Korean Politics

Sunshine Policy is one of the most phenomenon reunification policies of South Korea government. The policy opened the new era of inter-Korea relations, especially the government to government relations. It was even caused Kim Dae Jung, as a President and the initiator of the policy, awarded a Nobel Prize for his merit to establish the first Higher Summit among the two Korean leaders. It gained huge attention and compliments from international society. In fact, it was not happened in the domestic level. There were fusses in the society and politics sectors.
Polarization happened among two groups in the parliament, inter and within political parties, among medias, and even in the society. Supporters of Sunshine Policy named as progressive groups (left wing) and the oppositions named as conservative groups (right wing). Generally, the dispute based on polarization towards image of North Korea in the society. The polarization deepened into “ideological” views of the political parties on how policies towards North Korea adopted by the South Korean government. This phenomenon called South – South Conflict.
This thesis is writing to analyse why the conflict happened. Using two main aspects of Sunshine Policy as foreign policy, the sources of policy and the decision making process. Both of the aspects are influenced by the political culture of South Korean. Thus, the analysis will explain more on how the political culture affected the polarization and South-South Conflict.

Tóm tắt: Quá trình dân chủ hóa ở Hàn Quốc có thể chia thành 3 giai đoạn: giai đoạn chế độ dân chủ đại nghị vay mượn từ phương Tây (1948-1961), giai đoạn chế độ độc tài (1961-1987) và giai đoạn tái lập chế độ dân chủ đại nghị (1987-nay). Chế độ dân chủ ở Hàn Quốc hiện nay thuộc loại chế độ dân chủ tư sản. Bản chất của nó thể hiện qua 4 nội dung: 1-tổ chức bộ máy nhà nước trên nguyên tắc tam quyền phân lập; 2-hệ thống đa đảng nhưng nhất nguyên chính trị; 3-nền kinh tế thị trường đa thành phần và thành phần kinh tế tư bản tư nhân giữ vị trí chủ chốt; 4-công dân tự do tham gia các hoạt động chính trị. Khách quan mà nói thì chế độ này tiến bộ hơn so với các chế độ chính trị trước đây, nhưng còn nhiều khiếm khuyết: Tổng thống quyền hành rất lớn, chi phối nhiều đến 3 nhánh quyền lực; chỉ có giai cấp tư sản mới có khả năng tranh cử nghị trường; mối quan hệ giữa giới chóp bu chính trị với các tập đoàn kinh tế lớn làm tăng nạn tham nhũng, mất đi tính dân chủ trong bầu cử, ứng cử và tranh cử; những người dân thường nếu không có khả năng tài chính thì không thể tham gia đầy đủ các hoạt động chính trị… Như vậy, bản chất của chế độ dân chủ ở Hàn Quốc hiện nay thật sự là chế độ dân chủ của số ít người đối với đa số người. Thuật ngữ " dân chủ " xuất phát từ tiếng Hy Lạp cổ đại: " Demokratos " (được ghép bởi hai từ: " demo " = " dân " và " kratos " = " quyền lực "), nghĩa là " quyền lực của dân ". Khi xem xét vấn đề dân chủ, các nhà kinh điển Mác – Lê nin đã tán thành việc cho rằng dân chủ là quyền lực của nhân dân và là sản phẩm của sự tiến bộ của nhân loại. Chế độ dân chủ là chế độ chính trị tôn trọng và đảm bảo các quyền cơ bản của công dân bằng những quy định của pháp luật, một trong những quyền ấy là quyền tham gia xây dựng, quản lý và giải quyết các công việc của nhà nước. Tuy nhiên, không phải bất cứ quốc gia hay lãnh thổ nào dán vào cái mác dân chủ thì toàn dân ở đó được hưởng dân chủ thật sự. Thực tế lịch sử các chế độ dân chủ cho thấy chỉ có hai thứ chế độ dân chủ: dân chủ của số ít người và dân chủ của đa số người, tuyệt đối không có " dân chủ chung chung, phi giai cấp, siêu giai cấp " [Đỗ Tư 2004: 60] 1. Chủ nghĩa Mác-Lê nin cũng đã chỉ ra rằng bản chất của dân chủ là của số ít hay của số đông đều phụ thuộc vào bản chất giai cấp thống trị xã hội quy định. Hàn Quốc cũng là một trong các quốc gia theo chế độ dân chủ. Chế độ dân chủ ở Hàn Quốc với những đặc trưng riêng của nó đã thu hút nhiều nhà nghiên cứu trên thế giới. Nhiều khía cạnh liên quan đến chế độ dân chủ ở Hàn Quốc được tìm hiểu như: quá độ từ độc tài đến dân chủ, quá trình dân chủ hóa, hệ thống chính trị trong chế độ dân chủ hiện nay, văn hóa chính trị trong chế độ dân chủ… Nhằm góp phần làm phong phú thêm những hiểu biết về chế độ dân chủ ở Hàn Quốc, chúng tôi sẽ tìm hiểu một khía cạnh khác của nó: bản chất giai cấp của chế độ dân chủ. Để làm rõ vấn đề này, chúng tôi tập trung giải quyết hai nội dung: 1. Các bước phát triển của chế độ dân chủ ở Hàn Quốc; 1 Các trích dẫn trong bài viết này được lấy từ tài liệu tham khảo ở cuối bài, theo nguyên tắc: [Tên tác giả Năm xuất bản: số trang].

Wpływy Korei Południowej od dłuższego czasu przenikają do masowej świadomości. Zajadamy się kimchi, słuchamy k-popu, zgłębiamy koreańskie praktyki kosmetyczne i z zapartym tchem oglądamy kolejne nagradzane filmy. Pod tą maską, którą sami Koreańczycy chcą pokazywać światu, znajdziemy jednak trudną historię i jeszcze trudniejszą współczesność.

Roman Husarski porzuca stereotypy i uproszczenia i podróżując po Korei, szuka informacji u źródeł. Opowieści, które słyszy, okazują się dużo ciekawsze niż misternie kreowany wizerunek. To państwo, w którym ludzie żyją najdłużej na świecie, wielkie bogactwo spotyka się ze skrajnym ubóstwem, religie konkurują ze sobą niczym firmy, a wojny toczą nie tylko partie, lecz także regiony, pokolenia oraz płcie. Husarski barwnie opowiada o meandrach koreańskiej polityki, skomplikowanych relacjach z Japonią i Koreą Północną, ale przede wszystkim rozmawia z ludźmi, którzy zmagają się z odpowiedzią na pytanie, czym jest dla nich koreańskość i jak połączyć wieloletnią tradycję ze współczesną moralnością. Z tych opowieści wyłania się wielowymiarowa, niejednoznaczna i niezwykle fascynująca Korea.

Pod koniec 2018 roku w Korei Południowej wprowadzono do obrotu leki na bazie konopi (Cannabis sativa, Cannabis indica). Korea jest pierwszym krajem w konserwatywnej pod tym względem Azji Wschodniej, który odważył się na taki krok. Pacjenci muszą jednak mierzyć się z uciążliwym prawem, wysokimi cenami i przede wszystkim silną stygmatyzacją społeczną.

In the past 20 years neoliberalism has become the favoured term for activists and academics alike seeking to describe the ideology that informs political systems across the globe.  However, the increase in topics and issues it has been applied to has led to a growing number of conceptual critiques and calls for the terms’ abandonment (Venugopal, 2015; Dunn, 2016). Within this context this paper will examine if the term neoliberalism is useful.  In order to answer this question, this dissertation is split into three chapters. The first chapter draws on a wide range of academic literature on neoliberalism and critically examines the multiple ways in which the concept has been approached. The second chapter examines how the term is currently being used within the British media by conducting an atheoretical case study. This uses the example of the recent publishing of an IMF report on neoliberalism and analyses how different newspapers covered this event. These findings form the basis of analysis in the final chapter which engages with the criticism the concept has received before arguing that neoliberalism, if used precisely and consistently, can be used as the target of a counter-hegemonic movement which challenges mainstream politico-economic thinking.

For a long time, the world thought that the collapse of the USSR in 1991 would lead to a similar outcome in North Korea. Although the Kim regime suffered harsh economic troubles, it was able to distance itself from communism without facing an ideological crisis and losing mass support. The same core political myths are still in use today. However, after the DPRK left the ideas of socialist realism behind, it has become clearer that the ideology of the country is a political religion. Now, its propaganda is using more supernatural elements than ever before. A good example is the movie The Big-Game Hunter (Maengsu sanyangkkun) in which the Japanese are trying to desacralize Paektu Mountain, but instead experience the fury of the holy mountain in the form of thunderbolts. The movie was produced in 2011 by P'yo Kwang, one of the most successful North Korean directors. It was filmed in the same year Kim Chŏng-ŭn came to power. The aim of the paper is to show the evolution of the DPRK political myth in North Korean cinema, in which The Big-Game Hunter seems to be another step in the process of mythologization. It is crucial to understand how the propaganda works, as it is still largely the cinema that shapes the attitudes and imagination of the people of the DPRK.

Korea has a long history of linking conflict resolution with particular moral and societal values. In this chapter we explore the potentials and limits of this tradition by focusing on the concept of Han, which many Korean scholars claim as unique to their culture.  We explore in detail two important aspects of Han. First, the concept of Han explicitly acknowledges the emotional dimensions of conflict and its resolution. This focus on emotions contrasts sharply with Western approaches to mediation, which are part of a broader cultural tradition dominated by instrumental understandings of reason.  Second, the concept of Han, as understood and practiced in Korea, shifts the focus of conflict resolution from the individual to the collective. The main task is not to address and solve individual grievances or a clash between particu- lar individuals, as is the case in dominant Western approaches to mediation. The purpose, rather, is to find ways of harmonising the relationship between individuals and the society at large.

ABSTRACT

An under theorized area of Dark and War Tourism studies concerns the appropriation of tours for the perpetuation of political propaganda. Taking the case of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates North and South Korea this study demonstrates the extent to which heritage tours are used to present the political and military arguments of the South in order to persuade visitors of the justification of their actions in the ongoing conflict between North and South Korea.

KEYWORDS
DARK TOURISM, WAR TOURISM, HERITAGE, POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY, KOREAN WAR, NORTH KOREA, SOUTH KOREA, DMZ, PANMUNJEOM, MILITARY HISTORY, PROPAGANDA, PERSUASION, MANIPULATION, MILITARY HISTORY, CONFLICT STUDIES

This paper addresses the following puzzle: Why have increasing levels of economic interdependence (EI) led to improved political relations between China and South Korea but have not had the same effect on political relations between China and Japan? Using a most similar system design, this paper compares the relationship between trade and financial investments and political relations with the Sino-South Korean and Sino-Japanese dyads.
This research examines EI and political relations within the two dyads during four major events from 1987 to 2005. The findings show that high levels of EI can improve political relations during events that do not have broad security implications. However, when security concerns are paramount in the crisis, the effects of EI are likely to be limited by the need for national leaders to react strongly to the posed threat, consolidating national support for policy.

In this article, I challenge the view that Korea‟s successful macroeconomic recovery from the 1997/98 financial crisis was the result of market-oriented reforms and International Monetary Fund (IMF)-prescribed structural adjustments. I show that the recovery was mainly achieved by the „traditional strengths‟ of the pre-crisis development model, resting on export orientation and strong state capacity, rather than a transformation into a new „neoliberal‟ state. However, I also show that economic liberalisation and market reforms undermine state capacity and restrict a proactive and developmental role of the state. In short, the successful recovery was the last stage of the developmental state in Korea. The article is organised as follows. In section one, I provide a critical review of the relevant literature on Korean post-crisis restructuring and present my argument in more detail. In section two, I show that the main contributor in stabilising the economy and replenishing foreign currency reserves was Korea‟s exports, and not the process of regaining foreign investors‟ confidence through market opening and financial liberalisation. In section three, I illustrate the importance of state intervention for the economic recovery of Korea and, in section four, I argue that this state capacity is a product of the Korean developmental state, which has slowly been undermined by market-oriented reforms. I conclude in section five that Korea‟s successful recovery has been based on the two pillars of export orientation and state expansion, which face internal and external limitations, making a similar strategy unviable for other countries and even for potential future crises in Korea.

The prospect of a nuclear capable North Korea has seen the strategic crisis on the Korean peninsula take on an additional layer of complexity and potentially catastrophic lethality. Recent analysis tends to focus only on the period since the Korean War and consequently pays little attention to historical and cultural factors, which inform the context in which the North Korean (and the South as well for that matter) elites operate. This paper is an attempt to demonstrate how an appreciation of traditional strategic culture and the broader history in which the crisis is situated can enhance our understanding of the motivations for, and functions of, this nuclear capability.

In the 1980s and 1990s, rapid market oriented reforms, liberalization and privatization (“shock therapy”) in developing and transformational countries caused economic and social problems that began to undermine the legitimacy of political democratization and market reforms itself. Scholars in the field of transformation and development theory found that market coordination alone was not able to fill the void left by a weak or weakening state. In this essay, we look at the case of Korea to find out if an active civil society can substitute functions of the withdrawing developmental state since the 1980s. We show that civil society organizations (CSOs) in Korea have been relatively effective in influencing political processes, shaping public opinion, compensating the weakness of political institutions, and contributing to general development. Korean CSOs achieved this remarkable impact despite substantial organizational problems and a relatively unfavorable socioeconomic and political environment. This effectiveness and the synergy between state and civil society make Korean CSOs very interesting to study for development scholars. Korea might offer some valuable lessons on how to improve advocacy CSOs in an unfavorable environment similar to that of many developing countries.

Despite Chinese claims to not have enforced any sanctions against South Korean economic activities in Mainland China following the installation of the THAAD system in 2016, it quickly became evident that the Chinese government was making conscious efforts to hinder economic endeavors by Korean entrepreneurs and companies in China. This paper utilizes economic sanctions theory in order to investigate the covert nature of the Chinese government’s attempts at punishing South Korean businesses for political initiatives undertaken by the Korean government. The first part of the paper introduces the literature on economic sanctions theory and its utility in the Chinese context, and proceeds to account for the political events leading up to and following the deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea. It aims to emphasize Chinese reactions to the rationales and actions of the South Korean government, using primary sources and statements made by Chinese officials involved in the matter. The second part of the paper consists of a case study of Korean pop manufacturer SM Entertainment, in which the THAAD deployment’s effects on SM Entertainment’s activities in Mainland China will be accounted for. This part presents data, which argues that SM Entertainment was not observably affected by the crisis, but that it made deliberate efforts to redirect its activities to Japan following the THAAD deployment in response to severe restrictions on Korean popular culture products in China. Findings reveal that the Chinese government not only has a significant history of enforcing covert sanctions against sovereign nations in response to political decisions made by their governments, but also that it is highly likely to continue this form of punishment in an attempt to influence foreign politics without running the risk of military escalation or further conflict.

En el presente artículo se abordan los cambios acontecidos en las relaciones intercoreanas tras el derrumbe de los regímenes soviéticos. En los primeros años que siguieron a la caída del Telón de Acero, se mantuvo en todo el perímetro coreano un escenario de confrontación que parecía perpetuar el problema sine die. Pero en la segunda mitad de los años noventa, el Nordeste Asiático comienza a vivir un auténtico cambio que repercutirá en la aparición de contactos públicos entre las dos Coreas. El nuevo juego destapado oficialmente por la Sunshine Policy propició un replanteamiento muy profundo en las políticas exteriores de ambos estados, y abrió un nuevo capítulo en las relaciones intercoreanas que ha demostrado claramente la importante dimensión y repercusión del conflicto en el marco
geoestratégico de todo el Este Asiático, así como en la política internacional.

The Korean Airlines “nut rage incident” of December 2014 was for many Westerners another sensationalized glimpse into the social and cultural phenomenon that is one of the most rapidly modernizing nations and globally dominating technology developers in East Asia: South Korea. This incident, and many others like it, appear to be a Gordian knot for the country’s further cultural, social and economic development and Western acceptance, with threads tracing back 2500 years ago to ancient China. The purpose of this thesis is to “unravel” these threads which include Classical Confucianism; Korea’s adoption and adaptation of Confucianism, and breakneck industrialization; and the philosophy of professional ethics. By identifying each in relation to one another, a nuanced understanding of roles ethics will emerge as a pragmatic paradigm to facilitate the sustainment of social harmony in South Korea and societies writ large.

La Asociación Argentina de Estudios Coreanos (AAEC) y la Cátedra de Historia Contemporánea de Asia y África de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (UNC) convocan al I Workshop de Estudiantes y Jóvenes Investigadores en Estudios Coreanos a realizase los días 17, 18 y 19 de agosto de 2017 en la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades (FFyH) de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (UNC). En homenaje al Profesor Jaime I. Silbert.

Nueva fecha límite de envío de ponencias: Hasta el 20 de julio de 2017

1º circular - I Workshop de Estudiantes y Jóvenes Investigadores en Estudios Coreanos - 17, 18 y 19 de agosto de 2017 - Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades (FFyH) - Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (UNC):

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BzzpmXz8_-hsVHczZmV4WFo3SGs/view?usp=sharing

Formulario de inscripción:

https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSeUu2k4bXbG8CU4coRA9TeRJ90GcychHR0Uq7tP6118jHb7Lg/viewform

Contacto y envío de ponencias:
workshop.estudioscoreanos@gmail.com

A Key element of the new Korean strategy, Southeast Asia remains a laboratory of power for the Korean government and companies in their efforts to gain influences in the world affairs. The mechanisms elaborated in the region are already partly duplicated in some other parts of the world such as Latin American or Africa. Worried by the rise of China, South Korea seeks to create a network of friends with countries sharing similar concerns and with whom strengthen its relations not only economically but also politically and strategically.

Na Półwyspie Koreańskim wszyscy mówią o zjednoczeniu. Lecz tak naprawdę nikt go nie chce. Światowym mocarstwom odpowiada stan obecny. Dla reżimu północnokoreańskiego podział Korei to gwarancja istnienia. Południe zaś nie chce zapłacić za zjednoczenie. Wszystkim opłaca się podzielona Korea, choć nikt nie może tego powiedzieć głośno.

We commemorate in the year 2009 the third liberal revolution in Germany. After the european liberal revolution of 1848 / 49 and the social-democratic and republican Revolution of 1918/19 was the revolution of 1989 a contribution to the global liberation from communism.
In contrast to the fractional class of capitalists have state classes a high degree of centralization. The use of the surplus product, they are not subject to market competition, which would force a re-investment. "The state classes are rather free of the social surplus product for their own consumption to be used as long as the stability of the political system is not threatened." (Hartmut Elsenhans) The State class acts in the tension between self-interest of privilege and the need to legitimize their own power. Rent and profit are two different forms of surplus product. State classes are the owners of rents.
Communist state classes fight to legitimize their power from the opposition to capitalism and bourgeois-liberal democracy. They wont to create an ideological identification of interests of workers with a majority of the officials of the power structures.
Without constant massive influence and control this identification can not be forced. Communist elites need the strong control of society, they can not have free press and free publicity, so they need also the secret service as their only reliable sources of information. Before the eyes of the world, the elites struggling desperately to provide a strong facade, fake a powerful image. They are well aware of their secret service, that the majority of the population in the communist state is thinking, that the communism is not worth defending.
To the asked issue an overview is offered, remembering what happened. But this also with normative questions: How the government unit for the majority would have been created better? What are the dangers in such a transition? What can we learn from the german case for Korea?
How could succeed in the destabilization of the dictatorship in North Korea? How we can promote thus the reunification of Korea as a republic?
From the year 1985, the subversive groups in east-german "GDR" to assume, that the Soviet Union would have under Michail Gorbachev no longer interested in the defense of the government in East-Germany.
Today we can see in China there are three taboos: free trade unions, the leadership of the Communist Party and human rights.
It's just a matter of time until the government of China to the preservation of power in his own country is closer than the interest to be the protector of the North Korean dictatorship. In this respect, the situation could soon become comparable with the final phase of the east-german "GDR": The government of a part-state loses its supporting and protecting of a major power.
Then my thesis: Communist elites can maintain their power only as long as they are able both to prevent the escape as also the organized resistance of the population.
Finally, I offer fourteen recommendations for South Korea to the discussion.
For the resistance in a dictatorship is nothing more important than the external support and the media world's attention.

A comprehensive look at the different aspects of Beijing's ADIZ in the East-China Sea, including the motivations behind the move, the reaction by different countries (including Taiwan and Russia), the origins and evolution of ADIZs in international law, and the underlying conflicts between China and other nations. The paper also provides an overview of ADIZs in international law, indluding their origins and evolution. The connections between EEZs and ADIZs are also noted, together with Chinese perspectives on International Law.

The purpose of this study is to explain the causes of the incumbent advantage in South Korea by decomposing the officeholder effect (advertisement, credit claiming, and position taking) and quality effect (attractiveness and political skill). We test the two contending theories using the data of the 18th and 19th National Assembly election results in South Korea. We find that officeholder effect increases the probability of the incumbent's probability of reelection and decreases electoral competition. On the other hand, quality effect increases the incumbent's probability of reelection but does not have a significant impact on electoral competition. We also find that credit claiming or “pork-barreling” bolsters the incumbent’s reelection prospects while deterring electoral competition in the district. The results of our analysis implies that incumbents in the South Korean National Assembly are held accountable for their performance on constituency service.

(with Sang Un Park) (In Korean)

In this study, we tried to determine the exact level and means of the South Korean power. We wondered if South Korea could present itself as a pivotal state that is able to bridge antagonistic partners, both in Northeast and Southeast Asia. After considering the aspects of the South Korean power we concluded that the country is a traditional middle size power that has not yet acquired the status of regional power. In that sense the country is an untypical power. Facing three major powers such as China, the United States and Japan, South Korea has only a very narrow latitude to establish its international presence. Therefore developing its presence in Southeast Asia has become in just a few years an priority of its foreign Policy. For South Korea Southeast Asia is a privileged place where to learn and to develop its own external action, like it was for the post war Japan. Eventually, a unified Korea with the North Korean nuclear arsenal could weigh as much as demographically declining Japan. However as long as the anachronism of the separation will remain, South Korea will continue to grow alone regionally and in the international stage and will seek for external alliances.

When discussing North Korea, many observers tend to focus on relations with South Korea, the United States, China, and Japan. But we should not forget Pyongyang’s “other neighbour”, Russia. The confirmation that Kim Jong-Un will be attending WWII victory celebrations in Moscow, his first foreign trip since 2011 and one directly connected to the regime’s foundational narrative, plus the agreement between Russian RusHydro hydroelectricity company and South Korean K-Water governmental agency, serve as powerful reminders that Moscow remains a significant actor in the Korean Peninsula.

After the death ofthe Choson Queen Dowager Cho in 1890, a Qing mission arrived in Seoul to present the Guangxu emperor's letter of condolence. In accordance with established precedent King Kojong greeted the envoys outside the city and publicly prostrated before the imperial missive. Western scholars have long understood this event as an illustration of Kojong's willing submission to the Qing Empire and evidence ofthe persistence of "traditional " tributary relations into the modern era. The Choson government, however, actively negotiated for months with Qing officials in an ultimately failed effort to cancel the mission. Choson and Qing officials devoted such time and energy in debate not because they were especially concerned with maintaining ancient ritual forms but rather because they were acutely aware of theimpact the public display of tributary ritual would have on Western interpretations of Qing claims to imperial dominion over Choson. Despite continual Choson resistance, Qing officials thus planned and executed the condolence mission as a propaganda exercise for Western consumption in order to secure recognition of Qing authority over Choson. This Qing representation of the condolence mission and the tributary relationship in turn has come to inform decades of Western scholarship on late nineteenth-century Choson-Qing relations.

An analysis of the politics and conflict of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, and a 50-Year Reunification plan to bring stability to the Korean peninsula.

Instructor: Assistant Professor N. P. Singh, Ph.D.
Institution: Eastern Michigan University

In 2009 Indonesia and Korea updated their five-decade long relationship by initiating a strategic partnership in various fields of cooperation. Both countries’ head of states have also stated their interest to continue develop the present relation. In 2011 once again the governments of Indonesia and South Korea signed nine Memorandum of understandings (MoUs) in economic cooperation and investment. It is reported that such business partnership agreements could make Indonesia as South Korea’s main overseas investment hub in the world. The presence of hundreds of Korean companies operating in Indonesia, the steady economic relation, and the increasing number of people visiting respective country especially the cultural exchanges between the two countries have partly shaped the bilateral ties between Indonesia and Korea.
In this respect, it is also worth pointing out that two leading universities in Indonesia (Gadjah Mada University-UGM and University of Indonesia-UI) have placed themselves as the center of excellence for Korean studies in Indonesia—which indirectly support and maintain both countries’ relation. In 2003 Faculty of Cultural Sciences, UGM established the 3-year program on Korean language. Then, the Undergraduate Program of Korean Language was established at Faculty of Humanities, UI in 2006 and at Faculty of Cultural Sciences, UGM in 2007. Both are to cater the increasing demand of young generations’ interest in Korea-related studies. Supported by the scholars and researchers in Korean studies, both departments have shown an increasing trend of development. In addition, with the support from Korean Embassy and Korea-related institutions like Korea Foundation and KOICA, the departments have developed tremendously in the past five years. Currently, an effort to establish the Master Program in Korean Studies is underway at UGM. Once accomplished, it will widen the range and choices of Korea-related studies for Indonesian students and scholars.
Ever since Korea-related studies was introduced at two leading universities in Indonesia, the number of students enrolled and the number of mutual cooperation between the two universities and universities or institutions in Korea and Indonesia alike have flourished. This simple fact indicates the prospective future that Korea-related studies have in Indonesia. This fact also asserts the importance of UGM and UI to play pivotal roles in the future development of Korean studies.
This is where INAKOS (The International Association of Korean Studies in Indonesia - 인도네시아국제한국학회) sets in. Established on May 7, 2009, INAKOS attempts to support the current development of Korean studies in Indonesia by accommodating the various interests in Korean studies from international and Indonesian scholars, young generations, and those graduated from Korean institutions to develop the Korean studies at home. However, it is not an easy feat to nurture and develop the presence of INAKOS without mutual cooperation among the members of INAKOS and other institutions within and outside Indonesia. As an international association, INAKOS has a lot to do and prepare in order to maintain and strengthen its existence.
It is worth to note three current challenges that INAKOS has to cope with. First, not all Indonesians graduated from Korea would further apply their knowledge and expertise to develop Korea-related studies in Indonesia. Irrespective of the above fact, the number of scholars and students pursuing higher education in Korea is increasing. In itself, this has been a tremendous leap from the previous decade. They are the prospective and promising future of Korean studies in Indonesia. Second, INAKOS has to find ways to secure its place among international communities of Korean studies. Third, INAKOS has to prove its existence by incorporating both academic and nonacademic activities to cater the needs of its members. In the end, it is important to point out that any INAKOS activities must surely give positive impacts to Indonesia-Korea relation at present and future time.

In 2007 South Korea and ASEAN signed a free trade agreement (FTA) completed by an investment agreement in 2009. Also in 2009 the Asean-Korea Center had been created in Seoul. It aims is to promote economic relations and socio-cultural cooperation between South Korea and Asean countries. In 2010 on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Hanoi a joint statement Asean / South Korea for a strategic partnership has been adopted. The latter is accompanied by a concrete action plan covering the period 2011-2015 whose objective is to enhance economic and cultural ties and to strength dialogue and partnership on security issues. Furthermore the South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has proposed to create a structure allowing the Minister of Economy of the five Mekong countries (Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam) and their Korean counterpart to meet regularly to work on development programs. These actions are a part of the Korean strategy launched in March 2009 and called the New Asian Initiative that aims to develop relations with countries beyond South Korea usual scope (U.S, Northeast Asia and European Unio