Corporate Security Management

There have been a number of studies that have attempted to defi ne the concept of security. However, as past authors have indicated, security is multidimensional in nature and diverse in practice. This diversity leads to diffi culty in providing a single all encompassing definition for the many applied domains of security. Security cannot be considered singular in concept defi nition, as defi nition is dependant on applied context. This study reversed engineered an applied security defi nition through the critique of 104 undergraduate security degrees, resulting in the presentation of 13 core security knowledge categories. These 13 knowledge categories were then integrated into an existing Australian security framework, resulting in the presentation of the science of security framework model. This framework allowed a greater understanding of security through knowledge structure and placed concept defi nition within the applied context domain of organizational security.

Security Science integrates the multi-disciplined practice areas of security into a single structured body of knowledge, where each chapter takes an evidence-based approach to one of the core knowledge categories.

The authors give practitioners and students the underlying scientific perspective based on robust underlying theories, principles, models or frameworks. Demonstrating the relationships and underlying concepts, they present an approach to each core security function within the context of both organizational security and homeland security. The book is unique in its application of the scientific method to the increasingly challenging tasks of preventing crime and foiling terrorist attacks. Incorporating the latest security theories and principles, it considers security from both a national and corporate perspective, applied at a strategic and tactical level. It provides a rational basis for complex decisions and begins the process of defining the emerging discipline of security science.

Security is a multidimensional concept, with many meanings, practising domains and heterogeneous occupations. Therefore it is difficult to define security as a singular, although understanding may be achieved by its applied context in presenting a domicile body of knowledge. There have been studies that have presented a number of corporate security bodies of knowledge; however, there is still restricted consensus. From these past body of knowledge studies and supported by multidimensional scaling knowledge mapping, a body of knowledge framework is put forward, integrating core and allied knowledge categories. The core knowledge categories include practise areas such as risk management, business continuity, personnel and physical security, and security technology. Nevertheless, corporate security also has interrelationship with criminology, facility management, safety and law. Such a framework provides clear boundaries for the practising domain of corporate security, better reflects the security experts’ view of their practising domain, allows directed tertiary pedagogy and presents what could be considered the scholarly area of Security Science.

Information security can benefit from multiple approaches to achieve staff compliance.  While some will naturally accept their responsibilities, others require encouragement to stay on the right path.  Referring to deterrence theory, one potential factor is the desire to avoid feeling shamed by managers or amongst peers.  As such, this article examines the potential of shaming as a means of dissuading them from breaching policy.  In order to explore the practical potential, the discussion presents findings from a survey of 113 respondents, asking them to consider a range of possible punishments and the likelihood of these influencing their security behavior.  The results reveal that shaming could indeed have a positive influence, but there are also potential risks involved.  As such, the discussion also examines the wider considerations and constraints that organisations should recognize in relation to using shaming in practice.

Intelligent Buildings (IB) are facility-wide systems that connect, control, and monitor the plant and equipment of a facility. The aim of IB is to ensure a facility is more efficient, productive, and safe, at a reduced cost. A typical IB integrates diverse subsystems into a common and open data communication network, using both software and hardware; however, IBs suffer from diverse generic vulnerabilities. Identified vulnerabilities may include limited awareness of security threats and system vulnerabilities, physical access to parts of the system, compromise of various networks, insertion of foreign devices, lack of physical security, and reliance on utility power. IB risks are contextual and aligned with the threat exposure of the facility. Nevertheless, there are generic mitigation strategies that can be put in place to protect IB systems. Strategies include threat-driven security risk management, an understanding of system criticality, greater integration of departments, network isolation, layered protection measures, and increased security awareness.

Brooks, D. J. (2012). Security threats and risks of Intelligent Building Systems: Protecting facilities from current and emerging vulnerabilities. In C. Laing and A. Badii (Eds). Securing Critical Infrastructures and Industrial Control Systems: Approaches for Threat Protection (pp. 1-16). Hershey, PA: IGI Global.

Increasing political turmoil across many regions has increased concerns amongst business, social and governmental circles over the ability of organisations to anticipate and respond positively to disruptions. Organisations are spending increased sums of money to raise levels of governance and security protocols, under the term resilience. Nevertheless, term organisational resilience is vague, and the term itself implies multi-disciplined and diverse strategies and tactics, requiring a diversity of skills and knowledge that reaches beyond security and governance alone. The resilience domain is still developing; however, early embodiments of organisational resilience, originating in the United Kingdom and the United States, appear to be rebranding of business continuity management strategies, put together as a ‘resilience processes’ or ‘resilience systems’.
More recently ‘resilience management systems’, claiming to deliver benefits akin to those that the International Standards Organisation 9001 gave the Quality Assurance discipline have begun to appear. Nevertheless, there is a constant absence of a clearly defined and researched set of essential concepts that make up the theoretical structure of Organisational Resilience. It is argued that Organisational Resilience is both a top-down culture (value, leadership) and bottom-up, delivered by a number of functional processes such as risk management, governance, interdependencies, security management, situational awareness and business continuity. However, validation of these elements is required and is currently underway.

Braes, B., & Brooks, D. J. (2011). Organisational resilience: Understanding and identifying the essential concepts. (pp. 117-128). Antwerp: Security and Safety Engineering IV. Southampton: WIT Press.

This chapter reviews the juggernaut of surveillance technologies that have been (in the last three decades) and are constantly being developed around the world. It examines their technological capacities in detail, and highlights the enormous potential they have for good. On the other side of the coin, the intrusive and invasive power of the new technologies requires laws and policies that can hold accountable those who use and misuse surveillance tools. Legislators and policy-makers the world over need to be mindful of the challenges that confront them and problems that await them if they are to remain abreast of current developments.

In book: The Routledge Handbook of International Crime and Justice Studies, Edition: 1st, Chapter: Current and emerging technologies employed to abate crime and to promote security, Publisher: Routledge, Editors: Bruce A Arrigo and Heather Y Bersot, pp.327-349

Risk management is becoming a well established discipline, with its own body of knowledge and domain practitioners. States worldwide now have their own risk management standards and in many, it is the company director’s responsibility to ensure risk management compliance. A subset of risk management is security risk management; however, security risk management is unique from other forms of risk management and many of the more generic risk models lack key concepts necessary for effective design, application and mitigation of security risks.

This book defines the key concepts of security risk management and forms these into a conceptual map, based on an interpretative four-phase scientific study. The security risk management map demonstrates the inclusive and spatial locality of the more significant security risk concepts, domain complexity and the central aspect of such concepts as threat, criticality, etc. In addition, the book presents 14 core organisational security knowledge categories, arranged within a framework. Such an approach allows in-depth understanding, improved teaching and learning, system design and application of these areas of security and security risk management.

Property marking, as a situational crime prevention technique, has found to be largely ineffectual in the reduction of property theft, although past studies have not considered the role property marking as an aid to the return of stolen or lost property. However, automotive identification and some studies have found that in some cases property marking is effective. Furthermore, many crime prevention groups focus on property marking as a means to reduce crime and the fear of crime.
Therefore, the study investigated the processes of lost, stolen and seized goods by law enforcement personnel. The study undertook a qualitative analysis of law enforcement property identification process, including a documentary analysis of procedures and practitioner interviews for content-thematic analysis.
The study found that the use of manufacturer serial numbers was the initial line of investigative enquiry. Limiting factors were technical capability to find and use covert property markings. The successful implementation of a code of best practice or standardisation in the recording of serial numbers, and the availability of the community to quickly and easily record their property may have a significant effect in the reduction of property crimes; due to the perceived increase of risk and potential reduction of reward to the offender.