity. The integration of these topics suggests a new physical theory of the nature of consciousness.

2010

This paper distinguishes scientific and psychological time, and suggests how cycles of mentality define units of psychological time. This explanation explains the elasticity of psychological time and gives a broad account of the relationship between consciousness (mental activity) and time.