Hegemonic Stability Theory

O presente trabalho objetiva testar as recentes afirmações que indicam a queda da posição hegemônica norteamericana no século XXI. Para tanto, será feita uma breve revisão bibliográfica acerca do conceito de hegemonia, fase que será seguida pela apresentação da proposta de Susan Strange acerca dos elementos de determinação hegemônica. Ao sobrepor estes a recentes notícias acerca de posicionamentos americanos e demais desdobramentos internacionais buscar-se-á, finalmente, elucidar a real situação atual da hegemonia dos EUA.

La infancia, la comunicación y la educación han sido protagonistas en las agendas de la política pública durante las dos últimas décadas en la mayoría de países del mundo. También han sido objetos de estudio centrales en disciplinas como la sociología, la psicología, la antropología y la pedagogía. Recientemente han sido incorporados a campos de investigación de carácter interdisciplinario como los estudios culturales, los estudios de la comunicación, los estudios sobre la infancia y las neurociencias. Finalmente, tanto entidades del Estado como organismos multilaterales y corporaciones transnacionales, motivados por distintos intereses, han expresado que los tres, si son estimulados y potencializados, podrán favorecer el desarrollo y el progreso de las sociedades.

Esta mirada preliminar permite evidenciar que existe una preocupación creciente por estos temas y sus transformaciones. Asimismo, se puede deducir que hacen parte de un núcleo de inquietudes fundamentales en torno a la capacidad de las instituciones y la sociedad civil para responder a las nuevas expresiones de los sujetos en el ámbito cultural. Frente a estos desafíos y las posibles relaciones entre los tres conceptos, surgen frecuentemente dosposiciones: sorpresa ante la novedad o preocupación ante la crisis.

The deferred effort in trying to understand international relations is something that has taken place centuries ago. The use of theories that – through the use of certain methodologies previously defined – would have meant making reality more easily intelligible is part of that effort. Thus, the goal of this work is, through the confrontation between four of these theories, expose their points of conflict and convergence of ideas, which would allow me to establish more clearly the scope of each one, consequently, better understand how they would be adequate  to understand the 20th century Cold War. In this work, I use two theories that always had significance in academia and which even today are reference to the analysis of international relations: realism and Marxism, as well as their new and latest developments. At first I expose, in general, the major formulations of each one in order to demonstrate the theoretical content and later confront them. Finally, I present the conclusions.

Scholars of international political economy in the 1970s explored the relationship among a dominant power, leadership, and openness. The discussion soon centered on the concept of hegemony, meaning a situation in which a single state exercises leadership in creating and maintaining the fundamental rules of the international system. The scholarly arguments that ensued focused on the rationale for, and durability of, hegemony, and seemed relevant because of a shared assumption that U.S. dominance, so strong during the quarter-century after World War II, was declining. However, the debate was premised on a shared but incorrect empirical perception that American hegemony was declining. When similar questions arose again at the end of the 20th century, the terminology used was less that of hegemony than of unipolarity and hierarchy, and the key question was whether exercising continuing leadership would be so costly to the hegemon that its decline would be generated by its leadership. The issues of hegemony raised in this literature have taken on renewed relevance with the election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States.

Almost four decades have passed since the Argentina-Brazil balance of power gave way to a Brazilian uncontested primacy in the Southern Cone. The peaceful and cooperative nature of this regional power transition poses an interesting puzzle for structural theories and those concerned with the US-China transition. Why do certain countries accept accommodation more leniently, like Argentina did? I offer an explanatory model and use process tracing to show that key cooperative turns in this bilateral relationship—during the late 1970s and early 1990s—required concurrent structural changes, both at the international and domestic levels. My conclusions suggest, against the prevalent narrative, that cooperation between Argentina and Brazil was not a product of democracy. Instead, peaceful power transitions take place when the costs of confrontation are high and social coalitions are largely redefined in the declining state.

Negli ultimi anni la questione delle teorie di Tucidide e della sua Trappola hanno riempito il dibattito accademico nelle relazioni internazionali, collegandola alla questione della teoria dell’Egemonia.Il ruolo della teoria Tucididea nella teoria egemonica delle IR Theory.

As was the case with many newly independent African nations, Somalia was beset by a language problem whose complexity had begun well before independence and the unification of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland in 1960. With three languages (English, Arabic, and Italian) used as media of communication in government offices and in schools, various Somali administrations struggled to contain the impasse but found no tangible solution. Barely three years after Mohamed Siad Barre seized power in October 1969, he had his military regime introduce the Somali orthography in the Latin alphabet. Based on this milestone, Siad Barre's military rule is highly commended for taking a remarkable step forward in what came to be known as the Somalization project. However, officials of the government and Somali scholarship failed to

This article explores the possibility of conceiving South America and Southern Africa as subsystemic unipolarities under Brazilian and South African primacy, respectively. It argues that this concept, when applied to these regions, sheds light not only on the long-term strategies behind the Brazilian and South African foreign policies towards their neighbourhood, but also on the behaviour of secondary regional powers and small states. This hypothesis questions the maxim that considerations related to polarity affect great powers only. After examining the Brazilian and South African cases, the author undertakes a comparative analysis of 17 countries in these regions, showing that the behaviour of politically stable countries is as predicted by theories of unipolarity.

This introduction frames the contributions that follow in a reflection on how the Japanese experience has been assimilated in US debates on economic policy, on the larger historical significance of the current slowdown of all advanced economies and how it relates to Hansen's original concerns about secular stagnation.

This essay will assess the relevance of hegemonic stability theory (HST) in analysing today’s global political economy. The supposed decline of the United State’s economic and political hegemony towards the end of the 20th century has reinvigorated debate surrounding this theory and its applications in the modern international system. Questions remain as to why international economic stability has been retained, for the most part, after the decline of a hegemon. This paper will first dissect the concept of hegemonic stability then propose that HST still commands substantial relevance because of the legacy hegemonic regimes have left behind.

This Turkish article deals with the analysis of the current Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle Eastern countries, such as Israel, Syria, Iran and Iraq within the theory of Hegemonic Stability. According to this approach, a hegemonic power, which has the objective of formation and establishment of a regional order, urges other countries to share the burden of forming and managing costs. It is argued, that the Turkish foreign policy of the JDP government aiming to build up a Sunni front against the Shia
states is in line with US interests to develop a Greater Middle East

What follows is an exploratory piece making connections between different usages of hegemony and seeking answers to the following questions:
First, how is hegemony used in the literature?
Second, how is Gramscian hegemony reflected in the historical development of hegemony at the transnational level?
Third, noting there is no transnational state that has a monopoly of political violence/coercion, how would one characterize the networks of influence and the ensemble of institutions that perform the functions of the state at the transnational level?
Fourth, what functions does the hegemon (individual state or historic bloc) perform that deems it worthy of prestige?
Fifth, what are salient examples of hegemonic failures?
Sixth, looking specifically at the US, what periods do we see?
Seventh, has the current administration and its more recent predecessors squandered American Hegemony?
In addition, I offer a tentative framework for categorizing all of this in form of a chart or 4 x 3 table.
On one axis are the 3 dimensions of the state – relative power vis-a-vis other states (called 'height'), organizational capacity (called 'depth' referring to institutional density more than secret cabals) and the extent and strength of domestic support (called 'breadth').
On the axis are the 4 aspects of hegemony: the politico-military, the poltico-economic and the poltico-cultural, plus the wild card of technology.
Here are the approaches I use to provide approximate answers to these related questions:
First, expanding on William I Robinson (2005), who identifies 4 overlapping conceptions of hegemony, I add the original Greek conception and include both Hegemonic Stability Theory and Gramscian IPE frameworks. This results in 6 or maybe 7 ways in which the term is used, depending on how you count and categorize.
Second, focusing on Gramsci's insight that the division between 'Civil Society' and 'State' is merely analytical, not organic and that is a methodological misstep to take this as a concrete aspect of reality, I begin to work towards a unified concept of hegemony. The ultimate aim: the GUT of Hegemony.
Third, using Gramsci's idea of an extended state or integral state and applying the concept at the Transnational level.
Fourth, drawing on Gramsci's definition of hegemony as“spontaneous” consent that is“historically” caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group
Brian Ford; bpford1@gmail.com /
NYSPSA 2019 – “Comparing Theories of Hegemony from the Greeks to Gramsci and Beyond: Towards a Grand Unified Theory”
/ Page 4 of 95
enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production, I extend to security and other concerns which can also lead to a spontaneous consent. This thus leads back to unifying the concept of hegemony.
Fifth, describing hegemonic failures from Athens during the Peloponnesian Wars to Europe in the early 1900s to the United States since the 1980s, I make a lot of half-bake suggestions that I hope will improve with a little bit more time in the oven.
Sixth, suggesting 5 periods of American Hegemony: Reluctant Hegemon – 1915 to 1932; Retreat – 1930 to 1941; Leader of the Free World – 1939 to 1991; Leader of Free Markets– 1980 to 2008; The Essential and Overextended Country – 2001 to present, I argue that American hegemony is certainly diminished, but its end is hardly a foregone conclusion.
Seventh, providing a simple answer – the current administration is not squandering but disavowing American Hegemony. As for previous administrations, they all have ways in which they have squandered this role and I explore this, hoping to glean lessons from the future, but focusing on what the British called the Great Game
Finally, providing a framework to help pull this all together in the form of a 3 by 4 box, one axis devoted to a metaphor – the three dimensions of the state. Its 'height' ua the dimension by which we compare it to other states. Its 'depth' is its ability to build up its organizational apparatus. Its 'breadth' is the degree to which it has support among. The other axis is broken up by the functional areas of the state – politico-strategic, politico-economic, politico-educational and, lastly, its interactions with technology.
Wish me luck.

Existing theories predict that the rise of China will trigger a hegemonic transition and the current debate centers on whether or not the transition will be violent or peaceful. This debate largely sidesteps two questions that are central to understanding the future of international order: how strong is the current Western hegemonic order and what is the likelihood that China can or will lead a successful counterhe-gemonic challenge? We argue that the future of international order is shaped not only by material power but also by the distribution of identity across the great powers. We develop a constructivist account of hegemonic transition and stability that theorizes the role of the distribution of identity in international order. In our account, hegemonic orders depend on a legitimating ideology that must be consistent with the distribution of identity at the level of both elites and masses. We map the distribution of identity across nine great powers and assess how this distribution supports the current Western neolib-eral democratic hegemony. We conclude that China is unlikely to become the hegemon in the near term. The rise of China has generated renewed interest in theories of hegem-onic stability and transition. However, existing studies do not adequately address the central questions at the heart of the contemporary debate about the future of hegemony: how strong is the US-led Western hegemonic order and what is the likelihood that China can or will lead a successful counterhegemonic challenge? Existing work focuses either on military-economic power or the beliefs of policymaking elites. Taken together, these studies offer a thin conception of hegemony that reduces heg-emonic transition to material variables conditioned by elite perceptions of threat or calculation of interest. A thin conception of hegemony overstates the likelihood of a Chinese hegemony because it ignores a set of structural, ideational obstacles. That is, the strength and stability of hegemonic orders also depends on the distribution of ideas and identities among the great powers. In order to assess the prospects of We thank the editors of International Organization and two anonymous reviewers for comments that improved the paper. The paper benefited from presentations

Somewhere in between unipolar and imperial orders, hegemonies divide the continuum from anarchy to hierarchy in world politics, connoting interstate systems of the highest concentration of authority. However, depending on the author, hegemony might denote the concentration of relative capabilities in a single state, the presence of a state that seeks international leadership, general consent in the international society regarding subordination to a central order, or a combination of these phenomena. Similarly, scholars debate the extent to which the relation of authority entailed by hegemony should encompass the economic, military, and/or ideational domains. Given this multiplicity of meanings, this review of extant definitions illuminates some issues that must be addressed explicitly when dealing with this concept. Although hegemony might mean different things for different intellectual traditions, these understandings are interconnected in a family resemblance structure that has facilitated mutual intelligibility. A mapping of this network of meanings suggests that special attention needs to be paid to how scholars have thought about the capabilities that would-be hegemons have, the roles they play, and the type of response they elicit from subordinate states. It also suggests the economic, military, and ideational dimensions of hegemony should be explicitly considered in theoretical discussions. Finally, it highlights the importance of avoiding ambiguity by connecting theory with empirics and providing clear measurement strategies. Measurement is essential to delineate the geographical and temporal scope of hegemonies with more precision, to compare them, and to evaluate their effects on certain outcomes. Debates about hegemony have undergone important empirical progress throughout the decades rendering this a promising area for future research.

Thucydides’ History remains the basis for numerous claims within International Relations Theory, contributing to defining concepts from the security dilemma to the dynamics of bi-polarity and hegemonic transition theory. But the historical record that underpins Thucydides’ History provides a more complex view of the rivalry between Athens and Sparta. This analysis argues that basing explanations for the Great Peloponnesian War on the premise of Spartan “fear” is incomplete. A bi-polar, hegemonic rivalry did not lock-in the two states; they existed in a complex multi-polar system.
This multi-polarity allowed other actors—notably Corinth—to
play a key role in the outbreak of war. It was consideration for
alliances, empires, and political rivalries within the context of multi-polarity, rather than a prosaic Spartan “fear,” that were at the heart of the war. These unique characteristics combined with the misrepresentation of the historical record, make generalising from the Peloponnesian War dangerous.

This article analyses China's strategic intentions and how these may ultimately project its violent or peaceful hegemonic rise. It maintains that, although it is difficult to define accurately China's future hegemonic role and general systemic behaviour, a “Third Hegemonic Way” or Dutch‐style hegemony is highly instructive in this context and, thus, should be examined and added to the existing debate on China's peaceful or violent rise as either a benevolent or potentially coercive hegemon. We argue that the Dutch‐style hegemony may be the most viable way for China to proceed in its global hegemonic ascendancy in a future world order.

ABSTRACT
​The Squandering of American Hegemony is an exploratory piece making connections between different usages of hegemony and seeking answers to the following questions:
First, how is hegemony used in the literature? 
Second, how is Gramscian hegemony reflected in the historical development of hegemony at the transnational level?
Third, noting there is no transnational state that has a monopoly of political violence/coercion, how would one characterize the networks of influence and the ensemble of institutions that perform the functions of the state at the transnational level?
Fourth, what functions does the hegemon (individual state or historic bloc) perform that deems it worthy of prestige?
Fifth, what are salient examples of hegemonic failures?
Sixth, looking specifically at the US, what periods do we see? 
Seventh, has the current administration and its more recent predecessors squandered American Hegemony? 
In addition, I offer a tentative framework for categorizing all of this in form of a chart or 4 x 3 table.
On one axis are the 3 dimensions of the state – relative power vis-a-vis other states (called 'height'), organizational capacity (called 'depth' referring to institutional density more than secret cabals) and the extent and strength of domestic support (called 'breadth'). 
On the axis are the 4 aspects of hegemony:  the politico-military, the poltico-economic and the poltico-cultural, plus the wildcard of technology.
​
Here are the approaches I use to provide approximate answers to these related questions:
​First, expanding on William I Robinson (2005), who identifies 4 overlapping conceptions of hegemony, I add the original Greek conception and include both Hegemonic Stability Theory and Gramscian IPE frameworks.  This results in 6 or maybe 7 ways in which the term is used, depending on how you count and categorize.
​Second, focusing on Gramsci's insight that the division between 'Civil Society' and 'State' is merely analytical, not organic and that is a methodological misstep to take this as a concrete aspect of reality, I begin to work towards a unified concept of hegemony. The ultimate aim:  the GUT of Hegemony.
​Third, using Gramsci's idea of an extended state or integral state and applying the concept at the Transnational level.
​Fourth, drawing on Gramsci's definition of hegemony as“spontaneous” consent that is“historically” caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production, I extend to security and other concerns which can also lead to a spontaneous consent. This thus leads back to unifying the concept of hegemony.
​Fifth, describing hegemonic failures from Athens during the Peloponnesian Wars to Europe in the early 1900s to the United States since the 1980s, I make a lot of  half-bake suggestions that I hope will improve with a little bit more time in the oven.
​Sixth, suggesting 5 periods of American Hegemony: Reluctant Hegemon – 1915 to 1932; Retreat – 1930 to 1941; Leader of the Free World – 1939 to 1991; Leader of Free Markets– 1980 to 2008; The Essential and Overextended Country – 2001 to present, I argue that American hegemony is certainly diminished, but its end is hardly a foregone conclusion. 
​Seventh, providing a simple answer – the current administration is not squandering but disavowing American Hegemony.  As for previous administrations, they all have ways in which they have squandered this role and I explore this, hoping to glean lessons from the future, but focusing on what the British called the Great Game
​Finally, providing a framework to help pull this all together in the form of a 3 by 4 box, one axis devoted to a metaphor – the three dimensions of the state.  Its 'height' ua the dimension by which we compare it to other states. Its 'depth' is its ability to build up its organizational apparatus.  Its 'breadth' is the degree to which it has support among.  The other axis is broken up by the functional areas of the state – politico-strategic, politico-economic, politico-educational and, lastly, its interactions with technology.

​Wish me luck.

本文利用霸權穩定理論，檢證與比較中美兩國外援對跨國直接投資的影響。研究方法為結構方程式，研究對象為2000─2013年145個開發中國家與轉型國家。實證結果顯示：中美兩國外援都可充當國際投資公共財──降低跨國直接投資政治風險，且雙方都在搭對方的便車。
          具體而言，本文發現有六：第一，政治風險阻礙跨國直接投資，中資企業也不例外；這是過去文獻忽略之處。第二，中美兩國外援都有利於跨國直接投資。第三，排除政治改革的中國大陸外援，其對跨國直接投資的貢獻，明顯低於美國外援。第四，中國大陸外援旨在，為其企業走出去鋪路。第五，美國外援側重其國家安全。換言之，中美兩國提供國際公共財，都有其自利動機。最後，中美兩國跨國直接投資，都受惠於對方的外援；差別在於，中美雙方受惠程度不同而已。
          總體而言，霸權穩定理論對現今國際政經體系，具有高度的解釋力。唯本文的實證結果，可從三方面補充霸權穩定理論。第一，國際公共財的供給，並非霸權國專有權力；維繫國際政經秩序的意願，才是居中關鍵。第二，國際公共財的供給國，沒有意識型態限制，只要恪守市場經濟規範、不傷害受援國的治理品質亦可。第三，霸權國提供國際公共財，都不是純利他考量；反之皆為政治精算的結果。

Breve definición del COMECON: COMECON: se constituyó como una organización internacional de cooperación económica que se forjó al alero de la Unión Soviética, después de que ésta lograse posicionarse como una potencia regional, económica, política y militar. En el contexto de la guerra fría, muchos países de Europa del Este adhirieron al bloque soviético y, bajo el liderazgo de la URSS, conformaron el Consejo de Ayuda Mutua Económica. Análisis: Antes de iniciar el análisis, me gustaría dejar dos cosas claras. La primera, es la distinción entre organizaciones internacionales y regímenes internacionales, entregadas por Keohane, pues él define organismos internacionales, como un tipo específico de reglas que funcionan dentro de un régimen, siendo una entidad que tiene asignada una porción de recursos para el cumplimiento de ciertas metas; por otro lado, define regímenes internacionales, como algo más amplio que los organismos internacionales, pues la existencia de estos últimos, no es necesaria para que exista un régimen, ya que el propio régimen crea órganos de control que son embriones de los organismos internacionales. Lo segundo y último que quiero dejar claro, es que considero necesario recalcar que las distintas teorías de las Relaciones Internacionales sobre las instituciones, ofrecen miradas contrastantes sobre su surgimiento, sobre las funciones que pueden desempeñar y, en definitiva, sobre el modo en que inciden sobre la conducta de los Estados. Lo anterior, nos indica que podemos utilizar más de una teoría a la hora de analizar una organización internacional, pues de una u otra forma, habrá funciones de la organización que se adaptarán mejor en un caso, que en otro. Sin embargo, siempre existe una teoría que se adapta mejor al caso, que es más adecuada para éste. Es por ello que, en el siguiente ensayo de aplicación de teorías, emplearemos aquella teoría en la que encontramos mayor adecuación para dar cuenta del caso reseñado anteriormente -COMECON-. La teoría que utilizaremos es: La teoría de la Estabilidad Hegemónica para, finalmente, analizar en contraste a la teoría del neoinstitucionalismo liberal, el porqué de la elección de una teoría en declino de otras.

This chapter traces the changing role that the concept of ‘hegemony’ has played in international legal thought. It begins by establishing the original meaning of the term in Ancient Greece and follows its deployment in the Russian Revolution. It argues that by the end of the second world war, ‘hegemony’ had come be understood in two broad registers: as a ‘universalist’ strategy of class domination and as a vision of international relations in which a ‘predominant’ state shapes the global order. The chapter shows how, in the twentieth century, these two understandings became closely associated with the discipline of International Relations on the one hand, and post-structuralism on the other.

The chapter then shows how these two understandings have animated international legal thought. The international relations vision was used by a series of scholars to understand the ‘unilateral’ moment of US domination – particularly as reflected in War on Terror. The universalist vision was a more ‘internal’ vision, which examined how international institutions make claims to ‘neutral’ universality, when putting forward partial or particular legal interpretations.

The chapter contests both of these visions, showing – through a brief history of international financial institutions – that both are fundamentally idealist. The chapter suggests that by returning to Marxist conceptions of hegemony and imperialism might help us make better sense of international law.

ABSTRACT
This was my second shot at this subject.  Unfortunately, Because of passport problems I could not go to Montreal to present.  A shame.

“Towards a Grand Unified Theory of Hegemony” forms the middle and largely theoretical section of The Squandering of American Hegemony. It is an exploratory piece making connections between different usages of hegemony and seeking answers to the following questions:
First, how is hegemony used in the literature? 
Second, how is Gramscian hegemony reflected in the historical development of hegemony at the transnational level?
Third, noting there is no transnational state that has a monopoly of political violence/coercion, how would one characterize the networks of influence and the ensemble of institutions that perform the functions of the state at the transnational level?
Fourth, what functions does the hegemon (individual state or historic bloc) perform that deems it worthy of prestige?
Fifth, what are salient examples of hegemonic failures?
Sixth, looking specifically at the US, what periods do we see? 
Seventh, has the current administration and its more recent predecessors squandered American Hegemony? 
In addition, I offer a tentative framework for categorizing all of this in form of a chart or 4 x 3 table.
On one axis are the 3 dimensions of the state – relative power vis-a-vis other states (called 'height'), organizational capacity (called 'depth' referring to institutional density more than secret cabals) and the extent and strength of domestic support (called 'breadth'). 
On the axis are the 4 aspects of hegemony:  the politico-military, the poltico-economic and the poltico-cultural, plus the wildcard of technology.

Here are the approaches I use to provide approximate answers to these related questions:
First, expanding on William I Robinson (2005), who identifies 4 overlapping conceptions of hegemony, I add the original Greek conception and include both Hegemonic Stability Theory and Gramscian IPE frameworks.  This results in 6 or maybe 7 ways in which the term is used, depending on how you count and categorize.
Second, focusing on Gramsci's insight that the division between 'Civil Society' and 'State' is merely analytical, not organic and that is a methodological misstep to take this as a concrete aspect of reality, I begin to work towards a unified concept of hegemony. The ultimate aim:  the GUT of Hegemony.
Third, using Gramsci's idea of an extended state or integral state and applying the concept at the Transnational level.
Fourth, drawing on Gramsci's definition of hegemony as“spontaneous” consent that is“historically” caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production, I extend to security and other concerns which can also lead to a spontaneous consent. This thus leads back to unifying the concept of hegemony.
Fifth, describing hegemonic failures from Athens during the Peloponnesian Wars to Europe in the early 1900s to the United States since the 1980s, I make a lot of  half-bake suggestions that I hope will improve with a little bit more time in the oven.
Sixth, suggesting 5 periods of American Hegemony: Reluctant Hegemon – 1915 to 1932; Retreat – 1930 to 1941; Leader of the Free World – 1939 to 1991; Leader of Free Markets– 1980 to 2008; The Essential and Overextended Country – 2001 to present, I argue that American hegemony is certainly diminished, but its end is hardly a foregone conclusion. 
Seventh, providing a simple answer – the current administration is not squandering but disavowing American Hegemony.  As for previous administrations, they all have ways in which they have squandered this role and I explore this, hoping to glean lessons from the future, but focusing on what the British called the Great Game
Finally, providing a framework to help pull this all together in the form of a 3 by 4 box, one axis devoted to a metaphor – the three dimensions of the state.  Its 'height' ua the dimension by which we compare it to other states. Its 'depth' is its ability to build up its organizational apparatus.  Its 'breadth' is the degree to which it has support among.  The other axis is broken up by the functional areas of the state – politico-strategic, politico-economic, politico-educational and, lastly, its interactions with technology.

Wish me luck.

The American science-fiction writer Isaac Asimov (1919-1992) formed one of my main inspirations, with his introduction of the future-predicting scientific discipline of 'psychohistory'. This gave me the idea of doing the same for a country, in this case, the Philippines.

The Philippines are often mentioned as an emerging economy, but has nevertheless shown weak and inconsistent growth since independence. From one of the wealthiest countries in the region, it descended into becoming one of the poorest. The problem-solving question of this work is therefore: How can the Philippine economy develop from an underdeveloped into an emerging economy, taking into account internal developments and the hegemonic rivalry between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China? 

The goal of the author is the creation of a 'Seldon Plan' for the Philippines following Asimov's hero Hari Seldon, and following the current cliodynamists.

The paper's body following the introduction is divided into three parts, each consisting of two chapters. Part 1 provides an overview of the economic and relevant non-economic features of the Philippines. Part 2 gives insight in internal dynamics within the Philippine economy. Part 3 focuses on the external influence of hegemonic rivalry between the U.S. and China on the Philippine economy. Finally, the paper closes with a conclusion.

The author recommends a number of improvements in order to make the Philippine political and economic institutions less extractive and more inclusive. Culture and social attitude towards certain behavior is herewith pivotal, and the author therefore pleads for a cultural change of mind. In addition, the analysis of external factors show that the current attitude towards China is counterproductive and that negotiations and a better relation yield optimal result. The author therefore recommends the Philippines to improve their relation with China whilst keeping their warm and outstanding relation with the U.S.

This paper examines the utility of the hegemonic stability theory in understanding regional power dynamics within Africa. The study operationalizes the concept of regional hegemony by drawing insights from a comparative foreign policy analysis of African regional powers, with emphasis on Nigeria. Using a largely qualitative methodology supplemented with primary data, the paper examines the underlying assertions of Nigeria's perceived 'hegemonic' influence. Through the use of the hegemonic stability theory as a theoretical lens, this paper argues that Nigeria's foreign policy shows few signs of a continental hegemonic disposition. In applying this theory at a regional level of analysis, the study finds very little empirical evidence that it fits the African regional context. In short, hegemonic claims in Africa are mere (un)official rhetoric and lack substance.

In this article, I deconstruct the concept of legitimacy (notably in the form elaborated by Max Weber) by emphasising its conceptual complicity with the notion of sovereignty. Through an analysis of Derrida's critique of Austin's theory of performativity, I elaborate another, non-ontological 'concept' of legitimacy, located before and beyond sociological methodology, International Relations theory, and performative ontologies of power. This legitimation-to-come signifies the structural fallibility and pervertibility of the performative, and instantiates the archi-originary force of an unconditional resistance, conditioning both the position and the deconstruction of ontologies of sovereign ipseity (ipsocracy). Pursuing the efforts of Cynthia Weber and Rob Walker, I attempt to sketch the implications of this post-performative legitimacy with respect to the protocols of legitimation of International Relations theory and sociological methodologies, through an analysis of their persistent ontological presuppositions.

In this article, I engage with Derrida’s deconstructive reading of theories of performativity in order to analyse Max Weber’s sovereignty/legitimacy paradigm. First, I highlight an essential articulation between legitimacy and sovereign ipseity (understood, beyond the sole example of State sovereignty, as the autopositioned power-to-be-oneself). Second, I identify an originary force of alteration, an unconditional deconstructibility of sovereignty, foreign to the order of performative legitimacy. This disjunctive force implies an essential fallibility of the performative. The differential co-implication of legitimacy and sovereignty suggests an irreducible coloniality of law and language, but also points to an unconditional resistance located in the radical interpretability of the law, beyond determined positions of powers, dominations, sovereignties or resistances.
My reflection is triggered by a reading of Cynthia Weber’s theory of ‘performative states’, describing sovereignty under the form of an impossible ontology, which leads me to elaborate the notion of legitimation-to-come as a non-ontological ‘concept’: this unconditional legitimacy, beyond sovereignty, binds beliefs and phantasms to the unpresentable force of the event. Pursuing the efforts of scholars such as Rob Walker and Cynthia Weber, I sketch the implications of this archi-performative force of legitimacy with respect to the methodologies of International Relations and sociology, in view of elucidating the persistent ontological presuppositions of these disciplines.

In the discipline of international relations, debate over the relative advantages and disadvantages of different configurations of international order has been a long and historical tradition, especially during the past 100 years, in which the international system has undergone several major transformations. This debate is no less vibrant today, as many observers of international relations predict that the rise of developing countries such as China, India, and Brazil will cause an end to the unipolar era that the United States has experienced since the end of the Cold War in 1991. The possibility of a return to a bi-polar or multi-polar structure in international politics begs the question: which international distribution of power -persistent U.S. unipolarity, bi-polarity, or multi-polarity -is most likely to generate international political conditions tending toward the achievment of global security? As will be argued in depth below, the international system is best equipped to achieve optimal global security under the existing unipolar power structure. In the current unipolar system, the United States has used and uses its overwhelming power advantage to: first, create and sustain a rule-based international order based on certain acquired values enshrined in formal multilateral institutions such as the UN and WTO;

Somewhere in between unipolar and imperial orders, hegemonies divide the continuum from anarchy to hierarchy in world politics, connoting interstate systems of the highest concentration of authority. However, depending on the author, hegemony might denote the concentration of relative capabilities in a single state, the presence of a state that seeks international leadership, general consent in the international society regarding subordination to a central order, or a combination of these phenomena. Similarly, scholars debate the extent to which the relation of authority entailed by hegemony should encompass the economic, military, and/or ideational domains. Given this multiplicity of meanings, this review of extant definitions illuminates some issues that must be addressed explicitly when dealing with this concept. Although hegemony might mean different things for different intellectual traditions, these understandings are interconnected in a family resemblance structure that has facilitated mutual intelligibility. A mapping of this network of meanings suggests that special attention needs to be paid to how scholars have thought about the capabilities that would-be hegemons have, the roles they play, and the type of response they elicit from subordinate states. It also suggests the economic, military, and ideational dimensions of hegemony should be explicitly considered in theoretical discussions. Finally, it highlights the importance of avoiding ambiguity by connecting theory with empirics and providing clear measurement strategies. Measurement is essential to delineate the geographical and temporal scope of hegemonies with more precision, to compare them, and to evaluate their effects on certain outcomes. Debates about hegemony have undergone important empirical progress throughout the decades rendering this a promising area for future research.

Northeast Asia has traditionally been a region rife with historical and political conflicts that display characteristics that seem to follow a path of development different from other regions. As one goes through the massive inventory of international relations theory, it is still uneasy to find an explanation that befits developments in the region. This paper examines the hegemonic stability and evaluates its effectiveness in explaining developments in Northeast Asia, particularly the rise of China. In addition, this paper seeks to test the hegemonic stability theory by re-addressing US role in the region and challenges to the regional status quo.

The free and open multilateral trade order – an important public good provided through the World Trade Organization (WTO) – is in increasing peril. This dissertation makes evident the crisis in the WTO is primarily due to the decline of US hegemony, as US policymakers proceeded to obstruct those processes in the WTO that were considered to threaten national security.

a la fecha, es a través del desenlace de alguna o algunas de las situaciones de mayor magnitud que estén relacionados con las potencias emergentes que pretenden establecerse como hegemónicas en alianza, de acuerdo a lo acordado en Davos como Irán, China, Rusia, y posiblemente las mismas redes criminales transnacionales (CTO) aliadas con los grupos o familias que manejan grandes capitales y que impulsan internacionalmente la agenda 2030, pactado entre naciones y personalidades de la mayor capacidad económica en el Foro Económico Mundial, que cuentan con el apoyo de la ONU y el estado Vaticano.

Through bailout packages and policies that aim to align the economies of debtor states with that of their creditors, ordoliberalism has become the primary structure of European integration in recent years. By virtue of its effect upon, and subsequent constitution within the politics of the larger debt-stricken states of Europe, Italy and Spain, the latest integrative policies: Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT’s) and the Asset Purchase Programme (APP), present a sea change in the usual ordoliberal demands for integration via the convergence of fiscally-consolidative policy. Undeniably these new measures of
limited debt-sharing evidence the incorporation and convergence of Latin-based demands for the distribution of debt liability with that of earlier Germanic austerity packages. This demonstrates that a hegemonic social structure can be reorganised dependent upon the social agents whom it has subsumed. This is not to say that the composition of ordoliberalism is now half-Mediterranean, no, Germany remains the most important agent influencing the direction and speed of European integration. Instead, what is being conveyed here is the reciprocity of social structure; that which it effects will have an effect upon it. And as ordoliberalism advances and permeates other societies in Europe, through the institutions of the region, it will incorporate unconsciously the structures of those societies. It is important, therefore, to find a way to document this transformation.

Brief Description

The book was originally conceived of shortly after the 2016 election and consists of three principal parts: 'Hegemony and It's Disavowal,' which considers the actions of the current administration; 'Hegemony and It's Uses,' a theoretical account of how the concept of hegemony is used in the literature which also works to unify the concept; and 'The Squandering of American Hegemony,' which provides an overview of missed opportunities in foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. After making the distinction between 'disavowal' and 'squandering,' the book examines how US president's since the end of the Cold War have engaged in strategies that have defined the national interest in terms that emphasize either its appeal to core constituencies and/or in terms of partisan political advantage. In order to provide a framework, the author makes reference to a theoretical 'pincer movement' of Thucydides and Gramsci to surround the core uses of Hegemony in the literature, including realist views of Hegemony, Hegemonic Stability Theory, Long Duree and Long Cycle Theories, and, finally, theories of Historical Materialism and Sociological Transmission that draw on Gramsci, Polanyi and others.

The two flanks of the pincer movement are Gramsci and Thucydides. This seems appropriate, as Gramsci makes extended uses of military metaphors and Thucydides spent much of his life involved in and grappling with the events of war. From Gramsci, mainly his Prison Notebooks, we glean that the process by which the national interest is articulated depends on historical particulars; the nearly simultaneous and intertwined increase in globalization and the introduction of new technologies set the stage for political strategies that no longer relied on cross-class national cohesion, but instead were, among the investor and speculative classes, transnational and were based on shared class interests. From Thucydides, who to some extend stands in for Greek thought as whole, we see the danger of hubris and the negative consequences of appealing to the crowd. In his History, we see the dire consequences of appealing to the emotions of pride and anger, of stoking up resentments.

Peace negotiations with Afghanistan's Taliban are under way, but the majority of Afghans were either born after NATO arrived in 2001 or came of age - they are modern global citizens who are not keen to return to the days of Taliban rule. If negotiations do not go well on power sharing we can expect millions of them to leave for Europe and the United States.

RESUMO: Este trabalho tem por objetivo refletir uma possível disputa hegemônica entre Estados Unidos e China. Tendo por base os aportes da corrente do "capitalismo histórico", parte-se do pressuposto de que a ascensão material da China pode colocar em xeque a atual hegemonia dos Estados Unidos, cuja economia entrou numa fase de financeirização. Tal categorização se baseia numa perspectiva de longa duração, em que são importantes as contribuições de Fernand Braudel, Immanuel Wallerstein e Giovanni Arrighi. Nesse sentido, podemos encontrar evidências de uma potencial transferência do Ciclo Sistêmico de Acumulação (CSA) baseado nos Estados Unidos para o Leste da Ásia, região em que a China busca projetar seu poder econômico, político e militar visando contrabalançar o intento norteamericano de manter seu status quo na região da Ásia Pacífico.

Paper Starting Finance La Trappola di Tucidide e la sua influenza nello scontro Cina-USA

Quella fra USA e Cina è solo una tregua, per permettere alle due superpotenze di riprendere fiato. Infatti, la Cina difficilmente sarà disposta ad accettare un posizione subordinata agli USA. Questi ultimi, invece, vorranno probabilmente sfruttare la loro posizione di vantaggio nei confronti di Pechino. La guerra commerciale sembra ancora molto lontana dalla parola fine. Quali potrebbero essere, sul piano geo-politico, le conseguenze di una situazione del genere? Quali sono i possibili scenari?

https://www.startingfinance.com/news/usa-cina-tregua-no-pace/

Sommario

Il seguente elaborato analizza la guerra commerciale tra Stati Uniti e Cina confrontandola con un’analisi storica riguardante lo scontro egemonico tra Atene e Sparta, e con un focus che mette in risalto alcuni scenari geopolitici di egemonia cinese o statunitense in Asia e una simulazione di una possibile crisi commerciale che potrebbe tramutarsi in confronto militare.
Infine un’ulteriore analisi mette a confronto l’attuale scontro commerciale con quello che avvenne tra Regno Unito e la Germania Imperiale per la supremazia tecnologica navale.

Indice
Introduzione
La Trappola di Tucidide
La Stabilità Egemonica nella Trappola di Tucidide: Atene vs Sparta
Il Dualismo tra Atene e Sparta come precursore del bipolarismo
Cina vs Stati Uniti: i possibili scenari
Simulazione di una possibile Trappola di Tucidide: da una guerra commerciale ad un conflitto bellico
La Guerra per la supremazia tecnologica nel XX secolo: Regno Unito vs Germania Imperiale
Conclusioni

Klare’s analysis is timely, well written, and intriguing considering its central thesis that the world’s reliance on fossil fuels will eventually lead to increased geopolitical tensions. While other books may offer a more thorough account, this is a welcome read.

Although few disagree that advancements in technology and the establishment of trade-conducive transnational institutions play an important role in augmenting the potential for trade globalization, there is more disagreement surrounding alternative causal explanations of trade during the postwar period. While world-system scholars argue that international trade increases when a hegemonic nation-state is powerful enough to provide geopolitical stability and trade-conducive policies, world-polity theorists maintain that trade results from the emanation of ''cultural scripts'' that create compatible national institutions and trust among nation-states. This article tests these theories by analyzing a global-level data set with information from 1945 to 2005 via autoregressive integrated moving-average models. The results provide strong support for the world-system contention that increases in the power of the hegemonic nation-state amplify levels of trade globalization. Furthermore, although there is some support for the world-polity contention that the spread of democracy is positively associated with international trade, there is little evidence to validate the claim that the proliferation of intergovernmental organizations enhances trade globalization.