Minority Shareholders rights

Takeover regulation in the UK has historically been shareholder-centric and shareholder primacy has been the core principle of UK's takeover regulation. This article primarily examines the substantive law governing corporate takeovers in the United Kingdom and critically analyses whether the substantive law is effective in achieving equality and fair treatment of all shareholders involved in the takeover. This is followed by an exploration of the safeguards in place which ensure real time minority shareholder protection and the relating case law which further bolster the development of the law by providing clarity on certain issues relating to the safeguards. Furthermore, the article also analyses the proposed amendments and suggestions to the current UK regime. The proposed amendments that are examined consist mainly of the amendments and arguments discussed in the Takeover Panel's Consultation paper which was published after Kraft Food Inc.'s controversial takeover of Cadbury Plc in 2010.

El derecho de separación representa, dentro del Derecho societario, una figura clave del marco protector de los intereses individuales del socio. Por ello su regulación suele reflejar un mayor o menor interés del legislador por mantener esta protección. Sin embargo, tampoco hay que perder de vista que la contrapartida de este derecho es el principio mayoritario, y que la consecuencia habitual de su ejercicio suele conllevar la reducción del capital social y por tanto la reducción de la capacidad de autofinanciación de la sociedad. La presente obra parte de esta premisa y analiza el marco normativo previo a la aprobación del Texto refundido de la Ley de sociedades de capital, pero sobre todo la redefinición de su contenido y fundamentos surgida de la adopción de este texto legal y posteriores modificaciones. A lo largo del trabajo se examinan los supuestos legales de separación, así como las interpretaciones judiciales relacionadas con el alcance de la libertad reconocida a los socios para fijar causas estatutarias que permitan al socio abandonar la sociedad. Debido al continuo proceso de reforma y adecuación de la legislación societaria, hemos creído oportuno proponer modificaciones legales que a nuestro entender contribuirían a mantener el delicado equilibrio de proteger los intereses del socio sin menoscabar los de las mayorías sociales y la viabilidad económica de la sociedad. También hemos analizado los pormenores del ejercicio de este derecho y sus efectos, tanto en relación con el procedimiento necesario para reembolsar al socio el valor de sus acciones o participaciones sociales, como respecto de la casi ineludible reducción del capital social.

Este trabajo analiza la Ley 11/2011, de 20 de mayo de reforma de la Ley de Arbitraje, como una de las más acertadas respuestas del legislador español a la reciente crisis financiera. Con esta norma se reactiva la validez y utilidad del arbitraje societario en un momento de saturación de la administración de justicia, en la que este medio alternativo de resolución de conflictos cobra mayor fuerza. Para cumplir el objetivo propuesto se estructura en tres apartados: el primero aborda la solución al conflicto societario; el segundo, la impugnación de los acuerdos sociales y; el tercero y último responde a si existe similitud entre el arbitraje estatutario y el societario.

The essay — in the context of share capital increases to be settled through contributions in kind (evaluated by an independent expert appointed by the parties) — deals with the nature of, and the limits to, the power of the shareholders to request a new evaluation of the goods or credits contributed, taking into specific account the ruling issued by the Court of Milan on 3 January 2018. To this end, systematic reasons explaining the involvement of the shareholder vis-à-vis the power and duties of the directors to monitor and verify the evaluations carried out by the independent expert are investigated. Once the rationale behind the roles of the shareholders and the directors is clarified, the essay
suggests to regard the power of the shareholders (to demand a new evaluation) as subject to, and supplementary to, the power of the directors to assess and endorse (or reject) the evaluations of the contributions in kind rendered by the independent expert.

This thesis examines, in comparative terms, Canadian and Nigerian laws relating to the concept of corporate majority rule and minority protection from majority opportunism and oppression in private corporations. The key shareholder remedies of derivative actions and oppression are comparatively discussed, with highlights of the similarities
and differences in both remedies under Canadian and Nigerian laws.
From theoretical perspectives, this thesis examines the theory that considers the corporation a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among parties. It also considers the proprietary conceptualisation of the corporation. Another theory sees the corporation as an agency relationship between two individuals with differing goals and interests. Lastly, the legal personality theory of the corporation, which considers the corporation a legal person capable of acquiring rights and assuming obligations, is discussed. Understanding of these theories gives better insights into reasons why
conflicts arise amongst corporate stakeholders.
A comparative appraisal of the key minority shareholder remedies of oppression and derivative actions under Canadian and Nigerian corporate laws reveals certain areas of convergence and other areas of uniqueness. This work demonstrates that the shareholder remedies available in the two jurisdictions are very similar in nature and, in most cases, known by the same names. However, there are some differences bordering on, among others, proper parties to commence shareholder litigations, length of pre-action notice, and the codification of common law rules into the corporate statute. For instance, while Nigeria statutorily incorporates the common law rule in Foss v. Harbottle and its exceptions into its corporate law, Canada only utilises the rule for historical and analytical purposes.
This thesis advocates a reconsideration of the minority shareholder remedy of derivative actions with regard to close corporations, and the absence of a principled test for
determination of liability under the oppression remedy. The attitude of the courts has always been to treat each case according to its peculiar facts. It is further suggested
that the courts could, in the exercise of their discretion, liberally interpret the provisions of current corporate statutes to include discretionary, non-traditional corporate stakeholders, such as the environment, as beneficiaries of the dynamic remedy of oppression.

Close corporations deserve separate attention from other company forms. Given that their shares are not publicly traded, there are often close bonds between shareholders and between shareholders and directors (who may overlap), particularly in smaller close corporations where a lack of separation between ownership and control is acute. This closeness is a fertile breeding ground for acrimony, often leading to shareholder disputes. There are circumstances where minority shareholders in a close corporation who are bound by the decisions of the majority may feel that either their interests or those of the company have been unfairly disregarded and that there is a risk of detriment or harm. Decision-making power and dominance may be abused to the detriment of the minority’s interests and also to those of the company. Therefore the law steps in to provide mechanisms to guard against the abuse of power by the majority.

Resumen
Esta investigación se propone revisar la configuración legal de la OPA obligatoria para determinar en qué casos están justificadas las medidas defensivas y en qué otras situaciones, por el contrario, el ordenamiento impone una excesiva onerosidad que acaba impidiendo el dinamismo natural del mercado de control de las sociedades cotizadas. El análisis se realizará considerando el casuismo del contexto corporativo, que supera con creces los dogmas y conceptualizaciones legales. Por esta razón, el presente trabajo buscará interrelacionar diversos fenómenos problemáticos sobre la regulación de estas operaciones de control corporativo y la tutela que merecen los accionistas minoritarios, para así obtener un contraste entre la protección legal existente y los efectos o riesgos reales de la desprotección efectiva que se da en la experiencia, examinando para ello los costes regulatorios y las lagunas existentes. Se adoptará un enfoque funcional y también comparatista para arrojar luz al ordenamiento español a fin de ofrecer una visión crítica y reformista de política legislativa.

Abstract
This research proposes to review the legal configuration of the mandatory takeover bid to determine in which cases the defensive measures are justified and in what other situations, on the contrary, the legal system imposes an excessive cost that ends up preventing the natural dynamism of the control market of the listed companies. The analysis will be carried out considering the casuism of the corporate context, which far exceeds the dogmas and legal conceptualizations. For this reason, this work will seek to interrelate various problematic phenomena on the regulation of these corporate control operations and the protection that minority shareholders deserve, in order to obtain a contrast between the existing legal protection and the real effects or risks of effective lack of protection that occurs in experience, by examining regulatory costs and existing loopholes. A functional and comparative approach will be adopted to shed light on the Spanish legal system in order to offer a critical and reformist vision of legislative policy.

Palabras clave
OPA, derecho de sociedades, mercado de control societario, consejo de administración, accionistas minoritarios

Keywords
Takeover bid, corporate law, corporate control market, board of directors, minority shareholders

This year, the Dutch courts ruled two times in the AkzoNobel case. Two times, the courts denied the requests of activist shareholders of AkzoNobel to convene an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) to dismiss AkzoNobel’s chairman of the super- visory board. The reason for the shareholders’ request was the decision of AkzoNobel’s board not to engage in negotiations with PPG Industries (PPG) concerning its takeover bid
on AkzoNobel. The main arguments of the courts were based on the idea that the decision on a takeover bid is part of the company’s strategy, which belongs to the domain of the board, and that the shareholders failed to show a reasonable interest for convening an EGM. Therefore, it seems that the courts in the AkzoNobel case imposed significant restrictions to shareholder rights relating to the general meeting, in favour of the autonomy of the board and the interests of other stakeholders.

These decisions raise the question: are the decisions in the AkzoNobel case consistent with earlier Dutch case law? And are these decisions compatible with the Shareholder Rights Directive? This article discusses both decisions in the AkzoNobel case. Afterwards, the broader Dutch legal framework is explained. In particular, other Dutch case law is discussed concerning the restriction of shareholder rights to add items to the agenda of the general meeting or to convene a general meeting, such as the Boskalis/Fugro case and the Cryo-Save case. Finally, the compatibility of the Dutch legal framework with the Shareholder Rights Directive is analysed.

Main task in this article is to research corporate governance system, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world. Large investors appear to be necessary to force managers to distribute profits. These investors require at least some basic legal rights, such as the voting rights or the power to pull collateral, to exercise their power over the management. Legal protection and large investors are complementary in an effective corporate governance system. Shleifer and Vishy (1997) want to know how investors get the managers to give them back their money, and which corporate governance systems is the best. In sum, this survey deals with the separation of financing and management of firms, and tries to discuss how this separation is dealt with in theory and in practice.

This paper analyses the statutory derivative action in Malaysia, and compares it with the law in the United Kingdom, Australia and Singapore. We argue that the statutory action is unlikely to overcome many of the uncertainties and difficulties of the common law derivative action.

The investigative provisions of the Companies Act 2012 of Uganda have come been recommended as a suitable means of regulating the activities of companies to ensure compliance with the Act and to combat fraud and minority oppression. However, no detailed study of these provisions has been done yet. This paper is the first attempt at a complete analysis of these investigation provisions analysing their origins, delineating their scope and assessing their effectiveness in the overall company law regime.

Discharge means “acquittal, exoneration” and releases one from civil liability. In the context of 6102 numbered Turkish Commercial Code (TCC), discharge of board of directors from liability is a statement delivered at the shareholders’ meeting through a resolution that the stock corporation shall not claim any damages from the board in connection with the management of the corporation, during the process in which the board reports its actions for the relevant financial period. Discharge resolution may be in the form of an explicit or implicit discharge and an explicit discharge resolution may be in the form of a general or specific discharge. If a discharge is limited in terms of person, time, and transactions, it is accepted as a specific discharge. Still, the Yargıtay 18. H.D. E. 2012/14591 K. 2013/3764 T. 12/03/2013 case (in the context of associations) provides that the grant of financial discharge shall be inclusive of the grant of executive discharge, and that it is not possible to accuse a board with no financial fault, of an executive fault. When considered in the context of stock corporations, the fact that financial records of a company are correct does not necessarily mean that the board has directed the company prudently. For example, even though financial records may seem correct and accurate, it is possible that the company is made subject to tunnelling. All in all, rejection of an executive discharge would signal a dissatisfaction concerning the board members’ administration and may lead to an election. When TCC Art. 558(2) is considered together with TCC Art. 340, it should be accepted that articles of incorporation may also include articles on aforementioned separation, and that the abovementioned case precedent shall not be applicable.

Resumen: El objeto de este trabajo es analizar la idoneidad del derecho de separación en las sociedades de capital, examinando su regulación legal y el margen de libertad estatutaria, para su configuración e invocación por los socios paritarios (50%) en el marco de una situación de bloqueo de la junta general. Para ello, se desarrollará una aproximación crítica aplicada a esta problemática, siguiendo la sistematización que comparte actualmente junto al derecho de exclusión, en el Título IX del Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2010, de 2 de julio, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Sociedades de Capital. En primer lugar, se abordará el fundamento dogmático de este instituto, a partir de un análisis positivo y exegético de su regulación, y su posible aplicación para los supuestos de bloqueo orgánico de las sociedades con distribución de capital 50-50. Acto seguido, se tratará la vinculación existente entre la separación como derecho del socio y el derecho de exclusión, para después proseguir con su articulación causal y técnica, así como la discusión de la pertinencia de una reforma legislativa que introduzca el derecho de separación por justa causa. Finalmente se concluirá con una valoración crítica de un hipotético derecho de separación sin causa o ad nutum, y la problemática que su inclusión puede plantear en las sociedades cerradas, y particularmente, en las sociedades 50-50.
Palabras clave: derecho de sociedades, derecho de separación, bloqueo, sociedades de capital, sociedades cerradas, estatutos sociales, pactos parasociales, Ley de Sociedades de Capital
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the suitability of the appraisal rights and other shareholders´ exit rights in close corporations, examining their legal framework and the contractual freedom for their configuration and invocation by the co-equal shareholders in the context of a situation of deadlock of the general meeting. For this, a critical approach applied to this corporate conflict will be developed, following the systematization that it currently shares together with the exclusion of shareholders, in the Title IX of the current Spanish Companies Act. In the first place, the dogmatic foundation of this institute will be approached, based on a positive and exegetical analysis of its regulation, and its possible application for deadlock situations in co-equal corporations. Subsequently, the relationship between the appraisal right and the exclusion of shareholders will be discussed, and then proceed with its causal and technical articulation, as well as the discussion of the relevance of a legislative reform that introduces other types of exit rights for shareholders. Finally, this work will conclude with a critical assessment of a hypothetical exit right without cause and the problems that its inclusion might pose in closely-held corporations, and particularly in 50-50 corporations.
Keywords: Corporate Law, appraisal rights, exit rights, deadlock, corporations, closely-held corporations, bylaws, shareholder´s agreements, Spanish Companies Act

Die 2012 gegründete Zeitschrift "Spruchverfahren aktuell" (kurz: SpruchZ) wird per E-mail verteilt und online verfügbar archiviert (u.a. unter http://de.slideshare.net/SpruchZ). Sie erscheint jeweils nach Bedarf. Der Bezug ist kostenlos. Für Bestellungen und Abbestellungen wenden Sie sich bitte an den Herausgeber: Verteiler@SpruchZ.de Die Zeitschrift dient lediglich der Information über die aktuelle Rechtsentwicklung. Sie kann eine umfassende rechtsanwaltliche Beratung nicht ersetzen. Spruchverfahren aktuell Spruchverfahren aktuell -Nr. 5/2015 SpruchZ 2015 Seite 104 Gesetzgebung Aktienrechtsnovelle 2014: Bundesrat regt gesetzliche Regelung für Delisting-Fälle an von Rechtsanwalt Martin Arendts, M.B.L.-HSG Der Bundesrat regt in seiner aktuellen Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Aktiengesetzes (Aktienrechtsnovelle 2014) -die Begründung ist nachfolgend abgedruckt -eine gesetzliche Regelung für Delisting-Fälle an, nachdem der Bundesgerichtshof in seiner Frosta-Entscheidung die einschlägige Rechtsfortbildung aufgrund der sog. Macrotron-Rechtsprechung (Macrotron-Entscheidung des BGH aus dem Jahr 2002: BGH, Urteil vom 25. November 2002 -II ZR 133/01) zurückgenommen hatte. Für die Minderheitsaktionäre von einem Delisting betroffener Aktiengesellschaften bestehe die "Gefahr, ab Zeitpunkt der Antragstellung den Börsenwert ihrer Stimmrechte nahezu gänzlich zu verlieren". Der Bundesrat verweist in diesem Zusammenhang auf den bisherigen Schutz durch ein nach der Macrotron-Rechtsprechung erforderlichen Abfindungsangebot, so dass es während der Geltung dieser Rechtsfortbildung keine Kurseinbrüche gab (womit der BGH in einem klassischen Zirkelschluss ohne hinreichende Tatsachenbasis die Änderung seiner Rechtsprechung begründete; zu dieser Problematik siehe Karami/Cserna/Schuster , Wie frostig ist die FRoSTA-Entscheidung des BGH? -Kurseffekte von Delisting-Ankündigungen, vgl. nachfolgend S. 129). Im Falle eines Delistings müssten die wirtschaftlichen Interessen von Minderheitsaktionären ausreichend geschützt werden, da der jahrelange Schutz durch die "richterliche Rechtsfortbildung" nunmehr fortgefallen sei. Eine entsprechende zivilrechtliche Regelung solle im Aktiengesetz oder im Umwandlungsgesetz getroffen werden. Nur so könne ein "bundeseinheitlicher Schutz der Interessen von Minderheitsaktionären" gewährleistet werden. Ein öffentlich-rechtlicher/verwaltungsrechtlicher Schutz über das Börsengesetz ( § 39 Abs. 2 BörsG), auf den der BGH in seiner Frosta-Entscheidung abgestellt hatte, in Verbindung mit der Börsenordnung der jeweiligen Börse sei insoweit nicht ausreichend. Auch sei eine Überprüfung durch die Verwaltungsgerichte systemwidrig. Auszug aus der Stellungnahme des Bundesrats (Bundesrat-Drucksache 22/15, S. 7 f.): "Der Bundesrat bittet, im weiteren Gesetzgebungsverfahren zu prüfen, durch welche zivilrechtliche Regelung sichergestellt werden kann, dass die wirtschaftlichen Interessen von Minderheitsaktionären von Aktiengesellschaften, deren Aktien zum Handel an einer Börse zugelassen sind, im Falle eines Rückzuges der Gesellschaft von der Börse ausreichend geschützt werden. Begründung: In einer richtungsweisenden Entscheidung hat der Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) im Jahr 2002 zunächst festgelegt, dass für das Delisting einer Aktiengesellschaft von der Börse ein Spruchverfahren aktuell -Nr. 5/2015 SpruchZ 2015 Seite 105 Hauptversammlungsbeschluss notwendig sei und die Aktiengesellschaft den Aktionären ein Abfindungsangebot für die Aktien machen müsse (Macrotron-Urteil). Das Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) entschied im Jahr 2012, dass ein Delisting grundsätzlich nicht den Schutzbereich des Eigentumsrechts eines Aktionärs (Artikel 14 Absatz 1 des Grundgesetzes) berühre. Diese Rechtsprechung des BVerfG nahm der BGH nun auf und stellte fest, dass der Grundrechtsschutz nicht mehr als Argument für die Erfordernisse einer Hauptversammlungsentscheidung sowie eines Abfindungsangebots angeführt werden könne. 1 Auch andere Vorschriften, insbesondere das Aktiengesetz selbst, könnten nicht als Rechtsgrundlage für die Notwendigkeit eines Hauptversammlungsbeschlusses dienen. Spruchverfahren aktuell -Nr. 5/2015 SpruchZ 2015 Seite 106 Rechtsprechung zu Spruchverfahren Auch OLG Stuttgart hält Delisting-Spruchverfahren für nicht mehr zulässig OLG Stuttgart, Beschluss vom 18. Februar 2015, Az.20 W 8/14 -VARTA AG Leitsätze: 1. Auch nach der Neuregelung des Spruchverfahrensrechts durch das FGG-Reformgesetz ist eine Zwischenentscheidung über die Zulässigkeit des Spruchverfahrens analog § 280 ZPO zulässig. 2. Gegen eine erstinstanzliche Zwischenentscheidung über die Zulässigkeit des Spruchverfahrens ist die Beschwerde nach § 58 Abs. 1 FamFG statthaft. 3. Ein Spruchverfahren zur gerichtlichen Überprüfung eines im Rahmen eines Delistings abgegebenen Abfindungsangebots ist nicht statthaft. 4. Dies gilt auch für vor der Frosta-Entscheidung des BGH (SpruchZ 2013, 153 -Frosta) eingeleitete Altverfahren. Anträge auf Durchführung eines derartigen Spruchverfahrens sind deshalb auch dann als unzulässig zu verwerfen, wenn die Anträge vor der Frosta-Entscheidung gestellt wurden.

To date, the protection of shareholders’ property rights has been greatly argued. Recently, Ukraine and Georgia have undertaken vast legislative amendments with respect to the LLCs. Legislative revisions have had a significant impact on the exercise of the shareholders’ preemptive right, which at present is executed under the meticulous procedural provisions. The premise of the paper is to bridge between Georgian/Ukrainian legislative novelties; hence, to expose coherent lapses with respect to the equal and fair treatment of the shareholders. By the same token, the thesis endeavors to understanding the essence of preemptive rights from the perspective of the shareholders as well as the company. Exclusion of the preemptive right is also reasoned. The paper gives concluding remarks on building credible police in favor of shareholders’ enjoyment of preemptive rights.

In Turkish law there are two main regulations on “concealed distribution of capital”; one is in 6362 numbered Capital Markets Law and the other one is in 5520 numbered Corporate Tax Law. Concealed distribution of capital regulation is a subject that is transferred from the corporate tax law system to the capital markets law system. Although there are many court decisions and academic studies on the corporate tax law’s concealed distribution of capital regulation, it is not possible to state the same for the capital markets law regulation. This eventually makes it necessary to use a comparative method and to evaluate the capital markets law regulation by comparing it with the corporate tax law regulation. In this study, concealed distribution of capital subject is examined by comparing both laws’ regulations and by focusing on publicly-held joint stock corporations as these are the most important legal structures that are in the scope of both regulations.
As many people have interests connected with publicly- held joint stock corporations, activities of concealed distribution of capital which are carried out via these corporations affects many people. In Turkey, the number of publicly-held corporations and the money invested in these are increasing every year. Therefore, it is possible to say that the number of concealed distribution of capital activities will increase and thus the importance of this study will also increase in the near future.
“Transaction” and “associated persons” terms are the main determinants that determine if an activity is a concealed distribution of capital or not. As concealed distribution of capital regulations which are in capital markets law and corporate tax law have similarities, an activity that can be stated as a concealed distribution of capital sometimes can also be stated as a concealed distribution of capital for the other law. In this study, “transaction” and “associated persons” terms are evaluated from both laws’ aspects by comparing and evaluations are carried out on the similarities and intersections of these laws.

The content of this study is the introduction to Business Law – the general part, Industrial Property and Competition Law ,  Corporations Law, Bills / Securities  Law ( bill of exchange and checks ) , Insurance Law, Insolvency Law and Maritime Law. This present study has taken into account almost all of the rapid mass legislative modifications which have taken place in the aforementioned classical branches of Greek business law, especially pertaining to the years of the economic crisis in Greece. It basically concerns transitive and conjunctive regulations of law, which have a uncertain existence as enduring abiding regulations. In recent years there is a turn in business  law because of its characteristic inherent necessity to become a soft law, which can contribute, as is required, to the running of the private global economy. In order to satisfy contemporary commercial transactions, and its expediency to contemporary entrepreneurial activity, the Greek legislator will have to be more venturous in the difficult but necessary transition from the traditional commercial law of commercial undertakings to a much more broader and self-contained business law , which will also comprise of classical commercial law, labor and tax law. The law of commerce should be the equivalent of the global business in the sense that it should be adapted to the needs of the international environment as a more comprehensive  law of the economic market, but also to the particularities of the Greek social environment with respect to the restrictive principles of the current Greek law.

The primary objective of this study is to investigate whether stock price reactions in response to investment announcements made by firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (JSX) depend on 1) the nature of relation between transacting parties (Related Party Transaction (RPT) or Non-Related Party Transaction (Non-RPT)); and 2) the type of firms (part of group affiliation or not). This study constitutes an event study, i.e., to examine cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) surrounding the date of investment announcements. The study finds that the stock price reaction (as measured by CAR) for RPT is lower than that for Non-RPT. Therefore, the market perceives that RPT is subject to wealth expropriation by controlling shareholders to minority shareholders, and that this perception is eventually reflected in the relatively lower market reaction. Further, the study finds (albeit weak) that the stock market reaction for firms in group affiliations is lower than for those in non-group affiliations. Under the condition of inadequate supervision and ineffective law enforcement, firms in group affiliations can easily conduct expropriation without being concerned about being detected by the regulator.

This article provides a detailed analysis of the role of public shareholders in firm monitoring and corporate governance in one of the world’s most concentrated ownership environments—China’s controlled capital markets. It moves beyond the existing literature to explore in a comparative fashion innovative and sometimes idiosyncratic ways by which public shareholders can be involved in firm monitoring and corporate governance. In so doing, this article sheds new light on the global shift in the role of public shareholders towards greater empowerment and governance participation. Contributing to comparative corporate governance literature, this article offers a new analysis of current and prospective developments in the Chinese market, which is of particular importance globally as this market becomes increasingly central to the world economy.

Because minority shareholders can be a nuisance when running a company, a majority shareholder may want to freeze them out. The question arises to what extent the law should allow such freeze-outs. In general, the approach in the United States is more flexible than in the European Union. However, few authors have compared freeze-outs in the United States and in the European Union. In addition, the (mainly American) law and economics literature suggests that a flexible regime for freeze-outs might be beneficial for society, as it addresses a free rider problem and a holdout problem in the market for corporate control. However, these insights are rarely integrated into European legal scholarship.

This article endeavours to determine what constitutes an efficient legal framework on freeze-outs through a “comparative law and economics approach”. First, the legal regime on freeze-outs in the United States is compared with the regime of the Takeover Directive in the European Union and with Dutch law. Then, these legal systems are evaluated on their efficiency. Finally, some suggestions of reform are made for the European Union, such as lowering the threshold for freeze-outs and relying more on independent directors and approval by minority shareholders to protect minority shareholders.

This paper addresses the debate surrounding the lawfulness of below-par rights issues, starting from the actual meaning of “accountable par” referred to in Article 8 of the Second Directive and, more precisely, whether such phrase – in the context of rights issues – should be referred to the ratio between outstanding shares and existing share capital, or between new shares and the overall amount of the relevant share capital increase.
Indeed, the adherence to the first or the second interpretation, not only might determine the lawfulness or unlawfulness of below-par rights issues, but also entails the compliance or non-compliance to the Second Directive of the Italian provisions, especially of Article 2346, par. 5 of the Italian Civil Code.

Article 531 of the Turkish Commercial Code grants the right to request corporate dissolution for just causes to shareholders representing at least 10% of the capital in joint stock companies, and 5% in publicly traded companies. In addition to dissolution, the court can order purchase of the claimant's shares at real value (buy-out remedy) or adopt a different solution. This article conducts an economic analysis of the buy-out remedy against minority oppression and compares Turkish law with Swiss and English legislation. The buy-out remedy is supposed to provide an ex post control on the controller's conduct, and it is expected to function as a put option conditional upon oppression. However, the current provision does not provide the expected incentives. Addressing this issue, I suggest that: (1) the relief sought by the claimant should be taken into account; (2) the purchaser of the claimant's shares should be the oppressive controller, rather than the company in question; (3) the standard of 'just cause' to be proven should not be equal for each remedy, and thus, the courts should be able to give a buy-out order even if the facts do not justify corporate dissolution; (4) dissolution orders should not be given in cases where there is a going-concern value to protect; and finally, (5) the valuation of the claimant's shares should, in principle, be made on a going concern and pro rata basis, and any depreciation of the claimant's shares due to the controller's abusive conducts should be taken into account.

In vista della trasposizione della Direttiva (UE) 828/2017 (“SHRD II”), il MEF ha avviato una consultazione sulla bozza di decreto, con proposte di modifica del Tuf e del codice civile in materia di operazioni con parti correlate, identificazione degli azionisti, remunerazione degli amministratori, proxy advisors e diritto dei soci di porre domande prima dell’assemblea. Le proposte comprendono alcuni casi scelte rilevanti, in quanto rappresentato l’esercizio delle opzioni lasciate dalla direttiva al legislatore nazionale e, in alcuni casi, mantengono alcune previsioni della disciplina attuale italiana non previste dalla direttiva.
Considerata la rilevanza di questi temi e l’assenza di un adeguato dibattito pubblico sugli effetti sistemici delle scelte che potranno essere fatte al riguardo, Assonime ha deciso di organizzare un seminario a “porte chiuse” nel quale coinvolgere accademici, esperti e rappresentanti del mercato, per avviare una riflessione e confrontare possibili soluzioni, anche alla luce delle posizioni espresse da Assonime e Confindustria nella risposta alla consultazione.

What do we know about the politics of corporate governance in emerging markets? Although the state-level institutions have been amply explored, firm-level dynamics remain under-theorized. Complementing the orthodox emphasis on external finance as causal force behind the adoption of 'minority shareholder protections', the article outlines an alternative mechanism for firms operating in political settings with heightened risk of state intrusion. The Anglo-Saxon governance institutions can serve domestic managers as a strategy to build alliances with foreign stakeholders so as to counteract a dirigiste government. Empirically, the author seeks to explain the implementation of internationally accepted standards of corporate governance by Russia's big business between 1999 and 2004. The project disaggregates 'corporate governance' into specific institutions and examines their quality at the firm level. The causal inference links the shift in state policy vis-a-vis corporate property to the improved treatment of minority owners by the company insiders.

The two main models of corporate governance originated in the second part of the 20th century: the shareholder model, in the Anglo-Saxon world, and the stakeholder model, in Continental Europe. They are respectively mainly characterized by widespread and concentrated ownership and, consequently, by different agency problems. However, with the phenomenon of globalisation, the increased importance of financial markets and the international success of Anglo-American multinational firms, a debate has arisen as to whether there exists a convergence towards the shareholder oriented model. This research aims to explore this controversy by focusing the analysis on the ownership structure of the blue chip firms in the main stock indexes of Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. The research concludes that a convergence in corporate governance structure towards the shareholder model seems to exist in almost all of those countries.

“Reconceptualising Company Law: Reflections on The Law Commissions Consultation Paper on Shareholder Remedies”, (1997) 18 The Company Lawyer, “Special Issue on The Law Commission’s Paper on Shareholder Remedies”.  Editor, David Sugarman.  Foreword by Mr Justice Lightman.  “Part One” pp. 226-247.

Republished (with Part Two) as: “Reconceptualising Company Law: Reflections on The Law Commissions Consultation Paper on Shareholder Remedies”, in B.A.K. Rider (ed.), The Corporate Dimension: Essays on Corporate Law and Practice in Honour of Professor A. J. Boyle.  Foreword by Lord Templeman.  Bristol: Jordans, 1998 pp. 179-242.

Artykuł stanowi ekonomiczną i komparatystyczną analizę ustawowego uregulowania środków prawnych zmierzających do wyeliminowania z obrotu wadliwych uchwał walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy. Analiza prawnoporównawcza skupia się na najnowszych reformach przeprowadzonych w Niemczech i we Włoszech. Badanie prowadzi do sformułowania wniosków dla polskiego ustawodawcy uwzględniających z jednej strony podniesienie poziomu ochrony mniejszości, z drugiej zaś zapewnienie efektywności instytucji.

The Article provides law and economic as well as a comparative legal analysis of recent developments in shareholder actions against resolutions of general meetings in Germany and Italy. The two countries serve as examples of jurisdictions where important reforms have been implemented with a view of enhancing minority protection while balancing the protective goal with efficiency considerations.

El régimen de los directores independientes en las sociedades anónimas chilenas no incrementa el nivel de protección de los accionistas minoritarios. Los deberes y obligaciones de los directores independientes en el directorio son esencialmente los mismos que los de los directores no independientes. El grado de protección que pueda otorgar el comité de directores a los accionistas minoritarios no está determinado por la participación del director independiente. Si se suma a esto la forma cómo se distribuye el poder en nuestras sociedades anónimas y los incentivos para que éste se ejerza de determinada forma, podemos concluir que el director independiente no es una herramienta adecuada para otorgar protección a accionistas minoritarios frente a los eventuales abusos del controlador.

... Disusun Dalam Rangka Menyelesaikan Studi Pada Bidang Keahlian Teknologi Informasi dan Komunikasi Mata Kuliah E-Bisnis STMIK Amikom Yogyakarta Disusun oleh Fahmi Noor Syafi'ie 08.11.1904 SEKOLAH TINGGI MANAGEMENT INFORMATIKA DAN KOMPUTER ...

"Resumen: Con anterioridad a la aprobación del Texto refundido de la Ley de sociedades de capital, las causas de separación del socio compartían supuestos comunes a las sociedades anónimas y de responsabilidad limitada. A pesar de ello, era necesaria una redefinición de las causas legales, así como un pronunciamiento legislativo respecto del posible contenido de las causas estatutarias de separación. La LSC ha venido a suplir parte de esta necesidad como queda patente en el trabajo expuesto. Sin embargo, en el mismo también se pone de manifiesto la urgente necesidad de una profunda actualización del instituto que equilibre de mejor manera los intereses de la sociedad y de los socios minoritarios. Abstract: Prior to the adoption of the Revised Text of Business Companies Act, exit rights of shareholders and stakeholders in public and private companies shared some common grounds. Despite this, it was necessary to redefine these grounds and to improve the legislative criteria that regulate the content of contractual grounds of exit rights. The LSC has come to meet part of this need as evidenced by the work displayed below. However, it also highlights the urgent need of a thorough renovation of the institute that better balances the interests of the company and minority shareholders. "

reactions in response to investment announcements made by firms listedon the Indonesian Stock Exchange (JSX) depend on 1) the nature of relationbetween transacting parties (Related Party Transaction (RPT) or Non-Related Party Transaction (Non-RPT)); and 2) the type of firms (part ofgroup affiliation or not). This study constitutes an event study, i.e., toexamine cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) surrounding the date ofinvestment announcements. The study finds that the stock price reaction(as measured by CAR) for RPT is lower than that for Non-RPT. Therefore,the market perceives that RPT is subject to wealth expropriation bycontrolling shareholders to minority shareholders, and that this perceptionis eventually reflected in the relatively lower market reaction. Further, thestudy finds (albeit weak) that the stock market reaction for firms in groupaffiliations is lower than for those in non-group affiliations. Under thecondition of inadequate supervision and ineffective law enforcemen...

“Reconceptualising Company Law: Reflections on The Law Commissions Consultation Paper on Shareholder Remedies.  Part Two”, 18 The Company Lawyer, pp. 274-282. “Special Issue on The Law Commission’s Paper on Shareholder Remedies”.  Editor, David Sugarman.  Foreword by Mr Justice Lightman. 

Republished (with Part One) as: “Reconceptualising Company Law: Reflections on The Law Commissions Consultation Paper on Shareholder Remedies”, in B.A.K. Rider (ed.), The Corporate Dimension: Essays on Corporate Law and Practice in Honour of Professor A. J. Boyle.  Foreword by Lord Templeman.  Bristol: Jordans, 1998 pp. 179-242.

Grounding on the literature on resource dependence, board political capital and principal-principal conflicts, I conceptualize governmental minority shareholding as a governance strategy through which ventures access information about future policy shifts and better calibrate their decisions before policy implementation. I test these arguments on multi-country firm-level longitudinal data about European venture capital (VC)-backed and comparable non-VC-backed companies. By means of a difference-in-differences methodology and exploiting the staggered announcement of tax reforms across countries, I show that public VC-backed companies after a tax reform announcement show higher productivity than non-VC-backed ventures, and this effect lasts four years. After decomposing productivity, the post-announcement effect of public VC backing is mainly due to both an output effect (sales value increase) and an enhanced efficiency in the labor factor.

Involuntary dissolution is recognized as the primary mechanism to monitor opportunism and remedy the aggrieved minority shareholders of corporations. Contrary to general understanding, involuntary dissolution is not idiosyncratic to close corporations. However, its application to publicly traded corporations requires an approach different than the one for close corporations. This note discusses and recommends the approach necessary to justify and effectively enforce involuntary dissolution statutes’ application in the context of publicly traded corporations. It expresses the opinion that the contractual view of corporate law would provide the theoretical basis necessary to construe the statute for publicly traded corporations and exemplifies its approach through the shareholder oppression law of the U.S. corporate law.

The modern financial situation of organizations, having a developed corporate network both in Russian and abroad, has exacerbated a problem of establishing an effective system of settlement management inside the group of organizations and the necessity in development of the methodology of accounting and control over settlements in corporate systems, which would meet the requirements of the international practice. Objective. Several proofs, justifying the necessity of implemented settlements and occurrence of liabilities in corporate systems, are considered in this paper. It was substantiated that corporate systems are a centre of concentration of the capital and property, and settlements with partners and contracting parties become the connecting link that unite any system of holding type into a unique organism, which allows one, having separated circulations and profits, to design and build an efficacious model of management of such corporative system, to lower tax risks and to reduce expenditures on maintenance of the whole corporate system. Methods. In the studies, the methods of empirical research, comparison, grouping, and analysis of results of corporate activity, concerning the problems of financial resource reallocation inside the group and assessment of the occurring liabilities in corporate systems, have been applied. Results. Application of the method of empirical research is instruments of substantiation of divergent opinions among scientists with respect to liabilities assessment, on the value of which different factors exert influence in corporative systems. Having applied the comparison and grouping methods, the conclusions on structuring and validity of accounting procedures by the facts of occurrence, movement and termination of liabilities in corporate systems were made. The present paper aims to induce discussions and further studies of the revealed problems. Conclusion. As a result of the undertaken studies, the definition of liabilities is disclosed, and on its basis, the scheme of interaction of capital, profits and net assets has been developed, as well as on the basis of the essence of the guaranteeing function of authorized capital, the ways of minimization of liabilities inside a corporate system have been developed.

The modern financial situation of organizations, having a developed corporate network both in Russian and abroad, has exacerbated a problem of establishing an effective system of settlement management inside the group of organizations and the necessity in development of the methodology of accounting and control over settlements in corporate systems, which would meet the requirements of the international practice. Objective. Several proofs, justifying the necessity of implemented settlements and occurrence of liabilities in corporate systems, are considered in this paper. It was substantiated that corporate systems are a centre of concentration of the capital and property, and settlements with partners and contracting parties become the connecting link that unite any system of holding type into a unique organism, which allows one, having separated circulations and profits, to design and build an efficacious model of management of such corporative system, to lower tax risks and to reduce expenditures on maintenance of the whole corporate system. Methods. In the studies, the methods of empirical research, comparison, grouping, and analysis of results of corporate activity, concerning the problems of financial resource reallocation inside the group and assessment of the occurring liabilities in corporate systems, have been applied. Results. Application of the method of empirical research is instruments of substantiation of divergent opinions among scientists with respect to liabilities assessment, on the value of which different factors exert influence in corporative systems. Having applied the comparison and grouping methods, the conclusions on structuring and validity of accounting procedures by the facts of occurrence, movement and termination of liabilities in corporate systems were made. The present paper aims to induce discussions and further studies of the revealed problems. Conclusion. As a result of the undertaken studies, the definition of liabilities is disclosed, and on its basis, the scheme of interaction of capital, profits and net assets has been developed, as well as on the basis of the essence of the guaranteeing function of authorized capital, the ways of minimization of liabilities inside a corporate system have been developed.

Invitați [ordine alfabetică]
Av. Teodor Hnatec, Managing Associate VILAU | ASSOCIATES
Av. Alexandru Lefter, Partner PACHIU & ASOCIAȚII
Av. Cornel Popa, Partner ȚUCA ZBÂRCEA & ASOCIAȚII
Conf. univ. dr. Lavinia Tec, FACULTATEA DE DREPT a UNIVERSITĂȚII DE VEST (TIMIȘOARA)
Jud. Lucia Zaharia, CURTEA DE APEL BUCUREȘTI
Moderator
Dr. Andrei Săvescu, coordonator JURIDICE.ro
Prof. univ. dr. Mihai Șandru, Președinte Societatea de Științe Juridice
Tematica
– Abuzul de minoritate. Remedii
– Cat de puternic este asociatul minoritar in blocarea
cesiunii partilor sociale?

This paper considers evidence on business group productivity performance in China. It also carries out a detailed investigation into China's 50 largest groups to see if pyramidal groups are forming. As such, we further explore what can be considered as some of the positive and negative attributes of Chinese groups. We show that although improvements in productivity have taken place, some Chinese business groups are also taking the first steps towards developing pyramidal structures. This could have important implications for longer-term productivity growth in China's business groups.