Union's Role in Tunisia's Uprisings

University of Potsdam Chair of International Politics Dr. Benjamin Stachursky Winter Term 2011/12 Tunisia’s Uprisings: Between Failure & Success Daniel Baumert MA Political Science Social Protest and Political Change in the Middle East and North Africa Module: International Politics 4002 Student-ID: 762822 Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................. II 1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1 2. THEORIZING POPULAR UPRISINGS................................................................................. 3 2.1 STRUCTURAL FACTORS ....................................................................................................................... 3 2.2 ACTORS’ CONSTELLATION .................................................................................................................. 4 2.3 SITUATIONAL DYNAMICS.................................................................................................................... 7 3. THE MISSING ELEMENT ...................................................................................................... 8 4. UPRISINGS BETWEEN FAILURE & SUCCESS .................................................................. 9 4.1 THE REVOLT OF THE GAFSA MINING BASIN 2008 ....................................................................... 9 4.2 THE SIDI BOUZID REVOLT 2010/2011 ..................................................................................... 11 5. COMPARING UPRISINGS .................................................................................................. 14 6. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 15 7. BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................... 18 ii 1. Introduction At the beginning of 2011, the MENA-Region was shaken by an unprecedented series of popular uprisings leading to the toppling of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes, civil war in Libya and Yemen, and forceful repression in Bahrain and Syria. These events, occurring in a region perceived as resistant to democratization, had not been foreseen. Middle Eastern studies focused on the robustness of authoritarianism concentrating on missing requisites in the region to explain its failure to catch the third wave of democratization, which had reached nearly every other part of the world. After the occurrence of the Arab Spring, analysts quickly identified several causes for the popular discontent including the lack of political and economic opportunities, demographics, and social inequality. Social media tools, such as Twitter and Facebook, were often added as reasons for the successful mobilization of masses in strongly repressive states. However, all these factors fail to explain the different outcomes ranging from quick eradication of the ruler’s family, to continuous fighting between protesters and armed forces. They also fail to explain why protests achieved mass mobilization in 2011 and not earlier or later. Here, the regional context is of importance. However, if one analyzes the starting point of the Arab Spring, one can rule out the regional context and reveal dynamics on the country level. Therefore, this essay seeks to answer the question why the Sidi Bouzid Revolt 2010/11 1 achieved wide spread support leading to the toppling of Ben Ali’s regime. It attempts to single out the crucial element, present in this revolt, which was missing in past popular uprisings. By comparing it to a similar Tunisian uprising, the unsuccessful Revolt of the Gafsa Mining Basin in 2008, it is possible to find the missing element for a successful outcome of the Gafsa-Revolt, which is 1 In literature it is also referred to as Jasmine Revolution but it originated in Sidi Bouzid. 1 consequently the decisive factor for toppling Ben Ali’s Regime in 2011.2 Hence, it adds to the theoretical debate about necessary requisites for a successful popular uprising and it provides a profound interpretation of the 2010/11 revolt. However, it will not discuss questions of terminology and categorization of the events in regards to terms such as revolution, social movement or other questions often discussed in this matter. This perspective calls for precise accounts of the respective events. Whereas information on the Sidi Bouzid Revolt is plentiful, the events of the Gafsa-Revolt have hardly been covered by international media nor analyzed by researchers. Hence, source selection has proven difficult in both cases due to the situational challenges. The selected sources for both cases, however, have proven highly informative due to their reference to interviews and Tunisian sources. Besides the difficulty in obtaining empirical data, the theoretical literature on revolutions often provides only a narrow perspective focusing either on societal- or elite-centric views on structural variables, which proved insufficient for this research. By using Cilja Harders’ (2011) recently outlined analytical framework, the essay attempts to overcome this challenge by focusing on the different societal and elite actors involved, as well as their behavior, and the dynamics of the uprisings. To answer the above stated research question, the essay will first operationalize Cilja Harders’ analytical framework by adding findings of comparative revolutionary studies to formulate hypotheses explaining the different outcomes of both uprisings, concentrating on the missing factor of the failed uprising. It will then summarize the respective events, concentrating on the actors’ constellations and situational dynamics. These will then be compared to identify the differences and to negate one of the formulated hypotheses. In the concluding chapter the findings are summarized and used to pose further research questions and hint at theoretical shortcomings. 2 The two uprisings are similar in regards to the socio-economic factors underlying the unrest and the initial composition of protesters. 2 2. Theorizing Popular Uprisings The uprisings in the Arab world have challenged old paradigms and call for a new perspective on the region and revolutionary processes in general.3 Cilja Harders (2011) presents in a working paper such a new approach, combining several preexisting fields of studies such as movement, revolution and transition theory aiming for a focus on dynamics rather than stability and a combination of ‘societal’ and ‘elite’ perspectives. Her triad of structural factors, actors’ constellation, and situational dynamics will be used as a reference point for the analytical framework. It will be operationalized to fit the presented research question by drawing upon findings of comparative studies of past protest movements trying to identify necessary factors leading to a beneficial interplay of the three, which accumulates in mass revolts toppling a regime. 2.1 Structural Factors The structural factors influence popular mobilization and the strategy, structure, and impact of social movements, thus representing the political opportunity structure (cf. Harders 2011: 16f). According to Harders, relevant variables are the socio-economic situation, the regime type, the degree of repression, and exclusion. For the comparison of the 2008 and the 2010/11 uprisings, the above-mentioned relevant structural variables offer little explanation for the different outcomes of the two popular uprisings in Tunisia, assuming that those variables have not drastically changed on country-level from 2008 to 2010/11. Hence, a more narrow understanding of the political opportunity structure is necessary, to identify triggering mechanisms which set off protest and assess their ability to turn frustration into mass revolts. Sources of popular anger are limitless and can range from public speeches of government officials over government crimes of all sorts and repressive actions to stolen elections. However, they each offer varying 3 John Foran (1997) offers a comprehensive overview of theories available to analyze revolutions. 3 opportunity levels for opposition groups. Comparison of numerous cases in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe has shown that stolen elections create a particularly strong mobilization opportunity by offering a single government crime as focal point which affects a wide range of people (cf. D’Anieri 2006: 335; cf. Thompson 2004: 112f). 2.2 Actors’ constellation Analyzing who is affected, favorable to the cause, and participating in protest movements marks Harders’ second category: actors’ constellation. The analysis thereof divides actors along socio-demographic differences and their interests, demands, and resources. Therefore the actions and behavior of protest groups and regime elites will be analyzed. For this particular comparison of two popular uprisings in a sultanistic regime4, the divide between possible protest actors and regime elites is made in regards to either being part of the ruler’s friends and family including the security apparatus or being outside of the ruling, inner circle. When analyzing the protest groups, articulated demands, the degree of institutionalization, the modi operandi, and the composition of the movement are important variables. Conversely, the focus is laid on the applied repressive techniques and occurrence of elite division when analyzing regime elites (cf. Harders 2011: 17f). Herein lies the main focus of this comparison because differences in actors’ behavior and composition are assumed to play a crucial role in determining the outcome of popular uprisings. Robert H. Dix (1984) identified as major difference between success and failure the opposition’s “willingness and ability (…) to construct wide-ranging alliances (…) of opponents of the government” (p. 432). Cross-class coalitions have proven more likely to succeed than pure working-class or peasant struggles (cf. Thompson 2004: 118). However, those coalitions need to exceed traditional revolutionary peasant-intellectual-alliances.5 According to Dix (1984), a successful antiregime 4 Sultanistic regimes are characterized by a convergence of regime and family lacking societal and elite legitimacy but backed by a strong coercive apparatus. 5 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), chapter 5. 4 coalition needs to include important elements of the social order of modernizing societies such as urban middle-class and key elites (cf. p. 444f). Paul D’Anieri (2006) argues that elite support is crucial for coalition building by “publicizing the misdeeds of the regime and forming a single opposition movement” (p. 348). His definition of elites used for cases of colored revolutions in Eastern Europe, however, is not applied here.6 Sultanistic regimes mostly appoint family members and other highly loyal allies to important government positions or to positions in control of politically important resources. For this comparison, key elites are understood as people in important societal positions due to their education, income or membership in well-connected communities, civil associations and unions in contrast to the ruling elite, thus termed societal elites. The factor bringing those divergent actors together, referred to by Dix (1984) as the catalyst, is the articulated demands of a given protest movement. Harders (2011) claims that those demands, articulated by the movement, can only lead to broad-based societal participation if they are met by societal resonance. Thus, the demands succeeding a protest-trigger play a decisive role in determining the composition of a protest movement and whether it gains momentum and turns into a mass revolt or abates (cf. p. 18). Some may even argue that therein lies the answer to the question why some movements have been able to succeed and while others have failed. Dix (1984) singled out the catalyst to be the crucial ingredient of successful coalition building leading to regime change in cases of Latin American revolutions. Only the right catalyst pushes “otherwise non-radical elements of society into a loose negative coalition” (p. 443)7. According to him, challenging the regime’s existence is more likely to catalyze participation leading to a broad-based antiregime coalition than demands for reforms of social justice and the redistribution of wealth (cf. p. 444ff; cf. Thompson 2004: 117f). This move from protest to mass mobilization across classes occurs once a so-called 6 D’Anieri defines elites as those in high government positions, or controlling important economic resources, or controlling other important political resources such as media outlets or political parties. 7 His comparison identified a narrow, personalistic, repressive, and corrupt dictatorship as the essential catalyst (cf. p. 443), which is not considered sufficient for this case, because the regime type has not changed between the two uprisings. 5 ‘tipping point’ is reached and a self-reinforcing cycle starts resulting in more and more people participating in protests (cf. D’Anieri 2006: 333f). Apart from the composition of the antiregime coalition, the reaction of the ruling elite towards such a movement has proven crucial. It is argued that success or failure of revolutionary processes is determined by “the strength, coherence, and effectiveness of the state’s coercive apparatus” (Bellin 2004: 143). The lack of will and/or capacity of the security forces to repress an uprising are, according to Bellin (2004), necessary for a successful regime change. Zoltan Barany’s (2011) recent comparative analysis of the Arab Spring supports this view after having compared the behavior of military forces across the region and the respective outcomes of the uprisings. He concludes that the army’s backing is a necessary requisite for revolutionary success (cf. p. 28f). Disloyalty and defection of armed forces has been “strongly correlated with successful revolutions” (Katz 2004: 164). Such unwillingness to protect the incumbent regime must occur suddenly as a surprise due to the nature of authoritarian regimes where disloyal security personnel is not likely to remain in such positions. Being concerned about the unity of the military forces, even defection of only a few military units can initiate a chain reaction urging the leadership of the armed forces to move away from the regime towards ‘neutrality’ (cf. Katz 2004: 164, 169). The defection of armed forces creates a necessary balance of military power allowing for a successful outcome of a protest movement (cf. Thompson 2004: 82). The defection of armed forces can be explained by looking at structural variables including internal and external factors. To Bellin (2004), the robustness of a coercive apparatus and its behavior is determined by factors such as fiscal health, international support networks, its level of institutionalization, and the degree of popular mobilization (cf. p. 144ff). Barany (2011) identified among others the relation of the military to the state and civil society, the perceived legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of soldiers, generals and civil society, the relation to other security forces, and the militaries history in regards to past revolutions as important drivers of the decision whether to defect or to stay loyal. 6 2.3 Situational Dynamics Harder’s third category, situational dynamics, includes a temporal and a spatial dimension. The temporal dimension focuses on the degree and timing of repression and the possibility of regime division, whereas the regional dimension refers to trans local and regional context of events and so-called ‘domino-effects’ (cf. Harders 2011: 19). For this particular case, the spatial dimension is neglected. Regional diffusion can be eliminated since Tunisia marked the beginning of the Arab spring. The trans local context, however, is closely related to the analyzed actors’ constellation and behavior since spreading the word or information across the country involves a conscious decision by the actors to do so. Hence, it is ruled out as an independent, decisive factor even though its possible occurrence contributes to the power of a protest movement. The temporal dimension, however, will be taken into account when analyzing the chronology of the 2008 and 2010/11 events and is used to create causal links between actions and reactions. Thereby, it is possible to single out decisive actors and/or actions more or less directly linked to the different outcome of the popular uprising. Particular emphasis is put on events (protest-trigger and articulated demands) as well as actors (who articulate those demands) and their ability to drive the protest movement towards a ‘tipping point’ resulting in mass mobilization and possible regime division. Regime division, especially that of the armed forces, is to be understood as a consequence of the occurrence of a mass revolt which is met by beneficial preconditions within the armed forces facilitating such a division (cf. Thompson: 2004: 115). 7 3. The Missing Element A beneficial interplay of structural factors, actors’ constellation, and the situational dynamics leads to successful uprisings. To determine why one uprising was successful while another one failed, one needs to look at the difference in those three categories and their specific relations to each other. For this comparison of two uprisings in the same country under the same regime, born out of similar socio-economic marginalization, the structural factors can thus be put aside to concentrate on the actors’ constellation, which is influenced by, and influences the situational dynamics. However, the protest-trigger as part of the structural factors can offer some explanation for a less beneficial actors’ constellation and situational dynamics denying success. Comparative analysis of successful and failed cases of revolutionary uprisings in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia outlined favorable actors’ constellations that, when found, led to success. Accordingly, the Sidi Bouzid Revolt succeeded because it cohered a broad-based, cross-class coalition and a division of the regime’s armed forces took place, providing a balance of power. 8 The latter is understood as a consequence of broad-based popular unrest pressuring a regime. This leads to the following hypotheses explaining the failure of the 2008 uprising to topple Ben Ali’s regime, simultaneously pointing towards the difference of the 2010/11 uprising accounting for the change in outcome. Each hypothesis targets a necessary requisite for a successful uprising missing in the 2008 revolt. Hence, the actor or event providing that missing requisite proves decisive for the success of 2010/11. 1) The 2008 uprising failed to cohere a broad-based, cross-class coalition challenging the regime’s survival.  The articulated demands failed to draw in a divergent group of actors. 8 This explanation for successful uprisings can be found with varying emphasizes on the role of the armed forces and societal elites in Thompson (2004), D’Anieri (2006), and Dehez (2011). 8 2) The 2008 uprising achieved to cohere a broad-based, cross class coalition but no division of the armed forces occurred.  Internal and external factors have not been beneficial for a division of the armed forces. The following comparison will reveal which of the above-stated hypothesizes holds true in explaining the failure of the 2008 uprising to topple Ben Ali’s regime. This will then guide the analysis of the crucial actor or event pivotal for the successful outcome of the 2010/11 protests. 4. Uprisings Between Failure & Success This section will give a chronological overview of the two uprisings concentrating on the protest-trigger, the catalyzing demands, the composition of the protest movement, the geographical occurrence, and the behavior of societal elites as well as of the ruling elite and its armed forces. 4.1 The Revolt of the Gafsa Mining Basin 2008 The 2008 Gasfa Mining Basin uprising, born out of socio-economic marginalization and a feeling of injustice, started after the results of a hiring contest for 380 positions at the major local employer, the Gafsa Phosphate Company (GPC), were announced on January 5, 2008. It appeared that positions were given to relatives, friends and others based on tribal and political affiliation, thus breaking with an arrangement made in 1993 to regulate hiring processes with a set quota for local people. Beginning with small numbers of people growing from day to day, protests took place in front of the GPC head office, other industrial complexes, at strategic infrastructure spots, and in front of the local offices of the General Tunisian Labor Union (UGTT). They were directed at the GPC for their hiring processes but also at the trade union aristocracy favoring the status quo. Protests spread quickly across the region from Redeyef to the other large mining towns of Moularès and M’dhila with the exception of Gafsa itself. Although protest was similarly based on support from unemployed workers and their families, temporary workers, unemployed graduates, and high-school 9 students, it unfolded differently in those three central sites of protest in regards to the taken actions. (cf. Chouikha/Gobe 2009: 387f) The protests started in Redeyef, where in contrast to the other protest locations, it was supported by local trade unionists of the local section of UGTT for the primary education leading to rather organized protests. Lead by a negotiation committee supported by those trade unionists, demonstrations, sit-ins, and other peaceful actions took place circling around the UGTT local office. Trade unionists placed themselves in opposition to local union officials supporting people’s claim for a right to work whereas regional union officials denied any comment on the criticized hiring contest. High-ranking officials of the Regional Union even attempted to discredit actions taken by protesters aiming at disrupting their mobilization potential (cf. Gobe 2009: 17). After the initial phase of protests, regular demonstrations took place on Sundays proclaiming demands for work, freedom, and national dignity. (cf. Gobe 2011: 8-11) In Moularès, however, more drastic measures were taken and protest appeared less controlled and more spontaneous. Roadblocks were built at major streets and accesses to industrial sites such as a phosphate washing plant were blocked to halt or at least slow down economic activity. Despite the lack of organizational leadership and support of local trade unionists, long lasting sit-ins took place and slogans against corruption and claims for a right to work were heard. (cf. Chouikha/Gobe 2009: 382) In M’dhila, protests quickly turned into riots. Although they were set off similarly as at the other two protest locations, acts of vandalism soon started. Roadblocks of burning tires were built, town officials were openly harassed and intimidated, and infrastructure was destroyed to hinder economic activity. Vandalism reached a climax when protesters set fire to an office belonging to a caretaking company owned by a high-ranking UGTT Regional Union official. However, protest dynamics ceased after about a week. (cf. Gobe 2011: 9f) The security forces, mainly the police, stood aside during those first days of protest and observed the various demonstrations circling the towns in order to control entrances and exits. They counted on the “shortness of breath of the 10 movement” (Gobe 2011: 11). Instead of using coercive force, promises and agreements were negotiated with various counterparts trying to ease the unrest without further escalation. Those offers answered to the made demands by hiring a certain amount of people. This lead to the end of a number of mobilizations. However, the unwillingness of the authorities to question the results of the hiring contest continued to mobilize people to demonstrate, especially in Redeyef. (cf. Gobe 2011: 11f) Hence, the government decided in early April to use force against the betterorganized protest movements to put an end to the unrest. Despite the attempt to spread terror and break solidarity within the population by deploying police force and arresting people, protesters continued to demonstrate pushing forward their original demands paired now with calls for the release of those arrested protesters. Confronted by such movement, the police soon retreated again to strategic places outside of the town and released some of the formerly arrested. After a short period of increase in popular mobilization following the police retreat, the regime finally decided to put an end to the uprising with all force at the end of May. The army was deployed and took hold of major parts of Redeyef in June and arrests and raids increased. By the end of June, central protest movement figures were arrested, technically marking the end of the mobilization.9 (cf. Chouikha/Gobe 2009: 382-386) 4.2 The Sidi Bouzid Revolt 2010/2011 The Sidi Bouzid Revolt of 2010/2011 named after the town of its first occurrence became later known as Jasmine Revolution leading to the Arab Spring. The region of central Tunisia, characterized by economic marginalization and high unemployment10, especially among the youth, set the scene for a public selfimmolation of a 26-year old vegetable seller after having lost his dignity and 9 Demonstrations continued over the summer but become more and more frequent and were met with heavy repression. 10 Southern and central Tunisia were neglected by the ruling elites in regards to investments into job opportunities, educational and health facilities, as well as infrastructure projects, resulting in high unemployment, poor working conditions and frustration among the population. Coastal areas were favored and used as examples for the successful development case named Tunisia. 11 goods to the local police. On the same day, family members joined by trade unionists of the National Secondary School Teachers Union (SNES) expressed their anger in front of the local police headquarters. Non-violent expression of anger quickly turned into riots lasting for days targeted at the police, when local residents, neighbors, and youth identifying with the cause threw stones and engaged the police in street fights. (cf. IGC 2011: 3f) After several days of protest in Sidi Bouzid, protests extended to neighboring cities with a high population of Hamama-clan members, the family of the vegetable seller. In Sidi Bouzid protests grew even further after a second suicide occurred and, apart from the anger, the “lack of university and medical facilities, the massive youth unemployment, and the general lack of socio-economic opportunities” (ICG 2011: 4) were denounced. The unionists involved with the movement soon proclaimed that the initial suicide should be considered as “a political assassination” marking the vegetable seller as “a victim of the regime” (Crisis Group Interview cited in IGC 2011: 4), thus politicizing the movement and posing questions about the regime. The Teachers Union was joined by other local affiliates of the health and postal workers union. (cf. IGC 2011: 4f) Early on, the authorities adopted a “carrot-and-stick approach, matching harsh repression [applying deadly force] (…) with promises” (Murphy 2011: 300) to respond to the made demands. Days before the first presidential televised speech on December 28 reacting to the protests, deadly repression of the protest movement was reported, which led the involved trade unionists to extend their efforts to a regional level using their networks to diversify locations to make locally concentrated repressive techniques less effective. However, the UGTT did not proclaim a uniform position towards the movement. Whereas many local and regional affiliates and members were more or less actively siding with the protesters, the leadership assumed a mediating role between the local population and authorities. (cf. ICG 2011: 4) Nevertheless, the geographical diffusion of the protest movement drew in other actors of Tunisian associational life. Hence, the movement broadened and soon included actors from the middle class outraged by the violent repression applied by 12 police and security forces (cf. Murphy 2011: 301). Lawyers in particular played a significant role in further politicizing and increasing the geographical spreading of the movement. In Kasserine, for example, they protested for days until they rallied the masses putting pressure on the UGTT to join the protests. Members of the National Bar Association organized protests in Tunis and other major cities in northern Tunisia at the end of December. In the beginning of January, teachers, lawyers and others went on strike facilitating the participation of others. (cf. ICG 2011: 5f; Al Jazeera 2011) The spreading of participation across the country and the targeting of state institutions evoked an increase of police repression leading to raising death tolls and a shift in demands from socio-economic frustration to widespread regime challenge. Even Ben Ali’s promises to create 300,000 jobs over the next two years during his second speech on January 10, had no calming effect. This offer seemed delayed and disconnected since the movement’s demands had already exceeded economic marginalization. A day later, the National Administrative Council of the UGTT recognized in a public communiqué “the right of regional trade union structures to observe the protests” and the “right of citizens of other regions and professional sectors to express their active solidarity through peaceful protests (…)” (Statement of the UGTT National Administrative Commission cited in ICG 2011: 6). This aligned the UGTT leadership with local and regional sections already participating in the protests and pushed others towards it. Massive demonstrations all over the country occurred calling for the fall of the regime and a general strike was imposed by the “Tunisian Bar Association, the Teachers Union, University Lecturers, and the main UGTT” (Murphy 2011: 301). Again the regime reacted in a two-fold manner: On the one hand a curfew and a state of emergency were imposed ordering the military onto the streets to occupy strategic positions; and on the other hand Ben Ali offered in a final televised address far-reaching political reforms and to not stand for office again. Realizing that the protesters were unimpressed by his concessions, Ben Ali ordered the army to enact the curfew and state of emergency, which banned gatherings of more than three people, by force. The regime finally 13 toppled when the army chief of staff denied his loyalty and rejected the order to shoot at the protesters. Ben Ali fled the country on January 14. (cf. Murphy 2011: 301; Loetzer 2011: 32) 5. Comparing Uprisings The summary of the events of the uprisings in 2008 and 2010/11 revealed many similarities, thus making the differences even more decisive for the different outcome. Both uprising took place in economically marginalized areas of Tunisia with high unemployment, particularly among the youth, and were supported by some local trade unionists mainly from the Teacher’s Union. In their initial phase they consisted of local residents, unemployed workers and graduates, families of victims, and the youth raising demands of economic justice or denouncing the lack of socio-economic opportunities in their region. Even though the actual protesttrigger differed, demands soon evolved around similar claims using violent and non-violent means. Both movements were met with a carrot-and-stick approach promising better living conditions but applying coercive force when necessary. Despite all similarities, the Revolt of the Gafsa Mining Basin 2008 collapsed after six months with leading figures being arrested, while the Sidi Bouzid Revolt 2010/11 rid Tunisia of its regime after a little less than a month. What are the differences between those two that account for the change of outcome? Three major differences can be identified when closely analyzing the events, namely the articulated demands, the actors’ constellation, and the reaction of the regime elite including the coercive apparatus. Whereas the uprising of 2008 demanded jobs, better living conditions and dignity, focusing primarily on socio-economic deprivation, the Sidi Bouzid Revolt quickly politicized its initial claims challenging the regime’s existence. It was achieved by trade unionists that labeled the suicide a political assassination thus creating a focal government crime. The differing articulated demands lead directly to the dissimilar actors’ constellation. In 2008, the movement consisted of lower middle-class workers, 14 unemployed graduates, and a few Teachers’ Union members from the mining basin. In 2010/11, the movement was able to draw in other members of society including lawyers and doctors, and in the end even the national UGTT leadership, which refused to react to the earlier uprising in the Gafsa mining basin. Again, the mobilization of other societal actors all over Tunisia can be traced back to the efforts of local trade unionists activating their networks to spread the uprising to other parts of the country. The last apparent difference of the two protest movements refers to the regime’s reaction and methods used to ease the frustration and crush the protest movement. According to the sources, it appears that the police gave the Gafsa Mining Revolt almost three month until applying serious repressive methods while they cracked down on the later successful protest movement of 2010/11 rather quickly after the initial stage. In addition to that, a division of the armed forces took place, when in January 2011 military leaders disobeyed orders and protected the protesters. In 2008, the army proved loyal and helped to secure important parts of Redeyef, the biggest protest location. 6. Conclusion The comparison of the unsuccessful Gafsa Mining Basin Revolt in 2008 and the successful Sidi Bouzid Revolt in 2010/11 offered new insights into the starting point of the Arab spring. It reveals the decisive actor and its behavior leading to the toppling of Ben Ali’s regime, it relativizes popular interpretations of the 2010/11 uprising, and it points towards further areas of research. By looking at the summary of the Gafsa-Revolt it becomes apparent that it failed to cohere a broad-based, cross-class coalition challenging the regime. It remained confined to the mining basin consisting of its initial supporters with no diffusion of revolutionary tendencies to other regions or actors. Theoretically, this is linked to the demands articulated by the movement, which aren’t met by societal resonance pushing otherwise non-radical elements of society into a loose negative coalition. It is further argued that regime challenge is more likely to catalyze participation 15 than demands for reforms of social justice and the redistribution of wealth. (cf. Chapter 2) One can therefore argue that the articulated regime challenge, missing in the 2008 uprising, marks the pivotal factor leading to success in 2010/11. This appears to be shortsighted, however. The questioning of the regime was preceded by a conscious effort of trade unionists to influence the public’s perception of the protest-trigger, the suicide, not as individual tragedy but as a political assassination. Followed by the spreading of protests through local trade union networks, the actions undertaken by the unionists appear far more worth mentioning. One can argue that their active participation drew in other civil associations such as the Tunisian Bar Association, which further amplified the protest’s scale. Hence, local and regional trade unionists were the true catalyst marking the crucial difference to the uprising in 2008 accounting for the successful outcome. Consequently, the findings relativize the often-expressed surprise about the Tunisian uprising in 2010/11 and the notion of a ‘Twitter/Facebook Revolution’ by pointing at rather traditional sources and drivers of revolutionary movements. The analysis further adds to the theoretical findings of comparative revolutionary studies by supporting the point that a successful antiregime coalition needs to include important elements of the social order of modernizing societies such as urban middle-class and key elites (cf. Chapter 2). The comparison showed that the lacking support of civil associations led to failure whereas active participation of lawyers, regional trade unions, and others increase participation and diffusion increasing the pressure on the regime and its armed forces. However, the analysis could not identify what accounted for the behavioral shift of those key elites other than a shift of demands from social justice to regime change. Here, further research is needed to fully assess the reasons responsible for the shift. However, the comparison offers several starting points for such research. Further research could analyze if the different regime reactions, early coercion (2010/11) in contrast to late coercion (2008), accounted for the participation of 16 others such as middle-class actors leading to a radicalization through regime coercion. Another perspective could be, if the location of the initial outbreak and the involved actors proved decisive. By utilizing social network analysis methods, one could examine whether the trade unionists in Sidi Bouzid are generally better connected in Tunisia than the participating unionists of the Gafsa region, thereby facilitating the diffusion. A third possible perspective for further research could be to analyze if a learning cycle between the two uprisings occurred resulting in higher sensitivity for possible regime changes among societal elites and better strategies used by protesters. 17 7. Bibliography Al Jazeera. (06. Januar 2011). Thousands of Tunisias lawyers strike. Retrieved May 15, 2012 from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/201116193136690227.html Barany, Z. (2011). The Role of the Military. Journal of Democracy , 22 (4), 2839. Bellin, E. (2004). The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective. Comparative Politics , 36 (2), 139157. Chouikha, L., & Gobe, E. (2009). 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