Clientelism revisited

23rd WORLD CONGRESS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION July 19-24, 2014, Montréal, Québec-Canada. Mexican Clientelism Revisited Luz María Cruz Parcero Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, UNAM luzmaparcero@yahoo.com.mx Abstract Contemporary analysis of clientelism aims to revisit the core of the concept in order to study its potencial capacity for making work the relationships between social groups and the State. The paper is about a PH D research in wich is pointed out the topic of clientelistic relationships in the contemporary Mexican State. Heading from the main research in rural communities it is possible to identify bridges wich have allowed the moving of the relationships marked by clientelistic relationships to some horizontal linkages. The question is whether it is possible that new client networks may contain structural and functional elements capable of activating networks of social capital. 1 Introduction As Luigi Graziano (1973, 16-17) pointed, all political systems are more or less clientelars and it is important to analyze three properties (structural, political and as a development condicional element in a society) in order to establish how deep is the clientelar structure. Their role is more important than we think, when we seek clientelism, we find it (Médard, 1998). While the above statements are true, one of the issues that seem most important for the study of clientelism today is to see what are the characteristics of the exchange, how to dress, how it is structured and how it works in contemporary organizations. Following the first studies of patronage from an antropological perspective, many authors have described clientelism as a dyadic monolitic structure that represent the worst form of political domination and it’s mainly focuse in the electoral arena. From the point of view of a mexican historian clientelism “is one of the oldest and most persistent opponents of the republic and democracy in Mexico” that has been with us during the past five centuries (Semo 2012, 583). However contemporary scholars discussion tends to point out the subtile and profund differences between the past and present clientelism (Audelo, 2004; Combes, 2011; Gay, 1998), although most of these studies have focused on the election issue and exchange of favors for votes (Auyero, 1997; Díaz Cayeros-EstévezMagaloni: 2007; Fox: 1994, 1995, 2012; Freidenberg, 2014; Schedler 2004). As clientelism in not only electoral, we can find new forms of intermediation as a condensation of past reminiscences and the addition of new mechanisms of intermediation through mediators called brokers that provide new features and ways of client relationship, which involves rethinking problems and methodological approaches to the subject. This new forms compel us to search on the new mechanisms that let see the clientelism as a new way for the communication of interests and groups based on new elements of collective organization and identity. From a theoretical point of view the discussion involves a very important issue about democracy and representation. Like a kaleidoscope, democratic theory 2 has many reflections and despite being a deeply rooted phenomenon, clientelism is still an opaque and low light reflection. In order to analyze the clientelism properties in contemporary Mexico is important to look at its structure nowadays (not more as the same as the vertical structure described for authors in the middle seventies), therefore our proposition is to study clientelism not as the anthropological perspective that points out types of traditional domination with a legitimacy of subordination and described a face to face relationship where one is the dominant, but as a multifunctional structure with a very powerful function as the replacement structures described by Robert Merton (1965) and also into a new dimension of elements of collective organization and identity (Gay 1998,14). Conceptual definition and attributes In order to define and look for the attributes of clientelism, we can find three main perspectives: the anthropological, the political sociology and that of the political science. Since the British social anthropology of the fifties, there are studies that describe forms of client relationship in Mediterranean societies. In this perspective, client relations are not only systems of domination but domination of any legitimate way. Without entering into the realm of the legal or formal, we would be affirming that it is Weber types of traditional domination with a legitimacy of subordination. The anthropological vision focus on community relations and individual bonds, in pre-industrial societies, the individual exists not isolated but part of an institution-the community, be it urban or rural, which covers all their identities, including those associated with kinship and family. In modern societies, the individual becomes political unity. This empowerment of the individual also generates a process of atomization. The notion of citizenship requires that individuals feel a sense of belonging to a unit supraordinaria: the state. (Gunes-Ayata, 1997, p 47). Since the anthropological perspective, fifteen years later we find a turning point with Robert K. Merton (1965), who studied the functions of the political 3 machine and described how functional deficiencies of the official structure generate what he called replacement structures (unofficial) to rise existing needs. The contribution of Merton is a major conceptual leap and a major contribution to sociology and political science to analyze these intermediary structures in the sphere of the State. Another face of the phenomenon has been described by Gunes-Ayata, when she points how patronage linked elites with local leaders and also with the central government. At the same time, the positions of the local patterns could be shored up, and these guys could channel resources from the central government to consolidate their own power and their private profit. Similarly, sometimes could reduce the impact of predatory central government had on local communities. With the expansion of the state administration, local officials even got to be more or less attractive given their connections and their access to power centers located beyond the town. With modernization the amount of roles dedicated to linking positions and competition among local elites increased spread, but continued to prevail demands for implementation and particularistic distribution of public policies and benefits. The research indicated that patronage was not only inevitable but also functional (Gunes-Ayata, 1997, pp. 43-44). While in traditional networks of patronage recognition is based on adscriptive criteria such as land titles, etc., she finds that in the new models is based on performance, the ability to use the links that can transcend the local level for access to centers of power and positions of control over the distribution of resources and services (Gunes-Ayata, 1997, p. 50). The concept lands in political science after touring the anthropological visions and political sociology to explore the mechanisms by which bureaucracies are the necessary support to the growing functional state machinery. According to Weingrod, the difference between the anthropological approach and political science is that for the former, it is a type of social relationship and the second designates a characteristic of a system of government (Briquet p. 18). A classic definition for Political Science is given by Jean-François Médard in 1976: The client relationship is a relationship of personal dependence that is not linked to kinship, which is based on reciprocal exchanges of favors 4 between two people, the employer and the client, which control unequal resources (...). It is a bilateral, particularistic and blurred (...) relationship; a reciprocal relationship (...) which is a mutually beneficial exchange between unequal partners (Médard, 1976). In general, the concept has been used for any type of asymmetrical exchange ratio and increased use has been applied to the field of exchange of votes for favors, goods and/or services, leaving the other side exchanges: economic, political, religious, psychological, military, judicial, administrative, educational, etc. (Médard, 1976, p. 117). Beyond an exhaustive review of the contributions to the studies on the subject, it seems interesting to place five issues that are relevant in the discussion of the clientelism in contemporary societies, and can afford to take a step towards review of the concept from the new features that define the new forms and oiled the mechanisms by which becomes functional in their relationship with the bureaucracy. These five issues that I will address soon are some notes regarding the concept and its attributes, its functional aspects and clientelism think the proposal as a mechanism of social coordination. 1. Clientelism not only refer to the voting exchange, it’s a language and a practice that permeates social and political relations. In addition to its relationship with the electoral arena, it is important to look at the other faces of the phenomena. It is important to take account the other exchanges pointed out by Médard: economic, political, religious, psychological, military, judicial, administrative, educational, etc. 2. In terms of it’s position in the State structure it is important to focus on its pontential as a parallel channel for the promotion of interests, not only in the scope of the personal interests but also inscribed into an institutional order in wich its linkage function act as a bridge between the complex bureaucratic web of the State and the people that is in a marginal position in the same State. This perspective has been studied by Briquet and Sawicki when they said that the political machine is a device to reduce the compensation of public institutions dysfunctions allowing marginal populations integration within the formal political system (Briquet 1998, 16). 5 3. It is also a mean of connection for the resources exchange (economic, political, religious, psychological, military, judicial, administrative, educational, etc.), and as Robert Gay pointed out about the brasilian case, it seems that clientelism has become a means to collective rather than individual assets. Contemporary clientelism shows both hierarchical and relational elements as elements of collective organization and identity (Gay 1998). 4. It has become a mechanism of social coordination in a new network form. In this point is important to distinguish between political coordination in Lechner terms that means the State is in the top and it is a hierarchical relation with a centralized power and the coordination in the form of networks that seem to be more horizontal.1 5. In the scope of the rational choice approach, which reviews the phenomenon of clientelism from merely utilitarian exchange rates; it is a relationship in which the actor weigh the costs and potential benefits of trade, however, contrasted with anthropological, we find that agents can maximize other relationships that not always are linked with the utility. In this vein, think about the notion of reciprocity may help to better understand the phenomenon; it is about moral standards that force you to pay the benefits. This is to see if the client relationship is perceived as legitimate or as collaborative and an exploitative relationship; in this perspective, is a relationship between the balance of trade and the legitimacy of the relationship (Auyero, 1997, pp. 30-33). A good image to represent the perspective of political science is that of a river with many tributaries. In one tributarie flow a formal or official way of intermediation through political parties and the representative institutions; the other Coordination through networks is understood as "horizontal coordination between different stakeholders in the same case in order to negotiate and agree on a solution" (Lechner 1997, 14). Messner points out what constitutes a network: it is an institutional invention that meets the characteristics of a polycentric society; combines vertical and horizontal communication, but is a specific type of coordination, different forms of policy coordination or coordination by the market; link different organizations, establishing an interaction between their representatives (not about relationships within a single organization); it is politic when it meets state authorities (which may be different instances in conflict with each other) and / or political parties with economic and social actors; the in it tend to be more informal than formal (not involving the formation of a new organization); relationships that exist within tend to be more informal; there is interdependence between the participants in it; it’s goal is to formulate and implement collective decisions around particular shared issue; the starting point is a conflict or diversity of interests that it channeled through competitive cooperation (Lechner 1997, 14). 1 6 is where it flows informal relationships that exist through lobbyists or interest but does not have organizations formally recognized in the context of the state; it is the same phenomenon that is inserted differently in state structures. It turns out that these forms exist in a particular state, from the sociohistorical, political and economic processes that define them. Briquet (1998, 14-16) notes that when the issue of patronage is treated as parallel to the penetration of the state instrument (about the sixties) one can see two approaches: first integrator traditional and the other as obstacle to the attainment of the objectives assigned to that integration. It is a process that creates opportunities for social mobility and appropriation of power resources through mediation circuits from a state center. More like a device attenuating compensation dysfunctions of public institutions that allows marginalized groups integrating the official political system, whereby Merton renamed it the (unofficial) replacement structures that allow meet existing needs. From the ponit of view of the Political Science it is important to take account of the functional capacities of clientelism, as a replacement structure in the State, and take account if it is possible that this kind of structure may transform itself from vertical linkages to horizontal ones. The context. Clientelistic State and clientelistic structures. The revision of this phenomenon also implies to consider the context on wich clientelism networks are developed. Unless the democratization process wich contents are mainly related to the electoral arena, the oligarchical form of the Mexican State organization (with some kind of assistencial and interventionist machinery, and some kind of civil society expressions) is still like a pyramid. Unless some signs of democratization our transition to democracy is not yet completed. The corporativist regime that emerges since the post revolucionary process is strongly rooted in the State institutions, the language that links high bureaucracy with people is still, in many fields clientelistic in its exchanging forms. Since the post revolutionary process we most recognize the growth of the State that favored that some organizations, that have not been incorporated in their institutional frameworks but have spread like client networks for better and for 7 worse, and have occupied certain spaces outside the margins of the institutional framewoks of the state. From this perspective we can see two faces of clientelism: as a selfcontradiction of that big and oligarchical form of the state, in wich the counterpart of the same dynamics of growth or expansion brings with his inability to catch or order everything that happens in that what Easton called the black box of the political system; also as a capacity that generates functional areas outside of legal frameworks and political system that defines which has resulted in new mechanisms that refunctionalized one of its most traditional forms of intermediation: patron-client with the emergence of a new figure: the broker whose role is to link clients interests and demands with those of the patron and vice versa. The context for the study is then that space of development of a "set of practices, habits, rituals and unwritten rules that organize competition among actors", the space where conflicts, agreements and disagreements are processed and operate (Villa, 2012, p. 173). We must assume that with the mexican form of corporatism it was not possible to promote a different type of state structure to its essence. However, in today’s panorama we can see subtle changes that require us to study the phenomenon from certain empirical evidence that account for relevant changes to a democratic context. In Latinamerican context Robert Gay observe that the brasilian clientelism has been change and become a means to obtain collective goods instead of the traditional particular ones. In order to this change contemporary clientelism shows jerarquical and relational elements but also elements of collective organization and identity (Gay 1998,14). As a political process, the change is gradual and involves the juxtaposition of the older and the new forms of clientelism. In this perspective our question is if it is possible to find a kind of social capital emergence into this new forms of clientelistic networks. 8 As we can’t find pure traditional or pure modern structures is important to measure the structure and contextual data to find how deep is the clientelar structure and how this structure is moving forward through new forms of linkages. From the classics to the contemporary functions Around the sixties and seventies, a dominant perspective in studies of clientelism was one that was based on the idea that the development of democracy would result from loss of patronage ways that were detrimental to their development; from an evolutionary view, it is understandable the allocated negative value-laden in client relations. A new way to observe the phenomenon is based on certain traits rather than obstacles, that are part of the mechanisms by which institutions may incorporate the demands and needs of a wide variety of groups and interests in a logic of institutional efficiency (Briquet and Sawicki 1998). Médard himself recognizes an evolution of the dominant paradigms in the social sciences and their adaptation to clientelist phenomenon. Notes that the first works were placed in a perspective of development and political modernization that after a while has been rejected to make way for the adoption of a constructivist perspective that generates a series of reflections concerning the nature of clientelist phenomenon (Médard, 1998, pp. 307-8). Once we can establish that the democratization process did not meet the objectives clear from the political scene woven different relationships from the original patronage ones. In order to look at the refuncionlization patterns it would be necessary to take account on the components and mechanisms of action and try to establish what kind of links between actors are played as part of patronage networks in contemporary states and how they are inserted into the formal structures of the state. As Briquet and Sawicki pointed out, it’s important to seek for the relationships that oiled the mechanisms of action between communities and government agencies, recognized as informal and formal actors in the same State, land on which you can point a tension between democratic and bureaucratic logic (Briquet and Sawicki 1998 , 6). 9 To Médard, the phenomenon can be seen as cutting patrimonial practices, to understand its nature that need to be interpreted under the patronage of the sociology of social exchange and anthropology of the gift, which allows not only to understand the phenomenon as a mere manipulation of the rulers to the ruled, but also to observe the aspirations and demands of the latter (Médard, 1998, p. 309). It is also necessary to consider that the same forms of trade have changed and the sharply hierarchical patron-client dyad that allowed for many years to explain the phenomenon from more resources with which had the pattern has faded to make way for relationships which customers can now access valuable resources requires that the former pattern, which gives the terms of trade more even obligatory. Levitsky (2007) and Magaloni Diaz-Cayeros and Estévez (2007) have observed certain diversification mechanisms that have allowed the survival of patronage to the pair of related provision of public goods mechanisms relations. Javier Auyero placed reflection on a prime topic related to transformation of clientelism in forms of collective action from two perspectives: network whose malfunction collapses and transforms the reciprocal rivalry or oiled patronage networks, in good operating support collective action. In these studies, vertical networks do not need to break that collective action emerges; some of its key stakeholders (employers, mediators and / or clients), for many reasons, from threats to existing agreements or attempts to improve the position in the political field, get to organize collective action, which in some cases can be violent (Auyero 2012: 22-23). Rethinking clientelism Other relevant issue relates to the need to rethink the concept of clientelism and determine how their use remains valid from the observation of the different attributes and designed from the second half of the twentieth century functions, try to think of a renewal of the lenses with which the concept has been revised. In general, the attributes assigned to the client relations: patrimonial, personalistic, asymmetric, waste of traditional social forms, signs of dysfunctional institutions or pathologies of the political system, limit our scope of vision and impossible to see it as one of many ways collective action or social coordination with a potential to 10 become a kind of social capital. If, according to Ostrom and Ahn (2003), the essence of the perspective of social / collective action capital consists of analyzing the factors that affect the ability of individuals to solve collective action problems related to economic and political development, it would be relevant see the mechanisms involved in clientelism to determine the extent social relations in which these coordination mechanisms mediating limited clientele, promote or facilitate the ability of individuals and / or associations to resolve these collective action problems. The proposal is to open a new line that allows to develop the analysis of the clientelist phenomenon from a reverse position: see the phenomenom as one of many forms of collective action or social coordination. In Mexico I think the challenges of the analysis can be oriented in three ways, the first relating to the definition of conciliation and mediation mechanisms at the level of government agencies, the second has to do with the bargaining power to from the equalization of resources and the autonomy they have manipulated once submissive and clienteles and the third with the opportunity to observe what could be considered as seed capital. As Médard points in a very relevant observation for our purposes, we can see analytically relevant contrasts of principles that seem incompatible, however, the fact that theoretically combines these types are incompatible and that is where this type of work have much to contribute. I think the space where those bridges capable of communicating with the patronage capital weave their common elements are: trust, reciprocity and rules. Regarding the first approach, the definition of the mechanisms for consultation and government intermediation Carl Lane has reviewed clientelism as an addenda concept, arguing that modern institutional forms and patronage were not only compatible but complementary upon recognition of spaces informality where the constitutional or legal frameworks fail to meet all the needs of the community and its members (Gunes-Ayata, p. 46). In this logic the proposal made Briquet is provocative in the sense of starting with getting rid of those perspectives to analyze the rational bureaucracy, like L. 11 Graziano, from which the notion of patronage, to escape the forms of arrangements public relations and refer to a series of private agreements that exist outside the institutional, hindering what has been called modernization. For him it is a kind of formal logic in which the institutional design follows a legal-rational order and on the other the real political scenario in which informality is constructed. The interesting thing about the review is to make Briquet clientelistic forms as mechanisms that provide functionality to a state apparatus whose dimensions exceed their current capacities of order and regulation. To study from this perspective it is not enough only to guide the analysis to the description of dynamic aspects is also important to distinguish the forms of participation and mobilization of groups whose collective interests are structured within the framework of rational processes of political negotiation. The other perspective leads us to review positions traditionally analyzed as opposing the clientelism and forms of social capital. For Coleman (1990), social capital is a function that helps the cooperation relationship between trusted systems and the strength of social capital is established. This author looks at the relationship of reciprocity one of the features that distinguish the forms of social capital patronage when defined in terms of expectations that are directly proportional to the obligations. Thus, it appears that in the form of vertical structuring of client relations precludes a type of reciprocal exchange, while privatized and monopolized public goods. But clientelism personal relationship implies that both people should know well enough to build a relationship of loyalty and trust, is for that reason that the relationship is also called lop-sided friendship (Pitt-Rivers, 1961) or friend interested (Schröter , 2010, p. 146). It is a voluntary relationship that distinguishes clientelism notions as slavery or servitude. On the other hand, clientelism is also treated as a relationship based on mutual trust "to compensate for the uncertainty about the performance of a contract like exchange (Máiz, 2003: 14) relationship. If there is no such trust, the employer must provide incentives to create additional motivation, which can easily become coercion "(Schröter, 2010, p. 147). 12 To analyze the issue from this perspective can help uncover the incentives can mobilize a latent group to achieve cooperative behaviors in an organization or institution (Olson 1992: 71). As a conclusion of this paper and as points to advance the discussion of the topic, it seems necessary to rethink the concept of patronage from the shape and size of contemporary states, the concept is still valid as it allows, as pointed Briquet (1998, p 21), to account for how they can be structured in a particular way the institutions to identify activities that political modernity and describe characteristics of the relationships between groups and institutions beyond the circumscribed space relations of rural communities and identify gaps that appear frequently between actual operating logics of political systems and normative models from which we have sought to establish their legitimacy in ideological categories of "modernity" policy. A proposal for rethinking the concept necessarily involves the review of current mechanisms still exist the ties that bind together. The other approach involves the review of the concept from the new forms of joint while allowing jump one obstacle and marked by Auyero (1997, p. 36-7) vs. the patronage opposition. These provide greater elasticity to the concept in order to capture phenomena observed in contemporary states. The empirical work is certainly needed to trap source new forms of articulation that occur as forms of cooperation based on patronage networks. We face a great methodological challenge in order to explain the coexistence of two basic models: the older ones, characterized by a clear vertical structure where interests are clearly particularized and privatized and the emergence of new structures more horizontal with aggregated interests that combines some forms of the old model with new forms that haven’t yet been characterized. 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