Draft – please cite published version!
Disagreement, correctness, and the evidence for metaethical absolutism1
Gunnar Björnsson
Umeå University, University of Gothenburg
Metaethical absolutism, or just absolutism, is the view that moral concepts have non-relative
satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges and their particular beliefs, attitudes,
and cultural embedding. Absolutism is compatible with a variety of more widely discussed
views about moral semantics—descriptivist and non-descriptivist, naturalist and non-naturalist,
realist and constructivist—but it arguably has more practically important consequences than
either of these. If absolutism is true, there is an important sense in which parties of moral
disputes are concerned to get the same things right, such that their disputes can be settled by the
facts. If it is not true, as various forms of relativism and non-cognitivism imply, such
coordination of concerns will be limited.2
The most influential support for absolutism comes from two related premises. According
to the first, moral thinking and moral discourse display a number of features that are
characteristically found in paradigmatically absolutist domains, and only partly in
uncontroversially non-absolutist domains. Among these features, we find ways of thinking
about moral disagreement, and ways of attributing correctness to moral judgments. According
to the second premise, the best way of making sense of these features is to assume that
absolutism holds for this domain. Moral thinking and discourse display a certain unity that
would be less straightforwardly explained if forms of metaethical relativism or non-cognitivism
were true.3
One can object to this argument from unity in two ways. One might reject the first
premise, denying that morality displays “absolutist” patterns of disagreement. Or one might
1
I am grateful for feedback from audiences at the University of Connecticut, University of
Gothenburg, University of Edinburgh, Lund University, Umeå University, the 9th Wisconsin
Metaethics Workshop, and the Values in Context workshop at the University of Lisbon. Special thanks
to Tristram McPherson, Ben Lennertz, Robin McKenna, Jussi Suikkanen, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar
Francén Olinder, John Eriksson and Christian Munthe for extensive comments on earlier versions,
and to two anonymous referees. Work on this paper has been supported by the Swedish Research
Council, grants 2009-1507 and 2012-988.
2
For discussion, see Björnsson (2013).
3
For arguments of this form, see e.g. Brink (1989, ch. 2); Huemer (2005, chs. 2–3); Lyons (1976, 19–
20); McNaughton (1988, 39-41); Sayre-McCord (2006, 42); Shafer-Landau (2003, chs. 2–3); Smith
(1994); Streiffer (2003, ch. 1).
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reject the second premise, either denying that absolutism can make good sense of the unity of
moral discourse, or, as is more common, arguing that non-absolutist accounts can. My
concern here is to develop the latter sort of objection, an objection typically associated with
quasi-realist defenses of non-cognitivism, 4 but lately pursued more generally. 5 Instead of
focusing directly on the moral domain, I first look at how some aspects of unity can be found
in paradigmatically non-absolutist domains, involving judgments of personal taste and
likelihood. I then proceed to provide independently motivated accounts of attributions of
agreement, disagreement, correctness and incorrectness that can explain both why absolutist
domains display all aspects of unity and why certain non-absolutist domains display some.
Against this backdrop, I provide preliminary reasons to think that the unity of moral discourse,
to the extent that moral discourse displays unity, can be given a non-absolutist explanation.
1. Metaethical absolutism
As I have indicated, a central part of my strategy in the following sections is to draw lessons
from attributions of disagreement and correctness in the domains of personal taste and
likelihood. Unfortunately, the semantics for concepts and predicates of taste and likelihood is
notoriously contested. To allow us to distill the lessons without getting entangled in these
debates, this first section introduces a way of understanding absolutism that stays clear of
controversial talk about truth, content, or propositions expressed.
As I will understand it here, absolutism is a claim about moral judgments and moral
concepts, not about moral language. (Here and in what follows, I use “judgment” to denote
either the psychological act of judging whether something is such-and-such, or the
psychological state resulting from that act; I will use “claim” to denote the declarative
expression of a judgment.) More generally, what I will call “ABSOLUTISM” about a concept is
the claim that the concept has non-relative satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges
and judgments. The “satisfaction conditions” of a concept expressed by some predicate F are
those conditions that an item X needs to satisfy in order for someone’s act of judging that X is
F to be internally successful. Finally, for an act of judging whether X is F to be “internally
successful” is for it to achieve what one is aiming at—what one tries to get right—merely in
virtue of judging whether X is F.6 (Notice that internal success conditions are properties of
4
See e.g. Björnsson and McPherson (2014); Blackburn (1984); (1991b); (1993a); Gibbard (2003); Hare
(1970); Stevenson (1944); Tersman (2006).
5
See e.g. Björnsson and Finlay (2010); Finlay (2014, ch. 8); Plunkett and Sundell (2013).
6
In judging whether X is F (whether Belgium has a king, say), I might of course have a variety of goals
other than getting the judgment right (to test my memory, to save face, etc.), but those are not goals I
have merely in virtue of making the judgment.
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judgments, not of assertions.) To say that ABSOLUTISM holds for F, then, is to say that any two
judges who are judging in good faith whether some X is F are trying to get the same things
right, or, equivalently, that their judgments have the same (non-relative) internal success
conditions. If one of them judges that X is F and the other that X is not F, then if one is
successful, the other is not; if both make the same judgment, then they are equally
(un)successful.7
Admittedly, talk about what judges are “trying to get right” when judging whether X is F
or about the “internal success conditions” of their judgments might seem to be nothing but a
roundabout way of talking about the truth-conditions of judgments whether something is F.
That is not quite right, however, and it will be important later that the two come apart on
occasion. There are cases in which we have reasonably clear ideas about what judges are
trying to get right, and whether they are trying to get the same thing right, well before we
decide between quite different accounts of the semantics of the concept in question. There are
also cases where we can agree that someone’s judgment has been internally successful but
where it seems inappropriate for us to say that their judgment was true.
For illustration, consider an example involving judgments of personal taste. Gus and
Tibus both want something to enjoy on their way home from work. Each is looking at the
vending machine, trying to determine whether there is something tasty on offer. In doing so,
each is trying to get something right, but if they have different palates, they are presumably
trying to get different things right. Each, it seems reasonable to say, is trying to determine
whether there is anything on offer that satisfies his palate (perhaps under suitably normal
conditions). (Each, like most of us, knows perfectly well that others have other gustatory
preferences, but neither would think that this is relevant for the judgment he is making.)
Because of this, it might be that if Gus and Tibus both conclude that there is something tasty
in the vending machine, only one of them would be successful in his endeavor.8 Given this, we
know enough to conclude that ABSOLUTISM doesn’t hold for the kind of tastiness concept
exemplified by Gus’ and Tibus’ judgments.9 However, we are far from determining the
7
Here and throughout I set to the side putative counterexamples to the law of non-contradiction.
8
It should be noted that judgments of taste sometimes have more interpersonal or idealizing
pretentions, being concerned with whether something accords with the taste of most people, or with
suitably refined palates (cf. Doerfler (2012); Egan (2010); Loeb (2003)). This, however, does not mean
that all judgments of taste have such interpersonal or idealizing ambitions (cf. Goodwin and Darley
(2008)). In fact, I believe that the most common kind of attribution of tastiness in particular lacks these
ambitions, and this is the kind that concerns us here.
9
By contrast, ABSOLUTISM might well hold for explicitly relativized tastiness judgments: if Gus and
Tibus were both judging whether the machine contains something tasty for Gus, they would likely be
trying to get the same thing right. In saying this, I distinguish the concept at play when Gus and Tibus
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semantics of tastiness claims, i.e., of declarative expressions of tastiness judgments. Perhaps
such claims are best analyzed along contextualist lines: a tastiness claim asserts the proposition
that some relevant subject(s)—typically the speaker—is disposed to have positive gustatory
experiences from the item in question.10 Or perhaps an expressivist analysis is preferable:
tastiness claims express but do not ascribe such a disposition.11 Or perhaps the proposition
asserted or its truth-value depends on the dispositions of those who assess the claim
semantically, not on those of the speaker.12 By focusing on what judges are trying to get right
in making their judgments instead of on the semantics of characteristic expressions of such
judgments, we can avoid getting involved in differences between such analyses until they
become relevant for our purposes.
The case of tastiness judgments also illustrates the possibility of attributing internal
success to judgments without thinking that they are true. Suppose that after looking at a
particular item in the vending machine, Gus exclaims, “ah, there’s something tasty!” If the
item in question is one that we find disgusting, we will be reluctant to say that Gus was right,
or that he had said something true. But his judgment would clearly have been internally
successful if the machine contained something that would satisfy his palate.
ABSOLUTISM, then, is not understood in terms of truth, or propositions expressed, but in
terms of the satisfaction conditions of concepts, which in turn are understood in terms of the
judgment-internal success of the relevant kinds of judgments, and the concepts involved.
Metaethical absolutism is ABSOLUTISM about moral judgments and concepts. More specifically,
I will take it to be ABSOLUTISM about concepts that are central to moral thinking and involved
in paradigmatic cases of moral disagreement: concepts of intrinsic good, moral wrongness and
blameworthiness, justice, normative reasons, and ought-all-things-considered-to-be-doneness,
to mention some of the most prominent.13
are judging whether the machine contains something tasty from the concept at play when they are judging whether
it contains something that is tasty for Gus. I think of a concept expressed by a predicate F as a kind of
mechanism the operation of which constitutes the agent’s activity of judging whether something is F.
Since the two italicized characterizations of judgments in the previous sentence pick out two
extensionally different kinds of judgments, they also pick out two different kinds of concepts. This is
not to deny that the concepts are closely related—for all I have said, they might be simultaneously at
play when Gus is judging whether something is tasty. I thank Ben Lennertz and an anonymous referee
for pressing me on this point.
10
See e.g Glanzberg (2007); Schaffer (2011); Sundell (2011).
11
See Buekens (2011), who combines contextualist and expressivist elements.
12
See e.g. Egan (2010); Lasersohn (2005); Pearson (2013); Stephenson (2007).
13
Just as non-ABSOLUTISM about tastiness is compatible with a variety of analyses of “tasty”,
metaethical absolutism, as it is understood here, is itself compatible with different semantic views:
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2. The argument from UNITY
Hardly anyone defends absolutism with reference to detailed studies of the individual parties
of moral disagreements and what each party is trying to get right when making their judgment.
Rather, belief in absolutism is grounded in general and easily accessible aspects of moral
judgment and moral discourse. The most important and pervasive source of support for
absolutism is a package of interrelated features that people normally seem to attribute to
paradigmatically absolutist discourse and thinking, but not to clear cases of non-absolutist
discourse. The package can be described in slightly different ways, but I take the set of
features that I will call DISAGREEMENT, CORRECTNESS, INDEPENDENCE, and NO
RELATIVIZATION to cover its core. I will refer to this set as “UNITY”, as it is meant to represent
how we take people to be concerned with the same issue in paradigmatically absolutist discourse.
DISAGREEMENT:
If A claims that X is F and B that X is not F, then in agreeing with
one claim, one disagrees with the other.14 (When A and B both agree with their own
claims, they disagree with that of the other.)
CORRECTNESS:
If A claims that X is F and B that X is not F, then if one claim is
correct (true, right) the other must be incorrect (false, wrong).15
INDEPENDENCE:
What determines the correctness of A’s claim that X is (not) F are
features of X that do not essentially depend on A’s attitudes toward X.16
Kantian prescriptivism, non-naturalistic as well as naturalistic realism, what Sharon Street (2006) calls
“rigidifying antirealism”, and ideal observer or advisor theories. It is incompatible with various forms
of relativism as well as with at least some versions of non-cognitivism. For example, Gibbard’s (2003)
view seems perfectly compatible with the assumption that when different people are deciding whether
to plan to ϕ in C (i.e. judging whether ϕ-ing is the thing to do in C), what standards for such planning
they are ultimately trying to conform to might be quite different. However, absolutism is compatible
with a contextual semantics for evaluative and normative expressions such as “good” and “ought”. Even
if such terms pick out different ends or norms in different contexts, it might be that they pick out the
same ends or norms when used in moral contexts: moral value and the moral law, say. Finally, as it stands,
the definition allows for error-theoretic versions of absolutism, according to which no positive moral
judgments are ever internally successful.
14
Again, I set to the side complications due to obvious cases of vagueness and putative
counterexamples to the law of non-contradiction.
15
Cf. n. 14.
16
For simplicity, I’ll ignore cases where X itself involves A. The blocking of essential dependence allows
that contingent effects of A’s thinking might affect X’s F-ness. (For example, that A thinks that it would
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NO RELATIVIZATION:
If one is involved in disagreement about whether X is F, one
does not take answers of the form X is F relative to Y and X is not F relative to Z to resolve
the disagreement (unless a non-relative answer can be derived from these).
Talk about “agreement” and “disagreement” can be understood in different ways, some of
which will involve the other features of UNITY, in particular CORRECTNESS. However, I think
that there are weaker notions, captured by most everyday attributions of agreement and
disagreement. The notions I have in mind here can be roughly operationalized as follows: B
agrees (disagrees) with A’s claim that such-and-such if and only if B’s judgment about the matter
would make it natural to say “A said that such-and-such, and B thinks so too (but B doesn’t
think so)”. They are also naturally expressed using “yes” and “no” in reaction to claims, where
the target of the acceptance or rejection is not intuitively metalinguistic, concerned with the
pronunciation or choice of words as in: (1) A: “Pedants correct the [pro-noun-ciation] of
others. B: “No they don’t. They correct the [pro-nun-ciation] of others.” (2) A: “Burgers come
with chips.” B: “No they don’t. Burgers come with french fries.”17
It might seem plausible that, if we let “F” express any of the moral concepts with which
absolutism is concerned, UNITY represents how engaged participants tend to understand
moral reasoning and moral debate, even in cases of deep moral disagreement. (Think for
example of disagreements about whether we have an obligation to help distant strangers
people in need when we can do so at little cost to ourselves.) By contrast, we do not
understand recognizably non-ABSOLUTIST domains as involving all features of UNITY. For
example, suppose A claims that the cathedral is to the left while B denies that it is to the left,
but that A and B express directional judgments made from different spatial perspectives.18
Then we can well agree with and deem true or correct (or disagree with and deem wrong,
false or incorrect) what both said. Furthermore, this would be true even if A and B were allknowing and perfectly rational creatures, and any disagreement about whether the cathedral
is to the left might be fully resolved by determining whether it is to the left relative to a certain
perspective.
be morally wrong to treat B in a certain way might make it wrong to treat B in that way under certain
circumstances.)
17
The notion is thus somewhat narrower than that employed by Sundell (2011, 275–76), from which I
borrow the two examples.
18
In this case, ABSOLUTISM fails for A’s and B’s judging whether the cathedral is to the left when we
individuate kinds of judgments and corresponding concepts in a way that ignores differences in
perspective. ABSOLUTISM might well hold for judgments whether the cathedral is to the left from A’s perspective.
Cf. n 9.
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Insofar as it satisfies UNITY, then, moral discourse and thinking very much looks like an
absolutist domain, and looks unlike the clearest cases of non-absolutist domains. Moreover, if
the moral domain behaves in ways characteristic of absolutist domains, it might seem
reasonable to assume that it is an absolutist domain, unless we have positive reasons to the
contrary. (If it quacks, walks, and looks like an absolutist domain, our default assumption
should be that it is one.)
This argument can be strengthened by the following consideration: UNITY not only seems
to represent an ordinary understanding of absolutist discourse, but an understanding that
would seem perfectly adequate given absolutism. If we are indeed concerned to get the same
things right, it makes sense to let agreement, disagreement, and assessments of correctness follow
these patterns. If we are not concerned to get the same thing right, the rationale for these
features of the practice seems much less clear.
Metaethical absolutism might seem to be jointly supported, then, by its promise to make
straightforward sense of UNITY and by the fact that we characteristically recognize its full
package in paradigmatically absolutist domains of discourse and judgment, but never in
paradigmatically non-absolutist domains. Conversely, forms of non-absolutism seem to be
undermined. Or so people have thought.19
There are of course various ways in which one might resist the argument from UNITY.
One is to deny that moral discourse and thinking display UNITY. Empirical evidence suggests
that not everyone always understands moral discourse to satisfy all aspects of UNITY. However,
patterns of understanding characteristic of paradigmatically absolute domains seem
predominant (especially within cultures) for what most people take to be serious and
uncontroversially moral wrongdoing, and considerably stronger than for what is commonly
understood as matters of taste.20 Moreover, various rejections of aspects of UNITY do not
immediately undermine the argument, as at least some such rejections can be understood as
expressing doubts about the feasibility of insisting upon or producing generally convincing
arguments for the moral views in question, or as expressions of degrees of tolerance;21 further
empirical research is needed.
My focus here will instead be on the claim that absolutism provides the best explanation
of UNITY, to the extent that UNITY is indeed displayed in the moral domain. Elsewhere I have
elaborated on the familiar relativist or non-cognitivist argument that widespread and
seemingly fundamental moral disagreement undermines straightforward absolutist
19
For references, see n. 2.
20
See e.g. Goodwin and Darley (2008); J. C. Wright et al. (2012); Sarkissian et al. (2011).
21
See J. C. Wright et al. (in press).
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explanations of UNITY.22 My specific objective here is to propose what I take to be the most
promising route for non-absolutist explanations.
Non-absolutist accounts of UNITY can often seem problematic, relying on strong forms of
motivational internalism, or failing to make sense of disagreement that involves no clash of
attitudes.23 Moreover, one might worry that such accounts are too disconnected from a
general understanding of why UNITY is displayed elsewhere, and inevitably ad hoc in their
appeal to mechanisms that are clearly not at work in paradigmatic absolutist domains.24 In the
absence of other strong reasons to reject absolutism, then, one might well feel that UNITY gives
it considerable support.
What I will argue in this paper, however, is that non-absolutist explanations of UNITY
need not be ad hoc. Aspects of UNITY seem to hold not only in paradigmatically ABSOLUTE
domains, but also, to a limited extent, in paradigmatic non-ABSOLUTE domains, such as those
of personal taste and epistemic modals. Moreover, given an independently plausible general
account of the mechanisms governing attributions of agreement or disagreement and
attributions of correctness or incorrectness in both ABSOLUTE and non-ABSOLUTE domains,
such mechanisms might well give rise to the full range of UNITY independently of whether
ABSOLUTISM holds for that domain. This leaves open the possibility of an independently
motivated and entirely non-ad hoc non-ABSOLUTIST account of unity in the moral domain,
and one that does not rely on strong forms of motivational internalism.
3. Aspects of UNITY in non-absolutist discourse: the case of tasty and likely
We have already noted that elements of UNITY are violated by claims about whether
something is to the left, and the same is true about claims employing a variety of contextdependent locutions, including “local”, “ready”, and “tall”. But judgments expressed by other
paradigmatically non-ABSOLUTIST locutions—in particular epistemic modals and various
22
See Björnsson (2012).
23
Most metaethicists these days reject strong motivational internalism (see Björklund et al. (2012)). For
discussion of problems with accounts of disagreement in terms of clashing attitudes of the sort
proposed by Stevenson’s (1944); (1963), see e.g. Gibbard (2003), ch. 4; Dreier (2009), and Ridge (2013).
24
Simon Blackburn (1991a); (1991b), in a debate with Nicholas Sturgeon (1991), argues that the best
“projectivist” account of sameness of meaning is the mere application of a more general account,
covering ordinary descriptive discourse. Michael Ridge (2013) puts forth an account of disagreement
that is meant to be general and avoid problems with Stevenson’s and Gibbard’s proposals. (I think that
though Ridge’s account is on the right track, but argue elsewhere that it runs into problems with
disagreements about taste, and fails to capture what is ultimately driving intuitions about disagreement
(cf. Björnsson (ms)).) The account of UNITY developed here could be seen as an effort to lay the ground
for a more complete and independently compelling picture in the spirit of these earlier proposals.
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predicates of personal taste—seem to satisfy several aspects of UNITY even on occasions where
judges are trying to get different things right. Understanding why these judgments display
such patterns will tell us what to expect in the case of moral judgments.
In this section, we will consider one example each of two classes of predicates: predicates
of personal taste, and epistemic modals. Throughout, I will appeal to phenomena that have
been adduced in support of assessor-relativism in these areas, but as before I will remain
neutral as to whether relativistic analyses of these phenomena are preferable to contextualist
or expressivist analyses.
Tastiness
Start with predicates of personal taste, exemplified by tasty. Suppose that our friends Gus and
Tibus have each decided to determine whether Marmite is as tasty as some say, or as vile as
others claim. Each has a taste, and each expresses his judgment, in soliloquy:
Gus: “That’s surprising. Marmite’s tasty.”
Tibus: “What a disappointment. Marmite’s not at all tasty.”
We have already said that ABSOLUTISM is violated for tastiness judgments. When Gus judges
that Marmite is tasty, he doesn’t take the reactions and judgments of others to matter for his
verdict: the ultimate arbiter is whether Marmite would give him a pleasant gustatory
experience (perhaps under normal circumstances). Likewise, mutatis mutandis, for Tibus.25
Nevertheless, it seems that Gus and Tibus disagree, and more generally that if someone agrees
with one of the two tastiness claims, he thereby disagrees with the other. So DISAGREEMENT
seems to be satisfied for tastiness claims, even when judges are concerned to get different
things right when making the judgments expressed.26 Relatedly, it seems a little problematic to
think that both Gus’ and Tibus’ claims are true, as that might seem to involve agreeing with
both their claims. On the other hand, many would be hesitant to think that Gus’s (or Tibus’s)
claim was incorrect or false merely on account of disagreeing with him about the tastiness of
Marmite. So CORRECTNESS has at most a limited appeal. Similarly, INDEPENDENCE is
problematic. Many of us would find it misplaced of Tibus to deem Gus’s claim incorrect or
false without taking into account Gus’s taste disposition. Likewise, finally, for NO
RELATIVIZATION: once we have determined for whom Marmite is and is not tasty (and under
what circumstances), there seems to be nothing left of the question of whether it is tasty.27
25
Assuming, as before, that we are concerned with expressions of personal taste (cf. n 8).
26
This is of course part of what has motivated various relativist theories about taste judgments (see e.g.
Egan (2010); Kölbel (2004); Lasersohn (2005); Pearson (2012); Stephenson (2007)).
27
In effect, Robin McKenna (2014) relies on this mismatch between DISAGREEMENT and
CORRECTNESS
in the case of taste judgments to raise a problem for my earlier treatment of
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Notice, though, that attributions of correctness and incorrectness seem unproblematic
when all involved are assumed to have similar taste reactions to the item in question. If Gus
and Tibus knew that they have the same taste and Tibus claimed that Marmite isn’t tasty
while misremembering the taste of Marmite, Gus could naturally say, “you’re wrong, it really
is quite tasty”, and if Tibus had claimed that Marmite is tasty, Gus could have naturally
replied “that’s true, it really is”. In such contexts, tastiness judgments might seem to satisfy
CORRECTNESS.
Although the example of tastiness discourse shows that DISAGREEMENT is not unique to
ABSOLUTIST domains, it fails to satisfy the other aspects of UNITY, except to a limited extent
within contexts where an overlap of taste dispositions is assumed. In itself, then, the case of
tastiness might seem to strengthen the argument from UNITY: we (or at least many of those
involved in engaged moral disagreement) understand moral discourse along the lines of
absolutist discourse, not along the lines of this clearly non-absolutist domain.
Likelihood
Another family of non-absolutist predicates displaying aspects of UNITY are epistemic modals,
expressed in English by locutions such as “likely”, “improbable”, “might”, “possible”, “can”,
and “must”. Here we will focus on likelihood judgments. Suppose that Basil needs to get hold
of his cat Felix to bring him to the veterinarian. Basil muses:
“Felix does sometimes wander off to the stream to fish, but his favorite pastime is chasing birds, and
most birds are at the apple orchard today. So he is likely to be in the orchard.”
What Basil tried to get right in drawing his conclusion was a relation between evidence
available to him before the beginning of his search and the various places where Felix might
be: his question concerns where Felix is likely to be given that evidence. He knows that someone
might have better evidence—quite a few people are out and about and might have seen
Felix—but this doesn’t affect what he is trying to get right, as he has no feasible way of
accessing that evidence.28 As it happens, Claudia is one of the people who had seen Felix, as
he was heading in the opposite direction of the apple orchard a few minutes ago, towards the
stream where she knows that he occasionally goes to fish. When Claudia asks herself where
Felix might be, she concludes:
disagreement in Björnsson and Finlay (2010). The account of attributions of disagreement and
attributions of correctness and incorrectness (truth and falsehood) provided in sections 4 and 5
promises a principled explanation of this mismatch.
28
In describing this scenario, I am not denying that we sometimes make likelihood judgments with
more interpersonal or objective pretensions, just that this is what is going on here. Cf. n. 27.
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“Felix is unlikely to be in the apple orchard.”
Like Basil, Claudia knows that someone might have better evidence regarding Felix’s
whereabouts but lacks any feasible way of getting access to that evidence. Her judgmental
efforts, it seems, are internally successful if Felix is unlikely to be in the orchard given evidence
available to her. Since the evidence available to Basil and Claudia differs, ABSOLUTISM doesn’t
hold for their likelihood judgments.
At the same time, it seems that DISAGREEMENT is satisfied: intuitively, if we were to agree
with or accept Basil’s claim that Felix is likely to be in the orchard, we would disagree with
and have to reject Claudia’s claim that he is unlikely to be in the orchard. Moreover,
CORRECTNESS might seem to be satisfied in at least some contexts where ABSOLUTISM is
violated. Consider the following exchange:
FINDING FELIX
Alicia: “I need to find Felix. I wonder where he might be.”
Basil: “The birds are in the orchard today. He is likely to be there.”
Claudia: “I think that’s wrong, Alicia. I saw Felix head in the other direction earlier. He is more likely
to be by the stream.”
Claudia’s assessment of Basil’s initial claim seems natural enough. Claudia thinks that Felix is
unlikely to be in the orchard, and this seems to not only force her to reject Basil’s claim, but
also to negatively assess its correctness. Moreover, CORRECTNESS does not seem to
presuppose ABSOLUTISM: it seems natural to assume that Claudia’s assessment was based on
evidence that Basil was not concerned to relate to when making his judgment, evidence
available only to her.29
Similarly, I would expect parties of FINDING FELIX to take the other aspects of UNITY to
be satisfied. INDEPENDENCE will seem to be satisfied, as Claudia’s and Alicia’s assessments of
the correctness of Basil’s judgment will take into account any available evidence concerning
29
It might be argued that this assumption should be abandoned, and that the best explanation of why
CORRECTNESS
seems to hold in this context is that we take Basil to express a “communal” judgment,
concerned with what is likely given the information available to either of the parties of the
conversation. If he were, then ABSOLUTISM would hold for Basil and Claudia’s judgments. The
analogous argument has been made by Janice Dowell (2011) for the case of epistemic “might”. I
defend the naturalness and correctness of the solipsistic interpretation against Dowell’s argument at
some length in Björnsson and Almér (2010); Montminy (2012) independently replies along partly
similar lines (also cf. Swanson (2011)).
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Felix’s whereabouts, without restriction to what information Basil had. Likewise for NO
RELATIVIZATION: If Basil and Claudia agreed that Felix is likely to be in the orchard given
Basil’s evidence and unlikely to be there given Claudia’s, they would not thereby have agreed
about whether Felix is likely to be in the orchard or not.
It seems, then, that at least from the point of view of participants, some cases of nonabsolutist discourse can display all four aspects of UNITY. But the picture is complicated, as not
all the aspects hold universally, or from all points of view. Consider:
HINDSIGHT:
Having talked to Basil, Claudia and some kids, you now know the following: (1) At
nine o’clock this morning, Basil concluded, based on long experience and knowledge
about the whereabouts of the birds, that Felix was likely to be in the orchard.
(2) Independently, and at about the same time, Claudia concluded that Felix was
unlikely to be in the orchard, as she had seen him take off in the opposite direction,
towards the stream, earlier that morning. (3) As a matter of fact, however, and
surprisingly given either Basil’s or Claudia’s evidence, Felix was in the back yard at
the time, playing with the neighborhood kids.30
What is interesting about our situation in HINDSIGHT is this: while we know where Felix
actually was, and what evidence different people had about his whereabouts, we do not seem
to be in a position to judge whether Felix was likely to be in the orchard. It might be natural
to say that Felix was unlikely to be in the orchard in light of Claudia’s information, but likely to be
there in light of Basil’s, but it would seem odd for us to judge, based on everything we know,
without explicit relativization to some other epistemic perspective, that Felix was unlikely to
be in the orchard.
Now consider the four aspects of UNITY, as they will appear from our HINDSIGHT
perspective. First, DISAGREEMENT might seem difficult to assess. Exactly because we cannot
judge (without relativization) whether Felix was likely to be in the orchard, it is unclear
whether we are in a position to agree or disagree with Basil or Claudia’s judgments. Perhaps,
though, it is still true that if one were to agree with Basil’s judgment that Felix was likely to be
in the orchard—if one were to judge that Felix was likely to be in the orchard—one would
have to reject Claudia’s judgment, and vice versa. CORRECTNESS and INDEPENDENCE seem
more deeply problematic, however, as natural assessments of the correctness of Basil’s and
30
von Fintel and Gillies (2008) appeal to retrospective cases like this to undermine evidence for
assessor-relativism of the sort defended by Egan (2007), MacFarlane (2011) and Stephenson (2007).
Some of the other cases they appeal to transpose to the case of “likely”.
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Claudia’s judgments seem to relate them to their respective epistemic perspectives at the time,
rather than to information had by us now, or by others at the time of Basil’s and Claudia’s
judgments. For example, the following assessment of Basil’s judgment, explicitly relating to his
information, seems natural enough from the perspective of HINDSIGHT:
“Basil thought that Felix was likely to be in the orchard. That was correct: given information
available to him at the time, Felix was indeed likely to be in the orchard.”
By contrast, this assessment, relying on information not available to Basil, does not:
“Basil thought that Felix was likely to be in the orchard. That was incorrect: as we now know from
the kids, Felix was not at all likely to be in the orchard.”31
Finally, NO RELATIVIZATION seems to be violated from the HINDSIGHT perspective. If we have
answered questions of the sort “from epistemic perspective E, where was Felix most likely to be?” for all
interesting perspectives, we seem to have exhaustively resolved any disagreements we might
have had about where Felix was likely to be.
In this section we have seen how two paradigmatically non-ABSOLUTIST domains satisfy
some, but not all, aspects of UNITY, and sometimes only partially. In itself, this might seem to
reinforce the argument from UNITY. What I will argue in the next three sections, however, is
that when we understand why aspects of UNITY are displayed in ABSOLUTIST discourse and
partially displayed in non-ABSOLUTIST discourse, there is room for a non-ABSOLUTIST
account of UNITY in the moral domain.
4. Understanding DISAGREEMENT
The purpose of this and the following section is to propose, in outline, general accounts of the
various phenomena involved in UNITY. In particular, I will sketch accounts of what it is to
agree or disagree with what someone says or thinks, and accounts of what it is to take a claim
or judgment to be correct or true, or incorrect or false. The guiding principle is that the
31
In eliciting intuitions about cases like these, it is important to be aware of various sources of error.
One is that attributions of correctness might target the formation of a judgment rather than the
judgment formed. Another is that people might take beliefs that happen to be false to be less justified
(Young et al. (2010)), which can lead them to think that the judge (Basil, say) had not adequately taken
into account available information. Yet another is that people who know whether p is the case will fail
to assess the claim that p is likely, instead assessing the claim that p, as this is an epistemically more
relevant target of assessment (cf. Almér and Björnsson (2009); Björnsson and Almér (2010)). Still, new
evidence strongly suggests that hindsight judgments follow the patterns postulated here (Knobe and
Yalcin (forthcoming)).
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accounts should not only predict, but also make intelligible why all features of UNITY are
present in the case of paradigmatically absolutist discourse, none are in certain kinds of nonabsolutist discourse, and some are, to various degrees, in the case of tastiness and likelihood
judgments.
In this section, I propose a general account of agreement and disagreement. As illustrated
by cases involving tastiness and likelihood judgments, agreeing with someone’s claim is not
essentially a matter of thinking that they have been internally successful in making the
judgments they expressed. The explanation for this, I will argue, is that agreement and
disagreement relate to the claim’s communicative function, and to the related phenomena of
accepting or rejecting the claim.
Generally, accepting or rejecting an utterance is a matter of going along with, or ruling
out going along with, the standard flow of communication initiated by the utterance. We have
ways of saying, asking, entreating, and so forth, because such acts tend to have specific
communicative effects: that our audience believes what is said, takes on the task of answering
the question, forms intentions to comply, and so forth. To some extent, our understanding of
communicative function might be closely tied to an independent understanding of speakers’
perlocutionary intentions. But it is primarily driven by our general understanding of the words
employed and syntax, including the sentence form (declarative, interrogative, imperative), and
aspects of the context implicated by this understanding. Plausibly, this general understanding
is an understanding of the conventional communicative function of the sorts of expressions involved,
adapted to the characteristic psychological effects on hearers of the expressions that explains
why, in general, we tend to use those kinds of expression, and under what circumstances.32
Even when speakers clearly do not intend us to believe a claim, answer a question, or fulfill a
request, then, we can readily understand their utterances as utterances whose communicative
function, in virtue of the conventional function of its various elements and the context, is to
elicit judgments or intentions in hearers.
The idea now is that to accept a claim, question, or request, is exactly to do one’s part as a
hearer in the performance of its communicative function: judging that something is the case,
intending to provide an answer, or intending to comply. Correspondingly, to reject an
32
See e.g. Millikan (1984); Stevenson (1944). Following Millikan (1998), I take speech acts to be
usefully categorized based on their conventional communicative function, and traditional speech act
categories to closely track such functions.
Notice that the conventional communicative function of an utterance can be relational and
context-dependent. For example, it is presumably a conventional function of an utterance in the
declarative (“The cathedral is to the right”) to produce or make occurrent a judgment the content of
which depends on the words constituting the sentence as well as context needed to fix the content of
context-dependent expressions.
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utterance is to be in the sort of state that most directly rules out being in the former state:
judging that something is not the case, intending not to provide an answer, intending not to
comply. 33 Our primary concern here is specifically with what I have called “claims”—
expressions of judgment in the declarative. The characteristic communicative function of
claims, I take it, is to produce or make occurrent judgments in hearers: we characteristically
make claims because they produce or make occurrent suitably related judgments in hearers,
and our understanding of sentences in the declarative is shaped by this function.34 I thus
propose that:
ACCEPT/REJECT:
To accept a claim is to make the judgment that would constitute
doing one’s part as a hearer in fulfilling the characteristic communicative function of
that sort of claim; to reject the claim is to make the contrary judgment.35
33
The notion of communicative function is closely related to the notion of an expression’s context change
potential in dynamic semantics, and to the resultant of the force and content of a speech act (see e.g.
Stalnaker (1999)). Likewise, the notion of acceptance of a claim employed to be introduced is closely
related to notion of acceptance employed by Stalnaker (see e.g. (2002)). However, the use to which it is
put here does not presuppose the adoption of that semantic framework: for all I say here, the meaning of
sentences might be analyzed in some other way.
34
Relatedly, Millikan’s (1984) argues that the “stabilizing proper function” of the indicative mood is to
produce true belief in hearers: true belief because this is what both speakers and hearers tend to have an
interest in such that this reinforces speaker and hearer dispositions. This explanation is correct and
important, but for the explanations of acceptance, rejection, agreement and disagreement developed
here, we can bracket the truth-value of the judgment.
35
I am assuming here that the judgment that not-P and the judgment that P are each other’s
contraries. (Dialetheists will need a somewhat different account than that offered here; I set that
complication to the side.)
One might of course resist accepting an utterance without thereby rejecting it, namely by
withholding judgment or more generally being undecided. The sort of rejection in judgment that we are
concerned with here also contrasts with a metaconceptual or metalinguistic refusal to employ a certain
term or concept (because of its despicable connotations, say). I thank Guy Fletcher for raising this
complication. Another complication, raised by Michael Ridge, comes from contents that are in certain
ways peripheral to a clam, such as the implications of “even” in “Even Granny had some wine”, or
parentheticals like that in “Lance Armstrong, who was born in Copenhagen, won the Tour the France
seven times”. To produce or make occurrent acceptance in judgment of these contents seem to be part
of the communicative function of the claims, but contrary to ACCEPT/REJECT one might think it
possible to reject these contents without rejecting the claims. I lack space here for a full discussion, but
I am inclined to deny that possibility: we do reject a claim if we reject some of its peripheral contents.
The reason one might nevertheless feel that one “accepts the claim” is simply that these contents are
less central to communicative concerns: one can accept the central parts.
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The basic disagreement phenomenon is then understood as involving two claims the
acceptance of one rules out the acceptance of the other; disagreements involving judgments
are understood as propensities for disagreements of this basic form:
AGREE/DISAGREE: Two
claims are in agreement when accepting (rejecting) one would
mean accepting (rejecting) the other; they are in disagreement when accepting one
would mean rejecting the other. To agree (disagree) with some claim C is to make a
judgment the characteristic declarative expression of which would be in agreement
(disagreement) with C. To agree (disagree) with some judgment J is to make a judgment the
characteristic declarative expression of which would be in agreement (disagreement) with
the characteristic declarative expression of J.36
Consider how this applies to the case of most ordinary, non-relative, descriptive claims. The
characteristic communicative function of such claims, we can assume, is to inform (or remind)
hearers about a certain aspect of objective reality. Here, the judgment that satisfies the
characteristic communicative function of the claim is simply the judgment that this aspect
obtains. To accept the claim is thus to make such a judgment, and to reject the claim is to
make the contrary judgment. Given this, AGREE/DISAGREE yields DISAGREEMENT for
discourse involving ordinary, non-relative, descriptive claims. If A said that X is F and B said
X is not F, and F is a non-relative descriptive predicate, then accepting one claim means
rejecting the other. 37 Correspondingly, agreeing with A’s (B’s) claim means making the
judgment characteristically expressed by saying that X is (not) F, and thus to disagree with B’s
(A’s).
If this account of DISAGREEMENT in paradigmatically ABSOLUTIST discourse is correct,
the reason that claims expressing tastiness and likelihood judgments follow the pattern of
DISAGREEMENT should be that their communicative functions are relevantly similar to those
of ordinary descriptive statements. So what are those communicative functions?
Start with tastiness claims. Their characteristic function, I suggest, is to create (or make
occurrent) tastiness beliefs in hearers and corresponding expectations of what hearers will find
tasty or not, thus providing gustatory guidance.38 It is clear that we routinely do form tastiness
36
Understanding disagreement in judgment in terms of disagreement between claims might seem
roundabout, but I argue elsewhere that this idea explains why agreement and acceptance can come
apart in the case of tastiness judgments (Björnsson (ms)).
37
Ignoring, as before, complications related to vagueness and dialetheism.
38
More generally, tastiness claims function to express the speaker’s taste judgments, which can be
done to guide taste expectations, but at other times merely to convey one’s food preferences (as when
small children express their taste judgments to parents), or perhaps to compliment the chef. However,
as I have argued elsewhere (Björnsson and Almér (2010), pp. 23–6), this general expressive function
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beliefs on the basis of tastiness claims, and clear that speakers adjust their utterances in light of
this effect, making explicitly subjective claims (“I think that this is really tasty”) when they
have specific reasons to suspect that the audience does not share their taste preferences and
will be mislead if accepting a bare tastiness claim.39 Moreover, it makes good sense that
expressions of tastiness judgments would have this function. True, differences in taste are
common enough for us to only sometimes be in a position to confidently judge that all our
hearers will share our taste reaction to a particular item. But there is enough overlap for
expressions of subjective judgments to serve as reasonably reliable guides for others who have
not yet tasted the item.40
Given this communicative function of tastiness claims, the response required for its
fulfillment is that hearers expect to have the corresponding taste experience from the item in
question. Given ACCEPT/REJECT, to accept the positive claim that X is tasty or reject the
negative claim that X is not tasty is thus to expect to have a positive taste experience from X;
to accept the claim that X is not tasty or reject the claim that it is tasty is to expect not to have
a positive experience from X. Given that accepting one of these claims means rejecting the
other and given AGREE/DISAGREE, DISAGREEMENT follows for tastiness claims.41
A similar story is available for likelihood judgments and likelihood claims. The core role
of likelihood judgments is presumably to set our subjective probabilities for various
provides an appropriate target for assessments and potential acceptance or rejection only rarely, as
speakers tend to have epistemic authority concerning their taste dispositions, leaving hearers without
independent grounds for accepting or not accepting that speakers have the taste dispositions in
question. For this reason, intuitions of agreement (and correctness) will typically follow the guiding
function.
39
In saying that we withhold claims of the form “X is tasty” when we think that others have different
taste preferences, I am not saying that we also withhold our corresponding judgments. (For two different
explanations of why explicitly relativized or first-personal taste judgments makes for a different
communicative function, see Björnsson (2001, 101–03); Björnsson and Almér (2010, 26–27).)
40
This accounts for the major difference between the tastiness case and ordinary descriptive discourse:
the mismatch between the judgment expressed and communicative purpose. Taste claims functions to
create taste beliefs and expectations of taste experiences, but they do something weaker than assert that
others will have the relevant experiences. (To see why the assertoric content of ordinary tastiness
claims cannot plausibly be “all of us [in this conversation] would enjoy this”, consider first that such a
claim seems to require much more knowledge about one’s audience than does “this is tasty”, and,
second, that if this were the content, the fact that one judge, A, doesn’t like an item should provide
another, B, with grounds for rejecting C’s claim that the item is tasty, which it clearly doesn’t: in
normal conversational settings, B has such a ground only if B thinks that she doesn’t like it.)
41
The idea that agreement and disagreement about taste should be understood in terms of the
communicative function of taste claims is very similar to Egan’s (2010) proposal.
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possibilities—high for possibilities we judge likely; low for those we judge not likely—thus
affecting the amount of cognitive, emotional and physical work that we invest in these
possibilities. The suggestion now is that the characteristic communicative function of
likelihood claims (i.e. declarative expressions of likelihood judgments) is to produce the
corresponding likelihood judgments in hearers, i.e. likelihood judgments that would typically
set (roughly) the same subjective probabilities. A practice with claims performing this function
makes good sense when speakers often enough have better information about the matter at
hand and have thought more about the issue than have hearers. Unless speakers have
weighed the evidence erroneously, or hearers have relevant evidence that speakers have not
taken into account, hearers can improve their epistemic situation by adopting the
corresponding subjective probabilities, now based on evidence that includes the speaker’s
claim.42 Moreover, this practice would not only make sense, but seems to be our actual
practice. It is clear that hearers often respond in the relevant way to likelihood claims. It is also
clear that speakers adjust their utterances in ways relevant to this function, expressing their
likelihood judgments when epistemic guidance is needed and withholding or making explicitly
subjective their likelihood claims when they have specific reasons to think that others have
more information about the case at hand (“He is likely to be in the orchard, I think, but
Claudia knows more”).
Assume, as seems overwhelmingly reasonable, that this is the characteristic
communicative function of likelihood claims. Given ACCEPT/REJECT, to accept the claim that
X is likely or reject the claim that X is not likely is then to judge that X is likely; to accept the
claim that X is not likely or reject the claim that X is likely is to judge that it is not likely. Given
AGREE/DISAGREE, DISAGREEMENT follows for likelihood claims.43
It seems, then, that AGREE/DISAGREE can account for the relevant phenomena both in
ordinary descriptive discourse and in the case of tastiness and likelihood claims, given
independently plausible ascriptions of characteristic communicative functions to these claims.
This adds to the antecedent plausibility of the postulated connection between agreement,
disagreement, and communicative function.
42
Recently, a number of people have tried to analyze epistemic modals in terms of communicative
function. See especially Willer’s recent (2013) proposal to understand them in terms of their context
change potential and Björnsson and Finlay’s (2010) proposal to understand epistemic relativity in
deontic modals in terms of the practical function (cf. Lennertz (2014)). See also Montminy’s (2012)
suggestion that claims of the form it might be that p have as their main communicative function to
“weakly suggest” p, and that acceptance, rejection, and assessments targets this “suggestive”.
43
More generally, the suggestion that the function of epistemic modals is to guide likelihood judgments
setting subjective probabilities within an epistemic situation, seems to explain many of the problem
cases that von Fintel and Gillies (2008) raise against assessor relativist accounts of epistemic modals.
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5. Understanding CORRECTNESS, INDEPENDENCE, and NO RELATIVIZATION
Turn now from agreement and disagreement to the sort of attributions of correctness and
incorrectness (and cognates truth and falsehood, rightness and wrongness) that are directly involved in
the CORRECTNESS, INDEPENDENCE, and NO RELATIVIZATION aspects of UNITY. As in the
previous section, the task is to not only predict but also make sense of patterns of such
attributions across domains of discourse. The key here, as in the previous section, will be an
understanding of the characteristic function of the claims and judgments involved.
The account to be developed builds on the notion of a fundamental standard for judgments:
FUNDAMENTAL STANDARD:
S is a fundamental standard for a judgment, J, if and only if
there is evidential support for J to the extent that, and because, there is evidence that
J satisfies S.
For illustration, the fundamental standard for ordinary judgments about non-relative features
of the world is presumably that they represent the world as it is, or correspond to the facts
(leaving open how representation and correspondence are best understood). So, for example,
there is evidential support for the judgment that Hobbes wrote Leviathan to the extent that, and
because, there is evidence that the world is as represented by this judgment. Moreover,
treating correspondence as the fundamental standard makes sense given that these judgments
serve as our “map” of an intersubjectively accessible world, a map variously employed in
theoretical and practical cognition to serve our many concerns and interests. Normally, our
successful use of this map will rely on a systematic correspondence between its constituting
judgments and the relevant aspects of the world.
Using the notion of a fundamental standard, I suggest that the relevant attributions of
correctness and incorrectness (and cognates) work as follows:
CORRECT/INCORRECT:
We find a judgment correct, right or true (incorrect, wrong or
false) to the extent that we take that judgment (its contrary) to conform to the
fundamental standard for such judgments. We find a claim correct, right or true
(incorrect, wrong or false) to the extent that we take the sort of judgment constituting
acceptance (rejection) of the claim to conform to the fundamental standard for such
judgments.44
44
Notice that CORRECT/INCORRECT provides no account of truth, falsehood, etc., only an account of
our attributions of such properties. It should be compatible with a variety of substantive theories of
truth, including minimalist theories, but it might relate in most obvious ways to theories building on
the idea that truth is the goal of rational inquiry. For ways of building theories of truth on that idea
and related platitudes, see Lynch (2009) and C. Wright (1992).
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Assume that we take correspondence to be the fundamental standard for judgments
communicated in ordinary, non-relative descriptive discourse. Given CORRECT/INCORRECT,
perceived correspondence will then guide attributions of correctness and incorrectness to such
judgments, as well as to claims the function of which is to produce (or make occurrent) such
judgments. CORRECTNESS follows straightforwardly: if F is a non-relative descriptive predicate
and A claims that X is F while B claims that X is not F, then if one claim is correct (true, right)
the other must be incorrect (false, wrong). Likewise for INDEPENDENCE and NO
RELATIVIZATION.
What I will argue now is that there are plausible stories to tell about what we should
expect the operative fundamental standards to be not only for paradigmatically absolutist
judgments, but also for tastiness and likelihood judgments. Given these stories,
CORRECT/INCORRECT has enough substance to let us explain why CORRECTNESS,
INDEPENDENCE, and NO RELATIVIZATION obtain to varying degrees for these different kinds
of judgments.
Start with tastiness claims, focusing on the positive variety (“X is tasty”, as opposed to “X
is not tasty”). The characteristic communicative function of such claims, I have suggested, is
not to bring about judgments that some non-relative state of affairs obtains, but to provide
(fallible) gustatory guidance by making hearers expect that their own palates would react
favorably to the item in question. Correspondingly, the fundamental standards for accepting
or rejecting positive tastiness claims are standards that determine what we take to support or
undermine such expectations. Clearly, we do not in general take there to be any such
standards beyond the palates of the individual judges functioning under suitably normal
circumstances. Given this, CORRECT/INCORRECT explains why attributions of correctness or
incorrectness to tastiness claims seem off when there is reason to think that parties of the
conversation will have different taste reactions to the item in question: there is no one relevant
standard to appeal to in the discourse. If there is a standard to apply here, it is judge relative,
leading to violations of CORRECTNESS, INDEPENDENCE, and NO RELATIVIZATION. But
CORRECT/INCORRECT also explains why assessments of correctness and incorrectness seem
possible in contexts where it is assumed that all involved have matching taste reactions with
respect to the relevant foods: in such contexts, there is a common standard. Together with an
independently plausible account of the function of tastiness clams, CORRECT/INCORRECT can
thus explain both why CORRECTNESS is problematic for tastiness and why attributions of
correctness and incorrectness are nevertheless possible in some contexts.
Next consider likelihood claims. Their communicative function, I have suggested, is to
produce likelihood judgments that set the same subjective probabilities as the judgments
expressed by the claims. By CORRECT/INCORRECT, the relevant standards for assessments of
correctness, incorrectness, etc., would thus be standards for these likelihood judgments. What
standards are these? In general, we think that likelihood judgments governing subjective
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probabilities should be reasonable given the evidence, and be based on more relevant
evidence rather than less. This explains why we take a likelihood claim to be incorrect if we
can support rejection of it with reference to evidence going beyond what is accessible to the
speaker, as Claudia does in the case of FINDING FELIX. We thus have a straightforward
explanation of why likelihood claims can conform to CORRECTNESS even when ABSOLUTISM
is not satisfied for the judgments involved: the fundamental standards are insensitive to the
information accessible to particular speakers. For the same reason, INDEPENDENCE might
seem to hold: any evidence that hearers have access to, whether available to the speaker or
not, might be relevant for criticizing or supporting acceptance or rejection of the claim.
Likewise for NO RELATIVIZATION: To determine which likelihood judgments are supported
relative to the evidence available to different judges is not yet to resolve any disagreement
about whether Felix is likely to be in the orchard. This can only be done by determining
which evidence is best.
What, though, of our willingness, in HINDSIGHT, to deem correct Basil’s claim that Felix
was likely to be in the orchard, and our reluctance to say that it was incorrect? If a likelihood
claim should be rejected if our best evidence supports the contrary likelihood judgment, why
do we not just reject Basil’s claim? The explanation for this, I suggest, is the same as for our
difficulty to judge, in HINDSIGHT, whether Felix was likely to be in the orchard. Since the
function of ordinary, unrelativized, likelihood judgments is to guide our subjective
probabilities for a proposition, they have no place once we take the truth value of that
proposition for granted. Relatedly, likelihood claims having as their characteristic
communicative function to produce likelihood judgments have no such function in relation to
hearers who already know the truth value of that proposition. The correctness of such claims
must thus be assessed in relation to some other epistemic perspective than that of HINDSIGHT
knowledge. Since the most salient such perspective when considering the correctness of Basil’s
claim will be Basil’s own, we are naturally led to think about whether accepting the claim
would satisfy the standards relative to the information available in that perspective.45 Of
course, the same holds, mutatis mutandis, for our assessments of Claudia’s claim that Felix
was not likely to be in the orchard. So CORRECTNESS is violated, and, by extension, so are
INDEPENDENCE and NO RELATIVIZATION.
45
Cf. Björnsson and Almér (2010); Björnsson and Finlay (2010, 23). As noted for other epistemic
modals, related phenomena are displayed within a conversation when it is common knowledge that
one of the parties has more information but will not share it (von Fintel and Gillies (2008, 90);
Björnsson and Almér (2010, 31–32).
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6. Prospects for a non-ABSOLUTIST account of moral UNITY
Thus far I have proposed ways of understanding disagreement and attributions of correctness
that are independently motivated and seem to capture the extent to which UNITY is satisfied in
paradigmatically ABSOLUTE domains as well as in the case of tastiness and likelihood
judgments. Since space prevents a fuller defense of these proposals, my objective here has
been more modest: to present and provide initial motivation of a principled ground for
assessing non-ABSOLUTIST explanations of UNITY in the moral domain.
Suppose that AGREE/DISAGREE and CORRECT/INCORRECT are indeed on the right track.
Then a non-ABSOLUTIST explanation of moral UNITY requires two things. First, it requires
that moral claims have a characteristic communicative function such that judgments
constituting acceptance of these claims can differ in their internal success conditions. If they
do, people’s agreement and disagreement on moral issues do not depend on absolutism.
Second, it requires that people take fundamental standards for moral judgments to have
consistent content and apply equally across moral judgments, independent of variations in the
internal success conditions, and independently of assessors’ own relations to the judges. If
people do, this would be sufficient, independently of absolutism, for people to attribute
correctness and incorrectness along the pattern of CORRECTNESS, while taking
INDEPENDENCE and NO RELATIVIZATION to be satisfied.
Both requirements seem well within the realm of the possible. Consider the first.
Although few defend stronger forms of motivational internalism, it should be much less
controversial that moral claims have as their characteristic communicative function to bring
about or make occurrent judgments with a certain practical role. For example, it seems
plausible that claims of moral wrongness have as their characteristic communicative function
to bring about or make occurrent judgments that dispose judges to negative social emotions
towards the agent. Likewise, it seems reasonably plausible that claims of what ought to be
done under certain circumstances, all things considered, have as their characteristic function
to bring about or make occurrent plans to act accordingly. Neither of these functional
hypotheses requires any strong form of motivational internalism. What is required is merely
that we have default expectations that these claims are made in order that hearers make
judgments with certain practical roles, and that these expectations are embodied in our
default patterns of acceptance and rejection.46 Moreover, it seem at least possible that moral
46
This assumption is in line with recent empirical studies of internalist intuitions among lay people (see
Björnsson et al. (2014)) but should be compatible even with strong externalist views, such as those of
Strandberg (2012) and Svavarsdottir (1999); (2006). Practical roles might include not only being for or
against something, but also states of preferential neutrality, either all-considerations-considered, or allmoral-considerations-considered (see Dreier (2006); (2009); Silk (forthcoming)).
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claims have these practical functions even though internal success conditions for moral
judgments vary among moral judges. The lack of agreement—extensional or intensional—on
substantial characterizations of moral properties provides prima facie evidence that internal
success conditions do in fact vary, and it seems undeniable that we need coordination of
attitudes between people not antecedently committed to the same practical standards.
The second requirement seems equally surmountable. Non-absolutism itself says nothing
about how we conceive of the fundamental standards against which we assess moral
judgments, and forms of relativism and non-cognitivism seem compatible in principle with the
assumption that we conceive of such standards as invariant across judges and judgments. In
fact, if moral discourse and moral thinking are shaped to support the coordination of attitudes
through the coordination of moral judgments, as non-absolutists have often suggested,47 such
invariance in standards for judgments might be an important regulative ideal.
At least at a first glance, then, AGREE/DISAGREE and CORRECT/INCORRECT seem to
leave room for non-ABSOLUTIST explanations of moral UNITY. Interestingly, they also suggest
reasons why the moral domain might not display UNITY to the fullest extent. One possibility,
for example, is that people understand the characteristic function of moral claims as restricted
to an audience within the speaker’s society, roughly in the way that the function of likelihood
claims might be restricted to an audience sharing the same epistemic predicament. If people
do, they should find DISAGREEMENT problematic when considering the moral claims and
judgments of people in other societies. Another possibility, suggested by the case of
HINDSIGHT, is that some people see fundamental standards as relative in various ways, or
apply different standards depending on whose judgment is being assessed, perhaps depending
on the society in which it is made. People who do might reject CORRECTNESS and
INDEPENDENCE while thinking that DISAGREEMENT holds. 48 AGREE/DISAGREE and
CORRECT/INCORRECT thus provide tools given which UNITY can be systematically explained
in non-ABSOLUTIST discourse to the extent that it is actually there.
Of course, to say that some form of non-absolutism can explain UNITY in the moral
domain is not to say that there is one that actually does. For all I have said, absolutism might
be true, and both relativist and non-cognitivist accounts might ultimately succumb to
objections other than the argument from UNITY. If what I have said here is correct, however,
and if AGREE/DISAGREE and CORRECT/INCORRECT are on the right track, a systematic,
independently motivated and non-ad hoc account of moral UNITY is in the offing. This is an
interesting enough prospect to merit further consideration.
47
See e.g. Björnsson and McPherson (2014); Blackburn (1993b); Gibbard (1990).
48
The folk intuitions canvassed by Sarkissian et al. (2011) might reveal such an understanding.
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