Civil Law

MUST READ CASES (CIVIL LAW)

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Tanada vs Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
Article 2 of the NCC does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
Tanada vs Tuvera,146 SCRA 446 (1986)
If the law provides for its own effectivity date, then it takes effect on the said
date, subject to the requirement of publication. The clause unless otherwise
provided refers to the date of effectivity and not the to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
LA BUAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC. v. RAMOS, G.R. No.
127882, January 27, 2004
While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it
is not a ground for its invalidation since the Constitution, being "the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation," is deemed written
in the law. Hence, the due process clause, which, so Taada held, mandates
the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279.
Additionally, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for publication "either
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines," finds suppletory application. It is significant to note that E.O. No.
279 was actually published in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.
Roy vs CA, G.R. NO 80718 Jan. 29, 1988
The term laws do not include decisions of the Supreme Court because
lawyers in the active practice must keep abreast of decisions, particularly
where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in
advanced reports and the SCRA.
Ty v. Cam G.R. NO. 127406, Nov. 27, 2000
The two marriages involved in this case was entered during the effectivity of
the New Civil Code. The Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be
impairment of vested rights.
Floresca vs Philex Mining Corp.,G.R. 30642, April 30, 1985
The application or interpretation placed by the Supreme Court upon a law is
part of the law as of the date of its enactment since the courts application or

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interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that

the construed law purports to carry into effect.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo G.R. NO.L-68470 October 8, 1985
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
RCPI vs CA, 143 SCRA 657 (1986)
Dionela filed a complaint for damages against RCPI alleging that the
defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings
but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected his business as well
as because other people have come to know of said defamatory words.
There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding
extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to Dionela.
Gashme Shookat Baksh vs CA,219 SCRA115 (1993)
Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to
the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to article 21 of
the new civil code not because of such promise to marry but because of the
fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter.
University of the East vs Jader, G.R. NO. 132344, Feb. 7, 2000
A law student was allowed to graduate by his school with a failing grade but
was later on prohibited by the said school to take the bar exams. The
negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for
instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only imputable
to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.
SPOUSES HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. G.R. No. 179736. June
26, 2013
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code
should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places
where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The

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phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence," therefore, covers

places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private.
And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not
infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the
application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
WILLAWARE
PRODUCTS
CORPORATION vs.
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014

JESICHRIS

The concept of "unfair competition" under Article 28 is very much broader

than that covered by intellectual property laws. Article 28 of the Civil Code
provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall
give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage."
Geluz vs CA, July 20, 1961
It is unquestionable that the appellants act in provoking the abortion of
appellees wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and
morally reprehensible act, that cannot be to severely condemned; and the
consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the
immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that,
under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
Quimiguing vs ICAO, 34 SCRA 132 (1970
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided
under article 40 of the civil code.
Cario v. Cario, G.R. NO. 132529 , Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127
Whether or not the certification by the registrar of the non-existence of
marriage license is enough to prove non-issuance thereof. The records reveal
that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. NO. 167746 , Aug. 28,2007 531 SCRA
446
Whether or not, a marriage license issued by a municipality or city to a nonresident invalidates the license. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and

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issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to

the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage
Nial vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122, March 14, 2000
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to their wedding day because their cohabitation is not
exclusive. The Court ruled that the cohabitation contemplated under said
provisions must be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the
law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract
and characterized by exclusivity meaning nothird party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years andcontinuity that is unbroken.
Soriano v. Felix, L-9005, June 20, 1958
The affidavit is for the purpose of proving the basis for exemption from the
marriage license. Even if there is failure on the part of the solemnizing officer
to execute the necessary affidavit, such irregularity will not invalidate the
marriage for the affidavit is not being required of the parties.
Morigo v. People, G.R. NO. 145226 , Feb. 6, 200
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a
valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, G.R. No. 196049,
June 26, 2013
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, G.R. No.
198780. October 16, 2013
A marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship
is NOT void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the
Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render
a marriage void ab initio. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must

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be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A
"freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that
it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and
undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the
parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and
both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.
Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. NO. 169766 , Mar. 30, 2011 646 SCRA
637
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in
1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike
was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage
can exist at any given time.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. NO. 80116 June 30, 1989
Whether or not, the complainant, a foreigner, qualify as an offended spouse
having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his
filing the criminal complaint. The person who initiates the adultery case must
be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Recio vs. Recio G.R. NO. 138322. October 2, 2001
Whether or not the divorce must be proved before it is to be recognized in
the Philippines. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely
of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Rep. v. Orbecido, G.R. NO. 154380, Oct. 05, 2005
Whether or not, a Filipino Spouse can remarry under ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE where his,her spouse is later naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry. The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.NO. 186571, Aug. 11, 2010

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In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law
of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal
of his office.
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995)
The Supreme Court enumerated the three basic requirements of
psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of the
marriage: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA, 266 SCRA 324 (1997)
In this case, there was no sexual contact between the parties since their
marriage on May 22, 1988 up to Mar. 15, 1989 or for almost a year. The
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties of sexual cooperation
for the procreation of children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. NO. 167459 , Jan. 26, 2011 640 SCRA 517
In this case the court proved that respondent was the sex partner of many
military officials. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged
psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can
only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose
and not to the inception of the said marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA G.R. No.
171577, February 12, 2014
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely
physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article
68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of

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personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or

inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. NO. 157649,Nov 12, 2012 685 SCRA 16
Here, the experts testimony on Dominics psychological profile did not
identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity
because said expert did not examine Dominic in person before completing
her report but simply relied on other peoples recollection and opinion for
that purpose. Expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise
cause of the supposed psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show
that the psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the marriage.
Marcos vs Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000)
If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment
of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice
Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we
reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.
Tenebro v. CA, G.R. NO. 150758 , Feb. 18, 2004 423 SCRA 272
Whether or not, the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of PI is a
valid defense for the crime of bigamy. The declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator
that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity.

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Nollora v. People, G.R. NO.191425 , Sept. 7, 2011 657 SCRA 330

Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n
case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines,
or Executive Order NO. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall
apply." Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim
exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
Rep. v. Nolasco, G.R. NO. 94053 , Mar. 17, 1993 220 SCRA 20
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded
belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after
learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract
and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for
her there.
Valdez v. Republic, G.R. NO.180863 , Sept. 08, 2009 598 SCRA 646
Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of
absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982. To
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to
exhibit "well-founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her
second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated.
Rep. v. Tango, G.R. NO.161062 , Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA 560
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it
follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code
CELERINA J. SANTOS vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS, G.R. No. 187061, 08
OCTOBER 2014
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained
by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of
reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared
presumptively dead has never been absent.
Ong v. Ong, G.R. NO. 153206, Oct. 23, 2006 505 SCRA 76

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Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has
abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted,
following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal
separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal
separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year.
Pacete vs. Carriaga, G.R. NO. 53880, Mar. 17, 1994 231 SCRA 321
Whether or not, the order declaring in default a respondent in a legal
separation case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. In case of nonappearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
Arcaba vs. Batocael, G.R. NO.146683 , Nov.22, 2001 370 SCRA 414
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and
Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of
Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
Dewara v. Lamela G.R. NO. 179010, Apr. 11, 2011 647 SCRA 483
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife. Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does
not destroy this presumption.
BOBBY TAN, v. GRACE ANDRADE, ET AL. v. BOBBY TAN, G.R. No.
172017 / G.R. No. 171904 August 7, 2013

The presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code, that property
acquired during marriage is conjugal, does not apply where there is no
showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The
presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse
and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Moreover, when the
property is registered in the name of only one spouse and there is no
showing as to when the property was acquired by same spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to the said spouse.
Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear,

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categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the

exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests
upon the party asserting it.
Villegas v. Lingan G.R. NO. 153839 , Jun. 29, 2007 526 SCRA 63
Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of the
subject property. All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred
upon the expiration of the right of redemption. And where the redemption is
made under a property regime governed by the conjugal partnership of
gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property acquired by right
of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the
property.
Ferrer v. Ferrer, G.R. NO.166496 , Nov. 29, 2006 508 SCRA 570
The obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the
entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser
of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner- spouse.
Pana v. Heirs of Jose Juanite G.R. NO. 164201,Dec. 10, 2012 687
SCRA 414
Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the
criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership
assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such
indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered." No
prior liquidation of those assets is required.
MBTC v. Pascual, G.R. NO. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 246
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the Nature
of Conjugal Ownership. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson
and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal
partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration
continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and
partition of the partnership.
Espinosa v. Omaa, AC. 9081, Oct 12, 2011 659 SCRA 1
Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval
is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the
disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of
the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is

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exactly what Omaa did in this case. The "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has
no legal effect and is against public policy.
Dio v. Dio, G.R. NO. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011 640 SCRA 178
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
JUAN SEVILLA, JR. v. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, G.R. No. 202370,
September 23, 2013
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, as in this case. Under this property regime, property acquired during
the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the
couples joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the
present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where
the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held
that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as found by both
the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership.
Valdes vs. RTC Br. 102, QC G.R. NO. 122749, Jul. 31, 1996 260 SCRA
221
Whether or not, Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of
the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where
a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses. The rules set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to
the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses.
Cario v. Cario, G.R. NO. 132529, Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons,
like the absence of a marriage license

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San Luis v. San Luis G.R. NO. 133743, Feb. 06, 2007 514 SCRA 294
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation,
the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove
that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of
the Civil Code
SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA vs. AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN
G.R. No. 177235, July 07, 2014
As Leonardo and Serconsision were married sometime in 1985, the
applicable provision governing the property relations of the spouses is Article
172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that the wife cannot bind
the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent. In Felipe vs. Heirs of
Maximo Aldon, a case decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, the
Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that the sale of a land belonging to
the conjugal partnership made by the wife without the consent of the
husband is voidable. The Supreme Court further ruled that the view that the
disposal by the wife of their conjugal property without the husbands consent
is voidable is supported by Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that
contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such
consent is required are annullable at her instance during the marriage and
within ten years from the transaction questioned. In the present case, the
fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 22, 1986, one
month after or specifically on November 25, 1986, Leonardo died. Aurora as
one of the heirs and the duly appointed administratrix of Leonardos estate,
had the right therefore to seek for the annulment of the Deed of Sale as it
deprived her and the other legal heirs of Leonardo of their hereditary rights.
Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. NO. 177703, Jan. 28, 2008 542 SCRA 666
Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family
home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to
the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house
as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are
deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma
from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20
years back
Modequillo vs. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990.

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There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as

required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is,
therefore, a family home as contemplated by law
Olivia De Mesa v. Acero, G.R. NO. 185064 Jan. 16, 2012 663 SCRA 40
The family homes exemption from execution must be set up and proved to
the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. The petitioners
now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop them from later
claiming the said exemption.
Manacop vs. CA, 277 SCRA 57 (1997)
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code do not have a retroactive effect such
that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT
G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 satisfies the
requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses
under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
Labagla vs. Santiago, G.R. NO. 132305, Dec. 04, 2001 371 SCRA 360
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of
filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only
shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof.
Puno v. Puno Ent. Inc., G.R. NO. 177066, Sept. 11, 2009 599 SCRA
585
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar
has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the
information of a third person.
DE LA CRUZ v. GRACIA, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

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1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence

submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent;
and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein
be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent
as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, G.R. No. 206248.
February 18, 2014
An illegitimate child may use the surname of his father if the latter has
expressly recognized their filiation. However, the child is under no
compulsion to use his fathers surname. When Antonio recognized Andre
Lewis and Jerard Patrick as his sons, the two children had the right to use the
surname of Antonio. However, they were under no compulsion or mandate to
use the same. The law uses the word may, which dictates that it is merely
permissive.
Tonog vs. CA, G.R. NO. 122906 , Feb. 07, 2002 376 SCRA 523
In the case at bar, bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the
controlling factor, the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to
retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child
should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a
strange environment away from the people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment.
Abadilla vs. Tabiliran, Jr. A.M NO. MTJ-92-716, Oct. 25, 1995 249
SCRA 447
Whether or not, a child born out of wedlock, by parents who have a legal
impediment to marry each other, can be legitimated. As a lawyer and a
judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to
Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be
considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing
valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran.
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M.
CASTRO, A.K.A. MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO AND JAYROSE M.
CASTRO vs JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA
REGINA GREGORIO
G.R. NO. 188801, 15 October 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

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For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic

Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the
spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are
protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case.
Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.
In re: Adoption of Michelle & Michael Lim G.R. NO.168992-93, May
21, 2009 588 SCRA 98
The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of
marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the
marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That
being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required.
Gan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO.145527, May.28, 2002 382 SCRA 357
A judgment ordering for support is immediately executory despite pendency
of appeal.
De Asis vs. CA, G.R. NO.127578, Feb. 15, 1999 303 SCRA 176
Whether or not, a renunciation of the existence of filiation of the child and
the putative father, made by the mother, is valid. It is true that in order to
claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the
claimant and the parent, however, paternity and filiation or the lack of the
same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the
court to declare its existence or absence.
Laxamana v. Laxamana, G.R. NO. 144763, Sept. 3, 2002 388 SCRA
296
It is clear that every child [has] rights which are not and should not be
dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his
parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual
agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated
in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can
better be assured the rights granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to
present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative.
St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. NO. 143363, Feb. 6, 2002
376 SCRA 473

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The liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor
driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner
St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop, G.R. No 194366, Oct. 10, 2012 683 SCRA
253
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the
receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of
disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony
of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the
natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the
power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter.
FE FLORO VALINO vs. ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO,
RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA
ADRIANO BAYONA, AND LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO
G.R. No. 182894, 22 April 2014, EN BANC (Mendoza J.)
The law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario,
she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was
living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he
died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived
or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will
not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear
and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to
that end.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the
commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of
possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for
the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate
interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those
obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession
of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting
place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead
may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be
no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third
persons.
DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO vs. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, G.R. No.
175540, 14 April 2014

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There can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to

disseminate notifications intended to reach the relatives of the deceased.
The only question that remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allowed for
notices to reach the relatives of the deceased.
PROPERTY
Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. NO. 155076, Jan. 13, 2009
International telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders, the
telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing
said services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code. The construction by the respondents of Article 308 of the said
Code to include, within its coverage, the aforesaid international telephone
calls, telecommunication services and business is contrary to the letter and
intent of the law.
Tsai vs. CA, 366 SCRA 324
In the instant case, the parties: (1) executed a contract styled as Real Estate
Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage, instead of just Real Estate Mortgage if
indeed their intention is to treat all properties included therein as
immovable, and (2) attached to the said contract a separate LIST OF
MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT. These facts, taken together, evince the
conclusion that the parties intention is to treat these units of machinery as
chattels.
Caltex Phils., Inc., vs. CBAA, May 31, 1982
SC held that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas
station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty
tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for
without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been
attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein,
are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the
Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
MERALCO vs. CBAA, May 31, 1982
While the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may,
nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its
utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two
tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles
for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations.
Republic vs CA, 132 SCRA 514

Civil Law

Properties of public dominion is not susceptible to private appropriation and

cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription and thus they cannot be
registered under the Land Registration Law and be the subject of a torrents
title.
Manila International Airport Authority vs CA, 495 SCRA 591
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any
encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public
dominion is void for being contrary to public policy.
German Management & Services, Inc. v. CA. 177 SCRA 495 (1989)
The doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or
threatened dispossession, and not when possession has already been lost.
Palero-Tan v. Urdaneta AM NO. P--07--2399, Jun. 18, 2008
When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner
takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does
not become vested with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the
finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is
thus respondents duty to report to his superior or his officemates that he
found something.
Mercado v. CA, 162 SCRA 75, 85 1988
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title
to the land on which he builds, i.e., it is essential that he be a possessor in
concept of owner and that he be unaware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Nuguid v. CA, 452 SCRA 243, 252 (2005)
The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by the
law for the protection of builders in good faith. Its object is to guarantee full
and prompt reimbursement as it permits the actual possessor to remain in
possession while he has not been reimbursed (by the person who defeated
him in the case for possession of the property) for those necessary expenses
and useful improvements made by him on the things possessed.
BPI v. SANCHEZES, G.R. No. 179518, November 11, 2014
The Sanchezes have the following options: (1) acquire the property with the
townhouses and other buildings and improvements that may be thereon

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without indemnifying TSEI or the intervenors; (2) demand from TSEI or the
intervenors to demolish what has been built on the property at the expense
of TSEI or the intervenors; or (3) ask the intervenors to pay the price of the
land. As such, the Sanchezes must choose from among these options within
thirty (30) days from finality of this Decision. Should the Sanchezes opt to
ask from the intervenors the value of the land, the case shall be remanded to
the RTC for the sole purpose of determining the fair market value of the lot at
the time the same were taken from the Sanchezes in 1988.
Pecson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995
Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar.
Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be
applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to
avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the two
courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code
are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although
they differ as to the basis of the indemnity.
Vda. de Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 598 (1996)
Since the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the
Sun Valley Lumber Co., the accretion was man-made, hence, Art. 457 does
not apply. Ergo, the subject land is part of the public domain.
Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989)
The accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the
additional area by another person through prescription.
Agne v. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793, 805 (1990)
There need be no act on their part to subject the old river bed to their
ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of
acquisition becomes evident, without need of any formal act of acquisition.
Such abandoned riverbed had fallen to the private ownership of the owner of
the land through which the new river bed passes even without any formal act
of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a
trespasser.
Bahais v. Pascual, G.R. 169272,July 11, 2012
Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two (2) indispensable
requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding is claimed
to be casting cloud on his title. In this case, an action to quiet title is not the

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proper remedy because petitioner no longer had any legal or equitable title
to or interest in the lots. The petitioners status as possessor and owner of
the lots had been settled in the final and executory December 4, 1985
decision of the Bureau of Lands that the DENR Secretary and the OP affirmed
on appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and
ownership of the lots.
Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 541, 548, June 20, 2003
Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the
others, hence, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is
fiduciary in character and attribute.
Santos v. Heirs of Lustre, G.R. NO. 151016, Aug. 06, 2008
Any adverse ruling in the earlier case will not, in any way, prejudice the heirs
who did not join, even if such case was actually filed in behalf of all the coowners. In fact, if an action for recovery of property is dismissed, a
subsequent action by a co- heir who did not join the earlier case should not
be barred by prior judgment.
Rey Castigador Catedrilla v. Mario and Margie Lauron, G.R. No.
179011. April 15, 2013
In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest.
However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant
jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action for
the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners,
namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned
property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the
suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
VIRGINIA Y. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, LOUISE Y. GOCHAN,
ESTEBAN Y. GOCHAN, JR., and DOMINIC Y. GOCHAN v. CHARLES
MANCAO, G.R. No. 182314, November 13, 2013
Only the redeeming co-owner and the buyer are the indispensable
parties in an action for legal redemption, to the exclusion of the seller/coowner A party who is not the co-owner of a land subject of a compromise
agreement cannot claim that he was defrauded when the parties in the
compromise agreement entered into the same. As a third party to the
agreement, he is not indispensable for the agreement to materialize.

Civil Law

Parilla v. Pilar, G.R. NO. 167680, Nov. 30, 2006

One whose interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent
or usufructuary, is not qualified to become a possessor builder in good faith.
Bunyi v. Factor, G.R. NO. 172547, Jun. 30, 2009 591 SCRA 350
For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical
occupation of every square inch of the property at all times. Possession can
be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing
is subject to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right, possession can be acquired
by juridical acts.
EDCA Publ. V. Santos, G.R. NO. 80298, Apr. 26, 1990 184 SCRA 614
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership
over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a
matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the
private respondents to the books.
PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RAMON DUMADAG, ET. AL.,
G.R. No. 194336, March 11, 2013
Squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The length
of time that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they
are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of
their possession is presumed to have retained the same character
throughout their occupancy.
Quintanilla v. Abangan, G.R. NO. 160613, Feb.12, 2008
As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to
provide ingress and egress to a public highway and another right of way
which although longer will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the
second alternative should be preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant
estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory
easement.
Reyes v. Ramos, G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as
the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity,
if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be
imposed.

Civil Law

Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan, et. al, G.R. No. L-3422 Jun. 13, 1952
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking
in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children
are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the
danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his
own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new
danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive
nuisance."
Gancayco v. Quezon City, G.R. NO. 177807,Oct 11, 2011
The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of
persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure
illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., v. ARSENIO ALDECOA, ET. AL., G.R.
No. 166330, September 11, 2013
Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may
become nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they render the
enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the
complaint must be substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions
that to be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or excessive and
unreasonable. The determining factor when noise alone is the cause of
complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such
character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a
person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable
and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said to be substantial and
unreasonable in degree, and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent
upon all the circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard as
to what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance.
Republic v. Guzman, G.R. No. 132964, February 18, 2000
The donation is null and void when (a) the deed of donation fails to show the
acceptance, or (b) where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a
separate instrument is either not given to the donor or else noted in the
deed of donation, and in the separate acceptance.
Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011
When the donor used the words that the gift "does not pass title during my
lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two
aforementioned parcels"] the donor meant nothing else than that she

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reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land
until her death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of them
freely.
Quijada vs. CA, G.R. NO. 126444, Dec. 4, 1998
Since no period was imposed by the donor on when must the donee comply
with the condition, the latter remains the owner so long as he has tried to
comply with the condition within a reasonable period. Only then - when the
non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought to the donor's
knowledge - that ownership of the donated property reverted to the donor as
provided in the automatic reversion clause of the deed of donation.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Legarda vs. Saleeby, G.R. NO. 8936, Oct. 2, 1915
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land;
to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent thereto.
Sta. Lucia vs. Pasig, G.R.NO. 166838, June 15, 2011
While a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this
does not preclude the filing of an action for the very purpose of attacking the
statements therein. Mere reliance therefore on the face of the TCTs will not
suffice as they can only be conclusive evidence of the subject properties'
locations if both the stated and described locations point to the same area.
Republic vs. Santos, G.R.NO. 180027, July 18, 2012
Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands
and, as such, is the general source of all private titles. Thus, pursuant to this
principle, all claims of private title to land, save those acquired from native
title, must be traced from some grant, whether express or implied, from the
State. Absent a clear showing that land had been let into private ownership
through the States imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to the
State.
SPOUSES BERNADETTE AND RODULFO VILBAR v. ANGELITO L.
OPINION, G.R. No. 176043. January 15, 2014
Registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or
creates a lien upon the land. A certificate of title serves as evidence of an

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indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person

whose name appears therein. Since the spouses Vilbar did not cause the
transfer of the certificate title in their name, or at the very least, annotate or
register such sale in the original title in the name of Dulos Realty, have no
indefeasible and incontrovertible title over Lot 20 to support their claim.
LUZVIMINDA APRAN CANLAS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200894, 10 November 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen J.)
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court further clarified the
difference between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The
former refers to registration of title on the basis of possession, while the
latter entitles the applicant to the registration of his property on the basis of
prescription. Registration under the first mode is extended under the aegis of
the P.D. No. 1529 and the Public Land Act (PLA) while under the second mode
is made available both by P.D. No. 1529 and the Civil Code. Moreover, under
Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by Republic Act No. 1472, the 30-year
period is in relation to possession without regard to the Civil Code, while
under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves
extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in
relation to Article 1137.
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds 79 Phil 461
Aliens mat not acquire private or public agricultural lands.
Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals G.R. NO. 113472, Dec. 20, 1994,
239 SCRA 341.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred
or only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire lands of the public
domain.
Halili vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465
A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme, 146
SCRA 509
The time to determine whether a person acquiring land is qualified is the
time the right to own it is acquired and not the time to register ownership.
Tan vs. Republic April 16, 2012

Civil Law

Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not

clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not
intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show
exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use
and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally
known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMETERIA G. LUALHATI
G.R. No. 183511, March 25, 2015
It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable
and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.
Spouses Vallido v. Spouses Pono, et al., G.R. No. 200173. April 15,
2013
It is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a registered land need
not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly settled rule that where
there are circumstances which would put a party on guard and prompt him to
investigate or inspect the property being sold to him, such as the presence of
occupants/tenants thereon, it is expected from the purchaser of a valued
piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the
occupants. The burden of proving good faith lies with the second buyer
(petitioners herein) which is not discharged by simply invoking the ordinary
presumption of good faith. After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary
records, this Court holds that the petitioners are NOT buyers in good faith as
they failed to discharge their burden of proof.
SPOUSE PERALTA v. ABALON, G.R. No. 183448, June 30, 2014
The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot
convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land
Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles from the forger to the
innocent purchaser for value. Thus, the qualifying point here is that there

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must be a complete chain of registered titles. This means that all the
transfers starting from the original rightful owner to the innocent holder for
value and that includes the transfer to the forger must be duly registered,
and the title must be properly issued to the transferee.
Malabanan vs. Republic, 587 SCRA 172
Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period
for the acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run.
Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., 606 SCRA 444
Forest lands cannot be alienated in favor of petitioner private persons or
entities.
Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. 193443 G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012
There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
For one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive
prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property
as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession
preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be
considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. SPOUSES JOSE
MAGDALENA YBAEZ
G.R. No. 161380, 21 April 2014 FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin J.)

AND

Although a deed or instrument affecting unregistered lands would be valid

only between the parties thereto, third parties would also be affected by the
registered deed or instrument on the theory of constructive notice once it
was further registered in accordance with Section 194, i.e., the deed or
instrument was written or inscribed in the day book and the register book for
unregistered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or
city where the realty was located.
The only exception to the rule on constructive notice by registration of the
deed or instrument affecting unregistered realty exists in favor of a third
party with a better right. This exception is provided in Section 194, as
amended by Act No. 3344, to the effect that the registration shall be
understood to be without prejudice to a third party with a better right; and

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in paragraph (b) of Section 113 of P.D. No. 1529, to the effect that any
recording made under this section shall be without prejudice to a third party
with a better right.
WILLS AND SUCCESSION
In the matter of the Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, G.R. L16749, January 31, 1963
Whether or not, the intrinsic validity of the testamentary disposition should
be governed by Philippine Law, when the national law of the testator refers
back to the Philippine Law. Edward is domiciled in the Philippines hence,
Philippine court must apply its own laws which makes natural children legally
acknowledge as forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
Vitug vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.NO. 82027, Mar. 29, 1990 183 SCRA
755
A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares
or complies with duties to take effect after his death."
Cayatenao vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 524
The law which governs Adoracion Campos will is the law of Pennsylvania,
USA which is the national law of the decedent. It is settled that as regards to
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the wills as provided for by article 16
and 1039 of the New Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.
Parish Priest of Victoria vs. Rigor, 89 SCRA 483
The issue in this case is whether or not a male relative referred in the will
should include those who are born after the testators death. To construe it
as referring to the nearest male relative at any time after his death would
render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the
disposition of the estate.
De Borja vs De Borja, G.R. No, L-28040, August 18, 1972
There is no legal bar to a successor to dispose his or her share immediately
after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined
until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. The effect of such alienation is
to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.

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Bonilla vs Leon Barcena, G.R. L-41715, June 18, 1976

The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even
before the judicial declaration of their being declared as heirs. When
Fortunata died, her claim or right to the parcel of land in litigation in civil
case number 856 was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to
her heirs upon her death.
Borromeo-Herrera vs Borromeo, 152 SCRA 171
The properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be the subject of a
contract. The heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of death
of the decedent. In this case, the purported waiver of hereditary rights
cannot be considered effective.
Baltazar v. Laxa, G.R.NO. 174489, April, 11, 2012
It is an established rule that "[a] testament may not be disallowed just
because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither
does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting
witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court
is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting
witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly
executed in the manner required by law."
Echavez vs. Dozen Cons., G.R.NO. 192916, Oct. 11, 2010
An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805
requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves,
no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of
the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
Lopez v. Lopez, G.R.NO. 189984, Nov. 12, 2012
The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used
upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against
possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent
any increase or decrease in the pages.
Azuela v. CA, 487 SCRA 119
The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others,
that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the

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will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish
that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the
attestation clause itself.
Lee v. Tambago, 544 SCRA 393
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going
before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed.
It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares
to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard
the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is
administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.
Suroza vs. Honrado, 110 SCRA 388
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a
language "understood and known" to the testatrix but in its concluding
paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and
translated into Filipino language". That could only mean that the will was
written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is
void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that
every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
Garcia vs. Vasquez, 32 SCRA 489
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he
is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to
make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object
if they are not in accordance with his wishes. That the aim of the law is to
insure that the dispositions of the will are properly communicated to and
understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of
his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will should be read to
the latter, not only once but twice, by two different persons, and that the
witnesses have to act within the range of his (the testator's) other senses.
Alvarado vs. Gaviola, Jr., 226 SCRA 348
This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is
acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason
being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to
protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never

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intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary

privilege.
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil
aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and
the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon
being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only
then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence,
and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil
were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the
contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was
not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the
contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that
Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was drafted in
accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when
Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of
securing his conformity to the draft.
Javellana vs. Ledesma GR. No. L-7179, 97 Phil 258
The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the
testament was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of
the acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate
execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her witnesses cannot be
said to violate the rule that testaments should be completed without
interruption. 37
Cruz vs. Villasor NO.L-32213, 54 SCRA 31
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be
considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge
before himself his having signed the will. This cannot be done because he
cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other
to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will.
Caneda vs. CA, 222 SCRA 781
The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be revoked or relied
on by respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation
clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of
matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in
the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly

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inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements were
actually complied within the execution of the will.
Lopez v. Lopez, 685 SCRA 209
The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and
testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial
compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its
acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere
examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliunde.
Guerrero v. Bihis, 521 SCRA 394
The issue in this case whether the will acknowledged by the testatrix and
the instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of
his commission satisfies the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code?
Outside the place of his commission, he is bereft of power to perform any
notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside the limits of
his jurisdiction has no force and effect.
Celada v. Abena, 556 SCRA 569
While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, error in the
number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material
to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is
consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard
from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. 38
Rodelas vs. Aranza, 119 SCRA 16
The photostatic or xerox copy of a lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased
can be determined by the probate court.
Codoy vs. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333
The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a
statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with
the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when
used in a statute is mandatory."

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Ajero vs. CA, 236 SCRA 488

Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were
made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their
presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will
only result in disallowance of such changes.
Kalaw vs. Relova, 132 SCRA 237
To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard
the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can
neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner
required by law by affixing her full signature.
Roxas vs. De Jesus, 134 SCRA 245
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day,
month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there
is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the
authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the
date "FEB.,61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be
allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
Labrador vs. CA, 184 SCRA 170
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be
placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself
and executed in the hand of the testator.
Seangio v. Reyes, 508 SCRA 172
Holographic wills being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the
law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally
than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.
Palaganas v. Palaganas, 2011 640 SCRA 538
A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. But, reprobate or
re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country
is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time
before a competent court.

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Vda.De Perez vs. Tolete, 232 SCRA 722

What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the
testators reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of
the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses
executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same
provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in
nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate.
Casiano vs CA 158 SCRA 451
Revocation under this condition to be effective must have complied with the
two requirements: the overt act as mentioned under the law; the intent to
revoke on the part of the testator. The document or paper burned by one of
the witnesses was not satisfactorily established to be the will at all, much
less the will of Adriana.
Adriana Maloto vs. CA, 158 SCRA 451
For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was
not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana
Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under
the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her
presence.
Gago vs. Mamuyac NO. L-26317, 49 Phil 902
Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession
of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other
competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to
the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that
such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or
authority of the testator.
Seangio v. Reyes, 2006 508 SCRA 172
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the
same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall
be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were
stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents,
taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by

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his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the
disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
Molo vs. Molo NO. L- 2538, 90 Phil 37
The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the
revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive
conditions, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere
intent to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not
render the destruction conditional.
Gan vs Yap, 104 Phil. 509
The loss of the holographic will entail the loss of the only medium of proof; if
the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to
authenticate. In case of holographic will if oral testimony were admissible
only one man could engineer the fraud this way.
Rodelas vs Aranza 119 SCRA 16
If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is
available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is
the handwriting of the testator. But a photostatic copy or Xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the
standard writings of the testator.
Azaola vs Singson 109 Phil. 102
Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, the appellant is not
required to produce more than one witness. Even if the genuiness of the
holographic will were contested, article 811 cannot be interpreted as to
require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having denied the probate.
Codoy vs Calugay, 312 SCRA 333
We cannot eliminate the possibility that if the will is contested, the law
requires that three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting
of the deceased. A visual examination of the holographic will convince us
that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written
by the testator.
Gallanosa vs Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676

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After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness
of its execution cannot be raised anymore. It is not only the 1939 probate
proceeding that can be interposed as res judicata with respect to private
respondents complaint.
Roberts vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33
It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be
settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the
testate proceeding should hearing the two cases.
Nepomuceno vs CA, 139 SCRA 206
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the courts area of inquiry is
limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will.
Where practically considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
Aznar vs. Duncan, 17 SCRA 590
To constitute preterition, the omission must be total and complete, such that
nothing must be given to the compulsory heir.
Acain vs. IAC, 155 SCRA 100
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not
result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they
should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are
concerned.
Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced
heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled
ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer
from preterition.
Seangio v. Reyes G.R.NO. 140371-72, Nov. 27, 2006 508 SCRA 172
The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the
document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name

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was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his
son, Alfredo.
Legitime and Simulated Contracts; Spousal Marital Estrangement
Francisco vs. Francisco-Alfonso, 354 SCRA 112
Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his
illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale
was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and
rightful share in said property.
Capitle v. Elbambuena, 509 SCRA 444
Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and
legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
VEVENCIA ECHIN PABALAN, ET. AL. v. THE HEIRS OF SIMEON A.B.
MAAMO, SR., G.R. No. 174844, March 20, 2013

Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a

reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from
which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and
by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant. The reservor has the legal title
and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the
reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may
alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferees rights are revoked
upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor
but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor.
Sienes vs. Esparcia, 1 SCRA 750
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore,
subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership,
by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by
any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when
Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes
inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants

Civil Law

became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof
passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
Gonzales vs. CFI, 104 SCRA 479
Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen
grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her
daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her
estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make
a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the
reservees survived the reservor.
Vizconde v. CA, 286 SCRA 217
Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael, in fact, it was Rafael
who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the
Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property
may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela
property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael.
Palacios vs Ramirez, 111 SCRA 704
The word degree means generation and the present code has obviously
followed this interpretation by providing that the substitution shall not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted. The code thus clearly
indicates that the second heir must be related to and one generation from
the first heir.
Crisologo vs Singzon, 49 SCRA 491
In fideicommissary substitution clearly impose an obligation upon the first
heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the estate
bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular
event.
Rosales vs Rosales, 148 SCRA 69
The daughter-in-law is not an intestate heir of her spouses parents. There is
no provision in the civil code which states that a widow is an intestate heir of
her mother-in-law.
Delos Santos vs Dela Cruz, 37 SCRA 555

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In an intestate succession, a grandniece of the deceased cannot participate

in the inheritance with the surviving nieces and nephews because the
existence of the latter excluded the more distant relatives. In the collateral
line, the right of representation does not go beyond the children of brothers
and sisters.
Corpuz vs Corpuz, 85 SCRA 567
Since, Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and
since Juanita was the legitimate child of Tomas, himself was a legitimate
child, appellant Tomas has no cause of action to recovery of the supposed
hereditary share of his daughter, Juanita as a legal heir, in Yangcos estate.
Santillon vs Mirandan, 14 SCRA 563
If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse since they shall
equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to
the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to children or descendants, the
rule in the statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include
the singular.
Bacayo vs Borromeo, 14 SCRA 986
A decedents uncle and aunt may not succeed intestate so long as nephews
and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
In this case, the nephews and nieces were not inheriting by right of
representation because they only do so if they concur with the brothers and
sisters of the decedent.
Bagunu vs. Piedad, 347 SCRA 571
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree
to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the
extent that the right of representation can apply. In the collateral line, the
right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their
uncles or aunts.
Sayson vs. CA, 205 SCRA 321
The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting
parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of
either party.

Civil Law

Corpus vs. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567

In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be
succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules
established for legitimate brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's
half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to
succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 621 SCRA 142
Petitioners argument that the successional bar between the legitimate and
illegitimate relatives of a decedent does not apply in this instance where
facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate
grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her
husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their
businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedents husband, the
original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of administration.
Diaz vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 645
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the
person spoken of. The record shows that from the commencement of this
case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor
natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Diaz vs. IAC, 182 SCRA 427
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by
it. In accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it
should be understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as
the term is a general one.
Heirs of Uriarte vs. CA, 284 SCRA 511
A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no
descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. That private
respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial.
Delos Santos vs Ferraris-Borromeo, 14 SCRA 986

Civil Law

Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation unless

concurring with the brothers or sisters of the deceased which is provided in
article 975 when children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased
survive with their uncles and aunts but if they alone survive, they shall
inherit in equal portions.
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
DEGAOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 162826,
October 14, 2013
Degaos claims that his partial payments to the complainants novated his
contract with them from agency to loan, thereby converting his liability from
criminal to civil. The incompatibility in novation must take place in any of the
essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal
conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in
nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.
BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION vs. MA. ANTONIA R. ARMOVIT
G.R. No. 163654, 08 October 2014, FIRST DIVISION (BERSAMIN, J.)
The relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder is
a contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions found in the
card membership agreement. Such terms and conditions constitute the law
between the parties. In case of their breach, moral damages may be
recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a
wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. However, a conscious
or intentional design need not always be present because negligence may
occasionally be so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Hence, bad faith
in the context of Article 2220 of the Civil Code includes gross negligence.
FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC. AND FIL-ESTATE NETWORK, INC., v.
SPOUSES CONRADO AND MARIA VICTORIA RONQUILLO, , G.R.
NO.185798. January 13, 2014
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis cannot be said to be unforeseeable and
beyond the control of a business corporation, especially a corporation
engaged in real estate enterprise. Such corporation is considered a master in
projections of commodities and currency movements and business risks. It
has the ability to foresee such situation. Thus, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis
is not an instance of caso fortuito.
ANSAY vs. BOARD OF DIRECTORS, G.R. NO. L-13667, April 29, 1960

Civil Law

Appellants filed against appellees in the CFI a complaint praying for a 20%
Christmas bonus, contending that there exists a cause of action in their
complaint because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is
defined by law as a natural obligation. Article 1423 of the New Civil Code
classifies obligations into civil or natural, "Civil obligations are a right of
action to compel their performance, while Natural obligations, not being
based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of
action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the
obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered
by reason thereof".
SALEN vs. BALCE, G.R. NO. L-14414, April 27, 1960
Delfin, the father, was held jointly and severally liable with his minor son
Dante arising from the criminal act committed by the latter. The civil liability
which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor
children who live with them, is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty
of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them in
proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to
correct and punish them in moderation" .
SALUDAGA vs. FEU, G.R. NO. 179337 April 30, 2008
Saludaga, a sophomore law student of respondent FEU filed a case for
damages against it after he was shot by one of the security guards on duty
at the school premises. When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is a established contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with but which
FEU failed to perform when it did not provide a safe and secure environment
to its students.
NAPOCOR vs. CA, G.R. NO. 124378, March 8, 2005
The negligence of NPC as a result of its inability to maintain the level of
water in its dams has been satisfactorily and extensively established. In
crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages, which
are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of and it is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen
or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
GAISANO CAGAYAN, INC. vs INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA, G.R. NO. 147839, June 8, 2006
Petitioners argument is that it is not liable for the unpaid accounts because
the fire is a fortuitous event. If the obligation is generic in the sense that the
object thereof is designated merely by its class or genus without any
particular designation or physical segregation from all others of the same

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class, the loss or destruction of anything of the same kind even without the
debtors fault and before he has incurred in delay will not have the effect of
extinguishing the obligation, based on the principle that the genus of a thing
can never perish, (Genus nunquan perit) and an obligation to pay money is
generic; therefore, it is not excused by fortuitous loss of any specific property
of the debtor.
TELEFAST vs. CASTRO, G.R. NO. 73867, February 29, 1988
Petitioner and private respondent entered into a contract whereby, for a fee,
petitioner undertook to send said private respondent's message overseas by
telegram but which petitioner did not do, despite performance by said
private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges. Those
who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable
for damages.
MANUEL vs. CA, G.R. NO. 95469 July 25, 1991
Petitioner contends that private respondents are in mora accipiendi. The
failure of the owners to collect or their refusal to accept the rentals are not
valid defenses, since consignation under such circumstances, is necessary,
and by this we mean one that is effected in full compliance with the specific
requirements of the law therefor.
UNLAD RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. DRAGON, G.R.
NO. 149338, July 28, 2008
Petitioners contend that they have fully complied with their obligation under
the Memorandum of Agreement but due to respondents failure to increase
the capital stock of the corporation to an amount that will accommodate
their undertaking, it had become impossible for them to perform their end of
the Agreement. In reciprocal obligations, failure of the other party to perform
the obligation renders the other party to demand fulfillment of the obligation
or asked for the rescission of the contract, but not simply not performing
their part of the Agreement.
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORP. vs. BROQUEZA, G.R. NO.
178610 November 17, 2010
Respondents executed undated promissory notes. They were not able to pay
the monthly amortizations of their respective loans, which were suppose to
be paid through salary deduction, to the petitioner because of their
dismissal. Loans secured by their future retirement benefits to which they are
no longer entitled are reduced to unsecured and pure civil obligations and

Civil Law

the absence of a period within which to pay the obligation, the fulfillment of
which is demandable at once.
JAVIER vs. CA, G.R. No. L-48194 March 15, 1990
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth and effectivity
can take place only if and when the event which constitutes the condition
happens or is fulfilled, and if the suspensive condition does not take place,
the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.
PARKS vs. PROVINCE OF TARLAC, G.R. NO. L-24190, July 13, 1926
Appellant contends that a condition precedent having been imposed in the
donation and the same not having been complied with, the donation never
became effective. The characteristic of a condition precedent is that the
acquisition of the right is not effected while said condition is not complied
with or is not deemed complied with, consequently, when a condition is
imposed, the compliance of which cannot be effected except when the right
is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a condition precedent but a
condition subsequent.
ALILEO A. MAGLASANG v. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., G.R.
No. 188986, March 20, 2013
The court ruled that the power to rescind the obligations of the injured party
is implied in reciprocal obligations, such as in this case. On this score, the CA
correctly applied Article 1191, which provides thus: the power to rescind
obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should
not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose
between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the
payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after
he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. The court
shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing
the fixing of a period.
EDS MANUFACTURING, INC. v. HEALTHCHECK INTERNATIONAL INC.
G.R. No. 162802, October 9, 2013
The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a
slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental
violations as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the
agreement. It must be pointed that in the absence of a stipulation, a party
cannot unilaterally and extra judicially rescind a contract. A judicial or
notarial act is necessary before a valid rescission can take place.

Civil Law

Even if Article 1191 were applicable, petitioner would still not be entitled to
automatic rescission. Under Article 1191of the Civil Code, the right to resolve
reciprocal obligations, is deemed implied in case one of the obligors shall fail
to comply with what is incumbent upon him. But that right must be invoked
judicially. Consequently, even if the right to rescind is made available to the
injured party, the obligation is not ipso facto erased by the failure of the
other party to comply with what is incumbent upon him. The party entitled to
rescind should apply to the court for a decree of rescission. The right cannot
be exercised solely on a partys own judgment that the other committed a
breach of the obligation. The operative act which produces the resolution of
the contract is the decree of the court and not the mere act of the vendor.
UP vs. DE LOS ANGELES, G.R. NO. L-28602, September 29,
In the first place, UP and ALUMCO had expressly stipulated in the
"Acknowledgment of Debt and Proposed Manner of Payments" that, upon
default by the debtor ALUMCO, the creditor (UP) has "the right and the power
to consider, the Logging Agreement dated as rescinded without the necessity
of any judicial suit."
The party who deems the contract violated may consider it resolved or
rescinded, and act accordingly, without previous court action, but it proceeds
at its own risk, for it is only the final judgment of the corresponding court
that will conclusively and finally settle whether the action taken was or was
not correct in law.
AYSON-SIMON vs. ADAMOS, G.R. NO. L-39378, August 28, 1984
Defendants contend (1) that the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation in reciprocal ones are alternative remedies, and plaintiff having
chosen fulfillment in the Civil Case, she cannot now seek rescission; and (2)
that even if plaintiff could seek rescission the action to rescind the obligation
has prescribed. The rule that the injured party can only choose between
fulfillment and rescission of the obligation, and cannot have both, applies
when the obligation is possible of fulfillment, if the fulfillment has become
impossible, Article 1191 (3) allows the injured party to seek rescission even
after he has chosen fulfillment.
OSMEA III vs SSS, September 13, 2007
The Letter-Agreement, the SPA, the SSC resolutions assailed in this recourse,
and the Invitation to Bid sent out to implement said resolutions, all have a

Civil Law

common subject: the Shares the 187.84 Million EPCIB common shares,
which, as a necessary consequence of the BDO- EPCIB merger which saw
EPCIB being absorbed by the surviving BDO, have been transferred to BDO
and converted into BDO common shares under the exchange ratio set forth
in the BDO-EPCIB Plan of Merger. As thus converted, the subject Shares are
no longer equity security issuances of the now defunct EPCIB, but those of
BDO-EPCI, which, needless to stress, is a totally separate and distinct entity
from what used to be EPCIB.
Under the law on obligations and contracts, the obligation to give a
determinate thing is extinguished if the object is lost without the fault of the
debtor, and per Art. 1192 (2) of the Civil Code, a thing is considered lost
when it perishes or disappears in such a way that it cannot be recovered.
ARANETA, INC., vs.PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES, G.R. NO. L-22558
May 31, 1967
Araneta, who was not able to comply with his obligation to create side
streets on the sides of the land which were sold to the PSE due to the
presence of squatters, questions the decision of the lower court ordering him
to comply with his obligation within 2 years from the finality of the decision.
It must be recalled that Article 1197 of the Civil Code involves a two-step
process, the Court must first determine that "the obligation does not fix a
period", or from the nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a
period was intended, because courts can not fix a period merely because in
its opinion it is or should be reasonable and the complaint not having sought
that the court should set a period, but must set the time that the parties are
shown to have intended.
RONQUILLO vs.CA, G.R. NO. L-55138September 28, 1984
Respondent filed a modification of the order of the lower court in a collection
case praying for the "execution of the decision in its entirety against all
defendants, jointly and severally." In the absence of a finding of facts that
the defendants made themselves individually liable for the debt incurred
they are each liable only for one-fourth of said amount, the obligation being
described as "individually and jointly".
SPOUSES MINIAN0 vs. CONCEPCION, G.R. 172825, October 11, 2012
Admittedly, payment of the remaining balance of P200,000.00 was not made
to the creditors themselves, but rather, it was allegedly made to a certain
Losloso who was the authorized agent of petitioners. Respondents obligation
consists of payment of a sum of money, and in general, a payment in order
to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper
person, thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself or to an agent
having authority, express or implied, to receive the particular payment.

Civil Law

Payment made to one having apparent authority to receive the money will,
as a rule, be treated as though actual authority had been given for its
receipt. If payment is made to one who by law is authorized to act for the
creditor, it will work as a discharge.
TIBAJIA vs. CA, G.R. NO. 100290, June 4, 1993
Checks representing deposit money do not have legal tender power and their
acceptance in the payment of debts, both public and private, is at the option
of the creditor.
SPS. NAMAEL AND LOURDES BONROSTRO v.
CONSTACIA LUNA, G.R. No. 172346. July 24, 2013

SPS.

JUAN

AND

Tender of payment "is the manifestation by the debtor of a desire to comply

with or pay an obligation. If refused without just cause, the tender of
payment will discharge the debtor of the obligation to pay but only after a
valid consignation of the sum due shall have been made with the proper
court." Consignation is the deposit of the proper amount with a judicial
authority in accordance with rules prescribed by law, after the tender of
payment has been refused or because of circumstances which render direct
payment to the creditor impossible or inadvisable.
Tender of payment, without more, produces no effect. To have the effect of
payment and the consequent extinguishment of the obligation to pay, the
law requires the companion acts of tender of payment and consignation.
Spouses Oscar and Thelma Cacayorin v. Armed Forces and Police
Mutual Benefit Association, Inc., G.R. No. 171298. April 15, 2013
Consignation is necessarily judicial. Article 1258 of the Civil Code specifically
provides that consignation shall be made by depositing the thing or things
due at the disposal of judicial authority. The said provision clearly precludes
consignation in venues other than the courts.
DALTON vs. FG.R. and DEVELOPMENT CORP, G.R. NO. 172577 January
19, 2011
The withdrawal by the creditor of the amounts consigned was subject to the
express reservation of assailing the validity of the consignation. In such case,
the creditor is not deemed to have waived the claims he reserved against his
debtor. When the amount consigned does not cover the entire obligation, the
creditor may accept it, reserving his right to the balance.
FRANCIA vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-67649 June 28, 1988

Civil Law

Francia contends that his tax delinquency has been extinguished by legal
compensation and claims that the government owed him when a portion of
his land was expropriated, hence, his tax obligation had been set-off by
operation of law.
The general rule based on grounds of public policy is well-settled that no setoff admissible against demands for taxes levied for general or local
governmental purposes because taxes are not in the nature of contracts
between the party and party but grow out of duty to, and are the positive
acts of the government to the making and enforcing of which, the personal
consent of individual taxpayers is not required.
CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC. vs. STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC.,
G.R. NO. 147950. December 11, 2003
There was no change in the object of the prior obligations in the
restructuring agreement since it merely provided for a new schedule of
payments and additional security giving Delta authority to take over the
management and operations of CBLI in case CBLI fails to pay installments
equivalent to 60 days. With respect to obligations to pay a sum of money,
this Court has consistently applied the well-settled rule that the obligation is
not novated by an instrument that expressly recognizes the old, changes
only the terms of payment, and adds other obligations not incompatible with
the old ones, or where the new contract merely supplements the old one.
SPOUSES TONGSON vs. EMERGENCY PAWNSHOP BULA, G.R. 167874.
January 15, 2010
A valid contract requires the concurrence of the following essential elements:
(1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in
exchange for the price; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain
in money or its equivalent.
PALATTAO vs. CA, G.R. NO. 131726, May 7, 2002
Appellant made a qualified acceptance of appellees letter-offer of a parcel of
land but appellee made a new proposal to pay the amount in staggered
amounts within two years in quarterly amortizations. To convert the offer into
a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the terms
of the offer, for a qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer and is a
rejection of the original offer and such acceptance is not sufficient to
generate consent.
GALLARDO vs.HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R.
NO. L-67742 October 29, 1987

Civil Law

The issue here is whether or not the unnotarized deed of sale can be
considered as a valid instrument for effecting the alienation by way of sale of
a parcel of land registerd under the Torrens System. The general rule
enunciated in said Art. 1356 is that contracts are obligatory, in whatever
form they may have been entered, provided all the essential requisites for
their validity are present, except when the law so requires requiring a
contract to be in some form for validity or enforceability.
SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS, G.R. NO. L-25494 June 14, 1972
Since there may be no valid contract without a cause or consideration, the
promisor is not bound by his promise and may, accordingly, withdraw it, and
pending notice of its withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes, however, of
the nature of an offer to sell which, if accepted, results in a perfected
contract of sale.
TIU vs. PLATINUM PLANS PHIL., INC., G.R. NO. 163512 February 28,
2007
Respondent contends that the inclusion of the two-year non-involvement
clause in petitioners contract of employment was reasonable and needed
since her job gave her access to the companys confidential marketing
strategies. A non-involvement clause is not necessarily void for being in
restraint of trade as long as there are reasonable limitations as to time,
trade, and place.
CABAHUG vs NAPOCOR, G.R. NO. 186069, January 30, 2013
Disregarding the stipulations in the contract allowing additional
compensation for easement fee, the CA ruled that Cabahug's attempt to
collect further sums by way of additional easement fee and,or just
compensation is violative of said contract. It is settled that a contract
constitutes the law between the parties who are bound by its stipulations
which, when couched in clear and plain language, should be applied
according to their literal tenor and the courts cannot supply material
stipulations, which contradict the intent of the parties.
SPOUSES FLORENDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 101771
December 17, 1996
In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law
between the parties, there must be mutuality between the parties based on
their essential equality, hence, a contract containing a condition which
makes its fulfillment dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one
of the contracting parties, is void.
DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
118248 April 5, 2000

Civil Law

Being an heir there is privity of interest between the heir and the deceased,
hence, heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-ininterest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not
transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law.
PRUDENTIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. ABASOLO, G.R. NO.
186738, September 27, 2010
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, and if
a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, the
contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon
the third person.
FLORENTINO vs. ENCARNACION, SR., G.R. NO. L-27696 September
30, 1977
To constitute a valid stipulation pour autrui it must be the purpose and intent
of the stipulating parties to benefit the third. It is not sufficient that the third
person may be incidentally benefited by the stipulation.
ASIAN CATHAY FINANCE AND LEASING CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES
G.R.AVADOR et al, G.R. NO. 186550, July 5, 2010
A contract of adhesion may be struck down as void and unenforceable for
being subversive to public policy, when the weaker party is completely
deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.
URETA vs. URETA, G.R. No. 165748, September 14, 2011
Lacking in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a
valid and enforceable contract. Thus, where a person, in order to place his
property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to
another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control of
the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. Similarly, in this
case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio purely for taxation purposes,
without intending to transfer ownership over the subject lands.
LITA ENTERPRISES, INC.,vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-64693 April 27, 1984
Unquestionably, the parties herein operated under an arrangement,
commonly known as the "kabit system", whereby a person who has been
granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motors
vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee, and the petitioner prays
that private respondents be declared liable to petitioner for whatever
amount the latter has paid. It is a fundamental principle of in pari delicto that
the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave
them both where it finds them.

Civil Law

CARLOS A. LORIA vs. LUDOLFO P. MUOZ, JR.

G.R. No. 187240, 15 October 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen, J.)
The application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An
accepted exception arises when its application contravenes well-established
public policy. In this jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as that
principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that
which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public
good. The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of
the State.
CORONEL vs. CONSTANTINO, G.R. NO. 121069, February 7, 2003
Applying Articles 1317 and 1403 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals ruled
that through their inaction and silence, the three sons of Emilia are
considered to have ratified the aforesaid sale of the subject property by their
mother. Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts
and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which
without his sanction would not be binding on him , hence, an alleged silence
and inaction may not be interpreted as an act of ratification on their part.
YUVIENCO vs. DACUYCUY, G.R. NO. L-55048 May 27, 1981
Respondent judge assumed that as long as the requirements of perfection of
a contract are present in a contract which involves payment in installments,
the Statute of Frauds would no longer apply as long as the total price or
consideration is mentioned in some note or memorandum and there is no
need of any indication of the manner in which such total price is to be paid.
In any sale of real property on installments, the Statute of Frauds read
together with the perfection requirements of Article 1475 of the Civil Code
must be understood and applied in the sense that the idea of payment on
installments must be in the requisite of a note or memorandum therein
contemplated.
ORDUA vs. FUENTEBELLA, G.R. NO. 176841, June 29, 2010
Gabriel Sr., during his lifetime, sold the subject property to Antonita, the
purchase price payable on installment basis, thus, Gabriel Sr. appeared to
have been a recipient of some partial payments but after his death, his son
questions the verbal sale contract between Gabriel Sr. and Antonita, and
alleged that the contract is unenforceable for non-compliance with the
Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds, in context, provides that a contract
for the sale of real property or of an interest therein shall be unenforceable
unless the sale or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and

Civil Law

subscribed by the party or his agent. Where the verbal contract of sale,
however, has been partially executed through the partial payments made by
one party duly received by the vendor, as in the present case, the contract is
taken out of the scope of the Statute.
AIR FRANCE vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 104234
June 30, 1995
Petitioner moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution on the ground
of unsatisfied judgment against respondents and It likewise moved to declare
the sale to a third party of a parcel of land in the name of the private
respondent as one in fraud of creditors which was granted by the lower
court. Rescissible contracts, not being void, they remain legally effective
until set aside in a rescissory action and may convey title, and an action for
rescission may not be raised or set up in a summary proceeding through a
motion, but in an independent civil action and only after a full-blown trial.
LAW ON SALES
PEALOSA vs. SANTOS, G.R. NO. 133749, August 23, 2001
Respondent insist that the second deed is a complete nullity because a) the
consideration stated in the deed was not paid; b)seller was not present when
the deed was notarized; c) seller did not surrender a copy of the title; d)real
estate taxes were not paid. The elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1)
consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3)
price certain in money or its equivalent which are present in the second
Deed of Sale hence there is already a perfected contract of sale.
FIRST OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION vs. SECURITRON SECURITY
SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 199648, January 28, 2015
Since there is no perfected sale between the parties, respondent had no
obligation to make payment through the check; nor did it possess the right to
deliver earnest money to petitioner in order to bind the latter to a sale. As
contemplated under Art. 1482 of the Civil Code, there must first be a
perfected contract of sale before we can speak of earnest money. Where
the parties merely exchanged offers and counter-offers, no contract is
perfected since they did not yet give their consent to such offers. Earnest
money applies to a perfected sale.

Civil Law

MOLDEX RAELTY INC. v. FLORA A. SABERON, G.R. No. 176289. April

8, 2013
The lack of a license to sell or the failure on the part of a subdivision
developer to register the contract to sell or deed of conveyance with the
Register of Deeds does not result to the nullification or invalidation of the
contract to sell it entered into with a buyer. The contract to sell remains valid
and subsisting. The intrinsic validity of the contract to sell is not affected by
the developers violation of Section 5 of PD 957.Nevertheless, the
respondent in this case is entitled to 50% refund under the Maceda Law.
SPOUSES DELFIN O. TUMIBAY AND AURORA T. TUMIBA-DECEASED ET
AL. v. SPOUSES MELVIN A. LOPEZ, G.R. No. 171692, June 3, 2013
In a contract to sell, the seller retains ownership of the property until the
buyer has paid the price in full. A buyer who covertly usurps the seller's
ownership of the property prior to the full payment of the price is in breach
of the contract and the seller is entitled to rescission because the breach is
substantial and fundamental as it defeats the very object of the parties in
entering into the contract to sell. In the case at bar, the court finds that
respondent Rowenas act of transferring the title to the subject land in her
name, without the knowledge and consent of petitioners and despite nonpayment of the full price thereof, constitutes a substantial and fundamental
breach of the contract to sell.
HEIRS OF ARTURO REYES vs SOCCO-BELTRAN, G.R. 176474
November 27, 2008
It was unmistakably stated in the Contract to Sell and made clear to both
parties thereto that the vendor was not yet the owner of the subject property
and was merely expecting to inherit the same. The law specifically requires
that the vendor must have ownership of the property at the time of delivery
hence, there was no valid sale from which ownership of the subject property
could have been transferred.
DACLAG vs. MACAHILIG et al., G.R. NO. 159578, February 18, 2009
Petitioners contend that the 10-year period for reconveyance is applicable if
the action is based on an implied or a constructive trust. However, since
respondents' action for reconveyance was based on fraud, the action must
be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Respondent's
action for reconveyance was not even subject to prescription, since the deed
of sale that was executed in favor of petitioners was null and void because
the seller was not the owner of the land, nor has the authority when she sold
it to petitioners, hence, being an absolute nullity, the deed is subject to
attack anytime because an action to declare the inexistence of a void
contract does not prescribe.

Civil Law

NOOL vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 116635 July 24, 1997
Petitioners contend that they could repurchase the property that they "sold"
to private respondents when they allowed the respondent to redeem the
properties for them from DBP but DBP certified that the mortgagors' right of
redemption was not exercised within the period. Article 1505 of the Civil
Code provides that "where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner
thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with consent of the
owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had,
unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the
seller's authority to sell.", hence, petitioners "sold" nothing, it follows that
they can also "repurchase" nothing.
DAROY vs. ATTY. ABECIA, A.C. NO. 3046, October 26, 1998
The prohibition in Art. 1491 does not apply to the sale of a parcel of land,
acquired by a client to satisfy a judgment in his favor to his counsel as long
as the property was not the subject of the litigation.
ARCENIO vs. JUDGE PAGOROGON, A.M. NO. MTJ-89-270 July 5, 1993
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE PAGOROGON, A.M.
NO. MTJ-92-637 July 5, 1993
The respondent judge engaged the services of a mechanic to tow the jeep in
custodia legis and to place the jeep in good running condition, spending in
the process her own money and also registered the same in her brother's
name. The act of respondent judge is not unlike the prohibited acquisition by
purchase described in Article 1491 of the New Civil code and is in fact, even
worse when she did not acquire the said vehicle from it's owner but instead
whimsically spent for its repairs and automatically appropriated the jeep for
her own use and benefit.
VALENCIA vs. ATTY. CABANTING, A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543
April 26, 1991
Paulino alleged that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution
concerning his house and while the petition for certiorari was pending the
trial court issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this case
has already become final and executory". While it is true that Atty. Cabanting
purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there was still a pending
certiorari proceeding, and a thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is
some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it
becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.
FABILLO vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R.
NO. L-68838 March 11, 1991

Civil Law

After the court declared with finality that the petitioners are the lawful
owners, they refused to comply when the respondent lawyer proceeded to
implement the contract of services between him and the petitioners by
taking possession and exercising rights of ownership over 40% of said
properties which are the subject of litigation. A contract between a lawyer
and his client stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by said prohibition
under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code because the payment of said fee is
not made during the pendency of the litigation but only after judgment has
been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.
MANANQUIL vs. ATTY. VILLEGAS, A.M. NO. 2430 August 30, 1990
Complainant alleges that for over a period of 20 years, respondent counsel
allowed lease contracts to be executed between his client and a partnership
of which respondent is one of the partners, covering parcels of land of the
estate, but respondent claims that he is only acting as an agent. Even if the
respondent signed merely as an agent, the lease contracts are covered by
the prohibition against any acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties
involved in litigation in which he takes part.
BAUTISTA vs. ATTY. GONZALES, A.M. NO. 1625 February 12, 1990
The Solicitor General found that respondent counsel transferred to himself
one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the case
where the properties were involved. Persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the
Civil Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein
because of the existing fiduciary relationship with such property and rights,
as well as with the client.
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY
OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA, B.M. NO. 793. July 30, 2004
Maquera was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as
he acquired his clients property by exercising the right of redemption
previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal services,
then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for
handling his clients case. The prohibition extends to sales in legal
redemption and such prohibition is founded on public policy because, by
virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity
and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his
client.
PROVINCE OF CEBU vs. HEIRS OF RUFINA MORALES, G.R. NO.
170115, FEBRUARY 19, 2008

Civil Law

The City of Cebu was no longer the owner of the lot when it ceded the same
to petitioner under the compromise agreement and at that time, the city
merely retained rights as an unpaid seller but had effectively transferred
ownership of the lot to Morales. A successor-in-interest could only acquire
rights that its predecessor had over the lo which include the right to seek
rescission or fulfillment of the terms of the contract and the right to damages
in either case.
HEIRS OF AMPARO DEL ROSARIO vs. SANTOS, G.R. NO. L-46892
September 30, 1981
By the terms of the Deed of Sale itself, appellants declared themselves to be
owners of one-half (1,2) interest thereof and contend that the deed of
assignment of one-half (1,2) interest thereof executed by said Custodio in
their favor is strictly personal between them. Notwithstanding the lack of any
title to the said lot by appellants at the time of the execution of the deed of
sale in favor of appellee, the said sale may be valid as there can be a sale of
an expected thing.
JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-48194 March 15, 1990
The efficacy of a deed of assignment is subject to the condition that the
application of private respondent for an additional area for forest concession
be approved by the Bureau of Forestry which was not obtained. The efficacy
of the sale of a mere hope or expectancy is deemed subject to the condition
that the thing will come into existence, which did not happen, hence the
agreement executed never became effective or enforceable.
DEL PRADO vs SPOUSES CABALLERO, G.R. NO. 148225, March 3,2010
7
The parties agreed on the purchase price of P40,000.00 for a predetermined
area of 4,000 sq m, more or less, but when the OCT was issued, the area was
declared to be 14,475 sq m, with an excess of 10,475 sq m. Petititiomer,
however, claims that respondents are, therefore, duty-bound to deliver the
whole area within the boundaries stated, without any corresponding increase
in the price. Article 1542 is not hard and fast and admits of an exception and
the use of more or less or similar words in designating quantity covers only
a reasonable excess or deficiency, and clearly, the discrepancy of 10,475 sq
m cannot be considered a slight difference in quantity.
SEMIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 76031 March 2, 1994
Private respondent sold Lot 4221 to his nephew by means of a "Kasulatan ng
Bilihan ng Lupa" which incorporated both the area and the definite
boundaries of the lot, the former transferred not merely the 822.5 square

Civil Law

meters stated in their document of sale but the entire area circumscribed
within its boundaries.
If besides mentioning the boundaries, which is indispensable in every
conveyance of real estate, its area or number should be designated in the
contract, the vendor shall be bound to deliver all that is included within said
boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number specified in the
contract; and, should he not be able to do so, he shall suffer a reduction in
the price, in proportion to what is lacking in the area or number, unless the
contract is rescinded because the vendee does not accede to the failure to
deliver what has been stipulated.
DANGUILAN vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-69970 November 28, 1988
Respondent admits that she did not take physical possession of property but
argues that symbolic delivery was effected through the notarized deed of
sale. The thing is considered to be delivered when it is placed "in the hands
and possession of the vendee," and in order that this symbolic delivery may
produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had
such control over the thing sold at the moment of the sale, but if there is no
impediment to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the
purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the
execution of a public instrument is sufficient.
CHUA vs COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 119255, April 9, 2003
Petitioner insists that he was ready to pay the balance of the purchase price
but withheld payment because he required that the property be registered
first in his name before he would turn over the check to the private
respondent. 8
The obligation of the seller is to transfer to the buyer ownership of the thing
sold, but in the sale of a real property, the seller is not obligated to transfer
in the name of the buyer a new certificate of title, but rather to transfer
ownership of the real property, because as between the seller and buyer,
ownership is transferred not by the issuance of a new certificate of title in
the name of the buyer but by the execution of the instrument of sale in a
public document.
VISAYAN SAWMILL COMPANY, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
83851. March 3, 1993.
The seller gave access to the buyer to enter his premises, manifesting no
objection thereto but even sending people to start digging up the scrap iron.
The seller has placed the goods in the control and possession of the vendee
and such action or real delivery (traditio) transfered ownership.
MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
L-31189 March 31, 1987

Civil Law

Respondent discovered that a parcel of land she owns is being used by

Petitioner, Municipality of Victorias, as a cemetery for 29 years and when the
Mayor replied that Petitioner bought the land from her grandmother, she
asked to be shown the papers concerning the sale but petitioner refused to
show the same. Where there is no express provision that title shall not pass
until payment of the price, and the thing sold has been delivered, title passes
from the moment the thing sold is placed in the possession and control of the
buyer.
DE LEON vs. ONG, G.R. NO. 170405, February 2, 2010
Petitioner sold three parcels of land to respondent which were mortgaged to
a bank, hence petitioner and respondent executed a notarized deed of
absolute sale with assumption of mortgage, but petitioner some time
thereafter paid the mortgage and sold the properties to another person.
Settled is the rule that the seller is obliged to transfer title over the
properties and deliver the same to the buyer, and as a rule, the execution of
a notarized deed of sale is equivalent to the delivery of a thing sold.
PUROMINES, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEAL, G.R. NO. 91228. March 22,
1993.
Petitioner argues that the sales contract does not include the contract of
carriage which is a different contract entered into by the carrier with the
cargo owners.
As worded, the sales contract is comprehensive enough to include claims for
damages arising from carriage and delivery of the goods. As a general rule,
the seller has the obligation to transmit the goods to the buyer, and
concomitant thereto, the contracting of a carrier to deliver the same. Art.
1523 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 1523. Where in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller in authorized
or required to send the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier,
whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose of transmission to the
buyer is deemed to be a delivery of the goods to the buyer, except in the
cases provided for in article 1503, first, second and third paragraphs, or
unless a contrary intent appear.
"Unless otherwise authorized by the buyer, the seller must take such
contract with the carrier on behalf of the buyer as may be reasonable, having
regard to the nature of the goods and the other circumstances of the case. If
the seller omit so to do, and the goods are lost or damaged in course of
transit, the buyer may decline to treat the delivery to the carrier as a
delivery to himself,, or may hold the seller responsible in damages."
xxx xxx xxx

Civil Law

The disputed sales contact provides for conditions relative to the delivery of
goods, such as date of shipment, demurrage, weight as determined by the
bill of lading at load port.
BOY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 125088, April 14, 2004
Petitioner sold the subject property to respondents as evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, but contends that the respondents have no
right to material possession of the property since the respondents have not
paid the property in full. Unless there is a stipulation to the contrary, when
the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof is
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract.
SPOUSES BUENAVENTURA et al vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
126376. November 20, 2003
Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the
prices stated in the Deeds of Sale to their respondent father and assuming
that there is consideration, the same is grossly inadequate as to invalidate
the Deeds of Sale. If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the
price, the contract of sale is valid and gross inadequacy of price does not
affect a contract of sale, except if there is a defect in the consent, or that the
parties really intended a donation or some other contract.
HO, JR. vs TENG GUI, G.R. NO. 130115, July 16, 2008
RTC considered that although the sales of the properties on the lot were
simulated, it can be assumed that the intention of Ho in such transaction was
to give and donate such properties to the respondent. The Court holds that
the reliance of the trial court on the provisions of Article 1471 of the Civil
Code to conclude that the simulated sales were a valid donation to the
respondent is misplaced because its finding was based on a mere
assumption when the law requires positive proof, which the respondent was
unable to show.
HYATT ELEVATORS vs. CATHEDRAL HEIGHTS, G.R. NO. 173881
December 1, 2010
As revealed by the records, it was only Hyatt who determined the price,
without the acceptance or conformity of CHBCAI. The fixing of the price can
never be left to the decision of one of the contracting parties, but a price
fixed by one of the contracting parties, if accepted by the other, gives rise to
a perfected sale.
CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 119255, April 9, 2003
On the agreed date, Chua refused to pay the balance of the purchase price
as required by the contract to sell, the signed Deeds of Sale, and imposes
another condition. The vendee is bound to accept delivery and to pay the
price of the thing sold at the time and place stipulated in the contract.

Civil Law

FULE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 112212, March 2, 1998

While it is true that the amount of P40,000.00 forming part of the
consideration was still payable to petitioner, its nonpayment by Dr. Cruz is
not a sufficient cause to invalidate the contract or bar the transfer of
ownership and possession of the things exchanged considering the fact that
their contract is silent as to when it becomes due and demandable.
Neither may such failure to pay the balance of the purchase price result in
the payment of interest thereon. Article 1589 of the Civil Code prescribes the
payment of interest by the vendee "for the period between the delivery of
the thing and the payment of the price" in the following cases:
(1) Should it have been so stipulated;
(2) Should the thing sold and delivered produce fruits or income;
(3) Should he be in default, from the time of judicial or extrajudicial demand
for the payment of the price.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES ALFONSO, G.R.
NO. 131074, March 27, 2000
Respondents aver that they are entitled to cancel the obligation altogether in
view of petitioner's failure to pay the purchase price when the same became
due, while Petitioner claims that the respondent failed to comply with their
contractual obligations hence it was entitled to withhold payment of the
purchase price. Should the vendee be disturbed in the possession or
ownership of the thing acquired, he may suspend the payment of the price
until the vendor has cause the disturbance or danger to cease. This is not,
however, the only justified cause for retention or withholding the payment of
the agreed price, but also, if the vendor fails to perform any essential
obligation of the contract.
MANUEL UY & SONS, INC. v. VALBUECO, INCORPORATED, G.R. No.
179594. September 11, 2013
Articles 1191 and 1592 of the Civil Code are applicable to contracts of sale,
while R.A. No. 6552 applies to contracts to sell. R.A. No. 6552, otherwise
known as the Realty Installment Buyer Act, applies to the subject contracts
to sell. R.A. No. 6552 (Maceda Law) recognizes in conditional sales of all
kinds of real estate (industrial, commercial, residential) the right of the seller
to cancel the contract upon non-payment of an installment by the buyer,
which is simply an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey
title from acquiring binding force.
SPOUSES JAIME SEBASTIAN AND EVANGELINE SEBASTIAN vs. BPI
FAMILY BANK, INC., CARMELITA ITAPO AND BENJAMIN HAO
G.R. No. 160107, 22 October 2014, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

Civil Law

The protection of Republic Act No. 6552 (Realty Installment Buyer Protection
Act) does not cover a loan extended by the employer to enable its employee
to finance the purchase of a house and lot. The law protects only a buyer
acquiring the property by installment, not a borrower whose rights are
governed by the terms of the loan from the employer.
SPOUSES MICHELLE M. NOYNAY AND NOEL S. NOYNAY vs. CITIHOMES
BUILDER AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 204160, September 22, 2014
In Pagtalunan v. Manzano, the Court stressed the importance of complying
with the provisions of the Maceda Law as to the cancellation of contracts to
sell involving realty installment schemes. There it was held that the
cancellation of the contract by the seller must be in accordance with Section
3 (b) of the Maceda Law, which requires the notarial act of rescission and the
refund to the buyer of the full payment of the cash surrender value of the
payments made on the property. The actual cancellation of the contract
takes place after thirty (30) days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of
cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act
and upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer.
SKUNAC CORPORATION AND ALFONSO F. ENRIQUEZ vs. ROBERTO S.
SYLIANTENG AND CAESAR S. SYLIANTENG
G.R. No. 205879, 23 April 2014, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)
The requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply are: (a) The two (or
more sales) transactions must constitute valid sales; (b) The two (or more)
sales transactions must pertain to exactly the same subject matter; (c) The
two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject
matter must each represent conflicting interests; and (d) The two (or more)
buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must
each have bought from the very same seller.
Obviously, said provision has no application in cases where the sales
involved were initiated not by just one but two vendors.
SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR v. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI,
G.R. No. 181359 August 5, 2013

Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving unregistered
land. Suffice it to state that the issue of the buyers good or bad faith is

Civil Law

relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land, and the
purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to the
land is clean. In such case, the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the
registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value. Act
No. 3344 applies to sale of unregistered lands. What applies in this case is
Act No. 3344, as amended, which provides for the system of recording of
transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares
that any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a
better right.
INDUSTRIAL
TEXTILE
MANUFACTURING
COMPANY
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. LPJ ENTERPRISES, INC., G.R. NO. 66140,
January 21, 1993 21
Respondent alleges that it cannot be held liable for the 47,000 plastic bags
which were not used for packing cement as originally intended invoking it's
right of return. Article 1502 of the Civil Code, has no application at all to this
case, since the provision in the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform
Commercial Code from which Article 1502 was taken, clearly requires an
express written agreement to make a sales contract either a "sale or return"
or a "sale on approval", which is absent in this case.
Parol or extrinsic testimony could not be admitted for the purpose of showing
that an invoice or bill of sale that was complete in every aspect and
purporting to embody a sale without condition or restriction constituted a
contract of sale or return. If the purchaser desired to incorporate a stipulation
securing to him the right of return, he should have done so at the time the
contract was made. On the other hand, the buyer cannot accept part and
reject the rest of the goods since this falls outside the normal intent of the
parties in the "on approval" situation.
LO vs. KJS ECO-FORMWORK SYSTEM PHIL., INC., G.R. NO. 149420
October 8, 2003
The vendor in good faith shall be responsible for the existence and legality of
the credit at the time of the sale, unless it should have been sold as doubtful;
but not for the solvency of the debtor, unless it has been so expressly
stipulated or unless the insolvency was prior to the sale and of common
knowledge.
ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 177874, September 29, 2008
The seller, in declaring that he owned and had clean title to the vehicle at
the time the Deed of Absolute Sale, is giving an implied warranty of title
which prescribes six months after the delivery of the vehicle.

Civil Law

PNB vs MEGA PRIME REALTY AND HOLDINGS CORPORATION, G.R. NO.

173454, October 6, 2008
MEGA PRIME REALTY AND HOLDINGS CORPORATION vs. PNB, G.R.
NO. 173456, October 6, 2008
In a contract of sale, unless a contrary intention appears, there is an implied
warranty on the part of the seller that he has a right to sell the thing at the
time when the ownership is to pass, and that the buyer shall have a peaceful
possession of the thing and it shall be free from any hidden faults or defects,
or any charge or encumbrance not declared or known to the buyer.
ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 177874, September 29, 2008
The seller, in pledging that he will defend the same from all claims or any
claim whatsoever [and] will save the vendee from any suit by the
government of the Republic of the Philippines, is giving a warranty against
eviction. A breach of this warranty requires the concurrence of these four
requisites:(1) The purchaser has been deprived of the whole or part of the
thing sold; (2) This eviction is by a final judgment; (3) The basis thereof is by
virtue of a right prior to the sale made by the vendor; and (4) The vendor has
been summoned and made co-defendant in the suit for eviction at the
instance of the vendee.
DE YSASI vs. ARCEO, G.R. NO. 136586, November 22, 2001
Petitioner admitted that he inspected the premises three or four times before
signing the lease contract and during his inspection, he noticed the rotten
plywood on the ceiling which in his opinion was caused by leaking water or
"anay" (termites), yet he decided to go through with the lease agreement.
The lessor is responsible for warranty against hidden defects, but he is not
answerable for patent defects or those which are visible.
ENGINEERING & MACHINERY CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. 52267, January 24, 1996
The original complaint is one for damages arising from breach of a written
contract - and not a suit to enforce warranties against hidden defects. The
remedy against violations of the warranty against hidden defects is either to
withdraw from the contract (redhibitory action) or to demand a proportionate
reduction of the price (accion quanti minoris), with damages in either case.
DINO vs COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 113564, June 20, 2001 23
Respondent made the last delivery of the vinyl products to petitioners on
September 28, 1988 and the action to recover the purchase price of the
goods petitioners returned to the respondent was filed on July 24, 1989,
more than nine months from the date of last delivery. Actions arising from

Civil Law

breach of warranty against hidden defects shall be barred after six months
from the delivery of the thing sold.
LAFORTEZA vs. MACHUCA, G.R. NO. 137552, June 16, 2000
A MOA has this stipulation "....SELLER-LESSOR hereby agrees to sell unto
BUYER-LESSEE the property described within six (6) months from the
execution date hereof, or upon issuance by the Court of a new owner's
certificate of title and the execution of extrajudicial partition with sale of the
estate of Francisco Laforteza, whichever is earlier;...". Petitioner contends
that since the condition was not met, they no longer had an obligation to
proceed with the sale of the house and lot. The petitioners fail to distinguish
between a condition imposed upon the perfection of the contract and a
condition imposed on the performance of an obligation, failure to comply
with the first condition results in the failure of a contract, while the failure to
comply with the second condition only gives the other party the option either
to refuse to proceed with the sale or to waive the condition.
INTEGRATED PACKAGING CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
115117, June 8, 2000
There is no dispute that the agreement provides for the delivery of printing
paper on different dates and a separate price has been agreed upon for each
delivery. When there is a contract of sale of goods to be delivered by stated
installments, which are to be separately paid for, and the seller makes
defective deliveries in respect of one or more installments, it depends in
each case on the terms of the contract and the circumstances of the case,
whether the breach of contract is so material as to justify the injured party in
refusing to proceed further and suing for damages for breach of the entire
contract, or whether the breach is severable, giving rise to a claim for
compensation but not to a right to treat the whole contract as broken.
VISAYAN SAWMILL COMPANY, INC., vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. NO. 83851. March 3, 1993.
The petitioner agreed to deliver the scrap iron only upon payment of the
purchase price by means of an irrevocable and unconditional letter of credit,
which the respondent failed to obtain, thus, there was no actual sale. Where
the goods have not been delivered to the buyer, and the buyer has
repudiated the contract of sale, or has manifested his inability to perform his
obligations, thereunder, or has committed a breach thereof, the seller may
totally rescind the contract of sale by giving notice of his election to do to the
buyer.
DIAMANTE vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-51824 February
7, 1992

Civil Law

A right to repurchase was granted subsequently in an instrument different

from the original document of sale which caused the cancellation of the
permit or lease by the Secretary of Fisheries. An agreement to repurchase
becomes a promise to sell when made after the sale, because when the sale
is made without such an agreement, the purchaser acquires the thing sold
absolutely, and if he afterwards grants the vendor the right to repurchase, it
is a new contract entered into by the purchaser, as absolute owner already of
the object.
VASQUEZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 83759 July
12, 1991
Respondents sold the lot to the petitioners under a Deed of Sale, On the
same day and along with the execution of the Deed of Sale, a separate
instrument, denominated as Right to Repurchase was executed by the
parties, Later, petitioners resisted the action for redemption. The transaction
between the petitioners and private respondents was not a sale with right to
repurchase, the second instrument is just an option to buy since it is not
embodied in the same document of sale but in a separate document, and
since such option is not supported by a consideration distinct from the price,
said deed for right to repurchase is not binding upon them.
BAUTISTA vs UNANGST, G.R. NO. 173002, July 4, 2008
Where in a contract of sale with pacto de retro, the vendor remains in
possession, as a lessee or otherwise, the contract shall be presumed to be an
equitable mortgage because in a contract of sale with pacto de retro, the
legal title to the property is immediately transferred to the vendee, subject
to the vendors right to redeem and retention by the vendor of the
possession of the property is inconsistent with the vendees acquisition of
the right of ownership under a true sale.
ABILLA vs. ANG GOBONSENG, JR., G.R. NO. 146651, January 17, 2002
The legal question to be resolved is "May the vendors in a sale judicially
declared as a pacto de retro exercise the right of repurchase under Article
1606, third paragraph, of the Civil Code, after they have taken the position
that the same was an equitable mortgage?" No, where the proofs established
that there could be no honest doubt as to the parties intention, that the
transaction was clearly and definitely a sale with pacto de retro, the vendor a
retro is not entitled to the benefit of the third paragraph of Article 1606.
AGAN vs. HEIRS OF SPS. NUEVA, G.R. NO. 155018, December 11,
2003
The lower court's dispositive position states: "However, the vendors can still
exercise the right to repurchase said property within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this decision pursuant to Article 1606 and 1607 of the New Civil
Code." Article 1606 grants the vendor a retro thirty (30) days from the time
final judgment was rendered, not from the defendants receipt of the

Civil Law

judgment, "final judgment must be construed to mean one that has become
final and executory.
Spouses CRUZ vs. LEIS et al., G.R. NO. 125233, March 9, 2000 26
The lower court rationalized that petitioners failed to comply with the
provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial order for the
consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a retro to be recorded in the
Registry of Property. A judicial order is necessary in order to determine the
true nature of the transaction and to prevent the interposition of buyers in
good faith while the determination is being made, however, notwithstanding
Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of Property of the consolidation of
ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine qua non to the transfer of
ownership for the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of
registering the consolidated title.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. vs. SPS. VELOSO, G.R. NO. 141974,
August 9, 2004
The respondents offer to redeem the foreclosed properties and the
subsequent consignation in court were made within the period of
redemption, but the amount consigned did not include the interest and was
also way below the amount paid by the highest bidder-purchaser of the
properties during the auction sale. The redemption price should either be
fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court because only by
such means can the auction winner be assured that the offer to redeem is
being made in good faith.
LEE CHUY REALTY CORPORATION vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
NO. 104114 December 4, 1995
Petitioner questions the ruling of the Court of Appeals which concluded that a
prior tender or offer of redemption is a prerequisite or precondition to the
filing of the action for legal redemption. To avail of the right of redemption
what is essential is to make an offer to redeem within the prescribed period.
There is actually no prescribed form for an offer to redeem to be properly
effected. It can either be through a formal tender with consignation, or by
filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price
within the prescribed period.
VILLANUEVA vs. HON. ALFREDO C. FLORENDO, G.R. NO. L-33158,
October 17, 1985
It is not disputed that co-ownership exists but the lower court disallowed
redemption because it considered the vendee, Vallangca, a co-heir, being
married to Concepcion Villanueva. The term "third person" or "stranger in
Art. 1620 refers to all persons who are not heirs in succession, either by will
or the law or any one who is not a co-owner.

Civil Law

PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP. vs. SPS. VALENCIA, G.R. NO. 150060.

August 19, 2003
Article 1621 of the Civil Code expresses that the right of redemption it grants
to an adjoining owner of the property conveyed may be defeated if it can be
shown that the buyer or grantee does not own any other rural land.
G.R. NO. 134117. February 9, 2000
SEN PO EK MARKETING CORPORATION vs. MARTINEZ
Petitioner invokes its right of first refusal against private respondents, when
Teodora sold the property that petitioner has been leasing. Article 1622 of
the New Civil Code only deals with small urban lands that are bought for
speculation where only adjoining lot owners can exercise the right of preemption or redemption. It does not apply to a lessee trying to buy the land
that it was leasing, especially when such right was never stipulated in any of
the several lease contracts.
CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 162421, August 31, 2007
Petitioners may redeem the subject property from respondents-spouses, but
they must do so within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their
co-owners vendors. In requiring written notice, Art. 1623 seeks to ensure
that the redemptioner is properly notified of (a) the sale and (b) the date of
such notice, as the date thereof becomes the reckoning point of the 30-day
period of redemption.
SPOUSES SI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 122047, October 12,
2000
Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. A
written notice is a formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have
actual notice of the sale to enable them to exercise their right of redemption
within the limited period of thirty days. But where the co-owners had actual
notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or afterwards, a written notice of a
fact already known to them, would be superfluous. The statute does not
demand what is unnecessary.
FRANCISCO vs. BOISER, G.R. NO. 137677, May 31, 2000
Art. 1623 of the Civil Code is clear in requiring that the written notification
should come from the vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other
person. Since the vendor of an undivided interest is in the best position to
know who are his co-owners who under the law must be notified of the sale,
and is in the best position to confirm whether consent to the essential
obligation of selling the property and transferring ownership thereof to the
vendee has been given.

Civil Law

LEDONIO vs. CAPITOL

149040, July 4, 2007

DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION,

G.R.

NO.

An assignment of credit has been defined as an agreement by virtue of

which the owner of a credit (known as the assignor), by a legal cause - such
as sale, dation in payment or exchange or donation - and without need of the
debtor's consent, transfers that credit and its accessory rights to another
(known as the assignee), who acquires the power to enforce it, to the same
extent as the assignor could have enforced it against the debtor.
TEOCO, JR.,vs METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, G.R. NO.
162333, December 23, 2008
Would the exercise by the brothers Teoco of the right to redeem the
properties in question be precluded by the fact that the assignment of right
of redemption was not contained in a public document? NO, the phrase
"effect as against third person" in Article 1625 of the Civil Code is interpreted
as to be damage or prejudice to such third person, hence if the third person
would not be prejudiced then the assignment of right to redeem may not be
in a public instrument.
HEIRS OR REYNALDO DELA ROSA, Namely: TEOFISTA DELA ROSA,
JOSEPHINE SANTIAGO AND JOSEPH DELA ROSA, vs. MARIO A.
BATONGBACAL, IRENEO BATONGBACAL, JOCELYN BA TONGBACAL,
NESTOR BATONGBACAL AND LOURDES BA TONGBACAL
G.R. No. 179205, July 30, 2014
An equitable mortgage is defined as one although lacking in some formality,
or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless
reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a
debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. For the
presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, two requisites must concur:
(1) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a sale; and (2)
the intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.
CEBALLOS vs. Intestate Estate of the Late EMIGDIO MERCADO, G.R.
NO. 155856, May 28, 2004 30
Petitioner argues that Mercados delay in registering the Deed of Absolute
Sale and transferring the land title shows that the real agreement was an
equitable mortgage. Delay in transferring title is not one of the instances
enumerated by law in which an equitable mortgage can be presumed.
DEHEZA-INAMARGA vs ALANO, G.R. NO. 171321, December 18, 2008

Civil Law

The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be

an absolute sale, and in case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale
with right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable mortgage in
consonance with the rule that the law favors the least transmission of
property rights.
EUGENIO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. NO. 109404, January 22,
1996
Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the
non-payment of amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase
agreements entered into prior to the enactment of P.D. 957, "The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree"?
P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that
Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he
desisted from making further payment to petitioner due to petitioner's failure
to develop the subdivision project according to the approved plans and
within the time limit for complying with the same.
PNB vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. NO. 104528, January 18,
1996
A buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale cannot disposses prior purchasers
on installment of individual lots therein, or compel them to pay again for the
lots which they previously bought from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision
developer on the theory that P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers' Protective Decree", is not applicable to the mortgage contract in
question, the same having been executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957.
Moreover, the SC held that, P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law
obliges petitioner Bank to accept the payment of the remaining unpaid
amortizations tendered by private respondents. Privity of contracts as a
defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly grants to the buyer
the option to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the
mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such payments to reduce
the corresponding portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the
particular lot or unit being paid for.
HULST vs. PR BUILDERS, INC., G.R. NO. 156364, September 25, 2008
Petitioner contends that the Contract to Sell between petitioner and
respondent involved a condominium unit and did not violate the
Constitutional proscription against ownership of land by aliens. The law
expressly allows foreigners to acquire condominium units and shares in
condominium corporations up to not more than 40% of the total and
outstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or controlled corporation, since
under this set up, the ownership of the land is legally separated from the unit
itself.

Civil Law

CARDINAL BUILDING OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. ASSET

RECOVERY AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 149696, July
14, 2006
Section 20 of R.A. No. 4726, otherwise known as the Condominium Act,
provides:
Sec. 20. An assessment upon any condominium made in accordance with a
duly registered declaration of restrictions shall be an obligation of the owner
thereof at the time the assessment is made. The amount of any such
assessment plus any other charges thereon, such as interest, costs
(including attorney's fees) and penalties, as such may be provided for in the
declaration of restrictions, shall be and become a lien upon the condominium
assessed when the management body causes a notice of assessment to be
registered with the Register of Deeds of the city or province where such
condominium project is located. The notice shall state the amount of such
assessment and such other charges thereon as may be authorized by the
declaration of restrictions, a description of the condominium unit against
which the same has been assessed, and the name of the registered owner
thereof. Such notice shall be signed by an authorized representative of the
management body or as otherwise provided in the declaration of restrictions.
Upon payment of said assessment and charges or other satisfaction thereof,
the management body shall cause to be registered a release of the lien.
Such lien shall be superior to all other liens registered subsequent to the
registration of said notice of assessment except real property tax liens and
except that the declaration of restrictions may provide for the subordination
thereof to any other liens and encumbrances. Such liens may be enforced in
the same manner provided for by law for the judicial or extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgage or real property. Unless otherwise provided for in the
declaration of restrictions, the management body shall have power to bid at
foreclosure sale. The condominium owner shall have the right of redemption
as in cases of judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages.
Records do not show that petitioner had its notice of assessment registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Manila in order that the amount of such
assessment could be considered a lien upon Marual's two condominium
units. Clearly, pursuant to the above provisions, petitioner's claim can not be
considered superior to that of respondent. As mentioned earlier, the deed of
sale wherein Marual conveyed to respondent his two condominium units, was
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
CHATEAU DE BAIE CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION
MORENO, G.R. NO. 186271, February 23, 2011

vs.

SPOUSES

Civil Law

The petition sought to prohibit the scheduled extrajudicial sale for lack of a
special power to sell from the registered owner. Under RA 4726 (the
Condominium Act), when a unit owner fails to pay the association dues, the
condominium corporation can enforce a lien on the condominium unit by
selling the unit in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, and a special authority
from the condominium owner before a condominium corporation can initiate
a foreclosure proceeding is not needed.
Pagurayan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO. 154577, July 23, 2008
A contract of lease is a consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative
contract by which the owner temporarily grants the use of his property to
another who undertakes to pay the rent. Being a consensual contract, it is
perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds on the thing and
the cause and consideration which are to constitute the contract. Without the
agreement of both parties, no contract of lease can be said to have been
created or established. Nobody can force an owner to lease out his property
if he is not willing.
CA-AG.R.O-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. NO. 90027, March 3, 1993
We agree with the petitioner's contention that the contract for the rent of the
safety deposit box is not an ordinary contract of lease as defined in Article
1643 of the Civil Code. It cannot be characterized as an ordinary contract of
lease under Article 1643 because the full and absolute possession and
control of the safety deposit box was not given to the joint renters the
petitioner and the Pugaos.
PARTNERSHIP, AGENCY AND TRUST
LIM TONG LIM vs. PHILIPPINE FISHING GEAR INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R.
NO. 136448, November 3, 1999
A partnership may be deemed to exist among parties who agree to borrow
money to pursue a business and to divide the profits or losses that may arise
therefrom, even if it is shown that they have not contributed any capital of
their own to a "common fund." Their contribution may be in the form of
credit or industry, not necessarily cash or fixed assets.
ROSARIO U. YULO vs. YANG CHIAO SENG, G.R. NO. L-12541, August
28, 1959
The following are the requisites of partnership: (1) two or more persons who
bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common

Civil Law

fund; (2) intention on the part of the partners to divide the profits among
themselves. (Art. 1767, Civil Code.).
HEIRS OF TAN ENG KEE vs .COURT OF APPEALS and BENGUET
LUMBER COMPANY, G.R. NO. 126881; October 3, 2000
In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by Article 1825, persons who are not partners as to
each other are not partners as to third persons;
(2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not of itself establish a partnership,
whether such co-owners or co-possessors do or do not share any profits
made by the use of the property;
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership,
whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or
interest in any property which the returns are derived;
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is a prima
facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference
shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installment or otherwise;
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord;
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner;
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the profits
of the business;
(e) As the consideration for the sale of a goodwill of a business or other
property by installments or otherwise.
ALFREDO N. AGUILA, JR vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD S.
VDA. DE ABROGAR, G.R. NO. 127347, November 25, 1999
Under Art. 1768 of the Civil Code, a partnership has a juridical personality
separate and distinct from that of each of the partners. The partners cannot
be held liable for the obligations of the partnership unless it is shown that
the legal fiction of a different juridical personality is being used for
fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes, hence it is the partnership, not its
officers or agents, which should be impleaded in any litigation involving
property registered in its name, violation of this rule will result in the
dismissal of the complaint.
Villareal vs. Ramirez, G.R. NO. 144214. July 14, 2003
Since it is the partnership, as a separate and distinct entity, that must refund
the shares of the partners, the amount to be refunded is necessarily limited
to its total resources. In other words, it can only pay out what it has in its
coffers, which consists of all its assets. However, before the partners can be
paid their shares, the creditors of the partnership must first be compensated.

Civil Law

After all the creditors have been paid, whatever is left of the partnership
assets becomes available for the payment of the partners shares.
Angeles vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. NO. 142612, July 29, 2005
The Angeles spouses position that there is no partnership because of the
lack of a public instrument indicating the same and a lack of registration with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) holds no water for the
following reasons: first, the Angeles spouses contributed money to the
partnership and not immovable property; and second, mere failure to
register the contract of partnership with the SEC does not invalidate a
contract that has the essential requisites of a partnership. The purpose of
registration of the contract of partnership is to give notice to third parties.
Failure to register the contract of partnership does not affect the liability of
the partnership and of the partners to third persons. Neither does such
failure to register affect the partnerships juridical personality. A partnership
may exist even if the partners do not use the words partner or
partnership.
Ortega vs. CA, G.R. NO. 109248, July 3, 1995
The right to choose with whom a person wishes to associate himself is the
very foundation and essence of that partnership. Its continued existence is,
in turn, dependent on the constancy of that mutual resolve, along with each
partner's capability to give it, and the absence of a cause for dissolution
provided by the law itself. Verily, any one of the partners may, at his sole
pleasure, dictate a dissolution of the partnership at will. He must, however,
act in good faith, not that the attendance of bad faith can prevent the
dissolution of the partnership but that it can result in a liability for damages.
Among partners, mutual agency arises and the doctrine of delectus personae
allows them to have the power, although not necessarily the right, to
dissolve the partnership. An unjustified dissolution by the partner can subject
him to a possible action for damages.
Liwanag vs. CA, G.R. NO. 114398, October 24, 1997
Petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa and advances the theory that
the intention of the parties was to enter into a contract of partnership,
wherein Rosales (private complainant for Estafa) would contribute the funds
while she would buy and sell the cigarettes, and later divide the profits
between them But even assuming that a contract of partnership was indeed
entered into by and between the parties, SC ruled that when money or
property have been received by a partner for a specific purpose (such as that
obtaining in the instant case) and he later misappropriated it, such partner is
guilty of estafa.

Civil Law

Moran, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-59956, October 31, 1984
The rule is, when a partner who has undertaken to contribute a sum of
money fails to do so, he becomes a debtor of the partnership for whatever
he may have promised to contribute (Art. 1786, Civil Code) and for interests
and damages from the time he should have complied with his obligation (Art.
1788, Civil Code). Thus in Uy v. Puzon (79 SCRA 598), which interpreted Art.
2200 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, we allowed a total of P200,000.00
compensatory damages in favor of the appellee because the appellant
therein was remiss in his obligations as a partner and as prime contractor of
the construction projects in question.
Tai Tong Chuache & Co. vs. Insurance Commission, G.R. NO. L-55397
February 29, 1988
Petitioner being a partnership may sue and be sued in its name or by its duly
authorized representative. Thus, Chua as the managing partner of the
partnership may execute all acts of administration including the right to sue
debtors of the partnership in case of their failure to pay their obligations
when it became due and demandable.
Catalan vs. Gatchalian, G.R. NO. L-11648, April 22, 1959
Catalan and Gatchalian as partners mortgaged two lots together with the
improvements thereon to secure a credit. Catalan redeemed the property
and he contends that title should be cancelled and a new one must be issued
in his name. Under Article 1807 of the NCC every partner becomes a trustee
for his co-partner with regard to any benefits or profits derived from his act
as a partner. Consequently, when Catalan redeemed the properties in
question, he became a trustee and held the same in trust for his co partner
Gatchalian, subject to his right to demand from the latter his contribution to
the amount of redemption.
Evangelista & Co. vs. Abad Santos, G.R. NO. L-31684 June 28, 1973
Respondent industrial partner has the right to demand for a formal
accounting and to receive her share in the net profit that may result from
such an accounting.
ISLAND SALES, INC. vs. UNITED PIONEERS GENERAL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, G.R. NO. L-22493, July 31, 1975
Defendant company, a general partnership purchased from the plaintiff a
motor vehicle on an installment basis with the condition that failure to pay
any of said installments as they fall due would render the whole unpaid
balance immediately due and demandable. Having failed to receive the

Civil Law

installment, the plaintiff sued the defendant company for the unpaid balance
with Benjamin C. Daco, Daniel A. Guizona, Noel C. Sim, Romulo B. Lumauig,
and Augusto Palisoc were included as co-defendants in their capacity as
general partners of the defendant company. In this case, there were five (5)
general partners when the promissory note in question was executed for and
in behalf of the partnership. Since the liability of the partners is pro rata, the
liability of the appellant Benjamin C. Daco shall be limited to only one-fifth of
the obligations of the defendant company. The fact that the complaint
against the defendant Romulo B. Lumauig was dismissed, upon motion of the
plaintiff, does not unmake the said Lumauig as a general partner in the
defendant company. In so moving to dismiss the complaint, the plaintiff
merely condoned Lumauig's individual liability to the plaintiff.
ELMO MUASQUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-39780,
November 11, 1985
There is a general presumption that each individual partner is an authorized
agent for the firm and that he has authority to bind the firm in carrying on
the partnership transactions. The presumption is sufficient to permit third
persons to hold the firm liable on transactions entered into by one of
members of the firm acting apparently in its behalf and within the scope of
his authority.
ANTONIO C. GOQUIOLAY, ET AL. vs. WASHINGTON Z. SYCIP, ET AL,
G.R. NO. L-11840, December 10, 1963
Where the partnership business is to deal in merchandise and goods, i.e.,
movable property, the sale of its real property (immovables) is not within the
ordinary powers of a partner, because it is not in line with the normal
business of the firm. But where the express and avowed purpose of the
partnership is to buy and sell real estate (as in the present case), the
immovables thus acquired by the firm from part of its stock-in-trade, and the
sale thereof is in pursuance of partnership purposes, hence within the
ordinary powers of the partner.
J. TIOSEJO INVESTMENT CORP. vs. Ang, G.R. NO. 174149, September
8, 2010
Petitioner cannot avoid liability by claiming that it was not in any way privy
to the Contracts to Sell executed by PPGI and respondents. As correctly
argued by the respondent, a joint venture is considered in this jurisdiction as
a form of partnership and is, accordingly, governed by the law of
partnerships and under Article 1824 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all
partners are solidarily liable with the partnership for everything chargeable
to the partnership, including loss or injury caused to a third person or
penalties incurred due to any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting

Civil Law

in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority
of his co-partners.
PRIMELINK PROPERTIES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
LAZATIN-MAGAT, et.al, G.R. NO. 167379, June 27, 2006

vs.

On dissolution, the partnership is not terminated but continues until the

winding up of partnership affairs is completed. Winding up means the
administration of the assets of the partnership for the purpose of terminating
the business and discharging the obligations of the partnership.
MARJORIE TOCAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 127405, October
4, 2000
An unjustified dissolution by a partner can subject him to action for damages
because by the mutual agency that arises in a partnership, the doctrine of
delectus personae allows the partners to have the power, although not
necessarily the right to dissolve the partnership.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. WILLIAM J. SUTER, G.R.
NO. L-25532, February 28, 1969
A limited partnership, named "William J. Suter 'Morcoin' Co., Ltd.," was
formed on 30 September 1947 by herein respondent William J. Suter as the
general partner, and Julia Spirig and Gustav Carlson, as the limited partners.
The thesis that the limited partnership, William J. Suter "Morcoin" Co., Ltd.,
has been dissolved by operation of law because of the marriage of the only
general partner, William J. Suter to the originally limited partner, Julia Spirig
one year after the partnership was organized is not tenable. The subsequent
marriage of the partners does not operate to dissolve it, such marriage not
being one of the causes provided for that purpose either by the Spanish Civil
Code or the Code of Commerce. The appellant's view, that by the marriage of
both partners the company became a single proprietorship, is equally
erroneous. The capital contributions of partners William J. Suter and Julia
Spirig were separately owned and contributed by them before their
marriage; and after they were joined in wedlock, such contributions
remained their respective separate property under the Spanish Civil Code.
Country Bankers Insurance Corp.. vs. Keppel Cebu Shipyard, June
18, 2012, G.R. NO. 166044
In a contract of agency, a person, the agent, binds himself to represent
another, the principal, with the latters consent or authority. Thus, agency is
based on representation, where the agent acts for and in behalf of the
principal on matters within the scope of the authority conferred upon him.

Civil Law

Such acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally done by the
principal. By this legal fiction of representation, the actual or legal absence of
the principal is converted into his legal or juridical presence.
SALLY YOSHIZAKI v. JOY TRAINING CENTER OF AURORA, INC., G.R.
No. 174978. July 31, 2013
As a general rule, a contract of agency may be oral. However, it must be
written when the law requires a specific form. Specifically, Article 1874 of the
Civil Code provides that the contract of agency must be written for the
validity of the sale of a piece of land or any interest therein. Otherwise, the
sale shall be void. A related provision, Article 1878 of the Civil Code, states
that special powers of attorney are necessary to convey real rights over
immovable properties. Further the special power of attorney mandated by
law must be one that expressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a
necessary ingredient of the authorized act. Such power must be must
express in clear and unmistakable language. In the present case, the pieces
of documentary evidence by Sally did not convince the Court as to the
existence of agency. Necessarily, the absence of a contract of agency
renders the contract of sale unenforceable. Joy Training effectively did not
enter into a valid contract of sale with the spouses Yoshizaki.
Lintoja vs. Eternit Corp., G.R. NO. 144805, June 8, 2006
It bears stressing that in an agent-principal relationship, the personality of
the principal is extended through the facility of the agent. In so doing, the
agent, by legal fiction, becomes the principal, authorized to perform all acts
which the latter would have him do. Such a relationship can only be effected
with the consent of the principal, which must not, in any way, be compelled
by law or by any court.
Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. Cuizon, G.R. NO. 167552, April
23, 2007
In a contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to
do something in representation or on behalf of another with the latters
consent. The underlying principle of the contract of agency is to accomplish
results by using the services of others to do a great variety of things like
selling, buying, manufacturing, and transporting. Its purpose is to extend the
personality of the principal or the party for whom another acts and from
whom he or she derives the authority to act. It is said that the basis of
agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the
principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the
same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the principal. By this
legal fiction, the actual or real absence of the principal is converted into his
legal or juridical presence qui facit per alium facit per se. The elements of

Civil Law

the contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to
establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in
relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for
himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
Lintoja vs. Eternit Corp., G.R. NO. 144805, June 8, 2006
An agency may be expressed or implied from the act of the principal, from
his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency knowing
that another person is acting on his behalf without authority. Acceptance by
the agent may be expressed, or implied from his acts which carry out the
agency, or from his silence or inaction according to the circumstances.
Agency may be oral unless the law requires a specific form. However, to
create or convey real rights over immovable property, a special power of
attorney is necessary. Thus, when a sale of a piece of land or any portion
thereof is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing,
otherwise, the sale shall be void.
Naguiat vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 118375, October 3, 2003
The Court of Appeals recognized the existence of an agency by estoppels
citing Article 1873 of the Civil Code. Apparently, it considered that at the
very least, as a consequence of the interaction between Naguiat and
Ruebenfeldt, Queao got the impression that Ruebenfeldt was the agent of
Naguiat, but Naguiat did nothing to correct Queaos impression. In that
situation, the rule is clear. One who clothes another with apparent authority
as his agent, and holds him out to the public as such, cannot be permitted to
deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of
innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith, and in the
honest belief that he is what he appears to be. The Court of Appeals is
correct in invoking the said rule on agency by estoppel.
Siasat vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. NO. L-67889, October
10, 1985
A general agent is one authorized to do all acts pertaining to a business of a
certain kind or at a particular place, or all acts pertaining to a business of a
particular class or series. He has usually authority either expressly conferred
in general terms or in effect made general by the usages, customs or nature
of the business which he is authorized to transact. An agent, therefore, who
is empowered to transact all the business of his principal of a particular kind
or in a particular place, would, for this reason, be ordinarily deemed a
general agent. A special agent is one authorized to do some particular act or
to act upon some particular occasion, acts usually in accordance with specific
instructions or under limitations necessarily implied from the nature of the
act to be done

Civil Law

Veloso vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 102737, August 21, 1996
There was no need to execute a separate and special power of attorney since
the general power of attorney had expressly authorized the agent or
attorney in fact the power to sell the subject property. The special power of
attorney can be included in the general power when it is specified therein the
act or transaction for which the special power is required. Whether the
instrument be denominated as general power of attorney or special power
of attorney, what matters is the extent of the power or powers
contemplated upon the agent or attorney in fact. If the power is couched in
general terms, then such power cannot go beyond acts of administration.
However, where the power to sell is specific, it not being merely implied,
much less couched in general terms, there cannot be any doubt that the
attorney in fact may execute a valid sale. An instrument may be captioned
as special power of attorney but if the powers granted are couched in
general terms without mentioning any specific power to sell or mortgage or
to do other specific acts of strict dominion, then in that case only acts of
administration may be deemed conferred
Orbeta vs. Sendiong, G.R. NO. 155236, July 8, 2005
A special power of attorney simply refers to a clear mandate specifically
authorizing the performance of a specific power and of express acts
subsumed therein, and there is a specific authority given to Mae Sendiong to
sign her name in behalf of Paul Sendiong in contracts and agreements and to
institute suits in behalf of her father. Neither would the fact that the
document is captioned General Power of Attorney militate against its
construction as granting specific powers to the agent pertaining to the
petition for annulment of judgment she instituted in behalf of her father. As
Justice Paras has noted, a general power of attorney may include a special
power if such special power is mentioned or referred to in the general power.
Country Bankers Insurance Corp. vs. Keppel Cebu Shipyard, June 18,
2012, G.R. NO. 166044
Our law mandates an agent to act within the scope of his authority. The
scope of an agents authority is what appears in the written terms of the
power of attorney granted upon him. Under Article 1878(11) of the Civil
Code, a special power of attorney is necessary to obligate the principal as a
guarantor or surety.
Mercado vs. Allied Banking Corpporation, G.R. NO. 171460, July 24,
2007

Civil Law

Equally relevant is the rule that a power of attorney must be strictly

construed and pursued. The instrument will be held to grant only those
powers which are specified therein, and the agent may neither go beyond
nor deviate from the power of attorney. Where powers and duties are
specified and defined in an instrument, all such powers and duties are
limited and are confined to those which are specified and defined, and all
other powers and duties are excluded. This is but in accord with the
disinclination of courts to enlarge the authority G.R.anted beyond the powers
expressly given and those which incidentally flow or derive therefrom as
being usual and reasonably necessary and proper for the performance of
such express powers.
Angeles vs. Philippines National Railways, G.R. NO. 150128, August
31, 2006
A power of attorney is only but an instrument in writing by which a person,
as principal, appoints another as his agent and confers upon him the
authority to perform certain specified acts on behalf of the principal. The
written authorization itself is the power of attorney, and this is clearly
indicated by the fact that it has also been called a letter of attorney. Its
primary purpose is not to define the authority of the agent as between
himself and his principal but to evidence the authority of the agent to third
parties with whom the agent deals. Except as may be required by statute, a
power of attorney is valid although no notary public intervened in its
execution.
SHOPPERS PARADISE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
EFREN P. ROQUE, G.R. NO. 148775, January 13, 2004
Article 1878 of the Civil Code expresses that a special power of attorney is
necessary to lease any real property to another person for more than one
year. The lease of real property for more than one year is considered not
merely an act of administration but an act of strict dominion or of ownership.
A special power of attorney is thus necessary for its execution through an
agent.
VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC. vs. COURT OF , G.R. NO. 117356, June
19, 2000
One factor which most clearly distinguishes agency from other legal
concepts is control; one person - the agent - agrees to act under the control
or direction of another - the principal. Indeed, the very word "agency" has
come to connote control by the principal. The control factor, more than any
other, has caused the courts to put contracts between principal and agent in
a separate category.
Republic vs. Evangelista, G.R. NO. 156015, August 11, 2005

Civil Law

A contract of agency is generally revocable as it is a personal contract of

representation based on trust and confidence reposed by the principal on his
agent. As the power of the agent to act depends on the will and license of
the principal he represents, the power of the agent ceases when the will or
permission is withdrawn by the principal. Thus, generally, the agency may be
revoked by the principal at will. However, an exception to the revocability of
a contract of agency is when it is coupled with interest, i.e., if a bilateral
contract depends upon the agency. The reason for its irrevocability is
because the agency becomes part of another obligation or agreement. It is
not solely the rights of the principal but also that of the agent and third
persons which are affected. Hence, the law provides that in such cases, the
agency cannot be revoked at the sole will of the principal.
Lim vs. Saban, G.R. NO. 163720, December 16, 2004
Under Article 1927 of the Civil Code, an agency cannot be revoked if a
bilateral contract depends upon it, or if it is the means of fulfilling an
obligation already contracted, or if a partner is appointed manager of a
partnership in the contract of partnership and his removal from the
management is unjustifiable. Stated differently, an agency is deemed as one
coupled with an interest where it is established for the mutual benefit of the
principal and of the agent, or for the interest of the principal and of third
persons, and it cannot be revoked by the principal so long as the interest of
the agent or of a third person subsists. In an agency coupled with an interest,
the agents interest must be in the subject matter of the power conferred
and not merely an interest in the exercise of the power because it entitles
him to compensation. When an agents interest is confined to earning his
agreed compensation, the agency is not one coupled with an interest, since
an agents interest in obtaining his compensation as such agent is an
ordinary incident of the agency relationship.
RAMON RALLOS, Administrator of the Estate of CONCEPCION RALLOS
vs. FELIX GO CHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION, G.R. NO. L24332, January 31, 1978
By reason of the very nature of the relationship between principal and
agent, agency is extinguished ipso jure upon the death of either principal or
agent. Although a revocation of a power of attorney to be effective must be
communicated to the parties concerned, yet a revocation by operation of
law, such as by death of the principal is, as a rule, instantaneously effective
inasmuch as "by legal fiction the agent's exercise of authority is regarded as
an execution of the principal's continuing will. With death, the principal's will
ceases or is the authority is extinguished.
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS

Civil Law

BONEVIE vs CA, G.R. NO. L-49101 October 24, 1983

Petitioner assails the validity of the mortgage between Lozano and PBCOM
arguing that on the day the deed was executed there was yet no principal
obligation to secure as the loan of P75,000.00 was not received by the
Lozano spouses, so that in the absence of a principal obligation, there is
want of consideration in the accessory contract, which consequently impairs
its validity and fatally affects its very existence. A contract of loan being a
consensual contract, said contract of loan was perfected at the same time
the contract of mortgage was executed, and the promissory note is only an
evidence of indebtedness and does not indicate lack of consideration of the
mortgage at the time of its execution.
SAURA IMPORT and EXPORT CO., INC. vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-24968, April 27, 1972
The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that there was a
perfected contract between the parties when the application of Saura, Inc.
for a loan was approved by resolution of the defendant, and the
corresponding mortgage was executed and registered and that the
defendant was guilty of breach thereof.
An accepted promise to deliver something, by way of commodatum or simple
loan is binding upon the parties, but the commodatum or simple loan itself
shall not be perferted until the delivery of the object of the contract.
FRANCISCO HERRERA vs. PETROPHIL CORPORATION, G.R. NO. L48349, December 29, 1986
Pursuant to a contract, the defendant-appellee paid to the plaintfff-appellant
advance rentals for the first eight years, subtracting therefrom the amount of
the interest or discount for the first eight years, Plaintiff-appellant insists that
the lower court erred in the computation of the interest collected out of the
rentals paid for the first eight years; that such interest was excessive and
violative of the Usury Law.
The contract between the parties is one of lease and not of loan since the
provision for the payment of rentals in advance cannot be construed as a
repayment of a loan because there was no grant or forbearance of money as
to constitute an indebtedness on the part of the lessor, hence usury law will
not apply.
PNB vs. CA, G.R. NO. 75223, March 14, 1990
An escalation clause is a valid provision in the loan agreement provided that
(1) the increased rate imposed or charged does not exceed the ceiling
fixed by law or the Monetary Board; (2) the increase is made effective not

Civil Law

earlier than the effectivity of the law or regulation authorizing such an

increase; and (3) the remaining maturities of the loans are more than 730
days as of the effectivity of the law or regulation authorizing such an
increase.
ILEANA DR. MACALINAO vs BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, G.R.
NO. 175490, September 17, 2009
In its Complaint, respondent BPI originally imposed the interest and penalty
charges at the rate of 9.25% per month or 111% per annum which was
declared as unconscionable by the lower courts for being clearly excessive,
and was thus reduced to 2% per month or 24% per annum but which the CA
modified increased them to 3% per month or 36% per annum based on the
Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI Credit Card,
which governs the transaction between petitioner Macalinao and respondent
BPI.
The courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand, for
stipulations demanding interest excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and
exorbitant interest rates are void for being contrary to morals, if not against
the law.
ECE REALTY and DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. HAYDYN HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 212689, August 11, 2014
Since July 1, 2013, the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from finality
of the judgment until satisfaction has been brought back to six percent (6%).
Section 1 of Resolution No. 796 of the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas dated May 16, 2013 provides: "The rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest,
shall be six percent (6%) per annum." Thus, the rate of interest to be
imposed from finality of judgments is now back at six percent (6%), the rate
provided in Article 2209 of the Civil Code.
CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC CHURCH vs. CA, G.R. L-80294-95,
September 21, 1988
When respondents allowed the free use of the property they became bailors
in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to return
the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse
possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property
subject matter of commodatum. Hence, an adverse claim could not ripen
into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence
of just title.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BAGTAS, G.R. NO. L-17474,
October 25, 1962

Civil Law

The appellant had been in possession of the bull even after the expiration of
the contract. He contends, however, that since the contract was
commodatum the appellee retained ownership or title to the bull. Hence, it
should suffer its loss due to force majeure.
A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. If the breeding fee be
considered a compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull.
Under article 1671 of the Civil Code the lessee would be subject to the
responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith, because she had continued
possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract. And even if the
contract be commodatum, still the appellant is liable, because article 1942 of
the Civil Code provides that a bailee in a contract of commodatum
. . . is liable for loss of the things, even if it should be through a fortuitous
event:
(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated . . .
(3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value, unless
there is a stipulation exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of a
fortuitous event; xxx
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-46145 November
26, 1986
The disputed property is private land and this possession was interrupted
only by the occupation of the land by the U.S. Navy which eventually
abandoned the premises. The heirs of the late Baloy, are now in actual
possession, and this has been so since the abandonment by the U.S. Navy.
The occupancy of the U.S. Navy partakes of the character of a commodatum,
and one's ownership of a thing may be lost by prescription by reason of
another's possession if such possession be under claim of ownership, not
where the possession is only intended to be transient, in which case the
owner is not divested of his title, although it cannot be exercised in the
meantime.
HERRERA vs. PETROPHIL CORPORATION, G.R. NO. L-48349 December
29, 1986
The difference between a discount and a loan or forbearance is that the
former does not have to be repaid. The loan or forbearance is subject to
repayment and is therefore governed by the laws on usury.
BRIONES vs. CAMMAYO, G.R. NO. L-23559, October 4, 1971
In simple loan with stipulation of usurious interest, the prestation of the
debtor to pay the principal debt, which is the cause of the contract is not
illegal. The illegality lies only as to the prestation to pay the stipulated

Civil Law

interest. Hence, being separable, the latter only should be deemed void,
since it is the only one that is illegal.
INTEGRATED REALTY CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
G.R. NO. L-60705, June 28, 1989
OBM contends that it had agreed to pay interest only up to the dates of
maturity of the certificates of time deposit and that respondent Santos is not
entitled to interest after the maturity dates had expired, unless the contracts
are renewed. When respondent invested his money in time deposits with
OBM they entered into a contract of simple loan or mutuum, not a contract of
deposit.
BPI vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-66826 August 19, 1988
The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was
received by the bank for safekeeping. A deposit is constituted from the
moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation
of safely keeping it and of returning the same, but if the safekeeping of the
thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no
deposit but some other contract.
BPI vs. CA, G.R. NO. 104612, May 10, 1994
Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits; they are really loans
because they earn interest. The relationship then between a depositor and a
bank is one of creditor and debtor, and the deposit under the questioned
account was an ordinary bank deposit; hence, it was payable on demand of
the depositor.
SERRANO vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-30511,
February 14, 1980
All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be
treated as loans and are to be covered by the law on loans because it can
use the same. Failure of he respondent Bank to honor the time deposit is
failure to pay s obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from
depositary's failure to return the subject matter of the deposit
COMMONWEALTH INSURANCE
130886. January 29, 2004

CORPORATION

vs.

CA,

G.R.

NO.

Petitioners liability under the suretyship contract is different from its liability
under the law. There is no question that as a surety, petitioner should not be
made to pay more than its assumed obligation under the surety bonds.
However, it is clear from the above-cited jurisprudence that petitioners
liability for the payment of interest is not by reason of the suretyship

Civil Law

agreement itself but because of the delay in the payment of its obligation
under the said agreement.
THE MANILA INSURANCE CO INC vs SPOUSES AMURAO, G.R. NO.
179628, January 16, 2013
Petitioner imputes error on the part of the CA in treating petitioner as a
solidary debtor instead of a solidary guarantor and argues that while a surety
is bound solidarily with the obligor, this does not make the surety a solidary
co-debtor. A suretys liability is joint and several and although the contract of
suretyship is secondary to the principal contract, the suretys liability to the
obligee is nevertheless direct, primary, and absolute.
THE IMPERIAL INSURANCE, INC. vs. DE LOS ANGELES, G.R. NO. L28030, January 18, 1982
Imperial Insurance, Inc. bound itself solidarily with the principal, the
deceased defendant Reyes. In accordance with Article 2059, par. 2 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, excussion (previous exhaustion of the property
of the debtor) shall not take place "if he (the guarantor) has bound himself
solidarily with the debtor," hence the petitioner cannot escape liability on its
counter-bonds.
MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY CO., INC. vs. ALMEDA, G.R. NO. L-27249
July 31, 1970
There is no question that under the bonds posted in favor of the NAMARCO in
this case, the surety company assumed to make immediate payment to said
firm of any due and unsettled accounts of the debtor-principal, even without
demand and notice of the debtor's non-payment, the surety, in fact, agreeing
that its liability to the creditor shall be direct, without benefit of exhaustion of
the debtor's properties, and to remain valid and continuous until the
guaranteed obligation is fully satisfied. In short, appellant secured to the
creditor not just the payment by the debtor-principal of his accounts, but the
payment itself of such accounts. Clearly, a contract of suretyship was thus
created, the appellant becoming the insurer, not merely of the debtor's
solvency or ability to pay, but of the debt itself. Under the Civil Code, with
the debtor's insolvency having been judicially recognized, herein appellant's
resort to the courts to be released from the undertaking thus assumed would
have been appropriate.
RCBC vs. ARRO, G.R. NO. L-49401, July 30, 1982
The surety agreement which was earlier signed by Enrique and private
respondent, is an accessory obligation, it being dependent upon a principal
one which, in this case is the loan obtained by Daicor as evidenced by a

Civil Law

promissory note. By the terms, it can be clearly seen that the surety
agreement was executed to guarantee future debts which Daicor may incur
with petitioner since a guaranty may also be given as security for future
debts, the amount of which is not yet known; there can be no claim against
the guarantor until the debt is liquidated.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAL-FOX LUMBER CO., INC., G.R.
NO. L-26473, February 29, 1972
On whether the surety's liability can exceed the amount of its bond, it is
enough to remark that while the guarantee was for the original amount of
the debt of Gabino Marquez, the amount of the judgment by the trial court in
no way violates the rights of the surety. If it (the guaranty) be simple or
indefinite, it shall comprise not only the principal obligation but also all its
accessories, including judicial costs, provided with respect to the latter, that
the guarantor shall only be liable for those costs incurred after he has been
judicially required to pay.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710
October 3, 1985
The fact that when Sulpicio M. Tolentino executed a real estate mortgage, no
consideration was then in existence, as there was no debt yet because Island
Savings Bank had not made any release on the loan, does not make the real
estate mortgage void for lack of consideration. It is not necessary that any
consideration should pass at the time of the execution of the contract of real
mortgage, it may either be a prior or subsequent matter, but when the
consideration is subsequent to the mortgage, the mortgage can take effect
only when the debt secured by it is created as a binding contract to pay.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710,
October 3, 1985
Where the indebtedness actually owing to the holder of the mortgage is less
than the sum named in the mortgage, the mortgage cannot be enforced for
more than the actual sum due.
INTEG.R.ATED REALTY CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, G.R. NO. L-60705, June 28, 1989
OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA vs.CA, G.R. NO. L-60907 June 28, 1989
The facts and circumstances leading to the execution of the deed of
assignment, has satisfied the requirements of a contract of pledge (1) that it
be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation; (2) that the
pledgor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged; (3) that the persons
constituting the pledge have the free disposal of their property, and in the
absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose. The further

Civil Law

requirement that the thing pledged be placed in the possession of the

creditor, or of a third person by common agreement was complied with by
the execution of the deed of assignment in favor of PNB.
YULIONGSIU vs. PNB, G.R. NO. L-19227, February 17, 1968 67
The defendant bank as pledgee was therefore entitled to the actual
possession of the vessels, and while it is true that plaintiff continued
operating the vessels after the pledge contract was entered into, his
possession was expressly made "subject to the order of the pledgee." On the
other hand, there is an authority supporting the proposition that the pledgee
can temporarily entrust the physical possession of the chattels pledged to
the pledgor without invalidating the pledge. In such a case, the pledgor is
regarded as holding the pledged property merely as trustee for the pledgee.
MAKATI LEASING and FINANCE CORPORATION vs.
TEXTILE MILLS, INC., G.R. NO. L-58469, May 16, 1983

WEAREVER

A house of strong materials may be considered as personal property for

purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to
the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby.
There is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its
nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be
likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is
estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
BUNDALIAN vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-55739, June 22, 1984
The contract also provides that "it is agreed that the vendor shall have the
right to possess, use, and build on, the property during the period of
redemption." When the vendee acknowledged the right of the vendor to
retain possession of the property the contract is one of loan guaranteed by
mortgage, not a conditional sale or an option to repurchase.
TIOSECO vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-66597, August 29, 1986
When the respondents chose to enforce their right of redemption thru a court
action they were well within their right as the action was filed within one year
from the registration of the foreclosure sale of the real estate. The law does
not even require any previous notice to the vendee, nor a meeting between
him and the redemptioner, much less a previous formal tender before any
action is begun in court to enforce the right of redemption.
PNB vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-60208, December 5, 1985

Civil Law

When the foreclosure proceedings are completed and the mortgaged

property is sold to the purchaser then all interest of the mortgagor are cut off
from the property Prior to the completion of the foreclosure, the mortgagor is
liable for the interests on the mortgage. However, after the foreclosure
proceedings and the execution of the corresponding certificate of sale of the
property sold at public auction in favor of the successful bidder, the
redemptioner mortgagor would be bound to pay only for the amount of the
purchase price with interests thereon at the rate of one per centum per
month in addition up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of
any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after
the purchase and interest on such last named amount at the same rate.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710,
October 3, 1985
Where the indebtedness actually owing to the holder of the mortgage is less
than the sum named in the mortgage, the mortgage cannot be enforced for
more than the actual sum due.
RAMIREZ vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-38185, September 24, 1986
The antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by prescription the land
surrendered to him by the debtor. The petitioners are not possessors in the
concept of owner but mere holders placed in possession of the land by its
owners, thus, their possession cannot serve as a title for acquiring dominion.
OCAMPO vs. DOMALANTA, G.R. NO. L-21011, August 30, 1967
A proceeding for judicial foreclosure of mortgage is an action quasi in rem. It
is based on a personal claim sought to be enforced against a specific
property of a person named party defendant. And, its purpose is to have the
property seized and sold by court order to the end that the proceeds thereof
be applied to the payment of plaintiff's claim.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710,
October 3, 1985
A pledge or mortgage is indivisible even though the debt may be divided
among the successors in interest of the debtor or creditor. Therefore, the
debtor's heirs who has paid a part of the debt can not ask for the
proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as long as the debt
is not completely satisfied, neither can the creditor's heir who have received
his share of the debt return the pledge or cancel the mortgage, to the
prejudice of other heirs who have not been paid.

Civil Law

PHILNICO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION

MANAGEMENT OFFICE
G.R. No. 199420, August 27, 2014

vs.

PRIVATIZATION

AND

The Pledge Agreement secures, for the benefit of PMO, the performance by
PIC of its obligations under both the ARDA and the Pledge Agreement itself. It
is with the execution of the Pledge Agreement that PIC turned over
possession of its certificates of shares of stock in PPC to PMO. As the RTC
pertinently observed in its Order dated June 19, 2003, there had already
been a shift in the relations of PMO and PIC, from mere seller and buyer, to
creditor-pledgee and debtor-pledgor. Having enjoyed the security and
benefits of the Pledge Agreement, PMO cannot now insist on applying
Section 8.02 of the ARDA and conveniently and arbitrarily exclude and/or
ignore the Pledge Agreement so as to evade the prohibition against pactum
commissorium.
More importantly, the Court, in determining the existence of pactum
commissorium, had focused more on the evident intention of the parties,
rather than the formal or written form. In A. Francisco Realty and
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, therein petitioner similarly
denied the existence of pactum commissorium because the proscribed
stipulation was found in the promissory note and not in the mortgage deed.
680 HOME APPLIANCES, INC. vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 206599, September 29, 2014
The remedy provided under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 to the debtor becomes
available only after the purchaser acquires actual possession of the property.
This is required because until then the debtor, as the owner of the property,
does not lose his right to possess. However, upon the lapse of the
redemption period without the debtor exercising his right of redemption and
the purchaser consolidates his title, it becomes unnecessary to require the
purchaser to assume actual possession thereof before the debtor may
contest it. Possession of the land becomes an absolute right of the
purchaser, as this is merely an incident of his ownership. The debtor
contesting the purchasers possession may no longer avail of the remedy
under Section 8 of Act No. 3135, but should pursue a separate action e.g.,
action for recovery of ownership, for annulment of mortgage and/or
annulment of foreclosure.
TORTS AND DAMAGES
Ylarde vs. Aquino, 163 SCRA 697

Civil Law

Teacher Edgardo Aquino, after bringing his pupils to an excavation site dug
by them, left them all by themselves, and one of the pupils fell into the pit. A
teacher acted with fault and gross negligence because a teacher who stands
in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are
protected from all harm in his company.
Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association
Appeals, G.R. NO. 100727, March 18, 1992

vs.

Court

of

Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association, a group of drivers, took

over all jeepneys of a transportation company, Lungsod Corporation, as well
as the operation of the service in the companys route without authority from
the Public Service Commission. The act was in violation of Article 21 of the
Civil Code [Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages] because the constitutional right of the
drivers to redress their grievances with the company should not undermine
public peace and order nor should it violate the legal rights of other persons.
F.F. Cruz and Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 731
A fire that broke out in the furniture shop of the petitioner spread to an
adjacent house because of the shop owners failure to construct a firewall as
required by a city ordinance. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which is
applied by the Court in this case, may be stated as follows: Where the thing
which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care.
Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Dionisio, 148 SCRA 353
The driver of a dump truck parked it improperly at night near his residence
and it was bumped by the driver of a car, who suffered damages. The
proximate cause of the accident was the improper parking of the dump truck.
Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448
A fire broke out at a gasoline station while gasoline was being hosed from a
tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving
tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted, as a result of which several
houses were burned. Under the principle of res ipsa loquitor, the employees
negligence was the proximate cause of the fire which in the ordinary course
of things does not happen.

Civil Law

Gabeto vs. Araneta, 42 Phil. 232

Araneta stopped a calesa with passengers aboard on the street and seized
the rein of the horses bridle, by reason of which the driver brought the
carromata to the adjacent curb and alighted to fix the bridle, and while the
driver was engaged at the horses head, the horse moved forward bringing
down a police telephone box, and because of the noise caused thereby, the
horse was frightened and it ran away and one of the passengers jumped and
was killed. Araneta's act in stopping the horse was held as not the proximate
cause of the accident because the bridle was old, and the leather of which it
was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken.
Gregorio vs. Go, 102 Phil. 556
Go ordered his cargador, who had only a students permit to drive his truck,
but a policeman who boarded the truck took the wheel, and while driving the
truck, it hit and ran over a pedestrian. There was no direct and proximate
casual connection between the defendants negligence and the death
because the proximate immediate and direct cause of the death was the
negligence of the policeman.
Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148
SCRA 353
Dionisio's negligence was only contributory, that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care"
and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though
such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil
Code of the Philippines).
Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148
SCRA 353
Petitioners sought the application of the doctrine of "last clear chance". The
Supreme Court said that the common law rule of contributory negligence
prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if
the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful
act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear
chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been
negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the
casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any,
the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where
the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article
2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Civil Law

Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be

extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in
negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so.
Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine
whose negligence the plaintiff's or the defendant's was the legal or
proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an
exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the
use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location
in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts
or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into
account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent
act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks
created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. The
petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be
absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the
unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had
become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's
own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close
to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for
the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law
on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and
to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners'
pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 695
Respondent entrusted companys cash for deposit to his secretary who
defrauded the company by depositing the money, not to the companys
account, but to her husband who maintained similar account with the bank,
made possible because the duplicate slip was not compulsory required by
the bank in accepting the deposits. Under the doctrine of last clear chance,
an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of
damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability
sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have
avoided, the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here,
assuming that the respondent company was negligent in entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud
the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the
petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the
injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed
validation procedure.
Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384
The driver of a Pantranco bus encroached into the lane of an incoming
jeepney and failed to return the bus immediately to its own lane upon seeing

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the jeepney coming from the opposite direction, resulting to the death of
eight passengers of the jeep. The doctrine of last clear chance does not take
into operation here because it applies only in a situation where the plaintiff
was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made
liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintiff.
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. vs. William Lines, Inc.,
306 SCRA 762
The passenger ship of William Lines, Inc. caught fire and sank while in the
custody of Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works to which it was brought for
annual repair. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies here because the fire
that occurred and consumed MV Manila City would not have happened in the
ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence had been exercised
by Cebu Shipyard.
Radio Communications of the Phils., Inc. [RCPI] vs. Court of Appeals,
143 SCRA 657
Defamatory words were inserted in the telegram sent by respondent Timan,
which were not noticed and were included by the RCPI in the teleG.R.am
when delivered. Since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some
cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks
for itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding
the injury.
Custodio vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 483
Custodio filed a case for damages because his tenants cancelled their
contract of lease due to adobe fences constructed by adjoining lot owners
which restricted passage from and to his apartment. To warrant the recovery
of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted
by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom as a wrong
without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of
action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Tan Chuan Leong, 42
SCRA 352
Although B&I Trading had knowledge of the simulated sale between Tan
Chuan Leong and his son and had entered into the contract of mortgage
pursuant to a design to defraud Leongs creditors, no damage or prejudice
appears to have been suffered by the petitioner thereby. Absent damage or

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prejudice, no right of action arises in favor of the petitioner because wrongful

violation of a legal right is not a sufficient element of a cause of action unless
it has resulted in an injury causing loss or damages.
Yu vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 328
House of Mayfair, a foreign manufacturer of wall covering products, with
which Yu has had an exclusive distributorship aageement was duped into
believing that the goods ordered through the FNF Trading were to be shipped
to Nigeria only, but the goods were actually sent to and sold in the
Philippines. A ploy of this character is akin to the scenario of a third person
who induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract,
thereby entitling the other contracting party to relief therefrom.
Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 83122, October 19, 1990
Valenzuela did not receive his full commission which amounted to P1.6
Million from the P4.4 Million insurance coverage of the Delta Motors he
obtained for Philippine American General Insurance (Philamgen) because the
Philamgen terminated their agency agreement after Valenzuela refused to
share his commission with the company. Philamgen was found to have acted
with bad faith and with abuse of right in terminating the agency under the
principle that every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith (Art. 19, Civil Code), and every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damages to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 20 83
The driver was in violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when
its vehicle got involved in an accident that killed three persons. For the driver
to be found negligent petitioner must show that the violation of the statute
was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially
contributed thereto because such negligence, consisting in whole or in part,
of violation of law, like any other negligence is without legal consequence
unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.
Mckee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 211 SCRA 517
A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck driver and a car driver
Jose Koh, which resulted in the death of Jose Koh and two others because the
Koh avoided hitting two boys who suddenly darted across the lane. Under the
Emergency Rule, Koh was not negligent because his entry into the lane of the
truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a
greater peril of death or injury to the two boys. Under this rule, a person

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who, without fault or negligence on his part, is suddenly placed in an

emergency or unexpected danger and compelled to act instantly and
instinctively with no time for reflection and exercise of the required
precaution, is not guilty of negligence and, therefore, exempt from liability, if
he did not make the wisest choice of the available courses of conduct to
avoid injury which a reasonably prudent person would have made under
normal circumstances.
Del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co., 57 Phil. 478
An overhead wire of Meralco conducting electricity parted and one of the
charged ends fell to the ground, and a nine (9) year old school child touched
the wire and was electrocuted. It is doubtful whether contributory negligence
can properly be imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature years and
the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out of the
ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a
companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case.
Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil. 327
A young man by the name of Juan Diaz Astudillo met his death through
electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire connected with an
electric light pole owned by Meralco. Meralco was negligent in so placing the
pole and wires as to be within the proximity of a place frequented by many
persons, with the possibility of coming in contact with a highly charged and
defectively insulated wire.
Bernardo vs. Legaspi, 29 Phil. 12
Two automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide on turning a street
corner, and it appears from the evidence that the drivers were equally
negligent and contributed equally to the collision. Under the doctrine of
contributory negligence, neither can recover from the other for the damages
suffered.
Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 534
The ship captain of MT Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by PNOC, was
playing mah-jong when it collided off the Tablan Strait in Mindoro, with M,V
Don Juan owned by petitioner NENACO. The owner of the ship was found
equally negligent with the ship captain because of tolerating the playing of
mahjong by the ship captain and other crew members while on board the
ship and failing to keep the ship seaworthy.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
178 SCRA 94

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The jeepney of the respondents fell into an open excavation when the jeep
swerved from the inside lane of the street, respondents being aware of the
presence of said excavation. The negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban
was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the
very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining
factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages.
Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584
At the time of her admission, patient Erlinda Ramos was neurologically sound
but during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of a
gall bladder operation, she suffered irreparable damage to her brain and was
diaganosed to be suffering from diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage. The
damage sustained by Erlinda Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall
bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur in
medical malpractice as it was found out that brain damage does not
normally occur in the process of gall bladder operations, and does not
happen in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of
anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube.
Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334
A piece of rubber glove was left in the abdomen of a patient after a
caesarean section operation. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies
because aside from the caesarean section, private respondent Villegas
underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece
of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only
have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin.
Roque vs. Gunigundo, 89 SCRA 178
Atty. Gunigundo was charged by his client Roque with G.R.oss negligence in
not seasonably filing their motion for reconsideration and in not perfecting
an appeal from the trial courts order of dismissal. Atty. Gunigundo's filing of
motions for extension on the last day and sending them by registered mail
(thus giving the court insufficient time to act before the extension sought
had expired) and his omission to verify whether his second motion for
extension was granted are indicative of lack of competence, diligence and
fidelity in the dispatch of his clients business.
Adarne vs. Aldaba, 83 SCRA 734
Adarne was declared in default for failure to appear in the hearing because
his one of his lawyers honestly believed that he had appeared for the
complainant only for a special purpose and that the complainant had agreed

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to contact his attorney of record to handle his case after the hearing of
October 23, 1964, so that he did nothing more about it. An attorney is not
bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of
care and skill having reference to the character of the business he
undertakes to do.
Vestil vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 47
Theness, a three-year old child, was killed after she was bitten by a dog while
she was playing with the child of Purita Vestil in the house of Vicente
Miranda, the late father of Purita. Spouses Vestils contention that they
cannot be faulted as they are not the owner of the house where the child was
bitten cannot be accepted because under the Article 2183 of the Civil Code
the possessor of animal is liable even if the animal should escape or be lost
and so be removed from his control.
Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 315
Amadora was shot dead by his classmate Daffon inside the school
auditorium, when the classes had formally ended. As long as it can be shown
that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in
the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the
school authorities over the student continues.
Caedo vs. Yu Khe Thai, 26 SCRA 410
Yu was inside his car when his driver bumped a carretela in front and at the
same time hit another car coming from the opposite direct. Under [Article
2184], if the causative factor was the drivers negligence, the owner of the
vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the
mishap by the exercise of due diligence.
ANDAMO vs. IAC, G.R. NO. 74761November 6, 1990
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.
All the elements of a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana are present, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or
some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection
of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.
PONCE vs. LEGASPI, G.R. NO. 79184 May 6, 1992

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The present case stemmed from the filing before the Supreme Court OF a
complaint for disbarment against respondent by petitioner which was
dismissed. Respondent thereafter filed a complaint for damages against the
petitioner. The adverse result of an action does not per se make the action
wrongful and subject the actor to make payment of damages for the law
could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to because one who
exercises his rights does no injury, and if damage results from a person's
exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
MERALCO vs. RAMOY, G.R. NO. 158911, March 4, 2008
In the present case, MERALCO wilfully caused injury to Leoncio Ramoy by
withholding from him and his tenants the supply of electricity to which they
were entitled under the Service Contract. MERALCO's failure to exercise
utmost care and diligence in the performance of its obligation to its
customer, is tantamount to bad faith hence is entitled to moral damages.
MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICE, INC. vs. PHOENIX
ASSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK,MCGEE & CO., INC., G.R. NO.
162467, May 8, 2009
The Court ruled that Mindanao Terminal had duly exercised the required
degree of diligence in loading and stowing the cargoes, which is the ordinary
diligence of a good father of a family. There is no basis for the award of
attorneys fees in favor of petitioner since none of the circumstances
enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code exists because the present case
is clearly not an unfounded civil action against the plaintiff as there is no
showing that it was instituted for the mere purpose of vexation or injury.
AIR FRANCE vs.CARRASCOSO, G.R. NO. L-21438, September 28, 1966
Plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane
belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred
to the tourist class without his consent and against his will. The contract of
air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty, and
neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give
ground for an action for damages.
BAYANI vs. PANAY ELECTRIC CO., INC., G.R. NO. 139680, April 12,
2000
The requisites for an action for damages based on malicious prosecution are:
(1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was
himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an
acquittal;
(2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;
and

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(3) the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice.

WASSMER vs VELEZ, G.R. NO. L-20089, December 26, 1964
Two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old, simply
left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My mother
opposes it ... ", then enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and never
returned and was never heard from again. This is not a case of mere breach
of promise to marry but unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article
21 aforesaid and per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil
Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of
said Code.
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. vs. ERNESTO V.
SANTOS and RIVERLAND, INC., G.R. NO. 153004, November 5, 2004
The demand letter sent to the petitioner on October 28, 1992, was in
accordance with an extra-judicial demand contemplated by law. When the
debtor knows the amount and period when he is to pay, interest as damages
is generally allowed as a matter of right.
TELEFAST COMMUNICATIONS vs. CASTRO, G.R. NO. 73867, February
29, 1988
Petitioner and private respondent entered into a contract whereby, for a fee,
petitioner undertook to send said private respondent's message overseas by
teleG.R.am but which petitioner did not do, despite performance by said
private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges. The
award of exemplary damages by the trial court is likewise justified and,
therefore, sustained as a warning to all teleG.R.am companies to observe
due diligence in transmitting the messages of their customers.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
136202, January 25, 2007
Upon the prompting of Templonuevo and with full knowledge of the brewing
dispute between Salazar and Templonuevo, petitioner debited the account
held in the name of the sole proprietorship of Salazar without even serving
due notice upon her. The award of exemplary damages is justified when the
acts of the bank are attended by malice, bad faith or gross negligence and
the award of reasonable attorneys fees is proper where exemplary damages
are awarded because depositors are compelled to litigate to protect their
interest.
VELASCO vs.MERALCO, G.R. NO. L-18390, August 6, 1971

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It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the substation of

MERALCO and whether this sound constitutes an actionable nuisance or not
is the principal issue in this case and appellant asked that he be declared
entitled to recover compensatory, moral and other damages. Article 2203
clearly obligates the injured party to undertake measures that will alleviate
and not aggravate his condition after the infliction of the injury, and places
upon him the burden of explaining why he could not do so.
BPI vs CA, G.R. NO. 136202, January 25, 2007
The bank froze and later unilaterally debited an amount from the account of
A.A. Salazar Construction and Engineering Services without informing her
that it had already done so, which caused plaintiff-appellee great damage
and prejudice particularly when she had already issued checks drawn against
the said account and as can be expected, the said checks bounced, thereby
causing private respondent Salazar undue embarrassment and inflicting
damage to her standing in the business community.
A depositor has the right to recover reasonable moral damages even if the
banks negligence may not have been attended with malice and bad faith, if
the former suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, embarrassment and
humiliation.
VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L25499 February 18, 1970
The trial court and the Court of Appeals, both found that the accident and
the death of Policronio had been due to the negligence of the bus driver, for
whom petitioner was liable under its contract of carriage with the deceased
but the only issue raised in this appeal is the amount of damages
recoverable by private respondents herein. The determination of the
indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has therefore no
fixed basis and much is left to the discretion of the court considering the
moral and material damages involved, and so it has been said that "(t)here
can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and
the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical
calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case.
PEOPLE vs. EBAROLA, G.R. NO. L-69666, January 23, 1992
Appellant had been convicted of homicide and the trial court awarded the
amount of P100,000.00 to the heirs of Manahan as indemnity for death. The
indemnity for death must be reduced to P50,000.00 conformably with
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter and aside from the ordinary indemnity
for death appellant is obliged: (1) to compensate the heirs for the latter's

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loss of earning capacity; (2) to give support in the form of expenses for
education to dependents of the deceased and (3) to pay the heirs for moral
damages for the mental anguish suffered by them.
COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 119398. July 2, 1999
To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages
and for attorneys fees for acts done in the performance of official functions,
the plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by
evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, but even if their acts had not
been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if
they had violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights.
PLENO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-56505, May 9, 1988
Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory
damages and in arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages to be
awarded, trial courts are guided by our ruling that: There are cases where
from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss.
AREOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 95641 September 22,
1994
Nominal damages are "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated
and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual
present loss of any kind, or where there has been a breach of contract and
no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be
shown.