1

[G.R. No. 149375. November 26, 2002]

MARVIN MERCADO, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J .:
MARVIN MERCADO, together with Rommel Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark
Vasques and Enrile Bertumen, was charged with and convicted of violation of R.A.
6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, for which he and his co-
accused were sentenced to a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
[1]

The case before us concerns only the petition for review of accused Marvin
Mercado where he assails his conviction, and arguing that the Court of Appeals
having increased the penalty imposed by the court a quo to a prison term
of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, should have certified
the case to this Court as the penalty of thirty (30) years was already reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124,
[2]
of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
We cannot sustain the petition; we agree instead with the Court of Appeals.
In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the
provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124, relied upon by petitioner, was applicable only when the
penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua or higher as a single indivisible penalty, i.e.,
the penalty was at least reclusion perpetua. Hence, the penalty imposed by the
appellate court on the accused was clearly in accordance with Sec. 14 of RA
6538,
[3]
which is not considered reclusion perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13, Rule
124.
[4]

The Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution relied on People v.
Omotoy
[5]
where the Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty of arson and
sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of prision
mayor maximum, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua. The case reached this Court on
automatic appeal. In Footnote 16 of the decision, it was observed -
The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for the reason no doubt that the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is involved, albeit joined to prision mayor in its maximum period
in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Actually, the appeal should have
gone to the Court of Appeals since strictly speaking, this Court entertains appeals in
criminal cases only where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher (Sec.
5[2](d), Article VIII, Constitution), i.e., the penalty is at least reclusion perpetua (or life
imprisonment, in special offenses). The lapse will be overlooked so as not to delay the
disposition of the case. It is of slight nature, the penalty of reclusion perpetua having in
fact been imposed on the accused, and causes no prejudice whatsoever to any party.
Petitioner now asks whether the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to the instant case considering that the
penalty imposed was seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.
Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. While the
thirty (30)-year period falls within that range, reclusion perpetua nevertheless is a
single indivisible penalty which cannot be divided into different periods. The thirty (30)-
year period for reclusion perpetua is only for purposes of successive service of
sentence under Art. 70 of The Revised Penal Code.
[6]

More importantly, the crime committed by petitioner is one penalized under RA
6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 which is a special law and not under The
Revised Penal Code. Unless otherwise specified, if the special penal law imposes
such penalty, it is error to designate it with terms provided for in The Revised Penal
Code since those terms apply only to the penalties imposed by the Penal Code, and
not to the penalty in special penal laws.
[7]
This is because generally, special laws
provide their own specific penalties for the offenses they punish, which penalties are
not taken from nor refer to those in The Revised Penal Code.
[8]

The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months under RA 6538 is
essentially within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal. However,
such technical term under The Revised Penal Code is not similarly used or applied to
the penalty for carnapping. Also, the penalty for carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstance of violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things,
i.e., seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, does not
correspond to that in The Revised Penal Code.
[9]
But it is different when the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof, since this is penalized with reclusion
perpetua to death.
[10]

Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of x x x
imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum
to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
[11]
For these reasons the use of the term reclusion temporal in the decretal
portion of its decision is not proper. Besides, we see no basis for the trial court to set
the minimum penalty at twelve (12) years and one (1) day since RA 6538 sets the
minimum penalty for carnapping at fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
We see no error by the appellate court in relying on a Footnote in Omotoy
[12]
to
affirm the conviction of the accused. The substance of theFootnote may not be
the ratio decidendi of the case, but it still constitutes an important part of the decision
since it enunciates a fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. That this
rule is stated in a Footnote to a decision is of no consequence as it is merely a matter
of style.
It may be argued that Omotoy is not on all fours with the instant case since the
former involves an appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court while
the case at bar is an appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. As
enunciated in Omotoy, the Supreme Court entertains appeals in criminal cases only
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The basis for this doctrine
is the Constitution itself which empowers this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify
2

or affirm on appeal, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments of
lower courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.
[13]

Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty in a criminal case
brought to it on appeal is at least reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment, then
it should impose such penalty, refrain from entering judgment thereon, certify the case
and elevate the entire records to this Court for review.
[14]
This will obviate the
unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases between this
Court and the Court of Appeals, for by then this Court will acquire jurisdiction over the
case from the very inception and can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which
has fully completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.
[15]

On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty less
than reclusion perpetua, a review of the case may be had only by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45
[16]
where only errors or questions of law may be raised.
Petitioner, in his Reply, also brings to fore the issue of whether there was
indeed a violation of The Anti-Carnapping Act. This issue is factual, as we shall find
hereunder.
In the evening of 26 May 1996 Leonardo Bhagwani parked the subject Isuzu
Trooper in front of his house at No. 7015-B Biac-na-Bato St., Makati City, Metro
Manila. The vehicle was owned by Augustus Zamora but was used by Bhagwani as a
service vehicle in their joint venture. The following day the Isuzu Trooper was nowhere
to be found prompting Bhagwani to report its disappearance to the Makati Police
Station and the Anti-Carnapping (ANCAR) Division which immediately issued an
Alarm Sheet.
[17]

On 31 May 1996 Bhagwanis neighbor, fireman Avelino Alvarez, disclosed that
he learned from his daughter, a common-law wife of accused Michael Cummins, that
the accused Rommel Flores, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen and Michael Cummins
himself stole the Isuzu Trooper. Alvarezs daughter however refused to issue any
statement regarding the incident.
[18]

In the evening of 31 May 1996 SPO3 Miling Flores brought to his house
Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen, Rommel Flores, and complaining
witness Bhagwani. In that meeting, Cummins, Vasques, Bertumen and Flores
admitted that they took the vehicle and used it in going to Laguna, La Union and
Baguio.
[19]
They claimed however that it was with the knowledge and consent of
Bhagwani. They alleged that on the night they took the vehicle, they invited Bhagwani
to join them in their outing to Laguna. But when Bhagwani declined, they asked him
instead if they could borrow the Isuzu Trooper. Bhagwani allegedly agreed and even
turned over the keys to them.
[20]

Petitioner Marvin Mercado was absent during that confrontasi in the house of
SPO3 Miling Flores but his co-accused narrated his participation in the crime.
[21]

The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction but increased the penalty
imposed on the four (4) accused from a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.
[22]

Petitioner insists that the accused were more motivated by fun rather than theft
in taking the Isuzu Trooper, and that they merely took the vehicle for a joyride with no
intention of stealing it. If they were really thieves, according to petitioner, they would
have sold the vehicle outright instead of simply abandoning it in Baguio.
[23]

Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this is a petition for review on
certiorari where only questions of law, and not questions of fact, may be raised. The
issue before us being factual, a reevaluation of the facts and the evidence may not be
entertained in this appeal. Besides, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court.
[24]
This rule may be
disregarded only when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the
findings and conclusions of the trial court, or are not supported by the evidence on
record. But there is no ground to apply this exception to the instant case. This Court
will not assess all over again the evidence adduced by the parties particularly where
as in this case the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals completely
coincide.
[25]

However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals on its imposition of the penalty.
Republic Act No. 6538 imposes the penalty of imprisonment for seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months to thirty (30) years when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things. The evidence in
this case shows that the accused broke a quarter window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain
access to it, thus demonstrating that force was used upon the vehicle; nonetheless,
we believe that this does not merit the imposition of the full penalty. With the
application of The Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed may be
reduced to an indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
to twenty-two (22) years.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals denying the
Motion and Manifestation of petitioner Marvin Mercado dated 19 January 2001 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is reduced to an
indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two
(22) years. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.














3

[G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998]

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-
SUNTAY
*
and HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch
78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MARTINEZ, J .:
Which should prevail between the ration decidendi and the fallo of a decision is
the primary issue in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Federico
C. Suntay who opposes respondent Isabels petition for appointment as administratrix
of her grandmothers estate by virtue of her right of representation.
The suit stemmed from the following:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay)
and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out
of this marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel
Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the
marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay filed a criminal
case
[1]
against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo
filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI)
[2]
a complaint for legal separation
against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody
and care of their children who were living with their mother.
[3]
The suit was docketed
as civil case number Q-7180.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as
between the parties. It being admitted by the parties and shown by the records that
the question of the case and custody of the three children have been the subject of
another case between the same parties in another branch of this Court in Special
Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be litigated in this case.
With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of counsel that the third
party defendants are willing to pay P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is
willing to accept the offer instead of her original demand for P130,000.00, the
defendant is awarded the sum of P50,000.00 as her counterclaim and to pay
attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
[4]
(Emphasis supplied)
As basis thereof, the CFI said:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans
Memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8,
1967) the patient was already out of the hospital he continued to be under observation
and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration
classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as
1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed
under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown
marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9,
1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for nay of the following causes after (sic)
existing at the time of the marriage:
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the
mental condition of the plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without
sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the
neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy that in
reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).
[5]
(emphasis supplied)
On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent Isabels paternal
grandmother. The decedent died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will.
[6]

Five years later or on October 26 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco
Suntay filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
[7]
a petition for issuance in her favor
of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay which case was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-
95. In her petition, she alleged among others, that she is one of the legitimate
grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be appointed as administratrix of
the estate.
[8]

On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the
surviving spouse of the decedent, that he has been managing the conjugal properties
even while the decedent has been alive and is better situated to protect the integrity of
the estate than the petitioner, that petitioner and her family have been alienated from
the decedent and the Oppositor for more than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that
Letters of Administration be issued instead to him.
[9]

On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner
moved to dismiss the special proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent
4

Isabel should not be appointed as administratrix of the decedents estate. In support
thereof, petitioner argues that under Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child
has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her father
or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabels father predeceased his
mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession by
representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration by the
then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of the respondent Isabels parents is null and
void, the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her
paternal grandmother the decedent.
[10]
On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued
the assailed order denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss.
[11]
When his motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 9,
1998,
[12]
petitioner, as mentioned above filed this petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in denying his
motion to dismiss as well as his motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (a) a
motion to dismiss is appropriate in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of
a deceased person; (b) the motion to dismiss was timely filed; (c) the dispositive
portion of the decision declaring the marriage of respondent Isabels parents null and
void must be upheld; and (d) said decision had long become final and had, in fact,
been executed.
On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that petitioners motion to dismiss
was late having been filed after the opposition was already filed in court, the
counterpart of an answer in an ordinary civil action and that petitioner in his opposition
likewise failed to specifically deny respondent Isabels allegation that she is a
legitimate child of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, the decedents son. She further contends
that petitioner proceeds from a miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil Case No.
Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the
decision and its dispositive portion because in an action for annulment of a marriage,
the court either sustains the validity of marriage or nullifies it. It does not, after hearing
a marriage voidable otherwise, the court will fail to decide and lastly, that the status
of marriages under Article 85 of the Civil Code before they are annulled is voidable.
The petition must fail.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence
of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose
of annulling or modifying the proceeding.
[13]
There must be a capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.
[14]

A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the respondent court did
not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of
which are quoted hereunder. To with:
The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively assessed and the pertinent
laws applied, the Court finds that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate
considering the peculiar nature of this special proceeding as distinguished from an
ordinary civil action. At the outset, this proceeding was not adversarial in nature and
the petitioner was not called upon to assert a cause of action against a particular
defendant. Furthermore, the State has a vital interest in the maintenance of the
proceedings, not only because of the taxes due it, but also because if no heirs qualify,
the State shall acquire the estate by escheat.
The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality of the petitioner to file
ad maintain this special proceedings, that in the case at bench, the body of the
decision determines the nature of the action which is for annulment, not declaration of
nullity.
The oppositors contention that the fallo of the questioned decision (Annex A
Motion) prevails over the body thereof is not of a final decision is definite, clear and
unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or
construction.
Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of the decision may be
referred to for purposes of construing the judgement (78 SCRA 541 citing Morelos v.
Go Chin Ling; and Heirs of Juan Presto v. Galang). The reason is that the dispositive
portion must find support from the decisions ratio decidendi.
Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of Quezon City, marked as
Annex A of oppositors motion, the marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which
refers to marriages which are considered voidable. Petitioner being conceived and
born of a voidable marriage before the decree of annulment, she is considered
legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.).
[15]

The trial court correctly ruled that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is
inappropriate. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure to be
observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings.
[16]
The Rules do
not only apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for.
Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the Rules
on Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall under Section 1,
Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to dismiss may be filed within the
time for but before filing the answer to the complaint. Clearly, the motion should
have been filed on or before the filing of petitioners opposition.
[17]
which is the
counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions.
Not only was petitioners motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed almost
two years after respondent Isabel was already through with the presentation of her
witnesses and evidence and petitioner had presented two witnesses. The filing of the
motion to dismiss is not only improper but also dilatory.
The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from established
jurisprudence on this matter, as petitioner asserts, had in fact faithfully observed the
law and legal precedents in this case. In fact, the alleged conflict between the body of
5

the decision and the dispositive portion thereof which created the ambiguity or
uncertainty in the decision of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable. The legal basis for
setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is clear under paragraph 3,
Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment of the Family
Code.
Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI
decision has categorically declared that the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is
null and void and that the legal effect of such declaration is that the marriage from its
inception is void and the children born out of said marriage is illegitimate. Such
argument cannot be sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83
[18]
of the New Civil Code
classify what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the causes for which a
marriage may be annulled.
[19]

The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void
marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages,
with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of
the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by
legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children under Article 89
[20]
irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void
marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its
civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as
if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the
effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in
voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides
that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural
children by legal fiction.
[21]
(Emphasis supplied)
Stated otherwise, the annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the
legal character of the society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the
juridical consequences which the marital union produced during its continuance.
[22]

Indeed, the terms annul and null and void have different legal connotations
and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make
void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with
[23]
whereas null and void is
something that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that
isannulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is
terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply
declares a status condition which already exists from the very beginning.
There is likewise no merit in petitioners argument that it is the dispositive
portion of the decision which must control as to whether or not the marriage of
respondent Isabels parents was void or voidable. Such argument springs from a
miscomprehension of the judgment of the Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous
premise that there is a conflict between the body of the decision and its dispositive
portion.
Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of
the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is
the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties and the questions
presented, notwithstanding statement in the body of the decision or order which may
be somewhat confusing,
[24]
the same is not without qualification. The foregoing rule
holds true only when the dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite, clear
and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or
construction which usually is the case where the order or decision in question is
that of a court not of record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts and
the law on which the judgment is based.
[25]

Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and
the body of the decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body of the
decision in order to give effect to the intention, purpose and judgment of the
court. In Republic v. delos Angeles
[26]
the Court said:
Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that [i]n case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail. This mandate of law, obviously cannot be any less binding
upon the courts in relation to its judgments.
x x x The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be construed as a whole so
as to bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and
reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and part if possible,
and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court, consistent with the provisions
of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864 [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the CFI of Rizal
quoted earlier shows that the marriage is voidable:
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration
classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as
1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed
under expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown
marked progress, he remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9,
1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at
the time of the marriage:
6

xxx xxx xxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
xxx xxx xxx
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the
mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without
sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the finding of the
neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in
reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).
[27]

Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of
respondent Isabels parents based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil
Code. The legal consequences as to the rights of the children are therefore governed
by the first clause of the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary interpretation
would be anathema to the rule just above-mentioned. Based on said provision the
children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were
conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside their marriage on
October 3, 1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking appointment as
estate administratrix, the legitimate grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may
invoke their successional right of representation in the estate of their grandmother
Cirstina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had
predeceased their grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice to a
determination by the courts of whether Letters of Administration may be granted to
her. Neither do the Court adjudged herein the successional rights of the personalities
involved over the decedents estate.
It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Ruiz Castro, emphasized to all magistrates of all levels of the
judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be exercised in the formulation of
the dispositive portion of a decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed
once the decision becomes final. The adjudication of the rights and obligations of thoe
parties, and the dispositions made as well as the directions and instructions given by
the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the decision, must all be
spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for dispute,
debate or interpretation.
[28]

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.




G.R. No. L-4316 May 28, 1952
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. HIGINIO MACADAEG, HON. POTENCIANO PECSON, HON. RAMON SAN
JOSE, as Chairman and Members, respectively; of the Seventh Guerrilla
Amnesty Commission, and ANTONIO GUILLERMO, alias, SLIVER, as an
interested party, respondents.
LABRADOR, J .:
This is an action of prohibition against the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission,
composed of Honorables Higinio Macadaeg, Potenciano Pecson, and Ramon R. San
Jose, Judges of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to restrain and prevent it from
taking jurisdiction and cognizance of a petition for amnesty filed by respondent
Antonio Guillermo, alias Silver, who was convicted and sentenced by this Court on
May 19, 1950, for murder in G.R. No. L-2188.
*
The grounds upon which the petition
are based are (1) that this Court has already expressly ruled in its judgment of
conviction of said case that said Antonio Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of
amnesty, because the murders of which he was convicted were committed "not in
furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a fratricidal strife between
two rival guerilla units," and (2) that the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission can
take cognizance only of cases pending appeal in the Supreme Court on October 2,
1946 (date of Administrative Order No. 1 of the President), at that time. The
respondents filed answers independently of each other, and with the exception of
Judge Ramon R. San Jose, they oppose the petition, alleging (1) that the decision of
this Court does not prevent the respondent Antonio Guillermo from invoking his right
to the provisions of the amnesty, because said right was not an issue at the trial on the
case against him, and the pronouncement of this Court thereon is not final and
conclusive and is merely an obiter dictum, and (2) that under a liberal interpretation of
the administrative orders implementing the President's Amnesty Proclamation, the
respondent Commission has jurisdiction of said petition.
The record discloses that the original information against respondent Antonio
Guillermo was filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte on September 16,
1946, and as amended information, on July 15, 1947. The Court of First Instance
rendered judgment on March 29, 1948. Thereupon, Guillermo presented an appeal to
this Court, and this Court rendered its judgement on May 19, 1950. On June 5, 1950,
Guillermo's Counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, but this motion was denied on
July 13, 1950. On June 20, 1950, even before his motion for reconsideration was
acted upon, respondent Guillermo filed a motion with this Court for the suspension of
the proceedings and the reference of the case to the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty
Commission, but this motion was denied by this Court on July 13, 1950. Antonio
Guillermo filed his petition for amnesty for respondent Commission on July 8, 1950.
On August 2, 1950, the records of the case against Guillermo were remanded to the
clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for the execution of the judgment,
and on October 17, 1950, the respondent Commission required the clerk of the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte to forward the records of the case to it, and on
7

November 9, 1950, it is set the case for hearing over the opposition of the Solicitor
General. It was at this stage that this action of prohibition was filed in this Court.
The first ground upon which the opposition to the petition is based, namely, that the
holding of this Court that the respondent Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of the
amnesty proclamation, is merely an obiter dictum, is without any legal foundation, and
must be dismissed. An obiter dictum is an opinion "uttered by the way, not upon the
point or question pending, as if turning aside from the main topic of the case to
collateral subjects" (Newmanvs. Kay, 49 S.E. 926, 931, 57 W. Va. 98, 68 L.R.A. 908,
4 Ann. Cas. 39 citing United States ex rel. Johnston vs.Clark County Court, 96 U.S.
211, 24 Ed. 628), or the opinion of the court upon any point or principle which it is not
required to decide (29 Words & Phrases 15), or an opinion of the court which does not
embody its determination and is made without argument or full consideration of the
point, and is not professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself (29 Words &
Phrases 13.). A cursory reading of the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-
2188
**
against respondent Antonio Guillermo discloses that the ruling of the Court that
the said respondent is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty is not an obiter
dictum, but is a ruling of the Court on an issue expressly raised by the party appellant
on facts or evidence adduced in the course of the trial of his case. It is not an opinion
uttered by the way; it is a direct ruling on an issue expressly raised by a party. It was
not unnecessary to make that ruling; the ruling was absolutely essential to a
determination of a question of fact and of law directly in issue. It was not made without
argument or full consideration of the point; it was deliberately entered by the Court
after arguments on both sides had been heard. This Could not have avoided
determining the issue without the peril of rendering an incomplete decision.
Hereinbelow we quote portions of the decision of this Court, from it which it can readily
be seen that it had before it evidence of the claim of amnesty expressly raised before
the Court, and its ruling that appellant was not entitled thereto.
Apparently realizing the inconsistency and untenability of that position
appellant also contends that granting for the sake of argument that the
accused was the author of the crime, there is proof "that the ill-starred
seven were charged of (with) being spies for the Japanese.
The insincerity and weakness of this last-ditch plea is manifest. Appellant
does not claim that he killed the seven victims because he had proof and
believe that they were spies for the Japanese. He merely says that they
were charged (by Sagad) with being spies for the Japanese.
At any rate, the amnesty proclamation now invoked is not applicable. We
are satisfied from the proofs that the massacre in question was committed
not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a
fracticidad strife between two rival guerrilla units. That was to hinder and not
a further the resistance against the Japanese enemy. It was a shame: and it
would be adding insult to injury to stigmatize the memory of the unfortunate
victims of such lust for power of and supremacy as spies and traitors to their
country, in the absence of the competent proof as they really were. We
spurn the baseless suggestion as rank injustice.
A more serious contention is, May not respondent Guillermo raise the issue before the
corresponding guerrilla amnesty commission in view of our ruling in the case of Viray
vs. Crisologo, et al.
***
G. R. No. L-2540, in which we held that the fact that the
defendant has declined to take advantage of the amnesty proclamation at the
beginning of his trial before a court martial does not preclude him from invoking it after
he was found guilty and convicted. The express holding of this Court is that case is as
follows:
In our opinion the fact that respondent Crisologo had declined to take
advantage of the amnesty proclamation at the beginning of his trial before
the court martial does not now preclude him from invoking it, especially after
he was found guilty and convicted. Before his trial he may and he must have
entertained the idea and the belief that the killing was justified and was done
in the performance of his duties as an official according to the criminal law,
and that consequently there was no need for amnesty. However, after the
court martial had disagreed with him and disabused him of his belief, he
realized the necessity of invoking amnesty. There is nothing in the law that
stands in his way toward seeking the benefits of a law which in his opinion
covers and obliterates the act of which he had been found criminally
responsible.
We hold that the above cited is not applicable to the case at bar, for in that case the
defendant did not invoke the benefits of the amnesty at the time of the trial or on
appeal, and only did so after he had been adjudge guilty and convicted, while in the
case at bar he did so. It is true that the appellant Guillermo did not expressly plead
amnesty, but the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the act
charged against him as an offense were disclosed at the trial, from which facts and
circumstances he later predicated the issue, before this Court, that he was entitled to
the benefits of the amnesty. It may be true that the appellant Guillermo did not
expressly plead amnesty as a defense at the trial of his case. But the rules on the
criminal procedure do not include to be expressly pleaded. (Section 1, Rule 113, Rule
of Court.) Even without an express plea of amnesty, a defendant may submit evidence
that the commission of the act imputed to him falls within the provisions of the
amnesty proclamation, without a previous formal announcement of such a defense
before or during the trial. And even without such express plea, if the court finds that
the case falls under the provisions of the amnesty proclamation, it is the duty of the
court to declare the fact, if the fact justify such a finding, and extend the benefits of the
amnesty to him.
. . .; and the accused, during such trial, may present evidence to prove that
his case falls within the terms of this amnesty. If the fact is legally proved,
the trial judge shall so declare and this amnesty shall be immediately
affective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be released or discharged.
(Proclamation No. 8, September 7, 1946, 42 Off. Gaz., No. 9 p. 2073.)
8

That the respondent herein Guillermo did not submit evidence to that effect is inferred
from the claim of his counsel in the case against him that "there is proof that the ill
starred seven were charged with being spies for the Japanese." Not only that, he
expressly raised that issue in this Court on appeal. May he rise this issue again before
the guerrilla amnesty commission, and thus have this administrative body reverse or
change the finding of this Court?
Under the circumstances of the present case, we hold that he should no longer be
permitted to do so in view of "the general rule common to all civilized systems of
jurisprudence that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its
appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or state of facts, should be regarded as a final
and conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the
controversy at rest. Indeed it has been well said that this more maxim is more than a
rule of law, more even than an important principle of public policy; and that it is a
fundamental concept in the organization of every jural society." (Pealosa vs. Tuason,
22 Phil., 303, 310; section 44, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
It is also argued, in support of the claim that this Court had no jurisdiction to make the
ruling that respondent Guillermo is not entitled to amnesty, that the guerrilla amnesty
commissions are the first ones to pass upon petitions for amnesty, that regular judicial
tribunals can not rule upon such an issue (of amnesty) unless it has first been
resolved by a commission, and that these are not judicial tribunals but administrative
bodies acting as arms of the executive in carrying out the purposes of the amnesty
proclamation, which is merely a form of executive clemency. It is true that the grant of
amnesty originates in an exclusive act. But the proclamation was issued under
expressly authority in the Constitution [Article VII, section 10 (6)], was expressly
sanctioned by the Congress (Resolution No. 13 dated September 18, 1946), and has
the nature, force, effect, and operation of a law. That the cognizance of applications
for amnesty is vested in the guerrilla amnesty commissions are mere screening bodies
is not denied, but there is nothing in the proclamation to support the contention that
the authority to decide any claim for amnesty is to be exercised but said commissions
alone, to the exclusion of the courts. Neither can it be denied that any one charged
before the courts may claim as a defense, waive the filing of an application therefor,
and submit evidence thereof in the trial of his case. In this latter case it would be a
cumbersome procedure, indeed, if said defense were first required to be submitted to
commission for decision, latter to be reviewed by a court. The only sensible
interpretation of the law is that while all applications should be passed upon by
commissions, an accused may, instead of filing an application, choose the alternative
remedy of just raising the issue in a court of justice in the trial of his case. And if this
second alternative is chosen, the applicant should be declared estopped from
contesting the decision, as well as the authority of the court that adversely passed
upon his claim.
But there are further and other considerations, also weighty and important, that attend
respondent Guillermo's petition for amnesty. He is not one filed during the pendency
of this case in the Court of First Instance it is a petition filed after final judgment of
conviction in this Supreme Court. It does not appear in the record that during the one
and a half-year period (September 16, 1946, to March 29, 1948) that this case was
being coursed and tried in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, that he ever filed
an application for amnesty. Neither does it appear that the provincial fiscal has ever
reported Guillermo's case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission for Ilocos Norte,
pursuant to the direct mandate of the amnesty proclamation. Nor did Guillermo ever
claim amnesty as his defense at the time of the trial. May we not justly infer from these
positive circumstances that, during all the time the case was pending and up to the
filling of appellant's brief in the Supreme Court, amnesty was never thought of as a
defense, either by the accused himself or by the fiscal, or by the judge trying the
case? As a matter of fact, this Court found that the issue of amnesty raised in this
Court of Appeal was a "last-ditch plea." Guillermo only thought of amnesty on June 20,
1950, after this Court had found him guilty, overruling his defense of amnesty, and
before his motion for reconsideration was denied. We are therefore, constrained to
hold that his present petition is not entirely free from a reasonable suspicion as to its
ends and purposes. It seems to us to be a last desperate attempt by technicality to
avert or delay the execution of the judgment of conviction rendered against him. Of
course, no court of justice would countenance such ill-advised attempt.
The second ground upon which the petition for prohibition is based is that the Seventh
Guerilla Amnesty Commission has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent
Guillermo's application. We also find this contention to be correct. Administrative
Order No. 11, which creates the guerrilla amnesty commission, expressly assigns to
the Seventh "cases from the different provinces and cities now pending appeal in the
Supreme Court." (Emphasis ours.) Said administrative order was promulgated on
October 2, 1946, on which date the criminal case against respondent Guillermo was
still pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. His case was a case in the
province (Ilocos Norte) assigned to the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission.
Respondents cite administrative Order No. 217 of the Department of Justice dated
December 1, 1948 to support their claim that the Seventh has jurisdiction of the
application, because of that date Guillermo's case was already pending in the
Supreme Court. This department order was issued, as it expressly states, "in view of
the appointments of new Judges of First Instances," not for the purpose of setting forth
cases cognizable by each of the different commissions, which the President had
already done. Besides, it can not be interpreted to modify the President's
administrative order apportioning the cases among the amnesty commissions.
In resume of our conclusions, we state (1) that the finding of this Court that Guillermo
is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty, is not an obiter dictum but a pronouncement
on a material issue, and is final and conclusive against him and may not, under the
principle of res judicata, be again raised in issue by him in any tribunal, judicial or
administrative; (2) that having voluntarily raised the issue in this Court during the
consideration of his case, he is now estopped from contesting the judgment, of the
jurisdiction of the court that rendered the adverse ruling; (3) that this petition is an ill-
advised attempt of doubtful good faith, to arrest or delay the execution of a final
judgement of conviction; and (4) that the respondent Commission has no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the application for amnesty.
Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is hereby granted, and the preliminary injunction
issued by this Court on November 24, 1950, made absolute, with costs against
respondent Antonio Guillermo, alias Silver.
9

G.R. No. L-11986 July 31, 1958
BERNARDO MANALANG, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
ELVIRA TUASON DE RICKARDS, ET AL., respondent-appellees.
Luis Manalang and Associates for appellants.
Jorge V. Jazmines for appellees.
FELIX, J .:
Elvira Vidal Tuason de Rickards is the owner of private subdivision located at
Sampaloc, Manila, with an area of 44,561.80 square meters covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 40961 (Exhibit 13) in 1954, the lots therein were leased to
various tenants among whom were Bernardo Manalang, Vicente de Leon and
Salvador de Leon occupying Lots Nos. 174-C, 160 and 158, respectively. As the City
of Manila allegedly increased the assessment of said land effective January 1, 1954,
the administrator thereof notified the tenants of the corresponding increase of the
rentals of the lots therein, such that the rental for the lot occupied by Bernardo
Manalang was raised from P36 to 80; the rental for Lot No. 160 was raised from P10
to P43.12; and from P24 to P51.24 for Lot No. 158. The said tenants, however,
insisted on paying the former rate, and as the landowner refused to accept the same,
the former consigned them in court.
On April 27, 1954, Elvira Vidal Tuason de Rickards, assisted by her husband, Jose A.
Rickards, instituted with the Municipal Court of Manila Civil Case No. 31401 against
Bernardo Manalang; Civil Case No. 31406 against Salvador de Leon; and Civil Case
No. 31411 against Vicente de Leon, all for ejectment. Therein defendants filed
separate motions to dismiss invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1162, which
was approved on June 18, 1954. The matter was duly heard and on July 14, 1954, the
Municipal Judge of Manila issued an order denying the motions to dismiss and
suspending the proceedings for 2 years from the enactment of Republic Act No. 1162
or until further order from the Court.
On April 13, 1955, upon motion of the plaintiffs, the Municipal Judge issued an order
setting the cases for hearing on the merits. Defendants tried to secure a
reconsideration of the aforesaid order, but as their motion was denied, they filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil
Case No. 26135) against the spouses Rickards and the Judges of the Municipal Court
of Manila, alleging that the order of the same Court of July 14, 1954, already disposed
of the action and determined the rights of the parties. It was thus prayed that a writ
enjoining the respondent Judges from proceeding with the hearing the cases be
issued; that said respondents be declared without jurisdiction to hear the same; and
that the orders of Municipal Judge Estrella Abad Santos setting the case for hearing
on the merits and the order of Acting Judge Sumilang Bernardo denying their motion
for reconsideration be set aside and declared null and void.
To this petition, the respondent spouses filed their answer denying some of the
averments of the same. And special defenses, it was contended that the order of July
14, 1954, did not settle the controversy it being merely an interlocutory order, and as
such could not be reviewed by a petition for certiorari. It was, therefore, prayed that
the petition be dismissed and the Municipal Judges be ordered to hear the cases on
the merits.
On February 6, 1956, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petition on
the ground that the order of the inferior court was merely interlocutory in nature, and
that the statements contained in the body thereof were the basis of the court's ruling,
as embodied in the dispositive part thereof denying the motion to dismiss and
suspending the proceedings therein for 2 years or until further order from the court.
From this decision, defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter tribunal
certified the case to Us on the ground that it involves only a question purely of law.
The main issue presented by the instant action is whether the order of the inferior
court of July 14, 1954, is interlocutory or not and consequently, whether the lower
court erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed therein. The
aforementioned order of the Municipal Judge dated July 14, 1954, is hereunder copied
in full:
ORDER
After a thorough consideration of the Motion to Dismiss and the opposition
thereto, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that from the approval of
Republic Act No. 1162 no ejectment proceedings should be instituted or
prosecuted against any tenant or occupant and that the unpaid rentals of
the tenants, if any they have, shall be liquidated and shall be paid in 18,
equal monthly installments from the date or time of liquidation and that the
landlord cannot charge more than the amount being charged or collected by
them from their tenants as of December 31, 1953.
It is undisputed fact that the premises occupied by the herein-defendants
have been and are actually being leased to tenants, for which reason it is
governed by the provisions of the aforesaid Act. But inasmuch as these
three cases of ejectment have been instituted before the approval of said
Act, it is the considered opinion of this Court that its prosecution should be
suspended. As to the motion to dismiss same is untenable and without
merit, for if these cases of ejectment will be dismissed as claimed by the
herein defendants, the liquidation of the unpaid rentals could not be carried
out effectively as provided by said Act.
As to the unconstitutionality of section 5 of the Republic Act in question, the
presumption is that same is valid and constitutional until it is declared
otherwise by the competent tribunal, for which reason we deem it our
bounden duty to enforce the avowed policy of the Republic of the
10

Philippines, as expressed in said Act (Pastor Mauricio et al. vs. Hon. Felix
Martinez et al., CA-G. R. 5114-R, promulgated January 31, 1952).
WHEREFORE, this Court orders the denial of the motion to dismiss, and the
suspension of the proceedings in the three above-entitled cases during the
period of two years from the approval of Republic Act No. 1162 or until
further order of this Court.
We see no reason why the ruling of the lower Court should not be affirmed. The order
of the Municipal Judge of July 14, 1954, is clear enough to call for any construction or
interpretation, for while it opens with the paragraph stating that it was the opinion of
the court "and so holds that from the approval of Republic Act No. 1162 no ejectment
proceedings should be instituted", etc., the dispositive portion of the order decreed the
denial of the motion to dismiss which was based on the same Republic Act No. 1162.
And this ruling is understandable. It appears that the actions for ejectment were filed
before the enactment of Republic Act No. 1162 and conceivably under the general
principle that laws can only be enforced prospectively, the Municipal Judge for one
reason or another saw it fit to suspend the proceedings for quite a long period,
probably with the expectation that the question of the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 1162 might be in the meantime duly passed upon.
It can be seen from the foregoing that the issues presented in the ejectment
proceedings were not settled thereby, for precisely the motion to dismiss filed by
defendants based on the provisions of Republic Act No. 1162 was denied. Certainly,
said actions having been merely suspended, and the jurisdiction of the court over said
proceedings not having been assailed, the said court has the power to reopen the
same for trial on the merits in order that the rights of the parties therein could be finally
determined. It is argued, however, by appellants that the body of the order recognized
the prohibition laid down by Republic Act No. 1162 against the institution of ejectment
proceedings after the effectivity of said Act. It is an elementary principle of procedure
that the resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of
the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles
the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the
existence of statements or declarations in the body of said order that may be
confusing. In the case at bar, considering that the dispositive part of the order merely
suspended the proceedings without touching on the merits of the case or disposing of
the issues involved therein, said order cannot be said to be final in character but
clearly an interlocutory one which in this case cannot be the subject of an action
for certiorari.
Wherefore, and acting merely on the question of procedure submitted to Us by the
instant appeal, We have to affirm, as We do hereby affirm, the order of the lower Court
dismissing appellant's petition for certiorari and prohibition. Without pronouncement as
to costs. It is ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Conception,
Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-40675 August 17, 1983
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE ERICTA, Judge, Court, of First Instance of Quezon City, Branch
XVIII; THE ACTING BRANCH CLERK OF COURT, Branch XVIII; REGISTER OF
DEEDS- OF QUEZON CITY; and JAIME 0. RIVERA,respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner. Renato B. Herrera for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, Acting C.J :
The Court dismisses for lack of legal basis and merit this special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition to set aside the questioned orders of respondent judge
granting execution of its final and executory decision and judg[nent ordering petitioner
corporation to execute the sale of the subject property in favor of private respondent
and to annul the corresponding transfer certificate of title issued by respondent
register of deeds in favor of said respondent pursuant to the deed of sale executed by
respondent branch clerk of court on behalf of petitioner corporation as authorized by
respondent judge.
Private respondent Jaime O. Rivera had obtained as plaintiff the judgment of
December 28, 1971 granting his 6tction for specific performance and "ordering the
defendant petitioner [PHHC] to execute a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff
[respondent Rivera] of the entire property described in paragraph 2 of the complaint"
and to pay P2,000.00 - attomey's fees and costs. The judgment was - entered
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 3802 enacted by Congress on June 22,
1963 providing for the sale at cost to registered tenants/lessees like respondent of the
dwelling units occupied by them and for the application in full in their favor of an the
past rentals paid by them to the purchase price. Petitioner failed to appeal the said
judgment which has long since become final and executory. In fact, in Resolution No.
17 of its board approved on July 25, 1972, petitioner formally accepted respondent's
proposal to waive the P2,000.00 - attorney's fees awarded in his favor by the
judgment and approved the sale of the entire property (Lots 12-A to 12-H, Block 447,
together with the rowhouses thereon) with one unit for residential purposes and the
others for a general and maternity clinic.
Nevertheless, petitioner failed to execute the corresponding deed of sale in favor of
respondent despite two writs of execution issued by respondent judge at respondent's
instance, with the claim not set forth in the aforesaid board resolution that respondent
had not completed payment of the purchase price (at cost). Respondent consequently
filed a motion for the lower court to appoint and authorize the clerk of court to execute
the deed of sale on behalf of petitioner corporation in his favor, expressly asserting
that "as duly proven during the trial of this case, [that] he has completed payment of
the total consideration of the sale as he is covered by Republic Act No. 3802 which
provided for the sale at cost [of the 'properties] to registered tenants."
1
Overruling
11

petitioner's opposition thereto, respondent judge issued the questioned Order of
March 14, 1975 granting the motion, as follows:
Acting on the plaintiff's motion dated March 3, 1975, and the
defendant's opposition thereto dated March 6, 1975, the Court
hereby orders Atty. Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, Acting Branch Clerk
of Court, to execute a Deed of Sale of the property described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint for the amount of P31,427.01 which,
as per decision of this Court dated December 28, 1971, had
already been paid by the plaintiff to the defendant People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation.
The execution of this Deed of Sale shall be done at the cost of the defendant People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation and the Deed of Sale shall have the same effect
as if it was executed by the defendant itsell "
2

Petitioner filed an extended motion for reconsideration and respondent judge, squarely
meeting the issues raised, denied the same in the questioned extended Order of April
21, 1975, as follows:
The motion for reconsideration is based on the allegation that the
dispositive portion of the decision of this Court dated December
28, 1971 does not contain the purchase price of the property and,
therefore, its inclusion in the Order of the Court dated March 14,
1975 is allegedly contrary to Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court. The PHHC contends that only the dispositive portion of the
decision constitutes the real judgment which should be executed.
The dispositive portion which is being executed reads as follows among others:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment ordering the defendant to execute a deed
of sale in favor of the plaintiff of the entire property described in paragraph 2 of the
complaint;'
Precisely, the Order of the Court dated March 14, 1975 orders the
execution of the aforecited dispositive portion of the decision. This
decision has become final and executory. The inclusion of the
purchase pyice of P31,427 01 in the Deed of Sale to be executed
by the Clerk of Court does not prejudice the PHHC nor does it
alter the decisiom Although the purchase pyice does not appear
in the dispositive part; it can be found on page two of the decision
itself
The Court does not wholly subscribe to the view that the judginent
can be found only in the dispositive portion of the decision.
It is true that the resolution of the court in a
given issue, which determines and settles the
rights of the parties, is ordinarily embodied in
the last or dispositive portion of the decision
(Manalang vs. Rickards, G.R. No. L- 11986,
promulgated July 31, 1958), yet, not
infrequently such resolution or ruling may and
does appear in other parts thereol Style in
decisionmaking or preparation is personal to
its writer. As long as the decision satisfied the
requirement of the law (Art. VIII Sec. 12,
Philippine Constitution; Rule 35, Sec. 1.
Rules of Court), we find no compelling reason
to adopt a definite and stringent rule
underlining how and where the judgment
would be framed. Indeed it is well said that to
get the true intent and meaning of a decision,
no specific portion thereof should be resorted
to but same must be considered in its entirety
(Escarella vs. Director of Lands, 83 Phil. 491;
46 Off. Gaz. No. 11, p. 5487; I Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 Ed. p.
478, Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans' Board
and AssGciates Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.,
No. L-12779, dated August 28, 1929, 106
Phil. 125).
3

Hence, the present action of petitioner contending that respondent judge's court
"abused its discretion or acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction" in issuing the
aforesaid questioned Orders leading to the execution of the deed of sale by the clerk
of court on behalf of petitioner corporation and the issuance of T.C.T. No. 206668 of
Quezon City in respondent's favor "by adding therein matters which were not included
in the dispositive portion of the decision dated December 28, 1971. " As above stated,
the Court has found the petition to be without legal basis and merit.
Respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion nor did he act "capriciously
or whimsically" as to amount to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Orders.
As correctly stated by respondent judge in denying reconsideration, his court was
merely ordering the execution of the dispositive portion or judgment of the decision for
11 execution of a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff [herein respondentj," no more, no
less. Said judgment ordered the execution of such deed of sale unqualifiedly and
unconditionally and has long become final and executory. The entire record shows
that no claim is made by petitioner that the amount of P31,427.01 paid by respondent
by way of rentals for a period of ten years (1954 to 1964) (as expressly found in the
decision) does not cover the full cost to it of the property. The decision's clear
implication is that these rentals did fully cover the cost to petitioner of the property and
therefore constituted full,,payment of the purchase price as fixed by
12

Republic Act No. 3802. Hence, the judgment ordering unqualifiedly the execution of
the sale to respondent, subject to no further payment of any amount.
If petitioner wanted to dispute such judgment, it should have appealed the same but it
did not do so. Nevertheless, when respondent moved for authority for the branch clerk
of court to execute the sale due to petitioner's failure to heed the writs of execution,
pursuant to Rule 39, section 10 of the Rules of Court,
4
petitioner was given full
opportunity both in its opposition and at the hearing of respondent's motion to show
that such rentals paid by respondent did not cover the fun cost to petitioner of the
property (as fixed by the cited covering Act) but it could not cite any deficiency. It still
had another opportunity when it filed its motion for reconsideration, but could not do
so. Manifestly, respondent's rental payments fully covered the purchase price (at cost)
of the property. All petitioner could do was raise a technical question that the trial
court's final decision of December 28, 1971 did not contain the purchase price of the
property. This was utterly untenable since the judgment unqualifiedly ordered the
execution of the sale without any further payment and petitioner failed to show that
respondent's substantial rental payments over a ten-year period did not fully cover the
cost of the property. Finally, having submitted this issue for respondent judge's
resolution, petitioner is now in estoppel from "speculating on the fortunes of litigation"
and now challenging the adverse orders in these certiorari and prohibition
proceedings.
5

Two other submittals of petitioner are equally without merit. First, the fact that
respondent branch clerk of court executed the deed of sale before petitioner was
furnished a copy of the execution order of March 14, 1975 (due to an oversight of the
mailing clerk) in no way constitutes a jurisdictional defect that affects the validity of the
order.
6
The order for execution of the deed of sale was a matter of right flowing from a
final and executory judgment and could have been issued ex parte under Rule 39,
section 1 of the Rules of Court. At any rate, petitioner had fuu opportunity to contest
the order, through its motion for reconsideration which was denied in due course by
respondent judge per the reasoned Order of April 21, 1975. Second, contrary to
petitioner's claim, no abuse of disicretion was committed when respondent judge
issued the execution order notwithstanding the pendency in the Court of Appeals at
the time of CA-G.R. No. 51545-R entitled "Jaime O. Rivera, petitioner-appellee vs.
PHHC,respondent-appellant," which was an appeal by petitioner from the adverse
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City permanently enjoining it from
enforcing an ejectment order agikinst respondent in view of petitioner's subsequent
approval of the sale of the property to respondent pursuant to Republic Act No. 3802.
Clearly, the pendency of such appeal had no bearing on the questioned execution
orders at bar. At any rate, the ejectment order had manifestly become moot and
academic as correctly held therein by the lower court. Finally the records of said case
show that as per judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals on September 14, 1978,
the judgment appealed from by herein petitioner PHHC was affirmed and final entry of
judgment was therein made on October 13, 1978.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed and the temporary restraining order
heretofore issued is lifted effective immediately. No costs.
Brother Mike Velarde vs. Social Justice Society
(G.R. No. 159357, 28 April 2004)

Doctrine: Decision, more specifically a decision not conforming to the form and
substance required by the Constitution is void and deemed legally inexistent
(Panganiban)
Mike Velarde, Petitioner vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.
Date promulgated: April 28, 2004
Ponente: J. Panganiban

Facts:
-On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-
Manila against Velarde and his co-respondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin,
Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F.
Soriano.
-SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional
provisions, specifically on theseparation of church and state; and a declaratory
judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate
for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a
specified candidate.
-The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact that
alleged that the questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of action and that there
was no justiciable controversy.
-The trial courts junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons:
1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a
determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents were violative of
Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the petition has raised only a question of
law.
2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition
the separation of church and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical
background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court quipped at some point
that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a
clear violation of the separation clause."
-The trial courts essay did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive
portion, however. Due to this aberration, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions
for Reconsideration before the trial court owing to these facts.
-The lower court denied these Motions. Hence, this petition for review.
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14
-In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Courts
resolution:
1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo
was proper and valid;
2. Whether or not there exists justiciable controversy in herein
respondents Petition for declaratory relief;
3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for
declaratory relief;
4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein
respondent is ripe for judicial determination;
5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,
13

6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory
relief of herein respondent.

Issues:
In its oral argument, the Supreme Court condensed Velardes issues and divided it
into 2 groups:
A. Procedural Issues
1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy?
2. Did it state a cause of action?
3.Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?
B. Substantive Issues
1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the
Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?
2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be
prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be
banned from campaigning against said candidates? (Not answered in the affirmative)

Decision:
Petition for Review GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29,
2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila DECLARED NULL AND VOID and
thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to
state a cause of action.

Holding:
Procedural Issues:
1. NO. A justiciable controversy to an existing case or controversy
that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural
or merely anticipatory. A petition filed with the trial court should contain a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading
relies for his claim.

The SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to constitutue a jusiciable
controversy. Why?
a. It stated no ultimate facts. The petition simply theorized that the people elected
who were endorsed by these religious leaders might become beholden to the latter.
b. It did not sufficiently state a declaration of its rights and duties, what
specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein, and what
particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the
constitution,
c. The petition did not pray for a stoppage of violated rights (duh, wala
ngang rights na sinabi eh). It merely sought an opinion of the trial court. However,
courts are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion. (tantamount to making laws,
remember the questionability of justice panganibans guidelines for article 36 of the
family code)

It must also be considered that even the religious leaders were puzzled as to the
breach of rights they were claimed to have committed. As pointed out by Soriano,
what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS? Jaime Cardinal Sin adds
that the election season had not even started at the time SJS filed its Petition and that
he has not been actively involved in partisan politics. The Petition does not even
allege any indication or manifest intenton the part of any of the respondents below
to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, a
particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise
to an actionable right.


2. NO. A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in
violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter. (Rebollido v.
Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800)
Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.

The court held that the complaints failure to state a cause of action became a
ground for its outright dismissal. Why?

The Court found nothing in the SJS Petition to suggest that an explicit allegation of
fact that SJS had a legal right to protect. (trigger for the cause of action)

In special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of cause of action under
ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an
action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or
violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.

The justices could only infer that the interest from its allegation was its mention of
its (SJS) thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and
who are keenly interested. Aside from the fact that this general averment did not
constitute a legal right or interest, the courts inferred interest too vague and
speculative in character. Rules require that the interest must be material to the
issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument.

To bolster its point, the SJS cited the Corpus Juris Secundum and submitted
that the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a claim
against the defendant, but sought a judicial declaration of the rights of the parties for
the purpose of guiding their future conduct, and the essential distinction between a
declaratory judgment action and the usual action is that no actual wrong need
have been committed or loss have occurred in order to sustain the declaratory
judgment action, although there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur
or that the asserted rights will be invaded. (???)

During the Oral Argument, Velarde and co-respondents strongly asserted that they
had not in any way engaged or intended to participate in partisan politics. Not even the
alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below would have
provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by
any of those respondents.

Even if the SJS petition asserted a legal right, there was nevertheless no
certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents.
14


3. NO. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.

Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or
instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.

SJS has no legal interest in the controversy and has failed to establish how the
resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it.

Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute
must demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or
privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.

If the petition were to be valid, it should satisfy:

First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation, particularly
that of Congress' taxing power.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a
political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the
alleged acts of the respondents below, such as the deprivation of votes or barring of
suffrage to its constituents.
Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-
taxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond the contemplation of the
standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in
character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the
requirement of standing.
In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when
a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance or importance to the
people (IBP v Zamora). The Court deemed the constitutional issue raised to be both
transcendental in importance and novel in nature. Nevertheless, the barren allegations
in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated proceedings in the court would prevent
the resolution of the transcendental issue.

Substantive Issues


1. NO. The Constitution commands that no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the basis therefor.

Consistent with this are Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, Administrative Circular No. 1. which
states that :

A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The
decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge,
stating clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based, signed by
the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.

The SC has reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section `4, Art VIII of the
contsitution. This was evinced in Yao v. Court of Appeals where Davide, CJ said that
faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play.

In People v. Bugarin, the court held that the requirement that the decisions of courts
must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which they are based is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of
the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out
to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with
which he disagrees.

The assailed Decision contains no statement of facts (much less an
assessment or analysis thereof) or of the courts findings as to the probable facts. The
assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the question
or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions
involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural
incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length
opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state. Without
expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted
or denied, the trial judge ends her Decision with the clause SO ORDERED.

A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible
errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge
did so through the processes of legal reasoning.

It was truly obvious that the RTCs Decision did not adhere to the Bugarin
precedent because of its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it
was based. The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as
a precedent (how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of factual
comparison?).

Respondent SJS insisted that the dispositive portion can be found in the body (p.
10) of the assailed Decision. Stating Endorsement of specific candidates in an
election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.

The Court held that the statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal
question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively
declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant
any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required of a
dispositive portion.
15


The standard for a dispositive was set in Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards where
the resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the
decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor thatdetermines and settles
the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the
existence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing.

In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag: The rule is settled that where there is a conflict
between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on
the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is
merely a statement ordering nothing.

The statement quoted by SJS does not conclusively declare the rights (or
obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant proper relief under the
circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.

Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in
careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be
struck down as void.

2. It is not legally possible to take up, on the merits, the paramount
question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that the
constitutionality of a statute or act will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it
is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the
protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (So no answer)






[G.R. No. 155651. July 28, 2005]

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., SALES FORCE UNION-PTGWO-
BALAIS, petitioner, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals Decision
[1]
and Resolution
[2]
dated 22 May 2002 and 03 October 2002,
respectively, affirming the 21 January 2001 Decision of the panel of voluntary
arbitrators (Panel) of the National Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB) for the reason
that the Panel decision had already attained finality.

The following is a narration by the Court of Appeals of the undisputed facts:
The Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. Sales Force Union-PTGWO is a legitimate
labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and
is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all regular route salesmen,
regular relief route salesmen, regular lead helpers, regular relief lead helpers, regular
route helpers, regular relief route helpers and order-taker collectors who are assigned
in various sales offices specified in the parties collective bargaining agreement. On
the other hand, the respondent company is a domestic corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines and is engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of its soft drink products.
In January 1989, the UNION filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board raising certain issues for conciliation. As a result of said dispute, the
UNION staged a strike.
Subsequently, the Board succeeded in making the parties agree to a voluntary
settlement of the case via a Memorandum of Agreement signed by them on February
9, 1989. Among others, the petitioner and the respondent agreed, as follows:
1. Christmas Bonus
The Company shall grant to all those covered by the Bargaining Unit represented by
the Union an amount equivalent to fifty (50%) percent of their average commission for
the last six (6) months.
The union hereby acknowledges that the granting of a Christmas bonus is purely a
Management prerogative and as such, in determining the amount thereof the same is
solely a discretion of Management. The parties however agree that henceforth
whenever Management exercises this prerogative, the same shall include the average
commission for the last six (6) months prior to the grant.
Since then, the management granted to each covered employee every December of
the year a certain percentage of his basic pay and an amount equivalent to fifty (50%)
percent of his average commission for the last six months prior to the grant. However,
in December 1999, the respondent granted a fixed amount of P4,000.00 only,
eliminating thereby the said 50% employees average commission for the last six
months for members of the union. Thus, claiming the same as violation of the MOA,
the union submitted its grievance to the respondent. No settlement was reached,
hence, the case was then referred to a Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators.
Petitioner claimed that the MOA establishes the companys obligation to pay
additionally 50% of the average commission whenever it decides to grant a bonus and
that the fixed amount of P4,000.00 granted in December 1999, although denominated
as ex-gratia was actually a Christmas bonus. In support of its stand, the Union
submitted sample payslips for the prior years wherein the company granted a
16

performance grant or one time grant computed as a percentage of the employees
basic salary. An illustrative example was that given to Jose Manalusan. His payslip
dated December 6, 1996 shows his basic rate at P5,080.00 and an item SPL GRNT
in the amount of P4,786.41. On top of the payslip (sic) appear the words 80%
performance grant. According to the Union, this amount of P4,786. is P722.41 more
than 80% of Manalusans then basic rate (80% of P5,080.00 being PhP4,064.00).
Thus, the Union concludes that the difference of P722.41 represents additional 50% of
average commission. In sum, the Union asseverates that the grant of the additional
50% of the average commission has become a practice since 1989 and has ripened
into a contractual obligation.
On the other hand, the respondent company countered that in 1999 it suffered its
worst financial performance in its history; that its sales volume was twenty percent
(20%) behind plan and ten percent (10%) below the sales in 1998, as a result, it
suffered an abnormal loss of Two Billion Five Hundred Million Pesos
(P2,500,000,000.00); that faced with tremendous losses, the management decided
not to grant bonuses to its employees in 1999; that through Memorandum 99010
dated December 14, 1999, its President, Mr. Peter Baker explained to the employees
the companys financial situation and the decision not to grant bonuses; that in the
same memo however, the company granted a special ex gratia payment of Four
Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) to all its permanent employees, . . .
During the past year (sic) we have suffered greatly as a result of a number of internal
and external issues including the effect of the general economic pressures in the
Philippines.
Our sales volume in 1999 is approximately 20% behind the plan and 10% below last
year. This together with lower than expected prices and increased costs will result in
a financial performance which is undoubtedly the worst in our history.
The Coca-cola Amatil Board has announced that it expects an abnormal loss of
PhP2.5 Billion (AUD100 million) before tax at CCBPI in 1999 and that reported on-
going results will be below everyones expectations.
In these circumstances the CCBPI Executive Committee has decided that the CCBPI
is not able to pay bonuses to any staff in 1999. As your new president, it disappoints
me greatly to have to inform you of this situation.
Our situation has been discussed with the CCA Board and they are understanding of
the difficulties we face a (sic) present and grateful of the efforts of our associates at all
levels. Furthermore, the management of CCA has agreed to make a special Ex
Gratia payment PhP4,000.00 to all permanent employees of CCBPI. Our hope that
[t]his will assist in some way to allow you and your families to enjoy the festive season.
In denying the claim of the Union for the payment of the additional 50% of the average
commission for the last six months, the respondent argues that the said MOA is not
applicable since the company did not grant Christmas bonus in 1999.
After hearing and the submission of evidence and position papers, the Arbitration
Panel composed of Apron Mangabat and Noel Sanchez, as chairman and member,
respectively, denied petitioners claim and declared that the P4,000.00 given as ex
gratia is not a bonus, while Arnel Dolendo, another member dissented. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the special Ex Gratia
payment of P4,000.00 made pursuant to the Memo of Mr. Peter Baker dated
December 14, 1999 was not a Christmas bonus and therefore, the claim of the Union
for an additional 50% of average commission on top of said P4,000.00 is hereby
denied.
[3]

A copy of this Decision dated 21 January 2001 was received by petitioners
counsel on 20 February 2001. Said Decision was signed only by the Chairman of the
Panel, Mr. Apron Mangabat, and one of its members, Atty. Noel Sanchez. As to the
third member, Atty. Arnel Dolendo, instead of a signature on top of his printed name,
the following notation appears:
Dissented during deliberation.
Will file a separate opinion.
No separate opinion, however, was attached to the Decision as received by petitioner,
through its counsel. Thus, on 22 February 2001 (two days after receipt of the
Decision), petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion where it
essentially questioned the validity of the decision, opining that the Panels decision
without such dissenting and separate opinion attached thereto makes the decision
incomplete and prematurely issued. It consequently prayed that the questioned
Decision be held in abeyance and for the Panel to immediately issue an order to the
effect that the prescriptive period available to any of the parties to seek any legal
remedy or relief be suspended in the meantime.
The Panel did not directly act on this motion. Instead, on 02 March 2001,
petitioner received a Notice of Transmittal from the NCMB furnishing it a copy of Atty.
Dolendos separate opinion together with the 21 January 2001 Decision. Thus, on 12
March 2001, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 21 January 2001
Decision.
On 30 May 2001, the Panel denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. A
copy of the Order of denial was received by petitioner on 09 July 2001. By virtue
thereof, petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals on 24 July
2001.
In dealing with the controversy, the Court of Appeals adopted a two-tiered
approach. First, it held that contrary to the view of the Panel, theP4,000.00 special ex
gratia payment is a Christmas bonus, hence, petitioners members are entitled to the
additional 50% average commission for the last six months prior to the grant pursuant
to the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners motion for reconsideration dated
12 March 2001 of the Decision of the Panel that was originally received on 20
17

February 2001 was filed out of time; hence, the said Decision already became final
and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the Decision by
the parties pursuant to Article 262-A of the Labor Code. The Court of Appeals
ratiocinated thus:
On the matter of procedure, Article 262-A of the Labor Code governs. It provides that
the award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the
award or decision by the parties. Moreover, Section 6, Rule VII of the NCMB
Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings, dated July
28, 1989, states categorically, to wit:
Section 6. Finality of Award or Decisions. Awards or decisions of voluntary
arbitrator become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
copies of the award or decision by the parties.
The above-mentioned rule makes the voluntary arbitrators award final and executory
after ten calendar days from receipt of a copy of the decision or award by the parties.
Presumably, the decision may still be reconsidered by the Voluntary Arbitrator on the
basis of a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed during that period. Thus, the
seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration following the receipt by the petitioner
of a copy of the decision or award of the panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, is a mandatory
requirement to forestall the finality of such decision or award. In the case at bar
however, the petitioner filed on March 12, 2001 a motion for reconsideration of the
arbitrators decision, which it received on February 20, 2001. Without doubt at the time
the said motion was filed, which was beyond the reglementary period of ten (10) days,
the decision had already become final and executory. It is a hornbook rule that once a
judgment has become final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law,
and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as what remains to be done is the
purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment of
adjudicating bodies must become final and executory on some definite date fixed by
law. In the more recent case of DBP v. NLRC, the Supreme Court reiterated that the
doctrine of immutability of final judgment is adhered to by necessity notwithstanding
occasional errors that may result thereby, since litigations must somehow come to an
end for otherwise, it would be even more intolerable than the wrong and injustice it is
designed to correct.
And, acting on petitioners motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals held:
We cannot simply yield to the submission of the petitioner that the decision of the
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators had not yet became final and executory. It is not correct
to say that March 2, 2001, the date when the petitioner union received the January 21,
2001 decision of the panel of Voluntary Arbitrators together with the dissenting opinion
of Voluntary Arbitrator Arnel Dolendo should be considered as the reckoning date for
purposes of filing a motion for reconsideration. The absence of the dissenting opinion
in the copy of the assailed decision duly received by the petitioner on February 20,
2001 did not make the said decision incomplete, for it disposed of all the issues of the
case validly raised. Well settled is the rule that a dissenting opinion, as it is, is a mere
expression of the individual view of the dissenting justice from the conclusion held by
the majority of the court and therefore, not binding. It is the dispositive portion of the
decision or the fallo, which contains the final and actual adjudication of the rights of
the parties that constitutes the judgment of the court. Hence, to forestall the finality of
the arbitrators award, petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration within
the reglementary period of ten (10) days, without waiting for the dissenting opinion of
Voluntary Arbitrator Dolendo. Thus, the filing of the motion for reconsideration of the
arbitrators award only on March 12, 2001 was way beyond the ten (10) day
reglementary period and had the effect of rendering the panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
decision final and executory. Certainly, in allowing the arbitrators award to lapse into
finality on the flimsy excuse that it has to receive the dissenting opinion of Arnel
Dolendo does not find support in law. Finality of judgment becomes a fact when the
reglementary period to appeal lapses, and no appeal is perfected within such period. It
is a jurisdictional event which can not be made to depend on the convenience of a
party.
[4]

From this aspect of the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution, petitioner
now comes before us for redress, assigning as sole issue the following:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION ON MERE TECHNICALITY CONTRARY TO
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, AFTER FAVORABLY RULING ON THE MERITS IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER
The resolution of the present controversy hinges for the most part on the correct
disposition of petitioners argument that the Panels Decision sans the dissenting
opinion of one of its members was irregularly issued; hence, did not toll the running of
the prescriptive period within which to file a motion for reconsideration. To sustain
petitioners argument would mean that the subject Decision could still be reviewed by
the Court of Appeals. A contrary resolution would stamp the subject decision with
finality rendering it impervious to review pursuant to the doctrine of finality of
judgments.
Rule VII, Section 1 of the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary
Arbitration Proceedings provides the key. Therein, what constitutes the voluntary
arbitrators decision (and, by extension, that of the Panel of voluntary arbitrators) is
defined with precision, to wit:
Section 1. Decision Award. -- The final arbitral disposition of issue/s submitted to
voluntary arbitration is the Decision. The disposition may take the form of a dismissal
of a claim or grant of specific remedy, either by way of prohibition of particular acts or
specific performance of particular acts. In the latter case the decision is called an
Award.
18

In herein case, the Decision of the Panel was in the form of a dismissal of petitioners
complaint. Naturally, this dismissal was contained in the main decision and not in the
dissenting opinion. Thus, under Section 6, Rule VII of the same guidelines
implementing Article 262-A of the Labor Code, this Decision, as a matter of course,
would become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies
of the decision by the parties even without receipt of the dissenting opinion unless, in
the meantime, a motion for reconsideration
[5]
or a petition for review to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
[6]
is filed within the same 10-day period.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, a dissenting opinion is not binding on
the parties as it is a mere expression of the individual view of the dissenting member
from the conclusion held by the majority of the Court, following our ruling in Garcia v.
Perez
[7]
as reiterated in National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied
Industries v. NLRC.
[8]

Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the
petition before it as it no longer had any appellate jurisdiction to alter or nullify the
decision of the Panel.
[9]
The Panels Decision had become final and executory, hence,
unchallengeable.
We are not unmindful that in labor disputes, social justice exhorts courts to lean
backwards in favor of the working class. Corollary thereto, it is doctrinal that in labor
disputes, rules of procedure cannot be applied in a rigid and technical sense.
[10]
Thus,
in appropriate cases, we have not hesitated to relax matters of procedure in the
interest of substantial justice.
[11]
As applied herein, however, our hands are tied by the
fact that the case had already attained finality long before it got here. As we declared
in Nacuray v. National Labor Relations Commission
[12]
--
. . . Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and
executory it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and whether made by the highest court
of the land. The reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public
policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders
of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated 22
May 2002 and its Resolution dated 03 October 2002 are hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.



G.R. No. L-45404 August 7, 1987
G. JESUS B. RUIZ, petitioner,
vs.
ENCARNACION UCOL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J :
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte
dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's complaint for damages against defendant-appellee
on the ground of res judicata. The issue involved being a pure question of law, the
appellate court certified the appeal to us for decision on the merits.
The facts are not disputed, Agustina Tagaca, laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Atty.
Jesus B. Ruiz filed an administrative charge against defendant-appellee Encarnacion
Ucol, a midwife in the health center of Sarratt Ilocos Norte. In her answer to the
charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz who
wanted to get back at the Ucol's because of a case filed by Encarnacion Ucol's
husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to have made remarks that Atty. Ruiz
instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges.
The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file his own criminal
complaint for libel against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol's answer.
Upon arraignment, Ucol entered a plea of not guilty. During the proceedings in the
libel case, complainant Atty. Ruiz entered his appearance and participated as private
prosecutor. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment acquitting Ucol on the
ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. No
pronouncement was made by the trial court as to the civil liability of the accused.
Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for
damages based on the same facts upon which the libel case was founded.
Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and that the cause
of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. As earlier
stated, on appeal, the Court of Appeals certified the case to us, the only issue being
whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred by the criminal case of
libel.
Before going into the merit of this appeal, it is noteworthy to mention that there are
actually two cases now before us involving the contending parties. Defendant-appellee
19

Ucol filed an "appeal by certiorari" before this Court questioning the dissenting
opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Ucol prays for a ruling "that the respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse
of discretion in not dismissing the present case but instead in ordering the same
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings ... ."
Any ordinary student in law school should readily know that what comprises a decision
which can be the subject of an appeal or a special civil action is the majority opinion of
the members of the court, but never the dissenting opinion. Moreover, no decision on
appeal has as yet been rendered in this case. The act of the defendant-appellee's
counsel in filing such a petition defies logic or reason. It is totally inexplicable how a
member of the bar could be so careless or, if the act was deliberate, could have the
courage to come before this Court asking us to review a dissenting opinion. Counsel is
warned that we do not find his mistake in the slightest bit amusing.
Turning now to the present appeal, plaintiff-appellant Ruiz contends that there can be
no res judicata since nowhere in its decision did the trial court pass upon the civil
aspect of the criminal case nor did it make any express declaration that the fact on
which said case was predicated did not exist. He cites the pertinent provisions of
Article 29 of the Civil Code and Rule III, Section 3 subsection (c) of the Rules of Court
which respectively provide:
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. ...
RULE III, Sec. 3(c)
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. ...
We may also mention Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an offended party in
cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action separate and distinct
from the criminal proceedings whether or not a reservation was made to that effect.
The plaintiff-appellant's contentions have no merit. The right of the plaintiff-appellant
under the above provisions to file the civil action for damages based on the same facts
upon which he instituted the libel case is not without limitation.
We find the appeal of G. Jesus B. Ruiz without merit. We see no advantage or benefit
in adding to the clogged dockets of our trial courts what plainly appears from the
records to be a harassment suit.
In acquitting Encarnacion Ucol of the libel charge, the trial court made these factual
findings:
Clearly then, Atty. Ruiz filed the instant Criminal Case against
Encarnacion Ucol as retaliation for what he believed was an act of
ingratitude to him on the part of her husband. The precipitate
haste with which the administrative complaint was filed shows that
he was the one personally interested in the matter. All that
Agustina Tagaca told him was double hearsay. The incident, if
there was, happened between the accused and Ceferino in the
absence of Agustina; so that, all that Ceferina allegedly told her,
and she in turn told Atty. Ruiz, was undoubtedly double check
hearsay; and Atty. Ruiz should therefore check the facts with
Ceferino, but he did not do that, and he did not even present
Ceferino as a witness. For these reasons, accused has every
reason to believe that Atty. Ruiz was the author who concocted
the charges in the administrative complaint and had his laundry-
woman, complainant Agustina Tagaca, sign it. Agustina has very
little education and could hardly speak English, yet the
administrative complaint was written in polished English, and who
else but Atty. Ruiz could have authored those phrases in the
complaint: "The retention of Mrs. Ucol in this government service
is inimical to the good intentions of the Department to serve
humanity and a disgrace and liability to present administration."
As will be shown later on, it appears that it is this complaint
signed by Agustina, but authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous
and not the respondent's answer; and even, assuming that the
administrative complaint may not have been impelled by actual
malice, the charge(s) were certainly reckless in the face of proven
facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for
parties to give bent to their prejudice. The poor and the humble
are, as a general rule, grateful to a fault, that intrigues and
ingratitude are what they abhor. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp.
8-10).
The findings in the criminal case, therefore, show a pattern of harassment. First,
petitioner Ruiz had something to do with the administrative complaint. The complaint
was dismissed. Second, he filed a criminal case for libel based on portions of Mrs.
Ucol's answer in the administrative case. Third, he acted as private prosecutor in the
criminal case actively handling as a lawyer the very case where he was the
complainant. And fourth, after the accused was acquitted on the basis of the facts
stated above, Atty. Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols with implacability by filing a
civil action for damages. As stated by the trial judge, "court actions are not established
for parties to give bent to their prejudice." This is doubly true when the party
incessantly filing cases is a member of the bar. He should set an example in sobriety
and in trying to prevent false and groundless suits.
In Roa v. de la Cruz, et al. (107, Phil. 10) this Court ruled:
20

Under the above provisions (Art. 33 of the Civil Code),
independently of a criminal action for defamation, a civil suit for
the recovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought by the
injured party. It is apparent, however, from the use of the words
"may be," that the institution of such suit is optional." (An Outline
of Philippine Civil Law by J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. I, p.
54) In other words, the civil liability arising from the crime charged
may still be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended
party does not waive to have it adjudged, or does not reserve his
right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. (The
case of Reyes v. de la Rosa (52 Off. Gaz., [15] 6548; 99 Phil.,
1013) cited by plaintiff in support of her contention that under Art.
33 of the New Civil Code the injured party is not required to
reserve her right to institute the civil action, is not applicable to the
present case. There was no showing in that case that the
offended party intervened in the prosecution of the offense, and
the amount of damages sought to be recovered was beyond the
jurisdiction of the criminal court so that a reservation of the civil
action was useless or unnecessary.) (Dionisio v. Alvendia, 102
Phil., 443; 55 Off. Gaz., [25]4633.])
In the instant case, it is not disputed that plaintiff Maria C. Roa
upon whose initiative the criminal action for defamation against
the defendant Segunda de la Cruz was filed did not reserve
her right to institute it, subject, always to the direction and control
of the prosecuting fiscal. (Section 15 in connection with section 4
of Rule 106, Rules of Court; Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, 94 Phil.,
197). The reason of the law in not permitting the offended party to
intervene in the prosecution of the offense if he had waived or
reserved his right to institute the civil action is that by such action
her interest in the criminal case has disappeared. Its prosecution
becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. (Gorospe, et
al., v. Gatmaitan, et al., 98 Phil., 600; 52 Off. Gaz., [15] 2526).
The rule, therefore, is that the right of intervention reserved to the
injured party is for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability
born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the
accused. (People v. Orais, 65 Phil., 744; People v. Velez, 77 Phil.,
1026; People v. Flores, et al., G.R. No. L-7528, December
18,1957; see also U.S. v. Malabon, 1 Phil., 731; U.S. v. Heery, 25
Phil., 600).
Plaintiff having elected to claim damages arising from the offense
charged in the criminal case through her appearance or
intervention as private prosecutor we hold that the final judgment
rendered therein constitutes a bar to the present civil action for
damages based upon the same cause. (See Tan v. Standard
Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil., 672; 48 Off. Gaz., [7] 2745.).
We are, therefore, constrained to dismiss the present appeal. Atty. Ruiz has more
than had his day in court. The then court of first instance acquitted Mrs. Ucol and
stated in the dispositive portion of its decision that her guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. A review of the court's findings, however, indicates that the
disputed Answer of Mrs. Ucol in the administrative case contains no libel. As stated by
the trial court, "As will be shown later, it appears that it is this complaint signed by
Agustina, but authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous and not the respondent's answer."
(Emphasis supplied). The court found the charges against Ucol, if not malicious, at
least reckless in the face of proven facts and circumstances.
The trial court stated.
Analyzing defendant's answer Exh. "5", even with meticulous
care, the Court did not find any defamatory imputation which
causes dishonor or discredit to the complainant. She was the
victim of an unprovoked, unjustified and libelous attack against
her honor, honesty, character and reputation; she has a right to
self-defense, which she did in her answer, to protect her honesty
and integrity and the very job upon which her family depend for
their livelihood. Every sentence in her answer (Exh. "5") is
relevant, and constitutes privileged matter. She did not go further
than her interest or duties require. She did not go beyond
explaining what was said of her in the complaint for the purpose
of repairing if not entirely removing the effects of the charge
against her. She had absolutely no motive to libel Atty. Ruiz who,
by the way, cast the first stone. ... (Amended Record on Appeal
pp. 10-11)
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by appellant Jesus B. Ruiz is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The petition filed by petitioner Encarnacion Ucol is likewise DISMISSED for
patent lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
Gancayco, J., took no part.


21

G.R. No. L-17938 April 30, 1963
ESPERIDION TOLENTINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ADELA ONGSIAKO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Esperidion Tolentino for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.
Edmundo M. Reyes and Senen Ceniza for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J .:
Appeal from the order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its
Civil Case No. 3197.
The plaintiff-appellant, Esperidion Tolentino, prays in the complaint that he filed with
the lower court on 20 May 1959, for the enforcement of the dissenting opinion
rendered in the case entitled "Severo Domingo, et al. vs. Santos Ongsiako, et al., G.R.
No. 32776."
The decision in said case (in favor of appellees' predecessors, and adverse to those
of appellant) was promulgated by this Court on 4 December 1930, and, together with
the dissenting opinion, appears in Volume 55 of the Philippine Reports, starting on
page 361. Unfortunately, the records of said case were lost, or destroyed, during the
war.
The plaintiff-appellant claims to be the successor-interest of the late Severo Domingo,
who died without having received a copy of the decision, and alleges that plaintiff-
appellant learned of the decision, only about a week before he filed the
aforementioned complaint; that the decision of the majority of the Court was erroneous
and unjust; that the dissenting opinion is the correct view of the case, and should be
enforced. The court below, on motion of one of the several defendants, dismissed the
case, for lack of cause of action.
Not satisfied, the plaintiff-appellant interposed the present appeal, and urges that the
failure of service of a copy of the decision upon the late Severo Domingo was a denial
of due process, which invalidates the decision, and asks that, on equitable grounds,
the present case be heard as a proceeding coram nobis.
Assuming the truth of the allegation that Severo Domingo, appellant's predecessor-in-
interest, was never furnished a copy of the decision in G.R. No. L-32776, it appears in
the printed report of the case (55 Phil. 361) that he was represented by Atty. Ramon
Diokno. Being represented by counsel, service of the decision is made upon the latter
by the clerk of the Supreme Court (Sec. 250, Act 190), and not upon the client (Palad
vs. Cui, 28 Phil. 44); and the unrebutted presumption is that the said official of this
Court had regularly performed his duty (No. 14, Sec. 334, Act 190; Sec. 69 [m], Rule
123, Rules of Court). Appellant's alleged predecessor-in-interest was not, therefore,
denied due process of law.
Appellant's position that the decision was erroneous and unjust is entirely untenable,
because the issue sought to be reopened is res judicata, aside from its having stood
unchallenged for 30 years. The ridiculous prayer to enforce a dissenting opinion
requires no discussion, it being sufficient to state that there is nothing to enforce in a
dissenting opinion, since it affirms or overrules no claim, right, or obligation, and
neither disposes of, nor awards, anything; it merely expresses the views of the
dissenter.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t
Lastly, the appellant's claim that "the lower court erred in not allowing plaintiff-
appellant's cause as a proceedingcoram nobis", is devoid of merit. The ancient
common law writ of error coram nobis, now substantially obsolete even in common
law jurisdictions (49 CJS 561), does not lie after affirmance of a judgment on writ of
error on appeal (49 CJS 562); nor can it be grounded on facts already in issue and
adjudicated on the trial (49 CJS 567). Moreover, the jurisdiction of a writ of
error coram nobis lies exclusively in the court which rendered the judgment sought to
be corrected (49 CJS 568), so that it should have been sought by appellants, if at all,
in the Supreme Court, and not in the Court of First Instance.
In the Philippines, no court appears to have ever recognized such writ, the rule in this
jurisdiction being that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some
definite date fixed by law.
1
Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium.
The order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.




22

G.R. No. 79255 January 20, 1992
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE), petitioner,
vs.
BENIGNO VIVAR, JR., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
NESTL PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly FILIPRO, INC.), respondents.
Jose C. Espinas for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:
This labor dispute stems from the exclusion of sales personnel from the holiday pay
award and the change of the divisor in the computation of benefits from 251 to 261
days.
On November 8, 1985, respondent Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.) filed with
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition for declaratory relief
seeking a ruling on its rights and obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid
employees for holiday pay in the light of the Court's decision in Chartered Bank
Employees Association v. Ople (138 SCRA 273 [1985]).
Both Filipro and the Union of Filipino Employees (UFE) agreed to submit the case for
voluntary arbitration and appointed respondent Benigno Vivar, Jr. as voluntary
arbitrator.
On January 2, 1980, Arbitrator Vivar rendered a decision directing Filipro to:
pay its monthly paid employees holiday pay pursuant to Article 94 of the Code, subject
only to the exclusions and limitations specified in Article 82 and such other legal
restrictions as are provided for in the Code. (Rollo,
p. 31)
Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the limitation of the award to three
years, (2) the exclusion of salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers,
merchandisers and medical representatives (hereinafter referred to as sales
personnel) from the award of the holiday pay, and (3) deduction from the holiday pay
award of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave benefits
due to the use of 251 divisor. (Rollo, pp. 138-145)
Petitioner UFE answered that the award should be made effective from the date of
effectivity of the Labor Code, that their sales personnel are not field personnel and are
therefore entitled to holiday pay, and that the use of 251 as divisor is an established
employee benefit which cannot be diminished.
On January 14, 1986, the respondent arbitrator issued an order declaring that the
effectivity of the holiday pay award shall retroact to November 1, 1974, the date of
effectivity of the Labor Code. He adjudged, however, that the company's sales
personnel are field personnel and, as such, are not entitled to holiday pay. He likewise
ruled that with the grant of 10 days' holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from
251 to 261 and ordered the reimbursement of overpayment for overtime, night
differential, vacation and sick leave pay due to the use of 251 days as divisor.
Both Nestle and UFE filed their respective motions for partial reconsideration.
Respondent Arbitrator treated the two motions as appeals and forwarded the case to
the NLRC which issued a resolution dated May 25, 1987 remanding the case to the
respondent arbitrator on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to review decisions in
voluntary arbitration cases pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code as amended by
Section 10, Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and as implemented by Section 5 of the rules
implementing B.P. Blg. 130.
However, in a letter dated July 6, 1987, the respondent arbitrator refused to take
cognizance of the case reasoning that he had no more jurisdiction to continue as
arbitrator because he had resigned from service effective May 1, 1986.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner union raises the following issues:
1) Whether or not Nestle's sales personnel are entitled to holiday pay; and
2) Whether or not, concomitant with the award of holiday pay, the divisor should be
changed from 251 to 261 days and whether or not the previous use of 251 as divisor
resulted in overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay.
The petitioner insists that respondent's sales personnel are not field personnel under
Article 82 of the Labor Code. The respondent company controverts this assertion.
Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Said article defines
field personnel as "non-agritultural employees who regularly perform their duties away
from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual
hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty."
The controversy centers on the interpretation of the clause "whose actual hours of
work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty."
It is undisputed that these sales personnel start their field work at 8:00 a.m. after
having reported to the office and come back to the office at 4:00 p.m. or 4:30 p.m. if
they are Makati-based.
23

The petitioner maintains that the period between 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 or 4:30 p.m.
comprises the sales personnel's working hours which can be determined with
reasonable certainty.
The Court does not agree. The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field
be reasonably ascertained. The company has no way of determining whether or not
these sales personnel, even if they report to the office before 8:00 a.m. prior to field
work and come back at 4:30 p.m, really spend the hours in between in actual field
work.
We concur with the following disquisition by the respondent arbitrator:
The requirement for the salesmen and other similarly situated employees to report for
work at the office at 8:00 a.m. and return at 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. is not within the realm of
work in the field as defined in the Code but an exercise of purely management
prerogative of providing administrative control over such personnel. This does not in
any manner provide a reasonable level of determination on the actual field work of the
employees which can be reasonably ascertained. The theoretical analysis that
salesmen and other similarly-situated workers regularly report for work at 8:00 a.m.
and return to their home station at 4:00 or 4:30 p.m., creating the assumption that their
field work is supervised, is surface projection. Actual field work begins after 8:00
a.m., when the sales personnel follow their field itinerary, and ends immediately before
4:00 or 4:30 p.m. when they report back to their office. The period between 8:00 a.m.
and 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. comprises their hours of work in the field, the extent or scope
and result of which are subject to their individual capacity and industry and which
"cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." This is the reason why effective
supervision over field work of salesmen and medical representatives, truck drivers and
merchandisers is practically a physical impossibility. Consequently, they are excluded
from the ten holidays with pay award. (Rollo, pp. 36-37)
Moreover, the requirement that "actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined
with reasonable certainty" must be read in conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the
Implementing Rules which provides:
Rule IV Holidays with Pay
Sec. 1. Coverage This rule shall apply to all employees except:
(e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is
unsupervised by the employer . . . (Emphasis supplied)
While contending that such rule added another element not found in the law (Rollo, p.
13), the petitioner nevertheless attempted to show that its affected members are not
covered by the abovementioned rule. The petitioner asserts that the company's sales
personnel are strictly supervised as shown by the SOD (Supervisor of the Day)
schedule and the company circular dated March 15, 1984 (Annexes 2 and 3, Rollo,
pp. 53-55).
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the Court finds that the aforementioned
rule did not add another element to the Labor Code definition of field personnel. The
clause "whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer" did not amplify
but merely interpreted and expounded the clause "whose actual hours of work in the
field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." The former clause is still within
the scope and purview of Article 82 which defines field personnel. Hence, in deciding
whether or not an employee's actual working hours in the field can be determined with
reasonable certainty, query must be made as to whether or not such employee's time
and performance is constantly supervised by the employer.
The SOD schedule adverted to by the petitioner does not in the least signify that these
sales personnel's time and performance are supervised. The purpose of this schedule
is merely to ensure that the sales personnel are out of the office not later than 8:00
a.m. and are back in the office not earlier than 4:00 p.m.
Likewise, the Court fails to see how the company can monitor the number of actual
hours spent in field work by an employee through the imposition of sanctions on
absenteeism contained in the company circular of March 15, 1984.
The petitioner claims that the fact that these sales personnel are given incentive
bonus every quarter based on their performance is proof that their actual hours of
work in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty.
The Court thinks otherwise.
The criteria for granting incentive bonus are: (1) attaining or exceeding sales volume
based on sales target; (2) good collection performance; (3) proper compliance with
good market hygiene; (4) good merchandising work; (5) minimal market returns; and
(6) proper truck maintenance. (Rollo, p. 190).
The above criteria indicate that these sales personnel are given incentive bonuses
precisely because of the difficulty in measuring their actual hours of field work. These
employees are evaluated by the result of their work and not by the actual hours of field
work which are hardly susceptible to determination.
In San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Democratic Labor Organization (8 SCRA 613 [1963]),
the Court had occasion to discuss the nature of the job of a salesman. Citing the case
of Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, C.C.A. Okla., 118 F. 2d 202, the Court stated:
The reasons for excluding an outside salesman are fairly
apparent. Such a salesman, to a greater extent, works
individually. There are no restrictions respecting the time he shall
work and he can earn as much or as little, within the range of his
24

ability, as his ambition dictates. In lieu of overtime he ordinarily
receives commissions as extra compensation. He works away
from his employer's place of business, is not subject to the
personal supervision of his employer, and his employer has no
way of knowing the number of hours he works per day.
While in that case the issue was whether or not salesmen were entitled to overtime
pay, the same rationale for their exclusion as field personnel from holiday pay benefits
also applies.
The petitioner union also assails the respondent arbitrator's ruling that, concomitant
with the award of holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 days to
include the additional 10 holidays and the employees should reimburse the amounts
overpaid by Filipro due to the use of 251 days' divisor.
Arbitrator Vivar's rationale for his decision is as follows:
. . . The new doctrinal policy established which ordered payment
of ten holidays certainly adds to or accelerates the basis of
conversion and computation by ten days. With the inclusion of ten
holidays as paid days, the divisor is no longer 251 but 261 or 262
if election day is counted. This is indeed an extremely difficult
legal question of interpretation which accounts for what is claimed
as falling within the concept of "solutio indebti."
When the claim of the Union for payment of ten holidays was
granted, there was a consequent need to abandon that 251
divisor. To maintain it would create an impossible situation where
the employees would benefit with additional ten days with pay but
would simultaneously enjoy higher benefits by discarding the
same ten days for purposes of computing overtime and night time
services and considering sick and vacation leave credits.
Therefore, reimbursement of such overpayment with the use of
251 as divisor arises concomitant with the award of ten holidays
with pay. (Rollo, p. 34)
The divisor assumes an important role in determining whether or not holiday pay is
already included in the monthly paid employee's salary and in the computation of his
daily rate. This is the thrust of our pronouncement in Chartered Bank Employees
Association v. Ople (supra). In that case, We held:
It is argued that even without the presumption found in the rules and in the policy
instruction, the company practice indicates that the monthly salaries of the employees
are so computed as to include the holiday pay provided by law. The petitioner
contends otherwise.
One strong argument in favor of the petitioner's stand is the fact that the Chartered
Bank, in computing overtime compensation for its employees, employs a "divisor" of
251 days. The 251 working days divisor is the result of subtracting all Saturdays,
Sundays and the ten (10) legal holidays from the total number of calendar days in a
year. If the employees are already paid for all non-working days, the divisor should be
365 and not 251.
In the petitioner's case, its computation of daily ratio since September 1, 1980, is as
follows:
monthly rate x 12 months

251 days
Following the criterion laid down in the Chartered Bank case, the use of 251 days'
divisor by respondent Filipro indicates that holiday pay is not yet included in the
employee's salary, otherwise the divisor should have been 261.
It must be stressed that the daily rate, assuming there are no intervening salary
increases, is a constant figure for the purpose of computing overtime and night
differential pay and commutation of sick and vacation leave credits. Necessarily, the
daily rate should also be the same basis for computing the 10 unpaid holidays.
The respondent arbitrator's order to change the divisor from 251 to 261 days would
result in a lower daily rate which is violative of the prohibition on non-diminution of
benefits found in Article 100 of the Labor Code. To maintain the same daily rate if the
divisor is adjusted to 261 days, then the dividend, which represents the employee's
annual salary, should correspondingly be increased to incorporate the holiday pay. To
illustrate, if prior to the grant of holiday pay, the employee's annual salary is P25,100,
then dividing such figure by 251 days, his daily rate is P100.00 After the payment of
10 days' holiday pay, his annual salary already includes holiday pay and totals
P26,100 (P25,100 + 1,000). Dividing this by 261 days, the daily rate is still P100.00.
There is thus no merit in respondent Nestle's claim of overpayment of overtime and
night differential pay and sick and vacation leave benefits, the computation of which
are all based on the daily rate, since the daily rate is still the same before and after the
grant of holiday pay.
Respondent Nestle's invocation of solutio indebiti, or payment by mistake, due to its
use of 251 days as divisor must fail in light of the Labor Code mandate that "all doubts
in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules
and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." (Article 4). Moreover, prior to
September 1, 1980, when the company was on a 6-day working schedule, the divisor
used by the company was 303, indicating that the 10 holidays were likewise not paid.
When Filipro shifted to a 5-day working schebule on September 1, 1980, it had the
chance to rectify its error, if ever there was one but did not do so. It is now too late to
allege payment by mistake.
25

Nestle also questions the voluntary arbitrator's ruling that holiday pay should be
computed from November 1, 1974. This ruling was not questioned by the petitioner
union as obviously said decision was favorable to it. Technically, therefore,
respondent Nestle should have filed a separate petition raising the issue of effectivity
of the holiday pay award. This Court has ruled that an appellee who is not an
appellant may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment
on other grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or
affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. (Franco v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989], citing La Campana Food Products, Inc. v. Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank, 142 SCRA 394 [1986]). Nevertheless, in order to
fully settle the issues so that the execution of the Court's decision in this case may not
be needlessly delayed by another petition, the Court resolved to take up the matter of
effectivity of the holiday pay award raised by Nestle.
Nestle insists that the reckoning period for the application of the holiday pay award is
1985 when the Chartered Bank decision, promulgated on August 28, 1985, became
final and executory, and not from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code. Although
the Court does not entirely agree with Nestle, we find its claim meritorious.
In Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong, 132
SCRA 663 [1984], hereinafter referred to as the IBAA case, the Court declared that
Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9,
issued by the then Secretary of Labor on February 16, 1976 and April 23, 1976,
respectively, and which excluded monthly paid employees from holiday pay benefits,
are null and void. The Court therein reasoned that, in the guise of clarifying the Labor
Code's provisions on holiday pay, the aforementioned implementing rule and policy
instruction amended them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion. The Chartered
Bank case reiterated the above ruling and added the "divisor" test.
However, prior to their being declared null and void, the implementing rule and policy
instruction enjoyed the presumption of validity and hence, Nestle's non-payment of the
holiday benefit up to the promulgation of the IBAA case on October 23, 1984 was in
compliance with these presumably valid rule and policy instruction.
In the case of De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, 38 SCRA 429 [1971], the
Court discussed the effect to be given to a legislative or executive act subsequently
declared invalid:
. . . It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged
legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This
is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is
entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have
changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation
regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in

operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine
that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is
merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the government
organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is
valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial
review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired
prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination of [unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." (Chicot
County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language
has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1952])
and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even
more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court
in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (21 SCRA 1095 [1967]. (At pp. 434-435)
The "operative fact" doctrine realizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void,
undue harshness and resulting unfairness must be avoided. It is now almost the end
of 1991. To require various companies to reach back to 1975now and nullify acts done
in good faith is unduly harsh. 1984 is a fairer reckoning period under the facts of this
case.
Applying the aforementioned doctrine to the case at bar, it is not far-fetched that
Nestle, relying on the implicit validity of the implementing rule and policy instruction
before this Court nullified them, and thinking that it was not obliged to give holiday pay
benefits to its monthly paid employees, may have been moved to grant other
concessions to its employees, especially in the collective bargaining agreement. This
possibility is bolstered by the fact that respondent Nestle's employees are among the
highest paid in the industry. With this consideration, it would be unfair to impose
additional burdens on Nestle when the non-payment of the holiday benefits up to 1984
was not in any way attributed to Nestle's fault.
The Court thereby resolves that the grant of holiday pay be effective, not from the date
of promulgation of the Chartered Bank case nor from the date of effectivity of the
Labor Code, but from October 23, 1984, the date of promulgation of the IBAA case.
WHEREFORE, the order of the voluntary arbitrator in hereby MODIFIED. The divisor
to be used in computing holiday pay shall be 251 days. The holiday pay as above
directed shall be computed from October 23, 1984. In all other respects, the order of
the respondent arbitrator is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
26

EN BANC


LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 176951
PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
by LCP National President
JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS,
CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,
and JERRY P. TREAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY,
PROVINCE OF LEYTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU;
MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN,
PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG,
PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN,
PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR;
and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS,
PROVINCE OF QUEZON,
Respondents.

CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO,
CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO,
CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN,
CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB,
CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS,
CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS,
CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM,
Petitioners-In-Intervention.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


R E S O L U T I O N


CARPIO, J .:
For resolution are (1) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration and (2) motion
to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009 filed by petitioners League of Cities of the
Philippines, et al. and (3) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz
City, and Oroquieta City.
On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck
down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution and the equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme
Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the respondents first motion for
reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote,
denied the respondents second motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the 18
November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due
course, in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.

However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any
exceptional and compelling reason, the CourtEn Banc unprecedentedly reversed the
18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in
the Decision of 21 December 2009.

Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious
and accordingly reinstates the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring the 16 Cityhood
Laws unconstitutional.

A. Violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

27


The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law. There is only one Local Government Code.
[1]
The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the
creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress
cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and
other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria
found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the
criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the
income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This
took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government
Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy
the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income
requirement.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent
municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when
Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA
9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income
requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be
written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.

RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. Section 1 of
RA 9009 pertinently provides: Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as
follows: x x x. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. RA
9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the
new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Considering the
Legislatures primary intent to curtail the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be
converted into cities, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for the creation of
cities. To repeat, RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code, as
it expressly amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple, and clear. Nothing is unintelligible or
ambiguous; not a single word or phrase admits of two or more meanings. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 by increasing the
income requirement for the creation of cities. There are no exemptions from this
income requirement. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any
municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income
requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where
the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one.
[2]



B. Operative Fact Doctrine
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but
the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative
fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional.

However, the minoritys novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that
the enactment of the Cityhood Laws and the functioning of the 16 municipalities as
new cities with new sets of officials and employees operate to contitutionalize the
unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative fact
doctrine and sets a gravely dangerous precedent.

Under the minoritys novel theory, an unconstitutional law, if already
implemented prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court, can no longer
be revoked and its implementation must be continued despite being
unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of
unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before the
Court can declare them unconstitutional. This view is an open invitation to serially
violate the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped by the
Court.

The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an
exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no
effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional
act. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,
[3]
the Court stated:

The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It
produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no
protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation,
inoperative as if it has not been passed. Being void, Fertiphil is
not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in
accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust
enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones,
and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with
the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.
28

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the
general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It
nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing
that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal
case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the
accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by
a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. (Emphasis
supplied)

The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an
unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law
remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial
declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In
short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the
unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.

Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood
Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior
to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by
the new cities or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be
recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are
valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these
unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to
innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws
prior to the Courts declaration of their unconstitutionality.

C. Equal Protection Clause

As the Court held in the 18 November 2008 Decision, there is no substantial
distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11
th
Congress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11
th
Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from
another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill
in the 11
th
Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a
municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11
th
Congress might
even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood
bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11
th
Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to
prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11
th
Congress limits the
exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That
specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a
valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. In fact, the
minority concedes that the conditions (pendency of the cityhood bills) adverted to can
no longer be repeated.

Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing of their
cityhood bills before the end of the 11
th
Congress as against all other municipalities
that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.

In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities
with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities,
while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption
provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.

D. Tie-Vote on a Motion for Reconsideration

Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where
the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary
majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on,
and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original
action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed
cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed;
and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be
denied. (Emphasis supplied)

The En Banc Resolution of 26 January 1999 in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, reads:
A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION
OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A
DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY
OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS
THE CASE MAY BE, WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE
DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION.

IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED. (Emphasis
supplied)


The clear and simple language of the clarificatory en banc Resolution requires
no further explanation. If the voting of the Court en banc results in a tie, the motion for
reconsideration is deemed denied. The Courts prior majority action on the main
29

decision stands affirmed.
[4]
This clarificatory Resolution applies to all cases heard
by the Court en banc, which includes not only cases involving the constitutionality of
a law, but also, as expressly stated in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, all
other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc.

The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration
necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Since the
Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008
Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court order or directive.
[5]
The judgment
stands in full force.
[6]
Undeniably, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior
majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en
banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the
second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision
where there is no prior decision. Here, the tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no
majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009
Resolution, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied.

Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not mean that
the present cases were left undecided because there remain the Decision of 18
November 2008 and the Resolution of 31 March 2009 where a majority of the
Court en bancconcurred in declaring the unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood
Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision and the 31 March 2009
Resolution, which were both reached with the concurrence of a majority of the
Court en banc, are not reconsidered but stand affirmed.
[7]
These prior majority
actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a
tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action.

The denial, by a split vote, of the second motion for reconsideration inevitably
rendered the 18 November 2008 Decision final. In fact, in its Resolution of 28 April
2009, denying the second motion for reconsideration, the Court en banc reiterated that
no further pleadings shall be entertained and stated that entry of judgment be made in
due course.

The dissenting opinion stated that a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and
a non-majority does not constitute a rule with precedential value.
[8]


Indeed, a tie-vote is a non-majority a non-majority which cannot overrule a
prior affirmative action, that is the 18 November 2008 Decision striking down the
Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision stands affirmed. And
assuming a non-majority lacks any precedential value, the 18 November 2008
Decision, which was unreversed as a result of the tie-vote on the respondents second
motion for reconsideration, nevertheless remains binding on the parties.
[9]



Conclusion


Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that no x x x city
shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code. This provision can only be interpreted in one way, that is,
all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local
Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws
other than the Local Government Code, provided an exemption from the increased
income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene
the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
does not cripple Congress power to make laws. In fact, Congress is not prohibited
from amending the Local Government Code itself, as what Congress did by enacting
RA 9009. Indisputably, the act of amending laws comprises an integral part of the
Legislatures law-making power. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in
the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the
Constitution that [n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code. In other words, Congress
exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws
void for being violative of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the 21 December
2009 Decision and REINSTATE the 18 November 2008 Decision
declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389,
9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435,
9436, and 9491.

We NOTE petitioners motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009.

SO ORDERED.








30

Parts of the Case
Ratio decidendi (Latin plural rationes decidendi) is a Latin
phrase meaning "the reason" or "the rationale for the decision".
The ratio decidendi is "the point in a case which determines the
judgment"
[1]
or "the principle which the case establishes".
[2]

Obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta, often referred to simply
as dicta or obiter) is Latin for a statement "said in passing".
An obiter dictum is a remark or observation made by a judgethat,
although included in the body of the court's opinion, does not form a
necessary part of the court's decision. In a court opinion, obiter
dicta include, but are not limited to, words "introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument."
[1]
Unlike the rationes
decidendi, obiter dicta are not the subject of the judicial decision,
even if they happen to be correct statements of law.
A dissenting opinion (or dissent) is an opinion in a legal
case written by one or more judgesexpressing disagreement with
the majority opinion of the court which gives rise to its judgment.
When not necessarily referring to a legal decision, this can also be
referred to as a minority report.
[1][2]
The Disposition or Dispositive Portion
The resolutory or dispositive portion is important. The resolution of
the court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the
decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that
determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions
presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or
declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing.


Doctrine of operative fact
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule,
only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects
of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a
statue prior to a determination of unconstitutionality law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration.