F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

This study examines the role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff in strategic planning. Such planning began just after World War II as a way of preparing for a global war against the Soviet Union. After the demise of that monolithic threat in 1991, the general consensus of senior military leaders was that threats would become more diffuse and generally confined within a geographic region. That shifted the locus of planning efforts to the combatant commands and away from the Joint Staff. But declining defense budgets and the consequent need to more carefully husband resources prompted the Joint Staff to adopt a role of reviewing and balancing various combatant command plans. By 2015, however, the return of threats with global reach caused the staff to revert to its more centralized role, arbitrating and synchronizing combatant command efforts to address those threats wherever they appeared. This review not only connects presidential level strategy documents to those produced by the Joint Staff across these three different phases, but also for the first time documents how the twenty- first century concept of global integration came to be.

Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine poses multiple threats to international security, with nuclear safety and nuclear weapons returning to the forefront of global politics. Alongside verbal threats of using tactical nuclear weapons, Russia's invasion plans have included attacks on nuclear power plants (NPPs), such as the shelling of the Zaporizhzhia complex in Ukraine. These actions raise critical questions about the application of international law to military operations involving NPPs and liability for resulting nuclear damage. This paper examines the scope of international law in such scenarios and concludes with implications from the perspective of strategic studies and NATO nuclear policy.

approach to develop plans and orders for Canadian Forces operations. The CFOPP includes but is not limited to analysing the situation, identifying relevant factors, sketching courses of action, developing the commander’s guidance and decision, and producing detailed annexes necessary for orders and tasking of CF units. It is based on an Estimate Process. Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) is investigating computer-based decision support to improving the decision cycle and timeliness of orders and tasking. In this paper, we focus on key components of the CFOPP. In particular, this paper describes computer-based tools to support center of gravity analysis, decisive point analysis, risk management, criteria management, dynamic link management and decisionmatrix management. These tools have been embedded into DRDC Collaborative Operations Planning System (COPlanS), an integrated flexible suite of planning, decision

The implications of Effects Based Operations (EBO) on Course of Action (COA) development and evaluation are significant. EBO will potentially increase both COA complexity and the number of options one must evaluate to optimize results. Further, metrics must be found that can adequately describe and quantify the “goodness ” of such disparate COAs as a propaganda campaign versus a major military interdiction. The United States Air Force Research Laboratory Information Directorate (US AFRL/IF) continues to lead efforts to prototype a Modeling and Simulation (M&S) based methodology and toolset that allows quick and thorough exploration of this expanding tradespace. Specific thrusts within these efforts include: concurrent multi-hypothesis exploration via cluster computing; automated COA generation; automated simulation scenario generation; COA descriptive metadata representations; metrics metadata representations; and automated data reduction, comparison and visualization techniques. Th...

Planning under conditions of uncertainty, time pressure, and other stressors is a complex cognitive activity for military command post staff members. The Army and the Marine Corps have developed formal planning models intended as step-by-step guides. However, these models are inconsistent with the actual strategies of skilled planners, and they slow down the decision cycle. As a result, the formal models are usually ignored in practice, in order to generate faster tempo. Yet some procedure is needed, to direct inexperienced staff and to coordinate the actions of a planning team. We present a Recognitional Planning Model (RPM) based on a series of observations of Army, Marine, and Naval command post exercises. The RPM applies the concept of recognitional decision making. The RPM is intended as a prescriptive model to increase the speed of planning, but it is also a descriptive model capturing the strategies of experienced planning teams.

Wargaming can be used in military planning for four main purposes. At the beginning of the planning when evaluating the situation/task received, at the stage of preparation of courses of actions, at the stage of preparations of the plan and at the stage of evaluation of the plan.

The Commanders-in-Chief (CIN~s) of the Unified and Specified Commands are the key element in translating potential U.S. military capability into military power on the battlefield. it was the purpose of this study to examine how to better bring Ate-vews of th-CNCs to bear on the major defense acquisition choices of our time. The CINCs were formally established by the 1958 Amendments to the National Security Act. For the next twenty years, a number of failed attempts were made to involve CINCs in acquisition issues. From the late 1970s through 1986, small steps were taken to involve the CINCs In the whole PPB and acquisition processes, including the early weapons requirements processes. More recently the requirement was stated in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, that the CJCS reflect CINC priorities within a constrained program and budget. The creation of the position of Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) to carry out the law and the accompanying reorganization of the Joint Staff have created the mechanism to reflect more fully CINC views in the acquisition and the planning, programming and budgeting (PPB) processes.

The doctrinal definition of Information Operations (IO) focuses exclusively on offensive and defensive activities. This paper proposes extending the definition of IO to include information efficacy. Then it describes a new approach to military planning and execution called Anticipatory Planning. This approach seeks to merge planning and execution, and replaces reaction to events with anticipation of events, making more effective use of the information that is available during the conduct of military operations. This paper presents a methodology for the development of a prototype decision support system (DSS) for military decision makers, called the Anticipatory Planning Support System (APSS). This DSS facilitates indepth analysis of the voluminous data that is available to military decision makers during the course of operations. The paper concludes with an example of the application of Anticipatory Planning to intrusion response operations.

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: This thesis describes a functional framework for developing strategic assessment at the Combatant Command level, specifically European Command. The framework establishes a functional architecture based on derived requirements and objectives according to the systems engineering process described by Dennis Buede. This thesis describes the current methodology for developing theater plans based on the national strategies established by the President, Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, it provides an analysis of the system stakeholders in order to define the purpose and utility of a strategic assessment from various perspectives. Based on this analysis, the requirements and functions of the system are decomposed and arranged according to a hierarchy via Vitech's CORE 8 University Edition. Finally, the developed model is tested against a notional scenario that assesses a fictional exercise according to the derived functional model, in order ...

A cikk rövid áttekintést nyújt a különleges erőkről, illetve a műveleti környezetről. Az első fejezet tárgyalja a különleges erők parancsnokságának felépítését világszerte, illetve a hadszíntéren. A publikáció bemutat egy különleges műveleti alkalmi harci köteléket. A műveletek, és tevékenységek fejezet bemutatja, mely cselekvések tartoznak e témakörbe. Az utolsó fejezet bemutatja a különleges erők fenntartási rendszerét. This article provides a short overview of the special operational environments, conduct operations. Next is a discussion of the Army Special Operation Forces, Army Special Operation Forces Command, command structure, and a theater organization. The chapter then describes the Special operation task force. Operations and activities discusses, how Special Operation Forces accomplish the core operations and activities. The last chapter describes the Army Special Operation Forces sustainment structures.

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This paper draws upon the experiences, challenges, and observations from our work on behalf of the United States Government (USG) in Colombia, Taiwan, and Indonesia. From these experiences, we derive general insights, ideas, and approaches on how to assist foreign defense
institutions to develop joint concepts and doctrine. In turn, joint concept and doctrine development promote development of a joint culture within defense institutions. We find a joint culture – or jointness – is important for implementing a more effective and efficient force development process. Jointness also lends itself to better employment of existing forces.

T o counter increasingly capable near-peer competitors, the U.S. military services have been developing new concepts for multidomain operations (MDOs)-operations that involve two or more of the five domains: air, land, maritime, space, and cyber. The joint force already conducts MDOs today, but U.S. military leaders argue that MDOs have been episodic and that operations in different domains have often been deconflicted rather than truly integrated. Also, the joint force is grappling with how to integrate space and cyber, which are emerging as more important warfighting domains. The Air Force is now leading the joint initiative to assess how the current command and control (C2) construct might need to adapt to enable MDOs. This brief summarizes research results that identified potential impediments to MDOs in the current operational C2 construct for joint operations. The study drew on joint warfighting principles to identify C2 characteristics that could prevent MDO options from being considered, could make MDOs too time-consuming to plan, or could create too much planning uncertainty. Researchers analyzed current laws, regulations, and joint doctrine and conducted more than 150 interviews to identify specific aspects of the current C2 structure that have these characteristics. The study also developed four alternative joint all-domain C2 (JADC2) constructs for further analysis and experimentation.

Planning under conditions of uncertainty, time pressure, and other stressors is a complex cognitive activity for military command post staff members. The Army and the Marine Corps have developed formal planning models intended as step-by-step guides. However, these models are inconsistent with the actual strategies of skilled planners, and they slow down the decision cycle. As a result, the formal models are usually ignored in practice, in order to generate faster tempo. Yet some procedure is needed, to direct inexperienced staff and to coordinate the actions of a planning team. We present a Recognitional Planning Model (RPM) based on a series of observations of Army, Marine, and Naval command post exercises. The RPM applies the concept of recognitional decision making. The RPM is intended as a prescriptive model to increase the speed of planning, but it is also a descriptive model capturing the strategies of experienced planning teams.

Abstract: This paper presents the design and implementation of a course of action (COA) ontology for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This ontology supports the commander's C2 decision making processes for COA design, analysis and selection and represents the ...

Building partner capacity has been a key component of U.S. defense strategy since the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was issued. However, but for a few exceptions,
the Military Departments of the U.S. Armed Forces that have responsibility to organize, train, equip, and provide forces to U.S. Combatant Commands have not prepared
their people to be good or even adequate at planning for steady-state, peacetime security cooperation activities, which is the principal way the Department of Defense (DOD)
builds partner capacity. Rather, the focus of military education and training primarily remains on contingency and warfare planning. While useful in those contexts, it is not
useful for steady-state, peacetime security cooperation planning. Not only are people poorly prepared, the DOD lacks a framework for security cooperation planning. This
paper’s intent is to propose a framework for security cooperation planning that helps the DOD and its Military Departments understand how to adaptively influence, plan,
and resource security cooperation activities carried out in various foreign nations and with members of foreign security forces.

Is. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS 2i. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3. DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY OF REPORT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; b. OECLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE DI STR I BUT ION IS UNLIMITED 4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) S. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) .a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGAtIZATION 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION CHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITAR

When a situation arises to which the United States considers deploying military forces, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and President of the United States (POTUS) require a range of options from which to address the situation. The current course of action development process fails to provide these options. This failure to provide a range of options limits strategic flexibility and oftentimes leads to an inadequate or inappropriate solution for the given circumstances. Joint planners must change their traditional mindset for course of action development to include options that consider the multiple environmental conditions. The operational environment is rife with inconsistencies, incompatible desires, and competing requirements and, as such, requires the planner to develop multiple options that address the potential prominence of one requirement over another. By addressing the competing requirements in this manner, the planner presents a more comprehensive view of the environment while presenting the SECDEF and POTUS with the flexibility to approach the situation from different perspectives. Design thinking enables the planner to develop and propose such options within the current context of the joint operation planning process (JOPP) with a slight modification. In a potential or actual crisis, the President decides whether the employment of military capabilities is necessary. As stated in JP 5-0, -The President, SEDEF, or CJCS initiates planning by deciding to develop military options.‖ 1 The Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) also direct combatant commanders to develop military options based upon given assumptions and conditions. Lack of specificity and perhaps a lack of understanding regarding the term -options‖ as prescribed by the SECDEF and strategic guidance documents are at the heart of the problem. As opposed to providing senior leadership with options for the employment of military force as desired, the planning process develops multiple courses of action to select the best single option to solve the problem. As a result, the current process presents strategic leadership with a virtual -fait accompli‖ regarding ways to use the military. This essay proposes integrating elements of design thinking into the Mission Analysis and COA Development steps of the JOPP to develop the variety of options that the POTUS and SECDEF require in a complex and dynamic environment. This position is supported through the analysis of the strategic guidance and course of action development requirements. A discussion of the environmental constraints that shape the problem and the solution is critical to the critical and creative thinking process necessary when using the JOPP. The JOPP mission analysis step is discussed briefly to show how design thinking can be integrated into the planning process and 1

Contracting in expeditionary operations is not new. What is new is the scope and magnitude of the roles that contracting and contractors play in today’s mili-tary operations. Lack of planning and sound contract integration at the strategic level leads to inefficiencies, ineffectiveness, and, in many cases, outright fraud. Annex W, Operational Contract Support Plan, is the overall operations plan for Geographic Combatant Commands and the Services within the Adaptive Planning and Execution System framework. The authors propose an Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) model for opera-tional contract support and its integration into Annex W and existing war planning systems by congressionally mandating, authorizing, and funding IPE positions within Service structures. The IPE would be vested with the authority to establish, monitor, and manage Annex W.

: Contracting in expeditionary operations is not a new phenomenon. What is new is the scope and magnitude that contracting and contractors play in today's military operations. Even if global operating tempos decline, many experts believe that reliance on contractor personnel will remain at current levels, or even grow, in relation to the number of uniformed personnel. Lack of planning and sound contract integration at the strategic level leads to loss of efficiencies, lack of effectiveness, and, in many cases, outright fraud of the executing participants. The authors propose adopting Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) positions and embrace mandates for Operational Contract Support, including generating a thoroughly vetted Annex W into OPLANs. The authors contend that the best means to accomplish integration into existing war planning systems is by congressionally mandating, authorizing, and funding (via appropriation) the IPE positions at the flag and senior executive service...

It has long been apparent that modeling and simulation (M&S) should be able to provide indispensable tools for military decision-makers. However, other than specific, usually standalone, narrow-application tactical decision aids, few simulation tools are available. In general, M&S technology advancement has been driven by three application areas: training, commercial gaming, and operational analysis. Occasionally, simulations developed in these areas are modified to provide support tools for the tactical or operational decision-maker, but command and control (C2) by itself has not been a driver. This paper addresses the problem from a C2 point of view in order to derive the requirements M&S technology must meet to support C2 applications. These requirements are then matched to current M&S technology trends to determine the gaps and major challenge areas. It is contended that the main challenges are not in simulation fidelity or necessarily in simulation speed, but in the areas of si...

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

The purpose of this document is to solicit sponsorship by an appropriate DoD entity for the Joint Power Projection Support Platform (JPPSP). The document is formatted as an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) to present the underlying justification for a JPPSP in DoD terms, and form the basis for development of the JPPSP using Joint Capabilities Integrated Development System (JCIDS) procedures. The JPPSP is the military component of the Agile Port System concept developed by the Center for the Commercial Deployment of Transportation Technologies (CCDoTT) as proposed under the Strategic Mobility 21 (SM21) program sponsored by the California University Long Beach Foundation. SM 21 is developing the JPPSP as part of the SM21 program under contract with the Office of Naval Research. The vision of SM21 is that through network centric focused logistics we enable the adaptive global distributed logistics in support of full spectrum expeditionary operations. SM21 focuses on developing solutions to regional transportation issues and challenges. In particular, the project focuses on issues and challenges faced in the southern California region centering on the Ports of Los Angles and Long Beach (POLA/POLB) productive capacities in face of rapidly increasing commercial trade traffic and a physical infrastructure that has few options for physical expansion in current locations. This is a common problem in many parts of the United States, particularly with Strategic Ports, such as POLA/POLB. SM21 has established a consortium of public and private, governmental and non governmental, academic, and other impacted parties to develop and implement emerging processes and technologies to expand the productive capacities of POLA/POLB while balancing regional quality of life issues as well. SM21 recognizes the importance of POLA/POLB to DoD as a strategic port, and the importance of DoD's participation in this process. SM21 further recognizes this is a general concern to DoD as more and more strategic ports, because of conflicts with commercial activities, would rather not provide service to DoD for deployment and distribution operations. This ICD focuses on these challenges faced by DoD and provides a workable concept to maintain assured access to strategic ports. SM21 calls for a dual use inland terminal facility to provide for process change and physical expansion necessary to maintain the competitive status of ports and meet increasing demands for service. Dual use is a cooperative/collaborative commercial and military use of the terminal facilities. The JPPSP is the military component of the dual use inland terminal facilities. CCDoTT could easily have called for simply commercial applications at the inland facility, but they recognized the need to assure DoD access to strategic ports, particularly with emphasis in military transformation on increased reliance on force projection capabilities form the United States as a critical component of our national security policy. The JPPSP represents an opportunity for DoD to partner in the development of future port facility templates, and as a military capability, a transformational enabler help achieve JV 2020 deployment and distribution capabilities. The JPPSP leverages many current concepts, infuses them with Joint Functional Concept capabilities by use of emerging technologies and processes to change the focus of force projection July 28, 2004 JPPSP ICD Version 1.0 i UNCLASSIFIED operations from mobilization at installations and depots to flexible and responsive support from ports of embarkation to the warfighter executing expeditionary operations. The JPPSP represents a node within the envisioned Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) to manage and regulate the deployment and distribution flow as envisioned in the Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept. The JPPSP can be a prototype node, that can be used to determine requirements and capabilities for other similar nodes (like a Sea Base, ISB, Theater Distribution Center Etc.), as the end to end assessments are completed to fully define JPPSP operations, processes, capabilities, and capacities. The JPPSP can be the CONUS anchor to the JDDE as it develops to support forward deployed forces. This ICD formatted document provides the foundation for a sponsor to be able to develop the JPPSP using the JCIDS process. Identification of a DoD sponsor is required to take advantage of the opportunity to develop this capability in partnership with port stakeholders. July 28, 2004 JPPSP ICD Version 1.0 ii Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) for the Joint Power Projection Support Platform (JPPSP) The table below identifies all changes incorporated into the updated version of this document after initial approval. A change in twenty percent (20%) of the document constitutes a new version, which will also be identified in this table. The Change Request Number (CR #) provides a link to the history of the change request.

Future military operations rely on increasingly complex joint and multinational environments. This calls for innovative concepts, doctrine, and technologies to support the emergence of new planning and execution systems that are more flexible, adaptive, interoperable, and responsive to a time-varying uncertain environment. The ability to conduct joint operations imposes shared information and interoperability requirements to operate among coalition members as growing complexity and rapid pace of military operations transit from a rigid vertical organizational structure to a more integrated, modular and tailored one. In that regard, Network Centric Operations (NCO) offers a unique setting to take on emerging challenges. Even though deliberate planning tools focus on providing “on the fly” precise tailoring and time phasing of force deployment in crisis situations, suitable coordinated responses are subject to a variety of real-time constraints, local views reflecting incomplete time-...

Software tools are now available to assist the Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) with effects based Course of Action (COA) development, analysis, comparison and selection. In 2001, the Information Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) initiated an advanced technology demonstration program in the area of effects based operations. The program set out to develop new concepts and a software toolset to meet the AOC requirement for effects based targeting and campaign assessment. At the core of the toolset are the Strategy Development Tool (SDT) and Causal Analysis Tool (CAT). The Strategy Development Tool guides the user through the development of effects based COAs. During the initial planning phase, the Causal Analysis Tool predicts the probability of achieving commander's intent for the effects based COAs. During execution, the Causal Analysis Tool acts as a campaign assessment tool by incorporating accrued evidence provided by a multi-intelligence fusion component. An attrition-based campaign level wargaming tool was also developed to supplement COA analysis The goal is to transition the software tools to AOC strategists to help them achieve an effects based approach to the COA development process described in Joint Publication 3-30, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations." Though focused on air operations, the tools can be used at the Joint Force Command level as well.

The doctrinal definition of Information Operations (IO) focuses exclusively on offensive and defensive activities. This paper proposes extending the definition of IO to include information efficacy. Then it describes a new approach to military planning and execution called Anticipatory Planning. This approach seeks to merge planning and execution, and replaces reaction to events with anticipation of events, making more effective use of the information that is available during the conduct of military operations. This paper presents a methodology for the development of a prototype decision support system (DSS) for military decision makers, called the Anticipatory Planning Support System (APSS). This DSS facilitates indepth analysis of the voluminous data that is available to military decision makers during the course of operations. The paper concludes with an example of the application of Anticipatory Planning to intrusion response operations.

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Understanding the reasoning of others is a key aspect to achieving a shared understanding when collaboratively solving a problem, such as the generation of a plan, and recent observations of military planners suggest that it plays a key role in the planning process. An example of rationale is described where a misunderstanding is only resolved by the joint exploration and cross-challenging of the rationale. A prototype tool is described that permits the creation and visualization of the basic rationale via the use of Controlled English (CE). Using the example, the paper explores mechanisms that could potentially make more effective use of rationale.

The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CFOPP) is a methodological team approach to develop plans and orders for Canadian Forces operations. The CFOPP includes but is not limited to analysing the situation, identifying relevant factors, sketching courses of action, developing the commander’s guidance and decision, and producing detailed annexes necessary for orders and tasking of CF units. It is based on an Estimate Process. Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) is investigating computer-based decision support to improving the decision cycle and timeliness of orders and tasking. In this paper, we focus on key components of the CFOPP. In particular, this paper describes computer-based tools to support center of gravity analysis, decisive point analysis, risk management, criteria management, dynamic link management and decisionmatrix management. These tools have been embedded into DRDC Collaborative Operations Planning System (COPlanS), an integrated flexible suite ...

Future military operations rely on increasingly complex joint and multinational environments. This calls for innovative concepts, doctrine, and technologies to support the emergence of new planning and execution systems that are more flexible, adaptive, interoperable, and responsive to a time-varying uncertain environment. The ability to conduct joint operations imposes shared information and interoperability requirements to operate among coalition members as growing complexity and rapid pace of military operations transit from a rigid vertical organizational structure to a more integrated, modular and tailored one. In that regard, Network Centric Operations (NCO) offers a unique setting to take on emerging challenges. Even though deliberate planning tools focus on providing "on the fly" precise tailoring and time phasing of force deployment in crisis situations, suitable coordinated responses are subject to a variety of real-time constraints, local views reflecting incomp...

Future military operations rely on increasingly complex joint and multinational environments. This calls for innovative concepts, doctrine, and technologies to support the emergence of new planning and execution systems that are more flexible, adaptive, interoperable, and responsive to a time-varying uncertain environment. The ability to conduct joint operations imposes shared information and interoperability requirements to operate among coalition members as growing complexity and rapid pace of military operations transit from a rigid vertical organizational structure to a more integrated, modular and tailored one. In that regard, Network Centric Operations (NCO) offers a unique setting to take on emerging challenges. Even though deliberate planning tools focus on providing "on the fly" precise tailoring and time phasing of force deployment in crisis situations, suitable coordinated responses are subject to a variety of real-time constraints, local views reflecting incomplete time-varying uncertain information from multiple sources, bounded computational resources and communication bandwidth. The combination of artificial intelligence, operations research and data mining techniques to mention a few, and webbased and information technologies, offer a great opportunity to address new planning system design and integration requirements. In this paper pertinent mission planning and scheduling systems designed to support relevant and specific Air Force and in a certain extent Joint and Navy Forces needs were reviewed. The survey addresses various issues associated with mission planning functions and provides a brief description of methods, tools, and procedures used to plan and schedule complex military operations. Emerging techniques used to build advanced mission planning systems are also examined.

We argue that staffs and their leaders play an important role in disaster response. The main contribution of this paper is a conceptual staff model. It based on scientific literature on leadership, command and control, emergency response coordination patterns, staffs, staff regulations and an empirical basis of three command post exercises.

We present a modeling and simulation approach that clearly increases the efficacy of training and education efforts for peace support operations. Our discussion involves how a computer simulation, the Peace Support Operations Model, is integrated into a training and education venue in Kyrgyzstan for a ''Game for Peace.'' On September 12-23, 2011 members of NATO's Partnership for Peace Training and Education Centers collaborated to instruct a United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations course at the Kyrgyz Separate Rifle Battalion in Bujum, Kyrgyzstan. Phase II of the course was also conducted on October 17-21, 2011 for members of the Peacekeeping Brigade of the Kazakhstan Army (KAZBRIG) in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Although such courses are a mainstay in NATO support in preparing member nations for peace support operations, the application of a computer simulation is unique. We relate the decision to use a computer simulation to support the training event and provide an overview of the methodology for planning and executing the game. Insights from the game about training and educating future peacekeepers and lessons for using computer simulations are instructive for future efforts and mark the way to leverage the advantages of computer simulations.

Soğuk Savaş sonrasında ABD'nin yeni nesil savaş uçağı üretmek için yaptığı çalışmaların en önemli aşamalarından birisini Müşterek Taarruz Uçağı (MTU) ya da diğer adıyla F-35 Lightening II Projesi oluşturmaktadır. Beşinci nesil olarak da adlandırılan bu yeni savaş uçağı projesi, Amerikalıların "adil dövüşmeyiz" ("we don't fight fair") sloganında ifadesini bulan, yüksek teknolojiye dayalı hava gücü üstünlüğünü perçinlemek için gündeme getirilmiştir. Hazırlanan projede yeni ne-sil savaş uçağı başından itibaren hava, deniz ve deniz piyade kuvvetleri tarafından kullanılacak ortak bir platform olarak planlanmıştır. Bu kuvvetlerin halen envan-terinde bulunan tüm taarruz/darbe uçaklarının yerini alması planlanan F-35'ler, konvansiyonel kabiliyetlerin yanında nükleer darbe yeteneğine de sahip olacak şekilde tasarlanmıştır. Hala filo hizmetinde bulunan F-22 Raptor avcı uçağıyla başlayan beşinci nesil savaş uçaklarının temel ayırt edici özellikleri; sinsilik (ste-alth) yani düşük radar kesiti, ardyakıcı (afterburner) devreye sokulmadan ses üstü hızlara çıkabilmesi, yakıtı daha verimli kullanabilmesi ve ağ merkezli harekâta uygunluk olarak sıralanabilir.

Movement control is the planning, routing, scheduling, controlling, coordination, and in-transit visibility of personnel, units, equipment, and supplies moving over Lines of Communication (LOC) and the commitment of allocated transportation assets according to command planning directives. It is a field that involves synchronizing and integrating logistics efforts with other programs that span the spectrum of military operations. According to Lowe, D (2002). Movement control is a tool used to help allocate resources based on the combatant commander's priorities, and to balance requirements against capabilities. The transportation system is consists of three fundamentals, namely mode operations (highway, rail, water, and air), terminal operations, and movement control. Of these elements, movement control is the most critical component of the system and it is very much dependent upon movement control functions. A movement control system must coordinate the efforts of transportation modes, terminals, services, commands, contractors, and host nations during deployment, sustainment, and redeployment. The timely insertion of movement control capability into the area of operation is critical. The functions of movement control consist of planning, allocating, routing, coordinating, and in-transit visibility (ITV). The success of any transportation in military movement depends of proper application of the mentioned movement functions. Planning involves the acknowledged and anticipation of the unknown. Anticipation means being geared up to support combat operations at decisive times and places if need arises. It demands flexibility to have room for change, the ability to see the battlefield, and a thorough understanding of the mission and concept of operations and any likely movements to be done. As concluded by A. O Oparanma e'tal concluded that the application of planning as a strategy is the only way to manage the turbulent and competitive environment of business. It can also be applied to military operations. For movement planners, anticipation includes developing alternative plans of movement and to make up for routes and assets lost due to enemy action. Movement planners must also know the distribution system, the location of supply customer activities, the frequency and magnitude of their transportation requirements, and their material and container-handling capabilities. The transportation planning as a function is very important to the success of military operations at all levels of command. In

The F-35 was originally conceived as a multirole air superiority/ strike aircraft capable of operating in self-contained formations, or alone, into hostile airspace. As its development proceeded, however, it proved extremely difficult to overcome the trade-off between low observability, and range and weapons payload. This had a significant impact on the evolution of debates on concepts of operations, leading to a consensus over employing the aircraft as a decentralised node for command & control rather than as originally envisioned. Consequently, requirements for its integration into existing force structures among the programme's partners have not only changed, but have become more demanding and complex, prompting the need to rethink existing defence acquisition organisation and models. keywords

Future military operations rely on increasingly complex joint and multinational environments. This calls for innovative concepts, doctrine, and technologies to support the emergence of new planning and execution systems that are more flexible, adaptive, interoperable, and responsive to a time-varying uncertain environment. The ability to conduct joint operations imposes shared information and interoperability requirements to operate among coalition members as growing complexity and rapid pace of military operations transit from a rigid vertical organizational structure to a more integrated, modular and tailored one. In that regard, Network Centric Operations (NCO) offers a unique setting to take on emerging challenges. Even though deliberate planning tools focus on providing " on the fly " precise tailoring and time phasing of force deployment in crisis situations, suitable coordinated responses are subject to a variety of real-time constraints, local views reflecting incomplete time-varying uncertain information from multiple sources, bounded computational resources and communication bandwidth. The combination of artificial intelligence, operations research and data mining techniques to mention a few, and web-based and information technologies, offer a great opportunity to address new planning system design and integration requirements. In this paper pertinent mission planning and scheduling systems designed to support relevant and specific Air Force and in a certain extent Joint and Navy Forces needs were reviewed. The survey addresses various issues associated with mission planning functions and provides a brief description of methods, tools, and procedures used to plan and schedule complex military operations. Emerging techniques used to build advanced mission planning systems are also examined.

When U.S. military forces deploy, they require logistics support to achieve their goals, including a wide range of supplies provided by DLA, the military services, contractors, coalition partners, and other agencies. Unfortunately, during the opening phases of recent military deployments, including Operations Desert Shield (1990), Enduring Freedom (2001), and Iraqi Freedom (2003), there were serious problems and delays in setting up distribution infrastructure and processes. To prevent a reoccurrence, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)—in partnership with the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)—developed the Node Management and Deployable Depot (NoMaDD) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). The ACTD program is conducted by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Advanced Systems & Concepts.

NoMaDD’s Node Management component seeks to improve the visibility of the flow of materiel through the distribution pipeline, providing accurate and actionable management information to requisitioners, transportation and distribution node operators, and distribution pipeline managers. For demonstration purposes, this will be accomplished through development of Information Technology tools to run on a proven tactical computer system, the Army’s Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3). Web-enabled capabilities will be demonstrated on the USTRANSCOM's Intelligent Road Rail Information Server (IRRIS).

NoMaDD will support regional Combatant Commander (COCOM) physical distribution requirements through development of a Deployable Distribution Center (DDXX) operated by trained personnel and providing consolidated shipping, receiving, cross-docking, storage, communication, and order processing capabilities. The Deployable Distribution Center will be suitable for rapid deployment and operation anywhere in the world.

DDXX demonstrations in Korea and Japan will allow USPACOM to assess the military utility of NoMaDD capabilities. Modeling, simulation, and analysis is expected to illuminate operational issues associated the employment of NoMaDD during a major military deployment.