No 126 Wing RCAF

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION

No 126 Wing was a mobile fighter-bomber wing – one of the greatest fighting machines in history. Formed in July 1943 as part of the Royal Air Force’s 2nd Tactical Air Force (TAF), its mandate was to carry out air-to-air combat and ground attack sorties in direct support of the British and Canadian armies once they had landed on the continent. From D-Day to the end of the war, No 126 Wing was the most successful fighter outfit in the 2nd TAF, claiming an incredible 336 enemy aircraft destroyed. Different published sources put the grand total for the wing from its inception at between 355 and 365 aircraft destroyed.

Why was No 126 Wing so successful, and how did it rack up such an impressive score in what was essentially the last year of the war, and one in which the Luftwaffe was in rapid decline? To answer these questions we have to look at the genesis of Allied tactical air power, as well as its long gestation period.

At the start of World War 2 there were two very different ideas on how air power should be used in a future conflict. For its part the RAF focused on the new doctrine of strategic bombing, its founders and early leaders believing that destroying the enemy’s industrial capacity to fight would not only shorten any future war but see the conflict won by bombing alone. They also believed that it would render the other services obsolescent.

Based on this doctrine, the RAF firmly embraced the strategic bomber and the fighter interceptor, the latter for defence against enemy bomber attacks. When it came to fighter defence, the British were well ahead of the Germans in September 1939 as they had created the world’s first effective air defence system based on radar.

In this environment the RAF paid little heed to the needs of the British Army or Royal Navy. Few resources were allocated to support armies in the field and very little thought was given as to how aircraft could be used on the battlefield or overhead naval vessels sailing in enemy waters.

After the fall of Poland in September 1939, the British began sending forces to France in anticipation of the next German move. The Advanced Air Striking Force was formed (ten squadrons of Fairey Battles, two with Bristol Blenheims, four with Hawker Hurricanes and four with Westland Lysanders) and sent across the Channel. In name alone was this force in any way ‘advanced’, as it was largely equipped with single-engined Battle light bombers that proved a disaster once the Blitzkrieg was launched on 10 May 1940.

Time after time, the brave Battle and Blenheim crews were sent out without fighter protection and shot down in horrifying numbers. The result was a system of air support that was cumbersome, ineffective and devastatingly slow. Combined with the inept and criminal response from the French air force, the results were catastrophic. After the war it was revealed that the French had 1700 combat aircraft in the unoccupied southern zone and 2648 in North Africa. The failure of the two air forces to help stop the Wehrmacht from invading western Europe was one of the major contributing factors that led to the fall of France and the debacle at Dunkirk.

For the Germans it was a very different story. The Luftwaffe was designed from the outset to support the Wehrmacht directly, with its squadrons being equipped with a number of specialised aircraft. The most recognisable of these was the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bomber. The accuracy of the dive-bomber allowed it to attack pinpoint targets such as defensive forts, artillery positions, bridges and ships. It also had a terrifying effect on ground troops.

While the Stukas were attacking near the front, German medium bombers such as the Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17 and Junkers Ju 88 would be assigned to bigger targets such as railway stations, road junctions, supply depots and airfields. With targets softened up and the Allies in a state of disarray, Junkers Ju 52/3m transports would then fly in paratroopers and drop them en masse behind the frontline. These same aircraft were then re-roled as transports to fly in supplies required by fighter units in the field – drums of fuel, cases of ammunition and critical spare parts. All of these operations would be protected by both short-range Bf 109Es and long-range Bf 110C fighters.

This use of combined arms proved devastating to the Allies, and they would learn many lessons from the doomed defence of western Europe.

While the Germans had been victorious in Holland, Belgium and France, it came at a heavy price. No fewer than 1428 aircraft had been destroyed in France alone, this figure representing 28 percent of the Luftwaffe’s then total strength. These losses came despite the Luftwaffe having enjoyed a degree of air superiority. The fact that the latter had not been complete was another lesson that the Allies took away with them from the Battle of France.

Although still convinced that strategic bombers would win the war, the RAF quickly realised that air support for the army had to be improved. After the Dunkirk evacuation, Air Marshal A S Barrett, commander of the RAF in France in 1940, was put in charge of a new force within the RAF – Army Cooperation Command.

Two veterans of the recent disaster in France, Brig J D Woodall and Grp Capt A Wann, were then given the task of studying the ‘problem of air support to armies’ and coming up with workable solutions. Wann and Woodall quickly identified the need for a tactical air force. This would be a strictly RAF formation designed and equipped to initially obtain air superiority over the battlefield and then attack ground targets in close cooperation with army forces.

In the autumn of 1940, between 5 September and 22 October, Wann and Woodall conducted a series of signal exercises and command and control trials in the quiet backwater of Northern Ireland. Their report highlighted the need for the creation of an elaborate system of radio links that would allow for the rapid passage of air support requests through a dedicated communications network, all outside the normal chains of command. This report, and the lessons learned up to this point in the war, formed the basis of what was to become the RAF’s doctrine of air support.

In parallel with the Wann/Woodall report, developments in North Africa would also contribute greatly to the air support question. In the spring and summer months of 1941, and immediately after the two failed attempts to relieve the port of Tobruk in May and June of that year, two newly appointed air and land commanders – AVM Arthur Tedder and Gen Sir Claude Auchinleck – moved ahead with a series of conferences and exercises designed to solve problems of air support for ground forces. What resulted was a system similar to the Wann/Woodall report. Air Support Controls (ACS) were constructed and tested and fighter and bomber aircraft undertook a variety of tasks that were all designed to find their optimum role in air-to-ground operations. In combination these two developments led directly to the formation of the Desert Air Force – the Allies’ first Tactical Air Force.

RAF historian Sir Maurice Dean identified three vital principles critical for effective army air cooperation. They were goodwill (a willingness to cooperate), sound tactics and excellent communications. By the summer of 1942 all three of these principles were being applied to great effect in the Western Desert. Ironically, back in Britain that cooperation and understanding between the Army and RAF was non-existent.

Some believed that the only solution was the creation of a separate army air force made up of specially designed aircraft that were all controlled by the army. All of the army’s ideas were in direct violation of the RAF’s first principles of air power – centralised command and concentration of force. Slowly but surely, however, support was growing for a mixed force of fighters, fighter-bombers, medium bombers and reconnaissance aircraft all under one air commander. The latter could then evaluate and assess the air and ground situation and apply the correct forces where needed. After a year of rancour and infighting, the new Air Expeditionary Force Headquarters was finally established in Fighter Command. Exercise Spartan, held in March 1943, showed how effective an RAF Composite Group really was.

In November 1943 the AEF was renamed the 2nd TAF, and it eventually included No 2 Group (which had been transferred from Bomber Command) and Nos 83 and 84 Groups. The RCAF’s contribution to this new organisation was 12 squadrons under the command of No 83 Group. Three RCAF fighter wings (Nos 126, 127 and 144) equipped with Spitfires and one fighter-bomber wing (No 143) flying Typhoons would soon prove themselves in combat, contributing greatly to the overwhelming air superiority enjoyed by the Allies from D-Day right up until the end of the war.

MOBILE WING MAKE-UP

There were many reasons why the mobile air wing (a day-fighter wing consisted of three squadrons of 18 aircraft each with 39 officers and 743 other ranks – No 126 Wing would later grow to five squadrons) proved to be such a destructive and instrumental force on the battlefield. The first of these was, of course, its mobility. The ability to move as the army did and be close to the front was critical, so mobile wings had to be ready to change locations literally at a moment’s notice, often at night, setting up shop at their new location and declaring themselves fully operational within just a matter of hours. This meant the transportation of men, fuel, ammunition, food, clothing, spare parts and a vast array of other items.

EXERCISE SPARTAN

Exercise Spartan took place in the south of England in early March 1943. It was a large-scale exercise designed to sharpen the fighter and bomber groups destined for the invasion that was to take place in 1944. The opposing sides were listed as Eastland and Southland, with Southland representing the Germans. Each side had roughly the same number of squadrons, with 18-20 equipped with fighters, army support aircraft and light bombers.

No 411 Sqn groundcrew enjoy a tea break during Exercise Spartan in March 1943. As part of this exercise, two opposing forces were organised as Eastland and Southland, with the former representing the Allies and the latter the Germans. The purpose of Spartan was to test the effectiveness of the tactical organisation that the RAF had put in place for the upcoming invasion of occupied Europe in June of the following year. The exercise lasted until 12 March, and it was deemed to be a success (DND Pl 15562)

The two air forces were, however, very different in the way they operated. The Eastland force employed 12 of its squadrons as ‘mobile’ units. This was designed to test the RAF participation in the exercise, evaluating how the mobile squadrons performed in the field. The exercise, which ran till 12 March, was deemed a success. While some of the composite groups involved had been hampered by inexperience (many were newly constituted), the overall structure had proven itself.

Prior to the exercise commencing, fighter, fighter-bomber, reconnaissance and light bomber units assigned to Spartan had been formed into wings that were in turn controlled by a group. Airfield Headquarters were also established as mobile organisations following the lessons learned during this exercise, and these could be moved from airfield to airfield at a moment’s notice. Each Airfield Headquarters would normally control three squadrons, No 126 Airfield HQ, for example, being formed on 4 July 1943 at RAF Redhill, in Surrey, to control Nos 401, 411 and 412 Sqns of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). This organisation would subsequently be re-designated No 126 Wing at RAF Tangmere, in Sussex, on 15 May 1944.

Both the RAF and British Army were impressed with the results of Exercise Spartan, and they gave it their full endorsement. On 1 May the Chiefs of Staff approved the RAF’s Air Expeditionary Force (AEF). The new AEF would provide a composite group for both the British and Canadian armies taking part in the coming invasion. The new composite groups were a mix of fighters, bombers and reconnaissance aircraft, and they were not fixed to a prescribed strength. Their command arrangement closely mirrored those established and proven by units assigned to the Desert Air Force, but it was larger and more sophisticated. In this system all air support requests were evaluated by the air commander, who gave priority to the objectives he believed were vital to winning the ground battle.

Part of Eastland’s fighter defences were provided by these No 421 Sqn Spitfire VBs seen taxiing out at RAF Croughton, in Northamptonshire, during Spartan. Aircraft in the Eastland Force were painted with a white nose marking from the back of the spinner to the cockpit to help distinguish the opposing sides. Parked in front of the RCAF aircraft are the Spitfire IXs of No 124 Sqn (DND PL 15556)

Airfields also had to be either built from scratch or repaired – a tasked performed by engineers assigned to airfield Construction Wings. Their importance is revealed by the fact that they were some of the first support troops ashore on 7 June 1944.

All of this was backed up by Repair, Service and Salvage Units, which were responsible for major aircraft repairs and the collection of all 2nd TAF aircraft that crashed within Allied territory. Air Store Parks also played their part by issuing equipment and stores for frontline units, as did mobile radar units known as Group Control Centre (they provided radar coverage and control over the battlefield) and the RAF Regiment (responsible for airfield security, mine clearing and light antiaircraft defences). This well orchestrated machine provided the mobile air wing with the vital supplies and aircraft needed for sustained air operations. For the most part this system worked as planned, and for the wings equipped with the Spitfire in particular this was critical.

The Vickers-Supermarine fighter was originally designed as a short-range interceptor – perfect for defending Britain in 1940, but a liability when the Allies went on the offensive following the D-Day landings. Even with the advent of new slipper drop tanks, the Spitfire’s range was limited. Nevertheless, the vast majority of RAF and RCAF fighter units assigned to support the invasion of occupied Europe in the summer of 1944 were equipped with the Spitfire IX.

The aircraft’s armament was also a cause for concern. Although its two 20 mm Hispano cannon packed a formidable punch against both aircraft and most ground targets, the relative ineffectiveness of the Spitfire’s four 0.303-in Browning machine guns was well known in the RAF by this stage of the war. The fighter’s ability as a ground attack platform was therefore rather limited. This failing had been recognised by Fighter Command, and before the invasion there was a big push to upgrade the Spitfire’s armament to two 20 mm cannon and two 0.50-in machine guns. A portion of an official RAF report titled ‘Loose Minute’, dated 29 March 1944, describes the urgency concerning this matter at the time;

Spitfires of No 411 Sqn bask in the warm sunshine at B88 Heesch, in Holland, during the early spring of 1945. The pierced-steel planking (PSP) is clearly evident, with its straight lines and level surface. PSP has to go down as one of the greatest inventions of the war, as it allowed the Allies to turn almost any open, level, space into an instant airfield, thus making tactical air power possible (Public Archives of Canada PA 115095)

The Mk III MC 500-lb (227-kg) bomb was the principal air-to-ground weapon carried by the Spitfires of No 126 Wing. Unfortunately, this bomb, its fuses and tail assemblies were designed to be dropped horizontally, and the weapon was never intended to be delivered from an aircraft in a near vertical dive (DND PL 29247)

‘At the Commanders’ meeting this morning the Air Commander-in-Chief (AC–in-C) directed that every possible effort was to be made to get into service in the shortest possible time the maximum number of Spitfires fitted with 0.50-in Browning guns. He also described that 2nd TAF was to ensure that adequate stocks of ammunition of the right type were provisioned. The AC-in-C said that this retrospective conversion was to be given high priority. It will mainly involve the Senior Technical Supply Office as soon as the appropriate technical leaflet has been published.’

Another ‘Loose Minute’ dated 12 March 1944 reveals figures related to the number of Spitfires already converted, and aircraft coming off the production lines;

‘Air Commodore Battle, Chief Overseer, Ministry of Aircraft Production, rang to say that anticipated deliveries of 0.50-in Spitfire installations was as follows. For retrospective fitting – 80 sets in April and 80 sets in May. Off production already, 60 fitted in aircraft in March, 80 in April and 280 in May.’

In many respects the Spitfire IX was lightly armed when compared to the Typhoon (four 20 mm cannon) P-47D Thunderbolt (eight 0.50-in machine guns), P-38J Lightning (one 20 mm cannon and four 0.50-in machines guns) and P-51D Mustang (six 0.50-in machine guns), all of which were widely used by the Allies in western Europe as fighter-bombers. The Spitfire was also equipped to carry bombs and be used as a dive-bomber. Here again the British aircraft fell short of its contemporaries, however. All of the above fighters were capable of delivering 2000 lbs of bombs, whereas the Spitfire was only cleared to carry a 1000-lb load in September 1944! Air Fighting Development Unit Report No 141 describes the trials carried out to clear the Spitfire for heavier bomb loads;

SPITFIRE FITTED WITH THREE BOMB CARRIERS

Introduction – reference is made to Headquarters Air Defence of Great Britain letter reference ADGB/S32459/Air Tactics dated 10 July 1944, requesting that trials be carried out on a Spitfire carrying one 500-lb bomb under the belly and two 500-lb bombs on the wings.