Arctic Security

Greenland has taken center stage since the start of the second Trump Administration, becoming the object of intensifying strategic competition between the United States and its NATO partner the Kingdom of Denmark, which colonized and remains sovereign over Greenland today. With the polar thaw now widely accepted as a geographical and climatological fact of life, the United States is positioning itself for strategic predominance in an effort to secure the vulnerable northeastern flank of North America, shifting from a long-held trans-Atlantic to a newly articulated hemispheric security concept where the center of mass has shifted from protecting Atlantic sea lanes to defending the more remote, lightly populated, and newly accessible North American Arctic archipelago. As tensions rise and diplomatic competition within the Western alliance intensifies, the specter of a U.S. invasion and annexation of Greenland grows less implausible. This analysis considers what an American takeover of Greenland could look like.

A cross Arctic North America, from Alaska to Greenland, there has been an ongoing dialogue between the resource development and environmental factions of each community. The resulting dialectic oscillates like a pendulum across the generations-sometimes stopping big projects (such as Alaska's Project Chariot, to blast a deep water port with atomic weapons and the Rampart Canyon project to dam the Yukon River, as proposed in the Fifties); sometimes greenlighting them in exchange for concessions (such as the Alaska Pipeline in the Seventies and the Northwest Territories' diamond mines in the Nineties); and sometimes both (as with the NWT's Mackenzie Valley Pipeline project, rejected in the Seventies, but later approved in the Noughties, only to linger undeveloped since; and the vast rare earth and uranium-rich Kvanefjeld mineral deposit in Greenland, approved by the pro-development Siumut party when in power, but later rejected by the more eco-friendly Inuit Ataqatigiit party in 2021). The Inuit Ataqatigiit party (IA) rose to power largely due to its vocal opposition to the Kvanefjeld mine, tapping into popular sentiment, leading to Siumut's downfall. While Kvanefjeld is home to one of the richest rare earth mineral deposits (said to be the world's second largest), it is also full of uranium (the world's sixth largest deposit) and it has a long history associated with nuclear power. IA's decision to pull the plug on Kvanefjeld and to ban uranium mining in November 2021 (first banned in 1988, then lifted 25 years later), just a few months after banning future offshore oil exploration, suggests an independent Greenland may prove less 'open-for-business' than its leadership first asserted after Trump's 2019 overture (under Siumut's rule) and reiterated more recently (under IA rule prior to its electoral defeat last month). Greenland's opposition to Kvanefjeld development may reflect the ubiquity of anti-nuclear sentiment felt so strongly around the circumpolar world, from Point Hope (ever since Project Chariot) to Deline, NWT (where mining uranium for the Manhattan Project at the Eldorado Mine left a deadly legacy) to Narsaq, Greenland (where Niels Bohr imagined a nuclear future for Denmark). Resource extraction remains an underlying catalyst for the current geopolitical storm over Greenland, adding luster to Trump's renewed interest in gaining sovereign possession of the island to better position America to benefit from the many strategic energy and mineral opportunities that result from climate change.

A Greenland purchase, as improbable (and inappropriate to some) as it may seem, does have its own historical and geopolitical logic, as it would unify the northwestern and northeastern flanks of Arctic North America under the direct constitutional umbrella of the United States for the first time, bringing to an end one of the continent’s most persistent insecurities, which was last a central topic of strategic attention after Denmark fell to the Nazis and war came to the North Atlantic, with the defense of Greenland falling to the United States, as it would continue to do during the Cold War.

What began as a show of unity against Russian aggression is now revealing its internal contradictions. NATO’s Nordic enlargement, once framed as a stabilizing move, has fractured the very alliances it sought to strengthen—splitting indigenous homelands, paralyzing Arctic diplomacy, and provoking intra-alliance tensions from Greenland to the Baltic. Instead of reinforcing cooperation, the expansion has accelerated militarization, revived Cold War divisions, and undermined the multilateral ethos that once defined Arctic governance. By isolating Russia entirely and overextending its own strategic coherence, NATO may have weakened its ability to manage the region it is now obligated to defend.

Barry Scott Zellen explains why – as Trump 2.0 begins – Greenland is taking centre stage.  It was just over five years ago, in August 2019, that President Trump first proposed purchasing Greenland from Denmark, and to thereby complete the centuries-long project to decolonize the North American Arctic that began with the Alaska purchase in 1867, which ended Russia's colonization of the far northwest of North America, and the British North America Act that very same year bringing self-governance to Canada as well. The last colonial outpost in Arctic North America to be ruled by a distant European sovereign is Greenland, which is an autonomous region of Denmark. Trump's initial bid to acquire Greenland was quickly and soundly rejected by both the Danes and Greenlanders, the latter famously responding: "We're open for business, not for sale." The negative response to Trump's Greenland interest was as dismissive as that which greeted Secretary of State William H. Seward's 1867 Alaska purchase, which was widely lampooned as a "folly."

DoD's 2024 Arctic strategy places non-Arctic state China illogically at the top of its threat matrix for the Arctic region. The Pentagon suggests China should not be permitted to pursue its global interests like all great powers do, nor to have Arctic interests of its own. China is not alone to assert its Arctic interests and ambitions, not even close: Japan, Korea, Singapore and India, among others, are all increasingly active non-Arctic states with expanding Arctic interests and ambitions and these should not be perceived as threats to the Arctic or to the West, when in fact they are to the benefit of Arctic peoples, many of whom continue to live in poverty and face persistent gaps in health, nutrition and economic security with their fellow countrymen to the south, and who welcome increasing interest in developing their homelands after long histories of neglect and exploitation.
China’s Arctic policy resembles in many ways in form and substance that of its neighbours, particularly Japan, as does its Arctic capabilities which more closely resemble Japan’s than Russia, with whom it is equated here. China has risen fast and high as a global power, seeking “to pursue greater influence and access” all around the world as all great powers do.

The Mobile Striking Force, an airportable and airborne brigade group designed as a quick reaction force for northern operations, was an inexpensive solution to the question of how Canada could deal with an enemy lodgement in the Arctic. During training exercises, army personnel from southern Canada learned how to survive and operate in the north. In this image, taken during Exercise Bulldog II in 1954, Inuk Ranger TooToo from Churchill, Manitoba relays information to army personnel in a Penguin. DND photo PC-7066.

Ever since it emerged as another remote Cold War battlefield, the discourse regarding Arctic security has gone through a considerable change in both scope and depth. While this inhospitable environment was once only assessed as a rather insignificant element of the national security and sovereignty calculations of the two blocs throughout the Cold War era, such traditional perception of state-level relations has been shifting to a different plane in recent decades. This article examines the nature of this transforming security architecture of the Arctic from a competitive to a cooperative one in the last three decades. It goes on to evaluate the 'broad security perception' from the lens of three significant initiatives: the Murmansk Speech, the intended mandate of the Arctic Council, and economic development priorities spelled out by all Arctic states in their national strategies pertaining to the Arctic. The study, thus, concludes that unlike classical security formulations...

n this era of accelerated climate change and increased access to the waters of North America’s High Arctic, as well as the uncertain future of an increasingly alliance-skeptical United States in some influential circles and the rapidly moving international tensions, uncertainty surrounds the issue. A resolution at the intersection of sovereignty and security in the Northwest Passage dispute rejects an absolutist approach to sovereignty or precedent, and instead recognizes Canadian sovereignty to the Passage, allowing it to close off the Passage to any hostile forces, while allowing the Americans access to the Passage to protect the continent. It is a cooperative United States–Canada arrangement that will secure the continent for both countries.

In the 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy we see a continuation of America’s recalibrated approach to Arctic cooperation that's increasingly framed through an alliance-centric lens as the Arctic becomes ever more bifurcated. While the strategy describes itself as a “new strategic approach,” in actuality the Pentagon continues along its established trajectory. But in a new twist, we find heightened concerns with Beijing’s Arctic ambitions, now at the top of the Pentagon’s new strategic map of the Arctic. Presented to the Seventh China-U.S. Arctic Workshop, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, December 2-4, 2024.

In the 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy we see a continuation of America’s recalibrated approach to Arctic cooperation that's increasingly framed through an alliance-centric lens as the Arctic becomes ever more bifurcated. While the strategy describes itself as a “new strategic approach,” in actuality the Pentagon continues along its established trajectory. In a new twist, we find heightened concerns with Beijing’s Arctic ambitions, now at the top of the Pentagon’s new strategic map of the Arctic.

Introduction. Currently, there is an unprecedented increase in interest in the Arctic issues in various fields. The
analysis of scientific literature testifies to the actualization of the study the phenomenon of a region taken as a
fragment of the semiosphere and the formation of Arctic regionology. The research is devoted to representing
the integral image of the Arctic from the interdisciplinary perspective, as well as in the context of value-semantic
narratives in science and education. The purposes of this study are to present the key features of semiotics of the
circumpolar region, and to reveal its cultural-symbolic codes anchored in the linguistic consciousness of student
youth in contemporary Russia.
Materials and methods. The main research method used was the free associative experiment involving students
of Saint Petersburg Mining University. The study took place in several stages, starting in 2021. It was attended
by 400 students of different faculties, mainly aged 18 to 20 years old. The following methods were also used:
enquiry-conversation, systematic pedagogical observations, theoretical analysis of scientific literature.
Results. The respondents gave 2875 responses to the stimulus “the Arctic” in the course of the associative
experiment. The obtained associates were distributed into 5 thematic groups, which formed the “Arctic”
conceptual field. The analysis of its the core zone, the near core zone and the periphery obtained shows
prevalence of emotional-sensual reactions and estimations of the severe Arctic space, which is also perceived as
a place richest in natural resources, with unique conditions for all kinds of research activity. Of all the components
in the framework of the “Arctic” conceptual field, the ethno-cultural and geopolitical ones, together with any
spiritual-ideological connotations related, are underrepresented. The research was also verified by the free
interview of students in the form of a conversation.
Conclusions. The data obtained confirmed the hypothesis that the heroic narrative formed in the Soviet era is
no longer the dominant category in interpreting the conceptosphere of the Arctic and the North. However, the
symbolic value of the Arctic and the polar feat may become one of priority national ideas in modern Russia. The
analysis of the ideological orientations of students regarding the “Arctic” conceptual field is the most important
pedagogical and educational problem. It is necessary to revive educational traditions on the formation of “the
Arctic consciousness” among the younger generation and develop a unified socio-humanitarian paradigm of
knowledge about this unique region of the Earth.

Importance The article examines the specifics of Norway's contemporary military strategy in the Arctic. Objectives The research evaluates strategic plans of Norway, key areas of military construction, priorities of international military cooperation and capabilities of the Norwegian armed forces for achieving goals in the Arctic. Results The article shows the duality of the Norwegian strategy. On the one hand, the strategy supports anti-Russian trends and fits into the global containment between Russia and the USA, which is seen in the Arctic. On the other hand, Norway has a long cooperation history with Russia, thus being interested to continue the cooperation in the long run. The Ukrainian crisis aggravated the cooling trend in relationships between Norway and Russia. The armed forces of Norway are being modernized, with the scale of military construction showing the growing significance of the Arctic for defense policies. However, the defensive capabilities of Norway have not yet altered the balance of powers in the Arctic. The country focuses on integrating military policies of the Nordic countries as part of NORDEFCO and NATO. Conclusions and Relevance The military strategy of Norway will be teetering between the anti-Russian inclination and the military cooperation with Russia. The anti-Russian rhetoric of Norway is more reserved as compared with other Arctic countries. The possible deployment of armed forces in the Arctic does not pose a threat to Russia's national security so far.

The Northwest Passage is core to Canada’s national identity. Canadian asserts sovereignty over what it considers to be its historical internal waters, while the United States insists that the Passage is an international strait. Despite these divergent legal positions, this book charts enduring cooperation and collaboration between the two allies, who balanced sovereignty and continental security as the Arctic grew in geostrategic importance during World War II and the Cold War. Adopting a broader definition of continental security in light of climate change and new threats to the Arctic in the post-Cold War era, Elliot-Meisel argues that, in the interests of North American security, United States should recognize Canadian sovereignty over the Passage, while Canada should welcome a regular U.S. presence in the Passage.

This is the second half of a two-part series examining the NWT's 2024 wildfire season. The first installment appeared in the Sept. 6 edition of Yellowknifer. How we can prepare for a future Arctic aflame? James Hrynyshyn offers a sobering assessment. "The spectre of catastrophic local manifestations of climate change should force governments at the both nation and local levels to evaluate what's worth saving, and what isn't. "Any community that recent history and reasonable futures (based on sophisticated climate models) suggest could be flooded, burned to the ground, or otherwise rendered at least temporarily uninhabitable should be required to produce a contingency plan for the aftermath," says the longtime Northern News Service journalist and editor and owner of Class M Communications. For Yellowknife, whose mass evacuation remains a recent and traumatic memory, Hrynyshyn says "that would mean determining whether the territorial capital should be rebuilt or relocated, although none of the other communities south of the tree line in the NWT would likely present a more less-vulnerable profile when it comes to forest fires." Asks Hrynyshyn: "But how does the Canadian government justify spending the billions of dollars that would be required to rebuild the city should it be burned to a crisp?" He finds hope in the innovative, remote technologies that kept the economy running during the Covid-19 pandemic: "Thanks to the internet (and Elon Musk's Starlink network), the entire territory could be administered remotely, with only a skeleton crew of sorts living in the drastically scaled-back

This article will discuss contemporary Norwegian security and defense policy within a regional and contemporary historical perspective, with particular emphasis on the relative importance assigned to the North Atlantic and Arctic “High North” versus the Baltic Sea area. The main argument is that Norwegian security and defense policy is focused on deterrence and defense in the country’s immediate vicinity. The Russian Federation is identified as the main source of regional insecurity. Furthermore, the Nordic-Baltic region is increasingly perceived as one interconnected strategic space, with the geopolitical fault-line between NATO and Russia running straight through the region. While not divisible, the region arguably has two sub-theaters: the North Atlantic and Arctic “High North” and the Baltic Sea area. Norwegian decisionmakers view the Baltic States as being more at risk from Russian revisionism than Norway itself. This effort is less likely to take the form of overt conventional military aggression than of ambiguous and nebulous “political” and “hybrid” warfare. Therefore, in Norwegian security policy, the Baltic Sea area is today allotted far more attention and resources than before 2014. After years of neglect, Norway realized during the Ukrainian crisis that it had vital security interests in the Baltic Sea region. Nevertheless, the main security priority for Norway remains its maritime High North and Arctic region. The Baltic Sea area, while important, remains a secondary theatre in Norwegian strategy.

(KMI) is a government-affiliated research organization under the umbrella of the National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and Social Science (NRCS) in the Republic of Korea. Since its establishment in 1984, KMI has been a major think-tank in the development of national maritime and fisheries policies including shipping and logistics, port development, coastal and ocean management, maritime safety and security, and fisheries affairs. Currently, KMI is building research capacity on the new ocean industries, the so-called Blue Economy, for sustainable coastal and ocean resources development. KMI's international research network covers not only the Asian region but also other regions such as Africa, the Pacific islands, the Americas, Europe and the polar areas. The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue. Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options. The Center's 21-acre Honolulu campus, adjacent to the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, is located midway between Asia and the US mainland and features research, residential, and international conference facilities. The Center's Washington, DC, office focuses on preparing the United States for an era of growing Asia Pacific prominence. The KMI/EWC series on the Future of the Marine Arctic aims to provide an informal and inclusive forum where key individuals from various relevant countries and a range of stakeholders can develop relations of trust that will allow them to discuss complex and sometimes difficult emerging Arctic maritime issues in an open way with a spirit of problem solving rather than advocacy.

On November 22, 2021, Dr. Andrea Charron, Director for the Center for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba, presented on Arctic Security and Defence in a Competitive World at the 2021 CASIS West Coast Security Conference. The primary focus of Dr. Charron’s presentation was on three key areas of questioning the competitiveness of international order within Arctic security and defence. These areas were: competition, decision makers, and fora for navigating competition. The presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and CASIS Vancouver executives.

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is insulated politically from tensions between Canada and the United States (U.S.). We argue the reasons why are threefold. First North American defence is a low priority generally speaking and so NORAD is also low on the political radar. Second, NORAD is defended and challenged by misplaced politics of sovereignty (especially in Canada), both of which marginalize NORAD. finally, NORAD is largely managed by the military professionals of both states at the bureaucratic/technical level. This means that NORAD is able to adapt and evolve without any political interference; indeed, often without any political guidance which is problematic from a civil-military balance perspective. Despite the fact that "defending Canada" and "defending North America" are priorities number one and two for every Canadian defence policy since 1964, far too little attention is paid to how NORAD has evolved over time to adapt to new threats and geopolitical trends. NORAD, like other aspects of the CANUS defence relationship is left to run unencumbered by political distractions in other issue areas. While the lack of political attention is perceived as beneficial, it may be what most challenges NORAD in the long run as it seeks more funding to modernize and continue to evolve against new and more dangerous threats to North America. NORAD should be careful for what it wishes.

The Government of Canada's recent defence policy update, Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada's Defence (ONSF), in many ways reflects a different world than the one described in the federal government's 2017 defence policy Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE). As Defence Minister Bill Blair states pointedly in his opening message to ONSF, "[t]he world is at an inflection point." Notably, there is broad agreement that the Arctic, a region of immense strategic importance, is at the front and centre of this changing world, as evidenced by ONSF's focus on the region. Despite this changing world, ONSF's Arctic focus continues what is discussed in SSE in several ways. Canada's Arctic territory spans over 1.4 million square kilometres of diverse geography and environmental conditions and over 160 thousand kilometres of coastline, exposing the country to expansive maritime and aerospace approaches. This geography has consistently challenged the Canadian state's ability to monitor and control its Arctic territory, mainly as human settlement and infrastructure development is sparse relative to its southern territory. For instance, the harsh weather conditions and vast distances in the Arctic make it difficult to maintain a continuous surveillance presence, and the sparse population and lack of infrastructure make it challenging to gather real-time intelligence. These dynamics have led to repeated attempts to develop advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities through technological innovation, particularly during the Cold War, including underwater monitoring systems that never fully delivered on their promised outcomes. NATO defines ISR as "the foundation of all military operations," with surveillance and reconnaissance

The Arctic has emerged as a topic of tremendous hype over the last decade, spawning persistent debates about whether the region’s future is likely to follow a cooperative trend or spiral into conflict. Official Canadian military statements, all of which anticipate no near-term conventional military threats to the region, predict an increase in security and safety challenges and point to the need for capabilities suited to a supporting role in an integrated, whole-of-government (WoG) framework. This entails focused efforts to enhance the government's all-domain situational awareness over the Arctic, to prepare responses to a range of unconventional security situations or incidents in the region, and to assist other government departments (OGD) in their efforts to enforce Canadian laws and regulations within national jurisdiction. Despite popular commentaries suggesting that military deficiencies in the North make Canada vulnerable, we argue that the Canadian Armed Forces are gene...

The Department of Defense released its Arctic Strategy in June 2019 with the strategic approach of strengthening rules-based order in the Arctic, building Arctic awareness, and enhancing Arctic operations. The changing Arctic security environment, the Arctic strategic environment, and Great Power competition provides the necessary elements to focus efforts over time; however, the current state of the Joint Force's Arctic operational environment hinders the way-ahead for this Arctic Strategy. To fully operationalize the 2019 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, the Joint Force must designate Alaska Command as the Arctic Functional Combatant Command, create an Arctic Regional Campaign Plan, and develop a Joint Force with Arctic specific capabilities and training. These recommendations mitigate existing impediments obstacles currently preventing the operationalization of the latest Arctic Strategy.

This article explores how Inuit issues were addressed and portrayed in parliamentary committees. More specifi cally, we investigated if parliamentary committees allowed Inuit to present their perspectives and priorities, given that they play an important role in all stages of the public policy cycle, including policy development, implementation, and evaluation (Winfi eld 2010). The focus of this article is on the 41 st Parliament (June 2, 2011-August 2, 2015, the last Conservative Party government led by Stephen Harper) and the 42 nd Parliament (December 3, 2015-September 11, 2019, the fi rst Liberal Party government led by Justin Trudeau). Quantitative textual analysis techniques were conducted after retrieving textual elements via the R software. As a whole, the theme of economic development was central to Inuit and non-Inuit participants during the 41 st Parliament but was not as prominent during the 42 nd Parliament. For Inuit participants, education issues were much more important during the 41st Parliament, while health and wellness issues received most of the attention during the 42nd Parliament. Non-Inuit participants expressed concern for the health and well-being of northern communities during both parliaments. This study provides evidence that the Trudeau Liberal Government's rhetoric around inclusiveness translated into actions regarding Inuit political participation, as Inuit leaders were granted more time to present their perspectives during the 42 nd Parliament.

This article offers an in-depth exploration of China's Arctic aspirations, with a specific focus on the development of the Polar Silk Road (PSR), and the ensuing implications for the dynamics of global power. The Arctic region, once considered remote and inaccessible, is undergoing a transformation largely driven by climate change. This transformation is unveiling new opportunities for navigation and resource extraction, thereby attracting the attention of various nations, including China. Despite its geographical distance from the Arctic, China has been vocal about its Arctic aspirations, most notably through its proposed PSR initiative. The article scrutinizes the development of the PSR, a component of China's broader Belt and Road Initiative, and its potential to bolster China's economic prowess by unveiling new trade routes and granting it access to valuable resources. It also discusses the potential implications of China's Arctic ambitions for the balance of power among major powers such as the United States, Russia, and the European Union. Drawing on theories from political science and international relations, including realism, liberalism, and constructivism, the article provides a theoretical lens to understand these dynamics. It underscores the need for careful management of Arctic affairs to ensure that competition does not escalate into conflict. The article concludes by highlighting the need for further research to fully grasp the implications of China's Arctic policy and to explore potential responses by other major powers.

In order to study the ideas of development of the Arctic tourism the author offers: five levels of applied scientific research on studying the prospects of the Russian Arctic tourism, creation of regional innovative system of water resources in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, and also tourist recreational system in the Arctic as a model of the safe tourism in the Arctic.

This paper considers how sociotechnical imaginaries structure the development and use of sensing technology in the Canadian Arctic. The central claim is that these technological developments are grounded in a particular sociotechnical imaginary centred on risk, vulnerability, and probability, which frames the Arctic as a space threatened by myriad future dangers. Within this sociotechnical imaginary, the Canadian state's security and sovereignty are threatened by the potential for competing expressions of power enabled by climate change, technological diffusion, and other trends stemming from the international scale. Consequently, sensing is envisioned as a mode of sovereign power to protect Canada's Arctic territory and manage threats in their indeterminate and potential form.

The purpose of our study is to examine important dimensions of food security in the context of current wildlife management in Nunavut, Canada. In doing so, we attempt to bridge harvesting studies and food security studies. The latter have been primarily focused on household food affordability, which is not adequate in the predominantly indigenous areas of the Arctic. We presume that one of the appropriate levels at which food security can be meaningfully measured is the community level because households within communities are closely connected by sharing networks and because data on many dimensions of food security are publicly available at that level. We explore several important dimensions of food security looking at the composition of communities in terms of households with different income, employment, and demographic characteristics, and at the scope of harvesting by hunters in communities. Based on this analysis, we identify communities with relatively high and low levels of food security and discuss implications of our analysis for wildlife management in Nunavut that may also be useful for other indigenous areas of the Arctic.

Climate change is a hot issue in the politics of the early-21 st century. It has become a totalizing discourse, in the sense that it compels scientists to write reports and to develop future risk scenarios, or environmentalists to engage in climate change discourses. It has moved populations and individuals from positions of disinterest to one of genuine and shared concern about their (human) security. Even the Nobel Prize Committee was compelled to interpret climate change as a security issue. In the meantime, politicians react, lawmakers plan even stricter regulations as to what human beings are (or are not) allowed to do, citizens recognize these new regulations and modify behaviour according to them, and governments worry about their national security and sovereignty. Consequently, climate change (due to its impacts) has tremendous currency and social relevance and, because of the way in which it represents challenges to environmental security, can be understood as a risk to society, or a component of "risk society," as Ulrich Beck has defined it. We might even say that climate change has the potential to be a new "discipline for disciplining," that is to say it has potential to (re)define societal, political and legal impacts of climate change through new regulations and laws. Moreover, it has potential to encourage authoritarian solutions for climate change mitigation (since authoritarian solutions are often required in times of upheaval, since social order comes first), and to support technology-based solutions. Further, if the governing institutions have authority to use power in addressing the environment (for example through new laws), why and when would this kind of authority be needed or justified, and to what extent would the alternative interests of citizens be considered? While there are alternatives to these traditional solutions, what might come from self-sufficiency at the local level, for example, in the use of localized sustainable energy resources? And while there is no "once and for all" solution to ecological problems, an alternative way of dealing with them is to embrace a "non-disciplining" political ecology, where "solidarity" is taken literally and implemented. Climate change thus requires more and varied Climate Change and Human Security from a Northern Point of View 4 human responses at global, regional, national, and local levels. Correspondingly, human responses need new kinds of global and local stages for both inter-disciplinary discourses and open political discussions between relevant stakeholders. This requires more open and comprehensive discussion between relevant stakeholders; the development of institutionalized dialogue-building. Finally, in order to achieve these goals, an interplay and interface between science and politics is necessary to plot the proper path to follow when we are facing this kind of multi-functional challenge and its societal impacts. Climate change and risk society Climate change has been constructed as a "threat" because of its impacts on both human and environmental security (e.g. by putting settlements and man-made environments under threat, or challenging state sovereignty). Indeed, current rapid global warming not only foreshadows or suggests what global changes might mean in the future, but it also belongs to an existing environmental category of global problems or threats, like long-range air and sea pollution or a hole in the ozone layer. While such threats have been interpreted by many in strictly scientific terms-like impact of sea ice or temperature-climate change also has a relevant security dimension, particularly, when it comes to a comprehensive understanding and definition of security in terms which go well beyond "military" or "national security". (see Nicol, chapter 12 and Heininen, chapter 13). Why? Because climate change can be understood as part of a category of challenges to environmental security and, consequently, a threat to human security, broadly defined. As such, it poses a challenge to human systems engaged in the process of securing the survival of existing social, economic and political systems, and with the delivery of food security and environmental justice. This is not to say that climate change should always be interpreted as a threat or potential threat, however, since possibility and probability are two different measures. But it is safe to Climate Change and Human Security from a Northern Point of View 12 technical or not, has also both a strong social content and an economic content and thus deals with development. Therefore, "knowledge by organizations of human beings" includes traditional knowledge and local knowledge in general. For example, the Saami hey-shoe can be seen as the high technology of its time, and the same is true of traditional knowledge regarding the environment, i.e. Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK). Similarly, Inuit understandings of ice and snow conditions serve a similar role. Thus, technology has a strong cultural content, as well as an important "how to" component (see Tuisku, chapter 6). If this is true then would it be realistic to see the entrenchment of traditional knowledge, like that of the Inuit or Saami within schools, societies and communities? That is to say if technology will form the basis of adaptation, then the question is who are the keepers of knowledge. Moreover, how can different technologies and knowledges work together to save us? We could for example promote information and communication technology (ICT), adopt it to local systems, and connect Northern peripheries by, for example, crossing borders by using ADSL (Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line). Perhaps a more fundamental question is how to find and have a common language between experts on technology and its users in a society? Following from this, are there challenges of what we might call "tech-knowledgy"? For example, how to include human capital-building and regional capacity-building in technology in order to have new application of "tech-knowledgy" (Heininen 2008a: 10-11). And even further, how can we promote an interface between the issues of climate change and human development, as reflected by the gaps in knowledge raised and discussed by international Northern fora like the Arctic Human Development Report (Young and Einarsson 2004: 238-240), which is based on a close international, mostly multilateral, scientific cooperation and multidisciplinary research. All this serves to say that clearly we need a new kind of inter-disciplinary discourse on knowledge, technology, and policies and procedures on one hand, and on the other the interplay between science, politics, and business in general. Indeed, these two, interrelate and the interplay between science and politics, and business are much needed to create new knowledge, applications, practises, policies and programs, and new kinds of thinking. This volume attempts to make a beginning in this regard, bringing together authors from different academic and policy-making disciplines, perspectives, and countries. Its aim is to develop a cross-disciplinary analysis that assesses climate change from all perspectives, and examines the issue from the perspective of the science/political science interface. After all, faith in technology as well that of a growth-oriented economy might sound modern, but is too naïve, and discourses concerning climate change which begin and end from this Touinova 23

In this article, the author examines the Arctic region in the context of the energy and security policy of the Russian Federation. The author emphasises the factors which currently influence the increasing interest in the Arctic of the countries which claim rights to this region, which are: the US, Canada, Denmark, Norway and the Russian Federation. Among the most important factors indicating the essence of the Arctic, the author points out, inter alia: plenty of energy deposits, which because of the changing climate, are more available, the size of the Arctic area and new transport routes. The author indicates the possibilities of using the Russian Federation policy regarding the Arctic in order to, among other things, strengthen the country's international position. The author also presents the extent to which claiming the right to exclusive exploitation of mineral resources by the Russian Federation is the real motive of its actions and its intention to totally subordinate the Arctic area. Simultaneously, an attempt is made to answer the question whether the Arctic is likely to be a place of military conflict in the future? The article also examines the issues related to the legal status of the Russian Federation regarding the Arctic, the political activity of the Russian Federation in this region and the possibility of the Russian Federation exploiting energy resources in the Arctic region. The article brings together the issues connected with the Russian Federation and its policy in the region of the Arctic Ocean, and also portrays the importance of the Arctic in the changing international security environment.

In the last century, climate change has been more influential in the Arctic compared to the rest of the world. Access to the region becomes easier due to global warming, leading to longer seasonal opportunity for shipping and transportation. Consequently, search for new resources and their extraction has become easier. All these developments have allowed globalization movements to accelerate in the region. Due to its geographical location, the United Kingdom has the opportunity to interact with the region by means of a variety of routes. The country has been searching for petrol and natural gas in the coasts of the Arctic since 1960. Moreover, strategically important companies offering goods and services to a large variety of industrial areas based on the Artic have substantially increased in areas such as insurance and risk management, shipping and mining. Thus, the United Kingdom focuses on increasing its economic profit by widening its activities. Therefore, it spends great effort to strengthen bilateral relations with the countries of the region. To sum up, the aim of this study is to investigate the reasons why the Arctic has been playing a primary role in international trade along with the impact of climate change on regional economic activities as well as economic policies of the United Kingdom in this region.

The editor thanks the organizers of the Arctic Circle for including the panel of the "Security in the Arctic" in the inaugural international conference in Reykjavik, Iceland, on 12-14 October 2013 (see www.arcticcircle.org), and supporting the young participants of the panel. The editor also thanks and recognizes the contribution of the following organizations and person for giving a copyright permission to use third-party material (figures and tables): EU Institute for Security Studies (Chapter 7; Figure 7.2) and A. Arbatov (Chapter 6; Tables 6.1 and 6.2).

The USACOR Report forecasts that by 2050 the Arctic will become the major supplier of energy to the world, in particular oil and natural gas, and natural resources such as mineral water. In the coming decades, the population in the Arctic region is projected to increase significantly due to the expansion of exploration for resources. The Report recommends that a Zero emission policy be implemented throughout the Arctic area for water emissions into the seas, rivers, or estuaries and oceans. The Report recommends that the Arctic Council guarantees safe navigation and environmental protection, establishing a Fund to cover expenses to purchase icebreakers and towards the cost of the personnel in order to assist commercial navigation in the Arctic region. The Arctic Council shall also issue environmental rules to regulate the mineral exploitation in the region and ensure that the wildlife is protected and that the exploitation of resources is conducted in a sustainable manner.

Kuhnian' paradigms are a commonly used method of explaining the structure of knowledge production within the social sciences; however, in some ways, they are also in opposition with Popperian' critical thinking. The opposing approaches surmount to a comparative analytic method-Kuhn advocates undertaking science that is incommensurable, discipline-specific and ideologically and metaphysically fixed in nature; whilst Popper advocates science that is pluralistic, rebellious, interdisciplinary, and ideologically and metaphysically adaptable. This article utilises a systematic literature review of key peer-reviewed articles, book chapters and online articles from respected sources relating to Arctic scientific cooperation during and since the Cold War in order to provide a qualitative data source for comparative theoretical analysis. This article analyses key trends in Arctic environmental decision-making since the Cold War utilising a comparative critical constructivist framework based on epistemological challenges visible in the "Science Wars" between Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper. By applying two of the foundations of social science (critical thinking and paradigms) to Arctic International Relations and Geopolitics, this article assesses the state of Arctic science cooperation and; the potential for Arctic science cooperation to solve wicked environmental problems. The article concludes that there are power relationships within the epistemological background to environmental decision-making which impacts science cooperation in the Arctic and; current trends in Arctic decision-making further propels the Arctic along a trajectory of environmental degradation.

Western, and especially Canadian media reported, especially during the period 2007-2011, a significant number of Russian air patrols in the Arctic. These patrols were often described as potential threats for the Canadian security and sovereignty. However, a comparative analysis of the frequency of Russian air patrols in the Arctic and in other areas of operation attest to the rather low level of activity of the Russian air force. This suggests the narrative about the would-be Russian air threat reflects either misinformation or an oriented political discourse.