US Army Irregular Opposing Forces Manual

TC 7-100.
Irregular
Opposing Forces
January 2014
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TC 7-100.3
Training Circular Headquarters
No. 7-100.3 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 17 January 2014
Irregular Opposing Forces

Contents
Page
PREFACE..............................................................................................................iv
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................v
Irregular Forces ...................................................................................................... v
Irregular OPFOR and Hybrid Threat for Training .................................................. vi
Tailoring the OPFOR ............................................................................................ vii
Chapter 1 IRREGULAR OPPOSING FORCE FUNDAMENTALS ..................................... 1-1
Hybrid Threat ...................................................................................................... 1-1
Capabilities and Intent ........................................................................................ 1-1
Tactics ................................................................................................................ 1-4
Interactions of Operational Variables ................................................................. 1-4
Principles ............................................................................................................ 1-7
Motivations ....................................................................................................... 1-10
Support ............................................................................................................. 1-12
Blurring of Categories ....................................................................................... 1-14
Comparison and Contrast................................................................................. 1-15
Chapter 2 INSURGENTS .................................................................................................... 2-1
General Characteristics ...................................................................................... 2-1
Insurgent Organizations ..................................................................................... 2-3
Chapter 3 GUERRILLAS .................................................................................................... 3-1
Guerrilla Organizations ....................................................................................... 3-7
Guerrilla Brigade ................................................................................................. 3-8
Guerrilla Battalion ............................................................................................. 3-16
Guerrilla Company............................................................................................ 3-23
Guerrilla Platoon ............................................................................................... 3-25
Guerrilla Hunter-Killer Company ...................................................................... 3-25
Hunter-Killer Group........................................................................................... 3-27
Tactics and Techniques.................................................................................... 3-28
Chapter 4 CRIMINALS ........................................................................................................ 4-1
Characteristics .................................................................................................... 4-1
Motivations ......................................................................................................... 4-3
Criminal Organizations ....................................................................................... 4-4
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
i
Contents
Command and Control ........................................................................................ 4-6

Criminal Activities ................................................................................................ 4-8
Chapter 5 NONCOMBATANTS........................................................................................... 5-1
Armed Noncombatants ....................................................................................... 5-3
Unarmed Noncombatants ................................................................................... 5-7
Unarmed Combatants ....................................................................................... 5-16
Chapter 6 TERRORISM....................................................................................................... 6-1
Terrorism in Complex Operational Environments ............................................... 6-1
Motivations .......................................................................................................... 6-2
Terrorism Planning and Action Cycle.................................................................. 6-3
Terrorism Actions ................................................................................................ 6-7
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures................................................................. 6-9
Terrorism Trends and Emergent Vectors.......................................................... 6-21
The Specter of Terrorism .................................................................................. 6-26
Chapter 7 FUNCTIONAL TACTICS .................................................................................... 7-1
Functional Organization of Forces and Elements ............................................... 7-1
Types of Offensive Action ................................................................................... 7-3
Types of Defensive Action ................................................................................ 7-24
Irregular OPFOR in Hybrid Threat Tactics ........................................................ 7-36
Appendix A INFORMATION WARFARE .............................................................................. A-1
General Characteristics ..................................................................................... A-1
INFOWAR Organizations ................................................................................... A-4
INFOWAR Support to Irregular OPFOR ............................................................ A-6
Figures
Figure I-1. Irregular force actors ................................................................................................ v
Figure 1-1. Relation of irregular OPFOR principles to achieving the objective ..................... 1-8
Figure 2-1. Network types ...................................................................................................... 2-5
Figure 2-2. Typical levels of leadership, action, and support................................................. 2-6
Figure 2-3. Higher insurgent organization............................................................................ 2-10
Figure 2-4. Local insurgent organization.............................................................................. 2-13
Figure 2-5. Local and higher insurgent organizations network (example) ........................... 2-14
Figure 2-6. Insurgent direct action cell and team graphic symbols ..................................... 2-15
Figure 2-7. Insurgent supporting cell graphic symbols ........................................................ 2-20
Figure 3-1. Guerrilla organization symbols: brigade to team level ........................................ 3-7
Figure 3-2. Guerrilla brigade (example) ................................................................................. 3-8
Figure 3-3. Guerrilla battalion (example) ............................................................................. 3-17
Figure 3-4. Guerrilla company (example) ............................................................................ 3-24
Figure 3-5. Guerrilla platoon (example) ............................................................................... 3-25
Figure 3-6. Guerrilla hunter-killer company (example) ........................................................ 3-26
ii TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Contents
Figure 5-1. Armed and unarmed noncombatants (examples)................................................ 5-1

Figure 5-2. Noncombatant support to the irregular OPFOR (examples) ............................... 5-3
Figure 5-3. PSC organization by functions (example) ............................................................ 5-6
Figure 5-4. Media team organization (example)..................................................................... 5-9
Figure 5-5. NGO field office functions (example) ................................................................. 5-12
Figure 6-1. Terrorism actors in complex operational environments ....................................... 6-1
Figure 6-2. Terrorism planning and action cycle .................................................................... 6-4
Figure 6-3. Bombing: insurgent affiliate (example)............................................................... 6-11
Figure 6-4. Kidnapping: insurgent-criminal affiliation (example) .......................................... 6-13
Figure 6-5. Hostage-taking: guerrilla unit (example) ............................................................ 6-14
Figure 6-6. Raid: multiple insurgent suicide cell assaults (example) ................................... 6-15
Figure 6-7. Anthrax-laced letters: death-mayhem in targeted population (example) ........... 6-21
Figure 7-1. Insurgent ambush (example) ............................................................................... 7-4
Figure 7-2. Guerrilla ambush (example) ................................................................................. 7-5
Figure 7-3. Insurgent assault (example) ............................................................................... 7-10
Figure 7-4. Guerrilla assault (example) ................................................................................ 7-11
Figure 7-5. Insurgent raid (example) .................................................................................... 7-11
Figure 7-6. Guerrilla raid (example) ..................................................................................... 7-11
Figure 7-7. Guerrilla reconnaissance attack (example) ....................................................... 7-11
Figure 7-8. Simple and complex battle positions.................................................................. 7-25
Figure 7-9. Insurgent defense of a simple battle position (example) ................................... 7-28
Figure 7-10. Guerrilla defense of a simple battle position (example) ................................... 7-29
Figure 7-11. Insurgent defense of a complex battle position (example) .............................. 7-33
Figure 7-12. Guerrilla defense of a complex battle position (example) ................................ 7-34
Tables
Table 1-1. Comparison and contrast of insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals ...................... 1-16
Table A-1. INFOWAR elements, objectives and targets ........................................................A-3
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 iii

Preface
This training circular (TC) is one of a series that describes an opposing force (OPFOR) for training U.S. Army
commanders, staffs, and units. See the References section for a list of other TCs in this series. (Other
publications in the former Field Manual [FM] 7-100 series will be converted to TCs as well.) Together, these
TCs outline OPFOR that can cover the entire spectrum capabilities of regular and/or irregular forces against
which the Army must train to ensure success in any future conflict.
Applications for this series of TCs include field training, training simulations, and classroom instruction
throughout the Army. All Army training and red team venues should use an OPFOR based on these TCs, except
when mission rehearsal or contingency training requires maximum fidelity to a specific country-based threat or
enemy. Even in the latter case, trainers should use appropriate parts of the OPFOR TCs to fill information gaps
in a manner consistent with what they do know about a specific threat or enemy.
This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG) /Army National Guard of the
United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.
Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the proponent for this
publication. The preparing agency is the Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate
(CTID), TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)-Threats. Send comments and suggested
improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to CTID
at the following address: Director, CTID, TRISA-Threats, ATTN: ATIN-T (Bldg 467, Rm 15), 803 Harrison Blvd,
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1323.
This publication is available at on the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library (RDL) at
http://www.adtdl.army.mil. Also, see Army Training Network (ATN) https://atn.army.mil with Army
Knowledge Online (AKO) access. Two locations on the ATN front-page access TRADOC G-2 products. Click
the Training for Operations button and then click the CTID Operational Environment Page link. Click the
DA Training Environment button and click the OPFOR & Threat Doctrine link. Both of these sites provide
threat and opposing forces (OPFOR) resources and references for training, professional education, and leader
development. Updates subject to the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) approval process will occur as
required, and as a result of a normal review production cycle for an Army training circular. The date on the
cover and title page of the electronic version will reflect the latest change update.
iv TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Introduction
This training circular (TC), as part of the TC 7-100 series, addresses the irregular
opposing force (OPFOR), which in Army training exercises represents a composite of
actual threats and enemies that comprise irregular forces. The three primary
categories of irregular forces portrayed by the OPFOR are insurgents, guerrillas, and
criminals. These actors may operate separately or in conjunction with one another
and/or combined with regular military forces as the Hybrid Threat (HT) for training.
This TC also addresses other actors present in an operational environment (OE), who
may be affiliated with the irregular OPFOR through willing support or coercion,
and/or may be passive or unknowing supporters of the irregular OPFOR.
IRREGULAR FORCES
Irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police,
or other internal security forces (JP 3-24). The distinction of being armed as an individual or group can
include a wide range of people who can be categorized correctly or incorrectly as irregular forces.
Excluding members of regular armed forces, police, or internal security forces from being considered
irregular forces may appear to add some clarity. However, such exclusion is inappropriate when a soldier of
a regular armed force, policeman, or internal security force member is concurrently operating in support of
insurgent, guerrilla, or criminal activities.
Irregular forces can be insurgent, guerrilla, or criminal organizations or any combination thereof. Any of
those forces can be affiliated with mercenaries, corrupt governing authority officials, compromised
commercial and public entities, active or covert supporters, and willing or coerced members of a populace.
Independent actors can also act on agendas separate from those of irregular forces. Figure I-1 depicts
various actors that may be part of or associated with irregular forces.
? W
? C
DRUG
IED I G
Insurgents
Terrorists Criminals Passive
Guerrillas Supporters
Active Supporters Independent Actors
Figure I-1. Irregular force actors

Closely related to the subject of irregular forces is irregular warfare. JP 1 defines irregular warfare as a
violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant
population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full
range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversarys power, influence, and will. The
definition spotlights a dilemma of conflict in and among a population. It also indicates that the non-state
actors characterized as irregular forces may operate in other than military or even military-like
(paramilitary) capacities.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 v

Introduction
IRREGULAR OPFOR AND HYBRID THREAT FOR TRAINING

The function of the OPFOR is to portray a threat or enemy in training exercises. Army Regulation (AR)
350-2 establishes policies and procedures for the Armys Opposing Force Program. Since 2004, that AR
has defined opposing force as a plausible and flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a
composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces used in lieu of a specific threat force, for
training or developing U.S. forces. AR 350-2 has defined threat as any specific foreign nation or
organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or
challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies. However, that definition of threat
was much narrower than the way ADRP 3-0 now defines it.
A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm
U.S. forces, U.S. national interests, or the homeland. Threats may include individuals, groups of
individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances.
When threats execute their capability to do harm to the United States, they become enemies. (ADRP 3-0)
A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist
forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (ADRP 3-0). A hybrid
threat can consist of any combination of two or more of those components.
The preface of TC 7-100 says that TC outlines the Hybrid Threat that represents a composite of actual
threat forces as an opposing force (OPFOR) for training exercises. After focusing on real-world hybrid
threats in its first part, TC 7-100 states: Part two of this TC focuses on the Hybrid Threat (HT) for U.S.
Army training. The HT is a realistic and relevant composite of actual hybrid threats. This composite
constitutes the enemy, adversary, or threat...represented as an opposing force (OPFOR) in training
exercises. That means that, in the context of the HT for training, the OPFOR can also include nonmilitary
actors (such as criminal elements), which are part of the threat faced by the training unit. Since the
definition of hybrid threat includes other than military and paramilitary actors, it has broadened the
application of the term OPFOR.
The AR 350-2 definition of OPFOR used the term paramilitary forces, defined in JP 3-24 as forces or
groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization,
equipment, training, or mission. However, the ADRP 3-0 (and TC 7-100) definition of hybrid threat uses
the broader term irregular forces, defined in JP 3-24 as armed individuals or groups who are not
members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. Thus, irregular forces would
include paramilitary forces, but also other armed individuals or groups that do not resemble regular armed
forces. Although the ADRP 3-0 definition of hybrid threat includes terrorist forces, and/or criminal
elements, both criminals and actors who use terrorism as a tactic would actually fit under the JP 3-24
definition of irregular forces.
FM 7-100.4 lists criminal organizations under non-state paramilitary actors, but only because Criminal
organizations at the higher end of the scale can take on the characteristics of a paramilitary organization.
However, it notes that individual drug dealers and criminals or small-scale criminal organizations (gangs)
do not have that type of capability. FM 7-100.4 also refers to other armed combatants as nonmilitary
personnel who are armed but not part of an organized paramilitary or military structure. Nevertheless, they
may be disgruntled and hostile. ARDP 3-0 defines a party identified as hostile against which the use of
force is authorized as an enemy. In a training exercise, such an enemy would be portrayed as part of the
OPFOR.
FM 7-100.4 also recognizes the category of unarmed combatants. It says: The local populace contains
various types of unarmed nonmilitary personnel who, given the right conditions, may decide to purposely
and materially support hostilities against the United States. ... Individual criminals or small gangs might be
affiliated with a paramilitary organization and perform support functions that do not involve weapons. ...
Even unarmed individuals who are coerced into performing or supporting hostile actions and those who do
so unwittingly can in some cases be categorized as combatants. Thus, various types of unarmed combatants
can be part of the OPFOR.
Thus, a threat or enemy can be any individual or groupnot necessarily military and/or paramilitary, or
even armed. The same is true of the OPFOR that represents the threat or enemy in a training exercise.
vi TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Introduction
TAILORING THE OPFOR

The OPFOR must be a challenging, uncooperative adversary or enemy. It must be capable of stressing any
or all warfighting functions and mission-essential tasks of the U.S. armed force being trained. This TC
addresses the irregular OPFOR with a tactical focus on insurgents, guerrillas, and/or criminals. In exercise
design (see TC 7-101), the type(s) of forces making up the OPFOR will depend upon the conditions
determined to be appropriate for accomplishing training objectives. In some cases, the OPFOR may only
need to reflect the nature and capabilities of a regular military force, an irregular force, or a criminal
organization. However, in order to be representative of the types of threats the Army is likely to encounter
in actual OEs, the OPFOR will often need to represent the capabilities of a hybrid threat. In that context,
the force that constitutes the enemy, adversary, or threat for an exercise is called the Hybrid Threat, with
the acronym HT. Whenever the acronym is used, readers should understand that as referring to the Hybrid
Threat. The HT is a realistic and representative composite of actual hybrid threats.
Regular military forces of the OPFOR may have irregular forces and/or criminal elements acting in loose
affiliation with them, or acting separately from them within the same training environment. These
relationships depend on the scenario, which is crafted based on the training requirements and conditions of
the Army unit being trained. The OPFOR tactics described in TC 7-100.2 are appropriate for use by an
OPFOR that consists either entirely or partly of regular military forces. Some of those tactics, particularly
those carried out by smaller organizations, can also be used by insurgents, guerrillas, or even criminals.
Even those tactics carried out primarily by regular military forces may involve other components of the HT
acting in some capacity. When either acting alone or in concert with other components of the HT, irregular
forces and/or criminal elements can also use other tactics which are outlined in TC 7-100.3.
Note. After this introduction, the chapters and appendixes of this TC address their topics from
the OPFOR point of view. So, friendly refers to the irregular OPFOR and other parts of the
Hybrid Threat. Likewise, enemy refers to the enemy of the irregular OPFOR, which may be an
opponent within its own country or region or an extraregional opponent (normally the United
States or a U.S.-led coalition).
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 vii

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Chapter 1
Irregular Opposing Force Fundamentals
This chapter describes the fundamental characteristics of the irregular opposing force
(OPFOR). This TC portrays three main categories of irregular OPFOR: insurgents
(chapter 2); guerrillas (chapter 3); and criminals (chapter 4). Other actors present in
an operational environment (OE) can be willing, coerced, and/or unknowing
participants in irregular OPFOR activities (chapter 5). The irregular OPFOR interacts
with the eight operational variables that make up an OE. This interaction among
variables adds to the complexity of an OE and creates multiple opportunities for the
irregular OPFOR to optimize its capabilities against an enemy. The irregular OPFOR
can use terrorism as a tactic (chapter 6) in addition to military-like functional
techniques (chapter 7). A table in this chapter compares and contrasts the capabilities
and limitations characteristic of a guerrilla force, an insurgent organization, and a
criminal organization. The particular capabilities and limitations of the various types
of irregular OPFOR are described in subsequent chapters of this TC.
HYBRID THREAT
1-1. The irregular OPFOR can be part of the Hybrid Threat (HT). (For more information of the HT, see
TC 7-100.) The HT can be any combination of two or more of the following components: regular military
forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements. The irregular OPFOR component of the HT can be
insurgents, guerrillas, or criminals or any combination thereof. The irregular OPFOR can also include other
armed individuals or groups who are not members of a governing authoritys domestic law enforcement
organizations or other internal security forces. On occasion, situations may occur where unarmed
individuals or groups may be part of the irregular OPFOR and the HT. An example of unarmed individuals
aligned with the HT in an active support role is when segments of the population participate in public
demonstrations against an enemy of the HT. Possible HT combinations include parts of the irregular
OPFOR operating openly with regular military forces, being sponsored directly or indirectly by a states
government, or being supported by non-state organizations.
1-2. The irregular OPFOR can be part of the HT, but can also operate independently without any
allegiance to or collaboration with other types of forces associated with the HT. Various state and non-state
organizations, regular military forces, paramilitary forces, and/or criminal organizations might be operating
in the same space and time as the irregular OPFOR but not be part of the irregular OPFOR or the HT. To be
a hybrid threat, all these components would have to be unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects
(ADRP 3-0 and TC 7-100).
CAPABILITIES AND INTENT

1-3. The irregular OPFOR is adaptive, flexible, and agile. It can quickly change its composition to
optimize organizational capabilities and use those capabilities against known or perceived vulnerabilities of
an enemy. The irregular OPFOR takes prudent risks when an expectation exists for successful attack on an
enemy. However, it may also make significant practical sacrifices in individuals and materiel in order to
achieve a major psychological impact on an enemy. An example of such deliberate sacrifice is a number of
nearly simultaneous, small unit or direct action cell assaults on targets that result in the deaths of all
attackers, but receive sensational media coverage to a global audience.
1-4. The intent of the irregular OPFOR is to acquire a range of capabilities and use them at selected times
and locations in order to achieve desired effects. It can use those capabilities against an enemy. However,
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-1

Chapter 1
the irregular OPFOR can also use functional tactics and/or terrorism to manipulate a population and
dissuade support to an enemys military forces and/or other institutions. When necessary, it will use acts of
violence to gain influence and develop willing or coerced cooperation. Concurrently, it will use indirect
means to progressively degrade an enemys physical power and infrastructure, and to psychologically
influence the political, social, economic, military, and information variables of an OE. The irregular
OPFOR will attempt to exploit its familiarity with the physical environment and its ability to blend into the
local populace. The time variable normally favors the irregular OPFOR. The activities of the irregular
OPFOR are constant over a long period of time, but may change in pace, tempo, and speed. The timing of
actions will sometimes appear random when the actual mode of the irregular OPFOR and its activities are
deliberate decisions as part of a long-term campaign or strategy.
1-5. One of the most significant capabilities of the irregular OPFOR is the ability to manipulate and/or
ignore the restrictions and sanctions that apply to regulated military forces, law enforcement agencies, and
internal security forces belonging to a sovereign state. International protocols and conventions, national
statutes and law, and moral codes that guide behavioral norms and social interactions can limit the enemys
use of weapon systems and other capabilities that overmatch irregular OPFOR capabilities. The irregular
OPFOR can make exceptions by complying with these codes of conduct when that is advantageous for its
information warfare campaign. However, it can easily abandon those standards when they no longer
provide operational value. When regular military forces of a state incorporate clandestine use of the
irregular OPFOR, the state can often plausibly deny responsibility for actions conducted by
irregular forces.
1-6. Although violent actions by any individual organization or combination intend to receive immediate
notoriety, the irregular OPFOR complements violent actions with methodical, long-term psychological
warfare. The overarching agenda of the irregular OPFOR can include but is not limited to the
following issues:
Expand support and/or control within an area or region.
Deter opposition to its objectives within a relevant population.
Obtain popular recognition and support of its objectives by designated segments of a population.
Marginalize the governance and/or extraregional influence of an adversary.
Attract an international or global audience and/or external sources of influence to support irregular
OPFOR aims.
1-7. The irregular OPFOR seeks to gain the approval and support of at least certain elements of a relevant
population in order to obtain active or passive assistance. The methods by which it acquires such influence
are complex in any OE. Normally, it must communicate a compelling narrative of legitimacy that is
accepted by the population. This credential of legitimacy may require a gradual process of convincing the
relevant population that the irregular OPFOR is an acceptable means to achieve desired social, religious, or
political effects. However, the irregular OPFOR may confer authority on itself without regard to the
populations goals.
1-8. An enemy of the irregular OPFOR may maintain that the OPFOR concept of legitimacy is corrupt
and illicit. The irregular OPFOR may declare that its actions are justifiable under existing conditions, and
attempt to degrade the legitimacy of a governing authority. Over time, the irregular OPFOR seeks to obtain
recognition of its legitimacy by a willing populace and official recognition from external states and/or
organizations in order to accomplish its long-term goals. Once its authority is recognized, the irregular
OPFOR seeks to maintain the legitimacy of its cause, its leadership role, and its actions.
1-9. Sometimes external recognition and support is not as important to the irregular OPFOR as is
establishing a geographic enclave from which to plan, prepare, and conduct its activities and influence. The
irregular OPFOR conducts direct and indirect actions that are adaptive and persistent. This form of conflict
incorporates irregular forces typically categorized as insurgents or guerrillas, and includes selective actions
coordinated with criminal organizations. Particular actions can be purposely conducted as acts of terrorism,
or can employ more military-like tactics. All of these actions are described in terms of the common
functional framework described in the 7-100 series of FMs and TCs.
1-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Irregular OPFOR Fundamentals
COMPLEXITY AND COLLABORATION

1-10. The irregular OPFOR may be part of a complex array of irregular and regular OPFOR organizations,
units, or individuals with various coordinated and/or disparate single-agenda aims. A particular geographic,
political, cyberspace, or ideological environment may lead to alliances or affiliations that are dynamic and
constantly changing. Discrete incidents may not seem to be part of an overall plan. However, detailed
analysis of the irregular OPFOR actions and associated political, social, economic, information, and other
events normally reveals a vision supporting a long-range aim.
1-11. In particular conditions and circumstances, irregular OPFOR actions can include support from
regular military forces and/or special-purpose forces (SPF) from a state or states. Internal security forces
and/or law enforcement organizations that have been infiltrated by the irregular OPFOR can also support
irregular OPFOR actions within an area or region. The collaboration among organizations, units, and/or
individuals of a relevant population may be based on coercion, contractual agreement, and/or temporary or
long-term common goals and objectives.
1-12. Possible rationales for irregular OPFOR collaboration with other organizations or individuals in an
OE can include
Spotlight grievances for resolution.
Establish influence over a relevant segment of a population.
Develop acceptance and legitimacy of irregular OPFOR programs and actions.
Achieve OPFOR objectives without alienating critical segments of indigenous and/or
extraregional populations.
Cultivate active or passive supporters.
1-13. Irregular OPFOR objectives may promote solutions to grievances in the context of a particular
population. The irregular OPFOR may prefer to use indirect approaches such as subterfuge, deception, and
nonlethal action to achieve its objectives. However, it is committed to violent action, when necessary, in
order to compel an enemy and/or an opposing form of governance to submit to its intentions. Some
irregular OPFOR organizations such as affiliated criminal gangs exist for their own commercial profit and
power, and are not interested in the quality of life and/or civil security of a relevant population that they
influence or coerce. Other forms of the irregular OPFOR can be rogue individuals with single-issue
agendas who are willing to use criminal activity and/or terrorism in order to achieve their objective.
ADAPTABILITY
1-14. The irregular OPFOR is constantly adapting its capabilities in an agile and flexible manner to
achieve its objectives. These capabilities include improvements in organization, equipment, and tactics.
The irregular OPFOR can readily task-organize for a particular action. It tailors actions to support a
compelling agenda that resonates with a relevant population for active and/or passive support. It makes
adjustments when it gains or loses affiliated support or experiences degradation due to recent actions.
1-15. Irregular OPFOR actions are conducted as a continuum. Any pause in its operations is part of a
coherent campaign of persistent conflict. A long-term perspective guides near- and mid-term actions to
marshal capabilities for future actions. While one form of action may appear stalled, another form of action
is likely underway against an enemy weakness. Protracted actions can change quickly if the irregular
OPFOR observes unexpected enemy vulnerabilities.
1-16. The irregular OPFORs ability to quickly transition also gives it the agility and flexibility to
Command, control, and/or influence various activities.
Task-organize its forces.
Deceive and surprise.
Disperse and concentrate.
Retain freedom of movement.
Apply physical and psychological techniques in order to create anxiety in an enemy.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-3

Chapter 1
This agility and flexibility is critical to how effectively the irregular OPFOR adapts its patterns of
operations to maintain the initiative over an enemy. The irregular OPFOR perseveres in adversity by its
ability to adapt.
1-17. FM 7-100.4 (to be converted to a TC) outlines the baseline organizations and equipment of
insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals and provides general guidance on how these forces may task-organize
for particular missions. This process of task-organizing and/or tailoring of forces is flexible to
accommodate the particular mission and conditions in the OE.
Note. In order to achieve a desired level of capabilities, the irregular OPFOR order of battle or
task-organized structure may require adjustments in types and numbers of weapons systems, other
equipment, and personnel. If a particular piece of equipment in the organizational directories of
the OPFOR administrative force structure in FM 7-100.4 is not appropriate for a specific OE,
possible substitutions are identified in the Worldwide Equipment Guide.
TACTICS
1-18. Insurgents and guerrillas, as part of the irregular OPFOR, may employ variants of the functional
tactics outlined for smaller tactical units of the regular OPFOR in TC 7-100.2 (see chapter 7 of this TC).
Criminal elements do not normally have the ability to execute these functional tactics.
1-19. All three types of forces that make up the irregular OPFOR can employ terrorism as a tactic in order
to achieve their aims. (For actions typical of criminals, see chapter 4. For more detail on terrorism, see
chapter 6.)
INTERACTIONS OF OPERATIONAL VARIABLES

1-20. The irregular OPFOR is part of the military variable, which explores the military and/or paramilitary
capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given OE. However, irregular OPFOR
actions can affect or be affected by all the operational variables: political, military, economic, social,
information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) and their subvariables. The
impacts may be robust, moderate, or relatively insignificant. The interaction of the operational variables
and subvariables establishes conditions for various levels of irregular OPFOR capabilities and limitations.
The dynamic interaction and effects by the irregular OPFOR on operational variables are a physical and
psychological combat multiplier for the OPFOR. The following paragraphs discuss the impacts of the
irregular OPFOR on each of the operational variables. They also provide examples of how the actions of
one variable can directly or indirectly impact on other variables and affect the capabilities and influence of
the irregular OPFOR.
POLITICAL
1-21. The centers of responsibility and power at various levels of governance can be an objective for
irregular OPFOR subversion or violent action. The irregular OPFOR may target for willing or coerced
support of its aims
Constituted authorities at local, provincial, and/or state levels.
Tribal leaders and/or clan chiefs.
Religious leaders and councils.
Influential political organizations.
The irregular OPFOR may want to institute its own political goals for the perceived benefit of a relevant
population, or to create chaos within a governing authority in order create a protected geographic enclave
within a sovereign state. In either case, influence over a relevant population is essential. Given enough
electoral support in a relevant population, the irregular OPFOR may be able to win formal political
recognition at varied levels of a governing authority that it opposes.
1-22. Conditions of the political variable would very likely interact with social and economic conditions of
an OE. The political aim of the irregular OPFOR could have a genuine intent to provide a voice in politics
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to an under-represented relevant population, or be self-serving in order to obtain control of political

institutions for its own commercial profit. It may start as the former and transition into the latter. An
example of this transition could be if the irregular OPFOR emerged from an indigenous population of rural
farmers and tenants with grievances against absentee landowners and corporate businesses. However, over
time, the irregular OPFOR might shift its focus to commercial profit in racketeering and the production,
and distribution of illegal drugs to a transnational market.
MILITARY
1-23. The irregular OPFOR can infiltrate regular military and/or paramilitary forces of an enemy
governing authority. It can collect intelligence on military unit strengths and weaknesses, unit leader
preferences and biases, and/or readiness of weapons, support, and materiel. Covert actions by irregular
OPFOR members can undermine the effectiveness of enemy units by
Raising doubts about the validity of enemy unit missions.
Subverting leader and subordinate allegiances.
Questioning the general treatment of military and/or paramilitary members by the governing
authority.
1-24. With military training, weapons and equipment stolen or purchased by the irregular OPFOR can be
used more effectively to improve its armed capabilities. In some cases, the irregular OPFOR may attempt
to transition highly trained irregular forces into a more formalized paramilitary or security force in order to
demonstrate its ability.
1-25. An example of interaction of military and information variables could be a media campaign directed
at a local, regional, and transnational audience, in which the irregular OPFOR uses the symbols and
appearance commonly associated with military power and influence. The irregular OPFOR could use
progressive success in establishing and protecting a geographic safe haven with a declaration of
sovereignty. Announcements to a global information network could display senior irregular OPFOR leaders
in military uniform and attire, speaking publicly with official banners or flags, and maps or images of
territory declared as independent. A focused defense of the safe haven, assisted by an extensive and
supportive diaspora could achieve irregular OPFOR objectives unless challenged by an enemy
governing authority.
ECONOMIC
1-26. The economic effectiveness and prosperity of a governing authority can be marginalized with black
market activities coordinated by the irregular OPFOR. Criminal activities can include smuggling, theft,
and/or piracy of marketable goods. Insurgent or guerrilla actions can include disrupting the flow of
commerce throughout the economic chain of production, distribution, and consumption by the general
populace. The irregular OPFOR, in some instances, can become the illicit commercial broker for what
transactions occur in an economic sector. Front companies and/or organizations can launder resources and
money into legitimate enterprises in support of irregular OPFOR objectives.
1-27. An example of interaction between economic, infrastructure, and information variables could be
when the irregular OPFOR can deliver a satisfactory level of livelihood, health care, and commercial
advancement for a relevant population. The population may have been denied access to such expectations
by transnational corporations and a governing authority that extract natural resources from the region for
their own profit and exclusive use. The grievance of this economic poverty can result in irregular OPFOR
actions such as sabotage of pipelines, disruption of refining facilities, kidnapping of corporate officials,
and/or random acts of murder. The irregular OPFOR can use a media campaign aligned with the economic
grievances of the relevant population to emphasize the validity of OPFOR offensive actions. For example,
it could call attention to the presence of significant private security contractors of transnational corporations
and regular military forces of a governing authority conducting business security actions and military
operations for their own financial gain.
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Chapter 1
SOCIAL
1-28. Cultural, religious, and ethnic differences can be stress points within a population that the irregular
OPFOR can incite with real or false claims to further fracture a society and its social institutions. Unsettled
grievances based on traditional values and customs can range from dissatisfaction to violent demonstrations
against issues such as human rights, educational opportunities, and/or social mobility. The irregular
OPFOR can nurture the support of particular social and religious leaders of a community that align
themselves with OPFOR initiatives. Civic improvement associations and social welfare projects
administered by the irregular OPFOR focused on a relevant population can be part of a comprehensive
social unity program.
1-29. An example of interaction of the social and information variables could be the compelling influence
that a cleric or advisory council of clerics can have on a relevant population. Religious leaders may have
traditional authority in a culture that recognizes such an overarching authority, Based on that perceived
authority, the directives and prohibitions of that cleric or council can direct popular support of the irregular
OPFOR or civil disobedience to a governing political authority.
INFORMATION
1-30. Public communications by the irregular OPFOR can promote its own message with perception
management and also discredit programs of the enemy governing authority. Open source and human
intelligence collection operations can improve the irregular OPFOR awareness of enemy weaknesses.
Information warfare (INFOWAR) by the irregular OPFOR can deceive, destroy, or sabotage enemy
communication infrastructure. Examples of irregular OPFOR INFOWAR activities include blogs on the
Internet, publicizing incidents of alleged abuse by a governing authority in global news media, and/or
recurring presentations by charismatic individuals in social, political, educational, and religious institutions.
1-31. Another example of how the interaction of variables can cause significant impacts on irregular
OPFOR operations is the way the physical environment can influence the transmission and flow of
irregular OPFOR information and intelligence. In a rural setting, the irregular OPFOR may use normal
commercial transportation means of porters and mule trains. In an urban setting, it may use vendors and
daily routes of commercial goods. Thus, in either setting, sophisticated electronic monitoring capabilities
by an enemy of the irregular OPFOR may become insignificant. The irregular OPFOR can manipulate the
global information environment by using the Internet to encrypt and/or hide messages in innocent
appearing electronic communications. Verbal or electronic communications of a relevant population can be
stifled by irregular OPFOR threats and/or coercion when such information negatively affects its operations
in an area. Public claims of responsibility for acts of terror by the irregular OPFOR can further reduce overt
support of a relevant population to an enemy of the irregular OPFOR.
Note. The information variable is discussed in more detail in appendix A, which describes the
elements of the irregular OPFORs INFOWAR.
INFRASTRUCTURE
1-32. The irregular OPFOR can cause immediate, progressive, and long-term effects on of basic facilities,
services, and operational installations that provide the infrastructure for a community or society. Immediate
impacts can be the disruption of a sole-source oil pipeline and/or the destruction of a main electrical power
generation facility. Progressive acts to disrupt and cause long-term impacts can be the mining of regional
motor transportation routes with improvised explosive devices and recurring ambushes of commercial and
military convoys. From a more positive perspective, the irregular OPFOR could provide basic civil services
not being provided by a governing authority such as potable water and/or basic medical care.
1-33. Irregular OPFOR actions can include calculated disruption or destruction activities to limit enemy
capabilities and/or convince a relevant population that the enemy is incapable of protecting them and
providing adequate public or private services. The irregular OPFOR may choose to
Attack public utilities or the civil servants who service such utilities.
Prevent delivery of commodities that sustain performance of public services.
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Interdict services such as motor transportation, urban construction and repair.

Disrupt implementation of farming initiatives hosted by an enemy governing authority.
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
1-34. The irregular OPFOR can optimize the geography and/or manmade structures of a physical
environment by using restrictive rural terrain or dense urban communities to mask complex battle positions
and safe havens. Terrain, weather, climate, and vegetation can support the concealment and/or cover of
irregular OPFOR staging and conduct of operations. The growth of poor and underemployed populations in
many large metropolitan areas, and the increase of some cities to a status of megalopolis are prime
conditions to create grievances that can be manipulated by the irregular OPFOR.
1-35. An example of interaction among variables could be the impact of a governing authoritys land
reforms that adversely affect the immediate prosperity of a local or regional population. This could include
a directed destruction of one type of farming crop on limited usable terrain, and a replacement crop that
does not provide the same economic value to the farmer or local distributor. This situation can be part of
INFOWAR, with the irregular OPFOR promoting a story of how the governing authority it to blame for
these negative impacts.
TIME
1-36. Time can be a combat multiplier for the irregular OPFOR when the cultural perception of time
accepts a protracted conflict. During such a protracted conflict, the irregular OPFOR can use violent
actions, INFOWAR, diplomatic discussions, economic pressures, and progressive representations of value-
added for a relevant population. Timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions, as well as how the
timing and duration are perceived by various actors in the OE, can prevent or delay governing authority
activities in favor of irregular OPFOR aims.
1-37. The irregular OPFOR seeks to chose the time and place for engaging the enemy. Timing can be the
most significant aspect of determining when to tactically execute a decision to delay, deceive, fix, and/or
block. Timeliness of information and intelligence is another key aspect that the irregular OPFOR uses to its
own advantage. In order to affect enemy pace, tempo, and/or speed of action and reaction, the irregular
OPFOR may plant false information at a particular time and ensure that an enemy obtains it. The prudent
use of time is often combined with characteristics of a physical environment to create opportunities in
support of near-, mid-, and/or long-term objectives.
PRINCIPLES
1-38. The fundamental principles of the irregular OPFOR guide organizational and individual actions.
Regardless of whether the organization is military-like in appearance and operations, or includes elements
that are loosely affiliated with the irregular OPFOR in a political, social, or economic sector of a society,
these principles provide a common framework of how the irregular OPFOR plans and conducts actions.
Since the irregular OPFOR often resembles military forces in many ways, some of these principles are very
similar to fundamental military principles in the regular OPFOR. In some cases, however, the principles are
tailored in consideration of irregular OPFOR capabilities or limitations. Depending on the type of irregular
OPFOR organization and its goals and motivations, the irregular OPFOR adapts the following principles to
address particular situations. Figure 1-1 on page 1-8 shows how each of the principles interrelate and
contribute toward achieving an irregular OPFOR objective. That objective typically relates to a particular
grievance on the part of the irregular OPFOR or of a relevant population it seeks to influence.
INITIATIVE
1-39. Initiative is the ability of the irregular OPFOR to retain a freedom of action in its plans and
operations. Initiative enables the irregular OPFOR to force an enemy to react to its actions. Success often
goes to the side that conducts itself more actively and resolutely. Irregular OPFOR leaders encourage
initiative to make and implement bold decisions in order to establish or change the terms of the irregular
conflict in favor of the irregular OPFOR. Subordinates are expected to take advantage of new
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Chapter 1
developments immediately. They seek to overcome a position of relative inferiority while operating within
a senior OPFOR leaders intentions. Initiative exploits an enemys restrictive rules of engagement or
political restrictions.
Objective
Ends in order to achieve Results
Perseverance
with resolute
Adaptability Concentration Mobility

Means Actions
Surprise Deception Protection
that applies
Initiative
Ways focuses leader Concept
Grievance
Figure 1-1. Relation of irregular OPFOR principles to achieving the objective
DECEPTION
1-40. Deception is the ability to deliberately convey a false and/or distorted picture of the situation to an
enemy leader that is targeted for deception. Deceptive information causes an enemy leader to believe he has
accurate situational awareness and understanding. Irregular OPFOR leaders plan and direct deception that
helps them accomplish their objective, but does not hamper other concurrent OPFOR actions. Feints and
demonstrations are examples of deception. Other elements of INFOWAR attempt to optimize the effects of
deception in tactics and techniques. Various irregular OPFOR capabilities and actions can lead to a
compelling yet inaccurate analysis by the enemy leader. These means of deception, not limited by domestic
or international law and conventions, can include the following:
Physical activity or lack of activity.
Technical resources and employment techniques indicative of a particular tactic.
Administrative indicators such as visual, oral, or documentary evidence in order to manipulate and
distort reality.
SURPRISE
1-41. Surprise is the ability of the irregular OPFOR to take advantage of an enemy vulnerability in a
manner for which an enemy is unprepared or unable to effectively counter. Irregular OPFOR action is
normally swift and fleeting and may employ unexpected means. The irregular OPFOR attempts to shape a
setting so that an enemy is not expecting the action or create conditions that an enemy is not prepared to
confront. The irregular OPFOR achieves surprise through deception activities in conjunction with
protection and security measures and/or other elements of INFOWAR. Surprise can be achieved by means
such as the following:
Changing tactics, techniques, or the intensity of actions against an enemy.
Employing commercial or industrial materiel as a weapon in unexpected ways.
Presenting public indications of compromise or cessation of armed conflict. For example, the
irregular OPFOR may agree to a truce and series of negotiations with an enemy, but use the time
to prepare and stage for nearly simultaneous surprise attacks on military and civil government
facilities.
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PROTECTION
1-42. Protection is the ability to preserve irregular OPFOR effectiveness of its organizational assets and
capabilities. These assets and capabilities include OPFOR personnel, equipment, weapon systems,
operations, information, facilities, and/or infrastructure. Protection involves a continuous, integrated series
and/or group of measures that sustain the ability for the irregular OPFOR to plan, prepare, and conduct
successful actions. Protection and security measures are a key element in INFOWAR (see appendix A).
The irregular OPFOR normally operates with a minimal or unidentifiable signature within a relevant
population in order to avoid being a lucrative target. Protection complements the use of a safe haven, when
required, to refit or reconstitute irregular OPFOR combat power. An example of protection is an irregular
OPFOR guerrilla unit exfiltrating from a raid in hostile territory to a secure location in a neighboring state.
This unofficial support by a state near the area of OPFOR actions provides security and protection to the
guerrilla unit while it recruits and trains replacements due to casualties incurred in the raid.
MOBILITY
1-43. Mobility is the ability to sustain irregular OPFOR freedom of movement within areas controlled or
occupied by the enemy. The irregular OPFOR seeks to create an advantage over the enemy regarding
knowledge and use of geographic terrain and populations in order to position, reposition, and/or prepare for
and conduct effective actions. A high degree of mobility enables the irregular OPFOR to use available
combat power with maximum effect at a decisive time and place. For example, the irregular OPFOR can
blend into a population with similar clothing and daily habits in order to maintain anonymity while
transiting an area or region. This type of mobility can allow the timely supply of weapons and materiel,
fiscal resources, and/or manpower for designated actions in an area or region.
ADAPTABILITY
1-44. Adaptability is the ability of the irregular OPFOR to use initiative and creative thinking in order to
set particular conditions and take advantage of the resulting opportunities. Irregular OPFOR leaders
recognize emergent developments that change existing conditions, and apply initiative that causes the
enemy to react at a disadvantage to the actions of the irregular OPFOR. Simple tactics and techniques can
be adapted for use against an enemys sophisticated technology and weapon systems. For example, a
system of couriers can negate the intrusive ability of electronic monitoring devices to detect and locate the
financial transaction networks of a local insurgent organization that were formerly conducted with cellular
telephones. Conversely, the irregular OPFOR can adapt to sophisticated techniques such as encrypting and
hiding information within harmless appearing communiqus such as electronic files, images, and
documents transiting the Internet.
CONCENTRATION
1-45. Concentration is the ability of the irregular OPFOR to mass the capabilities of combat power in time
and space, in order to achieve a desired effect. Concentration of effort allows the irregular OPFOR to create
and dominate a condition for a specific amount of time. When the irregular OPFOR concentrates rapidly or
gradually from dispersed locations to conduct a particular action, a normal subsequent action is to quickly
disperse in order to avoid an effective enemy response against the massed OPFOR. An example of
concentration is the coordination to quickly mass irregular OPFOR insurgent cells, and use a swarming
technique in a raid to overwhelm a designated target at an isolated combat outpost. Once insurgents have
seized the objective and secured or destroyed designated weapons, equipment, and documents, the cells
quickly disperse into the countryside or urban areas in order to avoid capture or death.
PERSEVERANCE
1-46. Perseverance demonstrates the will of the irregular OPFOR to persist in long-term commitment to
fight an enemy until it accomplishes its goals and objective. Protracted and persistent operations are the
norm of the irregular OPFOR. Actions may be subtle and can be part of a gradual series of actions toward
achieving a task. Dramatic individual actions are often used to establish or sustain notoriety for the
irregular OPFOR, but rarely achieve a decisive effect. Periodic setbacks in irregular OPFOR missions are
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Chapter 1
anticipated and rationalized with effective INFOWAR announcements to sustain a moral dominance of the
irregular OPFOR over an enemy. INFOWAR techniques can also convince a relevant population to sustain
support of the irregular OPFOR even though its actions may require an extended period of time before the
population eventually benefits. The irregular OPFOR may attempt to achieve its objectives within a
specified timetable and announced milestones; however, the objectives may take decades or generations to
achieve.
MOTIVATIONS
1-47. Insurgents and guerrillas are normally motivated by social, religious, or political issues or some
combination of those. In most cases, criminalswhether they are part of the irregular OPFOR or not
have other motivations. Although individual actors who conduct criminal activity may not be part of the
irregular OPFOR, the individuals personal motivation and/or ideology may be the deciding perspective of
why he or she acts.
Note. The local populace may provide active or passive support out of a different motivation
than the insurgents or guerrillas they support. For example, the motivation of the populace might
be financial (payment or beneficial effects on business profits) or security provided them. The
populace might provide support, based on ethnic or religious issues, to an insurgent or guerrilla
organization even if they do not share that organizations political agenda.
INSURGENTS OR GUERRILLAS
1-48. Certain types of motivation are common to insurgents and guerrillas, the two most likely components
of the irregular OPFOR. However, insurgents and guerrillas that agree to collaborate against a common
enemy may or may not share the same motivations or ideology.
Note. If multiple insurgent and/or guerrilla organizations exist in a particular OE, they may share
some motivations but differ in others. In order to form an affiliated relationship, the
organizations just need to have one or more motivations that coincide with or complement each
other. An example of a coinciding motivation could be that both organizations resent the
presence of an extraregional force in their country. An example of a complementary relationship
would be if one organization has financial resources, while the other needs financial support
1-49. The motivation that incites violent as well as nonviolent actions by the irregular OPFOR is often
framed in the context of ideology. The irregular OPFOR acts in a particular way based on underlying
grievances, which are often linked to the ideals of an ideology. These unresolved grievancesperceived or
factualcreate conditions where armed and unarmed individuals believe they must act to obtain what they
believe is a just solution. The rationale and the resulting actions may be perceived in a positive and
negative light by a relevant population. The motivation and rationale typically are one or more of
the following:
Personal or group social identity.
Devotion to a particular religious belief.
Commitment to a form of political governance.
Combinations among these factors can further complicate how to describe the motivation and ideology of a
particular person or group. Other motivations exist and may become a primary prompt for action, though
only loosely associated with a social, religious, or political agenda. Aspects of ethnicity, geography, and
history affect personal and group relationships as witnessed in social status and networks, religion, and
politics. Combinations can occur among these factors to further complicate how to describe the motivation
of a particular person or group.
Social Identity
1-50. Social identity, as an individual and/or as a member of a social group, is often a fundamental aspect
of why people may be aligned with or alienated from the irregular OPFOR. They may be attracted by an
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ability to satisfy a perceived critical want or need in their lifestyle. Allegiance to a clan, tribe, or familial
grouping is an example of social identity and accountability. These forms of social allegiance can indicate
why change is desired or required in a social order. The same rationales can support why a set of ideals or
practices must be sustained or expanded within a relevant population. Several common categories of social
identity that can overlap with religious or political agendas are as follows:
Ethnocentric groups who understand race or ethnicity as the defining characteristic of a society
and basis of cohesion.
Nationalistic groups who promote cultural-national consciousness and perhaps establishment of
a separate nation-state.
Revolutionary groups who are dedicated to the overthrow of a governing authority and
establishment of a new social order.
Separatist groups who demand independence from an existing governance that appears socially,
theologically, or politically unjust to a relevant population.
1-51. A variation on these identity categories is an independent actor who conceives, plans, and conducts
violent or nonviolent actions without any direction from another person or irregular force. This type of
individual may be sympathetic to the aims of a particular group, but have no contact with the group or
affiliated members of the group.
Religion
1-52. Religion can be a compelling motivation. As a personal belief, religion can be interpreted as divine
edict and infallible. Practice of a faith system is a personal interpretation and decision. However,
fundamentalist clerics and/or religious mentors in some instances can interpret passages of religious
doctrine in a particular way that supports the irregular OPFOR agenda. Some interpretations may be a
purposeful misrepresentation never intended by an original religious author. Other clerics or radical splinter
groups may honestly believe in a religious duty to pursue a fundamentalist approach to worship and
lifestyle. In either case, religion can be used as a catalyst to instigate rivalry between and among ethnic
and/or religious denominational groups. Confrontations can be provoked by faith system practices that are
completely unacceptable to another faith group and/or can create an irreconcilable theological wedge
between cultural-faith groups in a relevant population.
1-53. The irregular OPFOR may attempt to link religion with declarations that governing political
authorities who do not accept a particular understanding of a faith doctrine are a wicked secular presence
that must be destroyed and replaced with a fundamentalist theocracy form of governance. Cults, although
not a religion by normal definition, can adopt similar forms of violence, mass murder, and mayhem as part
of a self-proclaimed apocalyptic vision and purpose.
Politics
1-54. The irregular OPFOR, especially the insurgent part, can have a political agenda. Prevalent political
systems that can be promoted by the irregular OPFOR include forms of governance such as
Single-party totalitarian state.
Nationalist-fascist authority.
Leadership appointed or democratically elected by popular vote.
Social self-management and equality aimed at reducing or eliminating political and economic
hierarchies.
Social-political process that evolves toward a classless-stateless society with common ownership
on means of production, communal access to commodities for livelihood, and general social
programs for the benefit of community and human wellness.
Pseudo-social and political authority that protects a geographic sanctuary and/or safe haven for
conduct of an illicit commercial enterprise.
1-55. The irregular OPFOR can use motivations of a political ideology to attract the attention of a relevant
population in order to develop influence with a particular community. This can lead to support and/or
collaboration or actually joining the irregular OPFOR. Since politics are integral to the overarching
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Chapter 1
conditions that affect daily life, commerce, vocation, freedoms, and family, the irregular OPFOR can use
political influencealong with social and/or religious appealto enhance its legitimacy. Visible actions,
often localized in perspective, focus on demonstrating power and authority.
CRIMINALS
1-56. Although actors who conduct criminal activities may not be insurgents or guerrillas, personal
motivation and/or ideology may be a deciding factor in their decision to join the irregular OPFOR
voluntarily or be coerced to participate. Criminals who become part of the irregular OPFOR may or may
not share some of the same motivations as other parts of the OPFOR. Regardless of their social identity and
religious or political preferences, criminals are motivated primarily by money. (See chapter 4 for more
detail on the motivations of criminals and criminal organizations.)
SUPPORT
1-57. Support for irregular OPFOR activities includes capabilities provided by individuals and
organizations internal and external to the geographic area. Multiple forms of support can be voluntary
and/or coerced from individuals, selected segments of a population, or activities and organizations with
particular capabilities. Affiliation with and/or among organizations indicates a common goal. However,
affiliation is not a formal association and subordination among participants. Support relationships are
often temporary and remain in effect only as long as the benefits of cooperation are mutual to the
involved organizations.
INTERNAL
1-58. Internal support includes the ideological and practical means to improve and/or sustain irregular
OPFOR operations. Insurgents or guerrillas seek to ally and affiliate with activities and people that range
from specific commodities and/or functional skills to networks of political, commercial, religious, and/or
social groups with required capabilities. Internal support indicates the commitment of leaders, active
supporters, and passive supporters to further the progress of the irregular OPFOR. As conditions change in
geographic, political, cultural, cyberspace, and/or ideological environments, the coordination of internal
support adjusts to accommodate emergent opportunities.
EXTERNAL
1-59. External support is not always necessary for the irregular OPFOR to succeed. However, some form
of external support is usually critical to sustain long-term operations. Activities and organizations often
provide external support for ideological reasons, but other motivations can include political power,
commercial enterprise, financial wealth, and/or some common grievance affecting a relevant population.
The motivations that incite the irregular OPFOR affect how and why support is obtained. Whether support
is voluntary or coerced, the rationale of why support is necessary reflects how discrete aspects of assistance
improve a cumulative capability.
1-60. Prominent categories of support are moral, money, and materiel. The morality of supporting the
irregular OPFOR links an ideology to an outcome of desired conditions by a relevant population. Money
enables the irregular OPFOR to acquire capabilities required in order to enhance its influence not only in a
paramilitary sense, but also across a full spectrum of operational variables in an OE. Materiel support
indicates the provision of equipment, supplies, and operating systems used by the irregular OPFOR and/or
its supporters. Materiel requires training, maintenance, and recurring systems improvement. These
capabilities suggest the need for trainers, advisors, and/or liaison personnel to support the irregular OPFOR.
To accomplish these actions, a safe haven or sanctuary allows a freedom of action in planning, preparing,
and staging for overt and covert operations. Three main types of external support are diaspora support, state
support, and non-state support.
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Diaspora
1-61. A diaspora is a relevant population that has voluntarily moved or migrated, and/or been forcefully
displaced from an established or ancestral homeland. However, they still have racial, national, tribal,
religious, linguistic, and/or cultural affinities with inhabitants of that homeland. Motives for support from a
diaspora can include ethnocentric, separatist, and/or nationalistic. A fundamental objective is to correct
proven or perceived injustices to a group of people in a larger community and relevant population. This
type of support is often linked to a common social, religious, and/or political identity.
1-62. Voluntary support from a diaspora is a preferred method for assistance to the irregular OPFOR.
However, compelling the support from segments of a diaspora may be required at times to ensure the
amount of general or specialized support required to sustain operations. Compelling support from a
diaspora is a calculated risk that is closely monitored by irregular OPFOR senior leaders in order to not
alienate a significant portion of the relevant population.
1-63. Beyond aspects such as financial and materiel contributions, the expansion of support through
INFOWAR with and for a diaspora can sway public opinion and obtain continuing extraregional and
international support for the struggle of the irregular OPFOR. In the spotlight of globalized media, a
diaspora usually accents the moral correctness of resolving proven or perceived injustices to a group of
people in a relevant population of the particular geographic region or state.
External State
1-64. Support from an external state for the irregular OPFOR can be covert and/or overt. A state acts
primarily based on its political objectives. Political, economic, social, fiscal, moral, and/or logistics support
can be provided while disavowing any direct connection to the irregular OPFOR. For example, a state may
condemn an adversary state for repressing a relevant population while covertly providing arms,
ammunition, sanctuary, training bases, and/or advise and other forms of assistance.
1-65. A state might employ SPF and/or covert agents of the state to conduct direct actions in support of the
irregular OPFOR. The state officially denies responsibility or state sponsorship for such activities, but can
engage in unofficial INFOWAR releases that indicate support for specified actions within the insurgency.
In other situations, a state may openly declare a legal or moral right to intervene in the affairs of another
state and support designated insurgent organizations and their affiliates. States may form a coalition to
condemn the acts of a governing authority and announce support for irregular OPFOR actions.
1-66. A state can act overtly by providing supplies, training, and other forms of support to the irregular
OPFOR. This support can be coordinated and provided without any specified control over an insurgent or
guerrilla organization by the state. Other options can exist where stipulations are mutually agreed upon
between representatives of the state and irregular OPFOR leaders in exchange for materiel and/or a safe
haven or protected staging area for operations. Other means of support can include
Access to training facilities and expertise not otherwise readily available to the irregular
OPFOR.
Extension of diplomatic protections and services such as immunity from extradition.
Use of embassies and other protected grounds.
Use of diplomatic pouches to transport weapons or explosives.
False documentation for personal identification and movements throughout geographic regions
and states.
1-67. States in a coalition or as members of an international organization may decide to intervene directly
in an insurgency with diplomatic envoys, observation teams, and/or military forces. A coalition may form
to condemn the acts of a governing authority and announce support for irregular OPFOR actions. The
irregular OPFOR insurgent organization leaders and coalition authorities can mutually agree to
Seek conditions for justice and respect arising from international treaties and other sources of
international law.
Promote social progress, economic advancement of indigenous people.
Maintain international stability and security.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-13

Chapter 1
Non-State
1-68. Forms of non-state support can range from non-state transnational networks with global reach
capability to individuals with a special or unique capability. These forms of support can be overt and/or
covert. Networks can be regional or international in their aims, and/or individuals committed to a single-
issue agenda. Whether support involves a type of network, hierarchical organization, or loosely coordinated
individuals, non-state support to an insurgency or independent guerrilla operations often includes
sophisticated criminal activities in foreign and/or indigenous environments.
1-69. Insurgencies may turn to transnational criminal organizations for funding. Other globalized
capabilities can provide advanced knowledge and technology exchanges, mobile international
transportation, and near-instantaneous cyber communication. Non-state support exchanges in capabilities
can occur directly and indirectly.
1-70. Transnational economic entities such as international business corporations may provide support to
irregular OPFOR operations in order to further their corporate business interests. Other supervisory or
workforce individuals in non-profit or private organizations may assist the irregular OPFOR based on
personal beliefs and/or as the result of coercion or extortion. Individual financiers may provide support in
order to advance personal agendas or cultural, ethnic, political, and/or religious causes.
1-71. External support from other parts of the irregular OPFOR and/or in conjunction with regular military
forces can include an exchange of personnel and equipment, as well as intelligence, training, recruitment,
logistics, and finances. In addition to individual and contracted mercenaries, a significant body of other
independent or loosely collaborative individuals may be available for hire to an irregular OPFOR
organization. These personnel may have served previously in guerrilla units or regular military units.
BLURRING OF CATEGORIES
1-72. Although three basic types of forces can be part of the irregular OPFOR, the distinctions among
insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals are sometimes blurred. That is because they may have more in
common than they have that is different. From the viewpoint of the existing government authority, for
instance, the activities of all three types are illegal, that is, criminal. Not just criminals but also insurgents
and guerrillas can engage in criminal activities. Some insurgent organizations can include guerrilla units
(developed from within or affiliated) and some guerrilla units may be part of an insurgency. In advanced
phases of an insurgency, guerrilla units may begin to look and act more like regular military units.
1-73. There are three general tactics available to the irregular OPFOR
Military-like functional tactics.
Criminal activity.
Terrorism.
1-74. At any given time, the irregular OPFOR could use any of these means. The differences among these
three can become blurred, especially within an urban environment or where the governing authority exerts
strong control.
INSURGENTS AND GUERRILLAS

1-75. As an insurgent organization grows, its cellular structure or parts thereof may develop into a more
hierarchical military-like structure. Within an insurgent organization, direct action cells may combine to
form guerrilla squads and platoons. In some cases, a platoon or company may retain some direct action
cells (possibly for terror tactics). Other specialized cells of an insurgent organization can evolve into
parts of
Supporting units of a guerrilla company, battalion, or brigade.
Staff elements of a guerrilla battalion or brigade.
1-76. Guerrillas may engage in more military-like operations after an insurgency develops extensive
popular and logistics support. When they feel the conditions are set, insurgents may generate a
conventional military force that can directly confront regular forces of the existing governing authority.
1-14 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

INSURGENTS AND CRIMINALS

1-77. There is often a nexus between insurgency and crime. Sustainment requirements, especially funding,
often drive insurgents into relationships with organized crime or into criminal activity themselves.
Insurgents may turn to local, regional, or transnational criminal elements for funding. Cooperating with
criminals may not be ideologically consistent with the movements core beliefs, although that does not
necessarily prevent such cooperation.
1-78. An insurgent organization itself may engage in criminal activities as a source of funding. Income is
essential not only for insurgents to purchase weapons but also to pay recruits and bribe corrupt officials.
Reaping windfall profits and avoiding the costs and difficulties involved in securing external support makes
illegal activity attractive to insurgents. Kidnapping, extortion, robbery, and trafficking (drug, human, black
market goods, and so on)four favorite insurgent activitiesare very lucrative, although they can also
alienate the population.
1-79. Insurgents may use coercive force to gain power over the population. Examples of organizations
providing such force are insurgent direct action cells, guerrilla units, gangs, and organized crime elements.
Such groups may use their coercive means for a variety of purposes unrelated to the insurgency. Protecting
their community members, carrying out vendettas, and engaging in criminal activities are examples.
Insurgent organizations may also attract followers through criminal activities that provide income.
1-80. Insurgencies attract criminals and mercenaries. Fighters who joined for money will probably become
bandits once the fighting ends and may engage in criminal activity during the fighting. This category
includes opportunists who exploit the absence of governing authority security and law enforcement to
engage in economically lucrative criminal activity, such as kidnapping, smuggling, or theft.
1-81. Some insurgencies can compartmentalize criminal activity, keeping it ancillary to the main effort and
preventing it from affecting the organization and its unity. However, some insurgencies can become
focused on criminal activity that once only served as a funding mechanism. Some insurgent cell leaders
may become crime bosses. The insurgency as a whole may degenerate into criminality, particularly if the
primary movement disintegrates and the remaining elements are cast adrift. Such disintegration replaces an
ideologically inspired body of individuals with a more diverse body, normally of very uneven character.
1-82. Even when criminal networks are not a part of an insurgency, their activitiesfor example, banditry,
hijackings, kidnappings, and smugglingcan further undermine the governing authority. Insurgent
organizations often link themselves to criminal networks to obtain funding and logistics support. In some
cases, insurgent networks and criminal networks become indistinguishable. Most insurgent groups are more
similar to organized crime in their organizational structure and relations with the populace than they are to
military units.
REGULAR AND IRREGULAR OPFOR

1-83. There can also be some blurring between the irregular OPFOR and regular OPFOR military units.
Both types of forces can use many of the same functional tactics (such as assault, ambush, and raid).
1-84. The regular OPFOR, especially SPF, may use terror tactics similar to those of the irregular OPFOR.
Since SPF may or may not be in uniform, they may be hard to distinguish from irregular OPFOR insurgents
or guerrillas, for which they often serve as trainers or advisors and alongside which they may fight.
COMPARISON AND CONTRAST

1-85. Within the irregular OPFOR, guerrilla units, insurgent organizations, and criminal organizations have
various capabilities and limitations. Table 1-1 on pages 1-16 through 1-18 compares and contrasts the basic
characteristics of the three types of forces in order to highlight their similarities and their differences.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-15

Chapter 1
Table 1-1. Comparison and contrast of insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals
Characteristic Insurgent Organization Guerrilla Unit Criminal Organization

Leadership Network is typical, but can Hierarchical with military-like Hierarchical structure or
include hierarchical sub- chain of command and control network dependent on origin
organizations; leaders may be or support systems; leaders of organization; even in small
located distant from the predominantly indigenous; criminal organizations,
geographic area of conflict; political advisors may leaders may be located
political or ideological mentors accompany guerrilla units in distant from the geographic
or council advisors and/or actions. Leader titles are area of conflict; political or
counsel senior leaders. Title military in nature such as ideological mentors or council
for personnel in command is battalion and/or company advise and/or counsel senior
usually leader. Some commander, platoon leader, leaders. Leader titles can be
leaders may use a religious, section leader, team leader, traditional or historical terms,
historical, or honorific title. hunter-killer group leader. or simple authority terms.
Motivation Insurgency movement with a Social identity, religion, or Intention to profit fiscally
political and/or ideological politics. Can be military through control of a process,
agenda. Can also be social component to an insurgency; commodity, and/or area;
identity or religion. or can be independent of an social identity as a power
insurgency with a specified broker in a designated
agenda. geographic, economic, or
social environment.
Organization Cellular-network model; can Military unit model with Hierarchical structure or
be hierarchical for designated echelons of command and network dependent on origin
capabilities or functions; can control; can include land, sea, of organization; general
include paramilitary capability and air capabilities; can be categories of gangs, large-
for a primarily political- affiliated with other irregular scale syndicates, and
oriented organization; can be OPFOR and/or regular transnational organizations;
affiliated with other irregular military forces; more likely organizations can be based
OPFOR and/or regular that other irregular OPFOR on family, ethnic, commodity,
military forces. components to be closely or specialized purpose. Can
integrated with regular military infiltrate or become affiliated
forces. with insurgent, guerrilla, or
regular military forces.
Objectives Concessions from and/or Military mission success Profit from activities and
defeat of a political opponent; within a campaign in support coercion; expand
ultimately, overthrow an of unit goals and desired end organizational influence within
enemy governing authority state; can be an independent an area, regional, or
and replace governance with and specified guerrilla unit transnational scope; preserve
insurgent movement agenda; can be the military control of specified
leadership; seek legitimacy as capability in insurgent commodities, geographic
movement. organization. areas, and/or services; avoid
contact with governing
authority.
Internal Active and passive support in Active and passive support by Active and passive support in
Support local and larger area segments of a local area local and larger area
population; can have population for military-type population; can use coercion
legitimate social-economic- capabilities; can expand to influence legitimate social-
political activities to mobilize support to regional area economic-political activities or
civil support. population. individual support.
External Regional safe havens; Regional safe havens; can Cooperative affiliations
Support Diaspora systems to promote receive cooperation or among gangs, large-scale
insurgent movement in assistance from regular syndicates, and/or
regional and/or international military, SPF, or state transnational organizations
communities; can receive activities opposing the can provide designated
cooperation or assistance governing authority in the support and services; co-
from regular forces, SPF, or area of guerrilla operations. opted governing authority
state activities opposing the offices may also assist.
Activity Local, regional, provincial, Military-like functional tactics Local, regional, and/or
Patterns and/or district activities with as norm; can expand tactical transnational activities;
intention of obtaining support actions into a military random or systematic activity
of relevant population; can be campaign focused in a to sustain influence;
social, economic, diplomatic, geographic area. specialized expertise can be
political, and military activities. part of functional business
model of larger commercial
enterprises.
1-16 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Table 1-1. Comparison and contrast of insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals (continued)

Composition Higher insurgent organization Brigade to squad-team Transnational organization,
and local insurgent guerrilla units; can be tailored large-scale syndicates, and/or
organization; functional for specialized missions; can gangs; can be groups
structure with cellular base; be supported by SPF advisors affiliated in temporary or long-
can receive assistance or and/or regular forces advisors term specific business
support from SPF and/or or liaison. arrangements.
regular military forces.
Personnel Indigenous and/or Predominantly indigenous Predominantly indigenous
transnational core; ideological core; can include members core, but can include
mentor support network; rank outside of indigenous members outside of
and file members can be in a population; rank and file indigenous population as
period of active service in the members typically remain in organization expands in
insurgent organization, or be the same military unit with a business connections; status
authorized inactive status and long-term commitment of may indicate familial or social
return to familial-social duty. lineage within organization;
responsibilities with their local rank and file members may
population. be specialized operators.
Recruitment Local, regional, or Local or regional population Familial or social affiliations
extraregional population recruiting base; informal may be membership
recruiting; often relates to an induction process with requirement; rank and file
ideological or faith system expectation of long-term or members may be contracted
commitment to serve; can be open-ended term of service; for skill sets; initiation rites
contract support; can use can use conscription from and tests may precede
conscription for limited local population; require acceptance; code of conduct
lengths of time or seasonal compliance with strict may demand absolute
terms of service. standards and discipline. allegiance to the organization.
Weapons and Tier 1-4 capabilities (see Tier 1-4 capabilities (see Tier 1-4 capabilities (see
Other Equipment Worldwide Equipment Guide) Worldwide Equipment Guide) Worldwide Equipment Guide)
dependent on support from dependent on access to local dependent on ability to
insurgent region and resources, or a higher and/or purchase or procure weapons
diaspora; can receive local insurgent organization if and/or materiel.
clandestine support from part of an insurgency; if
states, private organizations, independent, obtains
and/or criminal activities that weapons from raids,
oppose the governing ambushes, and black market
authority in conflict with the purchases; can include
insurgent organization. sophisticated systems and
heavy weapon capabilities
similar to regular military
forces.
Uniforms Local attire of populace as Varied military-like clothing or Attire of local populace as
norm; can wear military-like pieces of clothing, load- norm; can use civilian or law
pieces of clothing and load- bearing equipment, and enforcement or paramilitary
bearing equipment for insignia as norm; can wear pieces of clothing and
designated direct actions. local attire of populace to equipment in order to
facilitate mission. deceive.
Disposition Within political boundary of Within enemy-held, hostile, or Within geographic area under
governing authority as norm; denied territory; can be safe organization control; can be
can be safe haven in or near haven in or near geographic safe haven in or near area
contested territory; size and area of contested territory; involved in business
location of cells based on unit size, location, and transactions; size and location
local conditions. command integrity based on of organizational groupings
Rural and/or urban areas on local conditions. based on local conditions.
mission basis; often occupy Rural and/or urban areas on Rural and/or urban on mission
safe havens in populace, can mission basis; often occupy basis; often use protected
locate as dispersed cells, safe haven and complex locations in populace, can
and/or in CBP; can use social, battle position (CBP) away locate as dispersed groups;
economic, or political from populace; can locate co-opted social, economic, or
organizations as public and units in proximity to other political organizations can
visible presence in populace. guerrilla units for mutual prevent interference by law
support. enforcement or internal
security organizations.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-17

Chapter 1
Table 1-1. Comparison and contrast of insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals (continued)

Training Functional skills in local or Basic and advanced military Basic and advanced skills
regional safe havens, or skills instructed in safe haven learned in practice; special
contract support for niche or CBP in or near geographic skills and support can be
expertise; skills and services area of conflict. If part of contracted; training can
can include administrative, insurgency, coordinates for include administrative,
intelligence, direct actions, special skills and support; can intelligence, internal security,
supply, transportation, be augmented by SPF and/or operational franchise
communications, and/or regular military advisors. management, supply and
special skill sets; can be services, transportation,
augmented by SPF and/or communications, and/or
regular military advisors. special skill sets.
Internal Security Counterintelligence and Counterintelligence elements Internal security maintained
internal security cells monitor monitor guerrilla loyalty. through codes of conduct and
insurgent loyalty. monitoring activities and
outside contacts; specialized
groups monitor member
loyalty.
Logistics Self-sustaining with populace Self-sustaining with populace Self-sustaining with supply,
support; support from regional support; can receive mission- services, and materiel
safe havens and diaspora; based support from regular purchased, stolen, or coerced
can receive regular military military forces and SPF; can from a local populace, or
and SPF materiel support; barter and/or commandeer provided by a regional or
can commandeer materiel materiel from local area; can transnational network; can be
from local area. capture supplies and materiel supported from regional safe
from enemy forces. havens.
Communications Local, regional, and/or global; Local and regional; tactical Local, regional, and/or global;
easy access to media; access communications norm; secure easy access to media; access
to Internet and INFOWAR and encryption capable; to Internet and INFOWAR
technologies; secure and access to Internet and technologies; secure and
encryption capable; common INFOWAR technologies; encryption capable; common
use of messenger or courier. common use of messenger or use of messenger or courier.
courier.
Finances Periodic reward in goods and Semiformal or formal pay Payment to designated
services; may include system in local script and/or members based on
contract-for-hire payment barter materiel; can be performance and profit;
systems; can be obligation conscription with no pay. payments may be cash,
with no pay. services, and or in-kind
barter; investments and
payments are often laundered
to mask origin.
Terrorism Use or restriction of terrorism Use or restriction of terrorism Use or restriction of terrorism
can be due to insurgent based on guerrilla can be due to senior or
proclamation; psychological commander directive; intermediate leader decision;
weapon; actions are psychological weapon; field operators may use
integrated as part of actions are integrated as part terrorism within the domain
INFOWAR campaign; of INFOWAR campaign; can they control; psychological
purpose ultimately supports a be deliberate or random for weapon; actions can be
political objective can be intended effects. focused or random for effects.
focused or random for effects.
1-18 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Chapter 2
Insurgents
This chapter presents an overview of insurgent organizations and actions as part of
the irregular OPFOR for U.S. Army training. The insurgent irregular OPFOR is
representative of threats in a resistence movement and/or insurgency that can exist in
various operational environments (OEs). Insurgents can be armed or unarmed. In
addition to functional tactics (see chapter 7), insurgents can use acts of terrorism (see
chapter 6) to intimidate or influence a governing authority or a relevant population.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
2-1. Insurgents are armed and/or unarmed individuals or groups who promote an agenda of subversion and
violence that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. They can transition between
subversion and violence dependent on specific conditions. Both types of action intend to disrupt a
governing authority. They gradually undermine the confidence of a relevant population in a governing
authoritys ability to provide and justly administer civil law, order, and stability. Insurgents can achieve
their aims without violence, but this is not the norm.
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTORS

2-2. During an insurgency, the distinctions among insurgents, guerrillas, criminals, and other actors in an
OE are often unclear. Insurgents may use deception to add to this confusion and sometimes deny
responsibility for direct actions or acts of terrorism. Insurgent organizations can act separately from other
groups, organizations, and/or activities in conflict with an enemy or in conjunction with them to achieve
common goals.
2-3. Insurgents may conduct operations in combination with regular military forces of a state in conflict
with the governing authority that insurgents oppose. Advisors, liaison teams, and military forces
especially from special-purpose forces (SPF)can provide overt and covert support for insurgent actions.
2-4. When present in the irregular OPFOR, guerrillas are normally incorporated into and subordinate to a
higher insurgent organization. However, guerrilla forces can also be aligned with local insurgent
organizations. In some cases, lower-level guerrilla units may be subordinate to a local insurgent
organization. Guerrilla forces can also exist as an independent capability, completely independent of higher
and local insurgent organizations. Evolving conditions may cause affiliations or task organizations that are
particular to that context. The relationships between insurgents and guerrillas operating in an area may be
temporary and remain in effect only as long as the both organizations mutually benefit. Guerrillas are
described in detail in chapter 3.
2-5. Insurgents may also act in conjunction with criminal elements. Criminals may exploit the instability
caused by insurgency to further their own profit. Insurgents may consort with criminals or resort to criminal
activities themselves, in order to finance and sustain their operations.
Note. The Hybrid Threat (HT) used in training of U.S. Army forces can include all these types of
actors and capabilities. The HT can be any combination of two or more of the following
components: regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements. Possible HT
combinations include insurgents and other parts of the irregular OPFOR operating openly with
regular military forces, being sponsored directly or indirectly by another states governmental
ministries and/or departments, or supported by non-state organizations. (See TC 7-100 for
detailed discussion of the HT.)
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-1

Chapter 2
2-6. Insurgent organizations can form temporary affiliations with other commercial, social, or political
entities. They can also solicit or coerce the active and/or passive support of civilians in and outside of the
area of conflict. Such supporters can include
Those merely sympathetic to the goals of the insurgents.
Those providing monetary support.
Those actively supporting and engaging in direct actions alongside the insurgents and/or
guerrillas.
Insurgents may have the overt and/or covert support of a government-in-exile when both organizations
view a governing authority as a common enemy.
SCOPE
2-7. Insurgent organizations normally conduct irregular conflict within or near the sovereign territory of a
state in order to overthrow or force change in that states governing authority. Some insurgent activities
such as influencing public opinion and acquiring resourcescan occur outside of the geographic area that
is the focus of the insurgency.
2-8. An insurgent organization may begin or remain at the local level. A local insurgent organization may
exist at small city, town, village, parish, community, or neighborhood level. It may expand and/or combine
with other local organizations. Cities with a large population or covering a large area may be considered
regions and may include several low-level insurgent organizations. A higher insurgent organization may
exist at regional, provincial, district, national, or transnational level. Higher insurgent organizations usually
contain a mix of local insurgent and guerrilla organizations. The higher insurgent organization can apply
both types of forces with a wider scope of impact. The OE and the specific goals determine the size and
composition of each insurgent organization and the scope of its activities. (See sections on Higher
Insurgent Organizations and Lower Insurgent Organizations, below, for more detail.)
LINES OF EFFORT
2-9. An insurgency is fundamentally a political movement. The expectation of a long-term conflict requires
plans for and use of physical and psychological force. Civic actions develop, expand, and marshal the
support of a relevant population for the insurgencys agenda. A comprehensive plan of action typically
incorporates three main lines of effort:
Political influence.
Direct action violence and terrorism.
Civic interaction and support.
Political Influence
2-10. The political element provides the overarching command and control (C2) of the insurgent
organization. The political leadership plans and directs the strategy and actions to divide or weaken the
governing authority they oppose. Information warfare (INFOWAR) activities foster dissatisfaction of the
relevant population with the governing authority and show the insurgency as an opportunity for change.
The insurgency degrades the confidence of the population in the governing authority. At the same time, the
political element is preparing and/or implementing its own administrative and governance capabilities that
provide solutions to the populations grievances.
Direct Action Violence and Terrorism

2-11. Insurgent cellular organization provides an adaptable function-based capability. Direct action cells
reside primarily in local insurgent organizations and usually conduct small-scale and focused violent acts at
the tactical level of conflict. (Direct action cells are described in detail later in this chapter.) Actions can
range from one-person tasks to multiple cells tailored temporarily for specific operations. Subversion and
selective or random violence are planned acts to incite frustration and overreaction by a governing
authority. The government reaction can anger the relevant population and further undermine its allegiance
or passive support to the governing authority. If an insurgency advances to the use of guerilla units, the
2-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Insurgents
guerrillas conduct operations against elements of the governing authority with functional tactics. (See
chapter 3 for detail on guerrillas and chapter 7 on functional tactics.) Terrorism can be applied throughout
these direct and supporting actions. (See chapter 6 on terrorism.)
2-12. Targets are often the activities and organizations that provide civil law and order such as
Police.
Civil administrators.
Internal security forces.
Regular military forces of the governing authority.
2-13. Insurgent actions can range from simple threats and hoaxes to use of sophisticated technology and
weapon systems. Insurgent organizations generally do not possess much of the heavier and more
sophisticated equipment the guerrilla organizations possess. If the insurgents require these weapons or
capabilities, they may either obtain them from guerrillas, or the guerrilla organization may provide its
services depending on the relationship between the two organizations at the time. Some insurgent
organizations profess the desire to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Civic Interaction and Support

2-14. Civic interaction by insurgents with a relevant population establishes and maintains influence over
the population. It allows the insurgency to successfully organize clandestine actions. Activities can
Incite open demonstrations against the governing authority.
Improve recruitment efforts for the insurgency within the population.
Demonize the governing authority as a threat to the population rather than protector.
2-15. If a relevant population believes that a governing authority is incapable of effective governance,
insurgents can usually obtain increasing active and passive support from the population. Insurgents degrade
the operational effectiveness of a governing authority in selected functions. They use a full range of
INFOWAR capabilities to exhaust the resolve of a governing authority and increase the populations will to
support the overthrow of such governance.
2-16. Insurgents conduct some civic initiatives in a manner that does not overtly link the services to it.
Other actions often assist in providing basic social services that mitigate suffering of the population and
provide support. The insurgents will want to take credit for these. Such support can be humanitarian
programs for
Food.
Potable water.
Basic medical services and preventive medicine.
Basic safe guarding of personal and commercial property.
Arbitrating civil and social disputes ignored by a governing authority.
2-17. The insurgent organization can sometimes obtain enough public support its representatives can be
legally elected to political positions within a governing authority. Ultimately, the insurgency must convince
an increasing number of uncommitted citizens and passive supporters within the relevant population to
accept its agenda for change or replacement of the current governing authority.
INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS
2-18. Insurgent organizations do not have a fixed structure. The mission, environment, geography, goal,
and many other factors determine the configuration and composition of each insurgent organization. Their
composition varies from
Organization to organization.
Mission to mission.
OE to OE.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-3

Chapter 2
The structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons mix all depend on specific mission requirements. The
size, specialty, number, and type of subordinates also depend on the size, number, and specialties required
for specific missions in an OE.
Note. Additional details of insurgent direct action and supporting cells are in FM 7-100.4. To find
these details, use Army Knowledge Online (AKO) access to the Hybrid Thr e a t Do c tr ine
fo ld er at h ttp s://www .us.army.mil/su ite/f iles/30837459. The n , g o t o the F M 7 -
100.4 Org Guide folder and click, in sequence, as follows: Administration Force Structure; Vol
III Paramil Nonmil Orgs; 01 Combatants; 01 Armed Combatants; 01 Insurgent Orgs; 01 Local
Insurgent Org. This FM will transition to a TC 7-100.4.
The insurgent organization diagrams of FM 7-100.4 and the personnel and equipment lists that
accompany them represent a composite of actual insurgent forces. They are a baseline that U.S.
Army trainers can modify to provide the appropriate conditions required for a particular training
exercise and/or training task. FM 7-100.4 provides detailed step-by-step instructions on how to
construct a task organization based on the training requirements. FM 7-100.4 also describes how
to select equipment options. See also TC 7-101 for guidance on creating the appropriate OPFOR
order of battle during exercise design.
CAPABILITIES
2-19. Insurgent organizations are flexible, agile, and adaptable. They can quickly change their composition
to optimize capabilities and use these capabilities against known or perceived vulnerabilities of an enemy.
These dynamic organizations are able to
Adjust continually to changing conditions.
Shift organizational structures and alliances.
Influence and blend within a relevant population.
Simultaneously conduct covert and overt actions.
Use subversion and violence in innovative ways.
Shift between functional tactics and terrorism.
Employ a wide spectrum of lethalityfrom improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to possible
WMD.
2-20. The irregular OPFOR can include insurgent organizations in two levels of capabilities:
Higher insurgent organization.
Local insurgent organization.
2-21. A higher insurgent organization includes at least one local insurgent organization and can include
guerrilla forces. The higher and local insurgent organizations include direct action cells and supporting
cells. The direct action cells are primarily within local insurgent organizations. The differences in
supporting cells of higher and local insurgent organizations relates to the scope of mission and
responsibilities usually associated with the size of geographic areas within which they operate. Some direct
action and supporting cells break down into teams.
2-22. A higher insurgent organization can have subordinate guerilla units. In some cases lower-level
guerrilla organizations may be subordinate to or affiliated with a local insurgent organization. In either
case, guerilla units operate in conjunction with the activities of direct action cells and/or supporting cells.
NETWORKS
2-23. The interactions between and/or among organizations, units, cells, and teams vary in complexity.
They can be hierarchical but most often take the form of a network. Communication and coordination in a
network can be linear and visualized as links in a chain, with each node connected to the next node in
sequence. Another option is a hub, in which one node (a director or decisionmaker) is central to a number
of other nodes that are not directly in contact with each other. A wheel is a variation on the hub in which
each of the nodes is in contact with neighboring nodes, with the central node providing common source of
2-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Insurgents
information and/or guidance. An all-channel array provides contact among all nodes of a particular
network. The network of an insurgent organization can include a combination of all these types (as shown
in figure 2-1). (See figure 2-5 on page 2-14 for another example of such combinations.)
Networked
Organization
Chain
All-Channel
Hub Wheel
Figure 2-1. Network types

2-24. A network C2 structure adapts configurations to best use the capabilities of available organizations,
units, cells, and teams. Adaptability and innovation are hallmarks of the insurgent organization.
LEADERSHIP, ACTION, AND SUPPORT

2-25. Insurgents are flexible in how to organize C2. However, figure 2-2 shows six categories of
leadership, action, and support that normally exist in an organizational structure in either a hierarchy or
network:
Senior leaders.
Subordinate leaders.
Cadres.
Active supporters.
Passive supporters.
2-26. The pyramid illustration in figure 2-2 indicates a relative number of people in each category.
Underlying this pyramid is the relevant population that is critical to how these levels function for C2 and/or
influence. Insurgents can use the population in various ways, such as a mass human shield or to assist in
insurgent organization security.
2-27. The insurgents can also solicit and/or coerce support from the population. Another consideration is
the amount of support that is or is not provided by state and non-state sponsors for the insurgency.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-5

Chapter 2
Senior Leaders
Subordinate Leaders
Cadres
Active Supporters
Passive Supporters
Population
Figure 2-2. Typical levels of leadership, action, and support
Senior Leaders
2-28. Senior leaders are the recognized authority of the insurgency. They conceive and state a
philosophical or practical justification for actions by subordinate operational leaders and followers. These
senior leaders
Announce strategic direction and policy.
Approve goals and objectives.
Provide overarching guidance for operations and protracted conflict.
2-29. The leadership of an insurgent organization may be one individual or a group of leaders, who may or
may not consult formally with advisors. Leadership may informally use advisors or a council comprised of
tribal, religious, political, secular, radical sectarian, other associations, and/or any combination thereof. A
formal council of advisors is more common in a higher insurgent organization (see discussion of advisors
under that heading, below). The insurgent leader may also be a tribal, cultural, political, or religious leader.
The leader of a guerrilla unit may join the leader of a political element in an insurgency and form a
collective leadership for the insurgent organization.
2-30. Although leadership may be shared or apportioned among several individuals, one senior leader is
often identified as the recognized authority and primary spokesperson for the objectives of the insurgent
organization. The leader focuses on the strategic perspective and understands how to communicate the
ideology and/or objectives that motivate the insurgents. A leader may have risen from the tactical ranks of
the organization with calculated actions and political savvy, and/or may have achieved notoriety and/or
demonstrated his influence through acts of terror. The leader usually is knowledgeable of world politics and
complex socio-political environments. Individual leadership skills are often supplemented by personal
charisma.
2-31. Insurgent leaders can be located within or outside of the insurgent organizations geographic area.
These leaders provide strategic guidance that is implemented by subordinate leaders conducting operations
within the geographic area. Leaders use the media to convince or coerce targeted segments of a population
to act in a particular way. These leaders may solicit clandestine financing and other support for operations
to attack high-priority targets.
2-32. A situation may arise where the senior insurgent leadership is coordinating closely with a
government-in-exile in order to reestablish authority over a state that has had its legitimate government
ousted. Insurgent leaders can use multiple means to support a government-in-exile such as gradually
providing civil and social services the existing governing authority is not providing to a relevant
population. Another means is to gradually use political processes to obtain legitimate representation in
local, regional, and national political parties and institutions. Leaders use these informal and formal
processes to gain and sustain support of designated segments of a population and continually expand the
positive influence of the insurgent organizations agenda.
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Insurgents
Subordinate Leaders
2-33. Subordinate leaders of the insurgent organization command or control organizational activities
within geographic areas or functions. These leaders provide direction and guidance, approve goals and
objectives, and provide overarching coordination in support of senior leader guidance. They may be leaders
of cells and/or teams of specialized expertise or leaders of local insurgent organizations comprising several
cells. The subordinate leaders may have responsibilities as special advisors to the senior leadership, media
spokespersons, political leaders, or functional experts. If decentralized in structure, these leaders plan and
act within general senior leader mission guidance. Other leaders, if structured in a more hierarchical
military-type organization, plan and act within specified planning directives or guidance from senior
leaders.
2-34. For security and a division of labor, subordinate leaders may sometimes use intermediate leaders to
communicate directives and guidance to subordinate cells and supporting activities. Clandestine
communications can use sophisticated techniques such as electronic steganography to hide information
within a message or email, or simple techniques such as human couriers and intermediaries to relay oral
information and/or directives.
2-35. Leaders can have varied effects on an organizations effectiveness if they are eliminated. The
insurgent organization develops redundancy among leaders and subordinate leaders in order to minimize
significant disruption when a leader is killed or captured.
Cadres
2-36. In a general sense, a cadre is a nucleus of trained personnel capable of assuming control and of
training others. In an insurgent organization, cadres include both the political or ideological cadre of an
insurgency and the cadre of operators who direct and conduct direct action and supporting functions.
2-37. One type of cadre is the political or ideological core of an insurgent organization. Movements based
on religious extremism include religious and spiritual advisors among the cadre. Political advisors may
have a special role in some organizations. The cadre can be openly active or mask their activities within a
relevant population. Some cadre activities are violent enforcement of political and ideological discipline,
subversion of opponents, and/or manipulation of social power to support an insurgent program. Cadre may
perform key shadow-government or government-in-exile functions that are physically distant from a
relevant population.
2-38. Another type of cadre is the nucleus of experts in direct action or supporting cells of the insurgent
organization that carry out specific functions and/or instruct other insurgents in functional capabilities.
Some mid-level cadres are trainers and technicians such as bomb makers, financiers, and surveillance
experts. Low-level cadres can be direct action operators but usually supervise and coordinate other
insurgents rather than actually conducting direct action tasks. These actors can have functional, specialized,
multifunctional, and/or supporting purposes based on knowledge and skill sets.
2-39. Examples of activities conducted, coordinated, and led by cadre can include but are not limited to
Intelligence and counterintelligence networks.
Political affiliations and alliances.
Recruiting programs.
Training programs.
Ideology education programs.
Weapon system and communications acquisition and maintenance.
Logistics sustainment.
Finances and fiscal resourcing programs.
Social and medical welfare support.
INFOWAR capabilities against the opposition government and adversaries in the relevant
population and international community.
Operational missions.
Acts of selective and/or random terrorism.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-7

Chapter 2
2-40. Some cadres use coercion and leverage to gain limited, periodic, or one-time cooperation from
individuals in the relevant population. This forced cooperation can range from gaining specific information
on a proposed target to supporting or conducting a suicide bombing attack.
Active Supporters
2-41. Active supporters are fully aware of their relationship to the insurgent organization but do not
normally commit violent acts. They can continue normal positions in society while providing functional
expertise or general support to the insurgents. Depending on the type of organization, they may operate in
functional capacities, such as politics, fund-raising, and/or INFOWAR activities of the insurgency. Acting
as visible or tacit partners, active supporters may also
Conduct or augment intelligence, surveillance, and counterintelligence activities.
Provide and administer safe houses and safe havens.
Promote dissatisfaction with the status quo in recurring media affairs information releases.
Support recruiting efforts for new members and affiliates.
Solicit and collect financial or other types of donation support.
Provide civilian transportation.
Conduct courier and communications services.
Produce forged documents.
Acquire commodities to assist insurgent direct action and supporting cells.
Store caches of supplies, weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other materiel.
Assist in the manufacture of weapons and IEDs.
Assist in subversive activities.
Assist in sabotage, assassination, or other direct and violent actions.
Provide medical treatment and related support.
2-42. Supporters can improve insurgent initiatives to obtain the representation of legitimately elected
political officials. Other supporters may assist the actions of a direct action cell or a guerrilla hunter-killer
(HK) team. Active supporters may or may not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement in an
insurgent agenda. They can conduct covert and overt operations. They can infiltrate organizations of the
governing authority and conduct subversive activities against civil, social, and/or military programs.
2-43. Insurgent leaders often broker associations for active support with civil, political, or other
paramilitary organizations for selected purposes. Such associations may arise from specific mutual interests
when cooperative efforts might not normally be expected. Public statements and/or secretive agreements
that promote mutual support for a specific agenda of an insurgent organization can include the following
themes:
Historical and recent perspectives to remedy grievances.
Familial, tribal, or clan allegiance.
Business and social productivity.
Faith system dogma.
Personal beliefs, motivations, and ideology.
Civil and political opposition to programs of a governing authority in a state or region.
Interference of an extraregional state in the domestic affairs of a state or region.
Potential future roles in society.
Passive Supporters
2-44. Passive supporters are typically individuals or groups that are sympathetic to the announced goals
and intentions of an overarching insurgent agenda. However, they are not committed enough to take an
active role in insurgent direct actions or acts of terrorism. Sometimes fear of reprisal by opponents of the
insurgency leads to passive yet sympathetic support.
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Insurgents
2-45. Passive supporters may not be aware of their tacit relationship to the insurgent organization. They
may intermingle with active supporters and be unaware of their actual relationship to the organization.
Individuals may develop suspicions of activities that might be supporting insurgent actions, but decide to
ignore indications and continue their daily lifestyle actions.
2-46. The insurgent organization recognizes that a sympathetic base of passive support in a population is
an ever-changing factor with multiple social, economic, religious, or political motives. The insurgency
depends on a sympathetic segment of the population remaining passive. Nonetheless, passive supporters
can be useful for political activities, fund raising, and/or unwitting assistance in intelligence gathering and
other nonviolent activities. A primary value of passive support is minimal interference by the citizenry in
ongoing overt actions of the insurgent organization.
2-47. Passive support can undermine civil and social programs, and political and/or theological institutions,
of the governing authority. Many functions of such programs and institutions must rely on voluntary
cooperation by large segments of the population.
HIGHER INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS

2-48. The term higher insurgent organization includes any insurgent organization at regional, provincial,
district, or national level, or at the transnational level. Cities with a large population or covering a large
geographic area are considered regions. Higher insurgent organizations may control several local insurgent
and/or guerrilla organizations. They can have transnational affiliations or other overt and/or covert support.
2-49. The main capabilities of a higher insurgent organization that are not usually present in a local
insurgent organization are as follows:
Subordinate local insurgent organizations in their network. (Local insurgent organizations
usually do not have echeloned subordinate local insurgent organizations.)
Guerrilla units within their network and operating in the same geographic area. (Local insurgent
organizations may have temporary affiliations with guerrilla units or may occasionally command
and control them.)
Personal protection and security cell(s) for the organizations senior leaders and designated
advisors or special members. (A local insurgent organization does not normally have a personal
protection and security cell.)
Associations and/or affiliations with criminal organizations directly and without coordination
with subordinate local insurgent organizations. (The long-term vision in a higher insurgent
organization may include cooperation with regional or transnational criminal organizations for
specific capabilities or materiel available through criminal networks.)
2-50. Higher insurgent organizations have no standard organizational structure. They are not necessarily
subordinate to a regional, national, or transnational insurgent organization. However, higher and local
insurgent organizations can be subordinate to and/or loosely affiliated with regional and national insurgent
organizations. Any relationship of independent insurgent organizations to regional or national structures
may be one of affiliation or dependent upon only a single shared or similar goal.
2-51. Local insurgent organizations, guerrilla units, and other organizations (such as criminal gangs and
networks) often operate in the same geographic area as a higher insurgent organization and can be
subordinate, loosely affiliated, or independent of a higher insurgent organization. Any relationship of
organizations and units to one another may be allegiance, affiliation, or temporary association based on
shared aims and/or mutual support.
2-52. A higher insurgent organization is normally cellular and comprises a network of functional
capabilities. Figure 2-3 shows the types of organizations and cells that can comprise a higher insurgent
organization.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-9

Chapter 2
HIGHER
INSURGENT
ORGANIZATION
(Regional, National,
or Transnational)
LOCAL GUERRILLA
INSURGENT BDE/BN/CO/ ADVISORS PLANNING
ORGANIZATION PLT/HK Teams CELL
CI & INTERNAL PERSONAL INFORMATION

SECURITY PROTECTION WARFARE INTELLIGENCE
CELL & SEC CELL CELL CELL
LOGISTICS COMMS & TECHNICAL

TRADECRAFT SUPPORT FINANCE
CELL CELL CELL CELL
RECRUITING CIVIL
TRAINING TRANSPORT AFFAIRS
CELL CELL CELL CELL
SHELTER MEDICAL
CELL CELL
Note. While this organization chart appears in a hierarchical format, that is only for convenience.
In actuality, a network structure is most likely in an insurgent organization. Also, the numbers of
each type of subordinate organization or cell can vary, and some may not be present at all in a
particular organization.
Figure 2-3. Higher insurgent organization

2-53. Some insurgent organizations may not have separate cells for all of the required functions. However,
someone in the organization must be designated to perform all basic and critical functions. For example,
the intelligence cell may also incorporate the counterintelligence and security functions, or the logistics cell
may also perform the functions of the shelter and/or transportation cells.
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Insurgents
2-54. Subordinates and supporting cells of a higher insurgent organization may or may not be colocated
with each other or with the leadership of the higher insurgent organization. They may be located in separate
villages, towns, cities, regions, or countries, as long as they can adequately and securely provide the
required support in a timely fashion. The numbers and types of each, and their locations, may change
frequently.
2-55. A higher insurgent organization can have all the same types of supporting cells found in a local
insurgent organization. (These types are described under Local Insurgent Organization.) Compared to their
local counterparts, these cells may be larger and have expanded capabilities. However, the higher
organization may also have advisors and one or more personal protection and security cells.
Advisors
2-56. The senior leader (or leaders) may or may not have a council of advisors. He can receive advice from
others inside and outside the organization. However, he may rely heavily on his council of advisors to
provide counsel, guidance, and/or expertise on a wide variety of areas. If present, advisors can include
Political (international relations; shadow government).
Military (advice and liaison with affiliated nations or guerrillas; acquisition of military weapons
and equipment, advisors, or fighters).
Religious (religious leaders or liaison with them).
Cultural (ethnic, tribal, minority populations).
Financial (international and money-raising).
Mass media (perception management).
2-57. The number and types of advisors is situation dependent. Some insurgent leaders may have an
advisor for every issue requiring specialized expertise, while other leaders may have advisors that can
provide counsel on several functions. An example of a multifunctional advisor would be one that could
provide counsel on political, religious, and tribal issues. Some functions may require specialized expertise.
For example, in order to manipulate the media to achieve a specific goal in perception management, the
leader of the INFOWAR cell may require expertise and/or advice from several advisors such as a cleric, a
politician, and a tribal and/or ethic leader.
2-58. The number of permanent advisors can be many but is often limited to a few individuals. One of
these advisors generally rises to the position of primary advisor to the leader. In some insurgent
organizations, in addition to providing counsel, the primary advisor also serves in a position comparable to
that of a second-in-command, a deputy, or a chief of staff. The position of primary advisor is an extremely
prestigious, influential, and powerful position in the insurgency. The primary advisor is usually the
religious, political, or the military advisor. The choice of primary advisor typically reflects the insurgencys
goals and agenda.
2-59. Advisors may consult with the leader on policies, tactics, and weapons to be used. They may use
simple or information-age technology to exchange experience, practical observations, and lessons learned.
Such advisors may coordinate activities among various supporting cells while also coordinating selective
activities of direct action cells.
2-60. Even if not part of a formal council of advisors, leaders of supporting cells directly assist a senior
leader in planning and supervising the actions of the insurgent organization. For instance, the leaders of the
INFOWAR, logistics, and finance cells may advise the leader on matters pertaining to their functional
specialties.
2-61. Advisors may or may not be armed. In most cases, advisors will possess firearms but may not choose
to carry them on all occasions. There are typically security specialists (personal bodyguards) and drivers
assigned to the advisors. The advisors association with the insurgency may be covert, with very few
people aware of their connection. Most insurgent organizations have a mixture of overt and covert
counselors.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-11

Chapter 2
Personal Protection and Security Cells

2-62. A personal protection and security cell is responsible for the personal security and welfare of the
senior leader(s) and other important persons. The cells armed security specialists provide around-the-clock
protection for these personnel and vehicles for transporting them. The vehicle may or may not be armored.
Even if armored, it is built to appear just like any other vehicle commonly used in the environment. Some
weapons and/or equipment may be left in the vehicle until required or not carried on the mission at all. All
cell members are cross-trained in the use of all weapons, equipment, and vehicles assigned to the cell.
2-63. This cell works closely with both the counterintelligence and security cell(s) and the intelligence
cell(s). When needed, it receives augmentation of trained personnel from direct action teams.
LOCAL INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS

2-64. The term local insurgent organization applies to any insurgent organization below regional,
provincial, or district level. This includes small cities, towns, villages, parishes, communities,
neighborhoods, and/or rural environments. (Large cities are equivalent to regions and may contain several
local insurgent organizations.) Activities remain focused on a local relevant population.
2-65. Differences between a local insurgent organization and a higher insurgent organization are as follows:
Direct actions cells are present within a local insurgent organization. Their multifunctional
and/or specific functional capabilities may be enhanced or limited based on availability of
resources and technical expertise in or transiting the local OE. These direct actions are planned for
immediate and/or near-term effects related to the local insurgent organizations area of influence.
Guerrilla units might not be subordinate to the local insurgent organization. However,
temporary affiliations between local insurgents and guerrillas are possible for specified missions
coordinated by a higher insurgent organization. Direct action personnel may use, fight alongside
of, or assist affiliated forces, and guerrillas to achieve their common goals or for any other
agenda. Guerrilla units may operate in a local insurgent organizations area of influence and
have no connection to the local insurgent organization or a higher insurgent organization.
2-66. Criminals can affiliate with a local insurgent organization or a higher insurgent organization as a
matter of convenience and remain cooperative only as long as criminal organization aims are being
achieved. The local insurgent organization retains a long-term vision of its political agenda, whereas
cooperation by a criminal organization is usually related to localized commercial profit and/or
organizational influence in a local environment. This usually equates to criminals controlling or facilitating
materiel and commodity exchanges. The criminal is not motivated by a political agenda.
2-67. The local insurgent organization uses functional tactics (see chapter 7) and terrorism (see chapter 6)
as the primary means to achieve its goals. Terrorism instills fear and anxiety that coerces and degrades the
resolve of an enemy governing authority and selected people in a relevant population.
Relation to Other Insurgent Organizations

2-68. The local insurgent organization is the basic level of insurgent organization. Local insurgent
organizations are not always subordinate to a regional, national, or transnational insurgent organization.
They may be completely autonomous and independent of a larger insurgent movement and not be
associated with it in any way. In other cases, they can be either subordinate to or loosely affiliated with
such a larger organization. They may operate under the guidance of a larger insurgent organization even is
no command relationship exists. In some cases a local insurgent organization may provide only financial
support and general guidance to its direct action and supporting cells (see figure 2-4).
2-69. Cells of a local insurgent organization may be forced to provide for themselves in several areas. A
typical example of this is a smaller direct action cell separated from the parent insurgent organization by
distance, population, or ability to communicate securely. They may not have access to the expertise or
products such as IEDs provided by the technical support cell and must improvise IEDs by themselves.
2-70. Any relationship to a higher organization or among independent local insurgent organizations may be
dependent upon only a single shared or similar goal. These relationships are generally fluctuating and may
2-12 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Insurgents
be fleeting, mission dependent, event- or agenda-oriented, mutually coordinated, and/or coerced for a
specific temporary purpose. There may be loose coordination of certain actions, after which the
organizations revert back to their independent modes.
LOCAL
INSURGENT
ORGANIZATION
DA CELL DA CELL DA CELL DA CELL

(Multi- (Assassin/ (Kidnapping (Information
Function) Sniper) & Extortion) Warfare)
DA CELL CI & INTERNAL

INTELLIGENCE SECURITY PLANNING
(Mortar
& Rocket) CELL CELL CELL
INFORMATION TECHNICAL COMMS &

WARFARE SUPPORT LOGISTICS
TRADECRAFT
CELL CELL CELL CELL
SHELTER
FINANCE CELL TRAINING RECRUITING
CELL (Safe Houses) CELL CELL
CIVIL
TRANSPORT AFFAIRS MEDICAL
CELL CELL CELL
Note. While this organization chart appears in a hierarchical format, that is only for convenience.
In actuality, a network structure is most likely in an insurgent organization. Also, the numbers of
each type of subordinate cell can vary, and some may not be present at all in a particular
organization.
Figure 2-4. Local insurgent organization
Dispersion
2-71. Direct action cells and supporting cells disperse as a norm. They are not normally colocated with
each other or with the leader(s) of the local insurgent organization. Although in some cases direct action cells
may come together to provide mutual support, they usually carry out their mission independent of other cells.
Dispersion enhances the security and survivability of the local insurgent organization and its individual cells. It
also distributes the influence of the insurgency to a wider area and a larger segment of the population.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-13

Chapter 2
Leadership
2-72. Leadership in a local insurgent organization may reside in one individual or more than one
individual. Advisors or a small council may exist but are not always present in a local insurgent
organization to assist the leader or leaders. (See Advisors under Higher Insurgent Organization, above.)In
some cases, command directives can be very specific and focused. In other cases, the leadership may
purposely issue only general guidance to allow initiative at the cellular level for specific actions.
Insurgent Network Example

The C2 structure of a local insurgent organization can be a network, hierarchy, and/or
a combination of networked and hierarchical systems. However, a network is the
most likely structure. An example of a network in figure 2-5 includes
A higher insurgent organization.
A local insurgent organization (subordinate to the higher insurgent organization).
Direct action cells (some broken down into teams).
Supporting cells (some broken down into teams).
Guerrilla units (subordinate to the higher insurgent organization and affiliated with
the local insurgent organization).
A criminal organization (affiliated with the local insurgent organization).
Higher Insurgent Organization Local

Insurgent Criminal
Organization
Organization (Affiliated)
Guerrilla
Platoons Planning
Guerrilla
Company Cell
Mortar
Finance DA Cell
CI and Internal Team
Cell (Mortar
Security Cell
and
Guerrilla Rocket)
Intelligence
Battalion Training Rocket
Guerrilla Cell
(Affiliated) Cell Team
HK Company
Comms and
Tradecraft DA Cell
Guerrilla Cell (Kidnapping
HK Groups Recruiting and Extortion)
Cell
INFOWAR
Civil Affairs Cell
Cell
Guerrilla DA Cell
HK Logistics
(Assassin Cell
Sections and Sniper)
Assassin Shelter
and Sniper Cell
Guerrilla Team
HK Teams Assassin and Sniper Transportation
Team Cell
DA Cell
Suicide IED Team
(INFOWAR)
(Individual
Medical
and Vehicle)
DA Cell Cell
Technical (Multifunction)
Support WMD Demolition,
Cell Support Sabotage
Team and IED Teams
In this example, the local insurgent organization appears to be self-sufficient, relying

on its own supporting cells for support. In some cases, supporting cells of the local
insurgent organization would also have links to their counterpart cells in the higher
insurgent organization. In other cases, the local insurgent organization may lack
some supporting cells if it relies on the higher organization for this support.
Figure 2-5. Local and higher insurgent organizations network (example)
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Insurgents
Cellular Structure
2-73. As with a higher insurgent organization, local insurgent organizations have a cellular structure.
However, there are several differences in functions and scope of operations. Figure 2-4 and 2-5 show the
types of cells that may be present in a local insurgent organization. Local insurgent organizations are
typically composed of anywhere from 3 to more than 30 direct action and supporting cells. However, a
smaller insurgent organization may consist of as few as one direct action cell (see figure 2-6).
2-74. Cellular structure in the local insurgent organization comprises two basic types of capability. These
cells are
Direct action cells.
Supporting cells.
Direct Action Cell INFO

WAR
I Direct Action Cell
I Multifunction Information Warfare
Direct Action Cell

Assassination/Sniper
I
A Assassination
S Sniper
I Team I Team
Direct Action Cell

Kidnapping and Extortion
I
K
Kidnapping Extortion
I Team S I Team
Direct Action Cell

Mortar and Rocket
I
Mortar Team Rocket Team

I (60-mm) I (107-mm)
Note. If the I (for insurgent) does not fit in the diamond-shaped unit symbol, it is placed to the right of the
diamond. For multifunctional cells or teams and those with a specific function for which standard military
symbology has no functional symbol, it is necessary to either include an abbreviation for that function
inside the diamond or to identify the nature of the cell or team with a note outside the diamond. The
kidnapping and extortion cell can use different symbols for the currency of a particular state or region,
rather than the U.S. dollar sign. Subordinate teams of the mortar and rocket cell can be identified with a
specific mortar team or rocket team symbol when performing those functions separately. Using the symbol
for the mortar and rocket cell indicates that the cell is operating with both mortar and rocket capabilities.
Figure 2-6. Insurgent direct action cell and team graphic symbols
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-15

Chapter 2
Direct Action Cells

2-75. Direct action cells are the backbone of the insurgency movement. They contain the actual fighters of
the insurgency. Some direct action cells have a multifunction purpose, while others are organized to
perform a specialty function. Specialties can include, but are not limited to, assassination, sniper,
kidnapping, extortion, INFOWAR, or mortar and/or rocket attacks. Every direct action cell is capable of
performing all the missions listed above, to some degree. All cells are capable of sabotage and IED
emplacement and detonation.
2-76. Typical types of direct action cells that may be present in a local insurgent organization are
Multifunction.
INFOWAR.
Assassination and sniper.
Kidnapping and extortion.
Mortar and rocket.
2-77. The types of direct action cells and numbers of each can vary greatly from one local insurgent
organization to another. Some may have
All multipurpose cells.
All specialized cells, each with a different focus.
All specialized cells with a single focus.
Any mixture of the above.
Most insurgent organizations have a mix of separate specialty cells and multifunction cells. All these cells
are designed to operate independently (if necessary) once they have started their mission.
2-78. Direct action cells do not have a fixed structure. The structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons
mix all depend on specific mission requirements. The size, specialty, and number of cells employed also
depend on the size, number, and specialties required for specific missions. A cell typically contains from 6
to 10 personnel. However, a cell can be as small as 2 people or consist of over 20 people. Direct action
cells easily lend themselves to be broken down into subordinate teams whenever necessary.
2-79. All direct action cells record key events and successful results on digital video and/or still cameras.
In some cases, the key event may be staged for the camera. Upon mission completion, the direct action
cells turn the information over to the INFOWAR cell for manipulation and exploitation. The videographers
or camera operators try to blend in with crowds and disassociate themselves from the operation.
Sympathizers in the local population may also serve in this role.
2-80. Direct action personnel may be a mixture of men, women, and children. Local women and children
may be used as runners, messengers, scouts, guides, drivers, porters, snipers, lookouts, videographers,
camera operators, or in other roles. They may also emplace and/or detonate IEDs, signal flares, and mines.
Women (and possibly children) may be fighters and participate in assassinations, ambushes, or assaults.
They may also serve (willingly or unwillingly) as suicide bombers.
Multifunction Cell
2-81. The direct action cell (multifunction) is the basic direct action cell structure. It can employ functional
tactics or terrorism, as necessary. It possesses all the capabilities of specialized cells (such as assassination
and sniper; kidnapping and extortion; INFOWAR; and mortar and rocket) but normally to a lesser degree.
When not engaged in specialized activities the, specialized cells can serve as multifunction direct action
cells.
2-82. Bombs (especially IEDs) are the weapon of choice for multipurpose direct action cells. They can be
used in support of assassination, maiming, sabotage, and producing mass casualties. The cells usually
acquire IEDs from the technical support cell as unassembled, pre-manufactured components. The
multifunction cell assembles them and adds fuzes and detonators. Within the multifunction cell, an IED
team usually includes at least three people: a lookout, the IED emplacer, and a triggerman. In some cases, a
small multifunction cell of three or four personnel may act as an IED cell. The team or cell emplaces the
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Insurgents
IEDs, and the triggerman detonates them at the appropriate time. If additional assistance or IED expertise is
required, they receive it from the technical support cell.
2-83. Insurgents often use IEDs as secondary devices, to detonate on the arrival of personnel responding to
another attack or IED. IEDs can be detonated by a variety of means, including remote, command, electrical,
trip wire, pressure, time, and others.
Assassination and Sniper Cell

2-84. The primary mission of the direct action cell (assassination and sniper) is to terrorize a relevant
population and/or to assassinate preselected persons. (See chapter 6 on Terrorism.) In either the
assassination or the sniper task, the cell creates a psychological impact to intimidate and demoralize the
population. The cell may indiscriminately select individual targets in crowded marketplaces or religious
and political gatherings with the sole intent to terrorize.
2-85. An assassination is a deliberate action to kill political leaders or very important people rather than
killing common people, which is considered murder. The insurgent assassinates or murders people it cannot
intimidate, who have left the group, or who have some symbolic significance for the enemy or world
community. Insurgent organizations may refer to these killings as punishment.
2-86. Many targets of assassination are symbolic and often have a great psychological impact on the
enemy. For example, assassinating an enemy negotiator or successful businessperson can demonstrate the
enemys inability to protect its own people.
2-87. The assassination and sniper cell consists of two teams. The cell leader serves as a team leader of
one team, and another insurgent serves as the assistant cell leader and team leader of the other team. The
structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons mix all depend on specific mission requirements. Weapons
appropriate to each mission are selected. The other equipment is left behind or cached.
2-88. The cell could select its own targets based on opportunity, as long as hitting such targets supports (or
does not conflict with) the overall goals of the insurgent organization. Assassination methods include
remotely-detonated bombing, the use of firearms, and poisoning. The targets vulnerabilities determine the
method of assassination. The insurgent leadership and/or the planning cell can exercise centralized control
as necessary in order to orchestrate concerted action or to achieve a specific goal in its area of influence.
2-89. When not engaged in specialized activities, the assassination and sniper cell serves as a
multifunction direct action cell. Depending on mission requirements, the assassination and sniper
cell may also serve as a reconnaissance element, a stay-behind element, or provide security for
other direct action cells.
Kidnapping and Extortion Cell

2-90. The primary mission of the direct action cell (kidnapping and extortion) is to conduct kidnapping,
extortion, hijacking, and hostage-taking. These acts help to finance the insurgent organization and serve to
influence and/or terrorize the population. (See chapter 6 on Terrorism.) Each action, particularly a
kidnapping, requires detailed planning and support by a number of other cells.
2-91. The kidnapping and extortion cell may be authorized to identify victims as targets of opportunity as
long as hitting such targets supports (or does not conflict with) the overall goals of the insurgent
organization. However, the insurgent leadership can exercise centralized control as necessary, in order to
orchestrate concerted action, and might identify certain targets or types of targets in order to achieve a
specific goal in its area of influence. For a mission directed by the leadership, this cell may receive
augmentation of insurgents from other cells.
2-92. The kidnapping and extortion cell leader coordinates with the intelligence cell for reconnaissance and
surveillance of targets. The intelligence cell provides information on the targets vulnerabilities,
weaknesses, and routine behavior. Every member of the insurgent organization as well as sympathizers can
help gather this target information. The intelligence cell must thoroughly analyze the target so that it can
advise the insurgent leadership, the planning cell, and/or the kidnapping and extortion cell on selection of
the target site and method of kidnapping. Human intelligence is vital when planning and conducting a
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-17

Chapter 2
kidnapping. The intelligence cell continuously conducts surveillance on the target to identify potential
security flaws and identifies vulnerabilities that the direct action cell can exploit.
2-93. The intelligence cell and/or the kidnapping and extortion cell conducts detailed
reconnaissance/surveillance of potential kidnap sites to determine the best site, considering cover,
concealment, and escape routes. Once the target and site are selected, the kidnapping and extortion cell
(and/or the planning cell and intelligence cell) conducts detailed analysis to provide the kidnapping and
extortion cell with the requisite data on the target. The information required depends on the location of the
target and site, but typically includes
The exact route the target uses.
The method of conveyance and its specific characteristics.
The number of security personnel, their location, disposition, and types of weapons used.
The targets likes, dislikes, allergies, habits, and routines.
2-94. After planning and reconnaissance, the kidnapping and extortion cell conducts the actual action. For
a kidnapping, the cell leader designates a specific team to conduct the kidnapping. After receiving
intelligence, the team rehearses specific kidnapping techniques, such as an ambush or abduction, and
finalizes planning. The team plans the escape route in great detail because of the complexities of
transporting the victim. It usually disables the victim to make the escape easier. The team determines the
best method of disabling the victim (such as drugging, stunning, or binding him).
2-95. The kidnapping and extortion cell coordinates with the shelter cell for a safe house when kidnapping
and/or hostage-taking is the mission. The INFOWAR cell helps create and maintain the fear caused by
kidnapping and extortion through its propaganda and media manipulation means.
Information Warfare Cell

2-96. The direct action cell (INFOWAR) supports the insurgent organizations INFOWAR plan. It may or
may not receive guidance and assistance from the local insurgent organization. INFOWAR cell or its
counterpart in a higher insurgent organization. (See appendix A for more detail on INFOWAR.)
2-97. There may be as few as one direct action cell (INFOWAR) to over 20 such cells depending on the
mission, the targets within a relevant population and governing authority, and topics to be exploited. The
cells can be broken down into teams when necessary. The structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons
mix, all depend on specific mission requirements. Personnel select weapons appropriate to the mission.
Other weapons and equipment are added as required, such as computers, computer-rigged vehicles,
specialized antennas, and communications.
2-98. Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, the cell may be capable of
several functions. Examples of functions performed by the INFOWAR cell are
Selective sabotage actions.
Information management (internal methods, links, and security).
Media manipulation (misinformation and disinformation).
Communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda and indoctrination videos;
broadcast successes of the direct action teams).
Civic actions popular to a relevant population.
Cyber-mining for information and intelligence.
Some of the functions may require specialized expertise. For example, the media manipulation function
may require expertise and/or advice from a cleric; a political, tribal, ethic, or cultural leader; or other
subject matter experts. Some functions can also be performed by personnel outside of the INFOWAR cell.
Several members of the cell may be hired INFOWAR specialists or gun fighters.
Mortar and Rocket Cell

2-99. The primary purpose of the direct action cell (mortar and rocket) is to either terrorize or influence
the local populace and governing authorities. It may indiscriminately fire into crowded marketplaces
and religious gatherings with the intent to terrorize and influence a relevant population. Targets may
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Insurgents
include religious or national icons and/or landmarks. These attacks are often used to support the
overall INFOWAR plan. They may also be used in a manner to shift blame for the attack to the
enemy. The cell can provide indirect fires in support of insurgent missions. When insurgents need
additional mortar and rocket fires, they may look to affiliated guerrillas for support.
2-100. The rocket and mortar cell typically consists of a mortar team and a rocket team. Each team may
have approximately six personnel. The mortar team of the cell may have light and/or medium mortars.
When it uses medium mortars, it may require additional ammunition bearers and possibly a light truck for
transporting the weapon. The rocket team normally fires medium rockets, sometimes from improvised
rocket launchers. The mortar team and rocket team can conduct missions as a cell or conduct mortar and
rocket missions as separate teams. The normal plan is for the team(s) to execute a fire mission and quickly
disperse from the firing point.
2-101. When not engaged in specialized activities, the mortar and rocket direct action cell can serve
as a multifunction direct action cell. The mortars, rockets, and associated equipment may be
cached or left behind, in which case the cell members carry weapons and munitions similar to the
multifunction cell.
Supporting Cells
2-102. Supporting cells support and assist operations of the direct action cells or the insurgent
organization as a whole. At the local level, the supporting cells either support the roles of the direct action
cells or exploit their successes. The same types of supporting cells may be present in a higher insurgent
organization. Figure 2-7 shows the graphic symbols of supporting cells.
2-103. Supporting cells that may be present in the insurgent organization are
Intelligence.
Counterintelligence and internal security.
Planning.
INFOWAR.
Technical support.
Logistics.
Communications and tradecraft.
Finance.
Shelter.
Training.
Recruiting.
Transportation.
Civil affairs.
Medical.
2-104. The local insurgent organization normally possesses the supporting capabilities listed here.
However, some of these functions may be combined, rather than having separate cells. Also, supporting
cells are not limited to these types.
Intelligence Cell
2-105. The intelligence cell plans, coordinates, and implements the insurgent intelligence collection plan
and provides intelligence and information to support insurgent operations. The cell also conducts
reconnaissance to obtain information about the activities, tactics, and resources of the enemy and potential
supporters of the insurgency. Reconnaissance methods include surveillance, use of informants, and
infiltration of organizations. Observation is the most common method used to conduct reconnaissance.
2-106. The insurgent organization usually produces its own general intelligence and targeting
information. Every member of the insurgent organization is an intelligence-gathering mechanism.
Intelligence cell personnel may serve in any occupation (such as a taxi or delivery driver, or truck driver)
that allows them to blend in with the population and still provides them the flexibility and mobility needed
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-19

Chapter 2
to gather information. Information in raw form may be freely provided by sympathizers conducting
surveillance on behalf of the insurgent organization while living, traveling, or working near either a target
area or the enemy. Raw information may also be purchased locally from affiliated insurgents, guerrillas, or
criminal organizations. The intelligence cell analyzes all this information and turns it into intelligence.
2-107. In addition to conducting intelligence analysis, typical activities of an intelligence cell may
include
Tracking enemy movements.
Determining enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Scouting potential targets.
Establishing enemy vulnerabilities.
Selecting attack locations.
Stalking potential assassination targets.
MI Intelligence I Finance
I
CI Counterintelligence
SAFE I Shelter
and Internal Security
I
Planning Training
I I
INFO
WAR
I Recruiting
I
IED Technical
Support
I Transportation
I
I Logistics INFO
I Civil Affairs
Cell WAR
Communications
and Tradecraft I Medical
I
Note. If the I (for insurgent) does not fit in the diamond-shaped unit symbol, it is placed to
the right of the diamond. For cells or teams with a specific function for which standard
military symbology has no functional symbol, it is necessary to either include an
abbreviation for that function inside the diamond or to identify the nature of the cell or team
with a note outside the diamond.
Figure 2-7. Insurgent supporting cell graphic symbols
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Insurgents
2-108. Collecting information is a continuous function performed by every insurgent organization. Overt
activities include the open collection of information by individuals who circulate among the people. Other
activities involve secret collection of information. This can include information collected through the use of
extortion, bribery, or coercion. Insurgents also collect information using electronic devices and human-
intelligence agents who may join or infiltrate popular organizations, government organizations, and
nongovernmental organizations. The intelligence cell of a local insurgent organization may further
disseminate the information to its counterpart intelligence cell in a higher insurgent organization.
2-109. When planning any action, an intelligence cell analyzes information from all available sources.
Sleeper agents, members of the insurgent organization, or active supporters and sympathizers who may
have resided within the target area for years often have the specific mission of gathering information. This
information may later serve to support direct action missions.
2-110. The information gathered by the insurgent organization is used to plan future activities and
determine the feasibility of planned actions. In the offense, efforts are concentrated on the enemy at his
location and the area surrounding the target. In the defense, the reconnaissance effort is to determine when
and where the enemy will conduct offensive actions against insurgent forces.
2-111. The insurgent organizations intelligence may be superior to the enemys. This is because
insurgents may have
More intimate first-hand knowledge of all aspects of the local environment.
Close relationships with the population.
Penetration of governmental structures.
Ability to maintain observation across the countryside or urban area.
Counterintelligence and Internal Security Cell

2-112. The counterintelligence (CI) and internal security cell conducts internal CI and operations security
(OPSEC) activities. Members of this cell infiltrate other cells to identify security weaknesses or breaches,
and enforce proper security measures. The cellular structure of the insurgent organization helps ensure
against the compromise of the identity, location, or activities of leaders and members of other cells should
there be a breach of internal security.
2-113. The local insurgent organization must place great emphasis on the conduct of internal CI activities
because of the criticality of maintaining cohesion within the hazardous environment in which it operates. It
is susceptible to infiltration by enemy agents. If the local insurgent organization is infiltrated, it will not
survive.
2-114. It is within the CI and internal security cell that all OPSEC measures for the organizations
activities, as well as other security measures, are developed, disseminated, and enforced. In most insurgent
organizations, violation of these security rules can result in immediate death to the violator and/or his
family members. This cell is responsible for maiming or assassinating current or former insurgent members
who commit breaches. Paranoia among the members actually increases security, since all members desire
to remain free of suspicion. Individuals assigned to the CI and internal security cell are usually mature,
experienced, or senior in the organization.
Planning Cell
2-115. The planning cell conducts near-, mid-, and long-term planning for missions of the insurgent
organization. This cell plans current and future actions of direct action and other supporting cells that
contribute to the goals of the overall organization. It coordinates cooperation among cells, when necessary.
It works closely with the intelligence and training cells to coordinate capabilities and minimize the impact
of organizational limitations on insurgent operations.
2-116. The cellular structure of the insurgent organization helps ensure against the compromise of the
plans and actions of direct action and/or supporting cells should there be a breach of internal security.
Communication between and among cells may use intermediaries to provide additional security from
infiltration and/or identification of key leaders and planners.
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Chapter 2
Information Warfare Cell

2-117. The information warfare (INFOWAR) cell plans, coordinates, and implements the local insurgent
organizations INFOWAR activities. (See appendix A for more detail on INFOWAR.) This cell also
provides guidance and assistance to the direct action cells (INFOWAR) whenever required. Portions of the
cell may be dispersed.
2-118. Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, the INFOWAR cell may be
capable of several functions. Some example functions are
Media manipulation (misinformation and disinformation).
Public affairs designed to influence the population
Communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda videos, broadcast successes of
direct action teams, and printing).
Rumor control.
Sabotage actions.
Civic actions.
Fund-raising (including international).
Recruiting.
Indoctrination training.
Assistance in cyber-mining for intelligence.
All these functions are integrated to further short- and long-range goals. Some of the functions may require
specialized expertise. For example, the media manipulation function may require expertise and/or advice
from a cleric; a political, tribal, ethic, or cultural leader; or other subject matter experts.
2-119. IED and other attacks are often used to support the overall INFOWAR plan. In all direct action
cells, key events (especially successes) are recorded on digital video and still cameras. Upon mission
completion, the recordings are turned over to the INFOWAR cell for manipulation and exploitation.
Although the direct action cell has a video camcorder and digital camera capability within its cell, an
INFOWAR cell may be tasked to provide video or digital collection of the event for rapid media
distribution in the insurgent INFOWAR campaign.
Technical Support Cell

2-120. The technical support cell is responsible for all acquisition, manufacturing, and storage of bombs,
mines, and other tactical demolitions and fuze materiel. It is the primary bomb factory for the insurgent
organization. Bombs can include
IEDs.
Signal flares (actually a subcategory of IEDs).
Bombs configured for individual and vehicular suicide tasks.
Even a WMD, when materiel and expertise is available in the insurgent organization.
2-121. Bombs (specifically IEDs) are a preferred weapon of choice for the insurgent organization. This
is because
They are inexpensive.
The materials are readily available.
They are relatively easy to build.
They are extremely destructive.
Bombs (IEDs) may be very sophisticated or extremely simple. They easily lend themselves to
terrorizing the population. They are used in support of assassination, maiming, sabotage, mass
casualties, and mass destruction.
2-122. Although members of the technical support cell are very capable of emplacing and detonating
IEDs and other demolitions, they normally do not do so. Their expertise is far too critical for them to
routinely go on direct action missions. Direct action cells emplace and trigger the devices. On occasion, a
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Insurgents
representative from the technical support cell may be required to accompany the direct action cell to
properly emplace and detonate the device, especially when dealing with WMD IEDs. Those insurgents
requiring specific expertise in the fabrication, emplacement, and detonation of WMD such as radiation
(dirty bombs) and biological weapons may acquire the expertise and material from outside the local
insurgent organization.
2-123. The number of teams subordinate to the technical support cell is not fixed and varies depending on
the specific missions. Types of teams that may comprise the technical support cell are
Demolition, sabotage, and IED team.
Suicide IED team (individual and vehicular).
WMD support team.
2-124. Demolition, Sabotage, and IED Team. The demolition, sabotage, and IED team is the primary
IED and tactical munitions factory for the technical support cell. This team is responsible for all
acquisition, manufacturing, and storage of IEDs, suicide bombs, side-attack (antitank and anti-vehicle)
mines, and other tactical demolitions and fuzing for munitions. The team prepares these devices for
distribution to other elements of the insurgent organization or affiliated organizations and/or persons. Some
demolition, sabotage, and IED teams may be located in factories in small villages (or other remote areas or
local accommodations) where they build their IEDs and then smuggle them into cities, where suppliers may
then distribute them (or sell them) to insurgent organizations or other customers.
2-125. This team provides IEDs (usually unassembled, pre-manufactured components) to direct action
cells. The direct action cell then assembles and adds a fuze or detonator to the IEDs. Some direct action
cells may not have access to the expertise or products (IEDs) provided by the technical support cell. In
these cases, the team trains, advises, and provides expertise to direct action cells. The team may also train
direct action cells to manufacture limited qualities of IEDs for their own use.
2-126. The demolition, sabotage, and IED team may train, advise, and provide expertise to direct action
cells (especially the multifunction cells) on how, where, and when, to emplace and detonate munitions and
on the proper assembly, fuzing, and detonation of the devices. The team also provides instruction on
remotely detonated mines.
2-127. Suicide IED Team. A suicide IED team (individual and vehicular) is responsible for acquisition,
manufacturing, and storage of IEDs and/or vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) for
suicide missions. The number of such teams in a technical support cell is not fixed and varies depending on
specific missions. All suicide IED/VBIED team personnel are cross-trained to perform all functions
necessary to fabricate IEDs and VBIEDs including automotive welding and fabrication. Members of the
team are very capable of detonating IED/VBIEDs and other demolitions, but they normally do not do so
even to detonate a device carried or driven by someone else.
2-128. Direct action cells are responsible for the emplacement and detonation of the IED/VBIEDs.
Suicide bombers/drivers are recruited by the recruiting cell, and turned over to direct action cells to
properly emplace the individual-carried IEDs and VBIEDs. Once the direct action cell has ensured the
proper emplacement of the IED/VBIED, they can either trigger the IED/VBIEDs remotely or use other
detonation methods. On occasion, a representative from the suicide IED/VBIED team may be required to
accompany the direct action cell to ensure proper emplacement and detonation of the device.
2-129. WMD Support Team. The WMD support team has the primary purpose of creating weapons to
either terrorize or influence a relevant population and governing authorities. Insurgent organizations use
indiscriminate techniques to create mass casualties and mass disruption. Chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear (CBRN) weapons are the potential weapons of choice for organizations employing terror
tactics. Insurgent organizations may obtain or use CBRN weapons for a variety of motives. They might
threaten the use of these weapons as saber rattlers to raise the ante in response to political or military
actions of the governing authority or foreign powers. They may actually use such weapons to achieve a
specific objective or to terrorize.
2-130. Use of a WMD such as a radiological (dirty bomb) and biological weapon can require specific
expertise in fabrication, emplacement, and detonation or activation of the WMD. The WMD support team
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-23

Chapter 2
acquires necessary expertise and material from outside the local insurgent organization. Other types of
WMD may be relatively simple to fabricate and use with devastating effects.
2-131. Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and/or toxic industrial material (TIM) can be used as a WMD to
cause mass casualties and psychological stress and anxiety. Most WMD support teams have easy access to
TICs and TIM. TICs are highly toxic commercial chemical substances with acute toxicity that are produced
in large quantities for industrial purposes. They can be solid, liquid, or gas. These are the normal weapons
of choice for the WMD support team. TIM has similar toxicity and can be used as a complement to TICs or
other mass effects on an enemy such as officials of a governing authority and/or a relevant population. Even
though a mass release of TICs or TIM causing numerous noncombatant casualties was due to an IED explosion,
the insurgent organization might be able to blame the casualties on the enemy as an intentional act.
2-132. Once an insurgent organization acquires the ability to produce WMD IEDs, a WMD support team
will normally have at least one such weapon fabricated and available at any given time. It may also have
others in various stages of manufacture.
2-133. All WMD support team personnel are cross-trained to perform all functions necessary to fabricate
WMD IEDs. However, team members do not normally emplace and detonate WMD IEDs because their
expertise is too critical to risk in direct action missions. Direct action cells emplace and trigger the WMD
IEDs. On occasion, a representative from the WMD support team may need to accompany the direct action
cell to ensure proper placement and detonation of the weapon.
Logistics Cell
2-134. The logistics cell is the resource planner for the insurgent organization. This cell is responsible for
the planning, acquisition, and distribution of all resources human and materiel. Resources can come from
sources outside of the insurgent area of interest, or can be obtained from within the geographic area. In
addition to the direct purchase of materiel and/or support and services, the insurgent organization can
obtain logistics in ways to include the following:
Theft from the governing authority.
Voluntary donations from a supportive relevant population.
Tax and/or levy on local and area populations.
Specified materiel from a relevant population in exchange for social services and/or health
welfare support.
Self-manufacturing of designated materiel.
Communiciations and Tradecraft Cell

2-135. The communications and tradecraft cell is the communications planner for the insurgent
organization. The cell advises insurgent organization leaders on the feasibility of all insurgent activities
from a communications perspective. It also determines the internal communications equipment necessary
for the success of direct action missions.
2-136. This cell facilitates communications inside and outside of the organization with a courier service,
dead-drop locations, and other tradecraft (clandestine) communications. It also provides multiple electronic
means for digital and secure communications. It is equipped with computers, radios, small satellite
communication antennas, and long-range cordless telephones. The cell is a source of communications,
Internet, electronic tradecraft, and steganography expertise and provides training as required. It maintains
close coordination with the INFOWAR cell for Internet communications.
2-137. This cell provides courier service as s simple and secure means of communication among cells in
the insurgent organization. Transportation for a courier may be a civilian model motorcycle, moped, motor
scooter, bicycle, sedan, or even a taxi. The courier probably will not have an overt weapon or radio and will
appear to be a noncombatant. Another insurgent may ride with the courier as a lookout or to provide
security. Depending on the circumstances, some couriers may not use vehicles and will be used instead as
foot messengers. Couriers may be male, female, or even children. Messages may be written, encrypted, or
memorized and presented orally in person.
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Insurgents
Finance Cell
2-138. The finance cell is the financial and economic planner and provider for the insurgent organization.
It determines the internal financial requirements necessary for the success of direct action missions. This
cell plans local fund-raising activities such as bribery, extortion, robbery, and operating front companies in
order to finance and resource the insurgent organizations activities. It also has links to regional, national,
and international fund-raising activities. The cell also determines the roles of direct action cells and other
cells in acquiring additional funds for the insurgent organization.
2-139. Finance personnel establish and monitor internal and external funding and funds management
mechanisms. Skilled operators appeal to the local and international community, possibly through the
media, for political, monetary, and logistics support. They may do this in coordination with the INFOWAR
cell and logistics cell.
2-140. Voluntary or coerced contributions from the diaspora of a relevant population are a significant
enterprise of regional, international, and transnational connections for the insurgency. Both governmental
and nongovernmental donations and grants may wittingly or unwittingly finance an insurgency.
Shelter Cell
2-141. The shelter cell plans for and provides secure accommodations at safe houses for direct action and
supporting cells. Safe houses may also accommodate visiting and high-ranking insurgents. These shelters
are closely coordinated with the intelligence, planning, logistics, and transportation cells. Caches of
materiel can be aligned with locations of safe houses and/or transit routes to and from insurgent areas of
interest and territorial safe havens.
2-142. Sympathizers in the relevant population may volunteer their homes, equipment, vehicles, and
services. Maximum use is made of local assistance and facilities regardless of capability.
Training Cell
2-143. The training cell plans and coordinates training for the insurgent organization members. Training
covers the basic organization, duties, and responsibilities of the insurgent organization, and advances to
specialized training of insurgents for cell or team responsibilities.
2-144. Basic instruction includes
Basic marksmanship.
Surveillance and intelligence-collection methods.
Basic tactical instruction.
Communications techniques.
2-145. Examples of specialized instruction may include advanced tactical instruction such as conduct of
Ambushes.
Assaults.
Raids.
Assassination.
Bombing with IEDs.
Sniper activities.
Advanced surveillance and intelligence-collection methods.
Kidnapping.
Extortion.
2-146. Training may be centralized or be conducted at the cell level depending on the structure and
mission of the insurgent organization. Generally, training is a combination of both with the
basics taught in a centralized location and specific mission and functional training conducted at
the local cell level. Training may be distributed via the Internet. Training actions are coordinated
closely with the planning and recruiting cells.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-25

Chapter 2
Recruiting Cell
2-147. The recruiting cell provides the manpower resourcing and recruitment planning and for integrating
recruits into the insurgent organization. Recruiting can promote radical religious, militant ethnic,
nationalist, or social agendas that propose to remedy compelling grievances within a relevant population.
Recruits might not be aware of the true nature of the organization they are joining. Recruiting may be
wittingly or unwittingly financed from both governmental and nongovernmental donations and grants.
2-148. Often, legitimate organizations can serve as recruiting grounds for insurgent organizations. The
organizations from which individuals can be recruited need not necessarily be violent or illegal themselves,
but simply contain populations that are sympathetic to the same goals as the insurgent organization.
Recruiting may be for particular skills, training, and/or qualifications and may not be tied to ideological
characteristics. Insurgent organizations may attempt to recruit current and former members of national
armed forces, both as trained operatives and as agents in place.
2-149. The recruiting cell uses many varied and different methods to persuade potential insurgents to join
them. Some of these persuading factors may be monetary, religious, ethic, nationalistic, anger, promise of
power, or fear. The Internet is a powerful recruitment tool. The recruiting cell maintains close coordination
with the INFOWAR cell.
2-150. Insurgents may also use coercion and leverage to gain limited or one-time cooperation from useful
individuals. This cooperation can range anywhere from gaining information to conducting a suicide
bombing. Blackmail and intimidation are common forms of coercion. Threats to family members are also
employed. Coercion is often directed at personnel in government security and intelligence organizations.
2-151. Internal security is the primary concern of the insurgent organization when recruiting. First, a
potential recruit must pass an intense screening process. Once selected for recruitment, he/she is then
closely monitored by the CI and internal security cell prior to full recruitment and integration into the
insurgent organization.
Transportation Cell
2-152. The transportation cell plans and facilitates transportation for the insurgent organization. It
responds to transportation requirements of other cells in the organization, especially the logistics and direct
action cells. If sufficient or specific transportation is not available, the transportation cell either provides or
arranges for it.
2-153. Insurgents may have no vehicles or supplies at all and depend completely on caches, porters, or
other transportation or supply means. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services.
Depending on the mission, the local insurgent organization may be augmented by any and every type of
personnel and/or vehicle. Insurgents may requisition or confiscate local civilian transportation assets and
materiel. This includes the use of civilian personnel for drivers, porters, lookouts, and security personnel.
Draft animals may also be used as bearers and/or porters.
2-154. The vehicles in the transportation cell are indistinguishable from civilian vehicles and are always
kept as dispersed as possible, in order to prevent detection and destruction by the governing authority.
Rarely, if ever, will all vehicles in the cell be colocated. Whenever possible, vehicles are dispersed for use
by locals as commercial, delivery, agricultural, general cargo, construction, and general-purpose vehicles
used in everyday life. When required, the transportation cell assembles the appropriate mix of vehicles to
transport items and/or personnel to a specific location. After performing the necessary transportation tasks,
the vehicles then melt back into the general population and environment.
Civil Affairs Cell

2-155. The civil affairs cell is responsible for the planning, preparation, and implementation of all civil
affairs activities for the insurgent organization. It organizes a synchronized program of actions for the
benefit of a relevant population. The cell may work openly and/or discretely with the INFOWAR cell for
media manipulation to ensure the insurgent organization gets credit for providing those benefits.
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2-156. Key civil affairs events are digitally recorded on digital video and still cameras in order to
publicize results and successes intended to create a positive image in the relevant population. Some
activities may be staged to enhances the prestige of the insurgent organization and/or present a negative
image of the governing authority. The recordings are transferred to the INFOWAR cell for
manipulation and exploitation and/or released to sympathetic media for local or worldwide
distribution.
Medical Cell
2-157. Insurgent medics are combatants. When necessary, they fight. Insurgent medical personnel may be
a mixture of men and women. Women may make up 50 percent or more of the medical cell strength.
2-158. The insurgent organization has limited medical capability. However, insurgent medical care is
coupled with local medical assets in the area whenever possible. Maximum use is made of local medical
assistance and facilities regardless of medical capability.
2-159. Insurgents will persuade and/or coerce local civilian medical support when needed. Sympathizers
in the local populace may volunteer their homes, equipment, vehicles, and services for ad hoc medical care.
Local medical personnel may volunteer to treat the ill and wounded. Sympathizers may also assist in the
evacuation of wounded insurgents to civilian, militia, state, or even military facilities. Evacuation means
can include general-purpose cargo vehicles, carts, or even taxis.
2-160. When necessary, supported direct action cells receive litters from the medical cell to transport
wounded. The supported cell provides its own litter bearers. Noncombatants may also be forced to serve as
litter bearers.
2-161. A medical aid station is usually set up in a fairly safe area, while other medics may accompany
direct action cells or other insurgents. When necessary, medical functions are performed in tents,
tunnels, caves, or local accommodations. In some cases, the medical cell may colocate with a
village clinic. Insurgents may or may not have the services of a civilian medical officer (physician). If
available, the physician can provide immediate trauma stabilization and minor surgical intervention.
Meanwhile, the medics provide limited medical intervention, minor surgery, and treatment of most
common illnesses and lesser wounds.
2-162. Severe and long-term medical care relies on evacuation to civilian or other medical facilities. More
routine and excess ill and wounded are transported to civilian medical facilities or may be cared for in
insurgent safe havens.
2-163. As the insurgent organization establishes gradual control in designated areas, medical care extends
beyond the role of preserving capabilities of only the insurgent organization. Basic preventive medicine and
medical care can be offered to a relevant population as a means to encourage and develop popular support.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-27

Chapter 3
Guerrillas
This chapter presents an overview of guerrilla organizations and actions as part of the
irregular OPFOR for training U.S. forces. Training conditions presented by this type
of OPFOR are a composite of real-world guerrilla forces and indicate guerrilla
capabilities and limitations that may be present in actual operational environments
(OEs). Guerrilla combat power can be enhanced by possible affiliations with
other combatants such as insurgents, criminal elements, special-purpose forces
(SPF), or regular military forces. Passive or active civilian supporters can expand
guerrilla capabilities.
3-1. A guerrilla force is a group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along
military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory (JP
3-05). Thus, guerrilla units are an irregular force, but structured similar to regular military forces. They
resemble military forces in their command and control (C2) and can use military-like tactics and
techniques. Guerrillas normally operate in areas occupied by an enemy or where a hostile actor threatens
their intended purpose and objectives. Therefore, guerrilla units adapt to circumstances and available
resources in order to sustain or improve their combat power. Guerrillas do not necessarily comply with
international law or conventions on the conduct of armed conflict between and among declared
belligerents.
SCOPE AND DURATION OF OPERATIONS

3-2. The area of operations (AOR) for guerrilla units may be quite large in relation to the size of the force.
The reason for this is that a large number of small guerrilla units can be widely dispersed. Guerrilla
operations may occur as independent squad or team actions. In other cases, operations could involve a
guerrilla brigade and/or independent units at battalion, company, and platoon levels. A guerrilla unit can be
an independent paramilitary organization and/or a military-like component of an insurgency. Guerrilla
actions focus on the tactical level of conflict and its operational impacts. Guerrilla units can operate at
various levels of local, regional, or international reach. In some cases, transnational affiliations can provide
significant support to guerrilla operations.
3-3. Guerrilla forces are adaptive, flexible, and agile in quickly changing their composition to optimize
organizational capabilities against known or perceived vulnerabilities of an enemy. Guerrillas exploit
familiarity with their physical environment and the ability to blend into the local populace. Small guerrilla
units have great mobility and ability to move throughout enemy-occupied areas.
3-4. Guerrillas seek to gain small psychological victories. These victories do not need to be significant in
terms of material damage to the enemy. These tactical victories only need to show that a small guerrilla
force can defeat [at least parts of] a much larger enemy force.
3-5. Guerrilla forces take prudent risks when an expectation exists for successful attack on an enemy, but
may also make significant practical sacrifices in individuals and materiel in order to achieve a major
psychological impact on an enemy. Guerrillas also apply information warfare (INFOWAR) capabilities to
weaken or exhaust enemy resolve.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-1

Chapter 3
3-6. Ultimately, the resolve of guerrilla leaders and members of guerrilla organizations determines how
long to continue guerrilla operations. Time is a key factor that guerrilla forces use as a combat multiplier in
a long-term commitment to degrade and eventually defeat the will of an enemy. The goal is not necessarily
to defeat enemy forces but to outlast them. This long-term struggle includes a full range of actions that
range from espionage and media manipulation to more violent actions such as sabotage, assassination,
bombing, ambushes, and raids. Guerrillas can use acts of terrorism to achieve either selective or random
psychological stress and physical damage or destruction. Actions are typically quick and violent, followed
by rapid dispersal of assembled guerrilla forces.
3-7. Factors that affect the scope and duration of guerrilla operations include
The level of sympathetic support from an indigenous relevant population.
Regional sociological demographics and ethnic-racial relationships and tensions.
Governance actions and support services to a relevant population by a civil or military authority
in a contested region.
Economic stability and disproportionate distribution of benefits to a relevant population.
Physical and seasonal aspects of topography and climate.
The amount of covert or overt support from organizations or states with interests in a contested
region.
Note. TC 7-100.2 complements this publication in regard to tactics, and FM 7-100.4 provides
details of organization, manning, weapons, and equipment. For weapons and equipment data, see
the Worldwide Equipment Guide.
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTORS

3-8. Guerrillas can act separately from other groups, organizations, and/or activities in conflict with the
same enemy or act in conjunction with them to pursue common objectives. Depending on local or regional
conditions, some guerrilla units may be affiliated with or subordinate to regular forces or an insurgent
organization, or they may operate as independent of such organizations. Regular forces can provide overt
and covert support for guerrilla operations, including the expertise of advisors, liaison teams, and SPF.
Guerrilla units can be associated with regular forces on a temporary basis for particular missions, but would
be incorporated into regular forces only when their capabilities are similar to those of the regular forces
operating in the same geographic area.
Note. Affiliated organizations are those operating in another organizations AOR that the latter
organization may be able to sufficiently influence to act in concert with it for a limited time. No
command relationship exists between an affiliated organization and the organization in whose
AOR it operates.
3-9. Guerrillas are more likely to be incorporated in and subordinate to an insurgent organization when
both are parts of the irregular OPFOR. A guerrilla organization that is affiliated with or subordinate to an
insurgent organization may also be affiliated with SPF, other regular military forces, and/or criminal
elements. Guerrillas will generally accept help from any other organization as long as it meets a need and is
compatible with the guerrilla forces interests and objectives.
3-10. Guerrillas can be part of the Hybrid Threat (HT). The HT can be any combination of two or more of
the following components: regular forces, irregular forces (such as guerrillas and/or insurgents), and/or
criminal elements. Possible HT combinations include guerrillas operating openly with regular military
forces or various forms of covert cooperation or support. (See TC 7-100 for detailed discussion on the HT.)
3-11. Guerrilla associations with other actors in a contested region can vary, and relationships may change
periodically during a long-term conflict. Guerrillas may have relationships with local or higher-level
insurgent organizations or criminal organizations. If a standing relationship does exist among guerrillas and
other irregular OPFOR or HT actors, any allegiance or affiliation may be focused on single-issue
agreements or a mutual ideological commitment. Affiliation with criminal organizations is dependent upon
3-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Guerrillas
the mutual needs of a criminal organization and a guerrilla unit or may be a contractual arrangement for
specific tasks. Guerrilla activities often overlap with criminal activities.
3-12. In addition to possible affiliations with insurgent, criminal, or regular military organizations,
guerrilla units may also be affiliated with supportive civilians, perhaps covert informal support networks
acting with a faade such as a charitable organization. The support provided by different categories of
civilians can include
Coerced support of guerrilla actions.
Passive support by people sympathetic to the goals of the guerrillas.
Actors actively supporting and engaging in combat support or sustainment of the guerrillas.
Guerrillas may depend heavily on the active and passive support from the local population (see chapter 1).
Note. Active sympathizers may provide important logistics services but not directly participate
in combat operations. If they participate in guerrilla activities, they become guerrillas.
AFFILIATION WITH SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES

3-13. When guerrilla organizations are affiliated with the military forces of an external nation-state, they
are most likely to be associated with special-purpose forces (SPF). SPF carry out operations either
independently or in coordination with regular and/or irregular forces (such as guerrillas). In some cases,
SPF can provide funding for specific guerrilla activities or for the entire guerrilla organization. (See chapter
15 of TC 7-100.2 for more information on SPF.)
3-14. The nature of shared goals or interests determines the tenure and type of relationship and the degree
of affiliation between SPF and guerrillas. For example, the affiliation of an SPF detachment with guerrilla
organizations is dependent only on the needs of the guerrilla organization or on the needs of the SPF at a
particular time. The relational dynamics of SPF units are very fluid and apt to change from one day to the
next. For example, if an SPF mission requires close cooperation with guerrilla forces, those guerrilla units
can be included in the SPF task organization with the appropriate command and support relationships.
3-15. SPF can recruit, organize, train, advise, and support guerrillas and conduct (or lead) operations in
conjunction with them. SPF personnel may fight alongside such affiliates or assist them to prepare for
offensive actions, diversionary measures, or other missions. In some cases, the SPF will not only advise
and assist but actually control (command) the guerrilla units as a surrogate force. When guerrilla forces
support SPF teams, the SPF teams can serve as the planning and command element for these forces.
3-16. SPF sappers can accompany and/or augment guerrilla units. SPF sappers can train affiliated
guerrillas as sappers. SPF battalions using sappers in an assault and/or demolition role may need to form
several sapper platoons. In that case, the additional sapper platoons may be manned by affiliated guerrillas
or may be a mixture of SPF and guerrillas. SPF sappers can guide guerrillas through enemy lines and
obstacles to perform their missions (or guerrilla sappers can do the same for SPF teams). An SPF sapper
team may serve with and train guerrillas on how to infiltrate, set demolitions, and assault enemy
installations. In some cases, the SPF sappers may train guerillas in the manufacture and employment of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and signal flares. In other cases, an SPF sapper team may
manufacture the IEDs and signal flares and then give them to guerrillas to emplace and/or detonate.
3-17. The deep attack and reconnaissance platoon of an SPF battalion typically operates in enemy-held
territory. Its missions can include assisting guerrillas in offensive actions or providing communications,
liaison, and support to stay-behind guerrillas and guerrilla activities in the defense. Almost any type of SPF
unit can do the same.
3-18. The long-range signal platoon of an SPF battalion or a signal team from an SPF company can assist
in training affiliated guerrillas on how to set up, operate, maintain, and transport communications
equipment. SPF signal teams may accompany and/or augment guerrilla units and support guerrilla
operations. A single small SPF signal team can provide long-range communications support for guerrilla
units up to battalion size. A full SPF signal team can do the same for a brigade-size unit. This team may
also serve in a signals reconnaissance collection role.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-3

Chapter 3
3-19. Various other types of SPF teams may accompany and/or augment guerrilla units and provide them
with support whenever necessary. Such teams include the following:
SPF sniper teams, who may serve as part of a stay-behind element or a hunter-killer (HK) team.
SPF snipers can also train guerrillas to serve as snipers or marksmen.
SPF mortar teams, who may provide mortar support to guerrilla forces. They can also provide
mortars to the guerillas and train them in the proper use and maintenance of mortars.
SPF air defense teams, who may provide air defense support to guerrilla forces. They can also
provide air defense weapons to the guerillas and train them in the proper use and maintenance of
those weapons.
SPF medical teams, who may provide medical supplies and medical support to guerrilla forces.
Each SPF medical team is designed to provide medical support for guerrilla units up to brigade
size. A small medical team can support a battalion-size force. These teams can also train
guerrilla forces on how to perform emergency medicine, battlefield medical procedures, and
evacuation.
SPF unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) teams, who may provide UAV support to guerrilla forces,
including the acquisition of reconnaissance information on targets or facilities.
SPF diver teams, who may provide diving support to guerrilla forces, including water
infiltration, reconnaissance, and demolition. These teams can also provide diving equipment to
guerrilla forces and train them in its use.
Note. In some instances, SPF can provide guerrilla units with new or high-technology niche
weapons and equipment and train them to use it.
3-20. When SPF are to be air-dropped into an area known to contain a guerrilla force of sufficient size and
nature to warrant cultivating as an affiliated force, the guerrilla force, in all probability, will be receptive to
outside support. Other SPF or regular military forces may have trained the guerrilla force as drop zone
reception personnel. Once on the ground, the SPF team or detachment attempts to make contact with the
guerrilla forces.
LOGISTICS
3-21. Because guerrillas typically operate in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory, they must acquire a
self-sustaining capability. Although they typically rely on some support from the local population, they
need to avoid enemy retribution on the population and/or dissatisfaction of the population with the demands
of supporting a guerrilla force. One example of self-sustainment is to acquire weapons, ammunition,
supplies, transportation assets, and other commodities by raiding or ambushing enemy forces, locations,
and installations. In another example of self-sustainment, civilian medical facilities may be used to treat
guerrillas on a case-by-case clandestine basis, but a preferred capability is to develop medical treatment
stations and convalescence sites integral to guerrilla safe havens or complex battle positions.
3-22. Guerrilla units normally have sufficient assets to transport munitions and materiel for the immediate
short-term fight. Organic transportation and use of available resources of the local area provide the
guerrillas a degree of autonomy and freedom of action. For a sustained fight, however, guerrillas normally
require additional support and sources to transport or stage materiel. Such sources can include transport
assets from higher guerrilla organizations to transport materiel or preposition items in caches for resupply.
For example, a guerrilla battalion might depend on support from the brigades transport company, or a
guerrilla company might receive support from the battalions transport platoon. Other external sources may
include civilian augmentation.
3-23. A guerrilla brigade or its subordinates may be augmented by military or civilian vehicles
(motorcycles, trucks, cars, bicycles, carts, or high-mobility/all terrain vehicles) or personnel depending on
the mission. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. The guerrilla commander
may requisition or confiscate local civilian transportation assets and materiel. This includes the use of
civilian personnel for porters. Vehicles are a mix of military and civilian. The guerrillas may have no
vehicles at all and depend completely on caches, porters, or other transportation or supply means.
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Guerrillas
3-24. Requirements for obtaining supplies and services from a local population are evaluated in
conjunction with the sustainment needs of the population. Support to guerrillas from communities is
coordinated with a willing population, but is sometimes coerced due to tactical needs of the guerrilla force.
Guerrillas recognize that recurring requisition or confiscation of materiel may alienate the population.
Therefore, the guerrillas may institute a system for receipts and eventual compensation of the citizenry.
3-25. Sustained combat and/or participation in a fight by guerrilla units may require significant operational,
administrative, and logistics support from regular military forces operating in the same geographic area.
This type of regular forces support complements the significant sustainment that guerrillas require from
a local or regional populace. As a basic level of logistics support, guerrillas subsist primarily from
locally available resources. This limitation influences the size of a guerrilla unit and its proximity to
other guerrilla units.
PERSONNEL
3-26. Guerrillas often come from impoverished backgrounds and are used to hardships. Typically, they are
young and in good physical condition. They can make do with less by both design and background.
3-27. The military-like organizational structure and intent of a guerrilla unit is often accompanied by a
military style of clothing or uniform, equipment and weapons, and distinctive badges or insignia. However,
a guerrilla may not always wear a military-like uniform. They may wear civilian clothing and be
indistinguishable from the local population (other than weaponry, which they may conceal or discard).
Although most guerrillas are armed, they may seek to avoid being identified as guerrillas by giving the
appearance that their weapons are part of their normal civilian occupation or activities. Weapons and other
materiel may be concealed until they are needed for a guerrilla action.
3-28. Some, or all, guerrillas may be part-time fighters and melt back into the civilian population when not
assembled to conduct operations. Guerrillas may continue their normal positions in society and lead
clandestine lives as members of a guerrilla organization. They may be a local resident one moment and a
guerrilla the next.
3-29. Guerrillas may be a mixture of men, women, and children. Women and children may be used as
runners, messengers, scouts, guides, suicide bombers, drivers, porters, snipers, lookouts, or in other roles.
They may also emplace and/or detonate IEDs, signal flares, and mines. Women (and possibly children)
may be fighters and participate in drive-by shootings, assassinations, and/or assaults.
3-30. Since most guerrillas are indigenous to the area in which they are fighting, their knowledge of the
local population, customs, issues, language, and terrain are first hand. They use this understanding to
develop working relationships with the populace. They can apply this knowledge to win support, develop
intelligence networks, gain new recruits, and/or develop effective propaganda. If the guerrillas are not able
to persuade the local populace to provide support, they have the force to coerce them.
Note. Members of a guerilla force are predominantly indigenous to the region but may include
personnel who are not indigenous to a particular guerrilla units AOR and may have
characteristics significantly different from most of the guerrilla force or the local population.
BASE CAMPS AND TRAINING CAMPS

3-31. Like any other armed force, guerrillas have requirements for C2, rest, resupply, refit, and training.
The larger the guerrilla force and the more active they are, the more they will need established bases, both
semipermanent and temporary.
3-32. Guerrillas who are part-time fighters may prefer to continue to live in their own homes. They would
assemble into guerrilla units only for the time necessary to carry out a mission and then return to their
homes. They would establish and occupy base camps only if security does not permit them to live at home
or in order to prepare for actions involving more than just a few squads or HK teams. Platoon and larger
organizations typically operate out of a base camp.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-5

Chapter 3
3-33. Guerrilla forces may need to avoid large concentrations of troops in camps. Even though logistics
conditions may permit large troop concentrations, commands normally are broken up into small camps and
widely dispersed. Dispersion facilitates concealment, mobility, and security. Large forces may be
concentrated to perform specific operations. On completing the operation, the force is dispersed quickly
into small units.
3-34. Base camps must be relatively safe and secure in areas where guerrillas can rest, eat, and plan. More
sophisticated guerrilla base camps have command posts, training areas, communications facilities, medical
stations, and logistics centers. These base camps, however, are not the same as bases of regular military
forces. They are usually small in overall scope, spread out, and sometimes underground. Guerrillas try to
locate base camps within guerrilla-controlled areas where cover and concealment provide security against
detection. In rural areas, base camps tend to be in areas where the guerrillas have popular support. Urban
guerrillas may rent or confiscate houses for use as temporary bases for small guerrilla forces, such as HK
teams. Guerrillas will normally avoid battling over their base camp. If the site is discovered, the guerrillas
will abandon it and move to another location. Routes into a base camp will be constantly observed for
security. Mines, signal flares, IEDs, and ambushes are used as standard security enhancements. If surprised
or cornered, guerrillas will vigorously defend themselves with a delaying action while evacuating key
personnel and equipment.
3-35. Common characteristics of guerrilla base camps are
Covered and concealed.
Located on remote, rough, and inaccessible terrain.
Suitable for bivouac.
Well defined and defended perimeter.
Planned escape routes.
3-36. Guerrilla base camps are temporary or semipermanent and depend on secrecy for their existence.
These bases are kept small, and usually there is more than one base in the guerrilla units AOR. Guerrillas
typically use four types of base camps:
The main camp.
Reserve camps that are in a preselected location and would be occupied if the main camp must
be permanently evacuated.
Temporary camps located close to current combat operations and occupied only during those
operations.
False camps located away from main and reserve camps to deceive enemy forces.
3-37. Guerrillas favor level, well-drained campsites with good water supply, natural fuel, cover, and
adequate vegetation to provide concealment from visual observation. The preferred camps are also chosen
with a view toward easy access to the target population, access to a friendly or neutral border, good escape
routes, and good observation of approach routes for enemy forces. When enemy operations force the
guerrillas out of their preferred base camps, they tend to establish camps in rugged, inhospitable areas not
easily penetrated by enemy forces.
Base Camp Security

3-38. To provide security against detection, guerrillas attempt to locate base camps in areas with cover and
concealment. Usually, the rougher the terrain, the less likely is the chance of being surprised by enemy
forces. While guerrillas avoid defensive combat, they emphasize short-term defensive action in the base
camp vicinity to aid evacuation, if necessary.
3-39. Base camps are usually in relatively remote areas for security. To preclude accidental discovery, base
camps are not usually near inhabited areas. However, because the guerrillas must be able to fulfill their
logistics needs, their base camp usually will not be more than a days march from a village or town.
3-40. Guerrilla camps are normally located away from roads, main trails, and civilian communities. The
surrounding terrain should obstruct rapid enemy approach into the area. The site of the camp should
provide concealed evacuation routes. The camp is surrounded by guard and warning systems. Prepared
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Guerrillas
positions are organized to delay or destroy enemy forces when this action becomes necessary or desirable.
Almost every base camp is surrounded by observation posts, preferably located on hilltops. From these
posts, an early alert is passed enabling timely evacuation of the area.
Training Camps
3-41. Guerrilla training camps may be established in both urban and rural environments. While some
training is accomplished in urban safe houses or rural guerrilla base camps, most training is accomplished
at locations focused on training. This may be a special urban safe house, a remote guerilla base camp, or a
training center in another country.
GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS
3-42. Guerrillas use a military-like organizational structure for C2 and conduct of operations. For example,
the basic building block of a guerrilla organization may be a squad consisting of two fire teams. Such
squads are the basis for building guerrilla platoons, companies, battalions, and brigades. However, guerrilla
commanders can task-organize these units for specific actions. Even prior to specific actions, whole
guerrilla companies may already be restructured (task-organized) as hunter-killer (HK) companies, made
up HK groups, HK sections and HK teams. When a guerrilla battalion consists predominantly of HK
companies, it may be called a guerrilla HK battalion. When a guerrilla brigade consists predominantly
of HK battalions (or conceivably of multiple separate HK companies), it may be called a guerrilla
HK brigade.
Note. Although this chapter and FM 7-100.4 present typical structures of guerrilla units, these
forces are also irregular in the sense that individual units can vary in manning, weapons,
and materiel.
3-43. Guerrilla organizations may be as large as several brigades or as small as a platoon and/or
independent HK teams. Often a brigade-size guerrilla force may not be appropriate for a particular mission
or area AOR. It may be too large, and a task-organized guerrilla battalion may be sufficient. An example
task-organized battalion might have four or five HK companies, organic battalion units, a weapons battery
(with a composite of mortar, rocket launcher, and antitank platoons) from brigade, and possibly intelligence
and INFOWAR augmentations.
3-44. The hierarchy of military-like terms for guerrilla units (from the bottom up) is as follows:
Team or HK team.
Squad or HK section.
Platoon or HK group.
Company or HK company.
Battalion (or HK battalion).
Brigade (or HK brigade).
X II I
G G G G G G G G
Brigade Battalion Company Platoon Group Section Squad Team
Figure 3-1. Guerrilla organization symbols: brigade to team level
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-7

Chapter 3
Note. Some guerrilla organizations may have honorific titles that do not reflect their true nature
or size. For example, a guerrilla force that is actually of no more than battalion size may call
itself a brigade, a corps, or an army. A guerrilla organization may also refer to itself as a
militia. This is a loose usage of the term militia, which generally refers to citizens trained as
soldiers (as opposed to professional soldiers), but applies more specifically to a state-sponsored
militia that is part of the states armed forces but subject to call only in emergency. To avoid
confusion, the TC 7-100 series uses militia only in the latter sense.
3-45. Guerrilla units can be independent units or can be associated with insurgent organizations at local,
regional, provincial, national, or transnational levels. Organizational relationships between guerrillas and
insurgents can fluctuate and be mission dependent, event-oriented, mutually coordinated, and/or coerced
for a specific temporary purpose. The relationship may be one of loose affiliation or involve a more formal
command relationship. When an insurgency includes guerrilla units, the units may be under the C2 of a
local insurgent organization or of a higher insurgent organization. The relationships may be temporary and
remain in effect only as long as the both insurgent organization and guerrilla unit mutually benefit.
Note. The guerrilla organization diagrams of FM 7-100.4 (on which examples in this chapter are
based) and the personnel and equipment lists that accompany them are a baseline that U.S. Army
trainers can modify to provide the appropriate level of combat power as part of the conditions
required for a particular training exercise and/or training task. The organizational directories of
FM 7-100.4 provide detailed information on manning, weapons, and equipment for a typical
guerrilla brigade and its subordinate units, which represent a composite of actual guerrilla forces.
FM 7-100.4 provides detailed step-by-step instructions on how to construct a task organization

based on the training requirements. FM 7-100.4 also describes how to select equipment options.
See also, TC 7-101 for guidance on creating the appropriate OPFOR order of battle during
exercise design.
GUERRILLA BRIGADE
The composition of a guerrilla brigade may vary. The structure depends on several factors, including the
physical environment, sociological demographics and relationships, economics, and support available from
external organizations and/or countries. A guerrilla brigade may have over 4,000 guerrillas or may have
specified units significantly reduced in strength. Figure 3-2 shows an example of such a brigade.
G UER RILLA
BRIG AD E
BRIGADE GUER R ILLA W EAPONS R EC ON

HQ BA TTAL ION BA TTAL ION COMPAN Y
SAPPER TR AN SPOR T S IGNAL MED IC AL

C OMPAN Y COMPAN Y PLATOON PLATOON
Figure 3-2. Guerrilla brigade (example)
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Guerrillas
3-46. The typical composition of a full-strength guerrilla brigade may be as follows:

Brigade headquarters.
Three or more guerrilla battalions.
Weapons battalion.
Reconnaissance company.
Sapper company.
Transport company.
Signal platoon.
Medical platoon.
3-47. Guerrilla units are tailored organizational structures based on the conditions of a particular OE and
available manning, weapons, and equipment. The following are some examples of such tailoring:
In a particular OE, a guerrilla brigade could be a multi-battalion combat force operating in
several AORs, with a full range of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units
(as in figure 3-2) and possibly affiliated with regular military forces.
In mountainous or forested areas with no major population centers, a guerrilla brigade might
have only one or two battalions (or five or six separate companies) with little or no additional CS
or CSS. Options could include widely dispersed companies depending on sustainment from local
resources in a rural context or materiel obtained from defeated enemy forces and isolated enemy
installations.
A guerrilla brigade based in a major urban-industrial center or a megalopolis would probably
have a distinctly different structure of combat, CS, and CSS capabilities, tailored to readily
available resources within a densely packed population and urban terrain.
GUERRILLA BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS

3-48. The guerrilla brigade headquarters consists of the brigade command group, brigade staff, and a
headquarters and service section. The personnel and functions of these organizations are described below.
Brigade Command Group

3-49. The brigade command group includes the brigade commander and deputy commander (DC).
Guerrilla commanders have complete authority over their subordinates and overall responsibility for those
subordinates actions. In the event the commander is killed or incapacitated, the DC assumes command.
The brigade chief of staff (COS) is considered part of the command group but actually heads the
brigade staff.
Brigade Staff
3-50. The brigade COS exercises direct control over the brigade staff and is in charge of the main
command post (CP) in the absence of the brigade commander. His role is to direct staff planning and
coordinate all staff inputs that assist the commanders decisionmaking. He is the commanders and DCs
focal point for knowledge about the friendly and enemy situation.
3-51. The brigade staff has three primary staff officers: operations officer, intelligence officer, and officer.
Each of these heads one the following staff sections:
Operations section.
Intelligence and information section.
Resources section.
Operations Section
3-52. The brigade operations section is the basis of the main CP. The brigade COS normally resides with
this section. Operational signature is small. Whenever possible, staff functions are performed in tents,
tunnels, caves, or local accommodations. When mounted, the main CP usually operates from command and
staff vehicles. The brigade commander determines how to organize C2 of the brigade and how many CPs
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-9

Chapter 3
will be activated. The operations section is structured to simultaneously support a main CP and an auxiliary
CP. A forward CP may also be required.
Note. Guerrilla brigades and battalions may not have all the types of CPs discussed here.
However, specific situations may require various types.
3-53. The brigade operations section includes the operations officer (who also serves as the deputy COS),
the chief of current operations (who also serves as assistant operations officer), and the chief of future
operations. The latter two officers each head subsections.
3-54. Current Operations Subsection. The chief of current operations serves as the representative of the
commander, COS, or operations officer in their absence and has the authority to control forces in
accordance with the commanders intent.
3-55. Future Operations Subsection. The chief of future operations monitors the friendly and enemy
situations and their implications for future actions. He advised the commander on how to make adjustments
to the battle plan during the fight.
3-56. Functional Staff. Functional staff elements may augment the brigade operations section when
required. These experts in particular functions (such as fire support) advise the brigade command group and
staff on issues pertaining to their individual areas of expertise.
3-57. Liaison Teams. The operations section may also receive liaison teams from subordinate and
affiliated units that perform tasks in support of those. Liaison teams are not a permanent part of the brigade
staff structure. They support the brigade staff with detailed expertise in particular functional areas and
provide direct communications to their parent organizations. SPF advisors and liaison personnel from
regular military forces may operate from the brigade headquarters or may be located at lower echelons. The
brigade staff may also receive liaison and advisory teams from organizations covertly or overtly supporting
guerrilla operations. Their purpose may be based on functional military expertise for guerrilla unit
operations or may support selected political, economic, social, or INFOWAR tasks. If the guerrilla brigade
is affiliated with or subordinate to an insurgent organization, a political advisor may also be present.
Intelligence and Information Section

3-58. The intelligence and information section provides intelligence on the current and future OE. It also
provides insights on opportunities for ongoing and future operations and windows of opportunity. At least
one representative from the intelligence and information section is part of, and accompanies, each auxiliary
or forward CP. This section has three subsections: reconnaissance, INFOWAR, and communications.
3-59. Reconnaissance Subsection. The chief of reconnaissance, who heads this subsection, develops
reconnaissance plans, gathers information, and evaluates data on the OE. He supervises the efforts of
subordinate reconnaissance units.
3-60. INFOWAR Subsection. The chief of INFOWAR, who heads this subsection, coordinates the
employment of INFOWAR assets, both at brigade level and in subordinate units. This subsection oversees
the planning and execution of all elements of INFOWAR (see appendix A).
3-61. Communications Subsection. The chief of communications and his subsection plan the use of all
forms of communication and communications security. The subsection may be augmented by personnel
from the brigades signal platoon when necessary.
Resources Section
3-62. The resources officer is responsible for the acquisition, distribution, and care of all the brigades
resources, both human and materiel. He is also in charge of the brigades sustainment CP and may establish
multiple sustainment CPs. The resources section may be augmented from the brigades transport company
when necessary. The section is also structured to accommodate augmentation from the functional staff and
liaison teams. It consists of two subsections: logistics and administration.
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Guerrillas
3-63. Logistics Subsection. The chief of logistics heads the brigade logistics system. He supervises
transportation support. He is responsible for the acquisition and distribution of supplies to sustain the
brigade. He is also responsible for the all armament accountability, readiness, supply, utilization, repair,
and evacuation.
3-64. Administration Subsection. The chief of administration supervises all personnel actions and
transactions. This subsection assigns personnel and records losses.
Headquarters and Service Section

3-65. The headquarters and service section provides supply and transportation support to the brigade
headquarters. It includes a command team, a support team, and a supply and transport team.
WEAPONS BATTALION
3-66. The weapons battalion of a guerrilla brigade typically consists of the following units:
Battalion headquarters.
Towed mortar battery.
Rocket launcher battery.
Antitank battery.
Signal section.
Transport section.
This battalion provides fire support to any other subordinate units of the guerrilla brigade as necessary. In
some instances, due to the dispersed nature of guerrilla operations, a battery or parts thereof may be
allocated to a particular guerrilla battalion.
Battalion Headquarters
3-67. The battalion headquarters consists of a command section and a staff section. The weapons battalion
commander locates where he can best support the brigade operations and is often positioned in the vicinity
of the brigade commander. The command section also includes the battalions deputy commander, who
would be in charge of a forward or auxiliary CP, if necessary. The chief of staff (COS) is part of the
command group and staff. However, he is usually located with the staff on the battlefield, because he
exercises direct control over the battalion staff. He is also in direct charge of the battalions main CP in the
absence of the commander.
3-68. The battalion staff consists of the operations officer (who also serves as the deputy COS), the
assistant operations officer (battalion fire direction officer), the intelligence officer, and the resources
officer. The COS also serves as the chief of fire support. The signal section leader also serves as the
battalion communications officer. The transport section leader serves as the battalion logistics officer. The
staff section operates the main CP. During static operations, staff functions are performed in tents, tunnels,
caves, or local accommodations. The command and staff vehicles are then dispersed and camouflaged.
Towed Mortar Battery

3-69. The towed mortar battery normally consists of
Headquarters and service section.
Fire coordination platoon.
Two towed mortar platoons.
Supply and transportation section.
3-70. The headquarters and service section consists of a command team, a support team, and a supply and
transport team. The battery deputy commander (in the support team) normally is also the battery fire
direction officer. The fire direction chief (in the fire control section of the fire coordination platoon)
assumes the duties of the fire direction officer in the battery deputy commanders absence. Depending on
mission requirements, either the battery commander or deputy commander remains with the weapons
battalion commander to facilitate fire support.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-11

Chapter 3
3-71. When required, an observation team (from the observation section of the fire coordination platoon)
accompanies a guerrilla unit. In this case, the observation section vehicle drops the team off and returns to
the section headquarters. Supported units also provide additional observers.
3-72. The towed mortar battery normally has six 120-mm mortarstwo platoons of three mortar sections
each. However, some batteries may have six 100-mm mortars. For normal travel, the light truck (prime
mover) of each mortar section carries the mortar crew and ammunition for the immediate fire support
mission. For movement over short distances, the 100- or 120-mm mortar can be dismantled into three parts:
barrel, bipod, and baseplate. Animals or carts can pack the mortar in its three parts. Additional ammunition
bearers may be used when required. Civilians or draft animals may also be used as bearers or porters. The
guerrillas may have no vehicles at all and depend on caches, porters, draft animals, or other transportation
or resupply means.
Note. Another alternative is for the battery to have nine 81- or 82-mm mortars (not towed), by
adding a third mortar platoon.
Rocket Launcher Battery

3-73. The rocket launcher battery of the weapons battalion typically consists of
One multiple rocket launcher (MRL) platoon.
One rocket launcher platoon.
3-74. The headquarters and service section and the fire coordination platoon have the same structure and
functions as in the towed mortar battery (see above). The MRL and rocket launcher platoons may
receive additional transportation support from the weapons battalion headquarters or the brigade
transport company.
Multiple Rocket Launcher Platoon

3-75. The MRL platoon typically consists of a platoon headquarters and three MRL sections with one 107-
mm launcher each. The platoon can be employed as a platoon or broken into separate sections to support
guerrilla or HK companies. The 107-mm MRL on a wheeled carriage can be towed by almost any vehicle
or pulled by personnel or a yoked animal. Several versions can be broken down into man-packable loads.
When moving dismounted for any distance, an MRL section may require augmentation of other guerrillas
or civilian personnel to serve as additional ammunition bearers and to move the MRLs.
3-76. Single-tube, man-portable, tripod-mounted launchers are also available. Twelve single-tube 107-mm
rocket launchers may replace each 12-tube MRL. When using single-tube rocket launchers, a vehicle is not
required. However, extra porters and ammunition bearers are then required. Improvised 107-mm rocket
firing pads can be constructed using materials such as dirt, bamboo frames, pipes, or crossed stakes.
Rocket Launcher Platoon

3-77. The rocket launcher platoon typically consists of a platoon headquarters and six rocket launcher
sections. Each section operates two 122-mm single-tube rocket launchers. This provides a total of 12
single-tube rocket launchers in the platoon. When moving dismounted for any distance, a rocket launcher
section requires augmentation of other guerrillas or civilian personnel to serve as bearers to transport the
launchers and additional rockets.
3-78. Typically, each rocket launcher section has one light truck. The truck can carry one or both launchers
close to the firing point. The firing team dismounts, transports the launcher to the firing position and
prepares it to fire. The team then fires several rockets, probably no more than five, before detection
probability is high. Each launcher can fire on individual targets or it can fire preplanned volley fires with
other launchers against a single target. The truck (whenever possible) will return and pick up the firing
team and launcher. If the truck cannot retrieve the team and launcher, they either join up with another
guerrilla unit or exfiltrate to another possible pickup point.
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Guerrillas
3-79. The 122-mm launcher can be broken into two-one man loads for transport. The 122-mm rocket can
also be broken into two-one man loads. Improvised 122-mm. rocket firing pads can be constructed
using materials such as dirt, bamboo frames, pipes, or crossed stakes. Caches of rockets may be used
for resupply.
Antitank Battery
3-80. The antitank (AT) battery of the weapons battalion typically consists of a headquarters and service
section, three antitank platoons, and one antitank hunter-killer (AT HK) platoon. These platoons can be
broken down to support guerrilla or HK companies or their subordinates. The headquarters and service
section has the same structure and functions as in the towed mortar battery and rocket launcher battery
(see above).
Antitank Platoon
3-81. Each AT platoon typically has a platoon headquarters, an antitank guided missile (ATGM) section,
and a recoilless gun section. The AT platoon receives transportation support from the battery headquarters
and service section or the battalion transport section. Some ATGM and recoilless gun sections may have
additional ammunition bearers. Civilians, draft animals, carts, bicycles, and bearers/porters may also be
used to assist in transporting the weapons and munitions.
3-82. ATGM Section. The ATGM section of the AT platoon typically consists of a section headquarters
and four ATGM teams. It may be employed as a section or allocated by team to guerrilla or HK companies.
They may also be integrated into AT HK teams at company level. Each ATGM team has one ATGM
launcher and carries four ATGMs for its launcher. These and/or additional ATGM launchers may also be
dispersed among guerrilla HK teams.
3-83. Each ATGM team of the AT batterys AT platoon typically has four members. This organization is
different from an ATGM team in the guerrilla battalions weapons company, which has three members.
The difference is the addition of one grenadier and his ATGL to the team, and the team may be
reconfigured based on the available ATGM system.
3-84. Recoilless Gun Section. The recoilless gun section of the AT platoon typically consists of a section
headquarters and three recoilless gun teams, each with one recoilless gun. It may be employed as a section
or allocated by team to guerrilla or HK companies. When towed, a recoilless gun requires a crew of three.
When transported solely by the crew, it requires a crew of at least four. Some recoilless gun sections may
have additional ammunition bearers.
Antitank Hunter-Killer Platoon

3-85. The AT HK platoon typically consists of a platoon headquarters and three AT HK sections. It may be
employed as a platoon or by sections. It may also be broken up into teams and allocated to support separate
guerrilla or guerrilla HK units. The platoons primary weaponry is 18 84-mm recoilless rifles.
3-86. Each AT HK section typically consists of a section headquarters and three AT HK teams. The senior
team leader also serves as the assistant section leader. The AT HK section may be employed as a section of
six recoilless rifles or allocated by team to guerrilla or HK companies. Teams may also be integrated into
AT HK teams at company level.
3-87. Each team of six guerrillas operates two recoilless rifles, which typically are used together for
maximum effectiveness. Each AT recoilless rifle gunner carries three rounds (one round in the weapon and
two carried on load bearing equipment). The team leader, assistant gunner, and ammunition bearer all carry
at least six rounds each and may carry more depending on the type of ammunition. Additional ammunition
bearers may be used when required.
Signal Section
3-88. The signal section of the weapons battalion typically consists of a section headquarters, a courier
squad, a voice squad, a digital team, and a wire team. The structure and capabilities of this section are
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-13

Chapter 3
likely to be quite similar to those of the signal section in a guerrilla battalion (see below). The signal
section leader also serves as the battalion signal officer.
Transport Section
3-89. The transport section of the weapons battalion is likely to be quite similar to one of the transport
sections in the transport platoon of a guerrilla battalion. (See below.)
RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
3-90. The reconnaissance company of a guerrilla brigade typically has a company headquarters and service
section, three reconnaissance platoons, and one intelligence and electronic warfare (EW) platoon. This
company may be augmented by other guerrilla units, HK teams, or local sympathizers. Members of this
company (and augmentees) may be in civilian clothes, in which case they may not have a weapon or radio
and would appear to be noncombatants.
Reconnaissance Platoon
3-91. The reconnaissance platoon typically has a platoon headquarters and three reconnaissance squads. A
reconnaissance squad can break down into three or four teams. The platoon may be mounted in light trucks
or on motorcycles, or may be dismounted based on the tactical situation. Since there are typically not
enough vehicles to transport all the teams simultaneously, a squad or team may be dropped off at a point at
least part way to the location for its reconnaissance mission and perhaps picked up later at a designated
location. Motorcycles can be used to support their individual squad, or they can be grouped together to
serve as a high-mobility reconnaissance squad. Squads may be augmented by military or civilian vehicles
(motorcycles, trucks, cars, bicycles, carts, or high-mobility all-terrain vehicles) or personnel depending on
the mission. Local sympathizers may provide assistance and information.
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Platoon

3-92. The intelligence and EW platoon typically has a platoon headquarters, a signals reconnaissance
section, a global positioning system (GPS) jamming section, an EW squad, and an integration squad.
Whenever possible, the intelligence and EW platoon operates out of tents, tunnels, caves, or local
accommodations. Its activities are always covered, camouflaged, and concealed.
Signals Reconnaissance Section

3-93. The signals reconnaissance section conducts radio intercept or direction finding (DF) tasks. The
section typically consists of a section headquarters, a signal intercept and exploitation squad, and a radio
DF squad. Each of the squads consists of an (intercept or DF) base vehicle, a mobile (intercept or DF)
position, and three or more dismounted (intercept or DF) teams. The dismounted teams generally
accompany guerrilla units and report back to their squad leader.
3-94. The signal intercept and exploitation squad coordinates all intercept and DF operations based on
guidance received from the platoons integration squad, which receives its guidance from the intelligence
and EW platoon leader. The platoon leader, in turn, receives his guidance from the reconnaissance
company operations officer. The signal intercept and exploitation squad tasks the DF squad by providing
target technical data and priority of location. The effectiveness of intercept (HF/VHF/digital) capabilities
and/or radio DF depends on how the enemy uses his electronic systems.
Global Positioning System Jamming Section

3-95. The GPS jamming section disrupts enemy GPS receivers. The section typically has two GPS
jamming squads. Each squad has a mobile, trailer-mounted GPS jammer. The trailer-mounted jammers are
employed separately. Due to their high level of vulnerability, one may be held back for later use. Man-
portable GPS jammers are dispersed via two-man teams in civilian clothes and using motorcycles, bicycles,
or other civilian vehicles. These teams either transmit while on the move or emplace and operate the
jammers. In order to survive when dismounted, however, they must make frequent moves when
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Guerrillas
transmitting (jamming). Another way to increase survivability is to employ the jammers in areas of high
civilian density. Additional man-portable jammers can be distributed to other guerrilla units with
instructions on how, where, and when to use them. Sappers can infiltrate enemy compounds and
surreptitiously emplace man-portable jammers.
Integration Squad
3-96. The integration squad performs signals intelligence (SIGINT) analysis, collection management, and
reporting for the intelligence and EW platoon. It receives guidance from the reconnaissance company
operations officer through the platoon leader. This squad also disseminates intelligence information based
on the analysis of intercepted data and emitter locations.
SAPPER COMPANY
3-97. Sappers are guerrillas trained to perform some functions typically associated with raiders, engineers,
or rangers. Sappers are not engineers. The sapper company of a guerrilla brigade typically consists of
A headquarters and service section.
Three sapper platoons.
A transport section.
A guerrilla brigade can form more than one sapper company.
3-98. The structure and capabilities of the sapper platoons are likely to be quite similar to those of the
sapper platoon in a guerrilla battalion. (See Sapper Platoon under Guerrilla Battalion, below, for more
detail on the nature of sappers and the types of functions they can perform.) The main difference may be in
the scope of sapper activities. Sapper platoons, particularly those of a guerrilla brigade, can serve as an
independent combat force making deep thrusts from different directions simultaneously. However, a sapper
platoon or individual squads may also be allocated to accompany and support a guerrilla battalion, guerrilla
company, or HK company. The sappers may also augment other sapper squads, HK teams, and other
guerrilla units as necessary.
3-99. Sappers can perform the following functions:
Infiltrate enemy installations and areas.
Scout (making accurate diagrams for future attacks).
Guide other sappers or guerrillas (or affiliated SPF) through enemy lines and obstacles to
perform their missions.
Conduct route reconnaissance.
Conduct mine warfare.
Breach obstacles.
Emplace mines (especially nuisance minefield, IEDs and signal flares).
Conduct general demolition.
Emplace field expedient fortifications and obstacles (such as cratering).
Set side-attack mines.
Support antitank and countermobility operations.
Conduct and/or assist in ambushes.
Employ limited smoke or expedient obscurants.
Provide general engineer-like support.
See Sapper Platoon under Guerrilla Battalion, below, for more detail on which squad(s) within a sapper
platoon typically perform each of these functions. However, all squad members are cross-trained to
perform all sapper functions.
3-100. The transport section of a sapper company transports equipment and a basic load of mines and
demolition materiel. It includes support personnel armed with light machineguns, who are dispersed among
the trucks while moving.
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Chapter 3
TRANSPORT COMPANY
3-101. The transport company of the guerrilla brigade typically consists of a headquarters and service
section and three transport platoons. The structure and capabilities of these platoons are likely to be quite
similar to those of the transport platoon of a guerrilla battalion (see below). Some guerrilla brigades may
not require a full transport company. Only one or two platoons may suffice.
SIGNAL PLATOON
3-102. The signal platoon of a guerrilla brigade typically consists of a platoon headquarters and two signal
sections. Each signal section typically has a section headquarters, a courier squad, voice squad, digital
team, and wire team. The structure and capabilities of these sections are likely to be quite similar to those
of the signal section of a guerrilla battalion (see below for details). A designated signal platoon truck
primarily supports operations conducted in a main CP. It is equipped with a small satellite communications
(SATCOM) antenna, digital, and secure communications. Depending on mission requirements, other light
trucks and trailers provide the mobility for the platoon and its squads or teams.
MEDICAL PLATOON
3-103. The medical platoon of a guerrilla brigade typically consists of a platoon headquarters and two
medical sections. These sections have the same structure and capabilities as the medical section of a
guerrilla battalion (see below). The platoon provides immediate medical care, trauma stabilization, and
minor surgical actions. An officer (physician) or medical assistant (physicians assistant) and senior
noncommissioned officers provide limited medical intervention, minor surgery, and treatment. Guerrilla
commanders may mobilize local medical personnel from the population to treat their ill and wounded. The
guerrilla force has a limited inpatient capability. Whenever possible, medical functions are performed in
tents, tunnels, caves, or local accommodations. Severe and longer-term care relies on evacuation to civilian,
military, or other medical facilities. More routine and excess ill and wounded are backhauled in general-
purpose cargo vehicles.
3-104. Guerrilla medical support is coupled with local medical assets in the area when available.
Maximum use is made of local medical assistance and facilities regardless of capability. In some instances,
the brigade medical platoon may attempt to operate in conjunction with the assets of a village clinic. Local
sympathizers may volunteer their homes, equipment, vehicles, and services. They may also assist in the
evacuation of wounded guerrillas to civilian facilities.
3-105. Medical vehicles may be a mix of military and civilian, or all civilian. Carts may also be used to
transport wounded. Cargo trailers transport medical equipment and supplies, and in emergencies may
transport wounded. Supported guerrilla units receive liters from the medical section to transport wounded.
The guerrilla unit provides its own liter bearers.
3-106. Guerrilla medics are combatants, trained to fight as guerrillas. They fight when necessary to
support the guerrilla mission. A medical aid station is usually set up at battalion level while other medics
accompany guerrillas in the fight. Medical platoon personnel may be a mixture of men and women.
Women may comprise at least 50 percent or more of the medical platoon strength.
GUERRILLA BATTALION
3-107. The composition of a typical guerrilla battalion is as follows:
Battalion headquarters.
Guerrilla companies or guerrilla HK companies.
Weapons company.
Reconnaissance platoon.
Sapper platoon.
Transport platoon.
Signal section.
Medical section.
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Guerrillas
Figure 3-3 shows an example of a guerrilla battalion with two task-organized HK companies.
GUERRILLA
BATTALION
GUERRILLA
BATTALION GUERRILLA WEAPONS
HUNTER-KILLER
HQ COMPANY COMPANY COMPANY
RECON SAPPER TRANSPORT SIGNAL

PLATOON PLATOON PLATOON SECTION
MEDICAL
SECTION
Figure 3-3. Guerrilla battalion (example)
Note. HK company organizations configured from subordinate units of a guerrilla battalion are
discussed later in this chapter.
3-108. A guerrilla battalion may have as many as 1,000 guerrillas, but could be considerably smaller.
Each guerrilla battalion differs in capability, but all battalions have a similar structure of a battalion
headquarters and combat, CS, and CSS units. Depending on the number of guerrilla and/or HK companies,
the size and strengths of support units can also vary.
3-109. Often a battalion-size guerrilla unit will be tailored for a particular OE or mission. If task-
organized, capabilities may include four or five guerrilla or guerrilla HK companies, some organic battalion
units, a task-organized, composite weapons battery from a guerrilla brigade, and possibly intelligence and
EW support. A composite weapons battery could have a mix of mortar, rocket launcher, and antitank
platoons. Guerrillas can also coordinate and act in concert with local insurgent and/or higher insurgent
organizations.
3-110. A guerrilla battalion may be any combination of guerrilla companies or guerrilla HK companies.
When a battalion consists predominantly of guerrilla HK companies, its designation is a guerrilla HK
battalion. The HK company is especially effective in close environments such as urban, forest, or swamp
terrain that offers opportunities to canalize the enemy into preplanned kill zones. The HK company fights
as HK groups, sections, and teams. The guerrilla company fights as platoons, squads, and fire teams. With
sufficient equipment and resources, it can conduct sustained company-level actions.
GUERRILLA BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

3-111. The guerrilla battalion headquarters consists of a command section and a staff section. During
static operations, command and staff functions may be performed in tents, tunnels, caves, or temporary
and/or permanent local accommodations.
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Chapter 3
Command Section
3-112. The command section comprises the battalion commander, deputy commander, and the immediate
support personnel. The deputy commanders light truck may be used as a CP.
Staff Section, Guerrilla

3-113. The battalion chief of staff (COS) is part of the command group and staff, but is normally located
with the staff section in order to exercise direct control over the staff. He also controls the main CP in the
absence of the commander. The battalion staff consists of the operations officer (who also serves as the
deputy COS), the assistant operations officer, the intelligence officer, and the resources officer. Each
of these primary staff members heads a small staff section consisting of himself and one or two other
staff personnel.
3-114. The commander of the weapons company also serves as the chief of fire support. The signal
section leader also serves as the battalion communications officer. The platoon leader of the reconnaissance
platoon serves as the battalion chief of reconnaissance. The platoon leader of the transport platoon serves as
the battalion logistics officer. When the guerrilla battalion is affiliated with or subordinate to an insurgent
organization, the staff section may also have a political advisor.
3-115. Any liaison teams attached to the battalion would be under the operations officer. Liaison may
include SPF personnel for particular missions or training. Liaison may also be present from regular force
units operating in coordination with the guerrilla force.
WEAPONS COMPANY
3-116. The weapons company of a typical guerrilla battalion consists of the following:
Mortar platoon.
Multiple rocket launcher (MRL) platoon.
Antitank platoon.
Man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) squad.
Headquarters and Service Section

3-117. The headquarters and service section of the weapons company is very similar to that of the
guerrilla company, but with some additional transport and communications equipment. It typically consists
of a command team, a support team, and a supply and transport team. The weapons company commander
locates where he can best assist the battalion commander, which may often mean being colocated with the
battalion commander. The deputy commander of the weapons company (in the support team) normally is
the fire direction officer.
Fire Control Coordination Platoon

3-118. The fire coordination platoon typically consists of the platoon headquarters, a fire control section,
and an observation section. The fire control section serves as the company fire direction center. The fire
direction chief (in the fire control section) assumes the duties of the fire direction officer in the absence of
the company deputy commander. The fire control section may have a laptop-based automated fire control
system (AFCS). When available, the AFCS provides fast and accurate ballistic computations of artillery
and rocket launcher weapons, fire support coordination, message transfer in digital format and ammunition
accounting at the weapons company level. When required, an observation team accompanies a guerrilla
unit. Supported units also provide additional observers.
Mortar Platoon
3-119. The mortar platoon typically consists of a platoon headquarters and three mortar sections. The
sections normally consist of a section headquarters and two mortar squads, each with one 82-mm (or 81-
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Guerrillas
mm) mortar. A mortar squad normally consists of a squad leader, a gunner, an assistant gunner, and four
ammunition bearers. When moving dismounted, the section may require augmentation to serve as
additional ammunition bearers. The mortar section may be augmented with high-mobility all-terrain
vehicles, depending on the mission. 82-mm mortars can fire 82-mm and 81-mm ammunition including
extended-range munitions. However, this platoon may substitute 100- or 120-mm mortars for the 81- or 82-
mm mortars. As with its 81- and 82-mm counterparts, the 100-mm mortar, when broken down in three
parts, can be man-packed or animal-carried, or the complete weapon can be carried on a light vehicle. The
120-mm mortars may also be substituted; however, this heavy mortar requires a tactical vehicle or light
truck to transport each mortar.
3-120. Some mortar platoons may have only four mortars, consisting of two mortar sections of two
mortars each. The mortar platoon receives transportation support from the either the headquarters and
service company or the battalion transport platoon. Additional ammunition bearers may be used
when required.
Multiple Rocket Launcher Platoon

3-121. The MRL platoon typically consists of a platoon headquarters and three MRL sections, with one
MRL per section. It can be employed as a platoon or broken down into separate sections to support
subordinate companies or HK groups. The platoon receives transportation support from the either the
batterys headquarters and service company or the battalion transport platoon. The wheeled MRL carriage
can be towed by almost any vehicle or pulled by personnel or a yoked animal. In some cases, the MRL
can be mounted on a vehicle. When moving dismounted for any distance, an MRL section may require
augmentation of personnel to serve as additional ammunition bearers or to move the MRL. Some
versions of the 107-mm MRL can be broken down into man-packable loads. Light trucks that serve as
prime movers for the towed MRLs may also transport other assets of the weapons company, such as
mortars or recoilless guns.
3-122. In lieu of MRLs, some platoons may have single-tube rocket launchers. In that case, 12 single-tube
launchers replace each 12-tube MRL, and extra porters or ammunition bearers are required. Improvised
107-mm rocket firing pads can be constructed using dirt, bamboo frames, or crossed stakes.
Antitank Platoon
3-123. The AT platoon typically consists of a platoon headquarters, an antitank guided missile (ATGM)
section, and a recoilless gun section. The AT platoon normally has no vehicles. The ATGM section and
recoilless gun section may receive transportation support from the weapons companys headquarters and
service section or the battalion transport platoon. They may also be transported on the vehicles belonging to
the MRL platoon.
3-124. The ATGM section typically consists of a section headquarters and three ATGM teams. It may be
employed as a section or allocated by team to guerrilla or HK companies. These teams may also be
integrated into HK teams throughout the battalion. One person can fire the man-portable ATGM; however,
the crew normally consists of an ATGM gunner (team leader) and assistant gunner. The team may also
include one or more riflemen to provide security and/or carry additional missiles.
3-125. The recoilless gun section typically consists of a section headquarters and three recoilless gun
teams. It may be employed as a section or allocated by team to guerrilla or HK companies. A team
normally consists of a gunner (team leader), an assistant gunner, and a varying number of ammunition
bearers. A 73-mm recoilless gun is man-portable, but is usually carried in a vehicle or cart. Some versions
may have removable wheels; when towed, it requires a crew of three. When transported only by the crew,
the weapon requires a crew of at least four, including an additional ammunition bearer. Some recoilless gun
teams may use civilian personnel and vehicles from the local population to assist in transporting the
weapon and ammunition.
MANPADS Squad
3-126. The MANPADS squad typically has two MANPADS launchers and one heavy machinegun. The
entire MANPADS squad may be employed together, or it can be broken down into three teams. In the latter
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-19

Chapter 3
option, two teams with a single MANPADS launcher each and one team with the heavy machinegun can be
deployed with guerrilla or HK companies.
3-127. If the squad has a light truck, the vehicle can carry up to five missiles for each MANPADS
launcher. When dismounted, each MANPADS gunner carries a gripstock launcher and one missile. The
MANPADS assistant gunner carries one additional missile; he also carries the electronic plotting board and
enters location and direction data of approaching targets. Local civilian personnel and vehicles may
transport additional missiles. The senior MANPADS gunner is the assistant squad leader.
RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON
3-128. The reconnaissance platoon of a guerrilla battalion typically consists of a platoon headquarters and
three reconnaissance squads. Each squad can break down into two or three teams. One scout per squad is
designated as the sniper (or marksman) and uses a sniper rifle.
3-129. Based on the situation, the platoon may be dismounted or mounted in light trucks or on
motorcycles. Surveillance and communications equipment is man-portable, but some equipment may
require vehicle support. Some scouts may be assigned additional duty as a motorcycle or light truck drivers.
The reconnaissance squads may not be able to lift all their personnel and equipment at one time without
augmentation. The squads may be carried part way on a patrol and dismounted. They are then picked up on
the way back. Depending on the mission, the platoon may also be augmented with military or civilian
vehicles (trucks, cars, motorcycles, bicycles, carts, or high-mobility all-terrain vehicles) or with additional
personnel and equipment from guerrilla companies.
3-130. Each reconnaissance squad normally has a motorcycle, which extends the range of the squad.
Motorcycles can be used to support their individual squad, or they can be grouped together to serve as a
high-mobility reconnaissance squad. For longer patrols, the motorcycles can be loaded into a light truck.
3-131. Each reconnaissance squad is equipped with long-range cordless telephones (LRCTs). The LRCT
base station remains with the squad vehicle and serves as a retransmission station for the patrols. Digital
cameras, camcorders, or computers may be linked to the LRCTs for transmittal to the platoon headquarters
or battalion via the squad base station. The LRCT base station vehicle must remain within range of the
LRCTs used by the squad or by teams within the squad.
3-132. Reconnaissance personnel may wear civilian clothes and use common civilian model trucks, cars,
motorcycles, mopeds, motor scooters, or bicycles. In this case, the guerrilla would probably not have an
overt weapon or radio and would appear to be a noncombatant. Local sympathizers may provide assistance
and information.
SAPPER PLATOON
3-133. Sappers are guerrillas trained to perform some functions typically associated with raiders,
engineers, or rangers. Sappers are not engineers. Guerrilla battalions may use sappers in an assault and/or
demolition role. In a raider role, sappers are the lead or primary (assault) element in an assault on fixed
installations or military field positions. Armed primarily with explosives charges, sappers breach the
defensive perimeter and neutralize designated positions in advance of the attacking main body. The sapper
unit can serve as an independent combat force making deep thrusts from different directions in the enemy-
held region. At other times, they can accompany and support guerrilla and HK missions throughout an
AOR. The sappers also augment other sapper squads, HK teams, and other guerrilla units as necessary.
Sappers may also serve as a stay-behind or independent unit to conduct disruption operations. The sapper
platoon also coordinates suicide bombings.
3-134. Guerrilla sappers (or their SPF advisors from a regular military force) can also train local civilians
to be sappers. The sappers may be a mix of men, women, and children. Women and children may be used
as runners, messengers, scouts, guides, drivers, porters, fighters, suicide bombers, lookouts, or in several
other roles.
3-135. A guerrilla battalion may form more than one sapper platoon. A sapper platoon typically is
organized as
3-20 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Guerrillas
A platoon headquarters.
An infiltration and scout squad.
A mine warfare and demolition squad.
An improvised explosives and signal flares squad.
A general support squad.
Text below outlines the functions normally associated with each of these squads. However, all squad
members are trained to perform all sapper functions. Each squad normally carries a mix of mines and
demolitions. The mix varies according to the mission. A trailer may transport equipment and a basic load of
mines and demolitions and may be dropped off to be recovered later.
Infiltration and Scout Squad

3-136. The infiltration and scout squad serves as a sapper/raider element and may
Serve as the lead or primary (assault) element in an assault on a fixed installation or a military
field position.
Set demolitions and side-attack mines.
Serve as scouts (making accurate diagrams for future attacks).
Conduct route reconnaissance.
Guide other sappers or guerrillas (or affiliated SPF) through enemy lines and obstacles to
perform their missions.
Conduct and/or assist in ambushes.
A truck may transport squad personnel to an appropriate dismount point and return to the platoon.
Mine Warfare and Demolition Squad

3-137. The mine warfare and demolition squad may
Conduct mine warfare.
Breach obstacles.
Emplace mines (especially nuisance minefield, IEDs and signal flares).
Support antitank and countermobility operations.
Scatter mines using a man-portable mine-scattering system.
Lay controlled minefields.
field position.
A trailer typically transports equipment and a basic load of mines and demolitions. It may be dropped to be
recovered later. Minelaying operations may require a truck on-site to off-load the mines.
Improvised Explosives and Signal flares Squad

3-138. The improvised explosives and signal flares squad may
Manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and signal flares. (Signal flares are actually a
subcategory of IEDs.)
Emplace and/or detonate the IEDs. (Signal flares are triggered by the unsuspecting.)
Provide IEDs (or signal flares) to other trained sappers or guerrillas to emplace and/or detonate.
field position.
Augment other sapper squads and HK teams as necessary.
Coordinate suicide bombings.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-21

Chapter 3
Note. Guerrillas (and other irregular OPFOR) commonly use IEDs as secondary devices to
detonate on the arrival of responding personnel. IEDs can be detonated by a variety of means,
including remote, command, electrical trip wire, pressure, time, and others.
General Support Squad

3-139. The general support squad may
Provide general engineer-like support to the sapper platoon or the guerrilla battalion.
Employ limited smoke or expedient obscurants.
Provide water purification and minor construction.
Emplace field expedient fortifications and obstacles (such as cratering).
Conduct general demolition.
Conduct assault breaching.
Emplace anti-vehicle wire obstacles.
Augment other sapper squads and HK teams as necessary.
field position.
TRANSPORT PLATOON
3-140. The transport platoon of a guerrilla battalion typically has a platoon headquarters and two transport
sections. The platoon leader serves as the battalion logistics officer.
3-141. Each transport section operates with three light trucks and five medium trucks. Single- and two-
axle trailers provide additional cargo capacity. Water and POL trailers are augmented with flexible storage
bladders for both water and fuel. The transport platoon assists in transporting assets of the battalions
weapons company (mortars, rocket launchers, antitank weapons, and munitions) whenever necessary.
Whenever possible, corner-mounted mechanical hoists are used to load and unload the vehicles.
3-142. Vehicles are generally a mix of older civilianized military and civilian models, or all civilian
models. They will not appear to be or look like military vehicles and are intended to be indistinguishable
from civilian vehicles. The vehicles are kept as dispersed as possible, in order to prevent detection and
destruction by enemy forces. Rarely, if ever, will all vehicles in the transport platoon be colocated.
Vehicles may be dispersed for use by locals as commercial, delivery, agricultural, general cargo,
construction, militia, or general-purpose vehicles in everyday life. When required, the transport platoon
leader (battalion logistics officer) or the battalion resources officer will assemble the appropriate mix of
vehicles to transport specific items to a specific location. The vehicles can then melt back into the civilian
population when not assembled to support guerrilla operations. Guerrillas do not use static truck parks or
assembly areas for vehicles.
3-143. The cargo trucks normally carry materiel to meet only the immediate combat needs of the guerrilla
battalion. At other times, they may transport materiel for caches and prepositioning. When necessary,
additional transportation support may be received from higher headquarters or external sources.
Transportation can be augmented with vehicles, draft animals, or bearers/porters requisitioned or
confiscated from the local citizenry. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. Local
civilian mechanics service and/or repair the vehicles when required.
SIGNAL SECTION
3-144. The signal section of a guerrilla battalion typically consists of a section headquarters, a courier
squad, a voice squad, a digital team, and a wire team. The signal section leader also serves as the battalion
communications officer.
3-145. The courier squad typically uses motorcycles, mopeds, motor scooters, or bicycles of the same
types commonly used by the local population. High-mobility or all terrain vehicles may be substituted for
3-22 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Guerrillas
motorcycles. The courier may be a male or female in civilian clothes. In this case, the courier probably will
not have an overt weapon or radio and will appear to be a noncombatant. Another guerrilla may ride with
the courier as a lookout or to provide security. (In the latter case, the additional rider could have a rifle or
light machinegun.) Depending on the circumstances, some couriers may not use vehicles at all. Message
transmission can be written, digital, or memorized and presented orally to a designated recipient. The
courier squad can also conduct drive-by shootings or attacks.
3-146. The voice squad supports operations conducted in the battalion headquarters. A signal truck
primarily supports the battalion main CP. It is equipped with a small SATCOM antenna and can provide
digital and secure communications. Depending on mission requirements, organization, and terrain, two
light trucks may be substituted for the signal truck. Some staff communications are remoted back to the
signal section.
3-147. The digital team is responsible for all digital communications between the battalion command
section and staff, to other battalion subordinates, and to higher headquarters. It also provides a remote
communications capability. The team is equipped with a small SATCOM antenna and long-range cordless
telephones, and provides secure communications.
3-148. The wire team is responsible for all wire (landline) communications between the battalion
command section and staff and the subordinate units. It also provides a remote communications capability.
Landline communications are used whenever possible.
MEDICAL SECTION
3-149. The medical section of a guerrilla battalion is responsible for temporary medical treatment. A
medical aid station is usually established at battalion level with a number of medics directly supporting
guerrillas in the fight. Supported guerrilla units receive liters from the medical section to transport
wounded. The guerrilla unit provides its own liter bearers. Cargo trailers transport medical equipment and
supplies. In emergencies, the trailers may transport wounded. These trailers may be dropped at the aid
station when light trucks serve as ambulances. Evacuation and transportation may be a mix of military and
civilian vehicles, wagons, or carts. Whenever possible, medical functions are performed in tents, tunnels,
caves, or local accommodations. Local medical support may be available. Civilian sympathizers may
volunteer use of their facilities, vehicles, and services, or may be coerced into providing temporary medical
assistance. (For additional information on medical support, see the Medical Platoon under Guerrilla
Brigade, above.)
Note. Guerrilla medics are combatants, trained to fight as guerrillas. They fight when necessary
to support the guerrilla mission.
GUERRILLA COMPANY
3-150. A typical guerrilla company consists of
Three guerrilla platoons.
Weapons platoon.
HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE SECTION

3-151. The headquarters and service section of the company has a command team, support team, and
supply and transport team. The command team consists of the company commander, a radio telephone
operator (RTO) and a messenger-runner. The support team is the deputy commander, first sergeant, an
RTO, and a medic. The supply and transport team consists of the supply sergeant, drivers, and trucks that
provide the company a degree of autonomy from the guerrilla battalion.
3-152. Figure 3-4 shows an example of such a company. A guerrilla company fights as platoons, squads,
and fire teams (see Guerrilla Company, below).
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-23

Chapter 3
GUERRILLA
COMPANY
HQ & SVC GUERRILLA WEAPONS

SECTION PLATOON PLATOON
Figure 3-4. Guerrilla company (example)
WEAPONS PLATOON
3-153. The weapons platoon of a guerrilla company typically consists of a platoon headquarters, a mortar
section, a recoilless gun section, a machinegun section, and a sniper section. Weapons of this platoon
provide a heavy volume of fires and extend the range of weapons effects beyond the range of guerrilla
platoon weapons. The platoon receives additional transportation support from the supply and transport team
of the companys headquarters and service section. Unless vehicles are available, ammunition for the
platoons mortars and recoilless guns may require additional ammunition bearers and may be distributed
among members of the company. This platoon may also allocate weapons to individual guerrilla platoons.
When a guerrilla company is task-organized into an HK company, the weapons platoon typically ceases to
exist as a separate unit. Its weapons are then redistributed among various parts of the HK company.
Mortar Section
3-154. The mortar section typically consists of three mortar squads. The mortar section leader serves as
the squad leader of one of the three motor squads. The mortar section may be employed as a section or
allocated by squad to guerrilla platoons.
Recoilless Gun Section

3-155. The recoilless gun section typically consists of a section headquarters and three recoilless gun
teams. It may be employed as a section or allocated by team to guerrilla platoons.
Machinegun Section
3-156. The machinegun section typically consists of a section headquarters and three machinegun teams.
It may be employed as a section, or it may be allocated to support separate guerrilla platoons, in addition to
their own machinegun sections. Depending on the tactical circumstances, some machinegun sections may
have additional ammunition bearers.
Sniper Section
3-157. The sniper section typically consists of two sniper teams. The section leader serves as the team
leader of one sniper team. Each sniper team consists of a team leader/observer (spotter), a sniper (shooter)/
target designator, and an assistant sniper. The assistant sniper provides additional security, transports
equipment, and may serve as a backup for the sniper or observer. See chapter 16 of TC 7-100.2 for the
differences between snipers and marksmen and between snipers (or marksmen) in guerrilla forces and those
found in regular military forces.
3-158. The primary mission of the sniper section is to serve in a sniper-countersniper role. Depending on
mission requirements, a sniper team may also serve as a reconnaissance element, stay-behind element, or
part of an HK team.
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Guerrillas
Note. When a guerilla company is restructured into an HK company, the whole sniper section
typically becomes part of the HK companys headquarters and command section (a section
within a section). However, the section may allocate some or all of its snipers to be part of
HK teams.
GUERRILLA PLATOON
3-159. A guerrilla platoon typically consists of a platoon headquarters, three guerrilla squads, and a
machinegun section. Figure 3-5 shows an example of such a platoon. The size of the guerrilla platoon can
vary, and its weapons, equipment, and manning can be tailored for specific missions. One guerrilla in each
platoon is typically cross-trained as a medic in addition to primary duty as a rifleman.
GUERRILLA
PLATOON
PLATOON GUERRILLA MACHINEGUN

HQ SQUAD SECTION
Figure 3-5. Guerrilla platoon (example)
GUERRILLA SQUAD
3-160. The guerrilla squad consists of at least two maneuver fire teams (or HK teams). The squad leader
normally commands one fire team while the assistant squad leader commands a second fire team. Each
team typically consists of the leader, a machinegunner, a grenadier, an assistant grenadier, and either two
rifleman or one rifleman and a guerrilla designated as a sniper or marksman. (See chapter 16 of TC 7-100.2
for the differences between snipers and marksmen and between snipers [or marksmen] in guerrilla forces
and those found in regular military forces.) The squad may be augmented by elements from the
machinegun section to create three or possibly four maneuver fire teams or HK teams.
3-161. Fire teams structure around one machinegun with remaining team members normally equipped
with assault rifles. The riflemen support squad members with other weapons, including the machinegunner,
the grenadier, a sniper or marksman, or augmentation from the guerrilla platoons machinegun section or
the companys weapons platoon.
MACHINEGUN SECTION
3-162. The machinegun section, consisting of three teams. It may be employed as a section, or it may be
allocated to support separate guerrilla squads. This tailoring of capability enables a guerrilla squad to
operate with three or possibly four maneuver fire teams or HK teams. When a guerrilla platoon is
restructured as an HK group, the personnel and equipment of the machinegun section typically are
dispersed among HK sections and teams.
GUERRILLA HUNTER-KILLER COMPANY

3-163. The guerrilla company can be augmented and restructured into a guerrilla hunter-killer (HK)
company made up of numerous small HK teams. Those teams are typically organized into HK sections and
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-25

Chapter 3
the sections into HK groups. The HK team structure is ideal for dispersed combat such as fighting in urban
areas and can provide similar capabilities in rural terrain when cover and concealment and channelized
avenues favor the guerrilla. Tailored HK units are usually a company-level configuration; however,
complete battalions and brigades can be organized for combat as HK units.
3-164. An HK company is based on the personnel and equipment originally found in a guerrilla company.
However, the HK company may have additional equipment due to the dispersed nature of HK team
employment. For example, it typically would have additional antitank disposable launchers and flame
weapons. It may also have three additional 60-mm mortars, possibly dispersed to one team in each HK
group. These additional weapons do not necessarily require additional personnel.
3-165. The guerrilla company task-organized as an HK company typically consists of a headquarters and
command section and three HK groups. Typically, each HK group has four HK sections, and each HK
section has three HK teams. Figure 3-6 shows an example of such a company.
GUERRILLA
HUNTER-KILLER
COMPANY
HUNTER-
HQ & CMD
KILLER
SECTION GROUP
HUNTER-
COMMAND COMPANY SNIPER COMPANY KILLER
TEAM TRAINS SECTION SCOUTS SECTION
HUNTER-
KILLER
TEAM
Figure 3-6. Guerrilla hunter-killer company (example)

3-166. An HK company structured as in figure 3-6 can contain a total of 36 HK teams. If the two sniper
teams and the company scouts in the headquarters and command section are counted, the HK company can
have a total of 39 HK teams.
Note. When a guerrilla platoon is task-organized into an HK group, its machinegun section
ceases to exist as a separate unit. Its personnel and equipment are distributed among HK sections
and teams. Likewise, when a guerrilla company is restructured into an HK company, the
weapons platoon typically ceases to exist as a separate unit. Its weapons are then redistributed
among various parts of the HK company.
HEADQUARTERS AND COMMAND SECTION

3-167. The headquarters and command section of an HK company typically comprises the command
team, company trains, a sniper section, and company scouts. The company commander and the rest of the
command team locate with HK fighting elements. The deputy commander remains in charge of the
3-26 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Guerrillas
company trains. The former weapons platoon sergeant now serves as the senior sergeant in the trains. The
former weapons platoon leader now performs as a deputy commander for tactics, as part of the command
team. When required, the sniper section and company scouts provide flexible capabilities for additional
HK teams.
Sniper Section
3-168. The primary mission of the sniper section is to serve in a sniper-countersniper role. The sniper
section consists of two sniper teams. Each sniper team has three members. The section leader serves as the
team leader of one sniper team, and each team leader also acts as the observer/spotter. Other team members
are a sniper (shooter)/target designator and an assistant sniper. The assistant sniper provides additional
security, transports equipment, and may serve as backup for other team members. A sniper team may also
serve as a reconnaissance element, a stay-behind element, or as part of an HK team.
Note. When a guerrilla company is restructured into an HK company, the sniper section of the
former weapons platoon typically becomes part of the HK companys headquarters and
command section (therefore a section within a section).
Company Scouts
3-169. The company scouts typically comprise one team of four members, three of whom normally come
from the former weapons platoon of a guerrilla company. The scout team leader and senior scout is the
former recoilless gun section leader. The assistant team leader is the former machinegun section leader. The
scout who acts as radio telephone operator (RTO) is the former RTO for the weapons platoon. The remaining
scout is a former supply specialist with the headquarters and services section of the guerrilla company.
HUNTER-KILLER GROUP
3-170. An HK group is basically a task-organized guerrilla platoon. The HK group typically has a group
headquarters and four HK sections, each with three HK teams. (See figure 3-6 on page 3-26.) HK teams in
each HK section may vary in their manning, weapons, and equipment. Equipment may be transferred
among HK sections and teams. As in the guerrilla platoon, one of the guerrillas in the group is cross-trained
as a medic.
SECTIONS ONE, TWO, AND THREE

3-171. Sections one, two, and three are typically formed by augmenting the three squads of a guerrilla
platoon with personnel and equipment from that platoons machinegun section. Each of these three sections
has three teams, designated as HK teams one, two, and three. Each of the subordinate teams may differ, as
in the following examples:
The section leader also serves as team leader of team one.
Team one has a designated sniper or marksman.
Teams one and two each have a grenadier and assistant grenadier.
All three teams have a machinegunner, and team three, based on a machinegun team from the
machinegun section, also has an assistant machinegunner for its crew-served weapon.
Teams two and three have other riflemen who also have duties as ammunition bearers or
operators of antitank disposable launchers or flame weapons.
SECTION FOUR
3-172. Section four has a different task-organized HK structure because it comes from the guerrilla
companys weapons platoon. The weapons platoon had three machineguns, three mortars, and three
recoilless guns. One of each of these weapons goes to the section four of each of the three HK groups in the
HK company. In section four, these weapons form the basis for team one (machinegun), team two (mortar),
and team three (recoilless gun). The teams may receive additional transportation support from the company
trains in the headquarters and command section of the HK company.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 3-27

Chapter 3
TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

3-173. Functional tactics (see chapter 7) are characteristic of a guerrilla force. However, guerrillas may
also use terrorism tactics and techniques (see chapter 6). Functional tactics and terrorism are not mutually
exclusive. Guerrillas can use both forms of violent action simultaneously. Guerrillas also apply a full range
of information warfare (INFOWAR) capabilities to exhaust enemy resolve (see appendix A).
FLEXIBILITY
3-174. Depending on conditions, guerrilla actions can include a wide spectrum of offensive and defensive
actions. Guerrilla organizations are capable of independent actions or may be affiliated with regular
military forces and/or insurgent organizations. Actions may be conducted in close coordination with regular
military forces when such support is available. In a long-term conflict, this close association with regular
military forces can lead to integration of highly trained guerrilla forces into the regular military forces.
Specific weapons, equipment, manning, and materiel provide the level of combat power or sophistication
required for a particular situation. Guerrilla actions are characterized by elusiveness, surprise, and brief,
violent action. Guerrillas can use a broad range of tactics, from terrorism and sabotage through functional
tactics similar to those used by regular military forces. This enables them to escalate or deescalate activity
almost at will. They apply whatever tactics and techniques best fit the specific situation.
3-175. Guerrilla unit actions may be as large as several brigade-level operations or be as small as a
platoon raid or independent HK team ambush. Guerrilla organizations and capabilities can be tailored for
brigade, battalion, company, platoon, and squad or team levels of action. The objective of guerrilla actions
by small independent forces is often to harass, delay, or disrupt enemy operations. The objective of small
forces may be to inflict casualties and damage on the enemy rather than to seize and defend terrain. In the
latter case, operations are characterized by the extensive use of surprise.
FUNCTIONAL TACTICS
3-176. Guerrillas, as part of the irregular OPFOR, use variants of the same functional tactics described in
TC 7-100.2 for smaller regular military units or SPF. (See chapter 7 for more detail on these functional
tactics and examples of how guerrillas can use them.)
3-177. When guerrilla forces first become operational, they usually engage in limited or small-scale
activities and operations. If they reach more sophisticated levels of organization, equipment, and training,
then they may conduct larger operations using more complex forms of functional tactics, perhaps in
conjunction with regular military forces.
Offensive Action
3-178. Guerrillas typically use hit-and-run attacks by lightly armed, small forces. Their tactics emphasize
ambushes, raids, snipers, rocket and mortar attacks, and the use of explosive devices. Guerrilla actions are
generally offensive, not defensive, and are often harassing in nature. Guerrillas seldom attempt to seize and
defend physical objectives and, in general, avoid decisive engagement, unless they know they can win.
Their overall aim is often to cause confusion, to destroy infrastructure or security forces, and to lower
enemy morale. Guerrilla harassment attempts to keep enemy forces on the defensive and weaken them,
which can include destroying resources and disrupting lines of communication (LOCs). One advantage of
harassment is that it may create the perception that the guerrillas can strike anywhere and that the enemy
cannot prevent it. In rural areas, guerrillas may seize a remote area or conduct raids and small-scale attacks
on remote targets and LOCs.
3-179. Even when small guerrilla units are under the command of a guerrilla battalion or brigade, this
does not necessarily mean a mass concentration of personnel. On the contrary, small units remain dispersed
throughout the area. When enemy forces outnumber the guerrillas, the guerrillas seek to attain local
numerical superiority. If guerrillas can successfully concentrate, they can attain victory over small elements
of enemy forces. Guerrillas often use simple techniques of speed, surprise, maneuver, and especially
infiltration. (See Infiltration, below.)
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Guerrillas
3-180. Guerrillas use dispersion during their movements. However, near the target area, small guerrilla
units mass and then conduct offensive actions. (See Swarming, below.) While the guerrillas are
outnumbered by enemy forces, they seek to attain local numerical superiority. In this way, they can attain
victory over small elements of enemy forces. The most common techniques employed by guerrillas are the
ambush, raid, and small-scale assaults or reconnaissance attacks. These techniques usually target security
posts, small forces, facilities, and LOCs. These tactics, if successful, may compel enemy forces to commit
larger elements to defensive tasks. Guerrillas can employ some of the types of offensive action also used by
smaller tactical units of the regular OPFOR. (See chapter 7 for basic discussion of these offensive actions.)
Such actions can include
Ambush.
Assault.
Raid.
Reconnaissance attack.
Defensive Action
3-181. Guerrilla strength, equipment, and training is almost always inferior to that of the enemy.
Therefore, unless forced to do otherwise by the enemy, guerrilla forces hold defensive positions only for
brief periods in support of other actions by guerrilla or affiliated regular forces. Guerrilla forces usually
defend themselves by flight or dispersion, by withdrawals, or by creating diversions. Whenever possible,
defensive actions are accomplished by offensive raids and ambushes against the enemys flanks and rear.
Guerrillas may also try to ambush the initial enemy attack force to inflict maximum casualties.
3-182. When faced with a large-scale enemy offensive action, a guerrilla commander may chose to
Defend the area against attack.
Disperse units or individuals until the enemy offensive is over.
Conduct diversionary activities in other areas.
Withdraw into another area not likely to be included in the enemy offensive.
Withdraw in a wide, circling movement and then attack against the enemys rear and base
installations.
3-183. The object of the defense may be to make the attack so expensive for the enemy that he will soon
abandon it and will not wish to try it again. The guerrilla force seeks to avoid being pinned down so that it
can be encircled and destroyed. As the enemy overcomes various defensive positions, the defenders
withdraw to subsequent defensive positions or break up and infiltrate through the enemys lines and attack
his rear, flanks, and supply installations. The principles of guerrilla defense of fixed positions are the same
as those applicable to regular forces, except that there are fewer supporting fires and that counterattacks are
not practicable. Maximum use is made of complex terrain, defensive works, and mines.
Guerrillas can employ some of the types of defensive action also used by smaller tactical units of the
regular OPFOR. (See chapter 7 for basic discussion of these defensive actions.) Such actions can include
defense of a simple battle position and/or defense of a complex battle position.
TERRORISM
3-184. Guerrillas can also use terrorism achieve psychological impact. See chapter 6 for terrorism tactics
and techniques that guerrillas can use.
INFILTRATION
3-185. Land infiltration involves the use of various modes of transportation or techniques such as
commercial vehicles, railway trains, or infiltration on foot, possibly along with refugees. Before the
mission, the guerrilla unit is briefed on the known locations of selected individuals who will furnish
assistance and on the established means of contacting them. These individuals may be used as local guides
and sources of information, food, and shelter. Since there are local sources for survival items, the unit can
restrict the equipment and supplies to be carried to mission-essential items (individual arms, equipment,
and communications gear).
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Chapter 3
3-186. A very successful infiltration method used by guerrillas (and/or affiliated SPF) is to infiltrate under
the guise of reconnaissance probes. This is especially successful when the SPF are either guiding or using
affiliated guerrilla forces, from a team of three to four men to a squad, or a platoon, or even a company.
The guerrilla forces and/or SPF conduct small probes along the enemy defensive positions. If the enemy
does not respond to these probes, the guerrilla forces and/or SPF infiltrate in small numbers and spread out.
This permits larger numbers to penetrate. Once behind enemy lines, one team may cut off the escape route
of the enemy, while the other units conduct a coordinated assault on both the front and flanks. The attacks
will continue on all sides until the defenders are destroyed or forced to withdraw. The guerrilla forces
and/or SPF will then move stealthily forward to the open flank of the next enemy position and repeat
the tactics.
3-187. The OPFOR also conducts another very successful variation of this infiltration and subsequent
action. Another very successful variant is that the guerrilla forces and/or SPF do not immediately attack as
soon as they are successfully behind enemy lines. Once behind the enemy, they may wait a few hours or up
to 3 days or more and may number as much as a full guerrilla company or even a battalion, depending on
the circumstances. Once emplaced either behind the enemy or more likely behind and on both flanks of the
enemy, the infiltrated force then waits for the main attack. If the main attack is successful, the enemy will
either retreat or fall back. At that time, the infiltrated guerrilla forces and/or SPF will ambush and destroy
the remaining enemy forces. If the main attack is faltering or appears as if it may fail, the infiltrated
guerrilla forces and/or SPF simultaneously attack from both the rear and flanks, ensuring victory.
SWARMING
3-188. Swarming is a tactic that results in the convergent attack(s), from multiple directions, and possibly
multiple dimensions, by numerous elements on a single target(s). Guerrillas can use this type of attack,
especially when accompanied by affiliated SPF. SPF teams can plan or otherwise facilitate the attack and
may or may not accompany their surrogate forces conducting the swarming attack.
3-189. There are two basic types of swarming: the massed swarm and the dispersed swarm. In the massed
swarm, the elements begin as a massed (assembled) unit. On command, the elements then disassemble and
conduct a convergent attack(s) to swarm the enemy from numerous directions. In the dispersed swarm, the
elements are geographically dispersed from the beginning. On command, the elements infiltrate. Once
prepared, they attack (from their respective directions), converging on the enemy without forming a single
massed unit. Swarms are equally effective in both the offense and the defense.
3-190. Of the two types of swarming, the dispersed swarm is the most difficult to defend against because
the attacking elements never present a massed target. Guerrillas prefer to use the dispersed swarm attack
where the attackers are initially dispersed, then converge on the target(s). It is more appropriate to the
dispersed fight that guerrillas, and affiliated SPF, prefer. Once the attack is complete, the attacking
elements can either dissipate into the local population, exfiltrate back to where they came from, or move to
hide positions or sanctuary (possibly cross-border).
STAY-BEHIND
3-191. Guerrilla forces, usually HK teams, may remain in areas formerly under guerrilla (or other Hybrid
Threat component) control, or areas not previously occupied by the enemy. If SPF teams are also present in
such areas, they can help organize the guerrilla force to conduct surveillance or direct action. Stringent
precautions are taken to preserve security, particularly that of the refuge areas or other safe sites to be used
during the initial period of enemy occupation. Information concerning locations and identities within the
indigenous guerrilla organization is kept on a need-to-know basis. Contacts among various elements use
clandestine communications. Dispersed caches, to include radio equipment, are pre-positioned when
possible. SPF can provide communications, liaison, and support to guerrilla stay-behind activities.
3-192. Guerrillas (and associated SPF personnel) have a better chance of survival in small towns, villages,
and rural areas. However, when stay-behind operations are attempted in heavily populated urban areas, the
SPF teams may be completely dependent upon the indigenous guerrilla organization for security, the
contacts required for expansion, and the buildup effort.
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Chapter 4
Criminals
Criminal elements exist at every level of society and in every operational
environment (OE). Their presence, whatever their level of capabilities, adds to the
complexity of any OE. They may be intertwined with irregular forces and possibly
with regular military and/or paramilitary forces of a nation-state. However, they may
also pursue their criminal activities independent of such other actors.
CHARACTERISTICS
4-1. Some individuals, groups, and activities are criminal or illegal only because they violate laws
established by a recognized governing authority. Others may violate moral or ethical standards of a given
society or of the international community.
Note. In some OEs, the threat is more criminal than military or paramilitary in nature.
Insurgents, guerrillas, or other armed groups often use or mimic established criminal enterprises
and practices to move contraband, raise funds, or otherwise further their goals and objectives.
4-2. Criminal activity is a category of violence that is enmeshed in the daily life of most people in both
urban and rural areas. However, criminal activity thrives in areas where there is instability and lack of
government control or law enforcement. The actions of insurgents and guerrillas further erode stability and
effective governance, creating more opportunities for criminal pursuits. Sometimes, given those
opportunities, insurgent or guerrillas themselves turn to crimeeither to sustain themselves or for personal
profit. It may be difficult to distinguish crime from ethnic feuds, ideological and theological extremism, or
other elements of a culture that incite insurgency or guerrilla warfare.
4-3. Governing authorities often characterize insurgents and guerrillas as bandits. The reason for this is
that their activities in opposing the governing authority and sustaining themselves are illegal (from the
government perspective). Acts of subversion may be against the law (that is, criminal) even if not violent.
SCOPE OF OPERATIONS
4-4. Criminal organizations are normally independent of nation-state control. Large-scale organizations
often extend beyond national boundaries to operate regionally or worldwide. Large-scale organizations may
have the capability to adversely affect legitimate political, military, and judicial organizations. However,
individual criminals or small-scale criminal organizations (gangs) typically do not. Still, any criminal
organization can affect such government organizations and/or military operations by becoming affiliated
with the irregular OPFOR or with military forces of another nation-state.
4-5. Unless a criminal organization is in league with government officials, it must operate in ungoverned
or poorly governed areas. Otherwise, the governing authority would interfere with the criminal activity. In
todays world, the ungoverned area may be virtualin the Internet and cyberspace. Criminal organizations
can draw on virtual sanctuaries such as websites, chat rooms, and blogs.
4-6. Criminal organizations desire a space where they can conduct their activities unconstrained by a
government. They may seek to create or maintain a region where there is no governmental control or only
governmental control that they can co-opt. Such an area allows them sufficient latitude to operate and
discourage rival criminal enterprises. From this base area, they can generate more and more violence and
instability over wider sections of the political map.
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Chapter 4
4-7. Some criminal organizations can generate instability and insecurity within a state or across borders.
They can become partners with insurgents in order to further their criminal ends. A criminal organization
takes on the characteristics of an insurgency when it uses subversion and violence to negate law
enforcement efforts. Some criminal organizations may seek to co-opt political power through corruption
and intimidation. The more they seek freedom of action, the more they inhibit state sovereignty. A criminal
organization may create its own form of government by providing protection and enforcing its will on the
populace. If it can challenge the governing authoritys control beyond the local level of government, it in
effect becomes an insurgency unto itself, although its ends are materially focused rather than ideological.
RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTORS

4-8. Criminal organizations may have some type of relationship with guerrilla and/or insurgent
organizations or other actors, based on similar or shared goals and/or interests. The nature of the shared
goal or interest determines the tenure and type of relationship and the degree of affiliation. Any affiliation
depends on the needs of the criminal organization at a particular time. To criminals, any cooperation with
other actors is viewed through the lens of profitability. They may actually oppose other actors whose
activities degrade their criminal enterprises.
Note. Criminals and criminal organizations, both armed and unarmed, may be considered
noncombatants as long as they are neutral. However, they may be considered as combatants if
they become affiliated with regular military or irregular forces. In the latter case, they can be
considered part of the irregular OPFOR.
Irregular Forces
4-9. By mutual agreement, or when their interests coincide, criminal organizations may become affiliated
with insurgents and/or guerrillas controlling and operating in the same area. Such allies can provide
security and protection against government forces or other common enemies. They can also provide
support to the criminal organizations activities. In exchange, the criminal organization may provide
financial assistance, advanced technologies, or weapons.
4-10. Mutual interests of criminals, insurgents, and/or guerrillas can include preventing extraregional or
local government forces from interfering in their respective spheres. The amount of mutual protection
depends on the size and sophistication of each organization and its level of influence on the government or
the local population.
4-11. On behalf of a criminal organization, insurgents or guerrillas can conduct
Diversionary actions.
Reconnaissance and early warning.
Money laundering.
Smuggling.
Transportation.
Civic actions.
4-12. Criminal organizations may not be part of an insurgency. However, their activitiessuch as theft,
hijackings, kidnappings, and smugglingcan further undermine the governing authority. Insurgent
organizations often link themselves to criminal networks to obtain funding and logistics support. In some
cases, insurgent networks and criminal networks become indistinguishable. Many insurgent organizations
are more similar to organized crime in their organizational structure and relations with the populace than
they are to military units.
Note. If an insurgent organization creates a shadow government, criminals may co-opt elements
of that government for their own benefit or reach agreements for mutual benefit.
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Criminals
Nation-State Military or Paramilitary Forces

4-13. At times, criminal organizations might also be affiliated with nation-state military and/or
paramilitary actors. In time of war, a state may encourage and materially support criminal actions that
contribute to the breakdown of civil control in a neighboring country. Regular, reserve, and militia forces of
a state can maintain various relationships with criminal organizations. Special-purpose forces (SPF) can
support criminal organizations and possibly conduct operations in conjunction with them.
Local Populace
4-14. Criminal organizations may conduct civic actions to gain and maintain support of the populace. A
grateful public can provide valuable security and support functions. The local citizenry may willingly
provide ample intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and security support. Such support can also be
the result of bribery, extortion, or coercion. For example, a criminal organization might use bribery or
extortion to induce members of the local populace to act as couriers or otherwise support its activities. It
might also coerce a businessperson into running a front company on its behalf.
Private Security Companies

4-15. Large criminal organizations may hire private security contractors (PSCs) to guard key facilities.
PSCs can also provide bodyguards for a criminal leader or conduct surveillance or a search at a site prior to
his arrival.
PERSONNEL
4-16. In most countries and cultures, criminals fall into the lower orders of social groups. However, there
are some cases in which the criminals are well known and receive a degree of respect for their adherence to
traditional social values and their public social works (civic actions).
4-17. Criminals may or may not be armed. For instance, individuals who perform money laundering or
operate front companies might not be armed. Individual criminals or gangs might be affiliated with
insurgents or guerrillas and still perform support functions that do not involve weapons. Conversely, some
criminals are armed noncombatants who are not part of or affiliated with any military or paramilitary
organization. Some minor criminals may use their weapons for activities such as extortion and theft. They
might even steal from local government or extraregional forces, to make a profit. Opportunists may decide
to hijack a vehicle or a convoy by force of arms.
4-18. Individual criminals may be completely neutral or have leanings for either side, or several sides. At
least at the outset, they may not be members of or directly affiliated with the irregular OPFOR. However,
since some of them are already armed, they could easily become combatants, if their situation charges.
While some noncombatants are normally unarmed, there is always the potential for them to take up arms in
reaction to developments in the OE and their perception of the actions of local governing authorities or an
extraregional force.
Note. Most criminals (especially noncombatants) are not irregular forces or part of the irregular
OPFOR. However, they are included in this TC because of their relationships and interactions
with the irregular OPFOR. Their criminal acts can add to the general instability caused by the
irregular OPFOR.
MOTIVATIONS
4-19. Criminals, unlike insurgents or guerrillas, are seldom driven by any political or religious ideology.
They exist to make money or to wield power. However, some criminal organizations may align themselves
with insurgents or guerrillas if their interests are mutually supportable. Criminal organizations may even
become affiliated with military or paramilitary forces of a nation-state if their interests coincide.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 4-3

Chapter 4
Note. Insurgents, guerrillas, or nation-states may espouse a rigid religious or political ideology.
However, they may set aside those principles when using the drug trade or other criminal
activities to finance their operations.
PROFIT
4-20. The primary motivation of criminals is making as much money as possible with as little risk as
possible. To make a profit, they may fill a need or want with otherwise unavailable products or provide
services that are illegal. To mitigate risk, they may buy influence with politicians and police officials.
Failing that, they may eliminate those law enforcement and legal system personnel who interfere with their
activities, as well as criminal competitors.
4-21. The enemies of criminal organizations are any political, military, legal, or judicial institutions that
impede their actions and interfere with their ability to make a profit. However, there are other groups that
conduct drug-trafficking or other illegal actions as a means to purchase weapons and finance other
paramilitary activities. Criminals may tolerate or cooperate with such groups as long as they do not appear
to be competitors or infringe on their own ability to make a profit. A criminal organization may sell or trade
information to a military or paramilitary organization, for profit or mutual benefit.
POWER
4-22. Individual criminals and criminal organizations commit crimes not only for money, but also to gain
power and prestige. Actions such as assassination, murder, and maiming are intended to demonstrate the
criminal organizations power and control. That power may be over public officials, persons it cannot
otherwise control or intimidate, criminal competitors, or people disloyal to the organization.
4-23. Larger criminal networks and transnational criminal organizations conduct criminal activities on a
scale that can threaten whole societies and/or the international community. They can render governments
corrupt and ineffective. They often begin to control ungoverned territory within a nation-state, acquire
political power in poorly governed regions, and eventually vie with the governing authority for influence in
government-controlled space. They also look for ways to exert power and influence internationally.
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS
4-24. Very few crimes can be carried out by an individual criminal. Therefore, some form of organization
is normally required. It may be a group of two or three individuals or a larger, more sophisticated
organization. The higher the level of organization, the greater the potential for profit and power. Criminal
organizations may not change their structure in wartime, unless wartime conditions favor or dictate
different types of criminal action or support activities.
4-25. Weapons and equipment vary based on type and scale of criminal activity. Criminal organizations at
the higher end of the scale can take on the characteristics of a paramilitary organizationeither for self-
protection or as a private army for hire. Criminals may have the best technology, equipment, and weapons
available, simply because they have the money to buy them.
4-26. Criminal organizations generally fall into three types: gangs, large-scale criminal networks, and
transnational criminal organizations. Some gangs and criminal networks develop into larger criminal
networks and possibly into transnational criminal organizations. Thus, the lines of separation are not
always clear-cut. However, there are some basic differences in how these three types are structured and
how they operate.
GANGS
4-27. Some criminals may form loosely associated organizations with no true formal structure. These small
gangs are a concern to local law enforcement, but normally are not a threat to legitimate institutions.
Nevertheless, their often unpredictable acts of violence can destabilize the social and political environment.
Smaller gangs tend to have loose, unsophisticated leadership focused on turf protection, gang loyalty, and
4-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Criminals
local, petty crime (such as theft or small-scale drug sales). Even when many gangs with various leaders
operate in the same areas, they may or may not interrelate with each other.
4-28. These smaller gangs are not irregular forces, but their impact on the local populace can be significant
and may actually assist irregular forces. Even small gangs may become affiliated with insurgents or
guerrillas if they stand to gain profit or power.
4-29. Some smaller gangs may develop into larger gangs or into large-scale criminal networks. This can
happen in two ways. A small gang may grow into a larger organization, or several gangs may (willingly or
forcibly) be joined to form a larger organization.
LARGE-SCALE CRIMINAL NETWORKS

4-30. Gangs may develop into large-scale criminal networks. At this level, they expand illicit business,
increase profits, and typically focus on trafficking and market protection. These networks and the gangs
that comprise them also continue with the traditional sources of illegal income. However, they are much
more versatile, flexible, and able to adapt to various opportunities. The large number of criminal
organizations loosely associated with one another is able to exploit more opportunities with a variety of
means. Large-scale criminal networks can include any or all of the actions listed under Criminal
Activities later in this chapter.
Note. The term criminal network more closely captures the loose structure of many large
criminal groups that do have an enduring association but are more fluid and adaptable than the
more specific terms syndicate or cartel imply.
4-31. Most criminal networks are loosely structured and function primarily because each participant is
pursuing his own interests. Such a network is not necessarily a formally structured, hierarchical
organization with one individual controlling and running the operation. Rather, it may be a loose-knit,
intricate web of individuals or groups selected for their particular skills. However, they frequently continue
to operate independently until the network needs their skills. The network can quickly assemble the
appropriate resources to take advantage of opportunities for specific illegal activities and then release these
assets between jobs. This reduces exposure to detection and keeps individuals from having too much
information about the overall operation.
4-32. Even when there are strong vertical links, there can still be a great deal of autonomy among the
numerous small gangs that make up the network. The hierarchy may receive payments from those lower in
the organization, but each gang is free to pursue its own criminal enterprises when the larger organization
does not require its services. The small gangs may still operate relatively independently (and perhaps
competitively). They do not necessarily share key information with the larger structure. Even the highest-
level leadership may not be aware of all operations.
4-33. These criminal networks use violence as a means to create and protect their market as well as
marginalize and control their competition. They seek to control or weaken state security institutions. They
often begin to dominate community life within large areas of a nation-state. Criminal groups at this level
may begin to develop overtly political agendas to improve their market share. They may overtly challenge
state security and sovereignty. They may use subversion and violence as political interference to negate law
enforcement efforts directed against them.
4-34. Criminal networks that control local or regional markets may have ties to and frequently do business
with criminal organizations in other regions or other countries. They do so when they need wider networks
of customers, fences, money-laundering expertise, access to technologies, and other essentials for an
effective criminal venture.
4-35. Some criminal networks may develop into larger criminal networks or into transnational criminal
organizations. In some cases, a smaller network may simply grow into a larger organization. In other cases,
several networks may willingly join to form a larger organization. In still other cases, smaller organizations
may be forced (by coercion or by circumstances) to become part of a larger organization.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 4-5

Chapter 4
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

4-36. Some criminal organizations develop into sophisticated transnational criminal organizations. These
organizations may have ambitious economic and political agendas. They often begin to fill the power
vacuum in ungoverned or poorly governed regions within a nation-state and to challenge government
control of other regions. This provides the transnational organization with security and freedom of
movement to pursue its criminal enterprises. In some cases, the organization becomes a de facto insurgency
with ends focused on the material rather than ideological goals. Actions can include any or all of the items
listed under Criminal Activities later in this chaptersuch as drug and arms trafficking, money
laundering, and terrorism. Transnational criminal organizations develop their own transit routes for illegal
shipments and develop their own access to contraband.
4-37. Transnational criminal organizations take advantage of increased opportunities for profit and power
that are found internationally. Globalization is not limited to legal trade and commerce. Criminals in
various countries can cooperate in criminal ventures that take place across several countries. The increasing
ease and effectiveness of global communications plays a significant role in arranging criminal ventures and
in laundering the proceeds.
4-38. For example, smuggling is a big business that requires international organization. Illegal substances
or legal goods less expensive elsewhere are smuggled across state boundaries. (Drugs are the most lucrative
of smuggled items.) A significant part of the profits may go to suppliers and associates in other countries,
and profits may be laundered using international financial systems.
4-39. Also contributing to the international nature of crime is the increased movement of people across
borders. Businesses, both legitimate and illegitimate, benefit from expanding global travel. Another aspect
is movement of people forced from their homes by war or political persecution. Others move in order to
seek the opportunity to build a better life for themselves and their families. The vast majority of these
people are not criminals. However, the size of the movement provides perfect cover for those who are
connected to transnational criminal organizations. Some migrants avoid formal channels and pay smugglers
to get them into another country.
COMMAND AND CONTROL

4-40. Criminal organizations (especially gangs and criminal networks) tend to have a lose structure.
However, there is always some vertical link between lower-level subordinates and the organizations
leadership. When smaller organizations develop into larger criminal organizations by growth or by forcible
joining, the vertical links are more likely to take the form of a relatively strong hierarchical leadership
structure. However, when smaller organizations willingly become part of a larger organization, there is
more likely to be a rather loose leadership structure. The following paragraphs describe some of the levels
that may exist even in a loose hierarchical structure.
SENIOR LEADERS
4-41. As a general rule, transnational criminal organizations tend to be highly centralized with senior
leaders exerting control through a rigid chain of command. Gangs and criminal networks vary much
more in their leadership structure. Some are highly organized, while others may be near anarchic with
no central leadership.
4-42. Compared to gangs, the leadership of large-scale criminal networks tends to be more centralized, but
with a loose hierarchical structure. However, there are exceptions. For example, some networks (such as
drug cartels or crime syndicates) may be tightly organized with a rigid hierarchy. Some networks may
resemble a business enterprise with specially qualified individuals on the operational side, while others
supply the support services.
4-43. Different groups have varying titles for their leaders. Such titles may include boss, number one,
chief, father, or simply leader (in various languages).
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Criminals
INTERMEDIATE LEADERS
4-44. Intermediate leaders are the middle management of criminal organizations. Each of these is the
ranking member of his particular part of a larger organization. Again, titles vary from organization to
organization. Examples are sub-boss, underboss, street boss, or franchise leader. Those intermediate leaders
who, in the view of their organization, lead a crew of soldiers, may have military-like titles (such as
sergeant, lieutenant, captain, or brigadier). Regardless of the title, the mission is the same:
Turn orders into reality and make money.
Ensure loyalty and punish those who get out of line.
Avoid arrest and prosecution.
Eliminate or intimidate the competition.
SPECIALIZED AND TECHNICAL SUPPORTERS

4-45. All organizations have specialists. These are people who maintain a very high level of expertise in
one or two areas necessary for the success of the organization. In criminal organizations, this traditionally
includes such persons as
Accountants.
Defense attorneys.
Counselors.
Professional assassins.
Explosives experts.
Counterfeiters.
Smugglers.
Pilots.
Drivers.
In todays strategic and operational environments, it also includes
Hackers.
Computer programmers.
Telecommunications specialists.
Weapons experts.
Human traffickers.
FIELD OPERATIVES
4-46. At the lowest level of the criminal organization is the field operative. That is the man on the street,
willing to commit crimes for money, power, and prestige. These people may be full members (made men),
aspiring members (prospects), or those who want to be seen with the organization (hang-around,
associates). The titles for field operatives may include soldier, warrior, legman, or simply member.
Whatever their title, they are still criminals within a larger organization and will be the face of the
organization that most of the populace see.
PASSIVE SUPPORTERS
4-47. In many cases, there are individuals or groups who provide passive support to criminal organizations
for any number of reasons. Some see the organization as a defense against another group or corrupt
government officials. Some have familial connections. Some see neighborhood, community, or country
loyalty embodied in the criminal organization. Some are merely concerned about their own financial
security or material gain.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 4-7

Chapter 4
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
4-48. Criminals use many and varied tactics and techniques. Some of these methods overlap with one
another. The activities typically include an objective to make fiscal profit and/or achieve influence.
SECURITY
4-49. Security is crucial for criminal organizations. They may use the highest degree of sophistication
available to conduct intelligence collection and counterintelligence activities. These activities are a priority
and can be well funded. Intelligence sources may extend to high levels within government and law-
enforcement agencies. The local populace may willingly provide ample intelligence collection,
counterintelligence, and security support. Intelligence and security can also be the result of bribery,
extortion, or coercion.
4-50. Most members of criminal organizations are capable of protecting themselves and their assets.
Typically, they carry small-caliber weapons, such as handguns, pistols, rifles, and shotguns. They are
lightly armed out of necessity or convenience, not for lack of resources. When greater force of arms is
necessary to control people, protect vital resources, or obtain information, these organizations typically
have members who can use heavier arms, such as machineguns and assault weapons. Large criminal
organizations may hire PSCs to conduct surveillance, provide personal security for leaders, or guard
key facilities.
THEFT
4-51. Theft is the taking of another persons property without that persons permission or consent with the
intent to deprive the rightful owner of it. Thus, theft is an overarching term that covers various crimes
against property such as burglary, embezzlement, larceny, looting, robbery, and fraud. (See also identity
theft and intellectual property theft, both under Cyber Crime.)
FRAUD
4-52. A fraud is an intentional deception made for personal gain and/or to damage another individual
or entity. Defrauding people or entities of money or valuables is a common purpose of fraud. Fraud
can include
Ponzi schemes.
Insider trading.
Embezzlement.
Insurance scams.
Money laundering.
Forgery.
Fraud can also include cyber crimes such as
Identity theft.
Copyright infringement.
RACKETEERING
4-53. A racket is a fraudulent scheme, enterprise, or activity. It is usually an illegitimate business made
workable by bribery or intimidation. A racketeer is one who extorts money or advantages by threats of
violence, by blackmail, or by unlawful interference with business or employment. Therefore, racketeering
overlaps with bribery, intimidation, and extortion.
4-54. In racketeering, a criminal organization typically creates or perpetuates a problem or the perception
of a problem for which it then offers a solution, for a fee. The intent is to engender continual patronage. In
the traditional example of a protection racket, the racketeer informs a store owner that a substantial monthly
fee will be required in exchange for protection. The protection provided takes the form of the absence of
damage inflicted upon the store or its employees by the racket itself. Another example is malicious
4-8 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Criminals
software (malware) that pretends to be detecting spyware or other infections on a computer and offers to
download a cleaning utility for a fee. In actuality, the distributor of the malware is also the maker of the
cleaning utility. (This aspect of racketeering overlaps with the category of cyber crime, discussed below.)
In addition to protection rackets, racketeering can also involve numbers rackets or illegal lottery.
4-55. Racketeering can also include seemingly legitimate businesses that provide a front for illegal activity
such as buying and selling illegal merchandise. Loan sharking is another form of racketeering in which a
criminal offers loans at extremely high interest rates to borrowers who cannot qualify for loans from
legitimate sources. The debtor faces violence or other criminal means to cause harm if the debt is not paid.
4-56. Black markets fall under racketeering as illegal businesses. These can include traded goods and
services such as biological organs, transportation providers, illegal drugs, prostitution, weaponry, alcohol,
tobacco, currency, and fuel. Black markets tend to flourish in most countries during wartime, due to
rationing, and impact commodities such as food, fuel, rubber, and metal.
GAMBLING
4-57. In most societies, the act of gambling is in itself not illegal. What becomes illegal is an illicit
business based on gambling (also called gaming). It is illegal because either
It is conducted in a fraudulent manner.
The governing authority has outlawed it.
The gambling enterprise fails to share all its profits with the governing authority.
Gambling in the form of a numbers racket or illegal lottery is a form of racketeering. Internet gambling is a
form of cyber crime.
4-58. Many types of gambling have been, or still are, illegal in some places. Hence, criminals may be the
only operators of some games. Even when a governing authority legalizes some gambling ventures, it may
be difficult to keep criminals from becoming involved, due to the huge potential for profits. Besides
gaming operations recognized and (sometimes poorly) regulated by the state, there are many other
gambling opportunities in which criminals may be involved.
4-59. Gambling is often associated with other types of crime. Operators of legal gambling establishments
may receive kickbacks for allowing money laundering. Gambling operations earn large amounts of cash
and present particular opportunities for skimming and money laundering. Aside from skimming profits
from a legalized gambling enterprise, skimming can also occur with the granting of credit, which can lead
into loan sharking. In particular, problem gamblers who need money for gambling may easily fall prey to
loan sharks. Compulsive gambling can also lead to crimes such as embezzlement, robbery, check forgery,
and fraud.
PROSTITUTION
4-60. Prostitution is the practice of indulging in sexual relations for money. As a criminal enterprise, it also
involves a criminal or criminal organization that profits from the commercial sex act. Prostitutes may also
profit from the venture, although the criminal organization gets its cut. However, prostitution may be linked
to human trafficking, in which case the criminals get all the profits.
EXTORTION
4-61. Extortion is the act of obtaining money, materiel, information, or support by force or intimidation.
Criminal organizations use extortion to obtain information or cooperation or to protect members. Examples
of extortion include
Intimidating politicians to vote in a manner favorable to the criminal organization.
Intimidating judges to free an organization member.
Forcing a farmer to grow drug-producing crops.
Extorting money from local businesses in exchange for protection, which means not harming the
business or its members.
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Chapter 4
Using death threats against an individual or his family to cause him to provide information or
resources.
Intimidating other people not to take action against the criminal organization.
Using information warfare (INFOWAR) methods to create and maintain fear caused by
extortion.
BRIBERY
4-62. Bribery is giving money or other favors to influence someone. Criminals give money to people in
power who make or influence decisions. For example, bribes to law-enforcement officials can cause them
to have their patrols avoid a criminal organizations transit routes. If the organization is unable to bribe
someone, it employs harsher methods, such as extortion, assassination, or murder, to gain cooperation.
ARSON
4-63. Arson is maliciously burning another persons dwelling, structures, or property. This may be done to
as punishment for noncompliance with internal rules of criminal organizations. It may be the result of not
paying the criminal organization for protection. It may also be done on a for-hire basis or as a means to
inflict terror on a targeted person or group.
HIJACKING
4-64. Hijacking is stealing or commandeering a conveyance. Criminals may conduct a hijacking to produce
a spectacular hostage situation. Sometimes criminals may hijack a conveyance as a means of escape; in that
case, the criminals may eliminate any unneeded people and materiel, such as hostages or baggage.
KIDNAPPING
4-65. Kidnapping is an abduction or transportation of a person or group by force. The person is kept in
false imprisonment (confinement without legal authority). This may be done for ransom or in furtherance
of another crime (such as human trafficking or hostage taking). This type of crime has become very popular
with criminal organizations, and the methods vary by region. Kidnapping flourishes particularly in fragile
or failed states and regions in conflict, as drug traffickers and other criminal organizations fill the vacuum
left by governing authority.
4-66. The risk in kidnapping is relatively lower than in hostage taking. This is primarily because the
criminals take the kidnapped victim to a location controlled by the criminal organization. The criminals
then make demands and are willing to hold a victim for a long time, if necessary.
HOSTAGE TAKING
4-67. Hostage taking is typically an overt seizure of a person or persons to gain publicity, concessions, or
ransom. Unlike kidnapping, where usually a prominent individual is taken, the hostages are usually not
well known figures. Criminals attempt to hold hostages in a neutral or friendly area. The planning and
execution of a hostage taking are similar to those of a kidnapping or hijacking. However, criminals may
also take hostages as an expedient measure when they have difficulty exiting a crime scene.
MURDER
4-68. Murder is the unlawful killing of another human being without justification or excuse. Murder is
perhaps the single most serious criminal offense. Criminal organizations use murder as an enforcement tool
and as a method of generating revenue in murder-for-hire schemes.
ASSASSINATION
4-69. An assassination is the murder (usually of a prominent person) by a sudden and/or secret attack. It is
usually prompted by religious, ideological, political, or military motives, but may be done for payment.
Criminals and criminal organizations may use an assassination
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Criminals
For monetary gain.

To exert terror.
To display power.
To exact revenge on a public official.
To eliminate people they cannot intimidate.
To punish people who have left the criminal organization.
MAIMING
4-70. Maiming is a deliberate act to mutilate, disfigure, or severely wound a person so as to cause lasting
damage. Maiming can involve assault and battery on a person with intent to inflict serious injury. Other
methods include
Male castration.
Female genital mutilation.
Burning or branding.
Forcible tattooing.
Cutting off limbs.
Removal of tongue, eyes, or ears.
Throwing a corrosive acid or alkali to cause blindness or scarring.
4-71. The person maimed is an outward sign of the criminal organizations power and control. A criminal
organization often uses or threatens maiming
To enforce order within the organization.
To collect debts.
For extortion.
As a for-hire operation to generate revenue.
SMUGGLING
4-72. Smuggling is the clandestine transportation of illegal goods or persons. It usually involves illegal
movement across an international border. There are various motivations to smuggle. These include
participation in illegal trade, illegal immigration or emigration, and tax evasion. Smuggling is often related
to trafficking in persons, drugs, or arms.
TRAFFICKING
4-73. Trafficking is the transportation of goods or persons for the purpose of making a profit. Criminals
conduct illegal trafficking. Human trafficking (trafficking in persons) is the second largest criminal activity
in the worldfollowed by drug trafficking and arms trafficking.
Humans
4-74. Human trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons
(including children) for the purpose of exploitation. It involves the threat or use of force, coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, and/or abuse. Human trafficking may take two forms:
Sex trafficking in which a person is induced to perform a commercial sex act.
The recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or
services, for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, debt bondage, or slavery.
Criminals choose to traffic human beings because, unlike other commodities, people can be used repeatedly
and because human trafficking requires little in terms of capital investment.
4-75. Human trafficking is not the same as people smuggling. A smuggler may facilitate illegal entry into a
country for a fee, but on arrival at their destination, the smuggled person is free. The trafficking victim is
coerced in some way and is further exploited after arrival, in order to derive profits. Victims do not agree to
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Chapter 4
be trafficked; they are tricked, lured by false promises, or forced into it. Traffickers control their victims by
coercive tactics including deception, fraud, intimidation, isolation, physical threats and use of force, debt
bondage, or even force-feeding drugs.
Drugs
4-76. The illegal drug trade is a black market consisting of production, distribution, packaging, and sale of
illegal psychoactive substances. The legality or illegality of the black markets purveying the drug trade is
relative to geographic location. The drug-producing countries may be inclined to tolerate the drug
traffickers because of bribery or the effect on the countrys economy. Drugs often cross international
borders in order to reach the best paying customers. The massive profits inherent to the drug trade serve to
extend its reach. The social consequences of drug trade include crime, violence, and social unrest.
Arms
4-77. Arms trafficking involves illicit transfers of arms, ammunition, and associated materials. Criminal
organizations may be involved in two types of arms trafficking:
Small-scale transactions by individuals or small firms that deliberately transfer arms to illicit
recipients.
Higher-value or more difficult illicit shipments of arms involving corrupt officials, brokers, or
middle men motivated mainly by profit.
4-78. Arms trafficking is driven by a variety of clients, which include
Embargoed governments.
Armed groups involved in war, banditry, terrorism, or insurgency.
Criminals and criminal organizations.
Citizens who cannot obtain guns legally.
4-79. Some arms and ammunition may come from illicit arms manufacturers. However, the source of a
large proportion of illicit conventional arms is government disposals of surplus arms or thefts from insecure
government stockpiles. Governments themselves may deliberately facilitate covert flows of arms to their
proxies or allies, or to embargoed or suspect destinations for profit.
4-80. Arms trafficking is widespread in regions of political turmoil. However, it is not limited to such
areas. Most arms trafficking occurs at the regional or local level. Among the most common forms are
numerous shipments of small numbers of weapons that, over time, result in the accumulation of large
numbers of illicit weapons. While individual transactions occur on a small scale and do not draw attention,
the sum total of weapons trafficked is large.
CYBER CRIME
4-81. Cyber crimes are offenses targeting or using information technology. This includes computers,
computer networks, and other telecommunication networks such as the Internet (chat rooms, emails, notice
boards, and groups) and mobile phones. Such crimes may threaten not only individuals and groups but also
a nations security and financial health. Cyber crimes can facilitate a variety of other criminal activities,
including money laundering, extortion, fraud, racketeering, gambling, smuggling, and trafficking.
4-82. Criminals exploit the speed, convenience, and anonymity that modern technologies offer in order to
commit a diverse range of criminal activities. The global nature of the Internet allows criminals to commit
almost any online illegal activity anywhere in the world. In the past, cyber crime has been committed by
individuals or small groups of individuals. However, an emerging trend is for criminal networks and
criminally minded technology professionals to work together and pool their resources and expertise.
4-83. Cyber crimes include network intrusions, hacking attacks, malicious software, and account takeovers
leading to significant data breaches affecting every sector of the world economy. Advances in computer
and telecommunications technology and greater access to personal information via the Internet have created
a virtual marketplace for transnational cyber criminals to share stolen information and criminal
methodologies. The increasing level of collaboration among cyber criminals raises the level of potential
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Criminals
harm to individuals, companies, and governments. Members of online forums discuss cyber crime topics of
interest. Criminal purveyors buy, sell, and trade
Malicious software.
Hacking services.
Spamming devices.
Personal identification information.
Credit and debit card data.
Bank account information.
Brokerage account information.
Counterfeit identity documents.
Other forms of contraband.
4-84. Cyber crime falls into two broad categories:
Computer crimes.
Intellectual property crimes.
Computer Crimes
4-85. Computer crime refers to any crime that involves a computer or computer network. The computer or
network may be the target, or it may be used in the commission of a crime, the primary target of which is
independent of the computer network or device.
Crimes Targeting Computers

4-86. Criminals can cause damage to computers in many ways. For example, an unauthorized intruder can
send commands that delete files or shut the computer down. Intruders can initiate a denial-of-service attack
that floods the victim computer with useless information and prevents legitimate users from accessing it. A
virus or worm can use up all of the available communications bandwidth on an agency or corporate
network, making it unavailable to employees. When a virus or worm penetrates a computers security, it
can delete files, crash the computer, install malicious software, or do other things that impair the
computers integrity.
4-87. Extortion threats involving damage to a computer are a high-technology variation of old-fashioned
extortion. Intruders may threaten, unless their demands are met, to
Penetrate a system and encrypt or delete a database (erasing or corrupting data or programs).
Distribute denial-of-service attacks that would shut down (or slow down) the victims
computers.
Steal confidential data.
The threat need not be sent electronically.
4-88. Crimes may involve intercepting or interfering with communications through the use of electronic,
mechanical, or other devices. This applies to electronic communications as well as oral and wire
communications via common carrier transmissions. This may involve
Spyware or intruders using packet sniffers.
Persons improperly cloning email accounts.
Other surreptitious collection of communications from a victims computer.
The crime may extend to the unauthorized disclosure of the contents of an illegally intercepted
communication or using such information for other criminal purposes. Such crimes may also injure or
destroy various types of communication operated or controlled by a government or used for a states
military or paramilitary functions.
Crimes Using Computers

4-89. Crimes using computers or facilitated by computers include
Unauthorized access to computers (even government computers and perhaps law enforcement).
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Chapter 4
Unauthorized access to stored communications (including email, social networking data, and
voicemail).
Two of the most common uses are for
Fraud (computer fraud and wire fraud).
Identity theft.
4-90. Fraud. Computer fraud is the use of information technology to commit fraud. Criminals may devise
various schemes or artifices to obtain money, property, goods, or services of measurable value. These
include
Accessing a computer without authorization to obtain
Commercial data.
Information contained in a financial record of a financial institution.
Information contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a customer.
Information from any government department or agency.
Information from a protected computer.
Accessing without authorization a government, commercial, or personal computer and affecting
the use of the owners operation of the computer.
Accessing a protected computer with the intent to defraud and thereby obtain anything of value.
Causing the transmission of a program, information, code, or command that causes damage to a
computer system, personal injury, or a threat to public health or safety.
Trafficking in passwords or similar information through which a computer may be accessed
without authorization.
Manipulating market data for criminal purposes.
Data or information or even the use of a computer can be regarded as a thing of value.
4-91. Computer fraud can also fall under the more general category of wire fraud. In what is considered
wire fraud, criminals may use fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises transmitted by various
means of telecommunication, including
Wire.
Radio.
Television.
Mobile phone.
Facsimile.
Telex.
Modem.
Internet.
4-92. Money mule schemes could be categorized as computer or wire fraud. In such schemes, criminals
trick people into moving money for them. Through Internet phishing, criminals can steal money from
unsuspecting people by accessing their accounts. The phishers then face the problem of moving the large
sums of money acquired from the victims to their own accounts, often in other countries, without attracting
suspicion. Traditionally, drug smugglers have used people (referred to as mules) willing to carry small
amounts of drugs across borders for them for a price. In a variant of this scheme, phishers recruit innocent
people in the countries where their victims reside by offering them a lucrative job using their home
computers. Those recruited are usually unaware that these are not legitimate business opportunities. Thus,
phishers can dupe a large number of individuals (called money mules) into accepting relatively small
amounts of money stolen from peoples accounts and transferring the funds to the phishers in return
for a commission.
4-93. Identity Theft. Identity theft is almost always committed to facilitate other crimes. It involves
unauthorized transfer, possession, or use of a means of identification of another person with the intent to
commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with, any unlawful activity. Most commonly, it involves the
misuse of another individuals personal identifying information for fraudulent purposes. With relatively
little effort, an identity thief can use this information to take over existing credit accounts, create new
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Criminals
accounts in the victims name, or even evade law enforcement after the commission of a violent crime.
Identity thieves also sell personal information online to the highest bidder, often resulting in the stolen
information being used by a number of different perpetrators. Personal information can also be obtained for
the purpose of blackmail or other forms of extortion.
4-94. Criminals can obtain credit and debit card numbers by hacking into the wireless computer networks
of major retailers. Network intrusions can compromise the privacy of individuals if data about them or their
transactions resides on the victim network. Once inside the networks, criminals install sniffer programs
that capture card numbers, as well as passwords and account information. After collecting the data, they
conceal it in encrypted computer servers that they control. Then they sell the credit and debit card numbers
through online transactions to other criminals. In addition to these carders, there are phishers, who
obtain the same type of information via fraudulent emails.
4-95. The unlawful use of identification information can involve access device fraud. Such fraud can
include any device, number, or other means of account access that can be used to obtain money, goods,
services, or other things of value. It can also involve unlawful access to buildings or facilities.
Intellectual Property Crimes

4-96. Intellectual property crimes involve theft of material protected by copyright, trademark, patent, or
trade-secret designation. Such intellectual property is vital to local, national, and international economies.
4-97. The interconnected global economy creates unprecedented business opportunities to market and sell
intellectual property worldwide. Geographic borders present no impediment to international distribution
channels. If the product cannot be immediately downloaded to a computer, it can be shipped and arrive by
next day air. However, the same technology that benefits rights-holders and consumers also benefits
intellectual property thieves seeking to make a fast, low-risk profit. In addition, trafficking in counterfeit
merchandise also generates large profits.
4-98. The most egregious violators are large-scale criminal networks and transnational criminal
organizations whose conduct threatens not only intellectual property owners but also the economy of
nation-states. Because many violations of intellectual property rights involve no loss of tangible property
and do not require direct contact with the rights-holder, the owner often does not even know that it is a
victim for some time.
4-99. Intellectual property crimes can overlap with computer crimes, especially in the following areas:
Unauthorized access of a computer to obtain information.
Mail or wire fraud (can include the Internet).
Devices to intercept communications.
4-100. Unauthorized obtainment of information or electronic media covered by copyright, trademark,
patent, or trade-secret designation robs the rights-holders of their ideas, inventions, and creative
expressions. Such theft is facilitated by digital technologies and Internet file sharing networks.
4-101. Although fraud schemes can involve copyrighted works, it is not mail or wire fraud unless there is
evidence of any misrepresentation or scheme to defraud. Mail and wire fraud may exist, even if the
perpetrator tells his direct purchasers that his goods were counterfeit, as long as he and his direct purchasers
intended to defraud the direct purchasers customers. Wire fraud can include the Internet.
4-102. Intellectual property crimes may involve intercepting and acquiring the contents of
communications through the use of electronic, mechanical, or other devices. Criminals may then market the
contents of an illegally intercepted communication, including intellectual property.
MONEY LAUNDERING
4-103. A criminal organization conducts money-laundering activities to transfer funds into the legitimate
international financial system. Because of the legal restrictions levied by a governing authority, the
organization must have a way of transferring dirty (illegally earned) money into clean money. The
organization smuggles some currency back to its country of origin. However, large sums of foreign
currency are not feasible for the organization because it must use the legal currency of its country to make
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Chapter 4
transactions. For example, a farmer cannot receive payment for his drug crops in the foreign currency
because he would be unable to use it.
4-104. A more productive way to transfer funds into the legitimate financial system is to operate through
front companies. Front companies are legitimate businesses that provide a means to launder money. The
criminal organization establishes its own front companies or approaches legal companies to act as
intermediaries. Some front companies, such as an import or export business, may operate for the sole
purpose of laundering money. Other companies (possibly targets of extortion) operate as profit-making
activities and launder money as a service to the organization. Criminal organizations operate front
companies in their own country, as well as in other countries.
4-105. Personnel involved in money laundering can include accountants, bankers, tellers, and couriers.
Some are willing participants in the money-laundering process and accept bribes for their services.
Extortion and intimidation keep unwilling members active in the process. Members of money-laundering
organizations also establish and operate front companies.
4-106. Some members, such as accountants and bankers, perform their normal functions as in a legal
business. However, they may conduct illegal acts on behalf of the organization. Because of banking
regulations, members must conduct activities that do not draw attention to themselves. As an example,
couriers deposit in bank accounts a level of funds small enough to avoid banking regulations. However, not
all countries have such regulations, making it easier to launder large sums of money.
4-107. Couriers conduct many transactions with financial institutions. They travel from bank to bank
making deposits or converting money into checks and money orders to prepare for smuggling activities.
Money-laundering personnel may also use electronic fund transfers, which make tracking of illegal
transactions much more difficult, especially when the country has lax banking laws.
CIVIC ACTIONS
4-108. Criminal organizations conduct programs of patronage under the guise of civic actions. These
programs are only indirectly intended to benefit the general populace. Rather, the main intent of the
criminal organizations is to gain and maintain support, reward their supporters, and facilitate their
continued activities. They may build a school, improve a road, or supply food and medicine. These projects
benefit the local population because they improve the peoples quality of life and may improve their
standard of living. For example, road building makes it easier to transport goods to market and creates jobs.
Some of the jobs may be temporary, such as those in construction, while others may be permanent, such as
those in education and clinics. Through its propaganda efforts, the criminal organization ensures that the
population knows who is making the improvements.
4-109. Sometimes the criminal organization cooperates with an insurgent force to conduct civic actions.
They do not cooperate for ideological reasons. Their sole purpose is to inhibit the governing authoritys
ability to affect their activities by gaining the inherent security a grateful public can provide.
INFORMATION WARFARE
4-110. Criminal organizations may have the resources to conduct a variety of information warfare
(INFOWAR) activities (see appendix A). However, their focus is often on a well-orchestrated perception
management (propaganda) effort. This can be a powerful tool for intimidating enemies (governing
authority and criminal competitors) and encouraging support of the organizations money-making efforts.
The use of perception management techniques can ensure that the population knows who is making
improvements in the local environment and allow the organization to take credit for other benefits it
provides to the local population.
4-111. The criminal organization can also use counterpropaganda to spin events against the governing
authority. For example, the government may burn a farmers drug-producing crop and then broadcast
announcements that the action is a direct result of the farmers involvement with an illegal activity.
However, the criminal organization can counter this by instilling the idea that the governing authority does
not have programs to help the farmer make profits legally and reminding the populace of the new medical
clinic it built.
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Criminals
4-112. Various elements of INFOWAR can also be instrumental in other criminal activities. For instance,
perception management and deception are related to fraud, including computer fraud. Information attack
and computer warfare are parts of cyber crime.
TERRORISM
4-113. Terrorism is always illegal, whether conducted by insurgents, guerrillas, or criminals. When
conducted by regular military forces or other agencies of a nation-state (perhaps in the form of ethnic
cleansing or confiscation of private property), other states can consider it illegal by international standards.
For criminal organizations, terrorism becomes an action against an adverse governing authority, a criminal
competitor, or an innocent populace. (See chapter 6 for more information on terrorism.)
Note. Many of the tactics and techniques used by criminals and criminal organizations are the
same as addressed for terrorism in chapter 6. The only difference is that criminals may use these
as means to obtain profits rather than just to instill fear or coerce governments and societies.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 4-17

Chapter 5
Noncombatants
A host of noncombatants add complexity to any operational environment (OE). The
irregular OPFOR attempts to manipulate these noncombatants in ways that support
its goals and objectives. Many noncombatants are completely innocent of any
involvement with the irregular OPFOR. However, the irregular OPFOR will seek the
advantage of operating within a relevant population of noncombatants whose
allegiance and/or support it can sway in its favor. This can include clandestine yet
willing active support (as combatants), as well as coerced support, support through
passive or sympathetic measures, and/or unknowing or unwitting support by
noncombatants.
5-1. Noncombatants are persons not actively participating in combat or actively supporting of any of the
forces involved in combat. They can be either armed or unarmed. Figure 5-1 shows examples of these two
basic types of noncombatants that can be manipulated by the irregular OPFOR. These examples are not all-
inclusive, and some of the example entities can be either armed or unarmed. (See Armed Combatants and
Unarmed Combatants later in this chapter for more detail on various subcategories.)
Note. From a U.S. viewpoint, the status of noncombatants is typically friendly, neutral, or
unknown. Conversely, the noncombatants would view U.S. and/or local governing authority
forces as friendly or neutral in regard to themselves. For the sake of consistency throughout the
chapters of this TC, however, this chapter occasionally refers to the governing authority and
associated U.S. or coalition forces as enemy, referring to the enemy of the irregular OPFOR.
Noncombatants
Armed Noncombatants Unarmed Noncombatants
Private Security Contractors Media

Business Owners and Employees Nongovernmental Organizations
Criminals and Criminal Organizations Transnational Corporations
Private Citizens and Groups Private Citizens and Groups
Figure 5-1. Armed and unarmed noncombatants (examples)

5-2. Aside from military and paramilitary forces, the civilian population of a nation or region is often the
single most important aspect of an OE. This situation can be further complicated by the presence of other
noncombatants who are not indigenous to the country or region.
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Chapter 5
RELATION TO THE IRREGULAR OPFOR

5-3. The irregular OPFOR recognizes that noncombatants living and/or working in an area of conflict can
be a significant source of
Intelligence collection.
Reconnaissance and surveillance.
Technical skills.
General logistics support.
Therefore, the irregular OPFOR actively uses noncombatants within a relevant population to support its
goals and objectives. It sees them as a potential multiplier of irregular OPFOR effectiveness. It will also
attempt to use the presence of noncombatants to limit the effectiveness of its enemies. The irregular
OPFOR can marshal and conceal its combatant capabilities while hiding among armed and unarmed
noncombatants in a geographic or cyber location.
5-4. Changes in an OE and persuasion by the irregular OPFORs information warfare (INFOWAR)
activities can cause rapid or gradual shifts in allegiance by noncombatants. Any noncombatant is a potential
recruit to become a combatant in support of irregular OPFOR goals and objectives. However, the irregular
OPFOR will also attempt to use those who remain noncombatants to its advantage. It purposely exploits
noncombatants to cause doubt or hesitation in an enemys decision to act. It takes advantage of the
difficulties its enemies may have in distinguishing combatants from noncombatants. This uncertainty exists
because both may or may not be armed and may appear to not be participating in or supporting irregular
OPFOR actions. The irregular OPFOR may use noncombatants for shielding its operations close to and/or
within a relevant population, where enemy reaction may cause harm to noncombatants. Incidents such as
noncombatant detention and/or casualties can alienate a relevant population from enemy forces.
Note. The Geneva Conventions state criteria for combatants as individuals who operate under the
recognized command and control of an organization, are clearly armed, and do not attempt to
disguise their intended actions when deploying for and conducting military-like actions. The
irregular OPFOR is not bound by such conventions. The U.S. Army and regulated military
forces of other nations consider chaplains, medical doctors, and medics as noncombatants.
However, the irregular OPFOR does not necessarily recognize such functional distinctions. In
guerrilla units, for example, medics are combatants, trained to fight alongside other guerrillas.
MOTIVATIONS
5-5. The irregular OPFOR uses several forms of persuasion to motivate and obtain support from
noncombatants in a relevant population. Means of persuasion can include
INFOWAR activities.
Social welfare programs.
Political activism and mobilization.
Coercion.
5-6. When co-opted directly or indirectly by the irregular OPFOR, noncombatants are a means to weaken
control and legitimacy of a governing authority over its population. The irregular OPFOR attempts to
communicate a compelling narrative of its own legitimacy that is accepted by the relevant population. Its
visible actions, often localized in perspective, focus on demonstrating its power and authority.
5-7. The irregular OPFOR may appeal to noncombatants based on unresolved grievances of a relevant
population. These unresolved grievances, perceived or factual, create conditions where individuals believe
they must act to obtain a just solution. The irregular OPFOR can also appeal to aspects of ethnicity,
geography, and regional history that affect personal and group relationships. These are reflected in social
status and networks, lifestyle, employment, religion, and politics. The irregular OPFOR can manipulate at
least three areas of grievance by to obtain noncombatant support:
Personal or social identity and/or social mobility or advancement.
Religious beliefs and/or persecution.
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Noncombatants
Unjust political representation and/or governance.

5-8. Motivations to support the irregular OPFOR may vary from religious extremism to pure criminality
for personal or organizational profit. Often, the deciding factor may be the desire for local freedom from
control by the governing authority and its international supporters.
TYPES OF SUPPORT
5-9. The relevant population can willingly provide active or passive support to the irregular OPFOR. If
necessary, however, noncombatants can be coerced by the irregular OPFOR. Some noncombatants may be
aware of irregular OPFOR activities and choose to remain passive and not report information to the
governing authority. Noncombatants may be sympathetic to the irregular OPFOR but remain uninvolved in
any activity. Other noncombatants may unknowingly support irregular OPFOR initiatives such as money
donations to charities or apparent humanitarian relief organizations that are actually front organizations for
irregular OPFOR financing and/or materiel support. Those members of the local populace who elect to
participate in or actively support the irregular OPFOR become combatants, even if they do not bear arms. (See
Unarmed Combatants at the end of this chapter.) Figure 5-2 shows various types of support to the irregular
OPFOR.
Irregular OPFOR Organization

Senior Leaders Support
to the irregular OPFOR
Subordinate Leaders can be
Cadres
Active-Willing
Active Supporters
Coerced-Knowing
Passive Supporters
Population Passive-Sympathizing
Unknowing-Unwitting
Noncombatants within Relevant Population
Figure 5-2. Noncombatant support to the irregular OPFOR (examples)
ARMED NONCOMBATANTS
5-10. In any OE, there are likely to be nonmilitary personnel who are armed but are not part of an
organized paramilitary or military structure. Nonetheless, such people may be disgruntled and hostile to the
governing authority or forces that support it. Armed noncombatants may represent a large portion of the
undecided citizens in a population. Some of these nonaffiliated people may possess small arms legally to
protect their families, homes, and/or businesses. Some may use weapons as part of their occupation (such
as hunters, security guards, or local police). Some may be minor criminals who use their weapons for
activities such as theft or extortion. Given the fact that they are already armed, it would be easy for such
noncombatants to become combatants. Any number of reasons, including prejudices and grievances, can
cause them to choose sides or change sides. They may switch allegiances repeatedly as circumstances
evolve.
5-11. Some armed noncombatant entities can be completely legitimate enterprises. However, some
activities can be criminal under the guise of legitimate business. The irregular OPFOR can embed
operatives in legitimate commercial enterprises or criminal activities to obtain information and/or
capabilities not otherwise available to it. Actions of such operatives can include sabotage of selected
commodities and/or services. They may also co-opt capabilities of a governing authority infrastructure and
civil enterprises to support irregular OPFOR operations.
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Chapter 5
5-12. Examples of armed noncombatants commonly operating in an OE are

Private security contractor (PSC) organizations.
Local business owners and employees.
Private citizens and private groups authorized to carry and use weapons.
Criminals and/or organizations with labels such as cartels, gangs.
Ad hoc local militia or neighborhood watch programs.
PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

5-13. Private security contractors (PSCs) are commercial business enterprises that provide security and
related services on a contractual basis. PSCs are employed to prevent, detect, and counter intrusions or
theft; protect property and people; enforce rules and regulations; and conduct investigations. They may also
be used to neutralize any real or perceived threat. PSCs can act as an adjunct to other security measures and
provide advisors, instructors, and support and services personnel for a states military, paramilitary, and
police forces. They may also be employed by private individuals and businesses (including transnational
corporations).
5-14. PSCs may be legitimate, well-respected corporations providing contract advisors and employees as
part of a military nation-building program funded by a foreign government. A PSC that provides services
on a contract basis outside its country of origin also falls into the category of a transnational corporation.
Other PSCs may be domestic firms that supply contract guard forces. In its simplest form, a PSC might be a
local citizen organization that performs actions on a short-term contractual basis.
Relation to the Irregular OPFOR

5-15. The irregular OPFOR can identify required or desired capabilities in a PSC and either overtly or
covertly obtain the capabilities. It can also infiltrate a PSC with its own operatives, to covertly pursue its
own objectives. A PSCs use of local hires can make it relatively easy to infiltrate with actual or forged
documentation. Infiltration can allow the irregular OPFOR to observe actions and procedures, collect
information and intelligence for future sabotage, and/or incite dissatisfaction within and among foreign and
local contractors.
5-16. The irregular OPFOR might actually be a customer of a PSC. For example, the leader of an insurgent
or criminal organization may employ a PSC to provide bodyguards or conduct surveillance or a search and
assessment prior to his arrival. Another group, such as a drug organization, may contract a PSC to guard its
facilities. (A drug organization can afford to pay more than many small countries.) The PSC may erect a
fence or employ roving, armed guards to protect facilities.
5-17. PSCs use both active and passive measures that may be rudimentary or employ advanced technology
such as sophisticated surveillance, identification devices, and alarms. During the conduct of their duties,
members of a PSC can take offensive actions. For example, a security, guard, or patrol team might conduct
an ambush to counter an intrusion by a governing authority on an irregular OPFOR operation.
5-18. The irregular OPFORs INFOWAR activities can spotlight known or alleged abuses by PSCs in
order to build negative sentiments against governing authority and/or coalition actions. Incidents can
include PSCs
Shooting civilians misidentified as combatants.
Using excessive force.
Being insensitive to local customs and beliefs.
Other inappropriate actions.
The irregular OPFOR can exploit such incidents to damage international and coalition relationships and
trust. Additional public dissent might limit use of PSCs or restrict where and how they can be used.
Prohibition on use of PSCs in certain circumstances could further constrain governing authority and
coalition programs. It could also place additional operational requirements on enemy military forces.
5-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Noncombatants
Functions
5-19. Most functions of a PSC involve protecting personnel, facilities, or activities. Such security functions
normally require armed contractors. However, PSCs can also perform other, security-related functions that
do not require armed personnel.
Armed Functions
5-20. Functions typically requiring armed personnel can include
Personal security details to protect a person or group of people.
Guard protection of static sites (such as housing areas, building sites, government complexes,
and businessesboth legal and illegal).
Transport security support to convoys and special materiel shipments.
Security escorts.
Cash transport.
Covert operations.
Surveillance.
Intelligence services.
Advising and/or training of indigenous or extraregional security forces.
Operations and administration within governing authority prisons and/or detention facilities.
Unarmed Functions
5-21. Functions typically not requiring armed personnel include
Unarmed security functions when presence is deemed an appropriate deterrent.
Air surveillance.
Psychological warfare.
Intelligence support (including information collection and threat analysis).
Operational coordination (such as command and control, management, and communications).
Personnel and budget vetting.
Hostage negotiation services.
Risk advisory services.
Weapons procurement.
Weapons destruction.
Transportation support.
Advantages and Disadvantages

5-22. PSCs provide key capabilities and can often be hired quickly and deployed faster than a military
force with similar skill sets. This flexibility allows governmental or commercial organizations to adapt
quickly to a rapidly changing OE. Employing a PSC can keep military forces available to conduct
traditional or specialized military missions.
5-23. Evolution of private sector military-like services by corporations can be a very influential factor in
international and regional diplomacy. Although coalition operations may appear in need of services from
PSC, governmental authorities and private citizen groups can be concerned on the level of PSC
transparency and accountability when high-profile incidents occur that involve PSCs.
5-24. PSCs often hire large numbers of indigenous people from the local area. The vetting procedures may
not screen out some undesirable elements of the population. A legitimate PSC may be susceptible to insider
threats that infiltrate elements of the organization and subvert legitimate practices into forms of corruption.
PSC security for the governing authority or commercial enterprises can be a conduit for corruption that
disrupts support to a governing authority and/or coalition forces. The irregular OPFOR can cooperate with
or coordinate corruption and extortion by local or regional warlords and criminal organizations. Private
security subcontractors can be warlords, strongmen, commanders, and militia leaders who compete with the
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 5-5

Chapter 5
governing authority for power and authority. Providing protection services empowers PSC leaders with
money and legitimacy. In some cases, PSCs can become private armies. Irregular OPFOR operations under
the guise of a PSC can thrive in areas that appear to be devoid of government authority.
Organization
5-25. A PSC can be fairly small in scale or a large corporate organization. Figure 5-3 shows an example of
possible functions in a PSC organization. The board of directors acts much like a headquarters staff of a
military organization. Support services provide administrative, financial, and logistics support. Information
and investigative services collect, analyze, and disseminate all types of information and intelligence,
including economic intelligence. They also perform personnel security investigations and
counterintelligence functions. Security services provide active and passive security measures that may be
either rudimentary or use advanced technology. Guard services provide bodyguards, personal security
details, stationary guard teams, and surveillance teams. Patrol services conduct patrols and tactical may
conduct actions such as an ambush (to counter an intrusion). Security, guard and patrol service members
receive weapons training.
Board of Directors
Information &
Support Security Guard Patrol
Investigative
Services Services Services Services
Services
Teams Teams Teams Teams Teams
Figure 5-3. PSC organization by functions (example)

5-26. A PSC organization is tailored to serve its customers needs. However, its organizational structure
and level of capability are often directly related to a clients ability to pay. The capabilities of PSC
employees vary from highly trained former military members to uneducated, poorly trained recruits. The
level of competence and the sophistication equipment depends on what the client can afford.
5-27. The weapons and equipment mix is based on team specialization and role. Equipment might
include
Listening and monitoring equipment.
Cellular phones.
Cameras.
Facsimile machines.
Computers.
Motorcycles.
Helicopters.
All-terrain vehicles.
Light armored vehicles.
Assault rifles.
Machineguns.
Submachineguns.
Antitank grenade launchers.
Antitank disposable launchers.
Silenced weapons.
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Noncombatants
LOCAL BUSINESS OWNERS AND EMPLOYEES

5-28. Local commercial enterprises often have authorization to own personal firearms to protect their
workplace from theft or robbery. Authorization may be for either concealed or open carry. A business
owner or employee with a weapon is not necessarily a threat to the governing authority or coalition forces.
However, the mere presence of many weapons in public places adds to the uncertainty whether those forces
should consider such armed noncombatants as friend or foe. The irregular OPFOR can use this type of
uncertainty to slow the actions and reactions of the governing authority and/or coalition forces.
5-29. A local business may hire a PSC to protect its assets and interests. The irregular OPFOR or criminal
organizations may coerce a businessperson into running a front company on their behalf.
CRIMINALS AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

5-30. Criminals and the irregular OPFOR in an OE can be associated and/or affiliated with each other. For
example, some insurgents and criminals can form temporary coalitions when it serves their mutual
interests. Crime is a lucrative means to
Fund operations.
Coerce and control key leaders and/or a relevant population.
Erode governmental authority.
5-31. Some criminals may oppose the irregular OPFOR when its actions jeopardize criminal operations
and profits. Criminal organizations may hire PSCs to provide additional security. Larger criminal
organizations can employ paramilitary elements and tactics. Some may expand from traditional criminal
activities into a pseudo-insurgency and establish de facto governance in areas, regions, and enclaves within
an otherwise sovereign territory of the governing authority. (See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of
criminal organizations and their possible roles in support of and/or cooperation with the irregular OPFOR.)
PRIVATE CITIZENS AND GROUPS

5-32. Local citizens often have authorization to own personal firearms for the personal security. Some may
carry weapons as part of their occupation (such as hunters, security guards, or local police). Some are
members of legitimate private clubs for shooting competitions or hunting. In some societies, carrying a
weapon is simply part of the local culture. Many armed noncombatants openly carry weapons. This
generally includes the individuals mentioned above, as well as members of public law enforcement
agencies and various types of internal security forces. Other organizations and individuals may be
authorized to carry concealed personal weapons.
5-33. Ad hoc local militia or neighborhood watch programs may provide some of the same functions as a
PSC. However, they do so without some of the more sophisticated means and without the profit motive.
These ad hoc local citizen organizations perform such actions on a volunteer basis to protect their families,
homes, and businesses. (A local citizen organization that performs these functions on a contractual basis is
a PSC.)
5-34. Such a large number of armed noncombatants in public places makes it harder to distinguish them
from combatants. Members of the irregular OPFOR also try to blend in with the local populace when they
are not conducting operations. The irregular OPFOR can use this type of uncertainty to slow the actions
and reactions of the governing authority and/or coalition forces.
Note. In a broad sense, all individuals and groups not part of a formal, regulated military force
are civilians. That includes insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals.
UNARMED NONCOMBATANTS
5-35. Other actors in an OE include unarmed noncombatants. These nonmilitary actors may be neutral or
potential side-changers in a conflict involving the irregular OPFOR. Their choice to take sides depends on
their perception of who is causing a grievance for them. It also depends on whether they think their
interests are best served by supporting the governing authority. Given the right conditions, they may decide
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 5-7

Chapter 5
to purposely support hostilities against a governing authority that is the enemy of the irregular OPFOR.
Even if they do not take up arms, such active support or participation moves them into the category of
unarmed combatants. (See the section on Unarmed Combatants at the end of this chapter.)
5-36. Some of the more prominent types of unarmed noncombatants are
Media personnel.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Transnational corporations and their employees.
Private citizens and groups.
However, unarmed noncombatants may also include internally displaced persons, refugees, and transients.
They can also include foreign government and diplomatic personnel present in the area of conflict.
MEDIA PERSONNEL
5-37. An area of conflict attracts a multitude of media personnel. This includes local, national, and
international journalists, reporters, and associated support personnel. They may be independent actors or
affiliated with a particular news organization.
Capabilities and Vulnerabilities

5-38. The media can be a credible source of current information for multiple actors in an OE. News cycles
demand timely information and near-simultaneous reporting on current events. The irregular OPFOR
recognizes the value of media coverage of significant incidents. This coverage can draw attention to
irregular OPFOR successes or highlight failures or missteps by its enemies. The irregular OPFOR can
exploit media coverage to attack the will and resolve of
Its enemies regular military and internal security forces.
The governing authority.
A relevant population.
Media coverage of operations can dramatically affect international relations and strategic interaction.
5-39. The irregular OPFOR may closely observe media personnel. This surveillance can identify character
flaws or weaknesses of personnel the irregular OPFOR can co-opt to the advantage of its INFOWAR
activities. Although media personnel may seek to remain objective and report accurately, they can be
coerced or persuaded to promote an irregular OPFOR perspective. The irregular OPFOR uses threats,
extortion, and/or physical violence to minimize media coverage that is counter to its interests. Some media
representatives who support irregular OPFOR motives may purposely distort information to support
irregular OPFOR objectives.
5-40. The balancing effect of multiple reporting sources tends to reduce the impact of any one source with
overt bias. The irregular OPFOR recognizes that democracies with freedom of the press and widespread
access to media and other information systems can be less susceptible to INFOWAR. However, the
international public and foreign governments are still susceptible to how the irregular OPFOR presents its
agenda to a global audience.
Exploiting Media Access

5-41. The pervasive presence of the media provides access to information that might not otherwise be
available to the irregular OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR can use the physical access allowed to media
representatives to enhance its intelligence collection, information analysis, and consequent actions. Some
members of the irregular OPFOR or individuals who support them may be able to pass themselves off as
independent reporters or embed themselves in a media team under the guise of functional media expertise.
Media credentials can be easily counterfeited. The embedding may take place with or without the
knowledge of a sponsoring media organization. This may enable them to access plans and monitor
operations of the governing authority or regular military forces with which the irregular OPFOR is
in conflict.
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Noncombatants
Media Organization Structure

5-42. A media entity can be as small as an independent reporter or videographer operating as a free-lance
entrepreneur or as large as a sophisticated media team with the credentials of a major news corporation or
international sponsor. Well resourced reporters or media teams may have
Cellular telephones.
Cameras.
Video cameras.
Tape recorders.
Notebook or laptop computers.
General office equipment.
They may have an all-terrain vehicle equipped with the latest video manipulation technology and satellite
communication links.
5-43. Figure 5-4 shows an example of possible functions and individuals in a media team organization.
While most media teams carry out most of these functions, they do not necessarily have all these specific
coordinators and teams.
Media Team
Leader
Press Release Documentation Admin & Logistics

Coordinator Coordinator Coordinator
Videographer Cameraman Graphics Liaison Security

Team Team Designer Team Team
Figure 5-4. Media team organization (example)
Media Team Leader

5-44. The media team leader is responsible for the overall media coverage and news release program. This
individual supervises the development of products that the media team presents. He promotes the value of
its media resources and products and continually seeks to expand business investment in the team products.
Press Release Coordinator

5-45. The press release coordinator is the promotional face with the general relevant population and its
influential leaders. He develops the persona of a trusted member to relevant population.
Documentation Coordinator
5-46. The documentation coordinator transforms raw audio or video coverage and produces a final package
for release to the media-at-large via multiple means. Production coordination includes adding music, verbal
announcements, graphics, and other sound and visual elements to enhance a compelling message. This
coordinator is also responsible for crafting the long-term and recurring reinforcement of a particular
message in conjunction with the press release coordinator.
Administration and Logistics Coordinator

5-47. The operational administration and logistics of the media team is the responsibility of the
administration and logistics coordinator. Functions include
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Chapter 5
Personnel management.
Transportation.
Lodging.
Technical support.
Repair services.
Communications connectivity.
Transmission security.
The administration and logistics coordinator coordinates with the security team in planning, occupying, and
departing designated media coverage areas.
Videographer Team
5-48. The videographer team uses video camera equipment to record an assigned project. It then edits and
assembles an audio-visual production. The documentation coordinator and videographer team review the
product to ensure consistency and relevancy in support of an intended message. Each team member is
responsible for the operation and maintenance of the equipment used in shooting and editing. A
videographer may also be responsible for lighting and sound at a particular event. Depending on the
assigned task, videographers can use diskette, videotape, and/or live broadcast capabilities.
Cameraman Team
5-49. The cameraman team is responsible for physically operating a camera and maintaining composition
and camera angles throughout a given mission or task. Still-shot images are the norm for a cameraman.
Duties are similar to that of a videographer.
Graphics Designer
5-50. The graphics designer has expertise in emphasizing visual impact to using graphics or other special
effects such as animation. This individual also coordinates with media points of contact on how to best
promote the news message and image of materials including electronic and other media venues. Much of
the graphics design is focused on what effectively communicates with the targeted audience. This audience
is usually influential individuals of a relevant population in an irregular OPFOR area of responsibility
(AOR) as well as governing authority officials that are in conflict with the irregular OPFOR.
Liaison Team
5-51. The liaison team works closely with community members and leaders to ensure access to areas and
information that supports the media mission or task. However, other teams may conduct their own liaison.
Security Team
5-52. The security team is responsible for the physical security and protection of media team members in
the conduct of their duties. Security includes the actual mission sites, movement from and to the media
teams operating base and/or logistics support areas.
Relationship to OPFOR Public Relations

5-53. Like media affairs, OPFOR public relations involve focused efforts to understand and engage key
audiences of a relevant population. Their purpose is to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable
for the advancement of OPFOR interests, policies, and objectives. They accomplish this through the use of
coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with all regular OPFOR and
irregular OPFOR actions.
5-54. Public relations are part of the perception management element of INFOWAR. In an expanding
INFOWAR campaign, the irregular OPFOR seeks partners within the specific OPFOR AOR and regional
and/or global supporters. When external states provide overt and/or covert support, the irregular OPFOR
provides appropriate public relations guidance on how to portray or hide such support.
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Noncombatants
5-55. A significant audience external to an irregular OPFOR AOR can be the diaspora of a relevant
population. INFOWAR and public opinion are critical to obtaining diaspora support and keeping the
struggle of guerrillas and/or insurgents in the spotlight of globalized media.
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
5-56. A nongovernmental organization (NGO) is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization
dedicated to alleviating human suffering; promoting education, health care, economic development,
environmental protection, human rights; supporting conflict resolution; and/or encouraging establishment of
democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08). NGOs are likely to be present in any OE.
Variety of Types
5-57. The global community of NGOs includes a wide variety of organizations that are independent,
diverse, and flexible. They differ greatly in size, resources, capabilities, expertise, experience, and missions.
An NGO may be local, national, or transnational. It may employ thousands of individuals or just a handful.
It may have a large management structure or no formal structure at all. It may be a large organization with a
huge budget and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief or a newly created
small organization dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. NGOs are involved in such diverse
activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, development
programs, human rights, and conflict resolution.
5-58. Some NGOs represent members of a particular religious faith. In most of these cases, humanitarian
aid originates in faith-based principles, but promoting a particular religion is not part of the aid provided.
However, some missionary aid groups use humanitarian aid as a means of access for religious awareness
and conversion of a relevant population.
5-59. Within a particular OE, there may be local NGOs as well as an international support presence of
larger NGOs. International NGOs may use localized staffs in building capabilities in and for a region.
Sometimes larger NGOs from outside a geographic region may not be openly visible while operating
through these local organizations. This cooperation can provide resources unavailable at the local and
regional levels during a crisis while incorporating localized capacity and knowledge of conditions,
interpersonal relationships, and informal operations.
NGO Organizational Structure

5-60. A board of directors (sometimes called executive committee) is normally part of the large-scale
decisionmaking process and working issues of the organization. The board serves as the trustee body of the
NGO. Board members are valuable in that they extend the organizations resources into various
communities and include personalities that are not specifically significant in daily operations but provide
credibility to the organization as a whole. Many NGO boards have celebrities, former government officials,
experts, academics, and community leaders with the intention of attaining recognition or publicity. During
emergency appeals, NGOs will often send board members out to make public statements, write newspaper
or journal editorials, make speeches, or give interviews to spark focus on the organizations work and needs
in responding to the emergency.
5-61. NGO boards vary widely in style. Some are very active, often establishing close relationships with
NGO officers and staff and involving themselves in planning processes and fundraising programs. Other
boards are largely fundraising entities, lending their names to give credibility to an organizations
fundraising practices. Boards can be primarily symbolic and fulfill the legal requirements of meeting a
specific number of times each year and certifying financial obligations. The actual authority may reside in
leaders who purposely remain discrete or unpublicized donors of an NGO.
Note. The irregular OPFOR may seek to co-opt board representatives and/or influential
celebrities and donors to overtly or covertly support its goals and objectives.
5-62. Figure 5-5 shows an example of the possible functions of an NGO field office. A smaller, local NGO
may not have all these functions.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 5-11

Chapter 5
Board of Directors
Director NGO Coordinating Group

Field Office
Functions
Administration Operations Plans Logistics
Procurement Transportation Services Distribution
Communications Media Affairs Special Projects
Finance International Law Liaison Security
Figure 5-5. NGO field office functions (example)

5-63. Internal coordination, though not always formal, is the most common way civilian sectors organize in
humanitarian emergencies. NGOs coordinate extensively within the local NGO community to manage
information. They can act as advocacy bodies to international donors or local and regional governments.
There is also external coordination between NGOs, regular military forces, governments, and donor
agencies involved in a geographic region and/or international setting.
Capabilities and Vulnerabilities

5-64. Some internationally active NGOs may employ indigenous groups as local implementing partners.
Extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make NGOs valuable
sources of information about local and regional affairs and civilian attitudes.
5-65. Many NGOs are outfitted with very little, if any, equipment for communications and personal
security. They prefer instead to rely on the good will of the local populace for their safety. However, many
larger NGOs have very capable communications capabilities. Some NGOs provide considerable support
and assistance in the security area.
5-66. Communications provide some special challenges to NGOs. NGOs strive to provide assistance based
on need rather than race, religion, political affiliation, or ability to pay. To avoid the perception of
favoritism and operate in a neutral manner, NGOs normally do not use any encryption devices. They
operate with the understanding that the local governing authority will likely be monitoring all their
communications. They often have access to sensitive information that could assist political or military
objectives of either side. This requires that information be recorded and transmitted in a way that reduces
rather than incites conflict.
5-67. Modern communications equipment is essential for the NGO headquarters to remain in contact with
field offices or mobile teams. However, such equipment might make NGO personnel a target of crime in
areas where the technology is not commonly available. A satellite phone, which provides an NGO team
global coverage, might represent a significant capability if acquired by the irregular OPFOR or criminals.
The same might apply to a vehicle outfitted with a communication suite of sophisticated radios. In some
areas, simply carrying a cellular phone or radio could be viewed as a threat by actors who would like to
keep their activities concealed.
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Noncombatants
5-68. Security planning by an NGO is an ongoing process that continually reassesses threats. In some
cases, NGOs operate in violent environments without developing a strong organizational culture of safety
and security. Aid personnel often rely on the apparent immunity provided by a perceived humanitarian
space and do not view themselves as party to the conflict. Various factors, including programs connecting
an NGO and a governing authority, can cause specific targeting of NGO staff for kidnapping or murder by
violent groups. NGOs often have formal safety and security systems to meet these threats. Some NGOs use
professional security officers and/or PSCs with former military, police, or intelligence experience.
5-69. Reliable transportation is essential for NGO operations. However, this also poses the risk of
accidents, assault, injury, and death for aid workers. The NGO must balance the need for a completely
reliable vehicle against the risk of becoming a target of carjacking in areas of conflict or crime. NGOs may
hire local drivers who have knowledge of which routes to use and how to negotiate check points. Such
drivers may eventually gain trust as representatives of the organization. A driver from a group
disenfranchised due to religious, ethnic, racial, or caste, may cause prejudice against the NGO. A driver
might also be part of a criminal gang or the irregular OPFOR with the intent on stealing the vehicle or
committing a crime against the NGO.
NGO Cooperation with a Governing Authority or Colaition Forces

5-70. The mission of an NGO is often one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting a military
force in accomplishing its objectives. International guidelines on NGOs emphasize the principle of
humanitarian space (humanitarianism, neutrality, and impartiality).
5-71. The preferred external coordination for NGOs is a United Nations (UN)-coordinated effort rather
than a military-administered effort unless the UN is unable to do so. In cases where civil government is
incapable or not present to coordinate NGO response, NGOs and militaries can interface with each other in
operations centers administered by regular military forces.
5-72. Large NGOs often employ specialists or retired military personnel to assist in managing relations and
activities that require interface with military entities. NGOs and military units have many incentives to
coordinate and collaborate. NGOs often need many things from the military: logistics assistance,
communications, intelligence, and protection. Military forces often find value in coordinating with NGOs
for understanding ground-level activity, and to manage population movements, assistance projects, and
general humanitarian activities. Both groups find that coordination is essential.
5-73. Military personnel often contact a NGO coordination group, which can
Provide contact information for liaison with member NGOs.
Indicate what NGOs are doing in the region or area.
Identify which NGOs are active in specific areas.
5-74. The UN often sets up humanitarian information centers (HICs) as central coordination points. NGOs
are either required or voluntarily register with an HIC to keep updated on information and regional
developments. A civil-military operations center or humanitarian operations center can be established
for official coordinating between NGOs, the UN, governments, intergovernmental organizations, and
the military.
5-75. NGOs and military forces can operate together, but challenges exist. Sometimes, in a region
receiving NGO support and despite coordination efforts and extensive collaboration, NGOs can become
frustrated with the apparent idle capacity that military commanders have in reserve for emergency or
contingency actions. NGO managers may question why large numbers of military personnel, expertise, and
supply stores remain unused while NGOs are short-staffed and significant support requirements exist for
displaced persons and other elements of a relevant population. NGOs often want to ensure a distinct
separation between military operations and NGO relief activities.
5-76. Coordinating and cooperating among NGOs and regular military forces does not necessarily mean
sacrificing NGO impartiality or transparency. The benefits of working with military forces can enhance
more effective and efficient NGO operations. Some factors for and against cooperation are
NGOs are generally capable organizations but may lack robust communication and logistics
capacities.
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Chapter 5
NGOs are civilian organizations that do not fall into a military-style command structure.
NGOs prefer to keep their programs, activities, and image as independent as possible.
NGOs can work effectively and efficiently during an emergency, often with a comparative
advantage, in specific areas or regions.
Routine and informal meetings between the NGO community, UN agencies, and the military can
reduce much of collective tension and misunderstanding.
Motivations
5-77. NGOs are generally motivated by charity. They are trying to help the local population deal with
manmade and natural disaster and disease, hunger, and poverty. NGOs are not affiliated with a government,
but may be influenced by governing authority policies of their home nation.
5-78. NGO leaders and operators may have both stated and hidden interests and objectives. Some
organizations and individual participants may have motivations that differ from the NGOs public mission
statements. These motivations can be
Political.
Economic.
Ideological.
Religious or theological.
Social or cultural.
Private and/or personal agenda.
The irregular OPFOR may play on these motivations to induce NGO personnel to act in ways that favor its
own objectives.
Relation to Irregular OPFOR

5-79. Individuals participating in or in conjunction with an NGO may willingly support or be coerced to
support the irregular OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR seeks to embed its supporters and/or covert operatives
in NGOs operating its AOR. This could allow it to access plans and monitor operations of the governing
authority or regular military forces with which it is in conflict.
5-80. Perceptions can easily be interpreted as reality by a relevant population when INFOWAR presents a
compelling irregular OPFOR message and story of unresolved grievances. The irregular OPFOR can
manipulate NGO actions to knowingly or unknowingly serve its goals and objectives.
5-81. The irregular OPFOR can use visible cooperation by an NGO with regular military or internal
security forces of a governing authority to its advantage in INFOWAR. Media exploitation by the irregular
OPFOR can depict NGO presence as biased in favor of a governing authority that is unjust and corrupt.
Reducing NGO presence or causing NGOs to depart particular geographic regions may increase the civil
turmoil the irregular OPFOR desires in its actions against the governing authority.
5-82. NGOs can be inundated with large numbers of civilians seeking medical care in refugee camps and
NGO facilities. It may be difficult for an NGO to distinguish sick or wounded members of the irregular
OPFOR from others requesting care.
5-83. NGOs provide essential services, comfort, and hope to those in need. Unfortunately, the irregular
OPFOR may exploit the charitable sector to support its organizations and activities. This abuse can take
many forms, including:
Establishing front organizations or using charities to raise funds in support of irregular OPFOR
organizations.
Establishing or using charities to transfer funds, other resources, and operatives across
geographical boundaries.
Defrauding charities through branch offices or aid workers to divert funds to support irregular
OPFOR organizations.
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Noncombatants
Leveraging charitable funds, resources, and services to recruit members and foster support for
irregular OPFOR organizations.
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
5-84. A transnational corporation is a business that conducts commerce beyond national boundaries.
Corporate activities may be regional or global. The term transnational, as opposed to international,
accentuates the fact that these organizations and activities are not created or governed national
governments. Instead, they arise under private enterprise for profit.
5-85. Transnational corporations may enter into partnerships with countries that are trying to increase their
world economic position. Emerging states may invite such corporations to establish research and
manufacturing facilities in their countries as a means of building infrastructure. The presence of these
corporations can also enhance a countrys security. However, the motivations of transnational corporation
leaders are business oriented and not usually charitable. The corporations may try to influence regional
affairs or assist their host country in actions that promote their own economic gain.
Note. In pursuit of its own financial gain, a transnational corporation may provide overt or
covert support to the irregular OPFOR. This may include support in obtaining weapons and
equipment, fiscal funding, transshipment of materiel to irregular OPFOR sanctuaries, and/or
placing economic pressure on governing authorities.
5-86. When external forces become involved in a particular country or region, they must take into account
transnational corporations conducting business in the region. The presence of these outside business
interests can put additional pressure on the intervening external forces to avoid collateral damage to civilian
life and property.
Note. Some transnational corporations may have their own armed security forces, or hire PSCs,
to protect their business interests or perhaps also those of the host country and governing
authority. Such security forces become armed noncombatants. However, if they participate in
armed conflict on behalf of the host country, they become combatants.
5-87. A host country must also take into account transnational corporations conducting business within its
borders or region, and their international connections. If the host countrys actions adversely affect foreign
commercial enterprises or regional security, conditions may encourage local, regional, or international
support for irregular OPFOR goals and objectives.
PRIVATE CITIZENS AND GROUPS

5-88. The various types of civilians in an OE can include
Government officials.
Business people.
Farmers.
Lawyers.
Doctors.
Clergy.
Tradesmen.
Shopkeepers.
Other groups of the local relevant population.
Transients.
Internally displaced civilians.
Refugees.
These individuals and activities include offices, bureaus, and agencies of a governing authority,
intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, civil organizations, and independent or transnational corporations.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 5-15

Chapter 5
They provide a wide range of services, support, and other activities that can be susceptible to the influence
of the irregular OPFOR.
Note. The irregular OPFOR can attempt to embed operatives in low-level jobs in order to
infiltrate government, commercial, and military activities. Such an insider threat can reap
significant information and intelligence for the irregular OPFOR. It can also increase the
restrictions placed on a relevant population and/or incite additional dissatisfaction with policies
and practices of the governing authority.
5-89. Some government officials, such as police and emergency service personnel, have specialized
equipment and standard uniforms. Other officials, such as mayors and town council members, wear
clothing appropriate to the local customs. These officials are generally linked to a geographical area and/or
functional responsibility and authority. Each actor has varied concerns and agendas. In some instances, the
irregular OPFOR can masquerade as officials and act in a manner to discredit the governing authority.
5-90. Various political, religious, or social groups may be affiliated with the irregular OPFOR. Even if
unarmed, this can affect their status as noncombatant actors. Criminal organizations or elements of a
criminal organization can
Be unarmed noncombatants who violate civil law.
Be armed noncombatants.
Be involved in armed combatant acts.
Note. The irregular OPFOR identifies weaknesses in the social structure and/or individuals of a
relevant population and seeks to co-opt or manipulate particular individuals and/or groups to
enhance its agenda. It may also acquire organizational capabilities, skill sets, and/or materiel in
the population within which it operates. When possible, it gains this support voluntarily.
However, it uses extortion and violence to attain its objectives if required.
5-91. Support from the civilian population is a key to irregular OPFOR operations. The irregular OPFOR
recruits its manpower, gains intelligence, and receives safe haven and materiel support from the relevant
population. Even if it also has external support, the irregular OPFOR cannot exist for an extended period
without significant support from the civilian population.
UNARMED COMBATANTS
5-92. The local populace contains various types of unarmed nonmilitary personnel who, given the right
conditions, may decide to purposely support hostilities against the enemy of the irregular OPFOR. Such
active support or participation may take many forms, not all of which involve possessing weapons.
5-93. In an insurgent organization or guerrilla unit, unarmed personnel might conduct recruiting, financing,
intelligence-gathering, supply-brokering, transportation, courier, or INFOWAR functions (including
videographers and camera operators). Technicians and workers who fabricate improvised explosive devices
might not be armed. The same is true for people who provide sanctuary for combatants.
5-94. Unarmed religious, political, tribal, or cultural leaders might participate in or actively support the
irregular OPFOR. Unarmed media or medical personnel may become affiliated with a military or
paramilitary organization. Even unarmed individuals who are coerced into performing or supporting hostile
actions and those who do so unwittingly can in some cases be categorized as combatants.
Note. From the viewpoint of some governing authorities, any armed or unarmed person who
engages in hostilities, and/or purposely and materially supports hostilities against the governing
authority or its partners is a combatant.
5-95. Individuals who perform money-laundering or operate front companies for large criminal
organizations might not be armed. Individual criminals or small gangs might be affiliated with a
paramilitary organization and perform support functions that do not involve weapons.
5-16 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Chapter 6
Terrorism
Terrorism is a tactic. This chapter presents an overview of conditions that are a composite of
real-world capabilities and limitations that may be present in a complex operational
environment that includes terrorism. Acts of terrorism demonstrate an intention to cause
significant psychological and/or physical effects on a relevant population through the use or
threat of violence. Terrorism strategies are typically a long-term commitment to degrade the
resilience of an enemy in order to obtain concessions from an enemy with whom terrorists are
in conflict. International conventions and/or law of war protocols on armed conflict are often
not a constraint on terrorists. Whether acts of terrorism are deliberate, apparently random,
and/or purposely haphazard, the physical, symbolic, and/or psychological effects can diminish
the confidence of a relevant population for its key leaders and governing institutions. Social
and political pressure, internal and/or external to a relevant population and governing authority,
is frequently exploited by terrorists with near real-time media coverage in the global
information environment. The local, regional, international, and/or transnational attention on
acts of terrorism by state and/or non-state actors can often isolate an enemy from its relevant
population and foster support of organizations, units, or individuals who feel compelled to
use terror to achieve their objectives. The themes and messages promoted by terrorists can
accent anxiety, demoralize the resolve of a relevant population and its leaders, and eventually
defeat an enemy.
TERRORISM IN COMPLEX OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

6-1. Terrorism can be defined as the use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce
governments or societies. Often motivated by philosophical or other ideological beliefs, objectives are
typically political in nature. The pursuit of goals and conduct labeled as terrorism by some actors in
complex operational environments (OE) can be considered fully justifiable by other actors. The spectrum of
actors in an OE can range political, public, and/or commercial institutions, other institutions appearing
legitimate but disguising an illicit agenda, and/or organizations and individuals who openly declare intent
to use terror as a matter of policy and practice. Irregular forces typically use terrorism (see figure 6-1).
Insurgents Guerrillas Criminal Organizations
Irregular Force Adherents Independent Actors
Figure 6-1. Terrorism actors in complex operational environments

6-2. The geographical perspectives of local, national, regional, international, and/or transnational terrorist
acts can indicate why terrorism is used but a more effective measure of understanding terrorism must relate
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-1

Chapter 6
directly to the actors involved in a particular OE. Ultimately, terrorism is about people and the
psychological effectiveness of convincing or compelling a relevant population to act in a desired manner.
6-3. Multiple actors in an OE can use terrorism to enhance the conditions that favor their agenda and
overarching purpose. Terrorism in irregular actions favors indirect and asymmetric approaches. However,
terrorism can be employed within a full range of military and other explicit or subtle capabilities in order to
erode an enemys power, influence, and will. Irregular forces are generally categorized as armed
individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security
forces of a governing authority. Similarly, a hybrid threat can be visualized as the diverse and dynamic
combination of regular armed forces, irregular forces such as insurgent organizations and/or guerrilla units,
and/or affiliated and associated criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Other
irregular forces can include mercenaries, corrupt officials of a governing authority, compromised
commercial enterprises, public entities, active or covert supporters, and/or coerced and passive citizens
of a populace.
6-4. Independent actors using terrorism can also exist in an OE distinct and separate from the agendas
from other irregular forces. Adherents may have no direct connection with an irregular force but apply
terror in support of an irregular forces agenda. Threats can be as small as one individual or expand in size
from a small and discrete band, cell, or unit to the noticeable presence as a large group of rogue actors that
are affiliated or united in purpose.
6-5. Irregular forces adapt their capabilities in an agile and flexible manner to achieve organizational
objectives. Terrorism is a means of conducting violent conflict that typically provides significant
psychological impact on an intended target. Acts of terror may be actually intended for an audience other
than the victims of an attack. Conducting terrorism typically emerges from a deliberate decisionmaking
process. Terrorists usually compare and contrast advantages and disadvantages to evaluate probable cost-
benefits of a particular act or acts of terror. When an irregular force terrorist self-justifies the legitimacy of
using terrorism against an enemy, the terrorism often affects enemy combatants and noncombatants in a
relevant population. The analysis and decision to use terror is often a simple cost-efficient and effective
results-oriented means to pursue violent conflict in order to achieve a purpose.
Note. For the purpose of this TC, the term enemy refers to an enemy of the irregular force.
MOTIVATIONS
6-6. Motivations often include a wide range of reasons that an individual, cell, unit, or other type of
irregular force organization may feel compelled to use terrorism. Encouragement from outside an
organization to use terrorism can be part of the conditions and circumstances that influence an irregular
force to act. Support to use terrorism may be from regular military forces and/or special-purpose forces
(SPF) from a state or states. Internal security forces and/or law enforcement organizations that have been
infiltrated by an irregular force can also support irregular force actions within a local or regional area of
responsibility. The collaboration among organizations, units, cells, and/or individuals may be based on
coercion, contractual agreement, and/or temporary or long-term common goals and objectives.
6-7. Motivations for initiating and/or continuing acts of terrorism can include
Spotlight attention on unresolved grievances with an enemy.
Disrupt an enemys ability to continue actions against an irregular force.
Champion causes of a suppressed and/or disenfranchised segment of a relevant population.
Demonstrate irregular force capabilities.
Obtain active and/or passive support from a relevant population.
Receive overt and/or covert support from a state or non-state actor.
Deter continued enemy military operations in a particular geographic area.
Dissuade enemy governmental influence over a relevant population.
Develop acceptance and legitimacy of an irregular force agenda and programs.
Cause an enemy to overreact to acts of terror and correspondingly alienate a relevant population.
6-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Terrorism
Defeat enemy military and/or internal security forces and/or its governing institutions.
Achieve irregular force objectives.
6-8. Irregular force objectives promote solutions to grievances in the context of a particular relevant
population. An irregular force may prefer to use indirect approaches such as subterfuge, deception, and
non-lethal action to achieve its objectives, but is committed to violent action when necessary to compel an
adversary, enemy, and/or other opposing form of governance to submit to the irregular force demands. In
most cases, irregular force operations include politically oriented plans of action. Some irregular force
organizations, such as affiliated criminal gangs, exist for their own commercial profit and power and are
not interested in improving aspects such as quality of life and civil security of a relevant population that
they affect.
6-9. Transforming a grievance into a concept and plan for action develops typically along a pattern that
evolves from generalized ideas to tactical options and a heightened sense of needing resolution to a
grievance. Continuous information and intelligence collection refines options for the likelihood of success
and a decision to act. Motivation provides a momentum of commitment to actually conduct the terrorism. A
way to visualize this human dimension sequence is a terrorism planning cycle.
TERRORISM PLANNING AND ACTION CYCLE

6-10. A generic sequence and timing of irregular force terrorism depends on organizational capabilities and
limitations, operational constraints, and the level of commitment of an irregular force actor or organization.
To effectively understand this commitment, knowing the underlying motivation is fundamental to
appreciating the resolve to plan and act. The irregular force sets conditions to optimize its awareness,
training, and mission readiness to achieve objectives that counter enemy forces. When advantageous to
irregular force operations, coordination and cooperation can combine the capabilities of conventional
military, paramilitary, criminal activities, and/or terrorism.
6-11. Tactics, techniques, and procedures include creating conditions of instability in a particular OE,
alienating the population from the governing authority of the region, and improving the irregular force
influence on a designated populace and key leaders in that relevant population. In complex conditions, an
irregular force may be able to employ a range of organizational options from small loosely affiliated cells
to global networks in order to promote psychological effect and mission success. Such networks can be
local, regional, international or transnational affiliations; host simple or sophisticated media affairs
programs; as well as acquire covert and/or overt financial, political, military, or social support.
6-12. A terrorism planning cycle is actually a continuum. Irregular forces plan, prepare, act, and apply
experience and skill in order to achieve objectives. The concept of a spiral effect may be an effective way
to visualize and understand a planning cycle of terrorism. Even with periodic setbacks in acts of terror
capabilities and execution, the resolve of terrorists to a compelling agenda is often progressive, adaptive,
and long-term in order to achieve objectives.
BROAD TARGET SELECTION

6-13. Irregular force terrorism operations are typically prepared to minimize risk and achieve the highest
probability of success by avoiding an enemys strengths and concentrating attack on an enemys
weaknesses. Emphasis is often placed on maximizing irregular force security and terrorism effects. Security
measures usually include planning and operating with small numbers of irregular force members to more
effectively compartment knowledge of a pending terrorism mission.
6-14. Collection against potential targets may continue for years before an operation is decided upon.
Detailed planning is a norm but can be deliberately shortened when an opportunity arises. While some
targets may be vulnerable enough with shorter periods of observation, the information gathering and
analysis for intelligence will be intense. Operations planned or underway may be altered, delayed, or
cancelled due to changes at the target or in local conditions. Tactical missions conducted by and/or for
larger irregular forces complement operational objectives and strategic goals of the irregular force. The
psychological impact on a targeted population is the overarching objective of any terrorist operation.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-3

Chapter 6
6-15. There is no universal model for planning, but irregular forces use their experience and expertise to
effectively apply traditional principles for plans and operations. Irregular forces often exchange expertise in
particular skill sets such as recruitment, media affairs, and training on various forms of direct action in
terrorism. Tactical methods and analysis of successful missions are often shared via the Internet and
websites hosted by an irregular force. Adaptability, innovation, improvisation, and risk assessment are key
components of plans and actions toward mission success (see figure 6-2).
Conduct broad target analysis and general intentions.

Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.
Select specific target and resources.
Refine target surveillance and intelligence.
Rehearse plan and contingencies.
Attack.
Exploit effects.
Target Recon Select Refine Ready Act Exploit
Continuum of planning -- execution -- reapplication -- lessons learned evaluation
Figure 6-2. Terrorism planning and action cycle

6-16. Tactical and operational planning can be analyzed according to common requirements. A plans and
operation cycle provides a baseline in assessing particular organizational requirements to conduct an act of
terror. The significant differences among irregular forces often center on factors of intent and capability
and the organizational, key leader, and individual commitment to a philosophical, ideological, or otherwise
practical motivation and compulsion.
6-17. Irregular forces often pride themselves on being a learning organization. Combined with motivation
and a compelling agenda, irregular forces gather information and intelligence, analyze their own and enemy
strengths and weaknesses, determine enemy patterns, trends, and emerging actions susceptible to attack,
and identify key vulnerabilities in an enemys systems, functions, and actions.
6-18. Consideration in selecting potential targets focuses directly to counter enemy governing authority or
supporting force programs that demonstrate security, safety, and assurance to the relevant population that
the irregular force needs to influence. Tactical operations that might counter an enemy through irregular
force subversive or direct actions can include
Secure a critical segment of a relevant population.
Declare the control and/or sovereignty of geographic areas that support the irregular force.
Disrupt military and/or internal security forces of an enemy.
Diminish the credibility of civil police and law enforcement activities.
Degrade a public sense of safety and stability from the enemy governing authority.
Discredit the political agenda of the enemy governing authority.
Demonize key leader actions of the enemy governing authority and civil administration.
Provide basic social services not being adequately provided by the enemy governing authority.
INITIAL INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND SURVEILLANCE

6-19. Targets displaying significant vulnerabilities may receive additional attention and priority of effort
for intelligence gathering and surveillance. This potential for successfully attack establishes a requirement
to gather additional information on a targets patterns over time. This phase may be very short or can span
months and even years. The type of surveillance employed depends on the type of target and its location.
Elements of information typically gathered include
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Terrorism
Assessing the practices, procedures, and/or routines of an organization and/or facility. Items of
interest include scheduled product deliveries, work shift changes, identification procedures
and other observable security routines. Examples are as simple as recording when regularly
scheduled supply deliveries arrive or commodity pickup occurs, or where key leaders park
personal vehicles.
Observing the physical layout and individual activities at residences and business offices of key
leaders. Actions include knowing how the power grid services the location and critical points of
failure if electrical power is to be interrupted during an attack.
Monitoring transportation routes of travel for targeted individuals for common routes, choke
points, and limited visibility areas along routes that may be conducive for an attack. Personal
patterns can include routes among a personal residence, temporary lodging, commercial site, gym,
and/or school or university. Attention at facilities may include access and exit points, types of
vehicles allowed on the facility property, and/or physical security barriers that must be bypassed
or breached to enter a location.
Probing security measures to determine the complexity of security at a target and/or reaction time
of security response units. Other items of interest can include any hardening of structures, barriers,
or sensors; personnel, package, and vehicle screening procedures; and the type and frequency of
emergency reaction drills at a facility.
SPECIFIC TARGET SELECTION

6-20. Selection of a target for actual tactical planning typically considers some of the following issues:
Does success affect a larger audience than the immediate victim(s)?
Will the target attract immediate high profile media attention beyond the immediate region?
Does attack success emphasize the desired grievance to the appropriate audience that can resolve
the grievance?
Is the attack effect consistent with overarching objectives of the irregular force?
Does the target and mission success provide an advantage to the irregular force by demonstrating
its organizations capabilities?
What are the near-, mid- and long-term costs versus benefits of conducting the operation?
6-21. A decision to proceed requires continued intelligence collection against the selected target. Targets
that do not receive immediate primary consideration may still be collected on for future opportunities.
PRE-ATTACK SURVEILLANCE AND PLANNING

6-22. Members of the unit or cell that will conduct the attack begin to appear during this phase. Trained
intelligence and surveillance personnel or members supportive of the irregular force may be organized to
prepare logistics and/or locations for the operation. Operatives gather detailed information on the targets
current patterns in recent days to weeks. The irregular force assesses and confirms information gathered
from previous surveillance and reconnaissance activities.
6-23. The type of surveillance employed depends on the targets activities. Current information is used to
Conduct security studies.
Conduct detailed preparatory plans and operations.
Recruit specialized operatives and/or active supporters.
Procure a base of operations in the target area such as safe houses and caches.
Design and test escape routes.
Decide on types of weapons and other means of attack.
REHEARSAL
6-24. Rehearsals improve the probability of success, confirm planning assumptions, and assess
contingencies. Rehearsals test security reactions to particular attack profiles in primary and alternate plans of
attack. Irregular forces use their own operatives and/or unsuspecting people to test target reactions.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-5

Chapter 6
6-25. Typical rehearsals include

Equipment and weapons operational checks.
Communications and signals to be used in the mission.
Skills performance of all and/or particular specialists.
Final preparatory checks.
Pre-operations inspection drills.
Deployment sequence of movements and maneuver into the target area.
Actions near and/or on the objective.
Primary and alternate escape routes.
Initial safe haven, hide sites, and/or rally point actions.
Transfer plans from initial to subsequent safe havens or hide sites.
6-26. Confirmation checks in the target area can include
Target information gathered to date.
Target patterns of activities.
Physical layout of target area for changes in routes and/or manmade features.
Time-distance factors from the assault position to the attack point.
Security force presence during varied states of alert.
Reaction response timing by security forces to a demonstration, feint, and/or threat.
Ability to preposition and/or retrieve equipment or vehicles near the objective.
Ease of blocking and/or restricting an escape route at critical choke points.
ATTACK AND ACTIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE

6-27. The irregular force executes its tactical plan but remains flexible to changing conditions and adapts
accordingly. The plans and rehearsals have considered primary and contingency actions that possess the
advantages of initiative and deception. Actions provide for
Use of Surprise.
Choice of time, place, and conditions of attack.
Employment of diversions and supplemental attacks.
Support of security and related positions and/or forces to neutralize target reaction forces and
security measures.
6-28. Simultaneous actions may include an assault element, security element, and support element. Some
missions may require a breach element. Actions on the objective will sequence through several main tasks:
Isolate the objective site.
Gain access to the individual, individuals, and/or asset.
Control the target site.
Seize and/or destroy the individual, individuals, and/or asset at the objective.
Achieve the mission task.
ESCAPE AND EXPLOITATION

6-29. Escape plans are well rehearsed and executed. Rapid withdrawal and dispersal from the target site
can involve multiple withdrawal routes and temporary safe houses. Even in the case of a suicide attack, a
handler or observer-recorder requires a plan to evade identification and capture. Similar expectation to evade
capture occurs with an attack by fire element or support by fire element.
6-30. Media exploitation to a global audience will usually include video coverage, sometimes with audio
commentary by observers with a videographer. Mass casualties or major disruption of economic and social
services typically gain prime international media coverage. Extending the duration of an act of terrorism may
promote awareness of an irregular force agenda and assist the irregular force in winning the battle of the
narrative with a relevant population.
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Terrorism
6-31. The irregular force attack must be actively publicized to achieve an intended effect of exploiting a
successful attack. Media outlets influenced or coerced to support an irregular force agenda with prepared
public statements are examples of preparation to effectively exploit irregular force operations. Release of
warnings and/or announcements are timed to take advantage of media cycles for selected target audiences at
the local, regional, and global levels of information warfare.
6-32. Unsuccessful operations are often disavowed by the irregular force when possible. The perception
that an irregular force has failed can damage its prestige and indicate vulnerability.
6-33. In addition to the negative impact on the enemy, successful attacks can bring favorable attention,
notoriety, and encourage support such as funding and recruiting to the irregular force. The proof that an
attacker can attack and evade may sway potential recruits to join and/or convince recruits that have been
coerced to approach assigned tasks with an expectation of success and survival.
6-34. The general concept of planning and action by irregular forces is adaptable. The seven concept
phases are generally descriptive of tactics and techniques but are not prescriptive. Operations retain a flexible
expectation based on evolving conditions. Knowing the underlying motivations for terrorism is fundamental to
appreciating the resolve of irregular forces to plan and act.
6-35. When advantageous to irregular force operations, capabilities can include combinations of regular
military forces, paramilitary units, insurgent organizations and guerrilla units, and criminal networks. Any
and/or all of these groups can use terrorism. Regardless of an irregular force network as local, regional,
international or transnational in capability, media exploitation using simple or sophisticated systems is critical
to create the desired influence within a targeted population.
TERRORISM ACTIONS
6-36. Irregular forces apply terrorism for offensive and defensive purposes. Common tactical principles of
armed conflict and INFOWAR apply capabilities with the intent to cause psychological anxiety and fear in an
enemy in addition to physical effects. Adding aspects of surprise and deception to acts of terrorism often
weakens resolve of a targeted relevant population. Nonetheless, each situation in an OE can present tactical
variations and techniques to conduct a successful irregular force mission.
6-37. In applying a definition of tactics as an ordered arrangement and maneuver of forces in relation to an
enemy to achieve a mission objective, an irregular force has a wide range of technique options in traditional or
irregular conflict. Techniques describe methods used to conduct a tactic in order to accomplish required
functions or tasks. Techniques evolve through the analysis of an intended mission and observations and/or
lessons learned from successes and failures of previous missions. Procedures are standardized steps,
performed deliberately and consistently, that prescribe how to perform specific tactical functions and tasks.
The how-to of understanding terrorism is a composite of knowing TTP and the motivations that provoke
and compel their use by irregular forces.
6-38. Incidents of terrorism can range the rogue action of a lone individual or the sanctioned activities of
large organizations acting on the overt or covert policies of a state. Terrorism can also be sponsored or
conducted by non-state actors. The following descriptions focus primarily on individual and small unit, cell, or
group actions experienced as a sudden, violent engagement among friendly and enemy forces. These tactical
engagements usually orient on offensive actions and terrorism but may also require irregular forces to
transition temporarily to defensive forms of conflict.
6-39. The irregular force uses a flexible array of terrorism means and materiel to accomplish assigned
missions. The irregular force makes decisions under conditions of uncertainty but continually seeks to
minimize its risk and identify vulnerabilities in an enemy that can be attacked. Deception and surprise
compound the effects of massing an attack against a point of weakness in order to achieve physical effects and
create anxiety or fear. Understanding and applying these debilitating effects of coercion, anxiety, and/or fear is
central to the intended physical and psychological effects of terrorism.
6-40. The irregular force is adaptive and learns from tactical success and failure and will adjust techniques
to particular conditions in order to achieve an objective. TTP examples underscore the fact that the science of
tactics is only as effective as the leadership, training, and experience of an irregular force unit, cell, or related
organization. Elements such as demonstrated capabilities, weapon systems, location, restrictions and
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 6-7

Chapter 6
constraints, logistic support, and time-distance and weather and terrain factors are important to planning and
conducting an irregular force action. However, the essential aspect of executing an irregular force act is the
motivation and commitment of an irregular force in the individual and collective execution of tasks to achieve
a mission objective.
DEFENSIVE ACTIONS
6-41. Irregular force tactics can augment defensive actions with terrorism in order to
Defeat an enemy attack.
Gain time.
Economize irregular force capabilities.
Develop conditions favorable for subsequent offensive operations.
6-42. Other objectives for conducting defensive actions related to terrorism include denying access to an
area, causing extensive commitment of enemy forces and materiel, and/or fixing enemy forces for a specific
time. Since acts of terrorism are typically sudden, violent acts similar to an assault, ambush, or raid, defensive
actions often involve the delay or disruption of enemy response to the act of terrorism. An irregular force may
attempt to deny access to designated terrain or a resource for a specific time, limit the freedom of maneuver to
an enemy pursuit, or channel enemy forces into a killing zone for a subsequent assault or ambush. Defensive
actions remain closely linked to offensive actions and terrorism.
OFFENSIVE ACTIONS
6-43. An irregular force plans and acts decisively with deception and surprise as tactical enablers for
terrorism. Creating overwhelming combat power against a specified objective requires an irregular force to
have keen situational awareness and understanding of its AOR.
6-44. The shock effect of terrorism depends heavily on effective reconnaissance and surveillance in
information gathering and intelligence analysis. The resulting awareness and understanding improves the
ability to combine irregular force effects at a time and place for the optimum application of surprise and
deception with available resources for an expectation of mission success.
Attack Threat on Land

6-45. Attacks using terrorism are often considered most likely during the normal conduct of lifestyles in
familial, social, or commercial settings. Attacks often occur in the context of a local setting. Political
perspectives can affect each of these daily domains and the willingness of people to be an active or passive
supporter to an irregular force agenda.
6-46. An irregular force evaluates the situational context of its operational environment in order to
determine the most effective ways to advance its objectives. The variables of a particular setting and the
capabilities that exist for improvised or innovative actions by an irregular force can include physical domains
beyond conflict on land or its sub-surface. Two other domains can be maritime and aerial environments in
which to conduct irregular conflict.
Maritime Attack Threat

6-47. A maritime attack has the potential for significant disruption and/or damage on the economy of a
governing authority and other international actors with which the irregular force is in conflict. An attack at a
major port facility or a choke point on a main maritime route would cause significant regional disruption and
negative impacts on a global economy.
6-48. If a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) was detonated at any of these locations, the immediate
damage would be great to shipping and port facilities. However, a potentially even greater damage would be
the economic repercussions on regional and global markets and commerce.
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Terrorism
Aerial Attack Threat

6-49. An aerial terrorism threat can use multiple means to attack. Traditional forms include hijacking
aircraft and hostage-taking, sabotage of aircraft and facilities, and/or using a manned civil or military aircraft
as a suicide bomb against a designated target.
6-50. Another variation is use of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with an explosive payload to attack a
target. Techniques can range from small hobby craft model airplanes with small ad hoc explosive packages to
the acquisition and use of sophisticated cruise-type missiles with significantly larger warhead capabilities.
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

6-51. Irregular forces use a wide array of tactics and techniques to apply terrorism. The TTP are intended to
be flexible and adaptive approaches. Surprise, secrecy, and indirect methods of attack are fundamental to acts
of terror. The tactical options are as broad and diverse as the resolve of the irregular force leader to improvise
and/or innovate with available resources.
6-52. The irregular force leader uses tactics, forces, and weapon systems tailored to a particular mission.
Operations are planned for a specific target and effect and use reconnaissance and surveillance to plan,
counter, and overmatch an enemy. If changes or unexpected conditions render success unlikely, the irregular
force leader may cancel or postpone an operation and return at a more opportune time. He may choose a
different target and continue his planning and attack process.
6-53. Extensive use of the Internet encourages exchange of practical information, training, and
observations among terrorists. Training material, training videos, and on-line dialogues develop and sustain
initiatives and encouragement among irregular forces. Shared information and intelligence continue to
improve irregular force techniques as field experiences demonstrate degrees of effectiveness in employing acts
of terror.
6-54. Tactics, techniques, and procedures typical of irregular force actions and terrorism include
Threat-Hoax.
Arson.
Sabotage.
Bombing.
Hijack-Seizure.
Kidnapping.
Hostage-taking.
Raid or ambush.
Assassination.
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
THREAT OR HOAX
6-55. Irregular forces can use threats to coerce or preclude actions by a targeted individual or population.
Threats and hoaxes can degrade the effectiveness of preventive or countermeasures when a targeted individual
or population loses situational awareness of an actual terrorist threat or disperses finite assets against many
possible threats. At the less lethal end of the conflict spectrum, hoaxes can simply be methods to annoy and/or
degrade the alertness of security forces and keep the population constantly agitated. Bomb threats, leaving
suspicious items in public places, and other ploys consume time, resources, and effort from an enemy and its
security operations and contribute to general uncertainty and anxiety.
6-56. Extortion is an example of a threat that can obtain money, materiel, information, or support by force.
For example, numerous reports from a region could indicate that warlords and militias are in contractual
agreements with a governing authority to protect government and coalition supply convoys. However, these
same warlords and/or militia in many cases are corrupt and extort large sums of money from the regional
trucking contractors. Corrupt government officials or an activity that require bribes to retain business
permits or easy route access further complicates actual or alleged threats and extortion. Another example
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Chapter 6
of extortion can occur in the opium trade of a region with taxes levied on farmers, traffickers, and
competing trafficking networks.
6-57. Intimidation is another form of extortion. An irregular force individual, intelligence cell or
specialized team can intimidate people to obtain information on a target location or to provide resources.
Death threats against an individual or his family may cause the individual to provide information or resources
to a cell, unit, or organization with which he has no interest or allegiance. Intimidation can also be used as a
means to convince individuals not to take an action. For example, security personnel may be intimidated to not
implement required security measures during a specified period of time at a critical infrastructure facility.
6-58. The effects of coercing individuals can be significant while appearing irrational to some people.
Nonetheless, irregular forces have successfully used these simple techniques to coerce individuals to
participate in an attack that could include an individual suicide or vehicular borne suicide mission.
ARSON
6-59. Arson is most often used for symbolic attacks and economic effects. Examples of attack by irregular
forces can include
Assaulting and setting fire to a temporary staging area for fuel tanker trucks.
Burning transportation infrastructure in order to disrupt the flow of logistics along a main supply
route and a resulting requirement for reallocation of security forces to reinforce route protection.
Damaging communications nodes to disrupt cable or digital relay transmissions.
6-60. A number of arson attacks by small groups of armed extremists can hamper other ongoing governing
authority operations and/or regional law enforcement responsibilities. Arson can be combined, directly or
indirectly, with other forms of terror. An arson attack on residential areas or public facilities could injure or
kill noncombatants and incite civil unrest.
SABOTAGE
6-61. Sabotage is the planned destruction of the enemys equipment or infrastructure. The purpose of
sabotage is to inflict both psychological and physical damage. Sabotage can be an incident creating a large
number of casualties or cause a severe disruption of services for a relevant population.
6-62. Destroying or disrupting key services or facilities displays irregular force capabilities on the public
consciousness and either increases a target populations frustration with the ineffectiveness of its governing
authority or may inspire others in the population to resist along with the irregular force. Oil pipelines, water
purification plants, sewage treatment facilities, air traffic control hubs, and/or medical treatment or research
facilities are examples of potential sabotage targets. Sabotage and terrorism can also be demonstrated as a
combination of techniques such as bombing, arson, cyber, or use of industrial materials and contaminates.
BOMBING
6-63. Bombs are commonly used by irregular forces to conduct acts of terrorism. Bombs can be highly
destructive and easily tailored to a mission, do not require the operator to be present, and have a significant
physical and psychological impact (see figure 6-3).
6-64. The type of terrorism can employ varied explosive device
Military-grade type-classified mines.
Military-grade or civilian engineer/construction explosives.
Commercial-industrial products adapted to create explosive components and/or devices as
improvised explosive devices (IED).
6-65. Car bombs, commonly referred to as vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), are used
regularly in terrorism. Suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED) are a norm of some
terrorists. In a contemporary tally of attack methods used by irregular forces, only armed attacks surpass the
use of bombing.
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Terrorism
IED Bombing: Insurgent Affiliate (Example)
An insurgent organization affiliate operating within a sovereign state selected an urban

compound that housed coalition forces as the target for a vehicle borne explosive device
(VBIED) attack. The governing authority had been successful in suppressing any public
demonstrations by the insurgent organization as coalition forces arrived in the state to
assist in stabilizing the expanding insurgency of the region. A small cell of six insurgents
conducted reconnaissance and detailed surveillance of the compound and identified that
breaching an entry into the compound was not likely to succeed. The plan evolved to
detonate a large VBIED close to a perimeter wall near high-rise apartments inside the
compound. The fabricated bomb was sure to cause significant death and injuries to the
multinational military members and civilian contractors operating from the compound.
Insurgents placed several thousand pounds of explosive inside the bulk fuel tank of a
commercial tractor-trailer truck. Training and other logistical support was provided by the
insurgent organization in a neighboring state of the region. An insider threat identified that
the governing authority would not allow any expansion of stand-off distance along a
particular section of compound wall. Insurgent observers confirmed that physical security
checks by local police were infrequent and the area next to the wall was easy to access.
At an early morning hour with visibility limited due to a heavy rain, three insurgents waited
near the compound wall in a sedan. Other insurgents drove the tractor-trailer fuel truck up
to the compound wall, set the timing device on the bomb, and quickly departed the area
with the other insurgents in the sedan. An insurgent observer remained to observe
security force and first responder reactions to the bombing.
Guards inside the compound noticed the suspicious activity but were unable to warn
many of the residents in the apartments before the VBIED detonated. Structure damage
was significant to several apartment buildings. The bombing caused 35 deaths and over
100 other people were injured in the attack.
The public outcry from several coalition states caused the compound to be evacuated
within days. The insurgent organization claimed a major victory in forcing the removal of
coalition forces from the area as the insurgency increased its active and passive support
of the relevant population.
Figure 6-3. Bombing: insurgent affiliate (example)

6-66. A technique used often by terrorists is an initial bomb detonation followed by secondary bomb
detonations as first responders or other people arrive at the attack site. In recent years, bombs and in particular
IEDs increased in lethality and adaptation of techniques used by terrorists. Some IEDs are bulky devices often
made from artillery shells and detonated with simple electric triggers using garage door openers or doorbells.
However, irregular forces also produce and use smaller lethal devices that can be planted quickly and can be
detonated from longer distances with more sophisticated devices.
6-67. Another IED innovation is to use a device called an explosively formed projectile (EFP). The
penetrating principle is common to shaped-charge munitions in order to outmatch armor protection. Although
some technical skill and machining is required to obtain an optimum effect, a simple EFP is a section of pipe
filled with explosives and capped by a shaped copper disk. When the explosive detonates, the EFP liner folds
into a slug-like shape to penetrate armor plating of a vehicle. Emplacement of the EFP is factored to hit a most
likely weak point for penetration. The angle of an EFP attack can be from below a target, along a side of a
target, and can even be from above or at an extended height from a road or trail surface to attack wheeled or
tracked vehicles.
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Chapter 6
6-68. A prevalent suicide tactic involves an individual wearing or carrying an explosive device to a target
and then detonating the bomb or driving an explosive-laden vehicle to or into a target and then detonating the
bomb. Suicide attacks differ in concept and execution from other high risk operations. In other high-risk
missions, mission success does not require that the participant die. The plan allows for possible escape or
survival of the terrorist or terrorists.
6-69. Some terrorists have used people who are unknowingly part of a suicide attack. An example is an
individual associated with a terrorist cell who believes he is only a courier of information and materiel but is
unknowingly transporting an IED in a vehicle that is command- detonated by an observer-handler against a
selected target.
6-70. Another way of describing a suicide bomber is a highly effective precision-guided munition.
Psychological impact increases when confronted by a person who plans to intentionally commit suicide in
order to kill other people. Although a suicide bomber can be a lone terrorist working independently, the use of
suicide terrorism as a tactic is normally the result of a conscious decision on the part of the leaders of an
irregular force to engage in this form of attack.
HIJACK-SEIZURE
6-71. Hijacking involves the forceful commandeering of a means of transportation such as an airplane,
ship, train, or bus. Purposes for hijacking and terrorism can include
Hostage-taking activities.
Obtaining a means of escape from a tactical area of responsibility.
Obtaining a means to conduct a suicide attack with a weapon of mass destruction.
6-72. While hijacking of aircraft for hostage taking has declined in frequency in recent times, the use of
hijacked aircraft for escape or as a weapon continues to be a dangerous threat. The attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon in September 2001 are tragic examples of hijacking commercial jet planes that are
used for terrorism in a deliberate and multiple suicide attacks.
6-73. The use of hijacked vehicles for destructive devices is not restricted to aircraft. Trucks carrying
explosive or flammable materials have been seized for use as weapon delivery devices. The possibility of such
a technique could also apply to commercial transport ships carrying petroleum products such as liquefied
natural gas (LNG). The damage or environmental contamination caused by an explosion of such carriers or
other explosive commodities would be devastating. Accidental explosions of this nature are evidence of the
catastrophic infrastructure damage that would be caused to ports and people.
6-74. Seizure of a critical element of infrastructure, similar to hostage-taking, can be a physical site such as
a facility of critical importance to a relevant population or a cyber node that disrupts and/or prevents use of
selected cyber functions. The terrorism threat of disruption or destruction of seized infrastructure can be a
bargaining issue for an irregular force or could be the intentional seizure and use of infrastructure to
contaminate and/or damage a geographic area.
KIDNAPPING
6-75. Kidnapping is usually an action taken against a prominent individual for a specific reason. However,
kidnapping can be an indiscriminate act to cause anxiety in a relevant population. The most common reasons
for kidnapping include
Ransom.
Barter for release of a fellow irregular force member.
Desire to publicize a demand or issue with terrorism.
6-76. Success of kidnapping often relies on correctly assessing the impact to the governing authority in
maintaining their prestige with a relevant population. A contrast is the possible reactions of the governing
authority to demonstrate their resolve. Detailed planning considers contingencies of how to release the kidnap
victim and/or how often to move the kidnap victim among safe houses. The irregular force typically states
specific demands with a timeline for a response. Kidnapping can also be used as a means of financing the
organization. Ransom from seized individuals or groups is often a significant income for irregular forces in
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Terrorism
several regions of the world. Irregular forces are often willing to hold a victim for significant time in order to
have its demands satisfied (see figure 6-4).
Kidnapping: Insurgent-Criminal Affiliation (Example)
A criminal organization was contracted by an insurgent leader to kidnap a prominent

member of the regional governing authority. This appointed government official was a
leading advocate to disrupt the cross-border smuggling operations of the criminal
organization and had recently sponsored the arrest and detention of several criminal
leaders. Members of the criminal organization observed the daily routine of the official
and determined that seizing him at his residence provided the best opportunity for
success. No personal security existed once the driver and guard delivered the official to
his apartment. The criminals posed as city water engineers inspecting a reported water
leak in the apartment complex.
When the official allowed the engineers to enter his apartment, they gagged and bound
him before placing him in a work chest on rollers. The officials spouse and children were
gagged, blindfolded, and tied to a room radiator but were otherwise physically unharmed.
The kidnap victim was casually rolled out of the apartment complex to a waiting van and
brought to a safe house in a nearby town. The official was delivered to an insurgent cell
and brought to a separate safe house.
The insurgent organization sent photographs of the official and a manifesto to media
outlets and on the Internet that unless the criminal leaders were released from detention
by the governing authority, the official would be killed. Negotiations continued for two
weeks before the governing authority agreed to release the criminal leaders in exchange
for the official. Although the official was released unharmed, the kidnapping embarrassed
the governing authority in its apparent inability to curtail the criminal organization in its
illicit international smuggling operations. Concurrently, the insurgency gained more active
and passive support from the relevant population in the regions urban areas and
sections along the inter-border smuggling routes.
Figure 6-4. Kidnapping: insurgent-criminal affiliation (example)

6-77. Some kidnapping operations are actually assassinations with killing the victim as a planned outcome.
Actions include obtaining intermediate concessions and publicity during the negotiation process that the
irregular force would not receive from a simple assassination. Irregular forces may distribute videotapes
and/or photographs to the media and post similar exploitation means on Internet websites.
HOSTAGE-TAKING
6-78. Hostage taking is typically an overt seizure of people to
Gain publicity for a grievance.
Seek political attention and/or concessions.
Obtain safe passage for irregular forces contained by enemy forces during a mission.
Demand release of irregular force prisoners held by an enemy governing authority.
Ransom.
6-79. Unlike kidnapping where a prominent individual is normally taken and moved to an unknown
location, the hostages can be individuals not well known in the enemys society. Hostage situations are
frequently risky for irregular forces especially when conducted in enemy territory. This location exposes the
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Chapter 6
irregular forces to hostile military or police operations and carries the possibility of mission failure and
capture. Therefore, hostages may be held in a neutral or friendly area rather than in enemy territory. Irregular
forces will sometimes take often hostages with the intent to kill them after they believe they have fully
exploited the immediate tactical advantage and/or media coverage from the situation. However, some hostage
situations are conducted to cause a direct confrontation with enemy forces and the resulting global media
attention while negotiations are in progress (see figure 6-5).
Hostage-taking: Guerrilla Unit (Example)

G
A guerrilla unit was directed by its higher insurgent organization to seize hostages and
demand several political concessions from the governing authority with whom the
insurgency was in conflict. The raid by approximately 15 guerrillas approached the
opening day ceremonies of a middle school in a medium size industrial city. Guerrillas
jumped from trucks firing weapons into the air as they entered the large school courtyard
and quickly forced students, parents, and other relatives into the main school building.
Local police had been deceived earlier by a hoax and were in a different part of the city.
Government response to the hostage-taking was slow and ineffective.
Guerrillas barricaded the school building and after separating young male adults from the
main group of hostages, murdered the 20 male adults and dumped their bodies out of a
second floor window into a main street. Internal security police had arrived at the scene
along with regular military forces but were unable to prevent the murder and mayhem.
International news media arrived on the scene based on insurgent announcements

posted to the Internet. The governing authoritys response to the terrorism received public
criticism by the local citizenry and mass media as confused and sluggish. The guerrillas
allowed selected negotiators and news representatives inside the school to record the
tension and suffering of the hostages. Guerrillas stated their willingness to fight to the
death if attacked or if their demands were not satisfied.
The stalemate ended abruptly when a guerrilla improvised explosive device detonated
under suspicious circumstances. Both guerrillas and government forces started firing at
each other and many hostages were killed or wounded in the firefight. Beyond the tragic
loss of life and injuries, the governing authority was embarrassed in front of a global
audience. All guerrillas died in final room-by-room assaults by government forces inside
the school but the insurgent leader achieved his objective of spotlighting the plight of the
relevant population in the region being suppressed by an unjust governing authority.
Figure 6-5. Hostage-taking: guerrilla unit (example)
RAID OR AMBUSH
6-80. A raid or ambush is similar in concept and can be used to accent anxiety in an enemy with its sudden
and violent actions. A raid permits control of the target for the execution of some other action. The kidnapping
or assassination of a target may require a raid to gain access and control a particular person or area for a brief
period of time.
6-81. Some raids may not expect irregular force members to survive. Other raids may use raiders that
volunteer to attack with the expectation of committing suicide as integral to the assault and/or to fight until
killed in order cause the maximum amount of destruction and mayhem (see figure 6-6).
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Terrorism
Raid: Multiple Insurgent Suicide Cell Assaults (Example)
An insurgent organization conducted nearly simultaneous assaults with a cell of two and
three-person teams at multiple locations in a major metropolitan city. The choice of target
areas ranged business centers, famous entertainment sites, mass transit hubs, and
cultural landmarks for the purpose of indiscriminate killing as well as focused hostage-
taking and murder of citizens and foreign visitors based on their nationality or religious
faith. Terrorism was to exploit psychological trauma on a major urban population and
undermine the confidence of citizens on the ability of their governing authority to protect
its people and foreigners, as well as spotlight the insurgent organizations ideological
extremism and agenda to global attention.
A ten-person direct action cell was thoroughly trained and indoctrinated in the safe haven
of a neighboring state. None of the terrorists in the cell expected to survive the raid. The
insurgent organization prepared for more than one year with refined surveillance and
reconnaissance. The terrorist cell used a fishing trawler to infiltrate past coastal security
patrols and arrive at the citys harbor area. The cell unloaded their weapons, explosives,
and equipment and split into five two-person teams. Dressed as normal citizens with
travel bags, they moved to their separate objectives by walking, taxi cab, or a small
inflatable boat for travel further into the citys port.
Confirming via cellular telephone that all assault teams were in position, the terrorists
used semiautomatic rifle fire and hand grenades to assault people in a rail station,
hospital, urban streets, caf, hotels, and religious cultural center. Improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) had been hidden in taxis and were timed to explode well after the
simultaneous attacks were underway. These taxi explosions caused additional confusion
and mayhem in the first hours of the incident. After attacking a caf, one team quickly
joined a team assaulting an internationally famous hotel complex. Random killing
continued as they started fires in the hotel and seized hostages. Hostages at a cultural
center were tortured and murdered. Another team killed or wounded people randomly in
a train station and a hospital. As these terrorists attempted to link up with other insurgent
cell members they were intercepted and killed by internal security forces in a city street.
Several IEDs were emplaced with timers or tripwires at various sites in or near a hotel.
The terrorists barricaded in the hotel were in regular communication with senior insurgent
leaders in a neighboring state via satellite telephone, personal digital assistant (PDA)
devices, and cellular telephones. The insurgent leaders and cell handlers provided
ideological encouragement and tactical advice to the insurgents as the hostage crisis
continued for several days with live-feed media coverage to a global audience.
Regular military forces and special purpose forces eventually killed nine terrorists and
captured one terrorist but the insurgents had already achieved their information warfare
objectives. The murder or injury of hundreds of noncombatants and days of mayhem in a
metropolis embarrassed the governing authority in front of international partners and its
citizens and demonstrated the insurgents commitment to its extremist agenda.
Figure 6-6. Raid: multiple insurgent suicide cell assaults (example)

6-82. An ambush is another form of surprise attack characterized by terror, violent execution, and speed of
action. The intended objective may be to cause mass casualties, assassinate an individual, or disrupt enemy
security and stability operations. Explosives, such as bombs and directional mines, are a common weapon
used in ambushes as well as antitank rockets, automatic weapons, and/or other small arms fires.
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Chapter 6
ASSASSINATION
6-83. An assassination is a deliberate action to kill specific individuals. Targets for assassination are often
individuals that have notoriety in a relevant population such as political leaders, well-known citizens, and/or
public spokespersons. This form of terrorism can also target individuals with no public or governing authority
importance and appear indiscriminate. This type of targeting for assassination can intimidate and cause
anxiety and fear and coerce the passive support of a relevant population to an irregular force and preclude the
active support to a governing authority with whom the irregular force is in conflict. Extensive target
surveillance and reconnaissance of engagement areas is critical to planning and conducting an assassination.
Although many factors play into the decision, the targets vulnerabilities often determine the method
of assassination.
6-84. Many targets of assassination are symbolic and are intended to have significant negative
psychological impact on the enemy and the relevant population that it controls. For example, assassinating an
enemy senior government official, a successful corporate leader, or a prominent cleric can demonstrate the
inability of an enemy governing authority to protect its own people. Assassinating local representatives and/or
leaders of a society can contribute to civil disorder while demoralizing members of a local governing authority
and/or law enforcement organizations.
TECHNIQUE ENABLERS
6-85. Techniques that take advantage of restrictions and constraints on an enemy operating within a
relevant noncombatant population are a norm of irregular force actions. Limitations on an enemy can include
social traditions, moral codes, and/or legal policies of a governing authority and its forces. Irregular forces can
remain discrete and secretive within a population or can choose to be open in their operations when operating
in or from a safe haven. In either case, irregular forces seek to create an environment of authority and relative
protection in and from which to operate. Examples of these enablers include dispersion of the irregular force
organization within a relevant population and/or the use of noncombatants of the population as human shields
when confronting an enemy.
6-86. Actions by irregular forces demonstrate a tempo and/or pace based on the capabilities of the irregular
force as it attempts to gradually or dramatically impact on its enemy. Attacks preferably employ surprise and
deception with irregular force units, cells, or other organizations and also plan for the infiltration of insider
threats to enemy activities and infrastructure. Several offensive action techniques that can easily compound a
sense of anxiety, fear, and/or terror are use of suicide attacks, cyber attacks, and attacks with a weapon of
mass destruction.
Disperse
6-87. Dispersion in complex rural and urban environments can degrade situational awareness and
complicate enemy intelligence and targeting efforts. Urban areas offer excellent cover and concealment from
enemy ground forces and airpower because building interiors and subterranean areas are hidden from airborne
observation, and vertical obstructions hinder the line of sight to ground targets. Irregular force individuals,
cells, units, or other organizations are often decentralized and purposely dispersed in locations. Similar cover
and concealment in rural areas may be available in villages or natural terrain such as caves, tunnels, and/or
every restrictive physical terrain.
6-88. Safe houses or sites facilitate irregular force ability to discreetly transit from one location to another
by providing a place to rest, acquire resources, plan, prepare, and stage for acts. Active supporters in a relevant
population and/or criminal organizations can facilitate such networks and trafficking from location to location
in a local community and/or across regional and/or international borders.
Shield
6-89. Irregular forces can deliberately use noncombatants as human shields that limit enemy forces in using
their weapons systems when noncombatants may be injured or killed. Noncombatants are sometimes
prevented from evacuating likely engagement areas to ensure that irregular forces have human shields present
in their immediate vicinity. These groupings can conceal movements and/or be a means of escape for an
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Terrorism
irregular force after executing an attack. Some irregular forces purposely use the elderly, women, and/or
children as human shields. Activities to create selective areas of human shields can include
Orchestrating work strikes.
Fomenting mass rallies.
Coordinating peaceful-appearing demonstrations.
Coercing civilians to gather with and around an irregular force action, security, and/or support
element.
6-90. Types of withdrawal actions or repositioning through human shields causes terror for the
noncombatants involved and may allow an irregular force to regain a tactical initiative and renew offensive
actions. Asymmetric techniques take advantage of typical restrictions on enemy rules of engagement and often
reduce enemy capabilities to apply their full suite of weapon systems against an irregular force. Some
defensive tactics are to
Disperse within a relevant population of noncombatants.
Use noncombatants as a human shield during armed conflict with an enemy.
Exploit positioning in close proximity to infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, or places of
religious worship.
Conduct INFOWAR manipulation of actions when enemy forces cause noncombatant casualties in
combating the irregular force.
Women and Children Combatants

6-91. Women and children cover a broad range of irregular force capabilities. Women and children can be
involved in the direct actions of an assault, raid, or ambush and/or be critical to the security and/or logistics
support to an irregular force.
6-92. Media reporting often spotlights the contributions of women in irregular force operations. In some
instances irregular forces may encourage their front organizations to promote the visible presence of women
and children in their public awareness efforts. In other instances, irregular forces will co-opt women and
children to be suicide bombers in sensational incidents that receive much attention in media affairs.
6-93. Less obvious but often just as dangerous are other forms of direct combative and support activities.
Women and children can serve a valuable role as couriers when cultural custom or civil restrictions in a region
allow them easier ability to transit public areas without the level of detailed personal searches that a man
would normally experience at checkpoints of a governing authority and/or its internal security forces and law
enforcement organizations.
6-94. From other support perspectives, women can be key operators in the logistical systems of irregular
forces. Personnel operations can involve the recruitment of new members with a maternal image and be an
example of how a woman can obtain status within a social-cultural setting. Recruitment of women and
children can range from selective invitation of individuals perceived to be receptive to an irregular force
agenda to overt coercion and forceful levy for manning irregular forces in a local community. Alcoholic
beverages and/or drugs can be used at times to dull the ability of children to resist assisting irregular force
activities. Child fighters may be indoctrinated or coerced to conduct specific tasks and can be forced to act in
irregular force operations with little or no training.
6-95. However, training of particular skills such a bomb making or other functional capabilities can support
the transition of recruits to be fully integrated members in an irregular force. Women and men may be
responsible for establishing and maintaining safe houses for irregular forces that may require a periodic
sanctuary on short notice. Women and men may also be the overt presence in a facility used for maintaining
kidnapped people, cached supplies, or medical treatment sites. Similarly, fund raising and the informal
connections within a community can use women and children as a significant symbol of family value and
need. When public expression of an irregular force agenda is allowable in a locale or region with recognition
as a legitimate political party, women can be a spotlight for media affairs coordination and publicity. In some
cases, women are elected political spokespersons for an irregular force agenda.
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Chapter 6
6-96. Women and children can be fighters with a weapon, couriers of money or munitions, shields to male
fighters who engage an enemy with small arms fire, and/or other forms of support operations for an irregular
force. Women and children in irregular conflict are a significant combat multiplier for an irregular force.
Safe Haven
6-97. Safe havens are typically located in ungoverned or physical areas where irregular forces are able to
organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of
inadequate governance capacity by a governing authority with whom an irregular force is in conflict. In some
cases, safe havens are located in semi-autonomous areas within a sovereign state while in other cases an
enclave across international borders. Distant locations from an irregular force AOR may be more acceptable to
sustaining irregular force operations.
6-98. A safe haven is often used to train regional and/or foreign recruits and integrate them into the tactical
and/or logistical support operations of an irregular force. An extension of some safe havens is use of cyber
connectivity and the ability to mask or distort Internet irregular force cyber points of origin. Recruitment,
training, and encouragement can be particularly effective with recurring communications and encouragement
to irregular force members, affiliates, and/or adherents.
Insider Threat
6-99. An insider threat and intent to conduct acts of terror involve the infiltration by an irregular force
member or members into an area and/or facility. The insider threat is a practical and psychological perspective
that consumes significant enemy resources to counter such invasive actions.
6-100. The insider is an individual who is authorized access to open or secure systems of an enemy or
supporting organization that can include physical facilities and infrastructure as well as information systems.
In the context of irregular forces and terrorism, an insider can be a member of an irregular force and/or an
adherent of an irregular force agenda. In either instance in context of command and control and/or information
system operations and infrastructure, the insider threat can
Disrupt general and/or specific operations of an enemy.
Deny enemy use of particular systems and data.
Corrupt or destroy selected information.
Cause malicious damage or destruction to a facility and/or other infrastructure.
6-101. An insider threat mission can be planned as a one-time breach of enemy security measures or be
planned as a recurring, long-term covert investment to gather information and intelligence. An insider threat
can be a willing participant with an irregular force or be coerced into supporting actions that support irregular
forces. In addition to tasks on gathering specific information and/or intelligence on enemy operations and
procedures, a complementary task may be to identify weaknesses in a particular enemy capability or function.
6-102. Irregular force accomplices may already exist within an objective area and be able to assist the entry
and acceptance of additional irregular force members as an insider threat. Uniforms, security badges and/or
identification cards, and/or purposeful lapses in physical security measures are examples of insider accomplice
support. Once an insider threat is established in an assigned objective area, it may be directed to perform a
number of tasks or be focused with a specific function. Tasks can include
Remain discrete and report on current operations and personal observations in the objective area.
Plan for acts of sabotage on designated systems and/or equipment.
Attempt to subvert other actors in the objective area to support the irregular force.
Conduct sabotage as critical opportunities arise.
Support the actions of other insider threats of the irregular force.
Commit, on order, violent acts on a designated target.
Conduct a suicide attack on a designated target.
6-103. An insider threat or an irregular force observer in the objective area can sometimes capitalize on
witnessing an incident that identifies individuals with a personal and/or ideological grievance and who has
already been vetted for security clearance into an enemys organization and/or facility area. This type of
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individual may be gradually co-opted by an irregular force observer and recruited as an insider threat. On
other occasions, a personal grievance may incite an individual to act violently even though there is no direct
connection to an irregular force. The INFOWAR campaign of the irregular force will manipulate such
incidents to support its agenda and often claim responsibility for the violent and/or terrorism actions.
Information Warfare
6-104. Irregular force information warfare can disrupt popular support for a governing authority and its
allies and/or coalition partners. Irregular forces can spread rumors or misinformation as a means to offset the
official information from a governing authority and its military and/or internal security forces.
6-105. Irregular forces can use the Internet to disseminate their message as quickly as events occur. An
immediate press release from a Website offers irregular force control of initial message content and media
reporting. Irregular forces manipulate images and create special effects or deception that enhances the anxiety
and/or fear of terrorism. Audiovisual coverage of irregular force successes are incorporated in irregular force
recruitment efforts and sustain morale. Multimedia sites can display manufactured evidence of governing
authority atrocities and war crimes to turn domestic and international opinion against the governing authority.
Irregular forces use sympathetic media to reinforce their INFOWAR campaign (see Appendix A).
Suicide Attack
6-106. Suicide attack can be the act of an individual or a tactic planned and conducted by an irregular force
to spotlight a grievance with an intentional self-destruction and incidence of mass casualties, death, and
mayhem. Mass media attention is often focused on an organizations grievance when such a sensational action
occurs. As a tactic, suicide attack seeks to degrade the resolve of a relevant population and obtain concessions
from an enemy to an irregular force agenda. Organizational aims and ideological support to commit suicide in
attacking an enemy is often complicated in motivations but is typically an action used when other more
conventional means of combating an enemy are overmatched and produce nil results. A tactic of suicide attack
can also be evaluated for an operational intent and/or strategy to obtain support for an irregular force agenda
from state and non-state actors who might be otherwise unwilling to get involved in a social or political
conflict of an irregular force.
6-107. In whatever means a suicide attacker uses, an irregular force member conducting such an act of
terrorism has the ability to adjust actions until the moment of attack. This adaptive behavior makes a suicide
attacker particularly dangerous. When the weapon is a suicide bomb, the moment to detonate a suicide vest or
a vehicle borne improvised explosive device can be adjusted given conditions as they exist at a time and
place of a planned attack. An attacker can estimate the degree of mayhem that will be caused by the
explosion and change who and where to assault. In other instances, a handler of the suicide attack can
command-detonate a bomb on a willing and/or unknowing individual carrying a bomb. The attack can
be a deliberate assault on a specified target or can be intentionally an indiscriminate act to kill and/or
main combatants and noncombatants. Suicide attack is primarily a psychological assault on an enemy
and its supporters.
Cyber Attack
6-108. A cyber attack can be obvious or purposely masked to prevent an enemy from knowing a system has
been or is about to be attacked. Cyberspace use can be a key enabler to commit espionage, subversion, and/or
sabotage. From a terrorism perspective, cyber attack can create anxiety and fear in a targeted population or
group of key leaders. An intrusion into a cyber system can be embedded with a time delay feature and/or be
programmed to execute an action on order of a specific signal. Whether a cyber intrusion is from an external
source or has been emplaced by an insider threat, the reasons for conducting terrorism with a cyber attack on
an enemy can include
Sabotage cyber networks.
Extort concession from an enemy.
Damage enemy or supporting activities and infrastructure.
Endanger people within a relevant population as part of an irregular force objective.
Support other threat capabilities with a greater probability of success in mission conduct.
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Chapter 6
Identify vulnerabilities in cyber systems and facilities.

Evaluate enemy TTP for the ability to limit or prevent particular cyber attacks.
6-109. Irregular forces can employ a broad range of technology to support cyber attacks. Cyber technology
is readily available from commercial or illicit markets in order to conduct terrorism. The ability to exploit
advanced or low-cost technology and integrate with basic TTP is limited only by the fiscal means and
application skills of a terrorist. TTP can use a range of capabilities simultaneously to gather critical
information for planning and conducting a future while a cyber attack is in progress. TTP of a very simple
nature include
Exploiting social media to collect information through false representation
Gathering open source information from Internet or intranet electronic postings.
Exploiting people through techniques such as phishing, spearphishing, or whaling expeditions.
Infiltrating malware to disrupt, damage, or destroy cyber systems.
Exfiltrating critical information from cyber systems that enables sabotage and other types
of attack.
6-110. A model for planning and conducting cyber attack can be very sophisticated in attempt to breach
layers of detection and protection. Other models can be quite simple in concept. A cyber attack model
can include
Reconnaissance to identify and select potential targets.
Weaponization of a computer operating system or software application.
Delivery of malware by remote or physical access to a targeted computer.
Exploitation by triggering a malware code in a targeted computer.
Installation that creates an access point on a victimized computer and allows unauthorized entry
and exit on a victimized computer and network.
Command and control to send instructions to targeted computers previously installed with payload
malware and provides the means to conduct a cyber attack.
Actions to accomplish the intended cyber attack objectives.
Weapons of Mass Destruction

6-111. Listing a category of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) acknowledges a broad range of
capabilities that specific terrorist organizations, units, cells, and/or groups would like to acquire. WMD for an
irregular force can be as simple in concept as several tons of improvised explosive from fertilizer and
chemicals to acquisition of a sophisticated nuclear device from a rogue state and/or contract technicians.
Fundamental information on using materials to construct types of WMD is available on the open-source
Internet. Once skills are acquired and precursor or selected material and equipment are obtained by terrorists,
the possibility exists to threaten use and/or actually employ WMD for catastrophic results.
6-112. The types of WMD are categorized generally as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
(CBRN) materials. Sometimes WMD is described as nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponry. However,
this is a limiting viewpoint on what can be used as a WMD.
6-113. Materials that are weaponized as WMD can include toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) and toxic
industrial materials (TIM), biological agents, and/or radiological materiel. Low-yield and high-yield common
explosives can also be configured to cause results considered a WMD. Although difficult to acquire by
irregular forces, a nuclear demolition and/or bomb-like device is by its nature a weapon of mass destruction.
Any of these weaponized materials can be a significant irregular force and/or terrorism capability.
6-114. WMD can be employed through numerous types of delivery systems. Once a dangerous biological
agent is acquired, a simple means of employing the WMD can be letters contaminated with a biological agent
being sent through a postal service to cause death and/or severe injury to those individuals who are
contaminated. Additional impacts of such an attack are contamination and/or the potential contamination of
facilities that the letters transited during the delivery process. Extensive decontamination requirements would
disrupt or temporarily halt private and or commercial mail systems. The psychological impact on a relevant
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larger population would accent anxiety, fear, and frustration of how to prevent other similar attacks with a
WMD (see figure 6-7).
Figure 6-7. Anthrax-laced letters: death-mayhem in targeted population (example)

6-115. The expertise to acquire and use WMD remains a significant terrorist threat based on some irregular
forces intent to
Acquire materials to construct or develop WMD.
Threaten to attack with WMD
Attack combatants and noncombatants indiscriminately with WMD.
Create mass injury, death, mayhem, and damage with WMD.
TERRORISM TRENDS AND EMERGENT VECTORS

6-116. Trends of terrorism can be considered emergent variations and adaptation to age-old truths of conflict
when at least two forces are unequally matched in military power. Terrorism is often indicative of a weaker
force seeking vulnerabilities in a more powerful force and attacking those weaknesses with an expectation of
persistent conflict. No accurate prediction exists on the character, location, or duration of any specific future
terrorism; however, irregular force will continue to improvise, innovate, and adapt TTP to achieve success
through acts of terror.
6-117. Situational accelerators can spotlight probable vectors of terrorism adaptation by irregular forces in
near-term years. Uncertainties include the pace and/or tempo an irregular force can demonstrate in its
tactical or operational reach, effects an irregular force can display throughout the strategic depth of an
enemy, and how successful the battle of the narrative will be in influencing a targeted population. The
resilience of motives and ideological commitment of an irregular force and its leaders remain primary
strengths in an irregular force campaign of terror. Terrorism trends and emergent vectors that irregular
forces consider include
Improved situational awareness and understanding of the enemy.
Radicalized philosophy and/or ideology as a compelling motivation.
Adaptive organizational tactics and techniques.
Versatile organizational affiliations.
Expanded transnational affiliates.
Emergent independent adherents.
Devastating full spectrum weaponry.
Targeted economic disruption.
Globalized media affairs.
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IMPROVED AWARENESS AND UNDERSTANDING

6-118. Understanding situational context approaches the issue of irregular emergent vectors along an avenue
of action used by irregulars, paramilitary, guerrillas, terrorists, insurgents, or criminals. Intent has a premise
of adapting constantly to optimize knowledge, training, logistical support, and readiness to conduct irregular
operations. Terrorism will be used when this type of action accomplishes the desired psychological and
physical effects. Irregular forces can be patient. Irregular forces plan while waiting for critical opportunities
to strike.
6-119. Irregular force vectors consider the nature of irregular forces and the capabilities and limitations of
specific irregular forces in an evolving contemporary operational environment. As the regions of the world
advance in technological areas, expand the mobility opportunities of people, and exploit the Internet and
other media, extremists concurrently fuel grievances and alienate segments of populations to foster support
for their agendas.
6-120. Irregular forces assess and plan for conducting operations in an area of responsibility and also
consider how to attack forces and/or states that may exist in regions that are distant from a primary area of
land, air, and/or maritime conflict. Cooperation and collaboration among extremist affiliates and/or
adherents will plan for and attempt to attacks the homelands of those states that may be supporting a
governing authority with whom the irregular force is in conflict. Irregular forces also assess and plan
for attacking intermediate staging locations that would disrupt the flow or prevent significant support
from these states.
RADICALIZED MOTIVATIONS
6-121. Core grievances are real or perceived issues of segments in a targeted population. The importance of
the core grievances or even their existence can change over time. Irregular forces can manipulate core
grievances to create conditions for developing the willing support within a population. The perception of
foreign exploitation or a governing authority that appears to be excessively influenced by foreigners can be a
core grievance. For example, if foreign businesses dominate critical portions of the local economy, some of
the population may feel that they or their country are being exploited by outsiders. A foreign military
presence or military treaty may offend national sentiment as well. The mere presence or specific actions of
foreigners may offend local religious or cultural sensibilities. A state or regional governance in an area can
be a core grievance.
6-122. Extremists that are very conservative can be as revolutionary in intent as other groups that are
considered very liberal. Intents may include replacing forms of legitimate government with varied types of
authoritarian rule. Socialism or variants of communism and/or other forms of totalitarianism can exist in
many forms. However, ideology can range the political variable from fascist or other totalitarian intentions
to an opposite political perspective of anarchism. As regimes fail to demonstrate its value to a subjected
population, a population may gradually and secretly plan and act for change. Religious fundamentalism or
extremist viewpoints can become a core grievance. Pervasive and desperate poverty often fosters and fuels
widespread public dissatisfaction in a relevant population. Young people without jobs or hope are ripe for
recruitment into an irregular force. Lack of essential services in a population complicates an OE and its
effective governance. Examples of these essential needs are availability of food and potable water, credible
law enforcement, emergency services, electricity, shelter, health care, schools, transportation, and sanitation
programs for trash and sewage. Stabilizing a relevant population requires meeting these basic social and
civil needs. Frustration and a feeling of disenfranchised existence can sway a relevant population to support
an irregular force that promises change and improved living conditions.
ADAPTIVE ORGANIZATIONAL TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

6-123. In an era of sophisticated weapon systems and rapid international deployment of military forces,
incidents demonstrate the effectiveness of simple tactics conducted efficiently by small irregular forces.
Devastating attacks can be conducted by a small unit or cell of irregular force terrorists. Operating in two- or
three-person teams, they could simultaneously attack separate locations. The terrorists would be armed
primarily with small arms, hand grenades, and improvised explosive devices. The attacks and eventual
destruction of the terrorists could extend to hours or days of horrifying murder and mayhem. A methodical
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Terrorism
containment and room-by-room clearance of historic and multi-story buildings in a large metropolitan
complex would be covered by global media outlets throughout the incident. An irregular force conducts
operations with the expectation of such publicity to spotlight its irregular force agenda and embarrass the
governing authority that it defies.
VERSATILE ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

6-124. Irregular forces will normally start as small entities with modest operational capabilities. As
capabilities develop, plans may focus on acquiring improved capabilities across the functions of intelligence,
logistics, communications, media affairs, and direct action. Building capacity in order to demonstrate
commitment and capability is progressive. Temporary setbacks in plans and actions require flexibility to
adjust timelines and adapt support networks. These networks can be as local as a neighborhood information-
intelligence collection effort to a disciplined outreach for assistance from sources external to the immediate
community or region.
6-125. Organizational versatility can include units or cells focused on acts of terrorism or other actions and
organizations which are difficult to distinguish from civil crime. The increasing role of criminal activity in
financing an agenda, either in partnership or competition with traditional criminal activities, can be a
condition used by irregular forces. These enterprises include drug trafficking and human smuggling, fraud,
tax evasion, counterfeiting, money laundering, and theft. Some activities are associated with terrorists
evolving capabilities for false documents production and concealment of money transactions for their
operational purposes.
6-126. Irregular forces and criminal organizations can be closely related for mutual benefits. Mega-cities are
expanding in countries with poor services and weak governance. Bases and operations in rural and urban
environments will increase where law enforcement is often ineffective and/or corrupt. Rampant
unemployment and dissatisfaction creates a productive recruiting ground and operating environment for
irregular forces promoting grievances acknowledged by large segments of the population. Many of these city
areas have materiel, communication, and transport capacities for irregular forces to use, and a potentially
huge base of sympathizers and recruits.
6-127. A development related to this is the emergence of regions where governments exercise marginal
control of geographic areas within their sovereign territory. Control is imposed by sub-state actors that can
span criminal organizations, militias, guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists. Government forces confront
violent and capable irregular forces that often resort to open coercion and terrorism of officials, police
officers, military forces, their families, and the general citizenry. In addition to overt intimidation of a
populace, irregular forces exploit the vulnerabilities of new technologies to attack and have a great deal of
flexibility in their use of new technology. They have the advantage of only needing to attack or neutralize
specific systems or capabilities, and can concentrate fiscal expenditures on specialized counter-technology to
protect their criminal systems. Nonetheless, irregular forces can often neutralize advanced systems or
capabilities through the use of simple and unconventional techniques such as a suicide bomber.
EXPANDED TRANSNATIONAL AFFILIATES

6-128. Transnational actions and terrorism presents a global challenge. Some irregular forces seek to
conduct major operations that cause large scale, maximum casualty impact. Globalization removes the
perceived security that national borders and geographic distance from adversaries and enemies once
indicated. Commerce and finance is international, travel is international, and society in general is a much
more international community. Operating beyond the organizational reach of an opponent can provide the
physical space or fiscal and media affairs support to enhance an irregular force purpose.
6-129. Irregular forces can operate in and among this international reach and develop transnational
capabilities through a loose affiliation of clandestine networks, inserted sleeper or active cells within
geographic regions, and adaptability to constantly shift and change in organizational form. When extremist
ideology is the primary motivation, the commitment is often absolutist with no allowance for compromise
and seeks no negotiation. Violence signals a committed path to conditions with no restrictions by social
norms, laws, or values. Actions such as terrorism are often becoming more networks based. Irregular forces
can encourage loosely organized, self-financed organizational structures. The motivation of terrorists
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Chapter 6
appears to be based increasingly on theological extremes and ideological absolutes. International or

transnational cooperation among some terrorists provides an improved ability to recruit members, develop
fiscal support and resources, gain skills training and expertise, transfer technology, and when desired,
political advice.
EMERGENT INDEPENDENT ADHERENTS

6-130. The presence of varied irregular forces and/or possible independent actors that separate from an
originating organization can easily blur in organizations claiming responsibility for terrorism incidents.
These actors can be at the individual level or small cells acting on a specified agenda that may be similar but
distinct from more well known irregular force organizations. Independent actors may purposely minimize or
preclude public announcement of their plans and action in order to improve their cell security.
6-131. Independent adherents are adjusting their financial operations to be self-sustaining in their activities.
This independence from any external control is a value to an irregular force as it gains the impact of diverse
and separate adherent actions at no real cost to his own organizational base. The facility with which groups
can obtain and move funds, procure secure bases, and obtain and transport weaponry determines their own
operational abilities and the level of threat that they pose to a common enemy. The international nature of
finance, the integration of global economies, and the presence of terrorist adherents in the illegal economies
of slaves, drugs, smuggling, human trafficking, counterfeiting, identity theft, and fraud have aided an
independence from traditional sources of state-linked sponsorship and other interconnected support.
DEVASTATING FULL SPECTRUM WEAPONRY

6-132. Weapon lethality can be assessed in many ways but efficiency and effectiveness are two general
means to determine intent. Some weapons are quite simple and very deadly in effect. Lethality and overall
effects are key considerations when assessed with types of action to obtain attention and reaction. The
trauma of violent deaths as well as mass injuries and damage on a targeted population can be critical to the
psychological effect and consequent actions or inaction by the affected population. Terrorism will continue
to seek forms of indiscriminate violence. Acts of terror can also be targeted to specific people, groups, or
capabilities. Terrorism is merging and combining with various other state and sub-state actors, further
blurring the difference between criminals, rogue governments, and terrorists.
6-133. Ongoing conflicts display that terrorism attacks account for only a small fraction of civil violence but
the high-profile nature of many terrorist operations can have a disproportionate negative impact. Conditions
and changing dynamics in conflict can create a perception in a relevant population of unchecked violence
and fear. Such perception can harden differing opinions, empower militias and vigilante groups, increase a
middle-class exodus from a region, and disrupt confidence in a governing authority and its security forces.
Terrorism plays a key role in much of this physical and psychological violence.
6-134. The means to cause mass casualties can be a highly sophisticated weapon system such as a
weaponized military-grade nuclear device. However, mass destruction can also be caused by an improvised
low-yield explosive weapon such as the 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City and the
Pentagon. While purposeful mass casualty incidents may have appeared to be extraordinary events several
decades ago, contemporary acts of terror surpass these former acts and demonstrate a profound impact on
populations at the local, regional, national, and international levels. Emergent actions indicate that terrorism
previously centralized and controlled by formal networks and organizations, is being conducted increasingly
by loosely affiliated terrorists or groups that may generally identify themselves with an ideology or special
purpose agenda. The threat can be foreign and domestic.
6-135. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a particularly alarming issue. The projected effects
amplify the danger and fear of a catastrophic attack. Some of these materials that could be used to construct
some form of WMD are easily accessible in the public domain. Other potential capabilities are quite
problematic to weaponizing materiel. The knowledge and technological means of specialists to produce
WMD is a shadowy area of science, crime, and intrigue available to some terrorists.
6-136. The trend to exploit available simple and sophisticated technologies and the desire to cause mass
casualties could be demonstrated in irregular force attacks that employ WMD such as
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Chemical [sarin nerve agent] attacks in a metropolitan subway system.

Biological [anthrax] attacks using contaminated letters in postal system.
Low-yield explosive aerial bomb as in nearly simultaneous suicide attacks with large commercial
jet aircraft into critical infrastructure.
Low-yield explosive vehicular bomb as in a vehicle borne improvised explosive device attack on a
Federal governing authority building and commercial business locale.
Radioactive material placed in a public location for area contamination.
Nuclear weapon detonation in a controlled environment as a demonstration of capability.
TARGETED ECONOMIC DISRUPTION

6-137. Modern, high-technology societies are susceptible to a concept of complex terrorism. Dependence
on electronic networks in modern infrastructure, sometimes with questionable redundancy in systems, and
concentrating critical assets in small geographic locales can present lucrative targets for the irregular force.
Some emerging irregular forces wield effective power in failing states and view terrorism as an effective
mode of conflict.
6-138. Critical infrastructure and support systems provide terrorists with a wide array of potential targets in
land, maritime, cyber, and space environments that would directly affect economies on a regional and global
scale. Common vulnerabilities may focus on oil refinery operations and overland and/or maritime
shipment of oil products. Infrastructure for oil production has critical aspects in key areas of the world.
Single points of failure in the infrastructure or denying critical services for a period of time could severely
disrupt world economies.
GLOBALIZED MEDIA AFFAIRS

6-139. Exploiting mass media considers the value of effectively marketing an irregular force message
through a nearly simultaneous global information environment. An overarching principle is to create and
maintain international attention and impact. To gain international awareness and attention to grievances and
issues, incidents must often be spectacular to attract mass media coverage. Effectiveness of INFOWAR will
be measured by its ability to cause a dramatic impact of fear and uncertainty in a target population. Surprise
and sustained violence may be normal against specified people representing elements of civil or military
control and order of a governing authority with whom irregular forces are in conflict. Common citizens may
also be targets in a culture of violence. Damage or destruction of community, regional, or national
infrastructure and governance will be used to gain attention, provoke excessive reaction by host nation or
coalition military forces, and attempt to alienate general population support of a governing authority.
6-140. Irregular force operations consider a desired media effect and plan for verbal or visual reporting
coverage. Supporting events and interviews reinforce the desired message. These messages may present
disinformation and false perspectives. Frequently, military reluctance to comment on ongoing operations in
the media for operational security reasons can assist the irregular force. If no balanced information comes
from official sources in a timely manner, the media may use the information readily available from the
irregular force or a terrorist cell as a primary source for reporting an incident.
6-141. Future armed conflicts are more likely to be fought among the people rather than around the
people. Conflict in urban areas and populated locales is inevitable. Much of the worlds population is
already located in urban terrain. In the next two decades, estimates pose five billion of the worlds eight
billion people will live in cities. Many of the population hubs will be along coastlines throughout the worlds
regions. Irregular forces will attempt to blend into concentrated populations in order to marginalize
detection of their recruiting, training, and staging initiatives; obtain support within a coerced or passive
populace, and act at times and locations of their own selection. Media attention to a major incident will be
immediate in coverage.
6-142. Rural areas and their inhabitants, depending on conditions in particular regions, will complement
operations in urban centers. Irregular forces will evolve hybrid capacity of selective conventional military,
paramilitary, and criminal organization capabilities. Rural irregular forces will operate in regions providing
cover and concealment such as heavily forested or mountainous areas that hinder some forms of detection
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Chapter 6
and interdiction. Notwithstanding, a rural orientation must lead back to urban centers as a presence and
connection to the main population masses and the political infrastructure of governing authorities with
whom irregular forces are in conflict.
THE SPECTER OF TERRORISM

6-143. The specter of irregular forces using terrorism on a society illustrates the value that such acts can
provide to an irregular force that is often incapable of directly confronting an enemy with overwhelming
combat power. The key factors of a successful campaign of irregular force terrorism will continue to be the
long-term resolve and resilience of terrorists to continue the conflict until their aims are achieved.
6-144. The dedicated irregular force using terrorism must be adaptive and flexible to the periodic success of
an enemy. When terrorism is disrupted with key irregular force leaders killed or captured, and functional
capabilities are degraded or destroyed, other irregular force members, affiliates, and/or adherents are
prepared to continue the struggle against a declared enemy.
6-145. A relevant population is a critical qualifying environment of nearly all irregular conflict. Irregular
forces decentralize, network, and operate among a relevant population to overcome technological advantages
of an enemy. The resilience of an irregular force and the expected debilitating effects of terrorism on an
enemy require a determined long-term commitment from irregular force leaders to defeat an enemy. The
massing of effects over time often requires a patient and decentralized approach to irregular conflict. The
irregular force maintains a keen sense of cultural awareness and social understanding to establish a rationale
for terror that is tolerated to a relevant population. The irregular force must obtain and sustain the passive
and/or active support of the relevant population within which it operates.
6-146. An INFOWAR campaign must promote a resilient irregular force message of purpose and
commitment to a relevant population. The objective of terrorism in support of an irregular force agenda must
be recognized by a relevant population as a compelling outcome worth the amount of suffering and social
disruption that terrorism and other acts by an irregular force may cause. Whether the ultimate aims of an
irregular force are ideological, philosophical, and/or practical, terrorism will continue to be a vexing
factor in future conflicts among and between state and non-state actors throughout the world.
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Functional Tactics
Insurgents and guerrillas, as part of the irregular OPFOR, may employ adaptive
functional tactics. When planning a tactical action, an irregular OPFOR commander
or leader determines what functions must be performed to accomplish the mission.
Then he allocates functional responsibilities to his subordinates and synchronizes
the effort.
Note. Since criminal elements do not normally have the ability to execute these functional
tactics, the term irregular OPFOR in this chapter refers to insurgents and/or guerrillas.
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF FORCES AND ELEMENTS

7-1. An irregular OPFOR commander or leader specifies the initial organization of forces or elements
within his level of command, according to the specific functions he intends his various subordinates to
perform. At brigade level (when that exists in guerrilla units), the subordinate units performing these
functions are referred to as forces. At lower levels they are called elements.
Note. This functional organization provides a common language and a clear understanding of
how the commander or leader intends his subordinates to fight functionally. Thus, subordinates
that perform common tactical tasks such as disruption, fixing, assault, exploitation, security,
deception, or main defense are logically designated as disruption, fixing, assault, exploitation,
security, deception, or main defense forces or elements. Irregular OPFOR commanders and
leaders prefer using the clearest and most descriptive term to avoid any confusion. When the
irregular OPFOR operates in conjunction with an affiliated regular military force, there is the
advantage that regular OPFOR commanders also use this common language.
7-2. The commander or leader organizes and designates various forces and elements according to their
function in the planned offensive or defensive action. A number of different functions must be executed
each time the irregular OPFOR attempts to accomplish a mission. The functions do not change, regardless
of where the force or element might happen to be located. However, the function (and hence the functional
designation) of a particular force or element may change during the course of a tactical action. The use of
precise functional designations for every force or element involved in a particular tactical action allows for
a clearer understanding by subordinates of the distinctive functions their commander or leader expects them
to perform. It also allows each force or element to know exactly what all of the others are doing at any
time. This knowledge facilitates the ability to make quick adjustments and to adapt very rapidly to shifting
tactical situations. This practice also assists in a more comprehensive planning process by eliminating the
likelihood of some confusion (especially on graphics) of who is responsible for what.
Note. A subordinate designated as a particular functional force or element may also be called
upon to perform other, more specific functions. Therefore, the function of that force or element,
or part(s) of it, may be more accurately described by a more specific functional designation. For
example, a disruption force generally disrupts, but also may need to fix a part of the enemy
forces. In that case, the entire disruption force could become the fixing force, or parts of that
force could become fixing elements.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-1

Chapter 7
7-3. The various functions required to accomplish any given mission can be quite diverse. However, they
can be broken down into two very broad categories: action and enabling.
ACTION FORCES AND ELEMENTS

7-4. One part of the organization conducting a particular offensive or defensive action is normally
responsible for performing the primary function or task that accomplishes the overall mission goal or
objective of that action. In most general terms, therefore, that part can be called the action force or action
element. In most cases, however, the higher unit commander will give the action force or element a more
specific designation that identifies the specific function or task it is intended to perform, which equates to
achieving the objective of the higher commands mission.
7-5. For example, if the objective of the action of a guerrilla company or a grouping of insurgent direct
action cells is to conduct a raid, the element designated to complete that action may be called the raiding
element. In a brigade-level offensive, a force that completes the primary offensive mission by exploiting a
window of opportunity created by another force is called the exploitation force. In defensive actions,
the grouping that performs the main defensive mission is called the main defense force or main
defense element.
ENABLING FORCES AND ELEMENTS

7-6. In relation to the action force or element, all other parts of the organization conducting an offensive
or defensive action provide enabling functions of various kinds. In most general terms, therefore, each of
these parts can be called an enabling force or enabling element. However, each subordinate force or
element with an enabling function can be more clearly identified by the specific function or task it
performs. For example, an element that clears obstacles to permit an action element to accomplish a
battalions tactical task is a clearing element.
7-7. In most cases, irregular OPFOR tactical actions would involve one or more types of enabling forces
or elements designated by their specific function. The most common types include
Disruption force or element. Disrupts enemy preparations or actions; destroys or deceives enemy
reconnaissance; begins reducing the effectiveness of key enemy elements.
Fixing force or element. Fixes the enemy by preventing a part of his force from moving from a
specific location for a specific period of time, so it cannot interfere with the primary
OPFOR action.
Security force or element. Provides security for other parts of a larger organization, protecting
them from observation, destruction, or becoming fixed.
Deception force or element. Conducts a deceptive action (such as a demonstration or feint) that
leads the enemy to act in ways prejudicial to enemy interests or favoring the success of an
OPFOR action force or element.
Support force or element. Provides support by fire; other combat or combat service support; or
command and control (C2) functions for other parts of a larger organization.
Reconnaissance force or element. Conducts specific reconnaissance task(s) tailored to
the mission.
Note. In a defensive situation, there may be a particular unit or grouping that the irregular
OPFOR commander or leader wants to be protected from enemy observation and fire, to
ensure that it will still be available for further actions. This may be designated as the protected
force or element.
FLEXIBILITY
7-8. The function of a particular force or element may change in the course of a tactical action. For
example, a grouping originally designated as a reconnaissance element may locate an enemy unit that it has
the combat power to engage. In that case, the element in question could become an assault element, ambush
element, or raiding element.
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Functional Tactics
TYPES OF OFFENSIVE ACTION

7-9. Insurgents and guerrillas can employ some of the types of offensive action also used by smaller
tactical units of the regular OPFOR. Such actions can include
Ambush.
Assault.
Raid.
Reconnaissance attack (guerrillas only).
Insurgent cells typically do not have sufficient combat power to conduct a reconnaissance attack. (See TC
7-100.2 for basic discussion of these offensive actions, as they are also conducted by the regular OPFOR.)
7-10. Irregular OPFOR leaders and commanders select the offensive action best suited to accomplishing
their mission. Insurgent cells and small guerrilla units typically execute one combat mission at a time.
Therefore, it would be rare for such a cell or unit to employ more than one type of offensive action
simultaneously. However, irregular OPFOR organizations are dynamic and adapt very quickly to the
situation. An offensive action may have to make use of whatever cell(s) or unit(s) can take advantage of a
window of opportunity.
AMBUSH
7-11. An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position against a moving or temporarily halted
target. In an ambush, the actions of the enemy determine the time, and the irregular OPFOR leader decides
on the location. Similar to purposes used by regular military OPFOR, the irregular OPFOR can conduct
ambushes to
Destroy or capture enemy elements, personnel, and/or designated very important persons.
Secure supplies.
Demoralize enemy military forces and officials of a governing authority.
Delay introduction of international and/or enemy coalition assistance to a governing authority.
Block enemy movements and/or logistics support.
Canalize or restrict enemy movement.
7-12. The irregular OPFOR can use an ambush as a primary psychological tool in its information warfare
(INFOWAR) activities. The psychological effects of ambushes can be enhanced by
Conducting recurring ambushes at known areas and/or points where enemy forces must travel.
Changing the tempo or the number of ambushes to appear unpredictable.
Attacking targets that were previously considered safe or had not been attacked.
Using weapons with range capabilities previously not used in an area of conflict.
Increasing weapons and/or demolitions effects against particular targets.
7-13. A common tactic is to conduct an ambush as a means to set up ambush(es) of enemy forces that
respond to the original ambush. Multiple and nearly simultaneous ambushes can be conducted along likely
avenues of approach to the area of the initial ambush. Ambushes may also target enemy medical treatment
and evacuation assets, when irregular OPFOR commanders or leaders decide to not comply with
international conventions and law of war norms that regular military forces use. The destruction of means
to evacuate and treat wounded can instill a sense of tentativeness in enemy soldiers because they realize
that, should they become wounded or injured, medical help may not be forthcoming.
7-14. Attacking known points of enemy weakness is a fundamental planning consideration for the irregular
OPFOR. Correspondingly, the irregular OPFOR avoids enemy strength.
7-15. Surprise and overwhelming massed firepower at a specific place and time provides an expectation
of tactical success for the irregular OPFOR. Factors that complement tactical surprise and massed
firepower are
Detailed plans and rehearsals.
Selection of ambush positions.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-3

Chapter 7
Rapid and violent conduct of the ambush.

Disciplined withdrawal of irregular OPFOR elements from the ambush site.
Functional Organization for an Ambush

7-16. An ambush force is typically organized into three types of elements: the ambush element, security
element, and support element. There may be more than one of each element (see figure 7-1).
IED IED
IED
Ambush
Security Support Element
Element Element
(w/ Video Security
Camera) Element
Exfiltrate Exfiltrate
Exfiltrate
Figure 7-1. Insurgent ambush (example)
Ambush Element(s)
7-17. The ambush element has the mission of attacking and destroying enemy elements in kill zone(s).
Other tasks may include capturing personnel and/or recovering supplies and equipment.
Security Element(s)
7-18. The security element has a mission to provide early warning to irregular OPFOR elements of any
enemy presence that might disrupt the ambush. Another task can be to protect the ambush element from
becoming decisively engaged by enemy forces before, during, or after the ambush.
Support Element(s)
7-19. The support element can include direct and/or indirect fires and provides general support to improve
success of the ambush. The insurgent leader or guerrilla commander typically commands and controls the
ambush from the support element. However, he will position himself where he can best command and control.
Executing an Ambush
7-20. There are three types of ambushes based on the desired mission effectsannihilation, harassment, or
containment. The irregular OPFOR conduct ambushes with a particular purpose that often supports a larger
tactical action.
Annihilation Ambush
7-21. The purpose of an annihilation ambush is to destroy an enemy force within a designated kill zone. In
addition to massed direct fires, the irregular OPFOR often increases the lethality of a kill zone with indirect
fires, manmade obstacles, mines, and/or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to halt, contain, and kill the
enemy force in the kill zone (see figure 7-2).
7-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Functional Tactics
Note. For guerrilla forces, annihilation ambushes in complex terrain, including urban
environments, often involve task-organized hunter-killer (HK) teams.
Ambush
IED Support
Element
Element
G G
Security
Element
G
Support
Element
G
KILL
ZONE
IED
Ambush
Element
G
Ambush G Security
Element Element
G
IED
Figure 7-2. Guerrilla ambush (example)

7-22. Irregular OPFOR commanders and leaders may be willing to accept decisive engagement with the
enemy in this type of ambush. An annihilation ambush typically emphasizes tactical tasks to
Block.
Contain.
Destroy.
7-23. The ambush and support elements normally remain in their fighting positions until the enemy in the
kill zone is rendered combat ineffective. The intent is to destroy enemy personnel and equipment within the
kill zone with concentrated firepower.
7-24. Once the enemy is destroyed, the ambush element can secure the kill zone and eliminate any
remaining enemy in the kill zone. The support element provides overwatch protection to the ambush
element when the ambush element is directed to search the destroyed enemy force and equipment for
information and/or intelligence. Weapons and materiel can be seized by the ambush element for future
irregular OPFOR tactical actions.
7-25. The security element remains in fighting positions to ensure early warning, isolate a kill zone, and
prevent any enemy from escaping the kill zone. Once the ambush element clears the kill zone, the ambush
force withdraws from the ambush area. The ambush element withdraws first and is followed by the support
element. The security element is the last element to depart the kill zone area and delays or blocks any rapid
response of enemy forces that attempt to pursue irregular OPFOR elements as they depart the kill zone
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-5

Chapter 7
area. Depending on the size of the ambush force, the elements typically reassemble at a predetermined
location and time at a safe house or safe haven.
Note. An irregular OPFOR ambush could employ security elements to provide early warning
and/or isolate a series of kill zones on a known convoy route of the enemy. Restrictive natural
terrain and manmade features are reinforced with IEDs to disrupt and contain an enemy force in
the kill zones. A simple ambush technique is to employ a decoy IED that is observable on an
enemy force route. Once enemy forces halt to investigate the potential of an IED detonation, the
ambush force initiates the actual ambush with the simultaneous detonation of IEDs directed into
the kill zone where enemy soldiers and vehicles are expected to halt. Lead and trail vehicles are
initially the primary targets for massed direct fires and destruction. When they are destroyed, the
ambush and support elements shift direct and indirect fires from both ends of the enemy column
toward the center of the contained enemy forces. The enemy convoy is destroyed with massed
overlapping direct and indirect fires. Ambush elements and designated support elements
exfiltrate from the area while security elements provide rear security and an all-arms air defense
capability against any enemy response forces. On order, security elements also exfiltrate from
the ambush site and rendezvous with other guerilla elements at a safe haven.
Harassment Ambush
7-26. The purpose of a harassment ambush is to disrupt routine enemy activities, impede the enemys
freedom of movement, and/or create a negative psychological impact on enemy personnel. The irregular
OPFOR may choose to conduct a harassment ambush when the enemy has superior combat power and
destruction of an enemy force is not feasible as in an annihilation ambush. This type of ambush does not
require the use of obstacles to keep the enemy in the kill zone but can include terrain reinforced into a kill
zone with manmade obstacles, mines, and/or IEDs to halt and/or contain the enemy force for a limited
period of time. Compared to an annihilation ambush, the irregular OPFOR typically conducts a harassment
ambush at a greater distance from the enemy in a kill zone. A harassment ambush often considers the
maximum effective range of its weapons when massing firepower.
7-27. The irregular OPFOR does not normally accept decisive engagement with the enemy in this type of
ambush. A harassment ambush typically emphasizes tactical tasks that can include
Disrupt.
Delay.
Defeat.
7-28. The ambush and support elements are often combined to provide more effective control of fires
throughout the kill zone. This combination is especially useful when the kill zone is quite wide and/or
extends for a long distance. The security element provides early warning of any enemy forces conducting
reconnaissance prior to the ambush and/or enemy forces attempting to respond to the ambush.
7-29. Once the irregular OPFOR commander or leader determines that the ambush has achieved the
desired effects, he directs the ambush and support elements to withdraw along designated routes. The
security element continues to report on enemy activity in the kill zone area and any attempt of enemy
forces to pursue. The irregular OPFOR will not become decisively engaged by enemy forces and often
emplace mines and/or IEDs to delay enemy pursuit.
7-30. Repeated harassment ambushes against the enemy can
Cause the enemy to allocate a disproportionate amount of forces to security tasks which affect
other enemy force missions and potentially create enemy vulnerabilities.
Create a negative psychological effect upon enemy soldiers and leaders, and officials of a
governing authority with which the irregular OPFOR is in conflict.
7-6 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Functional Tactics
Containment Ambush
7-31. A containment ambush is a security task that is usually part of a larger tactical action. This type of
ambush can prevent the enemy from using an avenue of approach or interdicting another tactical action
such as a raid or another ambush.
7-32. The ambush element can be directed to secure a kill zone, but this task is not necessarily required for
mission success. The support and security elements perform the same functions as those described in an
annihilation ambush. Obstacles are an integral part of a successful containment ambush. The commander or
leader determines if his relative combat power compared to enemy forces is adequate to conduct a
containment ambush. The fact that containment may require the irregular OPFOR elements to remain in an
ambush site for an extended period places those elements in danger of being fixed and defeated by enemy
reinforcements.
7-33. The ambush force will normally not accept decisive engagement with the enemy in this type of
ambush. However, it can be directed to accept decisive engagement in support of a larger irregular OPFOR
action. A containment ambush typically emphasizes related tactical tasks that can include
Contain.
Fix.
Delay.
Defeat.
Command and Control of an Ambush

7-34. The commander or leader of the ambush force normally positions himself with the support element
and designates a subordinate leader to move and maneuver with the ambush element. However, the ambush
force commander or leader locates himself where he can best command and control the ambush.
7-35. Urban and rural complex terrain provides several tactical advantages to irregular OPFOR ambush,
security, and support elements. Operating among indigenous citizens in an urban area or other complex
terrain can be used to
Observe enemy forces along known canalized routes or areas of reconnaissance and/or avenues
of approach or directions of attack.
Provide for easily camouflaged irregular OPFOR reconnaissance and surveillance activities.
Provide covered and/or concealed irregular OPFOR routes into and out of the ambush kill zone
area.
Improve irregular OPFOR ambush, security, and support positions with cover, concealment, and
camouflage of the natural and manmade tactical environment.
Encourage deception activities in a relevant civilian population against enemy forces and a
Encourage techniques that employ overlapping direct fires from multiple directions into a
designated kill zone.
Support of an Ambush
7-36. An ambush typically requires several types of support. These can include reconnaissance, fire
support, air defense, engineer-like capabilities, logistics, and INFOWAR. Covert or overt assistance may
also be provided from external sources such as special-purpose forces (SPF) of another state.
Reconnaissance
7-37. Reconnaissance is critical to a successful ambush and is continuous in the objective area in order to
confirm and/or adjust information collection and intelligence previously collected and analyzed. The
irregular OPFOR uses active supporters in the relevant population to observe and report on enemy activities
at the planned objective area in order to select the best terrain on which to locate irregular OPFOR
positions.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-7

Chapter 7
7-38. The irregular OPFOR often has sufficient time in a local community and in vicinity of the objective
to observe and interact with the relevant population. Posing as innocent civilians or coercing local civilians
and/or civic leaders, irregular OPFOR reconnaissance and surveillance reports combine with the reports
from active supporters. Assessing and analyzing these reports assist the commander or leader in finalizing
his ambush plan. Once infiltration and exfiltration routes are planned, the irregular OPFOR maintain these
routes under constant surveillance prior to and during the ambush. Secrecy of irregular OPFOR locations
and activities is essential to tactical survival.
7-39. The irregular OPFOR will closely monitor
Routines of enemy forces selected as the target.
Enemy use of weapons and equipment, crew duties, and teamwork.
Lapses in local security measures among groupings of enemy soldiers and vehicles.
Routes and response time of enemy quick reaction forces during prior ambushes or irregular
OPFOR ruses.
Cooperation of governing authority law enforcement and paramilitary units with enemy forces.
Medical treatment and evacuation norms of enemy forces.
Fire Support
7-40. Fire support is typically in the support element. In most ambushes, support elements in proximity to
ambush elements provide supporting direct fires from light, medium, or heavy machineguns and/or antitank
grenade launchers (ATGLs). However, some support elements may also provide indirect fires from mortars
and rockets. Fires can also support security elements, if necessary. The irregular OPFOR emplaces fire
support systems with the intention of quickly withdrawing them at the conclusion of the ambush.
7-41. Artillery from an affiliated regular military force can augment fires organic to the irregular OPFOR
ambush force. Such artillery support can provide additional fires into the kill zone, illumination over it, or
smoke to permit withdrawal.
Air Defense
7-42. Capabilities for air defense during an ambush may be limited to an all-arms air defense concept,
using the small arms and direct fire weapons with the ambush force. However, guerrilla battalions typically
have a limited man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) capability in their weapons company. If
allocated to an ambush force, these MANPADS would likely be located in security element(s).
Note. Air defense in the irregular OPFOR can also be improved by state and non-state sponsors
providing sophisticated air defense weapons, technologies, training, and logistics support. Other
opportunities may arise when insurgents or guerrillas in armed conflict capture or acquire
sophisticated air defense weapons. In either case, clandestine state or non-state agents and/or
technicians can provide technical support to ensure the effective use of the weapon systems.
Examples of state-of-the-art air defense systems include shoulder-fired MANPADS and/or other
air defense missiles with detection and tracking systems mounted on wheeled or tracked
vehicles.
Engineer-Like Capabilities
7-43. Mobility and countermobility support often depends on insurgents or guerrillas with specialized
skills and expertise from their civilian occupations or previous military experience. Guerrilla units include
sappers, who are not engineers but can perform some engineer-like functions. Covert or overt assistance
may also be provided from external sources such as SPF of another state.
Logistics
7-44. Logistics are prepared as caches or supported from safe houses and havens as part of detailed
planning and rehearsals. The ambush force typically moves from a secured location with everything it
needs to complete the mission. In those rare situations that require a multi-day hide prior to executing the
7-8 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Functional Tactics
ambush, the ambush force will have to move with its own extra life support. Resupply of the ambush force
would significantly increase the chances of its detection and defeat its purpose.
INFOWAR
7-45. INFOWAR activities can support ambushes by concealing the intended action through deception and
information protection. An INFOWAR campaign may use successful ambushes to demonstrate the
progressive failure of an enemy force and/or governing authority. INFOWAR support of an ambush can
temporarily and psychologically isolate the enemy force. (See appendix A for additional information on
irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)
ASSAULT
7-46. An assault is an attack that destroys an enemy force through firepower and the physical occupation
and/or destruction of his position. An assault is a basic form of irregular OPFOR tactical offensive combat.
Therefore, other types of offensive action may include an element that conducts an assault to complete the
mission. However, that element will typically be given a designation that corresponds to the specific
mission accomplished. For example, an element that conducts an assault in the completion of an ambush
would be called the ambush element.
Functional Organization for an Assault

7-47. The insurgent cell(s) or guerrilla unit(s) conducting an assault constitute an assault force. The assault
force typically is organized into three types of elements:
Assault element.
Security element.
Support element.
There may be more than one of each of these types of element.
Assault Element
7-48. The assault element is the action element. It maneuvers to and seizes the enemy position, destroying
any forces there.
Security Element
7-49. The security element provides early warning of approaching enemy forces and prevents them from
reinforcing the assaulted enemy unit. Security elements often make use of terrain choke points, obstacles,
ambushes, and other techniques to resist larger forces for the duration of the assault. The commander or
leader may (or may be forced to) accept risk and employ a security element that can only provide early
warning that is not strong enough to block or delay enemy reinforcements. This decision is based on the
specific situation.
Support Element
7-50. The support element provides the assault element with one or more of the following:
C2.
Combat service support (CSS).
Supporting direct fire (such as small arms, grenade launchers, or ATGLs).
Supporting indirect fire (such as mortars or rockets).
Mobility support.
7-51. The assault force commander or leader typically commands and controls the assault from the support
element. However, he will position himself where he can best exercise C2.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-9

Chapter 7
Executing an Assault
7-52. An assault is a rapid and violent action that can have significant and even decisive effects. However,
a simple direct assault has a very low chance of success without some significant mitigating factors.
Decisive assaults are characterized by
Isolation of the objective (enemy position) so that it cannot be reinforced during the assault.
Early warning of any approaching enemy reinforcements and/or other security measures by the
security element.
Effective suppression of the enemy by the support element prior to the assault element
maneuvering on the enemy position.
Violent fire and maneuver into and through the enemy position.
7-53. The assault element maneuvers from its assault position to the objective and destroys the enemy
located at the objective. It can conduct attack by fire, but this is often not an optimal method and should be
used only when necessary. Typical tactical tasks of the assault element are
Clear.
Destroy.
Seize.
7-54. The irregular OPFOR normally does not assault to secure, since this task indicates an intention to
prevent the loss of an objective to subsequent enemy reaction. Any occupation of an objective is typically
temporary to minimize the ability of an enemy force to mass overwhelming combat power against the
irregular OPFOR. Speed of execution and surprise are critical to an assault. (See figures 7-3 and 7-4 for
examples of assaults.).
Security
Element
I INFOWAR
Coalition
KILL
TCP
ZONE
I
Support
Element
Assault Security
Element Element
I I
Coalition
QRF
Figure 7-3. Insurgent assault (example)
7-10 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Functional Tactics
IED
IED
Security
Element
Support Element G
2ea 7.62-mm PKM
G
Assault
Support Element
Element
G
KILL
ZONE
Support
G Element
60-mm
Security
Element
G
IED
Figure 7-4. Guerrilla assault (example)

7-55. The security element is equipped and organized to detect enemy forces that may be able to react to an
assault on an objective. While the assault is in progress, security tasks may include the requirement to
isolate the objective from any reinforcement by enemy forces, with tasks such as block, contain, or delay.
The security element may be directed to conduct similar tasks that allow the assault and support elements to
exfiltrate.
Note. A simple, effective, and successful assault technique employed often by the irregular
OPFOR is to surprise the enemy by focusing enemy attention in one direction and then
assaulting from a different direction in a nearly simultaneous action with massed firepower and
maneuver on the objective. Support element(s) shift and/or lift initial small arms fire across the
objective as the assault element assaults through the objective. Security element(s) prepare to
ambush any enemy response forces and provide early warning to other elements. The assault
element is already exfiltrating from the objective when the assault force commander or leader
gives the order to support and security element(s) to exfiltrate from the area. A security element
with an INFOWAR team can record the successful assault and relay the video and audio
coverage to an intermediary for delivery to local media outlets. The INFOWAR team can
publish its videotape with added narrative from a higher headquarters spokesperson on an
Internet website often within hours of the assault.
7-56. The commander or leader of the assault force typically exercises C2 from within the support element.
He can also lead the assault element when he determines that his personal presence in the assault is critical
to mission success.
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Chapter 7
7-57. The support element controls all combat support (CS) and CSS functions as well as any supporting
fires. Tasks expected of support elements in the assault are normally attack by fire and/or support by fire.
These direct and/or indirect fires are often intended to divert the enemys attention during the maneuver by
the assault element.
Command and Control of an Assault

7-58. Command and control of the assault masses irregular OPFOR capabilities in time and space for rapid
and violent attack on a selected objective. The irregular OPFOR normally plans an assault in detail to
improve tactical execution with surprise and deception and in order to achieve temporary superior combat
power against an enemy force. However, the irregular OPFOR will often take advantage of an unexpected
opportunity as it occurs in order to assault an enemy force.
7-59. Fighting in complex terrain can be a significant tactical advantage for the irregular OPFOR. In urban
areas the irregular OPFOR can use the civilian community and its infrastructure for shielding and obstacles
against enemy forces. The irregular OPFOR may decide to not comply with international conventions and
law of war restrictions that apply to regular military forces and governing authorities.
Note. Complex terrain is a topographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village
and/or of two or more types of restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the
same space. (Restrictive terrain or environmental conditions include but are not limited to slope,
high altitude, forestation, severe weather, and urbanization.)
7-60. Channelized corridors of urban traffic networks and the vantage points of multi-story buildings
and/or surface or subsurface infrastructure can be demoralizing to an enemy force attempting to counter the
irregular OPFOR. People and facilities in urban areas provide cover and concealment to the irregular
OPFOR. Beyond that, enemy forces often operate within a relevant population that they do not want to
alienate due to excessive civilian casualties, restrictions, and/or damage to their facilities and livelihoods. In
comparison, rural complex terrain may have fewer people within designated areas but can provide similar
cover and concealment advantages to the irregular OPFOR. The civilians that reside in such rural areas can
be influenced to support the irregular OPFOR involuntarily or voluntarily through an effective INFOWAR
campaign.
Support of an Assault
7-61. Support of an assault normally includes reconnaissance, logistics, and INFOWAR. When required
for a particular mission, capabilities such as fire support and air defense can be added to the elements
conducting an assault.
Reconnaissance
7-62. Reconnaissance effort for an assault is continuous in the objective area in order to confirm and/or
adjust information collection and intelligence previously collected and analyzed. The irregular OPFOR uses
active supporters in the relevant population to observe and report on enemy activities at the planned
objective area. Insurgents or guerrillas are often positioned in the local community and in vicinity of the
objective posing as innocent civilians conducting normal commercial or social actions. These
reconnaissance and surveillance reports, combined with the reports from active supporters, assist the
commander or leader of the assault force in finalizing his assault plan to shape, assault, and exfiltrate. Once
infiltration and exfiltration routes are planned, the irregular OPFOR maintains these routes under constant
surveillance prior to and during the assault. Secrecy of irregular OPFOR locations and activities is essential
to tactical survival. Locations of keen interest for reconnaissance and surveillance include
Caches.
Infiltration routes.
Assault position.
Support position.
Objective.
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Functional Tactics
Exfiltration routes.
Safe houses.
Fire Support
7-63. The primary mission of fire support in an assault is to suppress the objective and protect the advance
of the assault element. Fire support assets are typically part of the support element(s). In most ambushes,
support elements in proximity to ambush elements provide supporting direct fires from machineguns and/or
ATGLs. However, the support element(s) can also include indirect fire weapons such as mortars and
rockets allocated to the assault force.
Air Defense
7-64. The typical purpose of air defense support to an assault is to prevent enemy air power from
influencing the action of the assault element. All three elements of an assault typically employ the concept
of all-arms air defense. If specialized air defense weapons (such as MANPADS) are available, they could
be used in any of the elements, but are least likely to be found in the assault element. The security element
provides early warning of enemy aerial response to the assault and may try to destroy the enemy aircraft.
The support element provides overwatch of the assault element and the objective. (See note under Air
Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding additional air defense assets that may be available.)
Logistics
7-65. Logistics support for an ambush is similar to that for an ambush (see above). The support element is
responsible for CSS.
INFOWAR
7-66. INFOWAR support of an assault considers the rapid and violent nature of an assault and the intention
to temporarily and psychologically isolate the enemy force. Isolation of the enemy may also use physical
means such as simultaneous assaults on multiple objectives to overload the enemys ability to respond
and/or effectively reinforce an enemy force at a particular irregular OPFOR objective. (See appendix A for
additional information on irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)
RAID
7-67. A raid is an attack against a stationary target for the purposes of its capture or destruction that
culminates in the withdrawal of the raiding force to safe territory. Raids are usually small-scale attacks that
use surprise and combat power to successfully accomplish the purpose of the mission. Sudden violence
characterizes most raids and may be conducted to secure information, materiel, or individuals and can also
be used to confuse or deceive an enemy. A raid concludes with a planned withdrawal upon completion of
the assigned mission.
7-68. Raids can be used to
Destroy or damaging key systems or facilities (such as command posts, communication
facilities, supply depots, radar sites)
Seize hostages and/or prisoners.
Rescue insurgents, guerrillas, and /or active supporters being detained and/or imprisoned.
Destroy, damage, or capture supplies or lines of communication.
Obtain or denying critical information to the enemy.
Support INFOWAR actions that distract attention from other irregular OPFOR actions, keep the
enemy off balance, and/or to cause the enemy to deploy additional units to protect critical sites.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-13

Chapter 7
Functional Organization for a Raid

7-69. The size and configuration of a raiding force depends upon its mission, the nature and location of the
target, and the enemy situation in the objective area. Examples various raiding forces and their missions
could include
A small insurgent cell or guerrilla HK team attacking an isolated voting station or a portion of
unprotected railroad track.
A larger raiding force attacking an enemy checkpoint, convoy route, or a large supply depot.
A larger insurgent cell, group of cells, or task-organized guerrilla unit attacking an enemy
combat outpost that is attempting to interdict irregular OPFOR movements and control in a
geographic area.
7-70. Regardless of size and specific capabilities, a raiding force typically consists of three elements:
raiding, security, and support. However, a raiding force may employ other functional elements such as a
fixing element or breaching element. It may also obtain advice and direct assistance from SPF teams and or
regular military forces that are in conflict with the same enemy force or governing authority.
Raiding Element(s)
7-71. The raiding element executes the primary task of the raid. That is to destroy or seize the objective of
the raid. In some situations, the raiding element moves physically into the objective, and in other cases it is
able to accomplish the raiding task from a distance. Other elements of a raid support and/or protect the
raiding element while it approaches, enters, and departs the objective.
Security Element(s)
7-72. The security element in a raid is primarily focused on enemy containing enemy security forces,
blocking enemy response forces, and/or fixing enemy escape from the objective area. Any of these tasks
are usually conducted for a limited time period in support of the raid objective. The security element is
often equipped and organized to detect enemy forces in the vicinity of the objective and prevent them from
alerting enemy forces at the objective. Insurgents or guerrillas may infiltrate into the objective area and
position themselves posing as civilians until the time of mission execution.
7-73. The task of a security element is to occupy enemy security and response forces and fix these enemy
forces so that they cannot react to the raiding element. Security elements deploy to locations where they
can deny the enemy freedom of movement along any ground or air avenues of approach that can reinforce
the objective or interfere with the raid mission. Insurgents and guerrillas employ an all-arms air defense
concept that uses all available weapons to disrupt and/or defeat enemy aircraft. Any additional air defense
assets are most likely found in the security element(s).
7-74. Covering the withdrawal of the raiding element with a designated level of rear security, the security
element typically does not allow itself to become decisively engaged. The size of the security element
depends upon the size of the enemys estimated capability to intervene and disrupt the raid.
Support Element(s)
7-75. The support element in a raid serves several enabling functions that assist in setting the conditions for
success of the raid. This support may take several forms. The support element provides fire support,
logistics, mobility and countermobility actions, and INFOWAR support to the raiding and security
elements.
7-76. The commander or leader of the raiding force normally commands and controls the raid from within
the support element. However, he will position himself where he can best command and control the raid.
7-77. Critical support element tasks are often executed immediately prior to conduct of the raid and/or
facilitate its execution. Tasks that assist the raiding element(s) to achieve their objective can include
Breaching and removing obstacles to the objective.
Conducting diversionary actions.
Providing fire support.
7-14 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Functional Tactics
Executing a Raid
7-78. Irregular OPFOR leaders and commanders plan for a rapid and violent execution of a raid. They do
not intend to be decisively engaged with the enemy. The security and support elements normally remain in
their fighting positions unless a task requires an element to accompany the raiding element into the
objective. A breaching element may be required to clear a lane or lanes in enemy defenses and pass the
raiding element(s) through to the objective.
7-79. When the intent is to destroy enemy personnel and equipment within the kill zone, concentrated
firepower may be able to accomplish the task without physically entering the objective. For example, a
guerrilla unit could use indirect fire weapons to raid an enemy site as an attack by fire with no intention of
entering the objective site (see the examples in figure 7-5 and 7-6 at pages 7-16 to 7-17).
7-80. If the raiding task includes seizing individuals and/or equipment, the raiding element temporarily
secures the objective and seizes designated equipment, individuals, and/or other materiel. The support
element provides protection to the raiding element when the raiding element searches the objective for
information and/or intelligence. The raiding element can seize weapons and other materiel for future
irregular OPFOR tactical actions.
Command and Control of a Raid

7-81. A raid is conducted by elements that are often autonomous from other irregular OPFOR or regular
OPFOR cells or units but can be coordinated in actions to support a common purpose. A raid is not
necessarily associated with actions being conducted concurrently by larger OPFOR organizations in the
same area. Irregular OPFOR raids are typically conducted by small insurgent cells or guerrilla units at the
tactical level of conflict.
7-82. The commander or leader of the raiding force normally positions himself with the support element
and designates a subordinate leader to move and maneuver with the raiding element. However, the raiding
force commander or leader locates himself where he can best command and control the raid and may
maneuver with the raiding element into the objective when appropriate.
Support of a Raid
7-83. A raid typically requires several types of support. These types of support can typically include
reconnaissance, fire support, air defense, engineer-like capabilities, logistics, and INFOWAR.
Reconnaissance
7-84. The primary task of reconnaissance and surveillance in a raid is to collect information and
intelligence on the target of the raid and monitor all activities in and near the objective. Reconnaissance
also identifies the locations of response forces and their expected response routes to the objective
during a raid.
7-85. Reconnaissance elements confirm and/or adjust information collection collected previously in order
to determine current intelligence. Insurgents and guerillas are often members of a local community and
easily interact with the relevant population. The irregular OPFOR uses active supporters in the relevant
population to observe and report on enemy activities at the objective area in order to select the best terrain
in which to locate irregular OPFOR positions. Infiltration and exfiltration routes are planned and rehearsed,
and security elements maintain these routes under constant surveillance prior to and during the assault.
7-86. In preparation for a raid, the irregular OPFOR will closely monitor
Patterns of enemy force activities selected as the target.
Lack of discipline in enemy soldier use of weapons and equipment, crew duties, and teamwork.
Lapses in enemy local security measures in the objective area.
Availability of enemy quick reaction forces.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-15

Chapter 7
Raid Examples
Insurgent Raid
Insurgents could use a raid to rescue an insurgent leader who is being held in a
governing authority detention facility. A suicide vehicle-borne IED detonates at the
main gate to breach barriers and kill, wound, or daze internal security force (ISF)
guards in the immediate vicinity. Concurrently, support elements use small arms and
ATGL fire to kill and/or contain other guard forces at a separate gate and small
barracks. Security elements detect and ambush enemy reaction forces coming to the
aid of the detention facility.
Security MP
I Element
IED
Support
IED
Element
I Support
I Element
Raiding Element Raiding Element I Security

I 4ea (Motorcycle) 4ea(Motorcycle) Element
with Detainee
ISF
Leader Detainee I
Leader
(Linkup) ISF
Security I
I Element ISF
IED
ISF
IED
I
I Vehicle Borne
IED IED
Security I
I Element
Support
I Element Raiding Element
4ea (Motorcycle)
Security IED
I
Element
I
Figure 7-5. Insurgent raid (example)

A raiding element of four motorcycles moves through the breach at the main gate to a
designated linkup point inside the facility that had been coordinated within a covert
operative of the insurgency. The covert operative kills guards inside the holding cells
area and releases the insurgent leader. Once the raiding element secures the
insurgent leader, the element exits the facility through a side gate and quickly departs
the area on motorcycles to a safe house.
During the raid, security elements positioned along likely avenues for enemy
response forces ambush and delay law enforcement and quick reaction forces as
they approach the detention facility. The local insurgent leader in command of the
raid determines that the insurgent leader secured from the facility is now safe and
directs support and security elements to exfiltrate from the area.
An INFOWAR cell video and audio records the raid from several vantage points. It
releases an account of the successful raid on the Internet and to regional media
outlets within hours of the raid.
(continued)
7-16 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Functional Tactics
An INFOWAR cell video and audio records the raid from several vantage points. It
releases an account of the successful raid on the Internet and to regional media
outlets within hours of the raid.
Guerrilla Raid
A guerrilla battalion could employ a raid to demonstrate the inability of the enemy to
effectively defend critical infrastructure. However, the battalion in this example has
suffered significant losses, now having only one of its original three guerrilla
companies. Therefore, it is reluctant to attempt a raid against an enemy POL
installation by physically entering the objective, which has an enemy motorized infantry
company and two combat outposts in the vicinity. However, the guerrilla battalion still
has two of the original three 107-mm multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) of its weapons
company, although it has lost the crews trained to operate them. So the battalion
commander has one guerrilla platoon from his remaining company task-organized as
an MRL platoon and moved to a designated site for specialized training in MRL tactical
operations. SPF advisors from a neighboring state deploy into the area to train the
task-organized platoon and continue plans and rehearsals for the MRL raid. Insurgent
leaders and senior guerrilla commanders position themselves to observe the raid. An
INFOWAR cell of the local insurgent organization positions to record the raid.
MRL
I G 107-mm
Support
G CIV Element
SPF Support
Element G
INFOWAR
I Videographer
Security
Element
Security
Element Raiding
G Element
MRL 107-mm
Security Security
Element & Element &
Observer Observer
COP
(-)
COP
Figure 7-6. Guerrilla raid (example)

(continued)
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-17

Chapter 7
In this example, the raiding element is one MRL section from the task-organized MRL
platoon, with one MRL (broken down into man-packable loads), the mortar crew, and
additional riflemen (from the original guerrilla platoon). It infiltrates to a firing point
near the maximum range of the rockets and establishes observations posts and
security teams. With their weapon reassembled and ammunition ready for firing, the
section leader orders the firing to commence. Significant damage is accomplished
with three volleys of rockets from the MRL. The guerrillas quickly disassemble the
weapon and move to hide positions along multiple exfiltration routes. The INFOWAR
cell video and audio records the raid from several vantage points and releases an
account of the successful raid on the Internet and to regional media outlets with a
message from the local insurgent organization leader. On order, the guerrillas split
into small teams and continue to exfiltrate to safe havens in the neighboring
mountain range.
Fire Support
7-87. Most raids may use support elements in proximity to raiding elements with supporting direct fires
from light, medium, or heavy machineguns and/or ATGLs. In some cases, support element(s) can also
provide indirect fires from mortars or rockets allocated to the raiding force.
7-88. Fire support for a raid can assist in
Isolating a point of penetration in the enemy defenses at the objective.
Fixing enemy forces in the objective and protecting the breach of enemy defenses.
Suppressing effective direct and indirect fires from enemy forces.
Disrupting enemy response forces.
Obscuring the vision and sensors of the enemy as the raiding force withdrawals.
Air Defense
7-89. The irregular OPFOR recognizes that air defense is an all-arms effort that uses all weapon systems
and resources available to the raid. (See TC 7-100.2, chapter 11 for more information on the OPFOR all-
arms air defense concept.) The irregular OPFOR seeks new and adaptive ways to employ systems not
traditionally associated with air defense. However, guerrilla battalions typically have a limited MANPADS
capability in their weapons company. If allocated to a raiding force, these MANPADS would likely be
located in security element(s). Security elements provide early warning and fires against enemy aerial
response forces. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding additional air defense
assets that may be available.)
7-90. Irregular OPFOR cells and units do not have organic mobility and/or countermobility capabilities.
Breaching and/or removing obstacles before and during a raid on an objective may require insurgents or
guerrillas with specialized skills and expertise from their civilian professions or previous military
experience. Guerrilla sappers are not engineers but can perform some engineer-like functions. The irregular
OPFOR may also rely on assistance from affiliated SPF or regular military forces in support of a raid.
Tasks in either situation involve ensuring freedom of movement and maneuver to the objective, within the
objective and to the target, and timely withdrawal from the objective. Insurgents, guerillas, and/or SPF
soldiers with these skills may be located with the raiding, support, and/or security element depending on
the assigned tasks.
Logistics
7-91. Raids are typically brief in duration. The raiding force will move from a secured location such as a
safe house or safe haven to the objective area with all materiel required for the raid. Caches can be used in
the vicinity of the objective when this technique improves tactical security and/or when irregular OPFOR
materiel needs to be located close to the objective. Caches can also be mobile in transportation masked
7-18 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Functional Tactics
within a relevant civilian population in urban or rural environments. Examples of mobile caches are as
simple as a wheel barrow covered with a tarpaulin to a modern truck with hidden compartments as part of a
commercial convoy.
INFOWAR
7-92. INFOWAR primarily supports a raid by concealing the action through deception and information
protection. Successful raids can be used in INFOWAR to demonstrate the inability of enemy forces to do
one or more of the following:
Defend civilian, government, and military facilities.
Safeguard key representatives of the governing authority.
Protect civilian and military infrastructure critical to a governing authoritys counterinsurgency
or counter-guerrilla campaign.
(See appendix A for more information on irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)
7-93. Recurring irregular OPFOR raids can be conducted to
Isolate psychologically the enemy force and governing authority from each other and the
relevant civilian population.
Degrade the resolve of the enemy force and governing authority to continue counterinsurgency
or counter-guerrilla operations.
Obtain needed materiel to continue the irregular OPFOR.
RECONNAISSANCE ATTACK (GUERILLAS)

7-94. A reconnaissance attack is a tactical offensive action that locates moving, dispersed, or concealed
enemy elements and either fixes or destroys them. A guerrilla commander may also use it to gain
information about the enemys location, dispositions, military capabilities, and possibly his intentions.
(Insurgent cells typically do not have sufficient combat power to conduct a reconnaissance attack.)
7-95. The guerrillas recognize that an enemy will conduct significant measures to prevent them from
gaining critical intelligence. Therefore, quite often they will have to fight for information, using an
offensive action to penetrate or circumvent the enemys security forces to determine who and/or what is
located where or doing what.
7-96. The reconnaissance attack is the most ambitious method to collect information and is ordered by a
guerrilla commander only after prudent consideration of other tactical alternatives. Key factors in
reconnaissance attack considerations are
Accurate situational assessment of an area of responsibility (AOR) within which the guerrillas
operate.
Contact conditions: having maintained contact with the enemy or the requirement to reestablish
contact.
Current capabilities to simultaneously support the movement and/or maneuver of multiple
reconnaissance, security, and action elements in the guerrilla AOR.
Level of active support from the local relevant population.
Functional Organization for a Reconnaissance Attack

7-97. Depending on the situation, a guerrilla commander organizing a reconnaissance attack may designate
reconnaissance, security, and/or action elements. There may be more than one of each type. The
commander may also form various types of support elements.
Reconnaissance Element(s)
7-98. If the purpose of the reconnaissance attack is merely to gain information, a guerrilla commander may
organize several reconnaissance elements. Their role is to locate enemy elements operating in the units
AOR. If the purpose is to also have the capability to fix and/or destroy located enemy elements, the
reconnaissance elements provide reconnaissance and surveillance support to the elements that carry out
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-19

Chapter 7
those functions. A tactical option is for security elements to perform this role if reconnaissance
elements are not formed. Once a reconnaissance element locates an enemy element, it may become a
security element.
Security Element(s)
7-99. If the guerrilla commander believes he has sufficient combat power to engage enemy elements that
may be located, he may also organize one or more security elements. Size and task organization of security
elements are dependent on the assigned mission and the expectation of how long a security element will
conduct its functional tasks before arrival of action elements or other elements. (When performing some of
these functional tasks, the unit originally designated as a security element may receive a designation that
describes that specific function.)
7-100. Security elements can either work in conjunction with reconnaissance elements or perform the
reconnaissance role for the guerrilla unit. Upon locating an enemy element, a security element may be
directed to conduct one of several tactical tasks. It may
Report on conditions in the AOR.
Observe and monitor the enemy in the AOR.
Locate enemy direct-fire weapons concentrations such as enemy antitank ambush sites.
Locate enemy countermobility obstacles along friendly axes.
Identify bypasses to enemy countermobility obstacles.
Prepare infiltration lanes through enemy countermobility obstacles that cannot be bypassed.
Fix enemy forces (as a fixing element).
Block probable enemy avenues of withdrawal or reinforcement (as a blocking element).
Attack a smaller enemy element (as an ambush element or raiding element).
Action Element(s)
7-101. A guerrilla commander task-organizes one or more action elements to conduct designated tasks
against enemy element(s). These action elements may receive a functional designation that more
specifically describes the action they are to accomplish, such as raiding element. Once an enemy element is
located and/or fixed, the action element(s) attack to defeat or destroy the enemy. The number of action
elements for a mission is based on the anticipated tasks to engage enemy elements located by
reconnaissance and/or security elements. Action elements may be directed to plan for operations in
conjunction with one or more security elements in an AOR. Each security element may not necessarily
have an action element dedicated to follow and assume an offensive task.
Support Element(s)
7-102. One or more support elements can perform various supporting tasks. Typical CS and/or CSS tasks
are discussed in subsequent paragraphs under Support of a Reconnaissance Attack.
Executing a Reconnaissance Attack

7-103. Multiple attack axes often characterize reconnaissance attacks. Control measures may include start
times, check points, orientation objectives, and objective rally points designated for each axis. Multiple
axes of advance provide more tactical flexibility to guerrilla elements in accomplishing their respective
missions and tasks (see figure 7-7 on page 7-21).
7-104. Guerrilla elements normally infiltrate within or into an AOR. The norm is reconnaissance and/or
security elements maneuvering separately to find the enemy and/or report on activity and/or conditions
along designated routes or axes. When the enemy is located, the guerrilla commander decides on
subsequent tasks for his unit. A typical task is to fix the enemy with security forces and attack with action
elements to defeat or destroy the enemy. Success often relies on the ability of reconnaissance and/or
security elements to operate independently. Action elements are positioned within an AOR to quickly
respond to intelligence confirmed by reconnaissance and/or security elements. (See figure 5-7 for an
example of a reconnaissance attack.)
7-20 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Functional Tactics
Reconnaissance Attack Example

Recent combat actions have severely reduced a guerrilla battalion two guerrilla
companies and limited organic fire support. The guerrilla brigade allocates mortar
and rocket launcher support as the guerrilla battalion prepares for a reconnaissance
attack. The battalion commander uses remnants of his third company to create two
dummy companies as deception elements. SPF INFOWAR teams support guerrilla
deception activities. Avoiding enemy screening elements, several reconnaissance
elements infiltrate to reestablish contact with the enemy. Reconnaissance elements
report on activities and conditions within the AOR, identify enemy force locations, and
guide security elements into positions to fix enemy forces. Other reconnaissance
elements reach their orientation objectives without enemy contact and transition to
security tasks. The guerrilla battalion conducts simultaneous attacks on enemy forces
using massed direct and indirect fires.
Recon
Recon
Element
KILL Element
Security ZONE ?
G Element
Security
Raid G Element
Element
Raid G
Element G
Raid
Element
G
IED
MRL
G
107-mm G
IED Support
Element Recon
Element
G
Recon
RL 122-mm 120-mm G Element Action
Support Recon Support
Element G Element 82-mm IED Element Element
INFO Support G
WAR Element IED
G
G Action
G Element
Cache
SPF INFO
G
WAR
Cache
Cache
Figure 7-7. Guerrilla reconnaissance attack (example)

Guerrilla forces quickly withdraw to safe havens while security elements and on-call
indirect fires prevent any enemy pursuit. The surprise attack by guerrillas disrupts
enemy logistics and stalls enemy offensive operations.
Command and Control of a Reconnaisance Attack

7-105. A reconnaissance attack requires planning and coordination typically more detailed than in other
offensive actions for a guerrilla unit. The commander or leader must plan for multiple reconnaissance
and/or security elements operating across a broad area is one consideration. He must also position one or
more action elements to respond quickly to tactical opportunities identified by reconnaissance and/or
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-21

Chapter 7
security elements. The organization and positioning of functional elements is further complicated as
guerrillas plan to deceive the enemy as to their presence and tactical intentions.
Support of a Reconnaissance Attack

7-106. A reconnaissance attack typically requires several types of support. These can include
reconnaissance, fire support, air defense, engineer-like capabilities, logistics, and INFOWAR.
7-107. Special situations may exist when guerrilla units have levels of capability more expected of regular
forces. These capabilities can include armored fighting vehicles, aviation, and additional air defense or fire
support. Weapons and equipment can be
Provided by state and/or non-state sponsors.
Acquired from indigenous resources.
Captured from the enemy.
Purchased from criminal organizations and/or other commercial enterprise intermediaries.
7-108. Sustained intelligence activities, logistics, and training support are critical aspects of long-term
guerrilla unit effectiveness. These types of functional capabilities of a guerrilla unit can be supported by
SPF from a state overtly or covertly affiliated with the guerrilla unit.
Regular military force or intelligence activity liaison teams that operate with the guerrilla unit.
Criminal organizations with expertise and assets available on a contractual basis to the guerrilla
unit.
Adherents in the relevant population who actively support guerrilla actions but will not be
visibly involved in the direct actions and combat of the guerrilla unit.
Higher-level or SPF-supported INFOWAR activities.
Reconnaissance
7-109. Reconnaissance in a reconnaissance attack can be conducted in two primary ways. A
reconnaissance element can be formed with a mission to find the enemy forces and guide security elements
to locations that allow the security elements to fix the enemy forces. When no reconnaissance element is
formed, each security element performs its own reconnaissance tasks with the responsibility to both find
and fix an enemy force.
Armored Fighting Vehicles

7-110. Some guerrilla units may have armored vehicles present in their organization and can use them for
particular tasks. When a guerrilla commander believes he has a level of near parity with local enemy forces
and is confident in his air defense capabilities for limited periods of time, he can use armored vehicles in
his various functional element(s). With effective camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D), he
may decide to introduce wheeled and/or tracked armored vehicles from safe havens or local hide positions
to augment reconnaissance and/or security elements. The thermal imagers and other electro-optical aids on
armored vehicles can be of great value in detecting enemy forces. Armored vehicles can also increase
mobility, firepower, and protection for reconnaissance and/or security elements, significantly enhancing
their ability to fix and possibly destroy the enemy. The mobility and speed of these vehicles permit them to
serve in the action element(s), rapidly orienting on located and/or fixed enemy forces and moving to a
position of advantage to destroy them. Especially when the enemy was previously unaware of their
presence in the AOR, these armored vehicles can provide a significant advantage in firepower and
shock effect.
Fire Support
7-111. Fire support is positioned in an AOR to provide responsive fires throughout the reconnaissance
phase, security element movement and occupation of fixing and/or blocking positions, and the maneuver
and combat of action of elements. Various wheeled, towed, or tracked fire support systems may be
available to cover the withdrawal of reconnaissance, security, action, or other support elements after
completing the reconnaissance attack mission.
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Functional Tactics
7-112. Guerrilla units may include medium and heavy mortars, artillery, and/or rocket systems as a varied
collection of antiquated and contemporary capabilities. Mobility of systems can vary also. Guerrilla units
may have to improvise transportation, using captured military trucks, local commercial vehicles that
conceal a weapon system, or other expedient means. In some cases, pack animals, bicycles with reinforced
frames, and/or porters can be used to transport disassembled fire support systems for reassembly at
locations unexpected by the enemy.
Aviation
7-113. Aviation is not typically anticipated in a guerrilla unit order of battle. However, a guerrilla
commander can acquire small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with relative ease through normal means
on the commercial market and/or illicit purchases from criminal organizations or other sources. State
sponsors can provide technical expertise with clandestine agents and/or technicians or provide training and
advice through SPF teams. A guerrilla commander could acquire systems and technical expertise on a
contractual basis from disenfranchised experts or rogue non-state enterprises. UAVs in a guerrilla unit can
be used to enhance real-time reconnaissance and surveillance in conjunction with reconnaissance elements
maneuvering on the ground in an AOR. A number of small UAVs could be armed with IEDs to create an
aerial attack capability. Used with a swarm technique on a point or area target, a mass of low-flying UAVs
could conduct a disruptive or devastating attack on critical enemy assets.
7-114. Aviation in guerrilla units can also include rotary- and/or fixed-wing capabilities. Although these
capabilities may be considered exceptional for most guerrilla forces, state and non-state sponsors can
covertly introduce limited aviation capabilities into an advanced insurgency and/or highly trained guerrilla
units. Operating from a guerrilla enclave or safe haven, even one or two helicopters or fixed-wing
commercial aircraft could be converted into an attack system with military-grade rockets or bombs.
Capability for aviation attack against a governing authority or its military forces could create a significant
psychological impact in a guerrilla INFOWAR campaign.
Air Defense
7-115. Guerrilla air defense can be developed to a level of protection that limits enemy aerial response
forces and reinforcements from influencing a particular guerrilla mission in the AOR. Any guerrilla unit
conducts all-arms air defense as a norm to damage and/or destroy tactical enemy aircraft within the range
of their available small arms weapons systems. (For more information on the all-arms air defense concept,
see chapter 11 of TC 7-100.2.) However, guerrilla battalions also typically have a limited MANPADS
capability in their weapons company. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding
additional air defense assets that may be available.)
7-116. Mobility and countermobility support to a reconnaissance attack focuses on freedom of movement
and/or maneuver of reconnaissance, security, and action elements. Mobility and countermobility tasks are
performed by guerrillas with specialized skills. For example, guerrillas with expertise from civilian
engineering occupations and/or previous training by SPF teams may be assigned tasks that concentrate on
emplacing rudimentary obstacles and IEDs along planned withdrawal routes to disrupt any pursuit by the
enemy after a successful reconnaissance attack. Guerrillas from sapper units can be task-organized to assist
various elements in infiltrating through enemy security elements, breaching enemy obstacles, as well as
support attacks on located enemy forces or installations.
7-117. Additional mobility and countermobility support, training, and assistance can be obtained from
sappers in SPF teams that accompany and/or augment a guerrilla unit. SPF and/or guerrilla sappers can also
train active supporters in the relevant local population to assist the reconnaissance attack in specified
supporting roles. Guerrilla units can use to their advantage the blurred distinctions of what constitutes the
role of active support versus being considered a guerrilla. Regardless of who is providing mobility and
countermobility support, this guerrilla capability is essential to offensive action in fixing, blocking, and/or
attacking enemy forces.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-23

Chapter 7
Note. Guerrilla sappers are not combat engineers. However, sappers are trained to perform
several tasks that are typical of raider and combat engineer-like functions.
Logistics
7-118. A reconnaissance attack can be conducted by widely dispersed guerrilla elements operating over
extended time periods and distances. Elements typically carry sufficient logistics with them during their
movements. Guerrillas can create and stock caches and/or preposition designated logistics elements in an
AOR for multiple reconnaissance advances toward orientation objectives and during guerrilla unit
withdrawals to safe havens after a reconnaissance attack.
7-119. Guerrillas are self-sufficient as a goal but must often subsist on the local economy without
offending a local relevant population. Use of civilian facilities and support of the population to guerrilla
units may result in reaction by enemy forces and the governing authority on the civilian population and its
institutions. Guerrilla INFOWAR activities amplify enemy repression to increase and sustain tactical and
logistics support by a relevant population for guerrilla actions.
INFOWAR
7-120. With the support of INFOWAR deception, the guerrilla commander attempts to deceive the enemy
concerning the strength and composition of his forces, their current deployment and orientation, and the
intended manner of employment. False intelligence provided to enemy forces by active supporters of
the guerrillas disrupts enemy information collection. When successfully conducted, deception
activities support tactical surprise by the guerrilla force and improve the likelihood of achieving the
reconnaissance attack objective.
7-121. INFOWAR activities in a reconnaissance attack are primarily executed to
Deceive the enemy force regarding guerrilla actions and intentions.
Protect elements of the guerrilla force from being detected.
Create a false sense of security in the enemy.
Encourage the active and passive support of the guerrilla operations by a relevant population.
Demoralize enemy forces and the governing authority they support.
TYPES OF DEFENSIVE ACTION

7-122. Insurgents and guerrillas can employ some of the types of defensive action also used by smaller
tactical units of the regular OPFOR. Such actions can include
Defense of a simple battle position.
Defense of a complex battle position.
(See TC 7-100.2 for basic discussion of these types of defensive actions, as they are also conducted by the
regular OPFOR.)
7-123. Irregular OPFOR leaders and commanders select the defensive action best suited to accomplishing
their mission, given the conditions under which they assume a defensive posture. Some parts of an
insurgent or guerrilla organization may conduct defensive actions while other parts of the same
organization are on the offense.
BATTLE POSITIONS
7-124. A battle position (BP) normally is a defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of
approach. However, the irregular OPFOR may select defensive locations to avoid contact with an enemy
but provide for defense if discovered. When irregular OPFOR leaders determine that they will operate in a
defensive posture, defensive positions will be either a simple battle position (SBP) or complex battle
position (CBP). The mission and specific circumstances will influence the type of BP to establish and
occupy. Figure 5-8 shows examples of symbols for SBPs and CBPs (see figure 7-8 o page 7-25.
7-24 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Functional Tactics
G
G
CBP perimeter and

guerrilla company occupation
SBP perimeter and
platoon-size defense
SBP perimeter and DA Cell

squad-size defense I INFOWAR
Demolitions,
I Sabotage & IED
G Team
Cache DA Cell
I I
CBP perimeter and

Enemy insurgent cells occupation
Figure 7-8. Simple and complex battle positions
Note. Sometimes graphics show a relatively large unit, such as a guerrilla battalion or brigade,
inside a symbol for a CBP. This actually means that such a units subordinates occupy a series of
CBPs within that area.
Simple Battle Position

7-125. A simple battle position (SBP) is a defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of
approach. SBPs are not necessarily tied to complex terrain. However, they often employ as much
fortification and C3D measures as time allows. Defenses are improved upon continuously until the
SBP is abandoned.
Complex Battle Position

7-126. A complex battle position (CBP) is a defensive location designed to employ a combination of
complex terrain, C3D, and engineer-like capabilities to protect the cells or units within them from detection
and attack while denying their seizure and occupation by the enemy. CBPs typically have the following
characteristics that distinguish them from SBPs:
Not on or along an enemy avenue of approach.
Limited avenues of approach toward and/or in vicinity of a CBP.
Observation of any existing avenues of approach.
Defensive posture with an integrated 360-degree perimeter.
Countermobility and mobility efforts prioritizing C3D measures of the CBP location.
Substantial logistics caches.
Sanctuary.
DEFENSE OF A SIMPLE BATTLE POSITION

7-127. Construction of an SBP places special attention on the camouflage, concealment, and cover of
fighting positions in urban and rural terrain. The irregular OPFOR normally expects significant enemy
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-25

Chapter 7
reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities and recognizes that
sophisticated RISTA capabilities may be supporting the enemy. An effective counter to such levels of
sophisticated technology and systems may be to embed the SBP within a relevant population in an urban
and/or rural environment, or physically use rural and/or urban terrain to mask the presence of SBPs.
Examples include the use manmade underground shelters, tunnels, natural shelters such as caves,
and/or village or city dwellings. An SBP or group of SBPs establishes kill zone(s) on likely enemy
avenues of approach.
7-128. Deceptive techniques can include the faade of being commercial or private equipment, vehicles,
work places, and/or public institutions and public gathering places such as houses of worship, hospitals,
and civic centers with regular intermingling of the relevant population. Insurgents usually wear the clothing
of the local population and often keep weapons, munitions, and materiel in caches that are easily retrievable
in the vicinity of the SBP. The same may be true of guerrillas. However, guerrillas may transition to
recognizable paramilitary uniforms.
7-129. The irregular OPFOR commander or leader makes prudent risk assessments when establishing
SBPs. He evaluates the desirability and/or requirement to invest substantial time, effort, and materiel on an
SBP. He weighs this against the expectation that he must defeat an enemy that can typically mass combat
power quickly against an SBP.
7-130. Once the commander or leader decides to defend an SBP, he focuses his available combat power
on one or more kill zones. The irregular OPFOR plans and rehearses all actions necessary to prevent enemy
penetration of an SBP and/or what an SBP or group of SBPs is protecting, and also considers measures to
defeat an enemy penetration of an SBP if it occurs.
7-131. The commander or leader considers what criteria he will use to direct a withdrawal and/or
withdrawal under pressure from an SBP or group of SBPs. Unless directed to retain a specific SBP by a
higher level, the commander or leader responsible for an SBP recognizes that he is committed to a long-
term struggle and that preserving combat power for a future engagement may be the appropriate decision.
However, some insurgents or guerrillas may have a self-determined commitment or directed mission to
fight until killed or captured in a particular SBP.
Functional Organization for Defending an SBP

7-132. The commander or leader defends an SBP with cells or units that are organized as functional
elements. Typical functional designations are
Disruption element.
Main defense element.
Reserve element.
Support element.
Deception element.
7-133. There may be more than one of each type. The name of an element describes its function within
the defensive action.
Disruption Element(s)
7-134. Insurgents or guerrillas assigned to a disruption element have a mission of identifying enemy
reconnaissance efforts and reporting the location, disposition, and composition of approaching enemy
forces. When disruption elements have the capability to target and attack designated subsystems of an
enemy force, they conduct disruption actions as part of a comprehensive defense plan of the higher
commander or leader.
7-135. Disruption activities may include direct and indirect fires, remote-controlled or command-
detonated IEDs and/or other execution of obstacles to slow, channel, contain, or block an enemy force. The
normal intention of a disruption element is to not become decisively engaged by the enemy. However, a
commander or leader can direct decisive engagement if the action is necessary to preserve the combat
power of other critical capabilities in the irregular OPFOR organization.
7-26 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Functional Tactics
7-136. Tactical tasks typical of a disruption element include

Ambush.
Attack by fire.
Delay.
Disrupt.
7-137. The irregular OPFOR will typically not assign a small cell or unit a fixing task when an
expectation of fix is to deny movement of any part of an enemy force. A more probable task for the
irregular OPFOR in an SBP is delay with an expectation to slow the momentum of an enemy advance
and cause significant damage to the enemy force without becoming decisively engaged.
7-138. A disruption element for an SBP can be as small as one or two insurgents or guerrillas with assault
rifles, light and/or medium machineguns, grenade launchers, IEDs, and/or ATGLs. Typically, it is no larger
than 8 to12 such personnel.
Main Defense Element(s)

7-139. The main defense element of an SBP is responsible for defeating an attacking force. Insurgents or
guerrillas in a main defense element are prepared to use fires and maneuver to defeat the penetration or
seizure of their SBP or other SBPs. Main defense elements focus the combat power of available weapon
systems into designated kill zones to defeat or destroy an enemy force.
Reserve Element(s)
7-140. The reserve element of an SBP exists to provide the irregular OPFOR commander or leader with
tactical flexibility. The commander or leader will normally assign priorities of effort to the reserve element
for contingency planning and rehearsals. Although a reserve element may not have specified tasks to
perform initially, tactical tasks it can later receive include
Counterattack.
Block.
Contain.
Delay.
Defend.
Support Element(s)
7-141. The support element of an SBP can include
CSS.
C2.
Direct fires such as heavy machineguns, ATGLs, antitank guided missiles, recoilless rifles, or
automatic grenade launchers.
Indirect fires such as mortars or rockets.
Nonlethal actions such as smoke obscurants.
INFOWAR activities.
Engineer-like capabilities with specialized talents of individual insurgents or guerrillas.
Deception Element(s)
7-142. To keep the enemy from discovering the nature of the defenses and to draw fire away from actual
elements, the defending force may establish dummy firing positions and battle positions. In addition to
enhancing force protection, the irregular OPFOR may use these deception elements as an economy-of-force
measure to portray strength where none exists.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-27

Chapter 7
Organizing the Battlefield for an SBP

7-143. When establishing an SBP, the commander or leader of the defending force specifies the
organization of the battlefield from the perspective of his level of command. This normally includes a battle
zone and often a support zone. It may also include a disruption zone. (See figures 7-9 and 7-10 for
examples of SBP defense.)
Battle Zone
7-144. The battle zone is the area where the defending commander or leader commits the preponderance
of his force to the task of defeating attacking enemy forces. Generally, an SBP will have its battle zone fires
integrated with those of any adjacent SBPs. Fires will orient to form kill zones where the defenders plan to
destroy key enemy targets.
IED
IED
Main Defense
I Element
Security
I Element
RPK AKMS AKMS AKMS

RPG-7V
7.62-mm 7.62-mm 7.62-mm 7.62-mm
KILL
ZONE
IED
Main Defense
I Element Support
Element
60-mm
AKM with BG-15 Mosin/ AKMS PKM
7.62-mm 40-mm Nagant 7.62-mm 7.62-mm
IED
Figure 7-9. Insurgent defense of a simple battle position (example)
Disruption Zone
7-145. The disruption zone is the area outside the battle zone where the defenders may seek to
Report on the enemy situation.
Defeat enemy reconnaissance efforts.
Detect attacking forces.
Disrupt and delay an attackers approach.
Engage and destroy key attacking elements prior to engagement in the battle zone.
7-28 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Functional Tactics
7-146. Engagement (such as ambush or attack by fire) in the disruption zone may be beyond the
capabilities of a small disruption element. However, it may be able to delay or disrupt the enemy advance
or channel it away from the SBP(s). In any case, some level of reconnaissance and/or security will be
placed outside of an SBP for early warning of enemy approach.
Support Zone
7-147. Depending on the mission and size of the defensive positions, support capabilities may be
incorporated into the battle zone of an SBP, or there may be a support zone inside or outside the battle
zone. Aside from the support element(s), the support zone may contain a reserve element.
Executing Defense of an SBP

7-148. Aggressive security measures throughout the development and occupation of an SBP provide early
warning of enemy activities. Once enemy forces are detected, the irregular OPFOR commander or leader
decides when to engage the enemy. He may direct that disruption elements engage with direct and
indirect fires, or he can continue to observe movements and maneuver of the enemy as it approaches
SBP kill zones.
Disruption
Security
Element
Main
Defense
Element G
G
Reserve
G Support
Element
Support G Element
Element 60-mm
PKM 7.62mm
G
Main
G Defense
Element
Support Element
PKM 7.62mm
G
Main
Defense
Disruption G Element
Security
Element
Figure 7-10. Guerrilla defense of a simple battle position (example)

7-149. On order of the commander or leader, the irregular OPFOR engages the enemy to defeat and/or
destroy the enemy in designated kill zones. Given the norm of an enemy quickly responding to contact
with additional forces, the commander or leader may decide to withdraw or reposition from initial
defensive positions.
7-150. The irregular OPFOR can initiate deception activities to confuse an enemy when it is displacing
from its initial SBP or SBPs. Deception can include small stay-behind direct action cells or guerrilla teams
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-29

Chapter 7
to indicate a continued defense of an SBP or SBPs. Other actions that can slow the reaction of enemy
forces to irregular OPFOR maneuver are keeping insurgents or guerrillas close to or within a relevant
civilian population as a shield. Multiple IEDs along withdrawal routes can be both active and inert
munitions. Both types of IED-appearing obstacles cause enemy responses to assess and disarm or bypass
the munitions.
Note. The commander or leader of an SBP can position main defense elements to mass
overlapping small arms fire (SAF) and ATGL fires in to a kill zone or kill zones. He selects the
kill zone(s) to best use restrictions in terrain, such as difficult fords across a river. He reinforces
the terrain with antipersonnel mines to further channel, separate, or contain the enemy force as it
enters the kill zone(s). Security elements are located where they can observe any approaching
enemy along ground and aerial avenues of approach to the SBP. The security elements may be
directed to continue reporting on enemy activity and to not engage the enemy. Support elements
such as mortars are ordered to commence indirect fires in support of machinegun and automatic
rifle SAF that coincide with detonation of antipersonnel mines and/or IEDs in and near the kill
zone. All SAF orient on identified enemy in their kill zone(s).
When the commander or leader determines that he has achieved the intended effects on the
enemy, he directs exfiltration of his elements and rendezvous at a designated location. Main
defense elements disengage while support elements continue to suppress enemy forces. Security
elements may add their SAF to the suppression. Security and support elements disengage but
may leave observers in the area to continue reporting on actions of the enemy.
Command and Control of an SBP Defense

7-151. The irregular OPFOR commander or leader will position himself where he can best command and
control the defensive fight. Security during defensive preparations includes communications such as
couriers, landline or wire intercommunication systems, visual signals, and limited use of cellular
telephones. Once the irregular OPFOR initiates the defense with direct and indirect fires, communications
make full use of handheld radios and cellular telephone technology.
Support of an SBP Defense

7-152. Support of an SBP defense is typically provided from local resources in the geographic area and
may include CS and/or CSS. While some of this support resides in irregular OPFOR cells or units, a
higher-level organization may temporarily allocated some support or assign it to a particular subordinate
cell or unit.
Reconnaissance
7-153. SBP defenders will perform aggressive counterreconnaissance activities to prevent the enemy from
remaining in reconnaissance contact with the SBP. The irregular OPFOR will observe avenues of approach
to provide early warning; determine location, composition, and disposition of attackers; and direct fires
against key enemy capabilities.

7-154. The irregular OPFOR may occasionally capture armored fighting vehicles or acquire them from
other sources operating in the region. When possessed by the irregular OPFOR, armored fighting vehicles
are normally concealed and covered in hide positions until the commander or leader directs them into the
engagement. Their visible and other signatures are masked to preclude identification by enemy RISTA
systems. Once armored fighting vehicles are employed in defensive actions, they move frequently to
alternate and supplemental fighting positions to improve their survivability.
Fire Support
7-155. Fire support to an SBP or SBPs is usually under the command and control of the commander or
leader responsible for the defensive actions. When additional fire support assets are required in a defensive
7-30 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Functional Tactics
mission, a higher-level organization may allocate assets to a subordinate for a particular mission or on a
temporary basis.
Air Defense
7-156. The irregular OPFOR in an SBP can employ active and passive air defense measures to protect the
defender from air threats within an all-arms air defense concept. Medium or heavy machineguns and
shoulder-fired MANPADS may be found in or near an SBP. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an
Ambush regarding additional air defense assets that may be available.)
7-157. The irregular OPFOR commander or leader is responsible to countermobility and mobility tasks.
He uses the specialized talents that exist among insurgents or guerrillas in a cell or unit but does not have
cells or units structured for only engineer-like tasks.
Logistics
7-158. When present, logistics capabilities will normally be found with the support element, within the
SBP. However, they can also be located in caches and safe houses in or near an SBP. Weapons, munitions,
and materiel will normally be hidden from open surveillance until just prior to a defensive action. Items are
brought from concealment and emplaced in fighting positions on order of the irregular OPFOR commander
or leader.
INFOWAR
7-159. The SBP obtains support from INFOWAR activities that deceive the enemy as to the defenders
presence, actual locations, and/or intentions. A successful INFOWAR campaign can promote the
impression that the enemy to failing to effectively protect its population. Other INFOWAR messages
portray the enemy force and governing authority as a corrupt regime and further isolate them from a
relevant population the irregular OPFOR claims to protect. (See appendix A for additional information on
irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)
DEFENSE OF A COMPLEX BATTLE POSITION

7-160. C3D measures are critical to the success of a CBP, since the defenders generally want to avoid
enemy contact. Additionally, cells or units in a CBP will remain dispersed to negate the effects of precision
ordnance strikes. Generally, once the defense is established, non-combat vehicles will be moved away from
concentrations of personnel to reduce their signature on the battlefield.
7-161. Units defending in CBPs will use restrictive terrain and countermobility efforts to deny the enemy
the ability to easily approach the position. Construction of a CBP places special attention on the
camouflage, concealment, and cover of fighting positions in urban and rural terrain. The irregular OPFOR
normally expects enemy RISTA capabilities to be significant and recognizes that sophisticated RISTA
capabilities may be supporting the enemy. An effective counter to such levels of sophisticated technology
and systems may be to embed a CBP within a relevant population in an urban and/or rural environment.
Examples include the use manmade underground shelters, tunnels, natural shelters such as caves, and/or
village or city dwellings.
7-162. Cultural shielding is a tactical consideration to deny the enemy the ability to detect and attack a
CBP. Examples of cultural shielding in order to create tactical standoff are using a religious location,
school, community center, or medical facility as a base of fire or firing from within a crowd of
noncombatants.
7-163. If a CBP is identified and attacked, the commander or leader will engage only as long as he
perceives an ability to defeat the enemy. Prior to becoming decisively overmatched, he will withdraw in
order to preserve his combat power. A guerrilla commander or leader can be directed by a higher guerrilla
headquarters to accept decisive engagement in order to support a larger mission.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-31

Chapter 7
Functional Organization of a CBP Defense

7-164. The commander or leader of the defending force organizes his subordinates as functional elements.
Typical functional designations are
Disruption element.
Main defense element.
Reserve element.
Support element.
Deception element.
7-165. These functional elements conduct tactical actions very similar to those used in defending an SBP.
That is because the names of these elements identify their basic functions. However, the following
paragraphs highlight some differences. There may be more than one of each type of element.
Disruption Element(s)
7-166. The disruption element of a CBP is primarily concerned detecting attackers and providing
early warning to the defending force. The disruption elements may be directed to only observe and
report enemy movements and maneuver but can also be directed to attack enemy forces once they pass
the disruption elements.
Main Defense Element(s)

7-167. The main defense element of a CBP is responsible for defeating an attacking force. This element
can be directed to delay an enemy while other cells or units withdraw from direct contact with the enemy.
Reserve Element(s)
7-168. The reserve element of a CBP exists to provide the commander or leader with tactical flexibility.
Tasks for a reserve element can include
Counterattack.
Block.
Delay.
Defend.
Support Element(s)
7-169. The support element of a CBP has tasks that include C2, CS, and CSS for the defending force.
Other support functions can include direct and direct fires; countermobility or mobility capabilities; and/or
INFOWAR activities. Support elements typically are located within the CBP but can be outside and in the
vicinity of a CBP.
Deception Element(s)
7-170. To keep the enemy from discovering the nature of the defenses and to draw fire away from actual
elements, the defending force may establish dummy firing positions and battle positions. In addition to
enhancing force protection, the irregular OPFOR may use these deception elements as an economy-of-force
measure to portray strength where none exists.
Organizing the Battlefield for a CBP

7-171. When establishing a CBP, the commander or leader of the defending force specifies the
organization of the battlefield from the perspective of his level of command. He will determine if he
designates a battle zone supported by a disruption zone and support zone. (See figures 7-11 on page 7-33
and 7-12 on page 7-34 for examples of a CBP defense.)
7-32 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Functional Tactics
Battle Zone
7-172. The battle zone is the area where the defending commander commits the preponderance of his
force to the task of defeating attacking enemy forces or delaying them while the defenders withdraw. In the
defense of a CBP, the battle zone is typically the area in and surrounding the CBP that the defending force
can influence with its direct fires. It may be larger depending on the availability of indirect fires.
Disruption Zone
7-173. The disruption zone is the area outside the battle zone where the defenders may seek to
Report on the enemy situation.
Defeat enemy reconnaissance efforts.
Detect attacking forces.
Disrupt and delay an attackers approach.
Destroy key attacking elements prior to engagement in the battle zone.
Support Zone
7-174. The support zone contains C2, CSS, fire support, and other supporting assets. A reserve element
may also be located there. The support zone is normally located within the CBP.
DA Cell DA Cell Suicide
Support Disruption I IED TM
I Element
Observer Mortar SAFE
60-mm I I
DA Cell
Comms &
DA Cell
I Tradecraft Observer
I Extortion
I DA Cell
DA Cell Technical
I Finance I Support
IED DA Cell DA Cell
I Intell Transport DA Cell
I Disruption
Element I
DA Cell
I Planning CACHE Demolitions,
I abotage& IED
DA Cell I TM
DA Cell I INFOWAR DA Cell DA Cell
Main Defense Main Defense Main Defense
I I
Element Element I Element IED
SAFE
I DA Cell
I Multi-Function
IED Reserve
Observer
ENY
LZ ? DA Cell
KILL IED Disruption I
ZONE Element
Observer IED
DA Cell
Disruption IED
Element I
Observer
IED
DA Cell SAFE CACHE
Observer I
I Logistics
Figure 7-11. Insurgent defense of a complex battle position (example)
Executing Defense of a CBP

7-175. The commander or leader will determine whether or not to organize a disruption force in a
disruption zone. He may determine that the manning and capabilities of his organization are more
effectively used with security elements close to the defensive perimeter of the CBP. Whether near or distant
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-33

Chapter 7
from the CBP main defenses, security actions are disruption, active reconnaissance, and
counterreconnaissance. However, contact with the enemy is on order of the commander or leader. The
normal intention is to keep a CBP undiscovered by enemy forces. Working in close coordination with main
defense elements, support capabilities are often incorporated into the CBP.
7-176. A disruption element in the disruption zone can engage enemy forces in tactical depth as they
approach the CBP or CBPs. Direct and indirect fires coordinated by a disruption element can delay and
attrit enemy forces and cause them to enter the attack on a CBP in a piecemeal manner.
7-177. Main defense elements mass direct and indirect fires to defeat an enemy attack. The commander or
leader of the defending force may retain a reserve element and commit it only when necessary to prevent
defeat by enemy forces. Support elements in the support zone provide support to defenders in the disruption
zone and battle zone as required. In the event the commander or leader orders of a withdrawal from the
CBP, some support elements will exfiltrate quickly while other elements such as indirect fires
continue support to the main defense elements until directed to disengage by the commander or leader
and also exfiltrate.
KILL
ZONE
82-mm
IED
G G
PKM
7.62-mm
G
G
60-mm
G G
G
G
KILL
IED ZONE
IED
CSOP
G
Figure 7-12. Guerrilla defense of a complex battle position (example)
Command and Control of a CBP Defense

7-178. The irregular OPFOR leader will position himself where he can best command and control the
defensive fight. C2 of a CBP is generally more difficult than that of an SBP because the defenders may be
more dispersed. Insurgents or guerrillas operating in and from the CBP use secure communications such as
couriers and wire.
7-34 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Functional Tactics
Support of a CBP Defense

7-179. Support of a CBP can be provided from within the local insurgent or guerrilla organization and/or
local resources in the relevant population. Some support may be allocated higher-level irregular OPFOR
organizations or from a state or non-state sponsor. Specialized support such as SPF can be temporarily
associated with insurgents or guerrillas in a CBP in order to provide training, materiel, and/or tactical and
technical advice.
Reconnaissance
7-180. Reconnaissance assets observe avenues of approach key to providing early warning and allow the
commander or leader time to defend or to exfiltrate personnel and resources from the CBP. Insurgents,
guerrillas, and/or their active supporters embed themselves within local populations. The irregular OPFOR
is less likely to engage in counterreconnaissance activities if these actions would reveal CBP location.

7-181. Armored vehicles are not the norm in a CBP. When possessed by the irregular OPFOR, armored
fighting vehicles and ad hoc fighting vehicles mounting heavy weapons are normally concealed and
covered in hide positions. The commander or leader may retain armored vehicles as part of his reserve for
quick response to contingencies in defense of his CBP.
Fire Support
7-182. CBPs are typically self-supporting in their defense. Fire support assets normally locate within the
CBP but may also locate outside of the CBP perimeter to best employ specific fires. Defenders employ
these fires to
Defeat enemy forces in the battle zone.
Attrit enemy forces along avenues of approach near a CBP.
Disrupt enemy use of landing zones in the vicinity of a CBP.
Delay enemy forces to support withdrawal of the irregular OPFOR from the CBP.
Air Defense
7-183. Passive air defense is the norm for a CBP. Active air defense generally involves systems that do
not emit an electromagnetic signature. Insurgents or guerrillas engage aerial targets on order of the
commander or leader. An all-arms air defense concept involves using weapons of all personnel of a CBP to
protect against fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft threats. However, guerrilla battalions typically have a limited
MANPADS capability in their weapons company. When available, shoulder-fired MANPADS would likely
be located in disruption or security element(s) that occupy fighting positions near a CBP oriented on
probable enemy air avenues of approach. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding
additional air defense assets that may be available.)
7-184. The irregular OPFOR conceals fighting and survivability positions using C3D techniques with
locally available resources. Military-manufactured antipersonnel and/or antitank mines and/or IEDs are
emplaced on or near likely enemy avenues of approach. Particular mines and/or IEDs are emplaced
and secured with a cell or unit designated to arm and/or detonate the munition on order of the
commander or leader.
7-185. The irregular OPFOR reinforces urban and/or rural terrain to channel enemy forces into kill zones
on approaches to a CBP. Obstacles are generally more protective in nature than obstacles used near an SBP.
Insurgents or guerrillas may have specialized talents for engineer-like countermobility and mobility tasks.
When supported overtly or covertly by a state sponsor, SPF or regular forces may be associated with an
insurgent or guerrilla organization in order to provide training, materiel, and advice.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 7-35

Chapter 7
Logistics
7-186. Logistics operations of a CBP are generally self-sustaining and blend into the local commerce and
daily operations of a relevant population in the vicinity of the CBP. Provisioning a CBP with regular
resupply is facilitated by active supporters of the insurgent or guerrilla organization. The commander or
leader typically does not coerce local citizens to provide logistics support but can use such extortion when
critical commodities are required to sustain the CBP defense.
7-187. Supply caches and safe houses are distributed throughout the urban or rural area near the CBP.
Other supply caches and safe houses are located within the CBP perimeter.
INFOWAR
7-188. Elements from the CBP may attempt to integrate within any local communities for the purpose of
gathering information, collecting intelligence, and disseminating INFOWAR themes to the local relevant
population. Active supporters of the irregular OPFOR assist the commander or leader in keeping a low
profile. INFOWAR activities may focus on downplaying the existence or significance of the CBP.
Generally, the CBP will not conduct easily detectable INFOWAR activities that would call the enemys attention
to it. (See appendix A for additional information on irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)
7-189. If the presence of a CBP cannot be hidden, INFOWAR may attempt to convince enemy forces that
the defenders are friendly to them. It may attempt to convince leaders of the governing authority that the
insurgents or guerillas are willing to affiliate and/or associate with them in levels of reconciliation. Other
INFOWAR techniques can portray the enemy force and governing authority as a corrupt regime to further
isolate them from the relevant population. The insurgents or guerrillas can claim and demonstrate
themselves to be the populations protector. In some cases, senior irregular OPFOR leaders may conduct
INFOWAR from a CBP to convince followers in other locations that they are still alive and leading their
organizations in the struggle against the enemy. INFOWAR can include support to provide basic social and
civic services to the relevant population that is not being provided by the governing authority.
7-190. Other INFOWAR techniques can result in the gradual acceptance by the relevant population to the
point that members of the insurgent or guerrilla organization become informal or legitimate representatives
in civil governance. This recognition can lead to election in a states formal voting processes and/or
establishing self-proclaimed semi-autonomous enclaves within a state with which the irregular OPFOR is
in conflict. In either case, the irregular OPFOR ensures a significant INFOWAR campaign to weaken
enemy support and strengthen its own support from a relevant population.
IRREGULAR OPFOR IN HYBRID THREAT TACTICS

7-191. The above section of this chapter shows examples of functional tactics in which insurgents and/or
guerrillas employ some of the same types of offensive and defensive actions used by smaller tactical units
of the irregular OPFOR (see TC 7-100.2). However, insurgents and/or guerrillas may also participate in
larger-scale functional tactics when acting as part of the Hybrid Threat (HT). (See TC 7-100 for examples
of such involvement.) They often work closely with SPF units in such roles.
7-192. One would expect the irregular OPFOR to play a relatively minor role in HT tactics, perhaps used
as an economy-of-force measure when regular OPFOR units are not available. However, as examples in TC
7-100 show, insurgents and guerrillas can sometimes do things that regular military units cannot. For
example, they are well suited to dispersed actions as part of a disruption force in a disruption zone (in
offense or defense). However, their small size and ability to blend in with the local population also make it
easier for irregular OPFOR units or cells to infiltrate into enemy-held positions. There, they may serve as
enabling forces or elements, paving the way for exploitation by larger, regular military units, or they may
play key roles as part of an exploitation force or other action force or element that accomplishes the overall
mission of the HT action.
Note. Insurgents, guerrillas, or even criminals can perform acts of terrorism that complement
functional tactics actions separate from or in conjunction with a larger HT force. (See chapter 6
for more details on terrorism.)
7-36 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Appendix A
Information Warfare
The irregular OPFOR (including insurgents, guerrillas, and criminal elements) is trained to
use adaptive techniques to defeat a superior opponent. Naturally it uses information warfare
(INFOWAR) to obtain asymmetrical effects. These tactics are constantly evolving thanks to
the exponential growth of networking and information technology. Increased accessibility to
the Internet, commoditization of information, and unprecedented global awareness provide
the irregular OPFOR with the ability to focus its INFOWAR activities on one of the
enemies greatest weaknesseshis dependence on information communication
technology in every aspect of his operations.
A-1. The irregular OPFOR, along with the regular OPFOR, defines information warfare as specifically
planned and integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times.
Conducted in conjunction with offensive or defensive actions, INFOWAR is designed to exploit the
weaknesses of the opponents information systems.
GOALS
A-2. The primary goals of INFOWAR are to
Influence the enemys decisionmaking through his collected and available information,
information systems, and information-based processes.
Retain the ability to employ friendly information and information-based processes and systems.
TACTICAL TASKS
A-3. The effects of INFOWAR can be multidimensional and at times hard to pinpoint. However, the
irregular OPFOR highlights the following tasks and associated effects as critical to the application of
INFOWAR at the tactical level:
Destroy. Destruction tasks physically render the enemys information systems ineffective.
Destruction is most effective when timed to occur before the enemy executes a command and
control (C2) function or when focused on a resource-intensive target that is hard to reconstitute.
Neutralizing or destroying the opponents information capability can be brought about by
physical destruction of critical communications nodes and links.
Degrade. Degradation attempts to reduce the effectiveness of the enemys information
infrastructure, information systems, and information collection means.
Disrupt. Disruption activities focus on disrupting enemy observation and sensor capabilities at
critical times and locations. Disruption impedes the enemys ability to observe and collect
information and obtain or maintain information dominance.
Deny. Denial activities attempt to limit the enemys ability to collect or disseminate information
on the irregular OPFOR or deny his collection efforts.
Deceive. Deception activities strive to mislead the enemys decisionmakers and manipulate his
overall understanding of OPFOR activities. Deception manipulates perception and causes
disorientation among decisionmakers within their decision cycle.
Exploit. Exploitation activities attempt to use the enemys C2 or reconnaissance intelligence,
surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities to the advantage of the irregular
OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR also uses its various INFOWAR capabilities to exploit any
enemy vulnerability.
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Appendix A
Influence. Influencing information affects an enemys beliefs, motives, perspectives, and

reasoning capabilities, in order to support irregular OPFOR objectives. This may be done
through misinformation or by manipulating or spinning information.
INFOWAR ELEMENTS
A-4. Across the spectrum of competition, conflict, and war, the following elements are integrated when
developing and implementing INFOWAR:
Electronic warfare (EW). Activity conducted to control or deny the enemys use of the
electromagnetic spectrum, while ensuring its use by the irregular OPFOR.
Deception. Measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification
of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.
Physical destruction. Use of all types of weapons and explosives to destroy critical components
of the enemy force, focusing on C2 nodes and RISTA sensors.
Protection and security measures. A wide range of activities (including the elements of
deception and EW) to enhance survivability and preserve combat power.
Perception management. Measures aimed at creating a perception of truth that best suits
Information attack (IA). Intentional disruption or distortion of information in a manner that
supports accomplishment of the irregular OPFOR mission.
Computer warfare. Attacks focused specifically on computer systems, networks, and nodes.
A-5. The seven elements of INFOWAR do not exist in isolation from one another and are not mutually
exclusive. The overlapping of functions, means, and targets requires that they all be integrated into a single,
integrated INFOWAR plan. However, effective execution of INFOWAR does not necessarily involve the
use of all elements concurrently. In some cases, one element may be all that is required to successfully
execute a tactical INFOWAR action. Nevertheless, using one element or subelement, such as camouflage,
does not by itself necessarily constitute an application of INFOWAR.
A-6. The use of each element or a combination of elements is determined by the tactical situation and
support to the overall objective. The size and sophistication of an enemy force also determines the extent to
which the irregular OPFOR employs the various elements of INFOWAR. The commander or leader has the
freedom to mix and match elements to best suit his tactical needs, within the bounds of guidance from
higher authority. The resources and capabilities of the irregular OPFOR, and the appropriateness of the
INFOWAR medium to the target, determine the choices and the extent to which the various INFOWAR
elements are employed and integrated.
TOOLS
A-7. Tools for waging INFOWAR can include, but are not limited to
Conventional physical and electronic destruction means.
Malicious software.
Denial-of-service attacks.
The Internet.
The media.
International public opinion.
Communication networks.
Various types of reconnaissance, espionage, and eavesdropping technologies.
The irregular OPFOR can employ INFOWAR tools from both civilian and military sources and from assets
of third-party actors.
A-8. In some cases, the irregular OPFOR will conduct INFOWAR activities that are criminal in nature.
For example, it may
Use known computer exploitation tactics such as identity theft and industrial espionage.
Sell its computer warfare capabilities to create additional funding for its operations.
A-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Information Warfare
TARGETS
A-9. The OPFOR sees the targets of INFOWAR as an opponents
Decisionmakers.
Weapons and hardware.
Critical information infrastructure.
C2 system.
Information and telecommunications systems.
C2 centers and nodes.
Information links, such as transmitters, communication devices, and protocols, will be targeted. The
irregular OPFOR is extremely adaptive and will employ the best option available to degrade, manipulate,
influence, use, or destroy an information link. See table A-1 for typical examples of INFOWAR objectives
and targets.
Table A-1. INFOWAR elements, objectives and targets
Elements Objectives Targets
Electronic Warfare (EW) Exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the C2 and RISTA assets and
enemys use of the electromagnetic networks.
spectrum.
Deception
Mislead enemy decisionmakers. Key military decisionmakers.
Cause confusion and delays in the
decisionmaking process. General population and
Persuade the local population and/or international media sources and
international community to support Internet sites.
Physical Destruction Destroy the enemys information C2 nodes and links, RISTA
infrastructures. assets, telecommunications, and
power sources.
Protection and Security Protect critical assets. Enemy RISTA assets.

Measures
Perception Management Distort reality or manipulate information to Enemy RISTA assets.

support irregular OPFOR goals.
Local populace and leaders.
Media sources (international and
domestic).
Information Attack (IA) Alter or deny key information. Decisionmakers and other users
of information.
Systems reliant on accurate
information.
Computer Warfare Disrupt, deny, or degrade the enemys C2 and RISTA assets and
computer networks and information flow. networks.
WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY
A-10. To conduct successful action against a more powerful enemy force likely enjoying a technological
overmatch, the irregular OPFOR must exploit windows of opportunity. Sometimes these windows occur
naturally, as a result of favorable conditions in the operational environment (OE). Most often, however, the
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 A-3

Appendix A
irregular OPFOR will have to create its own opportunities. INFOWAR can help create the necessary
windows of opportunity for any type of offensive or defensive action, by executing deception techniques,
EW, perception management, and/or physical destruction.
A-11. Specific INFOWAR activities that can limit enemy force effectiveness can include
Deceiving enemy forces with recurring social and political activities by active supporters of the
irregular OPFOR that appear non-threatening in the vicinity of the targeted objective.
Exploiting enemy information collection with false intelligence provided by active supporters of
the irregular OPFOR and/or insider threats.
Disrupting enemy information collection through coercion and extortion of the relevant
population to not cooperate with enemy forces.
Influencing enemy forces with misinformation and/or manipulated claims against the governing
authority to which the enemy forces belong.
Demonstrating the inability of enemy forces to protect civilians, effectively defend civil and/or
military facilities, and/or safeguard key representatives of the governing authority.
Psychologically isolating the enemy force and governing authority from each other as well as
from a relevant civilian population.
Creating a positive impression of irregular OPFOR actions and objectives among local, regional,
and/or global audiences.
Influencing a local, regional, and/or global audience with near real-time media coverage of
successful irregular OPFOR actions against enemy forces and the governing authority.
Using media releases to indicate the increasing discontent in a relevant population due to the
governing authoritys actions and reactions affecting daily civil commerce and lifestyles.
Using progressive INFOWAR activities to degrade the resolve of the enemy force and governing
authority to continue counterinsurgent, counter-guerrilla, or anti-crime operations.
INFOWAR ORGANIZATIONS
A-12. Various types on non-state actors might be part of the irregular OPFOR, affiliated with it, or support
it in some manner. Even those organizations that do not belong to the irregular OPFOR or support it
directly or willingly could be exploited or manipulated to support its objectives. Irregular INFOWAR
organizations can be semiformal in the case of insurgent organization or ad hoc in informal organizations
such as guerrillas or criminal gangs. In most case, the irregular forces are organized to perform a specific
mission. Their number and size will increase or decrease based on the tactical situation.
A-13. INFOWAR organizations conduct actions either in support of or independent of established irregular
OPFOR units. The determining factors are base on those means that achieve their goals expeditiously.
Note. Special-purpose forces (SPF) can organize, train, and support parts of the irregular
OPFOR (insurgents or guerrillas and possibly even criminal organizations) and conduct
operations in conjunction with them. SPF missions can also include the use of INFOWAR.
A-14. Criminal elements will engage in INFOWAR activities to protect their operations. However, some
criminal organization specialize in INFOWAR and use technology to illegally produce profits either by
acquiring sensitive financial information or by selling hacking services and malware toolkits. (See chapter
4 for more information.) INFOWAR organizations will provide a variety of products and technical
assistance to aligned irregular forces through direct action cells or through specialized INFOWAR cells.
INFOWAR CELLS
A-15. In a local or higher insurgent organization, an INFOWAR cell plans, coordinates, and implements
the organizations INFOWAR plan and provides guidance and assistance to the INFOWAR direct action
cells whenever required. The INFOWAR cell may use a variety of lethal and nonlethal methods to
influence the enemy and the population. Examples of such activities include but are not limited to
Propaganda such as night letters and disinformation campaigns.
A-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Information Warfare
Incentivizing of destabilization activities such as criminal activities.

Assassinations and sabotage.
IED and other terrorist attacks are often used to support the overall INFOWAR plan. These attacks may
also be used in a manner to deceive the enemy and confuse the source of the attacks. The ultimate goal of
the INFOWAR cell is to create and maintain the perception that the enemy cannot provide security and
stability to the population.
A-16. Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, the INFOWAR cell may be
capable of several functions. Multiple functions and activities are necessary if the enemy has mounted his
own INFOWAR campaign. Some example functions performed by the INFOWAR cell are
Media manipulation, psychological warfare (PSYWAR), and public affairs designed to influence
the population.
Communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda videos, broadcast successes of
direct action teams, or printing).
Rumor control (misinformation and disinformation).
Sabotage actions.
Civic actions.
Indoctrination training.
Fund-raising (including international).
Recruiting.
Assistance in cyber-mining for intelligence.
All these functions are integrated to further short- and long-range goals.
INFOWAR DIRECT ACTION CELLS

A-17. An INFOWAR direct action cell supports the insurgent organizations INFOWAR plan and may or
may not receive guidance from the INFOWAR cell. Direct action as the title indicates is the nature of its
objective, purpose, and role. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other terror attacks are often used to
support the overall INFOWAR plan. These attacks may also be used in a manner to shift blame for the
attack to their enemy.
A-18. Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, an INFOWAR direct action
cell may be capable of several functions. Some example functions performed by this cell are
Selective sabotage actions.
Information management
Media manipulation (misinformation and disinformationPSYWAR).
Communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda and indoctrination videos,
broadcast successes of other direct action teams).
Civic actions.
Assistance in the cyber-mining for intelligence.
All of these functions are integrated to further short- and long-range goals.
A-19. Some of the functions may require specialized expertise. For example, the media manipulation
function (PSYWAR) may require expertise and/or advice from a cleric; a political, a tribal, ethic, or
cultural leader; or other experts. Portions of the INFOWAR direct action cell may be dispersed and are
assigned as the mission dictates. When countering the enemys INFOWAR campaign, specific knowledge
of stabilizing factors and systems is required. For example, if the enemy engages in reconstruction efforts
the direct action cell may require specific knowledge to sabotage the operation.
A-20. The mission, combat conditions, and many other variables determine the configuration and
composition of each direct action cell. Direct action cells do not have a fixed structure. Cell composition is
not fixed and varies from cell to cell, mission to mission, and OE to OE. The structure, personnel,
equipment, and weapons mix, all depend on specific mission requirements. Personnel select weapons
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 A-5

Appendix A
appropriate to the mission. Other equipment is added as required, such as computers, computer rigged
vehicles, specialized antennas, and communications. Several members of the direct action cell may be hired
INFOWAR specialists. Some functions can also be performed by personnel outside of the cell. There may
be as few as one INFOWAR direct action cell to over 20 INFOWAR direct action cells, depending on the
mission and other factors. Portions of the INFOWAR direct action cell are probably dispersed.
SUPPORT TO INFOWAR Cells

A-21. Irregular OPFOR organizations at times will compete for limited resources either from their higher
headquarters or from an external supporting state or non-state actors. This competition appears to the
outside observer as disjointed or lacking the discipline needed for unity of effort. However, individual
leaders of the irregular OPFOR are allowed to develop lines of operation as it sees fit given the unique set
of circumstances of its area of responsibility and the means at its disposal. When a particular tactic is
proven to be effective, it will be replicated as necessary in order to exploit success, increase the perception
of legitimacy for the irregular OPFOR cause, and to give the impression of progress. This sort of groping
in the dark for a successful strategy means that the irregular OPFOR is able to experiment to find what
works and to capitalize on effective tactics. The key is to open as many inroads as possible and to increase
the likelihood for windows of opportunity for the irregular OPFOR to exploit the political, economic or
social situation.
A-22. The operational variables will determine whether or not a local area will require all of the elements of
tradecraft for a complete perception management campaign. Important issues such as regional conflicts,
underprivileged and underrepresented populations, and the location of political, commercial or economic
power centers, all have the potential to be targets of an INFOWAR campaign plan. Support may come in
many forms from the general population. Online chat rooms, radio and television opinion shows and
politically motivated groups may all provide support to the INFOWAR mission. As the irregular OPFOR
assess the local environment and the enemys center of gravity is determined, INFOWAR planners will
target select groups, organizations, and individuals for a variety of activities.
A-23. Some INFOWAR missions may require cultural insights, organizational intelligence, and specialized
expertise for use in an INFOWAR campaign. For example, the media manipulation function (PSYWAR)
may require expertise and/or advice from a cleric; a political, a tribal, ethnic, or cultural leader; or other
experts. Other functions could be used to obtain specific technical expertise such as the configuration of
important infrastructure, industrial, economic, and financial systems to develop targets for cyber attack.
INFOWAR activities will leverage the knowledge of individuals employed by these sectors of the
operational environment.
INFOWAR SUPPORT TO IRREGULAR OPFOR

A-24. INFOWAR activities support all of the categories of irregular OPFORinsurgents, guerrillas, and
criminal elements. INFOWAR Cells provide the ways and means to conduct all elements of INFOWAR
activities. INFOWAR actions in the form of perception management or propaganda are designed to garner
support of the population for the irregular OPFOR. By establishing seemingly innocuous activities such as
web logs (blogs) and news outlets, INFOWAR cells can establish inroads for C2 functions, targeting and
other support functions. By targeting an information systems weakest link, (the user), INFOWAR cells can
obtain information that provides inroads for further attacks by the irregular OPFOR or to by components of
the Hybrid Threat. If the current governing authority has control over information technology, INFOWAR
cells can conduct their operations from the sanctuary of a sympathetic nation.
A-25. INFOWAR activities provide support to the irregular OPFOR covertly in both times of peace and
times of war. OPFOR INFOWAR organizations can provide a variety of products and technical assistance
to aligned irregular organizations. INFOWAR cells also provide information technology resources such as
servers and networks to the irregular OPFOR in order to protect INFOWAR activities and disassociate it
from INFOWAR operations.
A-26. Some examples of INFOWAR support
Locations of media outlets and personalities both friendly and enemy.
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Information Warfare
Accepted customs and norms and practices used to foster support for the irregular OPFOR.
Inside access to government, commercial, and financial leaders and institutions that support the
enemy.
Locations of civilian and government communications infrastructure.
Distracting of enemy forces through instantaneous civil disobedience such as flash mobs.
Economic data vital to projecting required resources necessary to establish local rapport.
Established networks for recruiting and mobilization of combatants and noncombatants.
Enemy forces mission command tactics techniques and procedures, and command and control
structure.
A-27. INFOWAR cells provide advisors and technological resources to the irregular OPFOR in either a
covert or clandestine manner depending on the objective. Examples of such support could include either
all or some of the elements of INFOWAR and range from hosting servers and managing networks for
an insurgency or criminal element to supplying software and/or EW equipment to guerrillas for
INFOWAR operations.
A-28. INFOWAR cells may or may not have the necessary resources to conduct research and development
of INFOWAR technologies and to develop mature INFOWAR training and doctrine. In some cases,
commercial-off-the-shelf technology satisfies the requirement for the irregular OPFOR. The INFOWAR
cell may provide funds or equipment such as computers and network equipment, low-power GPS jammers,
or software for use by other insurgents or by affiliated guerrillas or criminals. The benefit of using
commercial information technology is that it is dual purpose and has less chance of raising suspicion when
transporting it.
Perception Management Activities

A-29. Perception management involves measures aimed at creating a perception of truth or stability that
best suits the irregular OPFOR objectives. Perception management integrates a number of widely differing
activities that use a combination of true, false, misleading, or manipulated information. Targeted audiences
range from enemy forces, to the local populace, to world popular opinion. At the tactical level, the irregular
OPFOR seeks to undermine an enemys ability to conduct combat operations through PSYWAR and other
perception management activities aimed at deterring, inhibiting, and demoralizing the enemy and
influencing civilian populations.
A-30. The various perception management activities include efforts conducted as part of
PSYWAR.
Direct action.
Public affairs.
Media manipulation and censorship.
Regional or international recruitment and/or fundraising for affiliated irregular forces.
A-31. Information communications technology and global dissemination of the 24-hour news cycle has
empowered the irregular OPFOR to implement complex perception management activities public affairs to
affect change, garner global support, and generally shape the OE to its purposes. INFOWAR activities
engage in public affairs to involve interest groups and media outlets to gain influence and to obtain their
objectives. The irregular OPFOR can enable political and civic leaders at all levels to engage the population
to accept its ideology and support the irregular OPFOR.
A-32. Although the irregular OPFOR maintains that perception management activities conducted at the
tactical level must be consistent with, and contribute to, the goals of the highest levels of organization,
subordinates are allowed much discretion on the ways and means of achieving their perception
management objectives. For example, forming a partnership with a charitable organization or a local
business leader in order to obtain secure lines of communications, and a recruiting pool would be a natural
extension of the strategy necessary to influence the local populace. If there is a religious or other
ideological approach available, the irregular OPFOR will leverage this to establish drivers of social
mobility such as educational organizations or business alliances. These organizations also provide the
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 A-7

Appendix A
irregular OPFOR a conduit for recruiting, indoctrination, and long-term influence within the target group.
Additionally, the irregular OPFOR has the freedom to provide immediate assistance and disperse funds
without delay during times of crisis or whenever there is an opportunity to meet a particular objective. This
gives the irregular OPFOR the opportunity to be the so called first with the most in the struggle for hearts
and minds.
Psychological Warfare
A-33. PSYWAR is a major contributor to perception management. Targeting the forces of the enemy,
PSYWAR attempts to influence the attitudes, emotions, motivations, aggressiveness, tenacity, and
reasoning of enemy personnel. In addition to the enemys military forces, PSYWAR specialists also
concentrate on manipulating the local population and international media in favor of the irregular OPFOR,
turning opinion against the enemys objectives. Planners focus special emphasis on highlighting enemy
casualties and lack of success. They also highlight enemy mistakes, especially those that cause civilian
casualties or damage civil infrastructure.
A-34. The irregular OPFOR skillfully employs media and other neutral players, such as nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), to further influence public and private perceptions. However, if the irregular
OPFOR perceives the presence of NGOs to be detrimental to its objectives, it can be extremely effective in
hindering their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance, thus discrediting them.
Public Affairs
A-35. Local partnerships and projects are regarded as enhancing the strategic and operational goals of the
irregular OPFOR but are not necessarily prescribed by the higher command. The objective is to provide a
working solution that is culturally acceptable to the target population and does not compromise the core the
irregular OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR seeks to integrate its activities into the target society and does this
by providing the essential services for everyday life. Through cultural acceptance and shared goals,
INFOWAR operators are able to develop trust and loyalty among the society and create opportunity for
future projects and the perception of social mobility. Other examples of grassroots assistance given to a
disenfranchised segment of the population by the irregular OPFOR could include
Establishment or purchase of a local business or industry in order to buy influence, generate
funds for irregular OPFOR activities, and provide access to lines of communications.
Cash payments to victims of both natural and manmade disasters.
Support to religious, educational, or charitable institutions for public relations purposes, and
recruitment.
Provision of public services such as welfare, disaster response, or law and order services in order
to delegitimize the existing government.
Monetary support to religious, political, academic, or business leaders who are willing to support
the irregular OPFOR cause.
Establishing a parallel legal process where the population can obtain a just resolution for
disputes without unwanted corruption by external values.
A-36. If properly employed, the results of perception management activities become ingrained into
everyday life and can be viewed as a positive force to the targeted population. The targeted population gets
the services denied to them by the current governmental structure, while the irregular OPFOR is able to
move freely among the population and establish a support structure for future operations. Perception
management activities are regarded by the enemy as propaganda, despite the fact that the irregular OPFOR
enjoys more influence over the population than the existing government does. The irregular OPFOR is able
to maintain contact with the target population in an overt way that further legitimizes its presence. By
providing opportunities for education, work and charity, the irregular OPFOR receives in return loyalty and
support for its cause. The irregular OPFOR may adopt a long-term strategy that allows it to fully integrate
into all aspects of society. The fact that it administers resources and services that are unavailable to the
targeted population increases its influence and makes affiliation with its cause a desirable goal for the
target population.
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Information Warfare
A-37. Providing footage of perceived abuses of power by the enemy to the public helps INFOWAR
activities make a case for allowing the irregular OPFOR to establish an ideological foothold within the state
and provides the moral support needed to increase the resistance to the government.
Disaster Response
A-38. Response to disaster, whether natural or manmade, is viewed by the irregular OPFOR as another
opportunity to gain influence and support in a region. Human suffering on a large scale sets the conditions
for chaos and an overextension of the states resources. In many regions, disaster-relief services may be
inadequate, and there is usually an inordinate amount of suffering before any assistance becomes available.
Because of its access to resources and support systems that are outside the governments bureaucratic
structure, the irregular OPFOR can enable a more comprehensive response to natural disasters in certain
targeted areas. In some cases, it will augment the current regimes disaster-relief efforts and attempt to
integrate and legitimize its role in assisting the population. In other situations, it will supplant the existing
structure and outperform the competition. The goal is to be the first with the most in terms of aid and
assistance. Disaster response efforts may include
Evacuation of personnel from threatened areas.
Provision of humanitarian relief such as food and temporary shelter.
Long-term plans to rebuild structures destroyed by the disaster.
Cash payments to victims to pay for immediate needs or to compensate a loss.
A-39. The irregular OPFOR can couple these servicesincluding grassroots activism, social services and
disaster responsewith a political message and an intimidating presence. These combined methods allow
the irregular OPFOR to establish its legitimacy, separate its enemies from its friends, and build support
among the population while establishing inroads for future operations.
Media Activities
A-40. Irregular OPFOR will use all available means to exploit the media. These include both traditional
forms such as television and newspaper outlets and as new media such as social networks and other
computerized outlets. Benefits to the irregular OPFOR include the ability to connect with sympathizers for
recruiting and resourcing, channeling responses through emotive themes, and promulgating a narrative of
events that is more conducive to its objective.
A-41. The barriers to obtaining and using the media have diminished significantly with the ubiquitous
expansion of the Internet. Media resources are no longer restricted to a limited number of corporations or
individuals. Individuals with the technical knowledge can leverage a variety of commercially available
technologies and reach a large audience. In some cases video releases or newscasts produced exclusively
within the new media are used by traditional media outlets and are given more attention than the official
account of events. Unburdened by a multi-step approval process, irregular OPFOR can manipulate the
media to their political and military advantage. Oftentimes it is not the most accurate or properly vetted
message that attracts attention, but rather the first to hit the media.
A-42. Having the ability to appeal or relate to the broadest possible audience within the cultural context of
the OE, means that the irregular OPFOR has an intimate understanding of the target audience including
social and cultural factors such as race issues, economic status and education levels.
A-43. The irregular OPFOR uses its knowledge of technology and culture to craft a message that is both
targeted and suggestive. It also uses media operations as a front for reconnaissance and intelligence
operations. Some of the techniques available to the irregular OPFOR are
Producing pamphlets, signs, and banners to spread their message usually through the use of
images for illustration.
Using radio television and other media in a fashion that exploits freedom of speech laws in order
to operate on the fringe of social norms without being illegal.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 A-9

Appendix A
Computer Warfare Information Attack

A-44. OPFOR information warfare (INFOWAR) units engage in a combination of computer warfare,
information attack and perception management to establish and maintain information dominance in
cyberspace by using both direct and indirect attacks on their adversarys computer networks, information
systems and online media. Computer warfare and information attack targets both the networks and the
information enemy elements of national power need to function daily basis and conduct warfare.
INFOWAR brings to bear the information oriented elements of national power to decisively defeat
the enemy.
A-45. The complex nature of the information environment provides the conditions for both direct and
indirect INFOWAR attacks and presents an opportunity for INFOWAR tactics and techniques to augment
traditional military operations at all levels of command from tactical to the strategic. Modern militaries
rely on information systems and automation as well as worldwide connectivity to project power on a global
scale. These information systems are used in command and control; logistics support; surveillance and
reconnaissance; and for global positioning and navigation satellites which provide both navigation and
precision targeting data.
A-46. The direct approach to INFOWAR is a concerted operation designed to attack a specific target
whether it is key infrastructure, a civil institutions databases or critical command and control nodes. While
the indirect approach could involve the constant probing of the adversarys weaknesses and multiple
limited engagements designed to wear down electronic defenses, win decisively in the propaganda
campaign, or to identify vulnerabilities for future operations.
Providing Computer Warfare Tools and Services

A-47. Hosting services are the key to supporting INFOWAR activities in cyberspace. The INFOWAR unit
provides access for a variety of services and is a clearing house for exchanging successful techniques and
data on potential targets in chat rooms and on blogs. The irregular OPFOR can use these services to email
or embed links to servers outside the area of operations that can be used for recruiting, exchanging
intelligence and propaganda, and launching attacks.
A-48. Propaganda is still a key component of the INFOWAR campaign. Redirecting Internet users to
OPFOR themed websites will have the effect of not only spreading the irregular OPFORs message but
giving the enemy and his supporters the impression that the irregular OPFOR has compromised every
aspect of his society.
Developing Paralell Networks

A-49. Providing to the irregular OPFOR a C2 network is an effective way for the INFOWAR activity to
maintain situational awareness and gather intelligence on the states infrastructure and elements of power.
A dedicated communications network can also be used to recruit and mobilize large groups for specific
actions such as rallies, protests, riots, or attacks.
A-50. The irregular OPFOR posing as commercial or humanitarian venture, such as an NGO, a legitimate
business, or another noncombatant entity, can establish network connectivity in a contested area of interest.
This can be accomplished at another level by providing telecommunications infrastructure and switching
equipment to the states telecommunications company with embedded backdoor access to the input-output
systems of the equipment.
A-51. This will give the INFOWAR activity free access to important elements of the nations
telecommunications network. In other cases, after hostilities have begun, telecommunications equipment
can be replaced or reconfigured after a key node is physically seized and repurposed for manipulation and
use by the irregular OPFOR.
A-52. The irregular OPFOR has the ability to seize enemy civil telecommunications infrastructure and use
it for their purposes. Existing switching equipment can be integrated with that of their own and used with
existing lines and wireless towers to extend the range and services for the irregular OPFOR C2 network.
Once implemented the irregular OPFOR can commercialize its services. As more subscribers are added, the
A-10 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Information Warfare
network becomes a source of intelligence by logging calls made and received by persons of interest. It can
also be a source of revenue to fund future actions.
SPF and INFOWAR

A-53. INFOWAR capabilities provide clear advantages for SPF missions, due to the fact that SPF will
always conduct missions in small teams or detachments and will use INFOWAR capabilities and
techniques to maximize the effectiveness of their small numbers. INFOWAR capabilities have the potential
to increase situational awareness, facilitate deception, and disrupt the enemys decision making process.
A-54. SPF conducts an array of operations in support of the INFOWAR plan. Examples include
Perception Management.
Diversionary Measures.
Sniper.
Indirect Fire.
Air Defense (denial of airspace and enemy claims of air supremacy and/or superiority).
Electronic Warfare.
Note. SPF can recruit, organize, train, advise, and support local insurgents or guerrillas and
possibly even criminal organizations and conduct (or lead) operations in conjunction with them.
SPF personnel may fight alongside such affiliates or assist them to prepare for offensive actions,
diversionary measures, INFOWAR activities or other missions. In some cases, the SPF will not
only advise and assist but actually control (command) the irregular forces as a surrogate force.
SPF missions (and those of their affiliates or surrogates) can include the use of terror tactics. See
TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 7 INFOWAR, and Chapter 15Special Purpose
Forces for more information.
A-55. The nature of the shared goal or interest determines the tenure and type of relationship and the degree
of affiliation. For example, the affiliation of an SPF detachment with criminal (or guerrilla) organizations is
dependent only on the needs of the criminal (or guerrilla) organization or on the needs of the SPF at a
particular time. The relational dynamics of SPF units are very fluid and apt to change from one day to
the next. Shifts in affiliations may in turn cause adjustments in the SPF task organization to
accommodate these changes.
Direct Action Team

A-56. A Direct Action Team is embedded in most INFOWAR units to provide support to the PSYWAR
company. The teams specialize in infantry antiarmor style attacks; antiarmor ambushes; hit-and-run attacks
against armored and/or hardened or rear area targets. Usually one Direct Action Teams, each broken into
three attack elements of 4 persons each. The teams will probably be supported or augmented by different
types of SPF specialty teams such as Sniper Teams or Sapper Teams. The SPF Teams (UAV) may be used
to acquire reconnaissance information on targets or facilities.
A-57. SPF team members are cross-trained in the use of all equipment, weapons, and vehicles assigned to
the company. The equipment and weapons mix is determined by the mission. SPF Soldiers speak several
languages and are able to interact with the local populace for perception management and or PSYWAR missions.
All SPF teams may be augmented by other SPF personnel, weapons, and/or equipment. The team serves as a
standard SPF Team when not required for INFOWAR.
A-58. The SPF team leader coordinates all combat activities as well as reconnaissance and jamming
activities, operations, employment, monitoring, direction finding, collection, and reporting. This includes
GSR, sensor sets, remote sensor monitoring, and observation.
Signal Team
A-59. A single small SPF signal team can provide long-range communications support for guerrilla units up
to battalion size. A full SPF signal team can do the same for a brigade-size unit. Teams can also support
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 A-11

Appendix A
insurgent operations. This team may also serve in a signals reconnaissance collection role. In the collection
role, the signal equipment is exchanged one-for-one with communications intercept and direction finding
equipment. Each team then becomes a communications intercept and direction finding unit.
Sniper Team
A-60. The snipers (7.62-mm or .50 cal) in each attack element provide covering fires. The 35-mm AGL-L
and the 7.62-mm GP MG engage personnel when they exit the armored vehicles, pin down the supporting
infantry allowing the ATGM/ATGL gunner to engage the armored vehicle. and provide covering fires for
the ATGM and ATGL gunners. Sniper operations are useful to create hesitancy among enemy forces and to
disrupt the enemy decision making process by forcing enemy commanders to account for sniper counter
sniper operations.
A-12 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Glossary
SECTION I ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AKO Army Knowledge Online
AOR area of responsibility
AP antipersonal
AR Army regulation
AT antitank
ATGL antitank grenade launcher
ATGM anitiank guided missile
AUTL Army Universal Task List
BP battle position
C2 command and control
C3D camouflage, cover, concealment, and deception
CBP complex battle position
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
CI counterintelligence
CP comand post
CR counterreconnaissance
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
DA direct action
DODD Department of Defense Directive
EFP explosive formed projectile
EW electronic warfare
FM field manual
G guerrilla [in guerrilla unit symbol]
GANG criminal (generic) [in crimainal organization symbol]
GPS global positioning system
HEAT high explosive antitank
HK hunter-killer
HRO humantarian relif organization
HT Hybrid Threat
HUMINT human intelligence
HVT high-value target
I insurgent [in insurgent organization symbol]
IA information attack
IED improvised explosive device
INFOWAR information warfare
INS internal security
ISF internal security forces
JP joint publication
km kilometer(s)
LNG liquefied natural gas
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 Glossary-1

Glossary
LOC line of communications

LVCG live, virtual, constructive, and gaming
LZ landing zone
MANPADS man-portable air defense system
m meter(s)
mm millimeter(s)
MRL multiple rocket launcher
NGO nongovernmental organization
OE operational environment
OP observation post
OPFOR opposing force (AR 350-2)
OPSEC operational security
PSC private security contractor
PMESII-PT political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical
environment, and time
PSYWAR psychologcial warfare
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
RISTA reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
SAF small arms fire
SAM surface-to-air missile
SATCOM satellitte communications
SBP simple battle position
SIGINT signals intelligence
SPF special-purpose forces
SSM surface-to-surface missile
SVIED suicide vest improvised explosive device
SVBIED suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device
TC training circular
TCP traffic control post
TIC toxic industrial chemical
TIM toxic idustrial material
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command [US Army]
TRISA TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity [US Army]
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
US United States
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UJTL Universal Joint Task List
UN United Nations
VBIED vehicle borne improvised explosive device
WMD weapon of mass destruction
Glossary-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Glossary
SECTION II TERMS
adherent
An individual or one or more unit, organization, or cell that forms collaborative relationships with, acts
on behalf of, or is otherwise inspired, without any requirement of allegiance to another organization, to
take action in support of the goals and objectives of another irregular force [such as al-Qaidathe
organization and the ideologyincluding support and/or acts of violence]. (As adapted for TC 7-100.3
from U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism)
affilitate
An individual or one or more unit, organization, or cell that aligns with another individual, unit,
organization, or cell to influence, support, and/or act in concert with for mutual benefit. No command
relationship exists necessarily between an affiliate and the unit, organization, or cell in whose area of
responsibility it operates; however, localized operations of the affiliate may support the area, regional,
or global agenda of an organization [such as al-Qaida]. Affiliates are typically nonmilitary or
paramilitary individuals or groups. In some cases, affiliated forces may receive support from regular
military forces as part of an agreement under which they cooperate. (As adapted for TC 7-100.3 from
U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism)
antiterrorism
Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to
include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 3-07.2)
ambush
A surprise attack from a concealed position used against moving or temporarily halted targets in order to
destroy or capture personnel and/or supplies; harrass and demoralize the enemy; delay or block movement
of personnel and supplies; and/or canalize enemy movements. (TC 7-100.2)
area defense
A defensive operation designed to achieve tactcial decision by forcing the enemys offensive
operations to culminate before the enemy can achieve his objective, and/or by denying the enemy his
objectives while preserving combat power until decision can be achieved through strategic operations
and operational mission accomplishment. (TC 7-100.2)
area of reposnibility
The geographical area and associated airspace, as defined by the Opposing Force (OPFOR), within
which a commander has the authority to plan and conduct combat operations. An AOR is bounded by a
limit of responsibility (LOR) beyond which the organization may not operate or fire without
coordination through the next-higher headquarters. AORs may be linear or nonlinear in nature. Linear
AORs may contain subordinate nonlinear AORs and vice versa. (TC 7-100.2)
assault
An attack that destroys an enemy force through firepower and the physical occupation and/or
destruction of the enemy position. (TC 7-100.2)
attack
An offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both
destroys or defeats enemy forces and seizes and secures terrain. (TC 7-100.2)
battle
A battle consists of a set of related engagements that last longer and involve larger forces than an
engagement. (ADRP 3-90)
battle positon
A defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of approach. (TC 7-100.2)

Glossary
combating terrorism
Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and
counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to
oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CbT. See antiterrorism and
counterterrorism. (See also JP 3-26)
complex battle position
A defensive location designed to employ a combination of complex terrain, C3D, and engineer effort
to protect the unit(s) within it from detection and attack while denying their seizure and occupation by
the enemy. (TC 7-100.2)
condition
Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is
expected to operate and may affect performance. See also joint mission-essential tasks. (JP 1-02)
counterterrroism
Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to
terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 3-26)
deception
Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence
to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (JP 1-02; JP 3-13.4)
enemy
A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADRP 3-0) [The enemy in
the context of TC 7-100.3 is any hostile party to the irregular opposing force (TC 7-100.3)]
enemy combatant
In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an
armed conflict. The term enemy combatant includes both lawful enemy combatants and unlawful
enemy combatants. (U.S. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2310.01E, The Department of
Defense Detainee Program, September 5, 2006)
engagement
A tactical conflict, usually between opposing, lower echelon maneuver forces. (ADP 3-0)
guerrilla
A typically indigenous individual within a irregular unit structure organized along military lines in
order to conduct military and paramilitray operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. TC 7-
100.3 typically identifies guerrillas within the context of guerrilla units. [As adapted to TC 7-100.3
from JP 1-02/No approved JP 1-02 definition]
guerrilla force
A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct
military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 1-02; JP 3-05)
hybrid threat
The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all
unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects. (ADRP 3-0; see also TC 7-100)
improvised explosive device
A weapon that is fabricated or emplaced in an unconventional manner incorporating destructive, lethal,
noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate, harass, deny
mobility, or distract. Also called IED. (JP 1-02)
information operations
The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network
operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with
specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human
and automated decision making while protecting the irregular opposing force human and automated
decision making. Also called IO. [As adapted for TC 7-100.3 from JP 3-13]

Glossary
intergovernmental organization
An organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or
functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. (ADRP 3-0)
irregular forces
Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal
security forces. (JP 1-02; JP 3-24)
irregular warfare
A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant
population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full
range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversarys power, influence, and will. (JP 1-02)
insurgent
An individual organized within an irregular insurgent organization structure that uses subversion
and/or violence in order to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. TC 7-100.3 typically
identifies insurgents within the context of cells. [As adapted for TC 7-100.3 from JP 1-02 and
JP 3-24/no approved JP 1-02 defintion.]
kill zone
A designated area on the battlefield where the opposing force (OPFOR) plans to destroy an enemy
using obstacles and massed fires of direct and indirect weapon systems. (TC 7-100.2) [As adapted for
TC 7-100.3 from FM 3-21.8, ATTP 3-06.11, ATTP 3-21.9.]
lawful enemy combatant
Lawful enemy combatants, who are entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions, include
members of the regular armed forces of a State party to the conflict; militia, volunteer corps, and
organized resistance movements belonging to a State party to the conflict, which are under responsible
command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide
by the laws of war; and members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an
authority not recognized by the detaining power. (Department of Defense Directive (DODD)
2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program, 5 September, 2006)
maneuver defense
A defensive operation designed to achieve tactcial decision by skillfully using fires and manuever to
destroy key enemy elements of the enemys combat system and deny enemy forces their objective,
while preserving the friendly force. (TC 7-100.2)
militia
An organization which generally refers to citizens trained as soldiers (as opposed to professional
soldiers), but applies more specifically to a state-sponsored militia that is part of the states armed
forces but subject to activation only in an emergency. To avoid confusion, the TC 7-100 series uses
militia typically in the latter sense. Irregular forces might be referred to or declare itself as a militia;
however, the term militia is not typically used to describe gurrilas, insurgents, or criminals associated
with opposing forces. (TC 7-100.2; TC 7-100; TC 7-100.3)
mercenary
An individual who acts individually or acts a member of a formed group and volunteers from
recruitment locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; is operating directly in the
hostilities; is motivated by the desire for private gain, are promised, by or on behalf of a party to the
conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to the combatants of
similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party; is neither a national of a party to the
conflict nor residents of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; is not a member of the armed
forces of a party of the conflict; and, is not on official military duty representing a country that is not
involved in the conflict such as a legitimate loan service or training appointment between. (Geneva
Conventions IV)
nongovernmental organization
A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or
promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and

Glossary
conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.
NGO. (JP 3-08)
objective
The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. A location
on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide
for unity of effort. (ADRP 1-02)
operational area security
A form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces. Forces engaged in area security
operations focus on the force, installation, route, area, or asset to be protected. (ADRP 3-37)
operational environment
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)
operational variables
Those interrelated aspects of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that differ
from one operational environment to another and define the nature of a particular operational
environment. The eight operational variables are political, military, economic, social, information,
infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) (ADRP 3-0)
opposing force
A plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities
of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing US forces
(AR 350-2).
paramilitary
An irregular individual belonging to forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any
country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. [As adapted for TC 7-
100.3 from JP 1-02 and JP 3-24]
paramilitary forces
Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in
organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02; JP 3-24)
procedure
Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks. See also tactics; techniques.
(JP 1-02)
propaganda
Any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to
influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor,
either directly or indirectly. (JP 1-02)
protection
The preservation of the effectiveness of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel,
equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the
boundaries of a given operational area. (ADRP 3-37)
raid
An attack against a stationary target for the purpose of its capture or destruction that culminates in the
wihdrawal of the raiding dorce to safe territory. (TC 7-100.2)
reconnaissance attack
A tactical offensive action that locates moving, dispersed, or concealed enemy elements and either
fixes or destroys them; and/or gain information about the enemys location, dispositons, military
capabilities, and/or intentions. (TC 7-100.2)

Glossary
red team
An organizational element comprised of trained and educated members that provide an independent
capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the operational
environment and from the perspective of adversaries and others. (JP 1-02)
resistance movement
An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established
government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. (JP 1-02; JP 3-05)
risk management
The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making
decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. (JP 1-02)
rules of engagement
Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations
under which [United States] forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces
encountered. Also called ROE (JP 1-04; ADRP 3-0)
simple battle position
A defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach. (TC 7-100.2)
standard
A satisfactory level of performance for a task and condition for each individual and collective task to
ensure that the individual or organization meets mission requirements. When no standard exists, the
commander or organizational leader establishes a standard and the next higher commander or leader
approves it. All training conducted by the unit, organization, or cell is assessed against the
commanders or leaders intent for the training event, mission, and/or published doctrinal standards.
See also TC 7-101, Appendix A. [As adapted for TC 7-100.3 from ADP 7-0]
tactics
The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. See also procedures;
techniques. (JP 1-02)
task-organizing
The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and
composition to meet a unique task or mission. (ADRP 3-0)
techniques
Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks. See also procedures;
tactics. (JP 1-02 )
terrorist
An individual who commits unlawful acts of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce
governments and societies in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. TC 7-100.3
typically identifies terrorists in the context of cells. [As adapted to TC 7-100.3 from JP 1-02/no
approved JP 1-02 defintion.]
terrorism
The use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to
intimidate governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other
ideological beliefs and committed to the pursuit of goals that are usually political. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.2)
threat
Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm the United
States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADRP 3-0) Note. Irregular opposing
forces can apply this definition to actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm
irregular opposing force goals and objectives.
threat analysis
In antiterrorism, a continual process of compiling and examining all available information concerning
potential terrorist activities by terrorist groups which could target a facility. A threat analysis will

Glossary
review the factors of a terrorist group's existence, capability, intentions, history, and targeting, as well
as the security environment within which friendly forces operate. Threat analysis is an essential step in
identifying probability of terrorist attack and results in a threat assessment. See also antiterrorism.
(JP 1-02) Note. Irregular opposing forces can apply this definition to actors, entities, or forces that
have the capability and intent to harm irregular opposing force goals and objectives.
traditional warfare
A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the
objective is to defeat an adversarys armed forces, destroy an adversarys war-making capacity, or
seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversarys government or policies. (DOD
Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW), December 1, 2008)
transnational threat
Any activity, individual, or group not tied to a particular country or region that operates across
international boundaries and threatens [United States] national security interests. (JP 3-26) Note.
Irregular opposing forces can apply this definition to actors, entities, or forces that have the capability
and intent to harm irregular opposing force goals and objectives.
unconventional warfare
A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly
conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped,
supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source, and includes but is not limited
to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted
recovery. (JP 1-02)
unlawful enemy combatant
Persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United States or its
coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict. For purposes of
the war on terrorism, the term unlawful enemy combatant is defined to include, but is not limited to, an
individual who is or was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. (Department of Defense
Directive (DODD) 2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program, September 5, 2006)
weapon of mass destruction
Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or
causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such
means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 3-40) Note. WMD
effects can be caused by other means such as high-yield or low-yield explosives.

References
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
ADP 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics. 24 September 2013.
ADP 7-0. Training Units and Developing Leaders, 23 August 2013.
ADRP 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics. 24 September 2013.
AR 350-2. Opposing Force Program. 9 April 2004.
DOD MIL-STD-2525-C. Common Warfighting Symbology. 17 November 2008.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Available online at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.
TC 7-100. Hybrid Threat. 26 November 2010.
TC 7-100.2. Opposing Force Tactics. 9 December 2011.
TC 7-101. Exercise Design. 26 November 2010.
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.
ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.
ADRP 3-05. Special Operations. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.
ADRP 6-22. Army Leadership. 1 August 2012.
AR 11-33. Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP). 17 October 2006.
AR 381-11. Intelligence Support to Capability Development. 26 January 2007.
ATTP 3-06.11. Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. 10 June 2011.
ATTP 3-21.9. SBCT Infantry Platoon and Squad. 8 December 2010.
DODD 2310.01E. The Department of Defense Detainee Program. 5 September 2006.
DODD 3000.07. Irregular Warfare. 1 December 2008.
FM 3-21.8 The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 28 March 2007.
FM 3-22. Army Support to Security Cooperation. 22 January 2013.
FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. 15 December 2006.
FM 3-24.2. Tactics in Counterinsurgency. 21 April 2009
FM 3-37.2. Antiterrorism. 18 February 2011.
FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 27 February 2009.
FM 7-100.1, Opposing Force Operations. 27 December 2004.
FM 7-100.4, Opposing Force Organization Guide. 3 May 2007.
Geneva Conventions. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Geneva_conventions-1949.html
JP 3-05. Special Operations. 18 April 2011
JP 3-07.2. Antiterrorism. 24 November 2010.
JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011.
JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012.
JP 3-13.4. Military Deception, 26 January 2012.
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 References-1

References
JP 3-24. Counterinsurgency Operations. 5 October 2009.

JP 3-26. Counterterrorism. 13 November 2009.
JP 3-40. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 10 June 2009.
Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) [Database with Conditions Version 7.1.] 17 July 2012.
U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/06/29/fact-sheet-national-strategy-counterterrorism
DEPARTMENT OF ARMY FORMS

DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site (www.apd.army.mil).
DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
References-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Index
Entries are by paragraph number unless page (p.) or pages (pp.) is specified. After a
page reference, the subsequent use of paragraph reference is indicated by the
paragraph symbol ().
cadre, 2-36 immediate leaders, 4-44

A camera operator, 2-119, 5-93 passive supporter, 4-47
action element, 7-4 CBRN, 6-112 senior leaders, 4-41
action force, 7-4 cellular structure, 2-72, 2-73 cult, 1-53
action function, 7-1 1 child combatant, 6-91 cyber attack, 6-108
actions on objective, 6-27 civil affairs cell, 2-155 cyber crime, 4-81
active supporter, 1-57, 2-41 clan, 1-21, 2-43
adaptive, 2-19 clandestine, 2-34, 3-28, 6-129 D
adherent, 6-4, 6-130 clearing element, 7-6 deception elment, 7-170
adversary, 1-6, 1-64, 6-8 coalition, 1-67 deception force, 7-7
advisor, 2-29 combat service support, 7-50 deception, 1-40, 6-39,
affiliation, 1-10, 1-57, 2-48, 3-2. combat support, 7-57 defensive action, 3-181, 6-41,
3-13, 4-8, 5-66, 6-124 command and control, 2-10, 7-122
air defense, 7-42 3-1, 4-40 demolition, sabotage, and IED
all-arms air defense, 7-89 compare and contrast table: team, 2-124
allegiance, 1-56, 2-43, 5-10 communications, p.1-17 diaspora, 1-25, 1-601-63
ambush, 6-80, 7-11 composition, p.1-16 direct action cell, 2-11, 2-64,
annihilation ambush, 7-11, disposition, p. 1-16 2-70, 2-71, 2-75 2-81,
7-21 equipment, p.1-16 assassination cell, 2-84
containment ambush, 7-11, finances, p.1-17 extortion cell, 2-90
7-31 interal security, p. 1-17 INFOWAR cell, 2-117, A-15
harrassment ambush, 7-11, organization-structure, kidnapping cell, 2-90
7-26 p. 1-16 mortar cell, 2-99
antitank battery, 3-80 personnel, p. 1-16 multifunction cell, 2-81
antitank platoon, 3-123 recruitment, p. 1-16 rocket cell, 2-99
anxiety, 6-39, 6-55, 6-75 terrorism, p. 1-17 sniper cell, 2-84
area of operations (AOR), 3-2 training, p. 1-17 dispersion, 6-87
armed combatant, 5-1, 5-10, uniforms, p. 1-16 disruption element, 7-134
5-90 weapons, p. 1-16 disruption force, 7-2, 7-7
armor, 2-62, 7-110, 7-181 complex battle position, disruption zone, 7-145
arms trafficking, 4-73 7-122, 7-124, 7-126 drug trade, 4-76
arson, 4-63, 6-59 complex terrain, 7-59
assassination, 4-69, 6-83 E
computer crime, 4-85 economic disruption, 6-137
assault, 7-46 computer fraud, 4-90
assault element, 7-48 element, 7-1
computer warfare, A-44 enabling element, 7-6
association, 1-57, 2-43, 2-49, corporate organization, 5-25
2-61, 3-11, 3-174, 4-30 enabling force, 7-6
counterintelligence, 2-41, 2-53, enabling function, 7-6, 7-75
attack, aerial, 6-49 2-112,
attack maritime, 6-47 enemy, 6-5
counterreconnaissance, 7-153, engineer, 3-97, 7-43
attack on land, 6-45 7-175, 7-180 escape and exploitation, 6-29
B courier, 3-88, 3-145, 4-14, 5-93 exploitation force, 7-192
base camp, 3-313-37 criminal activity, 1-73, 4-2 exploitation, 6-29
battle position, 7-124 criminal network, 4-30 explosively formed projectile,
battle zone, 7-144 criminal organization, 4-4, 6-67
bombing, 6-63 4-30 external state, 1-8, 1-64, 5-54
transnational organization, external support, 1-71
breach, 7-77, 7-90 4-36
bribery, 4-62 extortion, 2-90
criminal, 1-56, 2-73,
C 4-1 F
cache, 7-91 field operatives, 4-46 faith system, 1-52, 2-43
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 Index-1

Index
finance, 2-39, 2-90 6-104, 7-45, 7-66, 7-92, non-state, 1-681-71

finance cell, 2-138 7-120, 7-159, 7-188,
fire support, 7-40 A-1 O
fixing element, 7-7 insider threat, 5-88, 6-99, A-11 objectives, irregular OPFOR
fixing force, 7-7 insurgents, 1-48, 2-1 1-12, 1-39
flexibility 7-8 insurgent irregular OPFOR, offensive action, 2-180,
forces, 7-1 2-1 3-178, 6-43, 7-9
fraud, 4-52 insurgent organization, 2-1 OPFOR, p. vii 1, p. vi 1
functional tactics, 1-18, 1-72, higher insurgent opposing forces, p. vii 1
p.7-1 1 organization, 2-48
fundamentalist, 1-52 local insurgent organization, P
2-13, 2-64 paramilitary, p. vii 4 , 1-2,
G insurgents-criminals,1-77, 6-76
gambling, 4-57 1-23, 2-43, 3-1, 4-1, 5-2
intelligence cell, 2-105
gang, 4-4, 4-27 passive supporter, 2-27, 2-44
internal security forces, 1-11,
Geneva Conventions, 5-4 2-12, 5-32, 6-3 perception management,
governing authority, 1-21 irregular forces, p. viii-ix 1-30, 2-37, 4-110, A-29
government-in-exile, 2-6, 2-32, irregular OPFOR, 1-1,1-9, planning cell, 2-115
2-37 p.7-1 2 PMESII-PT, 1-20
guerrilla, 1-471-48, 3-1 irregular warfare, p. vii 4, political, 1-21
guerrilla battalion, 3-107 military, 1-23
guerrilla brigade, 3-23, 3-46 economic, 1-26
guerilla company, 3-150 J social, 1-28
guerrilla company, hunter- killer, information, 1-30
3-163 K infrastructure, 1-32
guerrilla force, 2-22-3, 3-1 kidnapping, 4-65, 6-75 physical environment, 1-33
guerrilla hunter-killer group, L 1-34
3-170 time, 1-36
guerrilla platoon, 3-159 law enforcement agencies, 1-5 political advisor, 2-33, 2-37,
guerrilla scouts, 3-169 legitimacy, 1-7, 5-6, 6-5 2-56, 3-57, 3-114,
guerrilla squad, 3-160 local insurgent organization principles [OPFOR], 1-38
guerrilla unit, 2-65, 2-72, 3-1 2-64 adaptability, 1-44
logistics, 1-71, 3-21 concentration, 1-45
logistics cell, 2-134 deception, 1-40
H initiative, 1-39
hierarchical organization, 1-68 M mobility, 1-43
hijacking, 2-90, 4-64, 6-71 main defense element,, perseverance, 1-46
hoax, 6-55 7-132, 7-167 protection, 1-42
hostage taking, 4-67, 6-78 main defense force, 7-5 surprise, 1-41
higher insurgent organization, MANPADS squad, 3-126 private security company, 4-15
2-48 media activities, 6-136, A-40 private security contractor,
human shield, 6-89 media manipulation, 2-96, 5-13
human trafficking, 4-74 2-117, 5-41,6-30 protected element, 7-7
humanitarian, 2-16, 5-9 media organization, 5-42 protected force, 7-7
hunter-killer, 3-42 media personnel, 5-37 psychologcial techniques, 1-16
Hybrid Threat tactics, 5-188 medical cell, 2-157 psychologcial warfare, 1-6,
Hybrid Threat, 1-1, 2-5, medical section, 3-103 5-21, A-16, A-33
3-10, 6-3, 7-191 mercenaries, 1-71, 6-3 public affairs, A-35
militia, 3-44, 4-13, 5-31
I mortar battery, 3-69 Q
independent, 1-51, 2-4, 3-2 mortar platoon, 3-119
independent actor, 1-51, 6-4, motivations, 1-47, 4-19, 5-5, R
6-130 5-775-78, 6-6, 6-121, A-33 raid, 1-83, 6-80, 7-67
infiltrate, 3-185, 6-6, 7-192 multile rocket launcher raiding element, 7-5,
information warfare cell, 2-96, platoon, 3-75, 3-121 7-70
2-117 reconnaissance, 2-205, 3-58,
information, 1-30 3-90, 7-37, 7-62, 7-84,
elements, A-4 N 7-108
objectives, A-9 nationalistic, 1-50, 1-61, 2-149 reconnaissance attack, 7-94
tactical tasks, A-3 network organization,2-49,4-12 reconnaissance company, 3-90
targets, A-9 noncombatant, 5-1 reconaissance element, 7-7
tools, A-7 nongovernmental organization, reconnaissance force, 7-7
INFOWAR, 1-30, 2-117, 5-56 reconnaissance platoon, 3-128
Index-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Index
recruiting cell, 2-147 subversion, 1-21, 2-1, 4-3 transnational affiliate, 6-128
recruitment, 2-14, 6-94 suicide attack, 6-106 transnational corporation, 5-84
regular forces, 1-22 support element, 7-19, 7-50 transnational network, 1-68
regular OPFOR, 1-10 support force, 7-7 transportation cell, 2-152
regulated military forces, 1-5, support zone, 7-143, 7-147 tribe, 1-50
5-4 supporting cell, 2-18, 2-73
rehearsal, 6-24 surprise, 1-41, 6-39
relevant population, 1-6, 1-21 surveillance, 2-41, 3-129,
4-50, 5-3, 6-22 U
6-145 surveillance, pre-attack, 6-22
reserve element, 7-140 unarmed combatant, 5-1, 5-92
swarming, 1-45, 3-188
rocket launcher battery, 3-73 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
T 3-19, 6-50, 7-113, A-56
S tactics and techniques, 7-1
V
tailor, vii
sabotage, 6-61 target selection, 6-13, 6-20 videographer, 2-79, 5-42, 5-93,
safe haven, 1-25, 1-34, 1-54, technical support cell, 2-120 6-30
1-66, 3-21, 6-25, 6-97 terror tactics, 6-36
safe house, 2-41, 2-141, 3-41, W
terrorism, 1-72, 6-1
6-23, 6-29, 7-44 weapons battalion, 3-66
terrorism techniques, 6-37
sapper, 3-16, A-12 weapons company, 3-116
terrorist, p. viii 3, 6-1
sapper company, 3-97 weapons of mass destruction,
threat, p. viii 2
security element, 7-7, 7-18, 6-54, 6-111, 6-135
totalitarian, 1-54
7-25 WMD support team, 2-129
toxic industrial chemicals,
security force, 7-7 woman combatant, 6-91
2-131, 6-113
separtist, 1-50 toxic industrial material, 2-131,
shelter cell, 2-141
Y
6-113
simple battle position, 2-272, trafficking, 4-73 Z
3-183, 7-125 training, 1-60, 2-45, 6-10, A-16
sniper section, 3-157 training camp, 3-313-37, 3-41
special purpose forces, 1-11, training cell, 2-143
2-3, 3-13, 4-13, 6-6, A-53 training facilities, 1-66
stay-behind forces, 3-191
17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 Index-3

TC 7-100.3
17 January 2014
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
GERALD B. OKEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1402301
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Not to be distributed; electronic
media only.
PIN: 103548-000

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TC 7-100.

Irregular Opposing Forces

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Command and Control ........................................................................................ 4-6

ii TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Figure 5-1. Armed and unarmed noncombatants (examples)................................................ 5-1

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 iii

iv TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Figure I-1. Irregular force actors

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 v

IRREGULAR OPFOR AND HYBRID THREAT FOR TRAINING

vi TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

TAILORING THE OPFOR

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 vii

CAPABILITIES AND INTENT

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-1

1-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

COMPLEXITY AND COLLABORATION

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-3

INTERACTIONS OF OPERATIONAL VARIABLES

1-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

to an under-represented relevant population, or be self-serving in order to obtain control of political

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-5

1-6 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Interdict services such as motor transportation, urban construction and repair.

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-7

Adaptability Concentration Mobility

Figure 1-1. Relation of irregular OPFOR principles to achieving the objective

1-8 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-9

1-10 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-11

1-12 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-13

INSURGENTS AND GUERRILLAS

1-14 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

INSURGENTS AND CRIMINALS

REGULAR AND IRREGULAR OPFOR

COMPARISON AND CONTRAST

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-15

Table 1-1. Comparison and contrast of insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals

Characteristic Insurgent Organization Guerrilla Unit Criminal Organization

1-16 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Characteristic Insurgent Organization Guerrilla Unit Criminal Organization

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 1-17

Characteristic Insurgent Organization Guerrilla Unit Criminal Organization

1-18 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTORS

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-1

Direct Action Violence and Terrorism

2-2 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Civic Interaction and Support

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-3

2-4 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

Figure 2-1. Network types

LEADERSHIP, ACTION, AND SUPPORT

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-5

Figure 2-2. Typical levels of leadership, action, and support

2-6 TC 7-100.3 17 January 2014

17 January 2014 TC 7-100.3 2-7