The Ekstatic View of the Will

The ekstatic view of the will Critical Notice, T. Schapiro, Feeling Like It: A Theory of Inclination and Will (OUP 2021) Carla Bagnoli We often feel like doing something and yet not determined to it. This is ‘the moment of drama’, the point at which it is up to the agent to decide whether to go along with the inclination (15). This is the theme of a much-anticipated book by a leading scholar in ethics. Tamar Schapiro argues that to account for this drama, we must recognize that the agent enjoys a certain freedom to act as the inclinations prompt, and the aim of this book is to develop a philosophical conception of how agents exercise their freedom. In a nutshell, the puzzle is this: “inclinations are forms of motivation with respect to which we are distinctively passive. But to be motivated is not to be moved; it is to be self-moved. How is it possible to be passive in relation to your own self-movement?” (38). A successful theory of the will explains how we are simultaneously passive and active in regard to the inclinations. What is at stake is not whether agents do the right thing, but how agents “handle the pressure of the moment”, and ultimately, whether agents will become who they can (12, 18). Schapiro’s answer to this question points to procedural ideals of detachment, which have the function of disempowering the inclinations, that is, robbing them of the motivational function they normally have (13). Thus, the fundamental question is whether and why we need such ideals. The structure of the book is straightforward. In the first part of the volume (chapter 1-3), Schapiro organizes a debate between the monist and the dualist accounts of the motivational sources of action and criticizes the main theoretical options. Chapters 4 -6 build on the accomplishments of the pars destruens for shaping the positive view. Schapiro is a dualist: she wants to say that inclinations represent an independent motivational source of agency, and thus they may conflict with the will, even though they do not necessitate. She seeks a midpoint between two unsuccessful theories of the will. On the brute force view discussed in chapter 2, the will power is analogous to muscle power and inclinations are completely external to it (50). The practical thinking view discussed in chapter 3, instead, acknowledges that inclinations entertain a more complex relation to reason but underestimates the extent to which inclinations are perceived as external forces and overestimates the explanatory power of the claim that to be inclined to do something is to be engaged in practical thinking. The project is avowedly Kantian (21), stemming from the claim that inclinations incline the agent to act one way or another but do not determine the agent to act accordingly. According to Schapiro, Kant’s theory is underdeveloped, and he has not drawn all implications of the theory (4). Her work is designed to improve on Kant in addressing an issue that she finds under-theorized. Her major innovation in regard to Kant is the extension of Kant’s test of moral worth to actions in general: “whenever you determine yourself to there is a sense in which you determine yourself to -regardless-of-whether-you-happen-to-be-inclined-to-” (29). Unlike Kant, Schapiro holds that self-determination necessarily refers to inclinations: the will and the inclinations are “a package” (30), which is kept together by a sui generis relation, and bears both the marks of activity and passivity. According to Schapiro, some ambiguities in Kant’s Groundwork leave unclear whether he sides with either of the two camps she distinguishes regarding the status of inclinations (91-93). I think the issue largely depends on the way the notion of inclination is understood, as largely debated in Kant scholarship. The ekstatic view of the will Inclination is a term of art, and Schapiro takes it to refer to “essentially motivational” elements of our psychology, stemming not only from emotions but also from instincts and appetites. While the concept of inclination is motivational, it allows for the possibility that one acts without having the inclination to do so. In contrast to the brute view, Schapiro holds that inclinations are not merely external to agency but play a deliberative role. The asymmetric pressure that they exert is an “asymmetric volitional pressure, on us in our role as deciders of what to do” (54). Furthermore, agents are active in relation to inclinations: by cultivating them, agents shape themselves, embarking in the project of self-formation. To vindicate inclinations as an independent motivational source, playing a deliberative role, and positively interacting with the will, Schapiro personifies inclinations into an “inner animal”. On the inner animal view, there is a whole commitment of the animal part, the wholehearted activity of a part of you. Thus, “inclinations issue from a perspective that is itself a source of agency”, while initiating an activity independently of the agent’s will (82). The inner animal view holds that inclinations are not brute forces, but “a part of you that is already doing something, in a consciously guided way”, a sub-personal agent; it is a creature of instinct which stands against the deliberating self (85). This is why deliberation is the experience of an inner division. In confronting their inclinations, human agents face “a distinctive kind of predicament, one that holds peril and promise” (26). The predicament is distinctive of agents with a mind of their own, that is, free to assess and inhibit their inclinations, capable of determining themselves one way or another, despite and independently of how the inclinations incline them to act. This is a normative power that other kinds of agents do not have, but it is also a predicament. Agents lacking (or deprived of) the capacities for self-reflection, self-representation, and self-determination do not experience any puzzle regarding their inclinations, drives, and urges. It would be imprecise to say that such unreflective agents merely follow their inclinations, insofar as ‘following the inclinations’ entails the capacity to distinguish one’s own stance from the inclinations. Presumably, agents lacking any capacity for self-reflection also lack any sense of the distinction between themselves as agents and the forces acting in them: they are one and the same with these forces. Instead, self-reflective agents do not only have the problem of what to do, or how to reach a goal, but also and at the same time the problem of how to manage themselves through action. Thus, decision-making is not about bringing about something but also, and most importantly, about expressing and determining oneself in action. The moment of drama is the moment at which the agent’s stance is defined and is the peak of deliberation. How is the division overcome in deliberation? In the moment of drama, the agent is “being drawn out” of herself (86); “It is a condition of ekstasis, in which you are at a distance from a part of yourself. It is also a condition of suspense” (86). The dramatic term “suspense” emphasizes that the result of deliberation is not known ahead of deliberation: it is the agent’s own activity that determines action, not the force of inclinations. The suspense is analogous to the stage of distancing in Korsgaard’s account of the process of reflective endorsement (Korsgaard 1996, chaps. 3-4). But Schapiro remarks that the condition of inner division that the agent experiences in deliberation is not a condition of alienation. The term ekstasis is quite appropriate, though it is used only once in the volume. It tells us that while deliberation is described as a psychological phenomenon, the state of inner division is solved by a transcendental move, which suspends the motivational force of inclinations and ends up with authorizing action under the representation of freedom. This ekstatic conception of the will raises important issues about the nature of human agency, and the way its explication relates to temporality. Schapiro chooses to stay close at the level of practice and exemplifies the ekstatic conditions with examples from meditation practices (see chapter 2). But even in such practices the question of temporality importantly arises, and not solely regarding the subjective perception of time passing. Schapiro’s metaphor of being drawn out of oneself hints to a deep and intricate problem regarding the structure of human agency. Kant casts human agency as both “in and out of time”, (on the two-world view), or rather as “temporal and atemporal” (on the two-aspects view) since humans act in time and yet under the representation of freedom. To the extent that rational agency is viewed “out of time”, this may be regarded as an ekstatic view of rational will. Correspondingly, the problem of human agency is framed in terms of the possibility to break with temporal succession. This leads to the paradoxical claim that human agents constitute themselves in time while this presupposes both acting in time and out of time. To begin to solve the paradox, Kant undertakes two philosophical tasks, explanatory and practical (see Allison 1990, 25-28). Importantly, for Kant, these two tasks are neither mutually independent nor self-sufficient because the empirical and intelligible characters that are supposed to account for human action are related by reason. This is not the occasion to enter the complexities of a debate that has occupied Kant scholars for ages. However, it is useful to note that precisely to vindicate this duality, a sensible Kantian approach is bound to maintain that philosophy have both speculative/explanatory and normative/practical tasks in relation to human agency. While Kant accords priority to the practical use of reason, he does not discount the importance of the explanatory account of human agency. While Kant is a dualist regarding motivation, his conception of practical reason is meant to vindicate both the atemporal and temporal dimensions of human rational agency. The efficacy of reason ultimately depends on practical feelings. Thus, the question about how to deal with inclinations belongs in this dualist psychological framework, and Kant’s answer centers on the constraining function of respect as the moral incentive. Insofar as Schapiro rejects any explanatory task, her ekstatic metaphors raise worries about the temporality of human agency. Her account of how rational agents authorize actions by taking responsibility for them gives absolute priority to the issue of activity, over the explanatory issue. To this extent, this account departs from Kant and places itself in the wake of Sartre, as it were. Indeed, Schapiro’s drama of choice-making is marked by existentialist overtones. The strategy is that inclinations can guide action only after agents have chosen them as motives by according them authority. By reaching the condition of ekstasis, agents commit to do something through freedom, in a manner very much like Sartre’s original choice. This move justifies the method of inquiry into human agency as it unfolds in the perspective of the agent as an engaged and tacitly committed participant in a practice (23): “When you take up the standpoint of a practical reasoner, you take on the responsibility of an agent, which might be characterized as that of determining yourself according to principles in a shared social order” (25). The reader well versed in action-theory might note at least a superficial convergence with the first-person approach to action in contrast to the standard conception of action and the reductivist-naturalistic models of agency, but Schapiro is reluctant to adopt this characterization of the Kantian method of inquiry and hastens to remark that her problem is not epistemic (23 fn 20). However, to draw a sharp contrast between the first-person and the Kantian approach is unnecessary and potentially misleading because it underestimates the explanatory value of the distinction between speculative and practical knowledge, which holds across Aristotelian and Kantian varieties of practical cognitivism. Thus, the question arises about the comparative merits of her Kantian method vis à vis the alternative Aristotelian approach. Schapiro follows Korsgaard in her narrow definition of epistemology, see Korsgaard 2003, 110 ff. In so doing, she loses sight of the distinction between practical and speculative knowledge, cf. Bagnoli 2013: 160-165. On both views, rational agents authorize actions as agents aware of their efficacy, and efficacious through knowledge of themselves as the agents of the action. Practical knowledge is a variety of self-knowledge, but also a variety of practical efficacy. The similarity between the Kantian and the Aristotelian or Anscombian methods is structural, and points to the key role of self-awareness in practical reasoning which explains how we gain authority of action, which is precisely the problem that Schapiro sets out to explain. The psychodrama of deliberation By bringing into sharp focus the way in which agents relate to inclinations, Schapiro promises that we also gain a better understanding of the social dimension and significance of inclinations. This is because, in her view, “the relation in which we stand to our inclinations is paralleled by the relation in which we stand to our social environment. Social roles and scripts are sources of motivational influence in relation to which we can take two options” (3). The quoted passage suggests that the roles that we impersonate in the social space are sources of motivational force whose normative pressure is up to us to assess and undertake. Until and unless we do so, they remain sources of influences external to the self. Thus, Schapiro’s approach makes the problem of dealing with inclinations a totally internal affair – indeed, the agent’s own problem. In fact, practical reasoning is the standpoint of an agent taking responsibility for action/determining yourself according to principles in a shared social order (25), and there is an occasional reference to others as co-participants (26). The role of a shared social order and shared practices would be an important aspect of authorization, but it is unclear how it coheres with the ekstatic view of choice. Without an articulate account of how and under which conditions such practices are shared, it is hard to understand what co-participation is and how social practices contribute to rational choice in the moment of drama. These are well discussed themes in Kantian scholarship: the test of universality can be interpreted as a test of self-legislation or co-legislation, and Kant provides significant resources for making sense of social practices, see e.g., Reath 2006, Deligiorgi 2012, Bagnoli 2017, and 2022, section 4. To be sure, the pressure that an agent confronts in the moment of drama may originate from outside, and particularly from their social embedding. However, the social embedding does not play any role in Schapiro’s accounting of the normative pressure of the inclinations. The agent deals with it with bare hands, by jumping into the “ekstatic dimension” as it were. Yet the social embeddedness of emotions, needs, urgences, and inclinations does not merely represent a side complication but lies at the root of important problems regarding the way we should conceive of action authorization, and relatedly, of the way actions are expressive of the self rather than extorted or compelled from outside. On the social dimensions of inclinations, and the vices of culture, see e.g., Wood 2014. Some social inclinations, or passions such as greed and ambition, are social not only in the sense that they arise in society, but also because they are directed to humans and related to the predisposition to humanity. Arguably, the social nature of inclinations at least partly explains their normative authority, not only their motivational force. If so, the practical and normative significance of socially embedded inclinations may be already at least partially determined prior to the agent’s drama of decision-making, and there are interesting questions as to whether they can be socially instilled and to what extent they can be voluntarily abandoned or transformed. This problem resonates with large and extremely complex scholarly debates about Kant’s conception of radical evil, and the function of Gesinnung, cf. Hills 2014. For Schapiro, the inclinations can be single-handedly chosen in the ekstatic moment of rational deliberation, in a way that discounts the significance of their social embeddedness. To fully appreciate the implications of this claim, it would have been useful to rely on a more precise definition of inclinations. Unless the term restricts to instinctual and biological drives – an option explicitly averted as worrisome (section 4.6) – inclinations are also related to emotions. Emotions are not the only source of inclinations, but they are acknowledged as one source of them. As Bernard Williams reminds us in his study of shame, some emotions are best understood in terms of their function in a social network, as they convey social knowledge of one’s social position in the social order and standing in the shared practices. Several critics have pointed out the limitations of this approach to practical identity, starting with the respondents of Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity (1996), including Williams. Within the ensuing debate, this critique has inspired variants of ethical constructivism quite different from Korsgaard’s, see Bagnoli 2022, sections 2, 4. The individual uptake of responsibility for action is part and parcel of a social practical of mutual accountability, in which emotions play a large role. Apart from the opening remark about the parallel between inclinations and social scripts (3), Schapiro’s argument does not address the social dimension of the drama. Thus, deliberation is an activity of self-unification. In Schapiro’s account, the dramatis personae are the “acting person” and the “animal” within it. Supposedly, this is an amelioration of Korsgaard’s distinction between the “thinking self” and “acting self”, which personify the two sides of the reflective conscience and are crystallized in two subsequent stages of the activity of reflection: distancing and endorsement (Korsgaard 1996: 165). The purported amelioration is that the inclinations are agential, and while the activity of authorization requires distancing it is not alienating. This is not fully clear, however. Schapiro’s new metaphor of “being drawn out of oneself” is also suggestive of alienation, even though it is supposed to apply at a different level. As much as in Korsgaard’s account of reflective endorsement, the problem of the agent’s dealing with their inclinations is treated as a solitary internal affair: What is staged is a psychodrama, that is, a drama that plays in the agent’s mind. The (social) world enters solely as backdrop scenery, and social roles and scripts are ultimately up for choice. But this is reductive and unduly simplifies matters. In this regard, Kant’s forensic and political metaphors seem far more perspicuous in articulating the activity that leads to the agential authority of action. See, e.g., Reath 2006, Bagnoli 2017. Finally, the ekstatic view is bound to disregard the dynamic and historical dimension of rational agency. The ekstatic view of the rational will charges the dramatic moment of choice-making with all significance, hence implicitly overshadowing the long-term history of inner conflict and the preparatory and processual stages of deliberation. This may result in a loss of explanatory power regarding the diachronic dimension of practical thinking, the long-term activities leading to decision-making, the complex processes of self-formation, the construction of practical identity as well as the social practices and activities that help us to sustain our commitments across time. Schapiro draws on resources that may seem decisive in articulating a reply to the worries voiced above. Her solution of the psychodrama avowedly adapts Korsgaard’s definition of practical identity as the description under which agents value themselves (Korsgaard 1996: 165). Likewise, Schapiro holds that agents need a “guiding conception”, not a description of who they are but of the activity in which they are engaged (22). Indeed, in post-Kantian philosophy, the appeal to identity traditionally does the job of accommodating phenomena such as social embeddedness, history, and integrity over time. The notion of ‘practical identity’ qualifies as a mediating concept, but for Korsgaard the plurality of practical identities ultimately rests on the abstract notion of moral identity (1996, 3.3.1, 4; 2008, 1.4). But the role that practical identity plays in this debate is quite different. It is a theoretical device that serves three important tasks, all restricted to the individual self: it points out that the decision about what to do with one’s inclinations amounts to a choice that invests one’s self-conception; it centers on the modes of the agent’s taking responsibility for action; and it accounts for deliberation as a mode of expressing and shaping one’s agency, rather than merely performing or bringing about something. Why taking the “high road”? While the methodological convergence with Korsgaard resonates throughout the volume, in chapter 4, Schapiro explains that she finds the constitutional model advocated by Korsgaard unpromising for the problem of inclinations (121). Since the problem of inclinations is tantamount to the very problem of human agency, this is not a minor difference. However, the inadequacy of the constitutional model to account for inclinations may depend on the way “inclinations” are defined. Korsgaard seems to use the term in a narrower sense than Schapiro, and closer to Kant’s Neigungen, which refers to “the dependence of the faculty of desire on sensations” and always indicates a need (G 4: 413, R 26-27). A will determined by inclination would be reacting to stimuli, and thus qualifies as an instance of “animal choice (arbitrium brutum)” (MM 6: 213). Korsgaard writes that “because of the reflective character of the mind ... we must act ... under the idea of freedom” (Korsgaard 1996: 94). Desires and perceptions ‘happen’ to us, but which of them will determine our actions is a matter of choice (Korsgaard 1996: 96). On Korsgaard’s account, the answer to the problem of integrity as well as diachronic integration resides in the articulation of a moral identity, which commits human agents to rank humanity prior to other incentives, which spring not only from instinctual drives but also from the varieties of practical identities. A radical moral choice is the ground for any rational practical choice. Korsgaard explains this feature by suggesting that any rational choice ultimately requires the appeal to the value of humanity, which is the ground of moral identity. The significance of the appeal to identity is best appreciated in the case of tragic moral conflict, in which moral and practical identities clash. Rational and moral agency have a common root, and so no choice is fully deprived of moral significance. Critics of Kant have pointed out that it is hard to make sense of this claim without moralizing rationality. I think Schapiro is right in rejecting the view that rational choice resides in a moral “identity”. Perhaps the focus on inclinations is a better strategy to capture the Kantian view that any rational agency is continuous with moral agency. However, this focus helps us understand one side of the Kantian story, that is, the psychological underpinning of negative freedom. But what about positive freedom? Is it possible to act on the basis of reason alone? The absence of any analogue of Kant’s “moral sensibility”, which explains how one can be motivated independently of inclinations, makes it hard to understand how human agents, susceptible to all sorts of inclinations, effectively choose the high road, especially when the choice is costly and involves a loss in value. In setting aside moral sensibility and moral incentives, we lose sight of the Kantian resources for showing that the high road is not just an exceptional freak action. This is an uncomfortable position to hold, and it is bound to disappoint two distinct audiences, which may be otherwise sympathetic to a Kantian dualist view: the ones focusing on moral sensibility, and the ones working on the empirical and anthropological basis of ethics. First, dualists advocating moral sensibility argue that the merit of the Kantian account of agency is that it provides an explanation of why being moral is not only in our interest but also constitutive of rational agency. Without any account of the motivation by moral incentives, they worry that the very distinction between the high and the low road becomes blurry. The dramatization of the agent’s stance in terms of the contraposition of the acting and the animal self makes it apparent that the problem posited by the inclinations is perennial and pervasive. Thus, rational deliberation is a necessity for agents that are so divided, and presumably also a duty, insofar as the prompts of inclinations may be contrary to duty and the only way to stop them is to deliberate about them. This is a distinctively Kantian claim, in the sense that inclinations are original and ineradicable, and were the conflict with morality to arise, it cannot be lessened or ameliorated by practice or habits. The task of rational deliberation is not to reduce the pressure of inclinations and disempower them, but to demote them. The advantage of Kant’s argumentative strategy is that, unlike the appeal to a moral identity, the appeal to respect as a moral incentive does not lead to a moralization of rationality. Respect is called a moral feeling in contrast to pathological feelings, but its role is to explain how humans, animals endowed with reason, are motivated by reason alone. See, e.g., Engstrom 2010, Guyer 2010, Bagnoli 2011, Dean and Sensen 2021, chaps. 6-7, 9-10. The complex phenomenology and mixed valence of respect reflects how it furthers the activity of reason itself by dislodging the obstacles posited to it by the inclinations (5: 75, 76). Thus, respect, as part of the explanation of pure practical reason, is both able to eliminate the influence of inclination from the human will and to actively motivate it. In feeling respect, human agents experience both negative and positive freedom. Schapiro defends a dualistic conception of practical and pathological motivation (89), but unlike Kant, she does not think that practical reason operates via practical attitudes and has no place for respect. This is a significant point of departure from Kant, but the absence of any reference to moral sensibility might well be welcome as a decisive improvement over Kant’s obsolete moral psychology since it dispenses with the problematic distinction between pathological and moral feelings. This is not Schapiro’s motivation in dropping Kant’s account of respect as a moral incentive, however. She insists that her method is rigorously a priori, by which she means that it does not engage with current empirical psychology. The drama of decision-making amounts to facing the ultimate choice: going along with the inclinations or resisting them. But how to resist them? This is a source of concern for a second audience, interested in an embodied account of rational agency, or in the anthropological basis of Kantian ethics. This audience expects the characterization of inclinations in terms of animality to lead to an investigation of the predicaments of finitude and embodiment. This disappointment that such an investigation is set aside is not misplaced because the reference to animality raises crucial issues regarding embodiment, finitude, interdependency, and mutual vulnerability, which are recognized to be central in the Kantian debate. See, e.g., Wood 1991, Louden 2000, Frierson 2005, Grenberg 2005. Furthermore, a programmatic disregard for empirical research on motivation in building a theory of inclinations and the will is hard to defend precisely because of the advancement made on clarifying what are the methodological commitments associated with a priori reasoning. There are various places in the argument where engaging with current literature would have been helpful to understand how to respond to the challenges against the capacity of reason to guide action. For instance, Peter Railton argues that emotions operate without agential intervention, and this shows that a nondeliberative attunement to reason is possible but arises in the guise of a spontaneous recalibration without the supervision or exercise of agency, Railton 2016: 3-5. Even though the scientist and the philosopher undertake different tasks, it is a pressing philosophical question whether and how an abstract model of rational willing – which seems to vindicate some phenomena of folk psychology – squares with what sciences tell us about motives and action generation. To take up this question is not a sign of skepticism that rational agency and rational authority are genuine phenomena to be taken seriously. Science does not necessarily make progress by disconfirming the investigation of philosophy as resting on confusion, e.g., by explaining away rational willing. From interacting with science, we should not expect to gain a competing view of rational agency, but rather a more complex account of the processes and activities of self-formation and self-constitution, which the ekstatic view treats as mere uptakes. While the research program on embodied agency does not rule out a priori inquiry as such, it puts considerable pressure on philosophical accounts that reduce the complexity of human agency to ekstatic endorsement of motives. An example is the treatment of emotions. Schapiro laments that contemporary philosophers tend to evade the question: how you can be passive in relation to your own self-movement, when it is due to inclinations and emotions? Her diagnosis is that this is the result of a general reliance on desire, which is irremediably ambiguous and “logically tied to acting” (4-5), and an empiricist method which make such division recede in the background. However, the model that Schapiro sketches does not easily fit the emotions, and this misfit raises the issue of how emotions relate to inclinations. This issue depends on what emotions and inclinations are taken to be, a large question that is not exhausted in chapter 2. If emotions are more like processes than episodic states it is hard to frame the moment of drama in the way Schapiro claims. If emotions are not reducible to inclinations, a related interesting question is whether and how they contribute to the efficacy of practical reason. A large body of research on agency shows that the dialogue between philosophers and scientists promises innovative solutions to the problem of the causality of reason, in ways that do not displace the Kantian method but make it less unhelpfully metaphorical and averse to the sciences. In the manner of reviewers, I have pointed to some difficulties. But this is not to diminish the value of this well-crafted and admirably concise book, which will most certainly inspire further work in moral psychology and the philosophy of action. I am grateful to Stefano Bacin, Monika Betzler, Erin Kelly, and Oliver Sensen for their comments. I highly recommend it to anyone interested in these fields. Department of Education and Human Sciences University of Modena and Reggio Emilia carla.bagnoli@unimore.it References Allison, H. 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bagnoli, C. 2011. “Emotions and the Categorical Authority of Moral Reasons”, in Morality and the Emotions, ed. by C. Bagnoli, Oxford University Press, 62-81. Bagnoli, C. 2017. “Kant in Metaethics: The Paradox of Autonomy, Solved by Publicity”, The Palgrave Kant Handbook/Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism, Matthew Altman Ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 355-377. Bagnoli, C. 2021. “Respect and the Dynamics of Finitude”, in R. Dean & O. Sensen (Eds.), Respect Oxford: Oxford University Press, 121-139 Bagnoli, C. 2022. Ethical Constructivism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Deligiorgi, K. 2012. The Scope of Autonomy: Kant and the morality of freedom. Oxford University Press Engstrom, S. 2010. The Triebfeder of pure practical reason. In Andrews Reath & Jens Timmermann eds., Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, 90–118. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frierson, P.R. 2005. Kant’s Empirical Account of Human Action. Philosophers’ Imprint, 5, 1-34. Grenberg, J. 2001. “Feeling, Desire and Interest in Kant’s Theory of Action”. Kant-Studien, 92, 153-179. Guyer, P. 2010. “Moral Feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals”. In L. Denis (ed.), Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 130-152. Hills, A. 2014. Gesinnung: Responsibility, moral worth, and character. In G. Michalson (Ed.), Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide (Cambridge Critical Guides, 79-97. Louden, R.B. 2000. Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings. New York: Oxford University Press. Railton, P. 2016. At the Core of Our Capacity to Act for a Reason: The Affective System and Evaluative Model-Based Learning and Control. Emotion Review 9/3: 1-8. Reath, A. 2006. Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Theory. Oxford University Press . Williams, B. 1994. Shame and Necessity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wood, A.W. 1991. Unsociable Sociability: The Anthropological Basis of Kantian Ethics. Philosophical Topics 19 (1):325-351 Wood, A.W. 2014. The evil in human nature. In G. Michalson (Ed.), Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide (Cambridge Critical Guides, pp. 31-57). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1 1