Gender-Targeted Conditional Cash Transfers: Policy Research Working Paper 5257

Poiic\ Risiaicu Woixixc Paiii 5257
Gender-targeted Conditional Cash Transfers

Enrollment, Spillover Eects and Instructional Quality
Amer Hasan
Te World Bank
Latin America and the Caribbean Region
Poverty and Gender Group
March 2010
Ixiacr Evaiuariox Siiiis No. 44
WPS5257
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Produced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
Te Impact Evaluation Series has been established in recognition of the importance of impact evaluation studies for World Bank operations
and for development in general. Te series serves as a vehicle for the dissemination of ndings of those studies. Papers in this series are part
of the Banks Policy Research Working Paper Series. Te papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. Te ndings,
interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. Tey do not necessarily represent the views of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its aliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of
the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Poiic\ Risiaicu Woixixc Paiii 5257
Tis paper considers the eects of a gender-targeted
conditional cash transfer program for girls in classes 6
to 8. It nds that the program is successful in increasing
the enrollment of girls in classes 6 to 8 as intended. It
also nds evidence to suggest that the program generated
positive spillover eects on the enrollment of boys. Tis
success does, however, appear to be poised to come at
Tis papera product of the Poverty and Gender Group, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector of the
Latin America and Caribbean Regionis part of a larger eort in the department to evaluate the evaluate the impact of
social programs. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. Te author
may be contacted at ahasan1@worldbank.org.
a cost. Te student-teacher ratio in treated districts is
also climbing. Tis suggests that in the absence of active
steps to address these increasing student-teacher ratios,
instructional quality is likely to suer. Te success of the
program appears to be driven by enrollment increases in
urban schools. Tis suggests the need for a reassessment
of the targeting criteria in rural schools.

Gender-targeted conditional cash transfers: Enrollment, Spillover Effects and
Instructional Quality

Amer Hasan, PhD

Poverty and Gender Group
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit
Latin America and the Caribbean Region (LCSPP)
1850 I Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
ahasan1@worldbank.org

J EL classification: I2, I3, O1
Keywords: Conditional cash transfers; Spillover effects; Instructional quality

I would like to thank Dan Black, Robert LaLonde, Marcos Rangel and Rafael Lalive for helpful discussions on the topic.
Haeil J ung and Patrick Wightman provided valuable feedback on earlier versions of this paper. Mohsin Chandna and Syed
Sohail Raza were instrumental in gaining access to the data. Muhammad Muzaffar Iqbal patiently answered an endless
series of questions about the data. Ross Bagwell kindly provided the shape files used to create the maps.
2

1. Introduction
Conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) have become increasingly popular anti-
poverty instruments in the developing world. Spurred on by the well-documented success of
programs such as Oportunidades (formerly Progresa) in Mexico, policymakers around the world
have adopted, adapted and scaled up conditional cash transfer programs in countries as distinct
as Cambodia and Pakistan. These newer programs all share a basic feature of the original transfer
schemes: they provide cash incentives for investments in the health and education of children.
However, they vary on several other dimensions.
CCT programs can be roughly categorized into those that support investments in
education or health or both. Program eligibility and the size of the transfer () can vary
according to the characteristics (]) and gender (k) of the child. Often these characteristics are the
ages of the children or the grades in which they are enrolled. Thus boys and girls may receive
different-sized transfers and this may depend on how old they are or which grade they are
enrolled in:
j
k
= _
|u, (j)] i k = boy

|u, (j)] i k = girl

While Oportunidades / Progresa had a strong evaluation component built into its design
other programs have not taken a similarly holistic view of program design and implementation.
Consequently while policymakers have been adept and innovative at fine tuning program rules,
often they have not required the collection of quality data. This has meant that analysts have
been hampered in their attempts at evaluating these programs by governments who do not collect
data or worse yet agencies that do not release data already collected. Despite the large and
3

consistent body of evidence on the beneficial effects of various CCT programs, we are only now
beginning to understand the role various program features play in producing results.
This paper focuses on the use of gender-targeting to deliver a conditional cash transfer
program. This analysis extends our understanding of conditional cash transfers in the following
ways: (1) by analyzing data from the entire lifetime of the program, I am able to estimate the full
history of the effects of the program on enrollment. I analyze male and female enrollment
separately to test if there are any spillover effects on boys enrollment of a program that was
targeted only to girls. (2) I examine the student teacher ratio as an outcome to determine whether,
in the long run, the instructional quality at schools in treated districts is adversely affected. (3) I
investigate the existence of heterogeneous treatment effects by examining whether schools in
urban or rural areas are more successful at enrolling girls.
I provide a brief overview of the relevant literature in section 2 before describing the
program in section 3 and the available data in section 4. In the sections that follow I detail the
identification assumptions inherent in the analyses I perform (Section 5), and provide descriptive
evidence (Section 6). Section 7 details the empirical specification and describes the results. In
Section 8 I subject the results to a series of robustness checks. Section 9 concludes with a
discussion of the relevance of these findings for policy.
2. Literature Review
The prototypical CCT program is Mexicos Oportunidades program (formerly Progresa).
In part, the literature focuses on this program because it was implemented as a randomized
experiment and detailed baseline and follow-up data were collected on both treatment and
control group villages. Consequently there exist a host of evaluations of Progresa which utilize
4

data from the randomized experiment and supplement their findings with results from regression-
adjusted difference-in-difference estimators. Parker et al. (2008) provide an up-to-date and in-
depth review of the state of the literature. Therefore, in this paper I provide only a brief overview
of the strand of the literature relevant to the current analysis and then turn to program details.
The Progresa program has been evaluated on a range of outcomes: enrollment (Schultz,
2000 and 2004), labor force participation (Skoufias and Parker, 2001), morbidity, height,
prevalence of anemia (Gertler, 2004), food consumption (Hoddinott and Skoufias, 2004), intra-
household allocation of expenditure (Martinelli and Parker, 2008), and investment behavior
(Gertler et al. 2006). The effectiveness of Progresa is well-documented along virtually all of
these dimensions. Subsequent evaluations on the schooling effects of Progresa have sought to
identify how the effects of the program vary: via endogenous peer effects (Bobonis and Finan
2006), via within family effects (Parker et al. 2005) and family network effects (Angelucci et al.
2008).
What is absent from these evaluations is an examination of the role school location and
infrastructure might play in increasing enrollment. Do schools with better infrastructure register
larger increases in enrollment than do schools without such infrastructure? Are urban schools
more easily able to attract students than rural ones? Maluccio and Flores (2004) find increases in
food expenditures, school enrollment, nutritional status and participation in health care in their
evaluation of Nicaraguas Red de Proteccin Social program. When this program was shut down
because it was too expensive an examination of any long run effects was ruled out. This begs the
question, do CCT programs sustain their early successes?
5

Only a few conditional cash transfer programs are explicitly targeted to girls. Of
particular relevance to the current analysis are the programs in Cambodia, Bangladesh and
Pakistan. In each of these countries, policymakers have explicitly targeted the transfer on the
basis of gender providing transfers to girls only. Using repeated cross-sectional data, Khandker
et al. (2003) find that the Bangladesh Female Secondary School Assistance Program led to a
substantial increase in the enrollment of girls and found no spillover effect for boys. Evidence
on spillover effects from other programs is limited. Hasan (2009) examines the effects of a
gender-targeted CCT program on household time allocation. Chaudhury and Parajuli (2006;
2008) use school censuses in conjunction with a district-level eligibility cut-off and find that
Pakistans female student stipend program in Punjab between 2003 and 2005 increased
enrollment by six female students per school (a nine percent increase in female enrollment in
terms of relative change). Filmer and Schady (2006), exploiting the cut-off score used to
determine eligibility for Cambodias J apan Fund for Poverty Reduction (J FPR) scholarship, find
a 30 to 43 percentage point increase in the enrollment and attendance of girls.
1
Papers that
explicitly examine how program design features influence outcomes are more recent: for
example, Filmer and Schady (2009a) find evidence of diminishing returns to the size of the
transfer.
2

Consequently, this paper has a modest goal: to build on this earlier work and to provide a
more complete picture of the effects of a gender-targeted conditional cash transfer program on
outcomes of interest to policymakers: girls enrollment and boys enrollment. I consider whether
school infrastructure or location mediates the effects of the program. Lastly I examine whether

1
For additional analyses using the Cambodia data see Filmer and Schady (2009b) and Ferreira, Filmer and Schady
(2009).
2
See also de J anvry and Sadoulet, (2006.)
6

instructional quality is affected by testing whether the student teacher ratio increases when class
sizes increase through the introduction of CCT programs.
3. Program Description
As part of the government of Pakistans commitment to the reduction of gender disparity
in education, it initiated a conditional cash transfer program targeted to female students in
Punjab. Under the program girls receive a stipend of Rs. 200 per month (approximately US$ 3.5)
if they are enrolled in grades 6 to 8 in a government school and maintain a minimum attendance
of 80 percent.
3
The stipend is paid in quarterly payments to the student via a postal money order.
To give this amount context, consider that a days unskilled wage for a male in these areas is
estimated to be Rs. 60. Thus an unskilled male who works 30 days a month can expect to receive
Rs. 1800 a month. The stipend, then, amounts to one-ninth of the average monthly income for an
unskilled worker.
The program was announced in 2003. The government did not consider randomization
politically feasible and therefore used district-level literacy rates for the population aged 10 and
over according to the 1998 census (the most recent census at the time) to determine which
districts would be eligible to receive the stipend program. Districts with literacy levels below 40
percent were deemed most in need and hence were eligible for receipt of the stipend program.
Those districts with literacy rates higher than 40 percent were deemed ineligible. Implementation
of the program reportedly did not begin in full until the second quarter of 2004. Figure 1 reports
the literacy rates of the treatment and comparison districts on a spatial map, allowing the reader

3
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 80% attendance requirement is not strictly enforced and that enrollment is a
more salient condition.
7

to get a sense of where in the province the stipend program was active. Figure 2 condenses this
information and distinguishes between treated and comparison districts directly.
4. Data
This paper utilizes data from provincial school censuses made available by the Project
Management Implementation Unit (PMIU) of the Punjab Education Sector Reform Program
(PESRP). School censuses have been conducted annually since 2003 (the baseline year). This
paper uses all the rounds from 2003 to 2008. Each school is assigned a unique eight-digit code in
the Educational Management Information System (EMIS) which allows schools to be tracked
from year to year.
Each census covers approximately 60,000 government schools in the province of Punjab.
More than 40 percent of these schools are primary schools. While they are, strictly speaking,
only meant to enroll students in primary school grades (classes 1 to 5), some schools do report
students in typically middle school grades (classes 6 to 8). Schools report whether or not they are
functional and what their designated level is whether they are a primary or middle school and
whether they are a high school or a higher secondary school.
4
In addition information is provided
on whether the school is urban or rural and whether the school is for boys or for girls or in some
instances for both. The survey instrument asks about the type of material used in construction of
the school building, its state of repair, its ownership status, the year the school was established
and how much covered and uncovered area is occupied by the school.
Each year the census form requires schools to declare the number of boys and girls
enrolled in each class as of the start of the school year in September/October. These enrollment

4
A functional school is one that is open and operating. Schools may not be open or may not operate if there is a lack
of teachers hence the distinction between functional and non-functional schools.
8

figures are reported separately for boys and girls and for each grade from one to twelve.
5
In
addition to identifying the district where a given school is located, the census asks a series of
questions about the infrastructure of the school. These questions ask whether a school has each
of the following amenities: a toilet, drinking water, electricity, a main gate, a boundary wall, a
play ground, a library, laboratory facilities for physics, chemistry, biology, home economics and
computers. Lastly for each school the analyst is provided with information on the number of
teaching positions sanctioned by the educational authorities and the number of teaching positions
that are currently filled.
In the main analysis that follows, schools form the unit of analysis. There are three main
dependent variables of interest: girls enrollment, boys enrollment, and the ratio of filled
teaching positions to sanctioned teaching positions. The availability of longitudinal data from
two groups (schools in untreated districts and schools in treated districts) suggests a difference-
in-difference approach.
6

5. Identification Strategy
Consider the stylized example depicted in Figure 3. Data are available on an outcome ()
for schools from two sets of districts those that receive the stipend treatment (
=1
) and those
that do not (
=0
). The vertical dashed line at time t represents the implementation of the
program. Consequently t-1 is the baseline year (2003) and t+1 is the post-program period (2004
to 2008). Outcomes for two groups are shown: the control group (solid grey line) and the treated

5
In addition there are two sets of students for whom enrollment is also reported but who do not constitute a formal
part of the schools student body un-admitted students and students in the so-called katchi (nursery) class.
6
The application of a strict district-level literacy cutoff in determining program eligibility suggests that the data
could also be analyzed using a sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD). In the interests of space and because
these estimates have limited external validity, I focus on the cutoff for descriptive analyses only in Figures 12 and
13.
9

group (solid black line). The dotted line CD represents no change in the outcome of interest over
time. The line CEF represents the evolution of the outcome for the treatment group over time in
the absence of any program. Consequently, the distance FD is the natural trend in the outcome
over time that would exist in the absence of any program. The line AB shows how the outcome
for the comparison group evolved over this time frame.

Without such information, the effect of
the program would be overstated. The difference between the two groups at baseline (the
distance AC) is assumed to have persisted (the distance BF is drawn to equal the distance AC).
However, the implementation of policy causes the outcome for the treated group to evolve
differently. Consequently, the outcome for the treated group follows the path GH after the
program is implemented. The difference-in-differences methodology allows the decomposition
of outcomes over time into a part due to a natural trend over time (FD), a part due to pre-existing
differences between the two groups (BF) and the part that is due to the program (HF).
The data reveal that at baseline (before the program was underway) those districts with a
literacy level higher than 40 percent had (not surprisingly) larger enrollments for both girls and
boys for all the grades reported in Table 1. The schools in districts with no stipend program
provide a picture of the typical pattern of enrollment in the absence of the program. The
characteristics of these schools are reported in Table 2.
7
In the context of Figure 3, they provide
the information necessary to draw the line AB. By contrast in the districts where the stipend
program is available, schools provide the information necessary to draw lines CE and GH.

7
These characteristics are by and large similar to those in Table 1 and are reported for completeness as they will aid
in interpreting the regression coefficients reported in subsequent tables.
10

6. Descriptive Evidence
The most basic analysis proceeds from a comparison between treatment and control
districts of the average enrollments in various classes over the course of the program. These
enrollment figures are plotted in Figures 4 through 7 for girls in classes 5 through 8 respectively.
Of these classes 6 to 8 are eligible classes under the stipend program. The enrollment data on
girls in class 5 serves as a placebo test in the absence of strategic choices by parents. Since the
stipend is only for classes 6 to 8 there should be no effect of the program on enrollment in class
5. I plot the averages for treatment and control districts over time and along with their 95%
confidence intervals. At baseline there are differences in each grade as would be expected. Over
time the confidence intervals begin to overlap suggesting that there is a change in enrollments for
the treatment districts. Figures 4 through 7 suggest that the program increased girls enrollment
not only in classes 6 to 8 but also somewhat in class 5.
Similarly since the program is only for girls attending classes 6 to 8, there should be no
change in boys enrollment. In the absence of spillover effects, the enrollment of boys in grades
6 to 8 serves as a placebo test. Figures 8 through 10 reveal that the enrollment of boys in both
treatment and control groups follows a similar pattern for classes 5 to 7. For boys enrollment in
class 8 (Figure 11) there is slight evidence of a spillover effect as the enrollment of boys in the
treatment district appears to catch up to those in the control districts. Taken together the evidence
in Figures 8 through 11 suggests some evidence of a spillover effect due to the stipend treatment.
Figures 12 and 13 present district level aggregates for the eligible classes and exploit the
governments use of the literacy rate cut-off to differentiate treated and untreated districts from
each other. In figure 12 I order treated districts by the literacy rate (the so-called forcing variable
11

in terms of RDD nomenclature) and plot the total number of girls enrolled in classes 6 to 8. Each
panel represents a different year of the data. These display the progression of how the program
increased enrollment year by year. In figure 13 I repeat this graphical analysis using boys
enrollment in the same grades. At the level of descriptive statistics, these figures reveal much the
same pattern as those above: girls enrollment increased over time as a result of the program and
generated a positive spillover on boys enrollment as well.
7. Empirical Specification
In order to see if these trends are robust to the inclusion of controls, I estimate a
difference-in-differences model and apply the following empirical specification:
t
= o
0
+ o
1
I| = 1] + o
]
I|cor = ]]
2008
]=2004
+ o
]
I|cor = ]]
2008
]=2004
- I| = 1] +[
I
X
t
+ b
+u
t
L
I=1
(1)

Where
t
is the enrollment in school i at time t in a given class (5 to 8), the vector X
t
is a set of
time-varying observable characteristics of the school, the terms I|cor = ]] are indicator
variables for each year ] except the baseline and the term I| = 1] is an indicator variable that
equals one if the school is in a treatment district. The coefficient o
2004
captures the effect of the
program one year after program began and the coefficient o
2005
captures the effect of the
program two years after program implementation. Similarly, the coefficients o
2006
, o
2007
and
o
2008
represent the effect of the program three, four and five years after the program began
respectively. The term b
reflects a school-level individual fixed effect and incorporates the

influence of time-invariant regressors measured and unmeasured on enrollment and u
t
is an
error term. Basic descriptive statistics of the data are reported in Tables 1 and 2.
12

7.1. Results: Girls Enrollment
In Table 3 I recreate the estimates presented in Chaudhury and Parajuli (2006; 2008): a
first difference approach that uses only two years of data 2003 and 2005. This serves two
purposes: (1) to ensure that the data released by the government to both sets of authors is the
same and that comparable decisions were taken in cleaning and setting up the data for analysis
and (2) it highlights the fact that using boys enrollment as a counterfactual is an unwise choice
in the context of this gender-targeted program.
In particular, note that the estimates in Table 3 suggest that the average school in the
treated district experiences an increase of 11 girl students in classes 6 to 8 when compared to the
average school in the control district. Similarly the average school in the treated district
experiences an increase of 10 boy students in classes 6 to 8 when compared to the average school
in the control district. From Table 2, in 2003, a typical school in the treated district has roughly
42 girl students in classes 6 to 8 and roughly 77 boy students. Thus the point estimates from first
differencing (without controls) suggest a 26 percent increase in girls enrollment and a 13
percent increase in boys enrollment.
8
Given this evidence that is suggestive of possible spillover
effects, I choose not to perform a so-called triple difference analysis with boys as a
counterfactual.
9

Also the choice of an aggregate dependent variable masks potential variation in outcomes
that may exist by class. Consequently in Table 4, I examine the enrollment of girls in class 5.
This is not an eligible grade under the program. However, if households anticipate that the

8
The first percentage is calculated as [
11
42
- 1uu and the second is calculated as [
10
77
- 1uu
9
Strictly speaking I choose not to use the difference in the evolution of boys enrollment in the treatment district
compared to that in the control districts.
13

program will continue and realize that the only way to receive the stipend in class 6 is having
their child complete class 5, then there will be evidence of a rise in enrollment in this class as
well. Column 1 reports estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS). This pools the longitudinal
data and ignores the existence of repeated observations on the same schools. Column 2 explicitly
recognizes the presence of these repeated observations and reports estimates from a school-level
fixed effects regression. Standard errors are robust and allow for the clustering of observations at
the school level. Column 3 adds a series of indicator variables for whether a school has one, two
or all three of the following basic facilities available: drinking water, electricity and toilets. This
analysis suggests that when one compares all the schools in the treatment districts with all the
schools in the control districts (irrespective of their level primary, middle or secondary) there
was an increase in class 5 enrollment in the treatment district that exceeded the class 5
enrollment gain in the control district. However the point estimates in columns 1-3 are
practically small. The range of estimates goes from 0.165 students in 2004 to none in 2005 to
0.824 students in 2008. However, when one excludes primary and mosque schools from the
analysis a clearer picture emerges. In 2004 and 2005, the first two years of the program, there is
no increase in class 5 enrollment in those schools offering up to middle and high school grades.
In 2005, the program was expanded to include classes 9 and 10. It would seem that relative to
2003 in the period 2006 to 2008, the average middle and high schools in the treatment district
experienced an increase in class 5 enrollments of 1 to 2 students each year more than their
counterparts in the control districts. In terms of baseline enrollment these are modest enrollment
gains 10 to 16 percent.
10
They do however suggest that as authorities signaled the continuity of

10
The mean enrollment at baseline in middle and high schools in the treatment district is roughly 10 students. I
divide the point estimate in column 5 of table 4 by this number and multiply by 100.
14

the CCT program people whose children were in schools that offered classes 6 to 8 altered their
behavior early to be able to benefit from the program down the road.
I turn now to the classes eligible for the program classes six to eight. Each class is
covered separately in Tables 5, 6 and 7, respectively. As before, column 1 reports OLS estimates,
column 2 reports school-level fixed effects estimates and column 3 introduces controls. In Table
5 I find evidence to suggest that there was a one-year lag in responsiveness to the program. There
is practically and statistically speaking no difference between 2004 and 2003 when comparing
class 6 enrollments in the treatment and control districts. When comparing the point estimates for
2005 to 2008, I find evidence that the average school in the treatment district experienced a two-
student gain in enrollment compared to the average school in the comparison district in 2005 and
2006. This grew to a three-and-a-half student gain in 2007 and 2008. In relative terms,
combining this information with the information in Table 2, suggests that the enrollment increase
ranged from a low of 12 percent in 2005 to a high of 23 percent in 2007.
Enrollment in class 7 (Table 6) shows a similar pattern with estimates ranging from an 11
percent increase in relative enrollment in 2004 to a high of a 30 percent increase in enrollment in
2007. Likewise for girls enrollment in grade 8 (Table 7) the point estimates in column 3 suggest
a range of program impact from a low of 9 percent in 2004 to a high of 33 percent in 2007.
7.2. Results: Boys Enrollment
I noted at the outset that boys enrollments in the treatment districts seemed to be
growing at a faster rate than boys enrollments in the control districts. This was based on data
from one post-program year and for all three targeted classes (6 to 8) taken together. I present in
Table 8 a closer examination of the evolution of boys enrollment over time and consider classes
15

5 to 8 in turn. Each column corresponds to a different grade. I find evidence to suggest that there
might exist a spillover effect of this gender-targeted conditional cash transfer program on boys
enrollment. Enrollments increase for boys in the treated districts in all the classes reported in
Table 8. In percentage terms these gains are largest for boys in class 8 when comparing 2008 to
2004. To be sure there are gains made by boys in all classes for virtually each year of data
available. However the estimates vary and are largest for more recent years.
7.3 Results: Instructional Quality
With substantial increases in enrollments for both boys and girls, the logical question to
ask is whether quality of instruction is suffering as a result of increasing class size? In the
absence of test score data for these students, I proxy for instructional quality using the student-
teacher ratio. In this regard the detailed nature of the data is particularly useful. In developing
countries in general and in Pakistan in particular, there is often a disparity between the number of
teachers a school ought to have and the number of teachers it does have. This is particularly true
in hard to reach areas where the positions may have been sanctioned but no suitable or available
candidates have filled them. The school census form asks schools to report the number of
teaching posts that are filled as of the time of the survey and the number of positions that have
been sanctioned. I construct two measures of the student teacher ratio. One uses the number of
sanctioned teachers as the denominator and the other uses the actual number of posts filled. This
then provides us with an actual student-teacher ratio and an ideal student-teacher ratio (at least as
envisioned by the sanctioning authority). The means of these variables are reported in Table 2 for
both the average school in the treatment district and the average school in the control district.
There is some evidence to suggest that the actual student teacher ratio (regression estimates are
16

presented in Table 9) in practice is higher than what authorities would ideally like to have
(regression estimates are presented in Table 10). The average actual student teacher ratio is 34 in
a school in the treatment district. The coefficient on o
2004
is 1.71. This suggests a 5 percent
increase in the student teacher ratio from 2003 to 2004. It is imperative to remember that an
increase in the student teacher ratio, holding all else constant, is likely going to cause
instructional quality to fall. The fact that this is not as large an increase as the increase in
enrollment figures reported in earlier sections suggests that some attempts are being made on the
ground to ensure that the instructional quality does not falter. By 2008 the increase in the student
teacher ratio is approximately 16 percent. This is still half as large in percentage terms as the
increase in student enrollment.
Table 10 considers the ideal student teacher ratio by changing the denominator in the
dependent variable. This analysis provides us with some insight into how, if at all, policymakers
are revising the number of sanctioned positions per school. Focusing our attention on the
estimates in column 3 suggests that policymakers may be underestimating the need for
sanctioned teachers. The numbers reported in column 3 show that the ratio of students to the
sanctioned number of teaching posts also increases over time. In 2004, the average school in the
treatment district experiences a 7 percent increase in the student teacher ratio when compared to
the average school in the control district. By 2008 the increase when compared to 2003 is more
than twice that at 16 percent. It is however, still lower than the enrollment increases discussed
above. In the absence of test score data or other data on the quality of instruction, these two
pieces of evidence would appear to suggest that while enrollment has gone up so too have
17

student-teacher ratios. This may be adversely impacting the quality of the instruction taking
place.
Table 11 takes into consideration the evidence presented above that boys enrollment has
been going up. I consider separately the student-teacher ratios in boys and girls schools again
distinguishing between the sanctioned number of teaching posts and those actually filled. The
results indicate that the government is attempting to be reactive to the success of the policy by
increasing the sanctioned number of teachers in girls schools. It appears to be experiencing
issues of capacity since the student-teacher ratio actually observed is going up by more than the
sanctioned student-teacher ratio in these schools. In contrast, there is little evidence to suggest
that the sanctioned student-teacher ratio at boys schools changes at all over the time frame for
which data exists. However, the observed student-teacher ratio in boys schools is increasing.
This imbalance must be explicitly addressed if the stipend program is to avoid inadvertently
harming the learning opportunities of boys.
7.4. Results: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
There is little reason to believe that the effects reported above are the same for all the
units in our data. The most obvious dimension along which one might expect different program
effects are school location and infrastructure. Thus the question becomes do urban and rural
schools behave differently. If so, in what way? This question is addressed in Tables 12 and 13.
Table 12 re-runs the difference-in-differences analysis on the subsample of rural schools in the
data. Table 13 repeats the analysis using the subsample of urban schools in the data. At first
glance it is readily apparent there are large differences in the size of the point estimates for urban
and rural schools. Urban schools appear to be the driving force behind the results described
18

above. Rural schools in the treatment districts do improve but by nowhere near as much as their
urban counterparts. In order to test whether these coefficients are statistically different from each
other, I perform a Hausman test.
Denote the coefficient o
2004
for the rural subsample as o
2004
. Denote the corresponding

coefficient from the urban subsample as o
2004
u
.
The null hypothesis of this test is:
E
0
: o
2004
= o
2004
u

The test statistic follows the T-distribution and is given by:
I
2004
=
o
2004
- o
2004
u
_
(SE
6
2004
r )
2
+ (SE
6
2004
u )
2

(2)

In equation (2) SE denotes the standard error of the estimate and I assume the covariance
between the two estimates to be zero as they are from different samples.
Repeated application of this formula for each pair of coefficients from the difference-in-
differences analysis reveals that in 17 of the possible 20 comparisons the t-statistic I obtain
suggests that I reject the null hypothesis at the 95 percent confidence level or better.
11

11

Tests of equality of coefficients: Girls Enrollment in Rural v Urban
Grade 5 Reject
E
0
?
Grade 6 Reject
E
0
?
Grade 7 Reject
E
0
?
Grade 8 Reject
E
0
?
I
2004
-2.59 Y -3.10 Y -2.12 Y -1.95 N
I
2005
-1.74 N -5.82 Y -3.75 Y -2.56 Y
I
2006
-2.73 Y -5.89 Y -6.86 Y -4.64 Y
I
2007
-2.14 Y -6.61 Y -6.94 Y -6.98 Y
I
2008
-1.44 N -5.86 Y -6.19 Y -6.16 Y

19

8. Robustness Checks
I assess the robustness of the estimates in columns 4 and 5 of each of the preceding tables
(Table 4 to Table 7) by limiting the sample of schools included in the analysis. I first exclude any
mosque schools and any schools that are designated as primary schools (column 4). Mosque
schools likely do not follow the typical grade progression associated with the program and
primary schools (officially at least) are only able to offer instruction up to grade 5. Thus any
students enrolled in higher grades in these schools may not be eligible to receive the stipend from
the government. In column 5 I take advantage of access to program documentation from the
PMIU which explains that two districts though initially assigned to treatment and control status
respectively, subsequently had their treatment status interchanged. Specifically, when the
program went underway in 2004, Multan was assigned to treatment while Khanewal was
assigned to control status. This was done despite the fact that the district literacy figures from the
1998 Census would suggest that Multan was a candidate for control status while Khanewal
should have been treated.
12
These restrictions do not make a substantive difference to the results
detailed above.
9. Discussion
This paper finds that a gender-targeted CCT has substantial effects on enrollment. I find
that not only does this program appear to increase the enrollment levels of the girls in classes 6 to
8 the targeted group but that the enrollment levels of otherwise ineligible boys in similar
grades also appear to go up. It is possible that when girls are sent to schools their siblings are
sent as well in order to accompany them to school or because the receipt of the stipend frees up
enough resources to allow the household to increase the number of boys sent to school. It could

12
This determination was made on the basis of a Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) carried out at baseline.
20

also be that households that are induced to send their girls to school are unwilling to do so
without also sending their sons. While the school census data used in this analysis can say
nothing about spillovers within the household, a companion piece (Hasan, 2009) explores the
effects of this program on time allocation within households using household survey data.
I take a holistic approach to the policy process and consider if the success of the program
is able to shed any light on pitfalls policymakers must prepare for down the road. The school
census data allow an examination of the student teacher ratio which suggests that while the
student teacher ratio is increasing it is not increasing at the same rate as enrollment. This is
precious little solace however if it indicates that things are not as bad as they could be.
Policymakers must pay particular attention to the bottlenecks in the learning process that might
appear if a business-as-usual approach is taken to staffing decisions. The CCT program is
showing consistent evidence of being successful in terms of its stated goal of increasing girls
enrollment. However, this means that adjustments must be made to ensure that the students who
are enrolling in school are also learning. That enrollment and learning are often divorced from
each other is a point that has been repeatedly underscored in the literature on education.
13

Likewise I consider whether schools from urban areas are better at producing enrollment
gains. The evidence I find suggests that urban schools are driving the gains to the program. Rural
schools are contributing to the success of the program but not by nearly as much as their urban
counterparts. This goes to the very heart of the rationale for this program. The program
documents state that the size of the stipend is intended to cover transport costs for girls.
Transport costs may not be the right metric for assessing the size of the transfer in rural areas if
the issue is ability to attend (access) rather than ability to get to school (transport). How

13
See for instance, Filmer, Hasan and Pritchett, 2006 and the references therein.
21

successful the stipend program can be is inexorably linked to the state of infrastructure available
for girls education.
The evidence presented in Figures 14 16 suggests that this may indeed be the case.
Figure 14 shows that in almost all parts of the province, at the primary level girls school are
generally half of all schools available. At the middle school level (Figure 15) however, there is
much more variability. In a number of districts girls schools account for as little as one-third of
all schools. At the level of high school (Figure 16) the picture is bleaker with no district able to
document gender parity in the number of schools. This state of affairs feeds back into the
problem of having teachers to teach in these schools. If there arent enough girls schools at
higher levels of education where are the female teachers of tomorrow going to get their
education? This suggests one reason why rural schools might lag behind their urban counterparts
a dearth of well-qualified teachers in rural areas.
14
As the program continues and expands it
will need to confront these issues to maintain the success it has already documented.

14
In results not reported in this paper (for the sake of brevity) it appears that a simple index of facilities does not
differentiate schools in their ability to increase enrollments under the CCT program. I am currently engaged in
gaining access to information from the census forms on teacher qualifications. This might shed more light on how
urban schools are able to consistently out-perform their rural counterparts.
22

Figure 1: District Literacy Rates

Note: Authors calculations using PMIU-PESRP program documentation. District map of Punjab
province. Districts where more than 40 percent of the population aged 10 and over was estimated
to be literate at the time of the 1998 Census were deemed ineligible for the stipend program.
Those where less than 40 percent of the population aged 10 and over was literate were deemed
eligible to receive the stipend program.
23

Figure 2: Treatment and Control Districts

Note: Authors calculations using PMIU-PESRP program documentation. District map of Punjab
province. Districts with a darker shade were treated. These were districts where less than 40
percent of the population aged 10 and over was estimated to be literate at the time of the 1998
Census. Districts with a lighter share were untreated. These were districts where more than 40
percent of the population aged 10 and over was literate.

24

Figure 3: Stylized description of methodology

Vertical dashed line at time t represents the implementation of the program. Consequently t-1 is
the baseline period and t+1 is the post-program period. Outcomes for two groups are shown: the
comparison group (solid grey line) and the treated group (solid black line). The dotted line CD
represents no change in the outcome of interest over time. The solid grey line AB represents the
evolution of the outcome of the comparison group over time. Consequently, the distance BD is
the natural trend in the outcome over time that would exist in the absence of any program. The
line CEF shows how the outcome for the treated group would have evolved in the absence of the
program. The difference between the two groups at baseline (the distance AC) would have
persisted (the distance BF is drawn to equal the distance AC). However, the implementation of
policy causes the outcome for the treated group to evolve differently. Consequently, the outcome
for the treated group follows the path GH after the program is implemented. Using the
difference-in-differences methodology allows the decomposition of outcomes over time into the
a part due to a natural trend over time (BD), a part due to pre-existing differences between the
two groups (BF) and the part that is due to the program (HF).

2
5

Figure 4: Girls enrollment in Grade 5
Note: Figures report average district enrollments over time. Solid lines represent treatment districts. Dashed lines
represent control districts. Dotted lines and dashed lines with dots represent lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent
confidence interval respectively.

2
6


2
7


2
8


2
9

Figure 8: Boys enrollment in Grade 5
Note: Figures report average district enrollments over time. Solid lines represent treatment districts. Dashed lines represent
control districts. Dotted lines and dashed lines with dots represent lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence
interval respectively.

3
0


3
1


3
2

Note: Figures report average district enrollments over time. Solid lines represent treatment districts. Dashed lines represent
control districts. Dotted lines and dashed lines with dots represent lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence
interval respectively.

33

Figure 12: Girls enrollment around the literacy cutoff (District Averages)
Note: Average enrollment in grades 6 to 8 in treated and control districts reported. Vertical
dashed line represents the literacy cutoff (40 percent) used to determine program eligibility. The
black squares are treated districts. The grey circles are control districts. The first panel is the
baseline year 2003. Each panel is a subsequent year. In 2003, there is no discontinuity at the
cutoff as is to be expected. Over time a discontinuity emerges suggesting that the program is
effective at increasing girls enrollment in grades 6 to 8 taken together. The solid black and grey
lines overlay the fitted values from a linear regression.

34

Figure 13: Boys enrollment around the literacy cutoff (District Averages)
Note: Average enrollment in grades 6 to 8 in treated and control districts reported. Vertical
dashed line represents the literacy cutoff (40 percent) used to determine program eligibility. The
black squares are treated districts. The grey circles are control districts. The first panel is the
baseline year 2003. Each panel is a subsequent year. In 2003, there is no discontinuity at the
cutoff as is to be expected. Over time a discontinuity emerges suggesting that the program is
effective at increasing boys enrollment in grades 6 to 8 taken together. The solid black and grey
lines overlay the fitted values from a linear regression.

35

Table 1: Baseline difference between treatment and control districts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control Treatment Difference p-value
Number of Girls Class 5 (District total) 11,953 7,082 4,871 0.0051
Number of Boys Class 5 (District total) 14,641 12,670 1,971 0.2920
Drinking Water (1 =Yes) 0.806 0.810 -0.004 0.9124
Electricity (1 =Yes) 0.473 0.314 0.159 0.0012
Toilets (1 =Yes) 0.491 0.482 0.009 0.7502
Boundary Wall (1 =Yes) 0.611 0.514 0.097 0.0008
Main Gate (1 =Yes) 0.675 0.577 0.098 0.0021
Play Ground (1 =Yes) 0.354 0.379 -0.025 0.3404
Library (1 =Yes) 0.167 0.187 -0.020 0.3727
Physics Lab (1 =Yes) 0.266 0.252 0.014 0.6320
Biology Lab (1 =Yes) 0.191 0.166 0.025 0.3447
Chemistry Lab (1 =Yes) 0.210 0.184 0.026 0.3566
Home Economics Lab (1 =Yes) 0.038 0.034 0.003 0.7323
Computer Lab Morning (1 =Yes) 0.046 0.036 0.010 0.1997
Computer Lab Evening (1 =Yes) 0.019 0.009 0.010 0.0440
Observations 19 15
Notes: Treatment districts have literacy rates <40 percent. Control districts have literacy rates >
40 percent. Column 3 is calculated by subtracting column 2 from column 1. Enrollment figures
are district totals for each grade and gender. The indicator variables describing school
infrastructure and facilities are district averages representing the fraction of all public schools
with the facility/infrastructure available. For instance, 49 percent of all schools in all control
districts have toilets and 48 percent of all schools in all treatment districts have toilets. In
contrast 61 percent of control district schools have a boundary wall while only 51 percent of
treatment district schools do.

36

Table 2: Baseline difference between schools in treatment and control districts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control Treatment Difference p-value
Number of Girls Class 5 7 4 3 0.0000
Number of Boys Class 5 9 7 2 0.0000
Ratio of Filled to Sanctioned Teaching Posts 0.850 0.868 -0.018 0.0000
Student-Teacher Ratio (All Classes/Sanctioned) 27.670 28.667 -0.997 0.0000
Student-Teacher Ratio (All Classes/Filled) 33.848 34.158 -0.310 0.0591
Rural (1 =Yes) 0.878 0.912 -0.034 0.0000
Toilets 0.492 0.480 0.011 0.0070
Drinking Water 0.819 0.811 0.008 0.0106
Electricity 0.466 0.304 0.162 0.0000
Boundary Wall 0.607 0.519 0.088 0.0000
Main Gate 0.678 0.581 0.097 0.0000
Play Ground 0.365 0.385 -0.020 0.0000
Library 0.178 0.207 -0.029 0.0000
Biology Lab 0.190 0.139 0.051 0.0000
Chemistry Lab 0.205 0.155 0.050 0.0000
Physics Lab 0.270 0.225 0.045 0.0000
Home Economics Lab 0.033 0.027 0.006 0.1278
Computer Lab (Morning) 0.042 0.030 0.012 0.0037
Computer Lab (Evening) 0.016 0.007 0.009 0.0003
Observations 30,283 26,620
Notes: Treatment districts have literacy rates <40 percent. Control districts have literacy rates >
40 percent. Column 3 is calculated by subtracting column 2 from column 1. Enrollment figures
are school level averages. The indicator variables describing school infrastructure and facilities
are representing the fraction of all public schools with the facility/infrastructure available. For
instance, 49 percent of all schools in all control districts have toilets and 48 percent of all schools
in all treatment districts have toilets. In contrast 61 percent of control district schools have a
boundary wall while only 52 percent of treatment district schools do.

37

Table 3: Enrollment in Grades 6, 7 and 8
School Fixed Effects Regression
Girls Boys
(1) (2)

Stipend District

2005 7.398*** 10.524***
(1.200) (1.472)
Stipend District *2005 11.206*** 9.777***
(1.810) (2.047)
Constant 93.221*** 162.161***
(0.459) (0.540)
Number of observations 9,250 9,250
Number of schools 4,667 4,667
R2 within 0.041 0.040
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable in Column 1 is total
girls enrollment in grades 6, 7 and 8. The dependent variable in Column 2 is total boys
enrollment in grades 6, 7 and 8. Schools in this sample are restricted to High Schools
and Higher Secondary Schools. Only school census data for 2003 and 2005 are used in
this analysis. Point estimates are similar to those reported in Chaudhury and Parajuli
(2006), Table 4. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the
school level.

3
8

Table 4: Girls' Enrollment - Grade 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS FE FE +Controls
Excluding mosque and
primary schools
primary schools+Multan
+Khanewal
Stipend District -3.185***
(0.105)
2004 0.156*** 0.242*** 0.377*** 0.739** 0.756**
(0.0397) (0.0394) (0.0417) (0.273) (0.289)
2005 0.338*** 0.411*** 0.545*** 1.460*** 1.494***
(0.0433) (0.0427) (0.0439) (0.281) (0.297)
2006 0.364*** 0.206*** 0.210*** 0.0838 0.0873
(0.0460) (0.0447) (0.0452) (0.172) (0.171)
2007 -0.148*** -0.0567 -0.0459 -0.757*** -0.753***
(0.0440) (0.0436) (0.0448) (0.171) (0.173)
2008 0.231*** 0.320*** 0.332*** -0.0865 -0.0729
(0.0440) (0.0436) (0.0451) (0.169) (0.174)
Stipend District * 2004 0.175*** 0.163** 0.165*** 0.252 0.356
(0.0501) (0.0498) (0.0496) (0.199) (0.209)
Stipend District * 2005 0.0425 0.0596 0.0618 0.0304 0.131
(0.0543) (0.0531) (0.0527) (0.216) (0.226)
Stipend District * 2006 0.319*** 0.467*** 0.464*** 1.011*** 1.055***
(0.0592) (0.0581) (0.0581) (0.244) (0.252)
(0.0561) (0.0557) (0.0558) (0.224) (0.233)
(0.0580) (0.0577) (0.0577) (0.233) (0.246)

3
9

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS FE FE +Controls
primary schools
+Khanewal
Number of Basic Facilities =1 0.148*** 0.641* 0.728*
(0.0244) (0.266) (0.285)
Number of Basic Facilities =2 0.197*** 0.702** 0.753**
(0.0271) (0.263) (0.281)
Number of Basic Facilities =3 0.0961** 0.699** 0.752**
(0.0368) (0.267) (0.286)
Constant 7.081*** 5.544*** 5.408*** 12.42*** 12.26***
(0.0848) (0.0189) (0.0264) (0.255) (0.273)
Observations 345,196 345,196 345,196 69,047 64,476
Number of Schools 58,154 58,154 12,170 11,381
Adjusted R-squared 0.012 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
R-square within 0.00433 0.00442 0.00463 0.00465
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the level of the school. The dependent
variable is girls enrollment in grade 5. The average school in a treatment district school at baseline had 4 girls enrolled in grade 5. Column 1 reports
estimates from an OLS specification. Column 2 reports estimates from a fixed effects specification at the school level. Column 3 adds to column 2 a
series of indicators for how many of the following three facilities a school has: toilets, drinking water and electricity. The excluded group is no
facilities. The excluded year is the baseline year 2003. Column 4 excludes mosque schools and primary schools from the sample. Column 5 removes
two districts whose treatment status was interchanged once the program began: Khanewal (changed from treatment to control) and Multan (changed
from control to treatment).

4
0

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS FE FE +Controls
primary schools
+Khanewal
(0.865)
2004 3.234*** 3.896*** 2.482*** 2.480*** 2.609***
(0.203) (0.206) (0.519) (0.520) (0.553)
2005 4.376*** 5.375*** 3.962*** 3.967*** 4.075***
(0.251) (0.253) (0.536) (0.537) (0.570)
2006 1.790*** 5.856*** 6.182*** 6.188*** 6.368***
(0.278) (0.274) (0.283) (0.283) (0.282)
2007 2.421*** 3.789*** 4.156*** 4.154*** 4.218***
(0.265) (0.261) (0.272) (0.272) (0.281)
2008 1.469*** 2.921*** 3.317*** 3.314*** 3.414***
(0.237) (0.227) (0.240) (0.240) (0.248)
Stipend District * 2004 0.263 0.0728 0.124 0.124 -0.0400
(0.294) (0.302) (0.302) (0.302) (0.313)
(0.364) (0.380) (0.379) (0.379) (0.395)
(0.382) (0.419) (0.419) (0.419) (0.431)
(0.375) (0.394) (0.394) (0.394) (0.411)
(0.335) (0.346) (0.346) (0.346) (0.361)
Number of Basic Facilities =1 -0.326 -0.324 -0.288
(0.510) (0.512) (0.546)
(0.502) (0.504) (0.537)

4
1

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS FE FE +Controls
primary schools
+Khanewal
Number of Basic Facilities =3 -1.975*** -1.977*** -1.888***
(0.509) (0.510) (0.544)
Constant 25.74*** 20.23*** 21.60*** 22.21*** 22.14***
(0.639) (0.133) (0.494) (0.496) (0.530)
Observations 71,620 71,620 71,620 70,074 65,476
R-square within 0.0375 0.0383 0.0383 0.0389
estimates from an OLS specification. Column 2 reports estimates from a fixed effects specification at the school level. Column 3 adds to column 2 a
series of indicators for how many of the following three facilities a school has: toilets, drinking water and electricity. The excluded group is no facilities.
The excluded year is the baseline year 2003. Column 4 excludes mosque schools and primary schools from the sample. Column 5 removes two districts
whose treatment status was interchanged once the program began: Khanewal (changed from treatment to control) and Multan (changed from control to
treatment).

4
2

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS FE FE +Controls
Excluding mosque
and primary schools
Excluding mosque and primary
schools +Multan +Khanewal
(0.833)
2004 -0.999*** -0.369* -0.418 -0.421 -0.526
(0.177) (0.168) (0.464) (0.465) (0.486)
2005 1.572*** 2.537*** 2.488*** 2.494*** 2.447***
(0.230) (0.223) (0.481) (0.482) (0.503)
2006 -0.575* 2.995*** 3.053*** 3.053*** 3.202***
(0.257) (0.232) (0.240) (0.240) (0.238)
2007 1.222*** 2.582*** 2.649*** 2.648*** 2.727***
(0.253) (0.242) (0.250) (0.250) (0.259)
2008 1.022*** 2.496*** 2.568*** 2.565*** 2.614***
(0.237) (0.223) (0.236) (0.236) (0.244)
(0.232) (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) (0.235)
(0.311) (0.314) (0.314) (0.314) (0.329)
(0.337) (0.349) (0.349) (0.350) (0.358)
(0.347) (0.358) (0.358) (0.358) (0.374)
(0.324) (0.332) (0.333) (0.333) (0.348)

4
3

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS FE FE +Controls
Excluding mosque
and primary schools
Excluding mosque and primary
schools +Multan +Khanewal
Number of Basic Facilities =1 0.161 0.160 0.0689
(0.449) (0.450) (0.472)
Number of Basic Facilities =2 0.0411 0.0393 -0.0269
(0.449) (0.451) (0.472)
(0.456) (0.457) (0.479)
Constant 23.97*** 18.50*** 18.54*** 19.05*** 19.17***
(0.627) (0.114) (0.444) (0.447) (0.468)
Observations 71,607 71,607 71,607 70,065 65,469
R-square within 0.0362 0.0362 0.0362 0.0371
estimates from an OLS specification. Column 2 reports estimates from a fixed effects specification at the school level. Column 3 adds to column 2 a series
of indicators for how many of the following three facilities a school has: toilets, drinking water and electricity. The excluded group is no facilities. The
excluded year is the baseline year 2003. Column 4 excludes mosque schools and primary schools from the sample. Column 5 removes two districts whose
treatment status was interchanged once the program began: Khanewal (changed from treatment to control) and Multan (changed from control to treatment).

4
4

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS FE FE +Controls
Excluding mosque
and primary schools
Excluding mosque
and primary schools
+Multan +
Khanewal
(0.789)
2004 -0.676*** -0.0513 0.462 0.461 0.469
(0.196) (0.191) (0.566) (0.567) (0.606)
2005 -0.283 0.675** 1.188* 1.191* 1.196
(0.240) (0.230) (0.589) (0.590) (0.629)
2006 -1.030*** 2.186*** 2.144*** 2.143*** 2.304***
(0.268) (0.251) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263)
2007 0.807** 2.200*** 2.153*** 2.153*** 2.153***
(0.260) (0.251) (0.265) (0.266) (0.275)
2008 1.591*** 3.102*** 3.051*** 3.050*** 3.103***
(0.250) (0.242) (0.258) (0.258) (0.269)
(0.237) (0.232) (0.231) (0.231) (0.243)
(0.289) (0.283) (0.282) (0.282) (0.297)
(0.338) (0.346) (0.346) (0.346) (0.352)
(0.337) (0.346) (0.347) (0.347) (0.359)
(0.332) (0.343) (0.343) (0.343) (0.358)

4
5

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS FE FE +Controls
Excluding mosque
and primary schools
Excluding mosque
and primary schools
+Multan +
Khanewal
(0.542) (0.543) (0.582)
(0.548) (0.550) (0.589)
(0.557) (0.559) (0.600)
Constant 21.29*** 16.13*** 15.63*** 16.05*** 16.09***
(0.605) (0.118) (0.546) (0.549) (0.588)
Observations 71600 71600 71600 70058 65463
Number of Schools 13674 13674 12165 11377
R-square within 0.0320 0.0320 0.0320 0.0327
estimates from an OLS specification. Column 2 reports estimates from a fixed effects specification at the school level. Column 3 adds to column 2 a series
of indicators for how many of the following three facilities a school has: toilets, drinking water and electricity. The excluded group is no facilities. The
excluded year is the baseline year 2003. Column 4 excludes mosque schools and primary schools from the sample. Column 5 removes two districts whose
treatment status was interchanged once the program began: Khanewal (changed from treatment to control) and Multan (changed from control to
treatment).

46

Table 8: Boys' Enrollment - Grades 5 to 8
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Class 5 Class 6 Class 7 Class 8
Stipend District
2004 0.246 0.333 1.143* 0.626
(0.268) (0.484) (0.449) (0.455)
2005 0.445 3.940*** 3.030*** 2.051***
(0.274) (0.505) (0.468) (0.470)
2006 -1.426*** 5.126*** 4.029*** 2.354***
(0.140) (0.330) (0.287) (0.276)
2007 -1.547*** 1.895*** 3.944*** 1.723***
(0.137) (0.304) (0.281) (0.270)
2008 -1.131*** -0.811** 2.139*** 2.295***
(0.138) (0.301) (0.259) (0.255)
Stipend District * 2004 0.543** 1.847*** -0.187 0.563*
(0.184) (0.355) (0.290) (0.270)
Stipend District * 2005 0.0652 3.070*** 1.144** 0.620*
(0.194) (0.411) (0.348) (0.299)
Stipend District * 2006 1.071*** 2.705*** 2.549*** 2.009***
(0.201) (0.462) (0.407) (0.363)
(0.197) (0.413) (0.388) (0.358)
(0.202) (0.409) (0.367) (0.348)
Constant 15.16*** 32.48*** 27.30*** 24.14***
(0.250) (0.449) (0.424) (0.432)
Observations 69047 70074 70065 70058
Adjusted R-squared 0.011 0.029 0.026 0.020
R-square within 0.0108 0.0291 0.0265 0.0197
Controls Included Y Y Y Y
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the school level. School-
level fixed effects regressions reported. Dependent variable is boys enrollment in grades 5 to 8. Controls include a
series of indicators for how many of the following three facilities a school has: toilets, drinking water and electricity.
The excluded group is no facilities. The excluded year is 2003. Each column excludes mosque and primary schools
and two districts whose treatment status was interchanged once the program began: Khanewal and Multan. The
average school in a treatment district at baseline has 7, 30, 25 and 22 students in grades 5, 6, 7 and 8 respectively.

47

Table 9: Ratio of All Students to Filled Teaching Positions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE FE +Controls Excluding Multan +Khanewal
(0.272)
2004 1.598*** 1.413*** 3.158*** 3.077***
(0.156) (0.149) (0.823) (0.878)
2005 2.482*** 2.233*** 3.979*** 3.877***
(0.175) (0.168) (0.832) (0.887)
2006 4.167*** 3.856*** 3.825*** 3.665***
(0.219) (0.212) (0.216) (0.223)
2007 1.399*** 1.004*** 0.982*** 0.670***
(0.184) (0.176) (0.183) (0.190)
2008 1.162*** 0.658*** 0.629** 0.361
(0.197) (0.186) (0.195) (0.202)
(0.218) (0.207) (0.207) (0.220)
(0.246) (0.236) (0.236) (0.249)
(0.315) (0.304) (0.304) (0.322)
(0.277) (0.259) (0.259) (0.273)
(0.299) (0.276) (0.276) (0.292)
Number of Basic Facilities =1 1.429 1.394
(0.867) (0.927)
Number of Basic Facilities =2 1.865* 1.839*
(0.835) (0.892)
Number of Basic Facilities =3 1.776* 1.785*
(0.820) (0.877)
Constant 31.15*** 29.86*** 28.12*** 28.17***
(0.193) (0.0907) (0.823) (0.880)
Observations 70160 70160 70160 65562
Number of Schools 12168 12168 11380
R-square within 0.0494 0.0496 0.0483
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the
level of the school. The dependent variable is the ratio of students in a given school to filled teaching posts. The
average school in a treatment district school at baseline had a ratio of 34. Sample excludes mosque and primary
schools. Column 1 reports estimates from an OLS specification. Column 2 reports estimates from a fixed effects
specification at the school level. Column 3 adds a series of indicators for how many of the following three facilities
a school has: toilets, drinking water and electricity. The excluded group is no facilities. The excluded year is 2003.
Column 4 removes two districts whose treatment status was interchanged: Khanewal and Multan.

48

Table 10: Ratio of All Students to Sanctioned Teaching Positions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE FE +Controls
Excluding Multan
+Khanewal
(0.214)
2004 3.438*** 3.335*** 6.050*** 5.688***
(0.143) (0.137) (0.688) (0.703)
2005 5.797*** 5.731*** 8.444*** 8.065***
(0.152) (0.148) (0.697) (0.712)
2006 3.246*** 3.198*** 2.866*** 2.681***
(0.162) (0.154) (0.163) (0.167)
2007 0.858*** 0.822*** 0.460** 0.229
(0.153) (0.149) (0.172) (0.179)
2008 -0.367** -0.430*** -0.825*** -1.007***
(0.128) (0.126) (0.141) (0.146)
(0.212) (0.205) (0.204) (0.215)
(0.223) (0.218) (0.218) (0.230)
(0.232) (0.226) (0.226) (0.238)
(0.200) (0.194) (0.196) (0.206)
(0.181) (0.177) (0.177) (0.186)
Number of Basic Facilities =1 1.271 0.952
(0.678) (0.693)
Number of Basic Facilities =2 2.432*** 2.116**
(0.693) (0.709)
Number of Basic Facilities =3 3.260*** 2.925***
(0.696) (0.712)
Constant 24.27*** 23.08*** 20.40*** 20.70***
(0.151) (0.0685) (0.682) (0.698)
Observations 70205 70205 70205 65601
Number of Schools 12170 12170 11381
R-square within 0.103 0.105 0.103
level of the school. The dependent variable is the ratio of students in a given school to sanctioned teaching posts. The
average school in a treatment district school at baseline had a ratio of 29. Sample excludes mosque and primary
schools. Column 1 reports estimates from an OLS specification. Column 2 reports estimates from a fixed effects
specification at the school level. Column 3 adds a series of indicators for how many of the following three facilities a
school has: toilets, drinking water and electricity. The excluded group is no facilities. The excluded year is the baseline
year 2003. Column 4 removes two districts whose treatment status was interchanged: Khanewal and Multan.

49

Table 11: Ratio of students to teaching positions by gender of school
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Filled Sanctioned
School fixed effects regressions Girls Boys Girls Boys
2004 3.758*** -0.261 6.412*** 0.0348
(1.012) (0.640) (0.782) (0.141)
2005 3.909*** 0.225 7.893*** 0.122
(1.026) (0.648) (0.801) (0.142)
2006 3.680*** 2.220*** 2.829*** 0.0134
(0.258) (0.280) (0.201) (0.0531)
2007 0.894*** -0.326 0.577* 0.0517
(0.238) (0.204) (0.259) (0.0575)
2008 1.188*** -0.329 -0.0789 -0.00941
(0.251) (0.209) (0.190) (0.0553)
Stipend District * 2004 1.383*** 1.432*** 1.370*** 0.0890
(0.266) (0.215) (0.270) (0.0526)
(0.314) (0.259) (0.293) (0.0548)
(0.398) (0.345) (0.314) (0.0543)
Stipend District * 2007 6.521*** 4.045*** 4.886*** 0.209**
(0.355) (0.277) (0.287) (0.0691)
(0.389) (0.281) (0.240) (0.0538)
Constant 22.70*** 26.14*** 16.29*** 0.153
(1.007) (0.630) (0.766) (0.138)
R-square within 0.0636 0.0334 0.0943 0.00281
Observations 32,545 33,017 32,577 33,024
Controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multan and Khanewal Excluded Yes Yes Yes Yes
level of the school. Sample excludes mosque and primary schools and two districts whose treatment status was
interchanged. Estimates from a fixed effects specification at the school level. Controls are a series of indicators for
how many of the following three facilities a school has: toilets, drinking water and electricity. The excluded group is
no facilities. The excluded year is the baseline year 2003.

50

Table 12: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects - Subsample of rural schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
Stipend District
2004 0.205 3.339*** -0.253 0.0325
(0.107) (0.176) (0.134) (0.126)
2005 0.906*** 4.845*** 2.398*** 0.716***
(0.122) (0.214) (0.159) (0.144)
2006 0.363** 5.705*** 3.357*** 2.493***
(0.131) (0.224) (0.172) (0.164)
2007 -0.322* 4.028*** 3.237*** 2.805***
(0.126) (0.212) (0.185) (0.172)
2008 0.406** 3.300*** 3.071*** 3.688***
(0.133) (0.195) (0.171) (0.164)
Stipend District * 2004 0.00803 -0.553* 1.368*** 0.776***
(0.187) (0.249) (0.185) (0.166)
Stipend District * 2005 -0.126 0.455 1.110*** 1.482***
(0.202) (0.307) (0.231) (0.201)
Stipend District * 2006 0.528* 0.289 1.693*** 1.321***
(0.207) (0.341) (0.273) (0.248)
(0.212) (0.331) (0.282) (0.257)
(0.223) (0.297) (0.267) (0.261)
Constant 10.65*** 14.70*** 12.82*** 10.50***
(0.0708) (0.110) (0.0866) (0.0798)
Observations 54419 54982 54977 54970
R-square within 0.00722 0.0494 0.0594 0.0632
level of the school. The dependent variable in each column is girls enrollment in a particular grade. The sample
excludes mosque and primary schools as well as two districts whose treatment status was interchanged once the
program began: Khanewal (changed from treatment to control) and Multan (changed from control to treatment. All
columns report estimates from a fixed effects specification at the school level. The excluded group is no facilities.
The excluded year is the baseline year 2003.
51

Table 13: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects - Subsample of urban schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
Stipend District
2004 -0.790 6.578*** -0.994 -0.400
(0.604) (0.857) (0.736) (0.926)
2005 0.128 7.892*** 3.462** 0.545
(0.701) (1.066) (1.052) (1.136)
2006 -1.068 7.546*** 2.163* 1.679
(0.727) (1.093) (0.980) (1.142)
2007 -2.616*** 3.012** 0.0145 -0.582
(0.672) (1.123) (1.083) (1.185)
2008 -2.141** 1.704 0.116 0.695
(0.659) (0.926) (1.001) (1.155)
Stipend District * 2004 2.237** 4.196** 3.771*** 3.167**
(0.841) (1.514) (1.118) (1.212)
Stipend District * 2005 1.478 11.87*** 7.582*** 5.316***
(0.899) (1.937) (1.712) (1.484)
Stipend District * 2006 4.268** 12.92*** 14.08*** 9.816***
(1.353) (2.117) (1.784) (1.813)
(0.911) (1.953) (1.881) (1.798)
Stipend District * 2008 2.773** 12.00*** 13.16*** 12.98***
(0.996) (1.708) (1.725) (1.778)
Constant 25.65*** 53.10*** 51.68*** 48.68***
(0.358) (0.603) (0.564) (0.621)
Observations 10057 10494 10492 10493
R-square within 0.00694 0.0480 0.0361 0.0246
level of the school. The dependent variable in each column is girls enrollment in a particular grade. The sample
excludes mosque and primary schools as well as two districts whose treatment status was interchanged once the
program began: Khanewal (changed from treatment to control) and Multan (changed from control to treatment. All
columns report estimates from a fixed effects specification at the school level. The excluded group is no facilities.
The excluded year is the baseline year 2003.

52

Figure 14: Fraction of girls schools at the primary level

53

Figure 15: Fraction of girls schools at the middle school level

54

Figure 16: Fraction of girls schools at the high school level

55

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reflects a school-level individual fixed effect and incorporates the

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