How can argumentation be theorized?

Rui Alexandre Grácio rgracio@gmail.com How can argumentation be theorized? 1. Introduction How can argumentation be theorized? This is the issue I intend to deal with here by describing some of the steps of my research on the subject and also by pointing out a few personal suggestions. Let me point out, in the first place, that the question of «how to theorize argumentation» means that the theoretical diversity we can find in this range of studies implies questioning the theory of argumentation in terms of its descriptive adequacy. The questions that guided my research were: what phenomena are studied by the argumentation theory: the discourse? The functioning of «la langue»? The mechanisms of persuasive influence? The rules of good reasoning? The assessment of arguments? The argumentative interaction? ... What are the descriptive tasks of the argumentation theory? An essential aspect of the answer to these questions — assuming that the distance of the analytical lens enables it to change the scale between macro and micro and can, thus, focus on different effects — is to know at what distance should be placed the theoretical lens in order to capture the practical dynamics and vital the meaning of argumentative processes. In fact, the aim is to find what is considered to be «the right distance». And, at the same time, to denounce the distortions that an excessive functional differentiation in the study of argumentation brings about to the process of understanding the dynamics of argumentative practices, considering that this tendency has its grounds on the supposition that only strict logical and analytical procedures can lead to the formulation of normative logical criteria to assess argumentation. In classic terms, the issue at stake is to know how to interrelate argumentation, rhetoric and logic. Although the importance of the notion of «context» is now currently taken for granted in the field of argumentation studies, the fact is that many theorists — lead by Douglas Walton — are trying to typify these contexts as "forms of dialogue." Despite their belonging to the so-called stream of informal logic, they try to formalize these contexts of dialogue and support a functional theory of argumentation focused on understanding the arguments in terms of reasoning. 1 However, from my point of view, functional theorization leads to detaching the argumentative practice from its links to the profound philosophical and political views, which are at the core of the subjects concerning practical life and to consider them in terms of standardized solving techniques. As a result, functional theorization gives the impression that the initial context of uncertainty of practical issues, their requirements of creativity and performance and, finally, the emerging oppositional situation, can a priori be submitted to criteria of logic, be it formal or informal. Accordingly, the domestication of argumentation in terms of criteria, though useful in teaching, is incommensurable with its thematization on the basis of problematicity and rhetoric, perspective that I subscribe and which is sensitive to social conflict, to political choice and to the exercise of freedom. Indeed, the former tends to political asepticism — the word “political” being used here in the larger sense of adopting perspectives and values concerning an issue in question — thus emphasizing not the act of taking a perspective, but rather the justifying adjustment moment. The latter, on the contrary, highlights the conflicting visions and versions that are inherent to the problematicity of every argumentative question and about which one can try to put forward, in practice, our tendencies of response, but not give theoretical solutions that would annihilate the problem. The former, in addition to proposing guidelines for interpretation, leads the study of argumentation to the analysis and evaluation of reasoning; the latter acknowledges the inevitability of the conflict of interpretations and therefore values the notions of «problem», «subject matter», «opposition» and «thematization» as notions that define the focus of the approach that suits the understanding of argumentations. In this sense the proposal of ideas and criteria, in relationship with the subject matter, should also be seen as arguments and we should not only focus on the movements of justification. The former targets meta-argumentative instances in the evaluation of arguments. The latter implies that any assessment of an argument is always a way of participating in an argumentation and not an expert exercise, or a lecture. Finally, contrary to the perspective of the former, which reasons more in the domestic terms of compliance with 'game rules', the second reasons in the more challenging terms of dynamic rules that we try to discover, of solutions that we still do not have, and of hypotheses that we test but by which we are also tested. 2 This idea is, in fact, clearly expressed in the passage below, by G. Bateson, Steps to an Ecology in Mind (pp. 19-20), particularly in the text «About Games and Being serious»: «D: Is it you who makes the rules, Daddy? Is that fair? F: That, darling, is a dirty crack. And yes, it is probably unfair. But I’ll take it at face value. Yes, I make the rules. After all, I do not want us to go mad. D; All right. But. Daddy, do you also change the rules? Sometimes? F: Hmm, another dirty crack. Yes, darling, I keep changing them. Not all of them, but some of them. D: I wish you'd tell me when you change them! F: Hmm-yes-again. I wish I could. But it isn't like that. If it were like chess or canasta, I could tell you the rules, and we could, if we wanted to, stop playing and discuss the rules. And then we could start a new game with the new rules. But what rules would hold us between the two games? While we were discussing the rules? D: I don't understand. F: Yes, The point is that the purpose of these conversations is to discover the "rules." It's like life — a game whose purpose is to discover the rules, which rules are always changing and can’t be found» 2. The question of descriptive adequacy in the theory of argumentation However, it is important to clarify what I mean by «descriptive adequacy», by emphasizing two aspects: firstly, I would like to point out that this expression does not aim at any correspondence between the theory that I suggest and reality; it is, in fact, a part of a rhetorical device designed to create some sort of intelligibility. In the second place, this expression means a choice of a particular way of seeing which, I believe, is rich and assumes not only that the processes of selectivity occur on the level of description itself, but also that they cannot be avoided in the production of any theory. To clarify the selective processes involved in the description concerning the theorization of argumentation, I will use two passages by Aristotle. The first one is taken from the Topics and it restrains the scope of argumentation, focusing on a domain that is neither near nor far — it belongs to an intermediate plan. I quote: «Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only those which might be puzzling for the ones needing argument (…) The controversy should never be on subjects whose demonstration is close to it or far from it: for the former case admits no doubt, while the latter involves too many difficulties for the art of the trainer.» (105a) It should be noticed that, according to this passage, in an argumentation not everything can be questioned and that there are some aspects that are considered as acquired — this means that argumentation has a context and premises—and that it is displayed in a dispute or controversy — which implies that argumentation, more than with 3 the questionable, is concerned with the act of discussing and with what is really discussed rather than with what is liable to discussion. A third aspect must be underlined, that is to say, the intermediate situation of argumentative controversies, developed between evidence that would make the dispute useless, and the use of means of demonstration that would require specialization. We could therefore say that the rhetorical-argumentative competence should be considered as a spontaneous skill, inherent to any man in his social dimension. Accordingly, Gadamer writes that: «it is clear that the rhetoric is not a mere theory of forms of discourse and means of persuasion but something which, from a natural ability, everyone can have a practical mastery without making any theoretical reflection on the means available» (1982: 125). I would like to add, without going into further details, that rather than considerer argumentation as a technique serving objectives or goals, thus in a merely instrumental way, it is a crucial point to emphasize the binding nature of the argumentative processes in relation with the Self, made evident, for example, by H. Johnstone, Jr. (1965, 6) when he writes that «a person who chooses argument does in fact choose himself» This same idea is expressed when Marc Angenot writes that «Humans argue and discuss, they exchange 'reasons' for two immediate motives, logically prior to the hope, reasonable, scarce or null to persuade their interlocutor: they argue to justify, to obtain a justification towards the world (...) inseparable from a being right — and they argue to situate themselves in relation to other reasons, testing the consistency and strength they attribute to their own positions, to position themselves (with others positions, if possible), and, according to the metaphor of controversy, to support these positions and to be able to resist.» (2008: 441). The second extract by Aristotle, this time from the Nicomachean Ethics, concerns the nature of the conclusions in the processes of argumentation. These conclusions are not demonstrative in the sense of logical and mathematical necessity — indeed, they are not in the microscopic range of formal articulation of the arguments — but refer to ways of addressing issues in the discourse concerned with perspective taking. «We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each 4 class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.». (1094b) Therefore, the intermediate level in which argumentation develops is not correlative of the detail and rigor of mathematical reasoning, but rather of the views dealing with roughly and essential features. Although the scientific and philosophical tradition tends to depreciate common ideas as vague and confusing, owing to its inspiration in the mathematical model of thought, the fact is that in this passage Aristotle highlights them, following his idea that rhetoric and dialectic overstep each other. «Such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science» (1998: 43). In another passage Aristotle further states that the function of rhetoric «Is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning». (1998: 51). I suggest these last two statements should be understood not from the point of view of what can currently be referred to as the asymmetry between experts and laymen and of the tendency to identify expertise with authority, but rather in the frame of a parity and citizen responsibility in sharing ordinary life, implied in the very notion of citizenship. This aspect becomes, in fact, crucial to make a difference between, on one hand, what might be called a purely technical and instrumental use of argumentation — currently thematized, in the context of the current individualism and of a society fascinated by the power of the media, under the sign of effectiveness — that puts forward technical prescriptions of communication strategies according to the purposes of different areas of professional activity, prescriptions which are intended to improve the outcome of the performance, and, on the other hand, a non-professional use of argumentation, essentially connected with general issues that are not concerned with success or individual strategies, but are rather a matter of shared deliberation addressing both individual and communal interests. Indeed, only by placing the argumentative practice in the latter context, as something that occurs within a civil society and within the framework of citizen participation, are we able to preserve the conceptuality of argumentation from what would appear as unnatural 5 subordination to dogmatism or blind authority, be it embodied in the image of the judge who has the final word, in mechanisms that shun free expression or, in functional differentiations making it impossible to questioning the perspectives through which something is being thought. Further more it should be noticed —as M. Angenot (2008: 69) points out — that we are dealing with the range of probability, that is to say a «Area of knowledge where, in the best case, we know things, but vaguely and imprecisely». which is, however, indispensable to deal with the ‘doxic’ world of sociability, to the world in which we live together and in which the generation of affinities plays a major role in our destiny as a community. In fact, as M. M.ª Carrilho (2002: 94) suggested, rationality «is not the privilege of any culture, but a very diversified matrix, of how men deal with the traditions that they inherit, the contexts in which they live, the problems they are faced with and the dreams that motivate them». Hence, if we can speak of rationality concerning argumentation, it is essential to know what should be stressed. I would say that the point is not to convince, but to live together. This point — the importance of matching argumentative practices to the status of citizens belonging to a society ruled by dialogical mutuality — was well reported by Hamblin in a text worth quoting. In this text he rejects granting logicians the possibility to invest themselves as the judges of the arguments: «If he (the logician) says 'Smith's premises are true’ or 'Jones's argument is unacceptable' he is taking sides in the dialogue exactly as if he were a participant in' it; but, unless he is in fact engaged in a second-order dialogue with other onlookers, his formulation says no more nor less than the formulation 'l accept Smith's premises' or 'I disapprove of Jones's argument'. Logicians are, of course, allowed to express their opinions, bur there is something repelling about the idea that Logic is a vehicle for the expression of the logician's own judgments of acceptance or rejection of statements and arguments. The logician does not stand above and outside practical argumentation, and does not have to pass judgment on it. He is not a judge or a court, and there is no such judge or court: he is, at best, a trained advocate. Accordingly, it is not the logician’s particular role to declare the truth of any statement, or the validity of any argument.» (1970: 244) We think, therefore, that it is only in the framework of a certain parity and of community and in the context of a dialogue coexistence enabling the emergence of the Self (expressing a point of view, being heard, taken into account, but also having the possibility of weighing and the prerogatives of doubting, putting into question, suggesting and replying) that we can find the specificity of the argumentation field. 6 We believe, on the other hand, that only in this framework does it make sense to speak of argumentative practices as a form of co-construction in which one rehearses, with all the inevitable constraints, a possible achievement. That is how, according to Plantin (1996: 21), we can link the argumentation to «if not a democratic society, at least a democratic situation» and we can arguably say, in agreement with Wolton (1995: 11-13), that there is a «direct link between democracy, communication and argumentation», and that «without argumentation, there is no communication. Something is expressed, but there is no exchange (...). To communicate with others, taken as equals to you, implies the use of argumentation. (...) Argumentation depends on the freedom of communication». Once again, the idea is to emphasize the connection between argumentative practices and citizenship. We can finally invoke the words of Bauman who points out that «truth is an essentially antagonistic concept» (2006: 186) and therefore, more than to preview, the orator must know to wait and to give it time, because it depends on word of the other. That is why this sociologist writes that «The fact of others disagree with us (they do not value what we value and they value just the opposite; they believe that human society can benefit from rules different from those that we consider superior and, above all, the fact they doubt that we have access to a direct line to the absolute truth and also that we know with certainty where a discussion should end before it even began) is not an obstacle that leads to the human community. But the belief that our opinions are the whole truth, nothing but the truth and the only truth above all existing as well as our belief that the truths of others, if different from ours, are 'mere opinion', that yes, is an obstacle» (2006: 184). Let us go back to the texts above quoted, by Aristotle. In both excerpts, it seems to me, we face the problem of descriptive adequacy: they point out to the specificity of the argumentation field in its difference regarding other fields. The same happens with the three excerpts presented below, equally focusing on descriptive adequacy, which lead, once more, to question the theorization of argumentation. The first one points out the irreducibility between the dynamics involved in the argumentative situations and the logical analysis, whether formal (validity) or informal (plausibility). «It would be a caricature if the argumentative situation had to be interrupted at any time and over and over again, so that the receivers, armed with pencils, could certify the logical form of each argument, its formal validity, or even its plausibility» (Tito Cardoso e Cunha e Américo de Sousa, 2005: 18341835). 7 This passage debunks not only the adequacy of the analysis of the dynamics of argumentation from a logical point of view but also implies that such an approach does not capture what really happens in a situation of argumentation. Now, this concept of argumentative situation, is relevant not only as a framework to the approach of argumentation in its connection to the context, but also because it leads to multidimensional and plural aspects that must be taken into account. In fact, we may wander how many reasoning make up an argumentation? And, following the same path, we can think of the relationship between argumentation and the time in which it unfolds. Perelman, for example, repeatedly insisted on the importance of the role — and constraints — of temporality in argumentation. In the same way, Aristotle (1998: 155) had already written in his Rhetoric, that «First of all we must pick out a selection of valid and most suitable arguments about issues that may arise» This aspect — namely, the pointlessness of focusing on the logical-inferential processes when it comes to understanding and analysing argumentations — has not gone unnoticed to Thomas Conley. Underlying the character of the arguments as adapted to situations and separating the analysis of arguments from the schematizing of isolated arguments, he stressed that «Rewriting an argument in a syllogistic form or uncovering its underlying inferential scheme is equivalent to explaining a joke. And we all know what happens when you do that. The joke is no longer funny». (2003: 269). And he asks: «It does not make much sense to criticize an argument – or a poem, or a novel – by criticizing its rewriting, does it? (...) In short, whether or not it is a good joke – indeed, just what the joke is – is a deeply situational matter involving the teller, the audience, their shared beliefs and values, and the propriety of the joke: the very elements present in deciding when an argument is a good one or not». (2003: 269-271). So, he concludes that «Tradition values rewriting the original discourse, the latent over the manifest, and is one that calls for rigor and mathematical elegance above all else. There are perhaps times and places where such things are important. But people who hold those things in such high regard when it comes to inventing, analysing, and judging arguments, in my view, just don’t get it». (idem: 274). 8 In the second quote we can see the refusal of the categorial analysis adequacy of logic in what concerns situations of argumentation. Instead, his author mentions an intermediate scale and an approximate logic: «argument falls squarely into the realm of the problematic. (…) argument deals with the problematic and ignores the trivial or the certain, that it depends on the perceptions and choices of people who will decide whether viewing an activity as an argument is appropriate, and that it lies in the midrange of the more-or-less continuum of a variable logic and not a categorical logic.» (Brockriede, 1992: 74 e 77). This quote echoes the centrality attributed by Perelman to the ideas of strength and adhesion in his theory of argumentation, thus abandoning the traditional dichotomy between truth and falsehood. This third quote by Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, once again, concerns to the question of descriptive adequacy: «We have insisted, before undertaking the analytical study of arguments, on its schematic and arbitrary dimension. The elements isolated for the study are, in fact, a whole: they are in constant interaction and this in several ways: interaction between the various arguments put forward, interaction between them and the whole argumentative situation, between them and their conclusions, and finally between the arguments contained in the speech and those who to whom they are addressed» (1988: 610). In this passage, although not denying the importance of the study of arguments, the authors stress, however, the fact that this study is essentially arbitrary and schematic and they introduce the dynamics of interactivity as the core of argumentative situations. Now I would like to add that to the question of descriptive adequacy, which has its roots in the observation of the heterogeneity in the theorization of argumentation, and especially in the feeling that despite the fecundity of the intuitions of different ways of theorizing there was a strong gap between theory and practice (as if the explanatory power of theories fail to understand the dynamic practices that matter most), I associate two more efforts. One the one hand, it was important to displace the argumentative phenomenon from the aegis of a reason that finds in itself the resources to assess the arguments; and, on the other hand, it was important to reformulate the idea of the reasonable as inclusive of the speech of the other, which implies a dynamic relationship between discourse and counter-discourse, between talking and listening, between arguments and counter-arguments concerning an issue. But if we accept this hypothesis as the good one, then we must center the theorizing of argumentation on concepts different from those generally accepted, focusing, on the one hand, on interaction (bilaterally and eventual progression beyond the initial 9 argumentative diptych) instead of focusing on speech or on the text and, on the other hand, in its situational, circumstantial and episodic character, rather than in formal, corrective and orthopaedic standards. These considerations concerning the problem of descriptive adequacy — which imply, of course, the thematizing of the very notion of argumentation — were joined by personal motivations from my experience as a scholar and a teacher of argumentation and rhetoric. 3. Towards a general theory of argumentation: neither general nor restricted I have already mentioned earlier the theoretical diversity that characterizes the current state of the art of argumentation studies. This assessment is not new and several theorists have already stressed it. For example, van Eemeren (2003: 2) wrote that «The study of argumentation has not yet resulted in a universally accepted theory. The state of the art is characterized by the co-existence of a variety of approaches, differing considerably in its conceptualization, scope and degree of theoretical refinement, albeit that all modern approaches are strongly influenced by classical and post-classical rhetoric and dialectic». As far as he is concerned, Plantin (2001: 71-92) notes that «The field of argumentation studies is not structured by something like a ‘paradigm’. Deal with a paradigm would require a minimum of theoretical dialogue — meaning dialogue certainly not agreement, but at least one form of sharing objects, methods or issues — that do not currently exist. In the present case, each work constitutes itself as a paradigm». Finally, here is what Marianne Doury and Sophie Moirand (2004: 9-10) wrote about the subject: «The researchers that claim the argumentation field try to define this domain as a field in itself, a specific field of its own, particular and independent. But the unity of this field is immediately problematic, because of the variety of the related disciplines that came up with facts linked to argumentation without necessarily having argumentation at the core of the theories or methodologies of these disciplines: it the case of discourse analysis and textual linguistics of communication and information sciences, and of cognitive sciences in their relations to human speech and natural language. Not to mention the application domains, such as education (through the prism of shapes and connectors), marketing and political communication (through the influence of others and the power of persuasion) and so on». If this heterogeneity invites us to reflexion — even setting aside any intention of generalizing or establishing a consensus —, my own experience in teaching argumentation and rhetoric has also reinforced this reflexive impulse. 10 Concerning the theoretical approach to argumentation, I supported the idea according to which the starting points of every theory inevitably contain speculative decisions (related to the language, the previous ideas we had in mind concerning the study of argumentation or to disciplinary appropriation that we had of it) and that from the point of view of theoretical debate, these ideas must be questioned and problematized. On the other hand, I found that, from a theoretical point of view, there are two extreme positions in the theorizing of argumentation. The former, which I have classified as pan-argumentative, tends to see an argumentative strategy in any symbolic manipulation (which ends up diluting the argumentation in language and communication). We are here in a sort of «everything is argumentative». And explicit examples of this perspective can be found in the following passages: • «Communicate your ideas to someone it is always to argue» (Grize, 1997: 9). • «Any speech can be an argumentation. It offers some images, situated images, aimed to evoke in the audience the inferences that go in the desired direction» (Grize, 1996: 18). • «By identifying the latter [argumentation theory] with the general theory of persuasive discourse, which seeks to win the support, both intellectual and emotional, of an audience, whatever it may be, we claim that any speech that is not intended to impersonal validity is linked to rhetoric. Once a communication tends to influence one or more persons, to guide their thinking, to excite or soothe the emotions, to direct action, it belongs to the field of rhetoric» (Perelman, 1977: 177). • «Argumentation is not a type of discourse among others; it is an integrant part of speech as such and covers both the television news and a description, a travelogue, a familiar conversation. (...) It is a branch of discourse analysis» (Amossy, 2006: 246). • «My contention is that this capacity to argue constitutes an inherent feature of discourse. The argumentative nature of discourse does not imply that formal arguments are used, nor does it mean that a sequential order from premise to conclusion is imposed on the oral or written text. Influencing the way in which reality is perceived, influencing a point of view and directing behaviour, are actions performed by a whole range of verbal means. From this perspective, argumentation is fully integrated in the domain of language studies» (Amossy, 2009b: 254). The latter was to identify the «theory of argumentation» to very restricted approaches to argumentation (for example, reducing argumentation to the mechanisms of language or reasoning). Here are some examples: • «When we talk about argumentation, we always refer to discourses with at least two utterances E1 and E2, one of which is given to authorize, justify or to impose the other; the first is the argument, the second is the conclusion» (Anscombre and Ducrot, 1997: 163). • «Informal logic is the normative study of argument. It is the area of logic which seeks to develop standards, criteria and procedures to interpret, assess and construct of arguments and argumentation used in natural language» (Johnson e Blair, 1987b: 148). • «In general terms, the argumentative discourse is considered as rational persuasion when it consists of a set of propositions, advanced as reasons for accepting another proposition or for performing an action, which are intended to be so related to it that it would be inconsistent, in a way, to accept the set of reasons but not accept the proposition or endorse the performance of the action in question» (Blair, 1992: 358). • «The concept of proposition is fundamental to critical argumentation, because arguments are made up of premises and conclusions that are propositions. A proposition has two defining 11 characteristics. First, it is something, in principle, true or false. (...) The second characteristics of a proposition (...) [is that] ambiguous sentences are nor propositions. (...) The reason is that they do not have the property of being true or false» (Walton, 2006: 9-10). • « Logic is the evaluation of reasoning in arguments» (Walton, 1990: 417). And this last author states: • «From the point of view of logic, the science of reasoning should be the study of whether or not conclusions can be extracted correctly from premises (assumptions), as long as these assumptions are in the context of an argument. Logic has to do with defining the assumptions as well, or identifying them correctly, and with assessing whether a putative conclusion can be correctly derived from a given set of premises» (ibidem). The problem that arose from these two extremes, then, was the question of descriptive adequacy, which can be formulated as follows: what are the phenomena studied by the theory of argumentation? What are their descriptive tasks? What focus must be adopted? The problem turned out to be all the more complicated since it is not difficult to recognize the multidimensionality of argumentative phenomena, of which the following scheme can give a synthetic image: 12 Concerning my experience of teaching argumentation, I would like to emphasize two points: a) The exposure of different theoretical perspectives on argumentation and the examples of certain techniques and argumentative schemes were always somewhat insufficient in regard to the students’ expectations — legitimate expectation, let it be said. b) It was not so much the ability to build or analyse argumentative speech that interested them, but rather be tested in concrete situations in which more than having to find arguments, they found themselves involved in confrontational situations governed by oppositional turns of speech, involved in the game in which the tension of the arguments and counter arguments are crucial. Now, what I had to teach them — and this apart from the moments in which we debated on a divisive issue — revealed itself to be too narrow and somewhat disappointing in relation to their expectations. It lacked the practical, artistic and living component. In other words, the theory became silent when it came to interaction, though the bilateral interaction seemed to be the core of the argumentative situations. 4. Conceptual elements for argumentation theorizing In the wake of what was said above, it appeared necessary to go beyond the notion that «everything is argumentative» or beyond an analytical dimension of the speech on several levels, but little in line with the actual practice, in which the bilateral aspect, that is to say, the “Ping-Pong” of speaking turns, is the starting point. A general theory was needed: neither too general (focusing on the speech and the use of language: speaking=arguing) nor too restrictive (focused in reasoning, as detached from the perspectives and from discursive situations of opposition in which the ability to speak is as relevant as the ability to hear and to cross-talk). In other words, rather than a general theory of discourse or a theory that takes as its starting point the notion of argument, a theory was needed that highlights interaction and that takes into account the tensional dimension in which argumentation develops. I would like to add, moreover, that it is this dimension of confrontation, this game between discourse and counter-discourse, the one that best highlights the close relationship between argumentation and strategy, or, to use Meyer’s words, the one which excludes 13 both the blending of argumentation and rhetoric or their separation (in this respect, see, for example, Meyer, 2005: 15-16). But it was also necessary to articulate two core concepts in the theory of argumentation, namely, on the one hand, the notion of orientation which is typical to descriptive perspective and the notion of assessment which is typical to normative approaches, and try to see how they can be theoretically related. It should be noticed that de notion of orientation is related to the problematic of influence and of the effects of discourse, taken both at a macro level (inter-discourse) and at a micro level (linguistic mechanisms). On the other hand, the notion of evaluation focuses on the criteria of assessment and on the rationality of arguments. It is my purpose to adopt the two points of view – orientation and assessment — by acknowledging that they are both present at the core of argumentation. To that purpose, I have set on a secondary plan the analysis of argumentative phenomena as products of language that could be analysed as such, and I centered the argumentative situations on the interactive dynamics, which implies that arguments and argumentations must not only be considered in tension with other arguments and argumentations but also as shaped by the specific situation in which they occur. This shift of focus implies that the essential pole of argumentative situations is «the issue in question». An issue can’t be separated from processes of thematization, which are, in turn, connected to the notion of orientation through the selection and articulation of resources. In this sense, an issue is something plastic that can be made up by the choice of the elements we sort out to deal with it. I call this selection «thematization» and this notion includes the idea of perspective and not the idea of reasoning. Hence, firstly, the idea that argumentation thematizes issues and, accordingly, that these issues can be thematized because we do not just give answers to questions, but because, through our choice of the ideas to make up issues we try to suggest answers concerning its problematicity. Michel Meyer was a sound supporter of this aspect in his sharp criticism to propositionalism. He rejected considering the proposition as the minimum unit of thinking and suggested using the category of problem and the framework of problematology instead. More specifically, we can define the idea of issue as follows: • The term «issue» is a term of ordinary or common language. It corresponds to a mental organization that is both a way of focusing on (in the sense of framing) and pinpointing a potentially problematic area. It also refers to shared and common 14 elements and to the possibility of various standpoints in terms of thematization. An issue is a multidimensional category linked to problematicity. • «Issue» refers not only to an informative question, a question giving way to an answer, but also to a series of underlying elements that need to be considered, namely, data, questions and the different standpoints (hence the difference between questioning and asking). The approach to issues calls for the possibility of several perspectives (each one involving selection processes and procedures of filtering and salience related to valuations, depreciations and ranking). • An issue is something intermediate between ideas and propositions, between light and darkness, being nevertheless susceptible to thematization and framing. • An issue is something arising from a situation and referenced (arising from some data or considerations), and has a practical dimension. • It is a very flexible notion and raises possible standpoints and perspectives; it results in possibilities and connects the possible with the preferable. • When «the subject we talk about» involves controversy, an issue arises as a 'one case'. • It is something for which people tend to take a stand, or at least, something they have to deal with in the best way. However, to be able to capture the dynamics and the interactive dimension, and also to differentiate the argumentative situations from communication processes generally considered, it is necessary to underline that what characterizes argumentative opposition is the «in question» mode of addressing the issues. By saying this we are not referring to philosophical questions, but to the common denominator of every circumstantial dissent. An «issue in question» means that a collision between discourses brings out an argumentative question, a question to which it is always possible to give, at least, two opposite responses. And, as already mentioned, it is in the thematization of the dissention that we can see the interventions that embody argumentation. What, than, characterizes the «in question»? At this point, we can face three possibilities. a) By adopting a dialogic and polyphonic conception of language, we can say that opposition is inherent to argumentative discourse. This is the view endorsed by Amossy when she says that «every statement confirms, refutes and problematizes previous 15 positions, whether expressed in a precise way by a given interlocutor or in a diffuse way in the contemporary inter-discourse» (2006: 35). An example of this is, namely, foreseeing possible objections. b) A second hypothesis is to say that the every speech is a response to a question — which, by its very nature is ambiguous — in order to allow always at least two possible responses (Meyer). c) A third possibility — and that is the one I subscribe — is that the «in question» represents the actual presence of a discourse and a counter-discourse, a situation of conflict and dissonance in which the discourse of each part is criticized by the discourse of the other part. This preference imposes, however, some additional distinctions, the first of which is between argumentativeness and argumentation. We recognize that argumentativeness, as a component of the orientation and strength of speech, is inherent to discourse, but we suggest using the word argumentation to situations of discursive opposition focused on a given issue in question. Thus, a distinction must be made between argumentativeness as a process of social and communicational setup of the relevance and the way these processes work in situations in which we can explicitly find oppositional discourses focused on the thematization of their divergences. In fact, we consider that a situation of argumentation, rather than dialogic, is «dialogal» (in the sense of having to be understood in the context of a real interaction and not just as something virtual), more than mono-managed is multi-managed (in the sense that the definition of the terms of considering the subject matter is always at issue) and, finally, more than unilateral it is, at least, bilateral. To argue is to argue with and, as Willard (1989: 61) pointed out, it takes two to dance a tango. In this perspective we share Jeanine Czubaroff’s criticism to the tradition that considers rhetoric according to the persuasive paradigm: «The problem with the rhetoric-as-persuasion tradition, then, is its tendency to privilege monological, unilateral, power-based modes of influence and ignore dialogical-multilateral modes of power and influence. What dialogue offers to counterbalance the abuses committed in the name of monologic persuasion is multilaterality, availability, and accountability, a willingness to stand one's ground and grant the other that same right». (Czubaroff, 2007: 15). 16 These words echo, in fact, the criticism to adversarial advocacy made by Makau and Marty as they state that «First, even if the advocate’s goals are met, this unilateral standard of success is unreliable. It measures effectiveness almost entirely on the advocate’s terms — character, intentions, and performance — and therefore privileges the advocate’s perspective at the expenses of other people’s. Secondly, this unilateral standard necessarily reduces an audience’s active reception skills — attentive listening, critical reasoning, assessment… — to mere indicators of the speakers success. Consequently, substantive feedback and consultation are diminished in value as they are only assessed on the advocate’s terms, when they are taken into account at all. Lastly, adversarial advocacy violates the dialogic spirit inherent to deliberative communities; this violation allows advocates to treat other people with little regard. Such behaviour is in itself, an abuse of power that jeopardizes relational integrity and communal trust». (Makau e Marty, 2001: 197-198). After the distinctions mentioned above it is now possible to return to the «gordian knot» of the theory of argumentation, namely, the relationship between the notion of orientation (which focuses on the question of interpretation, but, by settling itself on the level of hermeneutics, runs the risk of falling into the problem of infinite interpretation) and the notion of evaluation or «assessment» (which, by virtue of a situation of opposition, brings up the question of the criteria as being part of the argumentative practices). By taking the «issue in question» to be a methodological unit in the analysis of argumentation, we can say that the situations of argumentation are those in which criticism and evaluation of someone’s speech are given by the speech of an interlocutor and that this is the phenomenon that must be described by the analyst of the argumentation. Plantin stated this idea in detail when he wrote that, on the one hand, «A given language situation starts being argumentative as soon as an opposition of discourse exists. Two juxtaposed, contradictory monologues without any allusion to each other stand as an argumentative dyptic. It is, undoubtedly, the basic argumentative form: each one repeats their position. Communication is fully argumentative when this difference is problematized into a Question and the three roles of Proponent, Opponent and Third are clearly separated». (Plantin, 2005: 63) and, on the other hand «The practice of evaluation of arguments is guided by a simple principle: who does not admit a speech is the first, if not the best, critic, and after all he speaks: we must take into account his word. This last statement is not a normative principle in what concerns to the argumentative activity, but in what concerns the method in the theory of argumentation. The task of this theory is to make the best account possible of this critical activity and not to replace it. The conclusion will be borrowed from Guizot: laissez faire, laissez aller — and let say. There is no super-evaluator capable to stop the critical process through a final evaluation that would silence 17 everyone. And, the more evaluations there are, the more exciting argumentations we have to describe» (2009 b). This view links, therefore, the criticism of one’s speech by the speech of somebody else to processes of evaluation whose criteria, I must insist, are immanent and not transcendent to the situation of argumentation. This can be philosophically enunciated through the cohesion between argumentation and perspectivism, the latter referring to the insurmountable rhetoricity of language, the coexistence of alternative versions and, finally, the tensional and confrontational character that is associated to the prevailing versions. Furthermore, perspectivism does not dissociate the argumentative rationality from the sociological rationality (there is an intersection of issues of argumentations with the issues of power and with the rhetorical dimensions of the ethos, the pathos and the logos). To put it in a simple way — and contrary to the trend that defines argumentation as aiming at persuasion — rather than persuade, what is at stake in argumentation is coexisting and assuming that coexistence is regularly crossed by conflict which makes it inevitable to deal with differences. 5. A definition of argumentation And so I arrived to the following notion: argumentation is the critical discipline of reading and interaction between the perspectives inherent to discourse, the divergence of which is thematized by the arguers around an issue in question. This definition would highlight the following aspects: • Discipline: I use the word «discipline» as the counter-discursive and discursive ability of focus and coordination required by argumentative situations. From the interactive point of view (which has its paradigm in a specific way of interpersonal communication), achieving progress in the argumentation process depends on the ability of the participants to focus on the issue in question, which they set up together, and on the coordination needed in order to maintain a minimal connection in the turns of speech through which argumentation proceeds. • Critical: I use the word «critical» to point out the emergence of discourses in opposition and to refer to the development and progression of this situation. The 18 point is not just to focus on the subject, but also to address it as a question, to deal with it as a problem resulting from a dissension and a divergence of perspectives that raises confrontation and evaluation. In this sense, the polarization of the interaction in an issue that has become a question to discuss is different from the argumentative skirmishes that don’t give room, or time, to the emergence of different versions and do not permit the criticism of a speech by someone else’s speech. • Reading and interaction: I prefer to use the word «reading» rather than the word «analysis». I further associate it with the word «interaction» to specify the essentially dynamic and tensional dimension of argumentative situations, held by turns of speech. • Perspectives: with this word, I mean what is at stake in a situation of argumentation, in other words, a divergence of perspectives. • Thematization and issue in question. By «issue in question» I mean the pole around which there is a divergence of perspectives and by the word «thematization» I mean the need to configure the issue whenever it is more than a mere conversational episode of contradiction. According to Plantin, conversational contradictions can be distinguished from argumentative disputes, particularly because the former occur and develop in an unplanned way, whereas the latter should be ratified and thematized, by focusing on and deepening the conflict that they deal with. 6. Consequences for the study and the teaching of argumentation From this point of view, that is focused on the «issue in question» and that avoids taking language and discourse as the starting point to explain the situations of argumentation, we can point out three consequences concerning the teaching of argumentation: a) It is important to value argumentative reading as critical one, keeping an eye on the production of a counter-discourse, on the ability to create an argumentative diptych in which perspectives are confronted and, finally, on producing counter-discursive sequences in which the opponent’s speech is resumed and in which a progression is aimed at (in this sense our suggestions especially value the notion of interaction, which they regard as essential). 19 Thinking that an argumentative situation involves roles (proponent, opponent and question) and turns of speech as proposed by the pragma-dialectic, we can distinguish: • The confrontation stage (during which a diptych or argumentative stasis is created). • The opening stage (during which the focus is set on the issue in question that divides the participants and the negotiation of its terms). • The argumentation stage (in which every one is tries to strengthen their own perspective and arguments in relation to the perspectives and arguments of the other part). • The closing stage (and this stage marks the end of argumentation and of the argumentative situation. Because I think that there can always be good, rich argumentation without resolution, I prefer to call this closing stage rather than the conclusion stage). This descriptive proposal is interesting because argumentation is seen in terms of progression and because the idea that people argue all the time can also be discarded. In fact, what we often see is the tendency to form argumentative diptychs, which can be more accurately classified as episodes of contradiction rather than as a conversational argumentative dispute. Indeed, some authors, like Willard, argue that argumentation involves the assumption of the opposition so he asserts that «'we are arguing' is a co-orientation, the definition of a relationship, an episodic assignment. My assumption is that actors act in a unique way only when they are 'arguing'. The focus of research on the argument must be the way they do.» (Willard, 1979: 188). Along with this same line, we can quote Pamela Benoit who uses the notion of «argument script». «The argument script requires that interactants consider their positions as an opposition. If that preliminary condition is not satisfied, then an argument cannot take place. (…) A second preliminary condition states that an argument must be worth the investment required to accomplish the script. This preliminary condition implies that arguments do not occur every time a disagreement is observed» (Pamela Benoit, 1992: 176-177). Moreover, Benoit also states that, «An argument script is called out when the preliminary conditions are no longer satisfied. An implicit preliminary condition for argument in interaction is the existence of, at least, two parties. When one of 20 the parties abruptly leaves the interaction, the argument must come to an end, at least until the parties meet again. Arguments require overt opposition and this preliminary condition is violated when the partner gives in, both participants reach some sort of agreement or the topic is changed to an issue where there is no disagreement. The argument script also requires joint agreement that the script is worth continuing and so, perceiving the argument as pointless is enough to call out the argument script ». (Benoit, 1992: 179). Thus, from a descriptive point of view, we can say that the analysis of an argumentation involves taking into account the following aspects: • The existence of a conversational context and a situation of communication developed in speech turns, which therefore involves two or more participants. • The polarization of the exchange in a sufficiently stable issue that is being built as problematic due to the divergence and the to the alternative perspectives revealed by the interventions of the participants. • The emergence of an expectation of fairness or an ethical relational context (or, to use M. Gilbert’s term, a certain coalescence). • Procedures of thematization (processed by techniques of association and dissociation) that originate the emergence of arguments (involving the selection of specific data and detailed features of various kinds). They determine how of the issue is being designed in the context of interaction, by taking into account the issue in question, the interventions of the debaters and the answers t being given to them. • The moves that mark the entrance or the abandonment of argumentation. b) A re-evaluation of the idea of 'fallacy', which should be taken not as a failure in argumentation, but as a reasoning strategy that mirrors the assessment of someone else’s speech (what Plantin called the fallacy of fallacies). Referring to the transformations that should be operated in the teaching of argumentation, M. Gilbert (1995b) points out three crucial aspects: the scarcity that represents viewing argumentation in terms of 'fallacies', which led him to highlighting issues of reasoning at the expense of communication and situational aspects which are paramount to understand and consider, the fact that the negative approach of «hunting fallacies» is not favourable to a coalescent approach of argumentation and, finally, the focus on reasoning tends to overlook the debaters. Now, Gilbert writes, «Argumentation is first and last, a subspecies of communication, and communication is a complex act 21 that integrates cultural and sub-cultural symbolism, social actors and a local context». (1995b: 127). And he adds: «If we are going to deal with arguments in a more than critical way we need to shift the focus from the argument to the arguer, from the artefacts that happen to be chosen for communicative purposes to the situation in which those artefacts function as a component. The emphasis now is too strongly in favour of language, and language is not nearly as precise as we would like to think it is. We focus on it because it is the only part of the entire argumentative process that is physically identifiable, and even then many juicy bits are left to our enthymeme-decoding imaginations» (1995b: 132-133) We can, however, choose more effective ways to analyse argumentative speech or argumentative interaction, because they take into account the multidimensionality of context and choices articulation (after all, we can always say that reasoning is good ... the perspective isn’t a big deal) — if, as suggested by Plantin, we choose to ask the following questions. «— If it is a monologue justifying a position, it is postulated that this justification implicitly responds to opposition and that there is somewhere a counter-discourse and a possibility of doubt, hence the following questions arise: What status grants this monologue to counter-discourse and doubt about the position defended? In other words, does it concerns with the opposed voices and to Third Parties? How are they present on the scene? — If it's an interaction, what are the argumentative roles of the actors involved? Does the interaction occurs in the presence / absence of those who are opposed? Who is allied with whom? How are partnerships manifesting? Do the players have the ability to switch their argumentative roles? If so, indeed some participant’s role actually changes? — The question is stabilized? Do it suffer transformations during the debate? Has it led to questions arising? What? — The fundamental purpose of the interaction is the treatment of the issue? Is there a script on this issue? Does being formed or already formed? — What is the nature of the place where the argumentation is developed? Is it an institutionalized argumentative place? How do occur the shifts of speech turns? What are the institutional features of that place? How are those places articulated in relation to argumentative roles? — Finally, you can consider the constitution of diachronic series of argumentative corpus (when and how this question has appeared, evolved and disappeared?) or synchronous (where in the issue being debated? What are the presented sets of arguments and how they vary from place to place? What actors take over the arguments? How are they articulated in each place, orally or in writing? ... All the tasks suggested by these questions are obviously to add to the classic works of argumentative analysis, which are to identify, describe, classify and, so they say, evaluate arguments» (Plantin, 1999: 47-48). Finally, to go back to the question of the teaching of argumentation, we think that Jean Goodwin captures the point by stating that, «Within the contest of this art, again, one goal of pedagogy must be to engage students in their own theorizing, helping them deepen their understanding as they extend their skills. 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