THE CENTENARY YEAR AND BEYOND –

A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE FOR

THE CORPS OF SIGNALS

Raakesh Thayyil

Jan 2011
 Page 1 of 36

THE CENTENARY YEAR AND

BEYOND – A STRATEGIC
PERSPECTIVE FOR

THE CORPS OF SIGNALS

by

Major Raakesh V Thayyil

"A strong, robust and secure information grid is

therefore a prerequisite for this. The information grid
must always act as a force multiplier and an enabler for
the soldier as well as the Commander in the battlefield"

(From the address of the Chief of Army Staff, General VK Singh at

a seminar on "Converged Infostructure for a T ransformed Force"
in relation to the battle space shifting from Platform Centric to
Network Centric War fare)

INTRODUCTION

1. The Corps of Signals, the Information Warriors of the

Indian Army is on the threshold of completing a glorious 100
years of existence. This entire period has seen the corps
being at the forefront of technological upgradation and
introduction of state -of-the-art communication and
networking technologies in the Army. We have been way
ahead of everyone else in keeping pace with the innovation
 Page 2 of 36

and rapid pace of change in technology. We can truly say

that we are at the pinnacle when it c omes to innovation and
change management. That we are keeping pace with the best
of available technology not only in peace areas but also in
the harshest and inaccessible terrains of our field and
frontier areas, speak volumes of our professional acumen,
innovation, dedication and adaptability. The advent of our
centenary is a good time to ponder and deliberate about the
future of our Corps especially the challenges that lie ahead
and how we formulate the key focus areas of the Corps in
the coming years. A well-thought out and logical strategic
perspective is required to pave the way for what needs to be
done both internally within the Corps as well as our wider
interaction with the Army and technological entities in the
civil sphere. This should entail in t he culmination of a
comprehensive long -term action plan and strategy for
execution by the Corps.

Challenges

2. An important assumption in military strategy is that

"Despite whatever effort there may be to prevent it, there
may be a war!" This is neither provocative nor a justification
for the existence of the armed forces, but an existential fact.
History tells us that nations that neglect this historical verity
are vulnerable to military surprise, defeat and eventual
humiliation. Various security threats, challenges and
vulnerabilities face India in the foreseeable future, these
namely being border and territorial disputes, hegemonic and
power politics, resource and financial crises, failed and
failing states, cross -border terrorism, economic challenges
and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In addition
 Page 3 of 36

to these external challenges, there are serious interna l

security challenges least of which are the insurgencies in the
Northeast, J&K and the Maoist movement, which has been
insidiously gaining momentum with the passage of time. The
emergence of China as a major power, and territorial
disputes with China and Pakistan coupled with the nexus
between these two nations has politico -security
consequences for India. India’s economic relations with
China may be improving but its security relations are
definitely not. With faster economic, technological and
military modernisation, China is likely to become more
aggressive and be in a position to create pressure points on
the border and other strategic issues, some facets of which
are already on display; such as its unwillingness to recognise
J&K, Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim as legitimate parts of
India and to issues staples visa to residents of these states
for visits to China, non -cooperation in mapping the disputed
border, not consulting India on the management of share
water resources and implementation of provocat ive
measures to keep the Indian security establishments
guessing as to the actual intent and focus of their policy and
strategy.

The Future

3. The evolution and future of the Corps in such a scenario

is a matter of concern as the advent of technology into both
homes as well as office, has exposed the wider army to the
efficacy and effortlessness of technology, thus leading not
only to heightened expectations from users but also a
lowering of the perceived usefulness and relevance of the
Corps, thereby affe cting the standing of the Corps amongst
 Page 4 of 36

the rest of the army. Immediate measures are needed to be

instituted to stem the dilemma, ‘How do we stay relevant
in the forthcoming technological era?’ that the Corps is
facing. This factor which we have to contend with, the
perception and significance of ‘technology’ is tough; as to
predict the future path of the growth of technology would be
rash. Notwithstanding, it is imperative for us to have an
impression of this future for us to effectively plan and
prepare for it. This rapid change in technology, spearheaded
by convergence of disparate branches of learning in
engineering and sciences has propelled us to a point where
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a reality bringing
about momentous changes in military doctrine and hardware.
Military technologies are changing swiftly and their optimal
procurement, induction, management and utilisation
demands appropriate discernment of the entire range of t he
technology spectrum. This will inevitably change the nature
of deployment and sustainment of combat forces, leading to
a paradigm shift across the operational, intelligence,
communication and logistics domains, vastly increasing the
operational promptne ss and combat effectiveness of the
Armed Forces in particular and the nation as a whole.
 Page 5 of 36

BEYOND VISUAL REACH

Paradigm shift from Platform Centric to Network

Centric Warfare

4. Visualising the present state of combat readiness and

effectiveness of f ighting forces around the world would have
been extremely challenging in the past, as recently as two
decades ago. Combat has undergone extraordinary changes
since World War II due to RMA, leading to increased
operational, intelligence and battlefield lucidity for
commanders down to combat troops, in the form of a flat,
unified and digitised battle space. The entire concept of
operations, logistics support, communication, networking,
surveillance, intelligence gathering, engagement and
decision making has undergone drastic and rapid changes.
The entire model of warfare has changed and is further
changing from being Platform Centric to Network Centric
Warfare (NCW). To achieve this, first we s hall have to
become a Network Enabled Army. N CW is a prerequisite of
the future battlefield as it bestows i nformation superiority
and information dominance to the entity which makes the
most effective use of the power of information and exploits it
through networks. NCW is about human and organisational
behaviour, based on adopting a new way of thinking -
network-centric thinking, and applying it to military
operations. It focuses on the combat power that can be
generated from the effective networking of wa r-fighting
elements, characterised by the ability of geographically
dispersed combat entities to create a high level of shared
battle space awareness that can be exploited through
 Page 6 of 36

network-centric operations to achieve the commanders’

intent. NCW supports s peed of command – the conversion of
superior information possession into speedy action before
the opponent has an opportunity to do likewise. NCW is
transparent to mission, force size, and geography and has
the potential to contribute to the coalescing of the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels of war. NCW is therefore,
not narrowly about technology, but broadly about an
emerging military response to the current and perceived
future Information Age.

5. NCW is based upon sharing information and asset s to

achieve synergistic, collaborative effects, and the proper
degree of coupling can only be realised through having a
high-performance, communications, and computational
capability providing access to appropriate information
sources, and allowing seamle ss interactions among battle
space entities in a “plug and play” fashion. The
determination of the nature of this enabling “ infostructure”
and the best way to acquire it, present significant challenges
to the Corps, in its role as the leader of the transfo rmation
of the Indian Army in becoming a Network Centric Force.
Communication support topology in NCW environment is
infostructural and network -based with distributed and
disseminated static and mobile infrastructure forming the
backbone, with users dynami cally accessing the network to
provide seamless adaptable and flexible communication
support. This would entail catering for a large number of
networks as well as users and discrete systems accessing
this infostructure, both simultaneously and intermittent ly,
converging, sharing information and interacting at different
levels. The primarily enabler for this would be a Network of
 Page 7 of 36

Networks, which necessitates the coalescing of all networks

of different types at the tactical, operational, strategic and
national levels. The analysis of the core competencies/
threat areas faced by the Corps would hinge on this
requirement of the Indian Army to become a Network Centric
Force. Flowing from this, would emerge our Key Focus Areas
for planning and engagement.

Fig. 1: Network Centric Warfare

 Page 8 of 36

KEY FOCUS AREAS

6. Expanding from the foregoing discussion, emerge the

key focus areas of the Corps. This by no means relieves the
Corps of our existing competencies but requires an addition
merging and melding into them. There are definitely
additional focus areas that could be derived from the wider
audience thorough deliberation and consultation. The
identified list, enumerated below is: -

 Network of Networks
 Information Superiority and Dominance
 Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (ESMO)
requiring a s ubstantial improvement – both defensive
and offensive – in Electronic Warfare (EW) .
 Extensive use of space technology and satellites for
communications.
 Technological convergence
 Cyber warfare – offensive and defensive
 Specialisation of disciplines
 Integrated equipment procurement

Network of Networks

7. The Indian Army currently has in use, multiple networks

with a variety of applications being run by different arms/
services & directorates over standalone and dedicat ed
networks. In addition, a variety of ad -hoc formation-level
applications and networks are in use across the Indian Army.
The multiplicity of networks and applications leads to
inefficient usage of scarce resources and needs to be
obviated. The logical so lution to this problem would be the
 Page 9 of 36

consolidation and integration of all networks and

applications, bearing in mind the need for security,
maintenance, interoperability, availability and redundancy.
This would entail considerable planning, preparation and
cooperation between the various directorates at Army HQ
with the adjudication of Directorate General of Signals, in
conjunction with the Directorate General of Information
Systems.

8. Necessity for Integration of Networks . These

multitude of networks and applications running concurrently
and independently, reach the same physical locations but
provide discrete services. A better solution would be an
integrated and consolidated network with adequate security
and redundancy providing high availability and ha ving all the
applications running over it. The current structure, wherein
there exist a multitude of networks and applications leads to
wastage of resources, effort, duplication of effort, lack of
redundancy, higher administration effort and associated
costs, less than desirable security levels and non -optimised
results.

9. Benefits of an Integrated Network . There are

myriad benefits to be gained from the integration of existing
networks and the convergence of applications on this unified
network. Major amongst them would be: -

 Lower administration costs

 Ease of maintenance
 Better return on investment & resources
 Improved control
 Page 10 of 36

 Higher grade of security & performance

 Greater flexibility
 Redundancy & hence better availability
 Ease of effort for upgradat ion of the network
 Seamless integration across users and locations
 Lower design developmental costs for future
applications
 Interoperability of various applications with each other
 Standardised baseline for operation across the army

10. Requirements of an Integrated Network . For the

planning and designing of this consolidated network, the
aspects which need highlighting and deliberation are
discussed in detail below: -

(a) Security. Security is of paramount concern

overriding all other considerations in ou r environment.
Without assured high -grade security, the best of
integrated networks would not be of any use to the
Army. Existing security measures need to be re -
evaluated and overhauled keeping in mind the present
and future threats as well as the securit y solutions for
the same. There has to exist a common and multi -
layered security solution deployed across the entire
spectrum of the Indian Army down to the level of every
user. The current situation wherein every station has
different security architectur e does not lend itself to
efficient or effective security management and
implementation. Additionally, every application employs
different security and access methods. This current
muddled situation needs to be reviewed and overhauled
 Page 11 of 36

on priority. Security has to be handled further as

under: -

(i) Network level Security . This is

essential to provide a secure yet flexible and
conducive framework for the further deployment of
applications and unhindered reliable access to
them for all users across the length & breadth of
the army. This should consist of a central solution
which can be configured, managed and audited at
a single point source; but at the same time also
provide distributed control and management
facilities. This will cater for identical security at all
locations across the army and entail a host of
benefits in terms of ease of operation,
maintenance, administration, fault identification
and rectification, higher levels of assured secure
and foolproof access.

(ii) Application level Security . The security

and access criteria should be laid down for various
applications which would be expected/ permitted
to run over the centralised network. It should
consist of a standardised list of protocols and
systems which should be implemented for every
application to be allowed to run over the network.
In the event of any application failing to meet the
required security standard, it should either be
redesigned to fit these criteria or scrapped in
entirety.
 Page 12 of 36

(iii) User level Security . User level security

should be organised in a manner such that every
user should have a unique user identification that
is portable across applications, locations and
technologies; providing basic access rights based
upon pre -defined access control lists. This will
ensure both authentication as well as non -
repudiation across the entire network, easing
accessibility issues as well as ensuring non -
violation of security protocols.

(b) Maintenance. The issue of maintenance requires

serious thought as the present structure leads to
bloated inventories as well as longer downtimes. The
consolidation of the network will ensure that there is a
common hardware and software configuration of the
entire ecosystem across the network leading to
increased efficiencies and lower downtimes.

(c) Interoperability. The present applications are

essentiality designed as standalone ones, without much
thought given to interoperability between any of them.
This leads to a situation where one application provides
multiple services coexisting with multiple applications
providing similar services. This is a situation, which
when viewed from an objective perspective displays
sheer chaos. This is both untenable as well as bein g an
undesirable scenario and needs to be rectified at the
earliest by employing strict remedial actions.
Interoperability between various applications will also
ensure less hogging of network resources as also better
 Page 13 of 36

planning of the network payload and ef ficient

utilisation, ensuring better uptime and quality of
service.

(d) Availability. With the coalescing of existing

networks into one single network, additional bandwidth
would be available through reallocation and
readjustment of network resources, pro viding increased
bandwidth to users and system administrators. This in
addition to the interoperability and prioritising of
applications will lead to smoother flow of data to the
right person at the right time in the battlefield as well
as at static and field locations.

(e) Redundancy. The design of the network should

cater for enhanced redundancy and survivability so that
in case of catastrophic failure, the inbuilt redundancy in
the system will ensure that important applications and
users will be unaffec ted and continue functioning at
optimum levels. The redundancy should be
comprehensive and cater for all contingencies and
natural calamities. The network should make use of
multiple physical access methods such as Fibre Optical
links, Satellite, Wireless, Microwave, Radio, etc. This
will provide sufficiently high level of redundancy for the
network to continue functioning at desired standard.

(f) Extensibility . The network should be easily

configurable and extensible, so that in the eventuality
of it’s being needed to be extended to operational/
 Page 14 of 36

field/ ad-hoc locations; it can be done readily, easily,

speedily and with minimal down -time. The network
configuration and addressing scheme should be dynamic
enough to set up and torn down quickly and efficiently .
Coupled with the anywhere user access envisioned with
user-level security, it will enable a truly integrated and
ever-present network.

11. Groundwork. The preparation of the Corps for an

integrated network of networks would need to be
comprehensive and could entail the re -training and re -
designation of relevant trades in the Corps to efficiently and
successfully implement this shift as also to later perform the
full spectrum of functions to successfully run this network.
This will necessitate the creatio n of additional training
facilities at our training centres and as also the Military
College of Telecommunication Engineering (MCTE) to impart
unassailable fundamental knowledge of network systems. Ad -
hoc and makeshift arrangements for the same is likely t o
result in grave abyss in our capabilities and may result in
slippage of targets/ loss of control and ground of our current
exclusive domain.

Information Superiority and Dominance

12. Information Superiority in military operations is a

state that is achieved when competitive advantage or full -
spectrum domination is derived from the ability to exploit a
superior information position. In military operations this
superior information position is gained from information
 Page 15 of 36

operations that protect our ability to collect, process and

disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while
exploiting and/ or denying an adversary’s ability to do the
same.

Fig. 2: Principle of Information Superiority

13. Information Dominance is the degree of information

superiority that allows the possessor to use information
systems and capabilities to achieve an operational advantage
in a conflict or to control the situation in operations short of
war, while denying those same capabilities to the adversary.
 Page 16 of 36

Fig. 3: Co mponents of Information Superiority

14. Information has the dimensions of relevance, accuracy,

and timeliness and the upper limit in the information domain
is reached as information relevance, accuracy, and
timeliness approach 100 percent.

Fig. 4: Information Domain

The desired effect of offensive information operations is to

drive one or more components of the competitor’s
 Page 17 of 36

information volume towards the origin. The desired effect of

defensive information operations is to keep our information
volume from being compressed. Information superiority is a
comparative or relative concept. Furthermore, its value is
derived from the military outcomes it can enable. These
capabilities are not valued for themselves, but for making
extended offensive and defen sive actions more effective.
Achieving information superiority increases the speed of
command pre -empting adversary options, creates new
options, and improves the effectiveness of selected options.
This promises to bring operations to a successful conclusi on
more rapidly at a lower expense. The result is an ability to
increase the tempo of own operations while pre -empting or
blunting the adversaries initiatives and options.

PEACE CRISIS WAR VICTORY PEACE

Fig. 5: Spectrum of Information Superiority

15. Information superiority is generated and exploited by

adopting network-centric concepts that allow organisations
to achieve shared awareness and self synchronisation. The
bottom line for value creation in military operations involves
the detection, identification and disposal of the most
 Page 18 of 36

important targets at any given time. The biggest challenge

lies in fleeting targets, those that are mobile and whose
value is time sensitive.

Fig. 6: Information Superiority

16. It is imperative for the commander and his supporting

elements to attain this information superiority and
consequently information dominance to attain victory in war.
This is easier said than done and to achieve this in the fog of
war requires detailed planning and conduct of regu lar well-
planned practices including all elements. Information
Dominance involves the control and domination of the
electromagnetic spectrum, an arena wherein the Corps is
currently present and effectively active in the spheres of
tactical and operational spheres of war and in the strategic
to a limited extent. Thereby, our next focus area of
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (ESMO) .
 Page 19 of 36

Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (ESMO)

17. Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (ESMO) are a

component of Information Superiority in the form of
Electronic Warfare (EW). EW elements and technology
with the Corps is currently undergoing a radical upgradation
and overhaul. This will see a revival in t he interest and
standing of EW as a formidable weapon system. EW needs
good coordination between the EW elements, operations staff
and other users; which is not in an optimal form. At present
the usage of EW is not as effective as commanders and users
expect distilled actionable tactical level information from EW
units; whereas the input data needs to thoroughly analysed
against the backdrop of previous information to reach a
logical and contiguous level of knowledge, fit to be
disseminated to the end -user environment. It must be
perceived, understood and accepted that EW is not a
standalone system but works and thereby must be employed
in conjunction with other means of surveillance and
information gathering. Needless to say, the current level of
awareness of EW within the Corps and the larger Army is
abysmal to say least. This disjoint between the capabilities
of EW operations and the expectations of the end -users
needs to be addressed proactively to attain a system which
is efficacious as well as dynamic. The introduction of EW
equipment should not be on a piece -meal basis but should be
part done on the basis of a long -term perspective keeping in
mind the capabilities and procurement of our adversaries
especially China. A substantial improvement in this reg ard is
required in both our offensive and defensive EW capabilities.
 Page 20 of 36

18. In addition to this, another important facet of the

Corps’ involvement in ESMO is frequency spectrum
management, which will gain even more importance with the
introduction and advent of personal communication and
networking devices down to the level of the combat soldier.
The increased density and usage of this limited resource is
going to be a challenge in the foreseeable future. Spectrum
management encapsulates the evaluation and al leviation of
electromagnetic environmental effects, managing frequency
allocation and maintenance of databases, frequency
interference resolution, policy determination, coordination
and management of the frequency pool allotted to the Army,
and EW coordina tion. The target of spectrum management is
to ensure uninterrupted and hassle -free access to the entire
allotted frequency spectrum to provide support to users in
their operational tasks. Spectrum management enables the
allotment of this limited natural re source to directly support
operational forces. Our Army uses the radio spectrum to
communicate downwards from the strategic levels of war.
Spectrum management enables electronic systems to
perform their functions in the intended environment without
causing or suffering unacceptable interference. If the
intention of NCW is full spectrum domination, then effective
management and control of our forces own spectrum
utilisation and security is an undeniably important issue,
which is not sufficiently highlighted within our Corps, as
reflected by the general awareness or rather the lack
thereof, about this crucial aspect of our responsibilities and
domain. Admittedly, the availability of domain specialists in
this field is seriously doubted. Measures to assuage thi s
debilitating shortcoming need to be incorporated in training
 Page 21 of 36

at MCTE by introduction of this as a subject in relevant

officer courses.

Space technology and Satellites for

Communications

19. The Army currently employs space technology

essentially in the form of Very Small Aperture Terminal
(VSAT) communication using transponders hired from the
Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and operated
under our direct control. The way ahead is to have an
accelerated methodology for the approval design,
fabrication, launch and operation of a set of dedicated
military satellites for communications, networking, astro -
navigation and surveillance. In view of the limited resources
and skills sets available within the Army and even in the
domain of the Armed Forces , the satellite system would be a
joint venture requiring the cooperation and collaboration of
the Armed Forces, Defence Research & Development
Organisation (DRDO), ISRO and the Department of Atomic
Energy (DAE). This is a long -term plan necessitating deta iled
planning, budget allocation, project management, execution
and delivery, for which a separate and autonomous
organisation with domain specialists and experienced user
representatives from our current related projects.
 Page 22 of 36

Technological Convergence

20. The proliferation of technologies and accessibility to

them is increasing on an exponential scale, which is hard to
visualise. The newer technologies are definitely more
competent in their usage of spectrum and bandwidth; but
their increased capabilities in handling large amounts of data
more efficiently inevitably results in the hogging of this
scarce and valuable resource. The way forward, is inexorably
the convergence of all technologies – both at the hardware
and software levels; with the eventual goal of a combat
soldier handling a single handy easy -to-use device providing
him seamless, dynamic and integrated communication and
networking facilities on the move without any complicated
configuration or operation; that is a “ plug and play” device.
This should be dovetailed into the Indian Army’s Future
Infantry Soldier as a System (F -INSAS) and integrated
with the Tactical Communication System (TCS) under
development as a replacement for Army Radio Engineered
Network (AREN). It should preferably also have the
capability for accessing the Army Static Switched
Communication Network (ASCON) and the upcoming
Defence Communication Network (DCN) .

Cyber Warfare

21. Cyber Warfare relates to the conduct of military

operations according to information – related principles. It
implies disrupting or destroying information and
communication systems of an adversary and trying to know
everything about an adversary while keeping the adversary
 Page 23 of 36

from knowing much about oneself. It i nvolves diverse

technologies for command & control, intelligence collection,
processing and distribution, for tactical communication,
positioning, identifying friend -or-foe and for “smart” weapon
systems. It also involves electronically blinding, jamming,
deceiving, overloading and intruding int o an adversary’s
information and communication circuits. It t urns the balance
of information and knowledge in one’s favour. The strategies
used could be Reactive, Proactive or Planned behaviours.
Cyber warfare consists of both offensive as well as defensiv e
strategies.

Offensive Cyber Warfare

22. This includes techniques to destroy, degrade, exploit or

compromise enemy’s computer based systems and the
information carried therein. It includes the capability to
attack and disrupt enemy computer networks; def end our
own military information systems; and exploit enemy
computer networks through intelligence collection. Offensive
Cyber W essentially consists of three components: -

(a) Cyber Counterintelligence . Counterintelligence

by any means, where a significant target or tool of the
adversarial activity is a computer, computer network,
embedded processor or controller, or the information
thereon. Cyber counter -intelligence are measures to
identify, penetrate, or neutralize foreig n operations,
that use cyber means as the primary tradecraft
methodology as well as foreign intelligence service
collection efforts that use traditional methods to gauge
cyber capabilities and intentions.
 Page 24 of 36

(b) Cyberspace Exploitation . It is the area of

Cyber W that seeks to prepare the IO battle space
through intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
and through extensive planning activities. It i nvolves
espionage that is usually performed through network
tools that penetrate adversary systems to return
information about system vulnerabilities or that make
unauthorized copies of important files. Tools used for
cyberspace exploitation are similar to those used for
cyberspace attack but configured for intelligence
collection rather than system disruption.

(c) Cyberspace Attack. It is the area of Cyber W

that seeks to disrupt or destroy information resident in
computers and computer networks. As a distinguishing
feature, it relies on a data stream used as a weapon to
execute an attack. For example, sending a digital signal
stream through a network to instruct a controller to
shut off the power flow is Cyberspace attack, while
sending a high voltage surge through the electrical
power cable to short out the power supply is Electronic
Warfare.

23. The modus operandi of offensive cyber warfare is as

under: -

• Step I – Foot printing by breaking into the target

system by:-

• Domain scanning

• Network mapping
 Page 25 of 36

• Port scanning

• Obtain/ program exploits

• If no matching exploits – hack by feeling in the

dark

• Step II – Privilege Escalation

• Obtain password file

• Get user names / login ids

• Gaining control

• Get Root access

• Get superuser privileges

• Step III – Misuse of computing resources

• Attack

• Steal / modify targeted data

• Obtain more data / access passwords

• Use hacked system to bounce off & hack into

other systems

• Denial of service

• Distributed denial of service

• Mail spoofing

• IP spoofing

• MAC spoofing

• Step IV - hide tracks

• At the outset turn off audit trails or other

tracking software

• Delete/modify files that may trace entry

• Use encryption
 Page 26 of 36

• Hide the files in unlikely directories with

obscure names

• Modify the OS – someone monitoring the system

would not notice the sniffer running

Defensive Cyber Warfare

24. It involves the application of action and resources in

efforts to protect information/ information systems and
critical infrastructure against potential enemies. System or
technology involved in the detection, tracking, interception
and destructive attacks against the information
infrastructure. The core principles are: -

• Confidentiality

• Authentication

• Integrity

• Non-repudiation

• Availability

Defensive cyber warfare consists of Detection, Prevention

and Threat Mitigation.

25. Detection. Systems and pol icies in this

category have the goal to detect possible attackers and
identify what are they trying to do and possible where they
are.

 Intrusion detection systems . The detection of

intrusions or intrusions attempts either manually or
via software systems t hat operate on logs or other
 Page 27 of 36

information available from the system or the

network. Analysis based on
o Signature based (Pattern matching).
o Statistical
o Integrity Checker
o Anomaly Detection/ Behaviour Based
o Flow Based

 Type of Responses – Security Monitoring

o Alteration to the environment
o Striking back
o Real time notification
o Throttling
 Limiting rate
 Slowing down attacks
o Session Sniping

 Log analysis. It is one of the overlooked aspects of

operational computer security. Spending on intrusion
detection systems (IDS) deployments is in vogue but
the analysis of firewall logs is still ignored. The tools
and knowledge to make use of that data are often
not there or the tools that exist are too inconvenient

26. Prevention. Stopping the attacker is the primary

concern even if the attack has not been identified (locking
the entrance door is always a good idea). Most of attacks are
simple and straightforward, like testing each door to see if it
is open and a good prevention is to simply lock it by: -

• Physical Security
 Page 28 of 36

• Logical Security

• Firewalls
• OS hardening
• BIOS security
• Authorization
• IDS/ IPS

• Organisational Security

• CERT-IN

• CERT-Army

27. Threat Mitigation. It consists of the following aspects:

-

 Core functionality. Consider information security

part of responsibility
 Policy. Develop, deploy, review, and enforce security
policies.
 Risk Management. Periodically conduct
information security risk evaluation that iden tifies
critical information assets, threats to critical assets,
asset vulnerabilities, and risks
 Security architecture & design to generate,
implement, and maintain enterprise wide security
architecture
 User Aspects.
o Accountability & training to establish
accountability for user actions and train for
accountability and enforce it
o Adequate expertise. Ensure that there is
adequate in-house expertise or explicitly
outsourced expertise for all supported
technologies including their secure operation
 Page 29 of 36

 System and Network management .

o Access control
o Software integrity
o Secure access configuration
o Data Backup
o Authentication & Authorisation

o Users

o Remote access & 3 r d parties

o Monitor & Audit

o Physical security
o Continuity planning & Disaster recovery

28. This brief overvi ew serves the highlight the complexity

and specialisation in the field of cyber warfare that the Corps
is yet to attain on the scale and depth that is required for
the conduct of NCW that we wish to attain. For this to
happen, this domain should cease to be treated as a
protected and restricted one and intensive training and
policy implementation needs to be undertaken, if we wish to
preserve our continued hegemony and hold over this domain.

Specialisation of Disciplines

29. A cursory glance at the functions undertaken by our

Corps would throw up an indicative list as:

 Electronic Warfare
 Communications and networking
 Static communications
 Cyber security
 Signals/ Communications Intelligence
 Page 30 of 36

 Radio Monitoring

In addition there are a host of sundry functions and

responsibilities being shouldered by us. A major lacuna in
the current system of employment of the Corps is the lack of
specialisation amongst all ranks and especially amongst the
officer cadre. This leads t o a situation where in every unit is
on a near incessant spree of re -training and re-orienting
every new entrant to the equipment, working culture and
operational environment of the unit. Thus we have a peculiar
situation, in which for example there are not sufficient
qualified and confident drivers for all ‘A’ vehicles in a unit.
This system has been pulling along till now, but in view of
the dynamic and fluid battle space envisioned in the not too
distant future, it is going to be sorely tested and may fail to
hold up to the heightened expectations of commanders and
combat elements unless there is a major review and
overhauling.

30. An assessment of the present system and structure of

the Corps needs to be conducted especially with respect to
the undergoing: -

 Grouping of units. Units need to be grouped in a

manner such that personnel have a set of
specialisations and diverse posting profile, to exploit
their experience and expertise gained over time.
Such a scheme of matters had been proposed in the
past and could be dusted off and reworked in light of
present requirements.
 Page 31 of 36

 Cross-attachment/ Exposure to the wider

environment . Related to the above is the posting of
personnel in varied appointments within the Army
and beyond to increase their exposure and improve
utilisation of cross-functional learning.
 Rationalisation/ Merging of Units . The number,
dispersion and responsibilities of units within the
Corps needs to reviewed to lessen the administrative
elements and improve our tooth -to-tail ratio.
 Provision of communica tion down to Battalion
Level. The Corps should take on the responsibility of
providing communications down to the battalion level
with accompanied increase in manpower levels to
provide uniform technical skill set across the army
particularly in view of th e expected technological
upgradtion of communications and networking in the
Army.
 Reorganisation of trades . The above should go
hand in hand with the reorganisation of trades
through amalgamation of existing trades, scrapping
of irrelevant and raising of new ones if need be.
 Raising of units . Currently news units are being
raised through the policy of “ save & raise”, without
sufficient accretion of overall manpower in the Corps
leading to a severe manpower crunch in units
especially in peace stations.
 Static Communications units. Provision and
maintenance of static communication in the
hinterland should be made the sole prerogative of
static communication units by strengthening of
existing units/ creation of new ones for this purpose.
 Page 32 of 36

Integrated Equipment Procurement

31. Another major change envisaged is the integrated

procurement of communication and networking systems,
software and services across the entire Corps. The situation
at present is that these are so varied and disparate in
different units and sometimes within the same unit, that the
end result is utter confusion in the training, operation and
maintenance of these systems. A more elegant solution
would be a common and integrated approach to procurement
with the ideal of commonality of functionin g, maintenance,
repair and interoperability. This will direct the effort and
lead the way towards a unified and integrated communication
and data network which is the crying order of the day.

Conclusion

32. The Indian Army is on the verge of a technological

revolution and the Corps of Signals is at the vanguard,
spearheading this revolution in infostructure. These changes
and the introduction of new systems will transform the Corps
from purely a communication provider to the possessor of
the latest weapon systems – a force multiplier – in the
Network Centric Army of tomorrow. This will obligate the
personnel of our Corps to shoulder additional responsibilities
in all aspects. These information systems while re ndering the
power of networks onto us will also expose use to their
inherent vulnerabilities against which we must remain
eternally vigilant to provide assured, seamless and dynamic
connectivity. The advantages of an integrated network can
rapidly turn aga inst us if penetrated and exploited by the
 Page 33 of 36

enemy. We thereby need to simultaneously and vigorously

plan, organise and implement our cyber warfare aspects on a
war-footing.
 Page 34 of 36

References

1. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka and Fredrick P. Stein,

“Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging
Information Superiority ”.

2. Cdr Phillip G. Pattee, USN, Retired, “Network-Centric

Operations: A Need For Adaptation and Efficiency ”, Air &
Space Power Journal, Spring 2008.

3. “Network-Centric Warfare”, http://en.wikipedia.org/.

Accessed on 10 Jan 2011.

4. United States Marine Corps Warfighting Publication

(MCWP) 3-36, “Information Operations ”.

5. United States Army War College, “Information

Operations Primer: Fundamentals of Information
Operations”.

6. United States National Counterintelligence Executive,

“Cyber Counterintelligence ”, Counterintelligence Open Source
Symposium, 17 Sep 2009.

7. John Rollins and Clay Wilson, “Terrorist Capabilities for

Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issue s”, United States
Congressional Research Services, ` The Library of Congress,
22 Jan 2007.
 Page 35 of 36

8. Col Marc Enger, USAF, “ Information Superiority ”,

Director of Information Operations, Air Intelligence Agency,
United States Air Force.