MARSILIO FICINO:

The
Philebus

Commentary

medieval and renaissance

Texts

and

Studies
2 6

Volume 2

MRTS Reprint Series

Number 3

MARSILIO FICINO:
The
Philebus

Commentary

Critical Edition

and Translation

by

Michael

J.

B. Allen

Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies Tempe, Arizona 2000

 Copyright 1975

The Regents

of the University of California

University of California Press

California Library Reprint Series Edition 1979

ISBN

0-520-03977-7

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 73-80826

Typography by Janet Mertes

Copyright 2000 Arizona Board of Regents for Arizona State University

ISBN 0-86698-268-X

@
It is

This book is made to last. smythe-sewn and printed on acid-free paper

to library specifications.

Printed in the United States of America

Dedicated

To
E.N.A.

&

W,

Corrigenda

page 51.16up:
page 134.4-5:

Book 2, chapter 4 not 1.3 You make the ship-bearing

teem with
life;

sea, the fruit-laden

.
.

land

For each race

page 198.14-12up: although they are supposed not to understand

such], since for understanding they too turn
selves towards objects within [the Ideas].

[as

them-

page 222.17up: page 234.Pl.3up: page 253n:

[genera] not [species]

insane not insance

6q dana\q.q |i^v aOidq58a|io0c;

dcTiefpova

dtTiavxa

Kat

aO^eiq
6q
to

g|i7taA.iv

&()f)f\Kxo\)q
attxrvoq

^xei^

Kax'

K6a|iov

Kp6vE

TtayyevfiKop,

Kp6ve
page 472.12up:

7ioiKi?i6|iu0E

(corrections

some of the

characters and accents)

add 234
ter

as a

footnote
(i.e.,

number
is

to the

end of the chap-

heading

234

currently missing)

page 536.5up:
page 539 n25: page 542 n95: page 543.3:

48, 49 not 38, 39

247 not 24 401D, 402A. (i.e., add 402A)

frag.

add In
the

his Protrepticus 21, in elucidating

"Don't poke

fire

with a sword"

as the

ninth Pythagorean dic-

tum
page 543 nl07: page 545 nl56:
nl58:

(symbol), lamblichus had also cited the Heracli-

tus saw.

passim
11-12
ref.

(cf. ref.

140 below).

see also not just see

(i.e., add 11 to 207 not 206

12)

page 547 nl98.2:

nl99:

add For "chaos" see Orpheus' Argonautica 12 and 415-25, and Kern's frags. 24, 29, 66a, 76, 79, and 107; also Ficino's own De amove 1.3, glossing Plato's Symposium 178B. Cf. ref. 206 below.
Ecclesiastica not Ecclesia

n204.2:

n206:

change

to Cf. ref.

199 above,

(i.e.,

not Orpheus, Argo-

nautica, 12

and Kern,

frag. 66b)

page 549 n233: page 552. 9up:

add Cf. lamblichus

Kunstgeschichtliches

Protrepticus 21,

symbol

6.

Acknowledgements

a joy to thank Professor Paul O. Kristeller who sat down out of the goodness of his heart two years ago and read through my typescript, correcting errors, providing me

Pre-eminently

it is

with invaluable suggestions and directing my attention to the Pesaro fragments. He is legendary for his kindness, but such spontaneous generosity of time and great learning is surely of
the golden age.

For encouragement and help at the dissertation stage I would like to thank my director. Professor Russell A. Fraser, and Professor John D'Arms particularly, and also Professors Gerald F. Else, Frank L. Huntley, William H. Ingram and John R. Knott. My good friend Mr. Ian D. Mackenzie has come to the rescue several times since then, as have several students at UCLA, among them Lynda Boose, Susan Nierengarten and
Stephen Sharborough, and my colleagues Professors Herbert B. Hoffleit and Henry A. Kelly. I am indebted to the Horace H. Rackham School of the University of Michigan, the Ford Foundation and the University of
California for the fellowships which

made

this

work

possible;

and to the British, Vatican, Laurentian, Oliverian and Bodleian libraries and the Bibliotheque Nationale for permission to use
their

manuscripts and incunabula. I am deeply grateful to Professor Fredi Chiappelli, Director of the Medieval and Renaissance Center at UCLA, both for his endorsement and for the Center's timely donation
Finally

towards the costs of publication.

Addenda

For end of Notes to Introduction, page 537

For
silio

a detailed study of Ficino's rendering of the Philebus itself, see

alia

now

Ernesto Berti, "Osservazioni filologiche

Ficino," in
//

versione del Filebo di MarfortunUy ed. Paolo Cosenza

Filebo di Platone e

la sua

(Naples, 1996), 93-171.

MS

Vat.

lat.

5953

(see

introduction page

8)

was once owned and annotatla

le

ed by Pier Leoni. See

ic

J.

Ruysschaert, "Nouvelles recherches au sujet de

bibliotheque de Pier Leoni, medecin de Laurent

politiques, 5th ser., vol. 46.1 (1960-61),

Magnifique," Academ12).

royale de Belgique: Bulletin de la classe des lettres et des sciences morales et

37-65

at

55-56 (No.

For end of References, page 549

The quotation on page 482.12-13up,

the stars,"
is

"finally conquered Earth gives him from Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy 4.7.34-35. See my "Homo ad Zodiacum: Marsilio Ficino and the Boethian Hercules," now in Plato 's Third Eye: Studies in Marsilio Ficino 's Metaphysics and Its Sources

(Aldershot, 1995), 13:218.

Contents

Introduction

Synopsis

59
I

The Philebus Commentary, Book The Philebus Commentary, Book

Four Unattached Chapters
Appendices
I

70
384

II

424

Additions and Omissions

443

II

The Ten Excerpts

Three Texts

446 480
490
493 519
538

III

IV The Pesaro Fragments

The Chapter Summaries

Footnotes to the Introduction

References in the Texts
Select Bibliography

550
555

Index of

Names

Sigla

Biblioteca Vaticana

MS.

lat.

5953
(the first version)

X =
Y =
P

Biblioteca Laurenziana

MS.

Plut. 21, 8
(the second version)

Commentaria

in

Platonem, Florence 1496

(the third version

and the

editio princeps)

= BibUoteca

Oliveriana

MS. 620
(fragments of the second version)

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m m

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wpendct'

qood -Kl bonnm iudicatum cft.rcl malum/ vcl ncnltrum St ucultnim nouaa cjco impeto*

Commentaria in Platonem. Florence, 1496. (In the 1496 corrigenda in quodcunque cessat of paragraph two, line 9, is corrected to in quo denique cessat;
sec p. 75 below.)

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Vat. lat. 5953.

f.

402v

(see pp. 381, 383, 385)

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f.

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Introduction
Cosimo de' Medici granted Marsilio Ficino a villa at Careggi and put at his disposal a number of precious Greek
In 1462

manuscripts, including a complete manuscript of Plato. Afterwards two or three dialogues became especially dear to Ficino,

among them

the Philebus. Like the majority of the Platonic

dialogues, the Philebus

since antiquity,

and

it

had been unavailable to the Latin west was Ficino who translated it from the

Greek for the

it

first time.'

More than

this,

in the climactic final

position of the

initial

he deliberately placed decade of dialogues

he prepared for Cosimo' s study. Cosimo and his friends discussed the decade culminating in the Philebus and these discussions informally constituted the inaugural meetings of the Florentine Academy. In 1464, as Cosimo lay dying in the last two weeks of July, it was the Philebus that was read to him; and
during the reign of his successor, Piero,
that Ficino first chose to
lecture
it

was on the Philebus

to

the city's patricians,

composed on the broad problems posed by the dialogue, they were of seminal importance: they contributed an introduction not just
including the young Lorenzo. Since the lectures were
to the Philebus but to Platonism
itself.

Platonism had never died during the Middle Ages. In the west

and mysticism, and even such staunch Aristotelians as St. Albert and St. Thomas Aquinas were imbued with certain Platonic concepts.
it

flourished under the guise of Augustinianism

In the Byzantine east Plato always occupied a premier position

and in the last decades of the empire's existence it was Pletho's outspoken championship of Plato which initiated a prolonged academic controversy among the Greek exiles in Italy. ^ But the actual face-to- face encounter with Platonic and Neoplatonic texts which took place in the Florentine Academy under the leadership of Ficino was responsible for the European diffusion of Platonism in its distinctively Renaissance form. As Paul O.
Kristeller observes, the "direct access to the

work of

Plato, of

Plotinus,

and of the other Platonist philosophers of Greek

Introduction

was in itself a major event in the intellectual history of Europe, and its importance was not diminished by the
antiquity
.

fact that the understanding

of these Platonist sources continued

first

to be affected

by Neoplatonic and medieval ideas."' The

public articulation of Ficino's "direct access" to the Plato text

was the series of lectures he delivered on the Phiiebus, a series which later formed the basis of the written commentary. Consequently, the Phiiebus was in the vanguard of what was both a revival of an ancient academic philosophy, and also a wideranging religious, cultural and intellectual movement peculiar to the Renaissance and constituting one of its chief glories,
Florentine Platonism.

Apart from

its

historical importance, the

crucial role to play in the

commentary had a development of Ficino's own philo-

sophical system; for along with the

Symposium commentary
and the
treatise

(1468-69), the huge Platonic Theology (1469-74)

Christian Religion (1474) it bears witness to the generation of his most profound and luminous ideas. It is

On The

remarkable for its broad orientation, the profusion and scope of its major theses, and the suggestiveness of its detail. Even in the longueurs, one can detect Ficino's enthusiasm for the dialogue's intricacies and his sense of continual intellectual excitement. After lavishing much energy and concentration upon the commentary initially, he returned to it at least twice and he made it the longest of his Plato commentaries with the exception of the commentary on the Parmenides. Despite its signal interest, however, scholarship has hardly begun to give it its due. Its various arguments, and particularly those concerning the universal act, the primacy of the intellect and the psychology of perception, have been referred to individually, but the whole commentary has not been
studied carefully for
scripts,
its

own

sake.

in

the

first

edition

Hidden away in three manuof Ficino's Commentaria in

Platonem, and in the corrupt, mispunctuated texts of the Basle and Paris editions of his Opera Omnia it has neither been edited in modern times nor ever translated. Now, by chance, it follows the Symposium commentary as the second principal


Introduction
Ficino's to appear in English. Such a place is not undeserved though, as the two commentaries are in many ways

work of

companion pieces/

My
tary;

introduction

has

seven

sections

dealing

with:

the

historical genesis,

provenance and composition of the commen-

the reasons for Ficino's choice of the Philebus; the

aspects

external

of the commentary; its main ideas; the intellect/ will controversy; the problem of the dating; and editoMuch of what follows is rial and translation practice. necessarily provisional in the light of the many gaps in our understanding of Ficino's life and work. /

In 1463, having asked Ficino to translate the Pimander (Poimandres) of the legendary Hermes Trismegistus, Cosimo^ also asked him to translate "ten of Plato's dialogues containing every precept for living, all the principles of nature and all the sacred mysteries of divine things.'" In the last years of his life Cosimo was anxious to read the newly discovered texts and to begin the revival of Platonism in his own city. There is even the possibility, as Raymond Marcel suggests, that he and Ficino consulted each other beforehand on the particular dialogues which should make up the initial group.' In the early days of 1464 Cosimo sent an impatient note to Ficino: "I arrived here at Careggi yesterday, not in order to till my fields, but to cultivate my soul. Come as soon as possible, Marsilio. Bring with you Plato's book on the highest good which by now I assume you have translated as you promised from the Greek into Latin for there is nothing I desire more ardently than to know the way that leads most surely to felicity. Farewell, and do not forget your Orphic lyre when you come.'" This note testifies to the esteem which Cosimo accorded the

unknown

Philebus, and specifically designates the dialogue as

the one most likely to lead

manuscripts are of importance here. In a fifteenth century manuscript in the Bodleian library {Canonicianus latinus 163) is the anxiously
to felicity.

him

Two

awaited translation, and

we

discover what the ten dialogues

Introduction

were; but the prefatory letter to

Cosimo and

the introductions

to each of the dialogues are in an even earlier manuscript too.*

While the introduction to the Philebus translation continued to

accompany the Philebus

translation in the various editions of

it

the complete Plato translation,

also reappeared as the

to the Basle editions of the Philebus

III).

commentary

(see

proem Appendix

The

ten dialogues (4-6 of which are

now

usually accounted

spurious)

consisted

of:

the

Hipparchus,

On

Philosophy,

Theages,

Meno, Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II, Minos, Euthyphro,

Parmenides, Philebus. In the letter Ficino explained his choice and justified the sequence he had adopted, concluding, **as our happiness consists in the vision of God, it seems just that the Philebus which treats of man's highest good should follow the Parmenides which treats of the highest good of all nature."' Kristeller says **this explanation is not too plausible" and the arrangement simply represents the chronological sequence in which Ficino translated the dialogues, Ficino's "unexpressed principles of selection" being: one, that the first eight dialogues in the decade were all "comparatively short or easy"; and two, seven of them had never been translated before and the three which had been Ficino may not have known about. He concludes therefore, "Ficino began his translation [of Plato] with ten dialogues which he considered to be 'new' to his Latin '"^ This is too dismissive. The Philebus and the readers Parmenides are two of Plato's longest and most difficult works even if the other eight are short and easy. Furthermore, there are several things of note in the prefatory letter. The Philebus is the culmination of the decade, Ficino says, because it treats of the goal of human endeavour, namely "the divine vision," or in

Cosimo's words, "fehcity"; even the Parmenides is made to it. Ficino may have been personally indebted for his conception of the Philebus' importance to Greeks like Bessarion who were then living in Italy. Or he may have been influenced directly by Olympiodorus' commentary on the Philebus, which he certainly knew since at one time he owned and wrote marginal notes on a manuscript containing it though he made Uttle use of Olympiodorus, surprisingly, in
precede

Introduction

his

own commentary." Most

likely,

however, he derived the

conception from Neoplatonism itself. First, the Neoplatonists also put the Philebus at the end of a decade of dialogues in a teaching cycle, though the other members of the ancient decade do not correspond to those in Ficino's group, nor did they always remain constant among the ancient Neoplatonists themselves.'^

Second, starting with lambHchus,

it

had become

ancient Neoplatonic practice to define the skopos or purpose of

each of Plato's dialogues as a preliminary step to the study of it." In two places in the dialogue (11 B and 60 A) Socrates had said Philebus' view was that pleasure was the goal for all living

and not just for man alone. This suggested to the Neoplatonists Plato was concerned with something more than a specifically human pleasure, therefore with something more
creatures

than a specifically human wisdom. Since lamblichus, the accepted view had been that the Philebus was concerned with man's very highest good which was at the same time the very highest good for all things. As Henry Sidgwick noted years ago,
the traditional distinction between the

absolute or universal good loses

subsumes ethics into have always been indissolubly blended.'* A.E. Taylor, for instance, suggested that in the Philebus Plato himself was actually "moderating" a quaestio disputata on the Idea of the good which was then narrowed down to a discussion of the good for man." Although Plato may have lost interest in the theory of
the Ideas as he got older, his successors elaborated

man and the someone who metaphysics. In Platonism the two goods
good
for
its

force for

on the

passages in the sixth and seventh books of the Republic (and elsewhere) where the Idea of the good is made to subsume the

them and its own nature as an Idea. Eventually the Idea of the good became identified with Plotinus' first principle, the one beyond being, and the last section of the Enneads is in fact entitled: "On the good, or the one."" For Ficino, then, the
other Ideas and even in

some

sense to transcend both

Philebus

traditionally

defined as a dialogue dealing with

man's highest good rather than with pleasure or wisdom was obviously not only concerned with the ethical good, but with

Introduction

the metaphysical

good

too,

that

is,

the one, the absolute

of all being and all felicity. The commentary's opening sentence testifies to the easy movement from the ethical to the metaphysical; and the entire conception, it seems to me, accounts for the Philebus' close association from the beginning with the Parmenides (the dialogue most favoured by the Neoplatonists), for the otherwise inexplicable esteem it was accorded in the 1460's, and for the overridingly metaphysical content of the commentary Ficino wrote upon
principle, the unitary source
it.

Marcel, in commenting on Ficino's introductory letter, says: "With what ingenuity Ficino applied himself to making a unity out of these somewhat disparate elements! He has linked them together in a continuous progression, which, commencing from
the desire for terrestrial goods [the Hipparchus], has blossomed
into the plenitude of the sovereign good.'"'
gest the decade represents a sort of
tainly, the enunciation in

He goes on to sugsumma platonica.^* Cer-

definitions of philosophy, of

sequence of the fundamental Platonic wisdom, of virtue, etc., leading to

to his suggestion

the ascent to the

good adds force

and

ties it in

with what has been said above.

Vespasiano da

Bisticci tells us that while

Cosimo waited

for

the Philebus translation in the year before his death in the

August of 1464, he had the Florentine chancellor, Bartolomeo Scala, read him Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Bartolomeo also read him the lecture notes which Donato Acciaiuoli had taken on Argyropoulos' influential lectures on the Ethics. " It is interesting Aristotle's Ethics should be linked from the beginning with the rebirth of the Philebus, not only because of the
characteristics they share in

common and
its

the obvious indebted-

ness of Aristotle's

work

to

predecessor, but also because of

the Aristotelians

the prevailing controversy

nists

among

and Plato-

over the Ethics, a controversy in which the Florentine

the late July

Academy was necessarily involved. As Cosimo lay on his deathbed in

the Philebus: "So, as

Ficino himself in a letter to Lorenzo that at last

you yourself know

since

we learn from Cosimo heard you were there,

Introduction

he died not long after we had read him Plato's dialogues on the one principle of things [the Parmenides] and on the highest good [the Philebus]. It was as if he did not want to wait to enjoy fully the good which had been the theme of the discussion."" The "not long after" was, in Ficino's own recollection, twelve

Once again, this is evidence for the felt connection between the two dialogues, though, parenthetically, Ficino was to postpone commenting on the Parmenides until much Later. From the ensuing discussions on the Philebus and the other nine dialogues which Ficino managed to complete before Cosimo died. Marcel suggests the meetings of the Academy as a religiophilosophical society were informally inaugurated among Cosimo 's friends. Till then the Academy had been simply an
days.^'

unrealized ideal."

Under

the reign of Cosimo' s successor the Medici patronage

seems to have been less certain." Piero had been a pupil of the Aristotelian Marsuppini. Nicolo Tignosi, Ficino's Aristotelian

had dedicated his anti-Platonic commentary on the Ethics to Piero" and there is other odd evidence to suggest Piero was predisposed to the Aristotelians rather than the
teacher,
Platonists. Nevertheless, Corsi, Ficino's first biographer, says

Ficino and Piero were in frequent contact and Ficino used to

visit

him

to expatiate

on the merits of

Plato. Piero in turn

encouraged Ficino to continue with his Plato translations: he gave him Greek and Latin books and also urged him to comment on Plato in public. Corsi goes on to say it was at that time {eo tempore), meaning in the reign of Piero, that Ficino did formally lecture on the Philebus before a large audience." Marcel supposes that after Cosimo' s death, Ficino had discussed the Philebus with his associates (this being his customary method) and "it was the enthusiasm aroused by his exposition of Platonic thinking on the sovereign good which led his friends and patrons to wish a bigger audience could take
advantage of his teaching."" Having moved from Ficino's desk to Cosimo 's bedchamber to the immediate Medici circle, the Philebus was now reaching the Florentine intellectuals. But it is doubtful if Piero himself played any part in this

Introduction
to his sons, Lorenzo

dissemination; he

left it

to other Platonic enthusiasts like

and Giuliano, and Landino and Valori.

books of

Corsi claims there once existed a manuscript containing

Ficino's lecture notes (collectanea) plus the four Ficino's youthful Institutiones Platonicae; neither are extant."

But we have another fifteenth century manuscript, Vaticanus lat. 5953, containing the putative first version of the Philebus commentary. What precise relation this version bears either to

was delivering or to the collectanea mentioned by Corsi has to be a matter for speculation. The preface to the commentary in MS. 5953 begins: "Since we are
the actual lectures Ficino

going to interpret the sacred philosophy of the divine Plato in this celebrated place at the request of our best citizens, I have thought it important we first briefly consider what philosophy is."" And Ficino goes on to deal with the nature of philosophy

and the life of Plato. This material he later transformed into two letters: one to Giovanni Francesco Ippoliti, Count of Gazzoldo iPp. Om., 761-763), and the other to Francesco Bandini (Op. Om., 763-770). The commentary's preface concludes: "I am deeply grateful to you illustrious gentlemen for having honoured my lecture with your presence. May the immortal God give you immortal thanks,"" and the
manuscript itself ends with a note saying Ficino has not yet completed or revised the commentary (see my p. 425). The preface points to a close connection between the public lectures and the written commentary as we have it and we must accede
to Kristeller's observation that "Ficino's

own public

teaching in
St.

Florence
Plotinus'

left

a permanent trace in his commentaries on

Paul's Epistle to the

Romans, on
"'

Plato's Philebus

and on
public

Enneads

Kristeller

suggests

the

teaching took place "mostly in the church of S. Maria degli

Angeli and presumably before an audience that was not limited

to the

members of

his

own

circle."'*

Marcel too suggests "this

celebrated place" of the preface was the convent church of S.

Maria

degli Angeli.

He

alludes to the speech entitled Oratio in

it

principio lectionis {Op. Om., 886, 2), while acknowledging

may

in fact

be concerned with Ficino's later lectures on the

Introduction

Enneads (which we know

for certain took place in S.

Maria

degli Angeli)." In the Oratio Ficino refers to the use of temples

by the ancient sages who wished to study or teach the "sacred mysteries of philosophy" and he continues: "Following in the
footsteps of the ancient sages therefore we will study to the best of our powers the rehgious philosophy of Plato in the midst of this church. In this dweUing place of the angels we will contemplate the divine truth."" The allocation seems reasonable. S. Maria degli Angeh was near the Medici palace and it had been made into one of the first centres of humanism by Ambrogio Traversari, the Minister General of the Camaldolese, the architect of the decree of union at the Council of Ferrara-Florence, and the renowned translator of Diogenes

and other Greek patristic texts. One can picture the scene as Marcel describes it: "For the first time a Latin, text in hand, explicates one of Plato's dialogues at the request of the noble citizens and before an audience as attentive as it was numerous. In fact, the choice of the Philebus was an extremely judicious one, for the thesis concerning the sovereign good which one finds expounded there could only seduce this elite which had grown up searching for the solution to the problem as they listened to their teachers commenting upon Aristotle's Ethics.*'^* Although Ficino had approached the same question in his early tract On Pleasure (1457), the lectures were the direct outcome of his newly acquired mastery of the actual Plato texts and of the philoLaertius, the pseudo-Dionysius,

The long complicated section on the final cause, serving as it does as the prolegomenon to the commentary itself, bears witness to Ficino' s sense of his audience (for it takes up the opening propositions of the Ethics)^ and to his missionary purpose (for it proceeds to incorporate
sophical stimulus they supplied.
these universally famihar propositions into a Platonic analysis

of the general good and in so doing makes extensive but abso-

unacknowledged use of the Summa Contra Gentiles)." lectures in their turn drew considerable attention. One clue to the contemporary reaction is provided by Landino's Camaldulensian Disputations. In the second book one of the
lutely

The

10

Introduction

interlocutors, Alberti, observes: **The Christians say then that

is the highest good. But Plato agreed before Christ was born and made man. You can easily see this, if you want to, from the commentaries MarsiHo has composed on Plato's Philebus. They are not only profound but also particularly clear and simple."" Ficino eventually succumbs to Alberti's entreaties and to those of Lorenzo, another of Landino's dramatis personae^ and undertakes to elucidate the theories he had developed in the Philebus commentary. The reference is sufficiently distinct for us to be able to recognize the sort of impact the commentary was having." Ficino never managed to complete the task he had undertaken." Marcel comments: "After Ficino had announced to his listeners that the Philebus is divided into twelve sections, without any warning he interrupts his exposition after the fifth section; and although subsequently twice in fact he showed his regret at not having been able to complete his exposition, we see him contenting himself with illustrating it with apologues, an odd conclusion for the

God

treatise."" (See

Appendix II for the ten excerpts not all of which are apologues, however which make up the "odd

conclusion.")

Marcel's suggestion that the interruption was caused by the

by the death of Francesco Sforza in the March of 1466 and the collapse of the alliances dependent on him, is completely untenable (see the penultimate section of my introduction), as is Arnaldo della Torre's thesis that Ficino was saddened by the charge that what he was doing was unchristian. Della Torre thought that Ficino passed through a period from 1459 to 1469 of "moral depression resulting from an internal struggle between his philosophical convictions and his religious feehngs,"*" because Corsi, having talked of Ficino's animi dolor, specifically referred it to the
political

situation,

precipitated

period of the Philebus lectures. Corsi said Ficino intended at that time to compose a book of Platonic theology and "to

of Orpheus and the Sacrifices [alluding possibly to Proclus' De Sacrificio et Magia], but from day to day a truly divine miracle prevented him from doing what he
publish the

Hymns

Introduction

wanted. His spirit, he said, was distracted by a certain sadness: This is said to have happened in the same way to St. Jerome with regard to Cicero."*' Delia Torre took this to mean, in conjunction with other material he worked up into proofs, that Ficino was undergoing a long crisis of conscience. But in actuality Corsi is not talking about a ten-year period at all and the
"certain sadness" is mentioned in a theological context, i.e., whether to write a Platonic theology. In dismissing Delia Torre's theory. Marcel attributes Corsi's remarks to Ficino's distress at his own inability to reconcile Platonism and AristoteHanism over the problem of the soul's immortality." Kristeller too rejects the crisis theory, refuting one by one Delia Torre's proofs and arguing "it is not the transition from paganism to Christianity that determines the development of Ficino's thought ... he was a Christian throughout his entire life."*' We must acknowledge the force of their refutations of

Delia Torre.

However, though there is no evidence in the commentary itwas depressed, there is also no reason to deny Corsi his point. Assuming Ficino had started to write the commentary while he was still lecturing on it, and that Corsi is
self that Ficino

specifically referring to Ficino's state

Philebus,
pirited

of mind vis-a-vis the we can easily suppose Ficino became somewhat diswhen he eventually realized he was being led into an

and that the commentary, while being multifariously suggestive, was nevertheless lacking in direction and plan.** Hence his decision to start on the much more clearly organized Platonic Theology. The Philebus comendless series of abstractions

mentary, concerned as it is with basic metaphysical principles and the Neoplatonic one in particular, obviously contributed in
its

own

discursive

way towards

the establishment of the onto-

framework which Ficino was going to elucidate systematically and at length in the early books of the Platonic Theology. Indeed, the Philebus commentary and the Platonic Theology have more in common from the metaphysical viewpoint than either has with the Symposium commentary and in neither, significantly, does the theory of love
logical

and

ethical

12

Introduction

play a preponderant role/' In a sense, therefore, the Philebus

commentary was a rough draft for the major work, though Ficino himself would not have conceived it as such. There is still one recurrent misconception which must be dispelled. Although the Philebus commentary may have been the first of Ficino's major extant writings to be conceived (and the public lectures suggest it was) and although its composition may antedate the composition of the Symposium commentary,*' it
cannot be dismissed as juvenilia. Michele Schiavone, for example, discounts Ficino's exaltation of the intellect over the will in the Philebus commentary as merely the result of a "neophytic" zeal to stand by Plato or a temporary inability to

move beyond
Theology

the "static" conceptions inherited from classical

philosophy.*' But the

Symposium commentary and the Platonic

which he admires unequivocally for conmost daring contributions to modern thought are products of the same period of thinking and the three works followed close upon each other, as we shall see. In the August of 1490, having just finished his commentaries on the Enneads, Ficino again turned his mind towards the
taining Ficino's

works

Philebus,
translation

that

is,

seven

years

after

the

complete

Plato
his

had gone to the

press. Since Ficino

had revised

translation at least twice (in the period

from 1477 to 1482 and

then apparently again in 1483 just before sending it off to the press), the Philebus commentary was written presumably on the
basis of Ficino's first draft of the Philebus translation.

Some of

the changes in the second version of the

possibly

some of

the changes in the

first

edition of the

commentary (and com-

may therefore be of the translation. However, the textual history of Ficino's Plato translation has yet to be explored before we can proceed further in this direction. In a letter to Francesco Soderini Ficino wrote: **It has just occurred to me again to finish the commentary on Plato's Philebus on the highest good which at one time I had almost half completed."*' This is the second version of the commentary as preserved in the fifteenth century manuscript
mentary, though
this is logically far less Hkely)

the direct

outcome of

his revision

Introduction

13

Laurenziana Pluteo 21,8. The original preface has disappeared; transformed as we saw into two letters, and in its place is a proem addressed to Lorenzo, dated the fifteenth of February, 1490 (see Appendix III). But February the eleventh is the date found in the subscription (p. 425) where we are also told that the manuscript was transcribed by Sebastiano Salvini, Ficino*s relative on the side of a paternal aimt, probably a first or second cousin.*' Since the Florentine year began officially on March 25, the February dating must refer to the year 1491 The second version not only contains nearly all the passages omitted in the first version but found in the first and subsequent editions, it also contains two extracts not found elsewhere (see Appendix I). Also, Ficino has made chapter numbers and divisions though they do not always correspond exactly with those found in the editions (in the first version he had only a few headings and intermittent breaks where the later chapter divisions were going to occur). The manuscript still concludes with the ten excerpts, but now he has divided them into two series. Those numbered fourth, seventh, ninth and tenth in the MS. Vat. 5953, have been relegated to the end of the group and entitled "apologues on pleasure.*"" A month or so later, sometime between March and April, Ficino took the four pleasure apologues and put them at the end of the tenth book of his letters, dedicating them to Martinus Uranius {Op. Om., 921, 2). During that same year he then had the whole commentary transcribed for Uranius, for on the 24th of November he was sending the last four quinternions to him {Op. Om., 928, 2; 929, 3). The second version is also partially preserved in a fragmentary fifteenth century manuscript now in the Biblioteca OUveriana in Pesaro (see
.

Appendix IV). The third and

final version, that

all

Florence in 1496 and of

pleted in 1492

of the first edition printed in subsequent editions either of the

Commentaria or the Opera Omnia, seems to have been comwhen Ficino was putting together his Plato commentaries." The apologues on pleasure and the other six

excerpts have been removed. In their place are four unattached

chapters and a

breakdown of all

the "chapters" in the Philebus

14

Introduction

and summaries of their contents. These summaries, incidentally, have not been translated as they are of diminutive interest. Since neither first, second nor third version represents the completed commentary, it is still referred to in the catalogue of Ficino's works compiled in 1493 as a commentary on part of the Philebus. The third version is the definitive version both from the point of view of content and text and it is the one translated here.
Later, to the 1496 edition of his Plato commentaries, Ficino

appended a

Orlandini for which the Philebus supplies the subject matter (see Appendix III and below); and
letter to his friend

up to the very last Ficino attempted to complete commentaries on the dialogues which seemed to him, as to the Neoplatonists
before him, to represent the foundations of the Platonic system:
the Parmenides, Timaeus, Theaetetus, Phaedrus, Sophist the Philebus.

and

As Corsi

laconically notes, however, death

came

and prevented him."

book one of the commentary in all three versions Ficino says his work is a response to the insistent queries of a great friend, the monk from S. Miniato, Michele Mercati, who was also a friend of Ficino's medical tutor, Nicolo Tignosi. At various points in his life Ficino addressed letters to
In the postscript to

Mercati; he dedicated a theological dialogue between the soul

and God to him and also a summa of philosophy; and he was one of the few people to whom Ficino confided he had written a commentary on Lucretius, a work which he felt compelled to burn soon after it was written." By way of digression, Baronius has a marvellous story about the two friends." Ficino and Mercati were supposed to have agreed one day, while they were discussing philosophy and in particular the problem of the soul's immortality, that whoever died first should return to contact the other and tell him about the mysteries of the afterlife. On the night of Ficino's death, Mercati, who was sitting inside his room pondering abstractions, was suddenly visited by the ghostly spirit of his friend on a white horse. Ficino galloped up to the door and shouted, **0 Michael, Michael, vera, vera sunt ilia" (O Michael, Michael, everything we said is utterly true). Mercati rushed out in time to see the back of his friend

Introduction

15

disappearing into the darkness. After a vain attempt to catch up

with the white horse, Mercati sped to Florence where Ficino was
trian visitation. Mercati, needless to say,

same hour as the equeswas suitably moved. The Philebus commentary has received some notice from modern scholars. Giuseppe Saitta talks of "the extremely beautiful commentary on the Philebus in which the superiority of the good over the beautiful is vigorously affirmed. All beauty is good, but not all good is beautiful: this is the Platonic concept
staying, only to find he

had died

at the

that Ficino

is

continually attempting to illustrate in his

this is supplied

way. However, a
beautiful,

own common bond exists between the good and the

etc." Later he by the appetite commentary on the Philebus** in
. .

and

talks of the "magnificent

which Ficino "had explicitly identified the universal act with the good."" Paul Kristeller has frequently referred to it and Michele Schiavone has used it as a whipping boy while devoting careful attention to certain theses. It would be interesting to speculate on the influence the commentary has had in subsequent centuries; but, as Saitta says, Ficino was often robbed but rarely acknowledged." Much more work has to be done on specific ideas and theories in Ficino and Renaissance philosophy in general before anything can be said with accuracy about the influence of a particular commentary and this is true even of the Symposium commentary." What we do know, however, is that the Philebus, more perhaps than any other Platonic dialogue, including the Symposium, seems to have dominated the early days of the Platonic revival, and it is important we take note of its popularity if we want to understand the genesis of Florentine Platonism. It was through the Philebus that the newly revived interest in Plato began to broaden into what was later to become a European movement. The commentary translated here is our chief witness to the crucial point of transition.
//
I

turn

now

to consider

some

further aspects of Ficino's choice

of the Philebus. Given the humanists' particular concern with

16

Introduction

problems and that the standard topic of classical ethics was happiness or the supreme good for man,' the designated theme of the Philebus, it was inevitable a humanist would write directly on the Philebus once it was made available. This humanist was to be Ficino himself. However, Saitta is not
ethical
strictly correct

when he

says **the ethical interest in Ficino

dominates over the speculative one."" Although man occupies a central position in Ficino's thinking, Ficino has, as KHsteller observes, no real system of ethics; for in the Renaissance *. .we do not find any system of ethics based primarily on
.

many were on Aristotle The leading Platonists of the Renaissance were interested in questions of metaphysics and cosmology rather than of ethics."*** This is mainly because the perfection of the soul "... is entirely bound up with
Plato, as so
. . .

its

spiritual ascent

and with the contemplative attitude."" As

in

the case of the ancient Neoplatonists, Ficino's ethical ideas are

part and parcel of a metaphysical framework: as a humanist

Ficino would be
Platonist

drawn towards an ethical dialogue, but as a he would be drawn towards it for metaphysical

reasons.

had long been the classical source for ethical studies. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries we find not only the great editions and translations of Grosseteste, William of Moerbeke and Gerard of Cremona but also the extended commentaries of such eminent scholastics as St. Albertus Magnus, Giles of Rome, St. Thomas Aquinas and many others. But in the fifteenth century, after Bruni's new, controversial translation and Argyropoulos' lectures too had again stimulated interest in the Ethics, the commentaries began to shift their emphasis. In Eugenio Garin's words: "They ceased to interpret this work in the narrow terms of social and political problems and of man seen as a political animal. They interpreted the Nicomachean Ethics as a final exaltation of the contemplative and separated intellect."" There is much resulting controversy over the nature of the separation and the relationship between the soul's natural and supernatural powers, and the book becomes a touchstone in the battle with Latin
Aristotle's Ethics
.

Introduction

17

Averroism.
restating

Many eminent

thinkers were, therefore, involved in

and reassessing the Ethics' arguments throughout the period, including Bruni, Donato AcciaiuoU, Ermolao Barbaro, Filelfo, Lefevre D'Etaples, and PhiUp Melanchthon. But, since
the principal Aristotelians were primarily interested in their

master's ethical writings,'' their opponents were forced to

become famihar with them

too. Ficino himself

had studied

under a dedicated Aristotelian (Nicolo Tignosi, who had taught theoretical medicine and natural philosophy at the Studio in Florence) and he knew his Aristotle well, valuing him in particular for his work in logic and physics." In the May of 1455 he had copied out Brum's translation of the Ethics and written his own notes in the margin; and, according to Eugenio Garin, his notes are even to be found in a copy of the first edition of AcciaiuoU's commentary on the Ethics (which was based on Argyropoulos' earlier lectures).'* When Ficino started to write on the Philebus, he aimed to do

and activist ethics had stemmed from the Ethics' commentators with new arguments drawn from Plato's counterpart to the Ethics; second, to reconcile and synthesize the two masters like the Neoplatonists before him. The first meant proving Aristotle had been betrayed by his commentators, the Alexandrists and Averroists; the second that he and Plato were not in real conflict, but concerned, rather, with different levels of moral experience (hence the Philebus was to subsume not supersede the Ethics iht appearance of the theory of the mean in both works was merely the most obvious instance of what Ficino saw as the absence of any "real conflict"). Third, apart from the two ethical aims there was a metaphysical aim. Ficino' s own city had seen a prolonged controversy, in which the Ethics had played a central role, between the Aristotehans and the Platonists on the subject of Plato's Ideas. The Philebus lectures were
three things:
that
first,

to counter the naturalist

Ficino' s

own
felt

initial

contribution to the controversy, so he

obviously

the dialogue was specially suited to

Aristotle's attack
local dispute

combat on Plato's metaphysics. The course of this

seems to have been as follows.

18

Introduction

Marsuppini, Bruni's illustrious successor as chancellor of Florence and an Aristotelian, there was a
struggle for his chair. The Platonists and their Medicean allies backed Cristoforo Landino, while Marsuppini's own disciples backed Antonio Rossi. The Aristotelian candidate was eventually defeated and the chair divided: Argyropoulos was appointed to the chair of Greek in 1456 and two years later Landino was appointed to the chair of Latin. The Platonists were triumphant." In the year 1457-58, before Landino's installation, Argyropoulos took the opportunity to lecture on

On the death of Carlo

the Ethics in the Studio, but used the occasion to

to prove Plato

champion

Plato too.'' In the course of his lectures, Argyropoulos wanted

and Aristotle were in accord, but, in commenting on the key fourth chapter of book one of the Ethics he maintained Aristotle did not understand the Ideas. (It was on these lectures that Donato Acciaiuoli had taken the notes which Cosimo wanted to peruse.") In 1460 Nicolo, Ficino's former teacher, took issue with Argyropoulos and published a polemical commentary on the Ethics which he dedicated to Piero, and also a tract actually on the Ideas. Finally, in 1469, the probable date of Ficino's Philebus commentary, Bessarion published his eirenic In Calumniatorem Platonis. Material from the Ethics appeared here, and Bessarion used St. Augustine and St. Thomas in an attempt to bring Aristotle and Plato together
in a Neoplatonic synthesis.
It is significant Ficino initially chose the Philebus in his own attempt to defeat the more militant Aristotelians and to make Florence into a Platonic city. He obviously felt it ideally adapted to the general defense of the Ideas and their ultimate

reality.

To us

this is ironic, since the

only reference to the Ideas

is at 15A-B where Plato seems to be referring problems enumerated in the Parmenides, a dialogue which A.E. Taylor says is "clearly presupposed" by the Philebus. " Instead of the Ideas Plato is concerned with the four classes and with conceptual forms and unities alone. Consequently, scholars deahng with the unity of Plato's thought have found it difficult to reconcile the Ideas with the classes,"

in the Philebus
directly to

Introduction

19

and

it

is

interesting

Ficino simply avoids the problem of

reconciling the two.

Apart from such external considerations, the Ethics' Platonic

predecessor clearly had an intrinsic fascination for Ficino just
as
it

did for the ancient Neoplatonists, Proclus and Damascius,

it."

who commented on

somewhat more hesitant or tentative in assessing the Philebus. Benjamin Jowett adverted to its "degree of confusion and incompleteness
scholars have been

Modern

which] the multiphcation of ideas seems to interfere with the power of expression," while at the same time he admitted it "contains, perhaps, more metaphysical truth more obscurely expressed than any other Platonic dialogue."" R.G. Bury thought it indisputable it was "jagged and distorted in composition," though "beneath the difficulties of expression and the peculiarity of form" he found "a sound core of true Platonic thought."" J. Gould talks of its "fundamental tension between two opposed concepts, those of purity and mixture" in which Plato was fighting against his "sense of
in the general design ... [in

reality," in turn accepting and fleeing from the "inextricable and everpresent mixture of opposites" in human life. The result in Gould's view is eccentricity of form and structure, a concern with the concrete rather than the abstract and an "aggressive allegiance" to a contemplative ideal which Plato knows is impractical.'* However, others have recently demurred. R. Hackforth says "the formlessness of the work has been often exaggerated," and the more he has studied it "the clearer has its structure become, and the more understandable its transitions, digressions, and postponements."" Auguste Dies talks at first simply of "a singularity of construction" and the "scholastic character of the discussion,"'* and he divides the Philebus into three parts: 11A-23B where it is proposed that the good life consists neither in pleasure or wisdom alone but in a mixture of the two (this part is Ficino's first book); 23C-59C where it is proposed that intelligence predominates in the mixture; 59Dend where Plato establishes the hierarchy of goods. Part two, however, contains long sections on the types of pleasure and wisdom, the section on the types of pleasure (31A-55C)

20
constituting

Introduction

more than

half the dialogue. Dies calls these

sections a **mass in the interior of the dialogue"

analysis

of pleasure

**a

block" inside

two and the the mass." Close

its

consideration leads Dies eventually to talk of the "perfect

logical continuity of

"abundance," of its Ficino was obviously drawn to the dialogue

development" in the Philebus, of "freedom" and "variety."'*

in part

because of

commentary stops just before the block begins. He was well into the digression on the divisions of reality (23C-27C) and the chapter summaries he affixed to the first edition indicate he was intending to deal at length with true and false pleasures, with pleasure and pain, with the pleasures in rest and in motion, etc. However, as we have seen, Ficino beheved the true theme of the discussion was not pleasure but "man's highest good" and he says all the arguments in the dialogue are introduced for the
the extensive pleasure "block"; although, ironically, his

good's sake

Accordingly, the dialogue has a twelve part structure, designed with the express intention of making it
(p. 127).

particularly clear what man's highest good is. We only need examine chapter nine to discover how Ficino thought of the structure: a simple ascent to the highest good effected by contrast and comparison. Patently, Ficino had a coherent theory about the transitions and digressions in the Philebus and was convinced of the dialogue's essential unity of purpose. The fact he felt it needed such extensive commentary suggests, however, he was well aware of its difficulties for the ordinary reader. What would have presented itself to Ficino as a thematic question tends to be complicated for us by other considerations. Although he was not completely oblivious to chronological problems (he was convinced for instance that the Phaedrus was Plato's first dialogue), he did not concern himself with the modern concept of an evolving or changing Plato." Consequently, he was not cognizant of the fact the Philebus is a middle or late dialogue in which Plato, if not actually abandoning, is moving away from his earlier concern with the Ideas and ethical intellectualism towards a new interest in logical, taxonomical and even psychological problems." Rather, Ficino, like

Introduction

21

the ancient Neoplatonists,

assumed the unity not only of Plato's

thought, but of the whole Platonic tradition; and his Hfe's

work

was to make the whole unified tradition available in translation and in commentary hence his work on the Areopagite, on Plotinus, on lambUchus, on the Pimander, on the Orphic Hymns, on the Symbola of Pythagoras, etc. The Platonic tradition, and again this is a Neoplatonic assumption, not only embraced Plato and his successors but also those enigmatic figures who were thought to precede Plato: Philolaus, Pythagoras, Aglaophemus, Orpheus, Hermes Trismegistus and

Zoroaster. These collectively Ficino referred to as the prisci

theologi, the ancient theologians,*' the interpreters of a perennial

wisdom stretching back long before Plato. Such an approach does away with the need to decide on the

authorship of particular concepts or to differentiate the pecu-

of individual dialogues (hence the ease with which apocryphal works were accepted as part of the canon). So, wherever possible, Ficino attempted to syncretize and reconcile the positions adopted in Plato's various works. In examining the Philebus commentary, one is gradually made aware of the other dialogues which were constantly in the forefront of Ficino' s mind, dictating the structure of his proofs and providing further authentication for his conclusions. They were drawn in the main from Plato's middle and late periods they are notably the Sophist, the Timaeus, the Parmenides, the
liarities

the Phaedrus" and they constituted body of metaphysical "doctrine," a word he himself used." Hence the wholly philosophical nature of the Philebus commentary. As Roberto Weiss observes, Ficino was not a philologist or a grammarian; he was untouched by the philological zeal of humanists like Valla and Politian, and was

Republic, the

Laws and

for Ficino a unified

concerned solely with exposition, not with textual problems'* which was as well perhaps considering the notorious difficulties the Philebus presents to the textual scholar. In elucidating the "secret" Platonism he assumed Socrates was imparting to the assembled adolescents, Ficino was quick to perceive the local dramatic ironies, and he took an obvious

22

Introduction

delight in imagining the personal aspects of the crossfire be-

tween Socrates, Protarchus and Philebus. But he was not oriented towards the modern concern with the ambiguities created by the dialogues' dramatic structure. Because he believed in their collective wisdom and the power of allegoresis to "explain" intractable or figurative passages, he refused to acknowledge the exploratory or interrogatory nature of many of the propositions. Hence his anticipation of Plato's conclusions in the Philebus: the idea, for example, that there is a tertium quid is indeed mentioned briefly at the beginning (11D-12A); but it is essentially something Plato arrives at in the course of the argument. Ficino, however, used it throughout his commentary as an established principle. For him the Philebus was obviously a normative work, concerned with Plato's unchanging conception of the unitary good; and he must have felt, therefore, it was an ideal text for educating his peers into the true secrets of philosophy, as well as for combating the
Aristotelians.

In short, Ficino chose the Philebus for a variety of intrinsic

and

extrinsic reasons

pedagogical

historical, philosophical, polemical and

interit.

all

stemming ultimately from the particular

pretation he accorded to

///
Initially the

commentary confronts us
.

as a medieval work.

Kristeller says

of Ficino, **the strongly medieval, scholastic consists not so much character which we notice in his works in specific philosophical ideas, but rather in the terminology and in the general method of arguing." But he goes on to say this scholastic element "was not due to an extensive reading of
. .

and thirteenth but rather to the training which Ficino must have had
the scholastic authors of the twelfth

centuries,
in the cur-

rent Aristotehanism of the schools as a student in the University

of Florence.'"' Kristeller maintains Ficino did not have any extensive firsthand knowledge of the medieval philosophers with the notable exception of Aquinas, but was able "to build his Platonism on the method and terminology of late medieval

Introduction

23 con-

Aristotelianism."" The result

is

daunting: the reader

is

fronted with chains of syllogistic reasoning which have the ap-

pearance of being tightly organized and utterly logical. But the it is attempting to answer; in this it is reminiscent of much medieval philosophy, the texture of which more nearly resembles a row of mental walnuts than it does a series of Euclidean proofs.
logic frequently begs the very questions

approach. This is typical not only of the Renaissance but of most medieval philosophy and, indeed, of patristic and Neoplatonic thinking." Ficino was not
is

The commentary

eclectic in its

trying to be original; he was trying to synthesize, as Charles Trinkaus has recently reemphasized." Besides the many quota-

and references to other Platonic dialogues in the commentary, there are references to other ancient authors, real and fictive, and to a few medieval ones; but Ficino rarely cites the specific works he is referring to. In addition to the acknowledged references, there are some which are unacknowledged.
tions

Most notable are the extensive borrowings from Aquinas

several of the chapters,

in

which are in paraphrasis rather than direct quotation. Marcel suggests in his new edition of the Platonic Theology that Ficino habitually reduced his quotations to the essential meaning and adapted them to his own context. Perhaps Ficino assumed some of his allusions were too famihar to need acknowledgment, but at times it seems as if he were deliberately concealing his authorities. Marcel observes: '*It is almost as if he wanted to appropriate their thinking or [wanted] to constrain his readers to admit principles or arguments which they would have refused to examine on principle [a priori] if they had known the source."" Ficino often groups his references by school and these group references are frequently taken en masse from later authorities: the list of ancient physicists and moralists, for example, he could have derived from Diogenes Laertius or Aristotle or Cicero or Augustine or Lactantius or Aquinas or from half a dozen medieval or contemporary sources. Marcel freely admits to resorting to "resonances" in order to suggest a source and the task is fraught with indecisions. I have tried to supply Ficino' s particular references (and

24

Introduction

some of his vaguer ones) but rather, in Marcel's words, "to call problem" than to pretend to offer **a definitive list.'"" More work has to be done on Ficino's indebtedness to scholastic philosophy as well as on his own development before we can move with any certainty here." Structurally the commentary is confusing because it is cumuattention to the
lative rather

than systematic in

its

approach. While

it

purports
it

to follow the order of the Philebus itself (though in actuality

gets

no further than 24A, hardly more than the opening fifth of the dialogue), the Philebus, which it must be remembered is
itself

trains of

a multifaceted work, simply serves as the starting point for thought which bear no organized relationship to it.
in their

While individual sections or paragraphs are systematic

construction,
the

commentary

itself

follows

much more
of

leisurely plan, gradually unfolding the central propositions

and epistemology with many repetitions and digressions (and in one instance a whole proof is repeated word for word).'^ But the absence of structural rigour does not prescind from the philosophical unity of Ficino's system as a whole, nor does it detract from the ferocious rigour Ficino
Ficino's metaphysics

often applies to the individual parts. Readers of Ficino's other

works will half recognize many of the passages and proofs. Given the relative priority of the Philebus commentary among Ficino's mature works, it must be the source for many of these recurring formulations, though earlier works like the lost Institutiones Platonicae (1456) must account for others. The cumulative approach can make for difficulties. Before any one section can be understood, it is often necessary to understand
the metaphysical principle involved. Since, in Trinkaus' words,
Ficino's philosophy
is

**to

a very great extent a seamless

garment,"" single propositions tend to stand or fall on the truth or adequacy of a few a priori assumptions. But this has one overwhelming advantage: the commentary is more than a
series

ramifications

of scholarly notes for it explores propositions with endless something it shares with other Neoplatonic and scholastic commentaries derivative in appearance but often

containing truly original insights.

Introduction

25

However, despite its medieval tone and texture, the Philebus commentary is a Renaissance document and in it we can hear echoes of numerous Renaissance themes and preoccupations.
There are passages of interest to historians concerned with: the "dignity of man" theme; educational theory; aesthetics; psychology; the debate over the merits of the active or contemplative Hves; the concepts of the intellect, the will and freedom; Pelagianism; Epicureanism; Averroism; Thomism; the inception of the idea of natural religion; iconography and myth, etc. Although the commentary is a piece of formal philosophical writing, it does spring directly from the imaginative and intellectual worlds of the humanists and reflects many of their obsessions. There are several suggestions, even, that it is more closely interwoven with Renaissance Hermetism and occultism than might appear feasible from its uncompromising facade.
First, Ficino spent the year

or so before Cosimo died not only

translating the ten dialogues, including the Philebus, but also

Hermes Trismegistus' Pimander. Second, Johannes Pannonius charged that at the time Ficino was writing the commentary he was overindulging himself in pj^art lore. Third, some of the sections dealing with dialectic and the dangers attending its use can be linked to the belief that a word has power over its referent
and the proper manipulation of words can
result

in

the

manipulation of things. Fourth, it is more than curious Ficino should spend so much time warning us about the dangers of admitting apprentice adolescents to the secrets of dialectic's sorcery. Finally, the whole idea of the mediating principle and
the mixture,

and the idea that the

species exist in the seed-plot

of the mind have implications extending far into the realms of magic theory. I do not believe for one moment that the commentary is an introduction to magic; I merely suggest there may well be some profitable connections to be made between it and the Hermetism which Ficino, Frances Yates says, rejuvenated
for
all

of Europe.'*
is

The Philebus commentary

Concerning
the
Christian

also the

work of

the greatest

Christian rationaHst of the Renaissance. In his preface to the

Religion

Ficino

talks

of

the

26
intelligence

Introduction

and the will as the soul's two wings enabling it to fly back towards its home: "the intelligence illuminates the will" and "the will embraces the intelligence" and so philosophy, the activity of the intelligence, being a gift from God must be used
to defend religion." In a letter to Pico della Mirandola, his

"brother philosopher," he refers to Platonism (which for him

is

synonymous with philosophy)

Christianity;
it

as the

way which

leads

men

to

is

the necessary

first

step which takes

the

unbeliever towards the concept of a natural religion and thence

towards Christianity itself.'* For a Christian the intelligence can be seen from two angles: either it is moved naturally by God towards the apprehension of a truth which the will does not yet believe in; or it is moved supernaturally towards the defense of a truth which the will already beheves in." Ficino is writing in order to lead men towards faith: hence his insistence that "the intelligence illuminates the will" and his subordination here of the will to the intelligence, an aspect we shall return to. Consequently, certain fundamental Christian ideas associated with the will are absent: the fall of man and his consequent need for atonement and grace are never mentioned and the concept of sin is subsumed into that of error. Nevertheless, the Christian context is there. As Kristeller says, "the Platonic Academy of Florence was Christian in its tendency and a center of religious as well as of philosophical and of literary importance."'* More particularly, the Philebus lectures took place in a church and were part of a conscious programme to harness the "divine Plato" to Christianity. So the emphasis on the withdrawn, contemplative life in the lectures must have had religious perhaps even specifically Augustinian implications for Ficino' s contemporaries." At all events, it can be placed, as we shall see, in the context of at least one major theological controversy.

IV
I

turn

now

to the

Ficino, like Plato before him,

here: he has Httle

commentary's ideas. First to its ethics. works in a very restricted area to say about the problems of intention and

Introduction

27

motivation and there

is

duty and

utility as
is

we

find

no anticipation at all of the concepts of them in post-Kantian ethics. Equally

vocab-

unmodern

his refusal to use a technically self-defining

ulary for ethical discussion, which he consistently sees against

the backdrop of a comprehensive metaphysical system.

Man

is

a being in internal discord, subject to the conflicting

demands of wisdom and pleasure. Ficino had long been intrigued by the concept of pleasure and by Epicureanism in general.'"" In 1457 he actually laid aside Plato to read and comment on Lucretius and he was familiar with the debate about the nature of pleasure involving such renowned humanists as Raimondi, Valla and Poggio. The debate was the result of the rediscovery of Lucretius and Diogenes.'*" Their
enthusiasm for Epicurus' doctrines, which offset Cicero's hitherto unquestioned censure, did away with the feckless libertine. Epicurus became a true philosopher, wholly engaged in the intellectual life and in promulgating a doctrine of strictly noetic pleasure. It is important to remember this, because Ficino envisaged Socrates fighting against the sensualism,
materialism and scepticism of Philebus and the atheism
plied, but not against
it

im-

hedonism

as such.

Moreover,

it is

obvious

Plato himself used Philebus and Protarchus to indicate he was

differentiating

between sensual hedonism and hedonism of a

more

subtle or refined kind. A.E. Taylor has argued that "the

Hedonists of the Philebus are more or less serious thinkers, with a reasoned-out view of 'values* " and that the difference between the Philebus and the Republic over this point is the

consequence of the rise of "a reasoned doctrine of philosophical Hedonism" (which he ascribes to Eudoxus).'"^ It is reasonable to suppose Ficino not only perceived this but wanted
it. Both the dialogue and the commentary plainly defend pleasure, though a pleasure that has been carefully circumscribed. Hackforth says the Philebus is constructive rather than destructive, and "seeks to do justice to the rightful claim of pleasure to be a factor in human happiness"; and Taylor has argued it is "part of his [Plato's] view that for a sentient being

to exploit

Uke

man pleasure must

[his italics]

be an ingredient in the 'best

28

Introduction

'"" Ficino, while recognizing pleasure's claims, usually insists on its subordination to wisdom. Periodically, however, he suggests happiness and intellectual pleasure are the same and there are ecstatically happy states in which wisdom and pleasure are fused and the soul becomes identified with its intelligence
life.'

(mens). Since the will

intelligence,

is

associated with pleasure rather than the

true pleasure is accordingly "the expansion of the will into the good and the rest of the will in the good,""** it means the ecstatically happy state is one in which
since

and

and pleasure are one. As Kristeller .the knowledge of divine truth coincides with the enjoyment of divine goodness.'""* Once a man has attained this state he can then become mystically
the intelligence, the will

observes: **In this highest act

identified with the heavenly intelHgence itself.'"* Protarchus, in

contradistinction to Philebus, never entrenches himself behind

any dogmatic view of pleasure, and proffers sundry

cated arguments which Socrates does not so

sophistireject as

much

modify.

On the other hand,

is

it is

clear Ficino

wanted to use Pro-

tarchus primarily as a springboard for the various problems

raised; there

no such

thing, that

is,

as a Protarchan position

any fundamental level. It is was attacking any particular philosopher or philosophical sect in Florence and there is no reason to believe the ''partisans" of pleasure refer to any persons in particular, as they may well do in the case of the
to offset the Socratic
unlikely,

one

at

besides,

that Ficino

P/i/7e^M5 itself.'"'

Granted the ultimate goal

is

the mixed

life

of wisdom and

and Does the intelligence the will, the main problem then becomes: or the will contribute more to the mixture? Since we must go into Ficino's presentation here in some detail, as it is one of the commentary's distinguishing features and has important consepleasure, which are individually the goals of the intelligence

quences, the next section

is

specifically reserved for a con-

sideration of the internal reasons Ficino educes for the subordi-

nation of the will to the intelligence.

important external one which

Apart from the internal reasons, there is an overwhelmingly I shall mention now. Ficino is

Introduction

29

ultimately trying, as Saitta suggests,'"* not only to reconcile

Platonism and Christianity, but also to explore the possibility of a natural religion, a religion inherent in man's nature from the beginning as opposed to one supernaturally revealed to him
subsequently.
to Plato to

The genealogy of Platonists stretching back prior Hermes and Zoroaster is the genealogy of those
is,

professing this natural religion,'"' which takes the form, inevi-

behef in the natural powers of man's own intelligence to apprehend the supreme good. Since any introduction of an all powerful "perverted will" would undermine such a belief, another concept has to be employed in order to account for man's fundamental instincts and energies; and it will be subordinate to, rather than opposed to, the intelligence. Hence Ficino more often talks about the "natural appetite" than he does about the will. Arguments from its existence can be used extensively to support the thesis there is a final cause towards which all things are drawn, and anyway it is the concept Plato himself is dealing with in the Philebus. ' Although the appetite is beneath the will, functions at a lower level, and is distinct in its own right, it is universally understood as the source of instinctual energy; it is uninvolved in the sort of moral choices that weaken and trap the will, and it can be harnessed by the intelligence without any sense of real
'

tably, of a variety of rationaUsm, that

conflict. Since the intelligence is indisputably superior to the

natural appetite,
intelligence
is

Ficino tends to argue therefore that the

all

superior to

non-intellectual activity.

The

dis-

between the intelligence and the appetite seems to rub off onto the distinction between the intelligence and the will (this is prescinding of course from the broader problem of
tinction

Ficino' s drive to
special

subsume

all

three "faculties").
its

The

result

is

emphasis on the intelligence and ceive the universal good.

unique

ability to per-

Ficino' s search for the natural rational religion not only

involved dealing with the intelligence but with the ideal intelligence, "the erected wit," which we find in the philosopher, but

not in the active

man immersed

in business, society
all

and

politics.

As a

result

of the natural appetite

men have

a natural desire

30

Introduction

for the good; but the philosopher

ceive

is

the only one

who can

per-

what the good

truly

iSs

He

is

therefore the rational animal

par

excellence, the wholly religious

man. Over and against the

weakness and dependency,

fideism and scepticism of the Ockhamists, which sprang from

an emphasis upon

man

in all his

Ficino reaffirmed the power and vahdity of man's intelligence

when it

is used to contemplate eternal truth. This reaffirmation (which some would call Pelagian) understandably adopted

many Thomist

positions, since

Thomas Aquinas was

it

the great

Christian apologist for the mind, but preeminently

ing the authority of Plato.
vitalised

was invok-

It was reaching out towards a reconcept of the intelligence in order to affirm the reasonableness, and indeed the logical necessity, of a natural

ethic.

There are two further points with regard to the intelligence. One, its nature was the subject of controversy between Averroists, Alexandrists, and other integral Aristotehans and the orthodox theologians. Inevitably Ficino had to concentrate on it when he brought Plato's authority to bear on his opponents' belief in the existence of a unitary and separated intelligence, a belief which made the possibility of personal immortality undemonstrable. Two, there are times when Ficino uses the terms

"man," "soul," and

the soul
is

"intelligence" almost interchangeably,'"

is

because man's highest part

his soul,

the intelligence.

and the highest part of Everything Ficino says in the

Philebus commentary about the intelligence and its knowledge of the species is therefore being said about the soul. As such it
prepares us for the Platonic Theology, where Ficino not only
the soul's metaphysical role as the universal
that
is,

defends immortality but offers us an extensive examination of bond and copula,

of its intelhgential and dialectical powers and its ability to mediate between the corporeal world and the world of
Plato's Ideas.

Neoplatonism had

fully elaborated the

major development of
idea,

Plato's successors, namely, the theory that the Ideas exist in the
divine intellect: in Ficino' s terminology species, ratio,
regula,

forma

all signify, in

Heitzman's words, "a universal

Introduction

existing in the divine intellect.""^ This

is

in contradistinction to

natura which refers to the universal's embodiment in matter.

Ficino occasionally gives other names to the universal in
its dis-

embodied form,
species.

e.g., unitas,

tinction;'" but the

Although

it

when he is making a particular disterm abounding in this commentary is is true, as Huit, Saitta, and Kristeller have
(as

pointed out, that the Platonic theory of the Ideas as such has

such it had, of course, Httle impact on Plotinus,'" or even, arguably, on the later Plato), Ficino does, in Kristeller's words, "[discuss] the theory of Ideas more
Uttle

impact on Ficino"*

explicitly

and more

clearly

[under] the direct influence of

the ancient sources.'"" This not only has a direct bearing

on

his

monism, but because of the ubiquitous influence of the concept of "participation" the concept that "what is more or less such and such is so called because of its smaller or greater distance or propinquity to that which is primarily and totally such and such,*" " the theory of the sovereignty of the intelligible world (signified by the prior existence of the universal species) does have an impact of overwhelming proportions on Ficino' s whole metaphysical system. Chapters 16 to 22 of Book I of the Philebus commentary are specifically concerned with establishing the higher reality of the species as contained in and perceived by the illuminated intelligence, which is the receptacle of the Ideas, as opposed to the reahty at a lower level of their embodiment in matter. Because the lower "participates" in the higher, the intelligible world of the Ideas can be reached both by

and by the greater disand the unattached chapter IV of the Philebus commentary are specifically concerned with dialectic in Plato's phrase the "coping
deduction and analysis, that
is,

by

logic,

cipline of dialectic. Consequently, chapters 23-28

stone" of the sciences.'"

Dialectic

was the major instrument of a

rationalist. Since the

time of Berengarius, Lanfranc and

dialectic,

there had been a continuous and sometimes rancorous debate on the nature of

Damian

on

its

relationship to faith

and on

its

validity as a

weapon

in the fight against epistemological scepticism.

As a

rationalist Ficino

was bound

to

champion

dialectic

and to

32

Introduction

justify

it and its function, just as Lull and other apologists had done before him. In distinguishing it from logic, Ficino writes: "Dialectic is a divine craft no longer concerned with words, but with things. By the pure probing of the intelligence above the senses it inquires into each thing's substance, and from all things it ascends to their one principle without the need for any other principle.'"" So logic is the art of the reason, dialectic is the art of the intelligence. The distinction was first introduced by Boethius who distinguished between the concepts of the intelligence and the reason. The ratio abstracts universals from

matter; the

mens or

inteiligentia

contemplates the reality of the

it compare them to the universals as perceived through abstraction.'" One must remember the intelligence is not the specifically human aspect of the soul, but its highest part, its angelic face,'^' and

universals within itself primarily, only then does

being the

receptacle

of the innate
it

Ideas,

it

is

therefore

essentially passive,'" awaiting illumination or activation

by

God. '" Once activated by God

is

operates dialectically and logic

arrogated rather than rejected. Both logical and dialectical

processes result in "true" knowledge, knowledge of the world

of the species as abstracted from matter and as illuminated in the intelligence. Moreover, both logic and dialectic share in an ascent within the intelligible world up through the hierarchy of the Ideas in their search for greater truth. This epistemological ascent takes on ethical and ultimately spiritual meaning. Since, in Kristeller's words, "all knowledge is implicitly directed to

God

[as the

source of the Ideas],

it is

easy to consider thought in

Dialectic

general as a

way of the Soul toward God.'""

reality.

becomes

a spiritual ascent into the divine

One

There are several stages in the ascent to pure knowledge.'" reason why Ficino subordinates pleasure is because it is
is

content with opinion; and since the will and pleasure are associated, the will

associated with opinion too.'" Ficino, like

it

Plato, does not dismiss opinion, but he does place

lower

down

on the

scale of authenticity.

The

intelligence does not rest

itself

content with opinion, but contains within

the species

which are the touchstone of

truth. Ficino introduces the Saturn

Introduction

33

and Prometheus myths in order to personify his ideas on the way in which the species in the intelligence are illuminated.'" The species in the intelligence and the species as they are embodied in things are not the eternal species themselves as they
but rather reflections or images of them, formulae idearum.^^* So the crucial problem devolves upon the three-way relationship between the three "existences" of the species and their need for each other. The images in things, the simulacra, are occasions for the activation of the reflections in the intelligence, the formulae idearum, which have been there potentially from the beginning.'" The occasion has, however, to be accompanied by activation by God; for, as Heitzman observes, "the existence of the innate ideas in our soul is not yet equivalent to their being known and comprehended.""" That is, the method of ascent corresponds to the ascending structure of reahty from things' essences to the innate ideas, to the eternal Ideas, to the Idea of the good. Since Plato said essences were known through dialectic, '^'
exist in the divine intellect,

and since the name is what denotes the essence,'" dialectic is concerned with names and with naming: "the power of a natural object reaches through the senses to the imagination, through the imagination to the intelligence itself by which it is apprehended and enclosed in a name.'"" Chapters 11-12 have a number of things to say about the power this in turn bestows on the dialectician. The naming of an essence becomes
the

and by the articulation of the name and gradually as the whole macrocosm is named it becomes activated within as the intelligible reality. The elaboration of such perceptual and conceptual problems in turn requires a metaphysical explanation of the sort of correspondence existing between the mental and physical worlds. Since this would take us into the theories of innatism,
as
its

same

activation in the intelligence: the external

internal "existences" of the essence are brought together

nativism, occasionalism, as well as into the

more famihar
Kristeller

debate over nominalism and reahsm,

to

refer further discussion

the

specialized

studies

of

Heitzman,

and

Schiavone.'"

34

Introduction

However, dialectic is not only the instrument of ascending knowledge, but of descending knowledge too. Miss Yates' remarks on Ramus pertain equally to Ficino here: ** natural
.
. .

dialectic
It is

is the image in the mens of the eternal divine light way of ascent and descent from specials to generals, from

'"" The conception goes back to Plato: dialectic is less a method than a spiritual movement, mounting by provisional hypotheses, i.e., by supposition, to the universal principle and thence returning to readjust the hypotheses in the light of pure intellection, that is, "demonstrating" them in the light of its understanding of the one alone.'" It is an intuitive
generals to specials

contemplation rather than a discursive process of reasoning: initially it makes use of logical induction and deduction, but then it becomes mysteriously creative.'" Ficino's view of

dichotomy between a priori and a posteriori knowledge into an organic unity and is part of his reappraisal of the problems of consciousness. Through the dialectical method the intelligence and will are united in the contemplative descent: the intelligence having seen the one then
resolves the traditional
it as it turns to contemplate the many in the one. In so doing it is demonstrating man's godlike knowledge and godlike powers."* The nature of dialectic with its dual concern for the one and

method

wills

identity and change, rest and motion, is in many ways suggestive of the nature and function of love as it is explicitly dealt with in the Symposium commentary and briefly but lyrically in this commentary.'" They both fulfill similar unitive functions, for the magical power dialectic has over essences and therefore over things, its ability to divide and

the

many,

tantalizing

unite reality

itself,

is

something

it

shares with love. In the

Platonic tradition they have always been related: the dialecti-

an instrument of knowledge. "" What Ficino was bringing to both concepts in the period in which he wrote the two commentaries was a heightened awareness of the
cian
is

a lover; love

is

kinship.

Other Platonic ideas are introduced too: the nature and existence of the world-soul, the hierarchical series of the Ideas

Introduction

35

and the hierarchy of the goods, the relationship of these two

hierarchies to the Idea of the good, the various categories of

reahty headed by the limit and the infinite,'*' attacks on the eristics and sophists, etc. However, I wish to close this particu-

with three consequences of the theory which has been with us since the beginning, namely the theory of the one. First, unlike St. Thomas who talks about unity as one of God's attriblar section
is a radical monist: the one is beyond being but is the principle of all being, it is God's essence.'*^ Hence the one supplies the cardinal premise in any argument and there is no philosophical question in the commentary for which this is not true: it is what makes the commentary central to the development of Ficino' s views as a metaphysician, not his ad hoc positions, important though they may

utes but not as His essence, Ficino

have been at the time. Second, the digressive, convoluted appearance of the commentary takes on new significance in the light of Ficino's unmitigating search for the universal principle. The commentary is unified by its preoccupation with the participation of
all

things in the one, and with the unitary conscious-

and to create the mysteand actions in the being and the actions of all other things. The reader cannot fail to detect Ficino's sense of awe and exhilaration whenever he approaches this body of ideas. Third, Ficino's constant concern with the one has a bearing on the unfinished state of the commentary. Ultimately, it seems to me, it could never have been finished. Ficino's subsequent writings are essentially a profound and continuous commentary on the Philebus and the metaphysics Ficino saw embodied in it. Which is to say, the sermons he
ness which enables us both to perceive
rious participation of our being

delivered to the cultural elite of Piero de' Medici's Florence

were early reactions to ideas which he continued to explore to

the grave.

V
I

turn

now

to the intellect/will controversy.

The Philebus

commentary is among other things an apology for ethical intellectualism; it is concerned with contemplation rather than the

36

Introduction

moral virtues and is philosophical rather than psychological in its approach. As both Kristeller and Sears Jayne have explained, the Platonic way of describing the pursuit of the highest good **is to relate the various parts of the soul to the characteristics of its goal" and this means equipping the soul with three principal faculties: the intellect, will and love.'*' But the issue is complicated by the fact that "Ficino regards love and will as essentially identical ... he sets them off together as differentiated from intellect.'"** Consequently, whenever Ficino asserts the will is higher than the intellect, it is because he is identifying will with love. Yet Ficinian love, in Jayne's words, is "essentially an epistemological term meaning desire for truth [it] remains .essentially an intellectual rather than an emotional process. Although he [Ficino] talks about love as the unifying force in the universe, he preserves the primacy of the intellectual life by the way in which he defines that love .... His whole life testifies to the fact that the supreme value is for him intellectual ... he regarded the principal objective of the soul as an
.

intellectual objective.'"*'

traditional subject of debate between Scotists

and the will was a and Thomists. Initially, Ficino was drawn towards the Thomist position, the position upholding the primacy of the intellect. As we have seen, it is to the Summa Contra Gentiles, Book III, that we must turn for his model. Here the argument proceeds from the proposition that "all things are directed to one end, which is God";'** and therefore "the knowledge of God is man's last end. Now the last end of man and of any intelligent substance is
relationship between the intellect
called happiness or beatitude
.

The

therefore the last beatitude or

happiness of any intelligent substance is to know God.'"*' Aquinas goes on to make the crucial point that "that operation of man whereby he first obtains God is essentially his happiness or beatitude. And this is understanding: since we cannot will what we do not understand. Therefore man's ultimate happiness is essentially to know God by the intellect, and not an act of the will.'"** Later Aquinas concludes, "man's ultimate happiness consists in the contemplation of the truth [and]
. .

Introduction

31

all

other

human

operations seem to be directed to this as their

is

end.'"*' Therefore the truly ethical Hfe

civic

intellectual

and the

and moral
is

virtues are

subsumed

into the intellectual ones.

is

This

not only the position which

broadly adopted in
it

chapter 37 of the commentary

on the PhilebuSy

is

also the

position attributed to "Marsilio" in Landino's Camaldulensian Disputations. "Alberti" has pointed out that although there is

complete agreement among the Christian theologians that God is the highest good, there is marked disagreement over whether speculation or love is the true means of attaining it (it is interesting, incidentally, that "Alberti" should contrast speculation
it means that for him also the Landino brings in Ficino to chamtwo have become pion the Platonic viewpoint and to argue that the highest good is to be reached via the intelligence rather than the will. James Wads worth maintains Landino misrepresented Ficino 's views here and that Ficino' s On Happiness is a "fully reasoned refutation of the thesis on the supremacy of the Intellect" which Landino had erroneously attributed to him." Still, it is interesting to note Landino was obviously convinced at the time of writing his second book of the Camaldulensian Disputations that Ficino did put the intellect above the will, and that his conviction was the result of Ficino' s discussion of the Philebus. However, in the light of other works of Ficino's "middle

to love rather than to the will, for

identified).

period" particularly the On Happiness, parts of the Platonic Theology and some of the letters, the Thomistic approach is surprising, and commentators have drawn attention to what seems to be genuine inconsistency. Let us examine the charges
with specific regard to the Philebus commentary. Giuseppe Saitta took an extreme view. He not only maintained the mature Ficino was always a voluntarist (a view that,
as

we

shall see, certainly

cannot be substantiated for Ficino's

last years),

but that he was already a voluntarist when he comthe Philebus commentary. He argued the commentary is posed fundamentally at odds with Plato's position: "in the commentary

on the Philebus, which,

significant

as you know, is one of the most of Plato's dialogues, what refers to the voluntaristic

38
nature of the good
the reason for this

Introduction

is

treated with breadth

and profundity, but

is

obvious: Ficino, in dealing with the various

problems touched on in this Platonic dialogue, is unable to disobey the demon spurring him on. It takes the form of positing an ethical idealism that is strictly voluntaristic, at the expense, as you can see, of rationalism.'"" The comment has to be taken in the context of Saitta's particularly "ideaHstic" approach to Ficino, but it does point up a central issue: the Philebus commentary, in using such detailed and powerful proofs to set up the intellect over the will, seems to beHe Ficino's real intentions as one can deduce them from some of his other works. In his extended study of Ficino's philosophy Kristeller, when speaking to this precise issue, also saw Ficino as a committed voluntarist, though unlike Saitta he recognized that the position expounded in the commentary was intellectualistic. He argued it was an early work and that Ficino upheld the superiority of the intellect because he still saw it as an independent and static faculty "the old ontological contempt for movement apparently still has some influence.'"" He juxtaposes the key proofs from Book I, chapter 37 of the commentary with quotations from the Platonic Theology and the On Happiness, arguing for the "close connection" if not the "identity" of the two systems of will and love in Ficino,'" and for the primacy of the will as Ficino's mature, sustained conception. Significantly though,
Kristeller 's

most convincing
alone.'**
It

illustrations are all

is

drawn from the

On Happiness

undisputable that in the

On

Happiness Ficino is indeed a committed voluntarist, since the arguments are there, and Ficino himself later singled it out as pro-voluntaristic; but it was the one piece he did so single out, and he must have felt that it was alone among his many works in maintaining an unequivocal voluntarism.
is

One reason for this apparent indecisiveness or inconsistency obvious. Ficino's analysis of the soul into parts, influenced as

by classical tradition, does not include the will. The idolum does contain an aspect referred to as the "vital force" and the body contains an image of this, the natura or "vital complexion" which Ficino usually calls the irrational soul. However,
it is

Introduction

39

apart from these two aspects which are concerned with the biological functions such as growth, reproduction, nutrition, etc.,

which were then attributed to the soul, the parts of the soul are the direct outcome of classical and medieval attempts to arrive at a theory of knowledge and perception; that is, their raisons
d'etre are epistemological.

this,

only fair to point out Kristeller not only acknowledges but assumes Ficino's intellectualism throughout his study, except when he is arguing with particular reference to the conflict between the Philebus commentary and the On Happiness.
It is

intellect

"from the beginning it [the will] is related to the and, so to speak, leans on it";'" and he quotes Ficino on the will's derivation from the appetite, "as the irrational appetite follows sensation, so the will, which is rational appewrites,
tite,

He

follows the intellect.'""

The
it

will is distinguished
is

from

other forms of appetite because

allowed to choose. The

process of choosing

however, an intellectual process; it depends on the reason and its deliberation: "the will desires the good to the extent to which the intellect offers it.'"" In the section in which Kristeller identifies will and love he admits that
is,

together they occupy a "double position in relation to the

theory of knowledge, being conceptually dependent on it in many points.'"" Ficino had defined will as "an effort of the

thought" (nixus inteliigentiae);'^^ he repeatedly talks of the will following the intellect;"" and although the intellect is properly directed towards truth, the will towards goodness, he frequently failed to make this distinction and assigned both goals to the intellect, "[the intellect] knows all things under the concept of truth and desires all things under the concept of goodness.'"*' Kristeller admits "the knowledge of God through the intellect and the love for God through the will are after all only two
conceptual formulae [elsewhere he calls them "indifferently in other words, parallel"] indicating the same concrete fact

the inner or spiritual ascent of consciousness to the highest

grade of contemplation.'"" At the same time, he maintains, "the real essence of inner or spiritual consciousness is revealed more deeply and more directly by the theory of the will than by

40
that of

Introduction

knowledge.'"" Yet the goal of the inner ascent is the knowledge of God. Kristeller says that happiness for Ficino "can consist only in the speculative virtue that is, in contemplation. Above all, it consists in that knowledge of God which the soul attains after separation from the body and in the joy connected with it.'"" Hence, he continues, "the contemplative attitude is considered the real content and measure of human life'"*' and the contemplative experience is "identified'* with philosophical knowledge.'" As we have seen, Ficino insisted that philosophy and religion were one and the same, and the soul had two wings, the intellect and the will, the philosopher depending mainly on the former, the priest on the latter. But from early on he upbraided those "who too impiously separate the study of philosophy from sacred religion" since wisdom and love, "true intelligence" (intelligentia vera) and "right will" (voluntas recta) are one. '" In the light

of Kristeller' s repeated recognition of these various points, it is surprising he adopted a negative approach to the intellectualism of the Philebus commentary. Yet such an approach does receive some support from Ficino' s own postscript to the commentary addressed to

Michele Mercati, and from a short letter Ficino wrote in 1496 to another Camaldolese friend, Paolo Orlandini, which is devoted entirely to the problem under debate. Ficino acknowledged that Orlandini and apparently others had asked him why he had preferred in the Philebus commentary the intelligence over the will, in accordance with Plato's own view, and then in the letter On Happiness the reverse. To Orlandini Ficino wrote: "I could
reply that in the Philebus [commentary]

view, in the letter

my own

view. But

I am giving you Plato's do not want MarsiHo's

view to differ from Plato's. So, briefly, I will say in reply that our intelligence operates in two ways, one natural, but the other
supernatural, which might properly be referred to as the
friend, as a result of

way of

ecstasy. In the first case, the intellect guides the will, just like a

some

naturally innate light; eventually,

it

when

it

has guided the will correctly,

it.

satisfies

it,

and

is

therefore superior to

In the second case, the case of ecstasy,

Introduction

41

however, a new light and power poured in by God does not fill' the intellect with the divine splendour, until it has kindled the will with a wonderful love." Ficino went on to say, **We have discussed the intelligence's natural process in accordance with Plato in the Philebus; but we touch on the ecstasy which is higher than the natural motion in the letter, and we have treated
accordance with Plato in the Phaedrus and Symposium. Ficino obviously thought he was reconciling the two viewpoints satisfactorily. Despite the traditional nature of his distinction,
it

'*'**

in

his

critics

think otherwise.
letter, says,

Orlandini
postscript

make nothing

of.'"*'

commenting on the "These latest words are a protest we can And Kristeller, in commenting on the
Saitta,
in
**.
.

and the
It is

letter, says,
. .
.

.it is

not necessary to take

these explanations

literally, for

they were obviously added

subsequently.

sufficient for us to recognize in

them an

admission of the difficulty and of the change of doctrine. Therefore we must accept the superiority of will and love over the intellect as Ficino's more mature and conclusive theory." He goes on to observe, however, that "the inner or spiritual
ascent of the soul toward

God

received

its first

systematical

interpretation in the theory of

knowledge" and was then "caught, in its dynamic element, in the theory of will and love."" His viewpoint here was adopted, necessarily, before the discovery of the letter written to Colet by Ficino in 1499.
Three decades later, however, Kristeller came to a less sweeping conclusion. In his review of Renaissance Thomism he traces the history of the will-versus-intellect debate. In general, Aquinas had affirmed the intellect was ultimately superior, though he conceded the will may be superior in this present Hfe.'" It is important to note that from the standpoint of the present and future lives this is the exact reverse of the view adopted in the Orlandini letter. Scotus, incidentally, took the extreme anti-intellect view, maintaining the will was always
superior in the present hfe and in the future one.'" Kristeller

reviews the problem in Ficino succinctly:

"The problem preon several occasions at different occupied Marsilio Ficino points in his Hfe. Indeed, it is one of the points on the subject of

42

Introduction

one can observe oscillations and changes in his thinking.'"" Again Kristeller contrasts the position adopted in the commentary with that in the On Happiness and various "Towards the end of his career, letters. He continues: however, he showed that he was again undecided. In preparing his commentary on the Philebus for publication, he admits, at an appropriate moment, to having resolved the question elsewhere in an opposite sense, and he tries to propose a compromise distinguishing between the will as a distinct faculty and the will as part of the intellect.'"^* Kristeller refers to the Orlandini letter with its crucial distinction between the soul's natural and supernatural powers in which the intellect and the will are superior respectively, and concludes: "The
which
solution
that the
is

not very clear or convincing, but

it

does

make

us see

problem continued to preoccupy him and that he had not succeeded at all in reaching a firm or categorical opinion on this particular point.'"" A contemporary of Ficino, Vincenzo Bandello, was provoked by the On Happiness, which Ficino had sent to Lorenzo in 1474, and proceeded to attack Ficino on Thomist grounds, choosing to ignore the modified Thomist position Ficino had himself adopted in the Philebus commentary. The issue centred around Ficino's theory of knowledge and its relationship to the will in the future life.''* Bandello made a radical break between this Hfe and the next and followed Aquinas exactly in making the will dominate the
one, the intellect the other. Ficino cannot consistently make such a radical break. Even though it undermines his previous
insistence

on the incongruity of
this:

Ficino's

two views,

Kristeller

emphasizes

"Ficino, for his part, as heir to the Neoplatonic tradition, does not admit that the difference can be that radical between the present and future lives. He is con-

vinced that the supreme experience of contemplation to which philosophy can attain in this life is an authentic anticipation of He insists on the fact that the experiences of the future hfe
the present

profoundly similar.'"" He comments: "It is interesting to find echoes of the debate in the writings of the humanists, who otherwise show such little

and future

lives are

Introduction

43

and in the questions raised by was an especially live issue among Ficino's pupils: Alamanno Donati wrote a Httle treatise on the theme and Lorenzo inhis L'Altercazione introduced "Marsiho" into his shepherd world to defend voluntarism. I have dealt with Kristeller's remarks at length because they offer us by far the best account of the differences over this fascinating issue between the Philebus commentary and the On Happiness. Even if we grant for the moment Kristeller's particular approach to the commentary, certain points are already established. First, Ficino showed continuing hesitation over assigning the primacy either to the intellect or the will. Second, Ficino's position in the Philebus commentary though certainly not Scotist, was not strictly Thomist either. Third, it was
interest in theological questions

scholastic philosophy.'"'*

It

Ficino's "first systematical interpretation ... [of the] inner or

of the soul to God," and as such provides us with the basis for exploring the origin and nature of his subsequent views. Fourth, the Philebus commentary brought the
spiritual ascent

authority of Plato to bear

on the

issue for the first time,

independently of Aquinas; and the impact of this integral

Platonism should not be overlooked. Fifth, the debate was a long-standing one, where both extreme positions, their modifications and possible combinations had already been explored by the Dominican and Franciscan schoolmen; there was obviously no incontrovertible solution and so Ficino could espouse a number of views with equal respectability. Finally, if it is true that Ficino refused to envisage a radical break between the present and future Hves, then anything said about either life will impinge on the other too. Ficino's indecision becomes not a matter of being unable to make up his own mind, but the inevitable consequence of a fundamental circularity in his thinking which is monistic and ultimately perhaps mystical. However, it is odd Kristeller's study of Thomism should make no mention of Jayne's work on Ficino and Colet, not only because of Jayne's carefully argued claim that Ficino was never an authentic voluntarist, but also because of the important evidence of the letter Ficino wrote to Colet in the July of 1499

44

Introduction
printed and translated by Jayne as Letter D. Here
is

which

is

Ficino takes an extreme intellectualist position: "intellect

primary and love is secondary. Intellect produces love; love is brought forth in intellect. Intellect faces inward; love faces outward. Intellect finally is purer, clearer and truer; love is more mixed, denser and thicker Will is crude intellect and intellect on the other hand is pure and refined will.'"" The letter is important on several counts. One, Ficino in his old age has taken up the cudgels again having been conciliatory for so long. Two, both love and will are now subordinated to intellect. Three, written in the last year of his life, it represents his final and unequivocal stand. Four, and most importantly, when taken in conjunction with the postscript to Mercati and with the fact that revising the Philebus commentary was one of the last of Ficino's projects, it suggests perhaps that it was the rereading of the commentary which brought Ficino back to the unequivocal intellectualism he had espoused at the beginning of
his career.

There

is

one other recent commentator whose views, though

expressed prior to Jayne' s book and to Kristeller's later book,

are particularly significant, since his overall approach to Ficino

opens up a number of provocative and fundamental questions about Ficino's modernity. Michele Schiavone's dynamic interpretation of Ficino's metaphysics is very persuasive. But I do feel his account of the Philebus commentary, attractive as it is from the viewpoint of his immediate thesis, has to be severely modified in the light of his own total reading of Ficino. While recognizing Ficino hesitated over the problem of the primacy of the intellect, Schiavone explains it in terms of Ficino's historical position rather than admitting the possibility of genuine oscillation and doubt on Ficino's part. He posits a Ficino who was gradually breaking away from a received metaphysics towards one that was "intimately phenomenalistic and modern.'"*" It involved breaking away too from a received vocabulary: "beneath a classification and a terminology which are classical new significances and new possibihties are hidden.'"" In the process of liberation from the structures of classical thought which

Introduction

45

Schiavone sees as typical of Ficino's early thinking, the Philebus commentary occupies a temporary position. It is **a youthful piece of writing" in which Ficino momentarily accepts Plato's intellectualism. Accordingly, Ficino's attempt to bring
it

and the

On Happiness into
and
respectively

the

natural

supernatural

accord by distinguishing between understandings (which are

the

intellect and the will) is shows too many traces of a compelHng desire to agree completely with Plato.'"" Schiavone goes on to give an explanation with a sirenic attractiveness: **In the commentary on the Philebus the reason for his assigning the primacy to the intellect is indicated by the superiority of activity without becoming, that is, dynamic concreteness ... in this youthful phase dynamism is understood as static action on another and not as self-determination by means of the determination of otherness; the result is an absence of that circularity and dialecticity which we can point to in Ficino's

controlled

by

unconvincing,

"because

it

maturity.'"" Even

this is to dismiss the

the theory is correct (and I believe it is), Philebus commentary too precipitately. As Saitta alone acknowledged in talking of "the breadth and profundity" of Ficino's treatment of "the voluntaristic nature
if

of the good," some of Ficino's best thinking here is very much concerned with the dynamic interrelationship, the "dialecticity," existing

between any one entity and

all

other things as a

of their mutual participation in the one good. The major portion of Book I, chapter 31, for instance, is devoted to a consideration of the one as act: "all things gather themselves toresult

gether into their one act [previously defined as the centre of

each object
it

*to

come and

go'], so that

which and from which all the rest of the things in through this, their one centre, they
all

may

adhere to the centre of

things.""* Ficino proceeds to

elaborate on the circularity of the ontological process and on

from the one to the soul and to matter and the reverse. Here we have one of several instances (the iconology of the Saturn, Jupiter, Prometheus group is another in chapter 26), in which Ficino deals with the triadic nature of the many's emanation from, turning
the intelligence's role in mediating the creative flow

46

Introduction

back towards, and return to the one in a continuing dialectic which passes through the intelligence: "The highest good of the intelligence is the perfected act of its nature: that is, when it has been turned back through one act towards the one act for it to become all acts and all things in act.'*' .The highest good of the intelligence [is] ... the one comprehension of the highest one in all the species.'"" Beneath the intelHgence the dialectical
.

process

is

repeated in the soul's relationship to the intelligence

and

in matter's relationship to the soul.

Consequently, the
the participation

totality

of existing things

is

involved in an ascent to and a

descent from the one which both devolve

upon

of each thing in the one and so in each other. Throughout the commentary, Ficino recurs to the ceaseless movement between the different levels of being and its consequence, the continual metamorphoses of matter into soul, of soul into intelligence, of intelligence into the one and back again.'" Ficino is using, admittedly, the traditional distinction between the one's transcendence, which he calls its "sublimity," and its immanence, which he calls "the beneficent glance of the divine countenance.""' But in elaborating on the two unities proceeding from the dual aspects of the one, he concentrates on the "beneficent glance" of the divine immanence. While God's sublimity is "the cause of the unity which preserves the proper simplicity of each thing," God's countenance is "the cause of the unity which results in things joining together.'"" It is not
only the ground of each thing's own individual unity but the cause of each thing's perpetual desire to be at one with all other
things; that
is,

the one's

immanence

is

not only reflected in the

plenitude of the cosmos, the procession from the one, but in

each thing's relationship to that plenitude, the return to the one. Moreover, the return is in an enigmatic sense "better" than the procession: "So God bestows the good on things in putting them forth; but in turning them back He gives them the highest good.""" Through its creative relationship with the one each thing is involved in a creative relationship with all other things,
the one's creativeness insuring there
is

a Hke creativeness in the

is

many. The whole of existence outside the one

therefore the

Introduction

Al

of a ceaseless flow of energy not merely downwards from' the one but upwards from the many as well. Ficino writes of the soul, for instance: "The highest good of the soul is the completion of the soul's one act: that is, when it has been turned back through its one act towards the one act of the intelligence and
result

the one act of

all

things, for

it

to

become

all acts,

that

is,

the

plenitude of

have here an ontological system with an emphasis on the organic union of all being and activity, an emphasis leading in turn to a new conception of consciousness, and more particularly of the intelligence. In the Neoplatonic system the intelligence constitutes the second hypostasis and alone mediates between the absolute and all subsequent hypostases. Therefore, since the one is regarded here in terms of its creative immanence, the intelligence has to possess creative attributes too. They would normally be
all

the species.'""

We

ascribed to the will,

if

the will as

we know

it

in

its

Christian

form existed

in the

Neoplatonic system. In transforming the

Neoplatonic system which he saw articulated in the Philebus, Ficino was faced with the task of transforming the intelHgence into a faculty which also functioned as the will. Or rather, the intellect/ will dichotomy was caught up by Ficino' s drive towards a unitary psychology, in which he was not going to subordinate or even combine mental faculties but do away with them as separate entities altogether. In their stead he was
introducing a

new awareness of

subjective reality

and the

indis-

soluble unity of the inner world.

I

must

refer further discussion to Schiavone's

own

extended

work on

monism, but one thing is clear: if he is correct in his view that Ficino was moving away from a static Neoplatonism towards a modern dialecticity, then it is ideas such as these (which Ficino had derived from Plotinus, Proclus, the Areopagite and Augustine but was working up into his own system) which testify to the movement. Ficino was already formuFicino's

which Schiavone finds proleptically modern and though they are clustered here around the concept of the intellect it does not mean they are any the less significant. We must recall Schiavone talks as if there were a
lating those very conceptions

48

Introduction

lengthy period of development between the approach adopted

commentary and the one adopted in the Symposium commentary and the Platonic Theology, key texts in his argument that Ficino was moving towards proto-Hegehan positions. However, since the three works were generated close upon each other, it indicates rather the simultaneity of the conflicting theses in Ficino 's mind. Ficino was not unaware of the conflict, he was simply exploring the various possibilities in his
in the Philebus

search for a new, organic synthesis.

My

disagreement with

Schiavone

lies in

the fact that

see such a search already well

underway

in the

Philebus commentary.

VI
I

turn

now to the problem of the dating.

was
lecturing

Since Corsi's remark

that Ficino

on the Philebus during the reign of

Piero there have been three attempts to date the written com-

mentary. The first was by the great historian of the Florentine Academy, Arnaldo della Torre, who says: "A Httle after he had finished the Symposium commentary, Ficino started on the Philebus commentary, but at this point Piero invited him to expound his interpretation in public.""^ This is notable on two counts: it puts the Philebus commentary after the Symposium commentary; it suggests the written commentary preceded the
public lectures.

few pages

later,

he notes that the second

commentary is grouped in the MS. Laur. 8 with Ficino's youthful writings; and later still, while 21, arguing Ficino chose the Symposium commentary and the Philebus commentary to divert himself from a personal "crisis," he says the pubhc lectures took place in 1468, i.e., the
version of the Philebus

year in which the

first

draft of

all

the Plato translations reached

completion.'" This series of arguments is based entirely on Corsi's ambiguous words eo/hoc tempore, and on the contents of MS. Laur. 21, 8; it implies amongst other things that the terminus ante quem for both the Symposium and Philebus commentaries
is

1468.
offers us the

Raymond Marcel

most recent and elaborate

attempt to date the commentary. First he argues from the

Introduction

49

specific references in

Landino's Camaldulensian Disputations

Book

II that

the terminus ante quern for the

commentary must

be the summer of 1468 since, he says, Landino's first two books were completed by that date."* But there is no proof that they were completed then. The references in Landino to the Philebus

commentary are
echoes

clear

enough

be confused with the date at which Landino imagines the conversation between Alberti, Lorenzo and Ficino to be taking place. Marcel argues that since the second book must have been written before the death of Piero on December 2, 1469 (because "Alberti" refers to Piero as being ill not dead), it was written during the summer of 1468 he gives no explanation why it should be 1468, however, when Piero did not die until the December of 1469.'" But "Alberti's" remark only proves Landino is projecting the conversation back to the time preceding Piero 's death. The references in the second book indicate the sort of impact Landino recalls the Philebus commentary having at the time of Piero's fatal illness; they do not prove Landino was writing it then, only that the commentary must have been written before 1474 when the Camaldulensian Disputations were dedicated to Count Federico of Urbino. "* The uncovering of new evidence to date the actual composition of Landino's second book more precisely would alone enable us to proceed further. Marcel's arguments to advance the terminus ante quem to 1466 are even more unsatisfactory. In April 1466, we know Ficino had the Cratylus translation in hand."' Marcel argues the Philebus commentary must have been composed before this because "the references to the Cratylus for example are not in the first version"; and in a footnote he writes: "For example the citation from the Cratylus at the beginning of chapter 23 and those in chapters 24 and 31 are wanting in the MS. Vat. lat. 5953."""

but

there

are

in

fact

verbal

the date of actual composition must not

It is

perfectly true the references at the beginning of chapter 23

and

in chapter 31

to the Cratylus

(my pp. 215, 299) are missing in MS. 5953 (one and one to Ficinos argumentum are also missing

50
in chapter

Introduction

26

[p.

247] but Marcel does not mention these"'). But

is

the reference in chapter 24 (p. 229)

certainly there (though the

paragraph following
(pp. 139, 141)

it

has been transposed); and there are three

in chapter 14 (p. 165),

two in chapter 11 which Marcel completely ignores. Since his 1466 argument depends solely on this initial absence of Cratylus references, it is invalidated by the presence in MS. 5953 of four of the seven references in the 1496 editio princeps. Indeed, since three of the four references occur and the specific reference in as early as chapters 11 and 14 chapter 14 is to the latter portion of the Cratylus (428D), which may suggest Ficino was almost through if not completely finished with the translation it would seem that even the early parts of the commentary were written after April 1466. I have compiled my own statistics on the incidence and frequency of the references to the various Plato dialogues but can come to no and one

further references to the Cratylus in the MS.,

watertight conclusions: there are just too

many variables.

on another issue affecting his attempt to date the Philebus commentary before the Symposium commentary. The genealogy of the six links in the gold chain of
Marcel
is

inconsistent

ancient Platonic philosophers ending with Plato himself

prisci theologi

appears

the

for the first time in the preface to

of the Pimander (1463) and it runs: Hermes, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras, Philolaus, Plato. In the Platonic Theology Book VI, chapter 1, as Marcel observes, the chain has become: Zoroaster, Hermes, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras, Plato. In order to preserve the symbolic hexad and include Zoroaster, Ficino dropped Philolaus and relegated Hermes to second position. Eventually,
Ficino' s

translation

in the preface to his

longer subordinated

commentary on the Enneads Ficino no Hermes but bracketed him in first place

I am not concerned here with the last development, or with the origins of the idea of the chain, or with the controversy over whether it was Pletho who first suggested the particular philosophers who should make up the links (though what I am going to say weakens Marcel's whole thesis). Rather, I am concerned with Marcel's claim that Ficino uses Zoroaster

with Zoroaster.

Introduction

51

for the first time as a theologian (as

magician) in his
to Marcel's

opposed to a mere Symposium commentary (completed according

authoritatively argued dating in 1469).

own

Now in

actuality the second version of the chain, the

one commencing
I,

with Zoroaster,
(p. 181)

is

cited in

its

entirety in

Book

chapters 17

and 26

aster

is

of the Philebus commentary (and Zorocited in Book I, chapter 29 and Book II, chapter 1
(p. 247)

[pp. 271

and 403]

in theological/philosophical contexts too).

Marcel is wrong in saying the "theological" Zoroaster appears for the first time in the Symposium commentary; or, if he is right, then the Philebus commentary must come after the Symposium commentary. In either case. Marcel fails to mention the appearance of the "mature" second version of the chain in the Philebus commentary, citing the one in the Platonic Theology Book VI as the first instance."" However, nothing can be proven incontrovertibly from the mention of Zoroaster in the Symposium commentary: Marcel's statement that Zoroaster occurs in a theological context for the first time in the Symposium commentary and yet remains subordinate to Hermes, the commentary's "uncontested master,""' is based entirely on the unsubstantial evidence of the reference in Book I, chapter 3, where Ficino is explicating the enigmatic passage from Plato's Epistle II, 3I2E-313A. There is no evidence in the Symposium commentary that Ficino had actually decided on the relationship between Zoroaster and Hermes. The enunciation of a Platonic hexadic chain does not occur in it at all; nor are Hermes and Zoroaster juxtaposed, for Zoroaster is mentioned only twice and Hermes once and then in quite separate contexts."^ All this suggests the Philebus commentary postdates the Symposium commentary, as Delia Torre originally supposed. have dealt with Marcel's arguments at length, not I only because they are the most detailed ones adduced so far, but also because they indicate the sort of approach that dating the commentary entails. Their refutation merely underscores the difficulties facing the investigator and does not, I hasten to add, detract from the importance of what
So,
either

52

Introduction

Marcel attempted to do, and succeeded so brilliantly in doing in other related areas. Paul Kristeller's proofs in his Supplementum Ficinianum I, p. cxxii, though prior to Marcel's, are the only ones which can stand scrutiny. He cautiously concludes the Philebus commentary must have been written before 1474, since it is mentioned in the brief Five Questions on the Intelligence and in the argumenta to the Cratylus and the seventh and tenth books of the

Laws

{Op. Om., 677, 1309, 1507, 1520) and also in the

first

catalogue (Op. Om., 619.3).

the

We have already seen the evidence

from Landino and Corsi also points to a date before 1474 and words addressed to Michele Mercati at the end of the first book do the same. Kristeller agrees with Delia Torre that the Philebus commentary succeeds the Symposium commentary but he departs from Delia Torre in insisting that the lectures preceded the written commentary. In his later book. The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, Kristeller is more specific; he says Ficino ** wrote his commentaries on Plato's Symposium and Philebus in 1469,""' but he gives no reason for being so
specific.
I

believe, though, that 1469

is

the correct date.

So

far the available evidence has pointed to a date prior to

is all. However, we do know Ficino completed his Symposium commentary in the July of 1469,"* and it would be important if we could establish whether the Philebus commen-

1474 and that

tary

Ficino was lecturing

was written before or after this. (Corsi of course tells us on the Philebus before this, but that is not
is

the issue at stake.) There

a Httle evidence, hitherto unnoticed, which has a bearing on the relationship between the two written

commentaries. In order to discuss

the following sigla:

this

evidence

propose to use

W
XP Y

= = = =

Symposium commentary
Philebus commentary: first version Philebus commentary: second version Philebus commentary: third version

In Y there is a passage which extends from **Omne enim corpus ab aho quodam movetur" (p. 99, para. 2) to "ergo ipsa principium motus existit" (p. 103, top 2 Us.). This I shall divide

Introduction

53

"Omne enim corpus ab alio quodam movetur ...secundum participationem talia fiunt," I shall call a\ "Rursus anima quoniam a se ipsa movetur ante ipsam esse quod primo est intelligens," I shall call b\ "Id totum sic ab initio Hoc ad materiam declinat magis, anima magis ad mentem," I shall call c; "Cum dicimus animam se ipsa moveri rationis cogitationis discursiones," I shall call d\ and "Agit mens sed cum aeternitate ipsa principium motus existit," I
into five sections:
.

shall call e.

A glance at the apparatus criticus will show that

has the sequence a-by XP has a-b-c-d, and Y has a-b-c-d-e. Moreover, with regard to the sections shared, the variae lectiones are virtually confined to XP; that is, and Y are

virtually identical.

In the
cel's ed.

Symposium commentary Book VI, chapter pp. 230-31) we find the following passage:
cum

15 (Mar-

Omne corpus ab alio quodam movetur; movere autem se

natura sua non potest,
propter anime presentiam se ipso moveri videtur
et

ipsum

nee agere per se quicquam valeat. Sed

propter ani-

quodammodo, absente vero, ab alio duntaxat movetur, utpote quod banc ex se ipso naturam non habeat sed anima proprie vim ad se ipsam movendi possideat. Nam cuicumque adest, vim ad se ipsum movendum impertit. Quod autem ipsa sui presentia impertit aliis, hoc ipsa multo prius magisque debet habere. Est igitur anima supra corpora, utpote que se ipsam secundum essentiam suam movere queat atque iccirco supra ilia debeat esse, que non ex se
ipsis

mam vivere et,

presente quidem anima, se ipsum movet

sed aliorum presentia ut se moveant assecuntur.

se ipsa

Cum

dici-

mus

moveri animam, non transitive, ut ita dixerim, quemadmodum a Platone accipi voluit Aristoteles, sed absolute ver-

bum illud proferimus,

se,

ut

cum

stare per se

deum, lucere solem per

pars anime movet, pars

calere

ignem asseveramus.

Non enim

agitatur, sed tota ex se ipsa, id est, sua natura, movetur;

hoc

est,

ab

alio in aliud ratione discurrit ac nutritionis,

augmenti, gener-

ationis opera per intervalla

temporum transigit.
sections.

This

shall divide into

. . .

two

"Omne

corpus ab alio
I

quodam movetur
shall call a*\

presentia ut se

moveant assecuntur,"

"Cum

dicimus se ipsa moveri

I

animam
will

inter-

valla

temporum

transigit,"

shall call d*.

this

A
S

cross-comparison

between the passage in

and

one

in

show a and a*

54
are parallel as are
tions however.

Introduction

d and

d*\ there are significant local varia-

Prescinding from the remote possibility there

earlier

archetype which

may be an we do not know about and to which

is

both
type?

refer,

can we determine which of the texts

the archein S. If
(S)

Let

were in

me turn momentarily to the omissions in W and W, we would have the convenient progression

a*-d*

(W) a-b-d (XP) a-b-c-d (Y) a-b-c-d-e. The constant accretion would indicate that S were the archetype and so predated W. But d is not in W. Conversely, if b were in S (as Z>*), we would have the progression (W) a-b (S) a*-b*-d* (XP) a-b-c-d (Y) a-b-c-d-e. Again, the constant accretion would indicate that were the archetype and predated S. But b* is not in S. This is to say that from a strictly logical viewpoint arguing from the omis-

sions gets us nowhere.

Nevertheless, I do feel there are two arguments which cast some light on the problem. First, the fact that a is virtually the same in the three versions W, XP and Y, but a* presents us with a number of variations, suggests XP and Y depend directly on without referring to S at all. But when he was at stage XP, and we Ficino must have resorted to S for d, since d is not in were the archetype, then we know XP postdates S. But if for o* and would have this situation: S would be looking to XP would be looking to for a but looking to S for d. But why remind Ficino of S, if at stage XP would the rereading of a in

S were not the archetype for a as well as dl I am arguing here, obviously, on psychological grounds. The following completely plausible situation would result if S were the archetype. At stage Ficino looked to S for a, then added b independently. At stage XP, having read a in W, he was reminded of o* in S; whereupon he saw the significance of d* and decided to borrow it too. But before doing so he introduced c to serve as a bridge between b (which he still wanted to keep) and d. That is, in working on expanding the whole passage at stage XP, it was completely natural for Ficino to return to S (since it was the archetype) and to borrow again from it.

Introduction

55

This argument is necessarily speculative, but my second argument is, I believe, less so. The sections a and </ in W, XP and Y are not just somewhat varied versions of cr* and d*\ they
are abbreviated versions. If
sive

we

turn to consider Ficino's extenthe original

borrowings from Aquinas (my pp. 81-83, 87-89, 295-297,

375-379)
into his

we

find invariably that the fuller version

is

one. In the process of incorporating Aquinas' argumentation

own text Ficino habitually abbreviated by omitting word, phrase, sentence or group of sentences, in the the odd
same way
as

we

all

do when we are taking

fuller versions)

notes.

From

this

perfectly legitimate analogy,

we may conclude,

therefore, that

a* and d* (being the

therefore predates

are the archetypes. S

W.

There is another parallel passage. The passage in the Philebus commentary (my pp. 109-11), "Sol profecto corpora visibilia. Ut pulchrum illuminat gratiamque infundit" (the first of which is repeated verbatim on my pp. 303-05), parallels part the second half of chapter two in the second book of the Symposium commentary (Marcel's ed. pp. 146-7). Except for one sentence, the three texts of W, X and Y are virtually identical (apart from the opening few words, P is not involved this time), whereas the text of S has a fuller version. Both the arguments elaborated above apply to this passage as well and would again
. . .

suggest that S

is

the archetype. Oddly, though,

is

has one

sentence missing which

present in the others:

"Ut

in obiectis

cognoscentes animae vires allicit, At first glance this would seem to be counterevidence. However, we are almost certainly dealing here with a mechanical error. The scribe's eye as he looked at the manuscript he was working from must have skipped over this

quae noscenda sunt

tres illas

gratia, pulchritudo."

sentence to the next sentence which also begins

the formal

"Ut

in.

..." In

hand of the

scribe the missing sentence

would

have occupied almost exactly two lines; something of the same was probably true also for the manuscript he was working from, in which case there would have been five Uts in near vertical succession and it would have been only too easy to slip over one of them.

56

Introduction

do to both the parallel each other: they suggest the Symposium commentary preceded the Philebus commentary. This means the terminus post quem for the latter is July

The two arguments, applying

I

as they

pairs

have been able to

find, reinforce

1469.

The only terminus ante quem we have

is still

1474, but

it is

psychologically unlikely (though logically possible) that Ficino

would have done much work on the Philebus commentary when most of his energies were being absorbed by the composition of the Platonic Theology, a work he began in 1469. In conclusion, then, I would argue for the latter half of 1469 as the period in which Ficino wrote the Philebus commentary. The sequence of his compositions from 1468 to 1474 would
therefore run as follows: completion of the Plato translation
(1468);

composition of the Symposium commentary (Nov. July 1469); composition of the Philebus commentary (July 1469 to winter 1469); composition of the Platonic Theology (winter 1469-1474); composition of the On The
1468

Christian Religion (1474).

If we accept this series of arguments and counterarguments, we must acknowledge that the Philebus commentary, far from

an integral part of Ficino' s most is to question the validity of commentary which has so far much of the interpretation of the been put forward by other scholars.
being a youthful piece,
is

productive years. Necessarily, this

VII The present text is based on the third version of the Philebus commentary found in the 1496 edition of the Commentaria in
Platonem printed in Florence (this incidentally has a corrigenda list which is easily overlooked). However, the edition has been collated with the three extant MSS., Vat. lat. 5953, Laur. Plut. 21, 8 and Oliver. 620, and all four readings have been recorded. None of the manuscripts is an autograph;"' they represent the commentary's two earlier stages as we have seen, and Ficino himself saw the 1496 edition, i.e., the third and final version,
through the press. The
first

edition

is

therefore authoritative.

Introduction

57
will

An

examination of the variant readings

show

that Ficino

made a number of minor

styHstic changes. Usually the

manu-

scripts agree with each other on a reading but differ from the edition. In a few instances the changes are substantive, but, again, attributable to Ficino's final revision. In most instances,

therefore, the first edition's readings have been adopted. Occasionally the first version provides the obviously correct reading,

own.

but the second version rarely provides a good reading on its On a handful of occasions grammar or sense have necessitated emendation, but this has always been noted. The
list

corrigenda

in the first edition has

been incorporated without

comment and non-substantive typographical errors ignored. The word-order is the first edition's, though it is virtually the
same in all three versions. The text of the Philebus commentary in the 1496 edition of Ficino's Commentaria in Platonem was reprinted in the first edition of his Opera Omnia, printed in Basle in 1561 and again in Paris in 1641. By now the text was peppered with variants and mistakes. The text in the second Basle edition of the Opera Omnia of 1576 (which is based on the first Basle edition) introduced further corruptions. My text has been compared word for word with these two editions of the Opera Omnia and in no single instance do they provide a better reading. With regard to the Philebus commentary anyway, the conclusion must be that the variants and mistakes were introduced by a printer's assistant or a compositor; there is no point in collating them. However, all my references are to the 1 576 edition since it is the one generally available in the Turin reprint of 1959.

My

paragraphing

is

the 1496 edition's since the manuscripts

and Paris editions). expanded and the spelling regularAll abbreviations have been ized, the most important feature being the ae/e differentiation which is not consistently preserved in either the manuscript or printed versions and is merely the result of scribal and editorial preference. The punctuation has been modernized; in the manuscripts, predictably, it does not conform to modern usage,
are largely unparagraphed (as are the Basle

but in the various editions

it

is

also repeatedly misleading.

58

Introduction

Ficino enthusiasts of the sixteenth and subsequent centuries must have spent hours of irritation following the logic through
the

maze of colons and commas. Translating Ficino demands, Marcel says, clarity, elegance
I

and concision."*

have only tried to be

clear;

but by using such

I

contractions as "can't" and "we've" to remind the reader the

commentary was

first

delivered orally as a lecture

achieved a certain concision as well.

scholastic terminology.

hope I have The main problem is the

Summa

With two recent translations of the Contra Gentiles in mind,"^ I have normally chosen to translate actus and principium, for instance, as "act" and "principle," even though they derive ultimately from energeia and arche, terms which require two or more equivalents in modern English. Although Aquinas' terminology derives from Aristotle, it is self-defining. In order to keep my notes to the minimum, therefore, I have made no attempt to gloss the commonplaces of medieval philosophy; rather, I would refer the interested reader to such recent works as the Aquinas
lexicon."*

word of explanation. The terms anima and animus do not seem to be differentiated by Ficino and I have translated both as "soul," even though animus
further items need a

Two

usually refers specifically to the rational part of the

(or

human

soul

sometimes

it

means "courage" or "intention"). Second,

mens has been translated throughout as "inteUigence" rather than as "mind" (I have been swayed here by Marcel's example) and it means the same as inteilectus; Ficino moves indifferently from one term to the other."' The foliation of MS. 5953 is shown in the body of the Latin
text;

and in the left-hand margin of the English translation is the pagination of the Stephanus edition of the Philebus. There are only a few, true lemmata, as distinct from Ficino's paraphrasis

and commentary, and these are in bold face. Italicized Latin and English texts indicate Ficino's unacknowledged citations from Aquinas.

Synopsis of the Commentary

(The numbers in parentheses refer to the pagination of the Basle 1 576 edition of the Opera Omnia.)

BOOK I.
Chapter 1, p. 73 (1207): The need to establish an end for life. Everything acts for some end including the body, the reason, the intelligence; this proves there is a universal end cause. Chapter 2, p. 81 (1208): Various proofs arguing for the necesof an ultimate end and the impossibility of an infinite series. The end for the natural appetite, and the ends of execution and
sity

intention.

Chapter

3, p.

87 (1209): Various proofs establishing that the

ultimate end has to be the good.

Chapter 4, p. 89 (1209): What the good is. The necessity for cosmic unity. The primacy of the one over multiplicity and over being. Above bodies is the soul; above souls is the intelligence; above intelligences is the one itself. Various proofs for this drawn from motion. The identity of the one and the good.

Chapter 5, p. 103 (1211): The reasons why everything seeks for the one and the good. The primacy of the good over being. The relationship of the good and the beautiful and the analogy with
light.

Chapter

6, p.

Ill (1213):

The need

to refer

man's good to the

absolute good.

The

other unsatisfactory ethical systems.

The

good is best apprehended and enjoyed by the intelligence.

60

Synopsis of the Commentary

Chapter 7, p. 1 15 (1213): Ficino returns to the text of the Phiiebus and, in the process of defining different sorts of wisdom and pleasure, he explains why Plato had chosen to compare these two terms.
Chapter 8, p. 121 (1214): The different sorts of good things. The contribution of wisdom to felicity. The two sorts of knowledge: the morning and evening knowledge. The distinctions that must be made between what leads to happiness, happiness itself and God. The relationship of all three to wisdom.

Chapter 9, p. 127 (1215): The real subject of the dialogue is man's highest good; other suggestions are dismissed. The
dialogue's twelve part structure.

Chapter 10, p. 131 (1216): Socrates proposes initially that he and Protarchus should each champion wisdom and pleasure respectively, but be prepared to abandon their positions should some third alternative appear. Socrates refuses to accept that Venus can be identified with pleasure. Chapter 11, p. 135 (1216): The divine names. The iconology of Uranus, Saturn, Jupiter and the two Venuses. The reason why divine names ought to be venerated. The power and origin of divine names. Chapter
12, p.

143 (1217):

The power inherent

in the divine

name and its various

forms.

Chapter 13, p. 145 (1218): The importance of the species as opposed to the genus or the individual. The method for estabtarchus' argument that

Hshing a definition. The genus of pleasure. Socrates refutes Proall pleasures must be alike because they
sures are actually

and maintains that some of Protarchus' pleaopposed to each other. Socrates differentiates between being good and being pleasurable. The good does not embrace opposites.
are pleasurable,

Synopsis of the Commentary

61

Chapter 14, p. 157 (1220): Socrates again emphasizes the difference between the genus and the species and warns us against
verbal sophistry.
pleasures

The two protagonists agree there

are dissimilar

and

dissimilar types of knowledge. Ficino

warns us

against self-deception.

Chapter

15, p. 165 (1221):

The nature of

the intelligence.

The

nature of truth and the theory that knowledge consists of the

correspondence between the thing and the inteUigence. The correspondence takes place in the human intelligence and in the divine intelligence. The hght of truth that comes from the good. The one and the many and the psychology of perception.

Chapter 16, p. 171 (1222): The nature of the relationship between the one and the many and the paradoxes it originates. Three ways the one can be many. The Platonic Idea really exists and exists prior to and more absolutely than the sensible object.

Chapter 17, p. 177 (1223): Three problems raised by the Ideas: one, whether they are merely mental concepts; two, if they actually exist, whether they are unitary and immutable; three, if they are unitary and immutable, how do they impart themselves to things which are many and mutable. Why the species are called unities or Ideas. The pagan and Christian writers who have testified to their existence.

The existence of the Ideas in God's The testimony of Augustine, Averroes and others. The contingent nature of the world and its dependence on the incorporeal species. Arguments from change, operation, moveChapter
18, p. 181 (1223):

intelligence.

ment,

etc., to

prove the existence of a higher cause which

is self-

sufficient, self-activating

and contains

all

the Ideas.
to prove the reality

Chapter

19, p. 191 (1225):

More arguments

of the Ideas and the unreaUty of bodily objects.

intelligence

To some
is

extent
first

the soul possesses the true species; but above the soul

the

which contains the

first

and

truest species.

These

species are identified with the intelligence itself.

62

Synopsis of the Commentary

p. 199 (1226):

Chapter 20,
tained in the

duction, etc., to prove the reality of the Ideas.

first intelligence.

More arguments drawn from reproThe world is con-

p. 205 (1227): The argument from the world's taken to prove the existence of the prime intelligence and to prove that it contains the Ideas. The coincidence of the intelligence and its Ideas. The eternal contemplation of the Ideas

Chapter 21,
is

design

is

independent of the intelligence's need actually to create them.

p.

209 (1227): More proofs for the existence of the fact of corruption, etc. The shadowy existence of everyday things. The need to believe in the Ideas, even if we do not understand exactly how things participate in them.

Chapter 22,
Ideas

drawn from the

Chapter 23,

p.

sary because of
the Philebus

215 (1228): To estabHsh truth, dialectic is necesits concern with the species. Ficino returns to

three cautions that

and inveighs against obstinacy in debating. The must be observed with regard to dialectic:
it;

one, adolescents should not be allowed to use

two, those

who

do use it must guard against the illusions which derive from the senses and the phantasy, and proceed via the intelligence; three, you must not go from one extreme to another without going through the intermediary points. The distinction between logic and dialectic. Dialectic is the instrument of philosophy par excellence. In the processes of uniting and dividing upwards and downwards, dialectic is constantly concerned with the one and the many. By using the one and the many, dialectic resolves, defines and demonstrates.
Chapter 24, p. 225 (1230): The relationship between definition and demonstration and the process of reasoning syllogistically. On resolving, dividing and compounding. Chapter 25,
p.

adolescents, sophists

231 (1230): Socrates again inveighs against and Cyrenaics, and their ethical relativism

Synopsis of the Commentary

63

and scepticism
tes insists

(i.e.,

the

first

caution). Ficino returns to the

Philebus. Altercation between Protarchus and Socrates. Socra-

on the crucial importance of dialectic.

p.

Chapter 26,

239 (1231): The illumination theory. The three

The triple intelligence as personified in Saturn, The triple powers of the soul. The Epimetheus/Prometheus parable. The iconology of Minerva, Vulcan and Mercury and their various gifts. The Uranus,
angelic motions.

Jupiter and Prometheus.

Saturn, Jupiter triad and what they symbolize. Prometheus' gift

of

fire

symbolizes the illumination that comes from God; so

dialectic

must be practised by the

intelligence (i.e., the second

caution).

249 (1233): The three arguments transmitted by the ancient theologians: one, everything subsequent to the one is compounded from the one and the many; two, the species are finite, but individuals are infinite; three, mediation is necessary to pass from one extreme to another. Various supporting proofs. On emanation from the one to the finite many to the infinite many. On the types of division (i.e., the third caution).

Chapter 27,

p.

Chapter 28, p. 261 (1234): Dialectic and the enemy discipline (which proceeds too quickly or too slowly from the one to the many). Various instances of the enemy discipline furnished from the ancients who ignored the importance of the a stage inintermediary stage between the one and the many volving the species. Ficino introduces the examples of music and dancing to illustrate the importance of the species in effect-

ing the transition from the one to the many.

Chapter 29, p. 271 (1236): Grammar is used as an example of going from the many to the one. The history of letters and their introduction by Hermes Trismegistus. The need to draw things out of the one into the infinite many via the finite many which exist between them; and the reverse. Protarchus urges Socrates to proceed at once to instruct them all in dialectic.

64

Synopsis of the

Commen tary

p. 283 (1238): The need to define the good and the and negative ways to do this. The negative way is to say that neither pleasure nor wisdom is the good itself. The good is above being and above the inteUigence. It is the absolute act. The god of love is the divinity inspiring Socrates when he talks about the good. The relationship between love, beauty and the good, where the good is prime. Various proofs estabhshing that the good is sufficient, perfect and desirable.

Chapter 30,

positive

Chapter 31, p. 299 (1240): The two acts: form and operation. The identity of the good and act. Act consists in unity. The good is compared to the sun. God as the good is all acts and all potentialities. The reflection of the one in everything is what unites everything. The emanation from the one and conversion to the one. The participation of the inteUigence, the soul and matter in unity and goodness. The one is present in everything. The creativeness of the one and the resulting beauty. The good is prior to the beautiful and desired by the natural appetite. The difference between rational and irrational pursuit of the good.
Chapter 32,
p. 315 (1242): In order to

prove that neither

pleasure,

is

the
all

good Socrates

divides

wisdom from

by dividing

mental activity whatsoever from it. The jelly-fish is a model for the life of pure sensation devoid of mental activity. The reason why such "deprived" organisms exist in nature. The great
chain-of-being.

Pleasure

is

insufficient

in

itself;

likewise

wisdom. The psychology of perception involves both wisdom and pleasure. In the case of both physical and mental events total act is pleasure. There are two sorts of pleasure: that in knowing and that which is the assent of the appetite. The mixture of the two makes for sufficiency in human and indeed all animate life. The life that does not have this mixture is chosen through ignorance or coercion.
Chapter 33, p. 333 (1245): Socrates differentiates between the prime inteUigence (which is unitary and unites pleasure and wisdom in itselO and the human intelligence. The prime inteUigence

Synopsis of the Commentary

65

not the good itself, but next to and inferior to it. After the prime inteUigence are the derivative intelligences; and next to them is the soul which becomes its intelligence when purified
is

from all other associations. The soul's happiness consists of wisdom and pleasure. The morning and evening visions of the good. Socrates prepares to define the good positively having
it negatively: this consists in finding out whether wisdom or pleasure is nearer to the good (since it has already been estabhshed that neither is the good itself). He intends to maintain that wisdom is nearer to the good. The hierarchy of goods with pleasure at the bottom. The company agrees that neither wisdom nor pleasure is the good. Socrates

already defined

procrastinates in order to

make

the group docile.

He must now

define

wisdom and

pleasure and proceed very cautiously.

Chapter 34, p. 347 (1247): The need for there to be one end. Man's end must be one and compounded from wisdom and pleasure. Wisdom and pleasure are made one by the one which is above. We apprehend the highest good by the unity in ourselves, which is like the charioteer in the Phaedrus who has two

and the will. The unity in ourselves converts these two into the one. So there are three happinesses: the human happiness when the charioteer controls the horses and directs them towards the heavens; the divine happiness when the soul becomes its intelligence; the happiness when we are made one by the one and so become one with God, that is, become
horses: the intellect

gods.

Chapter 35, p. 355 (1248): To obtain the right mixture of wisdom and pleasure you must have truth, proportion and beauty.
359 (1249): The highest good is the measure that moderator that gives proportion, the suitable that gives beauty. Various ways in which God is the measure, the moderator and the suitable. As the one He is all three. Things which share in Him share in all three. The one and the unity the one bestows are both acts. Therefore the highest good

Chapter 36,

p.

gives truth, the

66
is

Synopsis of the Commentary

the one act of the mixed life. This act occurs when the intelligence and the will have been directed to the one through wisdom and pleasure (when these in turn have been joined in accordance with three attributes deriving from the power of the one, namely, truth, proportion and beauty). The one act of the

one soul, which is from the one, for the one and in the one, man's highest good.

is

Chapter 37, p. 369 (1250): The subordination of the will to the and their respective relationships to things. Various proofs to establish the primacy of the intellect. The ultimate end concerns the intellect more than the will. The need for something to be the first inteUigible object. Pleasure's nature and use. God is our end: our understanding reaches Him first and our will follows the understanding. Ficino admits he has argued that the opposite is true in an epistle on happiness. Perhaps the
intellect
is to consider the will as part of the intellect rather than a separate faculty, and pleasure as something in the intellect. Ficino concludes man's end is one. Thus he claims to have resolved the doubts raised by his great friend, Michael from S. Miniato, who had wondered why Plato posited a mixed end for

best solution

man.

BOOK II.
Chapter 1,
limit
p.

385 (1253): Socrates introduces two concepts, the

infinite,

and attributes wisdom and pleasure to There are two sorts of infinity: the first excludes the limit, the second is in need of the Hmit. The first is the infinite limit of everything and is God, the second needs to be limited by something else. The Philebus is concerned with and the

them

respectively.

God

as things' limit, not as the infinite. In the Philebus, there-

fore, the infinite

means matter. As the

infinite,

God

transcends

He embraces it. The hierarchy which proceeds from nothingness to matter to form and is the result of varying degrees of participation in the limit and the infinite. On the nature of potentiality. The passive potentiality characteristic
creation; but as the limit.

Synopsis of the Commentary

of matter precedes
all else.

67

On

the nature of matter. All things

act

subsequent to

God

are

compounded from

and

potentiality,

being and essence. The existence of the being whose essence is being itself. Arguments derived from the fact that nature is subject to possibility

and limitation and made from the mixture of essence and being prove that all contingent things are compounded from potentiality and act. On matter as the receptacle
of all the forms.

Chapter 2, p. 403 (1255): The hierarchy among the principles of is headed by the one. The general character of an entity incorporates the idea of being; so, apart from being, there are five other elements: essence, rest, motion, identity and difference. There are also the two principles of the limit and the infinite. Depending on our approach, the full hierarchy can therefore consist of six, seven or nine members.
being

Chapters,

p.

409 (1256): Six elements derive from the

is

limit

and

the infinite. These six are equally divided between the limit and
the infinite, since each
universally present in the inteUigence,

the soul, bodies, quantity

and quahty. Their presence

creates a

hierarchy that descends towards the infinite.

Chapter 4, p. 415 (1257): How the limit and the infinite are disposed under God. The distinctions between creating, forming and generating. What is mixed from the limit and the infinite. The fourth principle, namely the cause of the mixture, is above the universe. The possibility that a fifth principle exists, namely the cause that subsumes all mixture, is not denied but put aside by Socrates. On the sublimity of God, i.e.. His transcendence, and on His countenance, i.e.. His immanent presence. The hierarchy existing among the principles and the right way to deal with it. The need to examine the limit and the infinite first.

UNATTACHED CHAPTERS
/,

p. 425 (1259): In the height of the understanding pleasure and understanding are identical. The usual differences between them.

68
IIy p. 427 (1259):

Synopsis of the Commentary

The good is the end. The reasons why pleasure and wisdom are not the end. The uses of pleasure.
431 (1259): The relationship between the one, the many,

///, p.

the limit, the infinite,

and

their

compounds, that

is,

rest,

motion, identity and difference.

IV, p. 433 (1260):

The art of dialectic, which is concerned with uniting and dividing. The nature of dialectic and its transmission. Its preoccupation with the species. The various steps in the
dialectical

method.
is

note explaining that this

all

there

is

so far, and what

follows are merely chapter divisions

and summaries. (See

Appendix V).
[Seep. 447 for a synopsis

of the ten excerpts. ]

THE COMMENTARY OF MARSILIO FICINO, THE FLORENTINE, ON PLATO'S PHILEBUS ON THE HIGHEST GOOD

MATERIAL THAT HAS BEEN HASTILY COLLECTED FROM MARSILIO FICINO'S LECTURES ON THE PHILEBUS

COMMENTARIA MARSILII FICINI

FLORENTINI IN PHILEBUM PLATONIS

DE SUMMO BONO*

COLLECTA CURSIM EX LECTIONIBUS

MARSILII FICINI IN PHILEBUM**

*the

title in

W; apparently

it

reflects Ficino

's

initial

optimism, for

it

anticipates the completion

of

boldly printed above the first chapter heading, in Y it is incorporated recognizes the commentary is still incomplete and is probably by an and Y (p. 425), and more particularly the postscript in Y editor. See the subscriptions in texts after the four unattached chapters (p. 439)
it is

commentary **the title in X and Y (in

the whole

into the first chapter heading);

it

72

Chapter

Chapter 1. That there

is

some end to all actions.

As the chief aim of all philosophy is concerned with the happy life and men seeking it have given themselves to its study, and as the happy life consists in the highest good, we will start to expound Plato's book on man's highest good before the rest. The highest good is the end for the sake of which all men do everything. But life's end must be known in particular, so that we can direct all actions towards it. In the same way a pilot has to decide above all on the port he's making for, or the archer
has to
first

inspect the target at which he's aiming his arrows.

Plato foresaw this in the Alcibiades, in the Euthydemus, in the

Republic Book 7 and in the Laws.

the

'

He

says, if

we don't know

good

itself, all

the other arts and sciences will be useless,

endeavours pointless, actions harmful. Now in art or deliberation an end is nothing other than the terminal point towards which the agent's intention is mainly directed and in which it comes to rest. As in nature motion is properly directed towards something, and as it stops once it has that something, it is therefore moving towards an end. Things in art and nature are both disposed towards an end in the same way, and once the end has been removed, causes for them cannot be assigned. So we'll first discuss Philebus' view he is arguing about man's highest good, the end of all our actions and we'll demonstrate there is some end towards which men's actions can tend. Then we'll try to show what this is and of what kind it is, and reject false opinions about it, and arrive at true ones. Finally, we'll point out the best way to get there. This then is the proposed order of dealing with the book. Every action arises either from the nature of bodily things, or from the impulse of the soul, or from the deliberation and disposition of the reason, or from the understanding of the intelligence. If it arises from the nature of bodies, it tends towards something definite. For the substances of bodies are mutually

Cap. I

73

[.?26r]

Quod sit aliquis^

finis

omnium actionum.

Cap.

I.^

Quoniam omnis
tulerunt, beata

philosophiae
vita in

summa ad beatam'
se

vitam
librum

refertur, atque earn quaerentes

homines

ad

eius studia conconsistit,

autem

summo bono

hominis bono* ante alios exponendum quippe bonum finis est cuius gratia omnia omnes agimus. Finis autem vitae imprimis noscendus est, ut ad eum actiones omnes dirigere valeamus, non minus quam
Platonis de

summo

aggrediemur.*

Summum

naviganti portus ad
sagittario

quem

deveniat ante

omnia statuendus,

et

signum ad quod' tela dirigat primum' inspiciendum. Quod quidem vaticinatus Plato in Alcibiade, in Euthydemo, in septimo de Republica, in Legibus: ait, si boni ipsius nobis
cognitio desit, artes
irritos,

omnes

alias et scientias inutiles,

conatus

noxias actiones fore. *Iam vero in arte

et consilio nihil

aliud est finis

quam

terminus ad
quiescit.

quem movetur

agentis intentio

potissimum

et in

quo

Cum

ergo in natura motus in

cesset,

ad finem. Similiter se habet dispositio rerum in arte et natura ad finem quo sublato non possunt causae assignari.** Quamobrem ad Philebi ipsius declarationem,' qui de summo hominis bono nostrarum omnium actionum fine disputat, nos primum parabimus, ostendemusque aliquem esse finem ad quem actiones hominum tendant. Deinde quis iste sit et qualis declarare conabimur, et falsas quidem de hoc opiniones reicere, veras astruere. Demum qua via maxime ad eum perveniatur monstrabimus. [326v] Id ergo libri huius propositum est, is ordo. Omnis actio aut a natura corporum provenit, aut animi impetu, aut rationis consilio atque habitu, aut mentis intelligentia. Si a natura corporum provenit, ad certum aliquid
aliquid proprie dirigatur
agit
tendit.

quo habito

Nam
W

corporum

inter

se

distinctae substantiae

sunt,

'ultimus add.
aliquis finis

'aggredimur

***om.

WX

omnium actionum (cf. p. 71) Y *em., quem IVXY

^Y reads Collecta cursim ex lectionibus 'beau Y

'inprimis

WX

Marsilii Ficini in Philebum quod sit 'qui Philebus inscribitur add.

WX

'declaratione

74
distinct, so their natures

Chapter

and powers are distinguished. So indiand appropriate natures are present in individual bodies. From them proceed appropriate movements. Succeeding the individually appropriate movements are the individually appropriate effects. The natures and movements of bodies strive towards the effects in order to achieve a result, and to rest once the result has been achieved. For anything doesn't come from anything, but proper effects proceed from their proper causes: a man from a man, a fig from a fig tree, heat from fire. But who'll deny the end of every nature and every activity is that towards which its force is always impelled in its own way and in which it can finally rest? Besides, every bodily movement
vidual
either tends to avoid destruction or acquire

something conveto
its

nient for
itself.

itself,

or destroy an opposite or create something like

it is

In avoiding and acquiring

moved

own

preser-

and So self-preservation and generation are the end of all bodily movements. Furthermore, if the nature of any body when it acts did not tend towards some determined effect, all effects would be indifferent to it. But what is disposed equally to many things doesn't effect one thing more than another out of the many possibilities. So every single body would either do everything or nothing. Each is impossible. For what does everything is the first principle of all, what does nothing is inactive. So the body tends towards a definite effect. But a definite outcome is called the end of an action. Again, the body's power either produces something by chance or by a necessary intention of the nature. It isn't by chance, because any one body would produce all possible effects and so anything would result from anything. Things wouldn't need a definite seed and the argument [discussed] by Lucretius would come to pass: *'If things were made from nothing, every genus could be born from every thing; nothing would need a seed. First, men could arise from the sea and the genus of fishes from the land and birds could burst from the sky."^ And surely what happens by chance rarely happens, and
vation; in destroying
creating, to the generation of some-

thing similar to

itself.

Cap. I

75

quare naturae eorum' viresque discretae. Unde singulis corporibus singulae insunt propriaeque naturae. Ex his proprii motus fiunt. Proprios singulorum motus sequuntur opera propria singulorum in quae naturae corporum motusque nituntur ut efficiant et effecto opere conquiescant.^ Neque enim quaelibet a quolibet sed a propriis quibusdam propria quaedam fiunt, ab homine homo, a ficu ficus,' ab igni calor. Quis autem negabit finem
esse cuiusque naturae effectionisque id

ipsum in quod proprie semperque nititur eius impetus et in quo denique cessat. Praeterea omnis corporum motus aut eo tendit ut vitet interitum aut quod* sibi conveniens est' adsciscat aut perimat contrarium simile gignat: dum vitat et adsciscit ad sui ipsius conservationem movetur; dum perimit atque gignit ad simiHs generationem.

Omnium

ergo corporalium motionum conservatio gen-

eratioque est

finis.

si natura corporis ahcuius dum agit ad aliquem effectum determinatum non tenderet, omnes ei effectus indifferentes essent. Quod autem aeque se habet ad multa non

Accedit ad haec quod

magis unum e pluribus quam aliud efficit. Quare unumquodque corpus vel omnia faceret vel nihil. Utrumque impossibile est. Nam quod facit omnia primum rerum principium est. Quod agit nihil est otiosum. Quare ad certum quendam tendit effectum; certus autem eventus actionis finis cognominatur. {327f\
Item corporis
vis

aut casu in opus incidit aut necessaria

quadam intentione naturae. Non casu, quia in quaecumque opera quodcumque corpus incurreret, atque ita quaelibet a quibuslibet fierent,
Lucretii eveniret.

neque certo

res

semine indigerent

et*

illud

Nam

si

de nihilo fierent ex

omnibus rebus

omne genus

nasci posset'; nihil semine egeret, e mari

primum

homines, e terra possit oriri squamigerum genus et volucres erumpere coelo. Et profecto* quod casu fit raro contingit, nee'

'erunt
*et

om.

'conquiescunt A'y 'etadd. IV 'profeao om. ^posse

WX

'quidem 'non

'est

om.Y

76

Chapter
in

it

happens not just

certain appropriate effects

one way but in various ways. But we see coming from individual things

from a particular

seed, at the established time, in the usual

order and way, in a set sequence, with the same middle terms

and the same rational principle and most of the time. So, as the corporeal power produces the effect from a necessary intention of the nature, it intends the effect in the proper way and what it intends it desires by natural instinct. What is desired by some agent is the end of [its] action, so each corporeal action is for an end. Moreover, the action which follows the soul's impulse, like anger, fear, greed, has some end in view. For if nothing were moving [the soul] from the outside, an impulse would not arise in the soul. So the impulse depends on something outside, which can be thought of as good, bad or neutral. If it were neutral, no new impulse would be occasioned by it. If it were
good, it proceeds to attain it, if bad, to avoid it. Therefore the end of every action following the impulse of the soul is either the acquisition of good or the avoidance of bad. Also, the operation following the reason's deliberation seeks some end. For to deliberate is to inquire. The person who inquires wants to find something out; for he doesn't seek what he has, he wants to discover something so he may rest in what he's discovered. But rest in what is discovered (which is what he was
seeking)
is

the action's end.

is,

Also, the action coming from the rational disposition, that

the one depending

towards a definite
it

and the arts, is directed end. If the action comes from virtue and art, on moral
virtue

isn't fortuitous,
itself.

but follows the rational principle of the disdisposition draws itself towards a suitable
it

position

The

operation or a suitable effect. But eventually

thing
it

stops in the

was drawn towards. Therefore the operation or the end of the movement which is born from the reason's disposition. There remains the operation which comes from the understanding of the intelligence; this must be referred to a definite end. For the intelligence, before it can act, forms an inner conception of what it is going to perform through the action, and
effect suitable to the disposition exist as the

Cap. I

77

uno dumtaxat modo sed variis provenit. Videmus autem propria quaedam a singulis, certo semine, institute tempore, solito ordine modoque,' digesta serie, iisdem mediis, eadem ratione et ut plurimum fieri. Ergo cum necessaria quadam intentione
naturae^ corporea vis effectum producat,^ proprie ilium* intendit et'

quod

intendit naturali instinctu appetit.

Quod ab
actio

aliquo

agente appetitur est ad finem. Quin etiam actio*

nihil

actionis est finis.

corporum quae animi impetum, ut iram,

respicit.

Omnis ergo

metum, cupidinem, sequitur finem aliquem

Nam

si

moveret' extrinsecus, animi impetus nullus insurgeret. Ab aliquo ergo exteriori impetus iste dependet, quod vel bonum iudicatum est vel malum vel neutrum. Si neutrum novus ex eo impetus nullus concitaretur. Si bonum ad consequendum*
pergit, sin

malum ad devitandum. Quapropter omnis

actionis,'

quae impetum animi

vitatio mali.

sequitur, vel boni consecutio finis est vel

Operatio quoque rationis consilium sequens aliquem expetit

finem. Consultare enim inquirere
veniat quaerit.
est;

quisquis inquirit ut in-

Neque enim

quaerit

quod

habet,' invenire

autem vult ut in" re inventa quiescat. [52 7v] Quies autem in eo quod inventum actionis ipsius quod quaerebat est finis. Necnon et actio ex habitu rationis, id est, morali virtute et artibus pendens, ad finem certum dirigitur; si ex virtute et arte procedit,'^ non temere fit, sed rationem habitus ipsius sequitur. Habitus ipse vel ad operationem trahit sibi convenientem, vel ad opus conveniens. In eodem vero sistit demum quo traxit. Operatio itaque vel opus habitui congruens motus ipsius, qui ex
rationis habitu nascitur, finis existit.

Restat operatio

ilia

quae ex

intelligentia

mentis exoritur,
prius
in se

quam ad finem certum referri necesse est. Mens enim quam agat, quod est per actionem paritura, concipit

'modo ('A' 'operatio

"in om.

WX

'naturae om.

'movere

WX

y
Y

'producit

y
Y

'consequentem

'illudA" ^tlom.WX 'operationis '*habeat

"procedit om.

78

Chapter 1
this

from

notion

it

acts

for the action

is

led towards the con-

ception.

So the conception is the action's end. The intelUgence acts either by knowing or by not knowing. If by not knowing, it isn't acting as the inteUigence, but as some life or substance, for knowing is proper to the intelligence. So the intelligence knows what it does, for what it does is to know. Can it will too?
Certainly
it

wills, for the intelligence isn't

forced to act. For

things are compelled

when they

are passive. Bodies are passive

and those things connected to bodies. But the intelligence is free of the body. Therefore the intelligence wills what it knows and does. But whoever desires something comes to rest in it as an end when he possesses it. So the action of the intelligence is directed to some end. For in so far as it understands, its end is the truth; in so far as it wills, its end is the good; in so far as it acts, its end is the beautiful. For the intelligence arranges all things according to number, weight and measure, mode, species and order. From this one infers that the operations of the nature, of the soul, of the reason and of the intelligence are directed by some ingenious and rational order to some proper end. They are not merely produced by matter's necessity, as Anaxagoras and Empedocles wanted; nor do they wander about without a definite end as the followers of Democritus and Epicurus
argued.
these views. For

Not only reason, but also the senses themselves refute we don't see the elements borne just anywhere,

but always to their proper places. Nor, in the case of animals and trees, do we see the parts of any of them joined at random;
the

but single things are always distinct in their own little parts and little parts are in turn so arranged that each seems created

always see in the earth's movements the same steady course is maintained, which also shows there is a definite end for everything and an ingenious rational principle is present. It shows there is one wise
for

the others'

sake.

And we

intelligence in

which can give a beginning to everything and establish an end, and can lead all movements to the end through the requisite intermediary stages, and bring them back to the beginning.

command,

the leader of

all

things,

Cap. I
atque ex ea notione

79

ipsa,

agit.

Actio enim' haec ad illud quod

conceptum est inducitur. Quare quod conceptum fuit actionis est finis. Aut enim intelligendo mens agit aut non intelligendo. Si non intelligendo non ut mens agit sed ut vita aliqua vel substantia. Nam proprium mentis intelligere est. Cognoscit ergo mens quod agit, agere enim ipsius cognoscere est. Utrum etiam velit? Vult certe. Non enim coacta mens agit; coguntur enim quae patiuntur. Patiuntur corpora et quae corporibus sunt coniuncta. Mens autem a corpore libera. Vult igitur mens quod intelligit atque agit. In eo vero quod quis appetit ut in fine
quiescit

cum

possidet.

Ad

finem

igitur

aliquem actio mentis

dirigitur.

quod intelligit finis eius est^ Veritas, quod vult finis est bonum, quod peragit finis pulchrum. Omnia enim mens in numero, pondere, et mensura, modo, specie et ordine

Nam

transigit.

Ex

his coUigitur et naturae {328r\ et

animae

et

rationis et

mentis operationes artificioso

et rationali

quodam

ordine ad

finem proprium dirigi, neque a materiae necessitate dumtaxat produci, ut Anaxagoras et Empedocles voluerunt, neque sine
certo fine vagari,
vere.

quod Democriti et Epicuri sectatores disputaQuos non ratio solum, sed et sensus ipsi redarguunt. Neque enim quocumque ferri elementa videmus, sed ad loca
propria semper; neque in animalibus
partes
et

arboribus cuiuscumque
singula
suis'

quibuscumque coniungi,

sed

semper
alterius

distincta particulis, easque invicem ita digestas ut

una

gratia genita videatur.

cernimus servari testatur rationemque*

Semperque eundem in mundi motibus tenorem quod et finem rebus adesse certum
inesse

praeesse sapientem, rerum

det cunctis, finem statuat,

artificiosam, mentem unam omnium ducem, quae et principium

motus omnes debita per media ad

referat.

finem

ferat,

ad principium

'autem f

A"

'eslom.Y

'fieri

'-qwom.

WX

80

Chapter!
is

Chapter 2. That there

an ultimate end to all actions.

all

Notwithstanding, perhaps someone will say

direct their

things always

movements to an end, but are ceaselessly going from one end to another. So what remains to be shown next is that an ultimate end is given to agents.' Surely, in the case of all things which act for an end, we call the ultimate end the one beyond
which the agent seeks nothing more, just as a doctor's activity
extends no further than getting you well again. But something
is

discovered in the activity of any agent beyond which the agent demands nothing more, otherwise actions would go on to infinity.

This

is

impossible, because, since nothing can pass through

*

an

infinite series,

nothing would ever start to

it is

act.

For nothing

is

moved towards something

the actions

impossible to reach. Besides, if

of any agent proceed to infinity, either some result will follow the actions, or no result. If some result, the substance of the result emerges after infinite actions. But what demands an infinite series before it can never exist, since one can 't pass through an infinite series. It can 't be and can 't become either. But the agent cannot make such a thing. So it is impossible for any agent to start to do something which demands infinite actions beforehand for its completion. However, if there is no result consequent on the actions, the disposition of the actions must be such that they either follow the order of the powers involved in acting, as when some man feels in order to think,
thinks in order to understand, understands in order to
will.

Or

they follow the series of the things constituting objects for us; for instance, if I look at the body in order to contemplate the

soul

itself,

but at the soul in order to contemplate the celestial

God Himself. But you can 't proceed to infinity with the powers involved in acting, just as you can 't with the forms of things, for the form is the principle of acting; nor can you with the things constituting objects for us. For things are not infinite, but (as we've shown elsewhere) the one is the principle of all. Consequently, actions cannot be extended to infinity. So there must be something [ultimate], and once it is obtained, each agent's drive ceases.
beings, but at these in order to contemplate

Cap. II

81
^

Quod sit finis omnium actionum

'

ultimus. Cap. II:

Ceterum'
sire.

dixerit forte

quispiam

res

omnes ad finem semper

suos motus dirigere, sed de alio fine in alium perpetuo pertran-

Quare deinceps ostendendum restat finem dari agentibus ultimum. Profecto in omnibus quae propter finem agunt, hunc esse finem ultimum dicimus ultra quem quod agit aliud nihil quaerit, quemadmodum actio medici usque ad sanitatem

Verum in actione agentis cuiuslibet aliquid reperitur ultra quod agens nihil exigit, alioquin actiones in infinitum progrederentur, quod quidem impossibile est, quia cum infinita
protenditur.
transire nihil possit nihil agere

umquam

inciperet.
est.

Nihil enim

ad

id

movetur ad quod pervenire impossibile

alicuius

agentis

actiones
{328v]

in

Praeterea si infinitum procedant, aut has

opus sequetur aut nullum. Si aliquod, substantia operis post infinitas actiones emergit; quod autem
actiones aliquod

ante se exigit infinita,

trans iri

esse

numquam^

potest

cum

infinita

non possint.^ Quod esse non potest nee potest fieri; id vero quod tale est agens ipsum efficere nequit. Quapropter impossibile est ut agens aliquod facere incipiat aliquid ad cuius expletionem actiones infinitae antea exiguntur. Sin autem opus
nullum actiones eas sequatur, oportet actionum huiusmodi dispositionem esse, vel secundum ordinem earum virium quae in agendo versantur, sicuti cum homo aliquis sentit ut cogitet,

secundum obiectarum nobis rerum seriem, velut si corpus intueor ut animum ipsum considerem, animum vero ut coelestia numina, haec autem ut
cogitat ut intelligat, intelligit ut velit; vel

Deum ipsum
neque enim
in

formis rerum, forma in rebus quae nobis obiciuntur, neque enim res infinitae sunt, sed unum omnium est principium ut alias ostendimus. Quo fit ut actiones in infinitum porrigi nequeant. Oportet igitur esse aliquid quo habito conatus
in
''

contempler. Procedi vero agendi virtutibus, sicut neque est agendi principium; neque

in infinitum

non potest,

agentis cuiusque desistat.

'omnium om. 'unquam

'no ch. break or heading

'possum

'ostendemus

WX

'certum

'incipiet

82 Again,

Chapter 2
in the case

of the things which act for an end, all those and the last end are the ends of the things preceding them and the principles of the things following them. So, if the agent's drive doesn't refer to something certain, but actions go on to infinity, the principles of acting will have to proceed to infinity. This is impossible, for whether you regard preceding or succeeding things, in no respect are they infinite. For if they were infinite according to a subsequent series, then every single thing you have possesses
things between the first agent
infinities

under

it.

Therefore

it is

the cause of infinities. Thereall

fore

it

has infinite power. Therefore

things are equal, for

if

infinities are

equal to each other. But

things are infinite

according to a preceding arrangement, whatever you have will be the result of infinite causes. Therefore it will preserve in itself
the countless powers of countless causes

thing will be infinite

and every possible and any effect will be equal to the cause, or

rather to infinite causes.

And

so, since

we

see effects are ex-

ceeded by their causes, we can't discover infinities either by going upwards or downwards. For this reason, Aristotle says,

we don't choose everything for the sake of another;' for in such a case we would go on to infinity and the result would be a vain
and
senseless greed. Therefore there's something

we want
[a]

for

its

own sake, and all the rest because of it.

Natural appetite
trying to
is

This

is

the ultimate end.

the necessary inclination of

fullness. Fullness

nature

and the ultimate end are the same. If the appetite has nowhere been given an ultimate end, but goes on from end to end endlessly, it can never be satisfied. So it tries to be satisfied in vain. Or rather, it will not even try at all; for no species of things will be moved towards that which is utterly impossible, since to be moved is to progress gradually from potentiality into act. Morever, there are two sorts of ends: one is the end of intention, the other of execution. But in either case something must come first. For what comes first from the point of view of intention is the principle which moves the appetite. When this has been taken away, the appetite won't be moved by anything. But that which is the execution's principle is what an operation

go from a want to

Cap. II

83

primum

quae propter finem agunt, omnia quae inter agens sunt fines quidem sunt praecedentium, principia vero sequentium. Quare si conatus agentis ad certum aliquid non refertur, sed in infinitum abeunt^ actiones,
Item
in his
et finem postremum
'

sibile est.

quod imposNullo enim pacto res infinitae sunt, neque si ad praecedentia respexeris, neque si [329r\ ad sequentia. Nam si secundum seriem subsequentem infinitae sint,^ tunc omne quodcumque ceperis infinita sub se habet; est igitur* infinitorum causa; vim itaque infinitam habet; idcirco paria omnia, infinita enim inter se paria. Sin autem secundum praecedentem ordinem infinitae res sint,* quicquid ceperis ab infinitis causis erit effectum; innumerabilium igitur causarum vires in se ipso servabit innumeras et* infinitum erit quodcumque et quilibet effectus causae
oportet agendi principia in infinitum procedere
par,
sis

immo infinitis par causis. Ideoque cum opera excedi a cauvideamus, neque ascendendo neque descendendo infinita possumus reperire. Hinc' Aristoteles: non omnia propter aliud
exoptamus;
sic

enim

in infinitum foret progressus

vanaque

et

stuita resultaret cupiditas.

Ideo

est aliquid

quod propter

se volu-

mus et cetera propter ipsum.

Appetitus enim* naturalis
indigentia

Is est finis

ultimus.

est necessaria

naturae inclinatio ab

ultimus

quadam adnitens ad plenitudinem. Plenitudo ac finis idem. Si nusquam ultimus huic praescriptus est finis sed

de fine in finem absque fine progreditur,

potest. Frustra igitur conatur impleri;

numquam impleri immo neque conabitur

quidem

enim rerum species ad id quod penitus movebitur,' siquidem moveri est a potentia in actum progredi paulatim.
ullo

modo,

nulla

impossible

est

Accedit ad haec quod duplex est in finibus ordo: intentionis

utroque autem ordine primum quod enim primum est in ipso intentionis ordine principium est quod appetitum movet.' Subtracto autem principio appetitus a nullo movebitur. Quod vero in exequendo principium est id est unde operatio incipit, quo
unus, executionis
alter.

In

aliquid esse oportet;

'effectivaot/d. H^
'in

add.

'abebunt 'Hinc om.

"monci {or possibly mAnel)

WX

'snntWX
'enim om.

WX

'trgoWX
movetur

WX

'sunt

84

Chapter 2

it, nobody can begin to do anyBut the intention's principle is the ultimate end. The execution's principle is the principle of those things contributing to the end. So in neither case can we proceed to infinity. For if there were no ultimate end, absolutely nothing would be desired: there would be no Hmit to an operation, and no agent's intention would come to rest. But if there were no first thing in the case of the things contributing towards the end, nobody would begin to do anything; nor would there be any limit to deliberation, but you would go on deliberating for ever. Next, the desire in things for some end is either there as a result of chance, usage or nature. It isn't there by chance, as it would rarely happen, nor only as a result of usage, since present in men before all usage is at least the desire for the things which we become used to afterwards. Therefore it is naturally there. In fact, what is always present to all things comes from the species and from nature, so from that which is the principle of nature and the species, that is, God. For nature, as Plato says in the Statesman^ is either God's art or God's instrument of art.* Therefore the appetite has not been given in vain; so sometime it will come to rest; so it attains the ultimate end. For the king who is wise and good doesn't give orders or move in vain, but God impels all things through the appetite. If we don't go on to infinity with the grades of forms, of materials, of agents but arrive at the highest grade, we shall certainly not proceed endlessly with ends but arrive at the highest end. But the highest end is the ultimate end in which the entire rational principle of the end can exist. So whoever takes away the ultimate end from ends, takes away the nature of the end from ends. But if there is a first factor with agents, there is a last factor with ends. For the agents act for its sake. Therefore

begins from. If you remove

thing.

the first agent does everything for

its

sake. Therefore

it's

the

ultimate end of

all.

Aristotle says in the Metaphysics

Book

III

that those

who

take

away the end from things and create infinity are taking away the nature of the good, for the good contains the rational principle of the end and the end contains the rational principle

'

Cap. II
subtracto operari aliquid nuUus [329v] inciperet.

85

Principiuiri

autem

intentionis est finis ultimus; executionis principium est

eorum quae ad finem sunt principium. Atque ita neutra ex parte in infinitum progredi possumus; nam si ultimus non esset finis,
nihil prorsus appeteretur,

nee operationi uUus esset terminus,

nee agentis alicuius intentio conquiesceret. Si autem non esset aliquid in his quae sunt ad finem primum, operari aliquid nullus
inciperet;

neque terminus

esset ullus consilii, sed ulterius

semper

consultaretur.

Adde quod

appetitio finis

cuiusdam

in rebus aut casu est aut

non usu tantum quoniam^ ante omnem' usum inest hominibus appetitus saltem ad ea in quibus post adsuescimus. Ergo natura; etenim quod inest omnibus et semper a specie est atque natura, ergo ab eo quod est naturae et speciei principium, id* est Deus. Natura enim ut dicit Plato in Politico vel Dei ars est' vel artificiosum Dei organum. Ergo non frustra datus est appetitus;' ergo quiescet quandoque; ergo ultimum consequitur finem. Non enim frustra praecipit et movet rex sapiens atque bonus,' Deus autem per appetitum concitat omnia. *Si in gradibus formarum materiarum agentium non progredimur in infinitum, sed pervenimus ad summum, quanto magis in finibus non procedimus absque fine, sed ad summum pervecasu, quia raro contingeret;

usu aut natura.

Non

nimus.

Summus
Quod

finis est finis

ultimus, in

quo

sit

tota ratio finis.

Sic qui aufert in finibus finem

ram

finis.

si

est in

mum. Agentia enim

*Aristoteles
tertio

sui

ultimum hie finibus aufert natuagentibus primum, est in finibus ultigratia agunt. Ergo agens primum sui

gratia agit omnia; ergo illud est ultimus

omnium
dicit,
'

finis.

metaphysicorum'

finem" rebus

et faciunt infinitatem, hi

Nam et bonum habet rationem finis contra rationem boni et finis est quod procedatur in infinitum. Praeterea** quemadmodum se habet quaeque ars ad

qui auferunt auferunt naturam boni. et finis rationem boni. Ergo

*est

'consulereturA' appetitus om.

WX

'MctaphysicaeA"

'quia 'A' 'communem y 'atque bonus o/n. '"qaoA add. "in add.

'illud

WX

A'

'Praeterea aJc/.

'csiom.WX

*-**om. IV

86

Chapters
is

of the good/ Therefore to proceed to infinity rational principle of the good and the end.
Besides, just as each art
is

contrary to the

related to

its

appropriate end, so

whose parts are in a way the arts, is related to a universal end. But individual arts reach an ultimate point, at which point they are perfected and beyond which their functioning and effort do not extend; for instance, medicine has health, the art of war has victory. So each life looks to some universal ultimate good by which it can be perfected. The ultimate end is the good which is the principle of movement in desire. So whatever moves the appetite moves it through the power and grace of the ultimate end, even if we aren't aware of it. If there weren't somewhere an ultimate end to intention, what moves the appetite wouldn't be anywhere, since one can't transcend an infinite series. So the influence of the good will not reach as far as the appetite if it goes from one good to another without end. Again, what desires, desires as an end either some result or operation, and the steps of each are infinite and terminate in the highest step. The highest step will be the ultimate end of the
the universal art of living,
appetite.

Chapter 3. The end of all actions

is

the good.

Now we have shown there is an end to all actions and there is

some ultimate end, we will show what this end is.^ But the end for whose sake all things operate is the good. For what is moved (as we said above) is not moved indifferently towards anything, but to something appropriate and suitable to it; for it isn't moved towards it, unless it has some agreement with it. But what is appropriate and suitable to each thing is the good for it. Again, the end is in what the mover's appetite and the appetite of what's moved come to rest. But the rational principle of the good is that it can satisfy the appetite. For the good is what all desire. So every movement leads towards the good. Moreover, in a way every action and movement seem to be

moved towards being itself: either in order

to preserve the being

Cap. Ill

87
ars vivendi, cuiiis
se

proprium
partes

[330r\ sibi finem, ita et

communis

quodammodo

artes sunt,

ad

communem

finem habet.

quiddam habent quo perficiuntur earum officium laborque non extenditur, ceu et ultra quod medicina sanitatem, res militaris victoriam. Omnis igitur vita ad ultimum quiddam respicit commune bonum quo perficiatur. * Finis ultimus est illud bonum' quod est principium motus in
Singulae vero artes extremum

appetendo, ita ut quicquid mo vet appetitum eius vi et gratia moveat, etiamsi nequaquam animadvertamus. Si nusquam sit finis intentionis ultimus, nusquam erit quod moveat appetitum, quia infinita non transeuntur. Ideo influxus boni non pertinget

usque ad appetitum, si de bono in bonum abeatur sine fine. Item quod appetit vel appetit tamquam finem opus aliquod vel operationem,^ utriusque gradus sunt finiti et terminantur ad summum gradum. Summus gradus erit finis ultimus appetitus.**

Finis

omnium actionum est bonum.

Cap.

III.

'

Postquam finem esse omnium actionum et ultimum aliquem esse finem ostendimus, quis iste finis sit monstrabimus. Est autem finis cuius gratia omnia operantur bonum; quod enim movetur (ut supra diximus) non ad quodlibet* aeque, sed ad proprium aliquid fertur sibique conveniens; neque enim ad
illud, nisi

Quod autem^ proprium

bonum.
Item finis est
in

propter aliquam cum eo convenientiam moveretur. cuique est atque conveniens id cuique

quo

appetitio eius

quod movet eiusque quod

motus ad

movetur

quiescit.

Ratio autem boni est ut appetitum^ impleat.

Nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Omnis itaque

bonum ducit.
Quin etiam omnis
actio atque

dammodo
'bonum om. Y

esse quosingulorum vel speciei ferri videntur, vel ut esse

motus ad ipsum

'vel

operationem om.

'2^x\cmom.WX

om.

Pfrag.

'no ch. heading or break I (17r) begins

'quolibet

88

Chapter 4
to reacquire

of individual things or of the species, or in order But this, which is being itself, is the good.
In addition, every action
perfection. For, if the action itself

it.

and movement turn towards some

is the end, obviously it is a second perfection of the agent. But if the action is the transmutation of external matter, obviously the mover is trying to introduce some perfection into what is being moved. But we say to be perfect is to be good. Again, every agent acts according as it is itself in act. But in acting it aims at something like itself So it aims at some act. But every act contains the rational principle of the good; for the bad isn 't found anywhere except in that potentiality where act is

missing.

Again, what avoids one opposite, necessarily follows the But everything always avoids the bad as far as it can. So everything follows the good. Next, just as we move away from a lower place with the same motion as we seek out a higher, so it
other.
is the same thing too that makes us avoid the bad and follow the good. But everything avoids the bad. For things that can think move away from something because they think it is harmful or bad, and things that can't think and are just naturally impelled move away from unpleasant places and seek out pleasant ones, avoiding things which are opposite to them and looking for things like them. So it is with the same impulse that everything

abhors the bad and seeks the good.

Chapter 4. What the good is; or that above the body is the above the soul the intellect, above this the one itself and the good.
soul,

Having said the end towards which everything is moved is the good, obviously we ought now to show what the good is. The entire structure of the world consists of multiplicity and unity, because it consists of many things which have been bound together by continuity, contiguity, similarity, equahty, suitability. If there were no union in the world's many parts, they wouldn't

Cap.
servetur, vel

IV

89
est esse

denuo acquiratur. Hoc autem ipsum quod

actio

bonum est. Adde quod omnis

motusque ad aliquant vergit perfectionem. Si enim ipsa actio sit finis, patet quod secunda agentis ipsius perfectio est. Sin autem actio exterioris materiae transmutatio est, patet quod perfect ionem aiiquam in eo quod movetur ipsum quod movet inducere nititur; hoc autem dicimus esse

bonum quod est esse perfectum. Item omne agens ut^ actu est agit. Agendo autem
sibi simile tendit;

in aliquid^

[330v] igitur aliquem in

actum

tendit.

Actus

autem omnis boni rationem habet.

ritur, nisi in

Nam malum nusquam repefugit^

ea cui deest actus potentia.

Item quod contrarium

alterum.

unum

necessario

sequitur

Omnia vero semper quoad possunt malum fugiunt. Omnia itaque bonum sequuntur. Porro sicut idem motus est

quo locum inferiorem fugimus et quo superiorem petimus, ita et idem quo a malo declinamus, bonum sequimur.* Malum vero fugiunt omnia. Nam quae cognitione moventur, quia pernicio-

sum malumque aliquid putant,

ideo fugiunt; quaeve natura sine

cognitione feruntur loca sibi noxia fugiunt, convenientia petunt,

contraria v it ant, similia quae runt.

Eodem

itaque nixu et

malum

horrent omnia et

bonum expetunt.

intellectus,

Quid bonum, quodve supra corpus anima, super animam super hunc est ipsum unum atque bonum.
Cap. IV.'

Postquam finem ad quern moventur omnia bonum esse diximus, quid ipsum bonum sit declarandum iam esse videtur. Universa mundi machina ex multitudine constat et unitate, quia
ex multis rebus quae unitae* sunt continuitate, contiguitate,
similitudine, aequalitate, convenientia. Si nulla esset unio in

'aut H^

'aWquid om.
c. Ill;

Quid bonum,

in

WXP X and P

'facit

>f
sit

'sequitur

J*'

'ch.

heading in

W reads

it

reads Quid

bonum,

c.

IV

'multae

XP

90

Chapter 4
in all directions;

remain together, but be scattered

nor would

there be any conformity in shape or quality or in anything else.

So there is unity in the plurality of things. Because the unity is in another, it is also from another. It doesn't come from a compound thing, because it is the function of the simple and the one
to give unity.

Nor again is that unity otherwise we shall go on to infinity.

Again,
all

in its turn in another,

the multiplicity of things which

it

we

see participates

in

some

unity. For, if

didn't, this, the universal genus of

things, wouldn't be one, nor

any part of

it

one.

It

would be

made from

various things and these in turn from other things

infinity;

and any of the things would be an utterly each would not participate in the one itself in any way (neither the whole of each nor any part of each), each would be utterly and entirely infinite. Next, any individual thing you take will either be one or not one. If it isn't
and so on to
infinite multiplicity, for, since

one,

it

will either

be

many

or nothing. But
is

if

individual things

But if it's many, anything will consist infinitely of infinities. However, these are impossibilities; for nothing consists infinitely of infinities for nothing is bigger than the infinite. But what is made from all things is bigger than individual things. Nor is something made from nothing. Consequently, the entire plurality of things
are nothing, the totality
also nothing.
participates in unity.

Therefore the one exists above all multiplicity. For, if the before the one, the one would participate in multiplicity and wouldn't be one; on the other hand the many above the one wouldn't participate in the one at all, since the many

many came

would be
isn't

existing prior to

the one
the
it,

itself.

However,

it

is

impossible for any multiplicity to be without the one. So there

many
is

before the one. But

if

many

coexists with the

one and
of what
neither

naturally arranged with

the one will not be the

many because of what it is; nor will the many be the one because
it is,

(since they are mutually different

and contrary

as

is

prior or posterior to the other). Accordingly, the

many

won't participate in the one in any way; which is impossible, for it would be infinitely infinite. So the many must be one and

Cap.
multis

IV

91

mundi

partibus, neque simul starent, sed spargerentur;'

neque

in figura vel qualitate vel in aliqua

cum

aliquibus cong-

rerum numero unitas, quae quia in alio est, est^ et ab alio. Non a composito quodam, quia unitatem dare unius est simplicisque officium; neque in alio est iterum, hoc est
ruerent. Ideo est in

ne in infinitum eatur. Item omnis haec

unitatis alicuius est

cernimus multitudo [33 Ir] rerum particeps. Nam si nuUius, neque universum

quam

hoc rerum genus unum esset, neque aliqua eius pars unum, sed ipsum ex aliquibus erit, illaque rursus ex aliis in infinitum,

horumque quodlibet multitudo

nullo

erit

penitus infinita.

Nam cum

modo

ipsius unius

sit

pars aliqua,

omnino

et

neque totum ipsum neque secundum omne infinitum erit. Porro

particeps,

unum erit vel non unum. Si non unum, vel multa vel nihil. Verum si singula nihil, totum quoque nihil. Sin multa, quodHbet ex infinitis infinite constabit. Haec autem impossibilia sunt, neque enim ex infinite infinitis quicquam constat. Nam nihil infinito maius. Quod vero ex omnibus constituitur singuHs maius est. Neque ex nihilo quicquam conficitur. Quo concluditur omnem hunc rerum
quicquid singulorum acceperis vel

numerum
Igitur

unitatis esse participem.

omnem multitudinem unum existit. Nam si unum esset, unum quidem multitudine participaret, neque esset unum. Multitudo vero quae supra unum est nullo modo esset unius particeps, siquidem, antequam unum
super

multitudo ante

ipsum sit, multitudo haec existeret. Impossibile autem est multitudinem esse aliquam unius expertem. Non est igitur multitudo ante unum. Sin autem simul cum uno sit cumque illo secundum naturam coordinata, neque unum secundum se ipsum multa erit, neque multitudo secundum se unum, quippe cum contra se invicem discreta sint, siquidem neutrum altero prius est aut posterius. Quare multitudo nullo modo unius erit particeps, quod impossibile est, esset enim infinite infinita. Quare necesse est ut
[331v] multitudo

unum

sit et

quicquid in ea est

sit

unum. Sin

'dispergerentur

WXP

'est

om.

XP

92 whatever
in the

Chapter 4

is

many must be
many,

one. But

if

the one doesn't

will

naturally participate in the

at least the

many

be sub-

sequent to the one, participating in the one, but in no

participated in by the one. But
if

way

the one participates in the

be one from the point of view of its own substance, but not be one from the point of view of its participation; it will be a united many. In which case the one will communicate with the many and the many with the one. But if things which agree and communicate with each other are joined together by another, they exist subsequent to that other. If, however, they join themselves, they aren't mutually opposed; for things which are

many,

it

will

mutually opposed do not seek each other. However, if there is something prior to them, which can join them together, it is either the one, or not the one. If it is not the one, it is either the many or nothing. Yet it is not the many, otherwise the many
will

be prior to the one.

And

it

isn't
it is

nothing; for

how would

it

join other things together? So

the one alone; for the one

cannot be at the same time the many as well, otherwise we would go on to infinity. So there is something which is one because of itself and outside the multiplicity of all things; from it all multiplicity proceeds. In fact, this is the principle of all things. Nobody should maintain, as the Manicheans and Gnostics maintain, that there are two principles both of which are one, for from two ones is the number two.' Unity comes before all number. Again, either the entire power which is in the one is in the other too; or more of it is in the one than in the other. If the entire power is in them both, they are identical and one of them is enough. If more is in one of them, that one is the principle, the other is subordinate to it. Again, either the total perfection is in each principle, or a part of it is in each. If the total, one is enough; if a part, each is imperfect. So above them both will be what is perfect. Again, either they agree entirely or not at all or partially. If entirely, they are one thing. If not at all, they won't
agree in the fact that each
there
is is

one nature in
in each

common

a principle. If they agree and differ, in each of them beyond their

is

individual differences.

So each one

compound and
is

the unity

which

is

one, being in another,

from another,

Cap.

IV

93

erit

autem ipsum secundum se unum multitudine non participat, utique multitudo uno posterior, participans quidem uno, nullo modo ab uno participata. Quod si unum est multitudinis particeps secundum substantiam suam unum erit, secundum participationem vero non unum, eritque multitudo quaedam unita. Quare et unum cum multitudine et multitudo cum uno communicabit. Quae vero congrediuntur communicantque vicissim, si ab alio copulantur, post illud existunt. Sin autem
ipsa se iungunt,

quae opposita inter

nequaquam sibi invicem *opponuntur. Nam se sunt baud se invicem** expetunt. At vero siquid est ante ipsa quod ea invicem copulet aut unum est' aut non unum. Si non unum, vel multa est vel nihil. Non tamen multa est, ne ante unum multitudo sit; nee etiam nihil. Nam quo pacto alia iungeret^? Unum itaque solum. Neque enim et hoc

unum
a

simul

erit et

multa, ne in infinitum progrediamur. Est

itaque aliquid per se

unum

extra rerum multitudinem

omnium,

quo omnis multitudo

est.

procedit.

Quod quidem

principium

omnium

Neque dixerit quispiam quod Manichaei et Gnostici dicunt duo esse principia, quorum quodhbet unum est. Nam' ex duobus unis est duitas numerus. Ante omnem numerum est unitas. Item vel tota vis quae in uno est, est et in alio, vel maior in uno quam in* alio. Si tota, idem sunt et unum sufficit. Si maior, in quo
maior
illud

principium

est,

aliud vero sub eo. Item vel tota

perfectio in utroque vel pars in utroque. Si tota,

Si pars,

unum

sufficit.

utrumque imperfectum. Supra utrumque igitur erit' quod perfectum. Item vel omnino conveniunt [332r\ vel nullo modo vel partim. Si omnino, unum sunt. Si nullo modo, neque convenient in hoc,' quod utrumque principium sit. Si conveniunt et differunt,^ una communis natura est in utroque praeter
proprias

utriusque
et unitas

differentias.

Compositum

igitur

est*

utrumque

quae

est' in utrisque,

quia in alio

est, est

ab

'es\om.W
'haecr

Mungit
'dicunt ff

'Nam o/n.
'estom.

H'

'inom.Y
'estom.

'ent repeated

-**om.

94
[namely] the one which
agree in having the

Chapter 4
is

above them both. Or rather, as they

reason
is

common reason of a principle, one

principle.
is

what makes each one a

But because of

their

individual differences neither

the universal principle, since

through the difference each differs from the other principle. So

in so far as they are a principle they are one; therefore they

ought to be reduced to one principle.

to itself

We call it one with respect

it is

and

to others: with respect to itself, because

com-

were it to have plurality of parts, its power would be diffused through the many. (But the most unitary power is the most perfect.) So it wouldn't be stronger than every other power. Rather it would be deficient, for it would need parts to depend on. So it wouldn't be totally sufficient, nor totally happy, for it wouldn't be enjoying itself completely as it wouldn't be wholly converted to the whole. The one is called one with respect to others, because it doesn't share the reason for its being a principle with anyone. Besides, just as individual orders of things are related to their
pletely simple; for

own principles,
principle.
species.

so the universal order

is

related to the universal

But

all

individual orders are led back to

is

some one

So the whole order of nature

suffices for a body,

led

back to the one

principle.

One soul

one master for a household, one

king for one state

light,

won't one God suffice for one world? From

comes all heat, from the sun's one light all from the one good all good things. All bodies fall under the world's one body, all natures under one nature, all souls under one soul, all intelligences under one intelHgence. But the good and the one is every single one of these. So all good things and all things that are one fall under the one good, just as all numbers can be reduced to unity. So the one is the principle of all. For each order, because it is unified in itself in so far as the single members are of the same order, comes from the one above the order. For the unity of an order doesn't proceed from some one member of the order; for it would be peculiar to that member, and wouldn't be appropriate to all the members. So it comes from the one above the order, which is the first of its
the fire's one heat

Cap.

IV

95

uno quod super utrumque. Immo vero cum in commurii ratione principii conveniant,' una ratio est qua utrumque est principium. Secundum vero proprias differentias neutrum
alio,

omnium

est

principium

cum per illam ab

alio principio differat.

Qua^ ergo principium sunt unum sunt, ad unum ergo principium reducendum. Quod unum vocamus respectu sui et aliorum; sui quia simplicissimum, si enim habet numerum partium, vim habet diffusam per multa. Vis autem unitissima perfecergo esset omni' alia vi potentius, immo esset indigum. Nam partibus egeret quibus dependeat/ Non ergo sufficientissimum, neque esset beatissimum;' non enim* se
tissima.

Non

omnino

frueretur, quia

tu alterius^ dicitur

non totum in totum conversum. Respecunum, quia in ratione principii non habet

comitem.
principia, sic universus

Praeterea sicut se habent singuli rerum ordines ad propria sui ordo ad universale principium. Sed

illi ad unam quandam speciem reducuntur. Quare et omnis ordo naturae ad principium unum. Uni corpori una sufficit anima, uni domui unus dominus, civitati uni rex unus, uni vero mundo Deus non sufficiet unus? Ab uno ignis calore omnes calores, ab una solis* luce omnia lumina, ab uno bono omnia bona. Omnia corpora ad unum mundi corpus; omnes naturae ad naturam unam; [332v] omnes animae ad unam animam; omnes mentes ad unam mentem.

omnes

Bonum

vero

et

unum unumquodque
sicut

istorum

est,

ergo omnia

bona et una ad unum bonum,

numeri omnes ad unitatem. Unum ergo omnium est principium. Omnis enim ordo quia in se habet unionem in quantum singula eiusdem sunt ordinis ab uno est supra ordinem. Nam unio ordinis non ab uno quodam ordinis est,' esset enim' illius proprium neque omnibus conveniret. Ergo ab uno supra ordinem quod est primo tale, ideo

conveniat y *a\\mom.WXP

'quiaA'P
'alicuiusA'P

'non f

'dependet ('A'P

'sola If

*es\.om.W

'qmiadd. WXP "enim om. y

96

Chapter 4
kind.
if

So the principle of good some good entity or good soul were the good, it wouldn't be the absolute good or the integral good, but good only according to the capacity of its companion. So it wouldn't be the first; for the first of a kind is absolute and integral. Therefore the first good, the first one, is nothing else but good and one.
kind, therefore nothing but
is its

things

the

good alone; because,

is nothing. But would be participating in something higher and wouldn't be one but many. So the principle of all things is the same as the one in itself. This isn't the body, as the Democritians maintain, for a body

In fact, the principle

is

that above which there

it;

the one itself has nothing above

for

it

parts. Nor is it the corporeal quality, as Strato mainwhich is coextensive with the body's parts.'" Nor is it the soul, as Varro maintains," since the soul participates through its powers and operations in multipUcity. For through one power it understands, through another it acts; for it does many things unconsciously and understands many things without doing anything. Nor is it the intelligence, as Anaxagoras maintains,'^ for the intelligence acts in order to understand itself. So in the intelligence there is what understands, understanding, and the thing understood. Nor is it Hfe, as Zeno maintains," for life is the movement of essence. So in hfe there are at least two things to be and to be moved. Nor is it essence itself, as David of Dinant says,'" for all things participate in the one, but not all in essence. For fluxes and privations don't have essence, but

has

many

tains,

nobody denies they are one. Nor is it being itself, as Alfarabi and Avicebron maintain," for being is the act of essence and
the participation of essence in the present says in the Parmenides.^^ But
if

moment,

as Plato

the one and being were the

same, perhaps multipHcity and nothing would be the same. So you wouldn't find any multiplicity in things. Again, being is just as appropriate to an army as to a house, but it has less of the one in it. So being is one thing, the one another. So either these are equal, or being is above the one, or the one is above being. If they are equal, being is without the one, so the class of things existing under being will also be without the one.

Cap.
nihil aliud est

IV

97

quam tale, ut bonorum principium sit' solum bonum; quia si bonum ens vel bona anima esset bonum, hoc^ non absolutum bonum, et esset bonum non integrum sed pro socii captu; ergo non primum.^ Primum enim absolutum est et integrum; primum ergo bonum, primum unum, nihil aliud est quam bonum et* quam unum. Principium sane id est supra quod est nihil. Ipsum vero unum
supra se nihil habet. Nam superiori participaret, essetque plura non unum. Idem ergo est principium omnium et ipsum per se

unum.

Quod quidem corpus non est, ut Democritii dicunt, multas enim corpus habet partes. Neque corporis qualitas, ut Straton, quae cum corporis partibus est extensa. Neque anima, ut Varro, quippe cum et in viribus et in operationibus anima sit multitudinis particeps, alia enim potentia cognoscit alia facit, facit enim multa non cognoscendo et' cognoscit multa non agendo. Neque mens, ut Anaxagoras, mentis enim actio est ut se ipsam intelligat; est igitur in

mente quod intelligit intellectioque et quod intelligitur. Neque vita, ut Zenon, est enim vita motus essentiae, in ea igitur {333r\ duo sunt saltem et esse scilicet et moveri. Neque essentia ipsa, ut Dinantes, nam uno quidem participant omnia, essentia vero non omnia; fluxus enim privationesque essentiam nullam habent, unum tamen esse non negantur. Neque ipsum esse, ut Alpharabius et Avicebron, est enim actus
essentiae et essentiae

cum

praesenti

momento

participatio, ut in

Parmenide dicit Plato. Quin immo si idem esset unum atque esse, idem forsan* esset multitudo atque nihil, itaque^ nulla forsan* multitudo in rebus inveniretur. Item non minus esse competit exercitui quam domui, minus tamen iUi unum convenit. Aliud itaque esse, ahud unum.

Aut ergo

paria haec sunt, aut esse super

unum, aut unum

et

super esse. Si paria sunt, esse unius est expers, ergo

rerum

'sito/n.

'forsan om.

WXP WXP

'huiusA^P 'Atque

ita

WXP

'principium y 'etom. 'forsan om.

WXP

'cto/n.

98

Chapter 4
if

being is above the one, the one will participate in being and won't be one but many. But being will be without the one, so it will either be nothing or an infinite plurality. But unity exists above all plurality. There is nothing above unity, for it wouldn't be unity. So the first principle of all things is the same as the one itself. What exists above the body, soul, intelligence, hfe, and essence is nothing other than the one, which '^ Plato's Parmenides indeed tells us. Moreover, you can learn from the Laws Book 10 that above all bodies is the essence of the soul itself, above all souls is the intelligence, above all intelligences is the one itself.'* For each body is moved by something else: it can't naturally move itself. But because of the soul's participation it is virtually moved by itself, and it lives through the soul. When the soul is present, in a way the body moves itself; but when the soul is absent, it is only moved by another (since it doesn't have this nature in itself and the soul possesses the substance which moves itself). For to whatever body the soul is present it imparts the power to move itself. But what imparts [this power] to others by its mere presence, exists prior to them and more totally than they. So the soul is above bodies, that is, the soul which can move itself because of its essence is above those things which become selfmoving because of participation.

But

itself

which

Again, the soul, seeing it is self-moving, belongs to the class is second to the nature whose essence and operation are motionless. Indeed, what moves itself comes before everything which is moved by another, but what is motionless before all moving things. So, if the soul, being moved by itself, moves others, there must be something before the soul which moves
others and
is

motionless. But the intelligence

steadfast

motionless;
ability to

it is

and always operates

in the

moves and is same ways.

In fact, through the intelligence the soul always possesses the

move

understand, just as through the soul the body can itself. For if the understanding were always first present

it would be appropriate to all souls, Hke self-moving. So the understanding is not first present in the soul. So that which is primarily understanding must be above the soul. This is

in the soul,

Cap.

IV

99

ordo sub eo existentium expers

erit

unius. Sin esse' super unum',

non unum sed autem unius expers erit, quare aut nihil erit aut numerus infinitus. Supra vero omnem numerum unitas extat, supra unitatem nihil, non enim unitas esset. Idem igitur primum rerum principium est et ipsum unum. Quod supra corpus, animam, mentem, vitam, essentiamque existit neque aliud quicquam est quam unum, quod quidem ex Parmenide Platonis Hbro colligi potest. Praeterea sic ex decimo Legum colligi potest: supra^ corpora omnia est animae ipsius essentia; supra' omnes animas mens; supra mentes omnes ipsum unum. Omne enim corpus ab alio quodam movetur. Movere autem se ipsum natura sua non

unum quidem
plura, esse

ipso esse participabit eritque

potest,

sed propter animae* participationem ferme' se ipso

movetur vivitque per animam. Et praesente quidem anima se ipsum movet quodammodo, {333v] absente vero ab alio dumtaxat movetur, utpote quod hanc ex se ipso naturam non' habeat et anima substantiam sese moventem possideat. Nam cuicumque adest vim ad se ipsum movendum impertit; quod autem ipso esse impertit aliis, hoc ipsa multo prius magisque existit. Est igitur supra corpora, tamquam quae se ipsam movere potest secundum essentiam supra ilia quae secundum
participationem talia fiunt.'

Rursus anima quoniam a* se ipsa movetur secundum obtinet ordinem ad eam naturam cuius et essentia et operatio est immobilis. Nempe omnibus agitatis praecedit quod se ipsum movet, omnibus autem moventibus quod immobile. Si igitur anima a se ipsa mota, movet alia, oportet ante ipsam esse quod immobile movet. Mens autem movet immobilis perseverans et semper secundum eadem operans. Etenim anima per mentem habet quod semper intelligat, sicuti corpus propter animam quod sese moveat. Si enim inesset animae semper intelligere primum, omnibus competeret animis, quemadmodum sese movere. Non igitur animae hoc primum inest. Oportet itaque ante ipsam esse

'esset

'super f

'super

JfAP
xv

non om.

WXP

'cf.

De amore

VI.

'animiP om. WXP

'icrmt om.

WXP

100

Chapter 4

confirmed from the beginning as follows. Since the body is quantity only because of matter and is divided only because of quantity, it follows it can be passive not active. So since bodies are seen to act, they act because of another. Is it perhaps because of quality which in itself is incorporeal (since many qualities can exist in the same body)? But quality is not through itself the principle of action. For what doesn't exist through itself, doesn't act through itself. Therefore one must turn towards an incorporeal something which can subsist through itself and can't be divided with the body. The soul will be like this. Because it is turned back towards itself, it subsists through itself. The power to act and so to move will be present in bodies from the soul. So every act and movement of bodily objects is from the soul, which is an incorporeal essence joined to but not mixed with the body, connected to but not dispersed through it. Above the soul is the intelligence. It is both an incorporeal essence and is entirely cut off from the body, so it has nothing in common with the body. The intelligence stays the same in essence and operation; the body changes in both; the soul stays the same in essence but changes in operation. The intelligence is completely in eternity; the body is in time; the soul is in both. The intelligence moves, is not moved; matter is moved, does not move; the body moves, moved by another; the soul moves, moved by itself. So the intelligence and matter are extremes, but the body and soul intermediaries.
all

made from matter and has

The body
gence.

inclines

more

to matter, the soul

itself is

more

to the

intelli-

When we

say the soul by

moved, we mean the

say the
intelli-

verb intransitively not transitively (as

when we

gence remains still, the sun shines, the fire is hot). " For one part of the soul doesn't move while another part is moved, but the whole soul is moved by itself: that is, it runs to and fro and brings to completion by means of time's intervals the works of nutrition, growth and reproduction, the products of reasoning and cogitation. The inteUigence acts, but in eternity; the soul acts, but in time. What is the soul's movement? Action in time. And as the first action in time is in the soul, consequently the
first

movement is in the soul, and in the

soul's rational principle

Cap.

IV
*Id

101

quod

primo

est

intelligens.

totum'

sic

ab^

initib

confirmatur.

Cum

corpus ex materia constet

et quantitatem'**

ratione materiae

solum

capiat, et' ratione quantitatis

solum

dividatur, sequitur ut per haec pati possit

non

agere. Siquidem'

ergo agere videntur corpora, per aliud agunt, forte per qualitatem quae ex se^ est incorporea, cum plurimae sint eodem in corpore qualitates. Sed neque qualitas est per se principium actionis;

ad incorporale aliquid
sit

quod enim non est per se, per se non agit. Eundum igitur est quod per se subsistat neque cum corpore
erit

anima, quae quia ad se convertitur per se subsistit. Ab ea inerit vis agendi corporibus, ergo et vis movendi. Omnis ergo actus et motus corporum est ab anima, quae essentia incorporalis est, unita corpori non commixta, coniuncta non dispersa. Supra quam est et mens, et essentia incorporalis et a corpore penitus separata. Ideo nihil habet commune cum corpore. Ilia stat essentia et operatione; corpus
divisum, talisque

omnino anima in utroque. Ilia movet in* aeternitate; corpus in tempore; non movetur; materia movetur non movet; corpus movet ab alio motum; anima movet a se mota. Ergo et mens et materia sunt extrema; media vero corpus et anima. Hoc ad materiam declinat magis; anima magis ad mentem. Cum dicimus animam se ipsa moved, absolute non transitive verbum illud proferimus, ut cum stare mentem, lucere solem, calere ignem. Non enim pars animae movet pars movetur, sed tota ex se ipsa movetur, id est, discurrit, transigit per temporum intervalla nutritionis augutroque
fluit;

anima

essentia stat, operatione fluit. Ilia

menti generationis opera, rationis et' cogitationis discursiones. **Agit mens sed cum aeternitate; agit anima sed cum tempore. Quid motus animae? Actio cum tempore, et quia prima actio cum tempore est in anima, ideo primus motus in anima et est in ea ratione sui in quantum iam a statu mentis degenerat.***

'hcrumAP
'siquidAT

'alio

adrf.AP

'quantitatc A7>

'seseP

'mom. Y

'etom.

'ttadd.XP 'elom.XP om. W(cont.)

om.XP(cont.)

102

Chapters
it

to the extent

has already degenerated from the unchanging

condition of the inteUigence. Therefore

movement

is

naturally

present to the soul. So the soul exists as the principle of move-

ment. Therefore the intelligence precedes the soul.

But the one

itself exists

above the inteUigence,

still it

for,

although

the inteUigence doesn't move,

isn't the

one; for the inteUiitself.

gence understands
all

itself

and operates with regard to

Now
all

participate in the one, whatever their condition, but not

participate in the intelligence; for the intelligence's participation

is

intelligence itself
ing.

proper to whatever has to participate in knowing, since the is the principle and the prime cause of know-

Again, the power of the one reaches as far as privations and matter, for they are one, but not the power of the intelligence, because the intelligence is the species and acts with the species (so it only acts upon the species). So the one itself is above the intelligence. And there isn't anything beyond the one which is higher than it; for the one and the good itself are the same, but
the

good

itself is

the principle of all.

Chapter
is

5.

The one and the good are the same

show
the one

thing;

and

it

the principle of all.

Now
good
is

will

and the good are the same, and the

it

the principle of aU. All things seek the good, because

preserves single things in their state. But what preserves

unites the parts of things to each other

is what and to the whole, and the whole to the cause. But to unite is peculiar to the one itself, just as to heat is peculiar to heat itself. So the one and the good are the same. Now all things are preserved by unity, but perish from disunity. The good is present to everything; it preserves things because it unites them and makes them one and contains them in the one. But to make one is the office of the one itself. So, if for each thing being united is well-being, union is goodness for each thing; and the simply one and the simply good are the same thing, and this gives unity and goodness to everything at the same time. So whatever departs from the good falls away from

Cap.

103

Ideo

ex sua natura inest

ei

motus; ergo ipsa principium motus

existit.**

existit, licet enim mens non tamen unum est. Intelligit enim se ipsam et circa se ipsam operatur. Quin et uno cuncta participant, quomodocumque sint, mente vero non omnia. Quibus enim partici-

Quare animae mens praecedit. Sed enim supra mentem unum ipsum
sit,

immobilis

patio mentis convenit ea cognitione participent necesse est, quia' intelligentia ipsa principium est^ et causa prima noscendi.

unius usque ad privationes et materiam currit, unum enim haec sunt, {334r\ mentis' vero* non, quia mens est

Item

vis

species* et speciebus agit, species igitur'

tantum

agit.

Igitur

mentem ipsum unum est. Nee ultra aliquid est uno supeIdem enim unum et ipsum bonum, ipsum vero bonum rius. principium omnium.
supra

Unum idem
pium. Cap.

est

atque bonum, atque

omnium

est princi-

V.''

Quod vero unum et bonum idem sit' bonumque omnium sit principium iam ostendam. Bonum quidem omnia expetunt,
quia singula suo in statu servat. Servat autem quod partes rerum unit invicem et ad totum et totum ad causam. Unire vero
ipsius unius est

proprium,

sicut caloris ipsius est calefacere.

Unum ergo et bonum idem. Unum

Unitate porro servantur omnia, disautem' intereunt. Bonum quibuscumque adest; ea solutione servat, ex eo quod unit unumque ea reddit et in uno continet.
unius officium. Quare si cuique cuique unio bonitas est et simpliciter bonum simpliciterque unum idem est, quod quidem unitatem omnibus simul praestat et bonitatem. Ideo quaecumque a bono

vero efficere

est ipsius
est,

unitum esse bene esse

'qfxaxcXP
est

'estom.P
'ergo

mens

IVXP

' JFAP rem/ quia species '\tTO om. IVXP 'mens 'sit om. 'no ch. break or heading WX; a chapter sign P

XP

WXP

'autem om.

XP

(cont.)

om.

WXP

104

Chapters

the one too; and the things which depart

from the one because of discord, depart from the good also. So unity is goodness and goodness is unity; and the good is the one, and the one in the first place is the good. This is also obvious because something is perfect and desirable because it comes from the good. But the one itself bestows this. For in ascending from bodies to the inteUigence you can
see that the greater the increase in unity the greater the increase

Therefore the good and the one are the same. But being itself is not enough for things, otherwise they wouldn't need anything over and beyond the fact that they are.
in perfection.

So they
are well

try to find being-with-the-good

if

and well-being. But they

they preserve or recover their complete nature. This

comes from the mutual union of parts and of parts to the whole and of the whole to the cause. So all try to find the one above being. The more something is one, the more sufficient and perfect it is, since it is less in want and more powerful because its power is united. So the one is the good itself, since it gives sufficiency and perfection. Again, the best evidence for good being present is pleasure. But all pleasure results from the unity of each thing with itself, pain from disunity. So union is good, disunion is bad. The one is not the same in things as being. For being derives from the one that it is integral, sufficient, capable, perfect, pleasing, desirable, and therefore good. So the one and the good are the same. Now the good itself is the first cause of all things; for, since all things come from one principle, the principle is either the good itself, or something better than the good. If it is better than the good, something passes into the universe from it, or
nothing does.
It's

absurd

if

nothing does, for

it

wouldn't be the

by it to things. However, if something is given to things by the principle (just as something is given to things by the good, namely, of course, goodness), it will be something given to things by the first cause better than goodness. For if it is above the good and better than it, surely it gives better gifts to things than the good itself. But
principle of things, unless something were given

Cap.
discedunt ab
et

105

uno quoque

decidunt. Et quae ab

uno abeunt

propter discordiam abeunt et a bono. Est igitur unitas bonitas,

bonitas unitas, et bonum unum, unumque primo bonum. Quod ex eo insuper patet, quia ex bono est, quod perfectum
aliquid atque expetendum.

sit

Hoc autem unum ipsum

praestat.

Nam a corporibus ad mentem ascendendo patet quo crescit unio magis eo perfectionem' magis excrescere. Bonum igitur et unum
idem.
Esse quidem ipsum rebus non sufficit, alioquin^ eo ipso quod sunt nihil ultra requirerent. Quaerunt ergo esse cum bono et bene esse. {334v] Bene autem sunt si vel integram naturam
servant vel restituunt. Hoc fit unione partium inter se et ad totum et ad causam. Unum igitur super esse expetunt omnia. Quo magis unum est aliquid eo sufficiens magis perfectumque, cum minus indigum' sit, sitque potentius ex unita virtute. Unum ergo bonum ipsum est, cum sufficientiam et perfectionem

suam

praestet.

vero

Item signa praesentis boni maxime voluptas cuiusque secum ipso omnis resultat
itaque

est.

Ex unione
ex

voluptas,

bonum, dissolutio malum. dissolutione dolor. Unum Neque unum idem est in rebus quod esse. Ex uno enim esse habet quod integrum sit, quod sufficiens quod potens quod perfectum quod gratum quod expetendum, ergo quod bonum.

Unum igitur et bonum idem.

ipsum bonum prima est rerum omnium causa. Nam cum omnia ab uno principio sint, principium illud vel ipsum
Atqui
et

bonum
ipso in

est vel ipso

bono

melius. Si

bono

melius, aut aliquid ex

naturam rerum procedit aut nihil. Si nihil, absurdum id quidem; non enim esset rerum principium, nisi aliquid ab ipso rebus tribueretur. Sin autem aliquid a principio isto rebus
datur,"

quemadmodum

et

bono rebus

ipsis

datum

est aliquid,

quod quidem bonitas

est,' erit

aliquid in rebus melius bonitate a

causa prima tributum.

Nam si super bonum sit ipsoque*

mehus.

'perfectiorem '

'nam

'bono add.

W^P

'indignum JfA"

'dareturA"

^tsiom.

106

Chapters
is

as something is said to be better has a bigger share of goodness? Moreover, since all things want the good only, if there is something above the good,
better than goodness
it

what

because

will they

want

it

or not? If they don't want

it, it's

absurd not to

desire the first cause

by which
it,

all

are preserved

and created and

converted. If they do want

they won't be wanting the good

most nor seeking everything for the sake of the good. However, since it is the good towards which all things are turned by desire, the good will be that by which all are created. Because it produces all, it is the principle; because it draws the appetites of all
to
itself, it is

the end; because

it

preserves

all, it is

the intermedi-

ary.

So the one and the good

itself is

the principle, middle and

called the

end of all things.

It is

called the one, because

it is

it

surpasses

all; it is

extended through all. So, as the one it is investigated by Plato in the Parmenides through negatives; as the good in the Republic Book 6 through analogies. ^"^ Although it extends itself through all things as the good, still it precedes being itself and all things. Plato says this in the Republic and Dionysius the Areopagite agrees in his book On the Divine

good, because

Names. ^^ The power of the good itself spreads further than the power of being; for formless matter and privation and flux aren't said **to be," for being comes through form and they are devoid of form. Yet they are in a way said "to be good," in so far as they tend towards act and towards the good because of some power instilled in them by the good. Therefore, when you say "the good itself," you must mean the good alone, not a good body, or good soul, or intelligence, life, essence, or good being. For you stain the good's purity by mixing it; you reduce its integrity by a subject; you refuse it fullness by adding to it. So do away with this good or that good, as Augustine tells you in the On the Trinity, and accept the good which is the good of all good, and you will know what God is." As Dionysius says in the On Mystical Theology, we can't reach Him by affirmation." For whatever we affirm about Him has been conceived in the intelligence, therefore it is something peculiar to us and limited. Therefore God is exalted above every concept. So what

Cap.

107

meliora certe rebus munera elargitur quam ipsum bonum. At vero quid bonitate melius, quippe cum melius aliquid ex eo dicatur quod bonitatis magis est particeps. Quin etiam cum

omnia bonum dumtaxat cupiant, si supra bonum est aliquid, utrum et illud appetant necne. [335r] Si non appetunt', absurdum est causam primam a qua quaeque servantur fiunt et convertuntur non appetere. Si appetunt, non bonum maxime appetent neque sub ratione boni cuncta perquirent. Cum vero bonum sit ad quod omnia appetendo convertuntur, bonum erit a quo omnia procreantur. Quia producit omnia, principium est;
quia appetitus

medium. Ipsum

omnium ad se rapit, finis; quia conservat omnia, igitur unum ipsumque bonum principium est
finis

mediumque et
se per

omnium.
dicitur ut supereminet

Quod quidem unum

omnia;

bonum

ut

omnia porrigit. Ut ergo unum est, per negationes a Platone in Parmenide investigatur; ut bonum est, per comparationes ab eodem in libro de Republica sexto. Etsi ut bonum est se per omnia porrigit, ipsum tamen esse omniaque praecedit, ut
et

Plato

ibi testatur et

Dionysius Areopagita in libro de Divinis

Nominibus

assentitur.

Nam boni ipsius vis ulterius se diffundit^

enim materia privatioque et fluxus esse non dicuntur\ esse enim est per formam, ista forma carent. Bona tamen quoquomodo dicuntur quantum* ad actum bonumque propter aliquam vim ipsis a bono insitam tendunt. Cum ergo ipsum bonum dicis, solum bonum intelligas, non
ipsius esse potentia. Informis

quam

bonum corpus vel bonum animum aut mentem vitam essentiam vel' bonum esse. Inquinas enim boni puritatem commixtione;
minuis integritatem subiecto; excludis plenitudinem additamento. Tolle igitur bonum hoc et tolle bonum illud ut Augustinus de Trinitate iubet, et accipe illud bonum quod est omnis boni bonum, et scies quid est Deus, ad quern, ut Dionysius de Mystica [555 v] Theologia dicit, affirmando ire nequimus. Quicquid enim de eo affirmamus mente conceptum est. Ergo prop-

rium

nobis

aliquod*

et

terminatum.

Ergo super

omnem

'appetunt o/n. H'AP 'em..\>on\xmWXYP

'diffunditur FT
'aliquid

'dicitur

fAT

"inquantum H^AT

AP

108

Chapters

God is not we can find out by negation; and how He acts and how others exist with regard to Him we can find out by analogy. But what God is is a secret. Now it can be shown from the foregoing how Plato ascends by negation to the good itself, but how he does it by analogy
will

natural order
beautiful as

emerge from the following. Whatever is beautiful in the is also good. Whatever is good is in a way
is

beautiful; for to attract the appetite

it

just as appropriate to the

Beauty is nothing but the splendour of the highest good, which blazes out principally in
is

to the good.

the things perceived

by the

eyes, the ears, the intelligence.

The

splendour converts the sight, the hearing and the intelligence through these things towards the good itself. Consequently,

beauty exists as a circle of divine light, emanating from the good, remaining in the good, eternally turned back through the good and towards the good. Plato revealed this mystery, which he received from the Sibyl, Diotima, to few people. What is the good itself? It is the one itself, the principle of all things, pure act, the act giving Ufe to all succeeding things. What is beauty itself? It is act giving life, issuing from the first fountain of

good

adorns the divine intelligence with the order of Ideas; then it fills the subsequent spirits and intelligences with the series of the reasons; thirdly it adorns souls with numerous arguments; fourthly it adorns natures with
things. First of all
it

adorns matter with forms. As Plato says in the Republic, certainly the sun produces both visible bodies and eyes that see." It pours lucid spirit into the eyes so that they may see. It paints bodies with colours so that they may be seen. Still, a light-ray belonging to the eyes, or colours belonging to bodies, are not enough to perfect vision, unless the one light itself above the many (from which the many and appropriate
seeds; fifthly
it

lights are distributed to eyes

and bodies) comes down, illumiand strengthens. In the same way the first act itself, in the process of creating, has bestowed a species and an act on single things. This act is weak and powerless to do anything when it has been received in the passive subject. But the one invisible and everlasting light of the divine sun is always
nates, stimulates

Cap.

109

conceptum supereminet Deus. Quid ergo non sit in venire possumus negando; et quo ordine agat et alia ad ilium se habeant comparando perquirimus. Quid vero' sit latet. Atqui quo pacto ad ipsum bonum Plato per negationes ascendat ex superioribus patere potest, quomodo vero per comparationes ita patebit. Quicquid ex ordine rerum pulchrum est, idem et bonum. Quicquid bonum, idem quodammodo^ pulchrum. Nam tam pulchri quam boni proprium est appetitum allicere. Pulchritudo quidem nihil aliud est quam summi boni splendor, fulgens praecipue' in his rebus quae ocuHs auribus mente percipiuntur, perque illas" ad ipsum bonum visum auditum mentemque convertens. Quo fit ut pulchritudo circulus quidam divinae lucis existat, a bono manans, in bono residens, per bonum et ad bonum sempiterne reflexus. Hoc Plato mysterium quod a Diotima Sibylla accepit' paucis revelavit. Quid ipsum bonum? Ipsum unum omnium rerum principium, actus purus, actus sequentia cuncta vivificans. Quid ipsum pulchrum? Vivificus actus e primo fonte bonorum effluens: mentem primo divinam idearum ordine* decorans; numina deinde sequentia mentesque rationum serie complens; animas tertio
numerosis discursibus ornans; naturas quarto seminibus; formis quinto materiam. Sol profecto, ut in Republica tradit Plato, corpora visibiHa et oculos videntes procreat: ocuHs ut videant lucidum infundit spiritum; corpora ut videantur {336r\ coloribus pingit.# Neque tamen proprius ocuHs radius propriive corporibus colores ad visionem perficiendam sufficiunt, nisi lumen ipsum unum supra multa, a quo multa et propria lumina oculis et corporibus distributa sunt, adveniat, illustret, excitet atque roboret. Eodem modo primus ipse actus speciem actumque rebus singulis producendo largitus est. Qui sane actus cum in subiecto patiente susceptus fuerit debilis est et ad operis executionem impotens. Sed divini solis perpetua et invisibilis lux

'vero

om.

WXP

'quodammodo om.

WXP

'accipit

'ut in re. pu. tradit Plato add.

'praecipue om. HPfrag. I(24v) ends

WXP

'illa<A',

iUamP

no

Chapter 6
fulfill-

present to everything, cherishing, giving hfe, stimulating,

ing,

and strengthening. Orpheus says divinely about it: **He is the one that cherishes all and bears himself above all things."" As the act of all and as it strengthens, it is called the good. As it gives life, assuages, smoothes, and stimulates, it is called the beautiful. As it draws the three cognitive powers of the soul" towards the objects they ought to know, it is called grace and beauty. As it is in a cognitive power and joins it to the known object it is called truth. As the good it creates and rules and fulfils. As the beautiful it illuminates and pours in grace. However, in order to receive the grace of the divine light everything has to be prepared: bodies by the proportion that consists in order, mode and species; voices by the harmony that comes from numbers and intervals; moral duties by being directed by righteousness towards the good end; the various sorts of learning by being directed in order towards the true object; the soul by the purity which turns away from lower things and turns back towards higher ones; the intelligence by eternally gazing at the good itself. The ray of the divine goodness and beauty penetrates gradually through all these things. It surrounds body, shining out in the measured proportion which is subjected to place and movement. It surrounds voices in the harmony which is independent of a definite place but which is spread through movement. It surrounds the duties and the various sorts of learning and the soul, where it is indeed in motion but where it endures because of some vital reason. It surrounds the intelligence, where it sparkles above movement in the eternal series of the Ideas. It surrounds the good itself as the pure act inserting life and grace into all things.

Chapter 6. In what the human good consists; and on the comparison of pleasure and wisdom to each other and to
the good
It

itself.
I

has been sufficiently shown,

think, that

all

things seek

some end and are brought back

to the ultimate end,

and that

Cap. VI

111

una semper omnibus adstat, fovet, vivificat, excitat, complet et De quo' divine Orpheus: Cuncta fovens atque ipse ferens super omnia sese. Ut est actus omnium roboratque, bonum dicitur. Ut vivificat, lenit, mulcet et excitat, pulchrum. *Ut in obiectis quae noscenda sunt tres illas cognoscentes animae vires aliicit, gratia, et^ pulchritudo.** Ut in cognoscente potentia eam applicat cognito,^ Veritas. Ut bonum procreat, regit et complet. Ut pulchrum illuminat gratiamque infundit. Praeparata autem esse oportet omnia ad gratiam divini fulgoris excipiendam: corpora quidem proportione quae ordine modo ti* specie constat; voces harmonia quae numeris intervallisque conficitur; officia morum rectitudine ad finem bonum; disciplinas ordine ad obiectum verum; animam puritate per aversionem ab inferis et conversionem ad supera; mentem per aeternum in ipsum bonum intuitum. Per haec omnia gradaroborat.

tim divinae bonitatis

et pulchritudinis

radius penetrat: circa

corpus

in

aequalitate

subiecta; circa voces in dispersa; circa officia

numerosa loco motuique harmonia extra certum locum sed motu disciplinasque et animam in motu quidem
refulgens
circa

sed ratione

vitali consistens;

mentem

super'

aeterna idearum serie micans; circa [ii6v] ipsum

motum in bonum actus

purus vitam

et*

gratiam omnibus inserens.

In quo'' consistat
voluptatis
VI.*

humanum bonum

cum

sapientia inter se et

et de comparatione ad ipsum bonum. Cap.

Quod omnia finem aliquem

reducantur finem, idque

expetant
et

sit ipsum bonum

et ad ultimum ipsum unum sitque

'quo om. 'quae Y

'et

om.

'cognitio

'no ch. heading but break

*et om. Y 'supra fVX Y W; same heading but numbered five X

*ct

om.

*'

***om.

112

Chapters

this is the

good

itself,

the one

itself,

and the

principle of all

things.

As a result the objections of the Aristotehans to divine Plato have now been exploded. But this good is the absolute good common to all. However, we are seeking the highest good for man. To find it we'll turn to Plato's text. He thinks man's
highest good, that
in the
is, man's felicity and the happy Hfe, consists enjoyment of the absolute good itself, since all that is conditional depends on the absolute. He will show what the possession of the good itself, which we call felicity, principally consists in. Next, the opinions of the people who don't refer our good to the first good have to be rejected as useless. Such was the opinion of Democritus, who was happy with quietness alone, which is the felicity of the stone; or of Aristippus, who pursued bodily pleasure, which is always contaminated by many opposites and shared with the individual beasts. Epicurus' tranquillity must also be rejected, for it isn't sought for its own sake, but in order to free us from worries and make us more prepared to attain the supreme good (on which our good also depends). Nor is the felicity of the Stoics and the Cynics enough for us; for above moral virtue, inasmuch as it's busily occupied and merely human, exists contemplation which is utterly at peace and is divine. Since our good can be nothing else but the complete possession of the first good itself according to our natural capacity, and since we can grasp what is highest in nature principally with our highest part, and since the highest part is the intelligence (as it is the leader of the rest of the parts),

we

are able to enjoy the

good

itself principally

with the

intelli-

gence. But the intelligence enjoys by understanding

loving.

and by

And so Plato will attribute the ability to attain

felicity to

the intelligence. But before he can take up this problem, he will reduce all the opinions about felicity to three main types. For either felicity is said to be pleasure or knowledge or some third thing. Under the general term "pleasure" are comprehended all the views of the people
lights

who reduced

happiness either to the de-

of the bodily senses,

like Aristippus

and Dionysius

[of

Heraclea], or to the gaiety of the soul as well, Hke Eudoxus. But

under the term "knowledge" are comprehended the views of the

Cap. VI

113

rerum omnium principium,

tum.

satis est, ut arbitror,

demonstra-

Ex quo Peripateticorum contra divum' Platonem cavillationes explosae iam sunt. Verum absolutum id bonum est omnibusque commune. Nos autem summum hominis bonum
expetimus.
qui

Quod

ut nobis pateat textum Platonis aggrediemur,

est,

summum

hominis bonum, id

hominis felicitatem bea-

tamque vitam
tratur,

in ipsius absoluti boni^ fruitione consistere arbi-

quippe cum omne quod cum conditione est ab absoluto dependeat. Declarabitque qua in re potissimum consistat ipsius boni possessio quam felicitatem vocamus. Porro sententiae illorum qui bonum nostrum ad bonum primum non referunt utpote vanae reiciendae sunt. Qualis fuit Democriti, qui sola quiete contentus fuit, quae lapidis felicitas est. Item Aristippi, qui voluptatem corporis sectatus est, quae semper plurimis est inquinata contrariis bestiisque singulis est communis. Mittenda est et Epicuri tranquillitas, neque enim propter se ista quaeritur, sed ut a perturbationibus liberi expeditiores' simus" ad supremi boni, unde et nostrum pendet bonum, adeptionem. Neque Stoicorum et Cynicorum felicitas nobis sufficit. Nam supra moralem virtutem utpote negotiosam et humanam contemplatio est pacata prorsus atque divina. Etenim cum bonum nostrum nihil esse aliud possit quam Integra pro capacitate naturae boni ipsius
primi possessio,

quod vero supremum

est in natura,

suprema
sit

praecipue nostri parte capere valeamus et pars suprema

mens, quia dux partium reliquarum, mente frui praecipue ipso bono possumus. Mens autem intelligendo fruitur et amando. Atque idcirco menti felicitatis assequendae Plato tribuet facultatem. Et antequam hoc exsequatur ad tria potissimum capita sententias omnes de felicitate reducet.' Aut enim voluptas esse
dicitur, aut scientia, aut* tertium ahquid.
tatis

Sub communi volup-

nomine omnes eorum sententiae comprehenduntur, qui vel ad sensuum^ corporis oblectamenta ut Aristippus Dionysiusque, *vel insuper ad animi hilaritatem ut Eudoxus** beatitudinem
retulerunt.

Sub nomine vero

'posstadd.W

scientiae

eorum

opiniones,* qui vel

'rt&xxaiWX

'divinum >f
'ut

'expediores fF

'sumus If

'sensum fF 'opmioncs om. animi W; vel et animi hilaritatem insuper ut Eudoxus

WX

"*insuper hilaritatem ut Eudoxus et

14

Chapter 7

people

who

assessed happiness either in terms of the moral vir-

in terms of of the contemplative virtues, Hke Solon and Anaxagoras. But the people who want them both combined for the sake of felicity in a way follow the third alternative, which Aristotle followed and before him Heraclitus and Empedocles.
tues, like

Zeno and Antisthenes, or Hke Epicurus

tranquillity, or in terms

Chapter 7. The hook's introduction in which the subject proposed. About wisdom, pleasure and good things.
1 1

is

A-C

Socrates had argued together at length about good one way and another and Philebus was tired of arguing, he greeted Protarchus, who had just arrived, and allowed him to take over his side in the dispute. Protarchus, being a young man, immediately agreed. Socrates, having turned to him, said, "Think about the job you're taking on, and don't rush into the argument rashly. Rather, listen first to each point of view, and when you've thought about it correctly and rationally take up the defence of the view that seems to you to be the more probable. Philebus says the highest good for all animate beings is gladness and pleasure and delight and the rest of the same class like joy, etc. But I say it isn't these, but to know, to understand, to remember, to judge correctly, to reason truly and suchlike. I say they are better and more excellent, that is, more desirable and more outstanding than pleasure
the highest

As Philebus and

not for all animals, as pleasure is, but for those capable of them, that is, for men and spirits. And I don't say the possession of them is only good and desirable in itself, but it is the most useful of all things to other people (and for other purposes), both to those who are alive now and to posterity." Socrates is showing his terms surpass pleasure, which is useful neither to the person who has it, nor to others, nor to posterity. Socrates doesn't say knowledge is the highest good, but that it is more outstanding and better and more useful than pleasure, since it is more suitable to the person living the better life and to

Cap. VII

115

morales virtutes ut Zenon et Antisthenes, vel' tranquillitatem ut Epicurus, vel contemplativas ut Solon et^ Anaxagoras beatitudinem censuerunt. Tertium vero quodammodo hi sequuntur, qui utraque volunt ad felicitatem esse coniuncta, quod secutus
est Aristoteles et

ante ipsum Heraclitus atque Empedocles.

Prooemium

libri in

quo subiectum proponitur. Item de

sapientia, voluptate, bonis. Cap. VII.

Cum multa de summo bono ultro citroque Socrates et Philebus invicem contulissent essetque Philebus dicendo defessus, Protarcho nuper advenienti gratulatus est Philebus, annuitque ut provinciam in disputando suam susciperet. Protarchus utpote adolescens statim assensus est. Ad quern con versus Socrates: Considera, inquit, qualem tutelam suscipias, neque temere in* disputationem properes. Immo audi utriusque sententiam prius, et eam quae tibi recta ratione examinanti probabilior [337v] apparet accipe defendendam. Philebus quidem summum bonum animantibus omnibus laetitiam esse dicit voluptatemque et delectationem et cetera generis eiusdem ut gaudium, etc. Ego autem non haec, sed sapere, intelligere, meminisse, recte opinari, vere ratiocinari et similia, meliora et
potiora id est optabiliora et praestantiora voluptate esse dico,

non omnibus animalibus,

ut voluptatem esse,' sed his

scilicet et

horum capacia sunt, hominibus horum possessionem dumtaxat

sed
et
aliis

per se

quae daemonibus; nee esse bonam expetendamque,

ad aliud aliorum omnium utilissimam, tarn praesentibus quam posteris omnibus. Quod ostendit ista voluptati praestare quae nee utilis est habenti nee ahis nee in posterum. Neque dicit Socrates scientiam esse summum bonum sed praestantiorem meliorem utiliorem esse quam voluptatem, quia et praestantiori viventi et potentiae magis propria est et meliorem virtute reddit habentem et ahis prodest magis. Quia vero
et

'et

IVX

'et

om.

'no ch. heading or break

W; a break but no heading X

'ad

WX

'em., iste

1VXY

116

Chapter?
and
it

his abilities,

makes the person who has

it

more

virtuous,

and

it

benefits others more. But since he said **the

good and

useful," you ought to recall the distinction Plato made in the Laws, where he calls "the good" what is sought for its own sake, **the useful" what is sought for the sake of attaining the good, "the necessary" what is sought in order to avoid the bad. The first is quietness, the second is victory, the third is war." He said this too in the Republic Book 2." He maintains the

good and the

desirable are the same,

and what
itself
is

is

sought for

its
is

own

sake exclusively, like honest and moderate pleasures,

exclusively good.

What

is

sought for

purpose, like feeling and knowing,

and for some other both good and useful.

What

sought merely for something else, like curing a sick etc., is merely useful. He maintains the same in the Gorgias.^^ The four terms, "joy," "gladis

person, exercising, working,

ness," "delight," "pleasure,"

mean

the following.

The

first

means the joy of the

ion; the third,

intelligence in the contemplation

of the

truth; the second, the gaiety

and gladness of the reason or opinthe amusements and the delight of the eyes and
remaining senses, that
is,

ears; the fourth, the sweetness of the

pleasure. But the Latins along with the Greeks use the term

"pleasure" in an argument to mean any enjoyment. This

Plato's assertion in this book, Aristotle's in the

is

Nicomachean

Ethics and Cicero's in the De Finibus. "

When
with

Plato says "to understand," he means the contemplathings.

tion of divine things;

human

when "to know," prudence in deahng But "to remember" is to preserve one's

thoughts. "Right opinion"

lie

is to have a true estimate through probable conjecture. "Truly discursive reason" is the induction of reason resulting in knowledge. But the power of all these he includes under the heading "wisdom" or "knowledge." Granted such, he says that the truth about them must be completely determined. For nothing is more important when it

comes to
rectly

living well or badly than to think correctly or incor-

about life's end. Perhaps somebody is wondering why in the dispute over the good itself Plato mainly proposed these two from among the

Cap. VII

117

utile dixit, meminisse oportet distinctionis illius quam Legibus Plato tradidit, ubi bonum vocat quod per se petitur, utile quod propter bonum consequendum, necessarium quod propter malum vitandum. Primum quies, victoria secundum, bellum tertium. Quod secutus in secundo de Republica: bonum

bonum et

in

et expetibile'

idem

esse dicit, et

quod per

bonum tantum,
propter se
et

ut honestae et

se expetitur tantum moderatae voluptates; quod

et utile, ut sentire et sapere;

propter aliud
aliud

bonum

aegrotantem curari, exercitari, laborare, etc. Idem in Gorgia docet. Quattuor ista nomina: gaudium, laetitia, delectatio, voluptas^ ita se habent quod [338r] primum significat mentis in veritatis contemplatione gaudium; secundum vel rationis vel opinionis hilaritatem atque laetitiam; tertium oculorum et aurium oblectamenta delectationemque; quartum reliquorum sensuum suavitatem id' est* voluptatem. Sed tam Latini quam Graeci cum disputandum est voluptatis nomine pro qualibet iucunditate utuntur. Quod Plato hoc in libro, Aristoteles in libris de moribus et in libris de finibus Cicero perhibet. Cum intelligere dicit Plato contemplationem divinorum intelligit; cum sapere humanorum prudentiam. Meminisse vero cogitationes suas conservare est. Recta opinio vera per probabilem coniecturam existimatio est. Veri rationis discursus inductio rationis ad scientiam conferens. Sed sub sapientiae vel scientiae nomine omnium istorum vim comprehendit. His positis infert omnino quid verum sit de his esse determinandum. Nihil enim magis ad bene vel male vivendum refert quam de fine vitae recte
utile,

quod propter

tantum

ut

non recte sentire. Ambigat forte quispiam cur e multis, quae bona dicuntur, duo haec potissimum, communem scilicet voluptatem
vel

'exoptabile
'id

om.

W
'et

^X supplies the Greek terms as

well

V0poavl>rj, X'^PO-t Tp\}/L<: , 7)601^

118

Chapter?
that
is,

many things which are referred to as good,

sure
referred to the

general plea-

and general wisdom. It's because all the soul's powers are two main ones, the power which knows, and the power which desires. The former seeks the true, the latter the
enjoyable. Therefore

men

either decide to live for the former,

or for the latter. If for the former, they refer everything to the
truth as the end. If for the latter, they refer everything to
pleases.

what

concerned with the truth, pleasure with what delights. Now just as some truth is obtained from each single object or art, so in all of them there is a certain wisdom, although in pre-eminent things there is pre-eminent truth and pre-eminent wisdom. And so in this book the term "wisdom" or "knowledge" embraces all inner thinking. In the same way, "pleasure," although it is properly corporeal, in this debate includes all enjoyment, since the term is better known, being used more often and more generally understood. But why isn't the object of the irascible power introduced here into the debate? '' It's because it helps the reason or the desire vis-a-vis what they choose as worth pursuing out of bravery, or abhor as what ought to be shunned out of rage. Similarly, there is no mention of the cause of the active life. For those who strive to do things make sure that things are arranged so as to satisfy either the affections of the senses or the longing of the intelligence; for nobody works for the sake of work, or is moved for the sake of moving. But if someone says "active control" refers to what can accommodate itself alike to bodily lust and mental contemplation, he will be trying in vain to mix things which are mutually repugnant. But if he is going to mix them, he will put a mean between them which will be more useless than both for attaining the good of the one or the other. In the Euthydemus this mean is proved to be worse than the extremes." Finally, in the Euthydemus it is shown that felicity consists not in the possession of good things, but in their use." But the soul uses them either in knowing or in enjoying; and since felicity is an inner good, it doesn't refer to external or corporeal things but to
is

For wisdom

inner acts, that

is,

thinking and feehng.

Cap. VII

119

communemque
proposuit. Quia
tur:

sapientiam, in boni ipsius disceptatione Plato

omnes animi

vires

ad duas praecipuas referunIlia

unam quae cognoscit,

ista

alteram vero quae appetit.

verum

quaerit,

instituunt aut

iucundum. Aut' ergo homines ad illam vitam ad istam. Si ad illam, omnia ad veritatem velut ad finem referunt; si ad alteram, ad id quod placet omnia. Circa

veritatem vero sapientia, circa id

quod
illis

delectat voluptas. Atqui,

quemadmodum
titur,

ex unaquaque re
[338v]

et arte Veritas

quaedam
sapientia

excuest,

ita

in

omnibus

quaedam

quamquam
praecipua

in

rebus praecipuis praecipua Veritas, sapientia

est.

Unde
etsi

et sapientiae

nomen

vel scientiae

hoc

in

libro intrinsecam

omnem
et

cognitionem complectitur.
est,

modum voluptas,

proprie in corpore

quia

Quemadnomen ex usu
notius
est,

rerum frequentiore

communion

perceptione

omnem continet hac in disputatione iucunditatem.

At cur non adducitur
hie in disputationem^ irascibilis virtutis

obiectum? Quia vel rationis vel concupiscentiae ministra est ad ilia, quae vel eligunt audacter exsequenda' vel abhorrent per iracundiam devitanda. Simili de causa activae vitae nulla fit mentio, qui enim laborant agendo, id contendunt quo* res suas
ita

disponant, ut vel sensuum affectibus vel intelligentiae desi-

Nemo enim gratia laborandi laborat et movendi movetur. Siquis autem dixerit gubernationem activam ad id referri' ut tam corporeae libidini obsequatur' quam mentis contempladerio satisfaciant.
tioni,

miscebit,

repugnantia miscere invicem frustra conabitur. Quod si medium constituet inter haec utrisque ineptius ad
vel huius vel alterius

consequendum. Quod medium in Euthydemo deter ius extremis esse convincitur. Denique in Euthydemo probatur non in possessione sed usu bonorum felicitatem consistere. Utitur autem his anima vel cognoscendo vel gaudendo, et cum felicitas intimum bonum sit, non ad externa vel corporea, sed ad intimos refertur actus, cognitionem scilicet'

bonum

et

affectum.

'\\.W
'consequatur

'disceptationem ffA"

'scilicet

om.

'et

sequenda

Jf'A^

*quoo/w. >f

'referri

om.

120

Chapters

Moreover, since Plato in other places often compared wisdom to the rest of the things called good, but nowhere compared it to pleasure, it's fitting that in this book he should compare wisdom and pleasure properly together to complete the comparison among good things and to find out about the good itself.

between good things. How wisdom contributes to felicity. Concerning knowledge of the good; that it is every virtue and makes people happy.
Chapter
8.

The

distinction

But if someone wants to understand the comparison above, he may first read about it in the Clitophon, the Meno, the Alcibiades and above all in the Laws, where Plato makes some
of the goods human, others divine." The

human

are those per-

taining to the body, the divine those pertaining to the soul.

Among
third

the

human

bodily health holds

first place,

then beauty,

comes strength, fourth riches. Among the divine firstly comes prudence, that is, wisdom, then the ordered disposition
of the soul, thirdly justice, fourthly fortitude.

He wants

all

the

human ones
finally

referred to the divine: external riches to bodily

endowments to morality, morality to prudence and to the intelligence as the leader. In the intelligence is the knowledge of the true and the good. Plato argues men are made happy by this knowledge in the Euthydemus, when he compares wisdom to other things. '^ Everybody defines felicity as getting what you want. But in any art or study knowledge is the means by which we get hold of the things we want. Military knowledge gets us victory; knowledge of navigation gets us to the port; medical knowledge gets
health, bodily

us well.

Again, we say those people are happy who have lots of good is, external things, the advantages of the body and the gifts of the soul. We don't say they are happy simply because they have the gifts, unless they use them; and not just use
things, that

them, but use them properly. For the

unless they benefit us;

gifts aren't

any good to

us,

and they do not benefit

us, unless

we use

Cap. VIII

121

Quin etiam cum Plato saepe alias sapientiam ad cetera qiiae bona dicuntur comparaverit, ad voluptatem vero non alias, merito ut bonorum comparatio ad ipsum bonum comperien-

dum

[339r] absolveretur

hoc

in libro proprie

ad voluptatem

sapientiam comparavit.

Distinctio

tatem, de scientia boni,

bonorum. Quomodo sapientia conferat ad feliciquod sit omnis virtus efficiatque

beatos.Cap. VIII.'
Superiorem vero comparationem intelligere siquis cupit, Clitophontem, Menonem, Alcibiadem^ et' imprimis librum de Legibus primum legat, ubi bonorum* alia humana, divina alia ponit. Humana quae ad corpus, divina quae ad animum pertinent. Ex humanis primum locum tenet sanitas corporis; secundum forma; tertium vires; quartum divitiae. Ex divinis primum prudentia, id est, sapientia; secundum moderatus animi habitus; tertium iustitia; fortitudo quartum. Omnia ilia humana ad divina referri vult: externas divitias ad corporis cultum, corporis dotes ad mores, mores denique ad prudentiam mentemque tamquam ad ducem, in qua veri ac boni scientia est, qua scientia felices fieri homines in Euthydemo sic disputat, dum sapientiam ad alia comparat. Felicitatem defmiunt omnes rerum consecutionem ad votum. In quacumque vero arte et studio ut rerum pro desiderio potia-

mur

scientia praestat: scientia militaris victoriae, gubernatoria

portus, medicina sanitatis consecutionem.

Item beatos dicimus eos qui bona habent plurima sciHcet* externa et* commoda corporis animique' dotes. Neque possessione horum sola beatos nisi utantur dicimus; nee usu, nisi recte

no ch. heading or break

'scilicet OOT.

WX

WX

*etom.

WX

'etPhnedonem add. '-que om. WX

WX

'ct

om. Jf

'horum

122

Chapters

them and use them properly, for the misuse of them is harmful (so it is better to do without than to misuse). But knowledge of things makes us use everything skillfully, for, in the case of particular skills, the person who has knowledge of that skill uses the instruments and material properly. Therefore, since fehcity comes from the acquisition and correct use of good things, and since knowledge of the good bestows this, knowledge of the good contributes mainly, or rather totally, to felicity. Again, when wisdom is in charge everything else is good for us. But when stupidity is the leader everything becomes perniriches, power, health, comeHness, vigour, quickness of mind, memory, magnanimity, a steadfast and invincible disposition, the subtlety of all the other arts and sciences. So knowledge of the good makes everything good. Plato calls this knowledge by three names: "eudaemonia," "eutychia," "eupragia." In Plato the three mean: "happiness," "felicity," "right action." They all coincide with knowledge of the good. Because it perceives good things and bad things, it is called "eudaemonia," that is, "happiness"; because it shuns bad things and attains good things, "eutychia," that is, "felicity"; because it uses advantages properly, "eupragia," that is, "right action." From this it is obvious that knowledge of the good is most able to attain the highest good. Indeed, as you can gather from Plato's Protagoras, knowledge of the good contributes most towards the highest good because it is itself all virtue." For wisdom is the knowledge of the absolute good. But prudence is the knowledge of bad things and secondary good things. Justice is the knowledge that distributes good and bad things. Fortitude is the knowledge that properly dares to confront or is afraid of good or bad things. Temperance is the knowledge of how to pursue or avoid what is good or bad. So there is one virtue in which the entire rational principle of virtue is included, knowledge of the good; every faculty is present in it for the sake of the good itself. For knowledge considers the good and directs all things towards the good and attains the good, the attaining of which is man's

cious

felicity.

Cap. VIII
utantur.

123

non sunt nobis bona,' nisi prosint; non prosunt, nisi utamur et recte utamur. Abusus enim nocet, quare melius est carere quam abuti. Uti autem scite rebus omnibus scientia
rerum
efficit.

Nam

Nam in singulis

artibus

is

instrumentis et materia

ut decet utitur qui scientiam artis habet.

Quapropter,

cum

felici-

tas ex bonorum consecutione rectoque usu proveniat, idque scientia boni praestet, haec utique ad felicitatem [339v] pluri-

mum immo totum valet.

Item hac ducente bona sunt nobis reliqua omnia. Insipientia vero duce cuncta perniciosa, divitiae, potentiae, sanitas, forma, robur, acumen ingenii, memoria, animi magnitude, constans et invictus habitus, artium omnium reliquarum et scientiarum subtilitas. Quare scientia boni bona efficit omnia, quam tribus nominibus Plato significat: eudaemonia, eutychia, eupragia.^

Haec apud Platonem

tria

nomina

sunt:

beatitudo, felicitas,

bene agere. Haec omnia boni scientiae competunt. Nam, quia bona malaque cognoscit, eudaemonia,' id est, beatitudo vocatur;

quia vitat mala consequitur

commoda,

eutychia,* id est,

felicitas;

actio.

quia commodis recte utitur, eupragia,' id est, bona Ubi patet quod * scientia boni ad summum bonum potest

plurimum. Atque, ut ex Protagora Platonis colligitur,** scientia boni ex eo maxime ad ipsum bonum confert, quoniam ipsa omnis est
virtus. Sapientia

namque absoluti boni scientia est; prudentia malorum bonorumque secundorum; iustitiaft scientia bonorum malorumque distribuendorum;' fortitudo scientia circa bona et mala Jut decet audendi atque metuendi; temperantia scientia circa bona et mala J J adsciscendi et fugiendi. Una ergo est virtus, in qua tota ratio virtutis includitur, scientia boni, in qua omnis ad ipsum bonum facultas inest. Ista enim et bonum inspicit et ad bonum omnia dirigit et bonum
vero tscientia
consequitur, quae consecutio hominis est felicitas.

'bona om.
*-quc add.

W W

''*'r/ie

om.

terms are missing in W; in

tttom.

X they are in Greek script

Xttom. Y

124

Chapters

Although moral virtue and wisdom contribute most to the good itself, still, neither moral virtue nor wisdom is the good itself, as you can see from the Republic Book 6." Moral virtue isn't, for it is usually enough for many people just to appear to possess it. But the good is what everybody wants to possess in
reality.

Wisdom
is

isn't,

because

it is

understanding. But under-

drawn towards understanding something, and when it has understood it, it comes to rest. So its perfection derives from something else. So its good is from something else. However, so we may know Plato's mind more clearly in different places, we must posit two steps in the knowledge of the good. The first is whereby we can conjecture from all the things which come from the good itself that there is some principle for everything, which is the one and the good. When through negation we have freed it from all other things, we can know what it isn't; and then when we've compared it to everything else by means of analogies, we can know what it is Hke. This knowledge
standing

by the theologians the 'evening" knowledge. It is in the splendour of the good. The second step is the one whereby we comprehend without any hindrance what the principle is in itself, and this knowledge is called the "morning" knowledge. It is in the light of the good." The first degree of knowledge and
is

called

way closest to felicity. The second is felicity itself. And whenever Plato says wisdom is "felicity," he means the
wisdom
second
it

is

the

sort; whenever he denies it, he means the first sort. Yet, must be understood the absolute good is one thing, our good another. The former is called God and the good itself; the latter
is

called felicity. Certainly, felicity

is

not the

first sort

dom, but the second. The good is neither the first sort, as is evident from the Republic Book 6." But when Plato "happiness," calls knowledge of the good and wisdom second sort. For if he "felicity," "right action," he means the were talking about the first sort, he'd be misusing words and confusing happiness and felicity with the way that is closest to
them.

of wisnor the second

from the reasons we've brought to bear from the remaining dialogues, Plato puts knowledge itself and
Certainly, to judge

Cap. VIII
Etsi virtus moralis et sapientia

125

conferunt,' neque

tamen
in

virtus

plurimum ad bonum ipsiim moralis aut sapientia ipsum

bonum
reant;

est,

quod

sexto de Republica patet.

Non

virtus

moralis, plerumque enim^ sufficit multis ut habere

eam appa-

vero habere revera omnes volunt. Non sapientia, quia haec intelligentia est. Intelligentia vero ad aliquid intelligendum fertur, in quo percepto quiescit. *Aliunde igitur eius

bonum

perfectiopendet.** AHundeigitur {340r\ ipsius

bonum.

Ut autem mens Platonis nobis passim

gradus in boni scientia ponendi sunt. rebus quae a bono ipso sunt esse coniectamus' aliquid omnium principium quod unum sit et bonum; ipsumque per negationem ab omnibus aliis eximentes, quid non sit cognoscimus,* et deinde per comparationes referentes ad omnia, quale sit
agnoscimus,* quae cognitio vespertina dicitur a theologis, quae est in boni' splendore. Alter gradus, quo quid sit in se ipso expedite comprehendimus, quae cognitio matutina dicitur in

duo Unus quo ex omnibus

clarius innotescat,

proxima est ad felicitatem via. Iste est ipsa felicitas. Et siquando dicit Plato sapientiam esse felicitatem, de gradu secundo intelligitur. Siquando negat, de^ primo. Intelligendum tamen aliud esse bonum absolutum, aliud nostrum; illud dicitur Deus et ipsum bonum, hoc vero* felicitas. Felicitas profecto' non est primus sapientiae gradus, sed secundus. Ipsum bonum neque primus gradus est, neque secundus, ut sexto de RepubHca patet. Cum
boni luce.
Ille

gradus scientiae

et sapientiae

vero scientiam boni

et

sapientiam vocat beatitudinem,

felicitasi

tem,'" bene agere," de secundo eius gradu intelligit.

Nam

de

primo

dixerit, abutitur vocabulis et

beatitudinem felicitatemque
in ceteris dialogis

capit pro via

ad eam quam proxima. Profecto per eas quas attuUmus rationes Plato scientiam ipsam sapientiamque

reliquis

omnibus

'conferant

WX

'bono

Jt'

"ctadtf.

'rtadd.W

W *om. W
'ut

'coniectamur

'sttoom.

WX

WX

'agnoscimus
'profecto om.

WX

'noscimus
"felicitatis A"

WX

Jt'A'

126

Chapter 9

wisdom before

all else. But in this dialogue he prosecutes the comparison with pleasure, so that, having looked at the comparison, we can understand what each contributes to the highest good and what the highest good is. In the beginning of the discussion in this dialogue he will not accept that "wisdom" stands only for knowledge of the good; rather it stands generally for knowledge of every possible truth. In the same way he will use 'pleasure" to stand not just for some particular enjoyment, but
*

generally for

all delight.

Chapter 9, Whathuman felicity consists in, namely the enjoyment of God. Also concerning the subject of the hook.
theme of the discusnamely to find out what man's highest good is (for that's the theme and subject of each argument: they are all introduced for its sake). But in order to make especially clear what the good is, he introduces pleasure and wisdom into the controversy it is apparent here and will often appear subsequently, particularly when he adds a third thing over and above them, and it shows you the error of the people who entitled this dialogue
In the foregoing Plato has declared the
sion,

"On
talk

pleasure."*"
less

Why not "On wisdom" since Plato

doesn't

about that than about pleasure? Why not "On the life compounded from wisdom and pleasure" he refers both since he investigates all to that life? Why not "On felicity" these things for the sake of discovering felicity (as he himself repeats a thousand times)? Accordingly, since the book's theme has been described, now the structure of the whole argument must be outlined. It is divided into twelve parts.*' In the first part he proposes the subject of the debate, which we've already discussed above: that is, what is man's good and whether wisdom or pleasure contribute more towards it? In the second part Plato tells us about the proper circumstances of the life of pleasure and also of wisdom, so that we can see which is more conducive to felicity. He must also see whether some third sort of life

any

Cap.
anteponit.

IX

127

Voluptatis vero comparationem in hoc

dialogo

peragit, ut hac comparatione inspecta quid utrumque ad summum bonum conferat, quidve summum sit bonum intelligamus. Neque accipiet hoc in dialogo in principio disputandi sapien-

tiam pro cognitione boni dumtaxat, sed [340v] communiter pro cuiuscumque veritatis scientia, sicut et voluptatem non pro
certa suavitate, sed pro

omni communiter iucunditate utetur.

In quo consistat humana felicitas, scilicet in fruitione Dei; et de subiecto lihri. Cap. IX.^
In superioribus declaravit Plato quid disputationis huius pro-

summum hominis bonum sit, propositum et subiectum est, illud enim disputationis cuiusque cuius gratia cetera omnia inferuntur. Sed, ut quid bonum sit potissimum pateat, voluptatem et sapientiam in controversiam
positum
sit,^

invenire scilicet quid

trahit,

quod

et hie patet et

saepe in sequentibus apparebit,

praesertim

cum

praeter ista tertium insuper addet.

Qua

in re

eorum patefactus est error, qui huic dialogo de voluptate inscripserunt. Cur non de sapientia, cum non minus de ilia quam de voluptate loquatur? Cur non de vita ex sapientia voluptateque composita? Ad quam utraque refert. Cur non de
felicitate,

cum

felicitatis

inveniendae gratia (ut ipse millies'

repetit)

huius

haec omnia investiget? Quare cum propositum libri praescriptum sit, iam disputationis totius ordo est
in partes distribuitur. In

tradendus/

prima parte quod tractandum est proponit, quam iam supra exposuimus, quid scihcet bonum hominis sit et' utrum ad id conferat magis, sapientia an voluptas. In secunda ponendam Plato monet vitae voluptuosae necnon sapientis conditionem, ut videatur utra magis ad fehcitatem conducat. Videndumque utrum tertius

Haec duodecim

'no ch. heading but break

'sit

om.

W; in X the ch.
'see

'miles

is numbered six and ct de subiecto appendix I/or passage added by

libri is

omitted 'etom. JV

128

Chapter 9

is better than the other two and leads to felicity does appear, we must consider which of the two is more nearly related to the perfection of this third thing, pleasure or wisdom. In this way we can not only know what

appears, which

more.

If

it

felicity is,

but also what the best

way

is

to

it.

Here
is

[Plato] will

try to divide pleasure

and wisdom

in order to effect the

compari-

son. In the third part he'll point out

why

caution

necessary in

the dispute. For he'll

show

that things have to be defined

and
he'll

divided before they can be mutually compared,

and

ought to be done. In the fourth part he'll describe what the conditions of the good itself are. For the person who's going to compare wisdom and pleasure to some third thing has to know about the third thing. Here Plato shows that neither is the highest good. This is a negative comparison for which the knowledge of the third thing together with a general perception of the extremes is quite enough. But for an affirmative comparison it is necessary to have in addition a distinct knowledge of the extremes. So, before he can complete the affirmative comparison (in which it has to be decided, since neither is the good itself, at least which is closer to it), he thoroughly examines what each is. And he comes to the fifth part in which he looks into each one's genus. To define something, the genus must be known first of all, likewise the difference has to be added. In this part Plato explains there are two universal genera which penetrate through all things after God, the finite and the infinite. He shows that something is mixed from them and he has a presentiment of the cause of the mixture. In the sixth part, as some spark of knowledge has been kindled through the genera, he starts on the comparison. In the seventh part he describes the mixture's cause more fully, and talks about the world soul and providence. Here he is exploring the comparison more explicitly. In the eighth part, now the principles and genera have been clarified, he looks into the differences. Here he is exploring the consistency of pleasure and pain, the manner in which they are appropriately born from
demonstrate
it

how

passivity,

and also how many parts they have. In the ninth part he examines what knowledge really consists in and divides it up.

Cap.

IX
ad

129

aliquis vitae status appareat utrisque melior et

felicitatefn
sit istius

potior.

Qui

si

apparuerit, considerandum utra illarum

non solum quid sit {341r\ felicitas, sed quae via ad illam commodior cognoscamus, ubi tentabit voluptatem sapientiamque ad comparationem faciendam dividere. In tertia parte docebit qua cauperfectioni cognatior, voluptasne an sapientia, ut

tione

disputandum. Nam ante definienda esse et dividenda quaeque monstrabit quam inter se comparentur, et qua ratione id fieri debeat demonstrabit. In quarta quae sint boni ipsius conditiones describet. Nam tertium cognoscat oportet, qui ad illud duo quaedam sit comparaturus. Ubi Plato neutram summum esse bonum ostendit. Quae comparatio negativa est,
sit

ad

quam cum communi quadam extremorum

cognitio'
tertii.

perceptione

sufficit

Ad

affirmativam enim extremorum

Ideo antequam com-

quoque

distincta cognitio

necessaria.

parationem affirmativam absolvat, in qua iudicandum est postquam neutra^ ipsum est bonum utra saltem illi sit propinquior, quid utraque sit perscrutatur. Et quintam aggreditur partem, in qua investigat utriusque genus. Nam primo genus ad defini-

addenda propemodum" differentia. Qua in parte duo quaedam' genera rerum, quae post Deum per omnia penetrant, aperit, fmitum et infinitum, ex quibus mixtum ostendit et mixtionis causam* praesagit. In sexta, quia
tionem accipiendum'
est,

per

ilia

genera

scintilla

quaedam

cognitionis accensa est, corn-

par ationem inchoat. In septima causam mixtionis illius explicat latius, deque mundi anima et providentia disserit, ubi planius

comparationem exsequitur. In octava

principiis

generibusque differentias investigat, ubi in

iam patefactis quo voluptas dolor-

que consistunt indagat, qua proprie ex passione nascuntur, quotque partes habent. In nona in quo proprie consistit scientia

'agnitio

WX

'neutrum

'quaedam om.

*causa

W W

'decipiendum

'postmodum

WX

130

Chapter 10

up the comparison: that is, there is some wisdom, as wisdom over pleasure. In the tenth part he tells us how these two are mixed together and that our good consists in such a compound. In the eleventh part he investigates what is in the compound, and what the chief element is by reason of which it is fehcity. Here our good and the absolute good shine forth. At last in part twelve, having carefully and gradually ascended to the highest good, suddenly Plato enumerates all the degrees of good things from the highest to the lowest and draws a picture of the happy man. And that's the end of the dialogue.
Here he
is

now

setting

third Hfe that takes the lead over

The arrangement of the arguments in the text; on the happy life and Venus and reverence for the gods.
Chapter
10.

UD12A

Notwithstanding, let's come to the second part. Socrates, having turned to Protarchus, says, "This is the best approach if you want to extol pleasure and I want to extol wisdom. In order
to

introduce an affecand I'll introduce a mental attitude. You can call the affection one of pleasure and I'll attribute the mental attitude to wisdom. Still, we oughtn't to argue so stubbornly
tion of the soul,

make each man completely happy, you

we reject a third alternative should it appear to be better than them. But we each ought to look on it favourably, and when it has been ascertained that it is better, we ought to find
that

out whether wisdom or pleasure

For since things are good to the extent they contribute towards the end, we ought to consider what disposition of the soul leads entirely to the end, then see whether wisdom or pleasure belongs to it. And if neither disposition seems to be sufficient to reach the end, we'll have to seek a third disposition to which you can compare each, and better conclude what is closer to it. Before, you concluded in the same way that the totally good was what led
is

closer to

it.

totally to the end.

be sure, should a more perfect life be discovered, it will contain in itself and in a more enduring way whatever is good in

"To

Cap.X
eamque
tati.

131

partitur,

\341\\ ubi

comparationem iam expedit, quod

scilicet tertia

quaedam

vita sapientiae praeest, sapientia volup-

Decima in parte docet quo pacto haec duo invicem misceantur quodve in composito huiuscemodi' nostrum est bonum. In undecima vero inquirit quid insit in eo composito quidve praesit cuius ratione felicitas sit. Ubi et bonum nostrum et bonum absolutum emicat. In duodecima tandem postquam ad supremum bonum sensim gradatimque conscenderat, subito gradus omnes bonorum a supremo ad infimum numerat, felicemque figurat hominem atque ibi libri huius^ est finis.

Dispositio verborum textus et de vita felici et Venere et reverentia deorum. Cap. XJ

Ceterum ut ad secundam veniamus partem; conversus ad Protarchum Socrates ait: si voluptatem extollere tu et ego
sapientiam volumus, optima* haec est ratio, ut
et tu

affectionem

ego habitum inducamus, quo maxime felix quisque reddatur, et tu quidem affectionem eam voluptatis esse dicas, ego sapientiae habitum ilium tribuam. Neque tamen usque adeo pertinaces esse in disputando debemus, ut siquis

quandam animi

et

tertius status utrisque praestantior apparuerit

eum

reiciamus;

sed utrosque

illi

favere decet et

illo

tamquam

potiori posito utra

cognatior

illi

sit

investigare sapientiane an voluptas.

sint

*Cum

enim' quaelibet eatenus bona

finem, considerandum est quae animi dispositio

quatenus conducunt ad omnino ad

hunc' conducat, deinde videre utrum ad illam attineat sapientiane an voluptas. Et si appareat neutram' dispositionem sufficere ad finem, quaerenda est tertia ad quam conferas utrumque et concludas mehus quod similius; sicut antea* concludebas omnino bonum quod omnino conducat.** Certe siqua vita perfectior reperitur, quicquid est in voluptate
vel'

sapientia boni ipsa in se et stabilius insuper continet;

'duscemodi

'istius

WX

'enim om.Jf

*idJlf

'neutnim >f

'no ch. heading or break 'anteA^

WX
'in

add.

add. W
om.

132

Chapter 10

pleasure or wisdom; for every single thing endures longer in

something better than

sure

it

and

my wisdom

will

does in something worse. So your pleabe completely overthrown by this life.

perfection. If pleasure

But we'll have to see which of them is closer to this life's is, it will defeat wisdom; if wisdom is, it

will defeat pleasure, for all the less

good things are

in turn

com-

pared by the standard of the greater good." But Socrates will maintain subsequently that the third more perfect life is the one which joins pleasure to wisdom in a marvellous way. Because of the joining together the whole of Hfe is more complete; furthermore, the pleasure is more lasting, since it comes from something that lasts and
it

comes with supreme moderation; and the

12B

contemplation of wisdom is more constant too, since what is done with delight is done for a longer time. But, since in this dialogue Socrates is about to derogate pleasure and Philebus had called pleasure, "Venus," he hastens to

make atonement,

fearing a goddess'

name

especially as a pious

12C

should. Atonement is the restoration of holiness that has been destroyed. Hohness is devotion to holy things, as in the Euthydemus/^ But Socrates had sinned against a god's name. Therefore he purges himself in the presence of Protarchus, so that Protarchus may excuse him before other men. He tells them he venerates both the goddess and the goddess' name: for fear he should offend somehow in using divine names, he trembles so much, he says, that for men no other horrendous source whatsoever can cause anything like this horror. Rather, it's the extreme limit of the greatest consternation possible, that is, beyond it nothing can be feared more strongly. Socrates says he is prepared to call Venus by any name most pleasing to her, if he could hear her true names alone; for instance "Ciprogenea," or "Citharea," or "Philomidia.""' But for the present he doubts "pleasure" is her name, since Venus, being a goddess, is one simple something, but pleasure signifies something varied and multiple and doesn't signify the goddess Venus, as Philebus wanted (he was young still and a follower of Eudoxus and Aristippus, whom the Epicurean philosopher, Lucretius, also
copied. Lucretius writes:

man

Cap.

133

unumquodque enim in re meliore stabilius quam in deteriori permanet. Unde ab ea vita longe et voluptas tua et mea sapientia

superatur. Sed
si

videndum

erit

utra istarum

sit illius
si

perfec-

tioni cognatior:

voluptas, superabit sapientiam;

sapientia,

voluptatem superabit.
maioris

Omnia namque minora bona secundum

\342f\ invicem comparantur. Tertiam vero perfectiorem earn in sequentibus esse dicet, quae iungit mirabili quodam modo cum sapientia voluptatem, qua copulatione tota vita integrior est. Quin etiam' voluptas

normam
et

banc vitam

firmior,

cum

ex re firma et optima moderatione sumatur,

diutius agitur.

et

sapientiae

quoque contemplatio assidua magis, quod enim cum

fit

delectatione

Socrates sit voluptati derogaturus, Philebus autem voluptatem Venerem appellaverit, Socrates in primis nomen deae veritus ut hominem pium decet expiare se
properat. Expiatio est sanctitatis abolitae restitutio. Sanctitas

Verum cum hoc in dialogo

divinorum cultus est, ut in Euthydemo. Peccaverat autem in dei nomen. Purgat ergo se coram Protarcho ut coram hominibus aliis eum excuset. Praedicitque illis venerari se et deam et deae nomen atque ita se contremiscere in divinorum nominum usu ne quid peccet, ut nuUus sit hominum pavor ex aliis quibuscumque rebus horrendis concitus huic horrori similis, sed maximae cuiuscumque trepidationis hunc esse^ extremum, id est, ultra quem metui vehementius nihil possit; et eo nomine vocare illam paratum se esse, quod magis illi placeat, si modo vera illius audierit nomina ut vel Ciprogeneam,' vel Cithaream," vel Philomidiam.' In praesentia vero diffidere se voluptatem nomen illius esse, quia Venus utpote dea unum quiddam* est simplex, voluptas autem variam rem multiphcemque significat non deam Venerem, ut Philebus iunior adhuc et Eudoxi et Quos Lucretius Philosophus Aristippi sectator volebat.
Epicureus imitatus, inquit:

'Ciprogenea '/or Quin etiam JfA" read et 'esseom. y 'intuetur earn veneratumque et in ipsa admodum ddcctatur add.

*vel

Cithaream o/n. A'

'unum quiddam om. Y

134

Chapter 11
"Mother of Aeneas and
sky,
his race,

dehght of

men and

gods,

Life-giving Venus, under the

wheeHng
sea,

constellations of the

You, who over the ship-bearing

the fruit-laden land

is

Frequently wander, each race of living things

conceived

Through you, and having

sun"*^).

risen

it

gazes on the rays of the

Chapter 11. On Venus and the gods; and on the gods names and reverence for them.
'

Three things must be asked here. In Plato what sort of divinVenus? How did the error arise of those who've called Venus "pleasure"? Why must the gods' names be held in reverence? To be sure, Orpheus (whose theology Plato followed) in his Book of Hymns calls the heavens, which most people refer to as the Sky, "the progenitor of all things" and "the beginning and end of all."** Perhaps Plato too wants the sky to be the first divinity not the sky which one sees with the eyes (for in the Timaeus he argues that this was created*'), but the first principle of the sky and of all things. He says in the Epistles that all things surround this king and all things exist for his sake, and he is the cause of all good things.*' In the Republic he called him "the sun of the upper world."** He maintains that his son is Saturn, a divine intelligence begotten immediately by God. This intelligence Porphyry calls "the reason or word of God the father."*' In the Timaeus Plato calls the intelligence "the maker of the world and the father of the gods.'"" In the Statesman he calls him "Cronos," that is, Saturn, the king of the eternal city, the converter of souls, the author of the resurrection of all things. *' In the Laws Book 4 Plato said he contains the beginning and end and all the middle points of things, and orders
ity is

individual things with uprightness according to [his] encircling

nature." Also in the Protagoras Plato calls him "the merciful giver of divine and human laws."" In the Epistles he calls him
"father and master.'"* Out of this divine intelligence a certain
living spirit
is

granted to the universal mechanism of the world;

Cap.

XI

135

Eneadum genetrix hominum divumque voluptas. Alma Venus coeli [342v\ subter labentia signa
Quae mare navigerum, quae terras frugiferentes Concelebras; per te quoniam genus omne animantum
Concipitur, visitque exortum lumina
soils.

De Venere atque
circa
ilia.

diis;
^

de nominibus deorum

et reverentia

Cap. XI.

Hie tria quaerenda sunt: quod numen apud Platonem sit Venus? Unde ortus sit^ eorum error qui Venerem voluptatem cognominarunt? Cur deorum nominibus reverentia sit' habenda? Orpheus profecto cuius theologiam secutus est Plato coelum quem plerique coelium* vocant in libro hymnorum genitorem omnium vocat' principiumque et finem omnium. Hunc forsan' et Plato primum Deum esse vult, non coelum, hoc quod cernitur oculis, nam^ genitum esse disputat in Timaeo, sed primum coeli omniumque principium. Circa quem regem in Epistolis ait esse omnia eiusque gratia omnia* et ipsum bonorum omnium causam esse; et' in Republica hunc mundi superioris solem vocavit. Huius filium Saturnum asserit mentem quamdam divinam statim a Deo genitam, quam Porphyrins' Dei patris rationem seu verbum vocat." Hanc mentem in Timaeo mundi opificem patremque deorum nominat Plato, et in libro de Regno, Cronon, id est, Saturnum, regem civitatis aeternae, conversorem animorum, resurrectionis omnium auctorem. In quarto Legum hunc'^ continere dixit principium et finem et media omnia'' rerum, rectitudine disponere singula secundum naturam circumeuntem. In Protagora quoque clementem divinarum humanarumque legum datorem hunc esse dicit; in Epistolis patrem ac dominum. Ex hac divina mente
universae

mundi machinae

vivens

quidam

spiritus est tributus.

consistently

'Late Latin form used 'sit om. WX 'sh om. Y 'nature y *agoWX 'vocat o/n. >f by Ficino in this context "vocant y "Porphyrius om. y *ti.om.W eiusque gratia omnia om. A" "media omnitmi W; medium onmium "In quarto Legum hunc om.
'no ch. heading or break

136

Chapter 11
indeed, which

borne above the waters, that is, above the flowing matter of the world. In the Timaeus Plato calls the spirit "the world's soul"; in the Republic Book 10 "necessity"; in the Statesman "fate"; in the Laws "the law of the stars and the rational Hfe of the world"; in the Epistles "the ruler of past, present and future things"; in the Phaedrus "Jove, the lord who sets the winged chariot into motion in the sky."" In this dialogue the world's soul will be called by Plato "the intelligence," "the all-governing wisdom," "the queen of earth and
a
spirit,
is

(in whom dwells royal intellect and royal soul). At least three powers are considered to be in this soul: one whereby it always adheres to the good itself, the first principle of things; another whereby it gazes on the beauty of the divine intelligence; a third whereby it extends the forms of things into matter. The first power is called "Jupiter," the second "celestial Venus," the third "inferior Venus." And so in the Symposium Plato introduces two Venuses, the mothers of twin loves:'* one was born the daughter of the sky without a mother; the other was conceived by Jove and Dione. From the former, honourable loves are born, from the latter, base loves. Since the rational principle of the soul itself has been turned back towards the glory of the divine intelligence, it sees her and worships her and delights completely in her. Conversion and recognition are called "the celestial Venus." But worship is divine love, delight, supernal joy and true pleasure. Hence love and the pleasure similar to her accompany the celestial Venus. Moreover, the power of that part of the soul, which is concerned with moving corporeal objects, longs to model the beautiful

sky," "Jove"

forms of things

in the

matter of the world. In this way, just as

the former part strives to contemplate the beauty of the divine

species, so the latter part turns to the

exemplar of higher things

lat-

in order to bring forth the beauty of corporeal forms. So the

ter part
is

of the soul is also called "Venus": its drive to procreate "love," its peace in the fulfilment of procreation is "pleasure." So you have twin Venuses, twin loves and twin pleasures. Because she's the one who does not look towards matter, the superior Venus is said by Plato to be without a mother. The

Cap.
qui vere super aquas fertur, id

XI
super fluxam
in

137

est,

mundi mate-

Timaeo; in decimo^ de Republica necessitatem; in libro de Regno fatum; in Legibus legem' siderum ac vitam mundi rationalem; in Epistolis rerum praeteritarum praesentium" et futurarum ducem; in Phaedro Jovem ducem, qui alatum in coelo citet currum; in hoc libro dicet banc mundi animam mentem esse et sapientiam omnium gubernatricem, coeli terraeque reginam, esseque Jovem in quo regius intellectus et regia insit anima. In hoc utique tres vires considerantur: una qua ipsi bono primo rerum principio semper inhaeret; altera qua divinae mentis pulchritudinem' intuetur; tertia qua rerum formas explicat in materia. Prima Jupiter dicitur; secunda coelestis Venus; tertia Venus inferior. Ideoque in Symposio Plato duas inducit Veneres geminorum matres amorum: unam coeli filiam* sine matre natam; alteram ex Jove genitam atque Dione. Ex ilia generosos amores nasci, ex ista vulgares. Ratio siquidem^ ipsius animae ad mentis divinae decorem conversa, intuetur earn veneraturque et in ipsa admodum delectatur. Conversio quidem* agnitioque coelestis Venus dicitur. Veneratio vero' amor divinus, delectatio, supernum gaudium veraque voluptas. Unde
et amor et voluptas similis comitatur. Quin animae istius quae ad corpora movenda porrigitur speciosas rerum formas in mundi materia exprimere concupiscit. Quare sicut pars ilia ad pulchritudinem divinarum specierum contemplandam nititur, ita haec ad pulchritudinem corporalium formarum gignendam ad superiorum exemplar se confert. Quapropter et haec pars animae Venus est [343v] dicta; eius nixus ad gignendum amor; quies in generationis expletione voluptas. Geminam itaque habes Venerem, amorem geminum,

riam. [343r\ Hunc'

mundi animam nominat

coelestem Venerem
vis

etiam

geminam voluptatem.
Superior Venus, quia ad materiam'" minime respicit, ideo
sine

matre esse dicitur a Platone. Venus inferior ex Jove,

'
'

id est,

'em., hanc 'filam y "est add.

WXY 'sexto Y 'quidem' WX

Mcgc
'ipsa IfJT

'praesertim

'pulchritudine

*\noom.WX

materia'

138

Chapter 11

inferior

Venus depends upon Jove, that is, the higher part of the soul which we've called Jove, and upon a mother as well, Dione, because she does look towards matter. So there are two loves, two pleasures, also two procreations in men: on one part as regards the divine species, on the other as regards the corporeal form. But what Hesiod says of Venus in his Theogony (when he says Saturn castrated the Sky and threw the testicles into the sea, and from these and the swirling foam Venus was born") must be understood perhaps as referring to the fertility
for creating
ciple
all

things.

The

fertility

Hes hidden in the

first prin-

and unfolds

of things; and the divine intelligence at first drinks it down it inside itself, then pours it out into the soul and into matter. It is called "the sea" because of movement and time and the wetness of procreation. When the soul is first abundant with that fertility, it produces intelligible beauty in itself by turning towards higher things. It begets the glory of sensible forms in matter by turning towards lower things. But from turning like this towards beauty and

from the generation of beauty the soul

is

called Venus.

And

since pleasure has been mingled into every glance at

beauty and into beauty's every generation, and since all generation is from the soul (which is called Venus), the majority have thought Venus is pleasure itself. Again, the pleasure in thinking
imparts an almost ceaseless action; and the pleasure in nourishment preserves the individual for a long time, and in generation makes the species everlasting and transforms the lover into the

beloved and creates all things in art and nature. These operations are divine, so people call pleasure a goddess. In addition, since all desire pleasure as the end, therefore as the principle, and since they take pains to direct themselves to her, accordingly, people call her a goddess. But they call her Venus, because
is the companion of venery. But since he was going to impugn pleasure, Socrates feared the name of Venus and didn't want pleasure to be the name of the goddess herself. As Plato says in the Cratylus, a name is some of the power of the thing itself.'* Initially it is conceived in the intelligence, then articulated by the voice, finally expressed in

she

Cap.
superiori ipsius

XI

139

animae parte, quam Jovem diximus, pendet, eX matre quoque Dione quia respicit in materiam. Ideo in hominibus amores duo sunt, voluptates duae, duae quoque generationes partim ad divinam speciem partim ad corpoream formam. Quod autem de Venere in Theologia' tractat Hesiodus, cum dicit Saturnum castrasse coelium testiculosque in mare iecisse ex quibus et spuma agitata nata sit Venus, intelligendum est forte^ de foecunditate rerum omnium procreandarum, quae in primo rerum latet principio, quam divina mens haurit explicatque in se ipsa primum, deinde in animam' materiamque effundit, quod mare dicitur propter motum ac tempus et generationis humorem.

Anima cum primum

ea foecunditate referta est per conver-

sionem ad supera intelligibilem in se ipsa procreat pulchritudinem; et per conversionem ad infera sensibilium formarum in materia gignit decorem. Ex eiusmodi* vero conversione ad pulchritudinem eiusque generatione anima ipsa Venus est nuncupata.

Et quia in omni tam aspectu quam generatione pulchritudinis voluptas inserta est, et omnis generatio ab anima est quae Venus dicitur, plerique Venerem voluptatem ipsam esse existimaverunt. *Item voluptas et in considerando

actionem reddit quasi

perpetuam,

et in nutritione

conservat diu individuum, et in

generatione speciem facit sempiternam et transformat amantem in amatum et omnia procreat in arte et natura. Haec divina
quasi

opera sunt ideo appellatur dea. Adde quia omnia appetunt illam fmem ergo ut principium et in eam' se convertere student, ob haec nominant eam deam, Venerem vero quia comes est
veneris.**

Socrates vero

cum

esset

Veneris

nomen
esse.

veritus est,

voluptatem [344r\ impugnaturus neque voluit deae ipsius voluptatem

nomen

Nomen

sane, ut a Platone describitur* in Cratylo,

est

rei ipsius vis

quaedam

mente concepta primum, voce deinde

'Jfo&o AosTheogonia
scribitur

Hontom.WX

'anima '
141)

'huiusmodi ffA"

'ea

om. W; shifted bade (seep.

140

Chapter 11

But the power of a divine thing is also divine. So we ought to venerate the names of God (since the divine power is present in them) much more than we venerate the shrines and statues of the gods. A clearer image of God is preserved in something made by the intelligence than it is in the works of the hands. In fact, in the Cratylus Plato wants the first and purest names of God to be in the inteUigences of the heavenly spirits (by whom God is conceived with greater clarity), the second-order names to be in the demons, the third in men's souls." He also says the names were revealed by the ancient holy men when they were either enraptured by God, or instructed by the intelligence's light. So God's names are Hke images or sunbeams of God Himself, penetrating through the heavenly beings, the heroes, the souls of men. However, whoever admires the sun venerates the sun's light too. So you must worship both God and God's sunbeams, the powers, the images lying concealed in the significance of names. Therefore, in the Phaedrus Plato introduces Socrates as having been seized by a demon, since he had sinned against Love, the name of a god." In the Laws Book 11 Plato wants those people accounted sacrilegious who defile the names of gods with lying and perjuries, and to be scourged to death by anybody with impunity; moreover, if some able person doesn't punish them, he is to be accounted a traitor to the laws (Plato himself decrees this)." Also in the Parmenides, since he's compared everything to the one God, he didn't think God's names ought to be despised." Dionysius the Areopagite, having copied Plato here, searches in the divine names for all the mysteries of theology.*' Origen in his boo\i Against Celsus says a miraculous power exists in certain holy names, which would not be there if the names were altered; so they mustn't be altered." For this reason the Hebrews placed a miraculous power in the name **tetragrammaton." Paul gave to Him a name which is above all names," Virgil wrote, "Virgin, what shall I name you?"" Homer says many things are named one thing among the gods, another among us." Paul writes that God's word is alive." Plotinus and Proclus also have things to say about names. Paul inwriting.

herited a

name how very different compared to those.

Cap.
expressa,

XI

141

litteris

demum

significata. Rei

autem divinae divina

cum illis divina vis insit quam delubra statuasque deorum. Expressior enim imago Dei in mentis artificio quam manuum operibus reservatur. Nomina vero Dei prima et sincerissima in Cratylo apud mentes numinum coelestium esse
quoque
vis est;

quare Dei nomina

venerari debemus, multo etiam magis

a quibus expressius Deus concipitur; secunda in daemonibus; in animis hominum tertia. Et a priscis viris sanctissimis fuisse prolata, sive Deo raptis seu lumine mentis instructis. Dei itaque nomina tamquam imagines et' radii ipsius Dei sunt per coelicolas heroas animos hominum penetrantes. Quisquis autem solem admiratur veneratur et solis lumen, ita et Deum colere oportet et Dei radios, vires, imagines in nominum significatione latentes. Ideo in Phaedro Socratem inducit Plato cum in amorem dei nomen peccasset correptum a daemone. Et in XI Legum eos qui mendacio et periuriis nomina deorum inquinant
vult,

impune verberibus caedi; et legum ut ipse iubet proditor habeature. In Parmenide quoque cum omnia ad unum Deum compararet nomina illius spernenda non censuit. Quod imitatus Dionysius Areopagita omnia theologiae mysteria in divinis nominibus exquisivit.' Origenes in libro contra Celsum dicit quibusdam nominibus sacris inesse mirificam virtutem quae mutatis nominibus non inesset. Ideo ilia non esse mutanda. Hinc Hebraei in nomine tetragrammaton* miraculosam ponesacrilegos haberi vult, et a quolibet
siquis potens^

non

punierit,

bant virtutem. Paulus dedit

illi

nomen quod

est

super

omne

nomen. Virgilius, Quam te memorem virgo? Homerus aliter apud superos aliter apud nos multa dicit nominata. Paulus, Vivus est sermo Dei. De his etiam Plotinus et Proclus. Paulus quanto differentius prae illis nomen haereditavit.**

'et

om.

inserted here

'praesens

WX

^passage "Item voluptas et ... est veneris" (see p.

Hetragammaton

*-**om.

W (cont.)

139)

142

Chapter 12
is

Chapter 12. That there in divine names.

It is

a living force in names, especially

not without great mystery that Paul attributes

it

all

the acts

of a living being to the divine word, making

spirit

penetrate the

and the soul and the body, making it distinguish between affections and thoughts and see and hear all. It's as if God Himself were there in His words even when they're presented through the prophets, just as the power of the intelligence is
there in the conception of a

name even when

it's

presented

beyond the

intelligence in the imagination.

Notice that the power of a natural object reaches through the senses to the imagination, through the imagination to the intelli-

gence by which
life

it is apprehended and enclosed in a name, just as and understanding are enclosed in the body. But notice that the divine power reaches through the heavenly intelligences to our intelligence by which it is apprehended and similarly named with a living name. And this name is more alive than the names of bodily objects to the extent that the movement coming down to us from those above is more powerful coming down to us, I say, when we become more like God, that is, when we recall our intelligence from lower things. But so great is the divine force preserved in these names that even men far removed from God and wrong-doers can work miracles by them. Finally, if permitted, I would remind you how great a power is present in the five words of the sacrament (I pass over the heretical concept that John was transformed

into Christ, that

is, with the words, ** Woman, behold your son," and, "You, behold your mother.")^' These things confirm the view that many names have been found from the individual peculiarity of things. Why does everybody call God by four letters? The Hebrews by the four vowels "he ho ha hi"; the Egyptians by "Theuth";

the the

Persians

by

"Syre";

the

Magi by

"Orsi"

"Oromasis"; the Greeks by "Theos"; ourselves by

whence "Deus";

Arabs by "Alia"; Mahomet by "Abgdi." Again, we accepted "Jesu" from Gabriel, in which name etc.'" Surely,

Cap. XII

143

Esse vivam in nominibus virtutem praesertim divinisCap. xii:

*Non absque magno

mysterio Paulus divino sermoni omnes

viventis actus tribuit: penetrare spiritum et

animam
omnia

et corpus,
et

discernere cogitationes et affectus, videre

ipse ita sit in verbis suis

audire.

etiam per prophetas proQuasi Deus latis, sicut mentis acies in conceptione nominis etiam praeter mentem in ipsa imaginatione prolati. Attende vim rei naturalis per sensus ad imaginationem per

banc ad mentem pervenire, qua concipitur nominique includitur quasi vita et intelligentia corpori. Vim vero divinam per mentes superiores ad nostram, qua concipitur similiterque nominatur nomine vivo; et tanto magis vivo quam^ nomina corporum quanto potentior a superioribus in nos provenit motus. In nos

inquam cum Deo

similiores evadimus, id est,

quando mentem

ab inferioribus sevocamus. Tanta vero divinitatis virtus his servatur nominibus ut etiam viri a Deo remotiores atque malefici his nominibus mirabilia operentur. Denique, si fas esset, commemorarem quanta vis insit quinque sacramenti verbis (mitto haeresim, fingentem Joannem in Christum fuisse conversum, illis videlicet verbis, Mulier ecce filius tuus, et, Tu ecce mater tua). Per haec confirmatur opinio multa nomina ab ipsa rerum proprietate inventa
fuisse.

Cur omnes Deum quattuor vocant litteris? Hebraei quattuor vocahbus, he ho ha hi;' Aegyptii, Theuth; Persae, Syre; Magi, Orsi unde Oromasis; Graeci, Theos; Nos, Deus; Arabes, Alia; Macometh,* Abgdi. Nos item Jesu a Gabriele accepimus, in**

'no ch. heading or break in

aut potius in

quodam

W; reads Caput Scptimum. Utrum felicitas sit in voluptate an scientia mixto. Item de genere speciebusque turn voluputis turn scientiae (cf. ch. 13
'quanto

heading on my p. 145) (cont.)***om. W(cont.)

'haehohaiy

MaumethesA'

144

Chapter 13

such diverse races would not otherwise have agreed on the one name of the unknown God, unless they were divinely inspired?

And

if

they received

it

from Adam,

it

was by divine inspiration

name rather than others. The Hebrews say that, if pronounced correctly, all miracles can be wrought in that name which is the most difficult thing
they received that

of all to do;

it

takes a miracle alone to pronounce

it. I

think

God

made

it

so difficult so

nobody should say

it

and work miracles

through it, unless like a trumpet God should proclaim through him (which shows the most acceptable of all to God was Jesus, whom the Jews acknowledge worked miracles by pronouncing that name correctly). The Jews themselves pronounce it by "Elphim"; the Greeks by a four letter word. God puts all things in order by means of four: essence, being, power, action. Celestial things He orders by means of four sets of three," sub-celestial things by means of the four elements. Accordingly, He wanted to be represented by four letters.

Chapter 13. Whether felicity is in pleasure, or knowledge, or rather in some third thing. Again, concerning the genus and the several species both of pleasure and of knowledge.
he brought pleasure and knowledge into the argument (which are thought to be the greatest goods among men), so it might be apparent from a comparison between them which is the better one and whether either of them is the good itself, or both are, or some third thing is. But in order to make the comparison and decide, it is necessary to know about them both beforehand. But each one is a certain genus containing many species under it and under the species an infinite number of individual things, so it is necessary to divide each one into its species for it to be underthe
itself,

Since Socrates wanted to

know

good

stood by knowledge. For, as Plato says in the Sophist and the Statesman, whoever is going to understand any genus of things perfectly mustn't rest content with the general notion itself of
the genus, nor

wander about through an

infinite

number of

Cap. XIII

145

*quo nomine etc. Certe non aliter tarn diversae gentes in uno nomine convenissent, nisi divinitus. Ac si acceperunt ab Adam divinitus hoc potius quam alia acceperunt. Tradunt Hebraei in nomine illo omnia fieri posse miracula, si
ignoti Dei

omnium difficillimum et miraculo puto adeo difficile instituisse, ut nemo pronuntiaret miraculaque per ipsum faceret, nisi Deus per ipsum quasi per tubam clamaret. Quod ostendit Jesum Deo fuisse omnium acceptissimum, quem fatentur Judaei per id nomen recte pronuntiatum fecisse miracula. Ipsi vero id per Heloin pronuntiant;' Graeci per tetragrammaton.* Deus omnia
vere pronuntietur

quod

est'

solo^ pronuntiatur.

Deum

disponit per quattuor:' essentiam, esse, vim, actionem. Coelestia

per quattuor triplicitates; sub coelum per quattuor elementa.

Sic quattuor voluit litteris exprimi.**

Utrum felicitas sit in voluptate an scientia aut potius in quodam tertio. Item de genere speciehusquCy turn voluptatis turn scientiae.

Cap. XIII.*'
cupit Socrates

[344v]

Quoniam

bonum ipsum
inter

cognoscere,
exis-

voluptatem

et scientiam, quae

maxima

homines bona

timantur, in disceptationem traxit, ut his inter se comparatis

utrum^ horum melius sit eluceret, et numquid istorum alterum ipsum bonum sit, vel utrumque vel tertium. Ad hanc vero comparationem iudiciumque necesse est ante utriusque illorum habere scientiam. Sed utrumque genus aliquod est multas sub se species et singula sub speciebus continens infinita, quare necesse
est

utrumque

in species suas dividere ut

prehendatur.

Nam,

ut in Sophiste et in

utrumque scientia comHbro de Regno docet

Plato, quisquis aliquod genus rerum perfecte est cogniturus,

neque

in ipsa

communi

generis notione quiescere debet, neque

per singula infinita vagari. Scientia siquidem* perfecta est et

'estom.Y
quidem'

'solo

om.

Y reads scilicet per

'pronuntiat y *tetragammaton A" *noch. heading or break W; a break only

y
'quid

'/or per quattuor

(cont.)*^*om.

WX

146

Chapter 13

single things, since

knowledge

is

the perfect and certain compre-

hension of each thing." But a universal power and potentiality for the many species lies concealed in any genus; and the person who doesn't know about a thing's power doesn't perfectly com-

prehend the thing

of the genus,
if

itself.

So you have to understand the power

aims
at

you're going to profess knowledge of the genus,

either

something through end it arrives at some result. But the genus' power and potentiality for the species is terminated through the differences. So the person who's going to understand the creative power of a genus and the result of its creativeness has to know about the differences and the species. When you know about the species, there's no point wandering around through single things. For they can't be enumerated, because they're infinite, and there's no firm and definite comprehension of them in the soul, because they are changed every single moment. So whoever wants to know about any genus of things can neither remain in the genus nor roam about to infinity through individuals. But rather, having a notion of the common genus, he must seek out a distinct and unconditional understanding of it in its species where the whole power of the genus is perfected. For individuals add nothing to the species that can increase the power of the genus. Rather,
giving
action, or receiving something through passivity. In the

However, power

those things peculiar to individuals are certain extraneous passivities;

they are completely foreign to the substance of the

For this reason the species of both pleasure and knowledge must be investigated since both are genera. But if someone's wondering that Plato should attempt to divide these things before defining them, he must understand
species.

that
all

some ordinary natural

it.

description of a thing has to precede

division of

Given

this,

you have to

try to divide the general

concept into

its

properties so the definition can be

more

clearly

and precisely understood. Accordingly, since everybody understands what is meant by the term, pleasure or knowledge, that is to say, recognition of the truth and enjoyment of life, they can work out from the general description how many ways pleasure can be obtained and knowledge can be perceived in which case

Cap. XIII
certa cuiusque comprehensio.

147

Sed

in genere quolibet vis quae-

dam communis et potentia ad species multas latet;

ignorat
generis teneat oportet, qui generis scientiam
sit

et qui rei vim rem ipsam baud perfecte comprehendit. Vim ergo

professurus. Vis

autem seu per actionem ad aliquid dandum, sive per passionem ad accipiendum tendat; ad effectum denique nonnullum pervenit. Vis autem generis et potentia' per differentias ad species terminatur. Differentias ergo et species teneat opus est, qui generis vim foecundam et effectum foecunditatis ipsius sit cogniturus. Cognitis autem speciebus vagari per singula irritum opus est. Nam cum infinita sint dinumerari non possunt, et quia singulis momentis mutantur nulla de his [345r\ firma est in animo certaque comprehensio. Quisquis ergo genus aliquod rerum cognoscere cupit, neque resistat in genere, neque per singula in infinitum pererret,^ sed communis^ generis habita notione distinctam eius et absolutam in speciebus ipsius quaerat intelligentiam, in quibus tota vis generis adimpletur. Nihil enim singula speciebus addunt quod vim generis augeat. Sed

quaecumque singulis propria sunt extraneae quaedam passiones sunt, et a speciei* substantia penitus alienae. Quare et species
voluptatis scientiaeque investigandae sunt,

cum

genera quaetentet

dam

sint utraque.

Siquis vero admiretur

prius

quod Plato divisionem istorum

intelligat

quam deflnitionem,
et

ante

omnem
rei

rei

partitionem

naturalem quandam
tionem.

vulgarem ipsius

haberi descrip-

Qua

posita, ut definitio distinctior et certior

compre-

hendatur, divisio

communis conceptionis in proprias quaeritur. Ideo cum quid nomine voluptatis et scientiae significatur omnes
hac
descriptione investigant quot modis comparari
ilia et

intelligant scilicet veritatis cognitio et iucunditas vitae, ex

communi

haec percipi possit, ubi dividunt.

Quo

invento, et communis'

'potentiaeA^

'pergerctA"

'community

'xtiWX

'communiusA'

148

Chapter 13

they are dividing.

When
all
is,

they

have discovered

this,

they

comprehend
its

perfectly

the

individual parts, that

genus and they grasp the rational principle of

us to use a

power of the

common

the species. So Plato

finally

tells

common

description

everyone knows when we divide, to define from

this division,

se

from the definition to reassess the division more carefully and to demonstrate in a more precise way the power and the quality of a thing. However, Socrates begins with the genus of pleasure, as it is better known than the genus of knowledge. And he shows pleasure is usually a genus thus: "Everybody thinks the genus is what is predicated about many species with reference to what it
But pleasure is predicated of many species, for pleasure seems to have one particular nature: namely, a person is delighted when it is present; and because of this one nature, pleasure is said to be some one thing. But it ought to be called many things as well, because it contains various and dissimilar forms, that is, species under it. For to be delighted, which properly comes from pleasure, occurs in many ways and from different things. We say an intemperate man is delighted by some lewdness, a temperate man by sobriety; an insane man is delighted by some foolish hope and wild opinions, the prudent man by reasonable hope and mature reflection. "But the person who denies these four species of pleasure are different and dissimilar is indubitably deranged. For what else
is.

are these delights

if

they're not particular

movements or disposi-

tions of souls or bodies?

But the movements and dispositions, which have been brought about in men in dissimilar ways from
dissimilar occasions for dissimilar effects

and ends, are certainly

12D

among themselves." Protarchus did not assent immediately to Socrates' argument but interrupted, "Socrates, although these pleasures proceed from opposites, they aren't, nevertheless, opposite among themselves. For in so far as they are pleasures, among themdissimilar also

12E

of all things most alike." him thus, "If you deny on this account that the species of pleasure are dissimilar, because each one is a
selves they are

Socrates counters

Cap. XIII
generis

149

singularum partium, id est, specierum rationem tenent. Ideo Plato ex communi descriptione omnibus nota dividendum monet, ex hac divisione definiendum, denique ex definitione divisionem distinctius iudicandam et rei vim et qualitatem certius demonstrandam. A voluptatis autem genere incipit Socrates, quia notius est quam scientiae genus. Atque ita ferme voluptatem esse genus ostendit: genus esse id omnes [345v] putant quod de speciebus pluribus in eo quod quid est praedicatur. Voluptas autem de
perfecte
et

vim

omnem

comprehendunt

pluribus dicitur speciebus, una enim

quaedam

videtur esse

voluptatis natura, ut scilicet ea praesente quis delectetur; et

propter banc naturam

Dici

unam unum quoddam

voluptas dicitur.

quoque debet

et

multa, quia formas, id

est, species

sub se

varias et dissimiles continet.

Nam

delectari

quod proprie ex

voluptate est multis contingit modis diversisque ex rebus.

Delectari dicimus intemperantem hominem lascivia quadam, temperantem' sobrietate; delectari insanum levi quadam spe temerariisque opinionibus, prudentem consulta spe et matura
sententia.

Atque has quattuor

species

dissimiles esse negaverit, procul

voluptatum siquis differentes et dubio delirabit. Quid enim

aliud delectationes istae, nisi vel

motus quidam

vel affectiones

aliquae
in

animorum

vel

corporum. Motus autem affectionesque

hominibus dissimiliter affectis ex dissimilibus occasionibus ad ef fectus terminosque dissimiles dissimiles certe inter se et ipsi
sunt.

Huic autem Socratis

trariis

ration!

baud statim consensit Protar-

chus, sed intulit: Voluptates istae,

O Socrates, quamquam coninter se

a rebus proficiscuntur, non tamen invicem ipsae con-

trariae.

Nam

qua voluptates sunt

ita Socrates: Si

omnium

simillimae

sunt.

Contra eum

miles esse negaveris, quia

ex hoc voluptatis species dissiunaquaeque voluptas sit, in quolibet

'temperantem repeated

150

Chapter 13

deny in the same way that there are dissimilar any other genus whatsoever, because the nature of each genus is found in its species. Therefore you'll say white and black are like each other, because each is a colour, when nevertheless, they are not only unhke but opposite, because within the genus of colour they are as far from each other as possible. Certainly, the colour white and the colour grey are alike; but white and red are unhke; and white and black are opposite. For each quahty is hke the one next to it, unlike the one further off, but opposite to the one furthest off. You're at liberty to see this in the case of tastes, and in a way with sounds and smells and things affecting the touch. Moreover, within the genus of shape itself mutually dissimilar and (in some respects) opposite species are present. For the triangle is sufficiently like
pleasure, you'll
species in

a quadrangle, very unlike a pentagon, completely opposite to

the circle. Although the one genus, shape,
these species,
still,

is included in all nothing prevents the shapes from being very dissimilar. For any genus whatsoever (in that the species are under it) has to be divided into the species by means of opposite differences; a species is constituted from the genus and a difference. In the same way as we say a higher place and a lower place are opposites not because of their dimensions, but because of the opposite powers inherent in them, so we say the cube, i.e., a figure with six faces, is opposite to a pyramid. We are following the Pythagoreans here, because it is they who think the cube is appropriate to the earth, the pyramid to fire. Colour in fact exists in whiteness, but it is a transparent colour; it also exists in blackness, but it is opaque. Animality is present in man, but it is rational; it is present in a beast, but it is irrational. As long as a genus remains one in itself and simple and everywhere similar to itself, no species is produced; hence it's not a genus either. As soon as a number of species is pro-

duced, what was one genus in

guished by various differences.

itself is

now shown

to be distin-

And

since the species are

made

from the

division of the genus through the differences, the

genus' division (and limitation) through the differences precedes every possible species.

The

differences were lying hidden

Cap. XIII
itidem alio genere species sub eo dissimiles negabis esse,
generis cuiusque natura in speciebus suis reperiatur.

151

cum
Dices

itaque
sit,

album et nigrum similia invicem, quia color utrumque cum tamen non dissimilia [346r\ tantum ista sint, sed con-

quia maxime inter se sub coloris genere distant. Profecto albus color et glaucus similes, albus autem et rubeus dissimiles,
traria,

quaeque ad propinquam ad remotissimam vero contraria. Quod in saporibus vocibus quodammodo et odoribus et his quae ad tactum pertinent intueri licet. Quin etiam in figurae
albus et niger contrarii.
similis,

Nam

qualitas

ad remotiorem

dissimilis,

ipsius

genere

species

inter

se

dissimiles

et

quodammodo

contrariae insunt.

Nam

triangulus quadrangulo satis similis,

pentagono dissimilior, circulo ferme contrarius. Quamvis in omnibus his speciebus unum figurae genus sit inclusum, nihil tamen prohibet quominus dissimiles figurae sint. Nam in quolibet genere eo ipso quod species sub eo' sunt per oppositas differentias divisum in eas genus sit oportet, ex quo et differentia fuerit species constituta. *Sicut locum superiorem et inferiorem contraria dicimus non propter dimensiones sed virtutes contrarias in illis constitutas, ita figuram cubicam, id est, sex facierum contrariam dicimus pyramidi secundum Pythagoricos. Propterea quod cubicam terrae, pyramidem igni propriam esse putant.** Color quidem inest albo sed lucidus color; inest et nigro sed opacus. Inest animal homini sed rationale, inest bruto sed rationis expers. Quoad^ genus in se ipso unum et simplex manet et sibi undique simile, nulla nascitur species; unde neque est genus. Cum primum multae nascuntur species, quod unum in se erat genus differentiis variis significatur iam esse distinctum.

Cumque

ex partitione generis per differentias species

generis praecedit partitio

constituantur,

quamcumque' speciem

limitatioque per differentias quae sicut in materia potentia

'ipso A*

'Quod ad y

'quacumque H^

-*o/n. >f

152

Chapter 13
genus
like potentiality in matter,

in the

but they are led into act

to

make the species. Therefore the genus has already been made different and particular when the species arises. So the species
differ inside the genus, because the

genus accords with one or

its

other of the species under one or other of

issuing into act. Species are distinguished

properties

now

among
it

themselves by

these substantial differences.

"So Protarchus' objection

either, since the

is futile;

and

isn't

convincing

same reasoning

applies to

all

the other genera.

He will argue that all that's in the genus is entirely one. There won't be any opposites in any genus or opposing differences. So there won't be species either. So you won't find any genus in things. Protarchus' reasoning was: the species are under the
won't be mutually distinguishable through the differences. So with every difference excluded we'll find only the genus in the species. But the genus without the differences is one. So everything in the genus will be one. So the opposite qualities which are in the same genus will also be utterly the same." To this argument in which he confirms that the genus of pleasure contains dissimilar species in it, Socrates adds another. He says he's afraid some pleasures can be found to be not only perhaps unlike but mutually opposite too: for instance, the
species

same genus, so they aren't aren't different. So the

dissimilar.

To

this we'll

add: so they

13A

the pleasure

compared to that from evacuation, from heat compared to that from cold, the pleasure from movement compared to that from rest, the one from contemplation compared to that from intercourse. For movements are like the ends for which they exist, the subjects in which they are, the affections from which they come. The pleasures we've described dwell in these opposites and come from opposing desires and mutually impede and avoid each other; nor can the
pleasure sensed in repletion

of opposites come together. Being young, Protarchus replied to the points with too little caution. Since Socrates had said he was afraid some pleasures would be found even mutually opposed, Protarchus casually replied, too confident as it were,
results

"But how

will this

run counter to

my

view?" Then Socrates

Cap. XIII
latebant in #genere, in

153

fabricandam. lam igitur differens

actum vero reducuntur ad speciem et proprium factum est genus

differunt [346v\ in genere species,

cum
aliis

species oritur.

Unde

quia sub alia

et alia sui

proprietate

iam

in

actum exeunte

aliis et

competit speciebus, quibus substantialibus differentiis inter

se species distinguuntur.

Quapropter obiectio ilia Protarchi futilis est neque illi est credendum, quia per omnia alia genera eadem ratio repetita.

Unum omnino quodcumque

Neque

sub genere est esse concludet. neque oppositae differentiae; ergo neque species. Quare nee in rebus genus ullum reperietur. Ratio Protarchi erat haec: species sub eodem genere
in aliquo genere ulla erunt contraria,

sunt, ergo dissimiles

non

sunt.

Huic nos addemus: ergo neque

guentur.

non distinSolum ergo genus omni exclusa' differentia in speciebus reperietur. Genus autem sine differentiis unum est. Unum igitur erunt omnia quae in genere. Ergo et contrariae qualitates quae in eodem sunt genere idem erunt omnino.
differentes, ergo species invicem per differentias

Huic argumentationi qua^ confirmat Socrates voluptatis genus dissimiles sub se species continere, addit ipse idem ulterius, metuere se ne forte voluptates quaedam non modo dissimiles sed et contrariae sibi invicem reperiantur: puta voluptas quae in repletione percipitur ad eam quae in evacuatione provenit; voluptas quae ex calore ad eam quae ex frigore; quae ex motu ad eam quae ex quiete; quae ex contemplatione ad eam quae ex coitu. Tales enim sunt' motus quales termini ad quos, qualia subiecta in quibus, quales affectiones ex quibus exeunt.
Atqui voluptates quas narravimus circa contraria ista versantur et ex oppositis appetitibus* et sese impediunt fugantque {347r\ neque invicem congredi possunt quae contrariorum' opera sunt. Protarchus ad haec utpote adolescentulus parum respondit caute. Quippe cum dixisset Socrates metuere se ne etiam contrariae

quaedam

inter se voluptates reperirentur,* forte respondit:

At hoc opinioni meae quomodo adversabitur; quasi nimis

'conclusa Jf 'contrariora

*<\mai

WXP

'rcpcrientur

'\xtadd. fV

HP frag.

*et ex oppositis appetitibiis II (41 r) begins

om. FKAP

154

Chapter 13

suddenly blasts pleasure by an unexpected attack. He immediback to the proposed division, for he says, "The concession that some pleasures are mutually opposed doesn't invalidate your view that all the species of pleasures exist as pleasures
ately goes

although in dissimilar things; for no reason prevents all the species of pleasure from being pleasures. But it does affect your desire for pleasures to be good. We maintain most are bad, be-

However, you're forced to acknowledge some are both dissimilar and opposite, and yet, you don't hesitate to call them all good. So you find out what is common and identical in all pleasures, the good as well as those which it is agreed are bad, and by the participation of this common factor you call all pleasures good. It's as if you were
cause
are mutually dissimilar.
saying:

many

'We

find a

common

factor in all pleasures, the nature of

But we see some pleasures are bad, namely, those opposite to the good ones. But this is contrary to the view you were maintaining that the nature of pleasure and of the good is the same. For if it were, just as the nature of pleasure is common to all pleasures and makes them all pleasures, so the nature of the good would be common to them all as well. So all pleasures would be good. But they aren't all good. So the nature of the good is not common to them all, and yet the nature of pleasure is common to them all. So the nature of the good is not the same as the nature of pleasure. So pleasure isn't the good itself, for the entire rational principle of the good would be in it." Health is predicated through analogy: firstly, of a stable constitution; secondly, of the things which contribute towards it; thirdly, of the symptoms attesting to it. It can also be predicated of the sharpness of the senses which both contribute and refer to it. Similarly the human good is predicated through analogy: firstly, of felicity; secondly, of the moral attitudes contributing towards it; thirdly, of the pleasure which attests to it; fourthly, not of the degree but of the kind of knowledge referring and contributing to it. Certainly, all that's correctly denominated by one particular name agrees in one particular nature, just as you denominate all delights by the general name of pleasure because they all share in the one disposition of pleasure. But if pleasure
pleasure.'

Cap. XIII
confideret.

155

Unde Socrates subito quodam et inopinato impetu voluptatem effulminat, at statim ad propositam divisionem Inquit enim: Concessio ista quod voluptates revertitur. quaedam inter se contrariae sunt nihil ad id nocet quod ais
voluptatum licet dissimilibus in rebus voluptates existere; nulla enim ratio prohibet quin omnes species voluptatis voluptates sint, sed ad illud officit quod volebas' omnes voluptates bonas esse. Nos enim plerasque malas asserimus, cum multae invicem dissimiles sint. Tu autem fateri cogeris nonnullas et dissimiles et contrarias esse, et tamen bonas omnes
species

omnes

Quid ergo commune et idem in omnibus tam bonis quam^ illis, quas esse malas constat, cuius participatione bonas omnes praedicas. Quasi dicat: commune aliquid reperimus in omnibus voluptatibus voluptatis naturam. Videmus autem aliquas esse malas eas scilicet quae
appellare

non

dubitas.

reperis voluptatibus

bonis contrariae sunt. Id autem' contra illam positionem

est,

qua" ponebas eandem esse voluptatis bonique naturam; si enim ita esset, ut communis' est' voluptatis natura omnibus volup-

unde omnes sunt voluptates, ita et boni natura omnibus communis;^ unde omnes essent bonae. Non sunt autem omnes bonae; ergo non omnibus natura boni communis. Et tamen voluptatis natura omnibus [347v] est communis; ergo non eadem boni voluptatisque natura. Non ergo voluptas ipsum est bonum, esset enim in ea tota ratio boni. Sanum per analogiam praedicatur: primo de firma habitudine; secundo de his quae ad eam conferunt; tertio de signis quae referunt. Potest etiam* praedicari de perspicacia sensuum quae et confert et refert. Similiter humanum bonum per analogiam: primo de felicitate; secundo de moribus ad eam conducentibus; tertio de voluptate eam repraesentante; quarto non quidem gradu sed modo de scientia et referente et conferente. Certe quaecumque uno quodam nomine vere denominantur una
tatibus
esset

quadam in natura conveniunt,

ut

omnes

delectationes

communi

'nolebas >f
esset

'quam om.
'etiam om.

*qaodadd.W

'qyanXP

''communius

156

Chapter 14

were the good itself, the rational principle of pleasure and the good would be the same. So wherever one came upon the rational principle of pleasure, there would be the rational principle of the good as well. But the rational principle of pleasure is
pecuUar to all the species of pleasure, so the rational principle of the good would be peculiar to them as well; so all the pleasures would be good. Yet all the pleasures can't be good, since most of them are unlike and opposite. But the good is neither opposite to nor unhke the good. In fact, the nature of the good is to preserve and to be desired, but the nature of the opposite is to destroy and put to flight. No one good destroys or puts to flight another good. On the contrary, a higher good preserves and perfects a lower, but the lower desires the higher. However, to the extent that something called good were to destroy something else that was good, it would be bad, since badness is the deprivation of good. But the deprivation of good is bad. The bad is also what destroys good. Good things are not unlike each other; rather, they are ahke, since it's proper for similar things to preserve themselves and mutually and freely to admit each other. But all preservation is good from the good, and it is for the good. Each desire too, which is excited by the
good, turns towards the good. Therefore, since good things are not mutually unlike or opposite, but lots of pleasures are mutually unlike or opposite, not all pleasures are good. On the contrary, lots of them are bad, namely those unlike or opposite to the good ones. So pleasure is not the good itself.

Pleasures are mutually dissimilar, otherwise would result. Again, concerning the differences of the [several] species within the genus.

Chapter

14.

impossibilities

13B-D

Protarchus does not admit Socrates' reason whereby pleasure is overthrown. But he says he rejects the division in which it is maintained some pleasures are good and some bad, so that he won't be forced to acknowledge pleasure is not the good itself.
Socrates says to him,

"But you

can't reject this division, if

you

Cap.

XIV

157

nomine voluptatis
esset et

unus affectus. boni voluptatisque' ratio. Ubicumque igitur ratio voluptatis ibi et ratio boni inveniretur.^ Voluptatis autem ratio omnibus voluptatis speciebus convenit, quare et boni; unde' et bonae" essent omnes. Bonae tamen' omnes esse non possunt,

omnibus convenit voluptatis Sin autem voluptas ipsum bonum esset, eadem
appellas, quia

cum

pleraeque dissimiles
est,

et*

contrariae sint.

Bonum

neque contrarium
conservare
et

neque

dissimile; natura

vero bono quidem boni est

fugare.

appeti, contrarii vero perimere atque

Nullum bonum alterum bonum

perdit et fugat,
et

immo

superius

bonum bonum
aliud

inferius

servat

perficit,

inferius

autem
dicitur

superius expetit. Quatenus

autem unum quod bonum

bonum

perderet, eatenus

malum

esset,

siquidem

malum
et id

est privatio boni.

Sin privatio boni est

quod bonum
cem,

destruit.

Neque

dissimilia [348r\

malum, malum est bona sunt

sit

invi-

immo

similia potius,

cum

similium proprium

sese con-

mutuo libenter adsciscere. Omnis autem conservatio a bono est bona et est ad bonum. Appetitio quoque omnis quae^ a bono excitatur in bonum vergit. Cum igitur bona invicem contraria et dissimilia non sint, voluptates autem multae invicem dissimiles atque contrariae, non omnes voluptates
servare, sese

bonae;

sunt et contrariae.

immo malae complurimae quae bonis scilicet dissimiles Non ergo voluptas ipsum est bonum.

Voluptates inter se dissimiles sunt, alioquin sequentur impossibilia. Item de differentia specierum sub genere.

Cap. XIV.*

Rationem

Socratis,

qua voluptas

prosternitur, Protarchus

nequaquam

admittit, sed ait illam se divisionem reicere,

qua

bonas esse partim malas, ne cogatur fateri voluptatem bonum ipsum non esse. Ad quem Socrates: At non potes partitionem banc spernere, si admiseris voluptates
asseritur voluptates partim

'et

voluptatis

AP

*etom.W

'inveniturP 'quae om. JfAP

*benc fT 'unum 'tandem 'no ch. heading, but paragraph break

WXP

158

Chapter 14

admit pleasures are mutually unlike and opposite." Protarchus says, **In fact, I don't admit it; for, in so far as they are pleasures, they aren't unlike and opposite." But Socrates refutes this, "If, in order to avoid the dissimilarity and opposition of pleasures, we were to say they aren't dissimilar in so far as
they're pleasures, we'll also say they don't differ in so far as

they're pleasures. But things that don't differ are entirely one.

not be lots of pleasures. So pleasure will not be a genus. Nor could many persons be affected by pleasure together, especially from different things; but only one pleasure

So there

will

will

emerge. But

all this is

absurd.

"Certainly, pleasures don't differ as pleasure; but then they

is, the genus But we're looking for the species not the genus. But since pleasures exist, they exist as species, and as such they also differ; for they presuppose a genus that has been divided already through the differences and included in them under one or other reason. So within the genus the species differ, since they don't accept the genus until it's been divided. A genus differs within the several species, since it belongs to them under one or other of its reasons. The species differ among themselves through the differences which establish them in actuality. So whoever denies the species differ on the grounds they have the same genus in them is denying the genus has been divided into them through the differences. So he's doing away with the species and leaving behind the genus alone. So every possible thing will be one. "So what you have to say is that the species in the genus both agree and differ. They agree in so far as some one common nature of the genus imparts itself to them. But they differ in so far as the genus, before imparting itself to them, has already been divided through the differences (which are in it in potentiality and issue into act). Under one or other of its characteristics the genus is imprinted in some or other of the species. For the differences are not sought for entirely externally. They are drawn out of the guts, as it were, of the genus itself. "But the examples offered above will not persuade you. Yet you've conceded them to be true. What's going to happen to us

aren't the species (or pleasures), but pleasure, that

itself.

Cap.

XIV

159

Turn ille: Hanc equidem non admitto. Neque enim dissimiles' et contrariae sunt, qua voluptates sunt. At hoc refutat Socrates: Quia si, ut vitemus dissimilitudinem contrarietatemque voluptatum, dixerimus non ex eo esse dissimiles quod voluptates sunt, dicemus etiam non differre quantum^ sunt' voluptates. Quae vero non differunt unum sunt omnino. Non multae igitur voluptates erunt, neque volupinter se dissimiles et contrarias esse.

genus erit, neque poterunt" multi simul affici voluptate, praesertim diversis ex rebus, sed una dumtaxat voluptas proveniet. Haec vero absurda sunt omnia. Profecto voluptates non differunt ut voluptas sic autem non
tas
igitur

sunt species neque voluptates, sed voluptas' scilicet' ipsum genus. Nos autem de speciebus {348v\ quaerimus non de
genere.
differunt.

Ut autem voluptates sunt, sic species sunt et sic etiam Praesupponunt enim genus iam per differentias esse

divisum et sub alia^ et alia ratione illis inclusum. Differunt ergo in genere species, quoniam' non ante accipiunt genus quam divisum fuerit. Differt genus in speciebus, quoniam' sub alia'" et alia sui ratione illis competit. Differunt inter se per differentias

negat ex eo
eis

quae" species actu constituunt. Qui igitur differre species quod idem in se genus habent, negat genus illud in

per differentias esse divisum. Tollit igitur species, genus

relinquit solum;

unum igitur erit quodcumque.

species in genere'^ et conveniunt

Quid ergo dicendum quod

simul et differunt: conveniunt quidem'^ quantum'* una quaedam communis natura generis sese illis communicat; differunt
illis sese'^ communicet," per difquae in eo potentia sunt exeuntes in actum iam distinctum est. Et sub alio sui" charactere aliis et aliis imprimitur speciebus. Neque enim omnino" extrinsecus quaeruntur dif-

vero'*

quantum," antequam

ferentias

ferentiae, sed ex generis ipsius quasi^' visceribus educuntur.

'sunt add. P 'voluptates y

Mnquantum
'scilicet

WXP WXP

'sunt
''"(/b'"

om.

WXP

'potcrint

WY
"suo

''inquantum J*'A'P

""inquantum JfA'P "omnino om. WXP

sub alia) substantialia Jf "quidemom. JfA'P "in genere om. y "in H^ "communicit >f "seA'/' "vero om. JfA'P "quasi om.

om. >f

160

Chapter 14

what usually happens to cowardly people and people unused from one mistake into many and they aren't consistent and they don't pursue the truth but charge after their opponent. If I wanted to copy you (Socrates says), what you're doing to pleasure I could do to all the remaining genera. In the case of substance, I can say that none of its speis

to debating; for they fall

cies differ

among
and the

themselves in so far as they are substances,

rest.

similarly in the cases of quantity, quality, relation, activity,

way the highest member of each genus wouldn't differ in any way from the lowest member, nor would quahty differ from quality (although many of them
passivity,
in this

And

and in turn repel each other). I can even say that one genus doesn't differ from another in so far as both are genera, and that in the universal order the highest member doesn't differ from the lowest in so far as each is said to be a member of the same order. And thus all will be one and every dissimilar thing will be the same as and most like whatever it is most unlike. And if two things are said to be among themselves in some way the most dissimilar of all, I shall show by your reasoning they are also utterly similar to each other. Just as one thing is most unlike another thing, so the other thing is most unlike the one thing. So they don't differ in the fact that they are most unUke, for they are equally most unUke. Things which don't differ at all are alike. So the things that are most unlike
are opposite are in turn things that are alike.
*'So (says Socrates),
if I

shall dare to
is, if I

maintain dissimilar
all

things are similar things, that the genera of things

want to wander around

by means of these useless quibbles, I'll be doing the same thing that you've done with pleasure. It will follow from such arguing that the most dissimilar thing is most similar to the thing it is most dissimilar to. In fact, the puerile and pointless inquiry will make us ridiculous and do away with
if we're going to linger over it too under debate will not be resolved." scrupulously, the problem After this he turns towards the types of knowledge, saying they ought to direct themselves again to the separation of the genera under discussion and recall the previous argument. But

the discussion in hand; for,

Cap.

XIV

161

Exempla vero' in superioribus posita nihil persuadebunt, quae tamen vera esse concessa sunt. Idque nobis eveniet, quod evenire solet hominibus ignavissimis et ad disserendum minime consuetis. Solent enim ex uno errore in multos incidere, neque
sibi

constare, neque veritatem sequi, sed insequi disputantem.

te,

Ego enim

inquit Socrates,

si

imitari voluero,

quod

et tu in

voluptate facis, potero et in ceteris omnibus^ generibus facere.

In substantia
se differre

enim qua substantiae sunt nullas

eius species inter

dicam. In quantitate similiter, qualitate,' relatione, actione, et passione ac reliquis, atque ita supremum [349r\ cuiusque" generis nihilo ab infimo differret, neque qualitas a qualitate, quamquam multae contrariae sunt seque invicem
fugant.

sunt [genera] differre dicam.

Neque etiam genus unum ab alio quantum* utraque Neque in rerum or dine supremum
diciet

ab infimo quantum' utrumque aliquid eiusdem ordinis esse

tur.

Atque ita omnia unum erunt

dissimillimum quodque disilia

simillimo cuique idem erit atque simillimum. Et siqua

se dissimillima

omnium

esse dicantur,

duo inter quoque simillima

sicut

invicem' tua
alteri

ilia

ratione esse monstrabo.

Nempe

unum

dissimillimum est, ita eo igitur quod dissimillima sunt non differunt, aeque enim sunt
dissimillima.

et alterum uni est dissimillimum. In

Quae

nihilo

differunt

similia*

sunt.

Quare
dis-

dissimiUima quaeque invicem sunt similia.'

Ego

igitur, inquit Socrates, si asserere

si

hoc audebo quod

simiha'" similia" sint, id est,

istas vagari in

voluero per inutiles cavillationes

omnibus rerum generibus, idem quod et tu in voluptate efficiam. Ex quo discursu sequetur dissimillimum quodque dissimillimo cuique esse simillimum. Quae quidem puerilis et inutilis inquisitio nos ridiculos reddet sermonemque propositum e medio toilet. Nam si in hoc superstitiosius immorabimur, quaestio proposita minime absolvetur.
Post haec ad scientias se convertit, dicens rursus propositorum generum partitionem esse tentandam et superiorem

simillima

'cuius y 'qualiute o/n. P 'omnibus om.P 'autcm JfA'P 'dissimillima If; simillima A^P 'invicem om. JK^P '''inquantum ffA'P "simiUima fAP fAP "dissimillima

WAP

162

Chapter 14

13E

14A

there's a chance for him to return to the original point and so resume the line of approach which Protarchus pursued above, perhaps (he says) they could come to a mutual understanding very conveniently. He says, "Protarchus, say I'm asked by you as follows: 'Socrates, wisdom, knowledge, intelligence and the other things you called good above (when you were asked what the good itself was), won't they come under the same conditions as pleasure, since the types of knowledge will seem to be many and some mutually dissimilar?' But if I were thus asked and perhaps suspected some types of knowledge did appear to be contrary, and if (in order to avoid the question) I immediately denied one type of knowledge was dissimilar to another, surely I wouldn't be worthy of the present argument? Certainly, if you do this with pleasure and I do the same with knowledge, you won't let the genus of pleasure be divided into species through the particular differences, and I won't let the genus of knowledge. So neither of them will be understood by a perfect and definite knowledge. So neither of them can be compared to each other or to another; nor can the good be understood in case it's one of them or both or another or whichever of them is the better. Accordingly, we will be playing at debating and this theme of ours will vanish away, since nobody is listening to true
if

reason because of stubbornness.

legend will be lost

As the proverb says: The when it's told to a corpse.'* But we will escape

safely through a lack of argument; because, since it can't be understood which is the better of the two, neither of us will be defeated. But it will be the result of a lack of argument. For either it will be we don't know how to reason because of inexperience, or we don't Hsten to reasons because of pigheadedness. Still, we mustn't tolerate this just so we can escape unharmed and safe and entire. We must think, so we can safely preserve our own reason at the same time as the argument under discussion.

14B

having cleared such trifles out of the way, it must be equally agreed and estabhshed in your argument and in mine that pleasures are dissimilar and many. There are also many and different types of knowledge. But there are no opposite types of
**So,

Cap.

XIV
si

163

orationem revocandam
et'

esse,

quod

vicissitudine

in

easdem ansas redeatur,

ita ut ipse

rursus

quadam fiat eandem vicem

subeat

quam

supra^ Protarchus,

commodius

forte sibi invicem

concessuros
Protarche:
et alia

ait.

Pone enim,

inquit, interrogatum

me

ita

abs

te,

Nonne sapientia,

[349v] scientia, mens,

O Socrates,

quae supra dixisti esse bona interrogatus quid ipsum esset bonum, idem patientur quod et voluptas, multae siquidem scientiae^ videbuntur esse et aliquae inter se dissimiles. Ego autem si ita rogatus suspicarer, ne forte et aliquae scientiae contrariae apparerent utque id declinarem, negarem protinus scientiam aliquam alicui dissimilem esse, an praesenti disputatione* dignus essem'? Nempe si tu ita circa voluptatem egeris, atque

ego itidem circa scientiam, neque tu in species dividi per* proprias differentias voluptatis genus permittes, neque ego scientiae. Neutrum itaque perfecta et certa scientia comprehendetur. Quare nee invicem vel ad aliud comparari poterunt, neque intelligi bonum, ne sit eorum alterum vel utrumque vel aliud vel quid eorum sit melius. Quapropter ludemus^ operam et nostra haec oratio evanescet, cum propter pertinaciam vera ratio minima audiatur, et ut proverbio fertur: Fabula disperdetur cum verba
fiant

defectu, quia,

mortuo. Nos autem sospites evademus quodam rationis cum non possit intelligi quid ex illis melius sit,
erit

neuter

convictus. Id

autem defectu

rationis eveniet.

Nam

ex

eo quod nee ratiocinari scimus ob imperitiam neque rationes ob pertinaciam auscultamus. Neque tamen id tolerandum est, ut sospites quidem nos et integri et incolumes evadamus. Ita est cogitandum ut et ratio simul nobiscum et disputatio proposita
integra conservetur.

mea

Nugis itaque huiusmodi* praetermissis, par istud in tua ac oratione ponendum ratumque habendum ut multae sint et

dissimiles voluptates.

Multae quoque differentesque

scientiae;

'et om. *peTom.

W W

'super

Maudemus

'et

add.

XP

'disputation!

'huiuscemodi

WXP

'esse

164

Chapter 15
if

knowledge. For

there were any, the types of knowledge of

is

opposite things would be completely opposite; which

for they are in the

not true,

same soul at the same time. On the contrary, same knowledge generally which knows opposites. So don't let us conceal the differences between your good and mine, Protarchus, but let's draw together for the common good, so we can learn by careful refutation whether pleasure is the good itself or wisdom or some third thing. For we ought not to defend our own views obstinately, or hold them doggedly, but we ought to search for the truth." For the worst deception,
it is

the

as Plato writes in the Cratylus,

is

self-deception,

for

the

deceiver never forsakes the deceived.'* But the person

who

persuades himself in a thoughtless

too
is

way

that false things are true

deceives himself. This obstinacy in arguing

bitterly deprecated in the

and the deception

in the

Republic Book

10, in

Gorgias and the Phaedo.^^ And condemning his friend Homer,

truth.'* Also he says: I will not be afraid or ashamed to tell the truth." For the truth, as he says in the Laws, is a solid good.'* And elsewhere he says: nothing is sweeter to the ears of a sensible man than the truth." But in the Phaedrus he says: neither among the gods nor among men has there ever been or will there ever be anything more venerable than the

Plato says:

A man
it

must not be put before the

mentioning

in the Letters

truth.

"^

Chapter 15. Concerning the intelligence and truth and the immortality of the intelligence. Again, concerning the source of the power to divide and unite.
However,
after this,

three things have to be considered

intelligence,

especially: first,

what
is

is

wisdom, knowledge?
left.

Now

the intelligence
truth

the countenance looking back towards the

and

it

has two eyes a right and a

The

right eye gazes

at the truth of those things that are inside the divine intelligence,

the left eye at those things that derive

glance

is

wisdom, the

latter

from it. The former knowledge. But the names can often

Cap.
contrariae

XV
sunt.

165

tamen

[350r\ scientiae nullae

Siquae enim

maxime contrariorum scientiae contrariae forent, quod quidem falsum est. In eodem enim animo sunt eodem in tempore. Immo oppositorum eadem ferme est disciplina. Ergo
tales essent,

meique boni abscondamus, Protarche, sed in medium adducamus, ut ex recta redargutione comperiatur utrum voluptas ipsum bonum sit vel sapientia vel tertium aliquid. Non enim opiniones nostras pertinaciter defendere mordicusque tenere debemus, sed veritatem investigare. Pessima namque deceptio est, ut in Cratylo scribit Plato, qua quis se ipsum decipit, nam deceptor numquam deceptum deserit. Decipit autem se qui falsa sibi pro veris temere persuadet. Quam pertinaciam disputandi deceptionemque in Gorgia atque Phaedone acerrime detestatur. Et in decimo' de Republica cum amicum suum Homerum damnaret ait^: Virum non esse veritati anteponendum. Quod et in Epistolis observans ait: Verum dicere nee formidabo nee erubescam. Veritas enim, ut in Legine differentias
tui

bus

ait,

solidum

est

bonum. Et

alias inquit nihil esse sanis

auribus dulcius veritate.

aut fuit

Immo

vero in Phaedro inquit: Neque

veritate venerabilius

apud deos neque apud homines

quicquam

umquam aut erit.

De mente

mentis immortalitate. Item unde virtus ad dividendum atque uniendum. Cap. XV.^
et veritate et

sit

Post haec autem

tria

praecipue consideranda sunt.* Primo

sit. Est autem mens vultus ad duo sunt oculi dexter et sinister. Ille veritatem eorum quae in divina mente sunt inspicit; hie eorum quae ab ilia. Ille intuitus sapientia, hie scientia. Saepe autem

quid mens, sapientia, scientia

veritatem conversus, huius

vocabula haec confundantur,' quia quisquis quae in mente**

'sexto Y capite only

'ait

om.

XP

'in

'no ch. heading or break W; a break and the subscript Finite hoc X X and P this sentence merely reads Tria sunt consideranda

'confundunturAP

-*om. Wfcont.J

166

Chapter 15

be confounded, because whoever perceives the things which are

them the things which derive from the and whoever perceives the things which derive from the intelligence infers the things which are in the inteUigence from them. The second thing to be considered is this. If there are any opposite types of knowledge, would the greatest such be the knowledge of the biggest thing compared to the knowledge of the smallest? But they aren't opposites, because they supplement each other. For whoever recognizes the biggest thing sees in it the cause of the smallest; and whoever recognizes the smallest thing ascends by these steps to the biggest things. Again, things associated with opposites would be totally opposite, but these types of knowledge are identical. But now, since the intelligence is adapted equally to the biggest things and to the smallest, and is able (when given anyin the intelligence sees in
intelligence,

thing) to recognize a bigger thing while seeking the cause of

each,

and
its

since

it

doesn't stop in anything while

it

it

can be

investi-

and which is adapted infinite. Therefore it is an equally to the smallest things and to the biggest and which is filled by the infinite alone. The sense isn't like this, for the biggest object defeats the sense's power and the smallest object isn't perceived and the biggest blocks the smallest. What can be
gating
cause,
rests

only in that which

infinite capacity

is

causeless

confined to a mean point is finite. Therefore the immortal, but a bodily organ is mortal. And since corruption arises from opposites, the soul isn't corrupted because it doesn't have opposites. Rather, it is so far removed from contrariety that what are opposites in themselves fully
defeated or
intelligence
is

is

cohere in the soul. The good and the bad, the true and the false, light and darkness, hot and cold cohere in the notions of the
soul.

The third point to be considered is that truth is the correspondence of the thing and the intelligence, and the truth of the intelligence is the intelligence's correspondence to things, and the truth of things is the things' correspondence to the intelligence. There are

two

intelligences: the divine

and the human.

Cap.

XV

167

sunt intuetur in eis videt quae a mente, et qui quae post mentem ex his quae in mente sunt conicit. Secundo considerandum quod siquae scientiae contrariae sunt maximae tales essent ea quae de maximo ad earn quae de minimo quodam. Hae vero non sunt contrariae' quia sese^
eo causam videt minimi, et ad maxima. Item quae de contrariis sunt maxime essent contrariae, hae vero eaedem sunt. lam vero* quia mens ad maxima et minima aeque se habet et
iuvant.
in

Qui enim' maximum novit

qui

minimum

his gradibus conscendit

quocumque dato maius

cuiusque, neque
potest, in solo

potest

nosse

sistit se in

aliquo

dum causam quaerit dum causam eius indagare

eo quod sine causa est et infinitum quiescit. Infinita ergo capacitas est quae aeque se habet ad maxima et
et solo infinito repletur.

minima

obiectum

vim

eius

superat,

Non ita sensus, maximum enim minimum non percipitur et

impedit minimum. Finitum est quod superatur et quod ad medium quoddam determinatur. Immortalis igitur mens, mortale autem' corporis organum. Et cum corruptio a
contrariis
traria.
sit,

maximum

anima non corrumpitur, quia non habet con-

Immo adeo a contrarietate remota est, ut quae in se ipsis contraria sunt in ea admodum cohaerescant. Bonum, malum,
verum, falsum, lux, tenebrae, calidum, frigidum in notionibus animae cohaerescunt. Tertio notandum quod Veritas est adaequatio rei ac mentis; et Veritas mentis est eius ad res adaequatio; Veritas rerum est

rerum adaequatio menti. Duae sunt mentes: divina, humana. Duae res: opera divinae mentis, opera mentis humanae. Unde**

'XP merely read 'autem om.AP

Hm non

'tram om.XP 'scP (cont.)*-**om. W(cont.}

'for

lam vero XP read et

168

Chapter 15

There are two sorts of things: the products of the divine intelligence and the products of the human intelligence. So in the Statesman Plato says there are two arts; there are two products of art, the divine and the human." The truth of a human product is its correspondence to the human intelligence, that is, for the product to be such that it can correspond to the artificer's idea. The truth of a natural product, which is the product of the divine intelHgence, is its correspondence to the divine intelligence, [that is,] for the product to exist in that purity and completeness where it strives to become its idea in the intelligence. The truth of the human intelligence is its correspondence to things, not to its own products, but to the products of the divine intelligence. Consequently it perceives things as they are in themselves through knowledge, but as they are in the divine intelligence through wisdom. However, the truth of the divine intelligence is not its correspondence to the things which are below it, but to those which are inside it. That is, its correspondence is to those seeds of things existing within its essence, for it is to them that the intelligence always coheres. But there is a light from the good penetrating through all intelligences and species and things, which is the cause of all correspondence and consequently of all truth, for it is the light of truth. So in the Republic Book 6 Plato shows the good is the fountain of light, and the light emanating from the good is the cause of truth. "^ That good Hght is grace. So firstly there's the good, secondly grace, thirdly truth, fourthly Hfe, that is, joy in the truth. "Above us is imprinted the light of your counte-

nance.""
itself is

Plato takes great pains with the one and the many. The one the creator. The one and the many is the rational crea-

The many and the one is something lower. Certainly, a creature is what proceeds from the simphcity of the divine substance by means of duality. In so far as the creator is on one side, on the other side has now been made a creature. Within itself the creature proceeds from the one into two, that is, the
ture.

one thing
substance

is is

divided into substance and accident. Again, the one

divided into two, essence and existence. Finally, the

Cap.

XV
est

169

in Politico dicitur duae artes sunt, duo sunt artis opera,

et

divina'

humana. Veritas humani operis

est, ut tale sit ut

adaequatio eius ad
divinae mentis opus
et integritate

hominis mentem, id

ideae artificis corresponest

deat. Veritas operis naturalis

quod

adaequatio ad divinam mentem, ut in ea puritate

fore idea sui in

mente conatur. Veritas mentis sit, qua ipsum humanae adaequatio rebus, non operibus suis, sed divinae mentis

operibus; ut

ita

de his sentiat ut sunt in se

ipsis

per scientiam,

et ut

sunt in mente divina per sapientiam. Mentis autem divinae

non his quae infra^ se sunt, sed his quae intra, id est, seminibus rerum in sua essentia existentium, illis enim semper mens cohaeret. Est autem lumen a bono per mentes et species omnes et res penetrans quod omnis adaequationis causa est, et ideo veritatis omnis, quod est veritatis lumen. Ideo in RepubUca sexto significatur quod bonum est fons luminis, et lumen inde manans est causa veritatis. Illud bonum lumen gratia. Primo ergo bonum est, secundo gratia, tertio Veritas, quarto vita, id est, gaudium in veritate. Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui. 'Plato assidue circa unum et multa laborat. Unum ipsum est
Veritas adaequatio rebus

creator;

multa et unum procedens a substantiae divinae simplicitate per dualitatem. Quantum* inde est creator, hinc creatura iam facta. Merito intra se ab uno procedit in duo, videlicet una res in substantiam accidensque dividitur. Item substan-

unum

et

multa

est creatura rationalis;

inferior. Profecto creatura

tia

una

in

duo, fessentiam atque

et

esse.

Denique accidens

unum

in

duo,tt virtutem

actionem. Hinc

fit

ut intellectus noster a**

add. Mn Y 'ch. break inXandP; heading reads Caput octavum. Quomodo derivetur in multa, atque multa coUigantur in unum. Item de dialectica divisione, composi(cont.) Mnquantum (cont.) *-**om. XVI, p. \1\) tione, definitione (cf. ch.
'scilicet

XP

unum

XP

t-ttom.

170

Chapter 16

one accident is divided into two, power and action. As a result, our intellect, having been made by God in the order of creatures, wanders around the one and the many. But since it is composed more of the one than of the many, it is, accordingly, moved in the first place towards the one when it initially sees something as one with a sort of confused glance. But next, by looking more carefully at the thing and by dividing it into parts, it proceeds from the one into the many. Thirdly, by gathering the parts together, it incHnes towards the one away from multiplicity. Fourthly, by composing the parts that have already been gathered together, it defines. In this process of defining, it is now brought back into the one. In the restoration, the circle from the many into the one and back again has been completed, just as in definition, the definition [is completed] when it is returned to what has been defined. Fifthly, it demonstrates why such a thing proceeds from another and why another proceeds from it. In the demonstration there's a movement: now from the one to the many, that is, from the one effect to the many causes, now from the many causes to the one effect.

Chapter 16. How the one is drawn into the many and the many gathered back into the one. Again, on dialectical division,

compounding and definition, and on the Ideas.

14C-E

Because he's mentioned the many species of pleasure and knowledge above and because he's put that many into one genus of pleasure and one of knowledge, the uncertainty arises whether the many can be one or the one can be many. To approach this uncertainty, Plato says we must try to reach a decision ratified by common assent. He admonishes us to discuss it the more intently as such an ambiguity fatigues the minds of all men willing and unwilling (that is, those who inquire into such problems and everybody else). It tires certain people at certain times. That is, it tires those in the main, who, though they've condemned the senses, rely too little on the reason. And it tires them chiefly at that time when they have

Cap.

XVI

171

creaturarum ordine factus circa unum et multa vagetur. Quoniam vero unius magis quam multitudinis compos est, ideo primum ad unum movetur quando rem primo percipit confuso quodam intuitu tamquam unam. Sed deinde distinctius percipiendo distribuendoque in partes ab uno procedit in multa. Tertio partes invicem conferendo a multitudine vergit in unum.

*Deo'

in

Quarto partes definitione iam

fit

collatas

iam componendo

definit.

In

qua

restitutio facta est in

unum.

In

qua

restitutione

circuitus a multis in

tione definitio ipsa

strat

unum atque vicissim, prout in definicum definito convertitur. Quinto demon-

qua ratione res talis procedat ab alio et qua aliud procedit^ qua demonstratione fit motus, tum ab uno in multa, id est, ab uno effectu in multas causas, tum a multis causis in effectum unum.^**
ab
ipsa. In

Quomodo unum derivetur in multa atque multa

in

colligantur

unum. Item de

dialectica divisione, compositione, defi-

nitione et de ideis. Cap. XVI.*

fecit

Quia de speciebus multis voluptatis et scientiae mentionem supra, et eam multitudinem in uno voluptatis genere et uno
esse possint et

genere scientiae posuit, suboritur dubitatio, numquid multa

unum
tione

unum

multa. Circa [350v]

tionem conandum

dicit

Plato ratam aliquam

quam dubitacommuni asser-

ferre sententiam, quod eo propensius discutiendum monet, quod huiusmodi ambiguitas omnium mentes fatigat et volentium et nolentium, id est, tam eorum qui' talia perscrutantur quam ceterorum omnium, et quorundam et aliquando, id est, eorum maxime qui, cum sensus damnaverint, ration! tamen parum confidunt, tunc praesertim cum primum aggressi

'adeo Y 'procedat 'no ch. heading or break

'His premissis propius iam accedamus ad textum add.

is

XP
(cf.

quam

W; no heading but a break XP; in XP the heading

transposed

p. 169)

(cant.)

*om.

172

Chapter 16
first

time the subtlety of arguing, but not mastery of the art of disputation. However, this conflict occurs in our souls, because the senses drag them towards the consideration of the scattered multitude of bodily objects, but the intelligence towards the simphcity of incorporeal things. But for the most part we mingle together the perceptions of the senses with the inteUigence's power to discern. So we are turned back towards the power of the unity and the divine nature less confidently than we ought to be. But Plato will explain at once what kind of doubts these are about the one
acquired for the

reached yet the

full

and the many. But you can think about the one being many in three ways: either one something has opposing aspects; or a whole something is made from its own many parts; or one simple something is shared by many things and diffused through many separated things. The last idea is fantastic and it can be doubted whether it is possible: whether you say one simple thing is borne through separated things or many separated things contain some one simple thing in common, you can be opposed as will shortly
appear.

15A

and second ideas. Whoever says Protarchus is one thing and many things big, little, Hght, heavy (that is, if he's compared to various things) isn't introducing anything extraordinary about the one and the many. For everybody knows this isn't marvellous and there's no need to deny Protarchus is one because he has opposing aspects. Such quibbles are considered puerile and facile and unworthy of
There's no need to wrangle about the
first

consideration, since they'll hinder the pursuit of truth

if

they're

admitted, as you can go on wandering Hke this through innumerable paradoxes. However, if it means the one is opposite things in an absolute sense, it must be rejected at once as an impossibility needing no discussion. Even were it admitted, we couldn't discuss it properly, since we would have already granted that opposites are one and everything is mixed with everything. Hence nothing could be refuted. But if it means the

one has opposing aspects when compared to diverse things, that's easily admitted and it would be childish to wonder about

Cap.
disserendi subtilitatem

XVI

173

nondum ad absolutum

disputationis

autem haec in nostris animis corporum dispersam multitudinem cogitandam trahunt, mens vero ad incorporalium rerum simplicitatem. Ut plurimum vero sensuum visa cum mentis iudicio commiscemus. Unde ad unitatis ipsius divinaeque naturae
artificium pervenerunt. Accidit

coUuctatio, quia sensus ad

potentiam diffidentius

dubitationes istae sint circa

quam decet convertimur. Quales unum et multa statim aperiet.

vero

vero esse multa tribus modis considerari potest: vel aliquid unum opposita circa se habens; vel totum aliquid ex pluribus suis partibus constitutum; vel unum aliquid simplex

Unum

commune

pluribus esse et per multa dispersaque diffundi.

Postremum hoc quidem mirabile dictu et an fieri possit ambiguum, et quodcumque istorum dicatur, sive quod unum simplex per dispersa feratur, seu quod multa et dispersa commune quid-

dam unum
patebit.

et simplex' capiant,

repugnari potest, ut paulo post

De primo autem atque secundo ambigere nullus debet. Neque mirum quicquam inducet circa unum et multa, qui Protarchum magnum, parvum, unum esse et oppositos dicet [351f\
ad diversos aliquos comparetur. Vulgo enim notum est non esse istud mirabile, neque esse negandum Protarchum unum esse ex eo quod circa ilium opposita sint. Cavillationes huiusmodi pueriles facilesque censentur, neque studio dignae, quippe, si admittantur,# veritatis inquisitioni impedimento erunt, cum per innumerabiles similiter
levem, gravem
est, si

hoc

ambages vagari
traria
sit

liceat.

Immo

si

intelligatur

quod unum con-

absolute, id

tamquam impossibile statim reicitur neque

Quin etiam*
si

inquisitione indiget.
recte disserere,

admittatur,

non poterimus

cum

liceat contraria'

unum

facere et miscere

omnibus omnia unde nihil redargui poterit.* Sin intelligatur quod unum contraria sit, si ad diversa comparetur, istud admittitur facile et puerile esset de hoc ambigere. Sed neque de

'et

simplex om.

'txiaxaom.

WX

'eiadd.Y

potitur Jf

itP frag. II (48v)

ends

174

Chapter 16

Nor do people disagree at all about the second idea: that the one is many and the many one in so far as some whole, composed from many parts, is many parts and again the many parts are one whole. In the same way certainly our body is one thing made out of many members and parts. So Socrates says there aren't going to be extraordinary facts about the one and the many emerging, if someone first of all divides the body into members and the members into smaller parts and keeps on cutting to infinity and then infers it is a marvellous and monstrous thing that the one is infinite things (and
it.

do away with the one). one thing that has been created and diffused through matter it's no wonder if it degenerates from perfect unity and endures opposites and multiplicity. But if someone introduces one simple, uncreated thing, it will seem wonderso strives to
Certainly, with any

can be diffused through multiplicity too, since each form is divided by body. Plato touches here on a one under the Ideas when he posits one Protarchus; again, on a one in the Ideas when he posits one man or one ox in a species; again, on a one coming from the Ideas when he posits one beauty (for it is the ornament of all the Ideas); again, on a one above the Ideas when he posits the good itself (that is, the first God), by whom the one goodness of nature, that is, creativity, is given to the intelligence (through which the Ideas are brought forth). And when he talks about the Idea of the good in the Republic,^* he means both the good itself by way of cause and the goodness of the intelligence by way of form; for the good is the Idea as cause, goodness the Idea as form. The one is the leader of the Ideas, the other is their principle. Plato often talks about the good, the beautiful, the just. The first is the divine creativity, the second the order in its understanding, the third the order in its will, the distributor of
ful: first, if

such a thing can

exist; then, if

it

the

first

order.

Indeed,
things
is

nobody doubts

there

is

some one thing

;

in created

and who doubts this one someone introduces the one eternal and incorporeal man, the one ox, the one beauty, the one good, he

bodies are obviously single

things? But if

many

Cap.

XVI

175

secundo ulla inter homines discrepatio est, quin unum ita sit multa et multa unum, ut totum quoddam ex partibus multis compositum multae sit' partes, rursusque partes multae unum illud sint. Ut corpus nostrum unum profecto est multis ex membris partibusque compositum. Quapropter dicit Socrates neque mirabilia ista fore circa unum ac multa, siquis corpus dividat in membra primum,

membraque in particulas,^ iterum in infinitum secans, inferatque deinde mirum istud monstrumque esse ut unum infinita sit
atque
ita

contendat
nihil

unum e medio tollere.

et circa

Profecto in eo uno quod genitum est

materiam

est

diffusum

mirum

est, si

a perfecta unitate degeneret oppo-

At vero siquis unum simplex ingenitumque induxerit, mirabile videbitur: primum [351v\ quidem, siquid tale sit, deinde, si et illud in multitudine sit dispersum, cum divisio cuiusque formae^ a corpore fiat. Tangit hie Plato unum quod sub ideis est, cum ponit* Protarchum unum. Item unum quod in ideis, scihcet' hominem vel bovem unum in specie. Item unum quod ex ideis, cum dicit pulchrum unum, est enim omnium idearum decor.* Item unum quod super ideas, cum dicit ipsum bonum, scilicet Deum primum, a quo bonitas una naturae scilicet foecunditas menti datur per quam ideae parturiuntur. Et cum ideam boni in Republica dicit, utrumque intelligit, bonum ipsum per modum causae, bonitatem mentis per formae modum; bonum enim idea ut causa, bonitas idea ut forma. Istud idearum caput, illud' idearum principium. Plato dicit saepe bonum, pulchrum, iustum. Primum est divina foecunditas, secundum ordo in eius intelligentia, tertium ordo in
sitaque patiatur et multitudinem.
eius voluntate primi ordinis distributor.

unum aliquod in rebus genitis, ut de singulis nemo ambigit, quodve unum illud sit multa quis dubitat? Siquis vero unum hominem aeternum et incorporeum, unum bovem, pulchrum unum, unum bonum
Quod
vero
sit

corporibus patet,

'sint Jf'

'particulis JV

'formae om.

y
'istud

'posuit F

'scilicet

om. JFA"

*X has both decor and decus as alternatives

176

Chapter 17

appears to be dreaming at first, as Aristophanes derisively says of Socrates, and the comedians, Timon, Alexis and Cratinus,
say of Plato,*' Diogenes the Cynic said he couldn't see Plato's Ideas. Plato replied he obviously didn't have an intelligence

with which to see them."

So

it is

that unless

somebody reduces
species, it's

the orders of individual

things to one

obvious he won't be able to anything for certain. But if he brings in just one separate species for every order, everybody will think he's dreaming. Aristotle was not afraid to slander the

common

understand anything, or

know

divine Plato

on

this issue.

Nevertheless, in the

Phaedo Plato proves

the Ideas must exist.

And in the Timaeus he says,

intellectual

since there are separate sensual

and

powers, they must have separate objects, and the universal objects of the intelligence must be more true and exist

more absolutely than

the rules with which

sensible objects to the extent that the

The objects of the intellect are you can distinguish between the truth and falsity of sensible objects and recognize the defects of existence. Therefore they are and they exist more truly and absolutely. Among the wise men of Greece arose the saying that Plato had three eyes: one with which he looked at human things, another at natural things, another at divine things (which was in his foreintellect is superior to the sense. *^

head, while the others were under his forehead).

However, given such

tries to find

species,

whoever carefully and

diligently

out

how they exist with regard to individuals will im-

come upon a problem concerning the division. For if each species isn't divided into many things, it won't appear to be capable of agreeing with many things. But, if it is divided, it will
mediately
ible

no longer appear to be one separate and eternal.

thing, nor

remain incorrupt-

Chapter
cation.
15B

17.

Three doubts about the Ideas and their

verifi-

Concerning these unities three major problems present themselves." One, are the species true or just conceptions of our

Cap.
induxerit,

XVII
videbitur,
ut

177

primum somniare

Aristophanes de

Socrate obloquitur, et de Platone Timon, Alexis et Cratinus

comici. Huiusque ideas videre se negavit Diogenes Cynicus, cui

respondit Plato, carere

eum

videlicet

mente qua ideae

cer-

nuntur.

enim se res habet, ut, nisi quis singulorum ordines ad speciem unam' communem redigat, intelligere nihil posse videatur, neque certum aliquid [352r\ scire; sin autem cuiusque ordinis speciem unam separatam induxerit, somniare vulgo videbitur. In quo et Aristoteles haud veritus est divum Platonem calumniari. Oportet tamen eas esse quod in Phaedone probat. Atque in Timaeo dicit, cum sint distinctae vires sensualis et intellectualis,
Ita

habere obiecta distincta

et

obiecta mentis universalia tanto

veriora esse debere et magis existentia

intellectus est sensu superior.

quam

sensibilia

quanto

Obiecta intellectus sunt regulae

per quas inter veritatem falsitatemque sensibilium discernitur

defectusque existendi recognoscitur. Ergo verius magisque sunt

et existunt. Inter

prudentissimos Graecorum natum est proverbium Platonem habuisse tres oculos: unum quo humana, alium

quo

naturalia, alium
alii

quo divina

suspiceret qui in fronte esset

cum

sub fronte. Positis autem huiuscemodi speciebus, siquis diligenter studioseque perquirat^ quomodo se ad singula habeant, statim circa divisionem ambiguitas orietur. Nam si non dividatur species quaeque in multa, multis convenire non posse videbitur; sin

autem dividatur, neque unum esse separatum amphus, neque incorruptum aeternumque manere.

Tria circa ideas duhia et confirmatio idearum. Cap. XVII,

Tres potissimae contra has unitates dubitationes insurgunt.

Una, utrum verae

sint

hae species an potius nostrae mentis

'unum

Mnquirat

WX

'no ch. heading or break

WX

178

Chapter 17

they really do exist, is each species one agreement with the many, and immutable although it's the cause of mutable things? Three, if each is one and immutable, how can it impart itself to many things and things which are mutable in such a way that it isn't made mutable in them, nor they made immutable by the fact that it's there? Also, can it be divided through the individual things, or can the whole of it be in them? It's obviously absurd that the species, if it is an eternal thing, should be divided by means of corruptible things. It's obviously incredible that one and the same whole should be at the same time in many things which are mutually separated, for the whole would also be separated from itself. Plato voices these doubts also in the Parmenides. But how they can be resolved can in large part be deduced from that dialogue and from the Timaeus, the Republic and the Phaedo,
intelligence?
if

Two,
it's

alone although

in

as

we shall subsequently show.*'

But Plato says such doubts are not those above, which are principally concerned with the one and the many. For to ask about the unities and species is to ask about the origin and substance of each thing. The person who gets this wrong is wrong over everything and handicapped; the person who gets it right can decide correctly and easily about everything. For in the Phaedo he says nothing is more sure and certain than the Ideas, and in them is revealed the total divinity of the soul.' But because Plato calls the species of things "unities," you have to remember that whenever Plato says one something he's introducing individual things. But when he says "the one itself" he wants you to understand the first principle of all things; whenever "monads," the principle of number; whenever "unities," the eternal reasons of all things which are in the divine intelligence, the maker of the whole world. And since one reason

enough to make many things a simple reason to make compounds, an eternal reason to make temporal things therefore
is

the species are called simple

creating things are in

and

eternal unities.

The

species for

God's

intelligence exactly as the

models for

products are in an artificer's mind, or the reasons for all the members and parts are in the seed of an animal or tree. But the

Cap.
conceptiones. Secunda,

XVII

179

si revera sint, utrum quaeque sit una dumtaxat cum multis conveniat, et immutabilis cum sit mutabilium ratio. Tertia,' si sit una et immobilis,^ quomodo multis' et mutabilibus se communicet, ita ut neque ipsa in eis fiat mutabilis neque ilia per eius praesentiam immobilia, et numquid per singula dividatur an tota {352v] sit in singulis. Absurdum quidem* videtur quod dividatur per corruptibilia, si res aeterna est. Mirum videtur quod unum et idem totum sit simul in multis invicem separatis. Nam illud quoque a se ipso erit seiunctum. Dubia haec etiam in Parmenide movet, quae vero haec solvant* multa inde et ex Timaeo, Republica, Phaedone colligi possunt, ut in sequentibus ostendemus. Dicit autem Plato haec' dubia non ilia superiora esse, quae circa unum et multa plurimum important. Quaerere enim de his

unitatibus et speciebus est quaerere de origine substantiaque

cuiusque, in qua qui aberrat in omnibus errat et claudicat,

quam
in

qui bene ponit vere et facile cuncta diiudicat. Dicit enim'

Phaedone nihil habere se' certius et firmius quam' ideas et in his totam monstrari animi divinitatem. Quia vero'** species rerum unitates vocat" Plato, ideo meminisse oportet quod quotiens Plato unum aliquid dicit, singula profert; cum autem ipsum unum'^ dicit, primum omnium principium intelligi vult; quotiens" monadas, principium numeri; quando vero unitates, rationes aeternas omnium quae fiunt in mente divina mundi totius opifice. Et
quia ad multa efficienda una, ad composita simplex, ad temporalia aeterna ratio sufficit, ideo species istae unitates simplices
aeternae dicuntur.

dorum

species

quam

Neque minus sunt in Dei mente procreanin artificis animo suorum operum exem-

semine animalis et arboris membrorum omnium et partium rationes. Quae vero in materia distincta sunt in
plaria, et in

'tria

'immutabilis H^A*

'sit

haewy
"vocavit

'tram

om.WX

fVX

"unum om.

*xom. WX 'in add. "monasvd add. Y

'quidcmom.

IfA'

WY

'solum autem If A" 'vero o/n. >f

180

Chapter 18

things which are distinct in matter are joined together in the

where there is distinction without separation, union without confusion. This is demonstrated by the unity of parts and the variety of quaUties in a material product. In any element or compound body the forms are present. It is by their power that similar forms are generated in matter. In trees and animals there are seeds; in the seeds there are reasons that can be kindled. In the arts there are notions. In the contemplative' s soul there are the lights and principles of all the conclusions he produces. So it's undeniable that the species of all God's works, the seeds, the powers, the reasons, the models, the notions are present in His intelligence, which is the creator of all things. Plato wants them both to be Ideas, namely the reason by which God conceives of individual men and creates man himself, and the Idea of such men; and similarly with all the Ideas. But as the ancient theologians said those whom Plato followed, Zoroaster, Hermes Trismegistus, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras the vain belief in many gods arose universally from the many names of the Ideas. But the Christian theologians, Dionysius the Areopagite and St. Augustine, also maintain that the Ideas must be thus accepted as true and that they were so accepted by Plato. Arguments selected from Plato's books, which I'll bring in later, will prove it. So it is in
efficient cause,

vain that the Aristotelians howl against Plato's majesty.

Chapter forms.

18.

Concerning the Ideas and the true and untrue

We'll demonstrate from Platonic arguments that the Ideas

exist, if

we show

first

that the Platonists introduced the Ideas to

oppose neither Christian theology nor counter the view of the Aristotelians. Listen to St. Augustine in the Book of the 83 Questions saying as follows: "Whoever acknowledges all existing things (that is, whatever is contained in its own genus by an appropriate nature), [must also acknowledge] that in order to exist they have been created by God the originator and

Cap. XVIII

181

efficiente causa sunt unita, ubi sine separatione distinctio, sine confusione est unio. Quod quidem' in opere materiae unitas

qualitatum varietas ostendit. In quolibet elemento [353r\ corporeque composito formae insunt quarum vi formae similes in materia generantur: in arboribus et animalibus semina, in seminibus rationes et
et

partium

fomites, in artibus notiones, in contemplantis

principia conclusionum

animo lumina

et

negabit in

omnium quae proferuntur. Quis ergo Dei mente omnium effectrice^ operum suorum inesse

omnium
Has

species, semina, vires, rationes, exemplaria, notiones?

qua Deus homines singulos ipsum hominem, et hominum istorum ideam similiterque de ceteris. Quod, cum ab antiquis theologis Zoroastre, Mercurio, Orpheo, Aglaophemo, Pythagora quos secutus Plato est diceretur,* ex plurimis idearum nominibus deorum plurium* vulgo vana est exorta suspicio. Ideas autem
esse ideas Plato vult, rationem

concipit procreatque

ita

revera accipi debere, et ita a Platone acceptas fuisse, theologi

et

quoque Christiani Dionysius Areopagita,

Aurelius Augus-

tinus perhibent; atque' rationes ex Platonis libris excerptae,

quas adducam postea, demonstrabunt. Itaque* frustra contra Platonis maiestatem Peripatetici latrant.

De ideis et deformis

veris

atque non

veris.

Cap. XVIII.''
si

'Ideas esse Platonicis argumentationibus demonstrabimus,

prius ostenderimus neque contra Christianorum theologiam

neque praeter Peripateticorum opinionem a Platonicis ideas inductas fuisse.' Aurelium Augustinum in libro octuaginta trium quaestionum audi ita dicentem: Quisquis'" fatetur omnia

quae sunt,

id est,

quaecumque

in

suo genere propria quadam

'quidem om. 'affectrice 'docerctur *plurimuin Y 'et W; om. 'Ex quo ''no ch. heading or break W; ch. numbered Villi by X; no ch. heading in P but a pens/roke before Ideas and XVIII in the margin faintly 'see appendix I for a passage added here by X, and in the middle of which Pfrag. Ill (52r) begins 'Quippe add.

WX

WX

WXP

"Quisque-W

182

Chapter 18

that individual things are ruled by His providence.

Once this has

has

been conceded,
irrationally.

who

will

dare say

God

established everything
that
all

The conclusion must be

by a rational
principle.

been

hasn't the same an absurd notion. Therefore individual things have been created by their own rational principles. But where else can the rational principles be thought to exist except in the intelligence itself of the Creator? For God didn't look to something placed outside Himself in order to establish what He was estabhshing according to it. But if the
established
rational principle as a horse, for that's

A man

rational principles for creating

all

things (or for creatures) are

if

contained in the divine intelligence, and

nothing can be in the divine intelligence unless it's eternal and unchangeable, and if Plato is calling these principal reasons for things "Ideas," not
only are there Ideas, but they are true, because they remain
eternal

and always the same and unchangeable.

It is

through
it is.

their participation that anything

may be

in

whatever way

"But among the things created by God the rational soul surpasses all; and it is closest to God when it is pure. To the extent
that
it

clings to

Him in love,

it

discerns (being in a

way perfused

and illuminated by that intelligible light) the rational principles. It does not discern them through corporeal eyes, but through the principal part of itself which excels, that is, through its
understanding.

By

this vision the soul

is

may be made

utterly

happy."" Therefore Augustine

the most reliable witness

says the

among Christians. But among the Aristotelians Averroes

same

in

com-

menting on books 11 and 12 of the Metaphysics: he says Aristotle, while denying Plato's Ideas, is also positing them as long as he puts the forms of things in the first mover of the heavens. Albert the Great maintains the same in his commentary on Dionysius, when he says Aristotle meant the first cause of things to be a cause in three ways: that is, to be the efficient cause, and (to use his own words) the final cause and the formal cause. The patterns for things he refers to the formal cause. Nor do we lack the testimonies of SimpHcius and Themistius and Eustratius." So let's go back to the Platonists.

Cap. XVIII
natura continentur, ut
dicere

183

sint,

auctore
regi.

Deo

esse procreata, singii-

laque eius [353v] providentia

ratione sint condita.

Quo

concesso, quis audeat

Deum irrationabiliter omnia

est

omnia Nee eadem ratione homo qua equus, hoc

condidisse? Restat ut
existimare.

enim absurdum
creata rationibus.
nisi in ipsa

Singula igitur propriis sunt

Has autem
creatoris?

rationes ubi esse arbitrandum est

Non enim extra se quicquam posisecundum id constitueretur quod constituebat. Quod si hae rerum omnium creandarum creatarumve rationes divina mente continentur neque in divina mente quicmente

tum intuebatur

ut

quam

aeternum et incommutabile potest esse, atque has rerum principales appellat ideas Plato, non solum sunt ideae, sed ipsae verae sunt, quia aeternae et semper eiusdem modi atque incommutabiles manent, quarum participatione fit
nisi

rationes

ut

sit

quicquid

quoquomodo est.

Sed anima rationalis inter eas res quae sunt a Deo conditae omnia superat; et Deo proxima est, quando pura est eique in quantum caritate cohaeserit in tantum ab eo lumine intelligibili perfusa quodammodo et illustrata cernit non per corporeos oculos sed per ipsius sui principale quod excellit, id est, per intelligentiam suam' istas rationes, qua visione fiat beatissima.
Inter Christianos igitur Augustinus testis est locupletissimus.

Inter Peripateticos

physicis
teles

undecimo

et^

autem testatur idem Averroes in Metaduodecimo libro, ubi dicit quod Aristo-

dum

Platonis ideas negat ipse interim ponit ideas,

dum

in in

primo
dicens

coeli

motore rerum formas ponit. Idem quoque

Dionysii commentariis Albertus

Magnus

asserit

Aristotelem
esse

primam rerum causam

tribus [354r\

modis

causam

voluisse: efficientem scilicet et, ut verbis ipsius utar, finalem et

formalem. Ad formalem vero causam rerum exemplaria refert. Neque nobis Simplicii desunt et Themistii et Eustratii testimonia. Quare ad Platonicos redeamus.

'em.

adopted from Augustine's

list

text,

suas

WXYP

'undecimo

et expressly

excluded in the cor-

rigenda

of Y

184

Chapter 18

We want to know especially whether this universal world which can be seen with the eyes comes from itself or rather from a higher cause. Obviously, it doesn't come from itself, because everything that does come from itself is necessarily indivisible. For everything that makes and creates from itself is incorporeal; for no action is appropriate to a body in so far as it is a body. A body, in fact, is composed of two things, that is, matter and quantity. It only possesses from matter the ability to receive from somewhere else, and from quantity the fact that it can be divided. But these are passivities in fact, quantity not only does not help action, it hinders it; for action is most effective when the agent's power is completely united and the agent is as close as possible to what is being acted on. But quantity results in the power being dispersed through different parts; and it prevents things joining together, since by means of extension it forces them to be separated in space. So if no action is appropriate to a body in so far as it is a body, whatever bodies do they do through some incorporeal quality. But a quality is incorporeal, because there are many qualities in the same body, but many bodies can't be at the same time in the same place. But a quality, since it's in another, comes from another, but not from the body, as the body can do nothing on its own account. So it comes from something incorporeal, which isn't a body (because it can act) and isn't in a body (lest we go on to infinity).

Therefore there's a certain incorporeal species existing through itself above bodily things, whose job it is only to act, not to be passive. Just as the function of the body is to be passive only not active, so the function of quality which is in the body is both to be passive, since it is in the body (for it is divided and perishes with it), and to be active, since it is incorporeal in itself. Therefore it is appropriate for an incorporeal species or power to be active, and for this reason corporeal things act through incorporeal powers fire through heat, but snow

through coldness.

So two things follow: one, there is a certain incorporeal body of the world and its nature, and this essence is the first to act. Whatever the world does, it does
essence above the

Cap. XVIII

185

De hoc universe qui cernitur oculis mundo imprimis quaerimus, utrum ex se ipso sit an superiori ex causa. Quod ex se ipso non sit ex hoc patet, quia omne quod tale est necessario est impartibile. Omne enim quod proprie facit et gignit incorporeum est. Nulla enim actio corpori convenit quantum' corpus. Corpus siquidem ex duobus constat materia scilicet et quantitate. Ex materia solum habet ut aliunde recipiat; ex quantitate
Haec vero passiones sunt. Immo vero quantitas non modo ad agendum non iuvat sed impedit actionem, actio enim tunc maxime provenit cum et agentis virtus unita est maxime et agens patienti proximum. Quantitas autem efficit ut diversas per partes dispersa virtus sit, et unionem rerum invicem
ut dividatur.

impedit

cum cogat propter extensionem distantiam in

si

rebus esse

locorum. Quare

in

quantum corpus

est^ nulla

corpori com-

agunt corpora incorporea quadam efficiunt qualitate. Est autem qualitas incorporea, quia multae eodem in corpore sunt qualitates, multa vero corpora simul et^ eodem in loco esse non possunt. Qualitas vero cum in alio sit ab alio est; non autem a corpore, cum nihil corpus ex se ipso agat, ab incorporeo igitur aliquo, quod neque est corpus ut agat, neque in corpore est ne in infinitum progrediamur. Est ergo quaedam species incorporea per se existens supra
petit actio, siquid

corpora,
qualitatis

cuius

officium [354v] est

patiatur. Sicut corporis

opus

est

tantum non ut patiatur tantum, non agat,

ut

agat

autem quae

in corpore ut patiatur, quia in corpore est

interit, et ut agat,

nam cum

eo dividitur atque

quia ex se

est

incorporea. Incorporalis itaque speciei atque virtutis proprium

est ut agant.

Unde

et

corpora incorporalibus agunt virtutibus,

ignis caliditate, nix

autem frigiditate. Unde duo sequuntur: unum, ut supra mundi corpus eiusque naturam essentia quaedam sit incorporea quae ipsa prima" agat.

'inquantum

Jt'A'P

^tsiom.

WXP

'elom.Y

'primo H'A'P

186

Chapter 18

because of the power of this essence.

From

the nature which

is

impressed in the world

all

the forms of things arise in matter.

nature. So the seeds of because the nature acts through the power of the higher essence, the reasons for all the are the forms are present in the nature.

The forms

made by the power of the

And

seeds which are in

Ideas. Therefore
is

it

are also in the essence.

We

call

them the

from the creativeness of the divine substance made creative; and from the nature various offspring are drawn into matter. So this is the reason for our first argument for demonstrating the existence of the Ideas. Our second argument for again demonstrating the existence of the Ideas follows from the fact the world can't exist by itself. For what is from itself acts on itself. When something acts on itself, the actor and the thing acted on are the same; but what acts is indivisible, and therefore the thing acted on is indivisible. So the world, since it is divisible, can't be of itself. So it needs a higher cause.
the nature
also

Again,
for

all

that subsists through itself also operates of

itself;

what produces itself is able before all else to operate in itself. But the world can't move itself, since it is corporeal; for, universally, no body can at the same time move itself and be moved by itself. For no totality can at the same time heat itself and be heated by itself, because what is being heated isn't hot yet, but what is doing the heating already has heat. And so the same thing will be, and will not be, hot. And if the whole heats a part, or a part heats the whole, or a part heats a part, the same thing is not heating itself. But if the same thing is heating itself, the whole is heating the whole. So the same thing will be hot and will not be hot. But just as it's impossible for some body to
to

move itself in the sense of altering move itself in the sense of any

itself,

so

it's

impossible for

it

sort of motion, since genera-

tion

and corruption, and similarly getting bigger and getting smaller and rarefaction and condensation, all presuppose alteration. So what can't move itself by altering itself also can't move itself by any other interior movement. What isn't capable of producing from itself its own interior movement in itself is even less capable of producing from itself an exterior movement

Cap. XVIII

187

Et mundus quicquid agit eius agat virtute. A natura autem mundo impressa omnes rerum proveniunt in materiam formae, quae formae vi naturae illius fiunt. Ergo in natura ipsa formarum insunt semina. Et quia natura agit vi superioris essentiae, omnium seminum quae in natura sunt sunt et in ea essentia rationes, quas ideas vocamus. Foecunditate igitur divinae substantiae fit et natura foecunda, ex qua in ma#teriam partus varii
educuntur.

Ex hac itaque ratione hoc primum sequitur ex quo ideas esse monstramus. Sequitur et alterum per quod ideas esse iterum
ostendemus,
et scilicet ut

mundus ex

se esse

non

possit.

Nam
ibi

quod quod

ex se est se ipsum

agit;

ubi aliquid se ipsum agit, idem est agens

factum.

agitur impartibile.
esse

Quod autem' agit impartibile est, ergo Mundus itaque, cum partibilis sit,
causam.

ex se ipso

non

potest, quare superiorem exigit

Item

omne quod

per se subsistit ex se etiam operatur. Multo

enim prius quod se ipsum gignit in se ipsum operari potest.^ Mundus autem nequaquam est per se mobilis cum sit corporeus, nullum enim {355r\ corpus universaliter simul per se movere et moveri potest. Neque enim simul totum se ipsum calefacere et'
a se ipso calefieri, quia

quod

calefit

nondum calidum

est,

iam habet caliditatem, atque ita idem erit si totum' partem vel pars totum vel pars'* partem calefacit, non idem se ipsum. Quod^ si idem se ipsum, totum calefacit totum. Quare* idem calidum erit et non calidum. Quemadmodum vero secundum alterationem aliquod corpus movere se ipsum impossibile est, ita et secundum quemlibet

autem
erit

calefacit

quod et non

calidum. Et"

motum, quia
ponunt
et

generatio

et

corruptio

alterationem praesupet

diminutio augmentatioque similiter rarefactioque

alterationis

ipsum condensatio. Quare quod motu non potest, nullo quoque alio' interiori motu. Quod vero ad interiorem motum suum non sufficit ex se in se producendum.

movere

se

'aMtmom.WX
'elom.X

'quia hoc ipsum facere

'pars

et

generari operari

f fldrf. WA"
'igitur A"

'etom.

'totam >f ItP frag. Ill (53v) ends

om.

'quod

om.X

'actio >'

188

Chapter 18

around a place or to another place, especially since what

changes itself alters its own position, situation, disposition, shape and state of being affected.

movement seems to be more than being active, since passivity is appropriate to bodies. But the power to move oneself is activity. So it's the function of some indivisible thing to be moved of itself. Therefore, because it's a body, the world doesn't move itself. So it doesn't exist through itself either. So it depends on another more pre-eminent cause.
But, universally, each corporeal
like

being

passive

But, in order to work, the pre-eminent cause either needs

choice and judgement, or

it's

can operate through being alone. If if it's the former, if it needs choice to act, absolutely nothing will be found which can do something without choice. For if the divine being itself isn't great enough to be able to act through itself, surely nothing at all will be able to act through itself. But we see each thing that now acts through choice also does something through being, for choice requires the soul. But if the soul presupposes another choice in order to be, and that in turn presupposes another, and that in turn another to infinity, no action will ever begin, since the result presupposes infinite decisions and innumerable choices. But you can never pass through an infinite series. So there is some operation and choice which proceeds from being alone, with no other interjected operation or choice. In fact, a man's soul, though it does many things through choice, nevertheless without choice gives life to the body through being: as soon as matter has been prepared, without choice the soul enlivens it straight away with its own life. For if this life resulted
it

the latter,

it

doesn't need to choose; but

from our choice, either it would never leave the body in the men always obsessed with the body, or it would frequently and easily do so in the men who separate the soul for the sake of contemplation, or in others who renounce the union of the soul with the

body because of bodily disease. Moreover, the soul would know

does in the body, for choice presupposes judgement. But not everything that operates through being alone has choice or can operate through it even: for example, the elements
all

that

it

Cap. XVIII

189

multo minus ad exteriorem motum ex se circa locum vel' ad locum alium deducendum, cum praesertim quod se mutat locis,
situ,

habitu, figura, affectione permutet.

autem omnis corporalis motus passioni magis cum corporum sit^ propria passio. Vis autem sese movendi actio est. Ergo impartibilis cuiusdam sese moveri officium est. Mundus itaque ex eo quod corpus est sese non movet. Quare neque per se existit; ex alia
Universaliter

quam

actioni similis esse videtur,

itaque causa pendet praestantiori.

Haec autem causa aut

non
indiget.

electione indiget consilioque ad opus,

aut ipso esse solo efficere potest. Si ipso esse *potest, electione

Quod
si

tione, nulla reperientur

agant.

Nam

non** potest indigetque ad agendum elecomnino quae sine electione quicquam ipsum esse divinum non tanti est, ut per se
si

[355v] possit agere, nullius certe rei esse per se operari poterit.'

Nunc autem videmus* omrie quod

etiam ipso esse facere.

per electionem agit aliquid

Nam

et eligere

opus animi

est.

Quod

si

aliam electionem a qua sit praesupponit, et ilia aliam rursus, et' rursus ilia aliam in infinitum, numquam incipiet actio, cum opus infinita praesupponat consilia et electiones innumeras.
Infinita

vero

numquam

pertranseantur.*

Quare

est

aliqua

operatio et electio quae a solo esse, nulla alia operatione et electione interiecta, procedit.

Etenim hominis anima

fit,

licet

multa per

electionem agat corpori tamen sine electione ipso esse dat

vitam. Et

cum primum

apta materia

illam

mox sine electione

sui ipsius vita vivificat.

Nam

si

vita haec a nostra electione

fieret,^ vel* numquam discederet a corpore vita in hominibus semper cum corpore conversantibus, vel facile et frequenter in hominibus qui ob contemplationem animam separant,' vel aliis qui ob morbum corporis communionem renuunt. Quin etiam

cognosceret anima quaecumque in corpore

facit.

Nam

electio

indicium praesupponit.

Non omne autem quod ipso esse operatur electionem habet per quam etiam operetur: ut elementa solo esse agunt, electione
'vcl

om.

'sint

X
om.

'potitur

'vides

'manaret

WX
Y

'vel

'superant

'pertranseuntur 'ct om. Y potest, electione non indiget. Quod

Y
si

non om.

190

Chapter 19

through heat, water through wetness. Therefore, if an operation which is completed through being has greater scope than an operation completed through choice, it's obvious it derives from another more noble cause, especially since any action proceeding from being always precedes an action made by choice an example would be the action by which choice is produced or another action. An action brought about through being alone is not unjustly attributed to divine things; for the action of those who act through being alone is effortless. But an effortless and happy operation must be attributed to divine things. Indeed, we live
act through being not through choice
fire

easily and with less trouble when we lead a divine life according to virtue. So the cause of the world does everything

more

through its own being, and so by its own substance. What acts by its own substance, however, is in first place; in second place is whatever is being effected. And what is in first place gives [something] to what is in second place, just as fire gives heat to another thing and is itself hot, and the soul gives life to the body and itself has life. Therefore the cause of the world, since it acts

upon the world through being

alone,

is

in first place.

What

is

in

second place is the world. So, if the world is the combination of all forms of the species, as Plato says in the Timaeus and Hermes Trismegistus too," all the species will be present primarily in the world's author. For the same cause produces the sun, the moon, the horse, the man, and the rest of the forms in
the world.

So they are all primarily in the world's another more outstanding sun than the one which another and more noble man, and so with all the rest.

creator:
is

seen,

Chapter

19,

Confirmation of the above; and above the unis,

true forms are the true forms, that

This
is

the Ideas.

by what Plato argues in the Phaedo, the Republic, the Timaeus and the Letters.^* The diversity of powers indicates a diversity of objects. But the sense is one thing, the intellect another. So the sensible object is one thing, the
also proved

Cap.XVIIII
nihil,

191

calore ignis, aqua humore. Si ergo operatic quae per esse

expletur'

ad plura

se extendit

quam quae

per electionem, patet

quod ab alia venit causa digniore, praesertim

quae
fit^

cum actionem

per electionem semper actio

ilia

antecedat: puta

qua

electio producitur, vel alia

secundum esse aliqua quaedam.

Nee immerito

divinis actio

quae

fit

per esse tribuitur.

Nam

illaboriosa est actio

eorum quae

ipso esse agunt. Oportet

autem

operationem tribuere. Nempe et nos facilius vivimus {356f\ minorique cum labore, quando divinam secundum virtutem agimus vitam. Causa igitur mundi ipso sui esse omnia facit, ergo et a sui substantia. Quod vero sua agit substantia illud primo est; quicquid secundo est id quod efficitur. Et quod primo est dat ei quod est secundo, ut ignis et alteri caliditatem dat et ipse est calidus, anima vitam dat corpori
divinis illaboriosam felicemque
et

habet ipsa vitam. Causa itaque mundi,

est

cum

ipso esse agat

Si ergo

mundum, primo est quicquid secundo

dus
est

mundus.

mun-

omniformium specierum complexio, ut et' Plato in Mercurius inquit, omnes hae primo in mundi inerunt auctore. Eadem enim causa solem procreat, lunam, equum, hominem et ceteras in mundo formas. Haec ergo omnia primo
Timaeo
et

sunt in opifice mundi, alius sol et praestantior

tur,

quam

qui vide-

homo alius et nobilior et reliqua omnia.

Confirmatio superiorum, et quod super formas non veras sunt verae formae, id est, ideae. Cap. X Villi.*
Testatur et hoc Platonis ratio quae ex Phaedone, Republica,

Timaeo, Epistolisque
tatem
indicat*

colligitur. Diversitas

potentiarum diversisensus
est,

obiectorum.

Sed

aliud

aliud

'completur >f
'areuit

WX

'quae

fit

om. WA'

'tlom.

'no ch. heading or break

iVX

192

Chapter 19

intelligible object another.

And

just as the intellect excels the

But the something through itself, therefore the intelligible object is something through itself too. But the latter is a universal rational principle that one understands. So the intelligible and universal species of things, which we call the Ideas,
sense, so the intelligible object excels the sensible.

sensible object

is

exist.

Moreover, in matter we see the forms of things mixed in a way with opposites: a circle with a square, equahty with inequality,

likeness with difference, beauty with ugHness, the

good with

the imperfection of a potentiality, and one thing in another, just

as the

these things truly

forms seem to be confused in the elements. So none of is what it is said to be, and each form loses its
doesn't entirely retain the power to act. Moreover,
all

perfection in matter, for, being impressed into a passive potentiality, it

bodies are in time and space and consist of matter and form.

Because they're in time they are measured by time, so each body's condition corresponds to the condition of time. But time is perpetually flowing in such a way that one moment always succeeds another without a break. Therefore in the body one
quality follows another in individual

moments, and so
isn't

in the

individual

moments each quaHty simultaneously begins and

begins isn't yet.

ends.

What
if

What ends

any longer. So the

bodies' qualities are never true.

And
power

time, we'll ask

someone maintains some quality lasts for a particular him at once whether the quality has the same
end as
at its beginning. If

at the time's

he says

it

will stay

exactly the same,

I'll

ask the same question about a subsequent

going to retain an identical power, it will always But it's not true that bodies always stay the same. So when the person is asked the question, he will be forced to answer the power is not the same in the quality at the time's end. It will be obvious it didn't stay the same because it lost part of its power. Therefore bodily qualities don't even last the shortest time. So, as Heraclitus and Timaeus maintain, as
period. If
it's

stay exactly the same.

often as you say **this is"

when demonstrating something,

you're lying, for

it's

being changed while you speak."

Cap. XVIIII
intellectus;

193

aliud ergo sensibile, intelligibile aliud.

Et

sicuti

praestat intellectus sensui, ita sensibili intelligibile praestat. Est

autem

sensibile per se aliquid,

quare

et

per se aliquid

est'

intelligibile.

lUud vero

est universalis aliqua species,

semper

enim universalis ratio intelligitur. Extant ergo intelligibiles communesque rerum species, quas ideas vocamus. Adde quod formas rerum videmus in materia contrariis quo-

dammodo
num

mixtas: circulum recto, aequalitatem inaequalitati,

ut in

similitudinem dissimilitudini, pulchritudinem turpitudini,^ boimperfectioni' potentiae, et alias {356v\ in

aliis,

elementis apparet formas esse confusas.

vere est

Nullum ergo istorum

sit

quod

dicitur, et

quaeque forma

in materia perfectionem

suam
actus
et in

amittit.

Nam cum

passivae potentiae

impressa, vim

omnino non retinet. Corpora quin etiam sub tempore sunt omnia et ex materia constant ac forma. Quia sub tempore sunt, tempore mensurantur. Quare conditioni temporis corporis cuiusque conditio correspondet. Tempus autem ita fluit iugiter, ut" aliud semper sine mora momentum alteri momento succedat. Semper ergo in corpore alia qualitas aliam'
loco

momentis
desinit

singulis subsequitur,'

quare in singulis quaeque qualiincipit

tas incipit simul et desinit.

Quod

nondum

est;

quod

non est amplius. corporum qualitates.

Numquam

ergo verae sunt istorum

dixerit,

Ac

siquis

aliquam stare aliquod^ tempus

eum

statim
fine

interrogabimus,

numquid par in ea
si

vis est in

temporis

illius

atque* in principio;

par stabit tantundem, de sequenti tem-

pore quaeram quoque similiter. Et semper tantundem stabit, si vim retinebit aequalem. Stare autem semper corpora falsum est. Quare interrogatus ille respondere cogetur, non parem esse in ea qualitate' vim in temporis illius fine. Unde patebit non stetisse eam cum partem virtutis amiserit. Ergo ne minimum quidem tempus affectiones corporum permanent. Quotiens ergo aliquo demonstrato, ut Heraclitus et Timaeus inquit, hoc est, dicis,'
mentiris utique,
'tj'MWX
"didt

nam te loquente mutatur.

'imperfection

'pulchritudini >f

'pa add.

'alteram IfA"

'subsequetur H^A"

^ipexadd.WX

atque om. Jf;ac A"

'qualiutis

194

Chapter 19
exist in space, they are

Moreover, since bodies

many parts. No one body

exists as

any one of

its

parts.

extended in But you

can think of the parts in anything as infinite. And you can say about every part that it isn't the whole itself: this part isn't the whole man, nor this and so on with the individual parts. Therefore a man is not a man in infinite ways, but only in one way. So a man is nothing else but man. Again, every body is made from matter and form. A body isn't called **man" or **fire" on account of matter, since matter is sempiternal and they aren't, and since matter itself is equally open to all forms. And so on account of matter some body is no more called "fire" than "air" or "man." Therefore a body is called such and such only on account of the form. But the form is a part. So [a body is called such and such only] on account of a part. But what is partly a man isn't a man, but man-like; what's partly a fire isn't a fire, but fire-like. So not one of these
bodies truly
is

what

it is

said to be.

Moreover, truth itself is eternal and changeless. For if you were ever to deny truth exists, either you would say it falsely or
truly. If falsely,
exist. If

then truth
is

exists. If truly,

it is

true truth doesn't

what you say

true, it's true

is

because of truth. There-

fore truth exists.'* Therefore truth

it

eternal

can't be sustained in a changing thing, for

changing thing is also changed with it. change, so the truth exists in none of them. Therefore they aren't true, nor do they truly exist. If, therefore, corporeal forms are imperfect, they are not the first forms. For what is the first of its type is completely such, for the rational principle of each nature is established in its totality in the first member. So above the imperfect forms there are some perfect, primary and complete forms which aren't sustained in a subject (for they wouldn't be complete). We call these the reasons and the Ideas of the imperfect forms. But if bodies' forms are not true, where, in fact, are the true forms? Nowhere? But the false would be more powerful than the true if it existed and the true didn't. But this is impossible, for what is stronger is stronger because of the truth; for, unless

and changeless. So what is situated in a But all bodies undergo

Cap. XVIIII

195

Praeterea quia in loco corpora sunt, in partes plurimas

extenduntur.
existit.

Neque corpus aliquod

aliqua partium

suarum

Partes autem [357r\ in quolibet infinitae considerari

possunt.

De quacumque
ut haec

vero dicere potes, haec totum ipsum

non est homo, neque haec, et ita de singulis. Infinite igitur non est homo, uno tantummodo homo est. Unde magis homo non est quam homo.
non
est:

Item corpus quodUbet ex materia constat et forma, et secundum materiam nee homo dicitur nee ignis, quia' materia sempiterna, ista nequaquam, et materia ipsa ad omnes aeque se

eam corpus aliquod quam aer vel homo cognominatur. Secundum formam igitur tantum tale vel tale dicitur. Forma vero pars est. Igitur secundum partem. Quod vero per partem homo non homo, sed humanum; quod per partem ignis non ignis, sed igneum.
habet formas. Atque idcirco non magis per
ignis

Nullum ergo istorum vere est quod

Praeterea Veritas ipsa aeterna est
dixeris

dicitur.
et

immobilis.

Nam

siquando

eam non

esse, aut falso

hoc dices aut^ vere.

Si falso, est

utique Veritas. Si vere,

est, veritate

verum

est

non

esse veritatem'. Si

verum

verum

est.

Est itaque Veritas. Sempiterna ergo Veriin re

tas est et

immobiUs. Quare nulla

mobih

sustinetur,

quod
vero

enim

in re mutabili iacet

cum

ea quoque mutatur.

Omnia

corporalia permutantur. Itaque in nullis est Veritas;

sunt vera, neque vere existunt.
Si

non ergo

ergo *formae corporum imperfectae sunt, primae formae

sunt;

tale est integrum tale, tota enim primo fundatur. Sunt itaque** formae aliquae super istas perfectae primae et integrae, quae non in subiecto sunt, neque enim integrae essent. Illas istarum rationes ideasque vocamus. Ac si formae corporum verae non sunt, ubinam verae sunt? Nusquamne? At potentius esset falsum quam verum, si illud quidem esset, hoc nequaquam; impossibile vero istud; quod enim potentius veritate potentius est, nisi enim verum sit esse

non

quod enim primum

ratio naturae cuiusque in

'quam

'an >f

'unitatcm

**om.

196

Chapter 19
true that
it's

it's

stronger,

it

rather,

what are

called false

won't be what it's said to be. Or forms can't exist without the truth's
it's

presence, for they won't exist, unless

true they exist.

So

somewhere the true

species exist.

But surely our soul has the species which are more true than With the former the soul judges the latter, approves and condemns and corrects them and gets to know the extent to which they've fallen away from the true species or the extent to which they agree. However, the person
the ones which are perceived?

who

doesn't see the true species can't compare other things to

them. The soul, in fact, corrects the visible circle when it doesn't touch the plane at a particular point, for otherwise it would never rest content. And it approves or condemns every structure

made by art and the measures of music, and decides about the goodness and badness of natural things, the utility, the bad
effects, the beauty, the ughness.

The

soul possesses the truer

forms and with them it judges concerning corporeal things. For the judge is more perfect than what is being judged. But the forms in the soul aren't the first forms, for they're changeable and although they don't exist in space, still, they do traverse the intervals of time. Nor do they always exist in act either, for the soul doesn't always act through them. Nor do they exist in the whole of the intelligence, but in a part of it. For just as the whole soul is not the intelligence (since it adds the nature of both moving and perceiving), so the intelligence in the soul isn't the total or first intelligence. For the intelligence is in the soul. But what is in another also comes from another, for what can't sustain itself can't produce itself (for that's the more
difficult job). Nevertheless, this intelligence doesn't

come from
intelli-

the soul, since the rational principle for producing the

gence would be in the soul. So the whole soul would be the intelligence and be the whole and perfect intelligence; and every
soul

would possess the

is

intelligence, since the rational principle

of the soul

present in every soul.

is

Therefore, above the soul and above the intelligence, which

part of the soul,
pletely itself
is

a certain prime inteUigence which is comand entirely absolute. In it will be the first and

Cap. XVIIII
potentius,

197

non

veritatis praesentia esse illae

dicuntur, nisi

quod dicitur. Quin immo sine non possunt quae falsae formae enim verum sit illas esse, non erunt. Alicubi ergo
[357v] erit

verae sunt species.

Nonne animus

noster veriores habet species

quam quae
et corrigit et

cernuntur. Quibus iudicat eas et probat damnatque

quo a veris discedant intelligit quove' congruant. Qui autem vera non videt ad ea comparare alia minime potest. Visibilem quidem circulum animus corrigit cum in puncto planum non tangat, neque enim quiesceret umquam; et omnem artificiorum structuram musicaeque modulos vel probat vel damnat, et naturalium rerum bonitatem vel pravitatem, utilitatem et nocumenta, pulchritudinem, turpitudinem iudicat. Veriores igitur habet formas animus, quibus de corporalibus iudicet. Perfectior

enim index est quam quod iudicatur. Sed neque hae quae sunt in animo primae sunt fonnae, mobiles enim et quamquam in loco non sunt, per temporis tamen intervalla discurrunt. Neque actu semper existunt, non enim semper per eas animus agit. Neque tota in mente sunt, sed mentis parte. Nam, sicut anima tota mens non est quoniam addit et movendi et sentiendi naturam, ita mens quae in anima non est mens tota nee prima. Est enim mens in anima; quod vero in alio est, et ab alio est, quod enim se sustinere nequit neque potest producere, maius enim id opus. Neque tamen haec mens ab anima, quia in anima mentis producendae^ ratio esset. Unde et tota anima esset mens et mens quidem tota atque perfecta; et omnis anima mentem haberet, quia in omni anima
ratio inest animae.

Quamobrem
mens
est

super

{358r\

animam et mentem quae pars animae est, quaedam prima in se ipsa integra ac penitus

absoluta. In

qua primae ac verissimae erunt rerum omnium

'-\com.

WX

'producente

198

Chapter 20

of all things, because they exist now above space and time and change. If they are the prime species for one must arrive at the prime ones they're not in another subject. So you haven't on the one hand the essence of the intelligence, and on the other the species in the intelligence. For there the rational principles of everything are the essence and the life. Whatever has been made by this intelligence, the world's creator, exists in life itself. Therefore Plato says in the Timaeus
truest species

that the creator of the world, the intellect, contemplates the

Ideas in the living substance and constructs the machine of the

world according to

his

own likeness."

Chapter

20.

Confirmation of the above; and on the natural

truth of the universal forms.

The special powers and forms of things are not only in an imaginary way in our intelligence, but also in a natural [i.e. real] way in God, in the angels, in the celestial souls and our souls, and in the heavens and the vegetable nature and in prime matter. In all these the universal powers exist, although we may know nothing about them. The powers are in the creativeness itself of the divine essence and so in a way they are in the angelic creativeness, although [the angels] are not thought to understand [the powers as such], since for understanding they too [like us] turn towards internal objects [i.e. the Ideas]. But such forms are also in the vegetable nature, although it does not need to understand. For who is going to deny there are powers in the vegetable nature which produce teeth and hair; or, if there are, that they are not different or that one teeth-producing or one hair-producing power is not enough to produce all the
teeth

and

hairs?'*

But we know also the universal powers are natural [i.e. real] from the beginning, middle and end of the universe: firstly, because the world's order is established by the intellect acting through the forms. The forms, since they are the first reasons and the universal causes of things are the most natural [i.e. real]

Cap.
species, quia supra

XX

199

locum iam et tempus motumque existurit. Quae si primae sunt, ad primas enim deveniendum est, in alio subiecto non sunt. Non ergo aliud ibi mentis essentia, aliud in mente species. Essentia enim ibi sunt et vita omnium rationes, et quicquid ab hac mente mundi opifice factum est in ipsa vita est. Quapropter Plato in Timaeo mundi opificem intellectum contemplari ideas dicit in vivente substantia et ad sui similitudinem mundi machinam fabricare.

Confirmatio superiorum; et de naturali veritate formarum universalium. Cap. XX

'

Speciales rerum vires

et

formae non solum imaginario

et'

modo
natura

sunt in mente nostra, sed etiam naturali modo animabus' coelestibus, nostrisque animis, et in* coelis
vegetali et in' materia prima. In his
vires, etsi'

in Deo,^ angelis,

omnibus universales sunt

et in ipsa

nos

nihil intelligamus.

Atqui

divinae essen-

tiae foecunditate et inde* in angelica foecunditate

quodammodo, etsi' fingantur non intelligere, quandoquidem et illi intelligendo ad' intima" se convertunt obiecta. Iam vero'^ in natura vegetali sunt tales formae, etiamsi cognitione non egeat." Quis enim dixerit in vegetali'* vel non esse vim dentificam et pilificam, vel, si sunt, non esse differentes, vel non sufficere dentificam unam unamve pilificam ad omnes dentes atque
pilos?

cognoscimus ex principio, medio, fine universi. Primum quidem,'* quia ordo mundi fit ab intellectu agente per formas, quae, quia primae
Universalia

vero etiam'*

naturalia

esse

rerum rationes causaeque sunt communes, maxime sunt naturales.

Deinde, non dicimus de essentia universi principaliter**

'animalibus Y 'X merely reads sed naturali in I>eo 'no ch. heading or break 'etiamsi 'inde om. Y *et in om. 'et om. 'animis, et in om. "egeant y "Iam veroom./etflrfrf. A" "intrinsecaA' etiamsi A^ "in A" *-**om. (cont.) "quidem om. "vegetativa A" "vero etiam om.

WX

200
Secondly,
species;

Chapter 20

we don't say
is it

the essence of the universe

is

the genera

principally, since, like the powers, the genera are referred to the

nor

principally the individual things, since they're

and changeable, and the universe is perfect without any numbering off of the single things one by one. Therefore the universe's essence is constituted from the species.
infinite, orderless

So

it is

they especially which are the real (as

it

were), that

is,

the
to

natural things. Thirdly, the purpose of the nutritive nature

is

have

nourishment. But, primarily, it's for nourishment as a species, for hunger's stimulus drives us towards food even when we've no mental picture of it; then, when we have, it drives us to
real

food
food.
it

in general before driving us

towards

this or that particular

is

The purpose of the reproductive nature

also the species;

has been implanted for the sake of propagating the species. But it wants the real species not an imaginary one. Finally, all

and movements in the world through their own goods contribute towards the general good of the whole, according to the primary purpose of nature. But what moves everything and is the perfection of everything is natural
the inclinations
particular
[i.e. real].

Consequently, notice that

beasts,

all

men,

in that they share the

accidental appearances peculiar to

have among themselves

is,

man and differ from one common origin for

the
the

accidental factors, that

the nature which they share

and

which distinguishes them from the beasts. This common nature is the real cause of real effects and it is true and one, even when mental activity has ceased. Don't let it disturb you that subsequent accidents seem to have divided this nature; for what is subsequent and unnecessary and changeable doesn't detract from that prior, one community of the nature. For when you divide one flame into two little flames, just as there was one fieryness, so one fieryness remains; for division, which is the enduring of dimension, doesn't affect fieryness. But fieryness, as Avicenna maintains, precedes dimension, although its immediate accidents may come after dimension (or at any rate fieryness properly adheres not to dimension but to matter).

Cap.

XX

201

esse genera, quia tamquam potentiae referuntur ad species; neque individua praecipue, quia infinita, inordinata, mutabilia, et singula singulatim dinumerando sine quolibet perfectum est universum. Ergo essentia universi constat ex speciebus. Praecipue ergo reales (ut
ita

dixerim) sunt, id

est,'

naturales. Tertio,

ad alimentum reale.^ Est autem speciem alimenti. Stimulus enim famis nos etiam non primo ad
intentio naturae nutritivae est

imaginantes ad' cibum urget;

et

deinde prius imaginantes cibum

Intentio

communem quam hunc vel ilium.

quoque

genitivae est*

ad speciem cuius propagandae gratia est inserta. Non autem est ad imaginem, sed ad rem eius intentio. Denique omnes in mundo inclinationes motusque per propria bona ad commune
totius

bonum

conferunt praecipua intentione naturae. Est

et

autem naturale quod movet omnia

omnium

est perfectio.

Proinde attende cunctos homines, sicut in apparentibus accidentibus homini propriis conveniunt inter se differuntque a brutis, sic' habere in se unam communemque accidentium eorundem originem, naturam scilicet illis communem a brutis differentem. Communis haec natura realis* est reahum^ effectuum causa et vera unaque, cessante etiam mentis discursione.

Neque
bus.

te turbet

quod

divisa videtur posterioribus accidenti-

Quod enim

posterius et superfluum et mutabile est

non

aufert priorem illam*

unamque' naturae communitatem.

in

Nam

cum flammam unam

dimensionis passio
dit

duas

diviseris

erat una, ita restat una.

Non

flammulas, igneitas sicut enim ipsam attigit divisio quae

vero, ut

est. Igneitas

Avicenna putat, antece-

dimensionem,

licet

praesentia eius accidentia dimensionem

sequantur; vel saltem igneitas non dimensioni proprie haeret sed

materiae.**

'reales (ut ita dixerim) sunt, id 'naturalisA 'sic om. (cont.)*'**om. W(cont.)

est,

'naturale A" 'adorn. A" 'est om. om. A^ 'illam om. -que om. A" 'naturaliumA

202

Chapter 20

Moreover, subsequent to division, the Idea which is in Hke a nursery garden in matter, makes fieryness continue on here and there. I omit that the species are predicated of individuals with a real predication; also, that natural knowledge is not about individual things but about the species. Besides, all things try to propagate their own power; so, as
nature,
far as they can, they exhaust
it

in generation. Firstly, they gener-

Then they generate themselves The elements produce appropriate qualities in themselves from the power of the appropriate species: from heat in potency comes the actual heat in the fire; from potential cold the actual cold in water. You can see this if you put water
ate themselves in themselves.

outside themselves.

that's

been heated by

fire into

coolish air; the water will restore

air won't do it, for coldness will be more intense in the water than it is in the air. But, when it has stopped being impeded by its opposite, the potential cold in the water gives rise in itself to its usual offspring, that is, actual
itself to its

usual coldness.

The

cold.

Each mature plant

is

also generates itself in itself

from the

integral creativeness of

its

nature, that

is, it

generates the seed.

In the seed
in

the plant's total power,

is

its

total reason. Similarly

itself.

animals the seed

the whole animal being produced in

it

Moreover, the soul, when

itself.

has been instructed in the sciences

itself in

of other things, recovers natural power and generates

For

it

can fashion
is

its

total nature in itself

it

by knowing

itself.

And

the intelligence does

the
first

intelligence

even better, because in the knowledge; in it is the most perfect

knowledge, therefore the knowledge closest to the thing that's known. So what's knowing, the thing known, and knowing are identical. Therefore essential generation will be in the intelligence. For all things are by way of essence in the very first
essence.

But in individual things external generation follows internal

generation. For after the fire's power has
also

made

the fire hot,

it

The plant too, when the seed has been fashioned in itself, brings it forth and creates a plant, and an animal does the same. The soul, when it knows itself and
hot.

makes the wood

Cap,

XX
tarn idea

203

*Adde quod post divisionem

quae

in natura est
et ibi

quam seminarium quod

continuat.

est in'

materia igneitatem hie

Mitto quod species de individuis praedicantur praedicatione reali.^ Item' quod naturalis scientia est de rebus non individuis
sedspeciebus.**
nituntur. Ideo quoad generantque se ipsa in se possunt eam exhauriunt generando; ipsis primum, extra se deinde se ipsa. Elementa ex virtute propriae speciei proprias in se qualitates gignunt: ex calore in* virtute, actu calor in igni; ex frigiditate in virtute, actu frigus in aqua.' Quod apparet siquis aquam igne calefactam in aere temperato posuerit; aqua ad soli tarn se ipsa redibit frigiditatem.

Praeterea omnia

suam vim propagare

Nee

aer

eam

dabit,

frigus;*

sed in

nam intensior erit in aqua quam in aere aquae potentia frigus remoto contrarii
suam

illo

sui

impedimento solitam

in se ipso gignit prolem, scilicet'

frigus in actu. Et planta

foecunditate se ipsam generat in se ipsa, id

tota vis est* tota ratio

quaeque adulta ex Integra naturae est, semen, in quo plantae. In animalibusque similiter semen

animal totum in se ipso producitur. Anima insuper cum in aliarum rerum disciplinis instructa est, naturalem vim recuperans, se ipsam generat in se ipsa. Nam se cognoscendo totam sui naturam in se ipsa figurat, idque mens

multo melius, quia enim in ea prima cognitio'" est," in ea est [358v] perfectissima, proxima igitur cognito.'^ Idem ergo cognoscens ef cognitum et cognitio. Essentialis igitur erit in mente generatio. In prima enim essentia sunt per modum essentiae omnia. Generationem vero interiorem in singulis exterior sequitur generatio. Postquam enim'* virtus ignis ignem fecit calidum, calidum facit et lignum. Et planta semine in se concreto extra promit et plantam concreat, animalque similiter. Anima, cum
efficit'

'

t&X.

in

transposed

'natural! A*

'luA"
'for vis est

*frigiditas

X
WX

Vilicet om.

WX

*'mom. WX 'aquam A' X reads vis cuius est, Y reads vis eius
"cognitio JfA^

facietWA"

"cogiutio

f'

"enim om.

(cont.) -*om.

"cstom.WX

"eiom.WX

204

Chapter 21

understands the true reasons of things which are inside itself, produces outside itself in its own likeness laws, artifacts, books, words, morals (producing them according to the rule of its
rational principles). Therefore all things first generate themselves in themselves, then generate themselves outside

themselves too. So the world's intelligence, which is the first essence, the first creativeness, and from which proceeds all

and external generation (as we've seen), creates the world. So the world, which is the intelligence's particular child,
creativeness
is

in a

way

the intelligence. For every single thing produces

And since nothing produces itself outside itself till it has produced itself in itself, so the intelligence first generates the world in itself when (unfolding itself in itself) it conceives its creativeness. Now joy accompanies the internal generation, just as pleasure accompanies the external.
itself.

first

Chapter

21.

Confirmation of the above and concerning the

first intelligence.

Again,

if there's

no cause to the universe, but everything

is it

occurs by chance,

how

the degrees of things have been

mu-

powers distinguished, the places separated? same steady way and individual things proceed from individual things according to the nature of each? Such order consists in the union of opposite things, and since opposites shun each other, they are joined into one from elsewhere. But there must be one something that bestows union on the multitude of different things. Therefore outside the individual parts of the world there is the one coordinator of all things. But this order is more marvellous and more beautiful than every order that can be caused by any other reason. Now every order has been generated by order, and every reason has been generated by reason. It follows therefore that in the world's coordinator there is a more beautiful order than the world's order, a more outstanding reason than all our reason, a
tually ordered, the

How is

it all

things always function in the

more venerable

intelligence than every intelligence.

Cap.
se noverit et rationes veras
derit,'

XXI
in se sunt

205

rerum quae

comprehenartificia,

ad

sui similitudinem extra se porrigit leges,

libros, verba, mores, ad rationum

suarum normam

educit.

Omnia ergo
est,

se in se ipsis

generant primo, deinde etiam se

igitur
et

generant extra se ipsa.

Mens

mundi quae prima

essentia^

prima foecunditas a qua

foecunditas omnis et generatio

extra se, ut vidimus,' gignit

mentis proles mens est

mundum. Mundus igitur propria quodammodo. Nam unumquodque se

nisi

ipsum
ipsam

gignit.

Et quia nihil se extra se gignit,

ante in se

genuerit, ideo in se
in se

primo mens generat* mundum,

dum

se

suam

explicans foecunditatem concipit.' Generatio-

nem

vero

interiorem

gaudium comitatur,

sicut

voluptas

exteriorem.

Confirmatio superiorum et de prima mente. Cap. XXI.

nulla est causa universi, sed casu currunt omnia, invicem ordinati sunt rerum gradus, distinctae vires, loca discreta? Quomodo eundem semper agunt universa tenorem et secundum naturam cuiusque a singulis singula proficiscuntur? Ordo huiusmodi in oppositorum unione consistit, et

Item

si

quomodo

quia opposita se invicem fugiunt, aliunde copulantur in unum. Unum vero esse debet quod diversorum multitudini exhibet
[359r] mundi partes omni ordine qui ab aliqua alia ratione fiat mirabilior est et pulchrior. Et omnis ordo genitus est ab ordine, et genita ratio a ratione. Ex quo sequitur ut in mundi ordinatore ordo sit mundi ordine pulchrior, ratio omni nostra ratione praestantior, mens omni mente venerabilior.

unionem. Unus itaque

est extra singulas

iste

omnium

ordinator.

Ordo autem

'comprehendit K 'essentiae 'no ch. heading or break

WX

'videmus ffA"

'genuitA"

'conciperet JfA"

206

Chapter 21

At all events, this intelligence understands itself much more than our reason understands itself. But it is the cause of the total order. So it understands it is the order's cause, the creator of all things, the beginning of all and the end of all too. But it couldn't know that it's the order's cause, the creator, the beginning and the end of all, unless it knew the order and knew all things. Therefore the notions of all things, which we
call the Ideas, subsist in that intelligence. If
it is

the prime intel-

undoubtedly its understanding is completely perfect. But the most perfect is the most certain. But the most certain understanding is closest to the thing which is understood and in it what understands and what is understood are identical. So it is the same intelligence's essence which understands and is understood. And so to an even greater extent the intelligence's understanding is the same as its essence, since understanding is the intermediary whereby the knower knows what is being known. So in the intelligence to be and to understand are the same, therefore to be and to live also. For to live is the mean between to be and to understand. In the same way movement is the mean between rest and conversion. Therefore essence, life, intelligence, being, Hving, understanding are identical: it is essence when it is at rest, life when it acts and is moved, intelligence when it goes back into itself. Returning
ligence,

into itself

it

sees all things in itself; they are in that essence as

in their principle.

But the intelligence doesn't look outside in order to underall things, for it understands them before they can be externalized: they presuppose its understanding just as they do its being. But understanding can't exist without something being understood. So before everything can exist, the intellistand

gence understands everything. But it doesn't understand everything in order to make everything, for it would be referring the internal operation to the external one which is less perfect. Or rather, if it contemplated everything in order to make everything, contemplation

tends everything already

would presuppose intending everything. But whoever inknows about everything beforehand.

Cap.

XXI
se

201

Haec utique mens multo magis

ordinis

ipsam

intelligit

quam

ratio

nostra se ipsam. Ipsa vero est totius ordinis causa. Quare se

causam

esse cognoscit,

omnium

effectricem,

omnium

principium,
ordinis,
potest, nisi

omnium quoque
ordinem ilium

finem.

Neque vero
noverit.

effectricem,^

principium,
et

se esse causam' finemque omnium nosse

omnia

Omnium

itaque

notiones ea in mente consistunt quas ideas vocamus.

prima mens est, est utique perfectissima eius vero quae certissima. Certissima vero quae rei cognitae proxima
et in

Haec si intelligentia. Haec

qua quod

intelligit et

quod

intelligitur

idem.

Eadem

ergo

mentis essentia est quae

Quare
gitur.

et intelligentia

quae intelligitur eadem. eius multo magis cum essentia eadem,

intelligit et

cum ea medium

sit quo intelligens aliquid intelligit quod intelliIdem itaque in ea et esse et intelligere est, ergo et esse et vivere. Vivere enim inter esse et intelligere medium, sicut motus

statum et conversionem medium est. Eadem ergo essentia, vita, mens, esse, vivere, intelligere: essentia ut stat, vita ut agit moveturque, mens ut in se ipsam redit. In se rediens in se videt omnia quae tamquam in principio suo in ea essentia sunt. Neque vero extrinsecus respicit ut intelligat omnia, prius enim intelligit quam externa sint, quae sicut eius esse sic eius intelligentiam [359v] praesupponunt. Intelligentia vero sine re intellecta esse non potest. Quare antequam sint omnia, omnia
inter

mens haec intelligit. Neque vero^ intelligit omnia^

ut faciat omnia.

Nam

internam

operationem ad externam quae minus' perfecta est referret.' Immo si, ut faciat omnia, contemplatur omnia, contemplatio haec intentionem omnium praesupponeret. Qui vero intendit

omnia cogitationem^ omnium iam praesupponit. Quare

vel

'

'vere

'cf ficientem yvx casum Y (in corrigenda list only; causum in printed text as such) 'rcfcrre Jf 'minus om. y 'Neque vero intelligit omnia repea/erf >f

'cognitionem

WX

208

Chapter 22

So either you will advance to infinity, or the contemplation of everything precedes the intending and effecting of everything.

Chapter

22.

are related to

Confirmation of the above and God and to lower things.

how

the Ideas

So all things are conceived in God's intelligence before they drawn out into matter. The conceptions are one and many. They are one in essence, otherwise there' d be a compounding of essences in the first essence which has to be the simplest of all (since whatever is the first in any genus of things is also the simplest). But the conceptions are many in their role as cause, otherwise everything they bring about would be entirely one. But they are called 'unities" by Plato mainly because, just as individual men can be reduced to one common nature in themselves and individual horses to theirs, so can these common facare
*

tors in individuals

be referred to
it

common

factors outside indiit's

viduals.

Now the one

factor in a multiplicity, as
can't

in another,

must come from another. But

in the multiplicity,

come from any one

thing

because it would be peculiar to that and not belong to the rest. Nor can it come from the many things in so far as they are many, because it too would be many things. Therefore it's from one something and the rational principle of the one something that surpasses the many. So above the nature common to individual men and the nature common to
individual horses there has to be the one rational principle of a

man and
one

the one of a horse.

And just

as

all

the natures exist in

matter, so all the rational principles exist in

one essence.

The former change in time, the latter stay still in eternity. The former have been divided by quantity, the latter are undivided. Therefore the rational principles of all the former exist prior to them all in the one intelligence, and are absolutely one and absolutely unchangeable. Each death either accords with the form being abandoned by its subject, or in the case of a compound with the dissolution of the parts. But the rational principles aren't in a subject, nor are
they

compounded from corporeal

parts.

Cap.

XXII

209

procedetur in infinitum, vel contemplatio intentionem effectionemque praecedet.

omnium omnium

Deum atque ad inferiora.

Confirmatio superiorum et quomodo ideae se habent ad Cap. XXII.

Concepta ergo sunt omnia Dei mente antequam in materiam educantur. Conceptiones istae et unum sunt et multa. Unum essentia, ne in prima essentia essentiarum compositio sit quae
debet esse
ratione, ne

omnium

simplicissima, quia quicquid

primum

in

quolibet rerum genere id et simplicissimum. Multa vero sunt

unum

penitus sint

quaecumque inde

efficiuntur.

Unitates vero ex eo

maxime

appellantur a Platone, quia, que-

madmodum
naturam
in singulis

singuli

homines ad unam

communem
sic istae

in

ipsis

et singuli

equi ad

suam reducuntur,

communes

ad communes extra singula referuntur. Nam quod unum, cum sit in alio, ab alio debet esse; non tamen ab uno multorum quia proprium illi esset et reliquis non competeret; non a multis illis qua' multa sunt quia et multa esset et illud. Ergo ab uno aliquo et ratione unius alicuius quod multitudinem supereminet. Quare supra naturam communem singulis hominibus et communem naturam equis singulis ratio una hominis, una equi debet esse; et sicut istae omnes in una materia {360r\ sunt, sic illae in una essentia omnes. Sub tempore istae fluunt, illae in aeternitate consistunt. Istae in quantitate divisae, illae simplices. Ergo rationes istorum omnium ante haec omnia sunt mente in una et unae maxime et incommutabiles maxime. Omnis* enim interitus vel formae convenit a subiecto desertae vel composito ex partium' dissolutione. Illae vero neque in subiecto sunt, neque ex partibus corporalibus sunt compositae.
est^ in multitudine

'no ch. heading or break

WX

'est

om.

WX

'quia

Omnes Y

'partim

210

Chapter 22

But if someone argues corruption also comes from an oppohe must understand that nothing can be a corrupting opposite for the forms which aren't in matter. For one thing doesn't destroy another, except to impart its own form to the other's
site,

matter; for nature doesn't aim at the bad. So where there's no shared matter, the reciprocal corruption of opposites can't exist.

And

if the intelligence is above bodies, it exists above bodily conditions which are division, time, place. Therefore the intelligence surpasses all time, place and division. So it includes and

encompasses them as

well.
is

Because bodies derive from the

present everywhere in
all

intel-

ligence, the intelligence

things, pre-

serving by its power the things that it makes. Because the intelligence exists above the conditions of bodies, it is present in all time but is eternal; it is present in all division but remains undivided; it is present in every place but isn't circumscribed. Therefore
it is

in all things but not included in them;

it is

above

all

things but not excluded

If all this is true,

from them.
is

and each Idea

manifesting

present in
it is

its

entirety everyitself

where and imparts

with anything.
It is

itself to single things,

its

not mixing

similitude not its essence. of the divine intelligence when it gazes into the mirror of matter manifests none of its parts, but copies of the individual parts. People who stare at matter don't see true things, but some things having the appearance of truth and certain empty adum-

power not its substance, its To sum up in a word, the countenance

brations of true things. Consequently, a person,

who
is

doesn't
said

see the true things also while looking at the copies,

by

Plato to be dreaming, since he's being deceived by false images and Hke a dreamer he's supposing those things true which are
just images.

The doubts which Plato here introduced now seem

to be sufficiently resolved

by all this. So what's been said about such problems is enough. Therefore, just as the image of one face is at the same time
back from a number of mirrors and one image is multiplied in a fractured mirror, so the total image of each Idea is in its individual things and is multiplied on account of the extent and distribution of matter.
its

in

entirety reflected

just as the

Cap.

XXII

211

et siquis dixerit a contrario etiam venire corruptionem', formis quae in materia' non sunt nihil esse contrarium corruptivum. Neque enim unum destruit aliud, nisi ut in eius materia^ suam inducat' formam. Nam intentio naturae non est
sciat

Sed

ad malum; ubi ergo non est communis materia, mutua" contrariorum corruptio esse non potest. Ac* si mens ilia supra corpora* est, super corporum conditiones existit: hae vero sunt
tempus, locus. Ergo mens omne supereminet tempus, omnem locum, omnem partitionem; ergo et ea complectitur ambitque. Quia a mente corpora sunt, ideo omnibus ubique praesens adest mens sua virtute conservans quae facit. Quia super eorum conditiones existit, ideo toti adest tempori sed aeterna, toti partitioni sed simplex, omni loco non circumscripta. Est ergo in omnibus non inclusa; super omnia non
partitio,

exclusa.

communicat suam exhibet non substantiam, similitudinem non essentiam. Et, ut verbo uno complecSi ita est, et idea

quaeque ubique adest

tota, et se

singulis, nulli se miscet; virtutem

tar, divinae^

mentis vultus in materiae speculum intuens nullas

suas exhibet partes, sed singularum partium simulacra. [360v\

Neque

veras res vident, qui in materiam vertunt oculos, sed

verisimilia

quaedam

et

brationes.

Quo

fit,

ut quisquis

verarum rerum inanes quasdam adumdum haec inspicit ilia quoque

falsis decipitur

non

suspicit

somniare a Platone dicatur, quia

imaginibus, et somniantis instar, quae imagines sunt res esse veras existimat. Ex his omnibus dubitationes quae introductae
hie sunt a Platone

iam

satis solutae videntur.

Quare de

his

haec

dicta sufficiant.

*Proinde,* sicut vultus unius imago in multis tota simul est

speculis' et quolibet fracto
fit

ex una multiplex,

cuiusque ideae

est in suis individuis et

fit

ita tota imago ob materiae dimensionem

divisionemque'"

multiplex.

Ac

etiam sui ipsius unitatem**

natura*'

'materiam A^
'divae >FJf

'inducit If

*mutuo H^

corpora om. ff
*-**o/n. fVfcont.)

'proindc om. A"

'specialis

'EtWX y

"-que om. A"

212

Chapter 22
preserves
its

And

still it

own
is

unity, just as the sun's light

still

remains one, although it various ways. Notice that matter, the

tains
its

sustained in various colours in

vilest

of

all

things, nevertheless re-

unity beneath
is

all

things. Notice that the

primary extenits
is

sion too, which

made
it

to be divided, similarly preserves

unity in every division.

But since corporeity

its

nothing but

matter in extension,
unity

too retains

common

unity in every-

thing. Therefore animality

and humanity can

retain a

common
than the

much more
[universals]

easily in their fewer derivatives

can in their many derivatives. If these corporeal [universals] can do it, subjected as they are to division and motion, the divine Ideas will be able to do it even more. But even if you don't understand the way in which they can do it, still don't deny what reason is telling you for certain. In the Phaedo Plato tells us to stick close to reason, even if the lower faculties are unreliable." Galen applied this to reason in the art [of medicine]; he tells us to stay with reason even if the result is not successful.'*"* For who's going to alter a foundation that's been laid correctly just because the wall on top of it hasn't been properly erected? In the Gorgias the same is applied to morals: we are told to stand firm in what reason approves.'"* To the extent the soul excels the body, so the soul's health is better than the body's and its disease worse than bodily disease; and the health of the soul must never be neglected, even at

meaner

the cost of everything of the body and this life. In the Republic and the Laws the same is applied to piety.'" For when, according to the Timaeus, you've deduced from the world's imperfection that the world depends on another and depends on the order, just proportion and power of that other

by the highest power, goodness and providence, and that one result comes from one cause, you ought to stick fast to this conclusion even if you don't see how it is brought about.'*" Otherwise, human error would appear to be disparaging providence. For nobody in his right mind denies a clock is made by a clockmaker or juggling tricks are done by a juggler simply
because he doesn't

know

exactly

how

they're done. Similarly,

Cap.
servat, sicut lumen
cipiatur
solis

XXII

213

quamvis

in variis coloribus vario sus-

modo unum tamen extat. Attende materiam omnium vilissimam tamen

servare se sub

omnibus unam. Dimensionem quoque primam cuius passio est divisio similiter unam in omni se divisione servare. Cum vero corporeitas nihil aliud sit quam extensa materia, ipsa quoque una communisque restat in cunctis. Ergo' animalitas et humanitas multo facilius in paucioribus suis retinere possunt

communem

unitatem quam viliora ilia in pluribus. Si corporea haec divisioni motuique subiecta id possunt, multo magis ideae
divinae id poterunt.

Tu

vero, etsi

modum quo

id valeant

non cognoscis, tamen

inhaeren-

negare noli quod certa

tibi dictat ratio, cui firmiter

Phaedone iubet, etiamsi posteriora vacillent. Quod Galenus ad artis transtulit rationem cui monet manendum etiamsi exitus non succedat. Nam quis fundamentum rite iactum mutet, ex eo quod paries non examussim fuerit superstructus? Idem in Gorgia transfertur ad mores, ubi iubemur rationi huic stare probanti. Quanto animus praestat corpori,
in

dum

tanto sanitatem animi,

quam

corporis meliorem esse,

morbum-

que peiorem; ipsamque animi sanitatem numquam esse negligendam, etiamsi ob eius studium iactura rerum omnium et corporis et huius vitae fuerit subeunda. Idem transfertur in Republica et Legibus ad pietatem. Postquam enim ex defectu mundi secundum Timaeum iudicaveris ipsum pendere ex alio atque ex eius ordine, commoditate, virtute pendere a summa potentia, bonitate, providentia, et opus unum ab uno, debes in hac sententia permanere, etiamsi non videas quo id modo fiat, ne^ error humanus derogare providentiae videatur. Nemo enim sanae mentis negat orologium factum esse a fabro, vel a praestigiatore praestigias propterea' quod modum quo fiant non**

'et

add.

'vel

'ex

eo Jf

(cont.)

**om.

W (com.

214

Chapter 23

nobody will deny it is the father's foresight that governs a home, whatever some small child has to babble about it.

Chapter
caution;

23. Why we ought to approach dialectic with and how we ought to divide the one into the many

or resolve the
It's

many into the one.

said in the Cratylus that in a long debate great diligence

must be applied in establishing the first principles.""* After that you can think about what follows. But if this must be done when you're establishing the principles of any particular art, it must be done even more with Hfe's end which is the principle of all arts and actions. Hence, when the subject is felicity, the dialectical faculty is quite rightly

introduced into the discussion as

the

way

to examine truth; otherwise we'd perhaps

make a

wrong or unfortunate judgement about the most important

thing of

Elsewhere the penalty for erring is ignorance, here misery as well. But why so much caution just at the beginning? It's because everything is contained in the beginning and comes from it. Consequently knowledge as well as ignorance about it is propagated through all that follows, and with the multiplication of the consequences there's a
all.

the penalty

is

multiplication of mistakes.

wisdom are the subjects of the debate, but both are common to a number of species and innumerable individual things. So, in order to know about them best, you have to have the skill that can draw the one common thing out into many
Pleasure and

and lead the many things back into the one (the former so that you don't stay in the genus, the latter so that you don't wander on through an infinite sequence of single things). As we said above, the person who's going to have definite and perfect knowledge of a thing has to think about this. However, the skill
things
isn't

easy at

all,

but difficult:

it

doesn't confine

itself to

dividing

and uniting corporeal

lems confront us on

things, but aspires to the level of uniting

or multiplying the incorporeal species. Therefore

all sides,

many

probto

as we've said, so

we ought

Cap. XXIII
*teneat. Item nullus negabit

215
patris providentia guber-

domum
ibi'

nari

ob

id

quod

puellus aliquis

balbutiat.

Qua cautione dialecticen aggredi debeamus et qua ratione dividere unutn in tnulta vel solvere^ multa in unum. Cap.
XXIII.'
In Cratylo dicitur in principiis constituendis

summa

diligentia

cum

longa disputatione est adhibenda. Post haec quae consequuntur considerandum. Quod si in principiis cuiuslibet artis id est faciendum, maxime circa finem vitae, qui est actionum omnium artiumque principium; ideo ubi de felicitate agitur,
merito dialectica facultas* in
tatis

examen, ne forte

in re

medium adducitur tamquam veriomnium gravissima male infelici-

terque iudicemus. Alibi enim erroris poena est ignorantia, hie

insuper poena miseria. Sed cur tanta in principio cautio? Quia

ab eo cuncta, quo fit ut tam scientia quam inscitia circa ipsum per reliqua propagetur multiplicatisque his quae inde sequuntur multiplicentur errores.** Positum est de voluptate et sapientia esse tractandum, utrumque vero commune est ad species multas et singula plurima. Igitur ut optime cognoscantur habenda est ea peritia quae unum commune in multa producere possit et multa in unum reducere: illud quidem ne insistat in genere; hoc vero ne
in

eo

et

per singula infinita' vagetur.

Quae

(ut

supra diximus) obserrei

vanda sunt

illi

qui certam perfectamque

scientiam

sit

habi-

turus. Peritia

autem haec* haudquaquam levis est, sed ardua; neque in rebus corporeis moratur dividendis et uniendis, sed usque ad incorporeas species uniendas et multiplicandas sese evehit. Unde et multae, ut dictum est, se illi undique dubitationes opponunt, quare diligenti cautione ad hanc nos conferre

'aliquis ibi
'infinite

om. A"

'resolvereA'

'inX this ch.

*istatVX

(cont.J**om.

is

numbered len

'facultas

om. A'

216

Chapter 23

15C

approach dialectic with great care. This is what has been learnt so far from Socrates' conversation. Protarchus assents to the arguments and says he has to try mainly to achieve the following: that is, to acquire such a skill and with it divide the subject of the controversy into many things and in turn gather the many things into the one and do both correctly. However, in order to urge Socrates on in the present argument, he says, 'Socrates, I personally and the people with me can easily agree with you over such things, and if you're afraid of the stubbornness of this argumentative fellow Philebus, dismiss him and don't have anything to say to him. For, as the saying goes, 'Let a sleeping dog lie.' Pythagoras' symbol is similar, 'Don't stab the fire with a sword'; and Heraclitus', 'It's a hard thing, to fight against anger. When it rushes out at full tilt you pay with your life.' The first proverb originated in Rhodes.'"' For after a huge colossus, that is, a statue, had fallen down and in so doing had brought about the ruin of many homes, the Rhodians didn't want it re-erected. And they countered the king who was thinking about putting it up again with the saying, 'A bad thing " that's lying quietly mustn't be disturbed.' But Philebus' previous stubbornness immediately appeared, for he was tired of arguing before he was convinced by Socrates, and in a little while he added, "Pleasure seems to me to excel wisdom and it will always seem to." He showed here he wasn't ready to be taught anything, since he was going to stop his ears
*

against future arguments, preferring to err in his

own

opinion

rather than judge correctly by using other people's arguments even though they were true. Plato inveighs against such men in the Phaedo and elsewhere.'"* He says they are annoying companions to other people and they are their own silent and familiar enemies as they indiscriminately deceive themselves. He tells us not to argue with them over important matters, since (passing over Philebus in a way) he admits Protarchus [alone] to the debate about the good

15D

which follows. So, complying with Protarchus' request, Socrates advances to dialectic. He says three things must be recognized. First,

Cap. XXIII

217

debemus. Haec hactenus ex verbis Socratis coUiguntur. His assentitur Protarchus et conandum imprimis ait ista perficere, id est, peritiam huiuscemodi consequi ac per earn id quod in controversiam deductum est in multa ut decet partiri et multa rursus in unum colligere. Ut autem Socratem ad praesentem' disputationem [361f\ exhortetur,^ addicit: Ego, o Socrates,
atque
isti

mecum

tibi talia facile

assentimur.

Ac

si

contentiosi

huius Philebi pertinaciam vereris, mitte ilium neque

cum

eo

verbum habeas uUum, nam ut habet proverbium: Malum quod bene iacet non est movendum; cui simile Pythagorae symbolum: Ignem gladio ne fodias; atque illud Heracliti: Durum est
adversus iram pugnare, nam cum in impetu est, vita emitur. Rhodi ortum hoc est proverbium. Nam cum vastus quidam
colossus, id est, statua, cecidisset,

quo ex casu domorum

plu-

rium ruina secuta est, noluerunt Rhodii in altum rursus attoUi colossum, regique de elevando colosso dehberanti opposuerunt: Malum quod bene iacet movendum non esse.
Philebi vero' pertinacia in superioribus statim apparuit.
prius defessus est disserendo"

Nam

quam

a Socrate persuasus, et

paulo post addidit:' Voluptas #mihi sapientiae praestare videtur semperque videbitur. Ubi indocilem se esse testatus est, utpote qui futuris rationibus obstrueret aures, ac potius propria cum
opinione errare
vellet

quam cum ahenis

rationibus etiamsi verae

sint recte sentire.

Hos homines
molestos esse

detestatur in

Phaedone

et

ubique Plato

et aliis

dicit socios, sibi

vero tacitos et famihares hostes,

cum

passim decipiant. Cum his non esse de rebus maximis disputandum monet, cum Philebo quodammodo praetermisso Protarchum ad sequentem de bono disputationem
se ipsi

adsciscat.

Socrates igitur Protarcho obtemperans

cam

aggreditur discip-

Hnam, ac

tria

in

ea observanda esse monet.

Primum ne

'sequentem H^A* 'exhortatur f Pfrag. IV(65r) begins

'\exoom.WX

'diffcrendo

'reddidit IT

218

Chapter 23
Next, those

adolescents aren't admitted to

it.

who

attempt

it

must guard against the illusions of the senses and the phantasy and proceed towards it by the divine light of the intelligence. Third, they mustn't dash from one extreme to another without
going through the intermediary stages. To understand these admonitions, you must notice that Plato divides the art of debate into two branches: one is called logic, the other dialectic. The first is the ability that concerns itself with the properties of nouns and verbs, with what's compounded from them, namely the sentence, with the various species of sentences and their combinations, with the resulting proofs, and finally with the
various classes of proofs. Logic
it is

is

pre-occupied with language;

all

not properly knowledge, but the instrument of

is

knowlintelli-

edge. But dialectic

a divine craft which

is

no longer concerned

with words, but with things.

By

the pure probing of the

gence above the senses

it

inquires into each thing's substance,

and from all things it ascends to their one principle without the need for any other principle. In the Sophist and the Statesman
Plato calls dialectic the true philosophy.'"' In the Republic he
calls
it

the outstanding task of the philosopher.'"* In the Parwill ever

menides he says nobody

without
it.

be able to get to the truth

all

'

So

dialectic either
all

compares the principle of

it

things to

all

things or

things to the principle, or

considers single things

individually, or refers

does,

it is

them to each other. Whichever of these it always uniting and dividing and considering the one

the one

and the many. If it compares God to all things, it is bringing in and the many, for it's considering the power of the one God propagated through many things. If it compares all things to God, it's considering the perfection of the many as bordering on one end. If it compares things in themselves, it's looking at some one whole constituted from many parts. For whatever is subsequent to the principle, because it is degenerating from the first one, falls away into multiplicity; and the further it
descends the
plicity.

less

unity

it

retains while sustaining greater multi-

The

spiritual

intelligences consist

of substance and

species. Souls

have

in addition to the species distinct

powers and

Cap. XXIII
adolescentes ad

219

banc'

admittantur;

secundum

ut

qui

earn

tractant sensus et phantasiae illusiones caveant [361 \] et divino

mentis lumine ad banc incedant; tertium ne ab extreme ad extremum sine mediis properent. Ad istorum intelligentiam

advertendum

est

disserendi distribui: et aliud logicam,

apud Platonem duo in membra artem aUud dialecticam dici. Ilia

est facultas quae de proprietatibus agit nominum et verborum, de horum compositione quae oratio est, de orationis variis speciebus, de orationum cum orationibus compositione ex qua argumentationes conficiuntur, ac postremo de variis argumentationum generibus. Haec circa sermonem versatur, neque proprie scientia est, sed scientiarum omnium^ instrumentum. Dialectica vero artificium divinum est quod non de verbis amplius, sed de rebus agit, et supra sensus pura mentis indagine

quidem

substantiam cuiusque

rei perquirit et

a rebus omnibus nullo alio

ascendit princi-

supposito principio ad

unum rerum omnium

pium. Hanc vocat. In Republica praecipuum philosophantis officium. In Parmenide dicit sine hac neminem umquam veritatem rerum consecuturum. Quare aut principium omnium ad omnia comparat, aut omnia ad principium, aut singula in se ipsis considerat, aut invicem refert singula. Quicquid istorum agat, unit semper ac dividit et unum multaque considerat. Si Deum ad omnia comparat, unum profert et multa, nam unius Dei vim per multa considerat propagatam. Si ad Deum omnia, multorum perfectionem in finem unum conterminantem. Si res in se ipsis, totum quoddam unum cernit ex pluribus constitutum. Quicquid enim post principium est, quia a primo uno {362f\ degenerat, abit in multitudinem, et quo discedit longius eo minus unitatem retinet dum maiorem suscipit multitudinem. Numinum quidem mentes ex substantia et speciebus constant; animae supra species vires adhibent operationesque distinctas; corpora insuper partes in
in Sophiste atque Politico

veram philosophiam

'earn

'omnium mn.

XP

220

Chapter 23

operations. Bodies have parts extended in space

the unity
to

and quantity

besides. Therefore the intelligence of the dialectician discovers

and multiplicity in individual things. And since it has comprehend the nature of single things, it must ascertain how each thing's unity proceeds into the many and how the many are
led into the one.

compares the individual things together which it sees how they are distinguished and how they agree. According as they agree, they are one;
Moreover,
if it

are under the principle,

according as they differ, they are

In His

many again.

the parts for the sake of the whole

works God everywhere joins the parts of each thing to itself, and joins the whole to something compatible. And He separates parts from incompatible parts, just as He separates a whole from an incompatible whole. Similarly, nature separates incompatible things from a subject and joins compatible things to it. It unites a created thing to something compatible and divides it from its opposite. Similarly, and last of all, art is concerned with uniting and dividing. Accordingly, divine and natural things and human
skills,

as they are

made

in their issuing forth, so they are pre-

served in their turning back by uniting and dividing; and the

same goes for the management of life. So, since the manner of knowing ought to follow on the manner of the things it knows,
it is

quite appropriate that the mistress of the sciences, dialectic,

always regards the one and the many equally, and alternates them in turn in the proper way now by dividing, now by uniting. But note that dividing upwards aims at the simple thing, for it distinguishes the nature [of something] from the contingencies. When these have been put aside, it reduces the many to the power of the one simple form. But dividing downwards ends in
a compound, for it divides the general nature through its properties (which aren't abandoned but joined now to the nature itself in act), so that it ends up quite correctly in a compound.

Whichever way it is done it is called division, but the division which ends up with the more simple nature is properly called resolution. Like fire, resolution, when it divides, leaves behind the additional and as it were terrestrial accidents on the ground.

Cap. XXIII

221

loco quantitate porrectas. In singulis itaque dialectici mens unitatem et multitudinem reperit. Et quia singulorum debet

naturam comprehendere tenere debet quo pacto unitas cuiusque in multa progrediatur et multa in unum ducantur. Quin etiam si singula quae sub principio sunt invicem refert, quo distinguantur videt et quo conveniant. Ut conveniunt unum sunt; multa rursus ut distinguuntur. *Deus in operibus suis ubique et unit partes rei cuiusque partibus ad ipsum totum, totumque unit convenienti rei, et tam partes ab alienis partibus, quam totum ab alieno dividit toto.
Similiter natura dividit a subiecto aliena unitque propria; rem'

genitam unit convenienti, dividit ab opposito. Demum ars similiter in uniendo et dividendo versatur. Ergo divina, naturalia, artificia tam in processu fiunt, quam in conversione servantur uniendo atque dividendo; similiter^ et gubernatio vitae. Cum ergo scientiae modus rerum sequi debeat modum, baud ab re dialectica, magistra scientiarum, unum semper et multa pariter contuetur, eaque' vicissim tum dividendo tum

uniendo decenter alternat. Sed nota divisionem in ascensu tendere ad rem simplicem, dividit enim naturam a contingentibus, quibus posthabitis, redigit multa in unius simplicis formae virtutem. Divisionem vero in descensu desinere in rem compositam, dividit enim generalem naturam per eiusdem proprietates, quas non relinquit sed actu iam ipsi naturae continuat, unde merito in rem compositam desinit. Quocumque id modo fiat, divisio nominatur, sed
divisio in
tio,

naturam desinens simpliciorem proprie

ignis instar,

dicitur resolu-

dividendo supposita relinquit humi* accidentia quasi terrestria, atque interim ab his specialem**

quae

'-que add.

XP

'-que add.

XP

'eoqucA^P

'humi

om.XP

*om.

W (cont.)

222

Chapter 23

Meanwhile evaporating the special nature from the accidents, it resolves it as if it were air into the sky. The dialectician does three things in the process of comparing things together by dividing and uniting through the one and the many. First, he resolves; second, he defines; finally, he demonstrates. First, this is

there are

how he sets about resolving. He determines many men, as he can see the dissimilar qualities of
So by dividing from the
fact

individuals.

of dissimilarity he pro-

ceeds into multiplicity. But because he sees individuals do simiaccordingly, that is, they reproduce, reason, laugh he finds the one nature in the individuals which produces the one result; and he calls the nature, "humanity." And this is how by uniting from the fact of similarity he ascends from the many to the one. One by one he does the same for all the individual species of animals and plants as well. Next, just as
lar things

he's reduced the

many individuals in any class

to one species, so

he reduces the many species to one genus. Because thinking, barking and neighing are dissimilar, he determines there are a number of species: of man, dog, horse. But he determines, because they have walking and feeling in common, that they belong to one genus of many [species]; and he calls the genus,

"animal."
into the

He divides this one genus through the differences many species, and brings the many species back

through the similar nature to the one genus. Moreover, he perceives animals differ from plants, because animals can feel and walk, plants can't. But, since animals and plants have nutrition in common, the dialectician can accordingly reduce the many species to one genus and call it the genus of "animate bodies."

And

so he goes

essence.

We

on till he comes to body and substance and always see the dialectician considering here the

many and the one.

After he's thus resolved the

many

individual things into

one species and the many species into one genus and the many genera into the supreme genus, he divides the supreme genus up again through the opposing differences and establishes the many species. For example, he divides substance into the
divisible

and the indivisible and establishes from them body and

Cap. XXIII

223

exhalans naturam quasi aerem

'Tria dialecticus agit

in

dum

dividendo

sublime resolvit.** et uniendo per

unum

ac

multa res invicem comparat. Resolvit primo, secundo definit, postremo demonstrat. In resolutione primum ita procedit. Quia dissimiles singulorum hominum inspicit qualitates, multos esse homines iudicat. Unde a dissimilitudine dividendo processit in multitudinem. Quia vero similes effectus singulorum videt hominum, hoc est, hominem gignere, ratiocinari atque ridere, ideo unam in singulis naturam a qua sit unus eventus esse reperit atque eam vocat humanitatem. Et hac ratione a similitudine uniendo ex multitudine ascendit in unum. Idem quoque in singulis speciebus animalium et plantarum efficit sigillatim. Deinde, sicut in quolibet ordine singula multa ad unam retulit speciem, sic et species multas ad genus unum. Nam ex dissimilitudine ratiocinandi, latrandi et hinniendi, multas esse species
[362v] hominis, canis et equi iudicat.

Ex simihtudine vero

et

gradiendi

et sentiendi,

unum multorum

esse genus, idque vocat

animal.

Quod unum genus in has multas

species per differentias

dividit; et species

multas per naturam similem in

illae

unum

redigit

genus. Praeterea haec animalia differre a plantis

ista sentiant

intelligit,

quia

nequaquam. Quia vero tam nutritio communis est, ideo genus in animalibus quam plantis unum multa haec redigit, illudque corpus animatum vocat. Atque ita efficit quousque ad corpus et substantiam et essengradianturque,

tiam veniat, ubi semper cernimus dialecticum multa

considerare.

et

unum

Postquam

ita resolvit singula

species multas in genus

unum,

et

multa in speciem unam, et genera multa in genus supre-

mum,

iterum^ genus illud per oppositas differentias dividit, multasque constituit species: ut substantiam per partibilem' et" impartibilem, unde corpus efficit incorporeamque substantiam;

In quo certe add. (cont.)*-**om.

'

'interim

'partibilia

*&.

om.

224
incorporeal substance.

Chapter 24

Body he divides into the animate and the inanimate and estabhshes animals and trees from the one, and all the rest of corporeal things from the other. Animal he
makes a man, from the other a dog. So the dialectician, when he is going upwards, resolves by dividing and uniting; and again, when he is going downwards, defines by dividing and compounding. And after he has defined, he demonstrates by dividing and comdivides into rational, barking, etc.

From

the one he

pounding. For, given the definition of something in which the thing's substance is comprehended, through it the dialectician can arrive at some conclusion by an ordered process of reasoning. Through the conclusion he can either, by being positive, compound certain things with the substance of the thing itself, for example those things which accompany it; or, by being negative, he can divide extraneous things from the substance. And, universally, whoever says anything is either being positive or negative, Whoever's being positive joins the many to the one. Whoever' s being negative separates something else from the one

and proceeds from the one into the many.

Chapter

24.

The relationship

between

definition

and

demonstration. Again, on resolution, division and com-

pounding.

The next problem

is

whether definition precedes the syllogism

it,

or the reverse. Definition apparently precedes

thing

since

no condi-

tion can be assigned to anything through a syllogism unless the

and the condition have both been understood first through a definition. But you could say perhaps there must be at least two syllogisms before a definition can emerge. For, since definition consists of the genus and the difference, the division
of the genus through the differences precedes definition. Again, the comparing of each difference, then the rejection of one difference and finally the acceptance of another [all] precede a definition. When you divide a genus, you argue thus: Each animal is either rational or irrational. Man is an animal. Therefore

Cap. XXIIII
corpus per animatum
etc.:

225

et

inanimatum, inde animalia arboresque

constituit, hinc reliqua corpora.

Animal per
conficit.

rationale, latrabile,
dialecticus

hinc

hominem

inde

canem

Unde

dum

ascendit dividendo et uniendo resolvit; ac etiam

dum

descendit

et componendo definit. Et postquam definivit, dividendo et componendo demonstrat. Nam posita rei definitione in qua substantia rei comprehenditur, per eam ratiocinatione composita conclusionem aliquam infert. Per quam vel affirmando componit aliquid cum rei ipsius substantia, ut puta quae illam sequuntur, vel negando ab ea extranea dividit. Et univer-

dividend

saliter

quisquis

loquitur

vel

affirmat
[363r\

vel

negat.

Quisquis

affirmat multa ligat in

unum.

Qui negat ab uno separat

aliud et in multa procedit ex uno.

habeat definitio ad demonstrationem. Item de resolutione, divisione, compositione. Cap. XXIIII.^

^Quaeritur utrum defmitio praecedat syllogismum an contra.'

Quomodo se

Videtur

ilia

hunc praecedere, cum nequeat

rei

conditio assignari
et res et

per syllogismum, nisi per defmitionem prius

conditio

cognita fuerit. Forte vero licet dicere antequam definitio oriatur duobus saltem syllogismis opus esse. Cum enim definitio constet

ex genere atque differentia, definitionem praecedit divisio

generis per differentias; item comparatio differentiae utriusque,

deinde reiectio alterius, denique alterius assumptio. Sic argumentando dum dividis genus: Omne animal vel rationale est vel
irrationale.

Homo

est

animal. Ergo

homo

est

rationale vel

'no ch. heading or break industria

.
. .

WXP

'the last

Plato conqueritur (my p. 229), transposed here

paragraph of this chapter, beginning Universa haec 'e converse WXP

226

Chapter 24
is

man

either rational or irrational. Again,

man
is

is

either a

rational or

an irrational animal. But he

it is

isn't

an irrational one.
the defini-

Therefore, he's a rational animal. This conclusion

tion of

man, and

the consequence of two syllogisms. Given

is

the definition, the next problem

to consider the
it, I

accompanying

conclude man is docile by this sort of syllogism: Man is a rational animal. But a rational animal is docile. Therefore man is docile. Again, a docile animal is not a wild one. Man is a docile animal. Therefore he is not a wild animal. We saw that two syllogisms already preceded the definition and two succeeded it and that in both cases the positive one was put before the negative.
condition.
I

As

find docility accompanies

However,
itself

if

someone

says an animal

is

already defined in

add that before the animal can be defined, body has been divided; and that before body can be defined, substance has been divided; and that before substance can be defined, entity has been divided. But entity can't be defined at all, since the general notion of entity is entirely undefinable and it can't be constituted from a genus and a difference. So you have to say first there's a confused description; then a division where the syllogisms originate which lead to a definition; third, a distinct definition; fourth, a
before
it is

divided, we'll accept this. But we'll

distinct division (since

first

more demonstrative

syllogisms than the

ones follow the definition).

By means of resolution the sight seizes the one simple image of colour. The image has been cut off from colour itself which is multiple and compound. In the process the image is both
divided from the colour and joined to the sight. Similarly, by

way of
[i.e.

resolution the imagination conceives of the pure image

the phantasm] from the visual image.

And by

resolution

the intellect conceives of the species which has been freed the particular phantasm.

from

intellect knows the universal knows the particular by turning back towards the phantasm. In the same way the imagination when it's awake knows something as a pure image. Afterwards it is turned back towards the sight and dreams about the something as a visual image. Thus resolution is everywhere first

So the

before knowing the particular.

It

Cap. XXIIII

227

animal rationale vel irrationale. Non est autem irrationale. Ergo est animal rationale. Haec conclusio est hominis definitio duos sequens {363v] syllogismos. Qua assignata, consideratur quae eam conditio comitetur, cumque inveniam eam comitari docilitatem, concludo hominem esse docilem tali quodam syllogismo: Homo est animal rationale. Sed animal rationale est docile. Ergo homo est docilis. Item animal docile non est ferum. Homo est animal docile. Ergo non
irrationale.

Item

homo est

est'

sisse et

ferum. Vidimus iam duos syllogismos definitionem antecesduos successisse atque utrobique affirmativum negativo

praeponi.
Siquis

autem

dicat animal prius in se definiri

quam

dividi,

fatebimur, sed addemus, antequam definiatur animal, corpus

esse di visum; et ante corporis definitionem divisam esse sub-

stantiam;

et

ante

huius

definitionem

ens

fuisse

divisum,

defmitum vero nequaquam, cum et indefinita omnino sit communis entis notio, et^ ex genere differentiaque constitui nequeat. Ergo dicendum est primo esse confusam descriptionem, secundo divisionem in qua syllogismi oriuntur ad definitionem conducentes, tertio definitionem distinctam, quarto distinctam divisionem, postquam definitionem sequuntur syllogismi magis demonstrativi

quam primi.
imaginem
coloris simpli-

Visus per

modum

resolutionis capit

cem unamque a
ilia et

colore multiplici et composito segregatam, ubi a colore dividitur et unitur visui. Similiter imaginatio resolutionis modo concipit puriorem imaginem ex imagine

visus.

Et intellectus resolutione ex particular! phantasmate solu-

tam^ concipit speciem; unde prius universale cognoscit quam particulare, scilicet per conversionem ad phantasma,* sicut imaginatio prius imaginibile vigilans quam visibile somnians in visum conversa. Sic primum ubique est resolutio ascendens ad

'est o/n.

WXP

^etom.

'absolutam

AP

'phantasmauAP

228

Chapter 24

things

ascending towards the simple, dividing in the meantime impurer from the purer thing and joining the purer thing to the
soul. This
is

rational nature

proper to fire. By the sudden impulse of the it proceeds thus far by resolving from the indi-

from the species to the genus. But by from the genus through the differences and compounding species from the differences, and so by defining and after defining by demonstrating, the whole process is brought to completion to some extent by a natural movement but to a greater extent by an artificial one. When it demonstrates, it makes a compound resolution, since the first resolution was simple. So in demonstrating it resolves now upwards from the cause, now downwards from the effect, now laterally from those things accompanying it. In this it's Hke fire. It's called "resolution" as if it were a "solution," [a setting free,] that's repeated. For the forms of things are first free in the Ideas, then they are bound in matter, third, they are made free again by the power of Apollo and of Saturn. Saturn is apart from matter, Apollo is the bearer of light and heat. Therefore, in the Cratylus Plato refers to Apollo as "the Apolyon," that is, "the resolver.""" The entire activity (which in dividing and compounding leads the one out into the many and the many back into the one), when it joins nouns and verbs and makes sentences and then joins sentences together to make the structure of an argument and either denies or affirms something, and when it resolves, defines, and demonstrates, is called in part logic and in part dialectic. Although it must be understood completely, still, it must be approached with this caution at first. As
viduals to the species,

dividing

Plato

tells

us in the Republic

Book

7,

we should impart

it

to

adults not to adolescents.'" For boys

subtlety of such questioning go

who depend on the around contradicting various

to destroy the legitimate civic
dis-

things indiscriminately
institutions

and use

it

of the hfe of mankind. But they haven't yet

covered better institutions themselves. So either they are too puffed up with pride or they surrender themselves to pleasures or judge ill of religion. Plato complains about this bitterly in
the La W5."^

Cap. XXIIII

229

simplex, interimque dividens impuriora a puriori, et uniens cuin

proprium. Et hactenus ab individuis ad speciem, ab hac ad genus. Hinc vero dividendo per differen-

anima purius,

[364r\

quod
fit

ignis est

subito rationalis naturae

instinctu resolvendo

tias et

ex his species
naturali,

componendo

sicque definiendo et post

fit

definitionem demonstrando, tota progressio

discursu quo-

magis vero artificioso. Atque dum demoncompositam, cum prima fuerit simplex. Resolvit ergo demonstrando tum sursum a causa tum' deorsum ab effectu^ tum in latus a comitantibus, quod ignis est proprium. Dicitur resolutio quasi repetita solutio. Nam formae rerum prius in ideis sunt solutae, deinde in materia ligatae, tertio resolvuntur virtute Apollinis et Saturni. Hie enim a materia separatus; ille lucens et calens. Hinc Apollon quasi Apolyon,' id

dammodo
strat

resolutionem

facit

est,

resolvens dicitur" in Cratylo.

quae dividendo et componendo unum in multa producit et multa reducit in unum, dum verba nominaque iungit et orationes constituit iungitque invicem ad ratiocinationis structuram, negatque aliquid vel affir[363r\ 'Universa haec industria,

mat, resolvit, definit, demonstrat, partim logica partim diabetica nuncupatur. Quae cum percipienda sit omnino, tamen hac

primum cautione tractanda, ut non adolescentulis eam sed adultis communicemus, ut in septimo de Republica iubet Plato.

Nam pueri
hominum
vel fastu

hac

freti

perscrutandi subtilitate redarguunt absque

delectu singula, tolluntque per eam* legitima et civilia vitae

instituta, ipsi vero nondum reperiunt mehora. Unde nimio tument, vel se voluptatibus dedunt, vel male de religione sentiunt, quod in libro^ de Legibus Plato conqueritur.

'

cum

^for ab cffectu

'didtur om.

WXP

'in

W this paragraph

P reads affectu

'

Apologlyon W; Apoglyon XP

is

transposed (see

my p.

225)

'singula add.

'quintoAP

230

Chapter 25

Chapter 25. On the art of dividing and uniting and why we ought to use it cautiously.
to attack something difficult as it were, Socrates first examines how he should approach the problem, the gravest of those confronting us. That is, he thinks about how he can describe rationally and talk diligently about the ability which concerns itself with dividing and uniting the one and the many. Many doubts spring up in succession in dealing with them, that is, the one and the many either the sort of doubts we've already mentioned or others you can think of. But Socrates demonstrates immediately that such an ability is absolutely necessary in order to know not only about wisdom and pleasure, but about anything at all. For we are all always forced to divide and unite in everything we think about or talk about, and to go from the one into the many and the reverse, from the many into the one. This has been shown above in greater detail. But if we use dialectic properly (which traverses everything), we will feel and talk about everything correctly; but if we abuse it, incorrectly. You can conclude therefore that the art which deals with dividing and uniting the one and the many is absolutely vital to knowledge. Plato also tells us why we ought to treat dialectic cautiously. First, he shows it must not be given to adolescents because they are led by it into three vices: pride, lewdness, impiety. For when they first taste the ingenious subtlety of arguing, it's as if they have come upon a tyrannous power for rebutting and refuting the rest of us. They are inflated with inane opinion and puffed up with arrogance. They deceive themselves with opinion and stubbornness, they molest others with their insolence and impu-

About
all

of

15D-

16A

dence. Plato exclaims against this pride in

all

the dialogues

opposing the sophists and their disciples. He calls them not philosophers, but "philodoxers," that is, men covetous of opinion and glory. "^

what Plato writes in the Phaedrus and the Republic Book 7. He says two leaders preside over man from the earliest years: the innate desire for pleasures, and the opinion acquired from civil and moral codes which leads us
to this

Add

Cap.
[364r]

XXV

231

tanda. Cap.
Socrates

De arte divisionis et unionis et qua observatione tracXXV.

tamquam ad rem arduam
accessurus
consultat

primum unde banc pugnam, quae dubitamus, aggrediatur. Hoc est qua
diligentia tradat facultatem illam,

plurima est circa ea de quibus

ratione declaret et
et

qua

quae dividendo

uniendo

ac multa versatur. In quibus tractandis, scilicet uno et multitudine, multae suboriuntur dubitationes, sive quales praediximus, sive quaevis aliae. Statim vero ostendit facultatem
circa

unum

eiusmodi non modo ad voluptatis et sapiemiae sed ad cuiuscumque rei cognitionem esse admodum necessariam. Omnes enim^ ac semper et in omnibus quaecumque vel cogitamus vel dicimus dividere et unire cogimur,' ex unoque in multa et contra ex multis in unum deducere, quod sane latius in superioribus est
ostensum.
falso.

Eo

[364v] vero

quod per omnia

et
ilia

currit, si recte uti-

mur, de omnibus vere sentimus

loquimur; sin abutimur,

Ex quo

concluditur ut ars

quae circa
sit

unum

et

multa

dividendo et uniendo versatur summopere

saria.

cognitu necesostendit

His addit qua

adolescentulis

sit

cautione tractanda,

primumque

non

esse tradendam, quia ex hac* tria in vitia'

adolescentes incidunt: super biam, lasciviam, impietatem. Nam cum primum artificiosam banc disserendi subtilitatem gustarunt, quasi tyrannicam quandam ad ceteros refellendos et convincendos vim nacti; inani inflantur opinione, fastu tumescunt. Se ipsi opinione pertinaciaque decipiunt; aliis sunt insolentia et

procacitate sua molestiores.

Quam quidem

superbiam omnibus
discipulos exec-

in dialogis Plato adversus Sophistas

eorumque

eosque non philosophos, sed philodoxos, id est, opinionis et* gloriae cupidos nominat. Accedit ad haec quod ut in Phaedro et septimo de Republica scribitur a Platone: duo a primis annis hominibus duces praesunt, innata voluptatum cupiditas, et acquisita opinio ex civilibus et moralibus institutis
ratur,

'a

break, but

no

ch.

omnes

heading 'coguntur

W;

in

X and P the ch.

*hoc

is

numbered

eleven

'viu

*et

om.

^WXP read Quippe

232

Chapter 25

towards the things adjudged by men to be honest and just."* Nine companions are present in every human soul. There's one god and two demons: that is, the soul's companion star and an airy and watery demon. Again, inside the soul there is one charioteer and two horses, a white and a black: that is, there's reason, the rational appetite and the appetite that obeys the sense. Again, there's one impulse and two leaders: that is, the impulse to the good, the desire that draws the soul towards the enjoyable good, and the opinion that leads the soul towards the honourable good. But adolescents who are given to the study of arguing often confute men's behefs about just and honest things. It's as if human institutions weren't good in actual fact but just seemed good, and weren't established by nature herself but were simply the result of a particular convention or usage. So the youths no longer venerate them. But they can't replace them with anything better because of their inexperience. Consequently, now the legitimate opinion has been discarded, they have another leader
is, the desire for pleasure, "and having talked about virtue, they go whoring.""* Thus arose the lasciviousness that took possession of the Cyrenaics, whom Plato calls **philosomaters" not philosophers, that is, lovers of the body."* These youths, moreover, when they've started on an argument, will assert that nothing exists except the thing for which they can apparently give a reason. But they don't yet grasp the reasons for divine things. Plato maintains in the Parmenides that adolescents aren't ready for them. "'For, in order to understand divine things, you must have long practical experience and be sustained by all the sciences, and you have to turn your

to follow, that

intelligence

away completely from

the things the eyes are accusin all three,

tomed to

seeing.

And since adolescents are deficient

they can't yet grasp the reasons for divine things. However,

they don't beheve in the authority and the laws of the rest of us,

inasmuch as they demand a reason for everything. So they

judge
of rehgion out of impiety, since either like Diagoras God exists, or like Protagoras they wonder whether there is a God or not, or Hke Democritus and Epicurus
ill

they deny that

Cap.

XXV

233

quae ad ea nos ducit quae honesta et iusta ab hominibus esse censentur. Cuique animae humanae novem comites adsunt. Deus unus, daemones duo; Stella scilicet sua compar et daemon aereus et humecteus. Item intra animam, auriga unus, equi duo
albus et niger; ratio scilicet et appetitus rationalis et appetitus'
sensui parens. Item impetus unus et duces duo; impetus quidem ad bonum, cupido trahens ad bonum iucundum, opinio ad bonum honestum. Saepe vero adolescentes ratiocinandi studio dediti opiniones hominum de honestis ac iustis confutant, quasi humana haec officia baud {365r\ revera bona sint, sed videantur, neque natura ipsa, sed positione et usu constent. Quapropter ea non amplius venerantur, meliora vero ipsi propter imperitiam reperire

non possunt. Quo fit ut opinione ilia legitima iam abiecta alium sui ducem sequantur voluptatum scilicet cupiditatem; et
de virtute locuti clunem^ agitant. Unde lascivia ilia exorta est' quae Cyrenaicos, philosomatos non philosophos ut Plato inquit, id est, corporis amatores invasit.

Quin etiam cum argumentationum viam

ingressi sint, nihil

asserunt esse, nisi id cuius rationem posse reddere videantur.

Divinarum vero rerum rationes nondum capiunt, ad quas ineptiores adolescentes esse in Parmenide testatur Plato. Oportet enim ad divinorum intelligentiam et longo rerum usu callere et scientiis omnibus esse fulctum, et mentem ab oculorum consuetudine prorsus abducere. Cumque his omnibus adolescentes careant, rationes divinorum nondum assequuntur. Ceterorum
vero auctoritati legibusque non credunt, utpote qui omnium exigant rationem. Quare impietatis causa* de religione male sentiunt, quoniam vel, ut Diagoras, Deum negant; vel, ut Protagoras, sitne an
rus,

non Deus dubitant; vel, ut Democritus et EpicuDei providentiam negant. Atque de hac impietate in

'rationalis et appetitus
'rci

om. ff

^c\\iimom. W, but a space provided

'estom. Jf

WXP

234

Chapter 25

Plato complains impiety'" and in ihc Apology he attests to the infamy that befell legitimate philosophers, particularly Socrates,
bitterly

they deny God's providence."* In the

Laws

about

this

from it.'" The adolescent quibbler falls into three vices. As soon as he stumbles on verbal paradox, he congratulates himself as if he'd come upon a treasure-house of wisdom and exults and throws his arms around with delight and promptly assays every paradoxical argument, now twisting the many round and round into the one, now unfolding and untwisting the one into the many. This gives rise at once to pride and impudence. Moreover, he injects the doubts caused by questions both into himself and into others, doubts about civil customs as well as religious institutions; and this gives rise to both lewdness and
impiety.

And

his conversation
is

is

universally disagreeable to

everybody. While he

engaged in refutation he spares no one: no one younger (here clemency and humanity perish) nor a peer (here friendliness dies) and no one older (here charity and reverence is wanting). To give even more vehement scope to his insance impudence, he'd start to quarrel with beasts and barbarians, Socrates says, if they could understand his paradoxical
statements.

Since Socrates had said these derogatory things about adolescence in the middle of a circle of adolescents, Protarchus, to

16A

urge him to instruct the young men more openly, says jokingly to him: "Socrates, aren't you scared that all of us, being young

you along with this impudent fellow, Philebus, if you provoke and irritate us with such threats and disparage adolescence so much and don't, moreover, instruct us in the proper discipline? But continue, Socrates, please, for we understand what you're talking about." Protarchus still thought there was another and better way to the truth over and above the art of dividing and uniting through the one and the many, and that here Socrates was condemning the latter art. So he meant to imply, **We reahse you've condemned this art. So go on. If there's some way to clear up the muddle and confusion in arguing and you can find a better road to reason, look around, please, and we'll follow it as best we can. For this isn't
ourselves, will attack

Cap.

XXV

235

Legibus Plato conqueritur, atque infamiam' adversus legitimos philosophos Socratem praesertim hinc exortam in Apologia testatur. Tria haec incurrit vitia adolescentulus cavillator. Qui ut primum captiunculas attigit admodum congratulatur, tam-

quam thesaurum
et

sapientiae nactus, laetitiaque exultat ac gestit

argumentatiunculas omnes prompte pertentat, turn gyro multa retorquens in unum, turn unum in multitudinem explicans
et

evolvens, ubi superbia et [365v\ procacitas statim exori-

tur. Inicit sibi praeterea et aliis

dubitationum scrupulos, tarn

religionis institutiones, ubi et

contra civiles mores,

quam contra

Et universaliter molesta ad omnes eius redditur conversatio; dum refellit quemque parcit nemini, neque iuniori, ubi dementia et humanitas perit, neque aequali,
lascivia et impietas emergit.

ubi amicitia moritur, neque maiori, ubi caritas et reverentia

deficit.

Utque

eius

tius

etiam

cum barbaris

insanam procacitatem exprimeret vehemenet bestiis litigaturus est, inquit, si ab eis

percipi eius argumentatiunculae possint.

haec Socrates in adolescentum illorum corona contra eum ad planiorem instructionem iuvenum incitaret, in Socratem ita iocatus^
adolescentiam ipsam dixisset, Protarchus, ut
inquit:

Cum

An non

metuis, Socrates, ne

omnes cum iuvenes simus'

una cum protervo hoc Philebo in te irruamus, si hisce nos lacessitos convitiis irritaveris tantum vituperaverisque adolescentiam, nee nos praeterea decenti instruxeris disciplina? Sed age amabo Socrates. Intelligimus enim quod ais. Credebat enim
Protarchus potiorem esse aliquam ad veritatem viam, praeter artem illam dividendi et uniendi per unum* ac multa, et hanc artem hie' damnasse Socratem. Ideo inferre voluit: Intelligimus
ergo, siquis modus est ad hanc turbationem confusionemque auferendam,' et semitam ad rationem rectiorem^ reperire licet, tu quaeso, circumspice, pro viribus ipsi sequemur. Neque enim exiguus hie est

quod artem hanc damnas. Age

disputandi

'infamia
'hinc IV

'est

add. fV

'sumus Jf
'rectorem

'auferandam P

*ct

uniendi per

unum repeorerf^P

236
trivial discussion,

Chapter 25

16B

about someabout the highest good and the way that leads to the truth." He added this because he'd said, "We'll follow as best we can," and also to provoke Socrates to continue. However, Socrates agreed they aren't dealing with a trivial problem. He called them boys (when he'd previously called them youths), because he was continually blaming them for their ignorance for not noticing he'd been censuring the abuse of dialectic not dialectic itself. But Socrates said they were accustomed to being called boys by Philebus, in
a.

and the present argument

isn't

thing frivolous;

it's

important rather, that

is, it's

order to sting Philebus' pride (because Philebus calls young

boys).

men

What's more, Socrates denied there was another better way or that there could be another; and he said he himself had always loved dialectic. It was as if he had had to be by nature a philosopher, but the way had often deserted him when he was younger which is to say, a person shouldn't start on it in adolescence. Here he confirms that the fault underlying the confusion mentioned above lies in the abuse of dialectic rather than in

proceed successfully with he will come momentarily to a second caution which must be observed in the art. But first he easily shows to stop them losing confidence in his words how the dialectical way is made more pleasant because of the subsequent cautions. Yet, to prevent them trusting too much in their own strength, he says
dialectic itself. Therefore, for us to
dialectic,

16C

be difficult to begin with. To however, he says all the inventions of art have shone forth because of it, for every art consists in the discovery of truth. But, as we demonstrated above, the
the

employment of

dialectic will

make them more

attentive,

ability to

do

dialectic

is

the best

way to the truth.

you need for any major
ability

In the Phaedrus Plato says

loftiness
is

of mind and the

skill

to

make

things work.'^'

given by the power to resolve, the second by the

The first power to

The two together are dialectic. In the Parmenides he nobody will be wise without dialectic.'" In the Phaedrus Socrates says that if he could find a man who knew how to proceed by uniting and dividing through the one and the many he would worship him as if he were divine. '"
divide.

says

Cap.

XXV

231

sermo. Hoc est non levi quadam de re, sed magna oratio praesens habetur, id est, de summo bono et de via ad veritatem ducente. Hoc adiecit, quia [366r] dixerat, sequemur pro viribus, atque etiam ut Socratem ad sequentia provocaret.
Consensit' autem Socrates

non

esse

rem levem qua de

agitur,

atque eos vocavit pueros cum continue magis eorum arguebat ruditatem,
advertissent**

antea iuvenes appellasset, *quia

cum nequaquam quod abusum increpaverat non artem. Dixit

appellari solitos, ut eius morderet

autem eos a Philebo pueros

fastum, quia^ adolescentes' vocat pueros. Negavitque aliam esse

meliorem viam, aut esse posse et eam se semper amasse, quasi natura philosophum esse oporteat, sed eam deseruisse eum saepe iuniorem, quasi non sit in adolescentia adeunda. Ubi confirmat vitium" perturbationis' illius in abusu esse potius quam in arte. Et ideo ut per eam proficiamus, paulo post* ad secundam cautionem quae observanda est ea in arte descendet; ante vero, ne illi diffiderent verbis, facile ostendit^ quo pacto

commodior per cautiones, scilicet subsequentes. Ne tamen opibus' nimis confiderent, usum eius praedicit fore difficilem. Ut autem attentiores redderet, omnia artium inventa per eam eluxisse dicit, nam quaelibet ars in veritatis inventione consistit. Ea vero facultas potissima est ad
via
ilia

reddatur

veritatem via, ut supra monstravimus.

tin Phaedro dicit in qualibet facultate

sublimitate mentis et efficacia ad operandum.

vim resolutivam; secundum per divisivam. In Parmenide dicitur nullum sine dialectica fore sapientem. Socrates in Phaedro dicit, si reperiat hominem scientem per unum et multa uniendo et dividendo procedere, se ilium quasi divinum adoraturum.ft

magna opus esse et Primum dari per Totum est dialectica.

'Assensit
'se

add.

WXP

'qui 'ostendi posse

WXP

'adaltisfrontes yv

'vitam fV

WXP

'operibus

WXP

-om.

'turbationis

WXP

t'ttom.

238

Chapter 26

Chapter 26. How God illuminates our intelligences and how Prometheus brought us the divine light from heaven, which consists in the art of dividing, uniting and demonstrating.
In the Republic Book 6 Plato argues that as in the corporeal world the most outstanding thing, that is, the sun, produces colours in matter and sight in the eyes with the same light (and when this is taken away the colours won't be seen and the sight won't see anything), so in the higher world the first thing, that is, the good itself and the one principle of things, creates with its light all the species of things and all intelligences

and illuminates the

radiance.'"

same The splendour, in fact, gives grace to all things and displays truth and knowledge to the intelligences when it
intelligences

and the

species with the

joins the enlightened intelligences with the illuminated things.

Therefore,

it

is

also agreed

among

Platonists that the light,

which the intelligences have in order to understand everything, is the same thing as God Himself by whom all things were made. Dionysius the Areopagite agrees. In the book On the Celestial Hierarchy he writes: Just as the ray of the sun descends through the heavens, through the sphere of fire and the sphere of air into the eyes, so God's light passes through the highest and intermediate and lowest ranks of the angelic army into the
soul.'^'

For just as the sun illuminates any star directly and also one through another indirectly, so God illuminates any intelligence directly and also one through another indirectly. Certainly you can learn from Plato's Timaeus that the divine intelligence itself, which the Hebrews call the Seraphim, has some three offices. For first, it lifts its head towards the good from which it emanates. (In the Phaedrus the charioteer of the soul is described by Plato as doing the same.'") Next, it keeps its breast to itself in the process of contemplating the beauty of itself. In the Timaeus Plato refers to this as "remaining in its own seat and sight." Finally, in providing and creating it extends its thigh towards the lower things. On this account Plato calls it "father" and "creator."'"

Cap.

XXVI

239

Quomodo Deus mentes illuminet et quomodo Prometheus divinum lumen coelitus in nos traiecity in quo consistit ars dividendi, uniendi, demonstrandi. Cap. XXVI.^
Plato in sexto de Republica disputat, quemadmodum quod in corporeo praestantissimum est, id est, sol, colores eodem lumine producit in materia et in oculis visum, quo sub-

mundo

tracto nee videbuntur colores, nee visus videbit quicquam, ita

in mundo superno primum, hoc est, ipsum bonum et unum rerum principium species rerum mentesque omnes suo

quod

procreat lumine,

eodemque
et^

fulgore et mentes illustrat et species.

praestat, et veritatem
illustratas' mentes hoc apud Platonicos

Qui sane splendor gratiam rebus omnibus

mentibus exhibet
scientiam, [366v]

dum
et

cum

rebus illuminatis coniungit.

Unde

ratum est lumen esse mentium ad intelligenda omnia *eundem Quod secutus Dionyipsum Deum, a quo facta sunt omnia. sius Areopagita in libro de Angelica Hierarchia scribit: Quemadmodum solis radius per coelos, ignem et aerem descendit in oculos, ita Dei lux per supremum, medium et postremum angelorum exercitum in animam penetrat. tSicut enim* sol illuminat quamlibet stellam sine medio et rursus aliam per aliam, sic Deus quamlibet mentem tum absque
medio' tum aHam per aliam. ft Profecto ex Timaeo Platonis coUigitur mentem ipsam divinam, quam Seraphin Hebraei nuncupant, tria quaedam habere officia: nam et ad' ipsum bonum a quo manat caput attollit, quod de auriga animi in Phaedro scribitur a Platone; et pectus secum ipsa retinet, dum sui ipsius pulchritudinem contemplatur, quod in circumspectu suo ac sede manere in Timaeo nuncupat; et ad inferiora femur providendo porrigit et creando, ex

quo patrem nominat

et

opificem.

break, but no ch. heading 'illustratasom. H'A'P

'a

W; in X and P the ch.

is

^aamom.XP

'/or

'adorn. f; in

AP

-om.

^-^^om.

'et om. WXP numbered twelve absque medio A' a/id Prearf immediate

240

Chapter 26

Therefore Dionysius in his book, On the Divine Names, says an angel has three movements: circular, straight, spiral.*" Now it is moved in a circle because, starting out from God, its operation turns (together with its being) back to God through understanding. It is moved in a straight line because it offers its power to subsequent things. But it is moved spirally in so far as it pays attention to itself. This act comes back to where it started from, so it is said to participate in the circle; yet it isn't a perfect circle because it isn't brought back to its very first point of departure, namely God. You find the same in the soul. So the ray of the good itself, although one in itself, becomes triple as well in the triple intelligence. When it strives towards the good, which some call the Sky, it is Saturn. When it turns back into itself, it is Jupiter. When it turns towards lower things, it is Prometheus, that is, providence. And when it descends, the same ray produces in matter every species of forms. It pours into the soul a similar number of rational principles. These are for judging the things which are produced and for fabricating the products of human skill. The soul in turn, since it is midway between the spirits and bodies, is accordingly endowed with a triple power. One power is that by which it is joined to higher things. Another is that by which it is extended to lower things. The middle power is that by which it retains its middle position and its proper energy. In the soul's highest part the ray received from the divine intelligence is called the light of the human intelligence, and it raises the soul upwards to the contemplation of higher things. The ray situated in the middle of the soul is the ability of the reason to make judgements; it teaches the civic disciplines. The ray residing in the soul's lowest part is the force of the phantasy; it suppHes the skills necessary for human livelihood and for adorning matter
with the [various] crafts.
In the Protagoras Plato embodies all this in a more extended Prometheus parable.'" He says Epimetheus, by whom he signifies nature, had armed the animals' bodies, but wasn't able to give men the skill to create things. The latter was bestowed by Prometheus, that is, by the ingenious providence of the divine

Cap.

XXVI

241

'Ideo Dionysius in libro de divinis nominibus dicit tres esse in

angelo motus, circularem, rectum, obliquum. Moveri autem circulo, quia una cum eius esse et operatic eius a Deo^ incipiens in eum redit intelligendo. Moveri recte, quia vim suam porrigit ad sequentia. Oblique autem prout se ipsum' animadvertit. Redit

enim hie actus illuc unde venit, ideo circuli dicitur particeps; non tamen perfectus est circulus, quia ad primum sui exordium, Deum scilicet, non reflectitur. Idem in anima reperitur. Ergo ipsius boni radius quamquam in se unus hac tamen in mente triplice resultat et triplex: dum ad bonum quod coelium*
aliqui' dicunt nititur, Saturnus;

dum

in se reflectitur, Jupiter;

dum

ad inferiora, Prometheus, hoc est,^ providentia. Idemque radius quot descendens in materia gignit formarum species, totidem et in animam fundit rationes ad ea quae producuntur diiudicanda atque ad artium opera fabricanda. Anima rursus quia media est inter numina corporaque, ideo
vertit*

triplicem est sortita potentiam:

unam qua ad
vim propriam

inferiora porrigitur,
retinet. In

unam qua supernis coniungitur, mediam qua mediam suique

suprema animi parte radius divinae mentis acceptus mentis humanae lumen dicitur, {367r\ et animam ad supernorum contemplationem erigit; in media fixus rationis indicium est ad civilem instruens disciplinam; in postrema* residens phantasiae industria est ad artes victui suppeditantes humano et materiam artificiis' exornandam. Haec omnia in Protagora prolixiori quadam'" Promethei parabola Plato significat, dum" Epimetheum, quo natura significatur, dicit animalium armavisse'^ corpora, industriam vero artium dare hominibus minime potuisse, sed eam a Prometheo fuisse traditam, hoc est, ab artificiosa mentis divinae

'this paragraph in

margin

'adeo

WY
'est

'em.,

aliqui

om.

WXP

'vergit

WXP

'artificii ff.artificisA'

"modi add.

om. "de Jf

'coelum ipsam WXYP 'postremam "armasse A'P

WXP

242
intelligence, the artificer

Chapter 26

of the world. He adds that Prometheus from the workshop of Minerva and Vulcan. The lowest part of the intelligence, which is called Prometheus, takes light and power from the middle part. The middle part looks three ways: towards its higher part from which

had taken the

skill

it

depends, towards

itself as

it

is

in itself,

towards the procalled Jupiter:

duction of the lower part. The

Jupiter the greatest

first

two are

and Jupiter the amicable and hospitable [one] and the preserver. The third is called Pallas and Vulcan. It is Pallas in so far as it gives the knowledge to create things to the lower part; it is Vulcan in so far as it gives the desire to create. So Pallas is born from Jove's head, because she gives to the lower part from the prime power. But Vulcan is called "lame," because there is something wrong in what is the
best,

and

product of desire.
Nevertheless, he says, the civic disciplines have not

come

down

to

men from Prometheus,

but from Jove via Mercury.

For the institution of the civil law has been shown to us to be derived from nowhere else but the disposition of the divine law, which the divine intelligence can see in itself when it reflects on itself. Now at that time it is called Jupiter. But it sent men the institution of the law via Mercury, that is, via the intermediate ray which Plato calls Mercury, since Mercury explains the mysteries of the divine law to human reason so that the civil law can be modelled on it. But in the Statesman Plato writes that the contemplation of divine things is bestowed by Saturn,''" since the ray of his intelligence, as it is raised to God, so in descending to us raises our intelligence too towards the divine countenance. In the Laws Book 4 Plato says Saturn is the true master of those who have
intelligence."'

Moreover, in the same book Plato divides the capability of

the

human

intelligence into three parts; for, either

it

inclines to

contemplation alone, or to action alone, or to something in between. In the first case there is wisdom, in the middle case
sovereignty, in the third
like

what ministers to sovereignty, things

the artificer's
skill.

geometry,

architecture,

All

these

Cap.
providentia,

XXVI

243

artifice. Ubi addit Prometheum earnMinervae et Vulcani. Accipit^ enim haec postrema mentis pars quae Prometheus dicitur lumen et vim a media quae tres^ habet respectus: unum ad superiorem sui partem unde est; alium ad se ipsam ut in se est; alium* ad producendam partem inferiorem. Illi duo Jupiter*

mundi huius

accepisse' ex officina

dicuntur: Jupiter*

maximus optimus,

et Jupiter^ amicabilis et

hospitalis' et servator. Tertius dicitur Pallas et Vulcanus. Pallas

quantum' inducit in' partem inferiorem cognitionem procreandorum; Vulcanus prout inducit illi affectum ad procreandum. Ideo Pallas nascitur ex capite Jovis, quia ex prima vi ad inferiorem partem. Vulcanus autem" dicitur claudicare, quia'^ in
effectu qui ex affectu est, defectus existit.''

Disciplinam tamen civilem non a Prometheo, sed ab Jove per Mercurium ad homines descendisse. Nam legum civilium institutio nobis non aliunde monstrata est quam a dispositione divinarum legum, quam in se ipsa mens intueatur'" divina dum in se ipsa reflectitur. Tunc vero Jupiter nominatur. Misit autem eam ad homines per Mercurium, per radium scilicet medium, quem appellat Mercurium, {367v\ quoniam mysteria divinarum legum rationi interpretatur humanae ad civilium legum
descriptionem.

Divinorum vero contemplationem a Saturno datam

Politico scribit Plato, quia eius mentis prout in

in

Deum

erigitur

mentem quoque nostram in divinum intuitum. Et" quarto Legum dicit Saturnum esse verum dominum'* eorum qui mentem habent. Porro in eodem libro Plato mentis humanae solertiam in tria dividit membra, quia vel ad contemplationem vergit tantum, vel
radius in nos descendens
attollit

ad actionem dumtaxat, medio'' imperium; in

vel

ad medium. In primo sapientia

ministerium,
veluti

est;

tertio

geometria,

architectura, fabrilis opera.

Omnis haec

industria nobis a divina

mente

est tradita:

prima ab eius

capite, scilicet Saturno;

secunda

'

WXP read Ubi addit quod Prometheus earn accepit

''supra

'accepit

XP
defectus

Hertius

W
"ad

*VaXmmWXP "aaitmom.WXP
"iaadd.W

'hospitabilis

AP

'inquantum JTAT
est, est

"qua IK

">f;(rPreK/ affectu

'*vD.X\itVai

WXP

divinum'

"in secundo

JfAP

244
abilities are
first

Chapter 26

handed down to us by the divine inteUigence. The comes from the head, that is, from Saturn. The second comes from the breast, that is, from Jove. The third comes from the thigh, that is, from Prometheus. So the one ray of the highest good (which has become triple in the triple divine intelligence and been triplicated in the triple soul similarly) is
said to have revealed three abilities to us: philosophy to the
intelligence,

the prudence which can govern things to the

skill

reason, the

to

As Plato
here too,

says in the Timaeus

all

employ the rest of the and in detail

arts to the phantasy. in the

the things that

men

Statesman and know are therefore God's

inventions and God's gifts.'"

However, here Plato said each such gift has been obtained from the gods through Prometheus. For these secrets are derived for us from the Sky out of the higher powers of the divine intelligence, that is, out of Saturn and Jove, through the
is, Prometheus. As the distributor Prometheus gives us an ingenious quickness of mind. But as the intermediary and the preparer, he turns our intelligence and reason towards wisdom, and towards civic skills too, especially since the intelligence and the reason are stimulated and prepared in us for more important things by the agency of the primary human skills. Because of this, Plato mentions Prometheus most, though the gifts of all the sciences derive from every single divine spirit. We can also refer to Epimetheus as the moon cherishing the

lower part closest to us, that

himself,

body, that

is,

ensuring the safety of the species through Venus,

refer to

and the individual through Jove. But we can

ensuring through himself
its its

Promeis,

theus as the sun cherishing the rational spirit especially: that

power to

perceive, through

Mars

power to divide, through Saturn its power to resolve, through Mercury its power to define, through himself again its power to demonstrate. And since the powers to perceive and to divide are the first parts of the gift, and since perception comes through light and division through heat, Prometheus is said to give these two with the brightest fire, that is, under the prime influence of the Sun and Mars.

Cap.
a pectore, id

XXVI
est,

245

est,'

Jove; tertia a femore, id

Prometheo:
nobis explirationi

Unus

itaque

summi boni

radius in mente divina triplice triplex

triplice triplicatus, tres

effectus,^ et in

anima itidem

cavisse dicitur facultates^: menti

quidem philosophiam;

gubernandi prudentiam; phantasiae artium ceterarum industriam. Quare omnes hominum disciplinae Dei inventa sunt

Deique munera, ut in Timaeo

Dixit

et Politico latius et hie asseritur.

autem hie Plato omne donum huiusmodi ex diis esse per Prometheum deHbatum. Nam a coeho ex superioribus divinae
mentis potentiis, Saturno
scilicet

ac Jove, per inferiorem nobis

proximam,

id

est,

Prometheum,
iste,

nobis

arcana

haec

hauriuntur. Prometheus autem

ut ipse est largitor, artificio-

sam praebet solertiam, ut autem medius est et praeparator, mentem nostram et rationem ad sapientiam convertit civilemque peritiam, praesertim cum ab artium primarum industria mens {368f\ et ratio ad maiora excitetur in nobis atque paretur. Quapropter licet dona scientiarum omnium ab unoquoque divino numine sint, Promethei potissimum Plato mentionem
facit.

Epimetheum dicere lunam faventem Venerem ad salutem speciei, per Jovem ad salutem individui. Prometheum vero solem faventem spiritui praesertim rationali, per se quidem ad percipiendum, per Martem" vero ad dividendum, per Saturnum ad resolvendum, per Mercurium ad definiendum, per se rursus ad demonstrandum, et quia percipiendi et dividendi vires partes sunt muneris
*Possumus
etiam
corpori, videlicet per

huius primae, et perceptio

dicitur dare haec

fit

per lumen, divisio per calorem,

cum

lucidissimo igne sub prima scilicet virtute

soHset Martis.**

'id est om. WXP 'affectus 'mortem Y *-**om. W(conl.)

'

WXP read tres nobis explicuit faculutes

246
In the

Chapter 26
first

use of the names, the Sky means God, Saturn

means the intelHgence, Jupiter means the soul. But in the second use, the Sky means God's creativeness, Saturn means God's understanding, Jupiter means God's will. In the third use, in any spirit, the Sky means looking upwards to higher things (so in the Cratylus it is referred to as "Uranos," the upward-looking), Saturn means pure self-regarding (so in the same dialogue he is called "Cronos," the pure and inviolable inteUigence), Jupiter means the glances downwards providing for inferior things (so in the Cratylus he is called "Zeus," that is, the vital, and "Dia," that is, he through whom others live'"). In any spirit, Prometheus and Epimetheus mean Jove's providence: it is Prometheus
in so far as
it

pertains to rational things, Epimetheus to irra-

tional things. Again, in the case of the

demons, those who promote the functions of the reason are under Prometheus; those who promote natural functions are under Epimetheus. The firmament shows the image of the invisible heaven: the first
planet
there
is

Saturn's, the second planet Jove's. Again, in the sun

is

beauty, light, heat.

^^*

Read

all

about

this in the introduc-

tion to the Cratylus.

16C

Plato adds that these gifts were handed

down

with the bright-

est fire, for individual things have been revealed by the ray of the divine truth. The ray of a fire has two powers: one burns,

the other illuminates. So

it is

with the sun's ray too, so too with

God's ray: it purges intelligences and souls with heat, separating them from lower things; it illuminates them with light. With the fervour of heat it inflames and excites the appetite of everything towards itself. With the splendour of light it reveals to all those

who

desire

it

the clarity of truth. Therefore the ancient theolo-

gians,

Zoroaster,

Hermes Trismegistus,

Orpheus,

Aglao-

phemus, Pythagoras, since they brought themselves as near as possible to God's ray by releasing their souls, and since they
examined by the light of that ray all things by uniting and dividing through the one and the many, they too were made to participate in the truth. In fact, everyone must heed this caution who wants to reach the truth, that is, they must prepare themselves especially by purity of soul for the flowing in of the divine

Cap.

XXVI
coelius'
significat

247
Deum',

Prima nominum

positione

Saturnus mentem, Jupiter animam; secunda vero coelius^ Dei foecunditatem, Saturnus Dei intelligentiam, Jupiter Dei voluntatem; tertia coelius' in quolibet numine aspectum ad superiora,

unde Uranos in Cratylo suspiciens dicitur, Saturnus respectum ad se purum, unde Cronos ibidem pura inviolabilisque mens dicitur, Jupiter prospectus ad inferiora providendo, ideo ibidem
dicitur Zeus, id est, vitalis et Dia, id est, per

quem

alia vivunt.

Prometheus Epimetheusque

in

quolibet

numine

significant

providentiam Jovialem. Sed Prometheus quatenus ad rationalia, Epimetheus quatenus ad irrationalia pertinet. Item in daemonibus Promethei sunt qui rationali favent officio, Epimethei qui naturali. Imaginem invisibilis coeli refert firmamentum; Saturni planeta primus; Jovis planeta secundus. Item in
forma, lux, calor. De his lege in argumento Cratyli.** Addit^ Plato' dona haec simul cum lucidissimo igni^ fuisse tradita. Nam divinae veritatis radio sunt singula revelata. Ignis
sole

radius duas habet vires:

radius.
Ita

una

urit, illuminat altera. Ita et solis

quoque

et

Dei radius: calore purgat mentes

luce
incitat
illustrat.

et

animas, ab inferioribusque secernit;

fervore in se

Caloris

omnium inflammat
omnibus

et

appetitum; lucis

fulgore appetentibus
et prisci theologi,

veritatis exhibet claritatem.

Unde

Zoroaster, Mercurius, Orpheus, Aglaophese solutione

et

animae ad Dei radium quam unum et multa uniendo dividendo omnia perscrutati sunt,^ veritatis compotes effecti* et sunt. Quae quidem cautio adhibenda est omnibus qui veritatem assequi cupiunt, ut imprimis puritate animi sese comparent' ad
mus, Pythagoras, quia proximos reddiderunt,
eo lumine per

'''coelusJfP
'affecti

JF

*-<witadd.W 'comparem [?] y

'Plato om. f (cont.)***om.

MgneAi

^saatom.P

248

Chapter 27

splendour. When it is this that is leading them along the correct path and by sure traces, they will discover the truth of things, and distinguish things' individual hiding places when, that is,

they proceed by dividing and uniting through the one and the

many, not with the opinions of the senses but with the scrutiny of the intelligence and the reason. For the senses will never
reduce the

many

single things to the universal one, since the

universal species are

unknown

to them;

and they

will

never

understand the one is present in the many without being dispersed. For the senses always see bodies, and no whole body can be present in many separate things at the same time, but it has to be divided. Now all this has made the second caution much more obvious, which, Plato says, must be observed in the employment of dialectic. But he hurries to the third caution straight away.

Chapter 27. Except for the first one everything is composed from the one and the many. Also, the species are finite.
16C-D

Plato refers here to three arguments that were handed

down

by the ancient theologians.

sal principle itself

First,
is

everything that the one univer-

has

made

composed from the one and the

many. Second,

in the universal order the species are finite, the

you mustn't pass from one extreme to another without mediation. The first has been more
individual things infinite. Third,

than sufficiently demonstrated above, but it can be put briefly in this way. The universal principle has total power devoid of weakness. Power consists in unity, weakness in diffusion. So the one is simple, devoid of all multiplicity. What follows the one would be equally powerful if it were equally one. Therefore, it could make itself and the things dependent on it;
consequently,
can. But
it
it

could

make just

as

many

things as the

first

one

it So it isn't equally one. But what is less one is less one because it is made impure by the admixture of multipHcity, just as something is less hot because of the admixture of coldness. So in all

can't

do

this.

isn't

equally as powerful. So

Cap.
divini splendoris influxum.
vestigiis

XXVII

249

Quo

ducente recto calle certisqu'e

veritatem rerum investigabunt singularesque' latebras

rerum

discutient,

dum

videlicet

non sensuum opinionibus, sed

examine per unum ac multa dividendo et uniendo precedent. Sensus enim^ singula multa in universale
rationis ac mentis

unum

reducent

incognitae, et

numquam, cum universales illis species sint unum multis inesse numquam sine sui dispersione

comprehendent, semper enim corpora intuiti sunt, quorum nullum simul in multis divisis totum inesse potest, sed dividatur oportet. In quo iam secunda cautio patefacta est, quam observandam in hac dialectica facultate [368v] Plato iubet. Statim vero ad tertiam properat.

Omnia praeter primum ex uno

tur.

et

multitudine componun-

Item species sunt finitae. Cap. XXVII.

Tria hie Plato refert ab antiquis theologis tradita:

primum

uno rerum principio sunt producta; secundum quod in rerum ordine species finitae sunt, singula infinita; tertium quod ab extreme ad extremum sine medio non est eundum. Primum illud supra superque est ostensum, sic autem breviter patet. satis Principium omnium omnem habet vim debilitatis expertem. In unitate vis consistit, in dispersione debilitas. Quare unum simplex* est, multitudinis omnis expers. Quod ipsum sequitur, si aeque unum esset, aeque' esset potens; posset ergo se ipsum facere et sequentia, ut totidem possit quot et primum. Id autem nequit. Non est igitur aeque potens, non igitur aeque unum. Quod autem minus unum per admixtionem* multitudinis inquinatum minus est unum, sicut minus calidum per^ frigoris mixtionem. In omnibus ergo sequentibus cum unitate desuper

quod ex uno

et

multis constant omnia, quae ab ipso

'singulasque

WXP

'quippe

IVXP

'a break,

numbered thirteen
'propter

'simpliciter JfJfP

and but no ch. heading W; in 'adnexionem (f 'aeque om. >f

P the ch.

is

^P

250

Chapter 27

subsequent things the multiplicity of external degeneration contends with the unity infused from above.

16D

We

the dissimilar

can demonstrate the second argument thus. Because of and disparate outcomes and effects of things, we

can conjecture there are dissimilar and disparate species, and the universal series is distinguished by higher and lower degrees. It is obvious in the case of the numbers descending from one. But the progression of the species can't ascend infinitely nor descend infinitely. If the species went on infinitely upwards, there 'd be no first in the series, so there 'd be no middle one either, since the first in a series is the cause of the middle. But when you've removed the principle, you've removed its effects. Again, within the species themselves, some are more one, true, good; others are less so. But whatever is more or less such and such is so called because of its smaller or greater distance or propinquity to that which is primarily and totally such and such. For instance, things are more or less white or hot or bright
because of the
first

thing that

is

bright or hot. Therefore, either

these species are equally distant

totally one, true,

from what

is

primarily and

good, or they aren't equally distant. If they were equally distant, they'd be on a par in goodness, etc. But they aren't on a par. Therefore it must be that some of them are nearer to it, but others are further away. So what is primarily

and

totally one, true,

nite distance,

good isn't separated from them by an infibecause no one species would be closer to it than
is first

one and good and true is the first principle of things, as we've shown elsewhere. Or rather, if there were no first good, there'd be nothing that was totally good. If nothing were totally good, nothing else could be called more or less good. But things are more or less good, so there is a first good. Therefore the species of things don't ascend to infinity; nor do they endlessly descend, since the end has to correspond to the beginning, the descent to the ascent,
another. But what

and

is

totally

the decrease to the increase, the least to the greatest.

Moreover, with these intermediate degrees, the higher is the cause of the lower. But the effect falls short of the cause, because it doesn't have the same power, since the cause produces

Cap.

XXVII

251

infusa externae degenerationis multitude congreditur.

Secundum vero

sic

ostendimus: propter dissimiles et inae-

quales rerum eventus atque effectus, dissimiles et inaequales esse species coniectamus' seriemque rerum superioribus et
inferioribus gradibus esse distinctam,

quod

in

numeris ab uno

descendentibus est perspicuum. Haec vero progressio specierum neque ascendere in infinitum potest, neque in infinitum descendere. Si
et

sursum abeant infmitae nulla

erit

prima, nulla ergo

erit

media, quia primum

alia

est causa medii. Principio vero sublato

sublata sunt opera. Item in speciebus alia est magis una,^ vera,

bona,

minus. Quaecumque vero magis et minus talia sunt, minorem vel maiorem' distantiam {369r] et propinquitatem ad id quod primo et maxime tale est* dicuntur: ut alba, calida, lucida magis et minus propter primum lucidum atque calidum. Aut ergo species istae aeque distant a primo et maxime uno, vero, bono, aut non aeque. Si aeque, pares essent in bonitate et cetera. Sunt tamen impares. Fit itaque ut alia illi sit propropter
pinquior, alia vero remotior.
distat

Non

ergo ab

eis infinito intervallo

maxime unum, verum, bonum, quia nulla alia.' Primum vero et maxime unum et bonum et verum primum rerum principium est, ut ostendimus alias. Immo vero si non esset primum bonum, non esset aliquid maxime' bonum. Si non maxime bonum, nulla dicerentur magis minusve bona. Sunt tamen ista, ergo et primum bonum. Non
quod primo
et
ipsi esset

propinquior

itaque in infinitum species rerum ascendunt, sed neque sine fine descendunt, siquidem finis principio, descensus ascensui, decre-

mentum incremento, minimum maximo respondere debent.

Quin etiam
causa
est.

in his intermediis gradibus superior inferioris

Effectus autem a causa deficit, quia

non par

in eo vis.

'arguimus
'alia

om.

WXP XP

'una repeated

'vd maiorem om.

XP

'esse

^maximum XP

252
both

Chapter 27

and those things under it but the effect doesn't produce So the effect's power won't extend to the same number of things as the cause's power, because it hasn't the same amount of power. But if there were infinities under it, it would extend to the same number of things. Again, movement decreases in the direction of the imperfect. Imperfection becomes defect. Defect eventually results in death. So the power which decreases is defective. But the cause's power decreases by degrees in its effects. Therefore you can deduce that the species of things are defined by a certain number. But the individual things under the species are said to be
it

itself.

because of the fact that the species are eternal, as we proved in the case of the Ideas. Therefore the species are always active, lest they become idle. But each species communicates
infinite,
itself to

many things and when

these perish

new

things succeed

them endlessly, as the Platonists maintain. So the production and diversity of single things goes on to infinity. Therefore, Orpheus, when he was talking about nature, said, dTeXT7c re
"the endless end": "endless," I think, because of the single things; "end," however, because of the definite number of the species. Also, he said about Saturn: "You who destroy all things and revive them again, you who are master of
reXeurr?,'"

the unbreakable chains through the infinite world,

oh Saturn,
saying
first

creator of a universal eternity,

oh Saturn, you who

are possessed
is

of the manifold plan.'"" In these Hues Orpheus

in destroying

that the divine intelligence itself, Saturn, creates all things,

and

them transforms them into new proclaims the infinity of the generation of single things). In order to introduce some limit, he said: "You who possess the
things (here he

unbreakable chains of eternity through the

[Saturn] arrests the infinite

infinite

world." For
eternal

generation by means of the

species and contains them in a certain limit. And the things which have been destroyed he remakes from the same species, with the result that, although individual things in the world are changed, nevertheless, by recreating through similar species and similar things, nothing will ever seem to be wanting. In the Universal Hymn, therefore, Orpheus calls God, 'P^pxhv t' rjde

Cap.

XXVII
ipse vero se
se extendet

253

cum causa producat et ipsum et quae sub ipso, producat. Non ergo vis effectus istius ad paria
vi

non

cum

causae, quia est vis impar. Sin autem infinita sub eo essent,
se extenderet.

ad paria

Item decrementum motus

est

ad imper-

fectum; imperfectio ad defectum; defectus denique ad interi-

tum. Deficit ergo

vis

in effectibus paulatim.

quae minuitur. Minuitur autem vis causae Ex his colligitur rerum species certo esse

numero

definitas.

Singula vero sub speciebus infinita dicuntur, propter ea' quod species, ut de ideis probavimus, aeternae sunt. Semper ergo
agunt, ne sint otiosae. {369v]

Quaeque vero plurimis

se

com-

municat, quibus intereuntibus, nova, ut Platonici volunt, sine

fine succedunt. Quare in infinitum generatio et varietas singulorum progreditur. Idcirco Orpheus, cum de natura loqueretur, ait, are Xt7<: re reXevrv,^ infinitus finis: illud quidem' arbitror propter singula; hoc autem" propter species definitas. Item de Saturno dixit: *Qui destruis omnia iterumque resuscitas,

insolubilia vincula possidens per infinitum

mundum

Saturne

aeternitatis universae genitor, Saturne multiplici consilio prae-

primo dicit quod ipsa divina mens, Saturnus, gignit omnia, et perimendo in nova permutat; ubi infinitatem generationis singulorum indicat. Et ut terminum induceret, ait: Qui habes insolubilia aeternitatis vincula per infinitum mundum. Nam per' aeternas species generationem infinitam certo sistit continetque in termino. Et quae destructa sunt ex eisdem reficit speciebus, ut, licet in mundo mutentur singula, recreando tamen per similes species, et similia nulla* umquam deficere
dite.** In his

videantur. Ideo in universali

Ilepac,
^

hymno Deum vocavit

'Apxvv

t' rjde

id est,* principium et finem.

Nam

idem terminat

certis

'ex

eo

IVXP

'propter Jf

'Greek om. 'uUa IT

'quidem om. WXP 'Greek om.W *\Atslom.

WXP

'autem om.

WXP
**om. WXP;

(k 5a7ram<: iiev
exet<:

dnavra

Kcu,cw^eL(; eixnaXiv ai;rd<: 5ea)uoj<: appriKTCo^ 6c

aicoi>o<;

Kar' aneipova Koop-ov

Kpove irayyeveTCjp, Kpove

nOUiCkopvQe add.XP

254
riepac ;'" that

Chapter 27
the beginning and the end. For He,
all

is,

who

lays

the foundations of
degrees.

things, terminates all things in fixed

16D

There remains the third argument: that we mustn't turn from one extreme to another without going through the intermediate steps. For the right way to approach things is to follow the way things themselves proceed. The obvious order in the case of things is this. Any cause out of its own nature makes things. So the process of making follows the nature. But what's made follows the process of making. So the nearest effect to any cause is the one most like it. But as it's deficient it has something dissimilar. But if this effect also makes something, it makes something similar to
itself,

and
at

that in

its

turn

is

deficient.

Thus

something dissimilar. Therefore, between extremes there is a mean point. Or rather, extremes would never exist unless there were an interval and an assumed distance. In the Timaens, therefore, Plato puts at least two intermediaries between the extremes."* One is more Hke the one extreme, the other is more Hke the other. The result is the first extreme has something like it next to it, and the last extreme is understood by the something similar next to it. Now a mean point is made from extremes. Extremes are opposite each other. If, therefore, there were only one mean point, there would be opposites in one and the same thing; and they would be equally powerful and mutually incompatible. So there are two means. Consequently in one mean the one opposite prevails, in the other the other opposite. And in this way one opposing subject is subordinate to the other and there is concord in the whole. Perhaps you could posit a mean which contained both opposites equally, that is, each in a diminished degree. Because of the modification each would be reduced to a third form which each would obey. But the mean has to be divided so that the extremes don't touch. Therefore there must be a beginning, a middle and an end. I repeat there must be a middle so that the beginning doesn't touch the end. So the one itself, since it only uses one power to do everything, straightway produces an effect which is wholly similar to
gradually
arrive

you

Cap.
in gradibus

XXVII

255

omnia qui inchoat omnia.

extremum
sine mediis

Restat tertium illud, ne ab extremo ad

adventemus. Verus enim ille est investigationis modus qui rerum progressus sequitur. In rebus autem hie ordo conspicitur. Quaelibet causa ex natura sua facit. Sequitur ergo naturam factio.' Effectionem vero factum sequitur. Quare cuilibet causae proximus est effectus persimilis. Dissimile vero quid habet ut^
deficit.

Siquid vero et

iste facit,

simile sibi facit, deficitque

Ex quo gradatim ad dissimile pervenitur. Itaque inter extrema medium est. Immo vero nisi intervallum sit, sublata distantia, extrema non essent. {370r\ Itaque in Timaeo duo saltem media inter extrema ponit, quorum unum uni similius sit, alteri alterum. Ut et primum sibi simile habeat proximum, et postremum a simili proximo comprehendatur.
rursus et illud.

Medium quippe ex extremis constat; ilia opposita sunt. Si ergo unum esset medium, in uno eodemque essent opposita, aeque vehementia,' neque sese compaterentur. Duo itaque sunt, ut in uno unum praevaleat oppositum, in altero alterum. Atque ita unum oppositum alteri subiectum pareat, fitque* in toto Concordia.

Posset forte poni medium aeque utrumque' continens, scilicet sub gradu utrumque remisso, ob quam temperiem ad tertiam redigatur formam, cui utrumque pareat. Oportet vero' medium esse dividuum, ne extrema se contingant. Ergo oportet habere principium, medium, finem. Medium, inquam, ne principium
tangat

fmem.
sibi

Unum ipsum igitur, cum sit ex una' virtute admodum efficax,

mox
effectum

simillimum unitissimumque producit.

Illud,

'effectio^P 'utrumque

'quidP vero om.

'aeque vdiemcntia om.

WXP

'uniu

WXP

^P

'axqat

WXP

256
itself

Chapter 27

and

utterly one.
it is

The

effect,

because
it

it is

from the one,

is

one; because

outside the one,

degenerates from oneness.

Then the opposite of unity enters, that is, multiplicity itself, for it regards both its cause and itself. But this too, since it is wholly united, is endowed with immense power, and therefore with creative oneness. It too produces a one which is wholly similar. This immediately degenerates and regards itself: it regards both its immediate cause and its remote cause. Therefore, after the one, two things appeared. After the two a trinity emerged. The same thing happens with all the rest of the steps [in the hierarchy], until in the process of decreasing you come down to the unlike thing and finally to the lowest thing. From the one you come to

16E

many which is very similar to the one. From many you come to another, and finally from the finite many you come to the infinite many which is unlike the one.
a united and finite
this

Now

things themselves also proceed out of the one into the

intelligence, out

of the intelligence into the soul, out of the soul

this point, therefore, the

into the nature, out of this into quality, out of quality into matter

extended in quantity. At

many

is

called infinite, since the division of quantity proceeds to infinity. Nature's progress stops at this, the sixth Hnk of the

golden chain introduced by Homer. So Orpheus tells us to stop ornamenting the song at the sixth generation: "^Ektt? 6' ev yeveq,...
KaTonavaaTe Koatiou
doiSfic.

'"

Consequently, the universal genera go thus. One genus is disnumber of species. The species descend into infinite individual things. Here the one has again fallen down through the finite many in the middle to an infinite extreme. So the conclusion is you have to pass from one extreme to another through intermediate points. Unless you observe this, you won't understand the extreme which is above, as you won't
tinguished into a finite

know how much of its power it needs to produce the intermediate stages. Nor will you understand the extreme which is below,
as

you won't have the nearest cause, because

it is

an intermedi-

ate stage.

Having described all this, Plato tells us how the ability to do dialectic was handed down. He described the tradition in full in

Cap.

XXVII

257

quia ab uno, unum; quia extra unum,' ab unione degenerat. Ubi unitatis subintrat oppositum, ipsa videlicet multitude, nam et causam respicit et se ipsum. Sed et hoc, cum admodum unisit, ingenti est potentia praeditum; foecunda igitur unione. Et unum gignit admodum simile. Continuo^ degenerat illud seque ipsum respicit, respicit causam proximam, respicit et remotam. Ergo post unum duo eluxerunt, post duo emersit et trinitas. Idem contingit in gradibus ceteris, quousque decrescendo ad dissimile ac tandem ad infimum descendatur. Et ex

tum

multitudinem unitam finitamque tamquam similiorem uni, ex hac in aliam, ac tandem ex finita multitudine in infini-

uno

in

tam uni dissimilem veniatur.' Nam et res ipsae ab uno [370v] in mentem procedunt, a mente in animam, ab anima in naturam, ab hac in qualitatem, a qualitate in materiam quantitate extensam. Ubi multitude ideo
dicitur infmita, quia in infinitum procedit quantitatis partitio.

Atque

in

cessat naturae progressus.

hoc sexto anulo catenae aureae ab Homero inductae Ideo iubet Orpheus* ut in sexta
"Ektt? 6' eu
-yeveq.
. .

generatione ornatum cantilenae finiamus: KaTanavoaTe Koofiou doi5f7<:. *

Proinde' rerum genera

rursus

sic se

habent, ut genus

unum in

species

fmitas distinguatur; species in singula infinita descendant. Ubi

unum
est

per finitam multitudinem

mediam ad extremam

prolapsum. Quare concluditur ab extremo ad media transeundum. Quod nisi quis servaverit, neque extremum quod supra est^ intelliget, cum quanta vis eius sit ad media producenda ignoret; neque extremum quod est

infmitam

extremum

esse per

infra cognoscet,

cum causam

eius

proximam quod medium

est

non

teneat.

His propositis, exsequitur Plato dialecticae facultatis traditionem,

quam in

Sophiste atque Politico abunde descripsit. Hie

'/or extra

unum

'Greek om.

r reads extremum
Et

WXP

'continue' 'estom. Y

'venatur If

*Orpheus om.

258

Chapter 27

the Sophist and the Statesman.^*" Here, however, he says that

you find in the universal order the one and the many and some end and infinity, and since knowledge is about the universince
sal

rational principles of everything (because

single

things

whenever you're trying to understand something, there is the one universal rational principle for a number of things. It is present in things in a way, and it is present more perfectly in the reason, and it is present most outstandingly in the intelligence. So you will find out about it. When you've accepted it, don't stay in the principle itself. For each thing's power can be more accurately assessed when it has been articulated in its effects. So you will go to the things which follow it most closely; and you will go to the genus. For all the universal rational principles must be accepted first, so you can descend from the most simple things to compounds. I repeat, you may divide the genus (if you're able to) through two differences; for the most convenient division is that done through opposites. But division occurs between two things and the first division consists in dividing something into two. For instance, essence becomes one thing in itself, another thing in something else; in the first case it is substance, in the second, accident. Substance becomes corporeal or incorporeal. Or you can divide into three. For instance, the genus of speech divides into judicial, dehberative and demonstrative. Or you can divide into four. For instance, an element can be either fire,
can't be
that,

known) so accept

or air, or water, or earth.

again. For instance,

And

divide every single

member

body becomes animate or inanimate. But bodiless substance is either separated from the body or joined to it. Or again animate body becomes either a tree or an animal. Thus you can keep dividing them until you've uncovered the individual species included in any genus. When you've enumerated them, you can talk about the infinite multitude of individual things

contained

under them.

You

can't

subject

the

multitude to one genus until you've found out how many intermediate species there are. In the case of the genus, knowledge is
confused; in the case of the single things,
case of the species,
it is
it is

uncertain; in the

certain

and

distinct.

So you mustn't

Cap.

XXVII
unum

259
reperitur et multa ef

autem

dicit,

quia in rerum ordine

et

finis aliquis et infinitas,

cognitio de universalibus rerum

rationibus est, quia singula sunt incerta, quotiens scientiam investigas,' unam ipsam universalem plurium accipe rationem.
Inest
inest

enim quoquomodo in rebus, inest et in ratione perfectius, et in mente praestantius. Itaque earn reperies. Cum eam

acceperis, ne in ea steteris,

nam

vis

explicata apertius iudicatur. Ibis ergo ad

tur et genus illud.

cuiusque in sequentibus proxima quae sequun-

Nam

communissimae quaeque rationes

accipiendae prius, ut a^ simplicissimis ad composita descendatur.

inquam, [37Ir] in species dividas, si potes, duas per differentias. Haec enim commodissima partitio est quae fit per opposita. Ea vero inter duo est, et prima divisio in
illud,

Genus

dualitate consistit, ut' essentia per se alia, alia per aliud; illud

substantia,

hoc accidens. Et substantia

alia

corporea,

alia

incorporea. Vel saltem in tria partiaris, ut dicendi genus, aliud iudiciale, aliud deliberativum, aliud demonstrativum. Vel in

quattuor, ut elementum aut ignis, aut aer,* aut aqua, aut terra. Et unumquodque membrum divide rursus, ut corpus aliud ani-

matum, inanime

aliud. Incorporea vero substantia aut a cor-

pore semota, aut coniuncta corpori. Rursusque animatum corpus, aliud arbor, aliud animal. Atque ita' utrinque dispertias, quousque singulas species in quolibet inclusas genere patefacias.

Quibus adnumeratis,* infinitam singulorum sub illis multitudinem arguas contineri, quam uni generi non prius subicias quam quot mediae species sint comprehenderis. In genere quidem cognitio confusa; in singulis autem' est incerta; in speciebus certa habetur atque distincta. Quare neque morandum in

'investigans

'ad >f

'ut

om. If

'autaerom.

'iXAom.XP

'dinumeratis

WXP

'autem om.

WXP

260
linger in the genus, nor yet

Chapter 28

wander on through

single things,

nor

pass over from one extreme to another without going through

the intermediate stages.

Chapter 28. Concerning divinity and the right use of the art of dividing and uniting.
and dealt with the must be observed in approaching it (and in order not to have passed on the precepts in vain), Socrates immediately exhorts his Hsteners to employ the art of dialectic with great circumspection; and he warns them in a way against the rival discipline [opposed to dialectic! Then through examples he makes them tractable and ready to perceive and understand. But most of all he encourages them when he introduces the divine authority. He says the gods bestowed on us the ability to contemplate everything in this way [i.e. with dialectic], when, relying on our own ingenuity, we try to discover something. And they bestowed on us the ability to be taught, that is, the ability to learn things from others through instruction and also the ability to teach others, that is, to teach them what we've found out ourselves and learnt from others. But we explained above that the gods gave us this [ability]: first, since they produced all things so they were one and many and between the one and the infinite many there was an intermediate finite many; and second, since they poured a ray from the same light with which they had thus distinguished things into our intelligence and reason. The ray can have the power to distinguish in the same way as the light. But Socrates warns them straight away against the rival discipline when he points out its accompanying vice. The rival discipline is the one which introduces the one and the many more quickly or more slowly than it ought to. For Socrates says among the wise men who are their contemporaries (that is, among those wandering around without the higher light who are guided by the senses and by human opinion) and however it occurs, that is, wherever
he's established the art of debating

Now

three cautions which

16E

Cap.
genere, neque est'
illo

XXVIII

261

tamen per singula pervagandum, neque extremo ad hoc sine mediis transeundum.

aib

De divinitate XXVIIL'

et recto

usu

artis

dividendi et uniendi. Cap.

Socrates, posita

iam disserendi

arte et tribus cautionibus

declaratis quibus tractanda sit, statim, ne frustra haec praecepta tradita sint, ad banc artem tali observatione capessendam audi-

tores hortatur, dehortaturque ab aliena

lina.

quodammodo

discip-

Deinde vero per exempla dociles reddit ad percipiendum et exsequendum faciles. Hortatur autem eos magnopere cum ad divinam inducit auctoritatem, dicens deos tribuisse nobis, ut hunc in modum consideraremus quaeque, dum proprio freti
ingenio invenire

quicquam nitimur. Atque etiam

[371 v] ut dis-

ab aliis per disciplinam perciperemus, rursusque ut doceremus alios, scilicet, quae per nos invenimus et quae ab aliis quibusdam didicimus. Quod autem dii nobis hoc dederint in superioribus est expositum, cum ea conditione res* omnes produxerint, ut unum essent et multa, et inter unum multitudinemque infinitam media esset
ceremus,^ id
est,

multitudo
verant,
tionis

finita; cumque ipsi ex eadem luce, qua res ita discreradium nostrae menti rationique infuderint,' qui discreeiusdem vim habeat. Statim vero dehortatur eos ab aliena

dum monstrat quid eam sequatur vitii. Ea vero est quae unum et multa celerius vel tardius quam deceat infert.
disciplina,

Dicit
est,

enim quod eorum temporum sapientes

inter

homines, id

qui sensibus opinioneque

humana
est,

sine lumine superiori

vagantur utcumque contingit, id

quo

sors eos trahit,

nam

'est

om.

P
Y

'a break,

but no ch. heading W; in

'diceremus

'rationes

'infudenint

Xand P the ch. Y

is

numberedfourteen

262
fate drags

Chapter 28

them

(for the senses

and opinion are moved by

exter-

nal force), there are

16E-

some who introduce the one and the many more quickly than it is proper for them to do. For example,

^^^

there are the followers of Democritus,

intervals

who

posited infinite

17

one void. There is also Anaxagoras, who posited infinities straight after the one intelligence; for after it nothing was one, but anything was infinite (for indeed everything was mixed with everything). But others are too slow in searching out the one. For instance Protagoras, Pyrrho and Herillus consider nothing is more one thing in itself than another, but there are innumerable aspects to things according to each man's judgement. So they never come upon the one, but claim eventually that the one exists simply as a term we use in everyday conversation. Around the time of Socrates there were certainly many adherents to both parties. Though some of them introduced the one too quickly, others too slowly, nevertheless, as a result of an error they all had in common, they brought in infinities right after the one the one either as a thing or just as a term. They didn't enumerate the definite intermediate stages between the one and infinities. It is through these intermediate stages you can show who is arguing dialectically, and who is arguing out of sheer obstinacy. For the person who comprehends the species midway between the genera and single things can give a firm and definite reason for everything. He can give a distinct reason for the genus in the species. He can give a firm reason for the single things in the species. He can give an appropriate reason in turn for [one] species in [other] species. But the person who doesn't have any intermediate stages, or just a few, can't assign an appropriate or true reason, since he doesn't know the one genus distinctly nor the single things in any firm way. And so he retreats into verbal quibbles and overcomes his opponents with tricks, and deceives them with verbal ambiguity, and beats them by threatening and brawling rather than convincing them by reason. But this is the vice which accompanies the rival discipline. But next, after encouraging and warning his listeners, Socrates makes them eager and ready to learn. So he opens up the
straight after the

and numberless atoms

Cap.

XXVIII

263

sensus et opinio externo' iactu moventur, partim celerius quain

decet

unum multaque

ponunt: ceu Democritii, qui post

unum

vacuum mox
runt; et

infinita intervalla et innumerabiles

atomos posue-

Anaxagoras, post mentem

unam

infinita statim, nihil

omnia namenim esse unum que omnibus esse commixta. Partim vero tardius unum quaerunt: ut Protagoras, Pyrrho atque Herillus, qui nihil magis in se tale esse quam tale sed innumeras esse rerum facies pro
post illam sed quodlibet infinitum,

cuiusque iudicio volunt.

sed

Unum

ergo

tandem unum nomen propter

numquam inveniunt, communem loquendi usum

isti

esse dicunt. Multi certe et illorum et istorum sectatores circa

Socratis erant tempora. Qui, quamvis^ partim celerius, partim

unum ponerent, tamen' communi errore post unum, sive rem unam sive nomen unum, infinita protinus inferebant; neque certa media inter unum et infinita dinumerabant. [372r]
tardius

Quibus mediis demonstratur qui dialectice et qui contentiose loquantur. Nam qui medias comprehendit species inter genera atque singula firmam ac certam potest de omnibus reddere rationem: de genere distinctam in specie; de singulis firmam in specie; de specie propriam rursus in speciebus. Qui vero vel species nuUas habet medias, vel paucas, cum neque genus unum clare cognoscat neque stabiliter singula, propriam ac veram assignare rationem non valet. Ideoque ad verborum captiunculas confugit, versutiis disputantes subducit, fallit

ambiguitate

verborum, convitiis iurgiisque superat potius quam ratione convincat. Atque hoc est vitium quod alienam illam sequitur disciplinam.

Sequitur autem,* ut post exhortationem dehortationemque

faciles auditores docilesque reddat.

Quare exemplis rem

omnem

'extrinseco W'A'P

'

Ucet

JfAP

'mUMiaWXP

'aMtmom.WXP

264

Chapter 28

whole problem by using examples. All of men's urge to do things either stops in the cunning of the intelligence, or it
is

articulated out of the intelligence into speech, or

it

needs

on its own body, or it effects something in external matter. The first is contemplative knowledge, like dialectic, geometry and the rest Hke them. The second is grammar. The third is vocal or instrumental music. The fourth is dancing and gymnastics. The fifth is craftsmanship in any of the arts. Of all these the
singing or playing as well, or

more than

this

it

acts

three middle ones have the best offer themselves in a

known

effect,

because they

way

to the senses

and operate with

own body. And, since we ought to take our examples from better known things, as Plato insists in the Republic and the Sophist,^ *^ Plato bases his examples on 17A-B these three mainly, and on letters first (for each person understands best of all the things which he learned first). Now for us the voice is one, that is, it's a sound coming out of our mouth. On the other hand the voice is infinite, for everyday each and every person produces various voices and the variety and repetition of voices goes on to infinity. If someone recognizes a man's voice is one (that is, one particular sound issuing from a man's mouth), he isn't a grammarian yet; for everybody knows this, but everybody is not a grammarian. Again, someone who recognizes you can hear a countless diversity of voices isn't a grammarian yet, for who questions this fact? But a grammarian is someone who knows into how many and into what sort of species a voice can be divided when it's being articulated clearly into the words conceived 17B in the intelligence. Furthermore, the person who knows the voice is one, or the person who knows it is endlessly varied 17C isn't a musician; even the person who knows that one voice is high-pitched, another low, another of medium pitch, isn't a musician yet. The person who doesn't know them is com17D pletely non-musical. But the musical person is the one who knows how many intervals of voices there are in the upper and lower registers and what sort they are, and considers their limits and the number of combinations that can be made from them.
regard to their

Cap.

XXVIII

265

aperit.

vel in

Omnis industria hominum vel in mentis cessat acumine, vocem ex mente producitur, vel etiam cantum requirit aut'
in'
efficit.

etiam sonum,^ vel praeter haec in corpus agit proprium, vel

externam materiam quicquam

Prima

scientia

contem-

plativa est, ut dialectica, geometria, et reliquae similes; secunda

grammatica; tertia musica vocum vel sonorum; quarta saltatio ludusque gymnasticus; quinta artis cuiusque fabrilis opera. Ex his omnibus tres mediae, quia et sensibus se quodammodo offerunt et circa corpus proprium operantur, notissimum habent eventum. Cum vero ex notioribus, ut in Republica et Sophiste docet Plato, exempla trahere debeamus, in his tribus exempla potissimum Plato conficit, atque in litteris primum, patent enim cuique maxime quae primo quisque percepit. Vox quidem una est nobis, id est, sonus ex ore nostro emanans. Est iterum infinita, nam et omnes et singuli quotidie voces proferunt [372v] varias, atque in infinitum varietas replicatioque vocum progreditur." Siquis cognoscit hominis vocem esse unam, id est, unum quendam sonum ex ore hominis erumpentem, nondum grammaticus est. Id enim sciunt omnes, non tamen' grammatici omnes. Item qui percipit diversita#tem vocum innumerabilem audiri posse, nondum grammaticus. Nam cui hoc dubium? Sed ille grammaticus est qui tenet quot* in species vox distingui possit et quales, dum ore articulatim in verba mente concepta distinguitur. Quin etiam neque musicus qui vocem unam esse intelligit, vel qui sine^ termino variam. Neque etiam qui vocem esse aliam acutam, aliam gravem, communis toni aliam noscit tantum, qui haec scit nondum musicus; qui ignorat a musica est admodum alienus. Ille vero in ea sapiens est qui intelligit quot intervalla vocum sunt in acumine et gravitate, et qualia, et terminos intervallorum considerat, et quot compositiones ex istis efficiantur.

'vdA"P
'sive

'somnum Jf
Pfrag.

'mom.Y

'cgreditur

JfAP

'tam

'quod IK

IV (8Iv) ends

266

Chapter 28

musical interval signifies the difference in pitch of one voice from another. The difference is brought about in several
ways. For either one voice
tension by an eighth
eighth
is

higher than another in pitch and

less

making a whole tone, or by

than an

making a semi-tone, as is described in the Timaeus.^*^ Plato calls the first interval "epogdoum;" but the second interval he calls "Hmma." Or the voice is a third higher and this interval is called **epitritos" and it produces the harmony of a fourth. Or it can be higher by a half octave and this interval is called "hemiolios" and it produces the harmony of a fifth. Or [hemiolios] can double itself and this dupHcated, that is, doubled interval produces the harmony of an octave. But two and two-thirds [hemioUos] produces the octave and a fourth. [HemioHosl tripled produces the octave and a fifth. [Hemiolios] quadrupled produces the harmony of a double octave. The
first ratio is 9:8,

the second
is

is

243:256, the third

is

4:3, the
is

fourth

is

3:2, the fifth

is

2:1, the sixth is 8:3, the seventh

9:3

and 9:27, the eighth

4:1. In the first ratio

the second the semi-tone. In the third ratio

we put the tone, in we put the interval

the fifth of the

of the fourth, in the fourth of the

fifth, in

octave, in the sixth of the eleventh, in the seventh of the

twelfth, in the eighth of the fifteenth. Yet all the species of

the intervals are included in the octave. the intervals.

So the differences are

But the intervals' limits are the consonances brought about by the differences (whose species we've enumerated). But the combinations of the intervals are tetrachords, pentachords, or octachords and similar orders of chords, which differ from each other through the intervals we've mentioned. But Orpheus introduced the tetrachord: for in the Hymn to Phoebus he gives Phoebus a lyre with four strings and he says summer comes when Phoebus touches the top string, winter when he touches the bottom one, autumn and spring when he touches the two middle ones.'"' But since Plato says a would-be musician must not only know how many intervals there are, but also what sort they are, you have to understand that in these differences of voice from voice

Cap.

XXVIII
consonum excessum

267
vocis

Musicum

intervallum significat

Qui sane excessus pluribus fit modis, nam superat una vox in acumine et intentione^ aliam octava sui aut parte tonumque efficit, aut minori parte quam octava et efficit semitonum, ut scribitur in Timaeo. Primam Plato proportionem epogdoum* vocat; limma vero secundam. Aut superat tertia sui parte, quae proportio epitritus dicitur efficitque diatessaron harmoniam. *Aut dimidia parte excedit quae proportio hemiolios/ harmoniam procreat diapente. Aut totam se tota bis aequat, quae proportio diplasia,' id est, dupla diapason harmoniam** gignit. Proportio vero dupla duarumque tertiarum, diapason et diatessaron; tripla, diapason et diapente; quadrupla, bis diapason. Primus excessus est novem ad octo; secundus ducentum quadraginta tres ad ducentum quinquagesimum sextum; tertius quattuor ad tres;' quartus trium ad duo; quintus duorum [373r\ ad unum; sextus' ipsius octo ad tria; Septimus novem ad tria* et novem ad viginti septem;' octavus quattuor ad unum. In primo tonum ponimus,'" in secundo semitonum; in tertio quartam vocem; in quarto quintam; in quinto octavam; in sexto undecimam; in septimo duodecimam; in octavo quintam decimam. Verumtamen omnes intervallorum species intra octavam clauduntur. Excessus itaque intervalla
unius' ad alteram.
sunt.

conficiuntur,

Termini vero intervallorum consonantiae quae his excessibus quarum species numeravimus. Compositiones vero intervallorum sunt tetrachorda, vel pentachorda, vel octachorda" et similes chordarum ordines sese invicem per intervalla quae diximus excedentium. Induxit autem tetrachordum Orpheus. Nam in hymno'^ Phoebi lyram Phoebo dat quattuor cum fidibus, dicitque aestatem produci cum acutam tangit, hiemem cum gravem, cum medias duas autumnum''
atquever.'*

'unus >f
'em., diplasion

'primum ff "aestatem

'em.,cnao\\iiXY Hcnsione JfA" 'epogdonum y *\ifsW 'novem IKA" A'y triaA' 'sextum >f "aestatem A" "hymnisA' "vd octachorda o/w. Jf

om.

268

Chapter 28

17D

17E

you can proceed mainly in three ways. For if you cross from semi-tone to tone[s], you have the diatonic scale, serious and steady. If you go through several semi-tones, you have the soft chromatic scale. But if you go in a way through lesser [tones], you have the difficult harmonic scale.""* And this is what Plato tells us to notice about music. Our ancestors, whom we follow, knew it too, that is, the Pythagoreans and the Orphics. They called harmony the measured arrangement which results in one voice being adjusted to another when all is observed.'*' But they called rhythm to come to the third example the dexterity and quickness which is pleasing to those who watch, and which can be seen everywhere in the dancers' and players' hmbs when they observe the "arithmoi," that is, the numbers and measures similar to those in music. Plato also talked about it in the Laws Book 2 and the Republic Book 3; you have to observe the same thing in dancing as you do in grammar and music, and so with all the rest."** For whenever you consider them in this way, you'll end up knowing about them; and when you consider the rest similarly, similarly you'll end up knowing about the rest. But the infinite multitude of single things and within single things of single things meaning of individual things numerically distinct, and within single things meaning within the parts of each body this multitude will make you ignorant and totally devoid of wisdom. It won't make you rational, harmonious or orderly, since you'll never be looking at a number in anything. Plato touches on three concepts here: wisdom, reason and number. Wisdom is the definite comprehension of something. Therefore the something has first to be distinguished by reason in order to be perceived with certainty, then defined by number

in order to

thing into parts and assigns a finite

be understood. Therefore reason distinguishes the number to them; then it understands. But single things are all of them infinite in number and qualities, and any one is infinite in its particles and the variety of its flux and contingencies. So there's no definite number of single things; so there's no certain comprehension of
them.

Cap.

XXVIII

269

Quia vero dicit Plato quod futurus musicus nosse debet non solum quot sint intervalla, sed qualia, intelligendum est in his excessibus vocis ad vocem tribus modis potissimum posse procedi.

Nam

si

semitonio in tonum ac tonum

sit

transitus, dia-

tonos oritur melodia gravis et constans; si per' semitonos plures eatur, chromatica mollis; sin autem per minora quodammodo, harmonica difficilis. Atque haec sunt quae iubet Plato circa musicam animadverti, quae cognoscentes maiores nostri, quos
sequimur, id est, Pythagorici atque Orphici, harmoniam vocaverunt eam concinnitatem, quae in vocum moduHs ex eiusmodi observatione resultat; rhythmum vero vocaverunt, ut ad exemplum tertium veniamus, eam dexteritatem^ gratamque aspectantibus promptitudinem, quae in saltantium ludentiumque [373v] membris ex arithmis, id est, numeris et mensuris

musicae consimilibus passim apparet. Quod in Legibus quoque libro secundo et RepubHca libro tertio declaravit, in qua idem est quod in grammatica et musica observandum, idem quoque in ceteris omnibus. Quotiens enim haec ita tractas circa haec
sapiens evadis et
sapiens. Infinita

cum

similiter cetera similiter et in ceteris

sin-

gulorum

scilicet

autem multitudo singulorum et in singulis, individuorum numero distinctorum, et in

sin-

gulis scilicet partibus corporis

cuiuscumque, imperitum te et expertem sapientiae passim reddet, neque rationalem, neque numerosum atque compositum, utpote in nullum in aliquo

numerum^ quandoque
Sapientia enim certa

respicientem.

Tria hie tangit Plato: sapientiam, rationem, et

rei

numerum.

Quare" prius ratione distincta sit res oportet ut certe percipiatur. Deinde numero definita ut comprehendatur. Ratio ergo distinguit in partes, finitumque illis assignat numerum. Mox vero comprehendit. Singula vero et omnia numero et qualitatibus infinita, et quodlibet particulis et varietate fluxus et contingentium infinitum. Ergo nullus eorum definitus est numerus; nulla igitur illorum certa comprehensio.

comprehensio

est.

'per

om.W

'ad exteritatem

'numero Jf

'distinaa orfd. A"

270

Chapter 29
29.

Chapter

many and back

You must proceed from the one to the infinite again from the infinite many to the one by

means of the finite many.

Socrates' listeners have been sufficiently persuaded by the argument above to pursue the art of debating with due care. So Protarchus turned to Philebus and approved of what Socrates said. While Philebus didn't deny Socrates was right, he did ask what it all had to do with the present debate over pleasure and wisdom; and Socrates replied that this was a good question. Protarchus, therefore, begged him to unravel the problem now in hand through the suggested arguments. Socrates promises to do so, only first of all he will finish with the examples. Since it's been agreed from the foregoing examples that you mustn't rush from the one to infinities without going through the intermediate stages, it remains for them to demonstrate that you mustn't return from the infinities to the one without going through the proper intermediate stages. Socrates demonstrates it by taking the example of letters. Now men start to think about everything either by using the intelligence's reason, or by using the senses. If they use the reason, they have to divide from the one into its many by way of the intermediate stages. But if they use the senses, they are brought back from infinities to the one by way of the intermediate stages. The first was established above; the second is

18A-B

18B

shown here in the case of letters. The use of letters has been continual, as Pliny shows in Book 7 and Plato indicates in the beginning of the Timaeus and in the Laws Book 3."*' But certain fixed systems of letters have been invented by different people. In order for his priests to have their own secret literature apart from the vulgar, Zoroaster established letters in the characters of the celestial signs and constellations. Hermes Trismegistus, who was moved by Zoroexample, gave letters to his priests in the shapes of animals and plants, so that the vulgar should not partake of theology. But there flourished in Egypt's Naucratis (as Plato describes in the Phaedrus^**)^ among those worshipped by the
aster's

Cap.

XXIX

271

Ah uno
XXIX.'

in multitudinem infinitam^ at vicissim ah hac ad unutn per multitudinem finitam est procedendum. Cap.

Satis ex superioribus persuasi sunt Socratis auditores

ad earn

disserendi artem debita^ diligentia

prosequendam/

Idcirco Pro-

tarchus ad Philebum conversus Socratis dicta probavit. Quod ille quidem non renuit, sed quid ista ad praesentem de voluptate

quaestionem conferrent, interrogavit. Quod recte quaesitum respondit Socrates. Oravit [374r] ergo Protarchus ut his propositis per haec iam' quaestionem propositam enodaret/ Quod se facturum Socrates poUicetur, modo prius, quod in exemplis restat, peragat. Siquidem ex superioribus exemplis constitit^ non esse ab uno ad infinita sine mediis festinandum, reliquum est exemplis ostendere non esse ab infinitis ad unum absque debitis mediis redeundum, idque in litteris aperit. Porro autem* homines aut' a mentis ratione considerare quaeque incipiunt aut a sensibus. Si a ratione, ab uno in multa sua per media partiantur oportet. Sin a sensibus, ab infinitis per media revertantur in unum. Primum supra constitit, alterum hie
et sapientia

in litteris declaratur.

Usus litterarum sempiternus fuit, ut in septimo libro ostendit PHnius et in Timaei principio Plato significat et tertio Legum. Sed certi quidam litterarum modi a variis inventi sunt. Zoroaster, ut sacerdotes sui propriam seorsum a vulgo haberent'" litteraturam, in signorum siderumque" coelestium characteribus litteras instituit. Mercurius eius exemplo commonitus'^ suis sacerdotibus in animalium et plantarum figuris dedit litteras, ne vulgus theologiae esset conscium. Floruit autem in Aegypti Naucrate,'* ut Plato scribit in Phaedro, quidam ex his quos

rmitam XY 'a break, but no ch. heading W; in X the ch. is numbered fifteen 'consistit 'enodarc 'persequendam 'iam om. Y "commotusA' "sidcraque y 'AutiVX *3LUtom.fV "habent y
'em.,

Melata fV

"em.. Naucratia

fVXY

272

Chapter 29

name among them is Theuth; Hermes Trismegistus and the Latins call him Mercury. In Hermes' time the king of Egypt was Tamus of Thebes (where Jupiter is worshipped as Hammon). Hermes was a friend of this Tamus. Inspired by the god Hammon, Hermes discovered arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and moreover introduced the use of letters as an aid to wisdom and a prop to the memory. Tamus, however, considered the use of letters would make men forgetful, because they would confide in writings and neglect to think; and it would make them careless about finding things out, inasmuch as they'd rely on the mental skill of their superiors and not on their own. The use of letters generally harms the memory; for the things we've laid aside in writing, we stop guarding as it were, and in that very security we abandon them. All this is in the Phaedrus. But here Plato says that when [Hermes] was considering the voice's infinity, he was either some god, or some divine man: god, because by God's light he was next to God; divine because no man must be called God, as Plato says in the
Egyptians as gods, one whose
the Greeks
it is

among

Sophist. '*' But the philosopher ought to be called divine. In the Phaedrus Plato also calls the philosopher "a demon," that is, wise.''" Since, as I said, that divine and wise philosopher, Hermes Trismegistus, was considering the voice's infinity and wanted to ascend to the one voice, he investigated certain inter-

18C

mediate species of voices. In the first species he put vowels and divided them into seven: aerjiovoj. Into the species which remained he put those which aren't in themselves voiced, but which bring a certain stress and tension when added to other letters. These we call consonants

and the

letters are

seventeen in number:

(5y8^dKXiJiv^-npoT(px^-

He

divided the consonants into two species: into semi-vowels,

which Plato

calls

here the intermediaries, and into mutes.

The

semi-vowels are eight: ^^ipXnupOy the mutes are nine: (5y5KTTT64)x. Again, he divided the vowels into three species: some are long:
Tyco,

some

are short:

eo,

some

are both: aw. But the eight semi-

vowels he divided into three species: into doubles, and immutables, and sigma, there being three doubles: f^i//, and four

Cap.

XXIX

273

Theuth;

Aegyptii ut deos venerati sunt, cuius nomen est apud Aegyptios apud Graecos Hermes Trismegistus; Latini hunc

Mercurium vocant. Eius tempore Tamus Thebarum Aegypti rex erat, ubi Jupiter celebratur' Hammon. Huius Tami familiaris fuit Mercurius. Hammonis autem Dei afflatu, arithmeticam, geometriam, astronomiam invenit et usum praeterea litter arum induxit tamquam sapientiae adminiculum memoriaeque subsidium.

Quamquam Tamus

propter scriptorum confidentiam

cogitationisque [374v] negligentiam obliviosos homines littera-

rum usum
tiores,

putaverit^ effecturum et ad inventionem negligen-

utpote non suo, sed superiorum ingenio fretos. Obest plerumque memoriae litterarum usus, nam ea quae in scriptis

reposuimus
timus.

veluti custodire desinimus, et ipsa securitate dimitin

Haec

Phaedro.
hie ait,

At vero Plato

cum

vocis infinitatem consideraret, sive

quis deus, sive divinus vir aliquis: deus, quia

Dei lumine Deo

proximus; divinus, quia, ut in Sophiste dicit, nullus' hominum Deus dicendus est/ Divinus vero est appellandus philosophus, quem et daemonem in Phaedro vocat, hoc est, sapientem. Cum

inquam divinus
gistus

ille et

sapiens philosophus Mercurius Trismevelletque ad

vocis infinitatem animadverteret,

species

unam

vocem ascendere, medias quasdam

In

vocum

investigavit.
in

prima

specie'

vocales

posuit,

distinxitque

septem:
se

aei7ioua;;

reliqua in specie eas posuit quae

et

vocem quidem per

tensionem inferunt litteris aliis additae, quas consonantes vocamus septem ac decem numero litteras: iiyS^dKXiiu^npoTcpx^- Has consonantes duas in species partitus est: in semivocales, quas hie medias vocat Plato, Semivocales octo: f^i/zAjnypa; mutas novem: et in mutas. |376K7rT00x Rursusque vocales in tres; ahas longas: t^co, alias breves: eo, alias duorum temporum: aw. Semivocales autem octo in tres: in duplas* et immutabiles et in sigma.^ Duplas tres: ^^^,

non habent, sed casum aliquem

'colcbatur

scUicet add.

WX WX

'puttvcnint

W
WXY

'nullum

'est

om.

'species

'em., sima

274
immutables:
thin, thick,

Chapter 29
X^ivp.

The mutes he divided

into three species:

and

in

thick ones:

0(/>x.

between. There are three thin ones: kttt, three and three in between: ^yb. Priscian divides

and consonants. The vowels are: a e i o u. All some among them are semi-vowels, some are mutes, some are Hquids. The semivowels are: 1 m n r s, the mutes are: bcdfghpqt, the liquids are: m n 1 r. Cadmus brought letters into Greece from Egypt and Phoenicia; the Pelasgi from Greece into Latium, as Pliny says in Book 7.'" But let's go back to Hermes. He divided letters so that he could arrive at individual letters; and each separate letter he called an "element," that is, an element of a syllable. He also called letters as a whole an element, that is, an element of dic18C-D tion and of speech. But as he reflected nobody would know any one letter without knowing them all (that is, nobody could know the power of any one letter without linking it with the others, or could distinguish clearly the nature of the one com-

them

into vowels

the rest he calls consonants:

mon
letter

voice without the individual voices),

accordingly,

he

divided the one voice into

with others in

many letters. And he intertwined any such a way that he introduced the one disci-

18D

and joining. This discipHne, which was concerned with the one common nature of the letters and their mutual relationships, he called grammar. When Socrates finished, Philebus says the last example has made him understand the nature of letters more clearly than the nature of music or gymnastics, which Socrates had glanced at earlier. Or rather, now, he says, he understands at last the
pline of dividing

nature of letters
before.

more

clearly than

mentioned. But he

still

when they were previously wanted to know the same thing as

Socrates replied, "Aren't you asking what it all has to do with the problem in hand?" Philebus replied that it is just what he and Protarchus had been inquiring about for some time.
18E

And

Socrates says, "Though, in actual fact, you know the answer already, you keep asking. For this long investigation

means, since we have to decide between pleasure and wisdom (which of them ought to be chosen preferably as the better one),

Cap.
immutabiles quattuor:
medias. Tenues
a e
tres:

XXIX
Mutas
in tres:

275
tenues, densasj

\iivp.
kttt,

densas

tres: 00x.

medias

tres: i376.

*Priscianus ita dividit in vocales et consonantes.

i

Vocales:

consonantes alias omnes vocat. Ex his alias semivocales, alias mutas, alias liquidas. Semi vocales: 1 n r s; mutas: bcdfghpqt; liquidas: n 1 r. Ex Aegypto et Phoenicia litteras in Graeciam transtulit Cadmus; e Graecia in Latium Pelasgi, ut in septimo libro inquit Plinius. Sed ad Mercurium redeamus. Hie litteras**' ita distinxit, ut

u;

ad^ singulas litteras perveniret, et

vit

unamquamque

[375 r] voca-

elementum, syllabae scilicet elementum; et cunctas etiam elementum vocavit,' dictionis sciUcet orationisque* elementum.

Cum vero cogitaret ille quod nemo unum quiddam

cunctis cognosceret, id est,

illorum sine
litterae

quod unius cuiusdam

vim

sine aliarum commercio non possetf ahquis scire, et communis unius vocis naturam distincte non possetft dignoscere sine singulis, ideo et unam distinxit vocem multas* in Htteras et quamli-

bet litteram

cum

ahis ita contexuit ut

unam

istius discretionis

connexionisque disciplinam induceret, quae de una litterarum communi natura mutuaque inter se habitudine cogitaret, quam

grammaticam nominavit.
His
dictis, infert

Philebus se in hoc postremo exemplo hanc

quam conditionem musicae vel gymnasticae quam supra perstrinxit. Immo etiam clarius nunc tandem htterarum conditionem intelligere quam supra, cum de eisdem litteris facta mentio fuit. Sed adhuc idem quod et supra requirere. Ad haec Socrates: Numquid postulas quid haec ad** quaestionem propositam conferant? Id ipsum esse respondit Philebus quod dudum ipse et Protarchus requirerent. Atqui Socrates ait: Cum iam id proprie^ assecuti sitis, quaeritis tamen. Nam id sibi vult diuturna haec investigatio ut cum de voluptate et sapientia disceptandum sit, utrum eorum potius sit ut melius
litterarum conditionem planius percepisse

\xqac add. ado/n.

'

WX

'in

*'madd.

'pcopcXY

**om.

WX

'omationisque (f

tttom.

'mutas

276

Chapter 29

we must understand them both

first by knowledge. But since each is a genus divided into many species (and the species are again divided into an infinite number of single things), the

higher discipline requires

into definite species
infinite

we consider how both must be divided and in what order, before we descend to the
the

19A

So

number of single things." Protarchus says, "Philebus,

I

question

isn't

frivolous one.
circle."

say again, Socrates has led us round in a

He

said in a circle because Socrates, starting out

pleasure and wisdom, after a very long digression,

from came back

again to pleasure and wisdom.

rates

He

also said

it

because Soc-

had ascended

into the intelligence through the senses

19B

(from the many towards the one), and descended into the senses through the intelligence (from the one into the many). [Protarchus continues,] "Let's see, therefore, who of us will reply to these points. Perhaps it's absurd, [Philebus,] that I, your successor in replying, cannot act on your behalf and am asking you to do the replying. Yet it would be more absurd if neither of us could reply and we were to remain for ever in the state of ignorance. (Here he is saying people ought to put up with anything rather than ignorance.) So let's see what we can do. "It seems to me Socrates is asking about pleasure and wisdom, whether they have many species under them and how many they are and of what kind." Socrates confirms this, saying, "Protarchus, son of Callias, what you're saying is true, for unless we can observe the points mentioned above both in everything which is said to be one, similar and identical, and in the things which are opposite, that is, in the many, dissimilar and different things, none of us will be of any use at any time." With these words Socrates challenges them to the utmost to take up the dialectical discipline. At the same time he shows them what a terrible drawback it is not to have it. You must note, since he talked about the one, the similar, the identical, that the one pertains to every sharing in common. If the sharing is in the case of a quality, it produces the similar; if of a substance, the identical; if of a quantity, the equal.

Cap.

XXIX

111

eligendum, utrumque prius scientia comprehendatur. Cum verb utrumque unum sit genus multas in species distributum, et in singula iterum infinita, considerandum iubet superior disciplina, quomodo utrumque et quo ordine in species definitas sit partiendum, prius quam ad infinita singula descendatur. Ait ergo Protarchus: O Philebe, baud levis ista quaestio est;

inquam

circulo

quodam

Socrates nos deduxit. Dixit circulo,

quia a voluptate \S75\\ et sapientia incipiens, longiori

quodam

ambitu in voluptatem rursus et sapientiam rediit; ac etiam, quia per sensum a multitudine ad unum processit in mentem et' per mentem ab uno in multitudinem descendit in sensus. Vide igitur uter nostrum ad haec sit responsurus. Forte vero absurdum est, ut ego tibi in respondendo successor gerere vicem tuam non possim, tibique respondendum praecipiam. Absurdius^ tamen esset, si neuter nostrum respondere posset, atque ita diutius in hac inscitia commoraremur. In quo docet quodvis aliud esse ferendum potius quam inscitiam. Vide igitur quid agamus. Videtur mihi Socrates quaerere de voluptate et sapientia, utrum plures sub se species habeant, quotve sint et quales. Confirmat haec Socrates dicens: Vera narras, O Protarche, Calliae fili. Nam nisi possimus' quae supra dicta sunt observare in omni eo quod unum, simile, idem dicitur, et in contrariis, scilicet multis, dissimilibus, diversis, nuUus nostrum quandoque ad aliquod* alicuius erit pretii. His verbis eos Socrates ad eam disciplinam vehementissime provocat, dum quam grave sit in eius privatione detrimentum ostendit. Quia dixit unum, simile, idem, advertendum est quod unum ad omnem pertinet communionem, quae, si in qualitate est, simile efficit, si in substantia,
idem,
si

in quantitate, aequale.

'amentearf</. >'

'absurdus >'

'possumus H'

'aliqiiid HOif

278

Chapter 29

What appears to be

However, any one thing ought to be drawn into the many. similar in itself [ought to be drawn] into dissimilar things if they are hidden under it at all: for instance, one
hot thing into dissimilar hot things (in so far as they differ among themselves by degrees), taste into dissimilar species of

taste.

Or what appears

the

same

in the

common

nature [ought
it

to be drawn] into diverse things if they are under

instance, an animal into beasts

at all: for

many ought

to be

and men. On the other hand, the drawn back again into the one, dissimilar

things into something similar, diverse things into something the

19C

same. For all things, however many or dissimilar or different they are, at least agree in some one condition, either of being, or living, or acting, or being acted on, or being good, or proceeding from the one, or returning to the one. Since Socrates had thus put his Hsteners under too great an obligation, Protarchus shrank from the important task and referred it back to Socrates, Protarchus says, "It's obviously a beautiful thing for a wise man to know everything; but if he
can't, the next best thing, that
sail, is
is,

the safe

way

for

him

to

obviously to recognize his

own

ignorance. Otherwise

19C-D

19D-E

be ignorant of the thing itself and of his own ignorance go wrong when he launches on what he doesn't know, he'll be unteachable or too proud." Plato tells us so in the Alcibiades.^^^ It's as if Protarchus were saying, "We acknowledge, in fact, that everything must be examined diligently and the best Hne of approach is the one you've told us about. But, being adolescents, we are inexperienced in such things, that is, we don't have the ability to do dialectic and we aren't yet ready for philosophizing. But you, you are better suited in age and experience and, besides, it concerns you to discuss all this. For at the time Philebus was saying pleasure is the highest good, you denied it on the spot and objected that wisdom is the more excellent. So you are the cause of the contention; for when an objection occurs, then the debate begins. So it concerns you to unravel what you yourself have tangled. Moreover, when the points were raised in the discussion, we warned you we were not going to let you go until
he'll

and and

he'll

Cap.
Oportet autem quodlibet

XXIX

279
deducere: sive simile

unum in multa

quoddam

dum
runt,
in

sub eo latent, ut caliin dissimilia calida in quantum' ea inter se gradibus diffein se videatur in dissimilia, siqua

saporem

in dissimiles saporis species; sive

idem communi

natura appareat in diversa, siqua subter sunt, ut animal in bruta et homines. Ac rursus multa in unum: dissimilia in simile
aliquod; diversa in aliquod idem. [376r\

Omnia enim quantumuna quadam^ saltem

ad

cumque^ multa

vel dissimilia vel diversa in

conditione conveniunt, vel essendi, vel vivendi, vel agendi, vel

patiendi, vel boni, vel procedendi ab uno, vel redeundi

unum.

Cum per haec Socrates auditores nimium astrinxisset, refugit grande hoc onus Protarchus, reiecitque in Socratem. Temquod si fieri non possit, secunda quaedam, id est, tuta navigatio iUi videtur suam ignorantiam recognoscere, ne et rem ipsam ignoret et ignorantiam, neque, dum quod ignorat temptat, aberret, neque sit indocilis, neque superbior; quod in Alcibiade Plato docet. Quasi dicat: Probamus quidem omnia esse diligenter examinanda, et earn esse optimam discussionem quam narrasti, sed ipsi ad haec ineptiores sumus adolescentuli, scilicet dialecticae expertes, neque dum ad philosophandum idonei. Tu vero
peritia et aetate aptior ac praeterea tua interest ista discutere.

perato inquit viro pulchrum videtur omnia nosse

Nam Philebo dicente voluptatem summum

ergo contentionis causa.
disceptatio.

esse

bonum,

tu pro-

tinus negavisti, obiecistique sapientiam esse praestantiorem.

Tu

Unde enim

obiectio oritur, inde et

Tua ergo interest explicare quod ipse implicuisti.* Quin etiam his' in disceptationem positis, praediximus tibi te nos minime dimissuros prius quam absolveris. Ipse vero

'quantis

'him o/n.

'quaecumque H^

'A^read^ in uno

quodam

'explicuisti If

280

Chapter 29

you resolved them.

Now you yourself promised to

yourself at our disposal as an arbitrator.

and you put But what has once

20A

been given ought not by right to be retracted." Having given three reasons why it should be Socrates who should proceed with the argument, Protarchus now outlines the way he wants it explained. "Therefore, stop talking Hke this, Socrates; it's both vague and perplexing. And don't inject scruples either. And don't keep asking us for something we cannot tell you. You brought up the uncertainty. We can't resolve it ourselves and people should not remain in a state of uncertainty. For uncertainty isn't the goal of a discussion but discovery. So it concerns you to do the inquiring, especially since you promised to. So accept the job now of demonstrating
the highest good. Discuss pleasure

and wisdom yourself, either by dividing them into their species, or by some other method if by some other convenient method you can and wish

to explain the things

we are uncertain about."

Plato called this a second voyage.

He

says the

same

in the

Phaedo.^" The second voyage means a safe journey, for people who go wrong on the first voyage sail more safely on the second. Accordingly, the Roman mime, Publius [i.e., Publilius Syrus],
says,
is

"The person who gets himself shipwrecked a second time wrong to accuse Neptune.""" Moreover, Protarchus said,

"Socrates, you were the cause of this gathering, and you your-

promised us you would set about inquiring what is the best thing in Hfe." Protarchus has demonstrated that the subject of the book is to debate not about pleasure, but about the highest good, not in the absolute, but for man. But when he referred to the "intelligence," "knowledge," "understanding," "art," by the "intelligence" he meant the
self

highest
tion,
it,

power of the soul, by "knowledge" the soul's disposiby "understanding" the experience in action coming from finally by "art" the rational skill that produces things. But
said the goal of a discussion
is

when he
tainty,

is

discovery, not uncer-

he

making

it

obvious that Plato proposes to pass on

doctrine, not ambiguities.

When

the Sceptics
fell

and Arcesilas and

Carneades pursued ambiguities, they

away from Plato.'"

Cap.

XXIX

281

promisisti, dedistique te nobis disceptatorem,

iure est

quod vero semel

datum, non

est

auferendum,
explanari ista desiderat.
Socrates, et^

Postquam

tribus rationibus ostendit haec a Socrate esse' trac-

tanda, hie iam

Mitte igitur turbulentum, neque scrupulos

solvere ipsi

modum declarat quo modum istum loquendi,

inicias,

vagum

et'

neque a nobis exquiras quae declarare non possumus. [376v] Dubitationem tu movisti;

non valemus;

in ea

resistendum minime

est,

neque enim inquisitionis

finis est dubitatio,

sed inventio. Tua*

ergo' interest quaerere, praesertim

summum bonum demonstrandum

et sapientia dissere*, sive eas in

cum promiseris. Quare ad iam accede. De voluptate tu suas species dividendo, sive quo-

modocumque

aliter,

si

aliter

commode

potes ac vis ea de^

quibus dubitamus exponere. Quod dixit secundam navigationem;

inquit.*

idem

in

Phaedone
ille

Tutum

significat iter,

nam

qui prima navigatione erra-

verunt in secunda tutius navigant.

Unde Romanus

Publius

mimus: Improbe
facit.

ait

Neptunum
dixit:

accusat qui iterum naufragium

tu huius coetus

Quod praeterea

O Socrates,

causam

nobis dedisti, teque ipsum nobis praebuisti investigaturum quid

in

esse

humanis rebus sit optimum. Ostendit huius libri propositum non de voluptate, sed de summo bono non absoluto sed

humano disserere.
Quando' autem dixit mentem, scientiam, intelHgentiam, mentem accepit animi vim supremam, scientiam eius habitum, intelHgentiam vero'" prudentiam agendorum inde manantem, artem denique" rationem faciendorum operum. Quod vero dixit finem disputationis inventionem esse, non dubium, docet Platonis propositum esse doctrinam tradere non
artem, per
ambiguitates; quas Sceptici et Arcesilas et Carneades secuti, a

Platone degeneraverunt.

'haec

W; esse om.

'et

om.

'et

om.

'tu iV

'erga

W
WX

disserere >fA'

'deom.

'etadd.

fVX

'Quod^

"\eio om.

"denique o/n.

WX

282

Chapter 30
30.

Chapter
it is

That the good

intelligence.

Or

superior to being and to the that the condition of the good itself is that
is

perfect, sufficient and desirable.

this,

After

Socrates comes to the fourth part of the dialogue

in detail the attributes
itself

of the good itself, in should be understood and what from among the various goods is closer to it. For the person who's going to compare the two, pleasure and wisdom, to the third thing [the good itself] has to know about the third thing. Now

where he describes

order that the good

two ways of comparing them to it. One way is the show that neither of them is the third thing. The other way is the positive way, where you try to find out which of the two is nearer to it. You don't need the art of dividing and defining, which we've described above, for the first way. So Plato postpones using that art to the time when he will compare them to each other and to the third thing by being
there are

negative way, where you

positive.

However,
itself,

in order to

know

that neither of

them
its

is

the

good

there's
it

no need

to divide each one into

species or to

define

and a proper notion of the third

too exactly; for some general understanding of both thing, which is the object of the

20B

comparison, is quite sufficient. So, since Protarchus had told him he could gladly prepare for the comparison either by dividing or by not dividing, whichever way he wanted, Socrates began the discussion with this Hberty. He joked initially thus, "There's no longer any need for me to be afraid of something bad happening now you're giving me permission to speak my

mind." He directed
fallen into the habit

this at the adolescents

who'd previously

of both threatening and encouraging him.

tractable

Since they were

difficulty, they

now

and scared by the general

bent their necks under the yoke of Socratic

bad happens in a debate to the person who's been given permission to approach or abandon the discussion according to his own free choice, and to select the plan for the discussion intelligently. Young people ought to concede this right to their seniors.
reason. But indeed nothing

Cap.

XXX

283
ipsius

^Quod bonum sit ente atque mente superius. Quodve

boni conditio est ut Cap. xxx:
sit

perfectum, sufficiens, expetendum.

qua, ut
sint

Post haec quartam dialogi partem aggreditur Socrates, in et ipsum bonum cognoscatur et quae ex aliis bonis illi
propinquiora, conditiones boni ipsius enarrat. Tertium

[377r] qui ad ipsum duo ilia voluptatem et sapientiam sit comparaturus. Comparatio vero istorum duplex est ad tertium. Una negativa, qua neutrum illud esse monstratur; altera adfirmativa, qua quaeritur utrum duorum tertio sit propinquius. Ad primam^ non est opus ea dividendi et definiendi arte quam supra descripsimus. Ideo eius artis usum ad id tempus differet' quando adfirmando ilia" invicem et ad tertium comparabit.

enim hoc cognoscat oportet

est

Ut autem cognoscatur quod neutrum ipsum bonum sit, non opus utrumque in species suas dividere et exactissime definire, sufficit enim utrorumque communis quaedam intelligentia, et propria quaedam illius tertii ad quod comparatio dirigitur notio. Ideo, cum Protarchus dixisset Socrati, ut ad banc comparationem seu dividendo sive non dividendo quomodocumque
hac libertate disputationem
inivit

vellet sese accingeret' libenter,

Socrates. Imprimis ita iocatus: Nihil grave mihi' amplius metu-

endum, postquam arbitratu meo loqui me sinitis. Hoc obiecit adolescentibus illis qui supra et comminari illi eumque urgere soHti erant, qui, quoniam dociles erant difficultate rerum perterriti, iugo Socraticae rationis iam cervicem' subiciebant. Immo vero nee grave illi quicquam in disserendo, qui pro voluntatis arbitrio et
et disputationis

aggredi et dimittere disputationem permittitur,

rationem ex mente deligere,*

quam auctoritatem

iuniores senioribus concedere debent.

but no ch. heading W; in 'primum IV and P the ch. is numbered sixteen 'iUam fV 'accingerc IV mihi om. Y 'coUa fVXP 'dibgert X; P gives both as alternatives ItPfrag. V(88r) begins
'a break,

'differt

284

Chapter 30

Relying on this right, Socrates approaches the negative comparison, namely, that neither pleasure nor wisdom is the good
itself.

You can't know the comparison until you know the good.
(as

The good

we've shown elsewhere)

is

above the inteUigence,

because the power of the intelligence only extends as far as the forms, since it is a species itself and acts through species. Each

by understanding. Therefore the intelligence the form for producing an effect, and it puts the form into effect according to the model it possesses. Again, each craftsman's intelligence puts only the form into effect, not
intelligence acts

conceives in

itself

all, for nature produces the matter. Just as the potter produces the dish's form, nature produces the clay. But just as part is to part in the same genus, so whole is to whole. Accordingly, just as a particular intelligence is to a particular matter, so the universal intelligence is to universal matter. But a particular intelligence doesn't create a particular matter but gives it form. Therefore the universal intelligence does the same to the universal matter. Therefore the power of no one intelligence extends as far as matter. So the good exists above the

matter at

intelligence.

The good

is

also

above being, because the power of being

only extends as far as the things which have been formed; the
is through form. But the power of the extended even as far as privation and matter, because they aim at good in actuahty because of some power implanted

being of these things

good
in

is

them by the good. good is above the intelligence and being, it is above the power of the inteUigence and its object, which is the first being. For the first object of the intelligence is its own being, for the first thing it understands is itself. The being of the
So, since the
intelligence
species.
is

the

first

being, because the intelligence

is

the

first

Being comes after the form. Therefore the first being is first species is. Here you have the species' subject and the species itself. The subject of the species doesn't lead itself into act, because it would already be an act not a potentiality. But already its species, because it is in another, is therefore from another; and it is from an act. Therefore above every

where the

Cap.

XXX

285

Qua sane auctoritate fretus Socrates comparationem negativam adit,' scilicet quod neutrum ipsum bonum est,^ *quod nosse non potest, nisi bonum ipsum norit. Bonum ipsum, ut
demonstravimus, supra mentem est,** quia vis mentis usque ad formas protenditur, cum {377v] ipsa species sit et speciebus agat. Omnis enim mens agit intelligendo; ergo faciendi operis formam concipit in se ipsa, ad eiusque exemplar agit formam.' Item cuiusque artificis mens formam agit tantum,* materiam minime, eam enim natura gignit. Ut figulus vasis formam, natura lutum. Sicut autem se habet pars ad partem in genere eodem, ita totum ad totum. Quare sicut mens particularis ad particularem materiam, ita universalis mens ad materiam universalem. Sed particularis# mens particularem materiam non gignit, sed format. Ergo et mens universalis universalem similiter' materiam. NuUius ergo mentis potentia' ad materiam usque porrigitur. Bonum igitur supra
alias

mentem

est.

Est et super esse, quia vis ipsius esse usque ad formata tantum, quorum esse per formam est, extenditur. Vis autem boni

etiam ad privationem atque materiam, quia haec in actum bonum tendunt propter vim aliquam ipsis a bono insitam. Cum ergo bonum supra mentem et esse sit, est super poten-

tiam mentis eiusque obiectum, quod ipsum^ primum esse est; primum enim mentis obiectum suum* esse est, nam primo se ipsam intelligit.' Mentis esse primum est esse, quia prima species est. Esse vero formam sequitur. Ideo primum esse ubi

prima

species.

tum

se

ipsum

Ubi haec, ibi subiectum speciei et species. Subiecin actum non educit, quia esset actus iam non
species eius, quia in alio, ideo ab alio, et ab

potentia.

Jam vero'

actu. Ideo super

omnem

speciem actus

est,

non

subiecti actus.

Hamen Jf 'forma If 'sitP addit y 'interfugit If suam r 'ipsum om. y Pfrag. V(88v)ends

'sinuliter

om.

H'A'

portio

"lam vero om. IfA"

***om.Y

286
species there

Chapter 30

is

an

act;

absolute act. Every species, which

not the act of a subject, but the utterly is the act of a subject, comes
is

from

it.

Being presupposes an act which

the

20B

good subject (that is, in an essence). So and the intelligence. Therefore it exists above the object and the power of the intelligence. So Socrates ascends towards the perception of the good not by his own strength, but by the favour of this very same good. For we don't see the sun, unless it's by the light of the sun. Accordingly, he says some god has now made him recall the things he had learnt through God's light, while listening long ago to Diotima the prophetess who'd been inspired by God to talk about the nature of the good. When Diotima talked, Socrates at that time understood it all as if in a dream, being young and addicted to the senses and mere opinion. That is, instead of believing in the good itself, he believed in its replica. For example, Diotima had said the good was perfect, sufficient, desirable. In the first stage of their lives young men attribute
exists

imprinted in a above being

of pleasure; in the second stage to the political and social life. Socrates had acted perhaps in this way himself. But at length, having woken up, that is, having used the intelligence to contemplate the truth, he gazed in reality at the good itself, not at its replica. This was because he had come
such qualities to the
life

to recognize

by means of a long examination by the intelligence that sufficiency and perfection were present in neither life. Now with the god inspiring him again, he is reminded of what he heard and thought about long ago. He will conclude shortly
through such recollections that neither wisdom nor pleasure the good itself, but the third more excellent thing is. But if it
so agreed, Philebus' pleasure will
is is

20C

good things, since it and the good itself are not the same. Nor will there be any need to divide pleasure or wisdom into their species to understand which of them is the highest good. For we can demonstrate through a general knowledge of them both and an appropriate notion of the third thing that neither of them is. You have to remember Socrates learnt music from Connus and the art of speaking from Aspasia, as Plato writes in the no longer surpass
all

Cap.
sed actus penitus absolutus a
est actus,

XXX
species est

287

quo omnis

quae

subiecti

quern actum esse praesupponit in subiecto illo hoc est essentia impressum. Bonum igitur super esse et mentem existit.
Igitur supra

obiectum vimque mentis ipsius

eius perceptionem

extat.'

Quare ad

non

[378r\ propria vi, sed ipsius

eiusdem boni favore ascendit Socrates. Solem enim non, nisi solis lumine, cernimus. Ideo dicit quod deus aliquis in mentem sibi reduxit iam quae quondam Dei etiam lumine noverat audiens^ a Diotima vate, Deo rapta de boni natura loquente. Quae, cum diceret^ Diotima, Socrates utpote iunior ac sensibus et opinioni deditus, quasi somnians, tunc primum accepit, id est, pro ipso bono boni est suspicatus imaginem. Bonum namque dixerat esse Diotima quod perfectum, sufficiens, expetendum. Quod quidem prima aetate iuvenes voluptuosae vitae tribuunt; secunda aetate vitae civili. Ita forte egerat Socrates. Demum vero excitus, id est, mente usus ad veritatis contemplationem, ipsum revera bonum non imaginem intuitus est, cum recognosceret longo mentis examine in neutra vita suf ficientiam et perfectionem inesse. Nunc quoque adspirante deo eorum recordatur quae audivit olim et quae examinavit, per quae hie paulo post concludet quod neque sapientia neque voluptas ipsum bonum est, sed tertium quiddam praestantius. Quod si constiterit, voluptas ipsa Philebi non amplius bona omnia superabit, cum non idem sit ac bonum ipsum. Neque opus erit voluptatem vel sapientiam in species suas dividere ad cognoscendum utrum istorum summum sit bonum, nam quod neutrum illorum sit per communem utriusque cognitionem et propriam tertii notionem concludere possumus. Meminisse oportet Socratem musicam didicisse a Conno, ab Aspasia dicendi artem, ut in Menexeno scribit Plato; atque ut in Symposio

'tKia.lom.WX

'audicns om. JfA"

'dicent

288

Chapter 30

Menexenus.^^^ And, as Plato mentions in the Symposium, Socrates received the art of love from the prophetess, Diotima.'" Through her he learnt to love, since he had come to understand through her what ought to be loved in reality, since she taught

him what the truly beautiful itself is and what the good itself is. So he will introduce into the discussion (concerned as it is with the good and with the desirable) what Diotima said. But who was that god, who inspired Diotima when she was telling Socrates about the beautiful and the good, and who enraptured Socrates when he was listening to her and then here, after the lapse of a long time, brought Socrates back to the same state of contemplation? It was surely the god, love. Dionysius
the Areopagite put love third
first

among

the divinities; since in the

place he put power, in the second beauty, in the third he

put love."* Power which has been unfolded becomes beauty; power which has been turned towards beauty becomes love. Plato also put the good first, the beautiful second, love third.
principle, the beautiful on the on the soul which has been turned back towards the beauty of the divine intelligence. So love strives towards beauty. Love first flourishes among the celestial souls who are gazing at that beauty from near at hand. From there love flows down into our souls. Like a sunbeam descending from on high, it turns our souls back towards the splendour from which it came, namely, towards the beauty of the divine intelligence. From there it leads them into the light which is the

He bestowed the good on the one

divine intelligence, love

source for the splendour of beauty shining in the divine intelligence. But that is the good itself. Therefore love guides our

by means of the representations of the beautiful into the itself, by means of the beautiful into the good. For the good itself is the principle of all. With the beauty of the species, of the reasons, of the forms, it forms the intelligence and the soul and matter. It converts matter into the soul. It lifts the soul into the intelligence. At length it enraptures all things to itself. So matter longs for. the adornment of the soul. The soul loves the beauty of the intelligence. All these thirst for the good itself, the fountain of beauty. They have been enticed
souls

beautiful

Cap.

XXX
accepisse, per

289

refert,

amatoriam artem a vate Diotima

amare didicit, cum ex ea intellexisset quid' revera ea siquidem docuit quid ipsum vere pulchrum \S78\\

quam amandum sit,

sit, quid ipsum^ bonum. Ideo Diotimae dicta ad propositam de bono et appetendo quaestionem adducet. Quis autem deus ille fuit qui et Diotimam afflavit, cum pulchrum et bonum Socrati revelavit, et rapuit Socratem audien-

tem et reduxit demum post longa tempora in eandem hie Socratem contemplationem? Profecto ille fuit amor, quem Dionysius Areopagita tertium in divinis posuit; in primo siquidem

amorem. Potestas
revoluta

potestatem posuit, pulchritudinem in secundo, in tertio locavit explicata pulchritudo fit; in pulchritudinem

fit amor. Plato insuper primo bonum posuit, secundo pulchrum, amorem tertio. Bonum uni principio, pulchrum menti divinae, amorem' animae in divinae mentis decorem conversae dedit. Amor itaque in pulchritudinem nixus est. Hie primum viget* in coelestibus animis qui proxime decorem ilium intuentur, inde et in nostros permanat; et quasi radius quidam superne descendens, in splendorem unde descendit nostros convertit animos, in divinae scilicet mentis ornatum. Inde in lucem illam perducit unde pulchritudinis splendor in divina emicat

mente. Id autem ipsum est' bonum. Unde amor per pulchri imagines in ipsum pulchrum, per pulchrum perducit in bonum. Ipsum enim bonum omnium principium; et mentem et ani-

mam

et

materiam specierum rationum

et

formarum

pulchrituattollit in

dine format. Materiam convertit in animam;

animam

mentem. Ipsum* denique ad se rapit omnia. Materia itaque animae ornatum appetit. Anima mentis amat decorem. Haec omnia ipsum bonum decoris fontem sitiunt, decore ipso quasi

'quod
'haec

WX

'pulchrum H^

'amore >F

*y\%<cXom.WX

'estom.

290

Chapter 30

by beauty
is

itself, as if by a certain foretaste of the good. So love a circle emanating from the good, proceeding through the

20D

and through and at last returned through the beautiful into the good. In the Phaedrus and the Symposium love was the god who goaded on the enraptured Socrates."' It is the same god who advised him here as he carried on the argument. And therefore Socrates will show immediately that the good itself has three conditions: it is sufficient, desirable and perfect. That the good is the principle of all things, because the good and the one are the same and the one is the first principle, we've shown elsewhere. Some part of the demonstration seems worth repeating straight away. Since all things come from the one principle, that principle is either the good itself, or it is better
the images turned back towards the beautiful

beautiful, running into the images of the beautiful,

than the good. If it is better than the good, either something proceeds from it into the nature of things, or nothing does. If nothing does, it doesn't make sense, for it wouldn't be the principle of things unless something were given by it to things. But if something is given to things by the principle, just as something
given to things by the good, which is of course goodness, something will be given to things by the first cause which is better than goodness. For, if it is above the good and better than it, it certainly gives better gifts to things than the good itself. But what's better than goodness, since something is said to be better because it has a greater share of goodness? Besides, since all things only desire the good, if there's something above the good, will they or will they not desire it? If they don't desire it, it doesn't make sense that the first cause by which everything is created and preserved isn't also desired by everything. But if they do desire it, they don't desire the good most of all, nor will they examine everything because of the good. But since the good is that towards which all things are converted when they desire something, the good will be what creates all things. For all things are converted to the point from which they set out. So the good is the first principle of things. Because it is the principle, it is said to be sufficient, desirable and perfect. I say it
is

Cap.

XXX

291

quadam boni
quidam
est

ipsius praelibatione pellecta. Ideo amor circulus a bono manans, per pulchrum progrediens, in pulchri [379r\ imagines currens, perque illas ad pulchrum conversus, et in bonum per pulchrum denique revolutus. Hie deus

in Phaedro et Symposio concitavit Socratem debacchantem; idem hie disputantem admonuit. Atque ideo statim tres esse

boni ipsius conditiones significabit, ut sufficiens dum, ut perfectum.

sit,

ut expeten-

Quod bonum rerum omnium sit unum idem sit, unum vero primum
repetenda videtur.**

principium, quia'
sit

bonum

et

principium, alias demon-

stravimus. *Cuius demonstrationis pars aliqua

mox

sequens

omnia ab uno principio sint, princibonum est, vel bono meHus. Si bono pium illud vel ipsum melius, aut aliquid ab ipso in naturam rerum procedit, aut nihil. Si nihil, absurdum id quidem, non enim esset rerum principium, nisi aliquid ab ipso rebus tribueretur. Sin autem ahquid a principio isto rebus datur, quemadmodum^ a bono rebus istis datum est aliquid, quod quidem bonitas est, erit aliquid^ in rebus
melius bonitate a causa prima tributum.
sit

Cum

Nam

si

super

bonum

ipsoque meHus, meliora certe rebus munera elargitur quam ipsum bonum. At vero quid bonitate melius, quippe cum melius aliquid ex eo'* dicatur quod bonitatis magis est particeps? Quin
etiam

cum omnia bonum dumtaxat

cupiant,

si

supra

bonum

est

utrum et illud appetant necne? Si non appetunt,' absurdum est causam primam a qua quaeque fiunt atque servantur non appeti et ab omnibus. Sin appetunt, non bonum maxime appetunt,* neque sub ratione boni cuncta perquirent. Cum vero bonum sit ad quod omnia appetendo convertuntur, bonum erit a quo omnia procreantur, quo enim omnium est conversio illinc
aliquid,
et

omnium est processio. Bonum itaque [379v\ primum rerum

est,

est

principium. Quia

principium

ideo sufficiens dicitur, expetendum, perfectum.

Sufficiens inquam,' quia' in se ipso

permanens ex foecunditate

'ctadd.X 'el add. IV 'inquantum 'appetent haec ad praesens est adhibenda

WX

fVX

'esse add. 'aliquod >f y 'quia om.

WX

'appetunt om. WA" *"**Ad quam demonstrationem

292
sufficient,
its

Chapter 30

is

of

because it produces the essences of everything out overflowing creativity while remaining in itself. It is desirable, because it immediately converts the essences which

have been produced towards itself. It is perfect, because it perfects and completes the converted essences. On the first count,

and the one; on the second, the middle and the way; on the third, the end and the life. Therefore Plato says in the Laws Book 4: God, as the ancient saying testifies, contains the beginning, end and intermediate points of all things, and in accordance with nature passes through and encircles them with righteousness.'*" But the
it is

called the principle, the truth,

ancient saying

is

Orphic, for

it

refers to Jupiter the principle,

from Jove Jupiter the foundation of the earth and the starry sky.'*' On account of all this He is called the good. That the good is sufficient can be shown from the fact that it creates without moving or changing. For if it created through
Jupiter the middle
all

things are born

movement, the movement would be either internal or external. If internal, it would change from the one and the good and so in a way recede from the one and the good and so be weakened. But something appears to be most powerful when it produces another. But the good would appear to be weak at that very point when its greatest power was most in evidence. But if the
is external, then is the movement it produces produced through movement or without movement? If the former, you will go on to infinity. If the latter, it's agreed the good creates without changing or moving. Or rather, since every movement is an impulse towards something that's needed, the first good needs something if it is moved. Either it is moved towards something better, or worse, or of equal value. It isn't moved towards something better, for nothing is better than the good. Nor is it moved towards something worse, for it isn't ignorant or coerced, since nothing is above it. But if it is moved towards a condition equal to its former condition, why is it moved, for it has the condition already? So, why is it looking? Therefore, since the good produces without any internal change, it creates while resting in itself. So it does not set out to

movement

Cap.

XXX

293

exuberante producit essentias omnium.'

versas perficit atque complet. Propter^

Expetendum, quia
princi-

essentias statim productas in se convertit. Perfectum, quia con-

primum quidem'
secundum

pium

et Veritas

et

unum

dicitur;

propter"

vero'

medium et via;
dicit Plato: et

propter* tertium finis et vita. Ideo quarto Legum Deus, ut antiquus sermo testatur, principium, finem

ram

media rerum omnium continens, rectitudine secundum natuperagit omnia atque circuit. Antiquus autem ille sermo est

Orphicus, inquit enim' Jupiter principium, Jupiter

medium

ex

Jupiter fundamentum terrae coelique omnia bonum dicitur.' Primum sic ostenditur, quod scilicet immobile permanens creat. Nam si per motum, aut motus ille in eo est, aut extra. Si in eo, ipsum mutatum'" esset ab uno et bono, ergo quodammodo ab uno et bono discederet, debilitaretur igitur. Maxime vero potens apparet aliquid, cum aliud efficit. Hoc autem tunc debilius appareret, cum maxime vis eius maxime" eluceret.'^ Sin extra sit, ergo motus ab eo productus utrum per motum an sine motu? Si primum, in infinitum ibitur. Si secundum, constat quod manens immobilis generat. Immo vero cum omnis motus impetus sit ad aliquid quod deest, deest aliquid primo si move-

Jove nata sunt omnia

stelliferi.

Propter*

tur.

Item vel ad aliquid melius movetur, vel deterius, vel Ad melius quidem*' non, nihil enim'* bono melius. Ad deterius quoque" non, non enim ignorans est aut cogitur, cum nihil supra sit. Ad aequum vero statum priori cur movetur,

aequum.

habet enim iam? Cur quaerit ergo? Quare

cum

nulla sui trans-

mutatione producat, \380r\ stans in se ipso creat. Non ergo" defectu proprio extrinsecus aliquid quaerens ad agendum exit.

'rerum >f
'inquit

A"

'''''secundum

enim om. "maxime om. JfA' "quoque om.

WX WX

WA" 'quidem om. >'A' 'bonum dicitur om. W; dicitur om. X

^stxoom.WX "motum WX
"enimom. >f

"elucet JfA'

"enim

"quidemowi.

Jf'A'

294

Chapter 30

look for something to do externally from any internal defect. Rather it propagates itself out of overflowing creativity. As Dionysius says, "The infinite goodness of God did not let Him remain in Himself without a seed.'"" In the Timaeus Plato
agrees

when he

says

God's goodness, devoid of maUce, supplied

the cause for producing things.'"

And

in the

Republic Book 2

Plato wants this principle to remain motionless.'*"

So the good

itself is said to be sufficient because of its motionless creativity. That is, it is sufficient both to itself and to others; while not emptying itself, it gives water to other things. That the good is desirable is obvious first from the testimony of Dionysius the Areopagite, who says all things seek God's likeness, each in its own way: those things which exist only in accordance with being, those which live in accordance with life, those which feel in accordance with the sense, those which understand in accordance with the understanding.'" It is desirable also because it immediately converts the appetites of young creatures to itself. For every single thing desires well-being. A thing has well-being from where it has being. Therefore it is turned back towards its cause. In fact, everything wants to be preserved in its being. That preserves being which gives being. For the preservation of being is also the continuation of being, which is like a perpetual and never-ending production as an image from an object in pools or mirrors, or as light from the sun. So it is the job of the same thing to preserve whose job it is to produce. So the effect desires its preserving cause. Therefore the good itself, since it is the cause of all, ought to be desired by all. Again, the order in the case of ends follows on the agents' order. '" For just as the supreme agent moves all the secondary agents, so the ends of the secondary agents ought to be arranged in accordance with the end of the supreme agent. For whatever the first agent does, it does for its own end. But the first agent performs all the actions of all the secondary agents by moving them towards its own action and consequently towards its own ends too. Hence it follows that all the ends of subsequent agents are directed by the first agent towards its own end. But God is the first agent of all things. But there is no other end for His will

Cap.

XXX
Atque

295
ut Dionysius

sed exuberante foecunditate se propagat.

ait, infinita

Dei bonitas non permisit eum sine germine' in se ipso manere. Quod in Timaeo innuit Plato dicens bonitatem Dei atqui livore carentem generandis rebus dedisse causam; secundo de Republica Plato immobile manere principium in
dicitur, id est,

vult.

Ex immobili igitur foecunditate sufficiens ipsum bonum quod et sibi una et aliis sufficit; dum se non

6xhauriens, irrigat alia.

expetendum patet primo Dionysii Areopagitae auctoritate dicentis omnia modo suo Dei similitudinem petere: quae sunt tantum^ secundum esse; quae vivunt secundum vitam; quae sentiunt secundum sensum; quae intelligunt' secundum intelligentiam. Deinde ratione sic, quia convertit in se statim nascentium appetitus. Unumquodque enim bene esse desiderat. Bene esse habet unde et* esse. Ad causam ergo convertitur. Etenim suo in esse servari quodcumque appetit. Conservat esse quod esse dat. Nam et' conservatio essendi essendi continuatio est, quae quidem est tamquam iugis perennisque productio, ut imago in aquis et speculis ab obiecto et a sole lumen. Eiusdem igitur conservare est, cuius et generare. Effectus igitur causam appetit conservantem.' Ipsum ergo bonum, cum sit omnium causa, est omnibus expetendum. Item ad agentium ordinem ordo in finibus sequitur, nam, quemadmodum agens supremum omnia agentia secunda movet, ita ad agentis supremi finem oportet fines secundorum agentium ordinari. Quicquid enim agit primum ipsum agens propter finem suum agit. Agit autem primum secundorum omnium agentium actiones [380v] omnes ad actionem suam movendo, atque ita et ad suos fines. Unde sequitur omnes posteriorum agentium fines'' a primo agente ad finem suum proprium dirigi. Agens autem primum omnium Deus est. Voluntatis autem ipsius nihil aliud finis

Quod

'germino

'servatricem

'tactum

J'

^flnes

om.

Mntelligant If

'ciom.Y

'etom.

WX

296
than His goodness.

Chapter 30

Therefore all things are turned back towards God. Besides, the ultimate end for any producer, in so far as he is a producer, is himself. For the things we've produced we use for ourselves. If someone at any time does something for someone else, eventually it has a bearing on his own good, being either enjoyable or useful or honourable. God
is

the author

of all

things:

directly.

So

He

is

of some things directly, of others inthe end of all things. Moreover, the end

holds principal place among the other causes, and thanks to it all the remaining causes can actually exist as causes. For the efficient cause does not act except for the sake of the end. But it
is by the efficient [cause] that matter is drawn into a form 's act. So matter is actually made the matter of this thing, form too is made the form of this thing on account of the action of the efficient [cause]; and therefore on account of the end. Moreover the ultimate end is the first cause. By means of the first cause an end preceding [the ultimate end] is understood as an end, for nobody is moved towards a proximate end unless urged to do so by the ultimate end. Therefore the ultimate end is the first cause of all. It and the good itself are the same. Therefore the good itself ought to be desired by everything. The good is also called perfect, because it brings all things* natures to completion and satisfies their appetites. The person who makes something is the one responsible for perfecting it. The person who begins something is the one responsible for bringing it to completion. What is superabundant, as it's above all things and is all things, is responsible for fulfilling them. But the first cause of all things makes, begins and converts them all. Or rather, since to satisfy is to arrest the appetite, and since what moved something towards itself is responsible for arresting it in itself, the good, which moves every appetite towards itself, also arrests each appetite in itself and satisfies it. In the good itself the appetite discovers whatever can be desired. Because the good exceeds the capacity of the thing desiring it, in comprehending that capacity it brings it to rest and fulfils it. Therefore, the good itself, which is God, is said to be sufficient, desirable and perfect.

Cap.
est

XXX
igitur

297

quam sua bonitas.

In

Deum

terea finis ultimus facientis cuiuslibet, in

est ipsemet;

omnia reflectuntur. Praequantum faciens est,

rebus enim a nobis factis propter nos utimur. Et siquis quandoque aliquid propter alium efficit in suum denique bonum refert, vel iucundum, vei utile, vel honestum. Deus est

quorundam proxime, aliorum per media. Est itaque finis omnium. Accedit quod finis inter alias causas principatum tenet, atque ab ipso ceterae omnes causae habent quod actu causae sint. Agens enim causa non nisi propter finem agit. Ab agente vero^ materia in actum formae deducitur, unde materia actu fit huius rei materia, forma quoque huius rei forma fit propter agentis ipsius effectionem, atque idcirco propauctor,
ter

omnium

fmem

quam praecedens finis

mum

ipsum. Finis quin etiam ultimus prior causa est, per intendatur ut finis. Nemo enim in proximovetur finem, nisi fine ultimo provocatus. Finis igitur
est^

ultimus prima

omnium

causa. Ilia et

ipsum bonum idem.

et

Bonum igitur ipsum omnibus expetendum.

Perfectum quoque
implet
dicitur,

quia complet naturas omnium,

illius est,

omnium

appetitus. Perficere

cuius est et facere;

complere cuius inchoare; implere illius quod exuberans est, quia super omnia est, et omnia. Facit autem, inchoat, convertit omnia causa prima omnium. Immo cum implere sit appetitum sistere, et illius sit in se ipso sistere, quod ad se movit, ipsum bonum, quod ad se movet [381r] appetitionem omnem, omnem quoque in se ipso sistit et implet; in quo quicquid appeti potest appetitio reperit, quod, quia appetentis supereminet
capacitatem, comprehendens

eam

sistit

ac firmat.

Ipsum

igitur

bonum
dicitur.

qui

Deus

est

sufficiens,

expetendum, perfectumque

'ex add.

'est

add.

298

Chapter 31

Chapter 31. In what way the good itself is to be admired, loved, enjoyed; and what the principal good is in every
single thing.
In the Cratylus Plato refers to the agathon as
if it

meant

agaston from the verb agamai, which means three things: to admire, to love, to be delighted.'*^ For the good is to be admired when we come to it, loved when we cling to it,
delighted in

when we

are satisfied by

it.

Firstly,

it

turns us back

from other things towards itself by making us recognize its it draws us towards itself by making us love this same beauty. Thirdly, it transforms and diffuses us into itself through pleasure and surrounds us with itself and satisfies us through goodness. Perhaps somebody is going to ask therefore: "You say the good itself is the principle of things, and is sufficient, desirable and perfect. But you say it is the good in itself, and isn't the good of another or in another. Therefore, what is the good in other things?" I say it is the image of the good according to each thing's capacity to receive it. All secondary hghts are images of the primary light, and they depend on the primary light. Therefore the habitual disposition of each thing is to be sufficient, desirable and perfect in so far as its nature allows. This is its highest good. It depends on the absolute good, just as colour depends on light, a hot thing on heat. Then what is the one thing which enables us to call the principle good, and other things good? It is act. What do all things flee from as bad? It is privation. Therefore all things
beauty. Secondly,

follow act, the opposite of privation, as the good.

Now

matter,

which

is

perpetually receding from formlessness

It

itself,
is

desires to

forming it. In the case of animal bodies pain comes when the form of the soul separates from them, pleasure when it adheres to them. But form is an act, since it is the principle of acting. Again, form bursts forth into action and motion and never stops operating.
receive form.

offers itself obediently to

what

The movements and generations of the sky and elements

to this. Souls are also always borne into act through the

testify

power

of nourishing and producing, of feeling and understanding.

Cap.

XXXI

299

Quomodo ipsum bonum sit admiranduntf amandum, iucundum; et quid potissimum in unoquoque sit uniuscuiusque bonum. Cap. XXXL^
*Plato in Cratylo dicit dyaBov
dici^

quasi dyaoTov

d-nd toO dyatioi.

Quod

tria significat: admirari,

amare, delectari.

Bonum enim

admirandum est' cum ad illud accedimus, amandum cum haeremus, iucundum cum eo implemur. In primo ab aliis convertit ad
cognitionem pulchritudinis suae. In secundo trahit ad se per amorem eiusdem. In tertio transfer! in se diffunditque per voluptatem, circumfunditque se ipsi et implet per bonitatem.** Interrogabit igitur* forte aliquis: Bonum ipsum principium rerum esse dicis, idque esse sufficiens, expetendum atque perfectum; id vero ipsum in se bonum est, neque est alicuius, nee in aliquo; quid ergo in rebus' aliis bonum? Huius, inquam, pro captu cuiusque imago. Omnia sequentia lumina primi luminis imagines sunt, a primo lumine dependentes. Habitus ergo
se per

quoad eius natura patitur, sufficiens, expetendus, perfectus; supremum eius est bonum. Hie a bono absoluto dependet, ut color a lumine, calidum a calore. Quid unum istud est tandem, quo et principium bonum dicimus, et alia bona? Actus. Quid ut malum fugiunt omnia? Privationem. Ergo ut bonum sequuntur omnia actum privationis oppositum. Materia quidem ab ipsa informitate discedens perpetuo ad formam suscuiusque
rei,

cipiendam inhiat, seque formanti exponit obedientem; animaliumque corporibus dolor innascitur cum ab illis animae forma

Forma vero actus quidam est, quoniam est agendi principium. Forma item in motum actionemque prorumpit, nee ab operatione cessat umquam;
disiungitur, voluptas

cum

adhaeret.

quod

elementorum motus generationesque demonEt animae per vim nutriendi gignendique, sentiendi, intelligendi semper in actum feruntur. Ergo sicut materia et
et coeli et

strant.

'noch. heading or break

W; numbered seventeen
'igitur o/n.

admirandum (id</.

A*

>f

'in

'did om. rebus o/n. A'

'amandum, iucundum:
*'**om.

300

Chapter 31

Therefore, just as matter and bodies always look for the act, so forms and souls always look for the second act. The
act
is

first first

form. The second act

is

operation. Intelligences also look

for the

same

thing, since the part of the intelligence

which

is

present in us delights completely in operation as the good.

And

every soul which desires the types of knowledge and the virtues
desires the species and act of the soul. Whatever soul desires the comforts of fortune or the body desires them in order to do something by using or enjoying them. Or rather, people desire both being and Hving in order to make use of both. But they use them by acting according to their capacities. Therefore act is what must be desired by all things. Act is also sufficient. For the first act, when it comes down, indicates the subject has now been sufficiently prepared and the compound is sufficient for acting. The second act indicates a thing is fully formed and has sufficient energy. For that which either moves another or produces another is now a complete, fully grown thing. Act is also perfect. The first act satisfies the longing of matter, puts a Hmit to its infinity, adorns its deformity. The second act brings the drive of the forms to completion and perfects the external result. Hence you can gather that these three are the conditions

appropriate to the good itself and appropriate to act itself. Therefore the good and act are the same. Each act has the three conditions in one respect or another. Therefore in one respect or another each act is good. The purer act has the conditions more abundantly. So it is more good. The purest act has the conditions totally. And so it is the highest good. It does not have them externally, since it has them for no other reason than

happens that one act has the conditions less than another because of the admixture of a subject, an impediment, privation. Therefore nothing has to be added to act to make it better; rather, the blemish it receives from having anything added to it has to be removed. Straight away it blazes out as pure act. When this, its natural purity, blazes out, the three conditions increase at once to accord with its purity. Then goodness is revealed. Moreover the good, as we said above, consists in unity. Unity consists in act. Therefore
the reason which

makes

it

an

act.

For

it

Cap.

XXXI
ita

301

formae animaeque \38lv\ secundum. Primus actus forma est. Secundus est' operatio. Idem et mentes quaerunt, siquidem pars mentis, quae
corpora primum semper expetunt actum,
nobis inest, in operatione

tamquam bono admodum

delectatur.

Et quisquis animus actumque appetit. Quisquis fortunae aut corporis commoda, ut per ilia et circa ilia utendo vel fruendo quicquam agat. Immo vero et esse et vivere appetunt, ut utroque utantur. Utuntur autem secundum eorum vires agendo. Actus igitur est quod omnibus expetendum. Est etiam sufficiens. Actus enim primus cum advenit^ subiectum significat sufficienter iam praeparatum, et compositum ipsum ad agendum est sufficiens. Actus
scientias et virtutes appetit,

speciem animi

secundus rem sufficienti vigore adultam declarat. Quod enim vel movet vel gignit aliud integrum ipsum iam et adultum est. Est et perfectus. Primus actus implet materiae desiderium, eius terminat infinitatem, ornat deformitatem. Secundus actus formarum nixum complet et externum perficit opus. Sic est igitur
colligendum
quis actus
tres' illae

sunt et actus ipsius* propriae. Ergo

ilia tria

boni ipsius conditiones sunt propriae, bonum et actus idem. Quis-

habet

quodammodo;

quisquis ergo

quodam-

modo bonum

Actus purior habet ea magis; ergo et magis bonum. Actus purissimus habet omnino; ergo et summum bonum. Neque habet haec actus extrinsecus, quia non alia ratione quam ea ipsa qua actus est. Nam quod ea minus habeat unus actus quam alius, subiecti et' impedimenti et' privationis admixtione contingit. Nihil ergo actui est addendum ut magis bonum sit, sed additamenti inquinatio removenda. Statim purus emicat. Statim, cum sua haec naturalis puritas emicat, ad
est.

puritatem suam
\382r\
est).

tria

crescunt

ilia,

et

bonitas demonstratur.

Quin etiam

in unitate

bonum

consistit (ut

supra dictum

Unitas in actu. Ergo in actu bonum. Materia enim tota una

'est

om.

'cum advenit rtpeated

Hertius

ipsius

om.

om.

302
the

Chapter 31

For matter is said to be completely one, comes from the first act, and because it lies under the one form of the world. Every matter is one from one particular form. For every matter is indifferent as regards the number of
consists in act.

good

because

it

When it has been given a form, matter has been made one particular thing. And all the parts of a compound thing are naturally or artificially made one from the certain form of the whole; for instance, the parts of a house. But the form
effects.

into

establishes itself best in the second act, that

is,

in operation,

when

and increasing its unity most. This one act shows there is one energy in the form, and it determines one result. The agent aims most at one [result] when it acts; and it acts most, when with one intention it joins all its
it is

preserving, renewing

little

parts into the result.

first thing, since it is

Therefore the
act.

the

good and the one,

it is

is

And,
is

since

it is

the highest good,

it is

purest act. For

act

in by the limits of any of any one thing, it is the subject. Since it isn't properly the act act of all things; and, since it isn't contained by any one thing, it is present to all things. Therefore the good of all things is above

which

a law to

itself. It isn't

bound

and in all things, just as the sun's light, since it is peculiar to no one eye, is the light of all eyes and in all eyes. A ray of light, however, which is pecuHar to a particular eye, is the ray of that eye alone, and is in it alone. So in the Republic Book 6 Plato represented the good itself by means of the image of the sun. He says the sun produces both visible bodies and
all

things

eyes that see.'"

The sun pours a lucid

spirit into the

eyes so that

they can see, and paints bodies with colours so that they can be seen. Yet the ray peculiar to the eyes and the colours peculiar to
the bodies wouldn't be enough to produce vision,
for the one light itself. This light
it

if it

weren't

is

above the many

lights.

From

the

many and

appropriate lights have been distributed to eyes

it

comes down, illuminates, awakens and strengthens. In the same way the first act itself, in the process of producing, has given a species and act to individual things. Of course, when this act is received in a passive subject, it is weak and powerless to execute an effect. But the everlasting and
and bodies; and

Cap.
quia a primo actu,

XXXI

303

dicitur,

et

quia sub una iacet forma mundi.

Quaelibet materia una, ex una

est facta; et

quadam forma,

indifferens

enim

materia' quaevis ad multa opera. Data forma,

unum quiddam

artem, ut

omnes partes compositae rei per naturam vel per domus partes, unum ex certa totius forma fiunt. Forma vero cum maxime suam servat, restituit, augetque unitain^

secundum actum, operationem scilicet, optime sese comparat. Qui unus actus unum in forma testatur esse vigorem et unum opus determinat. Et tunc maxime in unum dirigitur agens, cum agit; et agit maxime, cum una intentione in opus suas omnes unit particulas. Primum' ergo, cum bonum sit et unum, actus est; et quia summum bonum, actus est purissimus. Est enim actus sui iuris;
tem, tunc
nullius subiecti limitibus coarctatus.

Cumque

nullius proprie

actus

sit,

actus est

omnium; cumque

in nullo sit inclusus,

omni-

bonum omnium super omnia et in omnibus, quemadmodum solis lumen, cum nullius oculi proprium lumen sit, omnium est lumen et in omnibus. Radius autem, qui alicuius
bus adest. Est ergo
est oculi proprius, illius solius est et in solo.

Ideo Plato in sexto

de Republica bonum ipsum per solis imaginem figuravit, dicens quod sol et corpora visibilia et oculos videntes procreat. Oculis, ut videant, lucidum infundit spiritum; corpora, ut videantur,
coloVibus pingit.

Neque tamen proprius

oculis radius, propriive

corporibus colores ad visionem perficiendam sufficiunt, nisi lumen ipsum unum supra multa, {382v] a quo multa et propria

lumina oculis et corporibus distributa sunt, adveniat, illustret, excitet atque roboret. Eodem modo primus ipse actus speciem actumque rebus singulis producendo largitus est. Qui sane actus, cum in subiecto patiente susceptus fuerit, debilis est et ad operis executionem impotens. Sed divini solis perpetua et invisibilis lux una semper omnibus adstat, fovet, vivificat, excitat.

'materia

add

>f

'et

'principium H^

304

Chapter 31
of the divine sun
always close at hand to

invisible light
all

is

assist

awaken, fulfil and strengthen them. Concerning the sun, Orpheus says divinely that "it cherishes all and bears itself above all things.'"*' Also Hermes Trismegistus says that God is the potentiality of all acts and the
things; to cherish, vivify,
act of all potentialities.""

As

all

the

first acts

are created by

Him, God
all

is

said to be the effective potentiality of all acts.

As

and strengthened by Him, He is said to be the act of all potentialities; that is, the one who leads all potentialities into act. Each act bestowed by God, the first as well as the second, is called the good of each thing. It is called the highest good of each thing when it exercises its full power for action without any hindrance, and according to its nature, and when it operates without the least difficulty. But this it can do by the favour of the first act, when it is turned back towards the first act, which is called the good not of some one thing but
the second acts are aroused

of all things equally. Therefore the first act completes and sets free the act of each thing. When it completes and strengthens, it is called the

good itself. When it sets free and renders something pleasing and active, it is called the beautiful itself. But the act of something
is

at its best

when
it

it

has been strengthened;

is

delightful

But this total act, strengthened in itself and freed from any impediment, is the highest good of each thing since it is the highest act of each thing. That it can be an act in the first place comes from the first act. Then, that it can be strengthened and freed comes also from the first act and turning back towards the first act. So God bestows the good on things in putting them forth; but in turning them back He gives them the highest good. God's magnificence alone is enough for the first gift. For the second the future recipient of the gift must itself turn
has
set

and beautiful when

been

free.

back.

The one itself produces

in
its

all

things, that

is,

the intelligence, the

is

soul, matter. But, since the character of each cause

effect, in the individual effects there is

preserved

unity, imprinted in

them by the

first

one.

An

one particular act of something

Cap.

XXXI

305

complet, et roborat. De quo divine Orpheus: Cuncta fovens atque ipse ferens super omnia sese. Mercurius quoque ait:

Deum esse omnium actuum' potentiam et omnium potentiarum actum. Quia^ omnes primi actus ab eo creantur, potentia efficax omnium actuum Deus dicitur. Quia omnes actus secundi ab eo excitantur et roborantur, potentiarum omnium dicitur actus, id est, omnes potentias in actum reducens. Actus quisque tam primus quam secundus a Deo datus cuiusque bonum dicitur. Et dicitur cuiusque summum bonum, quando sine ullo impediexpeditissime

mento integram agendi' secundum sui naturam vim exercet et Hoc autem favore primi actus operatur. assequitur, quando ad ipsum convertitur, quod non alicuius sed

aeque omnium bonum dicitur. Primus igitur actus complet cuiusque actum et expedit. Ut complet et roborat ipsum bonum, ut expedit gratumque reddit et agilem ipsum pulchrum dicitur. Actus autem rei ipsius ut roboratus optimus, ut expeditus iucundus et pulcher. Totus"

quoad impedimenta alia bonum, quia summus sit, a primo actu habuit. cuiusque est actus. Quod primo actus Quod deinde robustus sit, et expeditus, a primo quoque actu, et a sua in eum [383r\ conversione. Dat ergo bonum Deus rebus
autem
hie' actus,

roboratus in

se, et

expeditus,

summum

cuiusque

est

in

mum munus sola

procedendo; dat bonum summum in convertendo. Ad priDei magnificentia sufficit, ad secundum con-

versio rei ipsius suscepturae requiritur.

Producit quidem ipsum unum* omnia, mentem scilicet, animam, materiam. Cum vero cuiusque causae character in opere suo servetur, in horum singulis una quaedam sua unitas est, a primo impressa uno. Actus quidam rei productae ab

'actum

'unum o/n.

'Qui >f

'augendiA'

*em.,toiumWXY

'em..hoclVXY

306

Chapter 31

produced comes from the absolute act of the producer. For each object possesses its principal something in itself: its one power or one subsistence or one condition. The one something
is

like the object's centre for

it

which and from which

all

the rest

of the things in

exist, just as

every line [comes] to the centre of

through

a circle and [goes] from the centre to the circumference. But this one act and centre all things are turned towards the

first act and the first one. But they can't attain the one, except through one something. For if the one were to be touched by pluraHty, it would be divisible and wouldn't be one. So all things gather themselves together into their one act, so that through this, their one centre, they may adhere to the centre of all things. The good itself is the centre of all things, because all things [come and go] from it and to it. Just as all the Hnes emanating from the central point have the point in themselves and returning to the centre touch the circle's point with their point, so all the things depending on God, on the one act, retain one act. With this one act they return to the first one and attain
it.

one (because
nothingness)

Therefore the intelligence which has been produced by the it is outside the one and has spread out into

falls away from the one act. Beyond the one act it has unformed hypostasis. The good's beginning is the first act and the one in the hypostasis. Through this one act the essence

of the intelligence is turned back towards the one supreme act. This turning back is the second act; it's the good's augmentation. Having been turned back, the inteUigence is embellished with the species for creating all things. This is the third act; it's the good's perfection and splendour. So the highest good of the intelligence is the perfected act of its nature: that is, when it has been turned back through one act towards the one act, for it to become all acts and all things in act. Again, the soul, when it's

been gathered into

highest point,

its unity, that is, into its principal power and and when it has reached the one by rejecting the senses, clings to the one good. And the one good illuminates the soul through the intelligence and fills it with the reasons and the species of all things. Therefore the highest good of the soul is

Cap.
absolute productoris actu.
sui in se habet, vel

XXXI
quaeque

307
res principale aliquid

Nam

vim unam,

vel subsistentiam

ditionem unam; quod

unum quasi eius centrum

est

unam, vel conad quod et a

quo cetera quae in eo sunt existunt, ut ad centrum et a centro omnes ad circumferentiam lineae. Omnia vero per hunc actum' unum centrumque ad primum actum unumque vertuntur. Neque vero attingere unum nisi uno quodam possunt. Nam si iliud pluribus tangeretur, divisibile esset atque non unum. Omnia igitur in suum unum actum se coUigunt, ut uno hoc centro sui centro omnium haereant. Ipsum bonum centrum est omnium, quia ab illo omnia et ad illud. Et sicut lineae omnes, a centro puncto manantes, punctum in se habent, et in centrum terminantes puncto suo punctum circuli tangunt, sic omnia a Deo^ uno actu pendentia unum actum retinent, quo uno redeunt
in

unum primum
Mens
igitur

illudque attingunt.

ab uno producta, quia extra

et ultra

unum

et circa nihil

manavit, ab uno degenerat actu,

actum unum hypoille

stasim habet informem. In qua hypostasis primus

actus et

unum; boni inchoatio est. Per quem actum unum essentia mentis in unum supremum actum convertitur. Conversio haec
secundus est et [5^5 v] boni incrementum. Conversa formatur producendorum omnium speciebus. Qui tertius* actus boni est complementum' ac splendor. Quare summum mentis bonum est actus eius naturae completus, id est, ut per unum actum conversa ad actum unum omnes fiat actus, omniaque actu fiat. Item anima in suam unitatem, id est, principalem vim
actus

apicemque

ipsius collecta, et sensibus reiectis

unum

effecta, uni

bono

haeret;

ab eoque per mentem illuminatur, rerumque

speciebusque completur.
unius actus' completio

omnium rationibus animae bonum eius

Summum

igitur

est, id est,

ut per

'atque >f *em., actusque

WXY

'adeoA"

'hypostas If

'trtsW

'complentum ff

308

Chapter 31
is,

the completion of the soul's one act: that

when

it

has been

turned back through its one act towards the one act of the intelUgence and the one act of all things, for it to become all acts, that is, the plenitude of all the species. Matter also, when it has been turned back towards the one soul through one hypostasis

and towards the acts of the soul, and when it has been turned back towards the intelligence through the soul, and towards the good itself through the inteUigence, is adorned with all the forms. Therefore the highest good of matter is the fulfillment of its natural conversion, which is a certain act: that is, when it has been turned back towards the one act through one act, for it to become all acts and be arrayed with all the forms. Therefore the absolute good itself is the one above all things, the one act. The highest good of the intelligence, of the soul, of matter, is the one which is all things and all acts. For the things which come after the first one cannot be the one in its simplicity. Therefore they must be one and many. But it is better to be one and all than one and some, so long as all things are possessed in the one. For the highest good of the intelligence isn't really that multiplicity of the species, but the one comprehension of the highest one in all the species. It is the one act in all the acts which exists for the pure act. Therefore the highest good of the soul too isn't the various and manifold probings through the reasons, but the one glimpse of the one God in all the reasons. Moreover, matter's good isn't the division itself of quantities and qualities, but the one loveliness that comes from them all, the one life that comes from the union with one soul. Therefore one thing is enough for individual things, that is, one enjoyment of the one, one glimpse of the one Hght, one act for the sake of the one act. So this one thing is the good, both in itself and in
others.

But the multitude of all acts everywhere follows the supremely creative presence of the one itself. This multitude is beauty. So the splendour of the good is beauty. In the intelligence the beautiful series of all the Ideas accompanies the glimpse of the one itself. In the soul the lovehness of all the reasons accompanies the consideration of the one. In matter the

Cap.

XXXI
omniumque unum

309
convers'a

unum suum actum ad unum

mentis

actum omnes actus efficiatur, id est, specierum omnium plenitude. Materia quoque per hypostasim unam ad unam conversa animam actusque animae, perque animam ad mentem, perque mentem ad bonum ipsum formis omnibus exornatur. Bonum ergo summum materiae naturalis eius conversionis quae conversio actus quidam est expletio, id est, ut per actum unum ad unum actum reflexa omnes actus fiat, formis omnibus insignita. Ipsum igitur absolutum bonum unum est super omnia, actus unus. Bonum summum mentis, animae, materiae unum omnia, actus omnes. Unum enim simpliciter quae post primum sunt esse non possunt. Unum ergo multa sint oportet. Melius autem est esse unum omnia, quam unum aliqua, dummodo in uno omnia possideantur. Summum enim mentis bonum non ilia multiplicitas specierum est proprie, sed una unius summi in speciebus omnibus intellectio, in omnibus actibus actus unus ad purum actum. Ita quoque animae bonum summum non varii per rationes multiplicesque discursus, sed unus in rationibus omnibus Dei [384r\ unius intuitus. Materiae insuper bonum non ipsa quantitatum' qualitatumque discretio est, sed unus ex omnibus decor, ex unius animae unione vita una. Unum ergo sufficit singulis, una scilicet unius fruitio, unus luminis unius intuitus,^ unus actus ad actum unum. Unum ergo hoc et in se et
in aliis

bonum est.

Sed ad^ foecundissimam ipsius unius praesentiam omnium

actuum passim sequitur multitudo, quae quidem pulchritudo est. Quare boni splendor est pulchritudo. In mente ipsius unius intuitum idearum omnium pulchra series comitatur. In anima unius inspectum rationum decor omnium. In materia unius animae fruitionem formarum sequitur ornamentum. Comes ergo boni pulchrum est. Comes itaque fruitionis eius" est

'quantitateA'

'unus luminis unius intuitus o/n. A'

'ado/n. (f

'eiuso/n. A*

310

Chapter 31

adornment of the forms follows the enjoyment of the one soul. Therefore the beautiful accompanies the good. Therefore joy accompanies its enjoyment. But what is the good? That which is sufficient, desirable and perfect; or rather, desirable and perfect
sufficiency; or rather, the sufficient act, the desirable Hfe, the

perfect one; or rather, the sufficient

total act; or rather, the
it is

life,

the perfect unity, the

life in

one act of the one

the highest

the one. In that

it

absolutely such,

it is

good

absolutely. In that

such proportionate to the natural capacity of each thing, it is the highest good for that thing. So Plato says here in the text the condition of the good itself is that it is the most perfect thing of
is

all,

that

is,

because

it

perfects all things; also, that

it

it

surpasses

all

existing things in sufficiency, since

exists

above being and

does whatever being does through unity and act. It's also necessary to maintain the good is desirable. For the natural instincts are necessary, because they have been put there by the higher mover and they precede choice and decision. But
the

good

is

desired by the natural instinct, because both those

things that lack knowledge seek the good, and

men

immediately

they are born desire the good. But those things that have knowl-

edge (and after they have it) desire the beautiful. So the desire for the good is older than the desire for the beautiful. So the good is older than the beautiful. Or rather, it's enough for the majority to seem to have beauty, but to seem to have the good is not enough. So the desire for the good is more important than the desire for beauty. Just as the intellect necessarily understands the principles of contemplating by a higher light, so the
will necessarily wills

what

is

a good principle of action by a

all

higher instinct. For the universal principle draws

things

But the universal principle is the good. Therefore all things necessarily desire the good. As a result of this instinct, as Plato says in the Republic, things guess something is the good, but they don't know what it is.'" Yet they divine it's something sufficient and perfect. So they choose as the good whatever seems to possess the species of sufficiency and perfection. So men proceed by various routes; nevertheless, they strive towards one end, that is, to attain life's sufficiency. Some think
towards
itself.

Cap.

XXXI
sufficiens,

311

gaudium. Quid tandem bonum? Quod

perfectum;

expetendum,

immo

sufficientia expetibilis atque perfecta;

vita,

vero sufficiens actus, expetibilis

actus unus in uno.

perfectum unum;

immo immo

vita sufficiens, perfecta unitas, actus integer;

immo

unius vitae

Quod

tale absolute, absolute' est

pro cuiusque capacitate naturae, dicit conditionem ipsius boni esse ut sit omnium perfectissimum, quia scilicet perficit omnia; item quod omnibus quae sunt praestet sufficientia, quippe cum super esse existat et quicquid esse agit per unitatem et actum
tale

bonum; quod

summum summum

cuique bonum. Ideo hie in textu

agat.

Necessarium

quoque

est

asserere

quod

expetibile

est.

Naturales enim instinctus necessarii sunt, quia a superiori movente insunt et electionem iudiciumque praecedunt. Bonum

vero naturali instinctu appetitur, quia

bonum
tunt.

et quae cognitione carent homines statim nati bonum appePulchrum^ vero appetunt, quae cognoscunt et postquam

quaerunt, [384v\

et

cognoverunt. Ideo appetitus boni antiquior

est

quam

pulchri.

Unde

et

bonum

pulchro antiquius.

videantur habere sufficit multis; quod

sufficit.

Immo quod pulchritudinem bonum videantur non

est

Ideo appetitus boni principalior

necessario
intelligit

quam

sicut

intellectus

principia

pulchri. Et contemplandi

superiori lumine, sic voluntas necessario vult

bonum

agendi

principium instinctu superiori. Trahit enim ad se omnia princi-

pium' rerum;

id

autem bonum

est.

Necessario igitur omnia

bonum

appetunt.

Quo

instinctu vaticinantur, ut in Republica

inquit Plato, aliquid esse

Esse tamen sufficiens

bonum. Quid* vero illud sit ignorant. quiddam et perfectum divinant. Ideo
homines
speciem habere videtur' ut calle procedunt, nitunalii

quicquid sufficientiae

et perfectionis

bonum
tur
Alii in

eligunt. Diverso igitur

tamen ad unum finem,

voluptuosa

id est, vitae sufficientiam pervenire.

in

vita, in militari alii, in civili alii,

'absolutum JfA"

'pulchritudinem A'

'principia )f

*Quod IK

'videnturA'

312

Chapter 31

sufficiency belongs to the life of pleasure; others to the military

20D

of contemplation. So the four dispositions of men by means of the four sorts of life seek one and the same thing, that is, sufficiency. But only the contemplatives reach it, for the contemplative life is closer to the good itself, which is God. For it seeks nothing externally; it is content with inner things; it is least in need. By fleeing the body, it avoids the bad things which afflict the body. Since all things desire the good, why did Socrates say here that each thing that has knowledge hunts after and desires the good? It's not because the things that don't have knowledge don't desire the good, but because they don't hunt it or choose it. For all bodily things always proceed by one and the same path towards the good, that is, towards the perfect act. Or rather, they are borne towards it, as an arrow is borne to the target by the archer's impetus alone. But those things having knowledge over and above a mover's impetus also exhibit a proper sagacity and skill for tracking down the good; and they
life;

others to the civic

life;

others to the

life

devise stratagems for catching

to choose

it,

and often deliberate

in order

one thing or another out of the many things that appear to be good. Here Socrates is positing three things: desiring, wanting,
hunting after. The
first is

and third are peculiar to the end, that is, the good

common to everything; the second men employing knowledge. Men want

itself.

They hunt after it, that is, by what it really is, where it is hidden, how it can be taken. They search for it in order to comprehend it truly, not merely to seem to have it. They want to comprehend it in order to possess it firmly and securely. Nor do
deliberating they try to find out

they search for anything other than the good. they choose, they choose because they think
it

And

whatever

will lead to the

good. For all things are desired because of the first desirable good. They are said to be perfected in the company of good things because they participate in perfection to the extent that they contribute to the good. Socrates also talks about possession with regard to the good, since whatever we long to possess, we long to possess to the extent that it pertains to the

Cap.

XXXI

313

affectiones'

contemplativa inesse sufficientiam arbitrantur. Quattuor igitur hominum per quattuor vitae genera unum et idem,

id est, sufficientiam expetunt. Soli

autem contemplantes

adipis-

cuntur. Nam vita haec ipsi bono qui Deus est propinquior.

Nihil

quaerit extrinsecus, interioribus contenta est, minimis indiget.

Per corporis fugam mala

vitat

quae corpus affligunt.

cur^ dixit hie Socrates

Cum

omnia bonum appetant,

omne

quod cognoscit venatur bonum et appetit? Non quia quae non cognoscunt non appetant, sed quia non venantur, nee eligunt. Omnia enim corpora in bonum, id est, actum perfectum, uno semper eodemque calle procedunt. Immo feruntur, ut sagitta [385 r] ad signum solo iaculatoris impetu. Quae vero cognoscunt ultra moventis impetum ipsa quoque sagacitatem propriam
solertiam ad vestigia boni invenienda' adhibent, et machinamenta ad consequendum moliuntur,* et ex pluribus quae bona
et

videntur ut eligant alter um saepe consultant.

Tria hie ponit: appetit, vult, venatur.

Primum commune

omnibus; secundum et tertium hominibus cognitione utentibus proprium.* Volunt finem bonum scilicet ipsum. Venantur, id est, consultando perquirunt quid proprie* id sit, in quo lateat, quomodo capiatur. Quaerunt ut vere comprehendant, non ut
videantur habere. Comprehendere volunt ut illud firme
stabili-

terque possideant; nee aliud quaerunt quam bonum, et quicquid eligunt, quia ad bonum conducere putant, eligunt. Nam sub
ratione boni appetibilis primi

omnia appetuntur, quae dicuntur

una cum
dere,

bonis perfici, quia eatenus perfectione participant quatenus ad bonum conferunt. Dicit etiam circa bonum possi-

quia quaecumque
attinent

bonum

possidere cupimus, quantum' ad cupimus possidere. Quin etiam ipsum bonum

'effeaiones

*prope

'cum

'reperienda

'inquantuin

WX

WX

'noluuntur

'propriam

314

Chapter 32

good. Moreover, we want to possess the good itself, that is, to enjoy it securely and perpetually. So what leads to satiety isn't the good.

Chapter

32.

Neither pleasure nor wisdom

is

the

good
good
let's

itself.

Having stipulated the conditions of the good

20E

itself,

Socrates
itself.

now shows that He says, "Now

what
sort

neither
let's
is

wisdom nor pleasure

is

the

consider and decide; that

Certainly, the

is, let's

consider
decide

of

life

appropriate to each. Then

itself.

whether

it's

the

good

good

itself is suffi-

21A

21 B

wanting in nothing. So what has the good itself else. Let's take the Hfe of pleasure, devoid of all wisdom, and let's see whether it alone is sufficient for us. If it isn't, it's not the good itself, as the good itself is sufficient for the person who has it. And similarly, let's divide wisdom from pleasure. Whichever of the two is the good itself will be sufficient for us without the other. But if neither one is going to be sufficient in itself, neither in itself is the good." Given this standard with which to judge, Socrates reverts to his examples and proceeds to judge according to Protarchus' own choice. For it's from will and choice that one judges the nature of the good. Accordingly, Socrates arranges the argument in this way. "You call pleasure the good itself. So it is sufficient in itself. So a life always flooded with pleasure, denuded of any particle of wisdom, will be enough for you. If you have pleasure, you won't need wisdom, or anything else further. So there'll be no need to know anything, or to understand, or to deliberate about useful things, or to do anything else of that sort, or even to see anything." He said to see, because sight has the incorporeal intellect's image, since it is the result of a moment and tends towards an incorporeal light. Protarchus agreed he'd have every good if he had pleasure. Socrates infers from this, "Granted the event, perpetual pleasure will be present in your Hfe. All wisdom will be absent. Therefore the
cient, so it's

doesn't require anything

intelligence,

that

is,

the

faculty

for

understanding,

the

Cap.

XXXII

315

possidere volumus, id est, firmiter et perpetuo frui. Ideo

fert'

quod

satietatem

non

est

bonum.

Neque

voluptas,

neque sapientia

est ipsutn bonufn. Cap.

XXXII.'
Positis ipsius boni conditionibus,

iam ostendit neque sapien-

tiam, neque voluptatem ipsum esse

bonum,

dicitque: Consiscilicet

deremus iam

et

iudicemus, consideremus
sit.'

utriusque vitam qualis

ludicemus^ deinde utrum

propriam sit ipsum

bonum. Certe ipsum bonum sufficiens est, nuUo igitur indiget. Quod ergo bonum ipsum habet nihil ultra requirit. Ponamus
voluptatis vitam, sapientiae [385v] totius expertem, videamus-

que utrum ipsa nobis sola sufficiat. Si non sufficit, non est ipsum bonum, quod ipsum per se sufficit possidenti. Atque
similiter

a voluptate sapientiam secernamus.

Utrum vis

illorum

bonum ipsum
se sufficiet,

sit absque altero nobis' sufficiet. Sin neutrum per neutrum per se bonum. Hac norma iudicii data ad exempla recurrit, et indicium secundum Protarchi ipsius electionem peragit. Ex voluntate enim et electione boni iudicatur natura. Argumentatur itaque Socrates hunc in modum: Voluptatem ipsum bonum vocas, ergo per se sufficiens. Vita' igitur semper voluptate perfusa,^ omni sapientiae parte nudata tibi

sufficiet,

quam
vel

si

possederis, nee sapientiam nee aliud quic-

quam

ultra requires.

Non

igitur

opus

erit

sapere quicquam, vel

intelligere,

de opportunis ratiocinari, nee alia id genus

fiat et

habere, neque etiam videre quicquam. Dixit videre, quia visus,

cum momento
quia,
rates:
si

intellectus incorporalis

ad incorpoream lucem tendat quandam, habet imaginem. Consensit* Protarchus, voluptatem habeat, omnia habeat bona. Hie infert Socposito, perpetua inerit tuae vitae voluptas, sapi-

Ex casu

entia aberit omnis.

Mens

igitur, id est, intelligendi facultas.

'gignit

iVX

'shorn. iV 'Assensit

WX

'abreak. butnoch. heading W; 'vobis f 'que add. fVX

in

X the ch.

is

numbered eighteen
'ctiam add.

UnaA'

316

Chapter 32
the sure

recognition of principles, and knowledge, that

absent.

is,

perception of the conclusions from the principles, they will be

And

reasoning too, that

is,

the elaborate process of

arguing from principles to conclusions, from causes to effects, it will be absent. Opinion also will be wanting, that is, the conjectural estimating of

when

things will occur;

and memory too,

all

that

is,

the steadfast preservation of the things which have

happened. But to
[terms]. Since

know

is

the

common

term for

these

you won't have the intelligence or knowledge, you won't know whether you're happy or not. Since you won't have the memory, you won't record you were happy at some
21 c

point nor preserve even for a

pleasure. Since

moment

the perception of present

21

you won't have true opinion, you won't ascertain you're happy when you are happy. Since you won't have the ability to reason, you'll never predict you'll be happy in the future. You'll be leading the life not of a man, but of some insensate jelly fish, or a stupid animal a life Uke that of the marine oyster. These animals only have touch, a little taste, and none of the other senses. The jelly fish is a maritime animal. It's very white and seems compacted from the foam. It has the shape and motion of a lung, for it's always opening and closing. It has little hairs inside. The whole of it is very soft and most delicate like snow, and it can be punctured on all sides by a finger. Often it is cast up by the waves of the sea onto the shore. It can't move forward and it has no differentiation of organs. This at least is the life of pleasure without wisdom. Nobody would ever choose it as sufficient: firstly, because it's considered the lowest form of life, the one closest to death, the one having the least of life to it; next, because pleasure would be present to the soul in such a way that the soul would enjoy pleasure to the minimum, for it wouldn't come from the past or the future, or last any interval of time or rather, it would be

were not there, since it wouldn't be known to be there and the soul wouldn't form the opinion it was there. You ought to notice that the soul by its nature, being the mean between the intelligences and bodies, as it regards the body, does the work of nutrition, growth and reproduction in
exactly as
if it

Cap.

XXXII

317

principiorumque cognitio, et scientia, id est, ex principiis conclusionum certa perceptio aberit.' Aberit et ratiocinatio, id est, a principiis ad conclusiones, a causis ad effectus artificiosa discursio. Opinio quoque deerit, id est, incidentium rerum per coniecturam existimatio; memoria insuper, id est, eorum quae contigerunt stabilis conservatio. Sapere autem commune vocabulum est ad haec omnia. Quia deerit mens et scientia, utrum laeteris necne ignorabis; quia memoria, quod laetatus quando-

que

fueris

non recordaberis

et voluptatis praesentis perceptio-

nem ne [386r\ momentum quidem^ servabis;- quia dum laetaberis, laetari te nequaquam existimabis;

opinio vera, quia ratioci-

natio,' quod in futurum laetaturus sis, numquam praesagies. Agesque vitam non hominis, sed pleumonis cuiusdam insensati et stupidi animalis, et ostreae marinae persimilem, quae animalia tactum habent solum, gustus parum, sensus alios minime. Pleumon animal est maritimum, albissimum, quod videtur ex spuma compactum. Habet pulmonis formam et motum, semper enim et aperitur et cteuditur. Intus habet villos. Totum est nivis instar tenerrimum et mollissimum, et undique digito perforatur. Defertur maris* undis saepe ad litus. Progressum habet nullum,

aut organi distinctionem.

Haec utique

voluptatis sine sapientia vita est,

quam nemo

umquam

ut sufficientem eligeret. Primo, quia vilissima existi-

matur' et morti proxima, minimum quiddam habens vitae. Deinde, quia ita adesset animae voluptas, ut minima ex parte anima voluptate frueretur, neque enim ex praeterito, neque ex futuro, neque per aliquam temporis moram. Immo perinde
esset, ac
si non adesset, cum adesse ignoraretur, et cum animus non adesse opinaretur. Advertendum est, quod anima natura sua, cum media sit

inter

mentes et corpora, ut corpus respicit, in eo nutritionis, augmenti, generationis opus exercet et per illud sentit. Nutrit

'aberit

om.

'quidem om.

'ratiocinatione

'nans

'estimatur

WX

318

Chapter 32

body and perceives things through it. So the soul in the body nourishes the body and perceives bodily things through the body. But as it regards the intelligence separated from the body and depends on it, so now it acts in such a way that it acts neither in the body nor through the body. So, to the extent that the soul has been granted the power of the higher intelligence apart from the instruments of the senses, it knows things by itself. Either through opinion it knows the images and natures of single things. Or through the intellect and the reason it knows their universal and eternal reasons. Or through the process of reasoning it proceeds by itself from image to image, or from reason to reason. But it preserves them all through the memory. All these functions it does without the body therefore in so far as it depends on the intelligence which operates without the body entirely. But any operation which follows the nature of the intelligence is called by the general name wisdom. So, if the soul is utterly deprived of wisdom, it won't retain any of the intelligence's power. So it will be said to be without memory,
the

opinion, reasoning, knowledge, intellect.

present to the external and corporeal senses,

So,
it

if

pleasure

is

be present to the body alone; it will not pass over into the undiluted soul. For the soul enjoys pleasure through inner comprehension, which is called opinion, and through memory and reason and intellect. But the soul separated from the intelligence doesn't have these. So the soul will not enjoy pleasures, since it cannot grasp hold of them by any internal power or transfer them into itself. Perhaps there'll be some agreeable feeling in the instruments of the body, but there'll either be no delight, or very little, in the soul, since the agreeable feeling will pertain to the body not the soul. This is because the soul won't comprehend it from nearby but from afar. The soul will suppose it is in another (because whether the pleasure is perceived or not will be hidden from it). The senses, in fact, perceive the body's external changes, but
will

they don't perceive or retain their

own

perceptions, for that's

the job of internal thinking. Thinking directs itself not only to

corporeal images but also to incorporeal concepts. So, if there's an exterior sense without an interior one, some pleasurable

Cap.

XXXII

319

ergo corpus in corpore; sentit per corpus corpora. Ut autem mentem respicit a corpore absolutam atque inde pendet, ita agit
iam, ut nee in corpore agat, neque per corpus. Ideo quantum' supernae mentis vim sortita est sine sensuum instrumentis

secum ipsa res cogitat. Vel per opinionem singulorum imagines atque naturas; vei per intellectum et rationem [386v] communes aeternasque rationes; ac per ratiocinationem secum ipsa de imagine in imaginem vel de ratione discurrit in rationem. Per

memoriam
transigit.

vero haec omnia servat.

Omnia haec

sine corpore

Ergo ut a mente dependet, quae omnino

sapientia nuncupatur.

sine corpore

operatur. Quaelibet vero operatio mentis naturam sequens

muni nomine
privata
sit

comQuare si sapientia omnino anima, nuUam mentis vim retinebit. Ergo sine
scientia,

memoria, opinione, ratiocinatione,

dicetur.

intellectu

esse

Adsit ergo sensibus eius exterioribus corporeisque

voluptas, soli erit corpori praesens, in

transibit.

meram animam non

et intellectum

Anima enim
dicitur, et

ipsa in se per interiorem cogitationem,

quae opinio
fruitur.

memoriam

et

rationem

fruetur^ voluptatibus,

Haec autem animae mentis experti deficiunt. Non ergo cum non interiori vi capiat et in se trans-

fundat. Eritque forte conveniens aliqua in corporis instrumentis

anima vero vel nulla vel minima inerit delectatio, quia non ad eam sed ad corpus ilia affectio pertinebit, quia non apprehendet cominus, sed eminus et in alio suspicabitur, quia latebit eam, percipiaturne^ voluptas, necne. Sensus enim exteriores corporis mutationes percipiunt, suas vero perceptiones non percipiunt neque reservant; id enim interioris est cogitationis officium, quae non solum ad imagines corporum, sed et* ad incoraffectio, in

porales' conceptus se confert. Quare,

interiori
sit,

si

exterior sensus sine

levi

quadam

gustatione et subita affectio aliqua

'inquantum JfA"
'corporales

'frueretur

'participaturne

Jt'

'eiom. fVX

320
feeling in the
taste,

Chapter 32

body can be

felt

little

as a slight

and sudden

fore-

know whether it's feeling or not. Just as it often happens when we are looking at or listening to various things with our external senses, yet we don't perceive whether we see or hear. It's because we don't notice the external changes when our internal thinking is attending to something
but the soul won't
else.

And

so the soul feels

is

no pleasure

arising

from shapes and

pleasure exists

sounds. There
in a soul

a change only in the organs.

isn't thinking.

No

Moreover, since there is no existing communion with the intelligence, the opinion won't make any correct decision. So we won't be able to form the opinion that something agreeable to the body is present when it is offered. So from the soul's point of view it would be exactly as if it were not there. This life, therefore, would resemble the Hfe of the animals we call sponges, purple-fish, mussels, and oysters, which have no internal sense, only two external ones. If someone wants to know why nature produces animals thus deprived, he must understand the universal series are distinguished by gradations so that what is the lowest member of a
is next to the principal member in the order subsequent to it. If it weren't, things wouldn't be bound together; the work of the one God wouldn't be one. The highest angel is

which

higher order

closest to

God, the lowest

is,

is

next to the

demon of
is

fire.

lowest demon, that

the

demon of water,

related to the

The most

outstanding man. The stupid

man

is

just like the clever brute.

The

inactive brute

is

next to the most beautiful tree.

The most

is almost the same as an inanimate body. Therefore, since the lowest member in the animal genus ought to be next to the tree, but since the tree nourishes itself without senses, it is appropriate we find animals which are virtually senseless, that is, which [only] have the senses which are absolutely necessary and are diffused through the whole body, namely, touch and taste. For the latter are necessary and sufficient for self-preservation and the production of offspring. Through the taste the proper nourishment is taken in and the improper rejected. Through the touch heat and cold and the other things which can maintain or destroy life are perceived.

lowly plant, like the truffle,

Cap.

XXXII

321
Latebit tamen

corporis voluptaria sentiri paululum poterit.

animam

sentiatur necne.

Quemadmodum

saepe in nobis accidit

videntibus {387r\ et audientibus aliqua externis sensibus, quae

tamen utrum videamus et audiamus non percipimus, quia interiori cogitatione ad aliud intendente externas mutationes illas nequaquam advertimus. Ideoque nulla animo ex figuris illis
vocibusque iucunditas provenit. Sola
tatio; in

est in organis'

transmu-

animo non cogitante nulla iucunditas. Quin etiam, cum mentis nulla insit communio, verum deerit opinionis indicium. Ideo, dum conveniens corpori res offeretur,^ adesse non aestimabitur.^ Erit ergo animo perinde ac si non adsit. Vita itaque ista persimilis erit animalium illorum quae spongiae, purpurae, conchae, ostreae appellantur quae sensum interiorem habent
nullum, exteriores duos dumtaxat.
Siquis quaerat cur animalia haec usque adeo

manca natura
in sequent!

producit, intelligat his gradibus rerum series esse distinctas, ut*

quod

in superiori ordine
sit

infimum*

est ei,

quod

ordine est primum,

invicem minime necterentur, nee unum esset Dei unius opus. Supremus angelus Deo' propinquus; infimus daemoni igneo proximus. Daemon
res

proximum; alioquin

infimus, id est, aqueus, homini praestantissimo est cognatus.

Homo stupidus sagaci bruto persimilis. Brutum iners arbori pulcherrimae proximum. Planta vilissima, ut^ tuber, inanimato corpori ferme est idem. Ideo infimum in animalium genere cum
proximum
arbori esse debeat, arbor autem nutritionem habeat

quae ferme nullum habeant sensum, habeant scilicet eos qui maxime necessarii et qui per omne corpus funduntur, tactum scilicet atque gustum. Hi enim ad sui conservationem et alterius generationem necessarii sunt, hi sufficiunt. Per gustum conveniens adsciscitur [387v] nutrimentum, quod conveniens non est
sine sensibus, conveniens est nonnulla animalia reperiri

'in organis o/n. Jf Dei Y 'tXW

'offertur Jf

'em., extimabitur JFA^y

*tlW

infinitum ff

322

Chapter 32

21E

But these senses are sufficient for the animals we were referring to, since (fixed as they are to stones and soil like trees) they don't seek food at a distance, but suck nourishment from nearby. They can't avoid things by running away, nor seize hold of them by running up to them. In so far as they can, they turn aside and seize food by their drawing back and reaching out. But nobody would choose the life of such animals. So for these reasons it is obvious the life of pleasure isn't the good itself, since it isn't in itself sufficient; nor would anybody choose it when it is apart from wisdom. Furthermore, it is obvious the life of wisdom isn't the good itself either, because it isn't sufficient in itself. For let it be entirely separated from all pleasure and pain: from pleasure, so that we can see whether it is sufficient in itself; from pain, so that what might be desired perhaps for its own sake isn't avoided because it's in a bad mixture (so that, in avoiding it, we may reject the bad thing mixed with it). We certainly don't seek the understanding itself as the sufficient good when it's devoid of all pleasure. For we
desire to understand, just as

we

desire to feel.
is

Now

just as the

sense

is

related to feeling, so the intellect

related to under-

standing. But, since

to feel

we don't want

to feel indiscriminately, but

what we look for with all the senses so we don't want to understand, to know, to remember, to form an opinion indiscriminately either, but to do it with joy. To understand is to act and to operate. But we avoid acting with pain as a bad thing. However, we are not drawn
with pleasure
fact, pleasure's

in

towards acting without pain or pleasure as that action's indifferent; or, if we've started on it, we soon leave off, having had enough. So what we want to do most is to act with pleasure. Therefore the act of understanding without pleasure is not what we choose most. So it's not sufficient in itself. So it's not the

good itself.
and But that action is utterly an action that is not mixed with passivity or an impediment and that is drawn towards the best object, that is, to what can be utterly in act. Something moves the sense.'" The
itself is act itself,

We demonstrated above that the good

good
act
is

the utterly

the one that

is

utterly

an

act.

Cap.

XXXII
et reliqua

323

reicitur.

Per tactum calor, frigus

quae

vel servare pos-

sunt vel perimere sentiuntur. Sufficiunt autem hi in his, quae

narravimus, animalibus, quoniam instar arborum affixa lapidibus aut terrae procul alimenta non quaerunt, sed cominus alimoniam sugunt. Et quae fugiendo vel accurrendo vitare et capessere nequeunt; retractione' sui et protractione decHnant quoad possunt et capiunt. Horum autem *vitam nemo eligeret. Ex his igitur rationibus patet voluptatis** vitam ipsum bonum non esse, quia ipsa per se non est sufficiens, nee eam quisquam a sapientia separatam eligeret. Quin etiam quod neque sapientiae vita ipsum bonum sit ex eo patet, quia non est per se sufficiens. Separetur enim ab omni penitus voluptate ac dolore: voluptate, ut videamus numquid per se sufficiat; dolore, ne quod per se forte appeteretur mali admixtione vitetur, ut eo vitato malum quod admixtum est declinetur. Certe intelligentiam ipsam omnis voluptatis expertem ut sufficiens bonum non expetimus. Ita enim appetimus intelligere, ut et sentire. Nam sicut se habet sensus ad sentiendum, sic intellectus

ad intelligendum. Cum vero non quomodocumque sentire concupiscamus, sed cum suavitate sentire, id enim per omnes sensus quaerimus, neque etiam intelligere et sapere et meminisse et opinari quomodocumque, sed cum gaudio cupimus. Nempe intelligere agere et operari est. At vero cum dolore agere tamquam malum fugimus. Agere autem cum neutro, nee
dolore, nee voluptate ut indifferens

non adsciscimus,

et si coe-

perimus,^ cito satietate affecti dimittimus.

Quod ergo potissiagere. Non ergo intelligentiae mum petimus est cum voluptate actus sine voluptate optabilissimum.* Non itaque per se sufficiens. Non [388r\ igitur ipsum bonum. In superioribus ipsum bonum actum ipsum esse monstravimus, et bonum esse maxime actum eum qui actus est maxime.
Ilia vero actio maxime actio est quae passioni et impedimento mixta non est, et quae ad obiectum optimum, id est, quod

'retractatione

'percepimus

'expetendissimum

WX

*'**om.

324
sense perceives

Chapter 32
If the thing is

it.

good,

it

then agrees with [our]

nature. For something has to strike the sense as something

can agree [with our nature]. Immediately the sense The feeHng then accords first with the sense's perception, then with the agreement. The agreement is as it were the blind pleasure; so too is the feeHng' s accord. But
before
it

perceives the agreement.

the seeing pleasure

is

in the sense,

when here

it

perceives the

natural agreement of

[its

own] movement with

[our] nature,
is,

and
[its]

there the feeling's accord first with itself (that

with

perception of the agreement), then with the agreement. The

That is, there's the good of [our] nature when agreement of [the sense's] movement with [our] nature. There's the good of the feeling, namely, the said accord. And there's the good of the sense, namely, the perception of both. Note that the feeHng 's accord is not only a quietness deprived of stimulus but an extending and striving towards the good of [our] nature and sense. It's Hke the principle of levity which both moves and stops itself and vehemently directs whatever it has moved and stopped. Read about these things in Olympiodorus. There you'll find pleasure is in the cognitive part also, and so is pain, although for the opposite reason.'" Therefore, let the sense be a potentiality free from passivity, and best prepared to perceive something. Let all external impediments be removed. Let the sense cHng to some excellent object with which it's in accord and which is also perfect and totally an

good is

threefold.

there's the

act, for instance to

a shape or harmony that's perfect, or to

act freely

some
pure,

sweetest flavour. Immediately, the sense's act, being a

unhampered act, wiU

it

and completely. The sense

proceed gladly and it will cHng [to the object] indissolubly. The completeness itself of the pure and
will start to act eagerly,

will

unhampered
act.

act

is

the

same thing

as the perfect act

and

total

Because it proceeds gladly to stop in itself the potentiality which was acting eagerly, it is called pleasure. Therefore completeness of the act and pleasure are the same. But completeness of the act is nothing other than total act. Therefore the same movement is both action and pleasure, although they differ in concept. For action is when the potentiality does something

Cap.

XXXII

325

maxime actu
sentit.
rit

sit,

fertur.
si

Mox illud, Mox

*Aliquid movet sensum; sensus illud bonum, convenit naturae. Prius enim occur-

ut aliquid sensui

quam

ut conveniens. Statim persentit con-

venientiam.
nientiae.

affectus consentit turn persensioni turn conveest

Convenientia

quasi

caeca

voluptas;

similiter

affectus ipsius consensio. Voluptas vero videns est in ipso

sensu,

dum

hinc persentit naturalem motionis convenientiam

cum natura, inde vero consensionem affectus, tum secum, id est, cum ipsa persensione convenientiae, tum cum ipsa convenientia. Hie triplex est bonum: scilicet bonum naturae ut motionis convenientia cum natura; item bonum affectus, scilicet dicta consensio; et bonum sensus, scilicet persensio utraque. Nota
consensionem affectus esse quietem non privativam solum
muli, sed diffusionem et
sicut levitas et
sti-

nixum

in

bonum

naturae sensusque,

movet

et sistit

applicatque vehementer

quod

movit atque firmavit. De his in Olympiodoro, scilicet quod voluptas sit etiam in parte cognitiva, similiter dolor, licet oppositaratione.**
Sit

dum

affecta;

ergo sensus potentia passionis expers optime ad sentienremota sint impedimenta externa; haereat obiecto
'

cuidam optimo

et

consentaneo, quod

et

perfectum

et actus

maxime sit,

ut figurae vel

harmoniae perfectae,

vel sapori alicui^

et

suavissimo. Statim ipsius sensus actus

ditus actus libere et integerrime aget.

tamquam merus
Avide agere

expe-

incipiet sen-

sus, libenter perseverabit, indissolubiliter adhaerebit.

meri

et expediti

actus integritas idem est

quod actus

Haec ipsa ipse comoperantem

igitur

pletus et

maxime

actus. Et quia potentiam avide

libenti perseverantia in se sistit, voluptas dicitur.

Idem

autem actus nihil aliud quam' maxime actus est. Quare motus idem et actio est et voluptas, quamquam differunt ratione. Actio enim est ut per
integritas actus atque voluptas.

Integritas

'extrinseca

WX

'alicuiom.

'quamom.

*'**om.

326

Chapter 32

through movement. Pleasure

ment.
well.

is

when

the potentiaHty, which

is

thus acting gladly with regard to the object, stops in the move-

What we

said about the sense, apply to the intellect as

Completeness in the sense's action is both total act and Each sense aims at the completeness as its highest good. Completeness in the intellect's action is both total act and pleasure, and the intelligence seeks this completeness as its good. Therefore wisdom's operation is not its own good no matter how it works. On the contrary, if it can be with pleasure, it is with pleasure. If it can be complete, it is such. When it is unimpeded, unmixed and joined to the best object, which is the highest act, then it is total act. When the act is total, then there's pleasure. So this, which is in actuality one (but for different reasons) and is mixed in a way from two things, wisdom and pleasure, is the highest good of the intelligence. So it is man's highest good as well, for man uses the
pleasure.
intelligence

and the crown of the

Phaedrus,
the

intelligence as his highest part.

Plato

in

the
this,

Phaedo and the

Theaetetus
10 accepts
it

maintains

and

Aristotle in the Ethics

Book

wilHngly."*
said to be dual. One pleasure is in the act itof knowing: this pleasure is knowing completely, and it's in the knowing power. The other pleasure accompanies knowing: this is in the power of the appetite. The former pleasure is the same as the pure unimpeded act, the latter is the assent of the appetite. The former is in the same genus as knowing, since it belongs to the genus of the limit, as it's the limit of unimpeded knowing. The latter is in the genus of the infinite, since it's the inclining and reaching out of the appetite towards the thing that knowing has decided is good. Plato
self

Now pleasure is

of pleasure into the argument to compare it with the intelligence, for it's the same. Rather, he introduces the second sort (which is in the power of the appetite and is different from knowing) to compare it to knowing.
doesn't bring the
first sort

We

show below that it isn't sufficient in itself, and it's what both we and Plato are referring to here, when we say pleawill

sure isn't sufficient. For the pleasure which

is

present in the

Cap.

XXXII

'ill

potentia aliquid agit; voluptas ut in eo motu circa tale obiectum libenter potentia sic operans conquiescit. Quod in sensu diximus in intellectu quoque intellige dictum. Integritas in actione sensus et actus maxime est et voluptas. Et banc

eum

integritatem quisque' sensus ut

summum

sui

bonum

affectat.

maxime est et voluptas; et banc integritatem^ ut suum' bonum mens expetit. Non ergo sapientiae operatio" quomodocumque se habeat suum' bonum
Integritas in intellectus actione et actus
est.

Immo si cum voluptate sit,

est

cum

voluptate. Si integra
et

sit,

talis est.

Cum

non impedita, non mixta,

cum

obiecto {388v\

optimo qui summus actus est coniungitur, tunc vero est actus maxime. Cum itaque maxime actus est, tunc est voluptas. Hoc igitur quod re ipsa unum est varia quadam* ratione ex duobus quodammodo sapientia et voluptate mixtum, summum mentis est bonum. Ergo et hominis qui mente et mentis capite suprema sui parte utitur. Quod et Plato in Phaedro et Phaedone et Theaeteto vult, et Aristoteles in decimo Ethicorum libenter
accipit.

Verum
actu,
tia.

voluptas duplex esse dicitur.

Una

in ipso cognitionis

quae cognitionis

integritas est, et est in cognoscente potenest. Ilia

Altera cognitionis comes, quae in appetitus potentia

idem est quod merus et expeditus actus; ista est appetitionis assensio. Ilia eiusdem generis cuius cognitio, quia in genere
termini ponitur,

cum

sit

expeditae cognitionis terminus. Ista in

et diffusio appetitus in id

genere

infiniti,

quia est inclinatio

quod cognitione iudicatum est bonum. Illam^ Plato in disceptationem non trahit,* ut cum mente eam comparet, idem enim est. Immo secundam voluptatem, quae est in appetendi potentia et aliud quiddam est quam cognitio, ad cognitionem confert, quam non esse per se sufficientem' infra monstrabimus. Atque de hac et ipse hie intelligit et nos cum sufficientem
esse

negamus.

Nam

quae

in cognitivae potentiae actu inest

'quisquis ff 'quisque sensus a</(/. 'ipsum WJf 'varia quadam om. sensus facientem/or per se sufficientem

^ WX

'summum WA'
'ilium >f

'operatio o/n. A'

'transibit >f

'If reads per

328
act of the cognitive

Chapter 32

power is
is

sufficient, because, as

soon as

this,

the integral

pleasure occurs,

wisdom has been joined

to the

second pleasure which

the assent of the appetite. Therefore,

when

the integral pleasure occurs, the

wisdom of

the

intelli-

gence and the pleasure of the appetite have been mixed

together.

22A

and wisdom
cause
it's

Accordingly, Socrates says here the life mixed from pleasure is desired more than either of them are singly be-

more
it

sufficient.

Also

it's
it

desirable to everybody, befor wisdom's sake, volupit

cause contemplative
tuaries

men

desire

want

as they are

drawn
it

to

for pleasure's sake, the

men

in

between also want

the

as they are

drawn

to

it

on both

counts.

above he concludes animals wouldn't choose were given the choice. Men don't think wisdom is enough without pleasure. The beasts too, if they are aware at all and are given the choice, won't judge
either hfe as sufficient, if they

From

the external pleasure of the

body

is

sufficient

without the
in

a way to wisdom. It is said of the beasts chiefly, because even the men who only live as beasts, that is, are delivered over to the senses, don't consider the most external and silliest pleasure is enough without the unbroken delight of inner
delight of the internal senses, a delight

which pertains

thinking.

22B

So Socrates concludes neither life is the good itself, because is sufficient or perfect. For if either were sufficient, it would have to be chosen before the rest and given precedence by all those who use their reason to dehberate and decide what they
neither

ought to choose. This goes even for the more perfect among the beasts, like dogs, horses, elephants. These animals receive things from the consideration of the inner phantasy over and beyond the external senses. For they seek something from both: to enjoy the delight of the sense and to be delighted by the inner phantasy and memory. This is obvious with monkeys and playful dogs, musical birds and honour-loving horses, the skilful bees and ants. It even appears with plants. Their nature eager as it were for the pleasure of the external

Cap.

XXXII

329

sufficiens est, quia cum primum haec integritas est sapientia coniuncta est cum alia voluptate quae est appetitus assensio. Ubi ergo haec est ex sapientia mentis et appetitus voluptate

facta est mixtio.

Quapropter dicit hie Socrates vitam ex voluptate et sapientia mixtam magis quam utrumlibet illorum expeti, quia sufficientior. Et cuique expetibilis est, quia contemplativi homines
{389r\ ratione

sapientiae

voluptate pellecti
studio tracti.

cam quaerunt, voluptuosi quoque eam cupiunt, medii quoque eandem utriusque
quod neutram vitam ut sufficientem Homines quidem sapientiam sufficientem non putant. Bruta quoque, si id

Ex

superioribus colligit
si

animalia,

optio detur, ehgerent.

sine voluptate ut

persentiant et optio detur, exteriorem corporis voluptatem sine

sensuum interiorum iucunditate, quae ad sapientiam quodammodo pertinet, ut sufficientem minime iudicabunt. Hoc de brutis ob id maxime dicitur, quia etiam homines, qui ut bruta dumtaxat vivunt, id est, sensibus mancipati, voluptatem extimam et
laevissimam illam sine cogitationis interioris continuata iucunditate sufficere

non

arbitrantur.

Per haec concludit quod neutra vita ipsum

neutra sufficiens
ceteris eligenda et
et

bonum

est,

quia

enim sufficiens esset, prae praeponenda esset ab omnibus' qui ratione de

perfecta.
Si

ehgendis consultant atque diiudicant. Immo etiam a brutis perfectioribus, ut canibus, equis, elephantibus, quae praeter sensus
exteriores interioris phantasiae

examine
et

res adsciscunt.

Haec
et

enim utriusque aliquid quaerunt,

sensus iucunditate perfrui

interiori phantasia et memoria delectari. Quod in simiis, et iocosis canibus, musicis avibus, et ambitiosis equis, *artificiosis apibus formicisque** apparet. Immo etiam plantis, quarum

natura quasi exteriorum sensuum voluptatis avida, gustu quasi

'hominibus

WX

'artificio sis opibus formatisque

330

Chapter 32

senses sucks the healthgiving moisture up through the roots and extends the roots out everywhere for the moisture as if by some sense of taste. It turns the leaves towards the sun's heat and embraces the nearest support with little twigs and twines and in creating brings forth the buds as if by some sense of touch. It paints and forms the body with artful shapes and with the countless species and variety of colour as if by some con-

scious art of the inner phantasy.

So you

see that in all things there

is

a certain innate feeling for

both wisdom and pleasure, or rather, that all men seek each one mixed. This goes for the stupid men who are given to sloth or

and those who are given to luxury and avarice; and those who are given to rage; and those who are given to busy reason; and those who are given to
the stomach

who Hve an

indolent

life;

tranquil contemplation.

We

call the first sort vegetables, the

second pigs and asses, the third Uons, the fourth men, and the fifth gods. For they all desire both wisdom and pleasure as far as they can; and they want to possess it through the whole of life as long as they can. But whoever chooses differently, that is, whoever chooses
death, or a troubled life, doesn't do so voluntarily. But either it's through ignorance for instance, the person who devotes himself to some study of life thinking it will be pleasant which at length is troublesome. Or it's through the compulsion of necessity and force for instance, the person who is commanded by a tyrant either to die or to live as a hired man, who chooses the hired life; or the person who is going to die and is told to choose either a cross or an axe, who chooses an axe. Nevertheless, whoever it is who chooses, he always chooses either what's better or less bad. But to choose the less bad instead of what's worse is to choose the good. Plato justifiably used the word choice; for we want the end, and choose those things which contribute to the end. We always want the good. Often we choose what is less bad, as Plato argues in the Gorgias and in the Protagoras. He says the bad is chosen by unhappy necessity, that is, the necessity which is contrary to felicity (which consists

in the highest good). '"

Cap.

XXXII

331

quodam humorem salubrem

radices passim

radicibus sugit, atque ad ilium

protendit;

et

quasi

calorem
titur

vertit folia,

ramusculis et viminibus

quodam tactu ad solis proximum amplec-

sustentaculum, germinaque gignendo producit; et quasi sapienti [55Pv] quadam phantasiae interioris arte artificiosis
figuris,

colorum varietate numerosa specie corpus suum pingit

ac format.

Vides ergo in omnibus esse innatum aliquem utriusque affectum; immo vero homines omnes utrumque mixtum quaerunt: et qui somno et ventri dediti stupidi per inertiam vitam agunt; et qui luxuriae et avaritiae; et qui iracundiae; et qui rationi negotiosae; et qui tranquillae contemplationi. Primos plantas vocamus; secundos porcos et asinos; tertios leones; quartos homines; quintos denique deos. Omnes enim hi utrumque appetunt quoad possunt, et quamdiu possunt per omnem vitam cupiunt
possidere.

Siquis vero aliud quam hoc, id est, vel mortem, vel vitam anxiam elegerit, non sponte istud, sed vel per ignorantiam, puta qui ad studium aliquod vitae se confert putans iucundum esse quod tandem est anxium; vel necessitate et vi coactus, ut qui tyranno iubetur vel mori vel mercenarium vivere eligit mercenariam vitam; vel qui moriturus iubetur vel crucem eligere vel securim securim eligit. Verumtamen quisquis eligit semper vel melius vel minus malum eligit. Minus vero malum ad mains, bonum est. Merito Plato electionis nomine usus est, volumus enim finem. Eligimus quae ad finem sunt. Volumus semper bonum. Eligimus saepe quod minus malum, ut in Gorgia et

Protagora Plato disputat. Electionem mali a necessitate infelici esse dicit, id est, quae contra felicitatem est, quae in bono

summo consistit.

332

Chapter 33

Chapter 33. The good itself is superior to the intelligence. Neither wisdom nor pleasure is the highest good, but rather something they share. This something is totally superior; nevertheless, wisdom is more nearly related to it than pleasure.
22C

From
good.

the argument above Socrates concludes that Philebus'

particular goddess,

namely pleasure,

is

not the same as the

is

He

didn't say goddess in order to maintain pleasure

goddess, for this would be to despise God, but rather to ridicule

Philebus

who had

referred to pleasure as a goddess. Socrates

is

denies here that pleasure

a goddess on the grounds that

pleasure isn't happy. But since he wanted to infer in the

same

conclusion that the intelligence, that

itself

is,

wisdom, also
is

isn't in

the good, [and] since the intelligence

a divine

name he

was not allowed to desecrate, Socrates wanted the assertion to be made by his adversary, Philebus. So Philebus replied, "Socrates, what you're defending, the intelligence, isn't the good itself either. For, as we showed above, it's open to the very same objections as pleasure: it's not sufficient, nor perfect, nor
alone desirable before
all

else."

For some conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing, however, Socrates agreed his intelligence and wisdom are not the good. It's as if he were saying "his" to stress the wisdom which is human and imperfect. For he doesn't possess the complete understanding, nor that pleasure which is the highest repose and
consent of the
cient in itself.
will.

And

therefore the intelligence isn't suffiin order to

show not only what the good is not, but also to indicate some ways for tracking down what the good is, he added that, while he agreed the imperfect intelligence wasn't the good itself, the perfect intelligence behaves otherwise. That is, it is different from the imperfect
However,
intelligence because
it is

happy.
it

Nevertheless, he didn't say

was the good

all

itself,

because

all

things desire the good, but not

things desire the inteUigence.

For not

all

things are capable of attaining the intelligence

vain).

and

wisdom (therefore many things would desire them in

And

Cap.

XXXIII
Neque
sapientia

333

Ipsum bonum
voluptas est

est tnente superius.

neque

sed potius commune quiddam. Potissimum vero superius aliquid, cui tamen sapientia est cognatior quant voluptas. Cap. XXXIIl.^

summum bonum,

Ex

superiori disputatione concludit Socrates

Philebi,^ id est,

voluptas non idem est ac

quod dea ilia bonum. Non dixit

deam, ut affirmaret esse deam, [390r] nam Deum sperneret; ut illuderet Philebum potius, qui deam dixerat voluptatem, quae dea esse hie negatur a Socrate cum beata non sit. Cum autem vellet in eadem conclusione inferre quod neque etiam mens, id est, sapientia per se ipsum sit bonum, id a Philebo adversario pronuntiari voluit quia mens divinum est nomen quod non erat a Socrate temerandum. Intulit ergo Philebus: Neque tua ilia mens, quam tutaris, o Socrates, ipsum est bonum. Nam easdem quas et voluptas, ut supra monstravimus, obiectiones patitur, quod neque sufficiens sit, neque perfecta, neque sola prae ceteris expetenda. Ut autem superioribus aliqua adderetur conclusio, consensit' Socrates mentem et sapientiam suam, id est, sui quasi dicat humanam et imperfectam,* bonum non esse. Nam neque integram habet intelligentiam, neque voluptatem illam quae voluntatis suprema est requies et consensio. Ideoque ipsa per se sufficiens non est. Sed ut non modo quid non sit bonum concluderet, verum etiam vestigia nonnulla ad inveniendum quid bonum sit indicaret, dum negavit mentem imperfectam ipsum

immo

bonum esse, adiecit quod mens perfecta aliter se habet, scilicet, quam imperfecta, quia scilicet beata est. Neque tamen dixit cam ipsum esse bonum, quia omnia bonum appetunt, mentem vero non omnia. Neque enim assequi mentem et sapientiam omnia possunt. Ideo multa eam frustra appeterent. Et ea quae mente carent non omnia mentem adipisci

'fl

break, but

'consentit

no ch. heading W;

in

'imperfectum

X the ch.

is

numbered nineteen

'Phcbi fV

334
not

Chapter 33
all

things which lack the intelligence try to acquire

it.

How-

which have the intelligence don't stop; they keep searching for the good. For to understand is proper to the intelligence. To understand is a particular movement. After this movement, the intelHgence finds itself either better or worse or just as before. It won't be worse, because action is perfection and nothing descends towards the worse except through ignorance or coercion. It won't be the same as before, for what accomplishes nothing is moved in vain, and nothing is moved towards something it already has. So it is moved in order to be better. So it isn't the good itself, for nothing is better than the good. Moreover, we seek wisdom and intelligence because of
ever, those

reason's impulse alone, but

we

seek the

good before reason

is

provides any incentive at

all.

For the same reasons

gence. Firstly,
it's

it's

obvious the good

above the
all

intelli-

because, in the process of desiring,

all

things

are turned back towards the good, but not

things are turned

back towards the intelligence. But the point towards which things are turned back is the point they started out from. So all things start out from the good, but not all things start out from the intelligence. So not the intelHgence, but the good is the first cause of all. Secondly, it's because the natural appetite of men is each and always for the good, but not each and always for the intelligence. So the natural appetite values the good more highly than it does the intelligence. Therefore the good is adjudged by natural instinct to be of more value and therefore of greater excellence than the intelHgence. Thirdly, it's because the intelligence imbibes goodness in the process of understanding (since it finds itself better). But it imbibes from elsewhere. If it had goodness in itself, there'd be no need of the movement, no need to profit from action. What it imbibes goodness from is the good itself, which is above the intelligence (since it pours the
liquor of
its

perfection into the intelligence).

So Socrates didn't caH the intelligence, though perfect, the good itself, since something else prior to the intelligence is the good. But he did say the intelligence was blessed when he said it was better than his own intelHgence.

Cap.
student.

XXXIII

335

bonum
gere

Quae vero mentem habent nondum cessant, sed adhiic quaerunt. Mentis enim proprium est intelligere. Intelliest.

motus quidam

Aut post hunc motum melius

se

mens

habet, aut deterius, aut aeque.

tio est et

Non

deterius, quia actio perfec-

ad deterius

nihil,

{390v\ nisi aut vi aut inscitia,

enim movetur quod nihil proficit, et nihil ad id quod habet movetur. Ergo ut melius se habeat movetur. Non igitur ipsum bonum est, nihil enim bono mehus. Quin
labitur.

Non aeque,

frustra

etiam sapientiam mentemque ex solo' rationis impulsu petimus, bonum autem etiam ante omne rationis incitamentum.
lisdem rationibus patet bonum esse supra mentem. Primo sic omnia appetendo convertuntur ad bonum, non ad mentem

omnia. Quo vero conversio est, illinc et processio. Omnia ergo a bono procedunt, non a mente omnia. ^ Quare non mens, sed bonum est^ causa* prima *omnium. Secundo sic appetitus hominum naturalis omnis et semper ad bonum, non omnis et

semper ad mentem; pluris ergo facit bonum quam mentem.** Igitur naturah instinctu bonum mente pretiosius, et idcirco emi-

mens intelligendo haurit bonitatem, Aliunde autem haurit. Si enim in se haberet, non esset niotu opus ut agendo proficeret. Illud unde haurit bonitatem ipsum bonum est, quod et supra eam est, cum in eam perfectionis suae liquorem infundat. tQuare mentem licet perfectam ipsum bonum esse non dixit, cum et aliud quid dam sit bonum et ante mentem. Sed beatam esse eam innuit, dum dixit melius se habere quam suam.jt
nentius iudicatur. Tertio sic
sese melius habeat.

cum

^xAoom.WX
and t-tt

*OTaa\&om.WX
margin W;

(cont.) inserted in

in

'If onrf A' reorf Quare bonum non mens est both cases we have the scribe's normal hand

'e&W

336
In fact, the
itself.

Chapter 33

good

creates the intelligence immediately next to

it is

This intelligence, since

the prime intelligence,

is

the
it

total intelligence.
is

Therefore
It's

it's

the true intelligence, because

it

pure and entire.

also divine, because

has always been

shaped by God. This intelligence creates our soul. The soul, since it is born from the intelligence, has part of the intelligence. But because it falls away from the intelligence and turns towards matter, it's not the entire, the pure intelligence, but the intelligence which is in the soul and is part of the soul (the soul
possesses

beyond the

intelligence: opinion, sense

is

ductive nature). So the soul's intention

entirely directed to the intelligence but

and the pronot always and

to bodily
closest to

more often
is

objects.

But since the

intelligence's nature
it

appropriate to the good (as

since
it's

and was created next by the good) and

the receptacle of blessedness, the soul won't accept

till its

total blessedness

other powers and functions have been

abandoned and it has been turned back with its whole intent towards the intelligence, its chief part, and been made in a way into the total intelligence alone. Then the soul will be the true and divine intelligence, that is, the first intelligence born immediately from God; and it will drink down the fullness of the good and be blessed. In this true, divine intelligence, surely, the most abundant blessedness is present. Because it's wisdom's total act, pleasure is innate in it. And so such wisdom is the sufficient good. There's no need for another, external pleasure to accompany it, because whatever's there is the intelligence: there isn't one power for willing and another for understanding (otherwise, to attain sufficiency, the will would have to assent to the understanding, and thus the appetite's pleasure would have to be united to the understanding's pleasure). It's obvious the power for wiUing isn't different there, because the will which does differ from the intellect is what stimulates [us] to attain the good with the understanding. But full possession of the good resides there where the intelligence, which is the closest receptacle of the good, is total and alone. Such is the blessedness of the prime intelligence and the blessedness of the soul, when with its whole intent it has been

Cap.

XXXIII
creat.

337

flpsum quidem bonum mentem proxime

Haec mens,

quia prima est mens, tota mens est. Ideo vera est mens, quia pura et integra. Est et divina, quia semper a Deo formata. Mens ista nostram gignit animam, quae prout a mente nascitur mentis

habet partem, quia vero a mente degenerat et ad mater iam vertitur, non tota et pura mens est, sed mens in anima atque
pars animae habentis ultra

mentem opinionem, sensum

et

naturam. Idcirco intentio animae non omnis semperque ad mentem, sed ad corpora plurimum.ft Cum vero mentis natura, quia proxime a bono creata, proximum sit et proprium boni, et beatitudinis receptaculum, beatitudinem integram anima non prius accipiet, quam reliquis potentiis et officiis praetermissis tota sui intentione in mentem sui caput
gignendi

conversa

fuerit,' tota et sola

erit

quodammodo mens

effecta.

anima vera
et

nata, bonique hauriet

et divina, ut mens prima statim copiam eritque beata. In hac utique vera divina mente plenissima^ beatitudo inest. Quia sapientiae

mens

Tunc ex Deo

actus integer cui est innata voluptas. Ideoque sapientia huius-

cemodi

sufficiens
sibi

exteriorem

bonum est. Nee opus est voluptatem aliam comitem adhibere, quia quicquid [391r\ ibi est^

mens

est.

Nee

est ibi alia volendi potentia, intelligendi alia, ut

ad sufficientiam consequendam voluntatem intelligentiae assentiri, atque ita voluptatem appetitus cum intelligentiae voluptate coniungi. Quod autem volendi potentia ibi diversa non sit patet, quia voluntas quae ab intellectu differt stimulus est ad bonum intelligentia consequendum; ibi autem boni est adimpleta possessio, ubi tota ac sola mens est quae boni
necesse
sit

est

proximum receptaculum.

quidem est beatitudo primae mentis et beatitudo animae, cum tota erit in mentem intentione transfusa. Quo loco
Talis

'sunt [?]

'et

normal hand

add.

'est

om.

(cont.)

^-Wserted

in

margin

in the scribe's

338

Chapter 33

poured into the intelligence. The souls of the spheres, whose whole intent is directed towards the intelligence, are always in that condition. For they don't move the heavens by busy intention but by the supereminent power of the essence and the seeds. But the soul's blessedness, in so far as it's a human soul, is compounded both from the understanding (which is entire to the extent that it can belong to the soul which is busy ruling the body) and from the consent of the will and each appetite. This consent
is

external pleasure. It's necessary for

human

sufficiency, so that

there should be

no

internal sedition, but all the parts should in

one way or another come together into one to possess the one gift of blessedness. In this book [Plato] often mentions the soul's human felicity which is in the first degree of wisdom, that is, in the evening vision of the good, in the splendour cast by the good itself. But the inteUigence's divine fehcity is in the second degree of wisdom; it's the morning vision of the good, in the very light of the good.'^* The morning vision Plato sometimes
secretly points to in this dialogue, but he argues at length, there-

fore pubhcly, about the evening vision. But

neither the Hfe of

now he's shown that

the

wisdom nor

pleasure

is

good

itself,

Soc-

22D

is more them because it's more sufficient. He says he will not fight to take away the palm of victory from the shared life, or to set up wisdom alone in front of it. However, he didn't mention pleasure, because it's the duty of Philebus and Protarchus to make such a concession for pleasure; and also because it's been demonstrated very clearly above that pleasure isn't enough. But now Socrates will prepare for the second comparison. Here the problem is to find out, since it's apparent neither of them is the supreme good, which one is nearer to it and occupies second position. But Socrates suggests questions, he promises, encourages, and prepares. Finally, he'll take up the comparison proposed in the fifth section of the book. He says in the comparison perhaps one of them will defend the intelligence. To show it's closer to

rates concludes the shared life

excellent than either of

the highest [good], this person will maintain that the intelligence is mainly the reason why the shared life is the good. But the per-

son

who defends pleasure will do the same for pleasure.

Cap.

XXXIII

339

intentio.

semper sphaerarum animae sunt, quarum tota in mentem est Neque enim intentione negotiosa coelos movent, sed

supereminenti essentiae et seminum potestate. Beatitude autem animae, quantum' anima est^ humana, composita est ex intelligentia, eatenus integra quatenus

animae regendo corpori occupatae competere potest, et voluntatis appetitusque omnis consensione,

quae exterior

est

voluptas.

Quae consensio ad
ut

humanam
seditio, sed

sufficientiam necessaria est,

nulla interior

sit

omnes

partes

quoquomodo

in

unum

beatitudinis possidendum. De animae felicitate ut plurimum hoc in libro loquitur, quae est in primo illo sapientiae gradu, in boni scilicet visione vespertina,

munus unum

concurrant ad hac humana

boni ipsius splendore. Divina vero ilia mentis felicitas in secundo sapientiae gradu, matutina boni visio est in boni luce, quam nonnumquam hoc in dialogo clam significat. De alia vero latissime disputat, palam' igitur/ lam vero, cum ostenderit
in

neutrum ipsum esse bonum, concludit Socrates quod communis

vita praestantior est

Quam

istorum alterum, quia sufficientior,

vitae

dicitque

minime

se

pugnaturum quo palmam communi

{391v] auferat, eique solam' sapientiam anteponat.

tate vero subticuit,
sio pertinet, ac

De

volup-

quia ad Philebum et Protarchum ea concesetiam quia liquidius demonstratum fuit in supesufficere.

rioribus

eam nequaquam

Mox
sit

vero ad secundam
pateat neut-

comparationem illam

se praeparabit, in qua,

propinquius inquirendum. Movet autem est quaestiones, pollicetur, exhortatur, et praeparat. Exsequetur demum comparationem propositam in quinta libri particula. In ea inquit forsan comparatione, qui partem mentis tutabitur, ut eam summo propinquiorem ostendat, asseverabit mentem potissimum causam esse ut commune id bonum sit; qui vero voluptatis voluptatem/
esse

rum

summum, utrum

illorum

cum summo

secundamque obtineat sortem

'inquantum

'solum erit utrumvis

WX

^esl om. 'em., palmam A" y,om. *Quare ex communi concessione neutrum ex his ipsum horum pro vario iudicantium arbitratu add. fV

WX

erit

'igitur om. bonum; boni vero causa

340

Chapter 33

But one mustn't persist in such partisan attitudes, for the perone thing comes eventually from the one, and the perfection of a compound thing from what is simple. And so some one thing must be placed above the compound life, so that there can be one something common to the parts given to this hfe and both the parts can be good and the whole can be good. Certainly, it is to this one thing that you have to compare wisdom and pleasure. Thus we'll see which is the better; for what is more nearly related to the one cause will be the better. Such will be the right way to make the comparison. Socrates says, "I'd
fection of
certainly fight against Philebus to affirm that the intelligence
is

one thing than pleasure whatever this thing is that makes the mixed life exist as good and eligible." He said the mixed life is good relative to itself (as it's almost perfect), eligible relative to the appetite (as it's almost totally desirable). He said the intelligence is closer to the good, that is, nearer to its genus, and more like it, that is, more in agreement with its property. This will be demonstrated subsequently. However, if we agree, in first place we'll put what endows the compound life with perfection, in second the comcloser to
like the

and more

pound

life,

in third the intelligence, in fourth the intelligence's

participation in the soul's processes of reasoning, in fifth,

finally, pleasure.

22E

Socrates adds that,

This will be obvious at the end of the book. if any credence is to be given to his (that is, a
is,

human)

intelligence, for the present (that

before he has

what the proposal is), this is the way such things must be decided. It's as if he were saying, "Perhaps you don't believe me at the moment, until I give you the reason.
rationally demonstrated
I'll

certainly give
it is

you the reason when

come

to

it.

Meanwhile,

accept

so,

having put your trust in what [my] intelligence

anticipates (the very intelligence Philebus has scorned).

The

intelligence certainly excels pleasure principally because of the

fact that, as you can see for yourself, we're now deliberating about the intelligence and pleasure through the power and the light of the intelligence itself. But we're not inquiring into either pleasure or wisdom through the light of pleasure, which is blind itself (for the appetite is bhnd too). So who will doubt the

Cap.

XXXIII

341

Neque tamen in his partibus insistendum, unius enim perfecab uno tandem, et compositi a simplici manat. Atque ideo aliquod unum supra compositam banc vitam est ponendum,' quo^ vitae huic datum unum aliquid partibus commune sit, quo et bonae partes et totum sit bonum. Ad quod unum certe sapientiam et voluptatem comparare decet. Atque ita videbimus quid ex his melius sit, quod enim uni causae cognatius id mehus. Atque hie erit rectus comparandi modus. Certe ego,' inquit Socrates, adversus Philebum pugnarem affirmaturus mentem esse
tio

quam voluptatem, quicquid mixta bona et eligenda existit. Bonam dixit, quoad^ se ipsam quasi perfectam; eligendam, [392r\ quoad appetitum quasi maxime expetendam.' Mentem dixit cognatiorem bono, id est, eius generi propinquiorem, et similiorem, id est, eius proprietati magis convenientem; quod in
illi

uni cognatiorem et similiorem

illud sit

quo

vita haec

sequentibus ostendetur.

Quod

si*

constiterit,

primo loco pone-

quod compositae vitae perfectionem tribuit; secundo compositam vitam; tertio mentem; quarto mentis participaillud

mus

tionem in discursibus animae; quinto denique voluptatem, ut in fine huius Hbri patebit. Addit Socrates ita esse de his iudicandum, siquid suae, id est, humanae, menti credendum est, in praesentia, id est, antequam ratione quod propositum est demonstret; quasi dicat, Forte mihi nunc non creditis' prius quam afferam rationem. Afferam certe loco suo. Interim ita
esse ponite, vaticinio mentis confisi, mentis eius

quam Philebus*

quae certe voluptati praestat ex eo maxime quod, ut mentis ipsius vi ac lumine et de mente et de voluptate consultamus. Lumine autem voluptatis, quae ipsa caeca est, nam et appetitio caeca, neque de voluptate neque de sapientia
spreverat,

nunc

cernitis,

'ponendam >f
expetendissimam

qq f; a
*si si

quo A'J'
'credis

'ergo

'quod ad
'Philebi

'W and X read qazsi

342

Chapter 33

intelligence excels pleasure

isn't

when

it

so judges pleasure that

it

judged by pleasure at all?" After this Protarchus accepted Socrates' first conclusion (derived from the first comparison), namely, that neither pleasure nor the intelligence is the good itself. He says pleasure has fallen, struck down by Socrates' arrows, that is, by reasons, and is now so prostrate it can no longer contend for the first
23

prize

among

the goods; for pleasure surrenders

and

lies

van-

quished. But in the judgement of those who know, the intelligence won't lay claim to the first victory either, since, if it tried to, the same things can be objected to it as to pleasure, namely,

and imperfect. (I am referring to the which is part of the soul.) Granted this, human intelligence, Protarchus encourages Socrates to pursue the other comparison, that is, the one where Socrates shows which one is the better (especially since he is going to demonstrate pleasure is inferior). Protarchus says, *'This will benefit men's life. For, since people value pleasure most highly, they're caught by it, like fishes by a hook,'" and they sink into vices. Tor the snake lies hidden in the grass."'* If you can show she occupies the lowest place among good things, men will despise her, and live more temperately and justly. If she's deprived of the second
it is

insufficient in itself

23B

men who now love her because they think her a wonderful thing will despise her because they'll see she is ignoble." But Socrates, before entering the argument, warns us we ought to strive for victory as modestly as possible, so that we should study to defeat the adversary rather than extinguish him. For it is proper to human beings to search for the highest good without destroying another. And so Socrates pretended he thought Protarchus had said those things in order to frighten him away from the contest, so that he wouldn't offend the many followers of pleasure. Socrates said, "Is it not better then to let pleasure go, and not pain her with an exacting scrutiny?" Protarchus said, "Nonsense!" Again, as he usually does, Socrates pretended not to understand. So he said, "Perhaps you're censuring me, because I talked about paining pleasure, which is an impossibility. For contraries don't admit each other,
prize as well, the

Cap.

XXXIII

343

quaerimus. Quis igitur dubitet quin mens voluptati excellat,

quae

ita

earn iudicat ut ab ea

minime iudicetur?
scilicet quod neque neque mens, dicens quod voluptas

Acceptavit posthaec Protarchus conclusionem Socratis pri-

mam prima ilia ex' comparatione inductam,

voluptas ipsum
est

bonum

est,

Socratis iaculis, id est, rationibus, percussa concidit et prostrata

usque adeo ut de palma prima bonorum non ultra contendat. Succumbit enim et iacet. Sed neque mens, eorum iudicio qui
sapiunt, sibi

primam victoriam
imperfecta.
est.

vendicabit,^ quia,
scilicet,

si

id temptet,

eadem
per se

sibi

obicientur quae voluptati,

quod

insufficiens

sit et

Mentem

[392v\

humanam

dico quae

His acceptis Socratem ad comparationem alteram exhortatur, scilicet in qua ostendit^ quid ex his melius sit, praesertim cum ostensurus sit voluptatem esse inferiorem. Proderit sane" hoc hominum vitae. Nam quia voluptatem plupars animae
rimi faciunt, ab ea capiuntur
vitia

tamquam

pisces

ab hamo,
si

et in

delabuntur.

Nam

latet anguis in herba.

Quam,

osten-

deris in bonis

locum infimum obtinere, contemnent temperatiodixit, si

resque et iustiores vivent. Ideo

etiam secundis privetur'

honoribus, homines qui nunc

rates vero,

eam amant, quia rem praeclaram

existimant, contemnent, quia esse ignobilem recognoscent. Soc-

antequam hanc discussionem ingrediatur, admonet modesti in victoriae contentione esse debeamus, ut vincere studeamus adversarium potius quam extinguere. Humanitatis enim est bonum summum* sine alterius interitu
nos

quam

quaerere. Ideoque dissimulavit quasi suspicaretur Protarchum

ea dixisse ut

eum

a pugna absterreret, ne multos voluptatis sec-

tatores offenderet. Praestatne, inquit,

eam

dimittere,

neque

exacta redargutione affligere? Id quidem Protarchus renuit. Dissimulavit rursus

more suo

Socrates, quasi

non

intelligeret.
dixi.

Ait ergo, Reprehendis

me

forte,

quod

affligi

voluptatem

'ex om. 'suum

WX

'iudicabit

'ostendat

WX

'quippe

WX

'privcntur

344
because,

Chapter 33

when one draws

I

near, the other either immediately

is,

perishes or goes away. Therefore, where pain

pleasure

is

absent. But

didn't

mean

pleasure

is

pained, but that her fol-

lowers are."
to

Why did

Socrates pretend
in order to

seem kinder to them;

final struggle unwillingly; in

all this? It was in order seem to be entering on the order to avoid their envy and

will. (He advises us to make sure of doing the Protarchus recalled Socrates, who was in a way same.) So making off. Protarchus said, "It wasn't only because of your argument I said you were talking nonsense, but also because

capture their good

you seem to be ignoring the fact that we aren't going to let you go until you've proved all this rationally, not just left it with us on trust." Here Plato is instructing young men in the attitude with which they ought to inquire into, pray for and extract the learning of their seniors. So Socrates does not approach the contest willingly, but provoked in a way, as is proper; for he was beseeched to start with, then coerced. (He is not coerced when he teaches, but he is coerced when he gives offence.) Therefore at the beginning he wins their indulgence and makes them attentive, when he says the following discussion will be particularly full and must be pursued by a new approach (as it isn't easy to resolve using the present reasoning). They need other reasons and other weapons to win a favourable victory for the intelligence and wisdom. This is because, in order to make the comparison between wisdom and pleasure, first you have to have defined each one and each one's genus and discovered the difference, and also distributed each one into its parts. The more such knowledge is distinct from the knowledge you had first, the more diligent an examination it needs. Therefore Socrates says they need new stratagems, although among those we've already mentioned there are some which will do again: for instance, the idea that the intelligence is more Hke the third good thing, and what was said about the finite and the infinite. These are things he has touched on above and they will have to
be discussed in what's to follow so that the genus of wisdom and the genus of pleasure can be tracked down. Therefore, having asked for indulgence because of the difficulty of

Cap.

XXXIII

345

quod impossibile est; contraria enim se invicem non recipiunt, uno enim accedente, statim alterum vel interit vel discedit. Ubi ergo afflictio est, voluptas abest. Ego vero non affligi voluptatem, sed eius sectatores intelligebam. Cur haec dissimulat Socrates? Ut mitior his appareat, ut ad extremum certamen
invitus descendere videatur,

ut invidiam [393r\ vitet, captet

benevolentiam. Ita certe nos facere monet. Revocavit ergo Protarchus Socratem quodammodo fugientem, dicens, Non ob id

tantum
nos
te

te nihil dicere

asserebam, sed etiam quia ignorare videris

non antea dimissuros quam ista ratione non fide declares. Ubi iuvenes admonentur quanto oportet affectu doctrinam
seniorum
exquirant,
exorent,

extorqueant.

Accedit

ergo

Socrates ad

eam pugnam non

sponte, sed ut decet,

quodam-

enim primo deinde coactus. Non coactus docet, sed coactus offendit. Captat ergo veniam imlacessitus, exoratus

modo

primis et attentos reddit,

dum

dicit

confertissimam esse sequen-

tem disputationem et nova quadam via peragendam, quia' non facile sit per praesentem rationem eam transigere, sed aliis opus sit rationibus et iaculis ad victoriam secundam menti et sapientiae vendicandam. Quia scilicet ad comparationem sapientiae et voluptatis inter se faciendam, opus est definisse^ utrumque
prius et genus utriusque et differentiam invenisse, in partes quin

etiam distribuisse suas utrumque.

distinctior est

Quae quidem

cognitio

quo

eo diligentiori examine indiget. Ideo dicit novis esse opus machinamentis, quamquam inter ea quae iam diximus nonnulla sunt quae ad futura conducant: ut quod
dictum' est
infinitum.

quam prima

mentem similiorem bono tertio, Quae in superioribus tetigit, quae et

et voluptatis

et

finitum et

in sequentibus

ad genus sapientiae

investigandum discutienda sunt. Statim ergo petita venia ex rerum difficultate, capta

'qui

'defuisse

'for

quod dictum

W reads addictam

346

Chapter 34

everything, having caught their attention because of the novelty

23C

and variety of the argument, and having made them wilUng to Hsten mainly because he had said some of the present and past ideas will do again, Socrates added, "So, there still has to be a fight, does there?" Protarchus says nothing can prevent it. Socrates warned them on the spot they would have to show great
care in establishing the principles of each thing, since the

way

What seem to be and narrow beginning are multiplied in the course of the many, broad intermediary steps. For instance, at the crossroads you go wrong by just a small distance, then the more you proceed the greater the deviation. So Socrates says, "While we're laying the foundations of this argument, let's take great care to accept only the good things, to use the greatest caution in sorting out the things we introduce, and
everything else follows
is

derived from them.

trifling deviations in the small

to distinguish everything very clearly."

be some one simple understanding and pleasure. The conditions which make this compound blessed. Also, the reason why the understanding
Chapter
34.

The ultimate end has

to

thing.

How it is put into a compound made from the

excels pleasure.

Before we come to the fifth part of the book, we must think about some of the things discussed above. Plato seems to be putting the ultimate end of life in wisdom and pleasure together. This is what he seems to argue from what precedes and to conclude from what follows. But the end has to be one thing, not many things. Were there two ends, either each would move the appetite equally, or unequally. If unequally, the one which moves more is the end, the other one contributes to the
end. If equally, the appetite
is

similarly

and equally drawn

towards them both. This similar and equal response is the result of the similar and equal nature of the person desiring. But a similar and equal nature hurries towards what is similar and equal. So things are not equally desired in so far as they are

'

Cap. XXXIIII

347

attentione ex novitate et varietate sermonis, et docilitate incepta

per hoc

maxime quod
ait ille.

ait

aliqua ex praesentibus et praeteritis ad

futura conferre, adiecit,

Nonne

ergo iam pugnandum. Nihil

sit

prohibet

Monuit

[iPiv] Socrates iUico quanta

cuius-

que rei principiis dihgentia adhibenda, cum ex eis omnium sequentium trahatur conditio, et quae minima in exiguo et angusto principio videntur esse dehcta, in plurimis et latis mediis propagentur. Ut error in bivio parvo distat intervallo, eo deinde distat magis quo ultra proceditur. Ideo, inquit, dum sermonis huius fundamenta iaciemus, omni studio annitamur ut bene accipiamus et maxima cautione quod inducimus discerna-

mus et plane admodum distinguamus.

Finis ultimas
voluptate, et
faciant.

unum aliquid et simplex modo ponatur in composito quodam

esse debet, et quo-

ex intelligentia et

quae conditiones compositum hoc beatum Item qua ratione intelligentia superet voluptatem. Cap. XXXIIII.'

Antequam ad quintam
sapientiam

libri

partem veniamus, quaedam ex

superioribus discutienda censemus. Plato finem vitae ultimum

et voluptatem simul ponere videtur, ut ex superioribus significare et sequentibus videtur concludere. Finis autem

unum quiddam

esse debet non plura. Sint duo, aut aeque appetitum movet utrumque, aut non aeque. Si non aeque, illud unum quod magis movet finis est, aliud est ad finem. Si aeque,
similiter pariterque
iste

ad utrumque
et simili

afficitur appetitus. Affectus

par

et similis

a pari

natura est appetentis ipsius. Par

et simile rapit. Non igitur quantum^ diversa sunt appetuntur aeque, sed quantum" una quaedam

autem similisque natura ad par

'

5 LevXafieioO at

signincat: bene cauteque accipere et distinguere

'a

componitur enim ex
is

ei)

5 id Xaid^dv CO. add X

'''inquantum

WX

break but no ch. heading

W; in X ch.

numbered twenty

348

Chapter 34

some one nature they share in common through which they are similar and equal and demanded in a similar and equal way. So what's being demanded is one thing. So there's one end. Moreover, each one thing seeks
different, but in so far as there's

an end that which contains its entire good. Therefore, if each thing looks for two things, its entire good must be contained in them. So either of the two things has either the whole good, or just a part. If either of them has the whole good, one of them is enough; and since every first movement begins initially for the
as

looks for nothing further when it arrives at the one. If either of the two ends has a part of the good, there won't be two ends, but one end which is the result of them both. sake of the one,
it

Again, the person desiring them either decides the two things are equally good, or he decides they are unequally good. If unequally, the one he decides is the better he'll desire more vehemently. But that one will be the end. If equally, he'll either decide they are equally good in so far as they differ, or in so far as they agree. It will not be in so far as they differ, for difference does away with equahty. (It is agreement in a nature and

power which produces equality.) Therefore he decides they are equally good in so far as they agree. If they agree, they agree over some one nature and power. Because of it, both are equally good. Therefore the appetite looks for one thing. For just as there is one outstanding part and one bdng to each thing, although it is made from many parts, so there is one outstanding power. Also there's one outstanding appetite, one outstanding result. Therefore there's one outstanding end towards which the one movement of [its] one being and nature is directed. Moreover, every single thing seeks as its end its own perfection. But of [its] one being there is a certain one perfection. Therefore it desires one end. For though it seeks many other things, it reduces them to this one perfection. So this is their one
end.

As the end of each thing has to be one, just as the beginning has to be one too, man's end has to be one. Therefore, how can
be two, pleasure and wisdom? These two aren't the end if they're separate, because neither is sufficient. But when they are
it

Cap. XXXIIII
natura communis est
et pariter similiterque

349
paria et similia sunt ergo est quod quaeritur.

in'

utrisque per

quam

petuntur.

Unum

Unus itaque finis. Praeterea unumquodque ut finem petit quod totum suum continet bonum. Si ergo duo petit, oportet in^ eis^ totum illius contineri bonum. Aut ergo quod vis illorum totum
habet, aut quodvis partem. Si quodvis totum,

quia omnis primus {394f\ motus ad

unum sat est; et unum primo incipit, cum

ex utrisque resultat. Item

ad

unum

pervenerit, nihil quaeret ulterius. Si quodvis partem,

fines erunt, sed

non duo

unum quod

bona ilia duo iudicat qui appetit, aut non aeque. Si non, quod melius iudicat vehementius appetit. Illud autem erit
aut aeque
finis. Si aeque, aut quantum* differunt iudicat aeque bona, aut quantum' conveniunt.* Non quantum^ differunt, differentia enim aequalitatem tollit; convenientia* in natura et potestate praestat aequalitatem. Ergo quantum' conveniunt aeque iudicat bona. Si conveniunt, in una quadam natura et potestate conve-

niunt, per

quam

quamquam ex pluribus constitutae, una pars est praecipua et unum esse, ita vis una praecipua. Una quoque praecipua appetitio, unum opus
dam
appetitio quaerit.
rei,

utraque aeque sunt bona. Nam sicut cuiusque

Unum

igitur quid-

praecipuum; unus ergo

sui ipsius

finis

praecipuus quo unius'" esse

et

naturae motus dirigitur unus. Praeterea

perfectionem expetit.

unumquodque ut finem Unius autem esse una quaedam

perfectio est.

Unum

igitur

appetit finem.

Nam

etsi

multa

quaerit alia, ad

unam banc

reducit perfectionem.

Haec itaque

ceterorum unus est finis. Cum igitur cuiusque rei

finis

unus esse debeat,

sicut et princi-

pium unum, necesse est ut hominis unus sit finis. Quo pacto igitur duo? Voluptas et sapientia. Non duo haec finis sunt, si seiuncta sunt, quia neutrum sufficit, sed cum coniuncta unum

'mom.W
cat

^aom.X

'ds owi.

A"; cius

*'''''*inquantum fTA"

'aeque iudi-

bona adtf. H^

'aamadd.X

"unus If

350
joined they

Chapter 34

make one thing. One compound made from both of

it is

proper for one compound thing to be the end for the soul, because the soul too is one compound thing made from the power which knows and the power which desires. From the first it has its need for wisdom, from the second for pleasure. But one thing results from them, the one thing that comes from both powers. Or rather,
is

them

the end, because

sufficient.

But

it's

two powers are reduced to the soul's one essence to them both, so wisdom and pleasure, when they've been joined together, have one thing in common. Because of it each is good and both are the good and the end for man. Accordingly, the one compound is the end because of the one which is in the compound. Or rather, there is one thing in the compound and because of it the compound is called "the end" and "the good." It is the sufficient and outstanding "end" and it is man's "good." What is this one thing? It isn't wisdom, because if the whole compound were good because of wisdom, the whole power and rational principle of the good would dwell in wisdom. In that case wisdom would be sufficient by itself. For the same reason it isn't pleasure. It isn't both together, because each one would either contribute the whole good, or each would separately contribute part of the good. If each contributes the whole good, one of them is enough. If each one separately contributes part of the good and therefore contributes to the one good, either they contribute to that one good in so far as they differ, or in so
just as the

which

is

common

far as they agree. In so far as they differ, they don't contribute

to

one thing, but to different things. Therefore, when they agree

is

over one thing, they contribute to one thing. Therefore there

some one thing in them both and through its power they work for the one good of man. The one thing whose power brings this about is more outstanding than either of them and more outstanding than both together; and it is the one end of the one soul. But above this one thing, which is in the compound and in something else, is the one which is the simplest of all things and above them all. The one thing in the compound derives from it. The one which is above all is called both the one itself and act

Cap.XXXIIII
faciunt.

351

utrisque compositum finis est, quia autem animae unum compositum finis est, quia** et ipsa unum quiddam compositum est ex ea quae cognoscit potentia, atque ea quae appetit. Ex ilia sapientiam

Unum

ex

*sufficiens. Merito

unum fit, ut ex utraque potentia unum. {394v] Immo vero quemadmodum duae potentiae ad unam animae essentiam reducuntur utrisque communem, ita sapientia et voluptas invicem iuncta' unum quiddam habent commune ratione cuius utrumque bonum est, et ambo ipsum bonum hominis atque finis. Unum itaque compositum finis gratia unius quod in composito est. Immo illud unum in composito potius per quod compositum dicitur finis et bonum
postulat, ex alia voluptatem, sed ex his

hominis bonum. Quid unum hoc? Non sapientia, quia si ratione eius totum hoc esset bonum, tota vis in ea boni ratioque consisteret. Ipsa ergo sola sufficeret. Non etiam voluptas hac eadem ratione. Non utrumque simul, quia vel quaeque totum praestant bonum, vel singula boni partem. Si quaeque totum, unum sat est. Si singula partem boni, atque ita ad unum conducunt bonum, aut
et sufficiens finis

praecipuus est

et

quantum

differunt ad id

unum

conferunt, aut quantum* con-

quantum differunt non ad unum sed ad diversa conducerent. Ad unum ergo conferunt, ut in uno conveniunt. Unum igitur quiddam est in' utrisque cuius unius vi ad* unum
veniunt. In

hominis

bonum perducunt. Unum

illud, cuius vi istud efficitur,

praestantius est utrisque, praestantius est

ambobus, unusque

est

animae unius finis. Sed et super hoc unum quod

in

composito

est et in alio est

unum quod
quod est
in

simplicissimum

et

super omnia, a quo et

unum hoc

composito manat.

ipsum et ipse actus dicitur, actum huic composito praebet; aprimo bono secundum bonum.

Unum quod super omnia et unum ut alias disputavimus. Unum igitur

'cuncta

Mnquantum

WX

'in

om.

'id fV

*-**om.

352

Chapter 34

as we've argued elsewhere. So it gives one act to the compound. From the first good derives the second good. This one gift of God is our good. The habitation and the temple where we receive and preserve the gift is the mixture from wisdom and pleasure. The temple's foundations are the intellect and the will. For we can't seize hold of the highest good except with the highest part of ourselves. The highest part is a certain unity, the crown of the soul, and this, the soul's head, is Hfted by two wings and flies to the one good itself. For it explores and looks around with the intellect and searches out with the will; it seizes hold with the intellect and retains with the will. When the intellect seizes hold, it is wisdom, that is, understanding; when the will clings on, it is pleasure. The ultimate end always corresponds to the first mover, because what moves moves for its own sake. For victory corresponds to the general; the intermediary steps between the general and victory correspond to his subordinates. For the end for every single thing subsequent to the general is some limited objective; for the general the end is the ultimate end perfected through the limited objectives. However, the first thing is what moves the soul towards the one good. That unity is the soul's "head." For in the Phaedrus it is written: "The souls which were about to be blessed raised their head above the heavens." Plato also refers to it as the "charioteer" when he says: "The charioteer, when he's stopped the horses at the stable, throws them ambrosia and also potable nectar.'"" For the soul's crown, which at first spurred the intellect and the will towards the good, having attained it, arrests the intellect's pursuit and the will's ardour; that is, it no longer moves them. It stops them so they don't depart from it (for lightness drew fire upwards and detains it in the upper regions) and throws ambrosia to the intellect, that is, sight, and nectar to the will, that is, joy. It isn't because the soul's unity is the first to see or rejoice, for it is above the understanding and the will, but because it was the first to move them and the mover is the one which arrests and restrains the moved. What is the good of the soul's unity? It's to
itself,

Cap. XXXIIII

353

plum

Hoc unum Dei munus bonum nostrum est. Habitaculum et temin quo id recipimus et servamus mixtum ex sapientia
[395r] et voluptate.'

voluntas.
parte,

Supremum enim bonum

Fundamenta huius templi intellectus et capere, nisi suprema nostri

non possumus. Suprema pars est unitas^ quaedam, apex animae, quod animae caput duabus alis ad unum ipsum bonum instigatur et
advolat.

Nam

intellectu explorat atque circumspicit, voluntate

petit; intellectu rapit, retinet voluntate.

Raptus

intellectus sapi-

entia, id est, intelligentia est;

adhaesio voluntatis est voluptas.

Semper primo moventi ultimus respondet finis, quia quod movet sui gratia movet. Duci enim respondet victoria; aliis agentibus' media quae inter ducem et victoriam sunt. Unicuique enim sequentium certum opus finis est, principi" ultimum quod per opera ilia perficitur. Primum autem quod ad bonum unum movet animam. Unitas ilia eius caput est. Nam in Phaedro
dicitur:

Animae quae beatae

caput.

futurae sunt supra coelum extulerunt

sistens

Quem etiam' aurigam vocat cum dicit:

equos obicit illis ambrosiam et apex animae, qui primo ad bonum intellectum instigavit calcaribus et voluntatem, eo accepto, intellectus indaginem sistit et voluntatis ardorem, id est, non movet amplius, sed retinet, ne inde discedant. Levitas enim ignem sursum traxit, et ignem in superioribus detinet et obicit intellectui ambrosiam, id est, visionem, voluntati nectar, id est, gaudium. Non quia unitas ilia primo videat aut gaudeat, est enim super intelligentiam et voluntatem, sed quia primo movit et quae movit firmat et cohibet. Quid huius unitatis bonum? Ut primo uno formetur, ut aer lumine, igne ferrum.

Auriga ad praesepe

super ipsam nectar potandum.

Nam

'et

voluptate o/w. Jf

'uniu

''mltradd.WX

'principii

'et

WA"

354
be formed by the
unity
is

Chapter 35

first one, like air by light, iron by fire. But the formed by the one, when it has formed the intellect and the will, and converted them from their diversion towards lower things to higher things, and united them to itself. When this conversion has been completed in so far as it is humanly possible, the intellect is formed by vision and the will by pleasure. After they've been formed, at last the unity, since it's no longer impeded, will plunge itself into the first one absolutely. The unity's good will be to become the one itself. But the intellect's and the will's good will be to become one act for the one's sake. Three ends or happinesses become apparent here. The first is

when through

the impulse of the charioteer the soul enjoys wis-

dom and
gence and

pleasure, having been converted through the intelliwill

towards higher things, in so far as it can attain busy ruling the body. The second is when, having relinquished the body, the soul directs every intention towards the intelligence. Here the understanding is entire and its

them while

it is still

entirety

is

inner pleasure.

The

third follows

it

instantly.

It is

the

fashioning of the unity

ness
is

human

of happiand pertains to the soul as soul. The second sort is

itself
first sort
it's

by the one. The

divine

and pertains to the intelHgence, and to the soul when

been transformed into the intelligence. The third sort is [to be] a god, for where God's form is, there God dwells. Plato talks about the last two sorts of happiness in the Phaedrus.^* In this dialogue he enlarges on the first sort, the human happiness, which, by virtue of the fact that it's human, consists in a compound made from understanding and pleasure in the intellect and the will. But this doesn't happen until the elements have been first joined together in the best possible way. For the good doesn't dwell in a mass of things badly put together.

Chapter 35. How three things are necessary for the happy mixture of wisdom, and pleasure: truth, proportion, beauty.
However, for two things to be well mixed together there are
three particularly necessary things. This
is

so they

may

desire

Cap.

XXXV

355

Formatur autem uno, cum ipsa intellectum [iP5v] voluntatemque formaverit, haecque ad inferiora diversa ad superna converterit et ea secum univerit. Qua quidem conversione, quoad homini possibile est, peracta, intellectus visione formatur, voluptate voluntas. Quibus formatis tandem unitas, utpote non amplius impedita, in unum primum se prorsus immerget; eritque huius unitatis bonum unum ipsum fieri. Intellectus autem et voluntatis bonum unus actus ad unum. Hie tres fines beatitudinesque elucent. Primus est quando anima aurigae ipsius instinctu, mente et voluntate conversa ad supera, quatenus dum regendo corpori occupatur assequi potest, sapientia et voluptate fruitur. Secundus cum relicto
corpore

omnem

intentionem

in

mentem

direxerit,

ubi
forest;

intelligentia ilia integra est, cuius integritas interior est voluptas.

Tertius post banc e vestigio sequitur: unitatis ipsius ab

matio. Prima

humana

est

et

uno animae quantum' anima

secunda divina et mentis est et animae, cum mens erit effecta;^ tertia deus quidam est, ubi enim Dei forma, ibi est Deus. Has duas in Phaedro exponit Plato. Hoc in libro primam illam atque humanam, quae, quoniam humana est, in composito quodam
ex intelligentia et voluptate in intellectu et voluntate consistit.

Neque in hoc est prius quam optime iuncta bonum est in congerie male disposita.

fuerint.

Neque enim

Quomodo ad
tria

felicem sapientiae voluptatisque mixturam necessaria sint: Veritas, commensuratio, pulchritudo.

Cap.

XXXV.'
tria

Ut autem duo aliqua bene invicem misceantur,

exiguntur, ut gratia

maxime

quadam

naturae

mutuo

sese appetant, ut

'inquantum (fA^

'affectaA^

no ch. brtak or heading

WX

356

Chapter 35

each other by a natural grace Hke heat and a dense liquid. For heat and cold avoid each other because they aren't mutually
pleasing. And it isn't enough for them to gladly seek each other. They must be glad to the extent that they can mutually penetrate each other. For example, the heat in iron and the wetness in gold don't mix together; they have to be thin and pure so they can flow together into one. And this purity and natural grace

enough, unless they've been brought together in the right and are mutually adjusted to each other. For, if you wanted to mix the hottest of heats with a small drop of a dense liquid, there would be no mixture; for the heat will immediately evaporate the liquid. If you try to do the reverse, the liquid will immediately extinguish the heat. So they have to be mutually adjusted in weight and power, so the things which have admitted each other through grace, and freely and easily come together through purity, can become absolutely equal to each other through moderation and remain together without the threat of being separated. Nature's grace is the inner beauty through which all things attract each other and by whose power Zoroaster wanted works of magic performed. Plato agreed. Each thing's purity is each thing's truth, for each thing's pure and entire nature is its truth. So Plato says in the Laws Book 5,
isn't

quantities

'AXT70eia 677 -nduTcov jxev dyadcov 6eoL<; rrfevTai udvTcov be cw6pdjiT0L<;

'*'

Truth is the leader of all good things among gods and men. So he says in the Phaedrus, out iv dvdpcoiroiq. ovre dedlq Tfi(; oK'qdeiaq nuLcorepov ovre earco ovre -nore ^orai Among men and gods nothing is more venerable than the truth.'" Plato's wonderful love for the truth appears here, because he expresses it in poetry in both passages. But purity and entirety are the same thing. A pure quality, which isn't restrained by any impediment, surely exercises its full power. But mutual moderation among things is called proportion. At the end of this dialogue, therefore, Plato
is

right to require three things for the best mixture:

truth,

proportion, beauty. For things that are pure moderately and

amicably and eagerly seek each other;

together; they firmly cling together.

they easily

When

agree such things have

is

been joined, because the parts are true, the whole

true too.

Cap.
calor et pinguis

XXXV

357

humor; nam' calor et frigus sese invicem fugiunt, quia grata sibi invicem non sunt. Neque {396r] sufficit ut se libenter petant, nisi adeo expedita sint, ut sese invicem valeant penetrare. Calor enim in ferro et humor in auro invicem non
ut in

miscentur; tenuia sint^ haec oportet et pura,

conflentur.
nisi

unum
si

Neque

satis est puritas

haec

et gratia ilia naturae,

quantitate moderata, sibique vicissim consona sint.

subito

Nam,

intentissimum caloris aestum exiguae pinguis humoris guttae

miscere volueris, mixtio nulla
fiet,

namque

aestus

humo-

calorem humor extinguet. moderata oportet, ut quae Sint ergo competenti vi et pondere per gratiam sese adsciverunt' et per puritatem expedite et facile congressa sunt per moderationem sese penitus aequent atque una procul a dissolutione permaneant. Naturae gratia interior pulchritudo est, qua sese adliciunt omnia, cuius vi magicae

rem

resolvet; sin contra, protinus

opera exerceri Zoroaster voluit et Plato probavit. Puritas cuiusque cuiusque* est Veritas, mera enim et Integra sui natura cuiusque Veritas est. Ideo in quinto Legum dicit Plato, 'AXrideia S-q
tt<wt(jOV fjtev

dyaddjv

deoL<: TTfetTai

-navnov be cwB p<Jjnoi(^.^ Veritas

est.*

tum

diis

tum hominibus bonorum omnium dux

our kv avdpCoitOL^

Itaque

et^ in

Phaedro,

ome

de6l<:

t^c aKr^deiaq Ti^Liorepov oine

eoToj ovT TTore ioraiJ Veritate nihil venerabilius est

apud deos

et

apud homines. Ubi apparet mirus amor Platonis in veritatem quod utrobique eam expressit carmine. Idem autem merum est
integrum. Nempe mera qualitas, nullo impedimento detenta, totam vim suam exercet. Moderatio autem rerum inter se mutua commensuratio nuncupatur. Merito igitur in fine huius dialogi tria ad optimam mixtionem Plato requirit: veritatem, commensurationem, pulchritudinem. Purae' enim res moderate [396v] invicem et amice et se avide petunt; congrediuntur'" facile; firmiterque cohaerent. Quibus iunctis, quia verae partes sunt, verum est et totum; quia moderatae, consonum et concinnum;"
et

'adsciverint A" 'sunt H^ 'verae A' ^eiom. are written as alternatives concinnum

'nee JfA"

*estom.

'cuiusque o/n. I' "congredientur Jf

'**Greekom.W "consonum ond

358

Chapter 36

And
ful.
i.e.,

because they are moderated, the whole is harmonious and in proportion. Because it's harmonious, it's comely and beauti-

So our good
mixed

will consist in the mixture made from wisdom, understanding, and from pleasure, at the time when they

way. They will be mixed together best at the time when they are true, in proportion and beautiful, and the mixture they make is true, in proportion and beautiful. Therefore because of truth, proportion and beauty the compound is the good. So truth, proportion and beauty are the good for man. For to join together true wisdom, that is, the
are
in the best possible

wisdom
that
is
is,

that

is

certain, entire
is

the pleasure that

and universal, with true pleasure, pure and unmixed with contraries, it

The result is only those pleasures can be accepted which can have some connection with wisdom. And the wisdom and the pleasure which should be bound together are those which are in turn eager for
and agreeable to each other. Here the mixture will be true because of the truth, and congruent because of proportion, and comely because of beauty.
Plato calls this mixture not properly the good, but the good's

necessary for them to be also in proportion.

home. Also, the three things in the mixture aren't the good, but the good's vestibule. Our good he calls in actual fact the one power, the one act, which is given by the highest good itself to the three. Because of the one act they are first of all true, in proportion and beautiful; secondly, they come together and in this coming together again you can see truth, proportion and beauty. Therefore there is one end, not many.

Chapter 36. The manner in which measure, the moderator, the suitable.
Plato signifies the highest good

God

is

called the

itself, the one principle of by three terms: the measure, the moderator, the suitable. As the measure it gives the truth to all things; as the moderator it gives proportion; as the suitable it gives beauty. The one itself

things,

is

called the measure.

It is

also called this in the

Laws Book

4,'"

Cap.
quia consonum, decorum
ex sapientia, id
consistet
est,

XXXVI
igitur in

359
mixtione

et

pulchrum. Tunc

intelligentia et voluptate

bonum nostrum

erunt. Tunc erunt optime iuncta, cum' vera erunt, commensurata, pulchra, eorumque commixtio commensurata, pulchraque existet. Ratione igitur vera,

cum optime mixta

veritatis,

commensurationis,
est.

et pulchritudinis

compositum

illud

bonum
hominis

Veritas

itaque,

commensuratio,
est,

pulchritudo

est

bonum. lungenda enim

sapientia vera, id est, certa,

integra, universa,

cum

voluptate vera, id

pura, contrariis

non permixta, commensurata sint etiam necesse est. Ut illae dumtaxat voluptates accipiantur quae commercium habere cum sapientia possum, et sapientia et voluptas^ illae invicem vinciendae quae sui vicissim avidae sunt et gratae; ubi et per veritatem vera erit mixtio, et per commensurationem congrua,
et

decora per pulchritudinem.

Hoc mixtum non bonum

nuncupat. Tria
ilia

proprie, sed boni

domum

Plato

quoque in mixto non bonum, sed boni vestibulum. Bonum vero nostrum vocat proprie vim unam, actum unum ab ipso summo bono his tributum, per quem primo vera
commensurata, pulchra; deinde congrediuntur et gressu rursus Veritas, commensuratio, pulchritudoque
sunt,
in con-

elucet.

Unus ergo

finis est

non

plures.

Quomodo Deus appellatur mensura, moderans, opportunum. Cap. XXXVI?

Ipsum quidem summum bonum et unum rerum principium tribus nominibus Plato significat: mensura, moderans, opportunum. Ut mensura rebus omnibus tribuit [397r\ veritatem; ut moderans commensurationem; ut opportunum pulchritudinem. Dicitur mensura ipsum unum, ut in quarto Legum etiam dicitur.

'cum om.

'et

voluptas om.

'no ch. break or heading

WX


360
because

Chapter 36

God

is
is,

for us the greatest measure of

all

things

and the descent of all things. For you can go up to Him, but you can't go higher; and the gradations of nature go down as far as His power extends, to diffused external things, but no lower. Again, He measures the power and the worth of everything. For everything is worth as much as that which imparts it. He is the measure making all
because, that
the ascent things equal according as His presence
fills all

He measures

things.

As He

He is the measure embracing all things. measures the movement of single things. He measures their going forth, because they proceed no further than from Him, and their turning back, because they are turned back no further than to Him. Again, He is also the measure of comparison. For in the same way as we decide about secondary hot or bright things by looking back to the first thing that is hot or bright, so we measure all things by Him when we compare all good things to the first good thing. Consequently, things are said to be better the nearer they are to Him and worse the further they are away from Him. He is also the measure of repetition. For what is compound and divisible doesn't measure what is simple and indivisible; for, if they are brought together, the compound either equates the whole of the simple thing with its whole self, or with a bit of itself. If with its whole self, the thing we've called simple would also be compound. But if with a bit [or point] of itself for we equate one point with another point what is being measured is indivisible, hence the measure is simple too. Therefore a compound can't be the measure of a simple thing. But by repeating itself the simple thing can be the measure of the compound. The point can be the measure of corporeal magnitude, for it surrounds objects on the outside and penetrates through them all. But the moment of time terminates the past, inaugurates the future, manifests the present and brings about the whole of time by its repetition. Just as the point becomes equal by its repetition to the total mass of a corporeal object, so eternity does to all the moments of time. For the point of eternity, in remaining single, views all the hastening moments of time from the viewpoint of the present, as the
exceeds
all

things.

Again,

He

Cap.

XXXVI

361

est mensura, quia ascensum rerum omnium et descensum metitur. Usque enim ad ipsum ascenditur, supra nequaquam; et quatenus se porrigit vis eius ad exteriora diffusa eatenus graduum naturae descensus, infra autem minime. Item vim cuiusque rei pretiumque metitur, tanti enim est quodcumque quanti est quod ipsum impertit. Est mensura adaequans omnia prout praesentia sua implet omnia. Est mensura complectens omnia, ut'*^ omnia supereminet. Item motum singulorum ipsum metitur, processum quidem, quia non altius quam ab eo procedunt, conversionem autem, quia non ulteriuS quam ad ipsum convertuntur. Est et comparationis mensura, ut enim ad primum calidum et primum lucidum respicientes de secundis calidis lucidisque sententiam ferimus, sic ad primum bonum bona omnia comparantes eo ita metimur omnia, ut quo propinquiora illi sunt eo meliora dicantur, quo remotiora ab illo eo deteriora. Est et replicationis mensura. Quod enim compositum est et partibile id quod est simplex et impartibile non metitur. Nam invicem admoveantur, aut compositum se toto adaequat simplex totum, aut puncto sui. Si se toto, compositum esset et id quod simplex dicimus. Sin puncto sui, puncto enim punctum adaequamus, impartibile est quod metitur ergo et simplex est mensura. Ideo compositum simplicis mensura esse non potest. Simplex autem compositi {397v] potest replicatione sui esse mensura. Punctum quidem magnitudinis corporum, nam et exterius corpora circumscribit et per omnia penetrat. Momentum autem temporis praeteritum' quidem terminat, futurum inchoat, praesens ostendit et sui replicatione totum efficit tempus. Quemadmodum punctum replicatione sui totam corporis molem adaequat, aeternitas omnium temporalium momentorum. Nam unicum aeternitatis punctum permanens omnia temporis momenta
scilicet

quod Deus nobis rerum omnium maxime

A" 'prout >f

'praesentia sua implet

</(/.

A^

'praesertim IK

362

Chapter 36

unchanging centre views the points of a moving line. Moreover, monad does the same for all numbers. For a number is nothing else but the repetition of the monad. What's ten? The monad repeated ten times. So the monad reckons all numbers. Therefore, since the one is the most simple of all things and is unchanging and supreme, [the following happens]. Because it is supreme, it encompasses all things. Because it is unchanging, it begins and ends and decides on the movements of all things; for every movement is discerned when it has been compared to some unchanging thing. Because it is the one, it fulfils and contains all the multitude of different things. Because it is the most simple, it measures all other things and isn't measured by other things. And by its repetition it perfects the nature of compounds; for every single thing possesses as many parts and powers as it participates in the modes of the one God Himself. Therefore God is the measure of all things. He is measured by nothing. He isn't the measure peculiar to this thing or to that thing, so He is the measure which is equally appropriate to all things because He is above all things. As a measure He is neither big nor small: if He were small. He would not fill big things; if He were big, He would not agree with small things. God is also the measure of limitation. For He establishes for single things by a fixed law the limits of substance, power, action, value and life. These Hmits it is impossible to transgress. He arranges everything by distinct grades, in a fixed number and ordered series, and imparts to each according to its natural capacity or merited worth. He determines matter with form, nature with
the
seeds, the soul with reasons, the intelligence with Ideas, and,
finally, all things

with Himself. Therefore we've said enough

about the way

in

which

God is the measure.

The job of measuring is more absowhereas the job of moderating consists in bringing things together. For He is the measure according as He gives to each thing a fixed, appropriate and determined nature and power. But natures could be present in single things so exclusively that there would be no communication between them. And so each thing would be one, but there would not be one overall result
the moderator.
lute,

He is also

Cap.

XXXVI

363

currentia praesens aspicit, ut centrum stans lineae currentis

Monas insuper omnium numerorum, nihil enim aliud Humerus quam monadis replicatio. Quid decem? Monas decies replicata. Omnes ergo monas computat numeros. Cum ergo ipsum unum sit omnium simplicissimum sitque permanens et
puncta.'

supremum: quia supremum, omnia

nens, motus^

circumscribit; quia permaiudicat,

omnium

inchoat,

sistit et

nam ad

stabile

aliquid comparatus omnis motus discernitur; quia unum, omnem diversarum rerum multitudinem implet et continet; quia

simplicissimum metitur alia nee ab

tione sua

aliis

mensuratur. Et replica-

naturam explet compositorum; tot enim partes totque vires possidet unumquodque quot modis Dei ipsius unius est particeps. Mensura igitur Deus est omnium a nihilo mensurata. Mensura nee huius nee illius propria ut omnium aeque mensura sit quod est super omnia. Mensura nee parva nee magna; si parva est, magna non implet; si magna parvis non congruit. Est et limitationis mensura Deus. Ipse enim singulis certa lege substantiae, potentiae, actionis, et dignitatis et {398r] vitae statuit
limites,

quos transgredi impossibile

est.

Omnia

distinctis gradi-

bus, certo in numero, ordinata serie digerit, et cuique pro naturae capacitate vel meriti dignitate impertit. Terminat materiam

forma, naturam seminibus, animam rationibus, mentem ideis, se ipso denique omnia. Quomodo igitur Deus mensura sit satis
est

dictum.

moderans. Mensurae quidem opus absolutum magis, moderationis opus in collatione consistit. Prout enim cuique certam, propriam, determinatamque naturam et vim tribuit, mensura est. Possent autem ita proprie singulis inesse naturae, ut nulla esset inter ilia communio, ideoque quodcumque unum
^Est et

'puncta om.

'motuniA'

^em.,

no paragraph break Y

364

Chapter 36
things.

from the individual

But the work of one

God must

be

one. Accordingly, there has to be moderation whereby single

things can be joined to single things. Because of measure the

proper nature is present to the intelligence. It makes the intelligence differ from the soul. But because of moderation the power to perceive the truth is common to them both. Again, because of measure the proper nature is present to the soul. It makes the soul separate from the body's nature. But because of

moderation they are joined together so that movement and life are common to them both. Moreover, with the elements you can see the power appropriate to each, and you can also see a mutual harmony whereby fire agrees with the air in heat, but differs from it in dryness. The air agrees with water in wetness, but the water differs from air in coldness. Water agrees with earth in coldness, but differs from it in wetness. Therefore to measure is to give individual determination to everything; but to moderate is to join things together in such a way that they also agree in some nature. It is to make sure one of them doesn't have so much power that it subsumes all the others. It is to make sure things mutually coexist and move and act, and in turn resist each other. But to make sure individual things agree among themselves is the job of the person who makes them, and makes them one and the one all things. Therefore God is both the measure and the moderator. Moreover, He is the suitable. Suitability means a certain grace and fitness among things which makes them mutually pleasing to each other and makes them in turn admit each other. But they're mutually pleasing and eligible because they agree together in having a nature and a regulated quality in common. But He who brings this about is the one who balances all things together through moderation. For He immediately makes things mutually suited and pleasing. On this account He is called the suitable. Therefore, in so far as He is called the measure, He bestows truth on all things, which is the pure and determined nature appropriate to each thing. In so far as He is the moderator, He bestows proportion, which is the concinnity and

mutual harmony of all things. In so

far as

He

is

the suitable.

He

Cap.
ex singulis autem

XXXVI

365

unum opus nequaquam efficeretur. Dei autem unius opus unum esse debet. Moderatione igitur opus est, qua singula cum singulis connectantur. Propria natura
esset,

menti per mensuram

moderationem

ab anima. Sed per percipiendam communis utrique. Item propria per mensuram animae inest natura, qua a natura corporis est seiuncta. Per moderationem vero ita cominest,

qua

differt

vis

ad

veritatem

'

parata sunt invicem ut motus et vita

insuper consonantia, qua
siccitate distinguitur.

sit

utrique communis. In

elementis quin etiam vis propria cuiusque conspicitur, et

ignis in calore

mutua

cum

aere convenit,

Aer cum aqua

in

humore

consentit.

Aqua

ab

illo

frigiditate dissentit.

Aqua

terrae in frigore convenit,

liquiditate discrepat. Metiri igitur est

unumquodque

in se ipso

determinare. Moderari autem ita res invicem comparare ut et in

aliqua natura conveniant, nee tanta vis insit in aliquo ut reliqua

adsumat omnia, sed [398v] invicem simul sint, moveantur, agant, vicissimque resistant. Facere autem ut singula inter se
conveniant,
et
illius est

qui singula facit et qui singula facit^

unum

unum omnia. Deus ergo et mensura est et moderans.

Est insuper opportunum. Opportunitas gratiam quandam et commoditatem rerum significat, qua sibi invicem mutuo placent seque vicissim adsciscunt. Quod autem grata sibi sint et optanda ex eo est quod invicem ex communi natura et temperata qualitate congruunt. Id autem ille facit, qui per moderationem libravit invicem omnia. Statim enim opportuna et grata ea invicem reddidit, ex quo dicitur opportunum. Ut ergo mensura dicitur, veritatem rebus omnibus tribuit, quae est propria cuiusque mera et determinata natura. Ut moderans, commensurationem, quae est concinnitas et mutua omnium consonantia. Ut opportunum, pulchritudinem, quae est gratia et rebus singulis

'naturae

'et

qui singula facit om.

366
bestows beauty, which

Chapter 36

is the grace which is both innate in single and accompanies that comehness which comes from the mutual congruity of all things. Or rather, as He is the one, He is those three things, and He makes these three things. As the one above all things who pro-

things individually

duces
limits.

all

things.

He

circumscribes individuals within fixed

purges away extraneous things from them. He establishes each in the purity of the proper nature. But individuals are one in themselves to the extent that they are circumscribed

He

by one

limit,

cleansed from irrelevancies, and retained in

[their]
all.
is

nature's one pecuHarity. Therefore, as

He

is

the one above

He

gives the

one

in the

way we have
is

described. But, as

evident, in this respect

He

the measure

and provides

truth.
all

However, as
things,

He

is

the one

who

keeps

all

things together in

He

binds

all

things together in an indissoluble

way

so

that they are one. But in this respect

He

is

being the moderator

bestowing proportion. As
thing

He

is

the one towards which every-

moves and who rouses everything, He excites single things through the grace which he gives to them as individuals in themselves. And through the grace which results in them all [as a group] He seizes them all to Himself. Here He is both joining individuals to individuals and all things to the one. But in this respect He is the suitable and produces beauty. Therefore as the one He is both the measure and the moderator and the suitable. So individual things also, according as they share in some one thing, are true, proportionate, beautiful. For this reason what is mixed from wisdom and pleasure is the dwelHng place of the human good; for the good is contained in it. The three attributes are the good's vestibule; for through them the good is received and admitted. But the unity given by the one, which causes the three attributes to be present in a compound and which itself blazes forth when it has been perfected by their presence, is man's good and depends on the good of the whole of nature. But that one and this unity are acts. The one is the act enacting all, by which all act, for which all act. The unity is the
act

which

is

the sake of the

impressed in things by the first act, enacting all for first act. Therefore act and the one are the same.

Cap.

XXXVI

367

ad singulas

res innata et gratia decoris illius

comes qui ex

congruitate rerum omnium mutua nascitur. Immo vero ut est unum est ilia tria et haec

tria facit.

Ut unum
limitibus

super

omnia,

producens

omnia,

singula

certis

circumscribit.

Ab extraneis purgat singula,

unum
ut

sistitque in propriae'

puritate naturae. Sic vero singula

limite circumscripta,

sunt in se ipsis ut uno

in

ab extraneis defaecata, ut

una

naturae proprietate retenta. Ut ergo

unum

est

super omnia,

unum

dat eo

modo quo

diximus.

mensura

est et

veritatem exhibet. Ut autem est

Eo autem modo, ut apparet, unum in omnibus

modo' invicem vincit [399r\ omnia, ex quo cuncta unum sunt. Eo autem modo moderans est commensurationemque largitur. Ut est unum ad quod omnia,
conservans^ omnia, indissolubili
citans

invicem concitat,

omnia, singula per gratiam quam tribuit singulis in sese* et per gratiam quae resultat in cunctis ad se

ipsum rapit cuncta. Ubi et singula unit singulis et universa uni. Hoc autem modo opportunum est et pulchritudinem exhibet. Ergo ut est unum et mensura est et moderans et opportunum. Quare et singula ut uno quodam participant vera sunt, commensurata, pulchra.

Quamobrem mixtum
ilia

ex sapientia et voluptate

humani boni
tria

est

habitaculum, in hoc enim

bonum

capitur. Ilia
et

vestibulum boni sunt, per

enim bonum excipitur

intromittitur. Unitas

autem data ab uno, per quam

a

et ilia tria

insunt composito et ipsa ilHs praesentibus* completa relucet,

hominis

bonum

est

bono

totius naturae dependens.

Unum

autem illud et unitas ista actus sunt. Unum actus agens omnia, quo agunt omnia, ad quem agunt omnia. Unitas actus a primo actu rebus impressus, agens ad primum actum omnia. Idem igitur actus et

unum.

Summum

itaque

bonum hominis

est

unius

'propria

'continens (f

'nodo ff

*se

'adsentibusadtf. If

368

Chapters?

Therefore man's highest good

for the

is the act of one life. It is one, it is one and it is in the one. Therefore the one end is the one act of the mixed Hfe, the Hfe that has been properly mixed and directed towards the one itself. For, in the process of understanding and rejoicing, it joins itself to the good itself absolutely. This joining is a most powerful act, merging itself into the good, transforming itself into the good. That is, in this life
[it is in the process of transforming itself]; in another Hfe, however, the transformation is complete. It is the one act of one

entire soul,

say again, in so far as

occurs only at that point in time

lect

it is humanly possible. It when both the act of the intel-

through understanding, and the act of the will through pleasure have been directed towards the one good itself. But they are so directed when they join together in accordance with the three attributes. These are present through the power of the one. Therefore the one act of the one soul, which is from the one, for the one and in the one, is man's highest good. Therefore, since the one act of this, the mixed life, is the highest good, it is certainly more outstanding than either pleasure or wisdom.

Chapter

than to than by the But

better,
if

Happiness seems to belong more to wisdom pleasure, and to be received more by the intellect
37.
will.

somebody were to ask which one of these was the wisdom or pleasure, you'd have to reply that wisdom is
it is

the better, because

Hfe.

closer to the conditions of the perfect

Undoubtedly, inteHigence (and wisdom) accords more with it is capable of the truth and is perception; pleasure impedes the truth. Moreover, it accords more with proportion, for intelligence (and wisdom) is tranquil and at peace, while pleasure is in a state of complete frenzy.
the truth than pleasure does, for

And
light

it

accords more with beauty.

as a beautiful

Men lead wisdom into^the and comely thing and show her off;

Cap.
vitae actus.

XXXVII
in

369

Unus ad unum atque

uno. Unus igitur

et

finis est

actus unus vitae mixtae,

directae.
unit. Unitio

bene mixtae,

in

unum ipsum
penitus sese

Nam et intelligendo et gaudendo ipsi bono

haec actus quidam est vehementissimus, in bonum mergens, in bonum se transformans, in hac scilicet vita, in sese alia vero transformatus actus. Actus inquam unus totius unius animae, {399v] quoad homini licet, qui tunc demum adest cum
et

actus intellectus per intelligentiam et actus voluntatis per

in

voluptatem
sunt

unum ipsum bonum directi

fuerunt.' Directi vero

vi

ilia unius cum secundum tria ilia adsunt. Unus ergo animae unius actus ex uno, ad unum atque

congrediuntur. Tria

in

summum est hominis bonum. Cum ergo mixtae illius vitae actus unus summum sit bonum, et voluptate certe et sapientia
uno
praestantius est.

Felicitas pertinere videtur

voluptatem

et intellectu

ad sapientiam potius quam ad magis accipi quam voluntate. Cap.

XXXVII.'
Siquis vero quaesiverit

voluptas,'

utrum istorum melius sapientiane an respondendum meliorem esse sapientiam, quia* conillius

ditionibus vitae

perfectae est propinquior.

dubio magis consonat mens et sapientia quam enim veritatis capax et perceptio est, haec veritatis impedimentum. Commensurationi quin etiam tranquilla enim et pacata mens et sapientia est, voluptas admodum furiosa. Pulchritudini quoque. Sapientiam quippe ut rem pulchram atque decoram in lucem educunt homines atque ostentant; voluptatis usum tenebris dedicant tamquam obscenam rem
Veritati procul
ilia

voluptas,

'fuerint

A'y

^no ch. break or heading

WX

'voluptateas >f

*(\\x\W

370

Chapters?

pleasure's use they dedicate to the darkness as an obscene thing

unworthy of the Hght. This proves those people are wrong who good itself is the tranquility of the will, which they call pleasure. For the highest good is contained in the higher rather than the lower power. But the intellect is more outstandinsisted the

ing than the will: firstly, because

vant; for

it is

the leader, the will the ser-

we know and

decide before

something to the extent that the want it. Secondly, it's because the intellect is never deceived, for where there's deception you have opinion not the intellect; the will is deceived by opinion and by the appearance of the good. Thirdly, the intellect is always of use in understanding the good

we want, and we only want intellect decides we ought to

more and more acute in all becomes bad in the process of wanting bad things. Fourthly, the intellect draws things towards itself. The will is drawn away by things. For the intellect doesn't conceive
or the bad and invariably becomes
things.

The

will

of things as they are in themselves, rather

in its

it

conceives of things

own way,

the

many

in

terms of the one species, changing

things in terms of stability, single things in terms of the univer-

and so on. With its own formulae it rectifies what is defective in things. But the will is drawn towards possessing things as they are in themselves. It is swept towards them by a notion which has been conceived of them. It doesn't alter them; but it itself is altered from a state of rest to one of motion. Again, since each motion is towards the good, the same nature which is moved towards the future good rests in the present good; [and] just as motion is related to the future good, so rest is related to the present good. But it isn't the good because the nature is moved towards it; because the object, [which is] end and mover, does not depend on the power which is being moved, but, on the contrary, the power depends on it. Therefore, because it's the good, there is movement towards it. Similarly, it's not the good
sal

just because there's repose in

it.

There's repose because

it's

the

good. Therefore rest itself isn't the good itself, but something else is; towards it there was motion, in it there's rest. Because a
higher place

wards

it

is the good for fire, accordingly fire is moved toand comes to rest in it. It isn't the good because fire is

Cap.

XXXVII

371

lumineque indignam. Ubi certe eorum pate factus est error qui voluntatis quietem, quam voluptatem vocant, ipsum bonum adseruerunt. Etenim supremum' bonum in potentia capitur
superiori potius
est

quam inferiori. Intellectus autem praestantior quam voluntas. Primo, quia dux est, ilia ministra; cognoscimus enim et iudicamus^ prius quam velimus, et tantum et eatenus et id volumus quod et* quatenus intellectu iudicamus esse volendum. Secundo, quia intellectus numquam decipitur, opinio enim est non intellectus ubi est deceptio; voluntas decipi-

semper proficit* sive bonum seu malum intelligat,' fit semper in omnibus clarior; ista in volendis malis mala. Quarto, ille res ad se trahit; ista a rebus trahitur. Nam* ille non ut res in se ipsis sunt eas concipit, sed modo suo multa in una specie, mobilia stabiliter,
tur {400f\ opinione et specie boni. Ter#tio,
ille

singula universaliter, et cetera, et quae' claudicant in rebus for-

Haec' autem inclinatur ad res ita possidendas ad eas' notione concepta, nee mutat eas,'" sed mutatur e statu in motum. Item cum omnis motus ad bonum sit et eadem natura quae ad bonum futurum movetur" in praesenti bono quiescat, sicut se habet motus ad futurum bonum ita ad praesens bonum requies. Non autem quia natura moveatur ad aliquid, illud bonum est, quia non obiectum'^ et finis et motor a potentia quae movetur, sed contra potentia'* ab illo dependet. Igitur, quia bonum, ad illud est motus. Similiter, non quia in illo requies, bonum illud est, sed quia bonum, requies. Non igitur ipsa quies ipsum est bonum, sed aliud quiddam ad quod motus fuit, in quo est requies. Quia superior locus igni bonus est, ideo ad ilium movetur ignis et quiescit in illo, non quia movetur et quiescit, bonum. Nam si
mulis suis
dirigit.

ut in se ipsis sunt, rapiturque

'undecipherable 'intdligant If

'iudiccmus If

'ct

om.

>f;

quantum Jf

*perficit

>f

^tXadd.W
"obiccti If

'quo If
"potentiaro

"Ista

"movcntur If

IfAP ''"ca IfAfP Pfrag. VI (121r) begins

372

Chapters?
by chance a stone were thrown went up and stayed up, it still wouldn't be the
to rest. For, if

moved and comes

upwards and it good for the stone.

this

Again, happiness is the attainment of the ultimate end. But attainment doesn't consist in the will's act, but rather in the act of the intellect. For the will is borne towards the absent end

when
it

and the present end when it comes to rest in But it's agreed that longing for the end isn't attaining the end, but movement towards attaining it. But the will feels pleasure because the end is present. It isn't the reverse: the end isn't present because the will delights in it. Therefore there must be something other than the act of the will through which the end itself becomes present to the person willing it. You can see this with the ends of external things. For if the attainment of money were the result of the will's act, as soon as a person willed it, he would attain it. But in actual fact money isn't there first of all; then it is acquired through work. Once you have money, enjoyment begins, since pleasure consists in a certain quietness of the will. That the will comes to rest in something, however, is the exclusive result of the goodness of what it comes to rest in. So, if the will comes to rest in some operation, the will's repose proceeds from the goodness of the operation.
it

longs for

it,

and

is

delighted.

The
will

will doesn't seek the

the act of the will

good in order to come to rest. would be the end, which is untrue,

If

it

did,

as Plato

show. But, therefore, the will seeks to rest in the operation because that particular operation is the good for it. So you can gather that the operation of the intelligence in which the will rests is more excellent than the repose of the will. The intellect comes to know the reason of a thing as a result of investigation. Then the intellect decides whether the thing is good, neutral or bad. The intellect can embrace these three concepts. The will is stimulated to want something only when it is decided it is good. So the intellect embraces more than the will. The intellect says, **This is good for me. I don't have it. So I must get it." Till now the will had been lying low; but, upon the pronouncement of such a decision, it is excited. Where does this
act of the intellect originate?

From its clarity. What is the source

Cap.

XXXVII

373

forte lapis cogeretur et ascenderet illuc et maneret,

illi

non tamen

id

bonum.
felicitas est finis ultimi

consecutio. Consecutio vero haec magis in intellectus actu consistit. Voluntas enim in finem fertur et absentem cum ipsum desiderat, et praesentem cum in ipso quiescens delectatur. Constat autem desiderium finis non esse finis consecutionem, sed motum [400v] ad consequendum. Voluptate' vero voluntas afficitur ex eo quod praesens finis est, non contra, quod praesens sit ex eo quod ipso voluntas gaudet. Oportet igitur aliquid esse aliud

Item

non

in actu voluntatis, sed

quam voluntatis actum per quod finis ipse praesens volenti fiat. Quod in finibus circa res externas intueri licet. Si enim pecuniae consecutio per voluntatis actum fieret, cum primum quis eam vult, consequeretur. Nunc autem abest primum, deinde
operando paratur. Parata exoritur dem^ in quadam voluntatis quiete
in

delectatio, voluptas siquiconsistit.

Quod autem
ex
illius

in

aliquo voluntas quiescat non aliunde est

quam

bonitate

quo

quiescit.

Quare

si

voluntas in aliqua operatione quiescat,

ex operationis bonitate quies voluntatis procedit. Nee voluntas propter quietem bonum quaerit, sic enim voluntatis actus finis
esset,

quod falsum

est, ut patebit.
ilia

Sed ideo quaerit ut

in opera-

tione quiescat, quia sibi est

praestantiorem
voluntas
vel
* Intellectus

esse

bonum. Unde mentis operationem in qua

operatio

colligitur

quiescit

quam voluntatis ipsius quietem.

vel

indagando rationem rei concipit, deinde iudicat neutram vel malam; ad tria haec se extendit. Voluntas ex solo' boni iudicio ad volendum excitatur. Ideo

bonam

latior est intellectus quam voluntas. bonum meum est. Hoc careo. Hoc ergo

Dicit
est

intellectus.

Hoc

comparandum. Hue

usque iacuerat voluntas, sed lata huiusmodi sententia excitatur. Unde trahit originem hie intellectus actus? Ex eius claritate. Unde voluntatis incitamentum? Ex indigentia. Perfectior ergo**

'

voluptati

P
etc.

tas.

Ex solo,

'quidem *-**om.

*XP punctuation alters the sense Ad tria haec se extendit volun-

W (cont.)

374

Chapters?

of the will's excitement? Need. Therefore the origin of understanding is more perfect than the origin of wanting. Which was
the one to taste the

good first? The intellect. It perceived the rational principle of the good while the will was still sleeping. But the person who was the first one to taste will be the first one
is

to find because he

the wiser. But the person

first.

who

tasted first

is

hunt the person who's the the one who drinks first to discover the tracks called upon his will to discover them. In the same way the person who first finds and catches the quarry will summon his will to catch it. And out of his own abundance he will give to the friend who's been participating in the hunt with him. Just as the friend was behindhand in following the quarry, he'll be behindhand in catching it. The initial proposal is in the intellect and it's this: we must acquire the good we lack. Given the proposal, the will springs up. The will is nothing else but a certain stimulus of the soul which won't be stilled until the good is acquired. The ultimate end is not the allaying of the stimulus, but the attaining of the end. Once the
in the

And

end has been acquired the stimulus itself is allayed. The ultimate end corresponds to the initial proposal. The inciting of the stimulus wasn't the initial thing proposed, but immediately followed it. So the allaying of the stimulus, which is pleasure, won't be the ultimate end, but something accompanying the
ultimate end. Therefore the
initial

proposal

is

to acquire the

good. The ultimate end is the acquisition of the good. The former was in the intellect, so the latter will be in the intellect too. The inciting of the stimulus followed the former. The allaying of the stimulus will follow the latter. But both the
inciting

and the allaying are

in the will.

Again, since man's happiness descends from above, it is seized by the power which the soul shares with those above rather than by the power which the soul shares with the beasts. The intelligence is shared with those above, the appetite with
those below. Again,'" with
all

the powers which are

moved by

of the powers (just as what moves naturally is prior to the movement and the experience of being moved introduced into what is
their objects, the objects are naturally prior to the acts

Cap.
*origo est intelligendi

XXXVII
volendi.

375

Quis primo gustavit bonum? Intellectus, qui rationem concepit boni dormiente etiam voluntate. Qui autem primo gustavit, utpote sagacior,
prior inveniet. Illius

quam

enim

est potatio cuius et praelibatio; et

qui

in venatione prius investigans, ad investigandum convocavit

voluntatem. Prius inveniens et consequens ad consecutionem similiter convocabit, reddetque ex propria plenitudine partici-

pem socium, qui sicut inferior fuit venando erit in consequendo inferior, Primum propositum est' in intellectu atque est eiusmodi^: bonum quo caremus comparandum. Hoc dato insurgit
voluntas, quae nihil est aliud nisi

quidam animi stimulus, qui non ante sedabitur quam comparetur bonum. Non est finis ultimus sedatio stimuli, sed consecutio eius, quo acquisito stimulus ipse sedatur. Finis ultimus primo proposito respondet. Stimuli incitamentum non fuit propositum primum sed illud secutum est e vestigio. Quare' sedatio stimuli quae est voluptas non ultimus erit finis sed finis ultimi comes. Primum ergo propositum bonum comparandum; ultimus finis boni comparatio.
In intellectu illud," ergo in intellectu et istud. Stimuli incita-

mentum secutum
autem
est

illud est; stimuli sedatio' istud. In voluntate

utrumque.** Item cum felicitas hominis superne descendat, ea animi vi capitur potius, quae animae cum superis est communis, quam ea, quae illi cum brutis communis existit. Mens cum supernis communis' est, cum inferioribus appetitio. Item in omnibus viribus, quae a suis obiectis moventur, obiecta secundum natu-

ram priora sunt quam virium iiiarum actus. Quemadmodum id quod movet natura prius est quam motio passioque in id quod movetur illata. Eiuscemodf vis voluntas est, res enim expetenda

'

est

om.

XP

'hoc

XP
est

'et

add.

XP

'X and P have what is either a punctuation

'communius Jf
'eiusmodi ff

mark or the abbreviation for id

(cont.)*-**om.

'etadd.X

376

Chapter 37

moved). The will is such a power. For a desirable object seizes hold of the appetite. Accordingly, the object precedes the act of the will itself. Therefore the will's first object precedes its every act. So the will's act can't be the first thing the will wants. But this is the ultimate end. So the will's act can't be the ultimate end. Moreover, with all the powers that can be reflected onto their own acts, the power's act has to be directed first towards another object. Afterwards it can be reflected onto its own act. For, if the intellect is to understand it is understanding, it must first understand another thing. After the thing, it can understand it is understanding. Of course, the understanding which the intellect understands in itself is the understanding of some object. So, either you have to proceed to infinity; or, if you can arrive at the first thing which is understood, it won't be understanding itself, but some intelligible object. For the very same reason also, the first thing the will wants isn't willing itself, but some other good thing. But the first thing an intelligent nature
wants is the intelligence's happiness. Moreover, every single thing, in accordance with those things which constitute its substance, has its own natural truth. For a true man differs from a painted man because of the things which make up the substance of a man. But true happiness doesn 't differ from false happiness because of the act of the will. For the will ends up loving and rejoicing equally in whatever it is that is presented to it as the good and as the highest good, whether this is truly or falsely such. But whether it is truly or falsely the highest good which is being presented is a distinction made by the intellect with the reason. Therefore the substance of happiness pertains more to the intellect than it

does to the will. Again, nature hasn 'tset up pleasure as the end, but has introduced it in order to bring operations to completion. For we see nature has given pleasure to those animal operations which are established for necessary ends. This is obvious in the case of

food and sex. Animals would abstain from them utterly if pleasure didn 't attract them. And so those who follow nature's lead won't set up pleasure as the end for themselves. Furthermore,

Cap.
appetitum
cedit.
dit.

XXXVII

377

rapit.

Obiectum

Primum

igitur

igitur voluntatis *actum ipsius praeobiectum eius actum eius omnem praece-

Non potest

igitur voluntatis actus

primum quod

voluntate

petitur^

[40 Ir] esse. Id

voluntatis** ultimus esse finis

autem fmis est ultimus. Actus igitur non potest. Praeterea in viribus

omnibus quae suos in actus reflect i possunt, ante oportet potentiae ipsius actum in obiectum aliud dirigi, postea suum in actum reflecti. Si enim intellectus intelligere se intelligit, prius rem
aliam intelligat necesse
est,

post earn se intelligere recognoscat.

Nempe

ipsum quod in se intellectus intelligit alicuius obiecti intelligentia est. Quare oportet ut vel in infinitum eatur, vel si ad primum quod intellectum est venire licet, hoc non ipsum intelligere erit, sed res intelligibilis aliqua. Eadem quoque ratione primum quod voluntas exigit non ipsum velle est, sed aliud quoddam bo num. Primum autem quod vult natura mentis
intelligere
est.
^

particeps eius felicitas

Quin etiam unumquodque secundum ea quae substantiam enim a picto homine verus homo per ea quae hominis substantiam complent. Vera autem beatitudo a falsa per actum voluntatis non differt. Aeque enim^ voluntas in amando aut gaudendo sese
eius constituunt habet^ naturae suae veritatem.* Differt

habet quicquid illud sit quod sibi ut bonum et ut summum bonum proponitur, sive revera tale id sit, seu falso. Utrum autem^ revera sit summum bonum quod tale proponitur aut
falso, ratione intellectus
tia

hoc

differt. Beatitudinis

ergo substan-

ad intellectum magis pertinet quam voluntatem. Item natura voluptatem utfinem nonposuit, immo ad operatic nes explendas eam induxit. Cernimus enim quod natura els'" animalium operationibus voluptatem dedit quae [401 v] sunt ad fines necessarios ordinatae, quod in usu cibi et veneris est perspicuum, a quibus animalia penitus abstinerent, nisi voluptate adlicerentur. Ita et qui naturam ducem sequuntur voluptatem sibifinem non statuent.

Adde quod

voluptas nihil aliud

'patitur

^eslom.XP
'autP

'habent Jf

'em. from Aquinas; yiitaitm

WXYP

'seadd.X

'eiusP

om.

XP

378
pleasure

Chapters?
is

nothing else but the repose of the

is

will in

some approwill

priate good, just as desire

the inclining of the will towards an

appropriate good. But just as

man

is

borne by the

towards

the end, so he rests in the end, just as natural things themselves

have certain natural inclinations too towards the end, which stop when they arrive at the end. But it's ridiculous to say the

proper place, but is its inclination 's repose or cessation in the place aimed at. For, if He had principally intended the inclination itself should come to rest and cease, the Creator of corporeal things wouldn't have given the inclination. But He gives the inclination so a body may arrive at its proper place through it. When the place has already been attained (as the end), the inclito

end of a heavy body's movement is not

be

in its

And therefore this repose and cessation not the end, but rather it accompanies the end. Again, if the end of something is some external thing, the operation whereby it acquires the external thing in the first place is also said to be the ultimate end. For instance, with the
nation 's repose follows.
is

people for whom the end is money, the end is said to be not to love or long for money but also to possess it. But the end of a rational substance is God. So the human operation whereby

man

first attains to
is

God

is

the one best suited for attaining

we are unable to want something until we understand what we want. Moreover, the ultimate end corresponds to the first mover, just as victory does to the general, the proper means for achieving it to his subordinates. But the intellect moves the will, which is in itself bhnd, and it uses a particular notion to do this. So the ultimate end concerns the intellect rather than the will. Now, if every single
happiness. But this

understanding. For

thing operates for

its

its

own

sake, the intellect

it is

own good. The

it

will, since

servile

moves the will for and blind, is subordiPlotinus says, isn't

nate to the intellect. Therefore the

sufficient, for

will, as

doesn't seek

its

own

good.'*'

it wouldn't be seeking people are always delighted by something

to seek pleasure,

And even were it its own good. For

else,

just as

it

is

something

else that

people desire.

And yet the good itself (which

anyone covets for himself) must not be some passion or

Cap.

XXXVII

379
sicut desi-

est

quam quies voluntatis in aliquo convenienti bono,

derium est eiusdem^ inciinatio in conveniens bonum. Sicut autem homo per voluntatem in finem fertur, sic in eo quiescit, sicut et naturales ipsae res quaeque naturales habent in finem quae cum pervenerunt ad finem cessant. inclinationes, Ridiculum autem dictu^ est quod finis motus ipsius corporis ponderosi non sit proprio in loco esse, sed quies et cessatio inclinationis in hoc in quod^ tendebat. Si enim hoc principaliter
intenderet ut inciinatio ipsa quiesceret et cessaret, auctor cor-

porum eam non

daret.

Dat autem eam

ut per

hanc proprium ad

locum deveniat, quo quasi fine iam acquisito inclinationis sequitur requies. Atque ita requies haec et* cessatio non finis est^ sed

finem potius comitatur.

Item si alicuius rei est aliqua res exterior finis, ilia eius operatio etiam finis ultimus esse dicitur^ per quam primo rem illam assequitur. Ceu^ in his quibus finis pecunia est, dicitur quoque
possidere pecuniam finis esse, non amare neque cupere. Finis autem substantiae rationalis est Deus. Ilia ergo hominis operatio ad felicitatem potior est per quam primo ad Deum attingit. Haec autem intelligentia est. Nam velle non possumus, nisi quod intelligimus. Praeterea primo moventi ultimus respondet
finis, ut

duci victoria, subiectis [402r\ propria ministeria. Intelse

lectus

autem sua notione voluntatem ex

caecam movet.

Illi

ergo potius

quam

isti

ultimus respondet

finis.

Nam

si

unum-

quodque

intellectus

ad sui bonum voluntatem movet, quae, quia servilis est et caeca, intellectui subest. Quapropter voluntas,' ut Plotinus ait, sufficiens non est, non enim quaerit idem. Neque etiamsi' voluptatem quaerat,
sui ipsius gratia operatur,

idem quaeret. Semper enim aliud

aliud quod
appetit.

est in

quo

delectatur quis,

Atqui oportet bonum ipsum quod esse sicut sibi quis expetit non esse passionem et affectionem aliquam in

'dusdcm om.
dicctur

'dictum P

'quoP
'voluptas

'tlom.Y
(i.e..

'est

om.

WXP
P

'cum

WXY

I have adopted the P reading)

'enim

si

380
affection in the person

Chapters?

person,

who attains the good. Accordingly, the who has the state of being affected alone (which anyone

can derive from the good) and thinks this state is the good, hasn't anything. So it's not enough for someone simply to think he has the state of being affected if he hasn't the thing actually causing the affection. For nobody chooses to be happy when his sons are absent as he would be if they were present. And nobody chooses to be happy when he's not eating as he would be if he were eating. Nor does he choose to be transported when he's not enjoying sex as he would be if he were enjoying it. Rather, a person chooses actually to have these things. Plotinus,
in writing

on

felicity,

proves that

felicity isn't in

pleasure

on

the

grounds that just as the appetite exists for the sake of another good, so the appetite's repose takes place in another good.'" Again, pleasure can be imaginary and it can be deceived. But the good doesn't consist at all in the passion of the person attaining the good. The passion can be the same because of a mistake even when the good is not attained. Nobody, however, would choose to be thus affected. The reasons above have put the act of the intellect in the happy man before the act of the will. In an epistle on feHcity I have tried to deal with the reasons that make the opposite view the more probable. Ultimately, perhaps the safer approach is not to think of the will as [something] cut off from the intellect, but to think of it and pleasure as though they were in the intellect itself.'*^ From all that's preceded we can conclude man's end is one, that is, it is the one act of the life mixed from wisdom and pleasure which is for the one good and in the one. We can conclude too that wisdom is of more use in attaining the end than pleasure. This has certainly resolved your question, my dear Michael of San Miniato, most learned man and brother philosopher. For, in disputing with me (as your frequent custom has been from the earliest years), you have often demonstrated with a number of reasons that man's end has to be one and simple. And therefore you said you wondered why Plato set up man's end as mixed. So I've now replied to your reasons; and consequently I've gladly admitted and accepted them as being

Cap.

XXXVII

381

eo qui consequitur. Unde et vacuus manet qui hoc bonum existimat habens passionem solam quam quis a bono haberet. Quapropter non satis sibi esse affectionem quis putat, dum re

quisquam non praesentibus filiis ita laetari ac si adessent, aut non comedendo ita laetari ac si comederet, aut veneriis non potiundo ita gestire' ac si potiretur, sed habere exoptat. *Plotinus de felicitate quod non in voluptate sit ita probat, quia sicut appetitus est ad aliud bonum sic eius quies in bono alio. Item voluptas potest esse imaginaria et decepta. Omnino vero bonum non consistit in passione consequentis bonum, quae potest esse similis per fallaciam etiam in non
ipsa caret;

neque enim

eligit

vero talem eligeret affectionem. Superiores quidem rationes intellectus actum actui voluntatis in beato praeconsecuto.

Nemo

posuerunt. Quibus vero rationibus oppositum probabiliter existimari possit in epistola

si

quadam de

fehcitate tentavi. Denique,

consideretur

non tam

voluntas ab intellectu discreta

quam

quod

in ipso intellectu est quasi voluntas et voluptas, erit forte

tentatiotutior.**

Ex
esse

unum, unum

superioribus omnibus coUigere possumus finem hominis scilicet actum vitae ipsius ex sapientia et

voluptate mixtae, ad

ad finem

unum bonum atque in uno, magis quam voluptatem conducere.

ilia

sapientiamque
In

quo

certe

soluta est tua

quaestio, vir doctissime^ Miniatensis Michael

dilecte.

conphilosophe noster plurimumque

Saepe enim

mecum

ut frequenter a primis annis consuevisti disputans unum et simplicem hominis esse debere finem rationibus multis confirmavisti.' Ideoque mirari cur Plato mixtum finem [402v] posuerit

dicebas.

Illis

ergo* rationibus tuis

iam

ita

respondi, ut

et'

eas

'gestare
rctuli

'sapientissime

dcmonstrasti

'ego

WXP WXP

'for
'et

muhis confinnavisti

om.

*-*om.

WXP WXP

read

illis

quas supra

382

Chapters?

completely valid, and at the same time I've defended our Plato's mixture. Elsewhere we'll respond to the rest of your
extremely subtle questions about Plato.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK OF THE COMMENTARIES OF THE FLORENTINE, MARSILIO FICINO, ON PLATO'S PHILEBUS CONCERNING MAN'S HIGHEST
GOOD.

Cap.

XXXVII

383

libenter

Platonis

admiserim et tamquam verissimas approbaverim, et nostri defenderim mixtionem. Reliquis tuis circa Platonem subtilissimis quaestionibus alias respondebimus.

nNIS PRIMI LIBRI* COMMENTARIORUM MARSILO FICINI FLORENTINI IN PLATONIS PHILEBUM DE SUMMO HOMINIS BONO.^

'W reads Explicit

eundem
liber

'sequitur eiusdem liber secundus add. X; sequitur eiusdem in liber primus secundus add. P (seep. 385 note 1)

384

Chapter 1

THE SECOND BOOK OF THE COMMENTARIES OF THE FLORENTINE, MARSILIO FICINO, ONTHEPHILEBUS.

Chapter 1. On the one principle of things and how all things subsequent to it are constituted from an infinite and a limit. Also on the primary genera of things.
23C
All the things that are

now

in the universe ...'** After Plato

proposed in the first part of the book what ought to be the main topic of discussion, and in the second part told us of a particular way and approach to discuss it, in the third part he told us why it ought to be discussed carefully. In the fourth part he began to treat of the good; and, since he was about to compare pleasure and wisdom to it, he explained what it is so you could see whether either of them is the good itself. In the process of comparing each one to it, he showed that neither is the

good itself.
remains to find out which contributes find this out, unless each is defined and divided into its parts. But definition first needs the genus, then the difference. Therefore in the fifth part Plato inquires into the genus of each, and introduces a certain genus of the infinite and also the genus of the limit."" Pleasure he
All this so far.
it

Now

more

to the good.

You cannot

refers to the infinite; the intelligence

and wisdom to the

limit.

And therefore,

to the extent that the limit excels the infinite, he

wants the intelligence and wisdom to excel pleasure. Here you have to understand before all else that the infinite is talked of in two ways. The first sort excludes the limit; the

Cap. I

385

SECUNDUS LIBER COMMENTARIORUM

MARSILII FICINI FLORENTINI INPHILEBUM.'

De uno rerum principio et quomodo post ipsum omnia ex infinito quodam ac tertnino cotnponuntur atque de primis
rerum generihus. Cap.
I.^

Postquam in prima in universo sunt tractandum erat proposuit Plato, et in secunda quod tractandi modum' quendam et ingressum tradidit, in tertia qua cautione disserendum sit docuit. In quarta tractare coepit de bono, et quoniam collaturus ad ipsum erat voluptatem et sapientiam, ut inspiceretur numquid istorum alter um ipsum sit bonum," quid bonum sit explicavit,' et ad ipsum utraque conferens neutrum esse ipsum bonum ostendit. Haec hactenus. Deinceps investigandum restat utrum istorum magis ad bonum conferat. Quod inveniri non potest, nisi et definiatur et dividatur in partes utrumque. Definitio autem genus requirit primo, postmodum differentiam. Ideo quinta hac in parte genera utriusque perquirit et infiniti quoddam genus necnon termini genus inducit. Ad infinitum voluptatem, ad terminum [403 r] mentem et sapientiam refert. Ideoque eo

Omnia quae nunc

parte

libri

praestare vult

mentem

et

sapientiam voluptati quo praestat

est

terminus infinito.

Ubi ante omnia intelligendum

infinitum.

Unum quod
W and
Y; in

excludit

quod duplex esse dicitur terminum, alterum quod

(see p.

'the separate title in

note 2)

^noch. heading

X and P there
'mundum

is

one rubric bridging the two books

'txadd.

383

H^

'tnjAvcwiX

WXP

386

Chapter 1

second sort is in need of the limit. For the infinite is what does not have the Hmit. But something can lack the limit in two ways. Either it's so simple by nature and supereminent and absolute it

middle it is indivisible, nor anything above it by whose limits it might be circumscribed; nor does it lie embedded in anything by whose capacity it might be restricted. Or it's formless and vague and wanders away from itself and is in need of the limit and is powerless by nature to provide itself with the limit it longs for. The infinite is talked about in both these ways; but the first infinite is excluding the limit, the second infinite is in need of the limit. The first infinite, since it doesn't have the limit above or within or below itself and since it's above and outside all things, is itself the limit of all things. It encloses all, forms all, sustains all, circumscribes all. Therefore the infinite which excludes the limit and the unlimited limit of all things are identical. For the limit is not itself limited; for it would be limited by another, and that other by another, and so you'd go on to infinity. So the
is,

has neither an inner limit of parts (that

part and last part) since

first part,

first limit excludes the Hmit. So it's infinite. So the infinite which excludes the limit and the limit of all things are mutually convertible. Such is God, namely the one itself whose infinity Plato praises in the Parmenides.^^^ There he called Him the infinite, but in this book he first calls Him the limit of all things, then the measure of all things. Plato added that God was the universal measure, in order to show He is not the limit which is imprinted in things, but the limit which encloses all things from the outside and which separates all things into their proper natures by imprinting in them the inner limit. The second infinite is in need of the limit in the sense that it is the limit of nothing but is limited by everything. Therefore the first infinite, which excludes the limit, is the infinite which limits another. The second infinite is limited by another. In the first instance infinity is better than the limit, because the hmit of all things comes from it, since it is not itself limited. But in the second instance the limit is better than infinity, because the limit has been sought for by infinity. The Parmenides is concerned

Cap. I

387

termino caret. Infinitum enim est quod non habet terminum. aliquid non habeat terminum duobus modis contingere potest. Aut quia tam simplex natura est et supereminens et absolutum, ut neque interiorem partium habeat terminum,

Quod autem

primam partem, mediam atque ultimam, cum impartibile sit, neque supra se quicquam habeat cuius limitibus circumscilicet

scribatur,'

neque

in aliquo iaceat cuius coarctetur capacitate.

et

Aut quia informe vagumque

indigum
et

errans ex se est et termini

sibi

suapte natura praestare

optatum terminum

impotens. Infinitum utrumque dicitur; sed primum infinitum excludens terminum,^ secundum infinitum termino carens.

Primum

infinitum,

cum ipsum
limitans,

nee terminum habeat' supra

et extra

nee intra nee infra, sitque super omnia

est terminus,

omnia,

omnium
sistens,
ter-

omnia

omnia formans, omnia

omnia circumscribens. Idem

igitur est infinitum

excludens

minum

neque enim terminus terminatur, nam ab alio terminaretur, illudque ab alio atque ita in infinitum procederetur. Primus ergo terminus terminum
et

terminus

omnium

sine termino;

excludit. Est igitur infinitum. Infinitum igitur excludens termi-

num et terminus omnium invicem convertuntur. TaHs Deus est, ipsum scilicet unum cuius infinitatem [403v] in Parmenide laudat Plato, et ibi infinitum pronuntiavit, hoc autem* in libro

primo terminum omnium deinde omnium mensuram. Adiecit mensuram omnium, ut ostenderet Deum non esse terminum rebus impressum, sed extrinsecus omnia limitantem et interioris

omnia in natura propria distinguentem. Secundum infinitum ita indiget termino ut nullius' sit terminus, sed ab omnibus terminetur. Igitur infinitum primum excludens terminum infinitum est aliud' terminans. Secundum infinitum est^ ab aho terminatum. Ibi quidem melius infinitas quam terminus, quia ex eo est terminus omnium, quia ipsum non tertermini impressione

minatur. Hie autem terminus infinitate melior, quia terminus

'circumscribiturP

'el

add.

'habeat om.

XP

'autem om.

1VXP

'nullusW

*mudW

'estom.WXP

388
with the one

Chapter 1

God himself, that is, God as the infinite.'" Here, however, [in the Philebus] Plato is concerned with Him as the limit of all things and as the measure. For, as the infinite, God is the good for no one but Himself. But as the measure and the hmit. He is the good for all things, because He is the substance, the salvation and the perfection of all. So, since Plato is concerned in this dialogue with the good for man, he calls God by the title which denotes Him as He communicates Himself to things and does them good, not as He flees from them.
Therefore, whenever Plato mentions in this dialogue the limit and measure of all, understand that it means God. Whenever he talks about the infinite which is in need of the limit either here

means the completely is formed and limited by the Ideas, in the soul by the reasons, and finally in bodies by the forms. As infinite material it comes from God as the infinite, so that from God's infinity comes the infinity of matter. From God as the limit and measure comes the limitation of matter. And although God as the infinite is more excellent in
or in the Timaeus,^^^ understand that
it

universal matter which in the intelligence

Himself than He is as the Hmit, nevertheless matter which is dependent on the former is not more excellent than the limitation which derives from the latter. For what does the pre-eminence of God's infinity do towards making things subsequent to it excellent? In a way that subHmity, which is free and impatient of circumscription, abandons everything else. Therefore univermatter, like some shadow, follows after God who is fleeing away. But the form in matter, as in a mirror, results from a certain beneficent glance of the divine countenance. Matter is forced by necessity to accompany the necessity of the divine preeminence, form to accompany the goodness of the [divine] glance. Therefore in the Timaeus Plato calls matter necessity, but the form he calls the intelligence.'" As matter is first, it is the first thing above nothingness. So it is only a little distance from nothingness. Form, being second, is the first thing above something. So there there's potentiaHty; here there's act. There
sal

there's essence; here there's being.

There there's inchoation;

as

here

there's

perfection.

There

you have matter

the

Cap. I

389

ab infinitate quaesitus. De ipso uno Deo, scilicet ut infinitum in Parmenide. Ut autem terminus omnium et mensura hie agitur. Ut enim infinitum nuUi bonum praeter quam sibi. Ut autem mensura et terminus omnibus bonum, quia omnium substantia, salus atque perfectio. Ideo cum hoc in libro de hominis agatur bono, Deum ea significat appellatione qua se rebus communicat
atque prodest non qua omnia fugit. Quotiens igitur terminum omnium dicit et mensuram hoc in libro, intellige' Deum. Quotiens termino carentem infinitum^
vel hie vel in

mam, quae
rationibus,
ries tas.

Timaeo significat, materiam intellige communissimente formatur terminaturque ideis, in anima in corporibus denique formis. Haec ut infinita matein

Deo est ut infinitum,

ut a Dei infinitate materiae

sit infini-

A Deo' ut terminus et mensura materiae

Ac
ut
licet

profluit limitatio.
sit

[404r\

Deus

ut infinitum in se ipso praestantius

quam

terminus,

tamen non

praestantior

materia

illinc

pendens quam hinc emanans terminatio. Ilia enim praestantia quid ad sequentium excellentiam? Deserit enim quodammodo reliqua exempta ilia et impatiens circumscriptionis sublimitas.

communis materies velut umbra quaedam fugientem* sequitur Deum. Forma vero in materia velut in speculo ex quoIdeo

dam

benefico'

divini

vultus

aspectu resultat.

Necessitatem

divinae praestantiae necessario materia comitatur; bonitatem

aspectus forma. Ideo necessitatem in

formam vero mentem. Materia

dum, inde primum super
ibi essentia, hie esse;

ut

Timaeo materiam vocat, primum, inde primum super

nihilum, parvo igitur intervallo distat a nihilo.'

inchoatio

Forma

ut secun-

aliquid. Ideo ibi potentia, hie actus;

ibi,

hie est perfectio. Materia

quidem

ut a

Deo

processus, forma ut in

Deum

conversio.

'intelligitP 'infinitatem ffA'P 'idcirco in Timaeo dicitur materia inter esse et nihil esse

'KAtoWX

'fugiendem Jf

'beneficio

yP

media add.

WXP

390

Chapter

proceeding from God. Here you have form as the turning back towards God. Turning back towards God is better than proceeding from God. The one separates things from the good and

compels them to degenerate; the other joins them to the good, repairs the harm, forms them into the good again. From God comes matter. From the pure act comes the pure potentiahty. From the act enacting all comes the potentiality which sustains
all.

Understand by matter the first thing God's super-eminence threw above the infinity of nothingness itself. Understand by form the second gift which God extended above the first. These two remain as constants through all the levels of God's creation. The infinite which is in need of the limit call matter. The limitation of matter call form. From the infinity which excludes the limit you can derive the infinity which needs the Hmit. For by the same token the former excludes the limit, the latter is born without the limit. From the Hmit which accompanies God's infinity you derive the limit which accompanies matter's infinity. Not that there are two things in God, infinity and the

He is His own infinity. His glance is the limit of other But necessarily there are two things in things, just as things. things necessarily go forth and are turned back.
limit; for

Set aside for the present the infinity of

dealt with in the Parmenides.^'^*

God

Himself, for

it is

Accept the fact that in this dialogue on the good Plato is deahng with the beneficent limit. Secondly, accept the infinity of all things which proceed from

God. Thirdly, accept in the case of this infinity that limit has been given to it by the limit. Fourthly, accept that there's a mixture from both. You need only concern yourself here with these four points, because the higher limit itself has been and
will

be discussed elsewhere. You're now concerned with the second sort of limit and with infinity. But let's deal with infinity first, because matter is the first to emerge. Accept that it is, and accept what it is. God is always equally powerful. Therefore the power to make things is always equal in Him. Therefore the potentiality to be made is always equal outside Him. For He

wouldn't always be capable of making everything,

if

everything

Cap. I

391

Melior conversio in Deum quam a Deo processio. Ilia enim disiungit a bono degenerareque' compellit. Haec bono coniungit, detrimentum restaurat, reformat in bonum. A Deo^ materia. Ab actu puro potentia pura. Ab actu agente omnia potentia
suscipiens omnia.

primum a Dei supereminentia iactum Formam intellige secundum Dei super donum super primum inde porrectum. Haec duo per omnes
Materiam
intellige

ipsius nihil infinitatem.

rerum gradus a Deo' permanant. Infinitum termini indigum voca* materiam; terminum, materiae formam. Ab infinitate terminum excludente infinitatem' deducas [404v] termini indigam. Nam eo ipso signo quo ilia excludit terminum ista nascitur sine termino. A termino infinitatis illius comite terminum infinitatis istius comitem. Nee duo in Deo sunt, infinitas et terminus,

nam

infinitas ipsa sua est,

aliorum aspectus

est

terminus. In

rebus autem duo

quaedam

necessario' sunt, sicut necessario et

manant

et reflectuntur.

Mitte ad praesens Dei ipsius infinitatem, nam de hac in Parmenide. Accipe in dialogo de bono beneficum terminum. Accipe secundo infinitatem rerum omnium a Deo manantium. Accipe tertio in hac infinitate terminum datum a termino.

Quarto quod ex utroque est mixtum. De his quattuor hie est dumtaxat agendum, quia vero de superno ipso termino alias et dictum est et dicetur. Nunc de termino secundo et infinitate, sed de hac primum, quia prima procedit materia. Quod ista sit et quid sit accipe. Semper Deus aeque potens est, semper ergo in illo aequa faciendi potestas, semper igitur aequa exterius fiendi potentia. Neque enim facere semper omnia potest, nisi fieri semper omnia possint.^ Aeterna igitur omnium factiva'

'degeneratquc ff

'-'adeo >'

'vocatP

'infinitcmP

'neccssaria A'P

'possum

facturaA'P

392

Chapter 1

tiality

weren't always capable of being made. Therefore the potencapable of making everything is eternal; eternal too is the

potentiality of everything to be

made. This potentiality to be

made something
everything.

(as

it

were)

is

either nothing, or something, or

is opposed to being But the potentiality to be made something longs for being. It isn't something; for it would already be something, it wouldn't be the potentiality to become it. Or rather, if it were something, it would be one distinct thing; in which case it wouldn't have an equal regard to everything. Or rather, it would have already actually been made into something; it wouldn't be the potentiality to be made it.

It isn't

nothing; for nothingness

and

repels being.

Therefore
is

it

is

everything.
it

It isn't

everything in act, because

into anything. Therefore
it it

there'd be no need for

to be

made

the state of being prepared for everything. Therefore

it is

is

indifferent as regards individual things. Therefore

the unde-

termined potentiality for everything.

But if somebody said the potentiality [to be made] is always from God and therefore God is always able to make it and it can always be made, and if this somebody asked about the [possibility of] any other passive potentiality, you ought to reply that forms and compounds presuppose both the active and the pasbut matter, (as it is itself all passive potentionly requires the active potentiality, and the active potentiality alone follows the passive potentiality. The passive potensive potentiality,
ality)
tiality,

which precedes everything and

it is

is

placed

midway between

nothingness and being, either of

to be, or

itself

determines to be, or not

it

indifferent to both. If to be,

wouldn't need the

it

action of the superior potentiality to possess form and being,

since
its

own

rational principle

would include these and so

wouldn't be the possible being, but the necessary being. If not to be, its rational principle would be the same as nothingness; so it would be nothing. Or rather, since its rational principle demands non-being for itself, being would be contrary to its rational principle. So it would be impossible for it ever to be. Therefore it is indifferent. So God is the necessary being, matter is the possible being, nothingness is what cannot possibly be.

Cap. I
potentia, aeterna et

393

omnium

potentia susceptiva.

Haec

(ut ita

dixerim) fiendi potentia aut nihil est aut aliquid aut

nihil, nihil
tia

omnia.

Non

enim ipsum

ipsi esse

oppositum

et esse fugat;

poten-

Non aliquid, esset enim iam, neque esset ad fieri potentia, immo etsi esset aliquid unum esset distinctum, ergo non omnia aeque respiceret. Immo vero iam facvero fiendi esse appetit.

tum actu
igitur

non fiendi potentia. Est igitur omnia. Non actu omnia quia non opus esset aliquid fieri. {405r\ Est
aliquid esset,

omnium praeparatio, quare ad singula est

indifferens. Est

ad quaelibet' indeterminata potentia. Quod siquis dixerit hanc potentiam a Deo' esse semper, ergo semper Deum eam facere posse, et semper eam posse fieri, quaeratque de alia fiendi potentia, respondendum formas et composita activam et passivam potentiam praesupponere, materiam vero, quia ipsa est omnis passiva potentia, activam dumtaxat exigere, et solam faciendi potentiam fiendi potentiam sequi. Haec fiendi potentia omnia antecedens, quae inter nihil et esse media ponitur, aut esse sibi ipsa determinat aut non esse aut ad utrumque est indifferens. Si esse, superioris actione ad formam et esse non indigeret, cum ratione propria haec
igitur

includeret, esset ergo

esse, ratio

non

possibile, sed necessarium. Si

nihil igitur esset.

non

sua

cum

nihilo

eadem,
sit

Immo cum
erit esse.

ratio sua

non

esse sibi exigat, contra rationem

erit,

suam

Impossibile igitur

ut

quandoque. Est ergo indifferens.

Unde Deus

necessarium, materia possibile, nihil impossibile.

'quaecumque

WXP

'adeo

394

Chapter 1
therefore Orpheus calls

And

God

"necessity"

when he

says,

"Strong necessity contains

the Republic

Book

all things.'"" Plato says the same in 10."^ Accordingly, matter is the undeter-

mined
limit.

potentiality for being or non-being,

all

and

it's

the indiffer-

ent inchoation for

the forms. Therefore

it is

in

need of the

Therefore
there
is

it is

infinite.

As

for

all

things one universal act

not

one with

reference to number, species or genus, but one, because from

the one

and

for the one

is

so there

is

for all things

it

one universal

matter. This

called one, because

follows after the super-

eminence of the one God, and because it has been made the subject of one act. Although this matter is appropriate to incorporeal things and is incorporeal in them, yet it does not disagree
with corporeal forms; for
real, as
it

when

it's

in

them

it is

also incorpo-

precedes quantity (from the dimensions of which

bodies are made).

Or

rather, this matter suffices

hand
it

for the incorporeal qualities

on the one and powers, and on the other

will also suffice for the Ideas. In the latter instance, in a

way

it

is

sustaining

something

corporeal,

namely

the

rational
it is

principles of corporeal objects. In the former instance,

sus-

taining something incorporeal,

namely the

indivisible qualities.

That this matter subsists in all things after God, however, can be demonstrated again thus. Things which are made by God as the principle don't proceed from themselves; if they did, they wouldn't need the principle. So they receive being and act from God, for being means the act which is present in the nature of things. So things either contain in themselves something else over and beyond the act of being, or they don't. If they contain nothing else, the act of being is pure, free from all deprivation, free from all the circumscription of a subject; it is utterly one, an infinite overflowing energy which excludes all limit and subsists through itself. And because it is existing in itself, it comes, accordingly, from itself. But this is only appropriate to the first thing, God. Therefore the act in things has something else added, otherwise it would be the first thing and infinite and subsisting through itself. The act in things is in another as in a subject. Consequently it isn't like the first utterly abundant act

Cap. I

395

necessitatem Orpheus Deum vocat, cum ait, Fortis omnia continet. Et in decimo de Republica Plato. Est itaque materia ad esse et non esse indeterminata potentia et ad omnes formas indifferens inchoatio. Est igitur indiga termini.

Quocirca

et

necessitas

Est itaque infmita.

Atque ut est omnibus unus communis actus, non unus numero, specie aut genere, sed quia ab uno ad unum, ita omnibus una est communis materies, quae ideo dicitur una, quia
unius Dei supereminentiam sequitur, et uni actui est subiecta.

Neque ex eo quod
his

incorporeis [405v] haec materia convenit in

eisque incorporea, ideo a corporeis dissentit' formis,

nam

et in

quoque

est

incorporea; antecedit siquidem quantitatem,

cuius dimensionibus corpora constant.

Immo quae
quoque

hie quahta-

tibus et viribus incorporeis sufficit, ilHc

Iliic

ideis sufficiet.

quidem corporate ahquid quodammodo

sustinet,

corporum

scilicet rationes. Hie nonnihil incorporale, impartibiles quali-

tates.

Quod autem omnibus

iterum
sunt;
sic ostenditur.

post

Deum

rebus haec subsit materies,

illo

Quae a

principio

fiunt se ipsis

non

neque enim principio indigerent. Inde igitur esse actumque accipiunt, esse enim praesentem actum in rerum natura significat. Aut ergo praeter hunc essendi actum ahud quicquam in se continent, aut nihil. Si nihil aliud, actus hie purus est sine omni privatione, liber ab omni circumscriptione subiecti, unum penitus, infinitus vigor

atque exuberans,

omnem

excludens termi-

num, per se subsistens. Et quia in se ipso existens, ideo ab se ipso. Id autem soh primo Deo convenit. Ergo actus ille aliquid aliud habet annexum, ne sit primum, ne infinitum, ne se ipso
subsistens, et in alio est ut subiecto,^ ne
sit

ut

primum

vigore

plenissimum. Est ergo in sequentibus omnibus

et

actus simul et

'desccndit

'subito

396
in energy.

Chapter 1

So there are
at the

in all things subsequent [to

God] both

act

and potentiahty
of
act.

same

time, potentiality being the subject

Furthermore, we understand by a thing's "essence" the by "being" the act of the essence itself which is present in the nature of things. You can learn this from the Parmenides. '" Therefore essence is one thing, being another. For whatever isn't included in the
rational principle of each thing's substance; but

and the understanding of the essence comes from outside and produces a compound when added to the essence. Since any essence can't be understood without the things which constitute its parts, but each essence can be understood even if it doesn't exist for we can understand what a phoenix is or a man is and at the same time not know whether
rational principle

they exist in the universe

is

it's

consequently obvious that being

other than essence, unless perhaps there's something whose

is its

essence

being
is

itself.

case of what
sons].

one and

first.

But this can't happen except in the For it's impossible for something

to be divided into

many

things except [for the following rea-

Either you get the addition of

is

some

difference;

for

instance, the nature of the genus

multiplied into the species.

different

Or you

get

the

form received

in
is

materials;

for

instance, the nature of the species

multipHed in the different

is

individual things.

Or you

get

one thing that

absolute by

itself,

but becomes something different

instance, a colour can be

when

it's

lying in another; for

one thing separated from a material, another joined to it, the difference being caused by the separation. But if you can posit something which is only being, that is, subsisting being itself, it won't receive the addition of a difference. For then you'd have one thing in the position of the genus and the shared potentiality, and another in the position of the difference and the act. So it wouldn't be the pure act. But being subsisting through itself is the pure act, for Plato calls being "act alone." So where you have being alone, you have act
alone. This being doesn't even sustain the addition of matter;

wouldn't be subsisting through itself. So something like this, which is its own being, can only be one thing. In order to be pure existence, which is what we mean by
for,
if it

did,

it

Cap. I
potentia actus ipsius subiectum. Praeterea essentiam

397

rei ratid-

intelligimus; esse vero actum rerum natura praesentem, ut ex Parmenide discitur. Igitur aliud essentia est, aliud esse. Quicquid enim in ratione intelligentiaque essentiae non includitur extrinsecus advenit et illi additum compositionem efficit. Quoniam essentia nulla sine his, [406r\ quae partes eius' sunt, intelligi potest, omnis autem essentia potest sine esse intelligi, intelligere enim possumus quid phoenix, quid homo, ignorare simul quod in natura rerum existant, ex quo patet quod esse ahud quam essentia est, nisi forte res aliqua sit, cuius essentia ipsum suum esse sit. Quae quidem res, nisi una et prima, esse non potest; impossible enim est aliquid in plura dividi, nisi vel per alicuius differentiae additamentum, sicut generis natura multiplicatur in species, vel propter id quod forma in materiis diversis recipitur,

nem

cuiusque

substantiae

essentiae ipsius in

sicuti

natura speciei in diversis individuis multiplex redditur, vel

ex hoc quod
sicut
si

unum absolutum
color^

est aliud

autem

in alio iacens,
alius

esset

ahquis

a materia

separatus,

a
res

coniuncto, ex ipsa sua separatione differens. Si

autem ahqua

sit esse tantum ita ut ipsum esse sit subsistens, hoc esse additionem differentiae non recipiet. Esset enim ibi

ponatur, quae

aliquid loco generis

rentiae atque actus.

communisque

potentiae, aliud loco diffe-

ergo esset actus purus. Esse autem per se subsistens purus est actus, esse enim actum dicit solum. Quare ubi solum ponitur esse, solus ponitur actus. Neque etiam
esse illud

Non

additamentum materiae suscipit, neque enim per se Quare res tahs, quae suum esse est, una est tantum. Certe primum tale est, ut pura existentia sit, quod per esse
subsisteret.

'axaom.W

'calor H^

398
being, such a thing
all

Chapter 1
certainly the first thing.
it,

is

And
is

therefore, in

the things subsequent to

all

essence has to be one thing, being

either derived

another. For

that agrees with something

from the
ability to

principles of that thing's nature, for example, the

comes from an external from the sun. But it is impossible for the being in things, which is distinct from the essence, to be made from the essence and nature of a thing as if from the efficient cause. Should this happen, anything would be the cause of itself and would bring itself into being. So everything which is such that its essence is one thing, its being another, derives its being from another. And since everything which exists through another can be derived from what exists through itself, namely the first cause, and since it receives being from this, it finds itself with regard to the first cause in the
it

laugh in man; or else

principle, as light

comes

to the air

position of the receiving potentiality. But corresponding to this

potentiality
after
is

the act of being which

is

received.

So

all

things
is,

God

are

compounded from
firstly

potentiality

and

act, that

from essence and being. from what I shall call created nature's from the fact that nature endures limitation, thirdly from the fact that it has composition. The first is obvious as follows. Because a thing has been produced by another, it is not from itself. It is from another, and placed apart from the other, it would not exist. So the thing can both be and not be; and it isn't its own being but the potentiahty for being. For nothing is the potentiality for itself, and nothing sustains itself and nothing is created as a result of sustaining itself. For the agent, when it acts, always makes what is such and such potentially such and such actually. Therefore every production
possibility, secondly
is

You can see this

not

the

result

of

potentiahty

being

impressed

into

it were, the product would still be in the and wouldn't yet exist. Nor is it even the result of act being poured into act, or the same thing into itself, because, [if it were,] the thing produced would exist before it existed. Rather, act is being poured into potentiality. But since act and potentiality are in a way opposed and the one is not the

potentiality, because, if
state of potentiality

Cap. I
significamus. Ideoque oportet ut in
aliud essentia
sit,

399

omnibus

id sequentibas
alicui convenit

aliud esse.

Omne autem quod

vel ex naturae suae principiis est

eductum, ut ridendi facultas

homini, vel ab externo principio advenit, ut aeri \406v\ a sole lumen. Fieri autem nequit ut ipsum esse in rebus quod ab essentia' est

distinctum ab ipsa

rei essentia et

natura

sit

effectum,

tamquam ab
est ut aliud in

effectrice causa.

Nam
sit,

sic aliquid sui ipsius esset

causa, seque ipsum in esse produceret.

Omne

itaque

quod

tale

eo essentia^ sua'
et

aliud esse, esse habet ab alio.

id

Et* quia
ut

omne quod per aliud est ad

quod per

se est reducitur

ab illo esse recipit, ad illud se ut potentia recipiens habet. Huic autem potentiae susceptus
essendi actus respondet.
scilicet et esse,

ad causam primam,

Ex

potentia igitur atque actu, essentia

post

Deum omnia componuntur.

Quod praeterea ostendendum est primo ex naturae creatae (ut

ita dicam) possibilitate; secundo ex ipsius limitatione; tertio eiusdem compositions Primum sic patet: nempe ex eo quod res producta ab alio, ex se non est. Est quidem ab alio et ab illo destituta non esset. Ideo et esse potest et non esse; et suum esse non est, sed ad esse ipsum potentia est. Nihil enim ad se ipsum potentia est; nihilque se ipsum suscipit et nihil suscipiendo se ipsum gignitur. Semper enim agens cum agit quod potentia tale est actu efficit tale. Fit ergo productio quaeque non quia potentiae potentia imprimatur, quia si ita fieret adhuc producta res in potentia esset, nequedum esset. Nee etiam actus infunditur actui, vel idem sibi ipsi, quia res producta esset antequam foret. Sed potentiae infunditur actus. Quoniam vero actus et potentia quodammodo opponuntur,' neque unum idem est

/or ab essentia yreods absentia 'componuntur

'substantia

AP

'sua;fP

'Eto/n. IF

400

Chapter 1
as the other, in creation, accordingly, the being

same

which

is

given to the essence possesses the rational principle of act, but

the essence which receives [the being] possesses the rational
principle of potentiality.

You can

see

it

is

so from [nature's] limitation. Since the

essence of souls and intelligences isn't in matter, the essence

certainly isn't contracted

on account of matter's capacity. So from the point of view of what's below it, it is infinite and
if

excludes the limit. Accordingly,

the essence doesn't receive

being different from

itself.

itself,

but

is its

own

being, then the being

hasn't been received in another. Therefore

it exists through pure and utterly infinite and excludes all limit. Its being isn't defined from above because it isn't in another; and its essence isn't defined from below

Everything that

is

such

is

because
all limit.

it

isn't in

another. Therefore on
is

all

counts
first,
is

it

excludes

But

this

only true of what comes

that the
first

not of what
constrained
is

comes second; for

by
its limits.

all

thing surpasses

Therefore with higher substances essence

one
all

thing, being another. But, since every

compound found

in the

higher substances must also be found in corporeal things,

corporeal things and incorporeal things have essence distinct

from being.

You can

see

it is

so from [nature's] composition. If created

its

nature were to exist as

own

being,

it

would be

entirely

simple, since being itself doesn't participate in anything in any way. For being is the substantial act; or rather, the total act of

the total thing. But participation

potentiality. Therefore

is brought about because of whatever has been created to be just being can't participate in anything else. So it exists as an entirely simple thing, therefore by nature entirely unchangeable. But this is not at all true of a thing that's been created. Therefore with all things subsequent to God Himself you find potentiality

and

act

and essence and being.

I

things

which is shared by all and non-being ahke; it is midway between nothingness and being and is unformed and equally receptive to all the individual forms. Matter is the first
Matter
call the potentiality itself

and

is

in itself indifferent to being

Cap. I

401

quod

est' et aliud,

ideo in creatione ipsum esse

quod

essentiae

datur rationem actus habet, essentia vero quae suscipit^ habet

potentiae rationem.

Ex limitatione {407r\ sic apparet. Profecto cum essentia animorum et mentium in materia non sit, non est pro materiae
capacitate contracta. Ideo
differens, sed
si

ad inferiorem partem comparetur,

si

infmita est excludens terminum. Quare

esse

non

suscipit a se

ipsum suum

esse est,

iam

esse id in alio

non

est

receptum. Itaque per se existit. Omne tale purum est et penitus infinitum, omnem excludens terminum. Neque sursum fmitur esse, quia in alio non est; neque deorsum essentia, quia non in
alio.

Undique

igitur

omnem

excludit terminum. Id soli

primo

competit, nulli vero secundo,

limitibus coercentur.

nam omnia ab

eo superata eius

Quapropter aliud

in supernis substantiis

essentia est, aliud esse.

Quoniam vero quaecumque compositio

quoque corporeis
insit

in supernis substantiis invenitur in rebus

necesse est, tam corporea omnia quam incorporea' essentiam habent ab esse distinctam. Ex compositione sic ostenditur. Si natura creata esse suum existeret, omnino simplex esset, quoniam ipsum esse nullo

modo

aliquo participat. Est enim substantialis actus;

immo
fit.

totus rei totius actus. Participatio vero ratione potentiae

Siquid ergo creatum solum esse est alio nullo participare potest.

Omnino
in

igitur

simplex

existit,
rei

ergo omnino immutabilis per

naturam, quod creatae

convenire nullo

modo

potest.

Quare

omnibus

Deum ipsum

sequentibus potentia reperitur

se ipsa

et actus

essentiaque et esse.

Potentiam ipsam
esse indifferentem

communem omnibus

ad esse

mediamque

inter nihil et esse,

et non informem et

'

est

om. ffAP

'suspicit

'incorpora

402
infinity in

Chapter 2

need of the limit. Because it is indifferent to being and non-being, it is therefore indeterminate as regards both, and is said to be indefinite and limited by another. Since it is midway between nothing and something, it occupies, accordingly, infinite space; for there is no greater distance than the distance between nothingness and being. Since it is unformed, it lacks the limit of the forms. Since it is equally disposed towards all the forms, it is disposed towards them indefinitely. Through infinite time it offers itself as the receptacle for the innumerable forms, and it accommodates itself equally and in Hke manner to all the possible movements of the forms. Moreover, it accommodates itself equally to all the places to which the movements of the forms lead. Therefore it has nothing of its own, nothing certain. Therefore it has no limit. Therefore it is absolutely
infinite.

What

is

matter? The potentiality for

all,

the infinite

interval

between being and nothingness, the

is

infinite capacity to

recieve forms, the indeterminate inchoation of

movements.

Matter

the

first infinity
it

of

all

things

and

in all things. All

and from the limit according to the Pythagorean Philolaus. Hermes Trismegistus calls the infinite "malignity and darkness," the Hmit "benignity and the splendour of God.""* Orpheus calls the infinite "chaos," the limit "ornament.""' Zoroaster introduced two principles, that is, he introduced prime elements from which all things are constituted, the good and the bad. In the place of the limit he put the
things are

made from

good, in the place of the

infinite

he put the bad.

Chapter

2.

among
entity.

the principles

Confirmation of the above. The hierarchy and elements which make up an

Plato accepted the two principles, [the infinite and the limit] and was right to introduce the two only after the one. The one is above all things; the two principles are what all things consist of. After the two, Plato numbered off three, that is, the infinite accompanying the limit, the Hmit in the infinite, and a third mixed from both. But when he mentioned the cause of the

Cap. II

403

aeque ad formas singulas praeparatam materiam voco, primairi ipsam termini {407v] indigam infinitatem. Quia ad esse et non esse indifferens, ideo ad quod vis illorum indeterminata est, et indefinita dicitur, et ab alio terminatur. Quia inter nihil et aliquid media, ideo infinitum tenet spatium, nulla enim
distantia

maior quam quae

inter nihil et esse.

Quia informis

termino formarum caret. Quia ad omnes aeque se habet, indefinita est ad formas; et innumeris formis per infinitum

tempus susceptaculum se exponit, quibuscumque formarum motibus aeque se pariterque accommodat; locis quin etiam ad quae formarum motus ducunt aeque congruit omnibus. Nihil igitur habet proprium, nihil certum. Nullum itaque terminum; prorsus igitur infinita. Quid materia'? Potentia omnium, infini-

tum

inter esse et nihilum^ intervallum, infinita

citas,

indeterminata
et in

motuum

inchoatio.

formarum capaHaec prima est

infinitas, ex qua et termino constant omnia, ut Philolaus inquit Pythagoreus. Mercurius infinitum vocat malignitatem tenebrasque, terminum benignitatem Deique splendorem. Orpheus infinitum^ vocat chaos, terminum ornatum. Zoroaster duo principia induxit, id est, elementa prima ex quibus constituuntur omnia, bonum et malum; loco termini bonum, loco infiniti malum.*

omnium

omnibus

Firmatio superiorum. Gradus principiorum elementorumque entis. Cap. II.'

Plato haec duo accepit principia, et merito post unum solum duo induxit. Unum super omnia; duo ex quibus omnia. Post

duo tria connumeravit, id est, infinitum cum termino, terminum in infinito, mixtum ex utrisque tertium. Statim vero

'mmW

'nihil

AT

'infmitam ff

'em., *'A'rP/ie<7d loco mali infinitum

'no ch. break or heading

WXP, though P has a faint Cap. Winihe margin

404
23D

Chapter 2

mixture, he immediately introduced four principles. But in the

Sophist Plato posited five elements in what

tity."^""

is called "an encompounded from essence and being, although the term "entity" itself refers more to the compound's being than to its essence. Therefore Plato

Plato understands by this something

didn't say an entity consists of being, essence, rest, motion,

[identity, difference,] for that

and

left

But he posited five out being, because being plays the major part in the exsix.

would be

pression

"an

entity."

So "entity"
is

refers principally to the being

infinity, to infinity. Plato

given by the Hmit, which

above

added

(namely the infinity which being presupposes), rest, motion, identity, difference. For in the case of every single thing that exists, five elements are added to being. First comes essence, that is, the formal cause of each thing. Identity is next, as each essence is entirely similar to and identical with itself and also always shares something with others. Immediately difference arises, because being and essence
five things to entity: essence

and [every entity] is often made from many things and it from other things which are outside itself. There is also rest in so far as it stays for some time in its own nature and persists in its unity. Motion arises too, which is nothing else but the movement away from essence; that is, motion is a certain operation (for all things do something). In the same way as the two principles, the limit and the infinite, are in all things after God, so the five [elements] are in them too. Because of the limit every
differ,

differs

single thing has being, that

fact that
it

is,

because of the higher

limit.

The

has being doesn't increase the number [of the elements], since being is included in the meaning of the term
"entity." But because of the infinite this
tity, first

thing,

namely enand

possesses essence. Again, because of the limit every entity

rest;

has identity and

because of the

infinite, difference

motion. You can

you say every entity consists of being, essence, identity, difference, rest and motion. Plato indicated this can happen when he said the
the elements into six as long as

make

completed, according to Orpheus, in the sixth generation."' But six is the most perfect number because

adorning of the song

is

Cap. II

405

intulit quattuor, cum mixtionis causam nominavit. Quinque vero in Sophiste posuit elementa [408r\ eius quod ens dicitur.

Ens

intelligit

compositum ex

essentia atque esse,

esse

nomen ens illius compositi magis exprimit

et cetera, essent

quamquam quam essentiam.

Ideo non dixit quod ens' constet ex esse, essentia, statu, motu, enim sex. Posuit autem quinque et esse praeter-

misit, quia in expressione entis esse praevalet. Significat ergo

ipsum esse a termino, qui super infinitatem est, datum. Huic adiecit quinque, essentiam, scilicet infinitatem ipsam quam esse id praesupponit, statum,' motum, idem, alter um. In unoquoque enim quod est ipsi esse quinque* sunt annexa. Essentia primo, scilicet ratio cuiusque rei formalis. Idem, quia essentia omnis sibi ipsi penitus similis est et idem, et cum aliis etiam semper in aliquo convenit. Statim oritur alterum, quia et esse et essentia alterum et saepe ex pluribus constituitur et ab aliis quae extra se sunt differt. Est et status quantum' in sui natura aliquamdiu moratur, et sua in unitate persistit. Oritur et motus qui nihil est aliud quam exitus de essentia, id est, operatio quaedam. Omnia enim aliquid operanens^ praecipue
infinitati

tur. Sicut in

omnibus post

Deum

sunt

duo

ilia,

terminus

et*

infinitum, ita et ista quinque in omnibus. Ratione termini esse

habet unumquodque, termini

esse'

scilicet superioris,

quod quidem

non auget numerum, quia

in ipsa entis

exprimitur. Ratione vero infiniti illud

denominatione primum scilicet ens habet

essentiam.* Ratione rursus termini est ilUc'

infiniti

idem

et

status,

alterum atque motus.

essentia,

Potest et numerus senarius addi ita ut dicatur constare ens

omne ex esse,

eodem,

altero, statu ac

motu.

Quod

fieri

posse significavit Plato

cum

dixit in sexta

generatione [408v]

secundum Orpheum ornatum cantilenae finiri.'" Is autem numerus perfectissimus est, quia proprie ex partibus suis

'cos

W
number

'eas

W
P

'statim

XP

*X has what

is

either the letter

the

5; scilicet

'inquantum

*for scilicet ens habet essentiam

W reads ex quaque
WXP

WXP

*ct

om.

est essentia scilicet,

S (abbr. for scilicet or 'quidem esse om. WXP andXP read ex quinque est

essentia scilicet

'est illic o/n.

"fieri

406
it is

Chapter!

properly constituted from its parts: from one, from two, and from three. And though the elements are six, the first one, which is being, Plato didn't mention in the Sophist when he enumerated them, because in talking about entity he meant it to
include being (for in entity being prevails over the other ele-

ments)."^ So, in talking about five elements, he meant five over

and above the one which is being, which is what he had principally meant by the term "entity." So there are six universal genera. After one correctly comes two, since two is what follows closest to one. After two comes three from which you get six. Firstly there's God. Secondly there's the limit and the infinite. Three of the elements come under the Hmit: being, identity, rest. Three of the elements come under the infinite: essence, difference, motion. So the one becomes two, the two three. Consequently after two, when three emerges, six also emerges simultaneously; for the three derivatives of each of the two make up six. You can't, as it so happens, go any further. For each of the two, in coming from the one, returns to the one through its three derivatives when it is in the one and proceeding from it and returning to it. Or rather, there are seven elements, for above the six is God. However, the number seven is the limit of nature. Or rather, the total is nine: God, the infinite, the limit, being, essence, rest, motion, identity, difference. All things come to an end in this number. For the one, in resting, moving and returning to itself, effects three things which undergo the same process in themselves and effect nine. You can't go any further because the three sets of three, which are in the number nine, make up the total power of one entity. For it rests, is moved, returns, [that is,] is, lives, understands. You have three things here: [essence, Hfe, intellect.] Again, in the essence there is life and intellect by way of essence; in life there is essence and intellect by way of life; in the intellect there is essence and life by way of intellect. So every going out and turning back is terminated in the number nine because, from the triple correspondence within any one thing through the sets of three, the maximum conversion into the one occurs in so far as it's possible.

Cap. II
constat: uno, duobus, tribus.

Am
sex sint, illud primuih

Ac

licet

quod

est esse in

Sophiste tacuit Plato in numerando, quia

intellexit

ens diceret significavit, in eo enim esse alia praevalet. Ideo

cum cum

quinque ultra unum, quod esse est, Sex itaque sunt genera quod rerum. Merito post unum duo, hoc enim proxime sequitur unum. Post duo tria, ex quibus sex complentur. Est primo Deus. Secundo terminus et infinitum. Sub termino tria: esse, idem, status. Sub infinito tria:' essentia, alterum, motus. Ergo unum in duo, duo in tria. Ex quo post duo, dum tria oriuntur, sex quoque pariter oriuntur. Nam sub unoquoque duorum tria
quinque
dixit,

per ens praecipue significaverat.

pendentia sex conficiunt. Neque forte potest ultra procedi,

nam

quodvis duorum per tria sua ut ab uno est ita redit in unum dum et est in eo et procedit et redit. Immo vero septem^ sunt, nam Deus supra sex. Septenarius autem naturae est terminus. Immo et novem: Deus, infinitum, terminus, esse, essentia, status, motus, idem et alterum. In hoc numero finiuntur omnia. Unum quippe dum stat, movetur,' reditque in se ipsum tria efficit. Tria pariter in se redeuntia novem. Neque ultra proceditur quia tres quae sunt* in novenario trinitates omnem unius entis vim explent. Nam et stat, movetur,' redit, est,' vivit, intelligit.

Ubi

tria sunt.

Item in essentia

est vita et intellectus

per
in

modum
in intel-

essentiae; in vita essentia,' intellectus per

lectu essentia, vita per intellectus
[409r] novenario
tur,

modum vitae;

modum. Quare
est,

numero
trini-

omnis progressio
fieri

omnis

reflexio termina-

quia ex hac' trina adaequatione in quolibet uno per

tates

maxima quoad

potest

fit

in

unum conversio.

'tenia

^septimum
'essentiae

W
P

'movet
hoc

*eiadd.W

'insunt

'etadd.

WXP

408

Chapters

Chapter 3. The conditions which all things share because of the infinite and those they share because of the limit.
But let's return to the point from which we digressed. Let's see what all things generally have in common from the nature of the limit and the infinite, then see what is particularly appropriate to individuals from the same. Because the Hmit, that is, act, has been given to things by God, a certain unity is present which copies the first one. Because infinity is present, that is, the potentiality which falls away from the one, multiplicity is present which degenerates from the one. Again, from the former comes being, from the latter, essence. From the former comes identity, from the latter, difference. From the former comes rest, from the latter, motion. For every single thing gladly persists in its act and Hmit. But it is moved towards something out of the need supplied by the passive potentiality. What isn't moved is the same as itself, but what digresses is different. If the Hmit alone were present, there would be only act, rest, identity. If infinity alone were present, there would be only potentiaHty, motion and diversity. But in things the latter have been mixed together; therefore the former have been mixed together too. From the limit comes the good; from the infinite, the bad, or the decrease of good. This is because act comes from the former, privation from the latter. Beauty comes from the former, from the latter comes deformity or ugliness. From the former comes action, from the latter, passivity; for everything acts through act, sustains through potentiality. They are what everything has in

common. From the

limit in the intelligence

is

eternal essence

and

operation and the fixed series of the Ideas. From the infinite is the multitude of the Ideas and because of them unceasing repetition.

From the infinite the

and
it

soul proceeds by operating through

in addition to the

the intervals of time,

species
vals.

number of

the

supplies the

From

the limit the essence stays

number of operations and temporal still and repeats the same

inter-

operations at fixed intervals.

is

From
its

the limit the universal world

parts

continuous and connected in

and contains the

finite

Cap. Ill

409
infiniti et

Quae conditiones competant omnibus ratione quae ratione termini. Cap. III.
'

Sed redeamus illuc unde digress! sumus. Videamus quid communiter omnibus rebus competat ex termini et infiniti natura; deinde quid proprie singulis ex eisdem conveniat. Quia
in rebus terminus est, id est, actus a Deo datus, inest unitas quaedam unum imitans primum. Quia infmitas, id est, potentia ab uno discedens, inest multitudo ab uno degenerans. Item ex eo esse, ex hac essentia. Ex eo idem, ex hac alterum. Ex eo status, ex hac motus. Quia unumquodque in actu et termino suo iibenter permanet. Movetur autem ad aliquid ex indigentia quam passiva praebet potentia. Et idem secum est quod non movetur, alterum vero quod digreditur. Si solus inesset termi-

nus, solus actus, status, identitas. Si sola infinitas, sola poten-

motus atque diversitas. Haec autem in rebus mixta sunt; mixta igitur sunt et ilia. Ex illo bonum, ex hac malum sive decrementum boni, quia ex illo actus, ex hac^ privatio. Ex illo pulchritudo, ex hac deformitas sive informitas. Ex illo actio, ex hac passio, nam quaeque per actum agunt, per potentiam capitia,

unt. Ista

omnibus sunt communia. Ex illo in mente aeterna essentia

series.

et

operatio est et certa idea-

Ex hac idearum multitudo perque eas incessabiHs replicatio. Ex infinito anima per temporis intervalla operando progreditur et supra specierum numerum operationum et temporis adhibet numerum. Ex termino stat essentia et operationes easdem certis repHcat intervallis. Mundus universus [409v] ex
termino continuus'
est

rum

partibusque* connexus* et finitas rerum

'no ch. break or heading

WXP

'hoc

'connexum

WXP

WY

'continuum

WXP

'-qiie

om.

410
species of things.

Chapters

From

the infinite the world

makes various

progressions and produces numberless single things; but by

measuring through the limit it also restores the progressions to fixed intervals. Again, from the limit the qualities and quantities of the lower bodies in a way possess the ability to check the capacity of matter and to limit the flux. From the infinite quantity possesses the ability always to be divided and increased. For it is appropriate to quantity which is in matter to be divided and extended. But each part of a quantity is a quantity. Therefore each part can be divided and extended, for quantity isn't made from non-quantities but from its parts; and unless it possesses a part it isn't quantity, so you can divide it to infinity. Each part of a quantity is a quantity. Each quantity has parts, therefore each can be divided. What can be divided to infinity can also be increased to infinity. For, by virtue of the fact that something descends to infinity, it leaves behind an infinite series above. Therefore, where there is an infinite descent, there is an infinite ascent behind it; for the descent isn't infinite unless there is an infinite series through which it can descend. As many steps in the series as are taken up in front, that number is left behind. In front they are taken up to infinity, therefore they are left behind to infinity. So an infinite thread is rolled up behind while an infinite thread is unrolled in front. But what can be extended to infinity doesn't disagree with itself. But it does disagree with a species, which requires a definite quantity just as it does an appropriate quality. But quantity can be extended to infinity because it's in matter. For, if it's above matter, it will certainly be the rational principle which isn't large (in order to agree with small itself of quantity things), nor small (in order to agree with large things). Therefore because of matter's infinity quantity finds itself open to any amount of extension or division. Again, quality, when it partakes of the limit, forms matter and possesses the one

matter's infinity,

its nature. But when it degenerates into can always be relaxed in its degrees to infinity or intensified to infinity. For to be intensified and relaxed is appropriate to the quality which is in matter. Each

property appropriate to
it

Cap. Ill
continet species.

411

Ex

infinito progressus efficit varies et singula

general infinita, sed et progressus per terminum metiendo'

Item qualitates et quantitates inferiorum corporum ex termino habent ut materiae quoquomodo sistant capacitatem et fluxum terminent. Ex infinito quantitas habet ut et dividi possit semper et augeri. Proprium enim quancertis restituit intervallis.
titatis est

quae

est^ in

materia dividi

et extendi.

Quaecumque
et^ dividi

vero quantitatis pars quantitas est. Igitur

et

quaeque pars

extendi potest, neque enim quantitas ex

non quantis

constat,
est

ex partibus
quantitas.

autem Quare

suis constat et nisi

habeat partem^ non

in

infinitum

dividitur.

Quaeque

pars

quantitatis est quantitas.

Omnis

quantitas habet partes; ergo

omnis

dividitur.

Quod

dividi potest in infinitum et in infinitum

enim ipso quod descendit in infinitum, supra relinquit gradus in infinitum. Ergo post tergum fit ascensus infinitus, ubi descensus fit infinitus; non enim descensus est infinitus, nisi infiniti sint gradus per quos descenditur. Quot gradus
augeri, eo

ante capiuntur tot retro linquuntur; ante in infinitum capiuntur,

retro ergo linquuntur in infinitum.
infinita,

Ergo

tela retro convolvitur

dum

ante infinita revolvitur.

sibi

Quod autem

in infinitum

extendatur

nequaquam

repugnat. Repugnat autem speciei

certam quantitatem postulat ut propriam exigit qualitatem. Id autem quantitati contingit, quia in materia est. Si enim sit supra materiam erit utique ipsa ratio quantitatis, {410r\ quae nee magna est ut parvis congruat, nee parva ut congruat magnis. Ab infinitate igitur materiae quantitas habet ut ad quamlibet extensionem et divisionem sit indifferens. Item qualitas ut termini est particeps materiam format unamque' habet suae naturae proprietatem. Ut autem in materiae infinitate degenerat et remitti in infinitum potest et in infinitum* gradibus semper intendi. Proprium enim qualitatis est quae inest mate-

quae

ita

riae ut intendatur et remittatur.

Quaeque pars

qualitatis est

'metuendo >'
'finituin IV

'quae

est

om. H^

'etom.

YP

'partes If

'unaquaequeAP

412
part of a quality
sified or relaxed.

Chapters
is

a quality, so each part can always be inten-

nothing else but the of intensity, so that it can agree with a relaxed quality; nor is it in a state of relaxation, so that it can agree with an intense quality too.
if

But

quality exists outside matter,

it is

rational principle itself of quality.

It isn't

in a state

Again, the quality which is in matter is received according to the capacity of matter itself. Matter's condition is worse than the form. So the quality is not received in matter in its total fullness. Therefore it can be diminished since it's disabled or increased since it's not entire. It's received by the subject more and more or less and less according to the. subject's various states of preparedness. But the quality which has been freed from the limits of a subject has the total completeness of its energy; it has it in an instant since it surpasses time, and it has it in one spot since it is above place. So it isn't stretched out in degrees nor extended from part to part. Moreover, because of matter there are infinite individuals in the same species of each thing or quality. For as matter nowhere possesses the total fullness of the form and is prepared to receive it everywhere, it keeps on desiring what remains. It is able to receive it and receive it in various parts. So matter

same nature in various ways and at various and space. You can see this with the things which we say are in the same species. The one common property and one act indicates there is one form. Yet there's the distinction which comes from certain conditions of matter itself: from time, from situation, from shape. So when you've subtracted them from the form one thing is left. But this diversity of individuals in the same species is caused by
receives the form's
intervals of time

quantified matter in the case of bodies; but in the case of souls

is

it

caused by the distinction of reason which is in the souls' Idea. Here each Idea receives some distinction in itself from the participation of infinity, as we've described. Conclude that the infinite is manifested in the intelligence only in the multitude of the reasons, in the soul in the multitude of the reasons and instants, in bodies in the multitude of the

Cap. Ill
qualitas,
remitti.

413

semper

igitur

quaeque pars intendi potest atque

sit

At

si

extra materiam

qualitas, nihil aliud est

quam

ipsa

ratio qualitatis. Ipsa vero nee intensa est ut remissae congruat,

neque remissa ut competat et intensae. Item quae in materia est pro captu materiae ipsius suscipitur. Conditio materiae forma
deterior est.

Quare non tota

minui potest,

sui plenitudine in

materia suscipitur

qualitas. Ideo

cum

sit

debilis, et augeri,

cum

tota

pro subiecti varia praeparatione magis magisque, vel etiam minus ac minus accipi a subiecto. Quae vero absoluta est a subiecti limitibus totam sui vigoris integritatem uno habet momento, cum tempus supergrediatur, et uno habet in puncto, cum sit supra locum. Non ergo de gradu in gradum protenditur, neque ex parte in partem extenditur. Quin etiam ratione materiae in eadem specie rei cuiusque et qualitatis infinita sunt indi vidua. Nam cum nusquam materia totam formae habeat plenitudinem et ubique ad recipiendum parata sit, adhuc quod superest appetit, potestque accipere et in
sit, et

non

temporum et locorum intervalhs diversis, diversis modis suscipit eandem formae naturam. Quod ex eo patet quia in his quae in eadem specie esse dicimus communis una omnium proprietas et actus unus unam
diversis accipere'

{410v] partibus. Igitur et

esse

indicat^

formam. Est

distinctio

tamen ex quibusdam
situ, figura.

materiae ipsius conditionibus tempore,

subtractis a

His ergo

forma unum remanet. Hanc vero diversitatem individuorum in specie eadem in corporibus materia quanta facit, in animis rationis distinctio quae in animorum idea est. Ubi distinctionem idea quaeque in se suscipit aliquam ex infinitatis participatione

quam diximus.
mente in rationum multitudine dumtaxat anima rationum et momentorum, in corporibus

Collige infinitum in
ostendi, in

'accipere

om. >f

'arguit H<AfP

414

Chapter 4

reasons and instants and points in space. Therefore infinity

increases in bodies, because the universal matter
receive quantity as
it's
is

the

first

to

subjected to the forms of bodily things.

There is a certain condition of the limit inserted into everything by the one itself; because of it individuals are one in themselves and everything is one. There is also a certain condition of the limit coming down from the intelligence with the energy of the one above; and because of it there is one unchanging order for all the species, reasons and forms. In a fixed and continuous series the order is turned back eventually towards the first one. There is also a certain condition of the limit given to matter by the soul from the energy of the intelligence and the one. This limit is form itself, quantity and quality. Moreover, in quantity's dimensions there is a fixed and measured and mutual proportion. In quality's degrees there is some number's species and a mutual moderation of the qualities among themselves. Given all this, vague movement ceases."' All things are bound together. From the various proportions of the quantities and moderations of the qualities various corporeal substances and
natures also arise. So, as the Platonist, Philo, says, individual

made from the condition of the limit itself in weight, measure and number. "Weight" he calls the fixed substance and nature of a thing. "Measure" signifies the determined proportion of the quantity; "number," the finite and consonant degrees of the quality."*
things are

Chapter

God and
mixed
23C

Again, the way in which the infinite is under the limit depending on it; and how these two are together.
4.

All things which are

rates says, "All

now in the universe things which are now in the

.

"* Therefore Soc-

universal order of

things

and descend from the one leader of the entire order let's separate into two elements; that is, into the limit and the infinite, that is, into the universal matter and the universal form and the conditions which follow them." He says "now" in

Cap.

IV

415

rationum, momentorum atque punctorum. Crescit ergo in corporibus infinitas, quia materia ilia communis ut subest corporalium rerum formis prius accipit quantitatem.

uno omnibus insita qua singula in se unum sunt et unum cuncta. Est et a mente quaedam superioris unius vigore descendens qua unus et stabilis omnium specierum, rationum et formarum ordo certa et conEst
conditio termini ab ipso

quaedam

denique primum reflectitur. Est et ab quaedam materiae termini conditio data, ipsa videlicet forma, quantitas et qualitas. Quantitatis insuper dimensionibus certa et mensurata mutuaque proportio;
tinuata serie in

unum

anima mentis

et

unius vigore

qualitatis gradibus

numeri alicuius species

[411r] datis
aliis

mutua moderatio. Quibus Simul omnia vinciuntur. Et

qualitatum inter se vagus cessat motus.

et

aliisque quantitatum propor-

tionibus et qualitatum moderationibus aliae

quoque et aliae cor-

porum
dere,
rei

substantiae naturaeque consurgunt.

Unde

singula, ut

Platonicus inquit Philon, ex termini ipsius conditione in pon-

mensura ac numero sunt constituta. Pondus certam dicit substantiam atque naturam. Mensura quantitatis proporfinitos et

tionem determinatam, numerus gradus signiflcat.

consonantes qualitatis

Iterum quomodo sub Deo est^ infinitum atque terminus inde dependens et quomodo duo haec invicem misceantur.
Cap. IV.'

Omnia quae nunc in universo sunt Dicit igitur Socrates, Omnia quae sunt in universo ordine rerum ab uno totius ordinis
. . .

principe descendentium in

duo elementa partiamur,

videlicet illam
illas

scilicet in

terminum

et infinitum,
et

materiam

communem

et

communem formam

conditiones quae
scilicet

sequuntur. Dicit

nunc, ut ostendat terminum,

formam, non ex materiae

'

est

om. y

'ach. break, but

no heading W; in X and P the ch.

is numbered

two

416

Chapter 4

order to show that the limit, that

23 D

is, form, isn't born from the bowels of matter by matter's energy, but is caused by God. It's as if he were saying that form didn't always exist, and wasn't the equivalent of matter's handmaid. Rather, before matter was turned back towards God and the divine countenance blazed in it as in a mirror, it was formless, it was chaos a confused mass (as Orpheus says),^* an empty and vacant potentiality, darkness above the face of the abyss, that is, of infinity (as Hermes says)."' But "now," that is, after God regarded matter, and the spirit of God (as the same Hermes says) was borne above the flowing matter of the world, the limit and every beauty shone forth, as is described in the Timaeus.^^* But the infinite didn't precede the limit in time, but in origin. St. Augustine also acknowledges this when he's expounding Moses, and Origen before him didn't deny it."' To the two elements Socrates adds a third besides, that is, what is compounded from them both; for a certain third nature results from the two when they've been mixed together properly. He said, ** Let's entertain some points from the arguments above." For he had also said

above that

God mixed

the one and the many, the finite and the

its

infinite in all things

which we described in
light,

[proper] place.

Socrates said too that

God himself through Prometheus,

that

is,

through His providence and

to the ancient theologians

had manifested these things

and to us "manifested," that is, declared them to us. Moreover, by way of manifestation God had created them. For there are three things: creating, effecting,
generating. "Creating" pertains indeed to

God who

operates

without the Idea and from a matter that did not exist before; for He Himself produces both. "Effecting" pertains to the intelligence which effects things in a stable way through the Idea

from a certain matter. "Generating" pertains to the soul which (through the seeds and reasons and from corporeal matter) acts with motion and in time. Accordingly, God "made manifest,"
that
is,

the foundation of

without any pre-existing matter He laid out the infinite, all; and without any pre-existing Idea He
all existing
is

applied the limit to the infinite. Socrates refers to

things as part the infinite, part the limit. This

not because the

Cap.

IV
Deo

417
exhibitam. Quasi

visceribus vigore materiae natam, sed a

dicat

non semper forma fuit, non aequa materiae ipsius pedissequa. Immo vero antequam materia in Deum converteretur et

divinus in

eam

vultus ut in speculum reluceret, erat informis,

erat chaos, congeries indigesta, ut ait Orpheus, inanis erat vacu-

aque potentia, tenebraeque' super abyssi, id est, infinitatis faciem, ut Mercurius inquit. Nunc autem, id est, postquam in materiam aspexit Deus et Dei spiritus, ut idem ait Mercurius, super fluxam mundi materiam est delatus, terminus ornatusque omnis eluxit, ut dicitur in Timaeo. Neque vero infinitum hoc tempore, sed origine praecessit terminum. [411v] Quod et Aurelius Augustinus dum exponit Mosen confitetur, et Origenes antea non negavit. His insuper duobus adiungit tertium, quod scilicet ex utrisque compositum, ex duobus enim invicem bene mixtis tertia quaedam natura resultat. Dixit, Accipiamus aliquos ex superioribus sermones. Nam et supra quoque dixerat

Deum in omnibus

rebus

unum et

multitudinem, finitum et

infi-

nitum immiscuisse, quod loco suo exposuimus. Et dixit ea Deum ipsum per Prometheum, id est, providentiam suam et lumen ostendisse; ostendisse, id est, nobis
priscis theologis ac nobis

declaravisse.

Quin etiam per

ostensionis

modum

creasse. Est

enim
ipse

creatio, effectio, generatio. Creatio

quidem^ ad

Deum

attinet, qui et sine idea et

ex nulla praecedente materia operatur,

enim ea producit. Effectio ad mentem, quae per ideam ex materia quadam stabiliter efficit. Generatio ad animam, quae per semina et rationes ex materia corporaH cum motu agit ac
tempore. Ostendit ergo Deus, id
infinitum
idea
iecit

est,

nulla praecedente materia

et nulla praeexistente

omnium fundamentum,
applicuit infinito. Dicit

eorum quae sunt alterum infinitum alterum terminum, non quia ibi quidem infinitum
terminum

'-queoOT.

'quidem om.

WXP

418
infinite

Chapter 4
can appear here and the limit separately there, but is one element of existing things and the the other. So of the three species, that is, degrees of

because the infinite

limit
is

two elements, the infinite and the limit; and what's constituted from them let's put third. The third thing is one something, because the two have been properly mixed together. For though the things that are mixed by the one itself are two separate things, still they are joined together through the one's power. Imitating the one author they are led to one being. For matter and form joined together are one being not two, just as the operation shines out as one. For matter exists by the being itself of the form. After this, as he wants to
things, let's put first the

bring in a fourth element that isn't in the universe like the other
three but above the universe, Socrates says, "It seems
it's ridic-

I'm a figure of fun, if I assert I have sufficiently divided and enumerated everything." He says "it seems," because in fact he has sufficiently enumerated everything, because he only promised to enumerate the things existis,

ulous of me, that

ing in the universe

and there are only three such

things.

And

yet

he would be ridiculous unless he introduced the cause which is above the universe. Or rather, Socrates did introduce it when he said that God made manifest. Yet it wasn't enough for him to
manifested two separate and distinct things. For from the one there has to be one something. Therefore Socrates had to say also that the one God joined the two things into one being. So the one is not only given the job of producing them,
say

God

but also of joining them into one. So

first

of

all

Socrates had

the one who produces different things; now he also makes God the one who brings things together. Consequently it's obvious that as the world's parts don't come from them-

made God

selves so they aren't

made into one through themselves, but

to join

that

towhatever needed a producer also needs someone gether. For opposite things shun each other, therefore they come together through the power of the one above. So look out for the fourth element over and beyond the other three, that is, look out for the cause which mixes them together. For all things have been united through the one's strength. Socrates said.
it

Cap.

IV

419

appareat' illic seorsum terminus, sed quia eorum quae sunt elementum unum infinitum, alterum vero terminus. Harum

graduum rerum, duas quasdam primo ponamus istas, infinitum et terminum, tertiam vero quod ex his constat, quod unum quiddam est, quia bene ista invicem mixta sunt. Quae enim ab uno ipso miscentur, quamquam duo sunt seorsum, tamen [4J2r] invicem iuncta unius ipsius vi.
itaque trium specierum, id
est,

ipsum imitantia auctorem in unum esse ducuntur. Nam et materiae et formae invicem coniunctarum non duo sunt esse sed unum, sicut operatio emicat una. Materia enim ipso formae esse existit. Post haec volens quartum inducere quod non in

Unum

universo^ est ut tria

ilia,

sed super universum,

si

ait,

Ridiculus

sum,

id est, deridendus ut videtur,

divisisse

asseverem
Inquit,
ut

me

sufficienter

omnia

atque' numerasse.

videtur,

quia

sufficienter numeravit, quia sola

quae

in universo sunt se dinu-

meraturum
induxit,

est pollicitus, ilia

vero tria sunt tantum. Et tamen

universum causam induxerit. Immo eam neque tamen satisfecit dum diceret quod Deus duo diversa et seorsum ostendit. Ab uno enim unum esse debet. Ideo adiungendum erat quod Deus unus ea in unum esse coniunxit, ut non solum producendi sed uniendi uni detur officium. Primo igitur Deum productorem fecerat idiversorum, nunc etiam conductorem facit, ut pateat sicut partes mundi ex se non sunt, ita neque per se una constare, sed et conducente indigere quicquid indiguit producente. Opposita enim sese fugiunt, unius ergo superioris vi coeunt. Ideo praeter haec tria vide et quartum, causam scilicet qua haec una miscentur. Nam unius vi unita sunt omnia. Dixit vide ut aperiret
ridiculus est, nisi super

cum

dixit

Deum ostendisse;

'apparet Jf

'/or in universo

^raniy inn umcroso

'atqut om.

420
''look out,"

Chapter 4
to

show

that the cause

is

not fourth in the

it's

sequence, for

it's first

in the sequence, but that

the fourth

one to be discovered. For, since we see opposites come together into one, we conjecture there is one author of the union above them. On this topic first the Democriteans are certainly refuted, and then the Epicureans who thought that all opposites cling
together because of a fortuitous dashing together.

Here you have to remember the first cause of the union is the God Himself by whose power the intelhgence and the soul bind all things into one. For the intelligence as intelligence only produces the forms. The soul in turn as soul produces the movement of the forms. But the two together give unity to something
first

according as they participate in the

first

one's unity.

23E

Protarchus asked whether there isn't a need for the fifth element, the highest cause, which can separate what's better from what's worse for the sake of the perfection of the better, just as the fourth element unites what's better to what's worse for the sake of the perfection of the worse. This Socrates didn't deny, but he did say there was no need in the present dispute to do it. For God both surpasses everything and communicates Himself to everything. The former is referred to as God's "subhmity," the latter as God's "countenance." The former produces the matter which is by itself, the latter joins form to it. When things after God copy the divine countenance, they always join themselves to lower things for the sake of the perfection of the lower things; and things which are equal meet and everything is brought to a single steady course. But when they desire God's sublimity, all the forms and essences, which can exist without lower things, free themselves from them for the sake of the completeness of each other and no longer communicate with what is worse. Therefore God is always the cause of unity.

God's countenance

is

things joining together. God's subhmity

the cause of the unity which results in is the cause of the

unity which preserves the proper simplicity of each thing. But in the first case God joins separate things together by mixing

them; in the second He unites every thing to Himself by separating them. So He is called on the one hand the cause of things

Cap.

IV
est

421

causam istam non

congredi,

esse

quartam gradu,

enim gradu prima,

sed inventu quartam.' Quia enim videmus opposita in

unum

conicimus auctorem. in loco Democritii primo^ redarguuntur, [412v\ et Quo certe postmodum Epicurei, qui fortuito' concursu haec omnia putaesse unionis super
ilia

unum

verunt invicem cohaerere.

est

Ubi meminisse oportet quod prima unionis causa primus ipse Deus, cuius vi mens et anima in unum omnia vinciunt. Mens enim ut mens est formas dumtaxat producit. Anima rursus ut anima formarum motum. Unionem vero dant ut primi unius
unitate participant.

num quinta* et suprema causa opus quae discernere possit a deterioribus meliora ad meliorum integritatem, sicut quarta unit meliora deterioribus ad
Interrogavit Protarchus
sit

deteriorum perfectionem.
praesenti disputatione
ilia

Non

negavit Socrates, sed dixit in

opus non esse, et enim Deus supereminet omnia et se communicat omnibus. Ilia Dei sublimitas, hie Dei vultus dicitur. Ilia solitariam producit materiam; hie illi unit formam. Atque ut sequentia vultum imitantur divinum, semper sese iungunt inferioribus ad illorum perfectionem, et paria congrediuntur, et omnia in tenorem unicum rediguntur. Ut Dei appetunt sublimitatem omnes formae et essentiae quae sine deterioribus esse possunt se eximunt ad sui ipsius integritatem, peiorumque' relinquunt commercium. Semper ergo Deus unitatis est causa. Dei vultus unitatis quae in coniunctione resultat. Dei sublimitas unitatis cuiusque propriam tutantis simpHcitatem. Sed ibi quidem commiscendo discreta unit invicem; hie autem discernendo sibimet ipsi unit quodcumque. Ideo ibi'
,

'quarta

XP

'priorumqueAP

'primo om. P Ibio/n. Y

'fortuitu

'quanU W; gta [?] X; quarta

422

Chapter 4

mixing; on the other, the cause of things separating. So above

the cause of the mixture there
is

also the cause of the separation.

In this dialogue we're concerned with the

mixed

life,

since we're

concerned with the happiness of the human soul (which perfects the intellect and the will). Therefore the cause of the mixture is sufficient. There's no need to discuss the cause of the separation. For the imitation of this cause pertains to the happiness which is the intelligence's alone and is the soul's only when it has finally separated the intelligence from its other parts.
there is no potentiality of the appetite and there's the complete act of understanding, there is happiness. It is just tasted in this life by the person who is seized by God, as Plato says in the Phaedrus.^^ But the soul actually enjoys it in another life, when it has come out of the body and is pure, as

Where

Plato says in the Phaedo.^^^

tates the fifth element,
life,

The fifth life is so called since it imiand since the first life is the concupiscible
the
life life

the second the irascible, the third the active, the fourth the
is

contemplative (which
fifth life is the

appropriate to the soul). The appropriate to the intelligence.

contemplative

Given the opportunity, it's the Hfe Socrates will follow gladly, whenever he recognizes it and is able to attain it. Protarchus willingly concedes him this point, although they are concerned here with protecting the mixed life. For we always ought to support the thing that is most true and not cling stubbornly to our opinions; we always ought to seize hold of what appears to be
the better alternative.

But of this elsewhere.

it's

Now to deal with human happiness,

life.

for

the

way

to the other

Therefore, having dismissed the

fifth element, Socrates

proposes to treat of the other four which

is,

pertain to the subject of the argument. Before doing anything

23E

else

he establishes the right approach: that

first

since there are

four elements, we'll consider the

three

first,

then the fourth

first

one which
three

is

the cause of the mixture. For through the

we can understand the cause. But with the three,

first

we'll deal

with the
mixture.

two, that

is,

dealing with the mixture. For from the

with the infinite and the limit, before first two comes the
we'll deal with the infinite first.

And with the first two,

Cap.
dicitur mixtionis, hie

IV
Super

423

autem

discretionis causa.

igitur cau-

sam mixtionis
mixta agitur
intellectum et

est et discretionis causa.

Hoc

[413r\ in libro de

vita,

quia de humani animi beatitudine quae et voluntatem perficit. Ideo causa mixtionis sufficit.
eius imitaest, et

De discretionis causa disserere nihil opus est, nam ad

tionem ea pertinet beatitudo quae solius mentis tunc demum cum mentem ab aliis partibus suis
citas est

animi

secrevit.

Ubi
feli-

nulla est appetitus potentia, ubi integer intelligentiae actus

quam hac

in vita gustat quisquis

Deo

rapitur, ut ait in

Phaedro. In alia vero fruitur animus qui mundus corpus egreditur, ut in Phaedone. Haec vita quinta dicitur, quoniam ad
quinti illius imitationem et
est,

quoniam prima
activa,

vita concupiscibilis'

secunda

irascibilis,

tertia

quarta contemplativa

animae propria, quinta contemplativa propria mentis, quam

vitam libenter sequetur Socrates,
et

noverit et assequi poterit.^

cum data opportunitate eam Quod libenter illi concedit' Proei

tarchus,

quamquam mixtam hie tutantur vitam. Semper enim

quod est verissimum favere debemus, nee opiniones nostras mordieus tenere, sed quod melius semper apparet capessere.
Sed de hac*
alias.

Nunc de humana

felicitate,

haec enim ad

illam via. Quinto ergo dimisso quattuor tractanda' proponit

quae ad disputationis propositum pertinent. Modumque traetandi ante omnia statuit, quod* videlicet, cum quattuor sint, primo tria eonsideremus, postea quartum, scilicet causam mixtionis. Nam per haec illam cognoscimus. Inter haec autem tria' prius de duobus sciheet infinito et termino quam de mixto. Hoe enim ex illis. Et inter haec duo prius de infmito, hoc enim terminum antecedit, et ad voluptatem praecipue confert de qua

'comiptibiUs JK

quae P

'tertia

'potucritP

'concedct Jr[?]

AP

')\ocXP

'tractando

424
for

Unattached Chapter
precedes the limit and
the chief contribution to pleasure,

it

is

which ought to be dealt with

ceed in the following
Hmit. Since
tered,

first.

But Socrates taught us to pro-

way when dealing with the infinite and the we see each is divided through the many and is scattry to gather each into the

we must
is

one

shared by individual things and so consider how

many. This

Plato's usual precept

all

and

it's

nature each is one and repeated in many

common

dialogues; since

things after

God

are one

and many,

it's

to

us investigate their unity and multiplicity and to do so with reference to individual things. But in every case, since the many individuals are outside knowledge, let's consider them in

make

terms of the one species. In order to understand their principle, let's contemplate the many species in terms of the one genus.

24A

Protarchus asks for a plainer explanation. Socrates explains himself thus: **I repeat, first of all two things must be investigated, the infinite and the finite." Since he had talked about the limit above, he introduces something having the limit into the
course of the argument. For something concrete is better known than something abstract. Socrates begins with the infinite. In it
discovers the many, since the many is better known. He then reduce [the many] to the one. So the topics to be dealt with are these and here is the way of deahng with them.

he

first

will

There follow, collected from the same lectures of Marsilio, some remains of annotations which have been separated.^^^ But Marsilio's commentaries have been summarily ar-

ranged according
Philebus.

to the

order in the text

itself

of the

Concerning understanding and pleasure and their mixture.

Porphyry says happiness can be called a simple good since the
pleasure of understanding can be scarcely distinguished from it.^" For when understanding is at the point of highest concentration, the height of its concentration
is itself

intimate pleasure.

Plotinus also says this.^'* But then

it is

totally simple
it's

and one.

But the understanding

is

delighted

when

been already

Annotationum Reliquiae

425

primo est agendum. {413v\ Tam vero de infinito quam de termino hunc in modum tractandum praecepit.' Ut cum utrumque videamus per multa divisum atque dispersum, conemur in unam communem naturam singulis competentem utrumque^ colligere, atque ita considerare quo pacto utrumque unum est et
multa.

Haec

solita ilia Platonis praeceptio est et multis in dialo-

post Deum et unum et multa sint, multitudinem investigemus, hocque faciamus in singulis. In cunctis autem indi vidua multa cum praeter scientiam sint, in una specie consideremus; species multas ut earum intelligatur principium uno in genere contemplemur. Petit Protarchus planiorem orationem. Socrates ita se aperit, Duo primum investiganda, inquam, infinitum atque finitum. Et cum supra dixisset terminum, hie in modo tractandi proponit terminum habens. Concretum enim notius quam absolutum. Et ab infinito incipit. Ubi multitudinem in eo utpote notiorem prius reperit, deinde in unum rediget. Haec ergo tractanda sunt, hie est^ tractandi modus.*
gis repetita; ut

cum omnia
et

unitatem illorum

^Sequuntur divuhae quaedam annotationum reliquiae ex eisdem Marsilii lectionibus collectae. Commentaria vero
Marsilii ordine disposita breviter sunt in ipso Philebi textu.

De intelligentia et voluptate eorumque mixtura.

Porphyrius inquit felicitatem dici posse simplex bonum quoniam voluptas intelligentiae vix ab ipsa distinguitur. Cum enim intelligentia est in summo gradu penitus expedito, ipsa sua expedita summitas est voluptas intima. Ut etiam Plotinus inquit. Tunc vero maxime est simplex atque unum. Gaudet vero

'pnedpitfVXP 'utcumque WXP 'in the subscription reads Commea'etiam y tana haec ego MarsQius nondum absotvi, nee emendavi. Similiter neque lamblici et Hermiae translationem. Finis; in Finis. Exscripsit clara haec opera Sebastianus Ssdvinus Marsilii Ficini amitinus, 'in (and P) ten excerpts iij idus f^ruarii 1490; in P Finis (and then a few illegible words) follow instead of these four odd chapters and the ch. divisions and summaries; see appendix II

WX

426

Unattached Chapter

formed, as it were, by the higher Ught. And just as the utmost point of Hght in a concave mirror is already heat, so the utmost point of being is already life, and the utmost point of living is sensation, of sensation is the imagination, of the imagination is reason, of reason is understanding, of understanding is joy, and of joy is the good. But now we've arrived at the highest degree we don't reach division but union. And just as the elements seek and enjoy something agreeable with the same natural drive, so the pure intelligence with its same act turns towards the object as something true and enjoys it as something good. To be sure, in the understanding's knowing there is a certain pleasure, in so far as knowing participates in the nature of a person who desires. Now in the power itself of knowing there is inquiry and discovery. Similarly in the power of desiring there is wanting

and

getting. Inquiry

is

Hke wanting, discovery

is

is

like getting.
is

Therefore, just as there

the

pleasurable getting, so also there

is

pleasurable discovery. Yet the power that desires

not precisely

same

as the

power that knows. This

is

especially true with

we come to know many things that we don't want and would have preferred not to have known, and vice versa. Again, we come to know for most certain what we least want; and in turn we very much want the things we do not come to know very
us, for
well.

That neither understanding nor pleasure pleasure least of all.

is

the end, hut

Neither understanding nor pleasure is the good itself, for we can desire neither the one nor the other; and now and then in one way or another we can reject or neglect either of them. But the good, in so far as it is the good, we cannot not desire; nor can we reject or neglect it. Pleasure isn't the end or the good itself, for it always accompanies either getting the good or moving towards it. But now, just as we desire the good as something other, so we rejoice in the good as in something other. But we don't desire desire, nor rejoice in joy. And just as pain is

Annotationum Reliquiae
se ipsa

All

tamquam
iam

superiori lumine

summitas luminis in speculo concavo iam est calor,

tas essendi
est vita, et vivendi sensus,

iam formata. Atque sicut ita summisemiendi imaginatio,

imaginandi
gaudii

ratio, rationis imelligentia, intelligentiae

gaudium,

bonum. Iam vero ad supremum gradum euntes non ad divisionem pervenimus sed unionem. Atque sicut elementa eodem naturae nixu petunt conveniens et fruuntur, ita mens pura eodem sui actu vergit in obiectum tamquam verum et fruitur

obiecto
est

tamquam bono.

Profecto

in

cognitione

sua

quaedam

voluptas quatenus cognitio naturae appetentis est particeps. Nam in ipsa cognoscendi potentia inquisitio est et
inventio. In potentia similiter appetendi est appetitio atque

consecutio. Inquisitio

quidem

appetitioni similis est. Inventio

vero consecutioni consimilis. Sicut igitur consecutio sic et inventio voluptaria. Neque tamen est idem penitus virtus appetens

nos praesertim, nam multa cognoscimus quae noiumus et quae cognovisse nollemus atque vicissim. Item certissime cognoscimus quae minime volumus et vicissim affectamus valde quae non valde cognoscimus.
atque cognoscens.

Apud

Quod neque

intelligentia

neque voluptas

est finis,

minime

vero voluptas.

Neque intelligentia neque voluptas est ipsum bonum, possumus enim neque banc neque illam appetere et alterutrum interdum quoquomodo respuere vel negligere. Bonum vero qua ratione bonum neque possumus non appetere neque respuere vel negligere licet. Voluptas non est finis ipsum ve bonum, semper enim comitatur vel adeptionem boni vel motum ad bonum. Iam vero sicut appetimus bonum tamquam aliud, ita gaudemus bono tamquam alio. Neque vero vel appetimus appetitum vel gaudemus gaudio. Atque sicut dolor aliud est quam malum, dolemus enim malo, nee omne malum dolor, ita

428

Unattached Chapter

something other than evil (for we are pained by evil), and just as all evil is not pain, so pleasure is other than the good and vice versa. Understanding is also other than the good, for understanding is what looks towards the good and to ways towards the good; it isn't content with itself. To be sure, pleasure is a certain feeling and cheerfulness in the person who's rejoicing, and it is a sort of passive state. But the good itself cannot be like someone's feeling or passive state. Rather, it is in itself that which exists; but of other things it's the maker and perfecter and end. Besides, the good is shared by all those qualities which are mutually opposite. Therefore none of the opposite quahties
is
it

the

good

itself.

Therefore, just as the good

itself isn't pain,

so

Again, if all things participate in the good, but all things don't participate in pleasure, pleasure is certainly not the good itself.
isn't pleasure either.

Though
delightful,

the

good

itself is pleasurable,

that

is,

sweet and

isn't pleasure itself and it's perhaps cut off from formal pleasure. For what brings delight is separate perhaps from delight itself, just as what introduces movement is separate from movement. If the good were brought to completion by the pleasurable, then, just as the useful and convenient, so too the pleasurable would certainly be present to everything whatsoever because of the good. But many good things don't arrive accompanied by pleasure. If it is appropriate to the good to preserve, preservation at least is enough to insure the presence of the good. But something that isn't filled with pleasure at all is preserved too. If the pleasurable brings the good to completion, why doesn't the unpleasurable bring the bad to completion? But every so often the bad too is without pain [i.e.,
still it

the unpleasurable]. If each action exists for the sake of the end,

each passive state must do so even more. But pleasure is a passive state; it is the result of something that pleases. But if it
exists for the

sake of the end,

it

isn't the end.

The

arts use

pleasure for attaining

utility, just

as medicine

and learning do.

But art imitates nature.^'' It's as if nature instituted pleasure for an end. If pleasure's intention is to attain and to season properly an action which
is utility.

Here the end for pleasure

Annotationum Reliquiae
voluptas aliud
aliud

429

quam bonum atque vicissim. Intelligentia etiam quam bonum, spectat enim bonum atque vias ad ipsum

bonum; neque se ipsa contenta est, Profecto voluptas est affectio quaedam diffusioque gaudentis et velut passio quaedam. Ipsum vero bonum non potest esse velut alicuius passio vel affectio, sed est in se ipso potius id ipsum quod existit, aliorum vero effector et perfector et finis. Praeterea bonum omnibus oppositis inter se qualitatibus est commune. Neutra igitur oppositarum est ipsum bonum. Igitur ipsum bonum sicut non est
dolor

nee est voluptas. Item si bonum participant omnia, non tamen omnia voluptatem, merito non est voluptas ipsum
ita

bonum.
ipsum bonum est voluptarium, id est suave atque delectamen non est ipsa voluptas, et forte segregatum a voluptate formali. Quod enim delectationem affert sic ab ea forsan est absolutum, sicut quod motum infert a motu. Si bonum a voluptario compleretur, certe quibuscumque per bonum adest utile atque conferens ita etiam voluptarium. At vero multa bonorum non simul cum voluptate proveniunt. Si proprium boni est servare, salus utique satis est ad boni praesentiam. Servatur autem etiam quod nulla voluptate perfunditur. Si voluptarium complet bonum, cur non et molestum complet malum? Passim vero malum est etiam sine dolore. Si omnis actio est ad finem, multo magis passio. Voluptas autem est
Etsi
tans,

passio

finem,

quaedam ab ipso delectante procedens. Si vero est ad non est finis. Artes sane voluptate utuntur ad utilitatem
sicut

consequendam,
est voluptatis.

medicina atque disciplina, ubi utilitas finis ars imitatur. Quasi natura ad fmem instituerit voluptatem. Si voluptatis intentio est attingere atque condire actionem proprie quae tendit ad bonum ut ad

lam vero naturam'

'em., natura

430

Unattached Chapter

aims at the good as the end, it's agreed pleasure belongs to the genus of those things which exist for an end. But pleasure is either in the sense or in the reason, so it familiarly accompanies the [sense's] perception of the good and to some extent the [reason's] anticipation of the good. The result is it often confounds the judgement, and pleasure itself appears to be the good. Pleasure nevertheless can be distinguished from the good which is entirely present or anticipated as present, just as the appetite is distinguished from the good which is absent.

How an essence is compounded front the one, the many,

limit, the infinite. Also,

the

on the genera of an

entity.

16C

compounds an essence from four elements as it were, from the one and the many, and also from the limit and the infinite. It seems to me that, in order to compound an essence, the one precedes the limit, and the many, infinity. For the one exists in itself, before it can Hmit something else or be
Plato
is,

that

many is thought of thought of as infinite things. If you think of them from the viewpoint of the creator, the one and the limit precede their opposites. However, if you think of
the limit of something else. Again, the

simply as the many, before

it is

them from the viewpoint of the creature, perhaps the reverse happens and the many and the infinite give the appearance of preceding their opposites. Finally, if you think of creator and creature together, perhaps (to compound an essence) the one proceeds together with the many, and the Hmit with the infinite. Then in the essence, which is now compounded as it were, movement and difference arise because of the many and the infinite. But rest and identity arise because of the one and the
limit.

But, as I've said before,

movement flows

as

it

were out of

the compounded essence before rest does. For the essence acts as soon as it is born, and there is a procession in it from one thing to another, however instantaneous. Again, with

movement

rest itself

rectly, unless at the

dawns. For the essence isn't moved corsame time the power itself remains the same.

A nnotationum Reliquiae
finem, constat voluptatem esse in

43

eorum genere quae sunt ad

ita familiariter

finem. Sed haec sive in sensu sive in ratione,

comitatur perceptionem boni

et

quodammodo spem

boni, ut

confundat saepe iudicium, appareatque ipsa voluptas esse ipsum bonum, cum tamen ita distinguatur a bono omnino
praesente vel sperato quasi praesente, sicut appetitio distinguitur ab absente.

Quomodo
mino,
Plato

essentia

infinito.

componatur ex uno, multitudine, Item de generihus entis.

ter-

componit quasi ex quattuor elementis, scilicet ex uno et multitudine, item ex termino et infinito. Mihi quidem videtur ad essentiam componendam prius esse unum termino, et multitudo prius infinitate. Prius enim est unum in se quam terminet aliquid, vel sit terminus alicuius. Item multitudo
essentiam
prius consideratur ut simpliciter multitudo

considerentur haec respectu creatoris,

vicissim

quam ut infinita. Si unum atque terminus

praecedunt opposita. Si autem respectu creaturae, fit forte ut multitudo et infinitum opposita praecedere
Si

videantur.

denique

simul

conspiciantur

creator

atque

creatura, forte procedit

terminus autem simul

unum quidem simul cum multitudine, cum infinito ad essentiam componenet

dam.

Mox

in essentia

iam quasi composita nascitur motus

alteritas

propter multitudinem atque infinitum. Status autem

identitasque propter
essentia ut

unum atque terminum. Profluit autem ab modo supra dixi composita motus quasi ante statum.
lucet.

Agit enim statim nata, fitque in ipsa ab alio processus in aliud

quamvis subitus. Item cum motu status ipse

recte movetur, nisi et virtus ipsa consistat.

At vero

Non enim post motum

432

Unattached Chapter
the beginning of difference,

But, after the movement, which follows difference

itself.

is

For because of the procession another openly appears and another differing from it. But along with
difference identity
is

equally preserved.

How

the function

and

craft

of dialectic

is

God's

gift

and

imitates the divinity.

The art of division refers to the procession of things, the art of resolution, to their conversion. The art of definition refers to independent existence, the art of demonstration, to dependent
existence.

But

all

the arts are reduced either to the art of joining

is

or unjoining. For to divide and to resolve

define and to demonstrate
is

to unjoin, but to

to join. Defining joins parts to the

whole; demonstrating joins wholes to wholes.

Plato says the art of dividing and resolving was given by God.

This
art

is

dialectic in its totality.

For

in dividing

one understands

the procession of things, but in resolving, their conversion.

The

of definition includes the conversion of the parts to the whole, the art of demonstration, the procession of the effect

from the cause.

Dialectic is said to be divinely given, since it is the power which resolves from matter into the divine form, and in dividing leads the images of the divine and universal form down into matter and separates unlike things from unhke things and compounds like things with like things. This entire function is divine, especially since in resolving it can refer to things' conversion, in dividing, to their procession, in defining, to their existence midway between procession and conversion. But in demonstrating it refers now to the procession from the cause, now to the conversion from the effect, now to the existence which is the result of them both being there. But dialectic is given with fire, that is, with the same sort of power that fire has. In rising fire

resolves the subtle things, in sinking

things; in leading

it

divides off the gross

it

back to

itself

it

defines, in lighting

demon-

strates. Dialectic illuminates the intellect, heats the will, raises

Annotationum Reliquiae
qui alteritatis est principium alteritas ipsa sequitur.

433

Nam

pet
se

processum palam apparet alterum atque alterum inter differens. Sed cum alter itate simul identitas aeque servatur.

Quomodo dialecticae officium artificiumque divinitatemque imitetur.

Ars divisiva
refert

sit

Dei munus

processum rerum, resolutiva conver-

sionem; definitiva existentiam independentem, demonstrativa

existentiam dependentem.

disiunctivam rediguntur;
gere, definire vero et
toti,

Omnes vero ad coniunctivam vel nam dividere et resolvere est disiun-

demonstrare est coniungere. Illud partes hoc tota quaedam totis. Plato dicit artem dividendi et resolvendi a Deo datam, id est, totam dialecticam. Nam in dividendo subintelligit processum

rerum, in resolvendo vero conversionem. At definitiva conversionem includit partium ad totum; demonstrativa processionem effectus a causa.
Dialectica dicitur data divinitus,

quoniam

est virtus resolvens

a materia in divinam formam,

atque dividendo deducens divinae universalisque formae imagines in materiam, discernens aliena ab alienis, componens propria cum propriis. Totum hoc officium est divinum, praesertim cum resolvendo referat con-

versionem rerum, dividendo processum, definiendo existentiam inter processum conversionemque mediam. Demonstrando vero tum a causa processum refert, tum ab effectu conversionem, tum a comitantibus existentiam. Datur vero cum igni, id est, cum tali virtute quahs est ignis. Qui resolvit elevando subtilia; dividit demittendo crassa; definit in se reducendo; demonstrat lumine. lUuminat intellectum; calefacit voluntatem; elevat

434

Unattached Chapter

both to divine things. In the Timaeus and the Protagoras and here Plato refers to this faculty (which can procure the divine truth) as the gift of God, for we are drawn by Him and to Him.^'* Plato calls it a gift, so that, when you realise you've received it from God not from yourself and received it free, you may be grateful to God and hand it on freely. In the Statesman and the Protagoras Plato writes that in the beginning itself of the world (either at the very first or after the floods) God's providence entrusted the race of men, which was entirely untutored and lacking in everything, to the care of the divine shepherds.^'' Through the shepherds certain men, who as a result of their birth were more fortunate than the others and were God's sons as it were, could be taught to discover the arts, in particular the divine arts. Origen's book Against Celsus proves it was necessary in that ruder age, and Avicenna maintains the same when he's talking about the prophets.^'* Therefore, just as a child while he is led and instructed by his parent (being too weak himselO does not sHp nor err in his repHes, but then, walking and replying by himself, often falls over and errs, so those first inventors of the arts (being guided by God) did not err. Therefore their successors who can err (being abandoned by God to themselves) ought to venerate the first men as if they were the adopted sons of God. And just as the animals, who wouldn't
otherwise preserve themselves
if

or burrow into the earth, have

they didn't fly away into the air some of them been given wings

by God with which to Hft themselves, others sharp claws with which to dig into the earth, so the soul, which has been created for the divine truth, has been given dialectic. Through dialectic the soul can both fly away towards higher things in resolving, and emulate the creative efficacy of those above in dividing. But dialectic divides the genus into the species, just as God divides matter into the forms. For the genus doesn't make the species, since with regard to them it's like matter and open to opposite species indifferently. So it would through itself make none of the species or all of them everywhere. Or rather, if it were going to make the species, it would actually have to possess opposite species; and this is what a nature that's been

Annotationum Reliquiae
utrumque
in divina. In

435

Protagora et hie facultateni Dei nominat, ab ipso enim trahimur et ad ipsum. Donum inquit, ut agnoscens te non abs te, sed a Deo, gratisque accepisse, et Deo sis gratus et des gratis. In Politico et Protagora scribitur in ipso mundi principio, seu primo sive post illuviones, Dei providentia hominum
et

Timaeo

divinae veritatis comparatricem

donum

genus rudissimum
dasse, per quos

omnium egenum
quidam

divinis pastoribus

commen-

viri

inter alios genitura feliciores quasi

illustrarentur ad artium inventa, praesertim divinorum. Origenes contra Celsum necessarium probat in saeculo rudiori fuisse. Idemque Avicenna disputans de prophetis.

Dei

filii

Quod

Itaque sicut puellus quamdiu propter infirmitatem ducitur a

parente atque instruitur, neque pede labitur, neque errat in res-

pondendo, deinde vero per

saepe cadit et errat,
qui a
sicut
sic ipsi

se

deambulans atque respondens,

primi artium inventores a

Deo

recti

non erraverunt. Eos ergo quasi adoptivos Dei

filios posteriores,

Deo

sibi ipsis relicti errare

possunt, venerari debent. Et

Deus animalibus quae aliter servari non possunt quam vel ad sublime confugiendo vel penetrando terram largitus est partim alas quibus elevarentur partim aculeos quibus terram dividerent, sic animo ad veritatem divinam creato largitus est dialecticam, per quam tum resolvendo ad supera revolaret turn dividendo superiorum efficaciam producentem emularetur. Dividit autem ita genus in species, sicut Deus materiam in formas. Neque enim genus efficit species, cum ad eas se habeat quasi materia indifferensque sit ad oppositas. Unde per se vel nullas vel ubique omnes efficeret. Immo si facturum sit, actu habere debet oppositas, quod creata determinataque natura

436

Unattached Chapter

created and determined can neither possess nor make.

So the
distin-

divine intellect draws the general nature into the special natures

within itself and produces them outside

guishes matter into the forms

itself

when
it

it

first

into the elemental or shared

forms, as
lar

it

were, then into others which are, as

were, particu-

forms.

And

in the generation of animals, the

body

is

made
in

before the animal, and the animal before the man. Similarly,
the artificer first

makes the form of the work and proclaims it

it

knowledge is brought about through the form, and its quahty depends on the quality of the form, knowledge through the material form of the genus is confused, and knowledge through the actual form of the species is distinct. Dialectic is concerned with uniting and dividing with regard to the one and the many. Division is twofold: either it divides the nature of the species from the individual things and in regeneral before proclaiming
in particular. But, since

solving joins

it

to the Idea; or

it

divides the nature of the genus

and the nature of the species into individual things and in compounding and defining joins the more common with the less common. Thus far, the compounding is the compounding of simple things with simple things. After this, you get the compounding of compound things with compound things. So dialectic makes a demonstration either by substituting the effect for the cause, or by putting the cause in front of the effect, or by juxtaposing things that are equal. In the first case you get the perfect demonstration: from cause to effect. In the second case you get the imperfect demonstration: from effect to cause. In the third case you get the demonstration that is least perfect: from parity, namely induction. Though the third demonstration is the clearer one for us, yet in itself it is less perfect, since it makes something known by using someinto the species

We begin with induction in the process of conceiving an opinion through the sense, or of building up experience through the frequency of both the sensation and the [resulting] opinion. From experience comes art too. So the conclusion which comes from induction presents us with the first
thing almost identical.
step of the syllogism.

Annotationum Reliquiae

437
in

neque habere potest neque facere. Ergo generalem naturam

ducit,

speciales intellectus divinus et intra se deducit et extra se pro-

dum materiam

distinguit in formas, elementales

alias quasi proprias.
fit

primum

quasi

communes deinde

Et in generatione

animalium prius corpus

quam

animal, animalque

quam

homo. Similiter artifex prius formam operis facit pronuntiatque communiorem, deinde distinctiorem. Cum vero cognitio per formam fiat et per talem tahs, cognitio per materialem generis

formam est

confusa, per actualem speciei

circa

formam est distincta.

versatur. Divisio duplex est: vel dividit specialem

dividendoque naturam ab vel dividit generalem individuis, unitque ideae resolvendo; naturam in species, specialemque in individua, unitque communius cum minus communi componendo atque definiendo. Hactenus est simplicium cum simplicibus compositio; post haec componit composita cum compositis. Unde facit demonstraDialectica
et

unum

multa

uniendo

tionem aut causae supponendo effectum, aut effectui causam praeponendo, aut paria paribus apponendo. In primo gradu est demonstratio a priori perfecta. In secundo a posteriori imperfecta. In tertio a pari imperfectissima, scilicet inductio, quae, quamvis nobis sit manifestior, in se tamen est imperfectior, cum idem declaret quasi per idem. Nos quidem ab hac incipimus per sensum concipiendo opinionem et per utriusque frequentiam

congregando experientiam, per quam

et

artem.

Unde

conclusio

inductionis principium nobis porrigit syllogismi.

438

Postscript

the material that has so far been hastily collected from Marsilio's lectures on the first parts of the Philebus. [In the future,] however, read the rest of the exposition in his commentaries on the whole Philebus. So what follows next are the chapter divisions in the Philebus and chapter

This

is

summaries

in lieu

of the commentaries.

Postschptum

439

Hactenus collects cursim ex Marsilianis lectionibus in

priores Philebi partes. Expositiones autem reliquas in

commentariis eiusdem in totum Philebum legito. Sequuntur ergo deinceps distinctiones capitum in Philebo, capitumque summae pro commentariis.^

'see

appendix

APPENDICES

Appendix I: Additions and Omissions

A. Fragments omitted 1496 (Y).
i.

in

the

editio

princeps

of Florence

ut decet audendi atque metuendi; temperantia scientia

circa

bona et mala

(p. 123).

ii.

essentiam atque esse. Denique accidens

potest, electione

unum

in

duo

(p. 169).
iii.

non

indiget.

iv. quod nosse non potest, nisi ipsum, ut alias demonstravimus, supra

Quod si non (p. 189). bonum ipsum norit. Bonum

mentem est (p.
285).

B.

Passages added in MSS. Laur. 21, 8 (X) and Oliver. 620 where extant (see Appendix IV).
(Inserted after

i.

iam disputationis
7];

totius

ordo

est traden-

dus

[ch.

IX end ofpara.
subiecto lege

see p.

Ml).

Olympiodorum. Nota qualitatem puta lumen multis modis esse; est enim lumen per causam in spiritibus super coelum, per formam in sole, per participationem veram in stellis, per imaginariam in diaphanis, per umbratilem circa solida, praesertim quo oblique pervenit. Ita mens per cau-

De

sam in Deo, per formam in angelis, per participationem veram in animabus rationalibus, per imaginariam in carentibus ratione, per umbratilem in corporum formis. Similiter voluptas, cuius umbra quaedam inest corporibus, quae ut inclinantur ad
conveniens referunt appetitum, ut se applicant illi voluptatem. Hie Proclus una cum lamblico et Siriano. Bonum ex mente voluptateque mixtum, ait, sub Deo usque ad formas corporeas procedere, in quibus formalis ordo mentem, applicatio voluprefert. Id autem cui mirum? cum Plato in Timaeo dicat omnia ex necessitate menteque componi. Sed ad disputationis ordinem redeamus. ii (Inserted at the beginning ofch. XVIII before Ideas esse

tatem

Platonicis argumentationibus demonstrabimus; see p.

181>.

444

Appendix I

Idea dicitur in quantum est formalis actus vel actualis forma; ratio in quantum per ipsam res intelligitur facien#da;

exemplar in quantum res

luntate et per ipsam
fit et

intellecta

refertur

prout intellecta est iam voad ipsam. Idea praecipue in

divinae potentiae fecunditate viget radicitus; ratio in sapientia

pululat;

exemplar

floret in voluntate. [#

P frag.

Hi begins (see

Appendix IV).]
iii.

(See p. 253>

X and P supply a quotation in the original

Greek.
C. Passages and/or fragments omitted in MSS. Vat. lat. 5953 (W) and/or Laur. Plut. 21, 8 (X) and Oliver. 620 where extant
(see Appendix IV).

i.

Iam vero in arte

. .

ii. iii.

*Aristoteles tertio
.

& X. causae assignari (p. 73) infinitum. Praeterea (p. 85) W.

.

ultimus appetitus (p. 87) W. Finis ultimus se invicem (p. 93) W. iv. opponuntur. Nam ipsa principium motus existit (pp. V. Id totum sic ab
.
.

101-103)
vi.

W.
sed ... ipsa principium

Agit mens

motus
1 1

existit (pp.

101-103)
vii.
viii.

XP (see v.).
.
.

Ut in obiectis
scientiaboni

gratia, et pulchritudo (p.

1)

W.

Platonis colligitur (p. 123)

. .
.

W.

ix. scientia

malorum
enim

iustitia (p. 123)

W. W.

X.
xi.

Aliunde

igitur eius perfectio

pendet
.
.

(p. 125)

Cum

quaelibet

quod omnino conducat

(p.

131)W.
xii.
xiii.

Item voluptas et

xiv.
(p.

comes est veneris (p. 139) W. litteris exprimi. (pp. 141-145) W. Origines in libro propriam esse putant locum superiorem Sicut
.
.

151)W.
XV.

Post haec autem

... in

effectum

unum

(pp. 165-171)

W.
Sunt itaque (p. 195) W. formae corporum individuis sed speciebus (pp. xvii. Speciales rerum vires
xvi.
.

199-203)

W.

Appendix I
xviii.

445

Proinde,

sicut vultus

multiplicentur errores (pp.

21 1-215)
xix.

W.
in operibus ... in sublime resolvit (pp. 221-223)

*Deus

W.
XX. quia continue
xxi.

magis
.

advertissent (p. 237)

W.

*In Phaedro dicit

. .

xxii. Sicut
xxiii.

divinum adoraturum (p. 237) W. enim sol aliam per aliam (p. 239) W. *Possumus etiam Epimetheum ... in argumento
. .
.

Cratyli (pp. 245-247)

xxiv.
[in

W.
. . .

Qui destruis omnia and P the Greek original

consilio praedite (p. 253)

WXP
267)

is
.

added, however].

XXV.

Aut dimidia parte

diapason harmoniam

(p.

W.
xxvi. *Priscianus ita dividit
xxvii. aliquis scire
xxviii. * Plato in
.
. .

Hie

litteras (p.

275)

W & X.

non posset
. . .

(p. 275)

W.

Cratylo

implet per bonitatem (p. 299)

W.
vitam nemo eligeret patet voluptatis (p. 323) W. XXX. *Aliquid movet sensum licet opposita ratione
xxix.
. .

(p.

325)

W.
Merito est, quia (p. 351) W. indagando autem est utrumque (pp.
.

xxxi. sufficiens.

xxxii. Intellectus

373-375)

W.
actum
ipsius praecedit
.
. .

xxxiii.

XP the only omission unique to X and P.

xxxiv.

igitur voluntatis (p. 377)

Plotinus de

felicitate

tentatio tutior (p. 381)

W&

XP.
The
asterisked passages are the

Kristeller in his

more significant omissions. Supplementum Ficinianum, Vol. I, pp. 79-80,

xiv, xix, xxiii, xxvi, xxx,

neglects to
xxxii,

mention nos. i, vi, xi, xii, among those I have asterisked.

Appendix II: The Ten Excerpts

The ten excerpts are found in their entirety only in the two complete manuscripts of the Philebus commentary (the Pesaro MS. 620 [P] has excerpts I, II, III, V and, incompletely, VI). Although untitled in MS. Vat. lat. 5953 (W), the sequence is prefaced in MS. Laur. Plut. 21, 8 (X) and in MS. P by the words: "Item alia excerpta breviter ex lectionibus Marsihi Ficini refers to excerpts VII, [om. X] in Philebum." However, MS. and MS. X refers to excerpts IV, VII, IX and X as "apologues" IX and X as "apologues on pleasure." This has confused some scholars. I have referred to the sequence as "the ten excerpts"

and reserved the term "apologue" for the four pleasure apologues in MS. X. In the edition of 1496 (and in all subsequent editions) the excerpts were replaced with the four unattached chapters which bore no relation to them (my pp. 425-437). I have adopted the order in MS. W. In MS. X the four apologues were transferred to the end. Later Ficino moved them to the end of the tenth book of his letters and dedicated them to Martin Preninger, alias Martinus Uranius {Op. Om., 921, 2). To judge from its omission of excerpt IV (i.e. apologue I), MS. P was following the same order as MS. X. My text is based on MS. X, but it has been collated with MSS. and P. Professor Kristeller's Supplementum Ficinianum, I, 80-86, has the six non-apologue excerpts in a text also based on MS. X, but without the MS. P readings and with a few readings

which

differ

from mine.

Marsilio Ficino's account of the triple end. [/]

Paris, the son of the eastern king,
is

life

and the

triple

pasturing wild animals in

the

wood; that

is,

the soul, created by

God,

is

nourishing the

senses in the disordered matter of the elements. Three goddesses

Alia Excerpta
SYNOPSIS.
[/]

Allegorical account of the judgement of Paris.

The

three lives, those of wisdom,

pleasure and power, and

why

pleasure

is

closer to genuine tranquillity than power. Allegorical ac-

Aeneid Book VI. The wood and the bough and their For lower things the end consists in inactivity, for middle things in moving activity, for higher things in motionless activity. [///] God gave us the ability to choose between wisdom, power and pleasure. Why we are mainly drawn to pleasure. Its ubiquity. The three pleasures pertaining to the body and the three to the soul. Men pursue even wisdom and power for pleasure's sake. Why the Philebus has Socrates choose between wisdom and pleasure without mentioning power. Power is "the least tranquil of things." [IV\ The evil demon leads us towards the false by means of verisimilitude, towards the bad by means of pleasure. God uses both to lead us towards the true and the good. [V\ Whether pleasure consists in the absence of pain or in motion or in rest. The various theories are considered with regard to the body and the intelligence. The nature of true pleasure in this life and the next. [ K/] The many species of pleasure between the two extremes of the intelligence's joy and the pleasures of touch and taste. Pleasure can be a quality, a movement, a tranquillity. [VIl\ A fable. The envy that drove the Bad to produce bad things in imitation of the Good.
count of Ulisses*
visit

to the underworld in the

Christian meanings.

[If]

Good
fable.

How the Good kept Pleasure subordinate and how the Bad wanted to advance her and ridiculed the for not doing so. The sdf-destructiveness inherent in bad things. K///] Why bad things can be
[

mutually opposed, but good things cannot: the

How

partake of unity, the former do not. [IX\ the Pleasures managed to defend themselves against their worldly power-seeking critics
latter

by choosing Shamelessness as
patroness,

their patron.

But

how

they were defeated by Pallas, the philosophers'

when they

elected Thoughtlessness as their spokesman: having tried to demonstrate

power before the tribunal of Jove, Thoughtlessness and the most abject of all things. [X\ A fable. Jupiter's first attempt to conquer Pleasure, who lived on earth, was to send Mars and Vulcan to defeat her; but they were defeated in turn. His next attempt was to send Pallas; but Pleasure not only managed to evade Pallas continually, she also penetrated her shield. Pallas' bid to enlist the aid of Pain did not work either and she returned to heaven unsuccessful. Jupiter therefore summoned old Saturn on Rhea's advice and Saturn told them to try to bring Pleasure to heaven instead of killing her. The demons were given this task but to no avail. Then Pallas consulted with Saturn again and they eventually decided to send Mercury, Apollo, the Muses and the Graces to entice Pleasure into heaven instead of compelling her to come as the demons had tried to do. The plan succeeded and Pleasure was happy to be brought singing and dancing into heaven. However, in order to help men to get along without her on earth, Jupiter gave them Hope. Then Pleasure and Pallas became one and the same. Meanwhile, Pluto, the king of the earth, had to find a way to keep souls in the lower world; so he created a false Pleasure by using the clothes and ornaments that the true Pleasure had left behind when she went away to heaven. The task of being this false Pleasure was given to Waste who was one of the Furies.
pleasures were suddenly routed

Pleasure's origin and the extent of her

when

Pallas mentioned Fear, the

Marsilii Ficini

'

expositio de triplici vita et fine triplici.

Paris regis orientalis filius in silva pascit bestias, id est,

animus a Deo creatus in confusa elementorum materia fovet sensus. Huic tris deae: Pallas, Juno, Venus se offerunt
'Fidniom.

448

Appendix II
to him: Pallas, Juno, Venus. ^"

They are quarreUing over who has the most beautiful form, and present themselves to him as the judge. Paris inclined to Venus and so the wars of Mars

come

arose. Because of the three sorts of Hfe, the contemplative, the

active, the pleasurable, three things present themselves to us as

ends: wisdom, power, pleasure.

pleasure; a considerable

Most people pursue bodily number pursue power; a few pursue wisdom. Those who pursue power and wisdom also do it for
pleasure's sake in a way. But the voluptuary locates pleasure in

the sense, the active

man

in the imagination, the

contemplative
the ambitious

man

in the intelUgence.

The

active

man,

that

is,

man, the worshipper of Juno, is further from the end than the others are. For the end consists in a certain tranquillity. But nothing is further removed from tranquillity than power and
the follower of power. But the voluptuary
is

closer [to the end].

The contemplative man

pleasure
is

is

closest [of all].

Moreover, the truest

in the intelligence, the less true in the sense, the least

So Aeneas is depicted as someone worry because of Juno, that is, because of his desire to rule; and Ulisses is disturbed for the same reason. But whenever each in a way inclines with moderation towards the things of Venus, that is, towards things associated with love, he is less miserable; and each is sometimes happy whenever he seeks refuge in contemplation. But without celestial inspiration neither was able to be perfectly content. So it's said that when Ulisses had been given a certain flower by Mercury,"" that is, light from God through an angel, he escaped the poisoned cups
true in the imagination.

who's

afflicted with

is, he escaped the allurements of corporeal love which transforms the human soul out of a man into a beast, that is, out of the reason into the sense. So at some point through this flower Ulisses is said to have escaped both the poisons of pleasure and the worries of ambition, and attained the secret mysteries of things divine. For the same reason in the Aeneid Book VI,"' when Aeneas wandered through the immense old wood (that is, through the world's matter) and became exhausted and implored divine help from the oracle, divine mercy allotted him the golden bough (that is, the Hght of

of Circe; that

Appendix II
tamquzim
iudici

449

de formae praestantia inter se certantes. Paris ad Venerem, unde orta sunt proelia Martis. {414r] Profecto pro triplici vitae genere scilicet contemplativae,
declinavit
activae, voluptuosae tria se nobis offerunt velut fines: sapientia,

imperium, voluptas. Plurimi corporis voluptatem sectantur, plerique imperia, pauci sapientiam, et qui haec duo etiam quodammodo gratia voluptatis. Sed voluptuosus voluptatem in sensu ponit, activus in imaginatione, contemplativus in mente. Activus scilicet ambitiosus Junonis cultor magis quam reliqui
aberrat a fine. Finis enim in quadam quiete consistit. Nihil autem a quiete remotius quam imperium eiusque sectator.

Voluptuosus vero propinquior, contemplativus est proximus. Adde quod voluptas in mente verissima est, in sensu minus vera, in imaginatione minime. Propterea fingitur Aeneas ob Junonem perturbatione vexatus, id est, ob studium imperandi, eademque ratione agitatur Ulixes. Sed uterque minus miser, siquando ad Venerea, id est, amatoria quodammodo et moderate declinat, et uterque felix interdum, quatenus confugit ad contemplandum. Quod quidem neuter implere perfecte potuit absque inspiratione coelesti. Quapropter fertur Ulixes accepto quodam a Mercurio flore, id est, lumine a Deo per angelum devitasse venefica pocula
Circes, id est, illecebras corporalis amoris, qui

humanam

ani-

mam ex homine in bestiam, id est, ex ratione transformat in sensum. Ergo Ulixes per huiusmodi' florem aliquando et voluptatis venena et ambitionis perturbationem dicitur declinasse et secreta divinorum attigisse mysteria. Eadem ratione Aeneas in sexto, dum per silvam immensam et antiquam, id est, mundi materiam pererraret iamque^ defessus divinum ab oraculo auxilium imploraret, divina dementia impetravit {414v\ ut ramum

'dusmodi

'-que om.

XP

450

Appendix II
from above). With
it

the intelligence poured in

safety. This

he could

penetrate into the obscure retreats of things with clarity and

imagined existing in the same wood: **For Nobody is imagined capable of plucking it unless he's someone who's been accepted by God: "For the darkness didn't comprehend the light. ""^ Nobody is imagined as being able to return from the wood below to the upper world unless he's born from God, that is, reborn by the divine grace. Hence the line: **They could do it who were sons of Gods";"" also the line: "But they were born from God.""* But when the Hne says, "If the fates call you,""* take it to mean, "If the providence of the divine mercy helps you." Hence the line: "None ascends to heaven unless drawn there by the heavenly father.""^ But because He is the father there is no need for us to spend a long time outwardly striving to be drawn by Him; it's enough for us to wish to be drawn by Him. So whoever stops being carried away by created things and wishes to be seized by the creator alone, and directly he has this wish, he seizes the golden bough in his hand, "and the bough will yield to him willingly and easily.""* When he has the bough, however, "nothing else is missing.""' For a spiritual gift is Hke light; it is neither diminished by being poured forth, nor is it ever wanting to those who desire it.
is

bough

the light shines in the darkness.""^

The end for lower things consists in inactivity, for middle things in moving activity, for higher things in motionless
activity, [//]

Since
inactive.

we

said the

end has the character of

air,

rest,

take note of

the following. Terrestrial bodies descend into rest in order to be

Water and

however, proceed to their ends on

is,

condition that they can not only rest there but also act, although
in a disorderly

way

that

they

may be blown about

in

some
end

way
a

or other by the winds. Fire, however, retires to

kind.

its

above not only for the sake of rest but also action, but action of

much more orderly

The

sky, however, possesses

its

place

Appendix II

451

mentis videlicet lumen infusum ab alto, quo perspicue tutoque posset per' obscuras rerum latebras penetrare. Fingitur eiusmodi ramum in eadem esse silva. Lux enim in tenebris lucet. Fingitur neminem posse decerpere, nisi qui Deo sit acceptus. Tenebrae enim lucem non comprehenderunt.

aureum

sortiretur,

Fingitur^

neminem posse ab ima'

silva

ad superna

redire, nisi

Deo genitum, id est, gratia divina regeneratum. Hinc illud: Dis* vero dicit: geniti potuere. Item illud: Sed ex Deo nati sunt. Si te fata vocant, intellige, Si divinae clementiae te adiuvat pro-

UW

videntia.

Hinc

et illud:

Nemo

ascendit in coelimi, nisi coelestis

pater traxerit ilium. Sed quia pater est, idcirco ut trahamur haudquaquam longo extemoque opus est conatu, sed sufficit velle trahi. Quisquis ergo cessat a creaturis rapi soloque creatore
rapi vult,

cum primum

vult,

aureum ramum

carpit

manu

et ille

volens facilisque sequetur.' Sed hoc accepto

Spiritale

non

deficit alter.

namque donum

luminis instar neque transfusione

minuitur neque

umquam volentibus' deficit.'

Finis inferiorum in otio, mediorum in actions mobili, supemorum* in actione immohili.

Quod diximus fmem rationem

quietis habere, nota terrena

corpora ad quietem descendere ut otientur, aquam vero et aerem ad terminos suos ea conditione procedere ut ibi non quiescant tantum, sed agant, quamvis inordinate, id est, ventis utcumque accidit agitentur, ignem vero ad finem sui supernum se recipere non quietis tantum [4l5r\ gratia, sed actionis atque huius quidem magis admodum ordinate. Coelum vero locum possidere suum non solum ut quiescat in ipso, sed etiam ut agat,

'per om. JF 'sequiturP

fingit

una

Sriolentius JF

'

'em. from Virgil: Dei W; Diis 'superiorum SKp. fie. sentence bareiy legible P

XP

452

Appendix II
it,

not only in order to rest in

hurries towards

but also to act and, though in motion, yet to act in the most orderly way possible. The soul
its

end

in order to find rest in the act itself

its

of
act

the reason.

The angel

clings to

end

in order to find rest in the

motionless act of the intelligence. Finally

God Himself

is

and

rest

and the end

itself

of all things.

Why we

are mainly drawn towards pleasure before all

things. [///]

The poets tell us Jove entrusted Paris with the task of judging between the three goddesses; that is, God gave our soul the freedom to choose and didn't subject us like beasts to a peculiar end. For when He gave us the triple powers the rational, the irascible, the concupiscible surely He also gave us the ability to choose between wisdom, power and pleasure. Man is more drawn to Venus, however, because the soul and the body alike are produced by and incline towards and are nourished by a certain pleasure: firstly, because God Himself is pleasure and by pleasure He makes all things. This is because God uses His

will to

make

things

and

in

Him

the will

is

pleasure
is

itself.

He

certainly creates the soul with a pleasure that

infinitely greater
it is

than that with which parents produce offspring. Next,

with

an instinctively natural pleasure that the soul inclines towards the body. Lastly the soul is immediately nourished by pleasure when it gets into the body: first with the ditties one sings to infants, then with stories, then very soon with little praises and promises. In the same way, as everybody knows, the body is conceived as a result of the parents' pleasure. Then it is with a certain natural pleasure that it eagerly admits the soul, as sulphur admits fire. Then once it is born it is with pleasure that it is nourished by milk. So far, therefore, we have enumerated six pleasures: three pertaining to the body, three to the soul. So, since the whole man advances in every direction by means of pleasure, pleasure is certainly as it were the end or the seventh step where he mainly rests, or at least hopes to rest. For should

Appendix II
et licet mobiliter,

453

ordinatissime tamen.

Animam ad

finem profini ut

perare ut quiescat in ipso rationis actu.

quiescat in mentis actu stabili.

Angelum haerere

Deum

denique esse actum

sta-

tumque ipsum omniumque finem.

Quare ad voluptatem maxime omnium proclives simus.

'

Tradunt poetae Jovem iudicium

Paridem demandasse,
tum. Siquidem
cupiscendi,
id est,

illud* inter tres

deas ad

Deum animae nostrae iudicium elifini

gendi liberum tradidisse neque ut brutis

proprio mancipa-

cum tres dedit

et

vires ratiocinandi, irascendi, con-

quam possemus potentiam voluptatemque eligere.** Quod autem homo proclivior sit ad Venerem, inde provenit, quod tam animus quam corpus voluptate quadam nascuntur et inclinantur et
nimirum
facultatem dedit per

sapientiam

et

nutriuntur. Principio
faciat

cum Deus

ipse ipsa

sit

omnia. Siquidem Deus voluntate

facit

voluptas eaque voluntasque in eo

et infinite

est ipsa voluptas.

Certe voluptate procreat

ipsi parentes.

animam

maiori

quam filios

Deinde anima naturalis volupin ipso

tatis instinctu vergit

ad corpus. Quin etiam

corpore

statim voluptate nutritur,

dum

infantibus cantilenae

primum,

deinde

fabellae,'

mox

laudatiunculae

pollicitatiunculaeque

adhibentur. Corpus similiter nullus ignorat parentum concipi voluptate, mox naturalis cuiusdam voluptatis aviditate sic ani-

mam adsciscere ut sulfur ignem,

nutriri.

deinde natum lactea voluptate

Sex ergo hactenus [4I5v] voluptates connumerantur: tres ad corpus, totidem ad animam pertinentes. tCum ergo totus homo per voluptatis undique vias progrediatur, nimirum in voluptate veluti fine septimoque gradu plurimum conquiescit vel saltem quieturum esse se sperat. Nam cui mirum viderift

'omnium om. ff
legible

'ilium IF

'fabdlasP

*** barely legible P

^-f\banly

P (cont.J

454
surprise

Appendix II
anybody
it

it

that

when

pleasure presents itself to us

we

immediately and embrace it as father and also as mother, as male nurse and also as female nurse, as tutor and tutoress? So it is that most people propose pleasure to themselves as the end. Those who desire it never desire it for the sake of power or wisdom; but those who pursue power or wisdom very often want them for the sake of pleasure. Also, there is nothing that the soul's three powers have more in common than pleasure. The concupiscible power acquires the pleasure of the lower senses; the irascible power pursues the deHghts of the higher senses and the imagination; the rational power, lastly, strives in so far as it can for the joys of heaven. But now at last let's come to the Philebus. Just as Paris was given the task of
recognize

judging between three goddesses, so Socrates was given the task of judging between two. To do it, however, Socrates called

and Protarchus. But why did Plato introduce only two goddesses, that is, wisdom and pleasure, into the contest but not power? It's precisely because anyone in his right mind can see without a debate that you can't hope to find rest, which is proper to the end, in power, which is the least restful of all things. However, wisdom can hope to find true rest

upon two

arbiters, Philebus

in eternal things;

dreams about a certain

and, as with the beasts, the desire for pleasure rest existing in the body.

A fable. The evil demon

similitude,
to

leads us to the false through veri-

bad through pleasure. But through verisimilitude and pleasure God leads us to the true and the
the

good. [IV]

God is truth and goodness and so He composed all things from truth and goodness. For anything is called true in so far as it remains in its integral purity and remains what it was made by God. But to the extent it is profitable to others, it is called the good for them. Again, to the extent one of its parts within itself is profitable to another, it is called the good for itself. But God
imprinted the truth of things with a verisimilar

mark

as

it

were;

Appendix II
tdebet,

455

quando voluptas

sese nobis offert, earn nos statiiri

agnoscere amplectique' tamquam patrem simul atque matrem, nutritorem pariter et nutricem, tutorem quoque atque tutricem. Hinc fit ut plurimi voluptatem sibi proponant velut finem, et
qui earn concupiscunt,

numquam

vel potentiae vel sapientiae

gratia concupiscant,tt at vero qui sapientiam secuntur aut

potentiam, ea saepissime voluptatis gratia cupiant. Fit etiam ut

in tribus

animae viribus

nihil sit

communius

voluptate.

Nempe

concupiscibilis voluptatem
cibilis

sensuum

adsciscit inferiorum; iras-

superiorum imaginationisque oblectamenta sectatur; rationalis denique coelestium gaudia utcumque potest aucupatur. Sed ut tandem^ ad Philebum perveniamus. Sicut trium iudicium delatum fuit ad Paridem, ita duorum ad Socratem. Ille vero duos convocavit arbitros, Philebum sciHcet atque Protarchum. Sed cur Plato duo tantum, scilicet sapientiam et voluptatem in certamen produxit, potentiam vero nequaquam? Quoniam videlicet absque controversia quilibet sane mentis iudicat in potentia tamquam inquietissima quietem quae finis propria
est sperari

non

posse. Sapientia vero

quietem potest, et quam in corpore somniat.

veram in aeternis sperare brutorum more quietem aliconcupiscentia

Apologus.^ Malus daemon per verisimile ad falsum, per voluptatem [416r] trahit ad malum; Deus vero per haec ad

verum
Deus

et

bonum.*
omnia ex
veritate et

Veritas est et bonitas, ideoque

bonitate composuit. Res enim quaelibet quantum' in Integra sui

puritate id

quod a Deo
aliis

facta est

permanet vera denominatur.

Quatenus vero

conducit ad aliquid, bona aliis nuncupatur. Item quatenus intra se aliud sui conducit ad aliud, bona sibi. Impressit autem Deus veritatem rerum verisimiU quasi nota,

bonitatem vero voluptate perfudit quasi esca ut occulta cuiusque

'complectiquc Sup. fic.

'ut add.

W
P

'Apologus om. JF

'whole apologue om.

'inquantum IV

(cant.) ^-^^bartiy legible

456

Appendix II
is

goodness, however, he bathed with pleasure as a bait. This

the hidden truth of each thing

so

may be

discovered through the

image resembling it, and God's truth may then be discovered through the truth of all things. On the other hand, it's also so single things may be drawn towards the good (which is hidden in itself) lured by the bait of pleasure, and then drawn through all good things to the good of God. But when the envious demon saw God drawing all things towards Himself, partly through the verisimilar mark and partly through the bait that resembled the good, he devised a scheme in emulation of the divinity whereby he could similarly draw all things principally towards himself. So he created a verisimilar mark and a bait that resembled the good. They were copies of the divine ones. He added the former to what was false and the latter to what was bad. Consequently he draws people's intelligences through the mark towards the false, and their affections through the bait towards the bad; and eventually he draws both towards himself. Since he is a rebel as it were and is utterly separated from the divine goodness and truth, there is a certain falsity and badness. Hence in the Timaeus Plato calls pleasure the bait that lures us towards bad things.""

Pleasure: [whether

it

consists] in the absence of pain or in

motion or in

rest. [V]

Jerome of Rhodes says desirable pleasure consists in the removal or absence of pain; he calls it painlessness. Aristippus and Eudoxus say it consists in movement; that is, in a return to the natural disposition. Democritus says it consists in the disposition itself, which he calls "euthymia" or cheerfulness. Epicurus in his youth agreed with Aristippus, in his age with Democritus. The first view is wrong because it doesn't take into account that privation [i.e. absence of something] is alien to the rational principle of the good; people don't particularly choose it nor can it satisfy. The second view is also wrong, for in the return [to the natural disposition] the pleasure is mixed with

Appendix II
Veritas per

457

imaginem verisimilem indagaretur, ac

demum

per

omnium veritatem Dei Veritas. Rursus ut per voluptariam escam singula ad bonum per se latens allicerentur, perque bona omnia ad Dei bonum. Cum vero daemon invidus Deum partim veritur,

nota partim boni simili esca ad se trahere cuncta contueremachinatus est tamquam divinitatis aemulus qua potissimum ratione ipse similiter ad se omnia traheret. Itaque notam verisimilem et boni similem escam ad divinae illius expressit similitudinem; adhibuitque tum illam falso, tum banc malo. Quo fit ut per illam mentes ad falsum, per banc affectus trahat ad malum, ac denique ad se ipsum. Ipse enim, cum a divina verisimili

tate bonitateque quasi rebellis atque alienissimus

sit,

falsitas

quaedam est atque malitia. Hinc Plato malorum escam Timaeo nuncupat voluptatem.

in

Voluptas in privatione doloris vel motu vel statu.

Hieronymus Rhodius

in privatione et vacatione doloris expe-

tibilem voluptatem ponit

pus Eudoxusque in habitum naturalem; [416v] Democritus in hoc ipso habitu quam vocat euthimiam. Epicurus in iuventute secutus est Aristippum, in senectute Democritum. Prima opinio ideo errat quia non considerat privationem a ratione boni alienam esse, neque
vel eligi

quam nominat indolentiam; Aristipmotu, id est, in' quadam restitutione in

a quoquam praecipue vel posse sufficere. Errat et secunda. Voluptas enim in ipsa restitutione perseverante indigentiae molestia dolori miscetur tenditque^ ad aliud sicut

motus

'an Jf

'tendique Sup. F/'c

458
pain:

Appendix II
it

comes from the continual discomfort of being

in need,

thing else. But

and as the movement towards the disposition it aims at someif somebody strays from the order of nature and assumes the return is the end, he is precipitated immediately from having a little, brief, impure pleasure into having pure, long-lasting and grievous pains. But since the second view
thinks pain
is

the bad,

it

erroneously considers that pleasure to

be the good which relapses of necessity into pain. The third view is the more likely one, for it's using the pleasure which is per-

movement for that perceived in rest. Just as the end of the movement is the disposition and being at rest, so the end of pleasure's movement is the pleasure of being at rest. Indeed, if
ceived in
the return to the natural disposition
it's
is

properly sweet because

being directed towards the natural disposition, the disposi-

tion itself ought to be even sweeter. But

to us? It's because novelties arouse

why

doesn't

it

seem so
quality

more wonder, and a

motion than in rest. It's because as long as we're in need the bait which will lead us to the end seems providently sweeter [than the end itself]. It's because
in

impinges on the sense more

state of returning [to the natural disposithrough heat, now through cold, through eating, through excreting, through motion and through rest but we never experience the disposition in its integrity. And sometimes the portion of the disposition that we have acquired doesn't manifest its sweetness to us, because the soul for one reason or another has been continually intent on a complete return [to the disposition]. But the sequence that appears in the sense and in

daily
tion]

we experience the

now

the intelligence ness

is

as follows. In the sense first there

is

painless-

when nothing in the body is being tortured or titillated. Then there's the pleasure of moving through the contrary states, as we've just described. Third, when some sort of return [to the
disposition] has been achieved, the

able to

body is well disposed and and quickly. As a result of a peaceful inner mildness and tranquillity and natural joy fulness it is either better prepared to accept some pleasures or more willing to produce them. In the intelligence too the first step in
do things
energetically

the sequence occurs

when it neither

rejoices nor grieves over the

Appendix II

459

ad habitum. Ac siquis ab ordine naturae aberrans earn sumat' pro fine,^ mox ex voluptate impura levi brevi in dolores puros graves diuturnos praecipitatur. Cum vero opinio haec dolorem existimet ipsum malum, *falso iudicat eam voluptatem ipsum bonum, quae necessario relabitur in dolorem. Tertia opinio probabilior est, utitur enim voluptate ilia quae est in motu illius gratia quae persentitur in statu. Et merito sicut status habitusque fmis est motionis, ita voluptas haec illius est finis. Profecto si restitutio in habitum naturalem ob id suavis est proprie quia in naturalem dirigitur habitum, ipse habitus suavissimus esse debet. At cur nobis id minus apparet? Quia nova magis admirationi sunt; quia qualitas cum motu magis agit in sensum quam in statu;** quia durante indigentia esca suavior ad
tione

fmem alUciens providenter est adhibita; quia quotidie in restitusumus modo per calorem modo per frigus, per impletionem evacuationem, per motum perque quietem, in habitu vero integro numquam sumus. Atque habitus ipsius portio quam
aliquando nacti sumus suavitatem suam patefacit minus, animo [417r] continue hinc vel inde restitutioni prorsus intenlo. Apparet autem ordo hie in sensu atque mente. In sensu quidem indolentia quando nihil in corpore vel cruciatur vel fovetur, deinde voluptas in motu per contrarios modos quos modo narravimus, tertio quando restitutione quaUcumque facta corpus bene se habet vivaciterque et ad officia prompte fcum intrinseca quadam et placida lenitate tranquillitate hilaritate naturae ad quaehbet oblectamenta sive accipienda paratius sive edenda propensius. In

mente quoque gradus primus apparet quando ob

nullius

opinionis^ vel praesentiam vel absentiam aut gaudet aut dolet,

secundus quando per opiniones rationalesque discursiones inft

'summantfF
T-ttftanf/y legible

'prosit

(?)'

'-ifatadd.

-banly kgiNe

P (cont.)

460

Appendix II

presence or absence of any one opinion. The second step occurs when the intelligence is restored to its natural disposition either

by the recent acquisition, or by the recollection, of the truth via opinions and discursive reasoning. The third step never occurs in this life, since the light which is natural and proper to the

which its disposition consists cannot be possessed among these shadows. For the closer we come to it the more vehemently we rejoice in the return. But we don't rejoice enough in the small portion of the disposition, since we're too assiduously preoccupied with the return. Moreover, in the body the sense is awake, but the intelligence is asleep. Since the sense is what receives the body's sustenance but the intelligence the image of its sustenance, the mental pleasures seem very diluted in the body but the sensual pleasures seem very concentrated. In the next Ufe the reverse is true. For in the next Hfe the highest disposition will be found, constituted from both the glorified body which obeys the soul absolutely and from the glorified soul which has become one with its appropriate Idea. Hence the hne: "The good for me is to cling to God.""' So the psalmist prays: "Strengthen me with your highintelligence

and

in

est spirit.""^

Then

at last, he says, he'll be in a state

of exulta-

tion.

The species ofpleasures are many.

The pleasure the
truth
is

[FT]

intelligence

is

seen to take in immaterial

similar in a

way

to the delight
is

we

receive

and

seeing, for this delight

sufficiently spiritual
it is

from hearing and has a

bearing on the pursuit of truth. But

dissimilar to the delight

we

receive

from smelling, for

this delight

already draws us

towards matter. It is totally dissimilar to the sweetness we receive from touch and taste however moderated it might be, since this sweetness is immersed in matter and penetrated by the material object. But if this [lower] pleasure keeps no measure, it

now assumed to be opposite to the intelligence's joy, since both move from opposite ends to opposite ends. The [lower]
is

Appendix II

461

tnaturalem mentis habitum restituitur vel nuper veritatem acquirendo vel reminiscendo, tertius in hac vita numquam quippe cum naturale mentique conveniens lumen in quo eius
consistit habitus in his tenebris haberi

At enim vehemenquo propinquius ad ipsum tius delectamur, habitus vero partiuncula parvula parum, prae-

non

possit.tt

accedimus, eo restitutione

cum assidue restitutioni occupati simus. Adde quod sensus quidem in corpore vigilat, mens vero dormit; cumque ille alimoniam suam accipiat, haec alimoniae suae umbram, nimisertim

rum in hoc corpore remissae apparent

voluptates mentis, sensus

vero vehementissimae, sed in altera vita contra. Tunc enim et corpus glorificatum animae prorsus obtemperans et glorificatus animus ideae propriae congruens in habitu praecipuo constituetur.

Hinc

petit:

Mihi vero adhaerere Deo bonum Spiritu principali confirma me; dicitque tunc
illud:

est.

Unde
se

demum

exultatunim. [417v]

Multae species voluptatum.

'

Voluptas mentis circa immaterialem percepta* veritatem quodammodo simiUs est videndi audiendique delectationi satis quidem spiritah et ad veritatis indaginem conferenti, olfactus vero

oblectamento dissimilis ad materiam iam trahenti,

gustus

tactusque suavitati etiam moderatae maxime est dissimihs, quandoquidem haec est immersa materiae et ab obiecto pene-

haec voluptas nullum servet modum, iam contraria mentis gaudio iudicatur, quia a contrariis terminis ad contrarios vergunt. Haec quidem ab immateriah ad materiale omnino detorquet, illud vero contra. Item contraria habent
trata materiali.

At

si

voluptas mentis add.

'praecepta

(com.) t-t^barefy legible P

462
pleasure turns us

Appendix II

away

material, joy the reverse.

one divides the soul

from the immaterial towards the They also have opposite functions: by scattering it into numerous moving
entirely

it into the opposite. Again, the presence of one hinders or repulses or flees from the presence of the other and vice versa. Finally, within the genus itself of pleasure

things, the other unites

one

is

as far

away from

the other as possible.

Now,

since the

movements

are considered opposite which

aim

at opposite ends,

the [various] reposes which exist in opposite [ends]

must

also be

opposite. Therefore, whether pleasure exists in a opposite.

movement

or

repose, the pleasures concerned with opposite things are entirely

pleasure, for

Nor can anybody you could say

one
in the

object they are one in the genus of

that opposite motions

and

qualities

genus of motion or of quality. Again, nobody can object that the whiteness in some hot body is not opposite to the whiteness in a cold body; or, similarly, that in opposite things the pleasures are not opposite in turn. For the two bodies [the hot and the cold] aren't white because they're opposites, nor are they opposites because they're white. Contrariety doesn't entail whiteness nor the reverse. However, the pleasure you hope from and perceive in an immaterial thing is the reason why you move from a material thing towards its opposite. Similarly, the pleasure you perceive in a material thing is the reason why you move from an immaterial thing towards its opposite. Again, the intellect rejoices because it moves towards an immaterial thing; and the touch is pleased because it sinks towards a material thing. In sum, as the opposites in a light or heavy object are now lightness versus heaviness, now ascent versus descent, now one repose versus another and particularly one repose versus another, since it's because of the repose which they have as their end that some things are judged to be opposite to others so with pleasure (whether it's defined as a quality or as movement or as repose): when occupied with opposite things one pleasure becomes opposite to another (especially if the pleasures are judged to be the reposes so to speak in opposite things). This is confirmed by
are similarly

the fact that opposite

moods

are excited

by opposite affections.

Appendix II
officia.

463

Haec

disgregat

animam

in res mobiles multiplicesque

diffundens, illud congregat in oppositum. Item huius praesentia

praesentiam impedit, fugat, fugit atque contra. Denique sub ipso voluptatis genere quam maxime distant.' Profecto cum motus illi oppositi iudicentur qui ad terminos tendunt oppositos, oportet et quietes in oppositis oppositas esse. Sive igitur in motu quodam sive in quiete voluptas sit, omnino volupillius

tates circa opposita sunt oppositae.

in genere

Neque obiciat quisquam

eas

voluptatum esse unum. Similiter enim dici posset contrarios motus et qualitates in genere motus qualitatisve unum esse. Neque rursus obiciat albedinem in corpore altero

quidem calido altero vero frigido non esse contrariam; similiter neque voluptates in contrariis invicem esse contr arias. Non enim duo ilia corpora vel quia contraria sint sunt alba, vel quia alba siilt contraria sunt,** neque contrarietas ad albedinem conducit neque contra. Voluptas autem quae speratur percipiturque in re immateriali causa est quare a materiali [418r\ in

motus. Similiterque voluptas quae in re materiali percipitur causa motus est a re immateriali ad eius oppositam. Item et intellectus# quia ad immateriale se confert gaudet, et tactus quia ad materiale labitur oblectatur. Summatim sicut in corpore gravi et levi contraria sunt tum levitas gravitati tum ascensus descensui tum quies quieti, et multo magis quies quieti quam alia cum ob eam velut finem alia
illi

banc

oppositam

fiat

iudicentur opposita, sic voluptas sive definiatur ut qualitas sive

ut

motus

sive ut quies

quando
si

circa opposita versatur altera

alteri fit contraria,

praesertim inde

tamquam

quietes in contrariis

iudicentur.

Hoc

confirmatur

quod

ex

contrariis

'dictantff

-bardy legibU P

Pfrag. VI (144v) ends

464

Appendix II

The moods move towards opposite pleasures. The pleasures incite the opposite moods and are also the result of them. They are both the principles and the ends of opposite movements.

A fable about good and bad things.

the Bad.

[F//]

Once upon a time there were only two things, the Good and As long as the Good produced nothing, however, the Bad wasn't goaded to produce anything out of vanity since it thought it could resist the Good on its own. Eventually the Good began to produce good things. Then the Bad feared for itself because of the Good and the good things, and thought to oppose them by producing bad things. But since it couldn't produce anything because it was sterile, it went begging to Fortune and bewailed its fate. Fortune favoured it and the Bad began to produce bad things in a way contrary to the way the Good produced good things. The Bad saw that the good things resembled the Good and turned to it, possessed power and retained the good in which they existed, were united among themselves in their

own

health and kept Pleasure behindhand; so the

is, it

up degeneration, obstacles, manifold commotion, impatience of what sustains the good, and the inability to accept the various good things together. Lastly the Bad put Pleasure in front of itself. At the same time it
did the opposite: that
set

Bad

because the Good had concealed its bait, [i.e. Pleasure,] by keeping her behind the good things when it would have been perhaps more correct to put her in front. In order for its kingdom not to be destroyed by the Bad, the Good first decided bad things should suffer from two enemies, namely another bad thing and a good
reproved the
with
[i.e.

Good

Momus

ridicule],

thing (since one

good

can't be

opposed to another). Next

it's

it

decided a bad thing should not only destroy another bad thing,
but also
itself;

for a

bad thing (whether

constituted through

defect or excess) eventually destroys the foundation

it's

on which
Conse-

sustained and apart from which

it

cannot

exist.

quently the

Bad cannot

possess infinite

power but the Good

Appendix II

465

affectionibus contrarii excitantur affectus vergentes ad contrarias voluptates

quae

et incitant contraries affectus

atque sequcontrari-

untur

tamquam

principia simul et fines

motionum

arum.

Apologus de bonis atque malis.

quondam duo quaedam sola, bonum scilicet atque malum. Quamdiu vero bonum generabat nihil, malum ad generandum baud irritabatur prae superbia, putans se solum posse bono resistere. Incoepit tandem bonum generare bona, tunc malum extimescens sibi a bono atque bonis concupivit contra
Erant
haec generare mala. Cum vero ob sterilitatem non posset deflendo sortem suam invocavit fortunam, qua favente, coepit generare mala atque contrario modo quam bonum bona. Videns enim bona referre bonum ad ipsumque conferre, habere virtutem, servare id in quo sunt, salute sua concordare inter se, habere a tergo [418v] voluptatem, contra haec obiecit opposita, scilicet degenerationem, impedimentum, numerosam turbam, impatientiam eius scilicet quod sustinet bonum, item ineptitudinem ad varia simul bona; denique voluptatem posuit in fronte mali, reprehendens una cum Momo bonum ipsum, quod escam boni occuluisset, a tergo bonis eam subdens quam forte rectius

At vero bonum ipsum ne regnum suum a malo primo quidem mala pati contraria duo, sciHcet malum alterum atque bonum, cum bonum bono contrarium esse nequeat; deinde ut malum non modo alterum destruat malum sed etiam se ipsum. Sive enim per defectum fiat sive per excessum destruit tandem fundamentum quo sustinetur, a quo seorsum stare nequit. Hinc fit ut malum virtute infinitum esse non valeat, bonum vero valeat. Denique constituit ut
praeposuisset.
dissolveretur constituit

466
can. Lastly

Appendix II
it

decided that bad things, even though they pre-

ferred the brief bait of pleasure, nevertheless should fall into

lasting pain.

Pythagoras meant this when he said: "Keep away from the animal with a black tail, that is, from vices. ""^

The reason why had things can be mutually opposite, but

the good things cannot. [VIII]
Since the origin of good things
certainly
is

unity

itself,

good things are

uniform among themselves and produce unity in others; and so they can't be opposites (especially because they're good to the extent that they look back to the good itself, their own fountain, as the principle, and look forward to it as
the end). Therefore, since they're the
they're also
things,

same to a third thing, the same among themselves. The origin of bad
is

on the contrary,

division.
is

Because outside the divine

already cut off from the

unity something else arises which

by going through multiplication the decrease draws towards the bad. Therefore, since division is the origin and support of bad things, bad things are deservedly opposed to each other. You can see this with the genus of morals: since the vices arise through excess and defect, they become even more opposite to each other than they are to virtue. But the virtues, which partake of the mean as a result of a certain temperance and conunity, a decrease of

good subsequent division and

occurs. Gradually

each other but contribute to each other. But the vice in either of two extremes destroys its counterpart and then itself. Take for instance the miser: in always hoarding, he desiccates and destroys himself and greed
sonance, not only don't
resist

at

The prodigal does squanders everything. The same is true in For in the living body health consists in a
the

same

time.

the

same when he

the genus of nature.

certain tempering of

the humours, just as beauty consists in the tempering of shape.

Health and beauty are both good things and they help each other. Disease, however, whether it's brought about through too much dilution or too much concentration (of the

Appendix II
mala etsi voluptatis escam praeferunt brevem tamen
decidant diuturnum.
in

467

dolorem

Pythagoras dicens: animali caudam habente' nigram abstine, id est, a vitiis.

significavit

Hoc

Ab

Quare mala esse invicem contraria possunt, bona nequaquant.

Cum origo bonorum ipsa sit unitas,

inter se sunt et unifica

nimirum bona uniformia

ideoque contraria esse non possunt. Praesertim quia eatenus bona sunt, quatenus bonum ipsum ipsorum fontem referunt ut principium atque ad id conferunt velut

fmem. Itaque cum eadem

sint uni tertio, inter se

quoque sunt

eadem. Contra vero malorum origo divisio est. Siquidem ex eo quod praeter divinam unitatem fit et aliud iam ab ipsa divisum, accidit [419r] decrementum* boni quod gradatim per succedentem divisionem multitudinemque succedendo tendit in malum. Merito ergo cum malorum origo et alimonia sit divisio inter se
repugnant. Id autem apparet in genere morum in quo vitia quia per excessum defectumque fiunt opposita sibimet magis etiam

evadunt quam virtuti. Virtutes vero in quadam temperatione consonantiaque medii consistentes non modo invicem non repugnant sed conducunt. Vitium vero in alterutro extremorum alterum destruit et tandem se ipsum. Puta avarus omnino servans se exsiccat et perdit simulque avaritiam, prodigus quoque similiter omnia erogando. Idem apparet in ipso naturae genere. Nam in corpore vivo sanitas in quadam humorum temperatione
consistit, sicut

dem et*

pulchritudo in temperatione figurae. Sanitas quipulchritudo utraque* bona sibique invicem conferentia.
sive per

Morbus autem

remissionem

nimiam sive per nimiam**

'habentcm'

Hum add.

'etom.

'dtraque Jf

om. Wfcont.)


468

Appendix II

humours]
destroys

and both are opposites and both are bad things

The concentration destroys the dilution, and both destroy the patient at the same time as they destroy themselves. Similarly with shape you can either exceed or come
itself.

short through the gradations of colour and line. You proceed through opposite modes and the excess destroys the defect and vice versa and then each destroys the subject and itself at the

same time.

and is

fable about the pleasure which conquers the ambitious itself conquered by Pallas. [IX]

Once upon a time the Pleasures, when they heard they were being blamed on every side by ambitious agitators, banded together in their own defense and chose Shamelessness as
patroness of their cause. They said: "Shamelessness, look at

how

ungrateful

all

these people are to us, seeing that

all their

happiness depends upon us. Yet they dare to censure us openly." Then Shamelessness said: "I wonder at your cowardSince you own the agitators and their homes, won't yoy^e brave enough at least to show your faces occasionally to the people from the windows and doors? Thus all the people will
ice.

you are the agitators' favourites and that the agitators you so nobody should steal you away." Then the Pleasures, relying on the counsel of Shamelessness and on her aid even more, showed their faces through the windows. They did this so their ambitious censurers should lose all faith and authority among the people and those who had censured Pleasure might be censured everywhere in turn on her account. But when they had conquered these false and empty enemies, they still had to defend themselves against their true and legitimate enemies, the philosophers. However, since the philosophers put Minerva before Pleasure, the judgement was transferred to Jove, with Thoughtlessness as the new advocate. So when the
realize

are censuring

trial

reached Jove, Thoughtlessness, the advocate for the Pleasures, said: '*It's only right that Minerva should be brought to

Appendix II
intensionem
fiat

469

perdit; turn intensio

'

quae duo et contraria et mala sunt se ipsurti remissionem** turn utraque subiectum

simulque se ipsa. Similiter in figura sive excedas sive deficias per gradus colorum atque linearum per oppositos procedis modos et excessus perdit defectum atque contra et uterque tandem subiectum simulque se ipsum.

Apologus.
Pallade.

De

voluptate quae vicit ambitiosos, victa est a

Voluptates
rantes

toribus passim vituperari in

quondam cum audirent se ab ambitiosis concionaunum pro sua defensione conspi-

patronam causae impudentiam elegerunt his verbis: Vide quam ingrati hi omnes erga nos sint? quippe cum in nobis tota illorum sita sit felicitas, at tamen audeant palam nos improbare. [419v] Tunc impudentia: Ignaviam vestram,^ inimpudentia
quit, admiror,

nempe cum illos illorumque aedes possideatis, non audetis saltem e fenestris portisque vestros interdum vultus populo demonstrare, quo inteUigant omnes in delitiis vos apud
illos

haberi, atque idcirco ab eis vituperari ne quis vos inde sub-

ripiat.

Post haec voluptates impudentiae fretae consilio atque

insuper ope vultus per fenestras aperuere suos. Hinc factum est
ut ambitiosi illarum vituperatores

omnem apud populum

fidem

auctoritatemque amitterent, et qui voluptatem vituperaverant ab ipsa vicissim ubique vituperarentur. Postquam vero vanos falsosque vicere hostes, reliquum erat ut adversus veros hostes legitimosque philosophos se defenderent. Quoniam vero voluptati

tate, in

Minervam anteponunt, indicium, advocata nuper temeriJovem est translatum. Cum igitur perventum esset ad
in

Jovem, temeritas

voluptatum causa declamatrix:

lus, ait, esse

'ipsam Sup. Fic.

'vestras W'

(cont.)*-**om.W

470
the
trial.

Appendix II
Her followers
illegally

put her before Pleasure as the

of all." When they had summoned Pallas, she Immediately Thoughtlessness made this charge: "Jupiter, according to the philosophers Pallas boasts she is your daughter and Pleasure is worth nothing. My reply is that Pleasure herself was born from you under the name of Venus. However Minerva is Pleasure's daughter under the name of Wisdom. All the philosophers follow Minerva for the sake of a certain pleasure. What more? Venus was born from you. But if Pallas boasts that she, Pallas, was born from your head, we declare she was also born with pleasure from your head." To which Pallas replied: "Pleasure, I say you arose from me. You
mistress

appeared.

arose from
gift

me

in the presence

of wisdom.

the person

You arose who invented

who was rejoicing in the among men too, for I was from me their various delights. You arose
of Jove
the other

among

the philosophers

on

hand from

my

image, for

they delight in and are enraptured by an image of

my

splen-

dour." Then Thoughtlessness said: "Let's put aside these dialectical subtleties since Pleasure is too simple and innocent to
protect herself with such prickly defenses. Jupiter, look around.

How ample is the kingdom of Pleasure. Look at Venus. Look at

Cupid assisting her. Look at the Graces following her. Look at the god of gardens, he is her servant too. Hers too is Ceres in the food-shop and Bacchus in the store. Hers is the ambrosia and the nectar which all the gods enjoy. Why do I need to remind you of Mars, the most ferocious of the gods; or yourself, Jupiter;

or those others

who

are everywhere entangled in

they can scarcely seize and by using violence; [whereas] Pleasure by herself can happily satisfy with just one nod. She compels no one. She draws every one after her willingly. She retains them because they want to be retained. She rules not only those who live on earth but also those who live in heaven
the delights of
rest

Venus? As for the

scarcely keep [anyone] eventually

and

rule in heaven. Pleasure takes to herself not only all the

living but also the dead. Besides, so that Pallas or

Vesta should not brag of their

Diana or own barrenness and escape from

Pleasure's power, Pleasure herself, Jupiter, orders Pallas to

Appendix II

All

Minervam
sita

in iudicium accersiri

quam

supra

quam

fas est secta-

omnium dominae anteponant. Pallas accercomparuit. Repente obiecit ita temeritas: Haec tua o Jupiter Pallas ex ore philosophorum voluptatem nihili pendens se
tores eius voluptati

tuam

At ego respondeo voluptatem ipsam natam, voluptatis vero flliam sub sapientiae nomine esse Minervam, quam voluptatis cuiusdam gratia
esse flliam gloriatur.
te

sub Veneris nomine ex

Ex te nata Venus est, ex tuo prodiisse capite se iactet Pallas, asseremus et ipsam abs te cum voluptate progenitam. Ad haec Pallas: At ego te o voluptas affirmo ex me ortam tum penes Jovem sapientiae
philosophi cuncti' sectantur. Quid plura?

quod

si

tum apud homines ex me quoque variorum inventrice oblectamentorum. Immo vero ex mea apud philosophantes imagine, hi enim imagine quadam mei splendoris delectantur atque rapiuntur. Tunc temeritas: Dialecticas, ait, mittamus argutias, voluptas utpote simplex et innocens eiusmodi se non munit aculeis. Circumspice Jupiter quam eunplum sit voluptatis imperium. En Venus, en Cupido huius astipulatores. Huius et pedissequae gratiae, huius et hortorum deus ipse minister. Huius in popina Ceres, atque Bacchus in penu. Huius ambrosia nectareque coelestes cuncti vescuntur. Quid memorem Martem deorum ferocissimum? Quid te ipsum Jupiter? Quid ceteros venereis passim illecebris irretitos? Et quidem ceteri^ violentia tandem vix assequuntur vixque retinent, una haec uno quodam nutu feliciter implet, nullum trahens, omnes volentes ducens, retinensque libentes. Neque solum quae in terris vivunt sed quae in coelo et quae coelum ducunt ipsa ducit. Neque viventia solum sed etiam non viventia rapit ad se^ quaeque voluptas. Ceterum ne Pallas vel Diana vel Vesta suam iactent sterilitatem imperiumque voluptatis effugiant, voluptas, o Jupiter, ipsa et Palladem iubet arcibus.
beneficio {420f\ se ipso gaudentem,

cunctis

'ceteris

'on., sua

WX

472
take pleasure in

Appendix II

bows and Diana

is,

hearths." Pallas angrily replied:

and Vesta in "Jupiter, you will soon see

in hunting

how

strong this Pleasure

she

who

so insolently boasts of her

power over everything. Bring Fear here

it's

the most abject

not only of the gods but of all things." Jupiter cried: "Hey, bring Fear here." Directly he had summoned Fear by name, all the timid Pleasures together with Thoughtlessness took to their
heels.

Then

all

the gods laughed and

such abject flight. Finally, Pallas put a seal

the gods thus:

condemned and ridiculed upon the sentence of

"What's more abject than Fear? For it's created exist, when it's created from the image of some evil that isn't there. Again, it's killed by what doesn't exist, when it's destroyed by the image of a good that isn't there. But Pleasure is even more abject than such abject Fear. For she's put to flight not only by Fear but by the shadow of Fear. Not only when she's [actually] afraid, but when she thinks
out of what doesn't

about being afraid she suddenly takes

flight;

or rather, to put

it

more

accurately, she perishes.

And

in order to perish with

greater

changed into some amicable thing like herself, but into her enemy. And this happens suddenly: while still aHve she's changed into Pain."

ignominy she

isn't

A fable

about Pleasure. You should not fight with her or hope for her on earth. \X\

When Jupiter learned that the souls didn't return to heaven because they were being retained on earth by Pleasure, he sent Mars and Vulcan, who were armed and very strong, to destroy Pleasure. But in the very first fight they laid down their arms; being young men they were seduced by the allurements of Pleasure. Next, Jupiter sent Pallas, who was armed and wise, [as] he
thought the other two had succumbed through thoughtlessness. So Pleasure said to Pallas: "Aren't you ashamed to fight with me? You're clothed and armed and a goddess and I'm naked and helpless and human." Pallas replied: "I want to fight you in order to conquer you." Pleasure said: "Since you won't

Appendix II
et'

473

venatione^

Dianam

et

Vestam

laribus delectari.

Ad

haec

mox videbis quam fortis sit voluptas haec quae tarn insolenter omnium gloriatur imperio. Accerse hue pavorem non deorum tantum sed omnium abiectisindignata Pallas:
Jupiter,

simum. Exclamavit Jupiter: Heus pavor, accede pavor. Confestim ad ipsum {420v] pavoris advocati nomen, voluptates omnes trepidae una cum temeritate fugam arripuerunt. Tunc omnes risere coelicolae fugamque tam vilem ridiculo damnavere iudicio. Denique Pallas deorum sententiam sic obsignavit. Quid nam pavore villus? Hie enim ex eo quod non est creatur, quando ex absentis mali fit imagine. Hie rursus ex eo quod non est necatur, quando ex absentis boni imagine perditur. Pavore vero tam vili vihor est voluptas. Haec enim non ab ipso solum sed ab eius umbra fugatur, quando non solum pavens sed cogitans pavorem subito fugit, immo, ut verius loquar, interit. Atque ut maiori cum ignominia pereat non in simile quicquam amicumve transformatur sed in hostem et id quidem subito;

dum in vita convertitur in dolorem.

Apologus.

De voluptate, quod non sit cum

ipsa congredien-

dum neque in terris speranda.

cognosceret Jupiter animas ad coelum non redire quia voluptate in terris detinerentur, misit Martem atque Vulcanum
et armatos ad voluptatem inter imendam,^ sed ii primo congressu utpote iuvenes voluptatis illecebris deliniti arma deposuere. Misit iterum Palladem armatam et sapientem, putans illos ob temeritatem succubuisse. Ad banc ergo voluptas ait: Nonne te pudet o Pallas deam vestitam, armatam certare mecum humana, inermi, nuda? Ilia respondit: Sic placet te* certare quo te superem. Ad haec ilia: Cum neque gloriae neque

Cum

ceu fortissimos
in

'etom. JK

'venationem ff

'imperimendam H^

'*iom.X

474

Appendix II

me (for in conquering me you obvious you are fighting only because you've been overcome by the pleasure of victory. You have no consideration of glory or gain." Then Pallas, who had been
acquire glory or gain in fighting
will

achieve neither),

it's

defeated by these words, lashed out and tried to strike her again

and again. But Pleasure, who is by nature yielding and nimble and very quick, straightway avoided the strokes. Then Pallas put her broad shield over her head. But Pleasure penetrated the
shield, for Pleasure's ability to penetrate
is

such that she can

Then Pallas called upon Pain in order to destroy Pleasure by her enemy opposite. However, since opposites do not mutually come together. Pain did not rush in to encounter Pleasure but kept drawing away to the side. Then Pallas, together with her associate Vulcan, who had brought his bellows, laboured to extenuate Pleasure and resolve
penetrate the

body and the

soul.

her. But Pallas couldn't extenuate her, since she's as thin as she can be; and she couldn't resolve her into anything further, since she's an ultimate term. For if the question is: Why does somebody do this? The reply will be: Because of that. And again if the question is: Why that? The reply will be: Because it's pleasant. If there's the further question:

Why

is

it

pleasant?

The

reply cannot be anything else but: Because

it's

pleasant. There-

fore (the story goes) Pallas returned to Jove pallid with pain

because she hadn't conquered Pleasure. Then Rhea approached Jove very quickly (because of her natural fluidity) and said: "Son, now you can see you need the advice of old Saturn. Till

now you've
in the

stolen the kingdom from him and kept him hidden bowels of the palace." That is, the active life has been distracting men completely from the contemplative. So, when the doors had been unlocked, Saturn was called for consultation. He said: "There are two principles of motion: pleasure for pursuing, pain for fleeing (painlessness does neither, however). So Pleasure mustn't be killed, otherwise souls won't want to come to heaven when Pleasure isn't even here. But Pleasure

must be brought here and Pain left among men. In this way everybody will leave there for here." They were pleased with the old god's advice. The attendants of Mars and Vulcan, the

Appendix II
utilitatis in

475

certando rationem habeas, neutrum enim victa

utilitatis

iiie

consequeris, constat te ipsa {421r\ dumtaxat victoriae voluptate

devictam certare, nulla gloriae vel

earn direxit.

habita ratione. Turn

Pallas verbis convicta prorupit in verbera telumque saepius in

At

ilia

cuius natura cedens est atque subintrans et

protinus declinabat. Ergo Pallas latum clipeum *in caput eius protendit; at ilia clipeum** penetravit, adeo enim ad penetrandum est potens ut corpus animamque penetret. Post haec advocavit Pallas dolorem, quo hoste

fugacissima

ictus

contrario perderet voluptatem.

At quoniam contraria

se

mutuo

non

accipiunt, dolor

non

voluptatis in faciem irruebat, sed iuxta

tendebat in latus.
potuit extenuare
ulterius aliquid

Tum

Pallas

una cum socio Vulcano acceptis

foUibus extenuare et resolvere voluptatem molliebatur.

Neque

eam cum tenuissima sit, neque resolvere in cum ipsa sit ultimum. Cum enim quaeritur:

Quare quis facit hoc? Et respondetur: Propter illud. Rursusque: Quare illud? Ac respondetur: Quia placet. Si quaeratur iterum: Quare placet? Non aliter respondebitur quam: Quia placet. Palladem ergo pallidam prae dolore, quia voluptatem non superasset, ad Jovem rediisse ferunt. Tunc Rhea utpote a fluxu proprio properantior agressa Jovem ait: O flli, nunc agnosces tibi opus esse senis Saturni consiHo, cui hactenus abstulisti regnum et in palatii penetralibus occlusisti. Activa videhcet vita homines a contemplativa plurimum distrahente. Reseratis ergo ianuis convocatur Saturnus ad consultandum. Tum ille: Duo sunt, ait, principia motus. Voluptas quidem prosequendi, dolor autem fugiendi, indolentia vero neutrum facit. Non ergo voluptas interimenda aHoquin animae coelum non petent, {421v\ voluptate etiam hie' extincta. Sed voluptas hue trahenda, dolor apud homines relinquendus ut inde hue cuncti confugiant. Placuit

Jiinc

-om.

476

Appendix II

demons, were sent to seize Pleasure, for it was feared the gods might fall for Pleasure's beauty and yield to her. The demons it was agreed, however, would have no use for beauty. But the demons could never get a firm hold on Pleasure. In a marvellous way she is softer and more slippery than eels, for the constant use of, and association with, soft and gentle things confirms the softness in her. Eventually Pleasure overcame the gods and the demons. The result was nobody dared to encounter her (for she ought to be avoided rather than attacked). But, so we shouldn't fail in our duties to the divine names for too long, let's acknowledge that on earth Minerva and the other gods, that is, human wisdom and power, are completely overcome by Pleasure; on the other hand Pleasure is overcome by divine wisdom. For Saturn consulted again with Minerva to try to seize Pleasure, not through violence which was her enemy but through grace which was her friend. So they sent Mercury, Apollo, the Muses and the Graces in order to allure Pleasure to heaven. Mercury was the first to speak to her. He dissuaded her from staying any longer on earth among her enemies fear, pain, wrath, hate, envy, toil, poverty and disease. Phoebus captivated her also with his lute, the Muses with songs and melodies, and the Graces with leaps and choral dances. Having been enticed by them, Pleasure joined the singing Muses, and with outstretched hands she linked herself with the Graces who were gently dancing. So in singing and dancing she accompanied the gods (who were returning to heaven) and was brought into heaven. Pleasure has deserted the earth, so men must go away from earth to heaven; but go in such a way that you don't turn back like Orpheus and lose the reward! When was it Pleasure ran away into heaven? It was at the time when Astraea, that is, original justice, ran away too (when Adam sinned)."' But lest

mortals, having lost Pleasure, should fight

among

themselves

each other among so many adversities, Jupiter pitied our misery when he stole Pleasure away and multiplied hope for us. But deceptive is the hope of attaining Pleasure here, that is, of winning her from mortal things. When she was led away by Mercury, Phoebus, the Graces and the Muses, she was

and

kill

Appendix II
senis consilium. Mittuntur

477

daemones Martis Vulcanique satelad voluptatem corripiendam. Timebatur enim ne dii illius Constabat autem pulchritudini indulgerent et cederent. daemones nuUam rationem pulchritudinis habituros. At daemones numquam voluptatem tenere manibus potuerunt, mollitie lubrica anguillas mirabiliter superantem. Eius enim mollitiem confirmat assiduus moUium dulciumque usus et habitatio. Voluptas denique et deos et daemones superavit ut nemo audeat cum ilia congredi; fugienda enim est potius quam invadenda. Verum ne diutius in divina nomina delinquamus,
lites

fateamur Minervam in terra et deos in terra alios, id est' humanam sapientiam et potentiam plurimum voluptate devinci, sed eam a sapientia divina superari. Nam Saturnus iterum una cum Minerva deliberaverunt ut tentandum esset voluptatem rapere non per violentiam illi oppositam, immo per gratiam eius amicam. Miserunt ergo Mercurium, Apollinem, Musas, Gratias ad voluptatem sursum alliciendam. Mercurius ad eam primus
inter hostes suos,

orationem habens dissuasit voluptati in terns moras trahere timorem, dolorem, iram, odium, invidiam, pauperiem atque morbum. Phoebus quoque eam^ laborem et
cithara delinivit;

Musae

cantilenis et modulis; Gratiae saltibus

atque choris. His enim pellecta voluptas inseruit se canentibus Musis, manibusque porrectis implicuit se Gratiis blande ludentibus.

atque [422r\ ludendo coelum repetentibus comitata voluptas coelo invecta est. Terra a voluptate deserta est, hinc ergo illuc abeundum; ita tamen ut abeundo te retro ne vertas, ne Orphei more perdas praemium.
Itaque

numinibus

his

canendo

Sed quonam tempore voluptas aufugit

Astraea originalis
scilicet

in

coelum?
peccante.

Quo

et

iustitia

Adam

Sed ne

mortales orbati voluptate inter tot adversa se afflictarent et perderent, Jupiter miseriae nostrae misertus dum abstulit volup-

tatem spem nobis multiplicavit. Sed fallit spes voluptatis hie consequendae, id est, ex rebus mortalibus reportandae. Nam ad

'for id est

W reads in

'tam

478
transferred to Minerva.
in the

Appendix II
So we can only attain complete pleasure wisdom (and there's a certain delight to

presence of divine

be had from the liberal disciplines also). After this, Pluto, the king of the earth, perceiving the bait for keeping souls for
himself in the lower world had been carried off, thought at least
to

model a

bait with a face like Pleasure's. So,

when he

received

the clothes and cosmetics which Pleasure

was accustomed

to use on earth (for he decided to equip and substitute another to take Pleasure's place. But he didn't adorn the demons for he needed them as attendants, nor the souls for they've been judged. He adorned

had left behind and she went into heaven pure),

one of the Furies.

fered

It

Pain, for Pleasure's clothes and shoes didn't

wasn't Wrath or Envy or Hate or Fear or fit them: they dif-

from her too much. But he adorned Waste,

whom he had
she was on

always
earth.

known to be So we ought

Pleasure's closest friend

when

pleasure. Otherwise
is

to take warning and flee far away from we will immediately tumble into Waste who

hidden there in Pleasure's clothes.

THE END

Appendix II

479

Mercuric, Phoebo, Musis, Gratiis perducentibus. Quamobrem voluptatem plenam penes divinam sapientiam tantum assequi possumus, delectationem etiam

Minervam

translata est,

quamdam

ex liberalibus disciplinis. Post haec Pluto rex terrae,

videns sublatam sibi escam detinendarum apud inferos animarum, cogitavit saltern escam fingere aspectu similem voluptati.

Acceptis ergo vestibus fucisque a voluptate relictis quibus in terras solebat uti, in coelum enim abiit pura, subornare et sub-

alium pro voluptate decrevit. Neque tamen subornavit daemones, ministri enim necessarii sunt; neque animas, adiudicatae enim sunt; sed aliquam furiarum. Non iram, non invidiam, odium, timorem, dolorem, non enim his, velut nimium diversis, congruebant vestes et calcei voluptatis, sed subornavit iacturam quam noverat semper terrenae voluptati familiarissimam. Hinc admonendi sumus ut voluptatem procul effugiamus, alioquin sub voluptatis praetextu in latentem
stituere

iacturam protinus corruemus.

FINIS

Appendix III
Appendix
III

contains the following:

1 The preface to the second version of the Philebus commentary as found in MS. Laur. Plut. 21, 8. This preface was dedicated to Lorenzo and, like the first excerpt, refers to the judgement of Paris. 2. The argumentum which originally accompanied the translation of the Philebus in Ficino's first decade of Plato transla-

tions. Later

it

served as the preface to the Philebus

in the first

and second Basle editions

commentary of the Opera Omnia, as

well as continuing to serve as the preface to the Philebus transla-

Opera Omnia; in was added consisting of the these instances a third paragraph passage found at the beginning of ch. 7 of the Philebus comapparet accipe defenmentary (Cum multa de summo bono dendam). The version presented here is that of the autograph
tion in the various editions of the Platonis
.

MS. fragment
the Bodleian

in the Bibliotheque Nationale, Lat. nouvelles

lat. 163. Apart from the title of Finis argumenti, however, the two ver-

acquisitions 1633, which has been collated with the version in

MS. Canonicianus

and the

final addition

sions are virtually identical.

3. The letter to Orlandini which Ficino appended to the Florence edition of his Commentaria in Platonem in 1496. In the Basle edition of the Opera Omnia it was used as a prefix to the commentary on the ninth book of the Republic {Op. Om., 1425-

26).

Marsilio Ficino's proem to Plato's Philebus [is] dedicated to Lorenzo de' Medici, the magnanimous, the saviour of his native land.

No
lives:

living being

endowed with reason doubts

there are three

is

the contemplative, the active, the pleasurable. This

Proemium

Proemium Marsilii Ficini in Philebum Platonis ad Magnanimum Laurentium Medicem Patriae Ser^atorem.
'

Tres esse vitas nemo ratione vivens dubitat: contemplativam, activam, voluptuosam, quoniam videlicet tres ad felicitatem
'this is

the preface to X; see Op.

Om.,

919.

482
because

Appendix III

men

pleasure.

wisdom, power, However, we understand by the term "wisdom" any

elect three routes to happiness:

application to the liberal arts, also religious peace. In using the

term "power" we think of having authority in civil government and likewise in the military, or having a lot of wealth or brilliant renown, or being actively engaged in doing things. Finally, and without a doubt, under the term "pleasure" are contained the delights of the five senses and the avoidance of labours and worries. Accordingly, the poets named the first Minerva, the second Juno, and the third Venus. Once upon a time in the presence of Paris the three goddesses contended for the golden apple, that is, for the palm and victory. Paris, having inwardly deliberated which he should choose as the best way to happiness, eventually chose pleasure out of the three. But since he'd rejected wisdom and power he deservedly fell into misery while hoping imprudently for
happiness."'
It is said Hercules only encountered two goddesses, namely Venus and Juno. Having neglected Venus, Hercules pursued the active virtue which was under Juno. Nevertheless because of this he was never happy among men, but vexed perpetually with the work of labours. But at last victory makes him equal to the sky; finally conquered Earth gives him the stars."' Two goddesses also met a certain Philebus, pleasure and wisdom. Each strove for victory and with him as judge it seemed Venus had beaten Pallas. However, a little later when Socrates decided the issue more correctly Minerva gained the victory. Rejected Venus, however, together with Juno eventually sentenced Socrates to death, after he'd been harassed by false judges. Finally, our Lorenzo, having been taught by the oracle of Apollo, has neglected none of the god[desse]s. For he has seen [all] three of them and he has, in addition, admired each one for her own merits. On this account he has won wisdom from Pallas and power from Juno and the graces and poetry and music from Venus.

15 February 1491

Appendix III
vias

483

homines elegenint: sapientiam, potentiam, voluptatem. sapientiae nomine quodlibet liberalium artium studium religiosumque otium intelligimus. Sub appellatione

Nos autem sub

potentiae auctoritatem in gubernatione

tari

civili

pariter atque mili-

splendorem gloriae negotiosamque virtutem comprehendi putamus. Sub voluptatis denique cognomento quinque sensuum oblectamenta et laborum curarumque declinationem contineri non dubitamus. Primam igitur poetae Minervam, secundam vero Junonem, tertiam denique Venerem nominaverunt. Tres olim apud Paridem de porno aureo, id est, de palma et victoria certaverunt. Consul tante videlicet Paride secum quam e tribus potissimam ad felicitatem viam eligeret, elegit denique
divitiarumque affluentiam
et

voluptatem.

Cum

vero sapientiam

spreverit

et

potentiam,
scilicet

merito imprudenter felicitatem sperans incidit in miseriam.

Duae tantum

occurrisse traduntur Herculi,

Venus

atque Juno. Hercules neglecta Venere animosam sub Junone virtutem est secutus. Neque tamen inter mortales propterea
felix, perpetuo certaminum labore vexatus. Sed hunc tandem exaequat victoria coelo; huic denique superata tellus sidera donat. Duae quoque Philebo cuidam obviae voluptas atque sapientia de victoria contenderunt, atque eo iudice Venus Palladem superavisse visa est. Sed paulo post Socrate rectius decernente Minerva victoriam reportavit. Spreta vero Venus simul atque Juno Socratem tandem sub falsis iudicibus agitatum

morte damnarunt. Laurentius denique noster Apollinis oraculo doctus nullum posthabuit super or um. Tres enim vidit, tres quoque pro meritis adoravit. Quamobrem et a Pallade sapientiam et ab Junone potentiam et a Venere gratias poesimque et musicam reportavit.

XV February 1490

484

Appendix III

A summary for

the Philebus, which is about the highest good, by Marsilio Ficino, the Florentine.
Plato wrote the dialogue, the Philebus, according to a wonIt is so clear that it doesn't really need a summary,

derful order.

since Plato himself sets forth all his material and the order he's going to follow at the beginning of the debate, then midway he resumes it, then at the end he gathers it together. However, the

book's object
is

is

to examine the highest

good of the

soul,

which

called the highest

all

good

conditionally, since the principle itself

So the condigood in the Parmenides."* However, just as a particular Hght depends on the fountain itself of all light, so does the conditional good proceed from the absolute. Therefore in the Phaedo"^ and the Theaetetus^*^ Plato says the soul's highest good is to be Hke God. But nothing can become like the sun except by some infusion of light itself. So the soul's good too will be the perfect attainment
of
things
is

called the highest

good

absolutely.

tional

good

is

dealt with in this book, the absolute

This light descends first into the intelligence, Truth is in the intelligence, joy is in the will. Here and in the Phaedrus Plato refers to them as the ambrosia in the intelligence, the nectar in the will."' Hence he located man's highest good in the mixture of wisdom and pleasure. However, before he did so, he denied happiness could consist in either wisdom's or pleasure's reason alone, because in neither do you find the highest good's three conditions: namely that it's utterly perfect and sufficient and desirable. It's perfect because it is wanting in nothing; sufficient because what possesses it is wanting in nothing; desirable because whatever can be desired is in it and from it. So because it's perfect it's sufficient, because
light.
will.

of the divine

then into the

sufficient desirable. Since

it's

sufficient for itself, it's sufficient

for another. Since

it's

sufficient for another, it's desired

by
to

another. Neither pleasure alone nor

satisfy these conditions,

wisdom are shown but some mixture from them both.

In

and nature of pleasure and wisdom are fully explored, along with the infinite and the limit, and compounding and the principle of compounding.
Plato's demonstration the genus, origin

Appendix III

485

Argumentum

Marsilii Ficini Florentini in

Philebum de

summo hono.^
Philebus dialogus miro
est.

quodam

ordine a Platone conscriptus

quippe

Atque adeo perspicuus ut ferme argumento non egeat, cum omnem sui materiam atque ordinem in principio

disputandi praeponat, resumat in medio, in fine denique coUi-

autem huius libri propositum de summo animae bono disserere, quod quidem summum bonum cum conditione quadam dicitur, cum ipsum rerum omnium principium summum bonum absolute dicatur. De illo igitur quod cum conditione bonum hoc in libro; de eo quod absolutum in Parmenide disputatur. Ab absoluto autem aliud hoc manat quemadmodum lumen quoddam ab ipso luminis totius fonte dependet. Quamobrem in Phaedone in^ Theaeteto dictum est a Platone summum animae bonum Dei similitudinem esse. Nihil vero soli sit simile, nisi quadam luminis ipsius infusione. Unde et animae bonum erit Integra divini luminis consecutio. Id lumen in mentem primo, in voluntatem deinde descendit. In mente Veritas, in voluntate gaudium; in mente ambrosia, in voluntate nectar a Platone et hie et in Phaedro cognominatur. Itaque summum
gat. Est

hominis bonum' in sapientiae voluptatisque conmixtione locavit.

Sed ante

in sola vel sapientiae vel voluptatis ratione beatitudi-

nem
sit et

consistere posse negavit, ex eo

conditio in neutro reperiatur.

sufficiens et
sufficiens quia nihil deest

Ea

est ut

quod triplex boni summi summopere perfectum

expetendum. Perfectum quia nihil sibi deest; illi quod ipsum capit; expetendum

illo et ex illo est quicquid appeti potest. Unde quia perfectum sufficiens; quia sufficiens expetendum. Nam quia sibi satest, alteri sufficit; quia sufficit alteri, desideratur ab altero. Haec neque soli sapientiae neque voluptati sed mixto cuidam ex utraque competere demonstrantur, ubi de voluptatis et sapientiae genere origine atque natura permulta dicuntur, de infinito

quia in

'In MS. 163 the title reads Argumentum Marsilii MS. 163

in

Philebum

'et

MS. 163

'bonum om.

486

Appendix III

Only then does he conclude that the highest and absolute good in nature is the measure of all things, that is, is the principle of all nature. But the highest good of the intelligence and soul is the enjoyment of that first good an enjoyment which coincides with the mixing together of wisdom and pleasure through truth, proportion and beauty. So Plato puts the measure of all things in the first degree of goods; truth, proportion and beauty in the second; wisdom in the third; knowledge, skill and opinion in the fourth; and moderate pleasure in the fifth. A man is said to be happy when he's acquired wisdom concerning divine things and experience about human things (the knowledge that consists of skill and opinion). The whole man exults in the joy of contemplation, and indulges in the pleasure of the senses only to the extent that wisdom and knowledge and joy aren't hindered by it.

Marsilio Ficino, the Florentine, to Paolo Orlandini, monk at the church of the angels and brother philosopher, salutation.

Yesterday you argued with me over matters of divinity with your customary subtlety and you eventually asked me why I give precedence to the will in my letter on happiness, while in [my commentary on] the Philebus I've followed Plato in giving precedence to the intellect. Now I could reply that in the
Philebus [commentary] I give you Plato's view, in the letter my own view. But I don't want Marsilio's view to differ from Plato's. So briefly I will reply that our intelligence proceeds in two ways: one natural, but the other supernatural, which might
properly be referred to as the
intellect

way of ecstasy.

In the

first

case the

guides the will as a companion because of some naturally innate light. Eventually, when it has guided the will correctly, it satisfies it, and is therefore superior to it. In the second

case, the case of ecstasy, however,

new hght and power

poured

in

by
it

God

dour, until

doesn't fill the intellect with the divine splenhas kindled the will with a wonderful love. When

Appendix III
et

487

termino, de composite et compositionis principio.

Ac demum

concluditur

summum

in natura

bonum

et

absolutum esse men-

suram

universorum, hoc est totius naturae principium. Summum vero bonum mentis et animae esse illius primi fruitionem, quae mixtioni ex sapientia et voluptate per veritatem com-

mensurationem et pulchritudinem convenit. Quapropter in primo bonorum gradu rerum omnium mensura ponitur; in secundo Veritas commensuratio pulchritudo; in tertio sapientia;
in quarto scientia ars et opinio; in quinto temperata voluptas. Beatusque vir dicitur qui sapientiam habet divinorum, humanorum peritiam scientiam arte et opinione constantem; gaudio

contemplationis totus exultat, voluptati sensuum eatenus se

committit quatenus sapientia scientiaque

et

gaudium impedi-

mentum inde nullum

accipiunt.'

Ficinus, Florentinus, Paulo Orlandino angelorum aede monaco conphilosopho suo, salutem

Marsilius

in

multa mecum de divinis ut soles subtiliter disputasti, quaesisti denique cum ego in Philebo tamquam ex

Postquam

heri

Platonis sententia intellectum voluntati praefecerim, cur in

epistola de felicitate praeferam voluntatem.

Equidem respon-

dere possem in Philebo quidem sententiam ferri Platonicam, in

epistola vero

Platonica

meam. Sed nolim Marsilianam sententiam a dissentire. Itaque respondebo summatim duplicem

esse mentis nostrae processum: alterum

alterum vero supra naturam,

quem

proprie

quidem naturalem, nominamus exces-

sum. In illo quidem processu intellectus luce quadam naturaliter insita voluntatem ducit quasi comitem; ac denique recte ductam implet, ideoque praefertur. In hoc autem excessu nova lux

'Finis

argumenti add. MS. 163

488

Appendix III
power of God. There love

the will has been thus kindled through the transmitted

heat and love,

itself,

it

draws the

intelligence into

the soul

whose function in the universe is generation, regenerates and makes it divine. We have discussed the intelli-

gence's natural process in accordance with Plato in the Philebus; but

ral

we touch on

the ecstasy which

is

higher than the natu-

and we have treated it in accordance with Plato in the >Phaedrus and Symposium. In the commentaries on Dionysius we've declared how the divine love, which
motion
in the letter,

has been kindled in the

unity where

will,

takes the intellect into the highest

is

we enjoy God

absolutely. But this

enough for a

letter. Proceed happily in your theological commentaries. Often

commend me to your venerable

both of
us),

father (or rather to the father of

Guido Laurentinus,

the restorer of the church of

the angels.

Florence 13

November

1496.

Appendix III
virtusque infusa divinitus

489

non

prius intellectum divino splen-

dore complet

quam amore
sic

mirifico accenderit voluntatem.

Quae quidem
est

risque efficaciam
in

accensa per ipsam translatoriam caloris amomentem traducit in Deum, ubi amor ipse cuius
generationis

universe

officium

regenerat

animum

Naturalem quidem mentis incessum una cum Platone tractavimus in Philebo, excessum vero naturali motu superiorem attingimus in epistola atque una cum Platone in Phaedro Symposioque tetigimus, et qua ratione divinus amor
efficitque divinum.

qui in voluntate accenditur intellectum in unitatem

transferat

summam

qua praecipue Deo fruimur in commentariis in Dionysium declaravimus. Sed haec pro epistolae modo satis. Tu vero in theologicis commentationibus tuis perge feliciter, et venerabili patri vestro, immo et nostro, Guidoni Laurentino angelicae aedis instauratori nos saepe commenda.
Florentiae
xiii

Novembris

MCCCCLXXXXVI.

Appendix IV: The Pesaro Fragments

The
first

Biblioteca Oliveriana's

MS. 620
and

is

damaged

in places,

particularly towards the end,

identified correctly

consists of seven fragments

Kristeller

by Professor

in

1967 as

belonging in the main to some stage of the Philebus commentary {Iter Italicum II, p. 65). There are six fragments of the

commentary, which I have called P frags. I, II, III, IV, V and VI (my pp. 87-109, 153-173, [444 and] 181-187, 217-265, 283-285, 371-425 and 447-455 and 457-463), and one fragment consisting of Ficino's De Virtutibus Moralibus together with some of his De Quattuor Sectis Philosophorum. The MS. has 68 folios and an older foliation (which I have used) going to 144v. It is written in a non-Itahan, perhaps Spanish, hand and is largely unparagraphed. I would like to revise Kristeller'
description of the contents thus:
l(l)-5(5)v. (M)Arsilius Ficinus

f.

Antonio Canisiano
[i.e.

S.

D.

Cum

sepe

mecum
De

egisses

ut deus efficiaris

the

De

Virtutibus Moralibus complete]

philosophorum eiusdem. (M)Arsilins fficinus dementi ffortino s.d. Tria sunt mi Clemens [i.e. the De Quattuor mundos et refici. Animum no Sectis Philosophorum incomplete].
6(6)-8(8)v.

quattuor

sectis

f.

9(17)-16(24)v. [Ficino's Philebus

3, all

commentary: the
5].

last Vi

of ch.
f.

of ch. 4 and the beginning of ch.

15(23)v. [at the

bottom

in

an eighteenth century hand]

Marsilii Ficini

Comment,

in prim, et secund.

Tomum

Perhiher-

men.
commentary: the end of ch. of chs. 14 and 15 and the beginning of ch. 16. Ch. 15 is not abridged: the heading to ch. 16 is simply transposed forwards, cf. MS. Laur. Plu. 21,8].
f.

17(41)-24(48)v. [the Philebus

13, all

Appendix IV
f.

491

25(52)-26(53)v. [idem: the beginning of ch. 18, including

in

most of an opening passage otherwise found

21,8 only].
*
f.

MS. Laur.

Plu.

27(65)-43(81)v. [/V/em/mostof ch. 23, allof chs. 24-27, the

beginning of ch. 28].

f . 44(88)-44(88)v.

[idem: the beginning of ch. 30]

all

f.

45(121)-63(139)v. [idem:

but the opening few lines of

ch. 37
f.

and

all

of book two,

i.e.

chs. 1-4].

49(125). Finis primi libri

Florentini in Platonis

Sequitur eiusdem in
f.

commentariorum Marsilii Ficini Philebum de summo hominis bono. eundem Hber secundus.

63(139)v. Item alia excerpta breviter ex lectionibus Marsilii

Ficini in
f.

Philebum.
I, II, III, V and two-thirds of from the ten excerpts which conclude the commentary

64(140)-68(144)v. [excerpts

VI

(i.e.

in the other MSS.)].

* * * *

present?

But what stage of the commentary does Pesaro's MS. It must be the second stage (the stage presented in its

entirety in

MS. Laur. Plu. 21,8) for the following reasons: the vast majority of P readings agree with a. when
from

differs

W and/or Y

(e.g.

my pp.

229, 239, 249, 255, 391,

421);

253, 444), as well as additions

X (e.g. my pp. 235, X and W or Y; c. P has omissions otherwise unique to X (e.g. my pp. 251, 255, 377, 387), as well as omissions common to X and W or Y;
b.

P has

additions otherwise unique to

common

to

d.

shares X's speUing conventions

when they differ from

and/ or
over
e.

(this is especially true

of

X and P's preference for iis

his)\

P agrees with X
than Y;

in

having fewer abbreviations than

W and

far fewer

492
f

Appendix IV

P follows the word-order of X when this

from that of

occasionally devito

ates
g.

W and/or Y;

P follows the chapter numbering unique

X (my pp.

231,

239,249,261,415). Within these seven categories of agreement the exceptions are very infrequent and usually trivial: P has a few independent over and against X and readings, even fewer agreements with Y, and only four agreements with Y over and against and X. It has some unique omissions (e.g. my pp. 239, 247) but no unique additions. Very rarely, incidentally, have I opted for the XP reading, and only once for a unique P reading (my p. 379). There seems to be no way of determining the relationship between X and P, but my feeling is that P was not a copy of X but of another MS. of the commentary's second stage. Finally, since stage three had already appeared in 1496 and appeared, moreover, in an edition, it seems less likely the scribe was reproducing stage two in the 1500s than working at the time of stage two itself. Accordingly, we ought to extend Kristeller's dating of P to include the 1490s, following Mazzatinti.

Appendix

V:

The Chapter Summaries

Instead of the ten excerpts, Ficino added these chapter sum-

maries to the third version of the Philebus commentary, i.e. the editio princeps in his Commentaria in Platonem of 1496; and
they accompanied
all

subsequent editions of the commentary.

My text incorporates the 1496 corrigenda list without comment.

Introductio

ad dialogum.

ca.

i.

** "Vide O Protarche quem nunc a Philebo, etc Proponitur tractandum quid sit hominis bonum, et utrum ad illud magis conferat voluptas an sapientia.

Dispositio dialogi.

ca.

ii.

" Primo quidem invenienda **Age igitur praeter haec, etc ipsa summi boni conditio. Deinde perpendendum utra magis
accedat ad illam voluptasne an sapientia.
Dispositio dialogi.
ca.

iii.

" Summopere verendum ne "At nunc expiationis gratia, etc contra divina nomina delinquamus. Ut voluptas et sapientia
cognoscantur iudicenturque, dividendum utriusque genus in
species. Si voluptas ipsa esset
esset

ipsum bonum, omnis voluptas bona. Sunt tamen aHquae malae, quae videlicet sunt con-

trariae bonis.

Bonum vero contrarium esse non potest.

Ambigitur quomodo unum multa. ca. iiii. "Hoc item multo magis mutua confessione asseveremus, ." Vetus et difficilis dubitatio est quomodo unum multa etc. sit atque vicissim. Facile quidem cognitu est quomodo unum hoc vel illud genitum et caducum, una cum unitate substantiae, habeat etiam multitudinem, et valde quidem diversam. Difficultas igitur non versatur circa eiusmodi unum sed circa unum sempiternum.
. .

494

Appendix

ca. v. Ambigitur quomodo unum multa. " Siquis introduxerit unam "Quando quispiam o puer, etc cuiusque naturalium specierum ideam separatam, dubia multa nascentur. Primum, utrum existant unitates eiusmodi ideales? Secundum, quales sint? Tertium, quomodo insint mortalibus

aut assint?

Artificium circa

ca. vi. abusus iogicae. " Animae rational! "At unde potissimum exordiemur, etc naturaliter insita est quaedam disserendi facultas, quae communiter ab uno in multa vicissimque discurrit. Ingeniosissimi quique ad eiusmodi artificium propensiores existent. Si id adolescentulis concedatur absque delectu, insolentes evadunt;
et

unum

multa

et

logicaque abutentes,

non

fiunt philosophi sed sophistae.

Divinitas ingenii circa

unum et multa.

ca. vii.

" Animus noster quatenus divini"Donum profecto, etc tatis est particeps eatenus ad dialecticam, id est, metaphysicam
facultatem est propensus. Itaque philosophi divini praecipue Pythagorici dixerunt omnia entia ex uno multitudineque constare et in uno habere terminum, in multitudine infinitum.

Atque in hoc mysterio fundaverunt nobis dialecticam facultatem, non in conceptibus cogitationis nostrae sed in ideis speciebusque naturalibus, ut in quolibet idearum spherarumque
inveniamus generalissimum, dividamusque ipsum per differentias suas in species gradatim usque ad species ultimas; neque praetermittamus medios differentiarum gradus,
ordine genus

unum

sub speciebus autem multis singula negligamus.

tamquam

innumerabilia

Quomodo considerandum unum et multitudo. " Vox humana unum "Quae modo dixisti, etc
multipHcari quoque

ca. viii.

genus

est,

singulatim possunt infinitae voces. Scientia

vocum

musica vel grammatica non habetur ex eo quod genus illud cogitet vel infmitas voces imaginetur, sed quod speciales gradatim vocum differentias distincte comprehendat. Similiter de Htteris atque de omnibus est putandum.
vel
aliquis vel

Appendix
Distinctio circa
ca.
viiii.

495

unum et multa ad scientiam necessaria.

*'

"An non
tas

de sapientia, etc
res

Neque

sapientia neque volup-

neque

uUa

perfecte iudicari potest, nisi genus ipsius in

sapientia

suas species dividatur. Subiectum huius disputationis est sum-

mum

hominis bonum, utrimi

sit

an voluptas an

tertium.

Tres ipsius boni conditiones.

'Nihil

ca. x.

" Promittit se probaturum ipsum iam grave, etc bonum non esse sapientiam vel voluptatem vel utrumque simul, sed tertium quiddam quod aliud est quam utrumque et melius est ambobus. Tres ipsius boni conditiones ponit, scilicet esse perfectum, sufficiens, omnibus expetendum.

Quomodo

voluptas vel sapientia se habeat

igitur, etc

ad bonum.

ca. xi.

"Consideremus

"Si
ab

sapientia separatur a voluphis

tate vel voluptas a sapientia et

sunt, scilicet opinione vera, praevisione,

quae sapientiae similia memoria, neutrum erit

ipsum bonum, quia neutrum ipsius boni conditiones habebit. Id tamen sapientia praestantius habet quod delectationem secum affert et hanc quidem mirificam atque intimam si intelligentia fuerit expedita. Voluptas autem sapientiam non introducit secum saepiusque excludit. Adde quod voluptas omnis plenitudinem habet a sapientia. Animadversio enim cum sit motio circularis ubicumque fiat fit inteUigentiae munere. Voluptas autem animadversione perficitur. Nam ubi sensus corporeus congruum voluptariumque attingit, nisi animadvertatur sentiendi motus, vel nulla vel stupida fit voluptas. InteUigentia denique ad vitam mixtam atque sufficientem proprius accedit quam voluptas, siquidem haec voluptatem propriam secum affert, neque vicissim voluptas propriam affert sapientiam.

Quomodo bonum in mixto.

"Quid autem,
sola
sit

ca. xii.

neque sapientia neque voluptas ipsum bonum, quia non sufficit appetitui, reliquum est
etc

"

Cum

496
ut

Appendix
nobis
in

V
quodam ex utrisque in quodam mixto con-

summum

bonum

consistat in

mentis hac aliud quidem est intellectus aliud vero voluntas. Purae vero divinaeque mentis bonum in simplici quodam, quoniam unum ibi magis est intellectus atque voluntas, gaudiumque ibi est ipsemet actus intelligentiae videlicet
mixto.
sistit,

Bonum quidem humanae

quoniam

expeditus.
ca. xiii. Quomodo bonum in mixto. " Summum hominis bonum "Palmam igitur, etc

est

unum

tiae voluptatisque certa

quiddam occultum atque divinum quod desuper in ipsa sapienmixtione suscipitur. Huic autem divino
similior est sapientia

quam

voluptas, ergo melior. Suscipitur

est

autem

illud in ipsa unitate

quae

voluntate superius, diciturque illud

caput animae intellectu et bonum capi a mixto, quoipsa

niam unitas

est utriusque radix.

Nee

bono

fruitur nisi vel

intel-

prius vel interim satis utrique

fiat,

per visionem quidem

lectui per laetitiam vero voluntati. Illud vero

bonum

quasi per

modum gustus tactusque efficitur atque est ineffabile.

De infmito
et

termino et mixto et horum causa.

etc

ca.

xiiii.

" Sub ipso uno rerum principio statim duo sunt amplissima entium omnium elementa, scilicet infinitudo atque terminus. Deus ex his duobus tertium quiddam, id est, universum ens commiscet. Utrumque vero genus est amplissimum multas species in se comprehendens. Ipsemet Deus ut communicabilis est causa mixtionis existit; ut autem supereminens causa discretionis apparet. Item per terminum unit, per

"Omnia quae nunc,

infinitatem vero discernit. Ipsa quin etiam alteritas in

intelligibili

mundo

causa

discretionis existit.

Quae sint in genere infiniti.

"Attende
igitur, etc
**

ca. xv.

Qualitati materiali suapte natura

non

repugnat remitti intendive per gradus absque fine. Similiter neque id repugnat motui actionique ipsius. Similiter dimensioni non repugnat minui vel augeri absque fine. Certus autem modus
his

ab auctore specierum desuper adhibetur, ubi enim destinat

Appendix

497

humanam

speciem vel equinam, simul certum qualitatis

et

quantitatis motionisque
igitur per se

modum

terminumve

decernit. Infinita

desuper finiuntur.

Conditiones generis
Benedicis, etc

infiniti.

ca. xvi.

" Progressio hinc inde per quoslibet gradus indifferens est proprium infinitae naturae. Haec autem fit aliter alibi, in materia quidem per formas, in dimensione vero per maius et minus, in numero per plus et paucius, in qualitate et actione per remissionem et intentionem, in motu per velocius atque tardius, in tempore per longius atque brevius. Praeterea
suo quodam pacto infinitae naturae persimile. Sed intellectus auctor specierum in virtute ipsius unius atque per animam ut instrumentum speciebus omnibus addit terminos, tum unicuique, tum invicem imponens
in rebus incorporeis est aliquid

insuper aequalitatem proportionemque

numeratam ad

termi-

num pertinentem.
Mixta ex infinito
et termino.
ca. xvii.

termino sunt formae rerum recta ratione compositae, ubi quae per se quodammodo infinita sunt vel etiam invicem opposita certum suscipiunt
etc

"Agedum,

" Mixta ex

infinito et

modum,

et mutua proportione conciliantur in unum. In parte quin etiam animae sensuali affectus per se infiniti et oppositi

modum terminumque
tionis ac terminos

accipiunt ab
est,

amat, id

dea quae ab ipsa mente.

ilia

est

causa mix-

Mixtum fit ab alio.

ca. xviii.
*'

"Ceterum quid, etc Mixtum ex infinito et termino invicem oppositis neque per se coeuntibus factum est ab alio. Non enim efficitur a se ipso, alioquin qua ratione faceret izmi esset. Qua vero ratione fieret nondum existeret. Causa vero a qua fit si dominatur operi non est pars operis aliqua. Partes enim non ipsae quidem causae sunt, sed ipsi causae serviunt. Vera causa
supereminet atque est efficiens
finis.

et

exemplar

et

quodammodo

498

Appendix
vita mixta,

V
de causa terminante.
et sapien-

De

de voluptate

et intellectu,

ca. xviiii.

"Agedum

deinceps, etc

" Vita quae ex voluptate

quaedam est in genere mixtorum. Voluptas in genere infinitorum, est enim quasi motus quidam ad magis
tia constat species

minusve indifferens atque multiplicabilis. Infinitudo haec voluptatem non efficit bonam, alioquin dolorem quoque faceret bonum. Mens scilicet intellectus aliquando deus dicitur, aliquando dea. Deus quidem si ad inferius, dea vero si ad superius
refle]ratur. Est

rum.
alter

Intellectus

autem intellectus et sapientia in genere terminomundi rex alter quidem est in anima mundi,
superior.

vero

mundo

Mentem

esse in genere termini con-

firmatur quia

dum

in se convertitur profecto terminat ordinat-

que

se

ipsam. Item speciem

modumque
infinitis.

et

ordinem sequentibus

adhibet, turn

mens mundana mundanis, tum humana humanis

Affectus enim

praesertim affectibus per se

tur aliunde ducendi

cum

infera-

munus nullum

habet. Mentis vero indicium

habet imperium. Hinc illud Platonicum atque Orphicum iudicium Jovis rex est universi. Quoniam vero intellectus manifestus est rerum definitor, ipsum vero bonum definitor occultus atque
superior, ideo intellectus nominatur a Platone propheta quasi
superioris interpres.
ca. xx. Corpus nostrum dependet ex universo. " Antiquiorum sententia "Utrum o Protarche, etc

est

ex

ipso mirabili

ordine confirmata, mundum non fortuna sed intelligentia regi. Elementa quae nobis insunt nee Integra sunt nee pura. Dependent igitur ab integris purisque

mundanorum

dementis quibus constat mundus. Ex toto igitur mundi corpore corpus nostrum conficitur et alitur atque regitur.

Mundus est animal intellectuale,

"Quid hoc,
etc

ca. xxi.

"

Mundanum

corpus quanto perfectius

est

quam nostrum tanto magis est animatum, neque nostram susciperet intellectualem animam ab intellectu artifice mundi nisi mundus suam inde animam suscepisset. Vitam vero irrationalem habemus etiam a vita mundi, per quam praeparamur ad

Appendix
intellectualem

499

nobis sunt

animam capiendam. Reliqua sic expone, si iii terminus, infinitum, mixtum atque ex his ipsa causa
efficit,

hominem rationalem

cur

non

et

mundum

ex isdem

melioribus constitutum effecerit sapientem? Atque si nostrum hoc sapientia gubernatur et arte, cur non etiam universum?

Causa ipsa his ordinem praebens est intellectus. Hie autem corpori non aliter quam per mediam animam inesse potest. Igitur in Jove, id est, in vivente mundo est mens et anima regia per virvirtute

tutem causae, id est, et per modum causae mundanae et a causae super mundanae. Mentis umbra est anima, animae umbra est vita corporis.

ca. xxii. Mens, voluptas, vita mixta, bonum. " Mens ilia vigens in mundi anima est "Praecedentem, etc causa mundanorum, et progenies supermundanae mentis quae est causa mundi totius. Mens supermundana progenies est ipsius boni quod est omnium causa. Nostra mens est progenies supermundanae mentis; est cognata quodammodo causis modo dictis, igitur in genere termini. Terminus enim proprietatem

habet causae potius quam infinitum. Est ergo mehor voluptate. Vita enim mixta ex sapientia et voluptate, ideo summopere est
eligenda
habet.

quoniam a divina causa eam

constituente

munus

Mens

igitur et sapientia quia cognatior

causae

quam

voluptas ideo melior.

Quomodofiat in composito voluptas atque dolor.

ca. xxiii.

" Voluptas dolorque ad corporeum "Oportet itaque, etc sensum praecipue pertinentes fiunt in composito quodam ex infinito et termino, ex materia atque forma: dolor quidem quotiens harmonia solvitur naturahs, voluptas autem quotiens
restituitur.

Voluptates

ad animum pertinentes vel ad corpus.

'*

ca. xxiiii.

"Pone
doloris

deinceps, etc

Sunt ahae species voluptatis atque

ad solam animam pertinentes quando expectans bonum malumve futurum laetatur aut maeret. Tu vero si vehs de voluf)tatis dolorisque conditione diiudicare, invicem omnino secemes

500

Appendix

cognoscesque utrum omnis voluptas et semper sit eligenda aut dolor similiter respuendus, an potius aliquando et certa quadam
conditione. Si enim voluptas

non

simpliciter eligenda,

neque
erit

dolor simpliciter respuendus, certe neque voluptas idem atque ipsum bonum, neque dolor idem atque malum.

De indolentia et voluptate animi.

**Primum
igitur, etc
fit

ca. xxv.

nee restituitur, non

harmonia nee solvitur dolor in sensum vel voluptas. Item merus

Si naturalis

"

contemplationis status absque

potest. Status eiusmodi forte

motu laetitiae vel molestiae esse maxime divinus est, siquidem talis

habitus sit deorum. Denique sicut est in anima sola per expectationem futurorum dolor atque voluptas ita per memoriam

praeteritorum.

De motu et sensu et passione. " "Primum quidem, etc

ca. xxvi.

Levissimae corporis passiones latent animum, graviores innotescunt. Sensus est perceptio corporeae passionis in anima. Motus igitur factus in corpore per

quem

sensus excitatur corpori simul et animae

in

quodammodo

videtur esse

quam

communis, quamvis anima; in illo quidem

hie

corpore passio, in hac vero indicium

aliter sit in

motus

atque actio.

De memoria et reminiscentia.
"Sensus praeterea, etc

ca. xxvii.

" Meminisse est simpliciter conservare vestigium vel imaginem quandam motionis quae sentiendo facta fuit in sensu. Meminisse proprie non includit in se
praesentem horum animadversionem. Reminiscentia vero animadversionem praesentem habet et fit in anima sine corporis passione. Est autem duplex, una quidem in parte sensuali quando recolimus praeteritas sensuum passiones, altera in
parte rationali

quae senserat
sine

quando post oblivionem quandam resumit quae didicerat. Agere vero potest non solum passione corporis sed etiam sine communione cum
vel

corpore.

Appendix

501

Quomodo

ca. xxviii. voluptas quaedam animi propria. " Cum primum ex obiecto quodam "Multa considerare, etc
fit

naturam, voluptas fit statim hoc praesente, servatur deinceps hoc in memoria. Post hac indigentia corporis ad idem vel simile nos incitante appetimus
proportionali nobis
restitutio in
illud rursus adesse.

Eiusmodi appetitus, non solum per indigen-

tiam corporis sed etiam per ipsam animae memoriam incitatus ad consequendum id quod a nobis abest, non est in corpore sed in anima. Corpus enim agit vel patitur solummodo per contactum. In hoc autem gradu nihil adhuc attingitur. Praeterea in
corpore quidem nunc indigentia est; appetitus interim ad repletionem movet huic oppositam, quasi sit aUbi quam in corpore. In corpore quidem passio est excitans appetitum. Appetitus

autem

in

animo

est,

non tam passio quam motio quaedam

hie de naturali vel quolibet appetitu

similis actioni.

Non autem

loquimur sed sensuaU.

ca. xxviiii. Voluptas corporis impura est. " Vita voluptuosa servilis est, servit praeterea, etc enim indigentiae corporali; est et anxia, mixtas enim voluptates

"Hoc

doloribus habet, ut quando quis propter famem dolet sed interim propter spem mensae statim futurae laetatur.

cum

ca. xxx. Voluptas corporis falsa est. *' Sicut opinio, spes, formido, sic et Hac talium, etc voluptas partim quidem vera partim vero falsa esse potest. Opinio rursus quando circa iudicium boni malive fallitur volup-

tatem

et

molestiam reddit vanam.

Voluptas corporis falsa est. Distinguamus igitur, etc

alia

ca. xxxi.

" Opinio

alia

quidem vera

est,

vero falsa, quamvis verum sit tunc hominem opinari etiamsi opinione fallatur. Similiter voluptas quaedam potest esse falsa,

quamvis interea verum sit sic affectum hominem delectari. Item sicut ex opinione prava sequitur voluptas prava, sic ex falsa
opinione falsa voluptas.

502
Voluptas corporis falsa
ca. xxxii.

Appendix
est.

V
et imaginatione.

Item de opinione

bibere.

" Hie quidem somniat se dulce "Nihil ne o amice, etc Hie vero vigilans dulce bibit utrobique voluptas est, sed

in vigilante sic vera voluptas sicut

sic falsa sicut

verum vinum,

in

somniante

falsum. Item tanto maior voluptas in vigilante

vini superat.

quanto vinum ipsam imaginem

Opinio ex sensu

memoriaque

proficiscitur

memoriterque iudicare sit homo vel equus, amicus vel inimicus, bonus aut malus. Hac ipsa quasi consultatione opinionem concipimus veram aut falsam, quae quidem opinio sermoni vel scripturae similis esse videtur. Praeterea est in nobis imaginatio quae actiones sensus opinionesque imaginibus secum ipsa consignat profundiusque imprimit et latius exprimit. Saepe vero ex opinione vera vel falsa
sequitur imaginatio vera similiter aut falsa. Potest utique imagi-

quando iterum sentimus aliquid illo non nihil pergimus, scilicet quod de

natio praeter id

quod nunc

existit

quodve iam possidet

alia

fingere multifariam et optare.

Voluptates

quaedam animi propriae.

recte, etc

ca. xxxiii.

" Opinio et imaginatio non solum ad praesentiam sed etiam ad futura et praeterita pertinet, voluptates autem et molestiae de praeteritis futurisve susceptae ipsius animae propriae sunt.
"Si

modo

Bonus vir tamquam Deo similis veras habet imaginationes atque

voluptates,

"Age ad
iustus.
est

malus vero contra. ca. xxxiiii. hoc, etc. ... " Bonus vir a Platone censetur qui in se

quidem temperatus, ad

Deum autem

pius est, ad homines vero

ceteris

Animus eiusmodi propter similitudinem Deo prae

amicus, malus autem propter dissimilitudinem inimicus. Itaque cum Deus et moveat intrinsecus et ubique provideat
et

nimirum opiniones

imaginationes spesque

bonorum virorum

verae frequenter evadunt, malorum vero falsae. Utrique gaudia quaedam excogitant, optant, sperant. Haec bonis tamquam
divinis atque veridicis vera frequenter evadunt, malis vero falsa.

Mali enim

tamquam

sibimet mendaces, sicut frequenter quae

Appendix

503

nee sunt nee fuerunt neque erunt fingunt atque optant, ita falsa saepius obleetamenta conflngunt. Denique si pravis tamquam a Deo discordibus suecedere spes non debent saepe tamen in
externis suecedere videntur, saltern sequitur ut intrinsecus

non

succedant.

Semper

igitur soUicitantur intrinsecus

falsis

atque lan-

guent voluptatesque eorum similes sunt aegrotantium, somniantium, insanorum.

voluptatibus

Unde voluptas

vera sit vel falsa, item

bona

vel mala.

ca. XXXV.

"Num

opiniones, etc

" Quaeritur an

sicut opinio propter

sit

falsitatem prava est sic et voluptas quia falsa

etiam

sit et

prava? An etiam propter aliam quoque causam iudicanda sit prava voluptas. Voluptas cognitionem appetitumque requirit, illinc igitur habet ut sit vera vel falsa, hinc autem ut bona vel
mala.

Confirmatio superiorum

et

quomodo

voluptas appareat maior

quam sit.

ca. xxxvi.

" Voluptates conferendae sunt 'Aggrediamur iterum, etc ad obiectum quod delectat. Si hoc revera bonum voluptas bona, contra mala. Si hoc revera adest quodammodo vera voluptas, sin minus falsa. Dicuntur quoque verae voluptates tum propter obiectum vere bonum, tum propter veram obiecti praesentiam; falsae quin etiam tum propter malum, tum propter absentiam. lam vero ubi voluptas apparet maior quam sit aut minor, est falsa voluptas, praesertim ea parte qua fallimur. Apparet autem maior voluptas praesens; praeterita vel futura sicut visibile comminus quidem maius, eminus vero minus esse videtur. Item voluptas apparet maior quae post molestiam sequitur vel quam appetitus acrior comitatur. Item maior saepe videtur quam sit quae post nuUas vel minimas voluptates nova denique venit, modis quoque quam plurimis. Praeterea contingit ex comparatione fallacia.

Utrum voluptas omnisfiat ex indigentia. ** Dictum "Post haec igitur, etc

ca. xxxvii.
est

quando

solvitur

504

Appendix

V
fieri,

harmonia corpori naturalis dolorem

quando

restituitur vo-

luptatem scilicet corporalem. Voluptates enim molestiaeque animo propriae alia quadam ratione contingunt. Voluptates insuper quaedam levissimae fiunt in sensu corporeo etiamsi tunc non fiat necessaria restitutio in naturam, ut dulce bibere sine siti. Denique nisi fiat necessaria restitutio vel solutio noxia neque voluptas vehemens sequitur neque molestia. Quaeritur interea utrum corpus aliquo tempore sine mutationibus sic oppositis esse possit. Quaestio in Theaeteto Theologiaque solvitur, sed

quantum ad voluptatis corporeae naturam

sistit,

spectat; qualitas qui-

dem eius in quadam congruentia rei ad sensum

spiritumque con-

quantitas autem in ipsa corporis et spiritus indigentia.

xxxviii.

Quae voluptas in statu, quae in motu. ca. *' **Ista sane sic, etc Si non quilibet motus

in corpore, sed

qui manifeste sensum movet voluptatem efficit vel dolorem,

sequitur ut in motibus sensum latentibus neutrum fiat. Affectio eiusmodi neque voluptas est neque molestia vera, quamvis si

conferatur ad manifestum vehementemque dolorem voluptas

quaedam appareat,
tur. Siquis

sin

ad similem voluptatem molestia videa-

autem dixerit affectionem mediam esse optabilem naturaeque gratam. Quoniam et ad vitam confert et actionem possidet expeditam, hie iam se conferet ad laetitiam quandam animo quidem propriam, nee satis ad sensum corporeum pertinentem. Voluptas quidem sensus in motu versatur potius quam in statu. Mentis gaudium consistit in statu; quamvis status eiusmodi possit sua quadam ratione motus cognominari, quatenus voluntas ad ipsum intelligentiae actum obiectumque quodammodo se diffundit. Siqua vero sit mens divinior in qua voluntas ab intellectu non discrepet ibique aliquid nominetur gaudium, vel etiamsi in quolibet intellectu iam absoluto gaudium appelletur in ipsomet intelligentiae actu stabili, tunc eiusmodi voluptas ad statum terminumque pertinere videbitur. Neque de hac ipsa
in

hoc dialogo uUa

fit

disceptatio.

Quam inanis voluptas corporis. "Quomodo id, o Socrates, etc

ca. xxxix.

" Democritii Epicureique

Appendix

505

voluptatem ab eis electam in corpore quidem indolentiam, in animo vero tranquillitatem vocant. Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, tamquam severi morum vitaeque censores, corpo-

contemptum trahere studuerunt, dicentes corpoream voluptatem non habere essentiam aHcubi propriam, sed
reas voluptates in

fuga illam ahquid apparere. Forte vero putant multa sensuum oblectamenta esse quaedam inferiorum daemonum veneficia, ut huiusmodi esca in rebus mortalibus nos illain ipsa doloris

queent.

Voluptas corporis
ca. xxxx.

quam

impura, falsa, procul ab ipso bono.

" Tunc voluptas apparet in corpore "Post haec autem, etc vehementior quando indigentia maior molestiorque acriorem incitat appetitum. Eiusmodi est in corpore aegrotante vel similiter se habente potius quam in sano. Eiusmodi quin etiam in animo propter intemperantiam aegro potius quam in animo temperato. Igitur vehementia voluptatis cum habitu pravo et
imperfecto concurrit.

Nam

in habitu meliore sive corporis sive

animi voluptas purior stabiliorque existat. AHud ergo est vehementia voluptatis, aliud vero eiusdem puritas atque Veritas; et ubi voluptas apparet maior ibi minus vera quia sincera minus, siquidem cum stimulo indigentiae appetitusque molesto miscetur, quo cessante desinit simul et vehementia voluptatis. Quis ergo dixerit voluptatem habere rationem finis et boni
atque perfecti, siquidem magnitudinem suam cum falsitate coniungat, et in habitu corporis adhuc imperfecto ad perfectumque tendente maior appareat quam in habitu iam perfecto,

immo apparente perfectione dispareat?

Quomodo miscetur dolor cum

voluptate.

ca. xxxxi.

" Voluptas quae percipitur in '*An non aliquas, etc perfricando pruritum vel calefaciendo frigidum corpus vel refrigerando calefactum saepe cum dolore miscetur. Eiusmodi mixtura fit in corpore propter mixtionem differentium qualitatum vel accidentium. Miscetur quoque in anima voluptas aliquando cum dolore propter mixtionem imaginationum

506

Appendix

motuumque vel respectuum differentium. In ipsa vero voluptacum dolore confusione aliquando voluptas superat saepius dolor, nonnumquam simul aequantur. Saepe etiam non in anima vel in corpore seorsum sed in communi contingit voluptatis cum dolore concursus, quando corpore sitibundo
tis

delectatur

animus interim spe

vini

iam proximi,

vel

quando dum

sensus oblectatur potu animus cura maeret.

Quomodo miscetur dolor cum

"Die
igitur, etc.
.

voluptate.

ca. xxxxii.
bills vel

." In scabie similique apostemate

sanguis fervidus vel etiam falsa pituita petit cutem. Pars quidem
crassa residens citra

autem media infusa

cuti

cutem tumefactione dolorem creat. Pars pruritum movet qui pertinet ad dolo-

rem, sed pars subtilior per frictionem foras evolat atque propter evacuationem super flui quae naturae convenit voluptatem affert, sed dolorem iterum frictio durior cutis continuitatem rumpens. Si ad cutem sic infectam calentem pannum admoveamus, dolor iterum sequitur et voluptas: dolor quidem dum pungit cutem iam infectam, voluptas autem dum quod ibi superfluum est dissolvit. Sin abluamus mediocriter aqua rosacea, dolorem iterum voluptatemque reportabimus: voluptatem sane dum temperatur aestus, dolorem quoque dum humor includitur intus et tumefacit stimulatque inclusus. Hactenus dolor quidem

plurimum
tatem.

intus est, voluptas vero foris, ac dolor superat volup-

Quandoque vero in hac vel simili quadam corporis affectione agitationeque nostra spiritus quidam qui hactenus torpuerant excitati per meatus

nervorum usque quaque percurrunt

lambentesque deliniunt, praesertim quia spiritibus diffusio

motusque congruit, unde voluptas quaedam intima et occulta sequitur. Sed hanc interim comitatur exterior molestia quaedam, quatenus ad pulsus spirituum moventur vapores humorum mah, cutisque exteriores nervos tendunt aut gravant. Hie vero ambiguum est in utram partem declinatio fiat: ad internamne magis an ad externam; rursus ad condensationem vel rarefactionem atque diffusionem; item ad dolorem an voluptatem? Nonnumquam vero in hoc vel simili corporis habitu voluptas ita dolorem superat ut non tam molestia vel punctio

Appendix
videatur

V
fit

507

quam titillatio quaedam,

qualis revera

quando

spiri-

exundans palpat tenditque nervos. Sed enim ibi voluptas vehementior oritur ubi et titillatio crescit, videlicet in effectu venereo, in quo voluptas quanto vehementior est tanto periculosior. Haec enim et occultum quendam timorem repentus genitalis

animo et discrimen interitus infert corpori concussione quam exhalatione spirituum proventam nervorum turi. Itaque voluptas haec etsi videtur magna tamen cum dolore
tinae mortis incutit

miscetur.

Mixtura doloris cum voluptate. *De voluptatibus o Protarche,

voluptates

ca. xxxxiii. etc

" Miscentur quoque

in anima cum doloribus sicut in corpore, sed quandoque conditione contraria, quando videlicet in anima quidem voluptas quaedam est, in corpore vero dolor, aut contra. Item anima quando repletionem cupit tunc movetur in oppositum praesenti corporis passioni, id est, evacuationi, et interdum corporeo sensu dolente propter indigentiam simul animus aliqua spe laetatur. Multis praeterea modis animus in affectibus a corpore discrepat. Sed iam dominandum est quomodo non in communi dumtaxat, sed in ipso etiam animo flat quaedam voluptatis cum dolore permixtio. Iam vero in appetitu vindictae una cum iniuriae dolore inest laetitia quaedam in effectu vel spe

vindictae victoriaeque fundata. Saepe etiam in timore, desiderio, quaerimonia,

amore, spes quaedjun

inest, vel

expurgatio

quaedam
diis re

atribilis

pertinens ad laetitiam, in aemulatione

cum

solicitudine miscetur spes victoriae, in lamentationibus et trage-

quidem

ipsa dolemus, sed

harmonia

et

ordine delecta-

mur, in comicis similibusque spectaculis apparatus et artificium nos delectat. Mollior autem vox vel habitus aut gestus liquefacit spiritum et enervat. Lacrimae quin etiam sicut in maesta contractione spirituum exprimuntur, sic in dilatatione ob laetitiam

nimiam

videlicet

humore roscido

foras spar so funduntur.

Confirmantur superiora.
"Invidiae nomen, etc

ca. xxxxiiii.

" In invidia praecipue dolor cum

voluptate proculdubio commiscetur. Praeterea sicut

optimum

508

Appendix

ipsum cognoscere, ita pessimum ignorare se ipsum. Multi quidem arroganter ignorant quomodo ad bona externa se habeant plures, item qua conditione ad corporis sui dotes quam plurimi, qua ad animi bona, quae quidem est ignorantia pessima, se videlicet aestimare scientem aut bonum cum non sit talis.
est se

Ignorantia et confidentia.

ca. xxxxv.
et confidentia sui

"Hoc iterum, etc dem potentia terribilis est,

" Ignorantia
si

nacta qui-

vero

sit

impotens

fit

ridicula.

Mixtura quaedam doloris cum voluptate. ca. xxxxvi. '* "Tristitia quaedam, etc Quando videmus homines quosdam nobis amicos vel saltem non inimicos se ipsos adeo
ignorare ut se pulchriores sapientioresve
Igitur

quam

sint existiment,

sintque etiam invalidi, solemus eiusmodi

et

habitum

irridere.

laetamur,

laetamur autem illorum malo,

id

est

ignorantia simul et arrogantia; livore igitur affecti

tristamur. Tristitiam itaque clam

cum

laetitia

sumus unde commiscemus.

Haec utique mixtionis

et invidiae species aliis

forsan occulta

deprehenditur a Platone.

Quae

voluptates indigentiae minus, puritatis plus habeant.

ca. xxxxvii.

" Resolutiva ratio nos docet mix"Secundum naturam, etc tum resolvere in simplicia formasque tandem ab oppositis segreItaque post oblectamenta mixta maeroribus ad pura gaudia progredi. Dictat praeterea ratio inter opposita, quod praestantius est habere potius habitus rationem, quod vero deterius conditionem potius privationis habere, sicut calor atque frigus, album atque nigrum. Hac igitur ratione considerationeque simplici dolor ad voluptatem comparatus privatio quaedam
gare.
esse videtur, potius

quam

vicissim.

Quapropter

etsi

quoquo-

modo tamen non omnino credendum

est dicentibus

voluptatem

privationem quandam vel sedationem doloris existere, praesertim quia voluptates purae haud palam sunt eiusmodi. Proinde voluptatem gustus et tactus praecedit, vel etiam comitatur indigentia ad essentiam necessaria, scilicet ad naturam singularem

Appendix
vel specialem.

509

Ideoque vehemens haec indigentia est et sensiii manifesta. Hinc stimulat et affligit. Voluptates autem circa ilia quae spectantur vel audiuntur vel odorantur non eiusmodi indigentiam stimulumve habent. Hi namque sensus quando bene naturaliterque se habent attinguntque suum aliquod obiectum
congruitate delectans impleri videntur qualitate

quadam

(ut ita

dixerim) peregrina quamvis grata iam et arnica, sed ad aliud

quiddam praeter essentiam

attinente.

Quapropter

absque

molestia esse possunt hae voluptates atque purae. Appellat

autem visum auditumque sensus divinos, non solum quoniam ad sapientiam praecipue nos perducunt, sed etiam quia coelestibus insunt. Hinc Orpheus et Homer us solem dicunt spectare omnia et audire. Appellat iterum haec pulchra, scilicet flguras, colores, voces non ob aliquem corporeum usum qui speretur ex illis, nee tamquam ad aliud comparata, sed propter quandam ipsis propriam qualitatem atque proportionem quae puram secum delectationem sensibus quasi speculantibus affert. Quae quidem voluptas a voluptatibus discrepat quae in motibus passionibusque circa gustum tactumque versantur. Denique voluptates omnes eiusmodi quae non necessario cum dolore miscentur ad unum genus redigit oppositum impurarum generi voluptatum.
Voluptates disciplinarum purae.
"Istis item, etc
ca. xxxxviii.

" Voluptas disciplinarum pura censetur, quia non necessario dolorem habet ad mixtum. Stimulus autem discendi vel reminiscendi non in natura sed in opinione consistit. Tanta est animae excellentia ut re prorsus nulla indigeat ad
essentiam.

Quae voluptates minus vehementes sed puriores.

ca. xxxxviiii.

"Postquam
est, acres,

voluptates, etc

*'

Voluptates plurimum corpo-

rales, scilicet

gustus et praecipue [t]actus stmt vehementes, id

acutae, concitatae, et quasi violentae.

Neque propter
necessariam

aliquam perfectionem suam

tales sunt, sed propter

corporis indigentiam. Voluptates aliae

non sunt vehementes

510

Appendix

quia nulla necessitate compulsae. lUae quidem nullum per se modum habent. Hae vero modum habere videntur. lUae igitur

plurimum habent, hae autem infiniti minus; sed utraeque quoniam magis minusve suscipiunt et ad corpus animamve pertinent, ubi infinitum per magis minusve apparet, in genere infiniti procul dubio continentur. Laetitia vero intelHgentiae purae, siquidem non habeat conditiones eiusmodi praesertim
infiniti

manifestas,

omnino

vel

maxima ex

parte est in genere termini.

Non quae

acrior sed quae purior voluptas, ea est verior atque

ca.
1.

praestantior.

" Non dimensio vel numerus vel "Socrates post haec, etc impetus aut passio vehemens efficit, ut substantia vel qualitas aliqua sit vera censenda, sed puritas et sinceritas per quam ipsa
quaUtas vel substantia re vera
specie
sit

hoc ipsum quod esse debet

qualitatibus
vel

in

sua,

sitque

ab

alienis

passionibus

segregata. Voluptas igitur quanto purior tanto verior.

efficitur ut

Hinc

corporeae voluptates

tamquam mixtae

molestiis

non sint, sed illae dumtaxat verae quae a molestiis segregatae, eiusmodi quidem sunt delectationes animi propriae, necnon visus auditusque, videlicet quasi contemplativae. Est autem imprimis eiusmodi purae intelHgentiae gaudium.
voluptates verae iudicandae

Praeterea qualitatis puritas atque Veritas indicat eam esse in suo genere summam. Quoniam et quae summa est sola videtur in naturah puritate sua et veritate consistere. AHud igitur est in voluptatibus vehementia, aliud vero summitas. Siquidem vehementia in voluptatibus non veris, id est, mixtis atque corporeis potius quam in ipsis puris animi mentisque gaudiis esse solet. Itaque si summitas cum puritate veritateque concurrit, vehementia vero contra cum impuritate confluit atque falsitate, hie necessario concluditur vehementiam voluptatum a veritate summitateque longe distare, voluptatemque puriorem etiam suaviorem existere atque magis optabilem. Tametsi vehementia ex indigentia stimulante contingens, saepe iudicium fallit, ut suspicari vel somniare quis possit vehementiorem voluptatem
esse potius eligendam,

utpote qui stimulo

quodam

interim

Appendix
urgeatur et vehementiam,

511

immo

violentiam impetumque pro

veritate suavitateque accipere compellatur.

Voluptas corporea propter

intellectualis contra.

motum
ca.
li.

remotior est a ratione boni,

"Socrates, quid vero ad hoc, etc

" Quando voluptatem

appellat generationem de voluptatibus corporeis et mixtis simili-

busque praecipue loquitur. Generationem vero nominat quasi motionem tendentem ad instaurandum habitum naturalem. Voluptas enim corporea praesertim motionem eiusmodi comitatur, est igitur semper alterius gratia, scilicet habitus naturaUs qui dicitur essentia quaedam. Ratio quidem boni atque finis est eadem. Bonum igitur est non proprie quidem quod aUcuius gratia fit, sed ipsum potius cuius gratia fiunt alia. Voluptas igitur corporea aliena videtur a ratione boni et siqua in animo huic assentitur, vel est quodammodo similis, siquidem tahs sit delectatio quae in discendo vel reminiscendo percipitur, in motu videHcet quodam ad habitum acquirendum. Gaudium vero

quod in habitu statuque percipitur

similius essentiae

quam gene-

rationi videtur, sed habet interim

non

nihil simile motioni,

quatenus versatur in voluntate se ipsam in obiectum actumque

cognitionis suaviter dif fundente. In
tas statui simillima iudicatur,

mente quidem divina volup-

siquidem ibi sit idem intellectus atque voluntas, ibique voluptas sit ipsemet subitus intelligentiae actus expeditus et gratus, firmus simulque totus. In ratione vero

intelligentiaque

humana

voluptas

omnis imitatur

motum,

quippe cum sit quasi actio quaedam temporaliter se expediens et a minore proficiens in maiorem; idque quasi stabiliter et tran-

audiendoque voluptates, et ilia insuper quando quis sine impedimento vivit et agit percipitque se bene naturaliterque habere.
quille.

Hanc

imitantur nonnullae in videndo

Voluptas corporea remotior est a ratione boni.

ca. Hi.

" Voluptas praesertim corporea non est "Quin etiam, etc ipsum nobis bonum, quia cogit deterioribus nos servire, scilicet
corporis evacuationi repletionique et alterationi inter oppositas
qualitates; item quia

non

in corporibus sed in

anima bonum

est

512

Appendix

V
animam

aestimatione dignum, id est divinum. Voluptas quidem

deflectit

ad corpus,

virtutes

autem cum

divinitate coniungunt.

Virtus igitur

bonum

nobis est potius

quam

voluptas. Praeterea

per ipsum

quod nobis bonum est appellamur

boni,

si

vero desit,

bonus nemo dicitur, neque per absentiam voluptatis malus. Rursus cum alia multa praeter voluptatem bona in nobis nostra et circa nos existant, non est voluptas ipsum nobis bonum, nee igitur ipsum universalem bonum, praesertim quia non est in omnibus. Sicui vero voluptati sit indulgendum, certe contemplationis voluptati potius incumbendum; voluptas enim corporis a maiori movetur frequenter in minus deficitque in habitu, delectatio vero mentis a minori procedit in mains et in habitu proficit.
mali; per voluptatis vero praesentiam solam

Quam necessaria sit artibus mathematica.

"

ca.

liii.

'*Ne tamen, etc Inter voluptates scientiasque eligenda est utrobique purissima, ut hae ad iudicium faciendum tam invicem quam ad ipsum bonum rectius comparentur. Scientiae quae utuntur manibus dicuntur artes. Hae perspicaciam perfec-

tionemque suam habent imprimis a mathematica facultate, sciUcet numerandi, metiendi, librandi quae maxime omnium
Mercurialis et rationalis
existit.

Absque huius munere

artes

omnes

titubant fallaci videlicet sensu vel imaginatione, experi-

omnisque conmathematico perspicacissima est. Musica consimilisque diligentia secundum tenet in artificio et perspicacia gradum quia gradu secundo mathematica nititur. Reliquae artes ob similem rationem tertium, quartumque deinceps gradum sortitae videntur. Memento vero hie de facultatibus rationaUbus agi, quae mediae sunt et quodammodo mixtae; non autem de supremis in praesentia,
entia coniecturaque confisae. Architectura igitur

simiHs quia

maxime omnium artium ingenio

utitur

de intellectualibus qualis est dialectica, id est metaphysica, neque de infimis, id est sensuahbus atque servilibus.
scilicet

ca. liiii. Usus mathematicae varius in artibus. " Aliter mathematica industria "Prorsus sed num o, etc

utitur contemplator, aliter vero practicus. lUe

quidem

unitates

Appendix
et

513

numeros considerat per se formaliter existentes. Itaque apud illud unum non differt ab uno, binarius non discrepat a binario. Hie autem numeros in rebus resque considerat numeratas. Quapropter apud hunc hoc unum ab illo uno diversum, scilicet lignum magnum a parvo, vel lignum a ferro; similiter duo exercitus, bovesque duo. lUe rursus quae sit proportionum virtus et proprietas contemplatur, quae virtus in proportione aequali vel dupla vel sesquialtera. Hie autem utrum aedificii longitudo dupla ad latitudinem esse debeat. Alio quoque tendit contemplatoris, alio practici

computatio.

ca. Iv. Quae scientia sit purior aliis. sed num, etc...." Quaeritur in praesentia partitio "Probe quaedam scientiarum, partitioni voluptatum aequa proportione respondens. Est igitur alia scientia vel ars purior alia, quemad-

modum voluptas voluptate purior; et quae facultas magis speculativa est adest facultati

magis practicae tamquam obscuriori clarior. lam vero mathematica disciplina etiam quae practicis inest artes omnes eiusmodi superat, quae vero mathematica lucet apud philosophum reliquam mathematicam splendore
praecellit.

Excellentia mathematicae atque metaphysicae.

ca. Ivi.

" Sicut mathematica speculativa practicam atque haec rursum practicas omnes excedit, ita dialectica, id est metaphysica, non solum istas sed etiam speculativas omnes excellit. Ipsa quidem scient[i]arum artiumque omnium iudex circa ipsum simpliciter ens versatur. Atque ad ipsum ens verissimum et aeternum praecipuo se studio confert, ideoque
**Sunto igitur, etc
facultates

omnes

sinceritate,

veritate,

perspicacia,

lumine

super eminet.

Res

et disciplinae

humanae naturalesque
Ivii.

et

mathematicae

et

divinae.

ca.

"Numquid

tale, etc

" Cognitio quidem humanorum natu-

raliumque opinio nominatur. Incerta sane et instabiUs sicut et ilia incerta et instabilia sunt. Cognitio vero mathematicorum

514

Appendix

V
et

atque divinorum scientia nuncupatur certa stabilisque, sicut

ilia

semper existunt. Sed divinorum quidem scientia intellectualis dici solet, mathematicorum vero scientia rationalis potius appellatur, intelligentia denique sapientiaque praestantissima proprie pertinet ad divina. Inter haec nota mundum esse factum quomodocumque sit factus; item mundum coelumque semper fieri nee umquam idem prorsus existere; denique humana ad naturalia, haec ad mathematica, haec ad divina tamquam ad superiora referri debere.
certa stabiliaque

Indagandum quomodo
ca.
Iviii.

sapientia misceatur rite

cum

voluptate.

"Ceterum
voluptas
ut

siquis,

etc...." Proponit indagandum

quomodo

cum

sapientia misceatur ad beatitudinem consequen-

ipsius boni proprietatem esse perfectum et sufficiens ac omnibus expetendum. Cum vero neque sapientia seorsum a voluptate neque voluptas ab ilia seorsum banc boni proprietatem habeat, sequitur ut neutrum sit ipsum bonum; sapientia vero magis ipsius boni participem esse
sit

dam. Repetuntur a principio dicta

constat.

Quomodo bonum adsit mixto;

ca.
Iviiii.

item de Dionyso atque Vulcano.

" Ipsum nobis bonum habitat in vita quadam ex sapientia et voluptate bene commixta. Haec igitur neque sapientia est neque voluptas neque vita mixta. Siquidem mixta vita boni habitaculum est, non ipsum bonum. Mixtum quidem hie accipitur non simplex hoc et illud, sed ahquid ambobus additum utrisque cognatum. Huic autem cognato divinitus adest ineffabile bonum; illius vero cognati praeparatio ad bonum non potest unico nomine designari. Explicabitur ergo deinceps per veritatem et commensurationem atque pulchritu**Aut igitur, etc

dinem. Voluptas quidem melli similis, quia sicut dulcedine blanditur, ita nocet facileque in bilem desinit amarissimam. Sapientia vero non vino similis propter ebrietatem adversam intelligentiae, sed aquae potius similis appellatur; neque tamen cuilibet aquae sed

Appendix
saluberrimae. Sed
tionis

515

curnam austerae? Ut ostendatur contemplafieri, sicut

fnictum ex austero dulcem denique

voluptatis

exitus ex dulci contingit amarus.

Dionysus atque Vulcanus mixturae passim harmonicae praeHaec quatenus in mentibus et animis inest ad Dionysum praecipue pertinet, quatenus autem in naturis atque corporibus potius ad Vulcanum. Duo vero haec numina in diis super coelum atque coelestibus sunt eiusmodi proprietates duae, sed infra deos duo quaedam genera daemonum ad haec officia maxime
sunt.

conferentium.

Quomodo misceatur bene

'Die age

voluptas

cum sapientia.

ca. Ix.

primum,

etc

" Ut per mixtura

scientiae

cum
est

voluptate beati simus,

bene.
eligere

non quomodoHbet sunt miscenda sed

Ut autem misceantur bene imprimis necessarium

purissimam verissimamque scientiam scilicet theologicam similemque voluptatem. Haec autem est imprimis quae ex ipsa contemplatione percipitur. Non enim video quomodo voluptates quae a contemplatione distrahunt conflari cum contemplatione possint. Conceditur in praesentia si hie beati futuri simus necessariam nobis fore sapientiam divinorum, scientiam quoque sequentium et prudentiam humanorum et cognitionem

cum speculativa practicam.

Qualis mixtio conducat adfelicitatem.
ca. Ixi.

" Si hinc quidem voluptati, "Rursus ad voluptatum, etc illinc autem intelligentiae detur optio, voluptas omnem cognitionem et hanc quidem exactissimam eliget. Cognitio enim circa

rem congruam
intelligentia vero

perspicacior exactiorem exhibet voluptatem;

non omnem voluptatem prorsus

admittet, res-

puet enim corpoream atque furiosam ut inimicam, delecta-

tionem vero ex contemplatione perceptam volet [em., Y reads nolet] ut necessariam ac sibi penitus naturalem. Oblectamenta visus auditusque harmonica eliget tamquam consona; necessarias denique corporis voluptates siquae mentem nullo modo
perturbant recipiet ut non dissonas. Ex intelligentia quidem ipsiusque gaudio mixtio perfecta conflatur. Ex his duobus atque

516

Appendix

insuper ex delectationibus auditus et visus quae etiam purae

compositio quaedam congrua etsi mixtio non pervero corporis voluptates etiam temperatae in compositionem cum intelligentia non conveniunt etsi non disdicuntur
fit

fecta. Necessariae

sonant. Si

omnem

cognitionem artemque

cum omni

voluptate

non perversa coniunxeris civilem efficies vitam Vulcaniamque mixturam. Sin autem contemplationem cum familiaribus
gaudiis copulaveris contemplativam reportabis vitam mixtu-

ramque ad Dionysum potius pertinentem. Proinde ubi admixtionem perveneris in qua Veritas et commensuratio pulchritudoque vigeat te iam ad splendorem boni pervenisse putato. Eiusmodi quidem splendor boni in universo est mundus intelligibilis ex ipso bono tamquam patre natus. Huiusmodi quoque splendor nostri iam advenientis boni erit in mente nostra mixtio intelligentiae cum gaudio per veritatem, commensurationem,
pulchritudinem absoluta.

Quomodo Veritas, commensuratio, pulchritudo adfelicem mixturam pertineant. ca. Ixii. " Sicut in qualibet mixtione perfecta sic "Atqui ad hoc, etc in eiusmodi mixtura voluptatis cum sapientia. Primo quidem est necessaria puritas atque Veritas per quam utrumque sit in se ipso sincerum atque ex ambobus veris compositum fiat verum. Deinde necessaria commensuratio est, in qua comprehenditur tum utriusque certa in se ipso mensura modusque virtutis actionisque definitus, tum etiam alterius ad alterum sociabilis et amica proportio; ex his continuo nascitur pulchritudo, id est consummatio et absolutio formae. Quae quidem formarum forma est diciturque formositas. Quando igitur coniunctio
voluptatis

cum sapientia tria haec possidet et

consequitur statim

per haec suum assequitur bonum. Sed undenam? Ab ipso videlicet quod est omnium in universo bonum, a quo sane, cum prius acceperit veritatem et commensurationem atque pulchritudinem per quae perfecta fit
mixtio, statim

suum
est

boni simulacrum diximus absoluta

bonum. Quod quidem et universi atque munus et in mixtione per tria quae
accipit

tamquam

in aede dicitur habitare. Inter haec

Appendix

517
conferre
ut

memento commensurationem quidem ad mixturam

quam maxime,
facile

pulchritudinem vero

ita

repraesentare

bonum

appareat ipsum bonum, sicut splendor lucem perspicue refert. Neque tamen est ipsum bonum; quippe cum nee semper nee ab omnibus appetatur. Sed quoniam in compositione ulti-

exactissimumque provenit, ideo artificem expressissime Est etiam pulchritudo quaedam quamvis non perfecta in qualibet mixti parte. Denique bonum ipsum mixti causa per unum in se continet idque excellentius quod per tria in mixto suscipitur atque distribuitur; similiterque a nobis exprimitur, non potentibus exprimere manifeste per unum, nisi forte sub nube dicamus unum aut bonum aut causam. Illud vero si nominamus veritatem intelligimus ab omnibus segregatum; si commensurationem cogitamus amicum et propitium atque congruum; si pulchritudinem consideramus Deum ad se omnia provocantem. Eiusmodi trinitas videtur quasi quidam ornatus incorporeus, id est intelligibi[li]s atque divinus. Sed cuiusnam est hie ornatus? Corporis videlicet animati, id est illius mixti, in
refert.

mum

quo voluptas quidem

anima.

est quasi corpus, intelligentia

vero velut

Sapientia est melior quam voluptas.

ca.

Ixiii.

"Quisque iam,

etc

" Cimi

trinitas ilia, scilicet Veritas,

com-

mensuratio, pulchritudo electo mixto data divinitus, sit causa per quam mixtum fiat bonum atque beatum, profecto sapientia quae huic trinitati est cognatior quam voluptas est mel[i]or voluptate. Est enim sapientia veritati, mensurae, pulchritudini

quam voluptas. Immo vero voluptas quo vehementior eo remotior. Veritas est boni lumen in mente ita cognatum menti sicut solis lumen stellis, luna superioribus, animae vero rationali ita congruum sicut lumen solis lunae.
longe propinquior

Multi bonorum gradus.

**Cun[c]tis igitur, etc

ca.

Ixiiii.

"In primo bonorum gradu numeratur

qua
videlicet

ipsum universi principium,

ratione

effector

omnium est et perfector et finis. Hac ratione Pythagorici mensuram modumque et opportunitatem et persimilia nominant. In

518

Appendix

secundo gradu ponitur mixtum

tate,

illud ex intelligentia et volup-

iam harmonicum

veritatis,

commensurationis, pulchritu-

dinis beneficio, videlicet tribute divinitus. In tertio intelligentia

quaelibet, sed imprimis segregatae mentis propria; consequenter

autem intelligentiae munus inde communicatum animae. In quarto discursiones animae propriae, scientiae, artes, opiniones. In quinto numerantur voluptates purae quas non antecedit vel comitatur indigentia, ita naturae necessaria ut
dolorem cum voluptate confundat. Quae quidem etsi quandoque accipiant occasiones a sensibus sunt tamen simplices perceptiones animi. Si praeterea introducantur necessariae aut

vehementes corporis voluptates, gradus erit sextus, sed hae dimittuntur, quia vel non consonant in unam cum intelligentia compositionem vel ab ilia dissonant.
Epilogus. Jupiter conservator gradus sextus.
**

ca. Ixv.

Tertio iam orationem, etc

" Epilogum

totius dialogi facit

eandemque summam iam tertio repetens inquit eam sacrificare se Jovi conservatory Huic sacerdotes antiqui ter libare pateram cons[u]everant, declarantes egere nos conservatore deo, non solum in rerum nostrarum vitaeque principio, sed medio etiam
atque
fine.

Tu

vero singularem huius dialogi proprietatem

consider a, neque enim certum habet principium neque finem;

imitatur sane bonum ipsum de quo quodammodo disputat. Hoc enim cum principium sit et finis omnium, merito neque principium habet neque finem. Atque hoc quidem ratione qua immensum in se est et penitus absolutum. Praetermisit ipsum in

superioribus nee in
fuisse per

ilia

distributione
nisi forte

graduum numeravit. Est

enim prorsus incognitum,

iubet, quasi
sit

quis suspicetur significatum

in qua Orpheus hymnos finiri Ubi senarium celebrari ab Orpheo tamquam finem sicut a Mose videmus, quoniam sit perfectus intra decem, quippe cum suis partibus, uno scilicet et duobus atque tribus, deinceps dispositis componatur. Impressum Florentiae per Laurentium Franci[s]ci de Venetiis Anno ab incarnatione domini nostri Jhesu Christi

generationem sextam,
ineffabile.

Mcccclxxxxvi, die

ii.

Decembris.

Footnotes to Introduction
'For a

list

of the humanist versions of Plato see Paul O.

(Florence, 1937),
I,

Kristeller, Stq>-

plementum Ficinianum

clv-clvi

hereafter cited as Sup.

Fie; also Eugenio Garin, "Ricerche sulle traduzioni di Platone nella prima meta del sec. XV," in Medioevo e Rinascimento: Studi in onore di Bruno

Nardi (Florence, 1955), I, 339-74. Prior to the humanist versions, the only Plato available to the West consisted of the Timaeus in Chalcidius' partial translation, the Meno and the Phaedo, and passages from the Parmenides embedded in Proclus' commentary. See R. Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition During the Middle Ages (London, 1 939) 'Paul O. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought I (New York, 1961), ch. 3, passim; and Paul O. Kristeller, "Renaissance Platonism," in Facets of the Renaissance, ed. W.E. Werkmeister (New York, 1%3), 105-107.
'"Renaissance Platonism," 109.
*See Sears R. Jayne, Marsilio Ficino's

Commentary on

Plato's

Sympo-

sium, University of Missouri Studies, 19 (1944). See also, however, Josephine

L. Burroughs' translation of the Quaestiones de Mente in Cassirer, Kristeller and Randall, The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (Chicago, 1948), 193-212; the many quotations translated in Paul O. Kristeller's invaluable work, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino (New York, 1943) hereafter cited as Philosophy; and Josephine L. Burroughs' translation of the Platonic Theology III 2, XIII 3, XIV 3 & 4 in her article, "Ficino and Pomponazzi on Man," Journal

of the History of Ideas, 5 (1944), 227-39. *Op. Om., 1%5: "[Cosmus] divi Platonis libros decem, et unum Mercurii e graeca lingua in Latinam a nobis transferri iussit, quibus omnia vitae praecepta, omnia naturae principia, omnia divinarum rerum mysteria sancta panduntur." See

Raymond

Marcel, Marsile Ficin (Paris, 1958), 258

hereafter

cited as Marsile.

Fie,

For the Pimander translation and the reason for its title see Kristeller, Sup. I, cxxxi, and his article, "Marsilio Ficino e Lodovico Lazzarelli," Annali delta R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa; Lettere, Storia e Filosofia, 2nd
Series, 7 (1938), 238-39.

'Marsile, 273.

'Qp. Om., 608, 1: "Contuli heri me in agrum Charegium, non agri, sed animi colendi gratia, veni ad nos Marsili quamprimum. Fer tecum Platonis nostri librum de Summo bono quem te isthic arbitror iam e Graeca lingua in Latinam, ut promiseras, transtulisse. Nihil enim ardentius cupio, quam quae
via

commodius ad

felicitatem ducat cognoscere. Vale et veni

non absque

Orphicalyra."

520

Footnotes to Introduction

'Paul O. Kristeller, "Marsilio Ficino as a beginning student of Plato,"

Scriptorium, 20 (1966), 41-54. Kristeller recently discovered two autograph

manuscript fragments: one in the BibUotheque Nationale (Nouvelies acquisi-

Parma. The and the two fragments together constitute the original draft for the preface and the ten introductions of Ficino's first decade. Since this Parma-Paris manuscript exhibits the preface and the introductions without the actual translations. Professor Kristeller's wife. Dr. Edith Kristeller, suggests Ficino composed these pieces at the same time, after he had completed the translations. On the basis of Professor Kristeller's discovery I have presented the Philebus introduction as it appears in the Paris fragment (see Appendix III).
tions latines 1633,
f.

5-7), the other in the Biblioteca Palatina in

Paris fragment includes the introduction to the Philebus translation

'Kristeller,

nostra consistat, iure Philebus de

summo totius

"Cumque in Dei visione beatitudo summo bono hominis post Parmenidem de nature bono locatus esse videtur" (105). See Raymond KlibanSup. Fie,
II,

103-105:

Ages and the Renaissance," Medieval (London, 1943), 313: "With Proclus and Olympiodorus he [Ficino] holds that the Parmenides enshrines the essence of Plato's theology and that it is the innermost sanctuary of Platonic thought."
sky, "Plato's Parmenides in the Middle
Studies,
1

and Renaissance

Note the religious language.

"Kristeller, "Marsilio Ficino as
"P/i/feftM5

a Beginning Student," 44-46.

also see

commentary (this edition), 325 hereafter cited as Phil, com.; Appendix I for another passage found only in MS. Laur. 21, 8, but

containing a reference to Olympiodorus/Damascius.

L.G. Westerink, "Ficino's Marginal Notes on Olympiodorus in Riccardi Greek MS. 37," Traditio, 24 (1%8), 351-78. Westerink notes that "Ficino's [the commentary on and summary of the Philebus] shows published work hardly any evidence of his having referred to his notes [on the commentary on the Philebus which was traditionally attributed to Olympiodorus but which Westerink attributes to Damascius (see note 12)], though there are some points of contact with the Greek text of Damascius" (354). Westerink then gives three minor references: Op. Om., 1223. 13-16 (the opening of ch. 17, my pp. 177-79) he compares to Damascius, paragraph 45; Op. Om., 1229. 27-62
.

(the second half of ch. 23,

. .

my pp. 221-25, beginning, "Cum ergo scientiae .") he compares to Damascius, paragraphs 54-56; Op. Om., 1269. 49-51
summary of
and 259.
ch.

(part of the

LXV, my

p. 518)

he compares to Damascius,

paragraphs

1 1

'^L.G. Westerink, Damascius: Lectures

1959), 2, notes 1-6.

The Parmenides

incidentally

on the Philebus (Amsterdam, was usually the culmination

of a second teaching cycle.

It is in the introduction to this edition that Westerink argues the case for Damascius' authorship of the commentary on the Philebus, usually attributed to Olympiodorus.

"

Footnotes to Introduction

52

"Ibid. Cf. Phil, com., 127, where Ficino defines iht skopos.

*HenrySidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics (Boston, 1960),2. "A.E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and his Work, 7th ed. (London, 1960),
410.

But see R. Hackforth, Plato's Examination of Pleasure (Cambridge, 1945), "There is nothing to suggest that Socrates has referred to any metaphysical or supersensible Good, or discussed the Form of the Good. Both parties have however been concerned with something wider than the good for
12:

Man; but

it is

this that

Plato

is

to

make the subject of his dialogue.

.
.

com., 107, where Ficino juxtaposes the Republic Bk. 6 and the Parmenides in order to prove that the good and the one are identical.
'*Cf. Phil,

'^Marcel, Marsile, 273: "avec quelle ingeniosite Ficin s'etait applique a

un tout de ces elements quelque peu disparates en les enchainant dans une progression continue qui, partant du desir des biens terrestres, s'epanouissait dans la plenitude du Souverain Bien."
faire

"Ibid., 273.

"Vespasiano da
VEtica d'Aristotile

"voile per passare tempo, innanzi circa

and 372. Cosimp uno anno che morisse, farsi leggere a messer Bartolomeo da Colle, cancelliere in palazzo; e
Bisticci,

Vite (Florence, 1938), 292

prego Donato Acciaiuoli, che arrecasse in ordine gli scritti che aveva ricolti sotto messer Giovanni [Argyropoulos] sopra VEtica; e secondo che Donato emendava, egli mandava i quintemi a Cosimo, e messer Bartolomeo leggeva; e lessela tutta; e questo comento che c'e oggi delVEtica, di Donato, fu quello che s'emendo, mentre che Cosimo se la faceva leggere" (292). See Eugenio
Garin,

La cultura filosofica del Rinascimento

italiano (Florence, 1961), 26-27

on Acciaiuoli's notes which later became a commentary; and 102-108 on the importance of Argyropoulos' lectures on Aristotle. Garin's book is hereafter cited as La cultura. On Cosimo's last years see Curt S. Gutkind, Cosimo de 'Medici (Oxford, 1938), 242-46. "Op. Om., 649: "Itaque postquam Platonis librum de uno rerum principio, ac de summo bono legimus, sicut tu nosti, qui aderas, paulo post decessit, tanquam eo ipso bono, quod disputatione gustaverat re ipsa abunde iam potiturus." See Klibansky, "Plato's Parmenides ...," 315: "...the masterpiece of Platonic dialectic was chosen, with the Philebus, to be read to the dying Cosimo as the fitting preamble 'for his return to the highest principle and the fruition of the highest good'." Cosimo died on August 1st,
Scala; 68, 69, 104-108

on

1464.

"See Ficino' s preface to Xenocrates'

De

Morte, Op. Om., 1965, Cf.

Marcel, Marsile, 275-78; and Andre Rochon, La Jeunesse de Laurent de Medicis (Paris, 1963), 39 hereafter cited as La Jeunesse. The discussion must

have occurred on July 20th. "Andre Chastel, Marsile Ficin and Marcel, Marsile, 274.

et I'Art

(Geneva and

Lille, 1954), 189-92,

522

Footnotes to Introduction

"Marcel, Marsile, 321, suggests that Piero was disinterested while Arnaldo Delia Torre, Storia dell'Accademia Platonica di Firenze (Florence, hereafter cited as Storia and Rochon, La Jeunesse, 295-96, 1902), 565-66, both argue for Piero's continuing support. "Arnaldo Delia Torre, Storia, 497. See Garin, La cultura, 63 note 1 on Tignosi; also A. Rotondo, "Nicolo Tignosi da Foligno," Rinascimento, 9

(1958), 217-55.

"Corsi's

life

of Ficino (which was dedicated to Bindaccio Ricasoli in 1506

is presented by Marcel in the first appendix to his book, Marsile Ficin; references to Corsi will therefore include the page reference in Marcel. For Corsi himself see Paul O. Kristeller, "Un uomo di stato e umanista fiorentino: Giovanni Corsi," La Bibliofilia, 38 (1936), 242-57. Corsi, VII {Marsile, 683): "Publice itaque eo tempore Marsilius magna auditorum frequentia Platonis Philebum interpretatus est ..."

but not published until 1771)

"Marsile, 322: "...etant donne que ce dialogue avait etc traduit du

vivant de
ses

amis des 1464,

Cosme, on peut supposer que, fidele a sa methode, il en discuta avec et que c'est I'enthousiasme suscite par I'expose de la pensee
le

platonicienne sur

haiter qu'il puisse faire profiter

Souverain Bien, qui amena ses amis et bienfaiteurs a souun plus large auditoire de son enseignement." "Corsi, VII {Marsile, 683): "... in quern adhuc etiam illius temporis nonnuUa eius exstant collectanea et cum lis quoque declarationum Platonicorum

quatuor volumina."
See Sup. Fie,
history.
I,

79-80, for further details

on the manuscripts and

their

""Cum
philosophia
321v).

optimis civibus nostris placuerit, ut celebri hoc in loco sacram

Divi Platonis philosophiam interpretemur, opere pretium fore censui, ut quid

sit

primum
viri

paucis perstringamus ..." (MS. Vat.

praestantissimi qui

lat.

5953.

f.

""Vobis autem
tales

meam hanc orationem

vestra pre-

sentia honestare dignati

estis,

ingentes gratias habeo, immortalis

lat.

Deus immor-

referam [sic]" (MS. Vat.

5953.

f.

326v).

"Paul O.
1956),
1

Kristeller, Studies in

Renaissance Thought and Letters (Rome,

16

hereafter cited as Studies.

and Elizabeth
vol. Ill (M),

See Arnaldo Delia Torre, Storia, 568 ff "Kristeller, Studies, 111. This could be the old church of S. Maria degli Angeli (Angioli) which has long been absorbed into what is now the office of
the disabled veterans* administration. For details see Walter

Paatz, Die Kirchen von Florenz (Frankfurt

107-47.

am

Main, 1943-54),

I would like to propose another intriguing possibility. Adjacent to the old church Brunelleschi began a new polygonal church for the Camaldolese in 1434 which is still standing and known as the Castellaccio or Rotunda. The Calimala provided money from the estate of Filippo Scolari (Pippo Spano)

Footnotes to Introduction

523

for its erection, but this was apparently diverted to help pay for the war with Lucca and construction stopped altogether in 1437. From what remains of the original work, from Giuliano da Sangallo's floor-plan (Vatican cod. Barberiniano lat. 4424. f. 15v), and from other sketches, we can get some idea of its shape and dimensions. By 1437 the outer sixteen-sided wall and inner octagon of columns had reached some 27 feet and more in places, the floor's mean diameter was 45 feet, and there were already fluted pilasters without their capitals and also molding in the eight side-chapels and on the sixteen exterior faces. The precise details of the future entablature, drum, dome, oculi, window and main altar locations, ornamentation and much else are open to speculation, as are the models for the central planning: the temple of the Minerva Medica and the Pantheon in Rome, S. Vitale in Ravenna, and Brunelleschi's own work on the Cathedral tribunes and lantern in Florence (see Patricia Waddy, "Brunelleschi's Design for S. Maria degli AngeH in Florence," Marsyas, 15 [New York, 1972], 36-46, for a review of the problems and further references). Surely in its unfinished state the Rotunda (which probably resembled a Roman ruin by 1466-68) would have been ideal for Ficino's Philebus lectures, given its shape, size, otherwise uselessness and the Platonic enthusiasms of the convent priors? It would have been especially attractive to the Florentine Platonists on aesthetic grounds and G.C. Argan has described it as " 'tutto al modo antico di dentro e di fuori' [quoted from Manetti's Vita] un esplicito tentativo di ricostruzione degli edifici rotondi classici o di un'opera

even more so on philosophical ones. Since

in

d'indubbio carattere umanistico" (Brunelleschi [Milan, 1955], 131) but it resembled the one ancient temple
,

Rome

dedicated to all the gods and was

itself

to be dedicated ecumenically

would have harmonized perfectly with Ficino's syncretism and his ideas on the historical relationship between Christianity and pagan theology. Second, if it was still open to the sky, as was most likely, Ficino's many references to the sun would be particularly pointed
to the Virgin
all

and

twelve apostles,

it

(and his audience knew too that the ancients habitually philosophized in the

was to be the first centrally planned, wholly concentric it would have appealed immediately to Ficino's Neoplatonic love of both circle and number symbolism. After Hve centuries of misuse and neglect, the Rotunda was disastrously completed by Mussolini in 1940; and in 1959, ironically, it did become a lecopen
air). Finally,

as

it

building of the Renaissance,

ture hall.
I

Today it is once more "in restauro."

article

am indebted to Mrs.

Waddy's
with me.

Geraldine Bass of UCLA for drawing my attention to and for sharing her own ideas on Brunelleschi 's intentions

"Marsile, 309, 476.

"Op. Om., 886, 2: "Nos igitur antiquorum sapientum vestigia pro viribus observantes, religiosam Platonis nostri Philosophiam in hac media

524

Footnotes to Introduction

prosequemur
veritatem."

Ecclesia. In his sedibus

angelorum divinam contemplabimur

The words vestigia and media would be especially appropriate if it is the Rotunda (see my note 31). '^Marcel, Marsile, 310: "Pour la premiere fois un latin, texte en mains, expUque un dialogue de Platon a la demande de nobles citoyens et devant un auditoire aussi attentif que nombreux. A la verite le choix du Philebe etait fort judicieux, car la these du Souverain Bien qui s'y trouve exposee ne pouvait
que seduire cette elite qui avait grandi en cherchant la solution de ce probleme en ecoutant ses maitres commenter VEthique d'Aristote."
II, 20r. "Dicunt enim deum summum esse bonum quod et ante Christum et hominem natum Platonem sensisse constat. Cuius quidem opinionem facile cum voles vel lis commentariis quos Marsilius non modo gravissime verum etiam in primis perspicue et enucleate in Platonis Philebum conscripsit cognoscere poteris ..." ^''Marsile, 321: ". .les references a Ficin dans ces deux premiers livres sont suffisamment nettes et elogieuses pour que nous puissions juger de son influence a cette epoque." "Ficino never did finish any of his Plato commentaries except for the one on the Symposium. More than any of the other dialogues which Ficino was particularly interested in commenting on, the Symposium has a clearly defined dramatic progression in which none of the speakers pre-empts material that is going to be used by the others. The struaure of the Philebus, conversely, seems to invite digression and repetition. "Marsile, 323: "Alors que Ficin avait annonce a ses auditeurs que le Philebe se divise en douze parties, sans aucun avertissement, il interrompt son expose apres la cinquieme et bien qu'il ait par la suite, et par deux fois, manifeste son regret de n'avoir pu completer cet expose, nous le voyons se contenter de I'illustrer par des apologues, qui sont pour ce traite une etrange
.

"P/i/7. com., chs. 1-6. See pp. 81-83, 87-89. "Cristoforo Landino, Disputationes Camaldulenses

conclusion."
*^Storia, 567 ff.: ". .per il Ficino nel decennio che va dal 1459 al 1469 cade un periodo di depressione morale, dovuto ad un combattimento intemo
.

fra le convinzioni fllosofiche e

il

sentimento religioso."

*'Corsi, VIII {Marsile, 683):

invulgare, sed divino prorsus miraculo, id

"...etiam Orphei hymnos ac sacrificia quo minus efflceret, in dies magis

impediebatur, quadam, ut aiebat, spiritus amaritudine distractus; id quod et divo Hieronymo in Cicerone accidisse memoriae proditum est." For the reference to Proclus compare Op. Om., 1928 and Sup. Fie, I, cxxxiv-v. Marcel
{Marsile, 347), however, suggests that
it is

to Porphyry that

we must turn

in

order to find a treatise on sacrifices; he translates Corsi's ambiguous phrase as "the hymns and sacrifices of Orpheus" (the reference would be to Porphyry's

De Abstinentia lly
*'Marsile, 353.

cf.

Op. Om., 1934).

Footnotes to Introduction

525

*^Studies, 52, 191-213 and especially 204-205: "... cioe non c'era bisogno una crisi intima per condurlo dal paganesimo al cristianesimo [perche] non il passaggio dal paganesimo al cristianesimo e cio che determina lo sviluppo del pensiero ficiniano; I'unico fatto che si puo ammettere fmo ad un certo punto e una crescente accentuazione dell'interesse teologico e
di
. . .

egli fu cristiano durante tutta la sua vita." important that Plato himself finishes the dialogue on an inconclusive note: when Socrates asks to go, Protarchus says, "There is a little which
.

dogmatico
"It
is

yet remains,

to go

and I will remind you of it, for I am sure you will not be the away from an argument." This is reinforced at the thematic level

first

too:

problems have been raised but hardly solved.

*'See Kristeller, Philosophy. 114-15, 399. Apropos the theory of the soul developed in the Platonic Theology Kristeller writes: "Soul, in its connecting power and in its effect in the world, has taken the place of love and is characterized in almost the same words that characterized love ... the Soul has ab-

sorbed the attributes of the all-comprehensive love as pendent qualities" (1 15). See p. 34 of this introduction.

its

own new and

inde-

**See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin: Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon (Paris, 1956), 41. Marcel gives July 1469 as the date of completion of

Symposium commentary. Hence in his Marsile, 393-94, he says, " .c'est de I'echec de son commentaire du Philebe qu'est nee la Theologie [sic] et accessoirement son Commentaire du Banquet. " This is wrong, as we shall see.
the
.
.

*'Michele Schiavone, Problemi filosofici in Marsilio Ficino (Milan,

1957), 141

**Op.
resse

and 143 hereafter cited as Problemi. Om., 914, 3: "Rediit enim mox in mentem absolvenda mihi supecommentaria in Platonis Philebum de summo bono quondam ad dimi-

dium usque producta."

"Kristeller, Sup. Fie, I, cxxiii; Kristeller was the first to note the difference between the February dating of the proem and the subscription. For Salvini see

Paul O.

Kristeller,

"Sebastiano Salvini,

Florentine

Theologian, and a

Member of

Marsilio Ficino's Platonic

1961), 205-43.
I,

Humanist and Academy," in

I,

Didascaliae, ed. Sesto Prete

(New York,

"See MS.
80-86.

Vat. lat., 413v-422;

Op. Om.,

921-24; Sup. Fie,

is

Raymond Marcel's note {Marsile,

323, footnote 2)

in error.

xU and The MS.

Laur. 21, 8 contains all ten excerpts not just the four pleasure apologues. "The sequence of the five commentaries in this collection is as follows:

Parmenides, Sophist, Timaeus, Phaedrus, Philebus. This accords, Ficino says, with the universal order since the Parmenides treats of the one principle of all, the Sophist of the general character of being, the Timaeus of the physi-

Phaedrus of worldly and human matters, and the Philebus likeHowever, Ficino makes a point here of praising the Phaedrus at the expense of the Philebus " ob longiorem videlicet divinonim disputationem praecipuumque divini furoris munus Philebo divinior" (Op. Om., 1136).
cal world, the

wise.

526

Footnotes to Introduction

"Corsi,

XIV (Marsile.
. .

685).

nous verrons Ficin jusqu' a la fin de sa vie tenter de completer ceux du Timee, du Philebe, et du Phedre, qui, a juste titre, representaient pour lui les assises du systeme platonicien." Why does Marcel omit the other three, however?
.et

Marsile, 456: "

''Sup. Fie,

II,

81-82, 88-89; also Kristeller, Studies, 44-45.

is

'*The episode

recorded in Baronius, Annaies ad

II,

annum

41

(Cologne,

1624), 371. See Sup. Fie,

216-17.

"Giuseppe

Saitta, Marsiiio Ficino e lafilosofia

dell'Umanesimo, 3rd ed.

(Bologna, 1954), 210-11: "...nel suo bellissimo commento al Filebo, la superiorita del bene sul bello e vigorosamente affermata. Ogni bello e bene,

ma non ogni
il

bene e bello: e questo il concetto platonico che il Ficino a modo suo cerca di mettere sempre in luce. Pure un fondamento comune tra il bene e
bello esiste, ed esso e costituito dall'appetito
al

..." and

219:

"Gia

nel suo

magnifico commento
universale con
il

Filebo

egli

aveva espUcitamente identificato

I'attivita

Bene."

"Ibid., 5, footnote 5.

"Cf. Paul Shorey, Platonism Ancient and Modern (Berkeley, 1938),

152-57 and 121. Shorey talks of Ficino's "meaty introductions" to the Plato
dialogues and of his enormous influence. Interestingly, the Philebus
increasingly recognized as an important source for Sir
is

being
see

Thomas More:

Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, trans. P. Pettegrove

(Austin, Texas, 1953), 110;

and the recent

article

by Judith P. Jones, "The

Philebus and the Philosophy of Pleasure in

Thomas More's

Utopia,'*

Moreana,

vol. 31-32, ed.

Thomae Mori, 1971), championship in general also played their part in directing More's attention to the Philebus. Another debtor to the Philebus and possibly to Ficino's commentary is, I suspect. Sir Francis Bacon. 'Paul O. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought II (New York, 1965), 15 hereafter cited as Thought II. "Saitta, 51: "L'interesse etico predomina nel Ficino suU' interesse speculativo ..." ^''Thought II, 34-35. Cf. Charles Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness, 2 vols. (London, 1970), 773 hereafter cited as Image.
^'Philosophy, 289.

Germain Marc'hadour (Angers, France: Amici 61-70. I suggest the Philebus commentary and Ficino's

"Eugenio Garin,
82
ff.

Italian

Humanism,

trans,

by P.

Munz

(Oxford, 1%5),

See La cultura, 64, footnote

3, for the

controversy surrounding Brum's

translation.

62-63, examines

Thought II, 34. Garin, La cultura, 60-71, and especially Brum's importance as a champion of the "ethical" as opposed to the "metaphysical" Aristotle extolled by the Scholastics.
"Kristeller,

"Delia Torre, 497; Marcel, Marsile, 180-81. Ficino frequently lauds

"

Footnotes to Introduction

527

Aristotle, e.g.:

Op. Om., 869: "Nam in eodem veritatis virtutisque cultu sumus unum. In quo Plato et Aristoteles non esse unum non potuerunt." Op. Om., 1438: [Plato] ... vel de naturalibus agit divine, quemadmodum Aristode divinis naturaliter agit."
Riccardian.
135, lr-138r,

teles, vel

"MS.

and Garin, La

cultura.

106-108. Cf.

Marcel, Marsile, 215.

"See Rochon, La Jeunesse,

de la autour de
tuelle
cite

37: "[Argyropoulos] conserva cette charge

il

jusqu'en aout 1471. Pendant ces quinze annees,

exer9a sur la vie intellec-

une influence decisive et forma d'illustres disciples, groupes lui dans le Chorus Achademiae Florentinae. Bien loin d'etre cantonne dans la philosophic peripateticienne, son enseignement englobait toute I'histoire de la pensee et de la civilisation helleniques, et ce n'est pas un de ses moindres merites que d'avoir fait connaitre aux Florentins les textes de
Platon." Rochon attributes Argyropoulos' election specifically to Donato AcciaiuoH and Alamanno Rinuccini. Cf. Marcel, Marsile, 189-97. "Marcel, Marsile, 176 ff. See Garin, La cultura, 106-108, on the importance of Argyropoulos as a reconciler of Plato and Aristotle.

"Marcel, Marsile, 177. In 1478 Acciaiuoli published

his

own moderating

contribution to the debate: Expositio supra libros Ethicorum Aristotelis.

"A.E. Taylor, Plato: Philebus and Epinomis, ed. by R. Klibansky (London, 1956), 49. '"See for instance R.G. Bury, The Philebus of Plato (Cambridge, 1897), section VI of the introduction; and Auguste Dies, Philebe (Paris, 1949 the

Bude edition),

xcii ff.
-

"See E. Zeller

R. Mondolfo,

La filosofia

del Greci nel suo sviluppo

storico (Florence, 1961), part III, vol. VI, 106, 126, 229;

and Westerink,
vols.,

Damascius, passim. '^Benjamin Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, rev. 4th ed., 4 (Oxford, 1968), III, 531 and 534. "Bury, ix.
'*}.

Gould, The Development of Plato's Ethics (Cambridge, 1955),

10.

219-24.

"Hackforth,
"Dies,
ix-x:

"...une
.

singularite

de

construction ... Le

caractere

scolaire de la discussion.

"Dies,
plaisir fait

ix:

"... [une] masse a Tinterieur du dialogue

et

que I'analyse du

bloc a I'interieur de cette masse."

"Dies, xvi-xvii:

"...La
.

parfaite

continuite

logique

du developpe-

ment..." "See Saitta,

"Jowett, 533
'Kristeller,

52: ".

.cio che gli

manca

e la coscienza critica della posi-

zione vera di Platone nella storia del pensiero."

and 545.
strictly defined.

Philosophy, 15. The genealogy was

See

528

Footnotes to Introduction

D.P. Walker: "The Prisca T/ieo/o^/a in France," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 17 (1954), 204-59; "Orpheus the Theologian and Renaissance Platonists," ibid., 16 (1953), 100-20; and his new book. The
Ancient Theology (London, 1972), especially the introduction on pp. 1-21. See also Trinkaus, Image, 502 ff., and 714; and Charles B. Schmitt, "Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz," Journal of the History of Ideas, 27 (1966), 507-1 1 1 have adopted Ficino's spelling of Aglaophamus. "This selertion is in general accord with the selection adopted by the Neoplatonists. See Paul Henry's introduction to Stephen MacKenna's trans.

lation of the Enneads, 3rd ed. revised

by B.S. Page (London, 1962),

xxxix-xl,

footnote 2; also the index to E. Brehier's ed. of the Enneads (Paris, 192428).
"P/i/Y.

com.,281.

^Roberto Weiss, "Scholarship from Petrarch to Erasmus," The

the Renaissance, ed. Denys

Age of

Hay (London,

1967), 139-40.

"Studies, 42.
"Ibid., 55. But Trinkaus rightly insists that "in

making use of Thomas

Aquinas, [Ficino] does so in a decidedly Augustinian way" {Image, 474). "See Maurice De Wulf, Introduction a la philosophie neoscolastique

(Louvain&
in

Paris, 1904), 108-109; Saitta, 59.

Kristeller,

"Trinkaus, Image, 504. See also

Thought

II,

38:

"In a period

which the emphasis

is

on authority and

tradition, originality will assert

itself in

"Raymond

the adaptation and interpretation of the tradition." Marcel, Marsile Ficin: Theologie Platonicienne,

vols.

(Paris, 1964, 1970),

29 hereafter cited as

Theologie: "

.comme

s'il

voulait

ou contraindre ses lecteurs a admettre des principes ou des arguments qu'ils auraient refuse a priori d'examiner s'ils en avaient connu la source." Cf. Ficino's preface to his Plotinus translation {Op. Om., 1537) where he talks of a "philosophical lure" for those "acute minds" who rely on reason and must be led to religion gradually.
s'approprier leur pensee
^"Theologie, 29.

"Typical of the manifold problems are questions such as these: Did Ficino have any detailed knowledge of Henry of Ghent, of Bonaventura,

Ockham; of the works of Aquinas apart from the Summa Contra when exactly did he acquire this knowledge? Why did he not make greater use of Olympiodorus' (Damascius') commentary on the
Scotus or
Gentiles! If so,

Philebusl When did he read Proclus? Obviously, each one of these questions is of vital importance when we come to consider Marcel's "resonances," and Kristeller may be wrong about Ficino's ignorance of the scholastics. See my

note 112.
"P/i/7.

com., 109-111 ff. and 303-305. "Trinkaus, Image, 468.

**See Frances

A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition

Footnotes to Introduction

529

(London, 1964) hereafter cited as Giordano, and D.P. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella (London, 1958) for full length
examinations of Ficino's initiation of the hermetic revival.

animus duabus tantum alls, id est, intelad coelestem patrem, et patriam revolare, ac philosophus intellectu maxime, sacerdos voluntate nitatur, et intellectus voluntatem illuminet, voluntas intellectum accendat, consentaneum est
*^Op.
1:
. .

Om.,

"Nam cum

lectu, et voluntate possit

"O

viri coelestis

patriae cives, incolaeque terrae, liberemus obsecro quan-

si possumus, possuvolumus, religionem sanctam pro viribus ab execrabili inscita [sic] redimamus. Hortor igitur omnes, atque precor, philosophos quidem, ut religionem vel capessant penitus, vel attingant: sacerdotes autem, ut legitimae sapientiae studiis diligenter incumbant." '*Qp. Om., 930: "Per quam sane quasi mediam quamdam viam, Christianam pietatem denique consequantur." See Raymond Marcel, "L'apologetique de Marsile Ficin," Pensee humanisteet Tradition chretienne au XV^ et au XVI^s. (Paris, 1950), 159-68.

doque philosophiam, sacrum Dei munus, ab impietate,

mus autem,

si

(Appendix III). 99 and 121. Cf. the reUgious role played by lamblichus ancient Neoplatonism.
*'See the Orlandini letter
** Studies,

in

"On

the Augustinian, ascetic strains in Ficino see Charles Trinkaus,

Will in the Renaissance and the Reformation," in Renaissance Essays, edited by Kristeller and Wiener (New York, 1968), 192;
also his earlier book. Adversity's Noblemen: The Italian Humanists on Happiness (New York, 1940), 37-38. In his most recent book, however, Trinkaus stresses the more optimistic, anthropocentric aspects of Ficino (Image, ch. IX passim, and especially pp. 482 and 484-89).

"The Problem of Free

"oSee Kristeller, Philosophy, 296-97; also Sup. Fie,

II,

81

ff.

""For Diogenes, see R.R. Bolgar, The Classical Heritage (New York, 1964), 278 and 472.

For the impact of the newly discovered Lucretius on Ficino himself see Eugenio Garin, "Ricerche sull'epicureismo del quattrocento," in La cultura,
72-86.

See also Miss Yates' comments in Giordano, 224-25: "

with the cosmic significance of
nature." This
is

.in

some Renais-

sance writers the Epicurean teaching on pleasure as a good becomes merged

amor as the intrinsic vital force in universal when we consider the propinquity of the Philebus and Symposium commentaries (cf. Garin, La cultura, 84). '"^Plato, Philebus and Epinomis, 15, 16 ff. '"Hackforth, 5; Taylor, Plato: Philebus and Epinomis, 92. '"'Op. Om., 108: "... voluptas, quae est dilatatio voluntatis in bonum, et
extremely pertinent
quies voluntatis in bono." Cf. Phil, com., 353-55, 379-81

'"Philosophy, 262.

"

530

Footnotes to Introduction

com., 197, 325-29, 335-39. "Taylor, Plato: Philebus and Epinomis. 15-25, and Plato: The Man and his Work. 409-10. "'Saitta, 81: "11 concetto d'una religione universale o naturale presenta nel Ficino, tutti i caratteri, che saranno oggetto di piu ampi e penetrant!
''''Sec Phil,
. . .

sviluppi." See also Kristeller, Philosophy, 318

'"Saitta, 84; Trinkaus, Image, ch.
""Kristeller,

ff.,

for further information.

ff.

XVI, pp. 722

Le Thomisme

et la

pensee italienne de

la

Renaissance
est

(Montreal, 1967), 97

hereafter cited as Le

Thomisme: "Chaque chose

un but naturel, et son essence s'accompagne toujours d'un desir, ou amour, ou appetit de ce but, et cet appetit ne peut etre vain puisqu'il constitue un element necessaire de I'ordre meme de I'univers."
dirigee par son createur vers
' '

'Kristeller,

Philosophy, 328. See 328, footnote 16, for further references.

"^Marian Heitzman, "L'agostinismo avicenizzante e il punto di partenza della filosofia di MarsiUo Ficino," Giornale critico delta filosofia italiana, 16 (1935), 295-322; 460-80; 17 (1936), 1-11. Page 299: "Tutti questi termini significano I'universale esistente neU'intelletto divino.
. .

Heitzman deals at length with the problems of Ficino's epistemology and with the history of the controversies surrounding them with particular reference to Ficino's probable debt to Avicerma and his illuminationism.

SeePhil.com., 199 ff. '"For example, Phil, com., 177-79. "^Charles Huit, "Le Platonisme pendant
240; Saitta, 50.
"'77ie

la renaissance,"
ff.;

Annales de
Philosophy,

philosophic chretienne, N.S., 33 (1895-96), 362

Kristeller,

Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philo-

sophy, ed. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 1967), 55.

'''Philosophy, 2A6.
'"Phil, com., 251. See "^Republic Wll,534E. '"Phil, com., 219.
Kristeller,

Philosophy, 126-31.

'"Heitzman, 460: "La relazione fra la ragione e

Ficino."
'*'Ibid., 320:

la

mente non e chiara

nel

"

.Tintelligenza

non

e la vera facolta dell'anima ragione-

vole."
'"Ibid., see 461. Previously Heitzman had explained why the intelligence above the order of destiny to which the sensitive soul is subject, but is itself

is

subject to the order of providence; the reason

free:

on the other hand

is

completely

"... per

la nostra

ragione

[ratio] discorsiva

invece siamo completamente

liberi e

scegliamo una direzione ad arbitrio" (320).

is

While agreeing that "Augustinione of the important antecedents of Ficino's Platonism" (42, footnote 40), Kristeller doubts the extent of Ficino's "Augustinisme avicennizant"
See, however, Kristeller, Studies, 35-99.

anism

Footnotes to Introduction

53

and disagrees in particular with Heitzman's differentiation between the intelUgence and the reason and consequently with his views on their respective freedoms.
'"Heitzman, 464 ff.: "Se si tratta dunque dell'atto di comprensione, si compie nella mente, ma il vero fattore agente e Dio come agente primo, e le formule come agente secondo, e la mente da se non fa che la parte
questo
della materia."

See Trinkaus, Image, 476, 488, 498, on man's of his thoughts and actions" (498). '"Kristeller, Philosophy, ISA. '"PA//, com., 249, 261, etc. '"Ibid., ch. 26 (i.e., pp. 241-47). '"Heitzman, 467: " Lc idee divine sono le piu alte misure della verita; ma noi, nel nostro pensare, non usiamo queste idee, bensi le loro copie che sono nella nostra mente e che Ficino chiama/ormu/ae idearum." '"Ibid.: "La mente ha dunque bisogno, in un certo senso, d'immagini sensibili per la sua funzione, benche non dipenda da essi, come asserivano i
ff.

'^*

Philosophy, 253

"striving to be a

god

in all

peripatetici."
"'Ibid., 474:

"

I'esistenza nella nostra

anima

di idee innate

non e

ancora equivalente colla loro conoscenza e comprensione."

'''RepublicWll, 534B.
pp. 143-45). This is an enormous topic, but of especial interest: D.P. Walker, "The Prisca Theologia in France," 231 ff.; and E.H. Gombrich, "Icones Symbolicae: The Visual Image in Neoplatonic Thought," Journal of the Warburg and Cour-

^"Sec Phil, com., ch. 12

(i.e.,

the following

two

articles are

tauld Institutes, 11 (1948), 163-92.

'"Phil., com., 143. '"Heitzman, 303 ff.; Kristeller, Philosophy. 49-54; Schiavone, 259-324. '"Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory {Pa\cgo, 1966), 240.

'"See Marcel, Marsile,

663;

"La

vcrite,

pour Platon,
elle etait

n'etait

pas
le

seulement
fruit

terme d'une induction ou d'une deduction, d'lme contemplation ..."

le

avant tout

'"See William J. Bouwsma, "Postel and Renaissance Cabalism," in Renaissance Essays, edited by Kristeller and Wiener (New York, 1968), 257-58. Bouwsma extends this idea further to embrace not only dialectic but language itself: ". .for the cabalist, language is far more than an arbitrary
.

instrument of communication between men. It is a general unifying principle, capable of comprehending all particular things. It originated in the words
taught by

God
it

to

Adam

designates:

represents the self-expression of

and hence possesses an absolute relation to what it God and reflects his creativity."
universal, magical language (for the

We can derive from this that there is one,

cabalists themselves, this

was usually thought of as being Hebrew), that can unify man's experience and give him absolute control over the universe.

532

Footnotes to Introduction

'"See also Frances Yates, Giordano, 111: ".

.the gnostic heresy that

man was

once, and can become again through his

intellect,

the reflection of

the divine mens, a divine being."

(i.e., pp. 289-91); also ch. 11 on the two Venuses. 265C-266D; Symposium 210A-21 IC; Enneads I, iii. '*'Taylor, Plato: The Man and his Work, All. Taylor says that Plato makes no attempt to unite these two concepts with the theory of the Ideas and that one cannot deduce a coherent ontology from them all.

'"P/i/7.

com., ch. 30

'*'>Phaedrus

'"See Marcel, Marsile, 670-71.

'"Scars Jayne, John Colet andMarsilio Ficino (Oxford, 1963),
after cited as Colet. In Kristeller's

57 here-

Philosophy see the entire ch. XIII on will and love; see too his important article, "A Thomist Critique of Marsilio Ficino's Theory of Will and Intellect," Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume,
English section, vol.
Ill

(Jerusalem, 1%5), 463-94

hereafter
ff;

cited as

"A

Thomist Critique."

Kristeller's article introduces

some

significant modiflca-

tions to the account presented in his earlier chapter. Cf. too

Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance (rey.

Critique," 483-85.
'*'Colet, 59-60.

ed..

New York,

1968), chs. Ill

'"Jayne, Colet, 57. Cf. Kristeller, Philosophy, 269

Edgar Wind, and IV. "A Thomist

'"References are to the English translation by the Dominican Fathers

(London, 1928).
'"Ibid., 60.

Summa Contra Gentiles III, ch. 26, p.

33.

'"Ibid., 65. Cf. In III Sent., dist. 27, q.l, a.4;

Summa

Theologica

I,

q.82, a.3; I-II, q.3, a.4.

'"Ibid., 78.

"See James B. Wadsworth, "Landino's Disputationes Camaldulenses,

Ficino's

De

Felicitate,

and L'Altercazione of Lorenzo De'Medici," Modern

Philology, 50 (1952), 29: and Rochon's refutation of

nesse, 475-543

Wadsworth

in

La

Jeu-

and

especially 480-81

and 495-503.

(Berlin, 1936), 70-94

See too A. Buck, Der Platonismus in den Dichtungen Lorenzo de'Medicis and Kristeller's review of Buck reprinted in Studies,
'"Saitta, 50:

214-16.

"Nei commentari al Filebo che, come si

che
si

sa, e

uno dei piu

sig-

niflcativi dialoghi di Platone, cio

riferisce alia

natura volontaristica del

bene e trattato con ampiezza e profondita, ma la ragione ne e chiara: il Ficino, pur discorrendo dei vari problemi toccati in quel dialogo da Platone, non poteva non obbedire al demone che I'agitava e che consisteva nella posizione d'un idealismo etico nettamente volontaristico, a spese, s'intende, della razionalita."

^"Philosophy, 272. See the entire section 271-76; and also

Critique," 474.

"A

Thomist

'"Philosophy. 269. Cf.

"A Thomist Critique," 471.

Footnotes to Introduction

533

''*

Philosophy, 272. Cf. Kristeller,

"AThomist Critique,"

475.

'"Philosophy. 257.

'"Qp. Om., 313: "...sicut appetitus irrationalis sequitur sensum,

voluntas, quae est rationalis aviditas, sequitur intellectum."

sic

'"Qp. Om., 236: ".

lectus offert
''*
. . .

.volimtas eousque affectat

bonum, quousque

intel-

" Cf.

Kristeller,

Philosophy, 259.

Philosophy, 256.

'"Op. Om., 219. '"pp. Om., 187, 307, 313. '*'Op. Om., 611: "... sub ratione veri

intelligit,

sub ratione boni appetit

477.

omnia." Cf.

Kristeller,

Philosophy, 260.

'*'Philosophy, 271 (cf. his p. 270). Cf.

"A Thomist Critique," 474,

'"Philosophy, 256.
'"Ibid., 290.

'"Ibid., 292. '"Ibid., 304.

'"Op. Om., 78 [the proem to the Platonic Theology]: "Quicunque

Philosophiae studium impie nimium a sancta religione seiungunt."

'"Pp. Om., 1425-26. See

my Appendix III for the Latin (pp.

487-89). Cf.

"A Thomist Critique," 476.

'*'Saitta, 53: "Queste ultime parole sono una protesta, di cui non sappiamochefare. ." ''"Philosophy, 276. But cf. "A Thomist Critique," 476. '""Summa Contra Gentiles III, ch. 26; Quaestiones Disputatae: De
.

Veritate. q. 22, a. 11;

Summa

Theologica

I,

q. 12, a. 12; q. 26, a. 2; q. 82, a. 3.

'^^Opus Oxoniense IV, 49, q.4; Reportata Parisiensia IV, 49, q. 2-4.

'"Paul O.

Kristeller,

Le Thomisme,

109-10:

Marsile Ficin a plusieurs reprises a diverses epoques de sa

"Le probleme preoccupa vie. De fait, c'est

Tun

des points au sujet desquels on peut observer des oscillations et des changements dans sa pensee." Cf. too "A Thomist Critique," 474-75. From the viewpoint of interpreting the Philebus commentary in the context of the intellect/ will controversy, Kristeller's positions in "A Thomist Critique" (1%5) and Le Thomisme (1967) are identical: they both give fuller recognition to the oscillations in Ficino's thinking, and the article even suggests there are three successive stages in his attitudes towards voluntarism. Further research might estabUsh this to be true for other problems as well. If so, we would have a key to Ficino's overall development. '^*Le Thomisme, 110: "Vers la fin de sa carriere, cependant, il se montre de nouveau indecis. En preparant son commentaire du Philebe pour la publication, il y admet, a I'endroit propice, avoir resolu la question ailleurs en un sens oppose et il cherche a proposer un compromis, distinguant entre la volonte au sens de faculte distincte et comme partie de I'intellect." Cf. "A

Thomist Critique," 475-76.

534

Footnotes to Introduction

'"Le Thomisme, 110-11: "Cette solution n'est ni tres claire ni convainque le probleme continuait a le preoccuper et qu'il n'avait pas du tout reussi a se faire une opinion ferme ou categorique sur ce point particulier." Cf. "A Thomist Critique," 476. "*Le Thomisme, 117-18. For Bandello, see Kristeller, "A Thomist
cante, mais elle nous fait voir

Critique," passim.

'"Le Thomisme,

19-20:

"De son cote,

Ficin, heritier

de

la tradition neo-

platonicienne, n'admet pas que la difference soit aussi radicale entre la vie

presente et la vie future.

II

est

convaincu que

1'

experience supreme de la conest

les

templation a laquelle

philosophe platonicien peut atteindre en cette vie une anticipation authentique de la vie future il insiste sur le fait que
le
. . .

experiences des vies presente et future sont profondement semblables." Cf.

"A Thomist Critique," 473.

"Le Thomisme, 108. ".
d'interet
.

.il

est interessant

de trouver des echos de la

si

discussion dans les ecrits des humanistes qui, par ailleurs, manifesterent

peu

pour les questions de theologie "A Thomist Critique," 478, 482.

et

de philosophie scolastiques." Cf.

est,

'"See Jayne, Colet, 82-83: "InteUigentia prior

ligentia parit
Stat.

amor

posterior. Intel-

amorem: amor funditur

in inteUigentia. Intelligentia

Amor

magis

foris extat. Intelligentia

magis intus denique simplicior, serenior, et

...

verior est.
intelligas

Amor quodammodo
scilicet

compositior, crassior et concretior est

crassum esse intellectum. Intellectum autem serenam et Hquidam voluntatem." Kristeller took account of this oversight in a later article, "The European Significance of Florentine Platonism," Medieval & Renaissance Studies, ed. John M. Headley (Chapel Hill, 1968), 228, footnote 69. In alluding to the
voluntatem
Colet
letter Kristeller writes,

superior, but the entire treatment

"Here Ficino seems to treat the is different from Ficino's earlier

intellect as

discussions

of the subject."
'"Schiavone, Problemi, 191. See particularly Schiavone's explanation of

monism pp. 52, 57, and ch. I, passim; also, Kristeller's opposing views in his Philosophy, 229, 249-51, and in his review of Schiavone's book,
Ficino's

The Journal of Philosophy, 58 (1%1), 51-53. ^*^ Problemi, 18-19: "...sotto una classificazione ed una terminologia classiche, si celino nuovi significati e nuove prospettive." '"Ibid., 142: " e forzato concordismo .risente troppo di un voluto ad oltranza verso Platone." '"Ibid., 143: ". .nel comment al Filebo il motivo che assegna il primato all'intelletto e indicato dalla preminenza dell'attivita senza divenire e della concretezza dinamica ... in questa fase giovanile, il dinamismo e inteso come azione statica swWaltro e non come autodeterminarsi mediante la deter.

minazione

dell'alterita: manca quindi quella circolarita mostrammo magna pars nel Ficino della maturita."

e quel dialettismo che

Footnotes to Introduction

535

'**Phil.

com., 307.

''Ibid., 307. 'Ibid., 309. '^Ibid.,

307-309. 421.

'Ibid., 389, cf. ''Ibid.,

421.

'Ibid., 305.

''Ibid.,

307-309.

"*Della Torre, 568:

Ficino
si

"Poco dopo

aver finito

il

commento

del Simposio,

il

mise a quello del Filebo;

la

ma a questo punto Piero lo invito ad esporre

pubblicamente

sua interpretazione."

''Ibid., 573, 591.

^**Marsi!e. 322:

"En

tout cas ce qui est certain c'est qu'a Tepoque

livres, Ficin avait

ou

Landino a

ecrit ses
le

deux premiers

'compose' son

Com-

mentaire sur
Philebe.

Philebe, car

textuellement. C'est

non seulement Landino le dit, mais s'en inspire done bien entre 1464 et 1468 que fut commente le

"
.

surely a non-sequitur?
"Done
etat

le livre a etc ecrit avant la mort de Pierre et nous permet de conclure que c'est au cours de I'ete 1468 qu'eut lieu la rencontre aux Camaldules que Landino nous rapporte ou imagine [my italics] ..." (314). Marcel's own words, "rapporte ou imagine,"

''Ibid., 314-22:

r aggravation de son

and undermine his own hypothesis. Another counterproof to the 1468 dating is the mention in the dedication to Landino' s first book of the defeat of the two Orsinis which took place in 1469; see Rochon,
are the operative ones

La Jeunesse,

40.

Marcel is in sUght error here. It was on August 21, was named Duke of Urbino by Sixtus IV. Landino still uses the title "Count" and so the book must have been dedicated to Federico before August 21 1474. The most recent work on the dating of the Camaldulensian Disputations is by Peter Lohe. In his article, "Die Datierung der Disputationes Camaldulenses des Cristoforo Landino," Rinascimento: Rivista dell'Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento, 2nd series, 9 (Florence, 1%9), 291-99, Lohe pushes the completion date of Landino's composition of the four books of the Disputations back to 1472: ". .dann konnen wir jetzt zusammemfassend festsellen: Landino hat die Disputationes Camaldulenses zwischen dem April und Dezember 1472 verfasst" (297). He proffers no information, however, on the possibility of dating the composition of Landino's second book, the book upon which Marcel's line of argument devolves. Lohe's article was kindly brought to my attention by Professor Roger L. Deakins.
'**Marsile, 313, 393.

1474, that Federico

'''Marsile, 322.

See KristeUer, Sup. Fie,

II,

88-89.
la citation
et

"Marcel, Marsile, 322 and footnote

Cratyle au conunencement

2:

"Par exemple,
des ch.

du

du

ch.

XXIII

et celles

XXIV

XXXI

536

Footnotes to Introduction

manquent dans le manuscrit Vat. lat. 5953." "'Kristeller argues on the basis of the Bodleian MS. Canon class, lat. 163 that Ficino composed the argumentum for each dialogue at the same time as
he translated
it

{Sup. Fie,

I,

xxxvii; Studies, 161.13). Since the chronological

se-

sequence in which he translated the dialogues seems to be the same as the

quence
since

in

which they appear

that

in the Plato edition {Sup. Fie,

1,

I,

cxlvii ff.),

and

we know

on April

1466 he had translated 23 dialogues, the

I, cli, and II, 88), the translation of the composition of its argumentum were probably both made early in 1466. Consideration of the argumentum therefore cannot be separated

Cratylus being no. 22 {Sup. Fie,

Cratylus
\ the

from consideration of the dating of the Cratylus as a whole.

"Marcel, Marsile, 603.
"'Ibid., 610.

"'Marcel, Commentaire sur

138 (Hermes).
^'''Philosophy, 17.

le

Banquet de Platon, 150, 221 (Zoroaster);

"*Marcel, Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon, 41

"'MS.

Vat.

5953

is

not an autograph. In the margins throughout the

few intermittent jottings in a hand other than the scribe's formal hand. These marginalia consist of proper names and
entire codex, however, there are a

headings which are single words or phrases or sentences taken either directly

from the text itself or modified so that they can stand independently. There no corrections or additions. MS. Laur. 21,8 has marginalia with the same general features, except that they are written in Salvini's "Roman" hand and are even briefer; they do not correspond to the marginalia in MS. 5953. The question which presents itself is this: Are the marginalia of MS. 5953 in Ficino's own hand? Currently, there is some debate over Ficino's handwriting. One view is that Ficino had two distinct hands: a rough-copy hand which made liberal use of abbreviations, and a neat calligraphic script, i.e. a book hand, where the abbreviations are less frequent. For this view see Martin Sicherl's article, "Neuentdeckte Handschriften von Marsilio Ficino," Scriptorium, 16 (1962), 50-61. Page 169 of H.D. Saffrey's article, "Notes Platoniciennes de Marsile Ficin dans un manuscrit de Proclus," Bibliotheque D'Humanisme et Renaisare
sance, 21 (1959), 161-84, contains a full page specimen of Ficino's rough-copy

hand;

this is the

hand
is

in

to the Philebus Ficino's

also written (see

which the Parma/Paris MS. containing the argument Appendix III and my note 8). Samples of

book hand can be seen in Raymond Marcel's edition, Marsile Ficin, Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon, in the plates facing pp. 32, 33, 38, 39,
134.

Paul Kristeller has questioned

this easy distinction

between the two hands in

Original Letters and Autograph Manuscripts of Marsilio Ficino," Studi di Bibliografia e di Storia in onore di Tammaro de Marinis, 3

an

article,

"Some

Footnotes to Introduction

537

He notes that Ficino's Greek, Italian and Latin hands and that his Roman may differ also from his Italic. But, he also wrote a book hand remains to be seen" continues, "whether Ficino (10; cf. 21), for the book hands of the fifteenth century humanists as a group "resemble each other so closely that one may very well despair of establishing the work of individual copyists" (8-9). Kristeller enumerates the characteristics of Ficino's rough-copy hand: "the long s, the roimd d, the h whose tail is drawn below the level of the middle line, the final m (which is turned around and looks like a z, according to a common medieval practice), the final i, which is often prolonged and without " (10). See the a dot, the initial f, which often has a double loop, and the g. illustrations in plates III, 3; III, 4; and III, 9. These characteristics, he says, "appear in all Ficino autographs from about 1469 on." Judging from the available plates and the descriptions of Kristeller and Sicherl, I am firmly convinced that the marginalia of MS. 5953 are not by Ficino. They are possibly in the scribe's own less formal hand.
(Verona, 1964), 5-33.
all

differ

"*Marcel, Theologie, vol.

I,

29.

^"^Summa Contra Gentiles, trans, by the Dominican Fathers (London, 1923-28); and again under the title On The Truth Of The Catholic Faith by
Dr. Pegis et
al.

(New York,

1956).

"Roy

J.

Deferrari,

Latin-English Dictionary of St.

Thomas Aquinas

(Boston, Mass., 1960).

"'See, for instance, Phil, com., 369-75.

References in The Commentary and

Appendices II and III

(a bracketed

question-mark following the reference means the ascription

is

guess)

'Alcibiades

I,

107B, I33C-E;

II,
I,

144D, 146D-147B; Euthydemus 280D631 B-D.

28 ID; Republic VII, 534BC;

Cf. Aristotle,
ii;

Laws

Nicomachean Ethics I, 1094a; Aquinas, Summa Contra Genand Lactantius, Divine Institutes I, ii-v. The opening section of this commentary (my pp. 72-110) is directly concerned not with the Philebus but with the absolute good or one. Ficino says that this defense of the Idea of the good is in order to "explode the objections of the Aristotelians" (my p. 113, cf. pp. 177 and 181). ^De Rerum Natura I, 159-163 (a direct quotation). 'The following passage is borrowed in a somewhat abbreviated and emended form from the Summa Contra Gentiles III, ii, paragraphs 3, 4, 5.
tiles III,

*Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics

II,

994a, 1-10.

com. 85-87 and ref. 7). Statesman 269C-270A. 'Metaphysics III, 996b [?]. Cf. Metaphysics II, 994b and Nicomachean
'Metaphysics
II,

994b, 10-15

(cf. Phil.

Ethics

I,

1097a.
is

'The following chapter

borrowed

in a

somewhat abbreviated and

iii,

emended form from 6 and 8.

'Cf.

the

Summa Contra Gentiles III,

paragraphs

2, 3, 4, 5,

Summa Contra Gentiles I, xlii, paragraph 23. De Natura Deorum I, 35; Academica II, 121 "Cf. Augustine, City of God Vlll, 1; VII, 6. 'Plato, Phaedo 97C; Augustine, City of God VIII, 2; Cicero, De Natura
"Cf. Cicero,
I,

Deorum

26.

"Cf. Cicero,
'*Cf.

De Natura Deorum
17, 12, q. 72,

I,

36; II, 22.

1

Aquinas, // Sent.,
t.

1,

and Albertus Magnus,

Summa
may

Theologiae, Ila,

membr.

4, a. 2, n. 4.
refs.

"Ficino's immediate source for these Alfarabi and Avicebron be Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia 4 and Quodlibet 11,5,5. 'Parmenides 1 5 1 E- 1 52A.
'

Parmenides mC-l42B; 159B-160B. "Law^X, 892A; 8%A-898B, etc.

''

"Cf. Aristotle,

DeAnima 1, 2, 404b.

'"Parmenides 160B-166B
''RepublicWl, 509B;

& passim; Republic VI, 508A-509B [?1.

,

On The Divine Names \

(PG,

3,

816B).

References

539

"On The

Trinity VIII, 3, 4:
ita

ToUe hoc [bonum]

et illud, et vide

ipsum

bonum si potes:

Deum videbis, non alio bono sed bonum omnis

I,

boni." Cf.

Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos 134 {PL, 36, 1430-74).

"On

Mystical Theology

u (PG,

3.

lOOOA

ff.).

'*Republic VI,

508A

ff.

"See Ficino's Opera Omnia, 934, line 12 of the first hymn (cf. my page ref. 169). This "Orphei versus de deo" is, as D.P. Walker has shown, an extremely free rendering of the Orphic fragment known as the Palinode or Testament (Kern, frag. 24, i.e. the Aristobulus version). Ficino was working from George of Trebizond's incompetent translation of Eusebius' Praeparatio Evangelica XIII, 12. Though this was not published until 1470, Ficino had access to a MS. version in the Laurenziana in 1462 (D.P. Walker, "Orpheus the Theologian and Renaissance Platonists," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 16 [1953], 110-111). "The intelligence, sight and hearing; cf. Ficino's De Amore II.2. "Laws I, 628CD. Plato talks of "peace" rather than "quietness." '^Republic II, 357B-358A. "Gorg/fl5 467C-468C. '"Nicomachean Ethics VII, 1 152b-l 154b and X, 1 172a-l 176a; De Finibus I, 29-57 and passim. "Cf. the proem in X to Lorenzo (Appendix III). "Euthydemus 306A-C. ''Euthydemus 280B-D. '*Clitophon 408E-cnd; Afeno 78C ff., 88D; Alcibiades I, 121E-122A; U, 144D ff., 146E-147A; Laws I, 631B ff.; II, 661A ff.; Ill, 697B ff., etc. "Euthydemus 28 1 B-282A. '^Protagoras 352CD, 357C. ''Republic VI, 505A-509B. "Cf. Augustine, City of God XI, 29 (cf. my p. 339 and ref. 176). "Republic VI, 505A-509B. '"Diogenes Laertius {Lives Of The Philosophers III, 58) says it was Thrasylus who maintained the Philebus was "on pleasure." Thrasylus also maintained the Parmenides was "on Ideas," the Symposium "on the good," and the Phaedrus "on love"; and consequently that the four of them consti305 and
tuted

"a tetralogy."
presumably correspond to the following in the

''Ficino's twelve parts

Stephanus pagination:
Parti:

Part
Part

II:

III:

Part IV: Part V:

Part VI:

IIA-IID 11D-15C 15C-20A 20B-23B 23C-27C 27C-30A

540

References

Part VII: Part IX:

30A-31B
55C-59C 59C-61C 61D-66A 66A-67B

Part VIII: 31B-55C

PartX:
Part XI:

Part XII:
In

my edition Part I begins on page 115, Part II on page 131, Part III on page 215, Part IV on page 283 and Part V on page 347. In the opening sentence of the argumentum Ficino talks of "the wonderful order" Plato employed in composing the Philebus. All but the most recent editors of the Philebus have had greater reservations, *'Euthydemt4S 273E (cf. Euthyphro 13B ff.) [?]. *'Cf. Hesiod's Theogony, 198-200.
**De

Rerum Natura
to

I,

1-5 (a direct quotation).

Uranus (4), 1-2; cf. Sup. Fie, II, 87 & 97. **r/maeM5 28B-29A. *' Epistle \hZ\lE. **Republic\l, 508A, 509B. *'This Porphyry ref. may derive from Augustine's City of God X, 23: "[Porphyrius] dicit enim Deum Patrem et Deum Filium, quem Graece appellat intellectum vel paternam mentem." The source of the Neoplatonic Kronos/Nous identification is Plotinus' Enneads V, 1,4; it derives in turn from Plato's Cratylus 396BC. '"Timaeus A%K. *' Statesman 269 \. "LflH'5lV,715E-716A. "Protagoras 322C-D. '* Epistle WhZliTi. ''Timaeus 30B; Republic X, 616C; Statesman 272E; Laws X, 897C; Epistle VI, 323D; Phaedrus 246E. '^Symposium 180D ff.

*>Hymn

''Theogony, 178-206.
'*Cratylus 390D-E, etc.
"Crfl/>'/M5

400Dff.

^''Phaedrus

234D

the reference

is

to the

word

"AaLiioviux:.'' Ficino

is

alluding to Socrates'

demon,

his attendent "spirit" or genius,

a subject upon

which the ancient Neoplatonists and their successors had speculated at some length. Cf. Apology 40A; Theaetetus 151 A; Euthyphro 3B; Cratylus 398BC; Augustine, City of God VIII, 14; and my p. 273. *'Laws XI, 917B [?]. The more likely ref. is to Laws X, 907E. "Parmenides 147D, 142B-157B.

"On the Divine Names passim.

**

Against Celsus V, 61 3

References

541

"Epistle to the Philippians

2: 9.

"Quoted
** Epistle

in the Cratylus 391 D.

Hebrews 4: 12. Mass Hve words enact the Sacrament, "Hoc est enim corpus meum." The heretical sacrament was based on St. John's Gospel 19.26. " In qua virtute, aut in '"Matthew 1: 20-21; Luke 1:31; Acts 4:7 vos?" quo nomine fecistis hoc "Here Ficino is referring to a pre-Areopagitian enumeration of the
to the
**In the Latin

spirits.

Dionysius' nine heavenly orders would be inappropriate here.

'^Sophist 253D; Statesman

262A

ff

^'Ficino has ingeniously tried to

make

sense of an allusion in the text of

The Greek means literally: "our argument would disappear and perish like a fairy tale." Raymond Klibansky in his edition of A.E. Taylor's Plato: Philebus and Epinomis (London, 1956), p. 256, n. 5, says that Plato is alluding to z formula used at the end of fairy
the Philebus which he did not understand.
tales.
'* Cratylus

A1%T>.
[?];

''Gorgias 451 C-45SB

'^Republic X, 595C.
''Epistle II,

Phaedo 90B-91B.

310D.

'*Laws

II,

663E.

pleasantest of

"Diogenes Laertius, Lives sounds" [?].

Statesman 258E. In

Of The

Philosophers

III,

39-40: "truth

is

the

'"Phaedrus 241C (a garbled reference

**

cf.

my p.

fact, Plato's division is

357 and ref. 182). between the practical and

purely intellectual sciences.

''Republic VI, 509B.

*>Psalm

4: 6.
ff.

**Republic VI, 505

"Aristophanes, Clouds, 225

ff.

(cf.

Plato's

Apology 19Q. For the

comedians' opinion of Plato see Diogenes Laertius, Lives Of The Philosophers 111,26-2%. "See Diogenes Laertius, Lives Of The Philosophers VI, 53.
*'

Phaedo

n\,

lOOB-E; Timaeus 41 A

ff.

"Successive scholars have differed as to whether Plato was asking two or

three questions here. Ficino's solution, interestingly,
is

the one adopted by

of A.E. Taylor's Plato: Philebus and Epinomis (London, 1956), pp. 257-59, n. 9. The controversial second question, Klibansky says, is: Since each of the units is a particular being, how can
in his edition

Raymond Klibansky

they be said to be eternal and self-identical?

**Parmenides 128E-136C & passim; Timaeus 28A-29C, 476A-480; X, 5%A ff., etc.; Phaedo 11 A, lOOB-E.

etc.;

Republic V,

542

References

^''Phaedo 77A, lOOB-E.

^'DeDiversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, Quaestio

two paragraphs
soul

"Whoever acknowledges that all existing things ... the may be made utterly happy" are copied almost verbatim from the con-

XL VI: De Ideis.

These

cluding section of Augustine's quaestio. Typically, though, Ficino has

left

out

one or two clauses and there are some minor variations. "The passage in question is Metaphysics XII, 1072b-1074a. Eustratius is the least well known of these commentators. During the twelfth century he was metropolitan of Nicaea and composed, among other works, commentaries on the Posterior Analytics and the Nicomachean Ethics, commentaries which were often cited during the Middle Ages and even translated into Latin by Robert of Lincoln. "Timaetds 30D. For the Hermes ref. see Ficino's own translation of the Pimander. chs. I and III (Op. Om., 1837, 1841). **Phaedo lOOB-E; Republic V, 476C ff.; Timaeus 28A ff.; Epistle II, 312E-313A.
"Cf. Plato's CratylusAOW.

De Vera Religione 39, 73. "r/mfleitf28A-31A,39E. "This is a confusing passage, partly because of the difficulty in deterangels? men? powers? creativemining the subject of the verb fingantur
'*Cf. Augustine,

nesses?

Ficino

is

stressing the distinction

between the universal powers or forms as

they exist naturally, or in reality, and as they exist as concepts in the angelic or

human
writes:

understanding,

i.e.

as they exist "in an imaginary

all levels

way."

Kristeller

"All forms are found on

of reality, from

God down to matter.

The natura

vegetalis corresponds to the lower soul, the vegetative power, which obviously lacks knowledge. Yet it does have forms (the seeds or seminal reasons) which are the direct causes of corporeal forms." He continues, "The phrase ad intima se convertunt obiecta refers to the angels and means that their thought, at least in one of its aspects, is directed towards the forms or Ideas inherent in themselves, that is, towards an internal object. I take this to be a generalized application of the Plotinian view that the soul is active in three directions: upwards (towards the intellect), internally, and downwards (towards the body)" (private letter, Sept. 1972). '*Phaedo 90D-E. 'Galen, On The Natural Faculties III, x, 179-180 [?]. "" Gorgias4S0 A-D. ""Republic IX, 591CD; Laws IV, 716A-E. '"'Timaeus 2SAff. "'*Cratylus 436D. ""For the Rhodes ref. see Strabo's Geography XIV, 2, 5 (but Strabo does not cite the proverb itself). For the Pythagoras ref. see Ficino's own translation

References

543

of the Symbola in his Op. Om., 1979. For the Heraclitus ref see fragment 105 (Bywater); it is quoted in the Nicomachean Ethics II, 1 105a and in Plutarch's
.

Life of Coriolanus, ch. 22. "'*Phaedo 89D-91A.

""Sophist 253DE,

etc.;

Statesman 266D.

^"Repubiic \lh534B-E. '"^Parmenides 135D-136C.

"Crfl/yus 405BCff.
'" Republic Wll,

537D-539D.
is

"'LawsX,90SCff.
'"The ref. to philodoxers (or perhaps doxophilists) 480A. "*Phaedrus 237D, 246 ff.; Republic VII, 538CD.
'"Juvenal,
Sflr/re II, 21.

in the

Republic V,

''*Phaedo 6SC.
'''Parmenides 135
"Cf. Cicero,
1,

A ff.

[?].
1,

De Natura Deorum
I,

2, 63,

17

and

III,

89 (for Diagoras);
I,

2, 29, 63,

17 (for Protagoras);

29, 120 (for Democritus);

I, ii.

18

ff.

and 57

ff.

(for Epicurus).

Also Lactantius, Divine Institutes

"Lflw5 X,908Cff. '*" Apology 23CD and passim.

' 'Phaedrus 269E-270A. '"Parmenides 136C. '"Phaedn4s 266B. ''*Republic \l,50SB{f. '"The Celestial Hierarchy III, 1 (PG. 3, 164D) and passim. "*Phaedrus2ABA. '"r/maeus 28C,29A-E. '"On the Divine Names IV, 8 (PC, 3, 704D) ff. ''* Protagoras 320D-322A. '"This is presumably a reference to Statesman 27 ID ff., or 274C, that
'

is,

to the

Promethean fire (see my p. 245). "'Laws IV, 71 3 A ff. '"Timaeus41C; Statesman 274CD. '"Dia is the Greek accusative of Zeus! Ficino
biavra (a

is

also referring to Plato's

derivation of the

name via Cratylus 3%A-C.

way of living) and bid (through)

is

sec

"*The argumentum to the Cratylus

his

the introduction Ficino himself

(cf.

wrote to accompany his translation of the dialogue

my third

appendix for

argumentum

to the Philebus).

'"Hymn "'Hymn
'^''

to

Nature (10),
(i.e.

8.

to Saturn (13), 3-5.

Universal Hymn

the introdurtory hymn), 42.

544

References

'"Timaetds 32AB. Cf. Aquinas,

Summa

Contra Gentiles

II, bcviii,

para-

graphs 6 and

7.

is described in the Iliad VIII, 18-27 and 153CD. The quotation from Orpheus is taken from the Philebus itself at 66C (see my pp. 403 and 405 and refs. 199 and 201). Cf. Plutarch, The EI at Delphi 391 D; Proclus, In Rempublicam II, 100, 23; and Kern, Orphica, frag. 14.

"The

"golden chain" of Homer

referred to in the Theaetetus

ff. [7] Statesman 274C (the Promethean fire). 368D-369A; Sophist 218D. "r/mflei35B-36B. '*'Hymn to Apollo (34), 21-23. '**Ficino is describing the three tetrachords of Greek musical theory. A tetrachord was a descending series of four tones that spanned the interval of a perfect fourth. Ficino has named and loosely described the diatonic and chromatic tetrachords, and described, but not named, the enharmonic tetrachord. Sec Gustave Reese, Music in the Middle Ages (New York, 1950), 23-24. For this and the following note I am indebted to Professors Charles R. Forker and Theodore Diaconoff. '^'Whereas the musical theory and practice of Ficino's time included "harmony" in the modern sense of tones sounded simultaneously, Greek music did not. For the Greeks "harmony" apparently meant the proper adjustment of singly-sounded notes to one another. Plato is often careless or casual with musical terms and he uses this word loosely. Ficino follows him in

**'Sophist

253C
II,

'*'Republic

this respect.

'*^Laws
'*'Pliny,

II,

654AC; Republic III, 412AB. Natural History VII, Ivi, 192-193

"ex quo apparet aeternus

ff. [?]

litterarum usus"

Timaeus 29B; Laws

III,

677A

(But in

680A Plato

says that letters did not exist in the early period succeeding the flood.)

'**Phaedrus 274C-215B. Cf. Cicero,

tius,

Div. Inst.

I, vi;

De Natura Deorum III, 56; Lactanand Ficino's own preface to his Pimander translation

{Op. Om., 1836).

'*'Sop/w/216B.

'"See '"See

ref. 60;

and

also

Phaedrus 249CD.

is a strange one: his "semivowels" consist of double consonants, liquids, nasals and a sibilant. The liquids and nasals can become "vowel-like" when they are protracted, but normally, of course, we reserve the term "semi-vowel" for w andy. Priscian is the famous and voluminous grammarian who lived in Constan-

ref. 147.

To

us Hermes' classification

tinople in the sixth century.

I, 117B-118B, 129AB, 133CE; II. 146E ff. ^"Phaedo 99D. The reference here is to the Aeme po<: nXoOc.

'"Alcibiades

''*Sententiae, line 331 (Loeb). Ficino is using the incorrect form "Publius." The correct form "Publilius" was established by Woelfflin in

References

545

P/i/7o/.xxii (1865), 439.

'"Cf. Cicero, Academica

38-39.

11,

94-98 and

De Natura Deorum
Academicos

I,

11;

Lactantius, Div. Inst. Ill, Iv-vi; Augustine, Contra

III, xvii,

"*Menexenus 235E. For the '''Symposium 201 D ff.

ref. to

Connus

cf.

Euthydemus 272C.

"On The Divine Names IV, 12 {PG, 3, 709B) and passim. '*'Phaedn4s 257A (see ref. 60); Symposium 202E.
''"Laws IV, 715E-716A. (See
'*'This
frag.
is

ref. 161 and Kern, frag. 21). from the Orphic fragment known as the Hymn of Jove (Kern, 21a, lines 2 and 3; and 168, lines 2 and 4). The fragment is quoted in the

Pseudo- Aristotle,

De Mundo
is

7, in

Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica

is

III, 9,

and

in Proclus, In Plat.

Tim. 28C. Ficino's source

Aristotelian version (which

probably the Pseudoshorter than, and differs from, the version in

it

Eusebius and Proclus) since he had already translated

grino Alio {Op. Om., 614,
i.e.

in a letter to Pere-

the De Divino Furore) dated

3,

December

1457.

'"On The Divine Names IV, x {PG. '"r/maeus29E.

''*

708B).

Republic

II,

380D-381C.

Names IV, xx {PG, 3, 720A) and passim [?]. '"The following passage is borrowed in a somewhat abbreviated and emended form from the Summa Contra Gentiles III, xvii, paragraphs 7, 8 and
'*'On The Divine
9.

'''CratylusAnC.
"'Republic Wl,50%Aff.
'*'See Ficino's

called Palinode of

Op. Om., 934, Orpheus (Kern,

1, line 12.

This

hymn

is

a version of the so-

frag. 247; see

my p.

Ill

and

ref. 25).

""See ch. 13 of Ficino's

own translation of the Pimander in

his

Op. Om.,

1856

Op. Om.. 1854). ''' Republic yi,505E.

(cf. ch. 12,

'"This

is

a difficult passage. Natura again refers to a part of the "irra-

body which is also called the "vital complexion." Ficino himself defmes it: "In each living body there is a certain effective and vital disposition or complexion, which the animating power of
tional" soul, to a quality inherent in the
its
is

soul gives to the body.

The

Platonists say that this

is

the nature of bodies;

it

like

a trace or shadow of the soul in the body" {Op. Om., 289).

I

To empha-

size this fact

The sense "which has

is

have translated natura here as *'our nature." part of the "rational" soul and it alone is capable of pleasure

sight" {videns) as opposed to the blind pleasure {quasi caeca

voluptas) which the feeling

and the natural complexion experience. "'Olympiodorus (Damascius), Lectures on the Philebus 155, etc. ''*Phaedrus 248A, 249C; Phaedo 65C, 65E-66A & passim; Theaetetus 173E ff. [?] or 185C-E [?]; Nicomachean Ethics X, 1177a-1179a.

546

References

'"Gorgias 46SA-C, 509E; Protagoras 355 A, 358CD,

"*Cf. Augustine, City of God XI, 29 '"Cf. Cicero,
''*\iTgi\,
(cf. ref. 38).

etc.

De Senectute xiii, 44.

Eclogue III, 93. '"Phaedrus 247E & 248 A. ''"Phaedrus 247C-248A, 249B-D. ''LflW5V,730C. '*^Phaedrus 241C. This is a garbled version. (Cf.
''Lfl>v5lV,716C.
'*The following passage
is

my p.

165 and ref. 80.)

borrowed

in

a somewhat abbreviated and

III,

emended form from the Summa Contra

11,14,15,16.
'*'Enneads ^**Enneads
I, iv,

Gentiles

xxvi, paragraphs 9, 10,

2, 3, 6, 14.
6.

I, iv,

''Cf. the letter to

Orlandini (Appendix

III)

and
it

my

Introduction. Notice

that this passage

still

is

omitted in the manuscripts:

will.

suggests a solution which

subordinates the
"Ficino
is

But see

Kristeller,

Philosophy, 275.

quoting from his

own

Latin translation of Socrates' proposal

in the

Philebus 23 C to divide
si vis,

all

existing things into

two or three

classes.

Ficino's Latin runs:

"Omnia quae nunc

trifariam."

in universo sunt, bifariam distin-

guamus, immo,

'*The fullest Neoplatonic elaborations of the importance of the limit

and

the infmite as cosmogonic principles are Syrianus, In Metaphysica

Com-

mentaria 112, 14

and Proclus, Platonic Theology III, vii-ix (and also on the Timaeus I, 176 and Parmenides 1119 ff.). We do not know, however, if Ficino had direct access to any of these by 1469. There is also the possibiUty Ficino is recalling the argumentation in Henry
ff.

Proclus' commentaries

of Ghent's

Summa

Theologica 21 2, 14.
,

The terminus (limit) and the infinitum (the infinite) are Ficino's choices for the Greek peras and apeiron. Although they seem to function with antinomic
force in Plato there are

many

inherent ambiguities. Jowett, for instance,

it

lists

the bundle of associations surrounding the term apeiron:

"is the negative of

measure or

limit; the

unthinkable, the unknowable; of which nothing can be

affirmed; the mixture of chaos which preceded distinct kinds in the creation of
the world; the
first

vague impression of sense; the more or

is

less

which refuses

to be reduced to rule, having certain affinities with evil, with pleasure, with

ignorance, and which in the scale of being

tiful

farthest

removed from the beauIll,

and good" (The Dialogues of Plato,

'^"Parmenides 137C-142B. '^'Parmenides 137C-142B,
'''Timaeus 51 AB.

rev.

4th ed. [Oxford, 1953], vol.

p. 537).

'^'Timaeus 47Ef{.

References

547

'**Parmenides 137C-142B.
**^

Hymn to the Night {l)

11:

bearq

yap dvdjKri

-noPTa KpaTvvei.

'**RepublicX, 616C-617D.
'^'Parmenides 1 42B- 1 57B.

'"See Ficino's
p.

own translation of the Pimander {Op. Om.,

1841) and

my

417 and

ref. 206.

and 201) and Op. Om., omnis omatus eorum"; and Plato's Gorgias 507E-508A and Timaeus 29D-30A. Omatus is
'**Philebus 66C (see

my pp.

257, 405 and refs. 139

1847. Cf. Genesis 2:1, "Igitur perfecti sunt coeli et terra, et

the adorning of chaos in the sense that

result being the

it is

the cancellation of the void, the

cosmos

(i.e.

order). In the

Symposium commentary
all

I,

iii

Ficino writes:
the Ideas
that
is

"To

designate this gathering together of

the forms and

all

word mundus in Latin and the word kosmos in Greek, adornment" (Formarum omnium idearumque complexionem, mundum latine, grece kosmon, id est, omamentum vocamus). For "chaos" setOxiAit\x&,Argonautica, 12 and 415, and Kern, frag. 66b [?].

we

use the

to say,

'"'Sophist

254D

ff .

(cf. my pp. 257, 403 and refs. 139 and 199). '"Sophist 254D-256E. Ficino translates to f ov amb as ens ipsum

"'See Philebus 66C

(254D), though in English this

is

often rendered as "being."

'"77mfleM5 30A.

"*This could be Philo of Larissa but

Eusebius, Historia Ecclesia
II,

is

more probably Philo Judaeus. Cf

and Praeparatio Evangelica VII, 13. See too The Wisdom of Solomon 11:21, "Sed onmia in mensura, et numero, et pondere disposuisti" (this was an oft-quoted text); and Augustine, De Libero
18

/4rW/r;o

II,

16,41 ff.

"'Ficino

is again quoting from Socrates' proposal at 23C (see ref. 188). "*Orpheus, Argonautica, 12 and Kern, frag. 66b [?]. "'See Ficino's own translation of the Pimander, ch. iii (Op. Om., 1841).

"^'Timaeus 48A

ref. to

the cosmos (cf. ref. 199).

I, 15, 29 (cf. too his DePrincipiisW^ 1,4 [?],

"'Augustine,

De
1,

Genesi

Ad Litteram

De

Genesi

Contra Manichaeos

17, 11); Origen,

''"Phaedrus 248A, 250A-B.

'''Phaedo 66D-68B.

"^L.G. Westerink

in his article, "Ficino's

Marginal Notes on Olympio-

dorus in Riccardi Greek MS. 37," Traditio, 24 (1968), p. 354, identifies three of these four odd chapters as being Ficino's "reading notes" on Damascius'

commentary on the Philebus. De intelligentia et voluptate eorumque mixtura (#1) are notes on paragraphs 10-13 in "a rewritten version"; Quod neque intelligentia neque voluptas est finis, minime vero voluptas (#2) are notes on paragraphs 121-126; Quomodo dialecticae officium artificiumque sit Dei munus divinitatemque imitetur (#4) are notes on paragraphs 54-56. But Quomodo essentia componatur ex uno, multitudine, termino, infmito. Item de generibus

548

References

entis (#3)

Westerink says are "reflections" on the Philebus

itself (i.e.

on

16C9-10) and apparently have "no connection with Damascius." Westerink has one surprising observation, however: he argues that the word

must refer to Ficino's "private reading" of Damascius, not to his on the grounds that "otherwise the agreement could not be so complete." This is open to several objections. The word iisdem emphasizes the fact that the four odd chapters belong to the same (sic) category as the rest of the commentary and Westerink nowhere suggests that the whole commentary is simply a collection of reading notes. To the contrary, he is at pains to show
lectiones
lectures,

how little evidence there is to suggest that Ficino ever referred to his reading of
references (see note 11 of

Damascius, apart from the three odd chapters and three other very minor my Introduction). Next, at the end of the four odd
is

a postscript containing the word lectio (p. 439); here it refers on the first parts of the Philebus, and reading would not make sense. Finally, the word lectio also appears in the alternative title to the whole commentary and must again refer to lectures (see my note on the
chapters there
speciflcally to lectures
titles).

In short, the evidence indicates that the editor of the

Commentaria

in Pla-

tonem, or perhaps the "literary executor" who Westerink posits as finding "some separate sheets" in Ficino's manuscript volume, did not realize three of these four odd chapters were reading notes on Damascius: after all, he

had no connection with Damascius. He must have assumed automatically that the four chapters were stray lecture notes which Ficino himself had composed on the Philebus but not yet incorporated into the body of his commentary: hence the wording of the two postscripts
inserted a fourth chapter that

(my pp. 425 and 439).

'"See Porphyry's

De

Abstinentia Animalium as excerpted by Ficino,

est

paragraph

2, entitled,

"beatitudo non
12.

divinorum cognitio sed

vita divina"

{Op. Om., 1932).

"*Enneads

I, iv,

'"Aristotle, Physics II, 2, 194a, 21. Cf. too Seneca,

Moral Epistle

65, 3.

*'*Timaeus 47BC; Protagoras 321E

^''Statesman

[?].
[?].

271DE

[?];

Protagoras 320D-322A
ff.

"Origen, Against Celsus IV, 560

. .

"Avicenna's Theory of Prophecy (Toronto, 1964), 159-178. '"Fulgentius, Mythologiae II, i. Cf. Plutarch, De Liberis Educandis 10 {Moralia 8A); Plato, Republic IV, 439D ff. and IX, 580D ff; and Ficino's
.

For Avicenna see M.E. Marmura, ," in The Seed of Wisdom, ed. by W.S.

McCuUough

proem to Lorenzo (Appendix

"''Odyssey X,2Sl-306.

III).

"'Aeneid VI, 136

cated the

ff.

Servius, the

first

great Virgil commentator, expli-

terms of the Greek word hyle, meaning both "forest" and the "elemental chaos" (In Vergilii Aeneidem VI, f.256r). His explication

word silva

in

References

549

became the standard one for the Middle Ages and then entered Renaissance dictionaries and the variorum editions of Virgil.
"*S/. John's

into the

Gospel

1:5.

"'Ibid.

"*Aeneid\l, 131. '"St. John 's Gospel 1:13. "^AeneidWl, 147. "'St. John 's Gospel6:U. "*AeneidWl,lA6. "*Aeneid\l,l43. ""Timaeids 69D.
'/>Sfl/m 72:28 (Vulgate).

"'Psalm 50:14
"'See Ficino's
Sup. Fie,
II,

ff.

(Vulgate).
translation of the

own

Symbola {Op. Om.,

1979); see also

98 where Ficino, in annotating lamblichus and this particular apothegm, says: "The pleasures of the body have a black tail, though they
present a beautiful face."

"*Cf. Vorphyry's Life of Pythagoras. 39. "'Cf. Aratus, Phaenomena, 96-136; Ovid, Metamorphoses

I,

150; Virgil,

Eclogue IV,

and Lactantius, D/v. Inst. V, v. "*Fulgentius, Mythologiae II, i (see the first of the ten excerpts and
6;

ref.

219 above).

"^enophon. Memorabilia
and
III, v.

II,

i,

21-34; cf. Cicero,

De

Officiis

I,

xxxii

Ficino

is

quoting from a poet as yet unidentified, for the same lines

occur elsewhere in his Op. Om., 920.3; 949.2; 958.1; 1309.1.

"*Parmenides passim.

"*Phaedo 80AB. ^*''Theaetetus 176BC. "'Phaedrus 247E.

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Fathers.

Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles. Trans, the Dominican London, 1928. Also trans. Dr. Pegis et al. under the title On the

Truth of the Catholic Faith. New York, 1956. Argan, Giuseppe C. Brunelleschi. Milan, 1955. Armstrong, A.H., ed. The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge, 1%7.
Bisticci,

Vespasiano da. Vite di uomini

J.

illustri

del secolo
1964.

XV.

Florence, 1938.

Bolgar, R.R. The Classical Heritage.

New York,

Bouwsma, WiUiam

"Postel and the Significance of Renaissance Caba-

lism." Renaissance Essays. Ed. P.O. Kristeller and P.P. Wiener.

New

York, 1%8. Pp. 252-66. Buck, A. Der Platonismus in den Dichtungen Lorenzo de'Medicis. Berlin,
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Index of Names in the Texts

Adam

556

Index of Names

Cronos (Saturnus)

Index of Names

557

lamblichus

558

Index of Names

Peripatetici

113,181,183
143
73, 115, 133, 217, 235, 237, 271, 275, 277,

Persae
Philebus
Philo (Judaeus ?) Philolaus

279, 287, 333, 339, 341, 455, 483

415
403
133
(see Apollo)

Philomidia (Venus)

Phoebus
Phoenicia
Plato

275
73, 109, 113, 117, 119, 121, 123, 125, 127,
129, 135, 145, 147, 149, 169, 171, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183, 209, 211, 219, 231, 233, 243,

249, 257, 281, 311, 327, 331, 347, 357, 359,

381, 383, 385, 387, 403, 405, 425, 431, 433,

455,485,487,498,502,508;
Alcibiades 13, 121,279;

Apologia Socratis 235;

Clitopho \2\;
Cratylus 139, 141, 165, 215, 229, 247 (also
the argumentum), 299;
/7/5/M/flel35, 137, 165, 191;

EuthydemuslZ,

119, 121, 133;

Gorg/a5 117, 165,213,331;

Legesll, 117, 121, 137, 165, 213, 229, 235;

II:

269;

III:

271; IV:

135, 243, 293, 359;

V: 357; X: 99; XI: 141;

Menexenus 287;

Meno

121;

Parmenides 97, 99, 107, 141, 179, 219, 233, 237,387,389,391,397,485;

Phaedo
485;

165, 177, 179, 191, 213, 217, 327,

Phaedrus 137, 141, 165, 231, 237, 239, 271,

273, 291, 327, 353, 355, 357, 423, 485, 489;

Philebus 383, 385, 389, 425, 439, 485, 487,

489;
Politicus 85, 135, 137, 145, 169, 219, 243,

245, 257, 435;

Protagoras 123, 135, 241, 331, 435;

Respublica 107, 109, 135, 175, 179, 191, 213,

219,265,311;
II:

117, 295; III: 269; VI: 107, 125;

VII: 73, 229, 231; X: 137, 165, 395

Sophista 219, 257, 265, 273, 405, 407;

Index of Names

559

Symposium

137, 289, 291, 489;

Theaetetus 321, 485, 504;

Timaeus 135, 137, 177, 179, 191, 199, 213,

239, 245, 255, 267, 271, 295, 389, 417, 435,

443, 457
Platonici

560

Index of Names

Timaeus

193 177

Timon
Ulixes

449

Varro