Food for Thought: Text and Sense in Aristotle, "Poetics" 19

Food for Thought: Text and Sense in Aristotle, Poetics 19 JOHN T. KIRBY EGTi 5e tcata ttiv 5idvoiav xav)Ta, ooa xitio xou Xoyot) 5ei TtapaaKEuaaGfivai. |i.epri 5e xoijtcov to xe ctTto5eiKvuvai Kai x6 ^tjeiv Kal x6 n6Qr\ napaaKCud^eiv (oiov eXeov r\ (poPov r\ opyriv Kal oaa xoiauxa) Kai exi lieyeOoq 56bl Kai niKp6xTixa(;. 5fiXov 5e oxi koi ev xoi(; Ttpdyiiaoiv dno xcov auxcbv i5£a)v 6ei xP^^jGai oxav r\ kXeewa r\ 5£ivd r\ [lEyaXa r\ EiKOxa Setji napaoKevaC^tiv nXr\v xooovxov 5ia5 (pEpEi, 6x1 xd |iEv 6£i (pa{vEa0ai dvEu 5i5aaKaX{a(;, xd bk EV xcbi Xoywi ujro xou Xeyovxoi; 7iapaaKEV)d^Ea9ai Kai Jtapd xov X.6yov yiyvEoOai. (1456a36-b7) bl-2 Kai Exi ^eyeGoc; Kai jiiKpoxriTac; seel. Else II 2 liiKpoxrixaq Parisinus 1741, Riccardianus 46: (a)|iiKp6xTixa Par. 2038 et (cf. alii recc. (sic et Arab.; 3 iSecov apographa Parisini 1741 1450b34): £i6£(bv Par. 1741, Rice. 46 (cf. 1447a8, 1456a33) 4 hir\\ exiguitatem Margoliouth in uers. lat.) II II recc: 6£i Rice. 46 {oportet Moerbeke in uers. lat.): 5' t\ Par. 1741 Perusal of the standard commentaries on the Poetics will show that the of chapter 19, which is concerned with Sidvoia or "thought," have led to various interpretations. I have supplied a portion of the text, difficulties edition, and furnished my own apparatus. essence an exploration of the contours of 5idvoia as from Kassel's 1965 Oxford The passage is in According to his habit, Aristotle SiaipeoK; of the topic of discussion, breaking it down into component parts. In this instance, however, the very syntax makes discernment of the 6ia{peoic; difficult; and more than one construction is possible. Having cautioned my reader that there is no universally accepted schematization of the train of thought here, I would like to offer my own (Figure 1). From this diagram it will be clear that I understand 8idvoia as operative on two levels within the performance of a play: in the words it applies in the composition of a tragedy. offers a dialectical spoken by the characters (vko to\) A-oyot)) and in their actions (ev xoic; The markers xd nev and xd 5e (b5) also reflect this major Tipdy^iaaiv).' ' Cf. D. W. Lucas, Aristotle. Poetics (Oxford 1968) 196 (ad b2). Illinois Classical Studies 78 20 (1995) What cannot be made clear in the diagram, however, is the fact over and above both the words and the actions of the dramatis personae is the planning and craft of the playwright, from which the text indeed takes Aristotle conceives of this as well in terms of 8idvoia, as will its being. distinction. that become clear from our examination of b3-4. I would like to devote some scrutiny to several phrases in this most difficult passage. Kal exi ^eyeGoq Kal liiKpoTTjTaq: Else considers this phrase a upon and destroys an essentially binary construction.^ gloss that intrudes Without it, he dnoSEiKvuvai Kal to Xveiv and to under the headings of ^.oyoq and TipdyiiaTa free to redistribute to te is Kadr\ TtapaoKE-ud^eiv respectively. This is a bold solution (as so many of Else's are) and provides a synthetic understanding of our passage; but the adoption of such a solution has repercussions further on, as we shall see. xa 6e: Having disposed of Kai bti \iiyeQoq Kal TOt |iev . . . [i\Kp6xr\xaq, Else seeks to and iiEyd^a home ii make toc |iev eiKOTa respectively: (to the spectator) and toc £?ieeivd be refer to eA.eeivd r\ Seivd 5eivd are to be "brought r\ without (explicit) exposition"; iieydA-a ii ekoTa are This, however, is unnecessarily to be "deliberately produced in speech."^ 6eivd to events, whereas things spoken may does not acknowledge that of course events in the play, as well as points of argument, may be iieyd^a or eiKOTa.^ I think rather that Ta Se should be read with the words that follow, i.e. Ta 6e ev Tcbi ^oycoi, "things spoken" or "argumentation," as opposed to Ttpdy^aTa, "things done." Else attempts to discredit this construction: he assumes that Ta \ikv ev toic; 7ipdy|iaoiv must mean "verbal effects gotten through action."^ But I find it more sensible to understand Ta }iev (sc. ev Toiq Tipdyfiaoiv) as = Ta 7rpdy|iaTa themselves, which may be r\ ekeeiva r\ 8eivd r\ [leyaXa r\ eiKOTa. The actual phrase ev xdlq Tipdyjiaoiv is used in precisely the same way at 1454b6-7 as here at 1456b2; and it is important to keep in mind that Aristotle's common term for the construction of the I have H\j9o(; is aiL)v0eoi(; TtpayjidTcov, the "assembling of 7tpdy|iaTa." restrictive: it limits also be £>.e£ivd r\ eXeewa 5eivd;'* r\ and it schematized the 5ia{peai(; according to this understanding; but I question r\ |ieyd^a r\ eiKOTa, and to that I now turn. iieydXa t] eiKOta: ii eXeeivdri 8eivd (1456b3) make a pair here, Tl and correspond (under the heading of Ttpdy^aTa) to the mention of the TcdOri at 1456a38-bl (under the heading of effects provided vnb xov X6yo\)). the authenticity of the reading ^ G. F. Else, Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge, Kassel and other editors, however, print it without qualm. ^ Else (previous note) 561, 564—65. * As the ancients also recognized; cf. e.g. Eur. Hipp. 498 Or even avayKaia on which see below. ^ ^ — Else (above, note 2) 566 spoke of earlier." n. 12: "This is cb MA 1957) 564 and nn. 7-9. 5eiva Xil,aa'. what has reduced the passage to the inanity we John T. Kirby 79 5idvoia vnb xov Xoyox) (a36-37) Kai ev xoiq Tipdy^aaiv (b2) \ I djioSeiicvuvai/ TtdGri lieyEGoq/ eXeeivd/ A.v)eiv TtapaaKEud^eiv IxiKpoTTixa^ 5eivd (a37-38) (a38) (bl-2) |i.eydA,a/ eiKoxa (b3) (b4) I eXeoc, (popoc; opyn oaa Toiauxa (bl) (bl) (bl) (bl) Figure 1 Beitrdge delineates three [xepri of 5idvoia here: to xe A,iL)eiv, to 7id9r| 7rapaoKe\)d^eiv, and iieyeGoc; Kai liiKpoTriTaq. In coming to 1456b3-4, he seeks to preserve this tripartite concept, and holds that r\ e^eeivd r\ 8eivd corresponds to to 7id6ri TiapaoKE'ud^eiv, jieyd^ia to jieyeGoq Kai iiiKpoTtiTac;, and eiKOTa to to t£ ocTioSeiKvuvai Kai to XxiZwP This provides a neat responsion, but it requires us to accept that ^eYdA,a and eiKOTa are each being used as a kind of shorthand for the longer phrases.^ In the interest of such a balance, I would have expected a simple KaBriTiKot (or the equivalent) instead of the explicit pair r\ eXeEiva r\ 5eivd in b3, which demands to be balanced with the pair t\ iieyd^a r\ eiKOTa as another dyad. What seems unnatural is the pair iieyd^ia/eiKOTa, for several reasons: (1) When Aristotle pairs jieyaq with another concept, it is regularly (as might be expected) with niKpoc;. In fact he has just done so at 1456bl-2.^ (2) "Probabilities" or "the probable," on the other hand, typically go in tandem with "necessary consequences" or "necessity," so that eiKOTa would typically be paired with dvayKaia; cf. 1451a38, Rh. 1357a22-b25, APr. 70a. (3) Aristotle has just remarked, at 1456a34-36, that 6idvoia has an Vahlen in his d7io8eiKvv)vai Kal to ^ J. Vahlen, Beitrdge zu Aristoteles Poetik (Leipzig 1914) 281. Assumed by I. Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (Oxford 1909) 257 (ad b4). A. Gudeman, Aristoteles OEPI nOIHTIKHZ (Berlin 1934) 332 (ad loc.) quibbles with Bywater's ^ wording, but also assumes the tripartition. ^ Though, as we have seen, the authenticity of the phrase there has been questioned. 80 Illinois Classical Studies especially close connection with rhetoric. 20 (1995) Now both pairs, iieYot'^/l^^Kpoq and EiKOTa/dvaYKaia, have close connections with rhetorical invention: (a) |iEYa<;/|iiKp6(; embodies the rhetorical motif of size or degree. We are told at Rhetoric 1403a 17-25 that to ai)^eiv Kai |ieiov)v is npbq to 5ei^ai oti fieya r\ [iiKpov. Furthermore, it is a concern of all three species of oratory (Rh. 1391b31-92al), though aiS^riOK; is especially suited to Related, though distinct, is the line of epideictic {Rh. 1368a22-27). argument known as the xonoq xov [laXXov Kai tittov {Rh. 1358al4, 1397b 12-27).'^ Castelvetro, in his 16th-century commentary on the Poetics, was to my knowledge the first to suggest the possibility of repeating the iieyaq/iiiKpoc; pair from bl-2 here at b4. He, however, prints eiKOTtt in his text. Else (the "gloss" notwithstanding) also perceives the binary structure of the sentence; but he too prints eiKOTa at b4. (b) eiKOTa and dvayKaia are the materials premises of syllogism. for the KpoTotoEK; or We see this treated extensively at Rhetoric 1357a-b, Prior Analytics 70a-b, Posterior Analytics 74b-75a, and Topics 112b. On the verbal level this is the way a speaker will reason and offer rationale for assertions; but at Poetics 1451a36-38 Aristotle has stipulated that in composing a |i\)0o(;, the author should take care to see that the events of the story flow one from another KaToc to eiKoq r\ to dvayKaiov. This is crucial I understand the 5ia{peoi(; for our understanding of 1456b4, because (as it is presented as of fundamental importance that the plot-structure be organized syllogistically i.e. in such a way that the audience can make sense of why one event occurs as the result of another. But while I submit, then, that r\ ^eydA^a r\ eiKOTa at b4 is corrupt. either substantive could be replaced to make a dyad that is relevant in a rhetorical framework, the topic more germane to the discussion of what is there) — needed ev toic; Tipdyixaoiv is that of rationale in plot-structure par excellence on the part of the author. Thus it is more —8idvoia likely that Aristotle r\ dvayKaia r\ eiKOTa here. avei) 5i5aoKaX(aq: 8i6aaKaX,ia is commonly taken as equivalent to dnoSei^K;, i.e. the giving of information (whether to a dramatic character or to the audience). D. W. Lucas maintains that it has "nothing to do with production,"'^ but it may possibly be a technical theater-term referring to the words of a play-script, the actors' "lines": LSJ s.v. 5i6aoKa?i(a II. 1 originally wrote '° To aii^Eiv Kai iieioTJv is said at 1403a to be, not a TOKoq, but rather the subject-matter The naXA,ov Kai tittov is a general line of argument used to shape enthymemes, while au^eiv Kai neiouv are applications of particular enthymemes. They differ further in that aij^rjoK; and lieicoan; are each capable of independent formulation, while an argument a fortiori consists in the very connection drawn between the (itepi a) of a certain kind of enthymeme. and tittov. However, Aristotle recognized the kinship of these concepts: at Rh. 1359a23 we find lieyeGoq and liiKpoTtiq mentioned in conjunction with to iiei^ov and to eA,aTTov. The reader should mark that Aristotle uses the word lonoq in more than one sense; see G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton 1963) 100-01. " Lucas (above, note 1) 196. [iaA.?i.ov — John T. Kirby shows that 81 by the time of the epigrammatist Dioscorides, whose floruit was only a century or so after Aristotle's own, the word could be metonymic for the plays produced; and even before Aristotle's time, xopo6i5aaKaA,0(; the term for the person and clearest The to who taught the chorus their lines. So it is was simplest understand avet) SiSaoKa^iaq as = "without dialogue." gist of the passage as I understand it, then, is as follows. (1) 6idvoia in drama functions on two levels: in the playwright's mind, as the work is being composed, and in the characters' minds, as the iivGoq unfolds (2) As regards the characters, dramatic dialogue has three ^ept): proof and refutation, (b) stimulation of the emotions, and (c) degrees of importance. (3) As regards the playwright, in putting together the events of 8idvoia should be used in the same way ev xoiq Tcpdyixaaiv the story anb xcbv aiJTcov i6e(bv 8ei xpf^oGai (sc. xfii Siavoiai) as when deciding about dialogue, except that Tipdynaxa must achieve their effect without the vehicle of language (avev bibaoKaXiaq): "Events, on the one hand (td |iev), must be perceived independent of verbal explanation, while argumentation, on the other (td 6e ev xcbi A-oyoai), must (by definition) be provided orally by the speaker, and must come into being as a result of speech." Thus (a) the piteous or fearful events themselves elicit pity and fear from the audience, and (b) the flow of causality in the plot must be recognizably clear as coming from connections that are either necessary or onstage. (a) — — — probable. '2 Purdue University '^ The text of this study was completed in February 1993. I am grateful to Professor Miroslav Marcovich, Professor Neil O'Sullivan, and the late Father William M. A. Grimaldi for their helpful critiques of an earlier version of this essay, and to Professor David Sansone for his expert editorial help.