STUDIES IN LOGIC, GRAMMAR AND RHETORIC 16 (29) 2009
Marcin Koszowy
University of Białystok
PREFACE:
THE VARIETY OF RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES
IN THE STUDY OF ARGUMENTATION
For the past four decades the study of argumentation has flourished.
Informal logic and argumentation theory have developed into two major –
albeit not rigorously demarkable – internationally well–known and strongly
institutionalized disciplines. They both consist of a great variety of research
ideas, approaches, conceptual frameworks, and methods which allow to inquire into the complicated phenomenon of argumentation. Yet, the argumentative discourse constitutes a key subject of inquiry not only for these
two disciplines which ex definitione aim at analyzing and evaluating arguments, but also for those branches of scientific research which deal with
various forms of language and reasoning. At least four of them should
here be listed:
• formal logic – as formal methods are applied in analyzing everyday
arguments. The current research directions reveal that “standardized forms
of argument that represent common species of arguments encountered in
everyday conversational argumentation need to have a precise, partly formal structure” (Walton 2008, p. xiii). Thus, formal-logical approaches to
argumentation are necessary for presenting the structure of argumentation, despite of their obvious limitations on grasping all features of natural language in which everyday argumentation is usually expressed, and
of commonsense reasoning which is performed in any argumentative discourse;
• semiotics (understood here as a general theory of language) – as analyses of linguistic utterances or speech acts constitute a basic point of departure for any evaluation of arguments;
• methodology of science – as methodological rules of scientific reasoning, questioning and defining are applied in analyzing and evaluating
arguments;
ISBN 978–83–7431–206–6
ISSN 0860-150X
7
Marcin Koszowy
• informatics – as software tools are used, among other applications,
for: (a) providing computational models for argument diagramming, and
(b) identifying formal and informal fallacies in reasoning, what is particularly important for artificial intelligence research (see e.g. Walton 2008,
Rahwan and Simari, eds., 2009). One of the reasons for developing intensive
research which involve argumentation theory and artificial intelligence is the
fact that computation is a major category in understanding reasoning (see
e.g. van Benthem 2009, p. vii).1
The list of disciplines indicated above shows that there exist many kinds
of legitimate tools in the study of argumentation. Moreover, international
conferences on argumentation,2 a great number of articles published in specialized journals (Informal Logic and Argumentation are especially significant), and activities of many research groups reveal that one of the crucial
tendencies in the study of argumentation is to build bridges between distinct research perspectives and traditions.3 This special issue of Studies in
Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric is to be a clear exposition of this research
tendency. The articles included in this volume support the thesis that various approaches in the study of argumentation, despite of differences in
methods of inquiry, try to realize a common research goal: elaborating tools,
in particular (1) language and (2) methods, for analyzing and evaluating
common-sense reasoning performed in an argumentative discourse.4
Thus, in accordance with this thesis the volume is to complete two tasks:
• to sketch a map of contemporary research directions in the study
of argumentation. For this purpose the issue focuses on prominent approaches to argumentation developed in such domains of inquiry as the
informal logic movement, the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation,
formal logic, and methodology of science (the latter includes also the
logico-methodological tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School which contri1 This idea is associated with Leibniz’s famous call “Calculemus” which was inspiring
for the raise and development of informatics and which is today carried on with the
help of some tools of informatics (see e.g. the domain “Calculemus” hosted by Witold
Marciszewski; http://www.calculemus.org).
2 The most important conferences are organized or sponsored by the International
Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), the Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation (OSSA), and the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking
(AILACT).
3 See e.g. the Proceedings of the 6th Conference of the International Society of the
Study of Argumentation (van Eemeren, Blair, Willard & Garssen, eds., 2007, p. XV).
4 We should note that not only the study of commonsense reasoning, but also the
inquiry into the structure and persuasive power of some other crucial cognitive procedures
– such as questioning and defining – is significant in informal logic and argumentation
theory.
8
Preface: The Variety of Research Perspectives in the Study of Argumentation
buted to the success of logical studies in Poland; see e.g. Woleński 1989,
Coniglione, Poli and Woleński, eds., 1993, Jadacki 2003);
• to introduce those formal logicians and methodologists of science who
are not familiar with this field of inquiry to major research problems of
informal logic and argumentation theory.5
The articles of the volume are organized in five sections. The first section contains papers discussing main theses representative for the two major research traditions. They are presented in the articles written by Ralph
H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair – the co-founders of the informal logic movement, and by Frans H. van Eemeren – the co-founder (with Rob
Grootendorst; 1944–2000) of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation
developed at the University of Amsterdam. These articles give an overview
of some distinctive features of informal logic and argumentation theory.
Ralph H. Johnson in his reflections on the Informal Logic Initiative (ILI)
explains the circumstances which gave grounds for the raise of the informal
logic movement in Canada and in the USA. Informal logic is contrasted
with the paradigm of good argumentation based on what Johnson calls
formal deductive logic (FDL). Some similarities and differences between the
tradition of research and teaching informal logic in Canada and in the USA
and the Polish tradition of logical culture are briefly taken into account.
This subject is also presented in the appendix (included in this article)
‘The Logical Culture in Poland’ written by Marcin Koszowy.
The problem of what is the scope of applications of informal logic (as
compared to applications of formal logic) is further investigated by J. Anthony Blair, who discusses the relationship between informal logic and logic. Three major areas of research (treated here as possible alternatives for
formal logic) are distinguished: the theory of informal fallacies; the conception of the acceptability of premises, and of relevance and sufficiency of the
premise-conclusion link; the argument scheme theory. Although informal logic originated with a rejection of the view of formal logic as a discipline which
is fully capable of analyzing and evaluating all kinds of everyday arguments
5 This project is in accord with initiatives aiming at popularization of informal logic
and argumentation theory among Polish researchers and at integration of Polish scholars
working in these fields. Among such initiatives I should mention the project ArgDiaP
(http://argumentacja.pdg.pl/) which aims at organizing a series of conferences devoted
to the major problems concerning rational and effective persuasion. Among other recent
events there are two conferences: Argumentacja: racjonalna zmiana przekonań (Argumentation: the rational change of beliefs) organized by the University of Silesia in Katowice
(April 1–3, 2009, Ustroń, Poland) and Rhetoric of criticism in academic discourse. Disputes, polemics, controversies (April 22–24, 2009, University of Warsaw) organized by
the Polish Rhetoric Society.
9
Marcin Koszowy
and commonsense reasoning, applications of argument schemes in computer
systems reveal that both disciplines are jointly treated as legitimate research
tools in informatics. The difference between informal and formal logic is indicated by presenting a specific subject-matter of informal logic: the class
of defeasible arguments (i.e. arguments which are rationally compelling, but
not deductively valid and which may be defeated by the implicit knowledge
determined by the context in which a given argument is formed).
Both papers sketch the picture of informal logic as an autonomous
multi-thematic research discipline, which – in spite of its close relation to
formal logic – has an independent research subject (i.e. argumentation and
commonsense reasoning in everyday communication), goals and methods.
Thus, the question of whether informal logic is in fact logic receives a positive answer which is supported by an overview of current research directions
in informal logic.
Frans H. van Eemeren presents the origins and current research directions in the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. This theory is to
realize jointly two basic goals: the descriptive goal i.e. it is to characterize
the use of speech acts in an argumentative discourse, and the normative
goal, i.e. it is to give rules for evaluating various kinds of arguments. The
author sketches a map of research areas which are crucial for the pragma-dialectical perspective. Among them he lists the conception of argumentation
and the study of the fallacies (started with the criticism of the Standard
Treatment of the Fallacies developed by Charles Leonard Hamblin in his
classical monograph Fallacies, 1970). Van Eemeren offers a survey of one of
the crucial problems known from the very beginnings of logic and rhetoric
which may be expressed by the question: how to reconcile the pursuit of success of argumentation aimed at persuasion (which is the distinctive goal of
rhetoric) with the maintenance of reasonableness (characteristic for dialectics)? The answer to this question is given within the program of strategic
manoeuvring, developed by van Eemeren together with Peter Houtlosser
(1956–2008). Within this program, argumentative fallacies are identified as
derailments of strategic manoeuvring.
The next section contains articles which explore formal tools in the
study of argumentation. Kamila Dębowska, Paweł Łoziński and Chris Reed
analyze the relationship between commonsense reasoning performed in
everyday argumentation and formal models which represent it. The question of particular importance for the research focusing on applications of
formal tools in the study of argumentation is that of how to bridge gaps
between various perspectives in the research on argumentation. The authors
answer this question by discussing the criteria of analyzing and evaluating
10
Preface: The Variety of Research Perspectives in the Study of Argumentation
arguments within the major research paradigms, e.g. informal logic and
pragma-dialectics. The range of applications of software tools (Araucaria,
Arguing Agents Competition, Argument Interchange Format) used either
in argument representation or in automated argumentation strategies is
discussed.
David Hitchcock elaborates the concept of non-logical consequence
which is to capture some basic features of commonsense reasoning. The
explication of the concept of formal consequence elaborated by Alfred Tarski in his classical paper ‘On the Concept of Following Logically’ is helpful
for making further considerations.
Katarzyna Budzyńska and Magdalena Kacprzak offer a set of formal
methods for analyzing and modelling the process of persuasion. The paper
constitutes an attempt to give an answer to the question of what scope
and limits the applications of formal-logical tools have in analyzing the
linguistic utterances designed for an effective persuasion process (convincing
the other side).
Dale Jacquette argues for the view called deductivism which may be
accepted either by formal or by informal logicians. According to the deductivist thesis, “good reasoning in logic is minimally a matter of deductively valid inference”. This thesis may be expressed as follows: formal logic
is a reliable tool to detect any rhetorical fallacy.6 So, deductivism may be
explained as a doctrine claiming that every argumentative fallacy may be
adequately analyzed by means of formal deductive logic. The consequence
of accepting the deductivist thesis is the claim that all fallacies of reasoning, including the so-called informal or rhetorical fallacies, are deductively
invalid inferences. The deductivist thesis is supported by the analysis of
fourteen kinds of rhetorical fallacies. The classification of those fallacies is
also proposed.
The case study of arguments analysis done by means of formal (cyclic)
proofs is developed by Mary Dziśko and Andrew Schumann, the representatives of the Belarussian school of logic. The authors analyze the argumentation which was used to support the decision to exclude Boris Pasternak
from the Associaction of the Writers of the USSR. In this argumentation
there were no opponents, as each speaker was in fact a proponent of exclusion. The application of cyclic proofs in argument analysis helps to develop
graphical tools to present the structure of argumentation.
6 This re-formulation of the deductivist thesis was made by Witold Marciszewski in
his comment on deductivism (see this issue).
11
Marcin Koszowy
The next two articles constitute a section devoted to the role of definitions in argumentation, and, correspondingly, to the role of the theory
of definitions in the study of argumentation. Robert Kublikowski gives
an answer to the question of what role do definitions play within the
structure of argumentation. The answer is given by distinguishing three
kinds of relations between a definition and the process of argumentation:
(a) argumentation about definition, (b) argumentation from definition and
(c) argumentation by definition. Whereas Kublikowski’s paper sketches
a map of main problems concerning argumentation and defining, the article co-authored by Douglas Walton and Fabrizio Macagno is an attempt
at elaborating tools to deal with one of the major research problems present either in argumentation theory or in computing, i.e. the problem of
how to deal accurately with polysemy and ambiguity of natural language
in a discourse. The overall aim of this article is to contribute to building an account of definitions which would allow us to solve this problem.
Thus, the pragmatic interpretation of the notion of essential definition is
proposed.
The next section is devoted to the model of argumentation developed
by Stephen E. Toulmin in his influential book The Uses of Argument (1958).
Tomasz Zarębski considers the relation between this model and the Toulmin’s views on methods of scientific research. It is claimed that Toulmin’s
model of argument may be helpful in explicating scientific discovery and
scientific arguments. Lilian Bermejo-Luque contrasts the deductivist model
of argument goodness (based on the claim that a ‘good’ argument is the
one which is deductively valid) with Toulmin’s views on argumentation.
The detailed discussion leads her to formulate a new interpretation of the
Toulmin’s model of argument.
Applications of argumentation theory in legal and moral argumentation are discussed in two articles constituting the last section of the volume.
Eveline T. Feteris and Harm Kloosterhuis explore systematically the relation between argumentation theory and legal theory in order to analyze
and evaluate legal arguments adequately. Yadviga Yaskievich undertakes
some issues concerning bioethical argumentation. She discusses some legal
problems connected with answering key questions in bioethics on the example of the argumentative procedures elaborated by the National Bioethical
Committee in the Republic of Belarus.
The volume concludes with Witold Marciszewski’s comment on Dale
Jacquette’s paper ‘Deductivism in Formal and Informal Logic’ included in
this volume. Marciszewski focuses on a particular issue, namely the concept of deductive validity of reasoning. In the comment it is shown how
12
Preface: The Variety of Research Perspectives in the Study of Argumentation
formal-logical criteria of identifying rhetorical fallacies depend on the accepted conception of deductive validity.
∗
∗
∗
The present volume – once its tasks indicated above are taken into
account – is the first editorial event of this kind in the Polish logical literature. If these tasks are at least partially achieved, one step towards
popularizing informal logic and argumentation theory should be made. For
the volume is to show that informal logic should not be contrasted with
formal logic, as many representatives of formal logic might think, but that
these two branches of research taken together give a comprehensive picture
of everyday argumentation. To make this point more explicit: on the one
side there is formal logic with its language and methods helpful in exploring the structure of argumentation, and on the other – there are informal
logic and argumentation theory which enable researchers to explore crucial
features of “real” arguments containing (a) notoriously ambiguous, vague
and fuzzy terms (which meaning depends on the context of everyday communication), (b) unexpressed premises, and many other hidden elements.
Thus, a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of commonsense reasoning
is only possible when those two perspectives are jointly taken into account.
I owe special gratitude to Prof. Ralph H. Johnson for his discussion of
many important issues concerning distinctive features of informal logic, in
particular its subject, goals and methods. I would also like to thank Prof. Kazimierz Trzęsicki, Prof. Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, Prof. Witold Marciszewski, Dr Dariusz Surowik, Dr Robert Kublikowski, Mgr inż. Rafał Lizut,
Dr Katarzyna Budzyńska and Dr Magdalena Kacprzak for their suggestions
concerning the structure of this issue. Many of their comments were of particular importance in giving the volume its final shape. I am also grateful to
my colleagues from the Department of Logic, Informatics and Philosophy of
Science of the University of Białystok for fruitful discussions. And especially
I would like to thank all the contributors for their enthusiastic participation
in this editorial project.
References
Benthem, J. van (2009), ‘Foreword’, in I. Rahwan & G. R. Simari, eds.,
Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence, Springer, Dordrecht – Heidelberg – London – New York, pp. vii–viii.
13
Marcin Koszowy
Coniglione, F., Poli, R. & Woleński, J., eds. (1993), Polish Scientific Philosophy. The Lvov-Warsaw School, Rodopi, Amsterdam.
Eemeren, F. H. van, Blair, J. A., Willard, C. A. & Garssen, B., eds. (2007),
Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the International Society for
the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), Sic Sat – International Center for
the Study of Argumentation, Amsterdam.
Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R. & Snoeck Henkemans, F. (2002), Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation, Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Mahwah, NJ – London.
Hamblin, C. L. (1970), Fallacies, Methuen, London, reprinted: Vale Press,
Newport News, VA.
Jadacki, J. J. (2003), From the Viewpoint of the Lvov-Warsaw School, Rodopi, Amsterdam – New York.
Rahwan, I. & Simari, G. R., eds. (2009), Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence, Springer, Dordrecht – Heidelberg – London – New York.
Toulmin, S. E. (1958), The Uses of Argument, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Walton, D. N. (2008), Informal Logic. A Pragmatic Approach, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Woleński, J. (1989), Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
Marcin Koszowy
Chair of Logic, Informatics and Philosophy of Science
University of Białystok
ul. Sosnowa 64, 15–887 Białystok, Poland
koszowy@uwb.edu.pl
14