The Weakness of Populism in Spain

DEBATS · Annual Review, 5 · 2020 — 197 / 209 DOI: http://doi.org/10.28939/iam.debats-en.2020-11 ISSN 2530-898X (print) ISSN 2530-8262 (electronic) The Weakness of Populism in Spain Astrid Barrio UNIVERSITAT DE VALÈNCIA astrid.barrio@uv.es Received: 22/05/2019 Accepted: 09/03/2020 ABSTRACT This paper analyses why Populism has failed to take root in Spain despite a ‘soil’ that has favoured its seeding and growth elsewhere. At first sight, Spain seems to provide the conditions in which Populism can thrive: a deep economic crisis (which began with the financial meltdown in 2008) and a succession of corruption scandals affecting all the main political parties. Even so, Populism has failed to gain a hold in Spain. The traditional Far Right is very weak, and new parties such as Podemos and Ciudadanos cannot be considered Populist. While Vox displays all the features of a radical right-wing party, it is one from which Populism is absent. We argue that the lack of Populism in Spain can mainly be explained by the highly fractured nature of the country’s politics, with left-right and national fault lines shaping how political competition plays out in the nation. Keywords: populism, Far Right, Radical Right, Podemos, Ciudadanos, Vox. Corresponding author: Astrid Barrio López. Departamento de Derecho Constitucional, Ciencia Política y de la Administración. Facultat de Dret. Avda. dels Tarongers s/n, 46022 València (Spain) Suggested citation: Barrio, A. (2020). The Weakness of Populism in Spain. Debats. Journal on Culture, Power and Society, 5, 197-209. DOI: http://doi.org/10.28939/iam.debats-en.2020-11 INTRODUCTION the country (Barrio, 2017a). The global financial crisis One of the most striking recent political happenings hit Spain in 2008 and this was followed six years later worldwide has been the emergence of Populism — in 2014 by a political crisis stemming from wholesale something from with few advanced democracies have corruption in Spain’s main parties. These crises created escaped unscathed. Indeed, Populism has spread to the conditions for the emergence of new political par- the point where some scholars have even gone so far ties — such as Podemos and Vox — and the expansion as say that it is now the norm in Western democra- of Ciudadanos [Ciutadans] from Catalonia to Spain cies rather than the exception (Marzouki, McDonnel as a whole. Yet at root, none of these parties can be and Rey, 2016). called ‘Populist’. The hurdles to Populism in Spain are the predominance of a Left-Right political division, This paper shows that Spain is indeed an exception and ‘The National Question’ [Spain as a centralised, even though many of the conditions needed for the unitary State, or as an assemblage of nations]. The emergence and growth of Populism can be found in two factors articulate politics in Spain. 198 — DEBATS · Annual Review, 5 · 2020 ASTRID BARRIO The paper comprises four sections. The first defines and instead focus on the phenomenon’s ontological Populism and sets out the conditions favouring its birth dimension. The latter approach is the one taken by and growth. The second gives the reasons for the Far Laclau (2005), who considers Populism as a logical Right’s limited presence in Spain up until Vox came system for structuring political life and for framing the on the scene. The third explains why Ciudadanos and struggle for hegemony. Thus, a movement, party, or Podemos — two recently-founded parties — cannot leader should not be labelled Populist merely on the be considered Populist parties. The fourth and final basis of its policies and ideology but rather because section sets out the reasons why Vox is a Far-Right the leader/party articulates them within a given logical party but not a Populist one. system. The idea of Populism as a discursive pattern or as a communication style puts the spotlight on the notion of ‘The People’ (as the fount of all virtue) cruelly betrayed by corrupt elites who must be overthrown for DEFINITION, EMERGENCE AND CONSOLIDATION the good of society. This is Populism’s leitmotiv and its The word Populism is now on everyone’s lips and has main argument. That is why another approach sees clearly pejorative connotations. It is used to demonise Populism as a strategy and/or a form of organisation parties and leaders who seldom consider themselves in which charismatic leaders seek direct, immediate, as such. Furthermore, it has been used to refer to a non-institutional support through their followers. bewilderingly wide variety of movements and parties With a view to overcoming the limitations of these in many places and at many times. It is little wonder different approaches, Moffit and Torney (2014) argue then that coming up with a satisfactory definition that Populism must be seen first and foremost as a of Populism is no easy task (Canovan, 1982). That political style characterised by an appeal to The Peo- said, this has not stopped academics trying to come ple as the bearers of sovereignty, and by opposition up with a single unifying theory. to a corrupt elite. Another ingredient of Populism is the idea that there is a national emergency, crisis, or Populism has been approached from many angles and threat that requires a tough ‘no-nonsense’ response. disciplines. They all share the premise that Populism takes a dualistic approach as a result of placing ‘The There are many ways of approaching Populism. Among People’ (characterised as naturally virtuous) in oppo- them, Mudde’s definition (2004: 543) of Populism as a sition to the governing elite (corrupt by definition). thin ideology is one that has gained broad acceptance. Going beyond this minimum common denominator, According to Mudde, Populism is “an ideology that the debate is grounded on the distinction proposed sees society as split into two homogeneous, opposing by Moffit and Torney (2014), in which Populism is groups — ‘the good guys’ (The People) and ‘the bad considered an ideology — a logic if you will — which guys’ (the corrupt elite). Populist parties argue that leads to a kind of discourse and communication style. politics should be an expression of The People’s Will”. Some go even further and suggest that it is a strategy This definition covers much of the various approaches and/or an organisational form. to the issue and, as Kriesi and Pappas (2015) noted, there are four key elements. These are: (1) acceptance Populism can be seen as an ideology insofar as it gives that there are two homogeneous groups — The People meaning to a consistent set of ideas on how society and The Elite; (2) the interests of the two groups are should be organised and how power should be wielded. diametrically opposed; (3) The People is sovereign; (4) Nevertheless, rather than an ideology in the strict sense, a perspective in which The People is put in a positive Populism is usually taken to be a thin ideology (Stanley, light while The Elite is vilified. 2008) that needs to be mixed with other ideologies (whether thick or thin ones), such as Nationalism. Pappas (2014) and Kriesi and Pappas (2015) add that By contrast, others see Populism as a logical system, Populism is an illiberal interpretation of democracy The Weakness of Populism in Spain DEBATS · Annual Review, 5 · 2020 — (Zakaria, 1997). That is because Populism is based consider to blame for the present state of affairs. By on a literal interpretation of ‘government by the contrast, Populism — argue its exponents — seeks to people’ and eschews classic Liberal checks and bal- govern in the name of The People and is the answer ances in the political system. Second, Populism is to representing it politically. From this standpoint, hostile towards ‘middle-men’ and seeks a direct link the rise of Populism is also a political phenomenon between leaders and the masses, with the stress on (Roberts, 2015). grass-roots democracy. Last but not least, it stresses the idea of a monolithic ‘Will of The People’ which As a result, Populism is not just a reaction to economic leaves no room for pluralism. Yet this monolithic problems and a view of globalisation as a threat but interpretation not only creates antagonism towards is rather a political issue that has been simmering for the elites but also towards other groups that are not a long while, undermining traditional parties. The seen as belonging to ‘The People’. This is where the shrinking support for traditional parties can be seen issue of identity arises, whether in national, cultural in their falling membership rolls and waning share or religious terms and linked with a ‘nativist’ outlook. of the vote, as well as in greater volatility in voting This is the common approach taken by Populist par- patterns. All these things reveal political parties’ woes, ties belonging to the Far Right in Europe. They argue and as Mair (2013) has noted, all need to be dealt that The People risks losing its identity in the face of with at the same time. Parties find themselves both globalisation, immigration, and multi-culturalism having to pander to the electorate’s demands in op- (Marzouki, McDonnel and Rey, 2016). These parties position but act responsibly when they are in power. see immigrants in general and Muslims in particular The combined impact of the economic and political as posing a threat to The People’s values and religious crises thus explains the surge in Populism. traditions, although in many cases the culture they consider to be traditional is most often one based Nevertheless Populism is not homogeneous but rather on laicism. By contrast, Left-Wing parties lack this is shaped by sundry factors. Some of these are of a identity element and lean towards laicism, lack of cultural nature and are linked to each society’s poli- faith, and multiculturalism. cies in this field (Norris and Inglehart, 2018). Others are institutional, such as the hurdles placed by each The absence of a general theory of Populism has not electoral system. Yet other factors are of a political hindered broad consensus on what the reasons are for kind such as the fault lines found in traditional politics Populism’s recent emergence and growth — especially and, with them, the degree to which parties and party in The West. Most of the explanations are rooted in systems are institutionalised. On this last point, one various dimensions of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis might expect that the persistence of classic political and its aftermath (Shambaugh, 2012). Taking this line, fault lines would hinder the emergence of Populism. Populism is the result of the anger and frustration Conversely, one would expect the weakening of those arising from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the fault lines and low institutionalisation of parties and austerity policies that followed. However, it might also the systems to which they belong to foster Populism’s be a reaction to the perverse effects of globalisation emergence and growth. This paper argues that the in broad swathes of Western society. Here, some of electorate in Spain does not differ from that in other those who have lost their jobs see mass immigration countries where Populism has taken root — especially as a threat, while many Middle Class voters have seen its Right-Wing variant (Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser, their wages and prospects shrink, giving them a sense 2015). In those countries, the electoral system has of relative privation (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018). not stopped new Populist parties making their mark Populist leaders have seized upon this seething dis- and altering the party system, making it much more content and have sought to mobilise ordinary people open-ended (Rodríguez-Teruel and Barrio, 2018). In against the political and economic elites whom they Spain however, the country’s strong political fault lines 199 200 — DEBATS · Annual Review, 5 · 2020 ASTRID BARRIO seem to be the main factor explaining why Populism ship to democracy, obtaining scarcely any institutional has put down very shallow roots. representation. Only Fuerza Nueva in 1979 was able to pass the electoral threshold to win just one seat in Spain’s Parliament. The seat was held by the party’s leader Blas Piñar. Since then, this ‘political family’ has THE LIMITED PRESENCE OF FAR-RIGHT POPULIST PARTIES failed to gain a foothold in any tier of government in After many years of fixed political fault lines and inability to come up with an attractive discourse; its stability in the party system, the first Populist par- nostalgia for Spain’s Fascist past; its dalliance with ties to shake up politics in Western Europe in the violence; strong internal rifts and lack of leadership; early 1980s were ones on the Far Right. This family Spaniards’ show an overwhelming preference for of parties is characterised by its ‘nativism’, seen in its moderate political parties. Together, these factors anti-immigration discourse, and its fierce opposition explain why Spain’s classic Far Right has been politi- to multi-culturalism, globalisation, and EU integra- cally irrelevant since the restoration of democracy. Spain (Casals, 1998). There are many reasons for this: tion (Mudde, 2007). Populism has been the political current that has waxed most in Europe since then but The failure of Far-Right parties (notwithstanding their this is not the case in Spain, where political discontent potential electoral appeal) has been ascribed by Alonso and opposition to immigration is broadly on a par and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015) to three political hurdles. with those found in other European countries where The first of these is that Spain’s electoral system makes Populist parties have sprung up. it hard for small parties to break into the political scene. The second is that Spanish politics has two very strong Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC) meets all the criteria fault lines: Left-Right, and Centre-Periphery. These for being considered a Right-Wing Populist Party and fault lines are so marked that it is well-nigh impos- was the first of its kind in Spain to win seats. The party sible to come up with new lines of conflict, especially was opposed to mass immigration, which it saw as a if they have an ‘exclusivist’ or ‘nativist’ component. threat to both Catalan and Spanish identities and to That is why the few parties that have tried to exploit traditional family values. It was highly critical when immigration or religion as political issues have had it came to crime and terrorism, arguing that natives so little success at the local level, as PxC’s case shows. should be given preference in assigning social benefits. PP’s presence is the third factor explaining the absence Here, the party made efforts to overcome traditional of the Far-Right in Spain. PP Is Spain’s main Centre- political divisions. Under the leadership of Josep Right party and it has long opted for a competition Anglada (who had a Far Right background), the party strategy that lets it fill the whole of the Right of the made a big impact on the media and was able to build political spectrum, running from the Centre-Right a modern Populist discourse with strong local roots to the Far-Right. Thus PP mobilises voters that might (Hernández-Carr, 2011). This strategy yielded modest otherwise vote for Far-Right Populist parties. results. PxC had a presence in Catalan municipalities with a high concentration of foreign immigrants but Even so, Esteban and Martín (2017) have recently never won seats in either the Catalan Parliament or questioned these explanations. With regard to the in the Spanish Parliament (Casals, 2011; Hernández- electoral system, they argue that although it did not Carr, 2012). The party was dissolved in February 2019 traditionally favour the entry of new parties, the but continued its activity as a foundation, forming advances made by Ciudadanos and Podemos during part of Vox. the 2014-2016 electoral cycle shed doubt on this argument. The system of parties was therefore not the The traditional Far Right linked to Francoism has also result of the electoral system (the classic institutional been very weak since Spain’s transition from dictator- explanation given by the Duvergerian matrix) but The Weakness of Populism in Spain DEBATS · Annual Review, 5 · 2020 — rather the result of political alignments reflecting by José María Ruiz-Mateos, who won two seats in rifts in society — which raise issues of a sociological the European Parliament in 1989, and by Jesús Gil, nature. In relation to the structure of these political whose Grupo Independiente Liberal (GIL) won seats fault lines, it has been argued that in other countries in several Andalusian municipalities, including that where there is a split between the centre and the of Marbella. Gil was elected Mayor of Marbella, and periphery (such as in Italy, Belgium, and The United as President of Ceuta (a small Spanish outpost and Kingdom) Right-Wing Populist parties have been able autonomous region in North Africa). As Álvarez Tar- to overcome the voting threshold to gain seats. They dío (2017) noted, both Ruiz-Mateos and Gil were have done so by linking link immigration with the businessmen who went into politics. Their political clash between centre and periphery, stressing worries pitch was that they would put a stop to the arbitrari- about identity, recalling similar linkages seen in Spain ness and corruption that had been inflicted on them (Pardos Prado, 2012). Finally, Esteban and Martín by the two main parties. Both initiatives exploited concluded that in some key respects, PP votes are no the opportunities offered by multi-tier governance different from voters for Far Right Populist parties structures, with Gil focusing on local and regional elsewhere in Europe, especially when it comes to their government, and Ruiz-Mateos on the EU parliament. views on immigrants’ religion and culture, and the Yet both found that extending their reach to other ‘threat’ they pose to jobs. Nevertheless, they differ tiers of government was no easy task. In the end, both in the following respects: (1) their tendency to sup- of them failed to expand their respective political port the governing party; (2) they are less belligerent toeholds. The last exponent of this first Populist wave towards immigrants because many of the latter are was another businessman, Mario Conde, who failed of Hispanic origin, with whom they share cultural to win a seat in Spain’s Parliament (Congreso de los roots; (3) a more pro-EU outlook; (4) greater respect Diputados) in 2000. The two major parties (PSOE and for Law and Order. Thus there are PP voters who PP) were strong and had a finger in every institutional might identify with Far Right supporters but that have pie whether they were in government or out. Against remained hidden among the heterogeneous mass of them, the Populist parties (based as they were on a the party’s share of the electorate. The PP is a highly single person and with few roots in society) did not institutionalised party that has lacked Right-Wing stand a chance and soon ran into the sand. rivals until recently. It has proved capable of attracting both potential Far-Right voters and moderate The second wave began in 2003 in Catalonia with the Right-Wing voters. However, the spell was broken emergence of Plataforma por Cataluña and Candida- when a host of corruption scandals undermined the tura d’Unitat Popular (CUP), the latter a regional Left- PP government. The upshot was that PP lost power Wing Party with a pro-Catalan independence agenda. in 2018 after a successful ‘No Confidence’ motion in Later on, more initiatives were launched to exploit Spain’s Congress. This put a new PSOE government the endless clashes between Catalonia and Spain, one (led by Pedro Sánchez) in the riding seat. From that such being Solidaritat Catalana. Yet neither Plataforma point on, the Right began to fracture, with Ciudadanos por Cataluña, nor Solidaritat had much success, only and its competitive strategy being wrong-footed by fleetingly holding seats in the Catalan Parliament the major electoral gains made by Vox. (2010-2012). By contrast, CUP won its first seats in the Catalan Parliament in 2012. Since 2015, CUP has not only held seats in every legislature but has also played a key role in forming coalition governments. THE NEW PARTIES: PODEMOS AND CIUDADANOS This helps explain the Populist drift taken by Catalan The rise of new parties in Spain coincided with the nationalism over the last few years (Barrio, Barberà, waves of Populism identified by Casals (2013). The Rodríguez Teruel, 2018). It also reveals why both the first wave spanned from 1989 to 2000 and was led party system and the national rift have become more 201 202 — DEBATS · Annual Review, 5 · 2020 ASTRID BARRIO important than the Left-Right rift (Rodríguez Teruel classic Populist scheme, Podemos sought to champion and Barrio, 2018). the rights of ordinary people against the interests of the elite, adopting the classic Italian concept of casta The third wave of Populism began in 2008. As we noted (caste) — an idea that spread like wildfire after being earlier, from this year onwards, many of the factors used on television by the party’s leading lights, such giving wings to Populism were now to be found in as Pablo Iglesias. The concept underlying the party Spain. These factors were: (1) a deep economic crisis was strongly shaped by the work La Razón Populista fuelling mass unemployment (25%-plus); (2) aggres- by Laclau (2005), which raised the idea of the Nation- sive austerity measures by successive PSOE and PP State as a construct to serve The People. Podemos’ governments involving deep cuts in social spending conception of the nation was based on three planks and a bail-out of much of Spain’s banking sector; (3) (Torreblanca, 2015: 139). The first was that the elites a host of corruption scandals affecting the two main did not represent The People, expressed in the slogan parties — especially PP, which had governed with an “They do not speak for us”, lifted from the 15-M absolute majority since 2011. Statistics from Spain’s movement. Here, Podemos positioned itself as that CIS (sociological research centre) reveal that citizens’ movement’s heir. The second concerned sovereignty, wrath at the political state of affairs was so great that which Podemos took in its traditional sense, referring from 2013 onwards, Spaniards considered politicians to the State’s autonomy from foreign influences — a and their parties as the main source of corruption clear allusion to supra-national bodies, especially The and of the economic problems plaguing the country. European Union which had shamelessly dictated Span- In this scenario, one might expect the emergence ish economic policy since the outbreak of the financial of Populist parties (whether Left or Right) in Spain crisis. The third plank drew on the same concept of given that this is what happened in other Western the nation to guarantee social rights. Podemos’ aim European nations. The slump and voters’ loss of trust was to build on social and national planks to build a in politicians from the two main contenders opened broad political platform capable of mobilising broad the door to new parties (Medina and Correa, 2016; swathes of the electorate in the same way the 15-M Cordero and Montero, 2015; Orriols and Cordero, movement had. Nevertheless, Podemos tripped over 2016; Rodon and Hierro, 2016; Bosch and Durán, two hurdles to its political ambitions, both stemming 2017). Even so, although all parties had picked up from the old political fault lines found in Spain. some Populist tricks, one cannot say that Populism had put down roots in Spain. As we shall see, the One of these hurdles was the Left-Right split and its Left-Right split in Spanish politics and the ‘national- historic importance in Spanish politics. The appear- ist’ split stopped Populism from gaining a foothold. ance of another new political party — Ciudadanos — considered by some to be the Right-Wing’s version Podemos came into being in 2014 and sought from of Podemos (as the famous banker Josep Oliu put it) the outset to impose a Populist approach of the kind forced Podemos to politically position itself in the Left- meant by Ernesto Laclau (2005). It was the only Span- Right battle. Later on, with a view to beating PSOE, ish party that defined itself as Populist, which is why it opted for a catch-all strategy which sought to put various authors have treated it as such (Zarzalejos, Podemos “at the centre of the political chessboard”. 2017; Sanders et al., 2017; Solà and Rendueles, 2017; That is why it became more Populist. Podemos can Ivaldi et. al., 2017). Podemos tried to overcome the be considered a radical Left-Wing party if one takes Left-Right dialectic in Spanish politics — the biggest Mudde and March’s criteria (2005). It is radical because rift in the Spanish political system — and to replace it rejects the socio-economic structure underlying it with the dualism of The People versus the elites contemporary Capitalism and its values and practices. (Rodríguez-Teruel, Barrio and Barberà, 2016; Barrio, Here, the party proposes alternative economic and Barberà, Rodríguez-Teruel, 2018). In keeping with the power structures that imply radical wealth redistribu- The Weakness of Populism in Spain DEBATS · Annual Review, 5 · 2020 — tion from the haves to the have-nots. It is Left-Wing centre and periphery. As we noted earlier, Podemos’ because of its commitment to collective economic and concept of nation was linked to the idea of democracy social rights. Nevertheless, its radicalism has waned and sovereignty, understood in the classic sense. It thus over time, especially since its entry into the coalition referred to the State’s autonomy and the social rights government in January 2020. guaranteed thereby. Nevertheless, Spain’s complexity as a Nation-State and the prospects for the party’s spread Podemos’ first election manifesto (for the 2014 Eu- and consolidation made it difficult to establish who: ropean Elections) clearly expressed this radical Left- ‘The People’ was; the party sought to represent; the Wing ethos. The programme was drawn up through nation comprised. Podemos and its allies in various open assemblies in which over 30,000 members regions — including Catalonia — assumed that Spain took part, many of whom had been involved in the was a State comprising several nations with diverse organisation of the 15M protests. This explains the aspirations. This was a notion that sat ill with a dialectic adoption of maximalist positions on economic mat- based on ‘The People against The Elites’. Accepting ters, such as retirement at sixty, the refusal to repay the principle of sundry demoi meant also taking it as Spain’s National Debt, a basic income for everyone, read that each demos had its own demands and aspira- and nationalisation of Spain’s key economic sectors tions within a system of highly asymmetric relations. — all measures that the party subsequently rejected Podemos had also faced the challenge of adapting as impractical. Later on, the party commissioned an its Populism to the various national identities found economic programme from two renowned experts, within the Spanish State. The party had shown that Vicenç Navarro (Full Professor of Politics and Social it was not only willing to give practical recognition Sciences at Universitat Pompeu Fabra - UPF) and Juan of Spain’s pluri-national nature but also supported Torres (Full Professor of Economics at Universidad de Catalonia’s and The Basque Country’s secessionist Sevilla — US). This programme shifted the party into goals. This is why Podemos supported Catalonia’s a social-democratic frame, giving it a better chance right to a legally-agreed referendum on the country’s of fighting PSOE on equal terms. This move towards independence from Spain. That said, the party began the Centre stopped Podemos following the path to to shift position as soon as it became a member of the political extinction taken by Izquierda Unida, a tiny coalition government. This re-positioning not only party that was the heir of Spain’s Communist Party. gave rise to strong internal tensions in the party but Later on, its alliance with PSOE from the 2016 Gen- also clearly contradicted the party’s Populist stance, eral Election onwards strengthened its positioning putting it in an ambivalent position on the centre- in this part of the political spectrum. The move also periphery fault line. helped consolidate Podemos’ growth at the expense of the internally-riven PSOE. Even though Podemos Nevertheless, as Vallespín and Bascuñán (2017) note, and PSOE were competitors, the former supported these hurdles have not stopped Podemos from keep- the latter in 2018 in a Motion of No-Confidence ing some of its Populist features, which include: (1) against the then PP-led government. The motion simplification of the language used; (2) mistrust of was passed, and Pedro Sánchez — the PSOE’s leader parliamentary democracy; (3) the rhetoric based on — became President. After the 2019 General Elec- The People as protagonist and with a clearly-defined tion, the two parties formed a coalition in which antagonist; (4) new communication techniques based Podemos held one of the Vice-Presidencies (exercised on emotive appeal and wrapped up in rationality. by Pablo Iglesias), with the latter party being given four ministerial posts. Ciudadanos Is a party that sprang to life in 2006 as a response to the demand by some sectors that were The second hurdle to Podemos’ Populist ambitions unhappy with the way some Left-Wing parties had leapt stemmed from the political fault line between Spain’s on the nationalist bandwagon (Rodríguez Teruel and 203 204 — DEBATS · Annual Review, 5 · 2020 ASTRID BARRIO Barrio, 2016). Despite a short-lived alliance with the even ideologically. This choice proved unpopular with Europhobe Libertas party in the 2009 European Elec- the party’s voters, with Ciudadanos nose-diving from tions, Ciudadanos cannot be considered a Populist party 57 seats in the April 2019 General Election to just 10 even if the Zeitgeist has rubbed off on it — something seats in the November 2019 General Election. that applies to many other European parties (Rooduijn et al., 2012). In this respect, Ciudadanos was one of the first parties in Spain (together with Unión Pueblo the established parties for their corruption. Here, one VOX; A RADICAL RIGHT-WING PARTY, NOT A POPULIST PARTY should note that this denunciation came well before The birth of Vox, like that of Podemos and of Ciudada- the 2008 and 2014 crises. Indeed, UPyD even went so nos, came about as a result of the political opportuni- far as to accuse the two mainstream parties of running ties opened up in 2014. It fielded candidates for the a kind of mutual protection racket. That is why Ciu- European Elections in that year. Unlike the other two dadanos argued the need for a renewal of democracy. Right-Wing parties, Vox obtained no seats in this or in This discourse, although it arose in Catalonia and ad- any other European Parliament election. Yet it did win dressed a specific Catalan issue, allowed Ciudadanos to a few seats in the 2015 municipal elections. This situa- spread its wings to the rest of Spain from 2014 onwards tion persisted until 2018 and the Andalusian Regional (Barrio, 2017b, 2017c). The party, along with Podemos, Election, when Vox made its first breakthrough. The was an exponent of a new style of politics. Without Andalusian election was important because it was the going so far as to take on the mantle of Populism’s first one since the PP had lost the confidence of Spain’s ‘The People versus The Elite’ dichotomy, Ciudadanos Congress. It was also the first election outside Catalonia — like Podemos — sought to overcome the Left-Right after this region’s illegal Independence Referendum held fault line and break the old political mould. The party on the 1st of October, followed by a Unilateral Declara- even stated that, like some Populist movements, it was tion of Independence, which was then quashed by the neither Left-Wing nor Right-Wing. It then steadily re- application of Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution positioned itself to end up as a Centre-Right party. At (involving a round-up of pro-independence Catalan its party congress held in February 2018, Ciudadanos politicians and a Central Government take-over of the (in keeping with its international membership of the Regional Government). From this moment on, given Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe) chose to the threat to Spain’s territorial integrity and a greatly remove references to Social Democracy in its credo and weakened PP, Vox positioned itself as ‘the country’s define itself strictly as a Liberal party. This, it hoped, saviour’ and saw a surge in both electoral support and would help it win more seats than PP following the organisational capabilities (Barrio, 2019). Vox made an fragmentation of the right of the political spectrum. excellent showing in the Andalusian election. There, At the same time, it upped the ante by vociferously the party not only crossed the threshold needed to attacking peripheral nationalisms, especially that in win seats but also became a vital piece in any coalition Catalonia, competing with PP and Vox in defending government. Vox also won seats in Spain’s national the unity of Spain. As some observers had foreseen, parliament following the April 2019 General Election, Ciudadanos shifted from being a middle-of-the-road getting no fewer than 24 deputies in Congress. The party party to become a Right-Wing version of Podemos. Its also crossed the vote threshold in some ‘autonomous support for PP during the Motion of No Confidence and communities’ (self-governing regions) such as Madrid its subsequent refusal to govern as part of a coalition and Murcia, and in some municipalities such as Madrid. with PSOE after the April 2019 General Election put the Vox also won three seats in the European Parliament. seal on this change. Here, one should note that such a After the November 2019 elections, it won 57 seats, coalition with PSOE would have been viable in terms becoming Spain’s third-strongest political force with of commanding a parliamentary majority and perhaps 3,656,979 votes. y Democracia — UPyD) to systematically denounce The Weakness of Populism in Spain DEBATS · Annual Review, 5 · 2020 — Vox is above all a Spanish nationalist party whose receive public aid. Like Donald Trump’s proposal to spectacular growth can be ascribed to the political build a wall between The United States and Mexico, fall-out from the Catalan crisis. Its gung-ho national- Vox would build a wall between Ceuta and Morocco, ism stems from concern over the unity of Spain and and between Melilla and Morocco, which it demands what it sees as the threat of Catalan nationalism. The should be paid for by the Moroccan Government. party is highly critical of the decentralised political Vox accuses Feminism (as do many other Right-Wing model ushered in by the 1978 Spanish Constitution, movements) of fostering a gender ideology and says that which created a ‘State of Autonomies’ [Estado de las Feminist organisations should be banned. Given half a Autonomías], which is to say a system where the re- chance, the party would also scrap gender quotas and gions enjoy a degree of self-government. Vox seeks to abolish Spain’s Gender Violence Act on the grounds turn Spain into a unitary State that is administratively that it discriminates against men. Vox would replace decentralised. The party recognises Spain’s cultural, the legislation by a ‘Family Violence Act’ in which all linguistic, and institutional diversity but stresses that family members would be treated the same. Spanish (Castilian) must enjoy a hegemonic position throughout the length and breadth of the land. Vox’s Security is another Vox hobby-horse. In this field, it extreme defence of Spanish unity is shown by the fact would toughen sentencing and prison conditions, and that it has even gone so far as to hint it would outlaw would scrap Spain’s membership of The Schengen Area independence parties (for instance, in Catalonia and until the EU gave a binding undertaking that nobody The Basque Country). Although it does not say so would be given safe haven from Spanish justice — a explicitly, it seeks to introduce a militant model of clear allusion to the many Catalan politicians who democracy that falls outside the Spanish Constitu- fled abroad seeking asylum. The party also defends life tion. Furthermore, it proposes a wide-reaching plan imprisonment of former members of the ETA terrorist to disseminate and protect the national identity by organisation, and barring those who have supported fostering Spanish nationalism of the kind last seen ETA’s political demands from public office. Among under Franco’s Fascist dictatorship. Vox’s more colourful proposals is giving citizens the right to bear arms, defend their homes by force, and The party’s nationalism is accompanied by tradition- even to decorate citizens who injure or kill a criminal alist, nativist, and xenophobic traits and it is hostile entering their homes and in self-defence. to what it terms gender ideology. Its traditionalism is patently clear in its defence of the traditional family On the other hand, Vox supports the idea of demo- as an institution that pre-dates the State. This is why cratic renewal and proposes reform of the electoral Vox opposes abortion and sex changes. The party also system. It favours: (1) less party control over drawing lauds traditions such as bull-fighting and demands the up candidate lists; (2) the elimination of gender and closure of fundamentalist mosques. At the same time, other quotas; (3) toughening up the law on political it demands reciprocity in opening places of Christian incompatibilities with public office; (4) tightening worship and demands that Islam be excluded from up control over public posts to stop parties receiving the school curriculum. In addition, Vox advocates public funding. In the same vein, it seeks to slash the the creation of an aid agency for threatened Chris- number of municipal and local representatives, and to tian minorities abroad. The party links immigration limit the number of political advisors employed. Vox strictly to the country’s economic needs and is keen has raised the idea of appointing members of Spain’s to encourage settlement by newcomers from Spanish- General Council of The Judiciary (CGPJ) and the Su- speaking Latin America. It also seeks to deport illegal preme Court (TS) on the basis of merit rather than on immigrants and those who commit serious crimes. political affiliation. Further proposals are that the TS By the same token, Vox opposes giving illegal im- assume the functions of the Constitutional Court, and migrants the chance to regularise their status or to that trial by jury be abolished. 205 206 — DEBATS · Annual Review, 5 · 2020 ASTRID BARRIO These features place Vox firmly in the orbit of Europe’s party system in general and by the wholesale corruption Far-Right parties, as its participation in the Koblenz of Spain’s two biggest parties in particular. Yet it does Summit in January 2017 clearly revealed. Its political not meet all of the criteria of a Populist party as set bedfellows at that summit were France’s Front National, out in the academic literature, and in particular those Germany’s AfD, and Austria’s Freedom Party [Freiheitli- defined by Mudde (2004). Thus Vox neither thinks che Partei Österreichs — FPÖ]. The aim of the summit that there are two homogeneous groups — a virtuous was for the three parties to co-ordinate their European People on the one hand and a vice-ridden elite on the strategy. Nevertheless, Vox is not fervently anti-EU other — nor does it assume an antagonistic relationship or particularly Populist. Indeed, after the European between them. Likewise, it does not see politics as the elections, it joined the European Conservatives and result of such an antagonistic relationship, nor does Reformists (ECR) group, distancing itself from efforts it show a preference for direct democracy versus the by Steve Bannon to form a group of Far-Right, Euro- other instruments in Liberal Democracy’s tool-box. It sceptic parties under the baton of Marine Le Pen and does not even suggest that sovereignty flows from The Matteo Salvini (Barrio, in press). People but rather sees it as stemming from Spain. While Vox is not wholly free from Populism’s reach — a trait Vox’s position on the EU is ambivalent. Its founda- shared by most parties in The West (especially those with tional manifesto contains no references to Europe a yen for political moralisation) — it is not Populist. whatsoever, from which one can assume that the EU is not a key issue for the party. Its manifesto for the Vox is a singular case of a Far-Right party that is not 2014 European Elections made vague noises about a Populist one. This makes Spain an exception on the improving the workings of EU institutions and policies, European scene. The 2008 political and economic crisis and to make the EU more democratic. Indeed similar gave birth to the party but that does not explain its proposals have been on the EU’s own wish list for success. Rather, it was the political crisis sparked by the decades without anything ever coming of them. From possibility of Catalonia’s secession at the end of 2017 2015 onwards, coinciding with The Refugee Crisis, Vox and the PP’s credibility crisis in the Spring of 2018 aligned itself with the positions taken by The Visegrad that gave Vox wings. Vox is a Spanish nationalist party Group on immigration, and began to favour a more that lies on the Far Right and whose growth stems not inter-governmental approach in the EU and being from its Populism but rather than from its position in more explicit in rejecting supra-nationalism and any relation to the two main fault lines defining political kind of non-State participation in EU decisions. That life in Spain. Both fault lines played a key role in the said, Vox does not question Spain’s membership of the last election cycle and — as in Spain’s Second Republic EU but rather seeks to change the organisation from (1934-1939) — tend to be super-imposed, magnifying within — a line taken by most Far-Right parties in the the seismic forces reshaping the political landscape. 2019 elections. In its manifesto for those elections, it stressed the sovereignty of States, their territorial integrity and the need to maintain Europe’s JudaoChristian culture in the face of foreign threats, and to FINAL CONSIDERATIONS tighten up on immigration, political asylum, and on In Spain, two factors combined that usually favour the security and defence matters. emergence of Populism. They were the 2008 economic crisis and the 2014 political crisis. Yet Populism has Even so, Vox lacks the Populist component usually not taken root in Spain, making the country a rare found on the Far-Right. It is true that it lambasts the exception among Western Democracies. main parties and calls for democratic renewal and the need to carry out institutional reforms. Vox argues that Historically, Far-Right Populist parties have had very such reforms are needed to stop the rot caused by the little impact in Spain and then only in the local tier The Weakness of Populism in Spain DEBATS · Annual Review, 5 · 2020 — of government. The reasons for this lie in: (a) the Finally, the emergence of Vox has shown that Spain is country’s rejection of Franco’s poisoned legacy; (b) not wholly immune to the Far-Right, disproving a belief the electorate’s ideological moderation; (c) the hur- that was widely held until recently. Nevertheless, the dles in the electoral system to winning seats and party’s rapid growth was fuelled by Catalonia’s attempt get institutional representation; (d) PP hegemonic to secede and the fragmentation of the Right and, with presence in which the party attracted voters who in it, a greatly weakened PP. By contrast, Vox’s rising star another context might be labelled radical Populists. had little to do with the economic and political crises Until recently, all these factors presented a well-nigh mentioned earlier. Vox shares various traits with other insuperable barrier to Populist parties’ wielding power. Far-Right parties: traditionalism; ‘nativism’; rejection of Feminism. Yet it still lacks the Populist component. The Populist parties that emerged in the various waves That is because the party does not have a dualistic found it hard to take root given the near-monopoly vision of society (‘We The People’ versus ‘them’, the of power exercised by the two main parties. Among elites). Neither does it pass itself off as ‘The Voice of The the new parties emerging from the crisis, Podemos is People’ or prefer ‘direct democracy’ to parliamentary one that calls itself Populist in keeping with Laclau’s democracy. It is thus a rare example of a Far-Right party definition. Yet the party failed to get its approach that is not a Populist one. Above everything, it stresses adopted and ended up by fitting in with Spain’s Spanish nationalism and the indivisible unity of Spain, framework for political competition and battling it revealing the primacy it gives to the traditional fault out with PSOE for pride of place on the Left of the lines found in Spanish politics. political spectrum. Despite the deep-seated changes undergone by Spain’s In any event, the presence of a strong national fault system of parties of late, the Left-Right fault line and line made it hard for Podemos to foist its Populist the national fault line have greatly hindered the birth notions on the country’s diverse demoi. Ciudadanos, and growth of Populism in the country. Both faults meanwhile, shared Populist criticism of the established tend to work in a synergetic fashion, stopping Pop- parties and stressed its eagerness to foster democratic ulism — as defined by Mudde (2004) — from taking renewal. Yet it shares no other features that would hold. This is because the notion of a society split into allow us to label it as ‘Populist’. Indeed, Ciudada- two homogeneous, antagonist groups (namely, The nos has been forced to stress its position as a Liberal People versus The Elites) has no traction in Spain and party in relation to the Left-Right fault line, and its merely elicits voter indifference and incomprehension. opposition to peripheral nationalisms in relation to Quite simply, there are issues dearer to Spaniards’ the centre-periphery fault line. hearts that shape the political battle lines. BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES Alonso, S. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2015). Spain: No Country for the Populist Radical Right?, South European Society and Politics, 20(5), 21-45. Álvarez Tardío, M. (2017). El populismo en la democracia española: De Gil a Podemos. In A. Rivero, J. Zarzalejos, J. and J. del Palacio (co-ord.), Geografía del Populismo (p. 260-271). Madrid: Tecnos. Barrio, A. (2017a). El populismo y la excepcionalidad española. Quaderni di Diritto e Politica Ecclesiastica, 2, 263-276. Barrio, A. (2017b). 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She was awarded a PhD in Politics by Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAE) and a DEA (Diplôme d'Études Approfondies — a first-year PhD diploma) by Institut d’Études Politiques de París (Sciences-Po). Her field of research covers parties, political elites, party systems, and nationalism. Astrid Barrio is the author of many books and has published papers in scholarly journals such as Ethnic and Racial Studies, Revista Española de Ciencia Política, Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Comparative European Politics, South European Society and Politics, and Mediterranean Politics, among others. She regularly writes in newspapers such as El Periódico and La Vanguardia and is a frequent analyst on TV3, Catalunya Ràdio, La Ser, RAC1, and RTVE. She is the founder of Agenda Política and the magazine Política & Prosa. Her entire academic output can be consulted at: https:// uv.academia.edu/AstridBarrio. 209