fm3 20

FM 3-20.
96
Field Manual HEADQUARTERS
No 3-20.96 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 23 December 2002
CAVALRY SQUADRON (RSTA)
CONTENTS
PREFACE .................................................................................................................. iv
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................1-1
Cavalry Squadron (RSTA) Organization ..................................................................1-3
Cavalry Squadron (RSTA) Missions.........................................................................1-6
Stryker Brigade Combat Team Overview.................................................................1-8
Operational Environment........................................................................................1-10
Battlefield Operating Systems ................................................................................1-20
Chapter 2 BATTLE COMMAND ...............................................................................................2-1
The Art of Command ................................................................................................2-1
The Command and Control System .........................................................................2-7
Communications.....................................................................................................2-31
Computers ..............................................................................................................2-40
Chapter 3 RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS ................................3-1
Fundamentals...........................................................................................................3-3
Reconnaissance Planning ......................................................................................3-14
Forms of Reconnaissance......................................................................................3-20
Surveillance Operations .........................................................................................3-38
Surveillance Planning .............................................................................................3-40
Reconnaissance Handover ....................................................................................3-42
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only
to protect technical or operational information that is for official government use. This determination was made on
12 June 2001. Other requests for this document will be referred to Commander, US Army Armor Center, ATTN:
ATZK-TDD-C, Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121-5000.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will protect disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
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FM 3-20.96________________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 4 SECURITY OPERATIONS.......................................................................................4-1

Purpose, Fundamentals, and Planning Considerations ...........................................4-3
Screen ......................................................................................................................4-7
Area and High-Value Asset Security ......................................................................4-26
Route Security ........................................................................................................4-29
Convoy Security .....................................................................................................4-32
Chapter 5 ENABLING OPERATIONS ......................................................................................5-1
Movement.................................................................................................................5-2
Assembly Areas........................................................................................................5-8
Infiltration/Exfiltration ..............................................................................................5-12
Linkup Operations ..................................................................................................5-17
Relief Operations....................................................................................................5-23
Retrograde Operations ...........................................................................................5-27
Battle Handover and Passage of Lines ..................................................................5-32
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defensive Operations......................................5-40
River Crossing Operations .....................................................................................5-48
Obstacle Breaching Operations .............................................................................5-51
Operations in a Noncontiguous Environment.........................................................5-58
Chapter 6 COMBAT SUPPORT ...............................................................................................6-1
Relationships and Responsibilities...........................................................................6-2
Employ Fires.............................................................................................................6-3
Army Airspace Command and Control...................................................................6-21
Army Aviation Support............................................................................................6-30
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare........................................................................6-84
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Support ............................................................6-98
Engineer Support....................................................................................................6-99
Air Defense Artillery Support ................................................................................6-106
Signal Support ......................................................................................................6-110
National and Joint Intelligence Assets..................................................................6-117
Chapter 7 SQUADRON URBAN OPERATIONS......................................................................7-1
Components of the Urban Area................................................................................7-2
Threat Urban Operations..........................................................................................7-7
Stryker Brigade Combat Team’s Role in Urban Operations ..................................7-14
Planning..................................................................................................................7-18
Execution ................................................................................................................7-37
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___________________________________________________________________Cavalry Squadron (RSTA)
Chapter 8 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT/SUSTAINMENT ...................................................8-1

Fundamentals...........................................................................................................8-1
Brigade Support Battalion.......................................................................................8-16
Squadron Organization...........................................................................................8-46
Combat Service Support Planning .........................................................................8-51
Trains and Logistics Package Operations..............................................................8-55
Supply and Transportation .....................................................................................8-66
Maintenance ...........................................................................................................8-72
Field Services .........................................................................................................8-75
Personnel Support..................................................................................................8-76
Combat Health Support ..........................................................................................8-85
Reconstitution.........................................................................................................8-91
Appendix A MDMP PROCESS/OPORD GUIDE ........................................................................ A-1
Appendix B FORCE PROTECTION ........................................................................................... B-1
Appendix C COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AND BATTLE TRACKING.................................. C-1
Appendix D STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS................................. D-1
Appendix E DEPLOYMENT........................................................................................................ E-1
Appendix F INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS .................................................................................... F-1
Appendix G SURVEILLANCE TROOP.......................................................................................G-1
Appendix H COMMAND POST OPERATIONS.......................................................................... H-1
Appendix I ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ..........................................................................I-1
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................Bibliography-1
INDEX................................................................................................................Index-1
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FM 3-20.96________________________________________________________________________________
Preface
This manual provides doctrine for the employment of the Cavalry Squadron (Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, and Target Acquisition [RSTA]).
FM 3-20.96 describes the tactical employment and operations of the RSTA Squadron. It
describes RSTA operations in support of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).
FM 3-20.96 is the doctrinal foundation that governs the development of equipment, training,
and structure of the squadron and its subordinate troops.
This manual covers basic doctrine in tactics, techniques of employment, organization,
exercise on command, control, movements, and tactical operations appropriate to the
squadron and its recce troops, surveillance troop, HHT, reconnaissance platoon, sensor
platoon, UAV platoon, and NBC platoon organic to the SBCT.
The procedures described herein are intended as a guide only and are not to be considered
inflexible. Each situation in war and military operations other than war must be resolved by
intelligent interpretation and application of the doctrine set forth herein.
This manual is designed for use with FM 3-21.31 (SBCT). The publication reflects and
supports the Army operations doctrine as stated in FM 3-0. Readers should be familiar with
FM 3-90.3 [FM 71-3], FM 3-20.97 [FM 17-97], FM 3-90 [FM 100-40], FM 3-91
[FM 71-100], FM 3-55 [FM 100-55], FM 1-02 [FM 101-5-1], and FM 3-20.98 [FM 17-98].
Examples and graphics are provided to illustrate principles and concepts, not to serve as
prescriptive responses to tactical situations. This publication provides units with the doctrinal
foundation to train leaders, guide tactical planning, and develop standing operating procedures
(SOP).
US Army Armor Center is the proponent for this publication. Submit comments and
recommended changes and the rational for those changes on DA Form 2028 (Recommended
Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to: Commander, US Army Armor Center, ATTN:
ATZK-TDD-C, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000, or e-mail comments to
Doctrine@knox.army.mil, attention to Chief, Cavalry Branch.
Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
iv
Chapter 1
Introduction
The cavalry squadron,
reconnaissance, CONTENTS
surveillance, and Cavalry Squadron (RSTA) Organization ........... 1-3
target acquisition Headquarters and Headquarters Troop ........ 1-3
Recce Troops .................................................. 1-5
(RSTA) of the Stryker
Surveillance Troop.......................................... 1-6
brigade combat team Cavalry Squadron (RSTA) Missions.................. 1-6
(SBCT) is carefully Capabilities...................................................... 1-7
designed to provide Limitations/Risks ............................................ 1-8
accurate and timely Stryker Brigade Combat Team Overview.......... 1-8
SBCT Capabilities and Organization ............. 1-8
information over a SBCT Operations ............................................ 1-10
large and complex Operational Environment................................... 1-10
operational Characteristics of the Operational
environment. This Environment................................................. 1-10
Battlefield Environments ................................ 1-14
environment is
Re-Examining the Contact Paradigm ............ 1-15
characterized by a Reconnaissance Purpose .............................. 1-19
new threat armed Battlefield Operating Systems........................... 1-20
with equipment from Intelligence ...................................................... 1-21
advances in global Maneuver ......................................................... 1-21
Fire Support..................................................... 1-21
weapons proliferation Air Defense ...................................................... 1-22
and unconventional Mobility and Survivability ............................... 1-22
terrorist/guerilla Combat Service Support ................................ 1-22
operating tactics. Command and Control ................................... 1-22
These asymmetrical
tactics are in use by regular and irregular forces, special forces,
terrorists, political factions, supporting government factions,
nongovernmental agencies, transnational organizations, organized
criminal groups, and even refugee populations. The geographical
area in which these threats choose to operate is characterized by
varying terrain, ranging from complex urban sprawl to areas with
weak infrastructure supported by inferior roads, bridges, and
transportation networks.
The squadron is essential to successful SBCT operations within this

environment in that it—
• Provides a significant dismounted/mounted reconnaissance

force, integrated with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV); a
ground sensor platoon; and a nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) reconnaissance platoon, that shapes
operations throughout the SBCT’s area of operations (AO).
• Enables the brigade commander to employ his ground forces
and joint fires precisely at the time and place of his choosing.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Assures protection of the highly mobile, light-armored force

by providing timely and accurate information.
• Allows the brigade commander to make decisions necessary
for the judicious application of power.
The squadron operations are key to the success of the SBCT in

combat. As the eyes and ears of the commander, the squadron
provides a great deal of the information and intelligence required to
conduct proper planning, direct operations, and visualize the
battlefield. In tactical operations that are characterized by non-
traditional adversaries and asymmetric application of capabilities,
the squadron accomplishes the complex task of building knowledge
in a very confusing, often unpredictable, environment. The squadron
possesses robust capabilities to successfully meet the varied and
unique intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
challenges inherent in smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations
and in major theaters of war (MTW). Done properly, RSTA operations
have extraordinarily high payoff in the areas of early warning, force
protection, battle damage assessment (BDA), and preservation of
freedom of maneuver. In addition, RSTA operations allow the
commander to shape the battlefield, accepting or initiating combat at
the time and place of his choosing and applying SBCT combat power
in the manner most likely to achieve desired effects and outcomes.
The fundamental role of the squadron is to conduct ISR operations

to develop and share a common operational picture (COP) of the
operational environment throughout the brigade. The COP is an
operational picture tailored to the SBCT commander’s requirements
for information of friendly forces, threat forces, and the terrain. It is
based on common data and information shared with subordinate or
adjacent commands. Analysis of the COP together with a
commander’s application of his experience and judgment establishes
a relationship among the factors of METT-TC [mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available,
and civil considerations], which leads to situational understanding
(SU). Situational understanding facilitates decision making by
identifying opportunities for mission accomplishment, threats to the
force, and gaps in information. The squadron provides data and
combat information to build the knowledge base necessary for the
SBCT to achieve situational understanding.
One key concept that enables the squadron to provide accurate and
timely information to the brigade is situational awareness (SA).
Situational awareness is seeing the battlefield: the impact of terrain,
the friendly situation, and the threat situation. The squadron
develops SA and its own SU to enhance its ability to conduct
successful ISR operations.
1-2
________________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction
Outfitted with Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS)

and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and
given clear commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR),
the squadron provides tremendous input into the situational
understanding of the SBCT. With its human intelligence (HUMINT)
collection capability (intelligence collected and provided by human
sources such as scouts and counterintelligence [CI] soldiers), sensor
assets from the surveillance troop, and access to other ISR
reachback information, the squadron is significantly capable of
providing situational awareness and understanding to itself and to
the SBCT. As it provides the SBCT with situational understanding,
the squadron fulfills its mission and answers the CCIR of the
brigade.
SECTION I – CAVALRY SQUADRON (RSTA) ORGANIZATION
1-1. The squadron serves as the brigade commander’s primary

eyes, ears, and sensors, and as the first line military assessment for
information gathered through ISR. As such, it is designed to
efficiently direct and execute information collection.
1-2. The squadron is composed of five troops: headquarters and
headquarters troop (HHT), three reconnaissance (recce) troops, and a
surveillance troop (see Figure 1-1).
HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP

1-3. The HHT consists of the command and control (C2) nodes and
logistical assets needed for the squadron to conduct and sustain
operations. The headquarters troop organization includes a small
mobile command group, the troop headquarters section, S1/S4
section, S2 section, S3 section, S6 [signal officer] section, and
medical section (see Figure 1-2). The organization of these elements
for combat operations is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 8.
1-3
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 1-1. Squadron Organization
1-4
Figure 1-2. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop

Organization
1-5
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
RECCE TROOPS
1-4. Each of the three recce troops includes a troop headquarters,
three recce platoons, and a mortar section (see Figures 1-3, 1-4, and
1-5). The three recce platoons are organized with four reconnaissance
vehicles with crews and a scout section (equipped with Javelins) for
dismounted reconnaissance. The mortar section consists of two 120-
mm self-propelled mortars and a fire direction center (FDC).
Figure 1-3. Recce Troop Organization – Troop Headquarters
Figure 1-4. Recce Troop Organization – Recce Platoons
1-6
Figure 1-5. Recce Troop Organization – Mortar Section
SURVEILLANCE TROOP
1-5. The surveillance troop provides the squadron commander a
mix of specialized capabilities built around airborne and ground
mobile sensors (see Appendix G). The UAV platoon launches, flies,
recovers, and maintains the squadron’s four aerial reconnaissance
platforms. The ground sensor platoon consists of ground-based radio
signals intercept and direction-finding teams capable of conducting
nodal and pattern analysis of area communications activities. The
ground sensor platoon provides remotely emplaced acoustics
monitoring capabilities that capture sophisticated threat personnel
and equipment measurements and signatures. The platoon also has
a dedicated communications terminal that transmits, reports, and
receives voice, data, digital, and imagery from sources through
national level.
1-6. The NBC recce platoon provides a special reconnaissance
capability and performs five critical tasks on the battlespace—detect,
identify, mark, report, and sample. It conducts route, zone, and area
NBC reconnaissance to determine the presence and extent of NBC
contamination. It can locate and identify life-threatening chemical
warfare agents and radiological contaminants. It does not have a
biological detection/identification capability, but can take samples of
suspected biological hazards for transfer to a Theater Army Medical
Laboratory (TAML) for further analysis. The platoon has three M93A1
NBCRS vehicles (FOX) equipped with the M21 Remote Sensing
Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL), capable of detecting nerve (GA, GB,
and GD) and blister (H and L) agent vapors at a line of sight distance
up to 5 kilometers.
SECTION II – CAVALRY SQUADRON (RSTA) MISSIONS
1-7. The squadron’s primary missions that support the SBCT’s

offense, defense, and stability and support operations are—
• Reconnaissance: (see Chapter 3).
Area reconnaissance.
Zone reconnaissance.
• Security: (see Chapter 4).
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Screen.
Area security.
1-8. The squadron is optimized to conduct ISR on the full range of
threats throughout the brigade’s AO. This means that the squadron’s
orientation is on the AO and the wide variety of threats that will face
the brigade. By leveraging information technology and air-ground
scout capabilities in complex and urban terrain, the squadron can
develop the situation by focusing on designated AOs and
multidimensional and asymmetrical threats. This empowers the
brigade commander to achieve battlefield mobility and agility while
choosing the time and place to confront the threat and the preferred
method of engagement. The squadron commander has a myriad of
tools to assist him in conducting ISR missions within MTW as well as
the more complex environment found in SSC. He task organizes his
assets to optimize the complementary effects of his ISR assets while
effectively covering the brigade’s AO.
CAPABILITIES
1-9. The squadron is organized to provide the following
capabilities:
• Provide all-weather, continuous, accurate, and timely ISR
in complex, close, and urban terrain.
• Engage in close reconnaissance with threat forces by
maximizing the teaming of HUMINT (ground scouts and CI
soldiers); and UAV, NBC reconnaissance, and ground
surveillance radar (GSR)/PROPHET assets.
• Gather information about multidimensional threats that
range from conventional to unconventional, and use
asymmetrical tactics to include—
Regular and irregular forces.
Special forces.
Terrorists.
Political factions.
Supporting government factions.
Criminal elements and nongovernmental agencies.
• Support targeting, using ground reconnaissance and UAV
assets.
• Rapidly develop the situation in depth.
• Rapidly deploy.
• Conduct stealthy ISR operations.
• Reduce risk to the brigade by assuring survivability
through information to avoid contact or achieve force
overmatch if contact is necessary.
• Assist in shaping the battlespace environment by
providing information or directing precision joint fires to
disrupt the threat commander’s decision cycle and deny
him planned or future options.
1-8
• Establish analog and digital information linkages

horizontally within the squadron and vertically to the
brigade and subordinate command nodes, which also
facilitates the employment of army or joint fires to achieve
the desired effects.
• Conduct collaborative and parallel planning that is fully
integrated with higher and adjacent units and results in
rapid and efficient orders dissemination.
• Act as an alternate brigade command post (CP) when
necessary.
• Conduct target acquisition for the brigade and the brigade
effects coordination cell.
• Fight for information against light/motorized forces or
heavier threats when augmented.
LIMITATIONS/RISKS
1-10. The squadron does have limitations that can be reduced with
proper employment and/or augmentation.
• Lacks standoff, lethality, and survivability in open and
rolling terrain and needs augmentation when a heavy
armor threat is anticipated.
• Requires augmentation to perform traditional cavalry
roles, such as security and economy of force operations.
• Has limited combat service support (CSS) assets
frequently operating over extended distances.
SECTION III – STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM OVERVIEW
1-11. The SBCT is a full-spectrum combat force. It has utility in all

operational environments, but is designed and optimized primarily
for employment in SSCs in complex and urban terrain, confronting
low-end and mid-range threats that may employ both conventional
and asymmetric capabilities. The SBCT deploys rapidly, executes
early entry, and conducts effective combat operations immediately on
arrival to prevent, contain, stabilize, or resolve a conflict through
shaping and decisive operations. The SBCT participates in an MTW,
with augmentation, in a variety of possible roles as a subordinate
maneuver component within a division or corps. The SBCT also
participates with appropriate augmentation in stability and support
operations as an initial entry force and/or to provide security for
stability forces by means of its extensive combat capabilities.
SBCT CAPABILITIES AND ORGANIZATION

1-12. As a full spectrum combat force, the SBCT typically maintains
an offensive orientation. However, depending on the nature and
evolution of the contingency, it is capable of conducting all major
doctrinal operations, including offensive, defensive, stability, and
support operations. Its core operational capabilities rest upon
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
excellent operational and tactical mobility, enhanced situational

understanding, combined arms integration down to company level,
and high dismount strengths for close combat in urban and complex
terrain. When employed in the operational environment for which it
is optimized, the SBCT has the capability to achieve early decision as
a result of its rapid response, shaping, and decisive operations.
1-13. The SBCT will have the requisite capabilities to achieve
decision in conjunction with the joint fight in some contingencies. In
others, the conditions may develop in a direction that requires
additional capabilities not resident within the SBCT. As noted earlier,
when the SBCT participates in an MTW, it will do so as a subordinate
element within a division. Adjustments to task organization,
including augmentation, will be required. Operational analysis and
the experience of past conflicts suggest that the most likely
augmentation packages for the SBCT will include the following:
• Lift and/or attack aviation.
• Armor.
• Cannon or rocket artillery.
• Air defense.
• Military police.
• Civil affairs.
• Psychological operations.
• Combat and construction engineers.
• CSS structure to support augmentation forces.
• Additional ISR assets.
1-14. However, when employed in its optimal environment, the
SBCT is not expected to require significant augmentation. (See Figure
1-6.)
1-10
Figure 1-6. Stryker Brigade Combat Team Organization
1-11
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
SBCT OPERATIONS
1-15. The SBCT is a divisional brigade. The major fighting
components are its motorized infantry battalions. The squadron’s
primary role for the SBCT is to enhance situational understanding to
enable the SBCT to conduct decisive action in its AO.
1-16. The SBCT is specifically designed for employment as an early
entry combat force. Encompassing personnel strength of
approximately 3,900 configured in ready-to-fight combined arms
packages, the entire SBCT can deploy within 96 hours of alert
notification to “first aircraft wheels up” and begin operations
immediately upon arrival at the aerial port of debarkation (APOD). In
essence, the APOD is the tactical assembly area (TAA). The SBCT
cannot conduct forced entry, but it provides the joint force
commander an improved capability to arrive immediately behind
forced entry forces and begin operations to shape the battlespace and
execute decisive action to expedite decision. Once committed, the
SBCT can sustain operations for up to 180 days without relief. In
addition, the SBCT’s organization is expandable through either
augmentation or scalability in accordance with the factors of METT-
TC in any given contingency.
1-17. Operationally, the SBCT normally fights under a division. The
SBCT can also fight under the direct control of a corps headquarters,
which will likely be designated as the Army Force (ARFOR) and,
possibly, the Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC)
and/or Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters, within a joint or
combined command. The SBCT is fully complementary to and
compatible with air expeditionary forces and US Marine Corps forces,
and may fight alongside them. In many contingencies, the SBCT will
(at least initially) be the single US maneuver command operating
under the ARFOR/JFLCC, although other coalition elements may
also be present. The SBCT is dependent on the division and higher
echelons of command for reach-back linkages to higher echelons to
expand its capabilities in the areas of information, intelligence, joint
effects, force protection, and sustainment. (Chapter 6 discusses the
brigade assets and augmentation that is available to the squadron.)
SECTION IV – OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-18. Trends indicate an increasing availability and integration of
more sophisticated technology and unorthodox operational
approaches by potential opponents. Offsetting their inherent
weaknesses, conventional armor and mechanized threat forces will
seek advantage in urban and complex terrain to remain dispersed
and decentralized, adapting their tactics to provide them the best
success in countering a US response. Threats may also consist of
unconventional, paramilitary forces, militia, special police, or even
organized criminal organizations equipped with small arms, mortars,
machine guns, and mines. These asymmetrical approaches seek to
1-12
counter the technological and numerical advantages of US joint

systems and forces, and to exploit constraints placed on US forces
due to cultural bias, ubiquitous media, rules of engagement (ROE),
and distance from the crisis location.
1-19. Within this environment, the threat will be unpredictable and
capable of operating in a dispersed, decentralized manner. Threat
actions will include using sanctuaries to employ limited high-tempo
tactics in an advantageous manner. Threat actions range from
conventional to unconventional to terrorist in nature through clever,
cunning applications of sophisticated ambushes in close, complex, or
urban sprawl terrain. Therefore, the operational success is
dependent on accurate and timely ISR of the threat and the
environment.
1-20. In general, common foreign perceptions of US vulnerabilities
that may be exploited include unwillingness to accept heavy losses;
risk-aversion that will result in avoidance of close combat and
reliance on stand-off capabilities; sensitivity of national leadership to
domestic and world opinion; lack of commitment over time; and
predictable patterns of military operations. Additionally, since the US
military is primarily a power projection force, it is tied to an
operational construct requiring entry operations and a deliberate
build-up of force capabilities for contingency response. Today, this
strategy demands airfields and seaports in the AO, forward operating
bases for air forces, significant in-theater logistical stockpiles, secure
air and sea lines of communication (LOC), technical ISR capability as
well as long distance communications for C2—all of which can be
interdicted or denied to some degree.
1-21. From these perceptions we see some common emerging
threads for dealing with US forces:
• Development of capabilities to deny, limit, interrupt, or
delay US entry and disrupt subsequent actions within the
AO.
• Deliberate actions designed to create mass casualties.
• Employment of multiple means—political, economic,
military, and informational—to undermine the coherence
of alliances and coalitions.
• Offsetting US strengths by countering high-tech
advantages, often with low-tech methods or specific
“niche” capabilities.
• Adoption of unpredictable operational methods with rapid
transition to conventional operations when decision is
assured.
• Conducting technical exploitation of C2 nodes, networks,
and systems.
• Increasing standoff distances through exclusion or other
means to protect forces and capabilities.
• Maintaining and preserving viable conventional military
capabilities to destroy threat forces, secure territory, and
maintain regime security.
1-13
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
1-22. Potential adversaries recognize that the US will likely retain

overwhelming advantages in air and maritime forces. US air forces
will continue to deny an adversary’s ability to attack US forces with
fixed-wing air assets. Similarly, US maritime forces will assure secure
sea LOCs to any theater of operation. However, investments by
potential adversaries in air and missile defense, active and passive
sensor technology, and new munitions will make medium- to high-
altitude air operations increasingly vulnerable. Mines, missiles,
submarines, and other new technologies are having the same impact
on coastal naval operations. Widespread technological proliferation
will continue and even accelerate, allowing potential state and non-
state adversaries access to weapons of mass effects (conventional
and unconventional), ballistic and cruise missiles, precision
munitions, and information warfare capabilities. Those capabilities
will confer a powerful ability and potentially decisive advantages in
some regional settings to those who possess them.
1-23. The operation of the squadron differs from past cavalry
operations in that the procedures for planning and executing ISR to
gain an understanding of an opposing threat early are much different
today than in the past. During the Cold War, commanders and their
staffs relied on extensive templates of a predictable conventional
threat force. Today, the premium is less on templating predictability
and more on determining and disseminating reality, thereby resolving
the unpredictability over large areas. Great breakthroughs in
reconnaissance have been demonstrated thanks to technological
advances, particularly when used synergistically with human “eyes
on.” The daunting task of gaining an understanding of the opposing
threat can be achieved far more accurately, in less time, earlier, and
over greater distances than ever before. The squadron is the vital
asset not only to seeing current tactical events but also to predicting
threat actions, recommending courses of action (COA), recognizing
risks or opportunities, and most importantly, retaining freedom of
options for the commander and combat units.
CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR THEATERS OF WAR

1-24. MTWs have the greatest potential of occurring in regions
containing moderate to well-developed infrastructure (especially
roads, rail, and bridges), complex and urban terrain with large urban
areas, and diverse weather patterns.
1-25. The most dangerous potential threat remains those who have
the capacity to prosecute full-scale combat actions. Threat military
capabilities common to an MTW will comprise high-end industrial
age and information age forces. These will include modern heavy
armor and mechanized formations, precision artillery and rocket
forces, large numbers of high tech antitank weapons, extensive air
defense systems, antimissile and antistealth systems with access to
space-based command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. WMD will
be present and used where possible. Special Operations Forces
(SOF), state-controlled terrorist organizations, and paramilitary
1-14
forces will also be part of a strategy of simultaneous, distributed

operations both inside and outside of the AO.
1-26. In MTW environments, the SBCT is capable of conducting
division-supporting efforts or participating in the division’s main
effort. The mission of the squadron in an MTW is to conduct
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition for the brigade.
When augmented with armor and/or mechanized forces, the
squadron may conduct security operations.
1-15
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES

1-27. Historically, SSCs like those in Panama, Haiti, and Kosovo
have occurred in regions with weak infrastructure (especially roads,
rail, bridges), complex terrain with large urban areas, and diverse
weather patterns. Humanitarian issues, such as overpopulation;
resource shortages; natural disasters; and inadequate local, regional,
and global response capabilities, complicate operations in these
areas. Threats in these environments usually contain mid- to low-end
industrial-age forces characterized by limited heavy forces, mainly
equipped with small numbers of early generation tanks, and some
mechanized but mostly motorized infantry. There is a pervasive
presence of guerilla, terrorist, paramilitary, special purpose forces,
special police, and militia organizations. These forces are equipped
with man portable air defense (MANPAD) systems, antitank guided
missiles (ATGM), mortars, mines, explosives, and machine guns.
There are limited fixed- and rotary-wing aviation assets. These forces
can be expected, however, to have robust communications utilizing
conventional military devices augmented by commercial equipment
such as cell phones.
1-28. Most threats in this environment are capable of limited
duration and limited objective brigade and division level operations
(i.e., destruction of a weaker force, seizure of an area or region, or the
seizure of an urban center), often emphasizing the use of
decentralized and distributed operations. They are also capable of
conducting defensive operations in complex and urban terrain.
Likewise they are adept at conducting long-term, sustained,
unconventional terrorist and guerrilla operations. Present and future
trends indicate the presence of more sophisticated and advanced
technology; greater, more capable and secure command, control, and
communications (C3); increased use of urban areas as sanctuary for
conventional capability and as operating bases; and tactics oriented
on sophisticated ambush as a key operating focus.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS

1-29. A peacetime military engagement (PME) encompasses all
military activities that involve other nations and are intended to
shape the security environment in peacetime. PMEs include
programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other
nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual
understanding with other countries, and improve interoperability
with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Operations in
support of peacetime engagements are normally interagency in
character and are designed to address the fundamental causes of
instability that can lead to regional conflict. A PME further serves to
demonstrate US resolve to allies and adversaries alike, improving
interoperability, conveying democratic ideas, deterring aggression,
and helping to relieve sources of instability.
CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1-30. The squadron has unique capabilities that make it an
important asset to Army units executing missions as part of stability
1-16
operations and support operations. The squadron may perform a

variety of missions in a wide range of political, military, and
geographical environments and in both combat and noncombat
situations. These operations will normally be decentralized and can
require immediate decisions, down to the squad leader level, that
may have strategic or operational consequences. The distinction
between these roles and situations will not always be clear,
presenting unique challenges for the squadron, its leaders, and its
soldiers.
1-31. Stability operations are conducted outside the US and US
territories to promote and protect US national interests by
influencing political, civil, and military environments and by
disrupting specific illegal activities. Combatant commanders employ
Army forces to accomplish those goals by supporting diplomatic
initiatives, improving military to military relations, and by deterring
or resolving conflict. Their overall purpose is to promote and sustain
regional stability.
1-32. Support operations employ Army forces to assist foreign and
domestic civil authorities as they prepare for or respond to crises and
relieve suffering. Support continues until civil control can be
reestablished or support is no longer required. The overall purpose of
support operations is to meet the immediate needs of designated
groups, for a limited time, until civil authorities can accomplish these
tasks without Army assistance.
BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENTS
1-33. While retaining the ability to operate linearly, the squadron
will use advances in information and mobility capabilities to operate
routinely in a non-linear manner. Depending on the nature and
evolution of the operation, conditions may require the squadron to
operate in a continuum of linear battlespace, or to conduct
noncontiguous operations with tactical actions separated spatially,
but focused with respect to timing and purpose against key threat
capabilities and assets. Whether the squadron is conducting
operations in support of MTW, SSC, stability and support, or PME, it
must be prepared to conduct operations in noncontiguous or linear
battlespace. Figure 1-7 depicts combinations of contiguous and
noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear operations.
1-17
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 1-7. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Area of Operation
RE-EXAMINING THE CONTACT PARADIGM

1-34. For the SBCT, there is a new actions on contact paradigm. No
longer does the brigade have to rely on chance contact to deploy its
combat forces. The squadron and its subordinate elements develop
the situation for the SBCT and in effect pull the SBCT combat forces
to the decisive point of the SBCT commander’s choosing. The SBCT
contact paradigm consists of the following steps:
• Make contact through ATCCS/FBCB2 or other ISR assets.
• Evaluate/develop the situation (SA and SU) out of contact.
• Maneuver the force out of contact (choose a COA).
• Make contact on your own terms (execute a COA).
1-18
1-35. With information and intelligence from the SBCT and the
ARFOR/division resources, the squadron and its subordinate
elements have to adjust the way they make contact as well. Planning
considerations include understanding the time required to conduct
actions on contact, knowing the forms of contact, and the steps for
conducting actions on contact. The squadron analyzes the threat
throughout the military decision-making process (MDMP), primarily
the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, to identify
likely contact situations that may occur during an operation.
Intelligence reports from higher help to clarify the threat’s COAs and
likelihood of contact. Through the planning and rehearsals
conducted during the MDMP, they develop and refine COAs to deal
with the probable threat actions/contact. The COAs will eventually
become the foundation for the squadron’s scheme of maneuver.
1-36. During the MDMP, the leaders must evaluate a number of
factors to determine their impact on the unit’s actions on contact.
For example, the squadron needs to consider how the likelihood of
contact will affect its task organization, choice of movement
techniques, and formations. In doing this, the squadron can begin
preparing the unit for actions on contact; for example, it may outline
procedures for the transition to more secure movement techniques or
cue surveillance assets before a contact situation.
1-37. The squadron must understand that properly executed
actions on contact require time at both platoon and troop levels. To
fully develop the situation, a platoon or troop may have to execute
extensive lateral movement; dismount and remount scout squads,
and/or call for and adjust indirect fires. Each of these activities
requires time. The squadron must balance the time required for
subordinate elements to conduct actions on contact with the need of
the troop and squadron to maintain tempo and momentum. In terms
of slowing the tempo of an operation, however, the loss of a platoon
or team is normally much more costly than the additional time
required to allow the subordinate element to properly develop the
situation.
FORMS OF CONTACT
1-38. Contact occurs when a
member of the squadron encounters EIGHT FORMS OF CONTACT
any situation that requires an active
or passive response to the threat. • Visual
These situations may entail one or • Direct Fire
more of the following eight forms of • Indirect Fire
• Obstacles
contact:
• Aircraft
• Visual contact or • NBC
observation. • Electronic
• Nonhostile
• Physical contact (direct fire)
with a threat force.
• Indirect fire contact.
• Contact with threat obstacles or ones of unknown origin.
• Contact with threat or unknown aircraft.
1-19
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Situations involving NBC conditions.

• Situations involving electronic warfare tactics.
• Nonhostile. This is a new form of contact that covers
contact with personnel or elements that do not pose an
immediate lethal threat to friendly forces. Some examples
are:
Civilians (belligerent or nonhostile).
Factions (military forces).
1-39. The squadron may conduct actions on contact in response to
a variety of circumstances, including the following:
• Reports from recce troop(s)/platoon(s)/section(s)
conducting actions on contact.
• Reports from the SBCT.
• Reports from GSR/Improved Remotely Monitored
Battlefield Sensor System (IREMBASS), signal intelligence
(SIGINT)/ PROPHET, UAV (surveillance troop).
• Reports from or actions of an adjacent unit.
STEPS FOR CONDUCTING ACTIONS ON CONTACT

1-40. The squadron should execute actions on contact using a
logical, well-organized process of decision making. There are two
types of contact the unit can expect and prepare for—known and
chance. Known contact entails information and intelligence on
known locations or positions of threat forces. Known contact actions
entail these seven steps:
• Make contact through sensors and other ISR assets.
• Develop the situation out of contact (evaluate the situation
[update the IPB process]).
• Maneuver the force out of contact (choose how, with what,
and where to make contact).
• Make contact on your own terms (deploy and report).
• Reevaluate and develop the situation.
• Choose and recommend a COA.
• Execute the selected COA.
1-41. When there is no intelligence about the threat’s location,

chance contact may be made.
• Deploy and report.
• Reevaluate and develop the situation.
• Choose and recommend a COA.
• Execute the selected COA.
1-42. The seven- (or four-) step process is not intended to generate
a rigid, lockstep response to the threat. Rather, the goal is to provide
an orderly framework that enables the unit and its subordinates to
1-20
survive the initial contact, then apply sound decision making and
timely actions to complete the operation. Ideally, the unit will acquire
the threat (visual contact) before being sighted by the threat; it then
can continue with visual contact or initiate indirect contact or
physical contact on its own terms by executing the designated COA.
It is also essential for the squadron to understand the brigade
commander’s intent of the reconnaissance to recommend COAs for
the SBCT to react to the threat contact.
Make Contact through Sensors and Other ISR Assets
1-43. Ideally there will be information and intelligence on the threat
in the squadron’s AO. The squadron will get this contact through the
ATCCS and provide contact information to its subordinate elements
through FBCB2 or other radio reports.
Develop the Situation out of Contact
1-44. Based on the unit’s current situation, the leaders must
evaluate this information and determine if it will gain further contact
with this threat element to further develop the situation. The
squadron may endeavor to make contact with sensor assets to
minimize the danger to soldiers. Optimally, the squadron develops
the situation out of contact, allowing the brigade to do the same.
Maneuver the Force out of Contact
1-45. The squadron develops the situation out of contact and
maneuvers to a position of advantage. It maneuvers ground forces
and sensors into position to better develop the situation and to
prepare to make contact with the threat force. The goal is to position
forces and sensors to support making contact with minimal assets, at
a location and time of the squadron’s choosing.
Make Contact on Your Own Terms (Deploy and Report – If Chance Contact)
1-46. When the selected forces are in position, the squadron makes
contact with the threat force and begins to gather information on the
threat’s activities. The squadron reports its activities to the brigade
and adjacent units to provide SU throughout the force. The unit that
makes contact must take responsibility for maintaining contact until
ordered to break contact or until handover can occur.
Reevaluate and Develop the Situation
1-47. As the squadron deploys, the commander and staff reevaluate
the situation and, as necessary, continue to maneuver to develop it.
The squadron analyzes the new information to determine operational
considerations, including the following:
• The size of the threat element.
• Location, composition, activity, and orientation of the
threat force.
• The impact of obstacles and terrain.
• Threat capabilities (especially antiarmor capability).
• Probable threat intentions.
1-21
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• How to gain positional advantage over the threat (from the

squadron and the SBCT’s perspective).
• The friendly situation (location, strength, and capabilities).
• Possible friendly COAs to achieve the specified end state.
1-22
Choose and Recommend a COA

1-48. After developing the situation and determining that enough
information exists to make a decision, the squadron selects a COA
that meets the requirements of the commander’s intent and is within
the squadron’s capabilities. Mindful of the SBCT commander’s intent,
the squadron may recommend an SBCT COA if contact has bearing
on the SBCT’s CCIR (priority intelligence requirement [PIR]) as part of
the reconnaissance effort.
Execute the Selected COA
1-49. Once a COA has been selected the squadron executes its
portion of the COA and, where required, supports other brigade unit
actions. The squadron maintains contact with the threat until
directed otherwise.
RECONNAISSANCE PURPOSE
1-50. In order for the squadron to successfully meet the brigade
commander’s intent, the commanders and staff must first have an
understanding of how the collected intelligence information will be
used to develop the brigade’s plan and to facilitate execution. The
purpose of the reconnaissance operation gives the squadron a better
understanding of the intent of the reconnaissance from the brigade’s
perspective. The squadron leadership must understand the three
reasons of employing the squadron. The reconnaissance purposes for
employment are—
• Reconnaissance push.
• Command push.
• Reconnaissance pull.
RECONNAISSANCE PUSH
1-51. The squadron is deployed early in the planning process. The
brigade staff uses the intelligence information collected to develop the
plan. This purpose requires the brigade staff to develop facts and
assumptions on the threat early enough to focus the squadron’s
effort. These facts and assumptions are generally based on threat
templates, predictive analysis, and a thorough IPB. As the squadron
confirms or denies these facts and assumptions, the information is
reported back to the squadron staff, analyzed, and disseminated
throughout the brigade and to the brigade staff in order to complete
the plan. Reconnaissance push requires the brigade to develop a
detailed ISR plan prior to the planning of the brigade’s (main body)
mission. The information must be gathered, analyzed, and reported
in a timely manner in order to influence the brigade’s planning
process. The result of reconnaissance push operations is a detailed
plan, based on reliable intelligence, for the employment of the
brigade. To be successful in a time-constrained environment, the
staffs must dedicate enough time on ISR planning, and then use the
intelligence information collected to develop or adjust their initial
plan.
COMMAND PUSH
1-23
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
1-52. This purpose is similar to reconnaissance push in that

collected information is used to develop the brigade’s plan. The
difference is that the brigade staff develops several detailed COAs
before the squadron deploys. The brigade and staff must also develop
a detailed ISR plan, normally based on the IPB process. The
squadron is deployed to gather detailed information based on the
brigade commander’s PIR. The brigade commander uses the
information to select the appropriate COA—massing the brigade’s
strengths against the threat’s weaknesses or center of gravity. This
method also results in a detailed plan, based on reliable intelligence,
for the employment of brigade.
RECONNAISSANCE PULL
1-53. The brigade staff develops a flexible plan, based on several
possible COAs, driven by the brigade commander’s intent. In order to
execute reconnaissance pull, the commander must ensure that all
subordinates truly understand his intent for the operation as this
type of operation calls for decentralized, but synchronized and
integrated execution. The plan must allow for maximum flexibility as
the squadron conducts reconnaissance and continually “pulls” the
brigade’s main body to a position of advantage against identified
threat weaknesses or center of gravity. The brigade commander uses
a series of decision points, based on the level of SU, to maneuver the
brigade. This method does not alleviate the squadron commander
and staff from planning reconnaissance operations. They must still
focus the reconnaissance effort by providing the troops with
reconnaissance objectives. The result of the planning process is a
flexible plan, based on decision points, that allows the brigade
commander to maneuver the brigade based on
information/intelligence collected by the squadron and ISR assets in
the brigade.
1-54. The objective of reconnaissance pull is to find weaknesses in
threat dispositions that can be exploited by the main body. The
squadron and other ISR assets are deployed over a broad AO, which
allows them to identify threat weaknesses to exploit and threat
strengths to avoid. Reconnaissance determines which routes are
suitable for maneuver, where the threat is strong and weak, and
where gaps exist. Thus, reconnaissance should pull the main body
toward and along the path of least resistance. Once these have been
identified, the SBCT commander exploits the situation by choosing a
COA that allows his decisive operation (main effort) to attach the
threat’s weaknesses and penetrate gaps in the threat’s defense. He
then commits forces to widen the gap and envelop the threat. The
squadron and other ISR assets continue to move, avoiding threat
strengths and “pulling” the SBCT deep into the threat’s AO.
Reconnaissance pull is also valid in defensive operations.
Reconnaissance determines which routes the threat is using, and
where the threat is weak, and where gaps exist. Thus,
reconnaissance enhances agility by identifying opportunities and
pulling the brigade along the path of least resistance to mass the
brigade’s combat power at the critical time and place.
1-24
SECTION V – BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS
1-55. Combat and staff operations are organized around the seven
battlefield operating systems. (BOS). This section provides a brief
overview by BOS of unique aspects of the squadron. Greater detail
will be provided in subsequent chapters. (See Chapter 2 for detailed
explanations of the digital systems.)
INTELLIGENCE
1-56. Battlefield intelligence operations may be the area of greatest
and most dynamic change in the brigade’s operations. Squadron
operations will be significantly impacted by intelligence systems and
the volume of intelligence data that will be available as well as the
increased amount of information that the squadron will be capable of
capturing in reconnaissance operations. Systems that will be organic
to the squadron or the squadron will employ are—
• FBCB2.
• All Source Analysis System (ASAS).
• UAV.
• Ground sensors (see Appendix G).
1-57. With the information that these various systems can acquire,
store, and display, commanders should be able to know more about
the threat and to rapidly exploit that information to defeat them while
taking action to protect their own forces.
MANEUVER
1-58. The squadron is highly mobile in all types of terrain. The use
of the other BOS capabilities, primarily intelligence and C2 at the
squadron level, increases SA of friendly and threat units, which will
increase the squadron’s maneuver capabilities. Though the squadron
has no mounted heavy armor-defeating systems, the troops do have
Javelin capabilities. Javelin employs lock-on-before-launch, fire-and-
forget technology that permits the dismounted scouts to move to an
alternate position immediately upon missile launch. The Javelin
weighs 49.5 pounds, is 47 inches long, and can kill any tank on the
battlefield within 2,000 meters.
FIRE SUPPORT
1-59. The indirect fires organic to the squadron are the 120-mm
mortar sections found at the troop level. The 120-mm mortars
provide quick, responsive, and accurate fires needed for the troop to
develop the situation. The brigade has an M198 155-mm towed
artillery battalion that can be readily available to the squadron. With
the application of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), the
squadron can also utilize supporting or joint fires such as close air
support and attack helicopters. The squadron will play a major role
in the brigade’s targeting process. The process consists of deciding
what the high-payoff targets are, detection of those targets, delivering
fires to the targets, and assessing the effectiveness of the fires (see
Figure 1-8). The squadron can assist in this process, especially in the
1-25
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
detection and assessing portions. FM 3-60 [FM 6-20-10] has more

detailed explanations of the process. Further artillery integration
occurs with the effects cell at the squadron level and the fire support
elements in the troop headquarters.
Figure 1-8. Fires and Effects Coordination Methodology
AIR DEFENSE
1-60. Air defense in the squadron is significantly reduced to passive
forms of protection (dispersion, camouflage, observation of weapon
status, proper reaction) and utilizing direct fire weapon systems
when necessary. The threat of hostile aircraft will be low due to the
efforts at the joint-force level to achieve air parity. As with the
squadron, the brigade has no air defense systems.
MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

1-61. The brigade has an organic engineer company that can provide
attached support to the squadron (see Chapter 6). Engineer
enhancements to the brigade include improved minefield capabilities
and digital terrain analysis. The NBC platoon within the surveillance
troop provides the squadron with responsive systems that afford early
warning against NBC attacks through digital systems. The platoon has
three FOX chemical reconnaissance vehicles equipped with the M21
(RSCAAL) system, capable of detecting chemical contamination five
kilometers away.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1-62. The majority of the squadron’s CSS is augmented from the
brigade support battalion. The brigade CSS is limited; therefore,
support for the squadron is even more austere because of dispersed
operations. Air resupply and evacuation will increase as a method of
supporting the squadron. Digitization of CSS elements will greatly assist
support operations.
1-26
COMMAND AND CONTROL

1-63. The squadron will receive several systems aimed at improving
C2 through information exploitation. In addition to the systems
described under each BOS paragraph in this section and the normal
array of FM and mobile subscriber equipment (MSE), the squadron
main CP will be equipped with the Maneuver Control System (MCS)
and the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS).
1-27
Chapter 2
Battle Command
Battle command is
the exercise of CONTENTS
command in The Art of Command .......................................... 2-1
operations against a The Elements of Command............................ 2-2
Battle Command Methodology ...................... 2-2
hostile, thinking Role of the Commander.................................. 2-6
opponent. It includes The Command and Control System .................. 2-7
controlling operations Personnel......................................................... 2-7
and motivating Information Management ............................... 2-8
Procedures ...................................................... 2-10
soldiers and their Command Posts.............................................. 2-11
organizations into Communications ................................................ 2-31
action to accomplish Responsibilities............................................... 2-32
missions. Battle Means of Communication .............................. 2-33
FM versus Digital Communications .............. 2-34
command entails Squadron External Communications ............ 2-35
visualizing the Squadron Internal Communications ............. 2-37
current state and a Communications Security.............................. 2-39
future state, then Computers........................................................... 2-40
Army Battle Command System...................... 2-41
formulating concepts FBCB2 .............................................................. 2-41
of operations to get Maneuver Control System.............................. 2-42
from one to the other All Source Analysis System........................... 2-42
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data
at the least cost. It
System.......................................................... 2-43
also includes Air and Missile Defense Workstation ............ 2-44
assigning missions, CSS Control System ....................................... 2-45
prioritizing and Supporting Systems ....................................... 2-45
Distributed Computing Environment ............ 2-46
allocating resources,
selecting the critical
time and place to act, and knowing how and when to make
adjustments during the fight. The command and control (C2)
system at the squadron level enables the commander to lead,
prioritize, and allocate assets required to employ and sustain
combat power. It does this by integrating command and control;
computer technology; communications; and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions that provide the
commander with accurate and timely information upon which to
base his decisions.
SECTION I – THE ART OF COMMAND
2-1. Command and control are interrelated. Command resides with

the commander; it consists of authority, decision making, and
leadership. Control is how the commander executes command. This
section discusses—
2-1
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• The elements of command (authority, decision making, and

leadership).
• The battle command methodology (visualize, describe, direct,
and lead).
• The role of the commander.
THE ELEMENTS OF COMMAND
2-2. Authority is the delegated power to judge, act, or command. It
includes responsibility, accountability, and delegation. Decision
making is the commander selecting a course of action (COA) as the
one most favorable to accomplish the mission. It translates the
commander’s vision into action. It includes knowing if to decide, then
when and what to decide, and understanding the consequences of
decisions. Decision making is both art and science. The commander
uses visualizing, describing, and directing to determine and
communicate the decision. The art of decision making is the
application of the commander’s intuition, knowledge, judgment,
experience, intellect, boldness, perception, and character. After the
commander has made his decision he must lead the squadron in its
execution. He leads by example and by direction, positioning himself
where he can best command without depriving himself of the ability
to respond to changing situations. Leadership is influencing people
by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to
accomplish the mission and improving the organization.
Commanders must lead through a combination of example,
persuasion, and compulsion. The leadership of commanders
ultimately includes force or will.
BATTLE COMMAND METHODOLOGY

2-3. Visualize, describe, direct, and lead (discussed in the “Role of
the Commander,” paragraphs 2-15 through 2-17) make up the
commander’s methodology for executing battle command. The
commander uses this process to visualize the battlespace, describe
the visualization to subordinates, direct actions to achieve results,
and lead the squadron to mission accomplishment. In this process,
the squadron commander combines the art of command with the
science of control.
VISUALIZE
2-4. The com-
mander’s visua-
lization is the core
mental process
that supports his
decision making.
It is the process of
achieving a clear
understanding of
the squadron’s
current state with
relation to the
threat and the
Figure 2-1. Commander’s Visualization

2-2
_____________________________________________________________Chapter 2 – Battle Command
environment, developing a desired end state that represents mission

accomplishment, and determining the sequence of activities that
moves the squadron from its current state to the end state (see
Figure
2-1). The commander begins to visualize the desired end state when
he receives a mission or perceives a change in the mission.
2-5. Two terms frequently used to help illustrate the commander’s
visualization of the battlefield are situational awareness (SA) and
situational understanding (SU). While situational awareness is not a
doctrinal term found in FM 5-0 [FM 101-5] or FM 6-0 [FM 100-34],
the phrase does enjoy wide usage across the force, and it offers a tool
by which reconnaissance forces can distinguish information provided
from information understood in all its ramifications and
consequences. SA may be described as the ability to maintain a
constant, clear mental picture of relevant information (RI) and the
tactical situation. Since the squadron normally operates dispersed,
with its troops and their individual platoons conducting decentralized
operations, all leaders must maintain SA so they can make sound,
quick, tactical decisions. The squadron assesses and reports RI
within their area of operations (AO) to fulfill their primary
responsibility of assisting the brigade in maintaining the common
operational picture (COP). The COP is near real-time display of the
current threat and friendly situation overlaid on terrain. It can
include annotations and graphic control measures, and it is intended
to provide an easy-to-understand image of the current operational
situation. But there is a difference between knowing what something
is, and knowing what it means. And that represents the subtle but
important difference between the commonly used term “situational
awareness” and the doctrinal term “situational understanding.” SA
amounts to knowing what is; SU is knowing what it means.
During a game of chess, a player will know how each of his pieces move. He
can, at any point, see the entire chessboard and know where each of his own pieces is
located, as well as those of his opponent. He has full situational awareness. He knows
what is. However, depending upon his skill and experience, he may or may not be able to
visualize several moves ahead. Situational awareness is knowing where the pieces are
and how they move. Situational understanding is realizing that you are three moves from
checkmate!
2-6. As the commander receives staff analysis of the mission, he

develops a mental picture of the friendly forces in relationship to the
threat, the environment, and the end state of the mission. The staff
supports this visualization by developing and maintaining the COP.
The commander’s visualization is his assessment tool that takes him
from acknowledging the presence and accuracy of information (what
is) to understanding the significance and impact of that information
(what it means).
2-3
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
2-7. The commander focuses on three main factors during

visualization:
• Understand the Current State of Friendly and Threat
Forces. This is SU derived from applying the commander’s
judgment, experience, expertise, and intuition to the COP.
This SU includes physical factors, human factors, and the
relationships between friendly and threat forces and the
environment—seeing the battlefield—that represent potential
opportunities or threats for the squadron (see Figure 2-2).
• Foresee a Feasible Outcome. The commander must identify
a feasible outcome to the operation that results in mission
success and leaves the squadron postured for the next
operation.
• Visualize the Dynamics between Opposing Forces. The
commander must identify the dynamics throughout the
sequence of actions. This includes evaluating possible threat
reactions and friendly counteractions. This evaluation may
lead to the identification of possible critical decision points
throughout the operation. This aspect of visualization is much
like a chess game where one must not only understand how
the various pieces move and where they are located, but he
must also anticipate movement and counter-movements
several moves ahead.
Figure 2-2. Seeing the Battlefield
DESCRIBE
2-8. The commander describes his visualization by participating in
the military decision-making process (MDMP) during planning,
preparing for, and execution of operations. Specifically, his
commander’s intent, planning guidance, anticipated decision point(s),
and his commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) all
2-4
serve to guide and to focus the C2 system to support his decision

making and communicate his decision for execution. He must apply
his judgment, experience, expertise, and intuition before making a
decision and describing that decision to subordinates. During
preparation, the commander uses confirmation and/or backbriefs.
He may conduct a rehearsal to further describe his intent and
concept to his subordinates, to identify and discuss options at
decision points, and to synchronize activities within the squadron.
During execution, the commander continues to visualize the
implication of events, and he describes his conclusions to his staff
and subordinates through updated CCIR, guidance, and fragmentary
orders (FRAGO).
DIRECT
2-9. The commander directs when he has made a decision and
communicates that decision to his subordinates through an order.
Plan
2-10. Orders (warning orders [WARNO], operations orders [OPORD],
FRAGO) should enable subordinates to understand their situation,
their commander’s mission and intent, and their own mission. Clear
direction is essential to mission success; however, commanders must
strike a balance between minimum direction and overly detailed
direction. The commander or his staff assigns graphical, written, or
procedural control measures (permissive or restrictive) to prevent
units from impeding one another and to impose necessary
coordination. The commander should impose only the minimum
control measures necessary to provide essential coordination and
deconfliction among units.
Prepare
2-11. The commander must update and validate his visualization
during preparations as the results of ISR operations become
available. He must determine whether new information (on threat
forces, friendly forces, or the environment) invalidates his plan,
requires him to adjust the plan, or validates the plan with no further
changes. He describes the implications of his updated visualization
on the order(s) and directs actions to effect his revisions.
Execute
2-12. Execution includes a continuous process of assessing the
current state of the operation and making adjustments to exploit
opportunities and to account for unforeseen threat actions. The
commander exercises judgment and initiative continuously,
assessing the situation and making decisions, often with incomplete,
conflicting, and vague information. Waiting for perfect information is
rarely an option. During execution, the commander uses his
visualization, continuously updated with a current COP, to ensure
that his subordinate units execute appropriate measures for the
actual situation. The commander achieves SU (visualization + COP +
experience) that allows him to make sound and timely decisions that
place his forces in favorable situations and deny the threat freedom
of action and initiative. SU is not some immutable conclusion, but a
malleable mental picture constantly subject to refinement and
2-5
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
revision. A major part of the art of command is to know when the

plan must change, what criteria point toward a need for changes, and
then determining what required changes will get the maximum
effectiveness from the unit. The commander directs these actions
primarily through a FRAGO.
2-13. The nature of cavalry operations inherently demands
flexibility, and squadron missions require the commander to directly
influence the action. He must be capable of rapid analysis of the
tactical situation and be able to make quick decisions. He must
synchronize his subordinates’ activities and integrate his squadron’s
actions with the remainder of the brigade. Commanders and staff use
the MDMP to analyze missions, develop tactical operations, and issue
orders to subordinates. The desired end state is the ability to make
decisions more rapidly than the threat, to control the battlefield
tempo in his AO, and to provide SU to the brigade commander.
2-14. Commanders control operations through command groups
and command posts (CP), which organize staff functions and provide
redundant and specialized control throughout the battlespace. The
Army is making rapid and drastic changes in CP design, taking full
advantage of the newest technology. Digital CPs integrate their
automated C2 systems into a unified system providing staff leaders
with timely and accurate information to support effective C2 of the
force. Because CPs are dynamic, not static, configurations, the
squadron will find itself operating in varied modes both in
conjunction with, and separate from, the brigade main CP.
ROLE OF THE COMMANDER

2-15. The squadron commander analyzes and states the mission
and concept of the operation, organizes the forces, and provides
support to subordinate units. He issues orders with sufficient details
for his subordinates to plan and lead their units. He understands
and acknowledges the professional competencies and expertise of his
subordinate commanders and allows them the flexibility to
accomplish their missions. He relies on his staff and subordinate
commanders for advice and assistance in planning and supervising
operations. He must understand their capabilities and limitations. He
must train them to achieve his intent during his absence, failure in
communications, or changes in the situation.
2-16. The squadron commander is the subject matter expert (SME)
to the brigade commander for squadron operations. He is responsible
for the planning, synchronization, and execution of all squadron ISR
operations that support the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT)
commander’s operations. He is responsible for reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) throughout the SBCT AO.
He ensures the synchronization of all squadron ISR operations within
the brigade AO and area of interest (AOI) with minimum gaps in
reconnaissance through direct coordination with brigade staff. The
squadron commander ensures reconnaissance is conducted to
answer brigade CCIR, support targeting (lethal and nonlethal), or
answer voids in the SBCT’s intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(IPB).
2-6
2-17. As the squadron SME, the squadron commander must know

the threat—its organization, its weapon systems, and how it fights.
He must know the terrain (including urban) over which his unit and
the SBCT will fight and the adjacent terrain the threat may use to
support or reinforce. He must know the society within the SBCT’s
AO. Every military action (or inaction) may influence, positively or
negatively, the relationship between the society and SBCT forces, and
by extension, mission success. The commander must endeavor to
know the needs of the society. With this awareness, the commanders
(RSTA and SBCT) can influence the society by planning operations,
implementing programs, and/or taking immediate action to
gain/maintain support of a friendly populace, or to neutralize or gain
support of hostile or neutral factions. Equally, the commander must
know the infrastructure within the AO. Knowing the infrastructure
assists the commander in understanding how the infrastructure
supports the society and threat and friendly forces. This knowledge
helps determine SBCT military operations directed at the
infrastructure that supports the SBCT mission. The example in
Chapter 3 for zone reconnaissance will illustrate the complicated
battlefield and environment the commander must understand.
SECTION II – THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
2-18. The C2 system is the arrangement of personnel, information

management, procedures, and CPs essential to the commander to
plan, prepare for, execute, and assess operations (see Figure 2-3).
The system supports the commander’s exercise of C2 by three basic
functions:
• Create and maintain the COP.
• Support decision making by improving its speed and
accuracy.
• Support preparation and communication of execution
information.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 2-3. Command and Control System
PERSONNEL
2-19. The C2 system in the squadron begins with people. No
amount of technology can reduce the importance of the human
dimension. The staff constitutes the most important element among
personnel dedicated to the C2 system. The staff exists to assist and
support the commander in making and implementing decisions. The
staff’s efforts must always focus on supporting the commander and
on helping him support his subordinate units. The staff supports the
commander by providing him RI, making estimates and
recommendations, preparing plans and orders, and monitoring
execution. Staff responsibilities are discussed as part of the
“Command Posts” paragraph later in this section. For additional
information on general staff responsibilities, see FM 6-0 [FM 100-34].
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
2-20. Information management is the provision of RI to the right
person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate decision
making. Information management uses the procedures and
information systems to collect, process, store, display, and
disseminate data and information. As part of the C2 system,
information management narrows the gap between the information
the commander requires and the information he has. All information
a command produces has one overriding purpose—to enable the
commander to make timely decisions during the fog and friction of
operations. All information must be relevant, and the staff must
ensure it is also accurate, timely, usable, complete, and precise.
Information management has two elements: RI and the information
systems (INFOSYS).
RELEVANT INFORMATION
2-8
2-21. If everything is important then nothing is important; hence, RI

is all information of importance to commanders and staffs in the
exercise of C2. RI is categorized into CCIR and information
requirements (IR) (see FM 6-0 [FM 100-34]). The brigade develops
procedures and systems that minimize the time and effort spent on
assessing information. This is accomplished by ensuring that
subordinate commands clearly understand what information is
relevant, when the information is needed, and in what format it is
delivered. Passing information just for the sake of information creates
battlefield noise and detracts from the commander’s ability to see the
battlefield. The commander must not be overburdened by large
volumes of information, rather only information he needs to make
decisions on or those that assist in understanding the situation.
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
2-22. INFOSYS are the equipment and facilities that collect,
process, store, display, and disseminate data and information. This
includes computers—hardware and software—and communications
as well as policies and procedures for their use. The primary purpose
of INFOSYS is to contribute toward the development of the COP by
using and managing information for timely and accurate decision
making and execution. INFOSYS allows the RSTA and SBCT
commanders and staffs to better understand their battlespace.
Information will be collected effectively; processed quickly and
accurately; stored in a manner that provides instant access through
distributed databases, displayed in a useable, tailored, and current
format; and disseminated to the right place, with few errors. The
systems include the ability to access analytical expertise and
databases through reach capability to army, national, and civilian
institutions.
Information Management Activities
2-23. Information management consists of five activities: collecting,
disseminating, processing, displaying, and storing information. In
practice the different activities overlap, effectively complementing one
another within the C2 system.
2-24. Collecting. Collecting is the continuous acquisition of RI
about mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) by ISR,
including direct observation, other organic resources, or other official,
unofficial, or public sources from the information environment. The
squadron commander establishes the priorities for collecting based
on the SBCT CCIR and his own CCIR. He continuously revises these
requirements during the operations process as the situation changes.
The squadron’s collection capabilities include reconnaissance (recce)
troops, the surveillance troop, and reach capability.
2-25. Disseminating. Disseminating is communicating RI of any
kind from one person or place to another in a usable form by any
means to improve understanding or to initiate or govern action. The
squadron uses FM, Army Battle Command System (ABCS), Force XXI
Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), tactical satellite
(TACSAT), and liaisons to disseminate information. (See Section III,
Communications.)
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
2-26. Processing. Processing is raising the meaning of information

from data to knowledge, which supports SU. Processing adds
meaning to RI through progressively higher-level and complex
cognitive methods. It includes lower-level mechanical and
mechanistic methods such as organizing, collating, plotting, and
arranging data and information (developing and maintaining a COP).
However, effective processing requires analysis and evaluation
(higher-level cognitive methods) for it to become knowledge and to
support SU (see Figure 2-4). The commander applies his judgment to
knowledge to achieve understanding. Understanding enables
informed decisions with less than perfect data. Understanding
generates action. (See FM 6-0 [FM 100-34] for more information on
information processing.)
Figure 2-4. Processing Information
2-27. Displaying. Displaying is representing RI in a usable, easily

understood audio or visual form tailored to the needs of the
commander that conveys the COP for decision making and exercising
C2 functions. The displays should be meaningful images, rather than
simply masses of data. The staff uses standard formats to organize
the display and to allow the commander to know where to look for
information. (See Appendix H, “Command Post Operations.”) There
are three ways to present information: written reports, verbal
narrative reports, and graphic displays. Standard formats ensure
that all RI is included and assist the user in finding needed
information. Displays facilitate communications because they do not
require lengthy instructions. Properly executed, displays aid
communications and understanding by using doctrinal terms,
graphical conventions, and formats for presenting information to
convey complex concepts.
2-28. Graphic displays visually represent current or future
operational information. When possible, commanders and staffs
graphically portray quantifiable information using standard formats
with automated or manual means. Graphic information should—
2-10
• Display symbols, graphics, and terminology consistent with

FM 1-02 [FM 101-5-1].
• Display RI only.
• Display information clearly and understandably.
• Display information accurately, reliably, and in a timely
manner.
• Change promptly and easily as the information is updated.
• Allow rapid distribution to higher, lower, and adjacent units.
2-29. This activity is more than just the communication and display
of data and information. It is the quality of the presentation of
information that facilitates the assimilation and development of
knowledge. A good display should allow a commander to look across
the AOI in space and time and rapidly focus on decisive points,
identifying opportunities, threats, or gaps in information. Cluttered
displays inhibit the momentum of the commander’s decision making.
Good displays should also allow the commander to communicate
directions to subordinates in a manner that facilitates understanding
of the desired end state.
2-30. Storing. Storing retains RI in any form, usually for orderly,
timely retrieval and documentation until it is needed for exercising
C2. Information is stored because not all information collected or
processed can be displayed at the same time, nor is it relevant at all
times.
2-31. Common databases provide powerful tools for transforming
data into information and knowledge required for military decisions.
By storing, ordering, and structuring data in a database based on
data models that reflect the needs of military decisions, a variety of
software applications use and share this data for multiple purposes.
The database provides a bridge allowing different systems with
different purposes to work together or interoperate. For example, data
on the location and identification of friendly units when processed
and compared with other data can support situation understanding
and assist in clearing artillery fire missions. Through the database,
multiple applications can simultaneously use the same data for
different purposes to support multiple decisions horizontally and
vertically. Using a database allows software applications to permit
operators and analysts to sort, store, organize, and query data by
unit identification, geographic location, resource status, or
consumption.
PROCEDURES
2-32. Procedures are standard and detailed sequences of activities
within the squadron to accomplish tasks. They govern actions within
the C2 system to effectively and efficiently exercise C2. Adhering to
procedures minimizes confusion, misunderstanding, and hesitance
as commanders rapidly shift forces to meet contingencies. There are
two levels of procedure within the squadron’s C2 system: doctrinal
procedures and standing operating procedures (SOP).
DOCTRINAL PROCEDURES
2-11
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
2-33. Doctrine establishes guidance on procedures for problem

solving and communicates the wisdom and judgment derived from
past operations to the field. Doctrine constitutes the starting point for
developing procedures for specific units, places, and threats.
Doctrinal procedures cannot be applied absolutely without
interpretation that accounts for the specifics of a given situation.
Doctrinal C2 procedures exist throughout the operations process and
create a framework within which units create tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP). (See FM 6.0
[FM 100-34]).
UNIT STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
2-34. SOPs detail how to apply doctrine to a specific unit in a given
location for a given threat. They standardize unit-level techniques
and procedures to enhance effectiveness and flexibility. See Appendix
H, “Command Post Operations,” for SOP considerations.
COMMAND POSTS
2-35. Squadron CPs provide sustainment and a work environment
for the elements of the C2 systems. To best direct operations, CPs are
organized by purpose and are distributed across the squadron’s AO
to increase the squadron’s span of control, improve communication,
increase survivability, and enhance mobility. The squadron normally
fields a command group, a tactical CP (TAC CP), a main CP, combat
trains CP (CTCP), and a field trains CP (FTCP). Other CPs include the
recce troop CP and the surveillance troop CP (see Figure 2-5). CPs
provide the physical facilities, personnel, and systems that allow the
commander to see the battle, control and synchronize forces,
communicate orders, plan operations, and position combat service
support (CSS).
2-12
Figure 2-5. Distribution of Command and Control
COMMAND GROUP
2-36. The command group consists of the commander and the fire
support officer (FSO) (see Figure 2-6). The command group may
include the air liaison officer (ALO), or other personnel the
commander deems necessary. The command group is not a fixed or
permanent organization. During operations, it is normally positioned
forward with the commander where he can track critical events,
make timely decisions, and command operations. The command
group may collocate with the main CP during the MDMP to facilitate
planning. The command group exercises its C2 functions using voice,
digital, and face-to-face communications.
2-13
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 2-6. Command Group
2-37. The command group performs the following functions:
• Provides leadership, intent, and guidance well forward on the

battlefield.
• Maintains situational understanding.
• Controls indirect fires.
• Coordinates air attack assets.
Squadron Commander
2-38. The squadron commander performs the following functions:
• Commands the squadron.
• Provides his vision and intent.
• Provides his CCIR.
• Provides the focus, tempo, and engagement criteria for
reconnaissance.
• Synchronizes brigade ISR operations in concert with the
brigade S3.
• Makes decisions to influence the operation.
• Provides leadership to his subordinate organizations.
• Makes recommendations to the brigade commander about
ISR and assists in his situational understanding of the
battlefield.
Fire Support Officer
2-39. The squadron FSO is the special staff officer for coordinating
fire support assets and operations for the squadron. The FSO uses
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), All Source
Analysis System (ASAS), and FBCB2 and tactical radios to maintain
situational awareness and to transmit combat information to
subordinate and supporting fire support assets. The FSO—
• Supervises the fire support element (FSE) to plan, coordinate,

and execute fires in support of squadron operations.
• Participates in the squadron MDMP process.
2-14
• Advises commander and staff on threat/friendly fire support

capabilities and limitations.
• Advises commander on available fire support assets.
• Produces the fire support paragraph to all OPORDs and the
fire support annex.
• Maintains, updates, and ensures execution of essential fire
support tasks (EFST).
• Ensures the battle captain has current information on fire
support capabilities and requirements.
• Coordinates with the battle captain and the ALO to maintain
proper airspace control and use of Army aviation and Air
Force assets.
• Coordinates fire support of subordinate fire support teams
(FIST) and higher FSEs.
• Controls squadron fire support net.
Air Liaison Officer (When Attached)
2-40. The ALO (an Air Force officer) is the special staff officer
responsible for coordinating tactical air assets and operations such
as close air support (CAS), joint suppression of enemy air defense
(JSEAD), reconnaissance, and airlift. He will use the combat and SU
information gathered from the Army digital systems such as ASAS,
Maneuver Control System (MCS), AFATDS, and his tactical radio nets
to assist in directing tactical air efforts and missions. The ALO—
• Prioritizes, plans, and requests CAS to support the mission in
conjunction with S3 and FSO to meet commander’s intent.
• Maintains control of all US Air Force aircraft in sector.
• Monitors all air traffic control through battle captain.
• Monitors availability of CAS assets.
• Provides terminal control for CAS and operates the Air Force
request net.
TACTICAL COMMAND POST
2-41. The squadron may establish a TAC CP to control current
operations. The TAC CP is a temporary C2 organization that directly
assists the commander with controlling current operations. Its
primary systems include MCS, AFATDS, ASAS, and FBCB2. The TAC
CP’s organization is simpler, smaller, and more austere than the
main CP. It operates as one integrated cell that may provide
intelligence, current operations, and fire support, depending on how
it is task organized. The TAC CP is composed of the TAC HMMWV
and the S3 HMMWV (as required). It is normally manned by the
assistant S3 and an intelligence analyst. In many cases the command
group and/or S3 will collocate with the TAC (see Figure 2-7). The S3
is responsible for the activities and employment of the TAC CP. Due
to its small size and high mobility, the TAC CP relies on frequent
displacement and a comparatively low electronic signature to
maintain security. When not deployed, TAC CP personnel assist
operations in the main CP. In addition to controlling current
operations, the TAC CP performs the following functions:
2-15
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Provides the command group with combat information and

intelligence.
• Relays the commander’s decisions and instructions as
required.
• Provides the net control station (NCS) for the command radio
net and backup NCS for the operations and intelligence (OI)
radio net.
• Provides a forward location for issuing orders.
• Provides a forward short-term planning facility.
• Serves as the main CP in the event the main CP is destroyed
or unable to function.
• May coordinate, then control, special operations such as a
passage of lines, relief in place, or shift of the main effort.
Figure 2-7. Tactical Command Post
S3 Operations Officer
2-42. As the TAC CP officer in charge (OIC), the S3 has overall
responsibility for TAC CP functions and operations. As such, he
performs the following tasks:
• Controls current operations; coordinates direct and indirect,
lethal, and nonlethal fires.
• Synchronizes all tactical operations with all staff sections.
• Assists the squadron commander in the development of the
ISR plan as part of the brigade’s MDMP.
• Assists the brigade S3 in preparing the brigade’s WARNO 2
(ISR plan).
• Prepares, coordinates, publishes, and distributes the
command SOP, operations plans (OPLAN), OPORDs, FRAGOs,
and WARNOs.
• Leads COA development and decision support template (DST)
development.
• Participates in targeting meetings.
2-16
• Recommends task organization and assigns missions to

subordinate elements.
• Monitors the progress of the squadron, anticipates
requirements, and coordinates the integration of all attached
and operationally controlled (OPCON) elements into the plan.
• Determines combat support (CS) and CSS requirements in
coordination with appropriate staff member.
• Determines combat potential and capabilities so as to provide
timely input to mission planning and decisions.
• Recommends general locations of squadron CPs.
Assistant S3 (TAC)
2-43. The assistant S3 (TAC) is responsible for the following:
• Serves as the TAC CP OIC in the absence of the S3.
• Responsible to the S3 for overall TAC CP operations.
• Understands the commander’s intent and guidance as it
impacts on the planning, preparation, and execution of each
mission.
• Gains and maintains situational understanding of the
operation—friendly, threat and other.
• Monitors the location, status, and activities of friendly units
two echelons down (battle tracking).
• In coordination with other members of the TAC, ensures the
COP is updated and displayed per the commander’s guidance.
• Ensures accurate display of RI per commander’s guidance.
• Remains alert to detect variances in the plan. As variances
begin to materialize, makes predictive analysis and presents
recommendations to the senior officers in the CP, or as
directed.
• Understands the higher commander’s intent and concept of
operation.
• Understands the commander’s concept of operation.
• Understands the task and purpose assigned to each
subordinate and supporting element.
• Understands the CCIR of the squadron and SBCT as well as
the decision points.
• Assists in reviewing and disseminating information within the
CP (information management).
• Reviews all incoming and outgoing reports, commander’s
situation reports (SITREP), and orders.
• Supervises the squadron/brigade command nets and mobile
subscriber equipment (MSE)/MCS operations.
• Provides situational updates as required or directed.
Intelligence Analyst Sergeant

2-44. The intelligence analyst sergeant performs the following:
2-17
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Assists the assistant S3 (TAC) in TAC CP operations.

• Ensures threat elements are tracked on FBCB2, ASAS, and
the operations map board and/or COP.
• Monitors reporting of CCIR.
• Maintains correct intelligence estimate and light/weather
data.
• Serves as the alternate NCS for the squadron OI net.
MAIN COMMAND POST

2-45. The main CP is the squadron’s primary CP, and serves as the
synchronization point for the entire squadron operation. It maintains
the pulse of the operation by receiving information from the TAC CP
and from higher, lower, and adjacent units using FM, tactical satellite
(TACSAT), and ABCS communications. Normally the squadron main
CP will collocate with the brigade main CP. By collocation, the
squadron staff can more effectively integrate with elements of the
military intelligence company and the brigade S2 as well as be part of
the detailed planning that occurs in the effects coordination and
maneuver cells of the SBCT. However, the squadron is fully capable
of independent operations (see Appendix H, “Command Post
Operations”) and will, upon circumstances dictated by METT-TC,
operate separately from the brigade main CP. The main CP is run by
the XO and contains all the staff sections except for the S1, who
operates in the CTCP (see Figure 2-8). The personnel/staff elements
that operate at the main CP include the XO, command sergeant
major (CSM), operations sergeant major (SGM), S2, analysis and
control team (ACT), S3 battle captain, signal officer (S6), chemical
officer, and FSE. Additional elements may be present in the main CP
depending on the mission.
2-46. The main CP performs the following functions:
• Maintains the COP.
• Acquires, analyzes, and disseminates tactical information.
• Updates the threat situation.
• Plans future operations.
• Synchronizes CS and CSS assets in support of operations.
• Keeps higher headquarters informed.
• Coordinates with adjacent units.
• Conducts terrain and airspace management.
• Maintains continuous operations for extended periods of time.
• Operates as NCS for all nets except administrative and
logistics (A/L) net.
Executive Officer
2-47. The XO is the commander’s principal assistant for directing,
coordinating, supervising, and training the staff. His specific duties
include—
2-18
• Direct and supervise the maintenance of the COP in the main

CP.
• Integrate and synchronize squadron OPLANs and OPORDs.
• Directly supervise the main CP and headquarters cell,
including displacement, protection, security, and
communications.
• Manage the CCIR.
• Ensure the staff integrates and coordinates its activities
internally and with higher, subordinate, supporting, and
adjacent units.
• Establish, manage, and enforce the staff planning timeline in
accordance with the commander’s guidance.
• Supervise targeting (lethal and nonlethal).
• Direct and supervise the MDMP in accordance with the
commander’s guidance.
• Integrate risk management across the staff for planning and
executing operations.
2-19
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 2-8. Main Command Post
2-20
S2 Section
2-48. The S2 is the OIC of his section, which is responsible for
collecting and applying intelligence to support operations (see Figure
2-9). The S2 and his section play a vital role in planning and
executing squadron operations. The S2’s coordination and interaction
with the S3 and fire support sections are critical to mission
accomplishment. The primary systems found in the S2 section are
ASAS and FBCB2.
Figure 2-9. S2 Section
2-49. Key tasks the S2 section performs are—

• Conduct IPB with the commander and staff.
• Obtain intelligence through reach capability.
• Request collection, production, or dissemination of existing
data, information, or intelligence from higher echelons.
• Coordinate to provide technical support for all squadron
assets conducting ISR.
• Prepare and disseminate intelligence estimates.
• Participate in preparation and execution of squadron plans,
including integration with higher and adjacent units.
• Assist the commander in developing and updating priority
intelligence requirements (PIR) and generate other information
requests.
• Maintain the red correlated picture in ASAS, disseminating
information to higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.
2-21
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Obtain and disseminate weather information.

• Maintain the threat situation on the conventional situation
map.
• Evaluate and interpret threat information, advising the
commander, staff, and subordinate leaders on the current
and projected threat situation.
• Synthesize information received from brigade, division, and
national assets with the tactical intelligence received from
subordinate units.
• Obtain documents of intelligence interest taken from enemy
prisoners of war (EPW), civilian internees, and civilian
detainees in coordination with the provost marshal and other
elements.
• Record, evaluate, and analyze collected information to
produce all-source intelligence that answers the commander’s
PIR and IR, including battle damage assessment (BDA).
• Maintain the current situation regarding the threat and
environmental factors and update IPB and the intelligence
estimate.
• Integrate staff input to IPB products for staff planning,
decision making, and targeting.
• Maintain control of squadron OI net.
2-50. The intelligence officer (S2) performs the following specific

duties:
• Recommend PIR to the commander.
• Assist the commander and S3 in informing the brigade’s ISR
plan and creating the squadron’s operational plan.
• Provide the commander and staff with assessments of threat
capabilities, intentions, and COAs as they relate to the
squadron and its mission.
• Determine threat courses of action (to include the most
probable and most dangerous) and key events.
• Serve as the senior intelligence analyst in the squadron.
• Manage the squadron’s intelligence requirements, to include:
Analyzing requirements and developing specific
information requirements (SIR).
Integrating the ISR effort by developing a strategy to
answer each SIR.
Recommending to the S3 tasking of assets based on
their capabilities and limitations.
Assisting in developing the ISR plan through an
integrated staff process.
Obtaining intelligence through reach capability.
Requesting collection, production, or dissemination of
existing data, information, or intelligence from higher
2-22
echelons and evaluating the progress of answering

each requirement based on the reporting of
information.
• Coordinate with the entire staff and recommend PIR as CCIR.
• Coordinate ground and aerial reconnaissance operations with
other ISR assets in the squadron and SBCT.
• Assist the S3 in deception operation planning by
recommending targets and objectives based on assessed
threat collection capability and susceptibility to deception.
• Assist the S3 in planning and managing intelligence collection
operations, to include target acquisition activities, in
coordination with the FSO.
• Assist the S3 with the preparation of OPORD overlays and the
threat COAs.
• Participate in the targeting meeting.
• Periodically issue intelligence update/intelligence summary
(INTSUM) over squadron command net/FBCB2.
• Create and maintain the products from all steps of IPB
process.
• Serve as the main CP operations security (OPSEC) officer.
2-51. The analysis technician performs the following specific

duties:
• Record, evaluate, and analyze collected information to

produce all-source intelligence that answers the commander’s
PIR and information requirements (IR), including BDA.
• Coordinate battlefield technical intelligence activities and
disseminate information.
• Prepare graphic intelligence products and briefings for the
commander.
• Monitor reporting of CCIR.
• Maintain correct intelligence estimate and light/weather data.
• In coordination with the provost marshal office (PMO) and
other elements, process materials taken from EPWs and
civilian internees.
• Participate in the targeting meeting.
• Assist the S3 in planning target acquisition activities and
collecting target information.
• Coordinate with the battle captain to ensure threat elements
are tracked on the operations map board.
• Assist the battle captain in conduct of battle update brief.
S3 Section
2-52. The S3 is the OIC of this section, and in his absence, the
battle captain is in charge (see Figure 2-10). This section is the focal
point for control of operations and creation of plans and orders. The
2-23
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
S3 advises the commander on operations and assists him in

controlling them. In the absence of the XO, the S3 assumes his
duties in supervising the staff in coordinating activities and creating
plans and orders. The S3 section coordinates directly with the
subordinate maneuver elements, commander, brigade main CP, and
adjacent units.
• Coordinate and synchronize of the staff during the MDMP
under the supervision of the XO.
• Plan and coordinate with the other staff sections for the
creation and dissemination of OPLANs and OPORDs.
• Plan tactical troop movements.
• Monitor tactical operations throughout the AO and assist in
ensuring CS and CSS operations are synchronized.
• Keep higher, adjacent, and subordinate units informed.
• Maintain the COP, both digital and analog.
• Coordinate the use of airspace and employment of air support
along with the FSO and the ALO.
• Deconflict land management issue.
2-24
2-54. The battle captain is the main CP OIC in the absence of the
XO. As the senior S3 officer on duty, he is responsible to the XO for
overall main CP operations. As such, he is also responsible for the
following:
• Understand the commander’s intent, concept of the operation,

and guidance as it impacts on the planning, preparation, and
execution of each mission.
• Gain and maintain situational understanding of the
operation—friendly, threat, and other.
• Monitor the location, status, and activities of friendly units
two echelons down (battle tracking).
• In coordination with other members of the staff and the G6,
ensure the COP is updated and displayed per the
commander’s guidance.
• Ensure accurate display of RI per commander’s guidance.
2-25
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Remain alert to detect variances in the plan. As variances

materialize, make predictive analysis and present
recommendations to the senior officers in the CP, or as
directed.
• Understand task and purpose assigned to each subordinate
and supporting element.
• Understand the CCIR of the squadron and SBCT, and
understand decision points.
• Assist in reviewing and disseminating information within the
CP (information management). Ensure unimpeded
information flows between staff, sections, and cells.
• Conduct staff huddles and battle update briefings.
• Supervise the shift change and the shift change brief.
• Review all incoming and outgoing reports, commander’s
SITREPs, and orders.
• Supervise the squadron/brigade command nets and
MSE/MCS operations.
• Provide situational updates as required or directed.
• Assist the XO in the conduct of the rehearsal.
2-55. The OIC of the fire support element (FSE) is the FSO, an
artillery branch captain (see Figure 2-11). The FSE coordinates all
fire support for operations. The FSO advises the commander and staff
on all fire support matters. Its primary system is AFATDS. Key tasks
the FSO/FSE perform are—
• Analyze higher headquarters fire support plan to determine

fire support resources allocated to the squadron.
• Develop and recommend essential fire support tasks (EFST) in
conjunction with the commander and S3.
• Develop and recommend high-payoff targets (HPT) in
conjunction with the S2.
• Develop the fire support plan, including fire support
coordination measures (FSCM).
• Translate commander’s intent and guidance into AFATDS
guidance.
• Keep the commander informed of the fire support assets
available, their mission, capabilities, and limitations.
• Serve as executing agent for clearance and coordination of
fires within the AO.
• Keep conventional situation map posted with current fire
support graphics and control measures. Likewise, is
responsible for developing, disseminating and maintaining
digital overlays.
2-26
Figure 2-11. FSE Section
2-56. The air liaison officer/noncommissioned officer (ALO/NCO)

performs the following:
• Maintain aircraft positioning report.
• Coordinate air routes and corridors with the brigade ALO, air
defense officer (ADO), and the FSO.
• Determine downed pilot pickup points and coordinate
recovery and pick-up operations.
• Maintain CAS window chart.
• Receive Army airspace command and control (A2C2) control
measures and directives from higher, incorporate applicable
measures into the squadron graphics, and maintain current
overlays in the main CP.
• Coordinate with the FSO for airspace coordination areas (ACA)
used by CAS.
• Monitor airspace ownership.
• Participate in planning process.
2-57. The operations sergeant major performs the duties below:

• Assist the CP OIC and battle captain in the functional
operation of the CP.
• Supervise the CP security plan.
• Oversee OPSEC for the CP.
• Plan and implement the defenses of the CP with the XO and
battle captain.
• Assist the battle captain in information management.
• Coordinate with the headquarters commander for support
(maintenance, mess, sleep area).
2-27
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Plan with the CP OIC for displacing the CP.

• Assist the CP OIC with enforcing the rest plan.
• Supervise the setting up, operation, and dismantling of the
CP.
• Assist the headquarters company command element with
casualty and equipment evacuation operations.
• Direct the shift noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) on
traffic control, shift changes, and orders production.
• Maintain supervision over communication nets, net discipline,
reporting, and log accuracy.
2-58. The battle NCO performs the following duties:

• Assist the battle captain as required.
• Receive information, monitor the situation, and update the
COP.
• Ensure that reports and messages are distributed properly.
• Supervise the publication of orders and graphics.
• Supervise all enlisted personnel in the operations cell during
his shift.
• Assist the operations SGM in managing guard rosters, sleep
plans, and shift schedules.
• Supervise journal clerks and radio/telephone and computer
operators in recording, disseminating, and posting of
information.
• Monitor field sanitation of main CP areas.
• Assist in reproduction of OPORDs and overlays as required;
verifies reproduced graphics and orders for accuracy and
neatness.
2-59. The chemical officer, who is also the FOX recce platoon leader,
is responsible for requesting and using chemical assets for nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) defense and smoke operations. He and his
NBC NCO use the MCS in conjunction with the Joint Warning and
Reporting Network (JWARN) (either resident on the MCS or as a stand-
alone system) as a tool for NBC warning and reporting and for
maintaining situational understanding and C2 of chemical defense units.
The chemical officer fulfills the role of platoon leader for the NBC recce
platoon since the RSTA main CP is usually collocated with the SBCT main
CP, allowing the chemical sections of both organizations can work
together. The chemical officer performs the following functions:
• In conjunction with the S2, advise the commander and staff
on the probability and effects of threat NBC weapons.
• Recommend reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveying
requirements.
• Disseminate warning messages of friendly use of nuclear
weapons (STRIKWARN).
2-28
• Recommend mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) and

operations exposure guidance (OEG) based on the S2 threat
analysis and higher headquarters guidance.
• Maintain unit radiological dose records.
• Plan decontamination operations in conjunction with the S3
and XO.
• Coordinate nonorganic NBC assets (decontamination,
reconnaissance, and smoke).
2-29
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
S6 Section
2-60. The OIC of this section is the S6, a signal branch captain. The
section contains the communications maintenance platoon and a
RETRANS section capable of operating three RETRANS sites (see
Figure 2-12). It coordinates directly with the reconnaissance and
surveillance troops and the signal company found at brigade. Its
primary systems include FBCB2, Enhanced Position Location
Reporting System (EPLRS), global broadcast service, and local area
network (LAN) equipment. The S6 section is responsible for
maintenance of communications systems, establishment and
operation of FM retransmission nodes, management of the tactical
internet (TI), and establishing/maintaining the CP LAN. The S6 works
with the XO and S3 in selecting CP locations.
2-61. The S6 is responsible for the installation, operation, and

maintenance of the squadron’s communication links, information
network, and reach communications. The S6 performs the following
functions:
• Develop network security plans, instructions, and SOPs.
• Serve as the signal expert to the commander, advising the
commander and staff on communications requirements.
• Develop network-supportable battalion CP locations in
conjunction with the battalion S3, operations SGM, and
brigade S6.
• Act as liaison with attached signal assets.
• Develop signal annex to the OPORD.
2-30
• Establish communications security (COMSEC) accountability,

distribution, and security procedures within the squadron.
COMBAT TRAINS COMMAND POST
2-62. During normal operations the CTCP operates in the field
trains collocated with the FTCP. The squadron S1 is the CTCP OIC
and serves as the principal personnel services planner for the
squadron. The CTCP includes the S1/S4 sections, the squadron
chaplain, and possibly elements of the medical platoon. The primary
systems of the CTCP include FBCB2, MCS, and Combat Service
Support Control System (CSSCS) (see Figure 2-13).
Figure 2-13. Combat Trains Command Post
S1 Section
2-63. The S1 section has responsibility for all personnel actions and
tracking the manning of the squadron (see Figure 2-14). Key tasks
the S1 and his section perform are—
• Monitor the personnel strength of all subordinate elements.
• Provide unit strength and loss estimates as part of the
planning process.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Coordinate receipt of replacements with higher and

subordinate units.
• Assist in execution and tracking of casualty evacuation
(CASEVAC).
• Conduct personnel support activities, including legal, finance,
promotions, awards, leave, and safety.
• Provide postal service.
• Monitor public affairs requirements and activities.
• Monitor family support activities.
• Assist the chaplain in coordination of religious activities.
• Monitor retention (reenlistment).
• Coordinate morale support activities.
• Assess and document EPW injury, sick, and wound rates.
• Monitor use of civilian labor.
• Operate the CTCP, along with the S4 section.
S4 Section
2-64. The S4 is the primary logistical planner for the squadron,
working with the BSB support operations officer (SPO) to keep the
squadron sustained (see Figure 2-14). The S4 is the principal
logistics planner for the squadron and normally operates from the
squadron main CP. He collaborates with the squadron S3, the BSB
SPO, and the SBCT S4 to anticipate, plan, and synchronize
sustainment and maneuver operations. The S4 may also serve as an
alternate battle captain in the main CP.
• Develop and synchronize CSS, to include supply,
transportation, maintenance, and services.
• Project requirements and coordinate all classes of supply,
except Class VIII (medical), IAW the commander’s priorities.
• Monitor and analyze the equipment and logistic readiness
status of the squadron.
• Determine the logistical requirements for the squadron during
the planning process and execution of operations.
• In conjunction with the XO, develop and synchronize all
squadron CSS requirements, to include supply,
transportation, maintenance, and services.
• Develop annexes to plans and orders, including designation
of supply routes and locations of logistical nodes.
• Monitor tactical operations to execute emergency resupply
operations, anticipate requirements, and initiate
requisitioning and resupply operations.
• Monitor and analyze equipment readiness status.
• Conduct operational and tactical planning to support
movement control and mode and terminal operations.
2-32
• Coordinate the construction and maintenance of facilities and

installations.
• Coordinate food services, water purification, mortuary affairs,
laundry, and shower services.
Figure 2-14. S1/S4 Section
2-66. The medical platoon leader is responsible for all combat

health support (CHS) issues in the squadron. He coordinates with the
squadron staff and BSB’s medical company to ensure medical
coverage is provided throughout the squadron’s AO. Specific
responsibilities include—
• Determine the medical and CASEVAC requirements for the
squadron during the planning process and execution of
operations.
• Develop mass casualty and NBC casualty plans.
• Develop combat stress control program.
• Provide health education and combat lifesaver training.
• Plan and execute medical care of EPWs and civilians within
the AO.
2-33
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Provide preventative medicine services (such as vaccinations,

field sanitation).
FIELD TRAINS COMMAND POST
2-67. The FTCP, under command of the headquarters and
headquarters troop (HHT) commander, coordinates the logistical
execution and sustainment of the squadron (see Figure 2-15). The
field trains normally collocates with the BSB in the brigade support
area (BSA). The HHT commander coordinates with the BSB for
positioning and defensive responsibilities in the BSA security plan.
When necessary, the field trains may locate outside of the BSA. The
primary systems found in the BSA are MCS, FBCB2, and EPLRS. The
FTCP monitors the command net and operates on the A/L net. It
maintains communications with the BSB normally by landline. Its
key tasks include—
• Organize supplies, personnel, and mail going forward into

logistics packages (LOGPAC) under the direct control of the
HHT XO.
• Dispatch LOGPACs.
• Maintain the COP.
• Coordinate logistical support.
• Coordinate personnel service support.
Figure 2-15. Field Trains Command Post
RECCE TROOP COMMAND POST

2-68. The troop CP serves as the NCS for the troop and is a critical
communications link to the squadron or SBCT CPs. The CP operates
under the direction of the XO, and is manned by the troop operations
sergeant, the HUMINT NCO, and may include one or both
communications maintenance personnel. The CP positions to
2-34
maintain communications with the platoons and the controlling

headquarters CP. The primary functions of the troop CP are assist
the command in command and control of the troop; maintain
situational awareness of friendly and threat forces in the troop’s AO
and AOI; coordinate combat service support for the troop; report
information to higher headquarters and adjacent units; insertion of
mortars, CSS, and attachments into the troop scheme of maneuver.
SURVEILLANCE TROOP COMMAND POST
2-69. The surveillance troop CP controls the execution of the sensor
platoon, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platoon, and the NBC recce
platoon. The troop CP receives and analyzes information collected
within the troop AO using FBCB2, FM voice, and UAV video feeds
from the ground control station (GCS) or remote video terminal (RVT).
Surveillance troop headquarters consists of the troop commander,
XO, and first sergeant (1SG). The supply section locates in the field
trains and moves forward to support the company during LOGPAC
operations. The troop operates on troop command net and monitors
the squadron OI and command nets.
2-70. The surveillance troop CP may be in one of three locations—
collocated with the main CP, collocated with the UAV launch site, or
at an independent location. Considerations for the location of the
surveillance troop CP are discussed in Table 2-1 below.
Table 2-1. Location of Surveillance Troop Command Post
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
Collocate with main CP Increased coordination with Increased signal footprint.
squadron staff. Increased terrain requirements to
Integrated into main CP defense support main CP.
plan.
Greater access to Trojan Spirit
Lite and TACSAT to speed
transition of imagery and sensor
data.
Collocate with UAV launch site. Increased control over UAV Reduced coordination with main
operations. CP.
Increased local security at UAV Increased signal footprint at UAV
site. site.
As a separate C2 node. Small signal footprint. Limited local security.
Increased range of UAV and Reduced integration with
sensor operations. squadron staff.
Reduced control of UAV
operations.
SECTION III – COMMUNICATIONS
2-71. Fundamental to reconnaissance and security is the reporting

of combat information. This information is of interest to other
maneuver units as well as the brigade staff and requires widest
2-35
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
dissemination possible by FM voice and digital systems. Squadrons

frequently operate over long distances, wide frontages, extended
depths, and great distances from the controlling headquarters.
Communications must be redundant and long range to meet these
internal and external requirements. Because threat and friendly
radar, radios, and lasers operate in the same electromagnetic
spectrum, commanders plan for interference. Interference may result
from unintentional friendly interference, intentional threat action,
equipment failure, atmospheric conditions, nuclear blast
electromagnetic pulse, or terrain interference. Planning to support
communications is increasingly complex and requires detailed
attention from all members of the staff, not just the S6. Planning
must address the impacts of extended battlespace operations and the
terrain as well as the potential for disruption of communications.
Planning should—
• Include a detailed communications line of sight (LOS) analysis
(a communications modified combined obstacle overlay
[MCOO]).
• Provide redundancy in means of communications.
• Ensure subordinates understand the commander’s intent so
that they know what to do if communications are lost.
• Plan communications architectures in detail, including the
use of retransmission means, digital network linkages, and C2
node placements.
• Define the initial task organization and expected changes in
order to establish and maintain the TI.
• Follow proper signal and COMSEC procedures.
• Keep digital orders, overlays, and messages concise to avoid
overloading the TI and digital systems.
• Establish SOPs that define which communications will be
transmitted digitally, which will be transmitted by FM, and
when they will be transmitted.
• Consider the employment of retransmission equipment for
each operation.
• Establish alternate communications procedures.
RESPONSIBILITIES
2-72. The traditional responsibilities for establishing
communications generally remain valid. However, with many of the
digital communications systems, all participants have roles that must
be executed to establish and maintain communications. The
fundamental rule is that all soldiers have a responsibility to establish
and maintain communications. The traditional communications
responsibilities are listed below.
• Senior to Subordinate. A senior unit is responsible for
establishing communications with a subordinate unit. An
attached unit of any size is considered subordinate to the
command to which it is attached.
2-36
• Supporting to Supported. A supporting unit is responsible

for establishing communications with the supported unit.
• Reinforcing to Reinforced. A reinforcing unit is responsible
for establishing communications with the reinforced unit.
• Passing to Stationary. Forward passage of lines.
• Stationary to Passing. Rearward passage of lines.
• Lateral Communications. Responsibility for establishing
communications between adjacent units may be fixed by the
next higher commander or SOP. If responsibility is not fixed
by orders, the commander of the unit on the left is responsible
for establishing communications with the unit on the right.
The commander of a unit positioned behind another unit
establishes communications with the forward unit.
• Restoration. Regardless of the responsibility, all units take
prompt action to restore lost communications.
2-37
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
2-73. The squadron uses the full spectrum of communications
means. Planning data for communications systems and sensors
found in the squadron is listed in Table 2-2.
Table 2-2. Communications System Planning Data
Planning Planning Low High Line Global

Short Freq Freq TAC
Full Name Range Range Data Data of Positioning Notes
Name Band Range SAT
(Voice) (Data)* Rate Rate Sight System
EPLRS Enhanced 3-10 km UHF 420- 14400 100+ Yes Yes Primary
Position Location 240 bps kbps means of
Reporting MHz FBCB2 data
System transmission
SINCGARS Single Channel VHF 30- 16000 -- Yes Secondary
Ground and 87.975 bps means for
Airborne Radio MHz FBCB2 data
System transmission
Manpack 5-10 km 1-10 km
Short range 5-10 km 1-10 km
vehicular
Long range 10-40 km 3-35 km
vehicular
NTDR Near Term Digital 10-20 km UHF 225- 200 Yes Yes CP to CP
Radio 450 kbps data transfer
MHz
AN/PSC-5 UHF/VHF 1-3 km 1-3 km UHF 224- 16000 Yes Yes Can provide
ManpacK LOS (LOS) 500 bps retrans for
and unlimited MHz SINCGARS
DAMA/SATCOM (TACSAT)
terminal
MSE Mobile Area Area UHF 225- 16000 Yes Signal
Subscriber 400 bps company
Equipment MHz maintains
MSE net
AN/TSQ- TROJAN Special Unlimited 512 No Yes Primary
190 (V) Purpose kbps means of
Intelligence sending
Remote video feeds
Integrated from UAV
Terminal
LRS UAV Launch and 50 km VHF Yes
Recovery Shelter
GCS UAV Ground 125 km VHF Yes Aerial retrans
Control Shelter extends
range by 75
km
IREMBASS Improved 15 km VLF 138- Yes Detection
Remotely 153 range: 50m
Monitored MHz dismounts
Battlefield Sensor 250m wheel,
System 350m track
GSR Ground 10 km j- 16- Yes Detection
Surveillance band 16.5 range: 5 km
Radar GHz dismounts,
10 km
vehicles
* Ranges are greatly reduced by using higher data transmission rates.
DIGITAL
2-74. The ABCS is a network of computer systems that allow for
advanced reporting, orders and graphic sharing, and database
management. These systems are described in detail in Section IV,
Computers.
2-38
RADIO FM
2-75. Reconnaissance operations normally depend on radio as the
primary means of communication for both voice and digital traffic.
Net discipline and SOP minimize needless traffic. To avoid detection
by threat direction-finding equipment, the squadron uses all other
means of communication to supplement the radio. Once in contact,
the primary means of communication will be FM voice. Radio
communications include electromagnetic communications in FM, AM,
UHF, and VHF spectrums.
COMMERCIAL LINES
2-76. Commercial lines are used when approved by higher
headquarters. If the unit is forced to withdraw, existing wire lines,
including commercial lines, are cut and sections removed so the
threat cannot use them.
SOUND AND VISUAL
2-77. Sound and visual signals are in the signal operating
instructions (SOI) or the unit SOP. Signals not included in the SOI
may be established by SOP. The battlefield will have many sound and
visual cues that become increasingly important in complex and
urban terrain. Commanders and staff planners carefully determine
how sound and visual signals will be used and authenticated. Sound
and visual signals include pyrotechnics, hand-and-arm, flag, metal-
on-metal, rifle shot, whistles, and bells.
MESSENGERS AND LIAISON OFFICERS
2-78. Messengers are used between the CP, trains, and higher and
lower headquarters. The use of liaison officers (LNO) becomes
increasingly important as digitally equipped units operate with
nondigitally equipped units.
WIRE
2-79. Wire is normally used for internal communications within the
CP, support areas, and assembly areas. It is the primary means of
communication whenever the situation permits.
FM VERSUS DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS

2-80. Whether to use FM or digital means for communication is a
function of the situation and SOPs. Even though both systems are
critical for effective C2 at all levels, FM will remain the primary
method for control within recce troops during operations while the
surveillance troop will primarily use digital communications means.
Some general considerations can help guide the understanding of
when to use which mechanism at what time.
• FM will be the primary method of communications when
troops are in direct visual contact, receiving fire, and/or when
time is a critical factor. Staffs at brigade and squadron level
must remain sensitive to the difficulty and danger of utilizing
digital systems when moving, receiving fire, or in direct visual
2-39
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
contact, and should not expect digital reports under those

conditions.
• Squadron elements receiving fire or in direct visual contact
should transmit spot reports (SPOTREP) on FM voice; their
higher headquarters should convert FM reports into digital
SPOTREPs to generate situational awareness. At troop level,
the XO, the 1SG, or the troop CP should perform this.
• Initial contact at any echelon within the squadron should be
reported on FM voice; this alerts the net that a digital
SPOTREP will follow as soon as possible in order to generate
threat SA.
• Elements moving about the AO (not in CPs) will utilize FM
voice unless they can stop and generate a digital message or
report.
• Emergency logistical requests, especially CASEVAC requests,
should be initiated on FM voice with a follow-up digital report
if possible.
• Calls for fire on targets of opportunity should be sent on FM
voice; FISTs submit digitally to AFATDS.
• Planned calls for fire from FISTs in the initial part of an
engagement should be sent digitally.
• Routine logistical reports and requests should be sent
digitally.
• Routine operational reports prior to and following combat
should be sent digitally.
• Orders, plans, and graphics should be sent digitally,
accompanied by an FM voice call to alert recipients that they
have critical information being sent to them. Additionally, the
transmitting element should request a verbal
acknowledgement of both receipt and understanding of the
transmitted information by an appropriate soldier (usually not
the computer operator).
• Obstacle and NBC-1 reports should be sent initially by voice
followed by digital reports to generate a geo-referenced SA
message portraying the obstacle/contaminated area across
the network.
SQUADRON EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

2-81. The squadron communicates on brigade nets as illustrated in
Figure 2-16 and discussed in the paragraphs that follow.
2-40
Figure 2-16. Squadron External Nets
BRIGADE AREA COMMON USER NETWORK

2-82. The area common user network is the primary system for
voice telephone, data, and hard copy communications in the
brigade area. The network is installed and operated by the brigade
signal company. It provides an interlocking network of
communications facilities providing the means to exchange
information throughout the brigade. Individual circuits within the
network are terminated by common user telephones, facsimile
machines, and data terminals that are user owned, installed, and
operated. The network is built on a series of communication nodes
providing communications support to headquarters and units
operating in the brigade area. CPs are connected to two or more
nodes to ensure redundancy, reliability, and survivability of
communications. The area common user network provides a limited
mobile individual call capability as well as a conference call. The net
is capable of passing secure traffic and provides reach capability to
division or Army Force (ARFOR) headquarters.
BRIGADE COMMAND NET
2-83. This is a secure FM voice net, controlled by the brigade S3.
The squadron command group, TAC CP, and main CPs will monitor.
BRIGADE OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE NET
2-41
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
2-84. This net is a secure FM voice net, controlled by the brigade

S2. The squadron command group, TAC CP, and main CPs will
monitor.
BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT NET
2-85. This is a secure digital net, controlled by the brigade fire
support coordinator (FSCOORD) from the brigade main CP. The
squadron command group, TAC CP, and main CPs will monitor.
BRIGADE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS NET
2-86. This is a secure FM voice net, controlled by the brigade S4
from the brigade rear CP in the BSA. The squadron CTCP, FTCP, and
main CPs will monitor.
TACTICAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
2-87. The brigade signal company provides the squadron with two
TACSAT communication terminals that link it to the tactical satellite
communications network. This network is used to provide critical C2
communications between the corps and its subordinate maneuver
units, echelons above corps, and national command authorities,
giving the squadron reach capabilities. The terminals normally
position with the squadron main CP and the UAV launch site, and
operate under the control of the regimental S6. This network may be
of particular importance during the early stages of deployment.
SQUADRON INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

2-88. The squadron operates on the internal nets illustrated in
Figure 2-17 and discussed in the paragraphs that follow.
2-42
Figure 2-17. Squadron Internal Communications
SQUADRON COMMAND NET

2-89. The command net is a secure FM net, controlled by the
S3 section at the main CP. It is used to command and control
the squadron. All organic and attached units, FSO, ALO, and
supporting units operate in this net. The command net is used to
send combat critical information to the commander or the S3 and to
allow troop commanders and the commander to talk to each other.
Ground recce troops are equipped to enter this net.
SQUADRON OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE NET
2-90. The OI net is a secure FM net, controlled by the S2 section of
the main CP. All routine tactical reports and other intelligence
matters are sent on this net. This net should be used to free the
command net for command and combat critical traffic. Recce troop
CPs and the surveillance troop are users of the OI net.
SQUADRON ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS NET
2-91. The A/L net is a secure FM net, controlled by the S4 section
in the CTCP. This net is used for A/L reports and coordinating
maintenance operations. The squadron XO, troop 1SGs, main CP,
medic platoon, and field trains operate on the A/L net.
SQUADRON FIRE SUPPORT NET
2-92. The fire support net is an FM and digital net controlled by the
FSE in the main CP. It is the primary means of calling for indirect
2-43
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
fires or CAS for the squadron. Troop FISTs, the main CP, command
group, TAC CP, and mortar sections are users of this net.
TROOP COMMAND NET
2-93. The troop command net is a secure FM net controlled by the
troop XO in the troop CP. All organic and attached elements of the
troop operate in this net. All tactical and logistics reports are
forwarded to the troop CP on this net. Platoons operate on internal
nets.
TROOP FIRE SUPPORT NET
2-94. The troop FIST controls this FM net. The troop FIST and
mortars operate on the net to call for fires. Any member of the recce
troop may enter the net as necessary to call for fire (see Table 2-3).
2-44
Table 2-3. Squadron Internal Nets
SQDN ARTY
BDE SQDN SQDN SQDN TRP/CO TRP FS
STATION/NET CMD FS
CMD OI FM A/L FM FS FM CMD FM FM
FM (DIG)
Sqdn Cmd
X A A X X
Grp
Sqdn TAC CP X X A
Sqdn MAIN
M X N O N X
CP
Sqdn CTCP X X O N
Trp/Co Cdrs X O A A A
Trp CP X X O/A O/A
Trp/Co Plts A A X A
Trp/Co FIST X X X N
Trp/Co 1SG A X X
Trp Mortars X X X
HHT Cdr X X
N – Net control station
X – Enter net
A – Enter net as required
O – Monitor
I – FSO operates on this net
RETRANS TEAMS
2-95. The squadron has three RETRANS teams in the S6 section,
which are dedicated to RETRANS mission any of the squadron nets.
Each team has the capability to RETRANS one FM net using single
channel ground-airborne radio system (SINCGARS), and to serve as a
link in the lower TI with its EPLRS. The S6 positions RETRANS teams
in the squadron AO, balancing the need to maximize LOS and range
with the requirements of local security. Capabilities and limitations of
RETRANS is an important planning consideration when operating in
a noncontiguous environment.
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
2-96. The brigade’s OPSEC program is managed by and the
responsibility of the S3. He analyzes the commander’s concept of the
operation to determine the essential elements of friendly information
(EEFI) that must be protected from exploitation by threat intelligence.
The S3 and S2 develop appropriate OPSEC measures, based on their
assessment of threat intelligence collection capabilities and on the
friendly indicators that may compromise the EEFI. These OPSEC
measures are primarily procedural in nature and include—
2-45
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Signal security (SIGSEC) to protect operational information by

practicing COMSEC and electronic security techniques.
• Information security to prevent disclosure of operational
information through written, verbal, or graphic
communications.
• Physical security that consists of physical measures that
protect personnel; prevent unauthorized access to equipment,
facilities, materiel, and documents; and guard against
espionage, sabotage, damage, or theft.
2-97. The S6 manages and is responsible for a unit’s COMSEC

program. COMSEC involves physical security, crypto security, and
transmission security. COMSEC procedures must be covered in the
unit SOP.
• Physical security. Physical security protects the crypto
system and classified documents (including plain-language
copies of messages and carbons) from capture or loss. Before
an area is vacated, soldiers inspect for messages, carbons,
cipher tapes, and copies of maps or orders. Wire lines are
patrolled to prevent threat tapping. When SOI codes or
cryptographic equipment is lost or captured, the unit reports
the facts promptly to the next higher command. The SOP
must contain instructions for destruction of equipment and
classified documents to prevent their capture or use by the
threat. Complete SOIs should not be carried forward of the
main CP. When necessary, the S6 distributes extracts for use
by forward elements. The SOP establishes priority for issue of
SOIs and extracts.
• Crypto security. Crypto security is maintained by using
operations codes, numerical encryption devices, secure voice
devices, and other secure communications equipment.
• Transmission security. Transmission security limits the
threat’s ability to listen to radio signals. Any signal
transmitted can be intercepted and jammed by the threat. All
transmissions should be short and treated as if the threat
were listening. Net discipline is the responsibility of all users,
but the NCS is responsible for policing the net. Brevity codes,
the terrain index reference system, and coded reports all serve
to reduce net traffic.
SECTION IV – COMPUTERS
2-98. Computers assist in the management of information within

the C2 system, support decision making, and disseminate execution
information. Computers consist of both hardware and software. In
spite of the wide spread of computers, there are two dangers with
their use. One is over-reliance on technology; the second is failing to
make proper use of technological capabilities. The squadron must
2-46
strike a balance to get the most out of the equipment while

integrating technology properly with the other components of the C2
system. This section provides information on the digital C2 systems
and architecture that supports C2 operations.
ARMY BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEM

2-99. The ABCS is the Army’s primary warfighting information
system that interfaces with the global command and control system-
Army (GCCS-A) and provides seamless C2 connectivity from battalion
through corps. ABCS is made up of the Army Tactical Command and
Control System (ATCCS) subcomponents, the FBCB2 system, and the
TI. The ATCCS, including the MCS, ASAS, AFATDS, Air and Missile
Defense Workstation (AMDWS), and the CSSCS, are the primary
digital communication systems for the squadron.
2-100. FBCB2, with its subsequent updates and refinements, is the
primary digital system for communicating and transmitting COP data
at squadron and below. ABCS employs a mix of fixed and semifixed
installations and mobile networks, depending on the subsystem that
interpolates with theater and joint information systems. ABCS
provides connectivity to combat information databases; processes
information; and provides the commander and staff with timely,
accurate, mission-critical information to support effective C2
functions. Figure 2-18 depicts the digital integration of GCCS-A and
ABCS.
Figure 2-18. Digital Integration of GCCS-A and ABCS
2-47
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
FORCE XXI BATTLE COMMAND BRIGADE AND BELOW

2-101. FBCB2 is the foundation system for ABCS and the TI.
Mounted on most of the vehicles in the squadron, each system is
linked to a position locator grid reference (PLGR) and a SINCGARS or
EPLRS radio. Each FBCB2 generates and transmits its own position
location. Collectively, the FBCB2 systems generate the Blue SA
picture. Operators utilize FBCB2 to generate threat SPOTREPs,
which create the majority of the Red picture at the tactical level. The
messaging, reporting, and orders/graphics capabilities of the system
support battle command for each battlefield functional area.
2-102. FBCB2 receives data across the TI via the internet controller
(INC). The INC is a tactical router built into the SINCGARS radio
system. The EPLRS data radio and the SINCGARS data/voice radio
transmit/receive digital information between vehicles. This
communication architecture is discussed in greater detail in the
“Tactical Internet” paragraph of this section.
2-103. The ATCCS discussed below has embedded battle command
(EBC) software that allows interface with FBCB2.
MANEUVER CONTROL SYSTEM

2-104. MCS provides the principal operational interface between
ABCS devices. It receives, processes, and displays automated, on-
line, near-real time information from various tactical information
systems. MCS integrates the maneuver function with the information
system of the other four functional areas: fire support, air defense,
intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW), and CSS. MCS is located in
the squadron TAC CP and main CP.
2-105. The MCS provides the squadron commander and staff with
automated, on-line, near-real time systems for planning, preparing
for, and executing tactical operations and for collecting, processing,
storing, displaying, and disseminating tactical C2 information. MCS
is the force-level commander’s information system. MCS provides
automated support in preparing and disseminating operational plans,
orders, and reports through the chain of command to facilitate
monitoring the execution of operations.
2-106. MCS capabilities cover maps and graphics, messages and
reports, planning, and user utilities.
ALL SOURCE ANALYSIS SYSTEM

2-107. ASAS is the IEW component of ABCS. It provides the fused
intelligence picture as received from the supporting analysis control
element. ASAS displays friendly and threat units, receiving threat
units from the analysis control element and friendly units through
the MCS. The ASAS disseminates the threat picture to MCS.
Intelligence analysts for target validation and BDA use ASAS. It
provides combat leaders the all-source intelligence needed to view the
battlefield and more effectively conduct the battle. ASAS provides a
tactically deployable system capable of receiving and correlating data
from strategic and tactical intelligence sensors and sources,
2-48
producing threat situation displays and rapidly disseminating

intelligence information. In addition, it nominates targets, manages
collection requirements, and provides OPSEC support. ASAS is
designed to operate in a joint environment across the spectrum of
conflict.
2-108. ASAS is located at the TAC CP and main CP in echelons
brigade through corps. ASAS capabilities cover maps and graphics,
communications, security, databases, imagery, target planning,
workstation system manager, and user utilities.
ADVANCED FIELD ARTILLERY TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM

2-109. AFATDS is a multi-service (Army and Marine Corps) fire
support software system that operates on the Army’s common
hardware for the ABCS. AFATDS serves as the force fire support
information system that integrates fire support through fire support
systems on the ground, in close air support, and by naval surface
fires. It interfaces with the Theater Battle Management Core System
(TBMCS) and Contingency Theater Automated Planning System
(CTAPS) to support the joint air operations center’s air tasking order
(ATO) production. AFATDS provides visual operational picture by
displaying unit locations, range fans, fire support coordination
measures (FSCM), airspace control measures (ACM), target overlays,
battlefield geometry, threat locations, and common reference
systems. It processes incoming Army Tactical Missile System
(ATACMS) fire missions received from various sources to include the
AMDWS. This system is located at the FSE in the main CP as well as
the command group and TAC CP.
2-110. AFATDS provides the commander with a robust ability to
conduct automatic digital coordination on all fire support requests
including ATACMS; air attack; naval surface fire; and mortar,
cannon, or rocket missions. This coordination allows the commander
to quickly and automatically prioritize and engage targets on multiple
missions to ensure that he processes the most important missions
first. It also checks incoming fire missions against FSCM, ACM, and
unit zone of responsibility. AFATDS notifies the operator of any
violations and electronically requests clearance from the unit that
established the control measure. The unit must approve or deny the
request before the mission can continue processing.
2-111. AFATDS has numerous capabilities. It—
• Processes the ATO (received from TBMCS and CTAPS,
displayed, parsed into Air Systems Command and
unsupported tactical air request list (UTARL), and transmitted
to other information systems).
• Processes the airspace control order (ACO), which is received
from TBMCS and CTAPS, parsed specific ACMs, displayed as
geometries, and transmitted to other information systems.
• Deconflicts ACMs with FSCMs.
• Transmits calls for fire (CFF).
• Resolves duplicated fires on targets.
2-49
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Prioritizes multiple missions to ensure that most important

missions are processed first.
• Screens and filters mission requests and recommends
denying missions that do not meet commander’s guidance
and attack criteria.
• Checks mission requests for violations to FSCMs and initiates
automatic coordination.
• Recommends best attack method.
2-112. The system provides the ability to—
• Create and disseminate fire support orders, graphics, and
control measures.
• Receive and process CFFs from other digital systems and
target acquisition radar.
• Manage mission allocation.
• Monitor firing unit status and locations.
• Transmit and receive reports and free text messages.
• Display the threat and friendly operational pictures from MCS
and ASAS.
• In conjunction with ASAS, provide integrated fires and IEW
management.
AIR AND MISSLE DEFENSE WORKSTATION

2-113. AMDWS is the air defense artillery (ADA) staff planning and
SA tool utilized from the ADA battery to theater echelons. It is the
ADA ATCCS tool that provides air and missile defense plans and air
SA to ABCS and commanders at all echelons. It also is the air missile
defense planning and control link to joint/allied C2 systems. It
provides direct connectivity to and interoperability with the Joint
Defense Planner, a theater-level air and missile defense planning tool.
SYSTEM CAPABILITIES
2-114. The AMDWS provides the commander with the tools required
to monitor current air operations while planning for future events. It
provides the brigade with SA of the air picture. From the Forward
Area Air Defense Engagement Operations system (FAAD-EO) and/or
the Air Defense System Integrator (ADSI), it receives a continuous
update of the air picture. This includes friendly, hostile, and
unknown fixed- and rotary-wing aircrafts, cruise missiles, and UAVs.
AMDWS also receives missile launch point, impact point, and current
position data from Tactical Data Dissemination System (TDDS),
Tactical Information Broadcast System (TIBS), and FAAD data link
(FDL) sources. AMDWS can also track personnel and logistics
information concerning the ADA unit. The capability also exists to
electronically generate, receive, and distribute overlays, conduct
terrain analysis, analyze multiple missions, and monitor the current
situation.
2-115. AMDWS information sources/feeds are explained below.
2-50
• Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System

(AMDPCS) links AMDWS to corps/army/theater echelons and
joint forces C2 elements.
• FAADC3I (Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence) passes air tracks and
related data (e.g., air strike warnings) and unit location/status
data to AMDWS. The two systems also pass battlefield graphic
control measures. For example, AMDWS plans, edits, and
passes boundaries to FAADC3I and receives back the current
battlefield picture.
• Joint Tactical Air and Ground Station (JTAGS) interfaces
with AMDWS allowing AMDWS to receive theater battlefield
management (TBM) air track information.
• Tactical Data Link-B (TADIL-B) interface allows AMDWS to
receive track positional data from a TADIL-B track source.
Ideally, any TADIL-B track source will have the capability to
receive the joint integrated air picture and relay that to
AMDWS.
• Tactical Battle Management Control System (TBMCS)
interface is the principle interface between AMDWS and the
Air Force C2 network for airspace coordination between the
Army and Air Force commanders. It allows for the reception of
the ACO and the ATO for planning and SA purposes. AMDWS
can view, print and/or forward the ATO. AMDWS is
responsible for submitting the ADA air control measures to
the TBMCS for joint approval and incorporation into the ACO.
• Tactical Information Broadcast System (TIBS)/Tactical
Data Dissemination System (TDDS) interface allows
AMDWS to receive the TIBS or TBM track information.
2-116. The AMDWS air defense force operations are the actions
required to plan, coordinate, prepare for, and sustain the ADA
mission. Force operations are primarily concerned with translating
the air defense concept, based on the OPLAN and the short-range air
defense (SHORAD) battalion commander’s planning guidance, into
detailed instructions. This includes weapons and sensor deployment,
task organization, air space control measures, battlefield geometry,
and logistics and personnel support. The AMDWS force operations
translate all this information into a tactical air defense concept.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CONTROL SYSTEM

2-117. CSSCS provides logistics status and information in support of
CSS planning and operations. The system receives subordinate unit
logistical reports from FBCB2 and other CSSCS terminals, and
transmits reports and requirements to echelons above brigade
support elements. The S1/S4 section in the CTCP will be equipped
with a CSSCS terminal and with FBCB2 to receive digital logistical
and situation reports from units within the squadron.
SUPPORTING SYSTEMS
2-51
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
2-118. In addition to the TI (discussed in a paragraph 2-125), several

related software or hardware systems work with or as a part of ABCS.
• Tactical Operations Center Server. The main CP server is a
software program that acts as a router for the CP, distributing
any C2 messages to the appropriate ATCCS component in the
CP. Main CP server software normally resides on MCS or
ASAS.
• Integrated Meteorological System. Integrated
Meteorological System (IMETS) is a software program that
provides the capability to perform detailed analysis of weather
effects on terrain and equipment. It normally resides on an
ASAS terminal at division level for use by the division staff
weather officer and the G2 section. The staff can access
IMETS data or request specific information or analysis
through the G2/S2 channels.
• Automated Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Information
System. The ANBACIS is used to report NBC strikes and
warnings and to predict the contaminated areas associated
with such strikes. The software is loaded on select MCS
computers.
• Video Teleconferencing. One of the most efficient and
powerful C2 tools that has emerged is the ability to conduct
video teleconferences (VTC) between CPs. The capability
normally resides at the main CPs at division and corps. It is
not organically available between the brigade and its
subordinate unit CPs, but can rapidly be added to a CP. VTCs
allow for quick updates, briefings, planning conferences, and
diagramming of ongoing and future operations.
• Digital Topographic Support System. The DTSS system is
used by the division engineer to create topographic and
terrain analysis products that can easily be accessed via the
MCS. This system is fielded at the brigade level in some units.
DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING ENVIRONMENT
2-119. The distributed computing environment (DCE) is used to
integrate software components on several different workstations
across a network. Each ATCCS subcomponent provides a service to
the other battlefield functional area’s ATCCS. The computer or
workstation providing a service is referred to as the server, while the
computer or workstation using that service is referred to as a client.
Every workstation can be a server to every other workstation. For
example, DCE allows any clients of the ATCCS workstations into the
MCS maps and overlays server to view the COP. It also enables the
separate clients of the ATCCS into the ASAS secondary imagery
server.
2-120. While each component of the ABCS is a powerful C2 tool
individually, the ABCS reaches its full potential when linked by a
LAN, a wide-area network (WAN), or the TI.
LOCAL AREA NETWORK
2-52
2-121. A LAN is a data communications network that interconnects

digital devices and other peripherals. Individual systems are linked
and distributed over a localized area to allow communication between
computers and sharing resources. Two or more computers linked by
software and connected by cable are considered a LAN. A LAN
includes—
• Digital devices (computers, scanners, printers, and other
peripherals).
• A communications medium that exchanges data from one
device to another.
• Network adapters that provide devices with an interface to the
communications medium.
2-122. Digital systems within a CP are normally connected on a LAN.
However, routers on the LAN allow addressees to change as needed
for jump or split operations. A tactical LAN is configured to
interconnect various main CP shelters. Staff leaders must ensure
that the LAN cables properly connect to their shelter or system and to
the previous and next shelter or system. The S6, the LAN manager for
the squadron, has approval authority over all systems connected to
their LAN. The LAN manager is responsible for physically
establishing, connecting, and maintaining the operation and for
troubleshooting the LAN. He also must ensure that the LAN connects
to the WAN. See FM 6-02.7 [FM 24-7] for additional information.
WIDE AREA NETWORK
2-123. A WAN connects several LANs and allows for the transmission
of large amounts of data over extended distances. Digital CPs use the
WAN to connect to higher, adjacent, and subordinate unit LANs using
one of the following types of communications systems:
• MSE network.
• Global broadcast service.
• Near-term digital radio (NTDR).
2-124. The LAN connects to the WAN at a gateway. The gateway is

located in a small extension node or large extension node. The
brigade S6 and supporting signal sections are responsible for
connectivity to the small extension node and WAN operations.
TACTICAL INTERNET
2-125. The TI consists of tactical radios (SINCGARS and EPLRS)
linked by routers that allow digital systems to interoperate in a
dynamic battlefield environment. The TI should provide timely,
reliable, and secure battlespace information. The TI provides the
seamless communications connection necessary to deliver the COP
and other C2 data to digital C2 systems. FBCB2 communicates with
ATCCS via the TI. Two distinct sub-networks comprise the TI: the
lower TI and upper TI.
Lower Tactical Internet
2-126. The lower TI provides for the digital communications for
echelons at brigade and below. It is comprised of three primary
2-53
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
components: EPLRS, SINCGARS, and INCs. The function of each in

relation to the TI is listed:
• EPLRS provides data-only communications (vehicle position
information, network coordination, and data communication)
capability.
• SINCGARS provides data and voice communications
capability.
• INC is the Internet controller built into the SINCGARS radio
mount. It provides routing interface between EPLRS and
SINCGARS. The INC controls information traffic routing.
EPLRS is a server in the TI. All systems are associated with a
server to pass digital traffic. Systems not equipped with
EPLRS pass data via the INC through SINCGARS to their
EPLRS server. If the server is degraded, the SINCGARS
automatically searches for a quality server and will jump
servers if necessary. This jump is invisible to the operator.
Upper Tactical Internet
2-127. The upper TI, or warfighter information network-terrestrial
(WIN-T), provides COP and other C2 information dissemination
between brigade and squadron CPs and echelons above brigade CPs
(see Figure
2-19).
2-54
2-128. The components of WIN-T include:

• Main CP server.
• Main CP LAN.
• NTDR.
• MSE.
2-129. The main CP server is the software router through which

information is routed from higher, adjacent, and lower elements into
the ATCCS in the CP. At the CP, the main CP server interfaces with
the main CP INC, main CP LAN, and NTDR. NTDR hauls data for CP-
to-CP communications at brigade and below. Eventually, the Joint
Tactical Radio System (JTRS) will replace NTDR. The replacement
system can transmit voice, data, and video on the battlefield.
Figure 2-19. Squadron Upper Tactical Internet
2-55
Chapter 3
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Operations

The brigade’s primary
source of intelligence CONTENTS
is its organic cavalry Fundamentals......................................................3-3
squadron (reconnais- Reconnaissance Operational
Environment .................................................3-3
sance, surveillance,
Reconnaissance Focus...................................3-6
and target acquisition Fundamentals ..................................................3-10
[RSTA]). One of the Capabilities ......................................................3-13
primary roles of the Limitations .......................................................3-14
squadron is to Reconnaissance Planning..................................3-14
Planning Considerations (Commander’s
perform intelligence, Reconnaissance Guidance) ........................3-14
surveil-lance, and Reconnaissance Methods...............................3-18
reconnais-sance (ISR) Forms of Reconnaissance..................................3-20
opera-tions, along Zone ..................................................................3-20
Area...................................................................3-29
with its other
Route ................................................................3-37
responsibilities of Surveillance Operations .....................................3-38
target acquisition and Purpose ............................................................3-38
battle damage Fundamentals ..................................................3-38
assessment (BDA). Capabilities ......................................................3-39
Limitations .......................................................3-39
Successful conduct of Surveillance Planning .........................................3-40
ISR operations facili- Planning Considerations ................................3-40
tates the brigade Surveillance Methods......................................3-41
commander’s ability Reconnaissance Handover.................................3-42
to retain freedom of Considerations of Reconnaissance
Handover.......................................................3-43
maneuver in order to Example of Reconnaissance Handover .........3-45
concentrate combat
power and apply
assets deliberately at the decisive time and place of his choosing
by determining which routes are suitable for maneuver, where the
threat is strong and weak, and where gaps exist.
Reconnaissance is a focused collection effort performed before and

during other combat operations to provide combat information and
intelligence used by the brigade commander and staff to develop,
confirm or modify the commander’s plan. Surveillance is the
systematic observation of airspace or surface areas by visual,
aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Surveillance is
inherent in both reconnaissance and security missions, but may
be conducted separately utilizing the squadron’s unique assets.
The focus and tempo of the collection effort primarily comes from
the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) specified in the brigade
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), his intent,
and the specific (critical) areas in which information is needed.
Specific requirements for ISR operations are found in the brigade’s
ISR plan and reflected in the brigade’s ISR operations order
(OPORD). See Appendix A for the OPORD guide.
3-1
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
ISR missions are undertaken continuously throughout the

brigade’s area of operations (AO) to obtain information by visual
observation or other detection methods to identify—
• The activities and resources of the threat (actual and

possible).
• The activities and resources of noncombatants.
• The meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic
characteristics of a particular area.
The squadron has numerous systems available for executing ISR

operations. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), ground-based
sensors (GBS), scout, and human intelligence (HUMINT) collectors
are at the commander’s immediate disposal. Commanders and
staffs need to know the capabilities and limitations of the various
sensor systems, understand that they may be susceptible to
countermeasures, and lack the ability to convey the human
dimension of the battlefield—assessing the threat’s morale, taking
prisoners, or making crucial on-the-spot decisions/judgment calls.
The scout directly observing the target is still the most valuable
reconnaissance asset the squadron commander has. The
commander will still need to maximize the dismounted scout
observer teams to accurately report the threat and the effects of
the terrain on both forces.
With the use of digital and analog systems, the squadron

commander can also utilize external assets available to him from
the joint and national level (see Chapter 6). These added
capabilities provide increased situational awareness (SA) that
facilitates situational understanding (SU), and increased lethality
when integrated with joint fires. They aid the squadron when
conducting decentralized operations over extended distances in a
complex environment. The squadron can directly provide the
brigade commander with real-time information and intelligence,
and is the most valuable and effective ISR asset available to the
brigade commander. The new systems and technologies will
greatly improve the interconnectivity between the squadron and
external intelligence collection assets, increasing the availability of
intelligence for planning and conducting operations.
The squadron may conduct ISR operations pure, or it may be task

organized with additional ground or air assets from the brigade or
rotary-wing aviation, and/or ground cavalry from a supporting
division. In many situations, the brigade will operate over
extended distances at a high operational tempo (OPTEMPO),
requiring increased emphasis on air-ground reconnaissance
operations coupled with the use of digital command and control
(C2) systems.
3-2
____________________________________ Chapter 3 - Reconnaissance and Surveillance Operations
The squadron commander and staff use digital C2 systems during

reconnaissance operations to—
• Facilitate parallel planning that will speed the development

and distribution of plans.
• Rapidly develop the situation for the brigade through
increased SA.
• More effectively integrate and synchronize all combat
multipliers available for the reconnaissance effort.
• Distribute information obtained with greater speed,
precision, and clarity.
ISR operations can be conducted utilizing four methods—

dismounted, mounted, aerial, and sensor. For the most effective
reconnaissance, a combination of all methods should be
considered. Stealth is always the primary consideration in all ISR
operations and must be strongly emphasized in every training
event. The squadron will most likely execute operations over
extended distances and far in advance of the brigade’s execution of
combat operations. Stealth is needed to gain information without
compromising or alerting the threat of the brigade’s intentions.
Aggressive reconnaissance is not a method the squadron should
routinely employ. The exception to this may be in stability
operations and support operations where military presence is
desired and in situations where the commander has decided it is
necessary to fight for information. With the additional sensors,
scouts, and intelligence systems available to the squadron, the
frequency that the squadron has to fight for information may be
reduced. If fighting is required, it will be on a limited scale,
precisely focused, and under conditions favorable to the squadron.
However, in situations where a soldier/unit is compromised by the
threat, self-defense will always override the need for stealth.
SECTION I – FUNDAMENTALS
RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3-1. The squadron must be able to conduct ISR operations against
threat forces, which leads to the SU of the operational environment
(OE) in all of its multiple dimensions—political, cultural, economic,
demographic as well as military factors—rather than a narrow focus on
the adversary, his capabilities, and the terrain. Additionally the
squadron takes a multilayered approach to reconnaissance by fusing
its ISR assets, creating a synergistic network in gaining information
within this complex environment. This multidimensional approach to
reconnaissance means that the squadron must develop an
understanding of not just what is happening, but why. In the
3-3
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
asymmetric environment, identifying threat centers of gravity, decisive

points, and the means to influence the threat’s will and behavior is one
of the most important contributions the squadron can make to the
brigade’s success. In order for the squadron to successfully contribute,
the squadron commander, staff and subordinate commanders must
understand the affect of the OE on reconnaissance operations.
3-2. To date, the Army has focused its efforts on traditional
combat—open, force-on-force, and symmetrical threat formations. The
standard reconnaissance approach to this environment has been
simply to focus on gaining information on the threat and the terrain.
The Army’s thinking must expand to include nontraditional
environmental variables that could influence its operations. In the
future, the Army will not habitually face conventional forces in open
areas. The millennium, with the information age, has brought upon the
Army the specter of asymmetric warfare—a strategy in which a weak
opponent successfully engages a stronger opponent by using a variety
of offsets for gaining advantage in hopes of achieving its objectives and
goals. The asymmetric threats include regional military forces,
paramilitary forces, guerrillas and insurgents, terrorists, criminal
groups, and certain civilian groups and individuals. Threat asymmetric
approaches involve information
operations, weapons of mass Asymmetric warfare: a strategy in
destruction (WMD), hugging which a weak opponent
complex (mainly urban) terrain, successfully engages a stronger
civilian involvement, and evasive opponent by using a variety of
offsets for gaining advantage.
attacks against US forces and
soldiers (see Chapter 1).
3-3. The squadron must be ready to concentrate on both the
traditional approach to reconnaissance of gathering information on
threat forces and terrain as well as focus on the asymmetric aspects
of an OE that impacts military operations.
3-4. Additionally, of all the environments in which the Army may
be called upon to conduct operations, the urban environment
confronts commanders with a combination of difficulties rarely found
in other environments. The distinct characteristics of the urban
environment are primarily a function of the following factors:
• The increasing size and global prevalence of urban areas.
• The combinations of manmade features and supporting
infrastructure superimposed on the existing natural
terrain.
• The density of civilians in close proximity to combat
forces.
3-5. Of these, the third factor and the human dimension it

represents is potentially the most important and perplexing for
commanders to understand and evaluate. The urban environment is,
first of all, a human environment. That makes it different from all
other forms of environment. An urban environment is not defined
solely by its structures or systems but by the people who compose it.
An urban environment reacts and interacts with an army in a way
that no natural environment could.
3-4
3-6. Although complex, understanding the urban terrain is

relatively straightforward in comparison to comprehending the
multifaceted nature of urban society. Military operations often require
Army forces to operate in close proximity to a high density of civilians,
and their presence, attitudes, actions, and needs affect the conduct of
operations. As urban areas increase in size, they become less and less
homogenous; therefore, commanders must understand and account
for the characteristics of a diverse population whose beliefs may vary
based on many factors (see Society and Infrastructure subparagraphs
in the “Reconnaissance Focus” paragraph that follows). The behavior of
civilian populations within an urban area is dynamic and poses a
special challenge to commanders conducting military operations.
Civilian populations continually influence, to varying degrees, military
operations conducted within an AO.
3-7. The center of gravity during a military operation, particularly
in stability operations and support operations, may be the civilian
inhabitants themselves. The side that enjoys the support of the
population retains many advantages. To gain and/or retain the
support of the population, commanders must first understand
(through reconnaissance) the complex nature and character of the
urban society and its infrastructure. Second, they must understand
and accept that every military action (or inaction) may influence,
positively or negatively, the relationship between the urban
population and Army forces, and by extension, mission success. With
this awareness, commanders visualize decisions they must make,
plan operations, implement programs, and/or take immediate action
to maintain support of a friendly populace, or neutralize or gain the
support of hostile or neutral factions.
3-8. Understanding how operations affect the urban society (and
vice versa) normally begins with intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) and reconnaissance of the society and its
infrastructure. These two elements allow commanders to determine
the proximity and numbers of civilians as well as the infrastructure
in relation to decisive points within their AO. Commanders can then
decide whether civilian presence and/or density represent a
significant risk to the accomplishment of their mission. Through
reconnaissance of the society and infrastructure, the brigade
commander then can visualize and decide what actions he must take
to influence and/or exploit the society and its infrastructure. It
should be emphasized that the society may assist friendly military
operations by providing information on threat forces or by supporting
friendly forces with its infrastructure resources. If civilians are the
primary focus of the operation, as in many stability operations and
support operations, this same analysis may help to determine the
decisive points.
3-9. In the broader mission of providing information for SU of the
OE, the squadron must direct its reconnaissance on a myriad of
dimensions—demographics, political, social, cultural, economic,
infrastructures, open terrain, and complex terrain—as well as
military factors. This multidimensional reconnaissance approach
expands on the traditional focus of reconnaissance by concentrating
on additional asymmetric threats, urban environment, society,
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
infrastructure, and other aspects that can influence military

operations. There are a myriad of ISR assets (see Chapter 6) that
should be fused at the lowest level to assist in this multidimensional
approach to reconnaissance.
3-10. Multidimensional reconnaissance is not a mission; it is an
expansion of the focus of reconnaissance as well as the fusion of ISR
assets that will direct information collection by the squadron for the
purpose of fulfilling information requirements (IR) for the brigade.
RECONNAISSANCE FOCUS
3-11. Based on the future OE, reconnaissance is focused on more
than just the threat and terrain. The focus defines on what the
squadron needs to concentrate its information gathering and allows
the commander to select which critical tasks must be accomplished
and with what asset(s). Focus enhances the squadron’s ability to
fully understand its environment and conduct a more detailed,
comprehensive reconnaissance. Understanding the multiple
dimensions of the focus of reconnaissance is paramount in the
squadron’s understanding of the OE. Reconnaissance focus must be
linked to answering the brigade and squadron commander’s CCIR,
supporting targeting (lethal and nonlethal), and filling additional
voids in relevant information (RI). The focus of reconnaissance is
characterized in these broad terms: threat, society, infrastructure,
and terrain.
THREAT
3-12. The squadron no longer faces a single, monolithic, or well-
defined threat. During the cold war, planning centered on
confronting numerically superior armored opposing forces in Europe,
the Far East, or Southwest Asia. Today’s reconnaissance units must
be able to conduct operations across the range of military operations
(such as major theater of war [MTW], smaller-scale contingencies
[SSC], and stability operations and support operations) against
threats ranging in size from major regional powers to asymmetric
threats. These may include conventional threat forces, insurgents,
paramilitary forces, guerrillas, criminal groups, and certain civilian
groups and individuals. Because of the diversity of the threat, the IPB
process becomes even more important at the brigade, squadron, and
troop levels. No longer will the threat always fit into a neat time-
distance scenario. Potential adversaries may use a variety of doctrine,
tactics, and equipment. It is extremely important to quickly identify
who the threat is in an operational area. This will continually be the
major focus of reconnaissance for the squadron. However,
reconnaissance focus may be the identification of the unknown
threat as well. That is why the understanding of the society and
infrastructures of an area are also an important focus for
reconnaissance.
SOCIETY (SOCIAL/HUMAN DEMOGRAPHICS)
3-13. The focus of reconnaissance may be the society of a given
area. Gaining an awareness of how the society impacts military
operations and how military operations impact the local society may
3-6
be critical to the commander in order for him and his staff to make
decisions.
3-14. The center of gravity during operations may be the civilian
inhabitants themselves. To gain and/or retain the support of the
population, commanders must first understand the complex nature
and character of the society. Second, they must understand and
accept that every military action (or inaction) may influence,
positively or negatively, the relationship between the urban
population and Army forces, and by extension, mission success.
Without the support of the society or understanding its needs, the
society may become a threat to the brigade/military operations. With
this awareness, commanders can plan operations, implement
programs, and/or take immediate action to maintain support of a
friendly populace, or neutralize or gain the support of hostile or
neutral factions. Understanding how operations affect the society
(and vice versa) normally begins with gaining information on the size,
location, and composition of the society. Having understanding of the
society (gained by reconnaissance) gives the commander vital
information to shape the OE.
3-15. The squadron must be aware of the demographics in its AO.
The traditional reconnaissance is mainly focused on conventional
forces. Both traditional threat and unconventional threat military
forces impact the society. Threat conventional and unconventional
forces are still a part of understanding the civilian demographics;
understanding how threat operations affect the society (and vice
versa) will have an impact on military operations. The troops within
the squadron must understand the different cultural and economic
backgrounds of the people it encounters. The troops must clearly
understand the threat—be it conventional forces, paramilitary,
terrorist, or organized crime—that undermines the stability of the
society. The squadron leadership must be familiar with the factional
leaders, such as mayors, police chiefs, and local military
commanders. These relationships, while important in stability
operations and support operations are also critical in SSCs and
MTWs. The squadron should be very concerned with understanding
the needs of the local populace. Refugee situations are a part of the
demographic makeup of an environment. Understanding the full
dimension of demographic framework of a society is the basis of the
characteristics of an environment and determines much of the
reconnaissance objectives/focus.
3-16. Elements of a society may itself be a threat to the brigade. A
mob demonstrating against US military presence could impact
military operations and consequently be a specific focus for
reconnaissance. Refugees clogging routes the brigade may want to
use for combat operations may pose a threat. A focus may then be to
identify these groups (and the leaders of these groups) to allow the
brigade to make a decision to use lethal or nonlethal effects to deal
with the problem. The examples are endless, but these should
indicate how society-focused reconnaissance will help the brigade
shape its OE.
3-17. The following are examples of social/human dimensions of
reconnaissance focus on an AO:
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Population demographics: Race, sex, age, religion,

language, national origin, tribe, clan, class, party
affiliation, education, or any significant social grouping.
• History.
• Government.
• Factional leaders.
Mayors.
Local police chief.
Local political leaders.
Local military commanders.
Local religious leaders.
• Nongovernmental organizations.
• Economy.
3-8
• Media.
Organizations.
Reporters.
Publications.
Broadcasts.
INFRASTRUCTURE
3-18. The infrastructures are those systems that support the
inhabitants and their economy and government. Destroying,
controlling, or protecting vital parts of the infrastructure can isolate
the threat from potential sources of support. Because these systems
are inextricably linked, destroying or disrupting any portion of the
urban infrastructure can have a cascading effect (either intentional
or unintentional) on the other elements of the infrastructure.
3-19. To successfully operate in an area, the squadron must
understand the local infrastructure. The squadron must understand
it physically in terms of utilities, transportation, and food availability
as well as the many other products that make a community run. The
squadron must understand the infrastructure financially. What is
the monetary base of the different communities, the income
demographics, and the black market trade? Additionally, who can
provide the friendly force with combat service support (CSS) needs?
The squadron must also understand the local community, political,
and governmental structure. This includes religious, military, and
paramilitary, such as local security and police forces that work
independently from one another. The leadership must develop a
general understanding of these organizations—how they fit into the
community at large and how they relate to one another. A
reconnaissance mission focused on infrastructure might look at
these dimensions—
• Communications. (Wireless, telegraphs, radios,
television, computers, newspapers, or magazines.)
• Transportation and Distribution. (Highways and
railways [to include bridges, tunnels, ferries, and fords];
cableways and tramways; ports, harbors, and inland
waterways; airports, seaplane stations, and heliports;
mass transit; and the trucking companies and delivery
services that facilitate the movement of supplies,
equipment, and people.)
• Energy. (System that provides the power to run the urban
area and consists of the industries that produce, store,
and distribute electricity, coal, oil, and natural gas. This
area also encompasses alternate energy sources such as
nuclear, solar, hydroelectric, and geothermal.)
• Commerce. (Area includes business and financial centers
[stores, shops, restaurants, marketplaces, banks, trading
centers, and business offices] and outlying
industrial/agricultural features [strip malls, farms, food
storage centers, and mills] as well as environmentally
3-9
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sensitive areas [mineral extraction areas and

chemical/biological facilities]).
• Human Services. (Includes hospitals, water supply
systems, waste and hazardous material storage and
processing, emergency services [police, fire, rescue, and
emergency medical services], and governmental services
[embassies, diplomatic organizations, and management of
vital records, welfare systems, and the judicial system].
The loss of any of these often has an immediate,
destabilizing, and life-threatening impact on the
inhabitants.)
TERRAIN
3-20. The best terrain analysis is based on a focused
reconnaissance of the AO. Identifying the voids in RI of the terrain
that a map analysis cannot satisfy is the first step in terrain-focused
reconnaissance. The squadron must see the terrain as it pertains to
friendly forces as well as threat military operations. Terrain
reconnaissance includes the effect of weather on the military aspects
of the terrain. Terrain-focused reconnaissance evaluates the military
aspects of the terrain (observation and fields of fire, cover and
concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach
[OCOKA]) and provides valuable information back to the commander
to support his ability to C2 and his decisions. The side that can best
understand and exploit the effects of terrain has the best chance of
success.
3-21. To date, cavalry and reconnaissance forces have not focused
on urban terrain. In fact, doctrine has supported and focused on the
identification of bypasses around urban terrain. Because of the
nature of asymmetric warfare, threat elements will further exploit
terrain to gain an advantage over US forces. In the future, the
squadron must become more familiar with the aspects of complex
and urban terrain. It must also see terrain not only in its traditional
role, but also as it might apply in a stability, support, and SSC
environment. In a stability, support, or SSC environment, key terrain
may be a religious or cultural monument or a historic geographical
boundary or town.
3-22. Urban areas include some of the world’s most difficult terrain
in which to conduct military operations. Unlike deserts, forests, and
jungles that confront the commander with a limited variety of
uniform, recurring terrain features, urban operations are conducted
within an ever-changing mix of natural and manmade features.
Urban areas vary immensely depending on their history, the cultures
of their inhabitants, their economic development, the local climate,
available building materials, and many other factors. This variety
exists not only among different urban areas but also within any
particular area. Urban areas present an extraordinary blend of
horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and subterranean forms
superimposed upon the landscape’s natural relief, drainage, and
vegetation. The squadron must become familiar with conducting
terrain reconnaissance and evaluating the military aspects of urban
terrain (OCOKA) as much as forest, desert, and jungle terrain.
3-10
Reconnaissance leaders must become familiar with urban IPB (see

FM 2-01.3 [FM 34-130] and FM 3-06 [FM 90-10]).
3-11
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FUNDAMENTALS
3-23. Successful reconnaissance operations are planned and
performed with seven fundamentals in mind:
• Orient on the reconnaissance objective.
• Ensure continuous reconnaissance.
• Maximize reconnaissance assets.
• Gain and maintain contact.
• Develop the situation.
• Report all information rapidly and accurately.
• Maintain the ability to maneuver freely.
ORIENT ON THE RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVE

3-24. Due to the brigade’s
expanded battlespace, the The reconnaissance objective must be
squadron will be focused at a minimum on—
responsible for conducting Threat.
operations over an Society.
Infrastructure.
extended battle-space. To
And/or terrain feature.
avoid becoming The squadron must endeavor to link the
overextended, the reconnaissance object and the focus of
squadron focuses the reconnaissance to—
reconnaissance effort on a CCIR.
specific (critical) area or an And/or supporting targeting.
objective in which And/or filling additional voids in the
information is needed. This IPB.
objective may be a terrain
feature, control measure, threat, society, and/or the infrastructure
within an AO. During the IPB process, the S2 will identify additional
requirements related to the threat, society, infrastructure, and
terrain. These IR, combined with the CCIR/PIR, are used as tools to
direct the reconnaissance efforts of the squadron. This is where the
focus of reconnaissance is addressed in order to fill in the gaps of
information and assist in answering the CCIR. Additionally the
squadron may orient its reconnaissance to support targeting for the
squadron/brigade. This is linked to higher CCIR or may just support
the targeting process. Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops
and support available, time available, and civil considerations
(METT-TC), especially time, will influence which critical
reconnaissance tasks can be executed during the conduct of the
mission.
3-25. Reconnaissance efforts may be focused on all aspects of an
area (threat, society [human demographics], terrain, or
infrastructure). If reconnaissance efforts are oriented mainly on a
threat force, the commander must specify the terrain and
maneuverability data for the troops to gather as well as social and
infrastructure aspects. In a stability operations and support
operations environment, several things might reflect the
multidimensional reconnaissance objective. In Bosnia, the
reconnaissance objective was complying with the Dayton Peace
3-12
Accord, as indicated by compliance with inspectors at weapons

storage site facilities, the disbanding of illegal factional checkpoints,
or the absence of police activity in the zone of separation. Optimally,
the reconnaissance objectives are based on the PIR established by
the brigade commander and serve to focus the intelligence collection
effort—avoiding wasted effort and time in areas that are not
important to the commander’s planning or decision cycle.
ENSURE CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE
3-26. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) conducts ISR
operations before, during, and after all operations. Before an
operation, ISR operations provide reconnaissance pull by answering
IR identified during IPB and enabling selection of a choice of
maneuver or course of action (COA). During the operation, ISR
operations provide reconnaissance push by collecting updated
information on threat compositions, dispositions, and intentions as
the battle progresses. This allows the SBCT commander to execute
decision points (DP) and make other decisions based on the actual
events within his AO. After operations, ISR operations maintain
contact with the threat to enable the SBCT to locally exploit success
or initiate planning for a subsequent operation. The troop
commander must consider the squadron’s ability to conduct
sustained operations across depth and time. The commander may
rotate elements to maintain continuous coverage. Observation by
UAVs and scouts can be alternated to maintain continuous
reconnaissance, or units can be rotated in and out of contact.
MAXIMIZE RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS
3-27. The diverse organization of the squadron allows for flexibility
in conducting its reconnaissance mission. Every observer is actively
employed in the conduct of reconnaissance. All systems are
complementary and enhance the effectiveness of each other. The UAV
safely extends the squadron’s range of operations and provides early
warning. GBS increase the range and duration of ISR operations.
Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance capabilities
predict, detect, conduct full analysis, and establish the footprint of
contaminated areas quicker than conventional soldier methods.
Ground scouts are highly capable of conducting reconnaissance in
complex terrain. They add the human factors of adaptation,
action/reaction, and initiative; make on-the-scene judgment calls
when dealing with the local populace; and develop the situation. The
HUMINT collectors found in each squad of the reconnaissance (recce)
troops are trained in collecting information from the local populace,
are the subject matter experts in dealing with civilian personnel, and
provide training to the scouts so they can operate effectively in
largely populated areas where societal information is key to the
brigade’s success. The integration of systems and their synchronized
effects nullify their individual weaknesses, enabling the squadron to
provide all weather, continuous coverage of critical reconnaissance
objectives. UAVs can reconnoiter the outskirts of and approaches to
complex/urban terrain as ground scouts conduct reconnaissance
within the complex/urban terrain. GBS can detect moving elements,
then hand over the responsibility to the ground scouts to actively
gain and maintain contact with the element. The squadron
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
commander can assign UAV/GBS/NBC reconnaissance directly to

the ground troops if closer integration or mutual protection is
required, or deploy these sensors apart from ground troops in order
to satisfy specific mission requirements over extended distances.
GAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTACT
3-28. Contact with the threat or reconnaissance objective is critical
to collecting information. Once contact is established, activities are
monitored continuously until no longer needed. Contact is
maintained until ordered to be broken or successful handover has
occurred. Close coordination is required in passing the threat from
one observer to another within the squadron and eventually to
follow-on maneuver units. Single vehicles, sections, dismounted
scout observers, UAVs, and GBS can be used to maintain contact.
The primary concern is handing over responsibility of the contact to
follow-on maneuver units—these procedures must be clearly
articulated in the brigade’s ISR order and OPORD. The squadron may
be required to engage with precision direct/indirect fires, confirm
BDA, conduct battle handover, conduct reconnaissance handover, or
maintain contact.
DEVELOP THE SITUATION
3-29. During reconnaissance operations, it is important to rapidly
gain SA to provide the brigade commander the information and
intelligence required to effectively maneuver the brigade. How this is
accomplished depends on METT-TC. For example, the squadron may
need time to maneuver or reposition its assets to better observe a
named or targeted area of interest (NAI or TAI) or determine the exact
size, composition, disposition, activity and likely intentions of a
threat force. The squadron can transmit vital combat information in
near real-time and can rapidly provide intelligence, creating SA
through digital and analog spot reports (SPOTREP) so the brigade
commander can develop the situation out of contact, develop his
COA in order to concentrate combat power against the threat
through decisive maneuver. Once a threat force is identified, the
reconnaissance element determines its size, composition, disposition,
location, and direction of travel, and activities.
REPORT ALL INFORMATION RAPIDLY AND ACCURATELY
3-30. Combat information is extremely time sensitive. Information
loses its relevance as it ages. The brigade commander and staff will
develop the plan to employ the brigade and base their tactical
decisions on the battlefield information obtained through the
squadron’s reconnaissance efforts; opportunities may be missed or
the wrong decisions made if information is not passed quickly and
accurately to the right element. The squadron must accurately report
what it observes and report it in a timely manner. Scouts, UAVs,
sensors, and radio intercept/jamming capabilities allow for rapid
dissemination and accuracy of the intelligence information gathered
as well as the timeliness with which it can be sent to the brigade
commander. Scouts must report what they see, keeping in mind that
the absence of certain activities may be just as important as
occurring activities. Seemingly unimportant information may be
extremely important in the larger picture viewed at squadron,
3-14
brigade, or higher levels. Ensuring that all leaders know the CCIR, its
significance, and who/how to report is critical. Additionally, all scout
elements must be thoroughly knowledgeable of the specific
information requirements (SIR) developed by the S2. With the
increasing capabilities to create and transmit information, knowing
the CCIR is more important than ever to focus information
management and prevent information overload.
MAINTAIN THE ABILITY TO MANEUVER FREELY
3-31. The ability to maneuver is essential to reconnaissance
operations. The squadron’s assets are lightly armed and conduct
their reconnaissance from medium-skinned vehicles and are not
capable of surviving engagements with a superior or heavily armed
threat force. If the squadron becomes decisively engaged,
reconnaissance ceases; therefore, the squadron must not become
decisively engaged, otherwise their own survivability and ability to
execute the reconnaissance mission will be at risk. The squadron can
maximize the use of precision long-range indirect/direct fires and
conduct effective hand over of threat elements to supporting friendly
maneuver forces. Dismounted reconnaissance also affords vehicles
the opportunity to maneuver more securely. Contact with the threat
should be gained through the squadron’s acquisition capability
rather than a chance meeting. The UAV and GBS provide the
squadron early warning and maximum standoff range and limit
exposure to threat acquisition systems. Troop mortars and Javelin
antitank missile systems will assist in disengagement or responding
to contact. Decisive engagement can be avoided by planning
operations in depth; keeping subordinate troops situationally aware;
and using proper overwatch, movement, and reconnaissance
methods. Leaders must anticipate tactical developments and be
constantly developing and analyzing COAs that will avoid decisive
engagement and maintain the ability to maneuver.
CAPABILITIES
3-32. The squadron is optimally organized to operate in stability
operations, support operations and in SSC; however, it can operate
in MTW but is limited by its lack of armor protection and firepower.
METT-TC will always govern the squadron’s ability to conduct
reconnaissance. The squadron can—
• Provide all weather, continuous, accurate, and timely
reconnaissance in complex, close, restrictive, urban
terrain.
• Reconnoiter up to nine routes simultaneously in a
permissive no threat environment. Reconnoiter up to six
routes in a low-threat environment. Reconnoiter three
routes in a medium- to high-threat environment.
• Conduct a detailed zone/area reconnaissance at a
relatively slow rate of movement, depending on the terrain
and executing all the critical tasks associated with the
mission. (A zone/area reconnaissance properly performed
normally takes considerable time, typically about 1
kilometer per hour.)
3-15
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Conduct thorough reconnaissance in a zone/area using a

combination of dismounted, mounted, aerial, and sensor
assets.
• When faced with a light-equipped threat, conduct either
aggressive or stealthy reconnaissance, depending on the
higher commander’s guidance.
• Fight for information, when required, under permissive
METT-TC conditions.
3-16
LIMITATIONS
3-33. Survivability is reduced due to the squadron’s lightly armored
vehicles. Medium-heavy weapon systems and indirect fires pose a
significant threat to the squadron. Proper movement techniques,
employment, and strict adherence to the fundamentals will improve
survivability.
SECTION II – RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS (COMMANDER’S RECONNAISSANCE

GUIDANCE)
3-34. The squadron can conduct reconnaissance operations across
the full spectrum of conflict (stability operations and support
operations, SSC, and MTW) and in all types of terrain (open/rolling to
complex/urban) to collect, analyze, and disseminate information for
the brigade, allowing the brigade to gain the SU it needs to execute
decisive maneuver within the battlespace.
3-35. In order for the squadron to conduct effective reconnaissance,
it needs to be deployed far in advance (time and distance) of the
brigade, and the brigade commander must issue guidance that
contains at a minimum:
• Focus.
• Tempo.
• Engagement criteria.
3-36. This information is labeled commander’s reconnaissance

guidance and is developed early during the military decision-making
process (MDMP) with input from the squadron commander and staff.
The guidance answers the three basic questions the squadron
commander needs to know to plan and execute his mission and in
turn provide essential guidance to the subordinate commanders and
staff. This is meant to fully clarify his intent for reconnaissance. The
squadron commander then translates the brigade commander’s
reconnaissance guidance and issues similar guidance to his
subordinates tailored to their mission. The commander’s
reconnaissance guidance is outlined below.
• Focus of the The focus of reconnaissance is
reconnaissance. clearly linked to—
Threat. CCIR.
Targeting (lethal and nonlethal
Society. effects).
Infrastructure Relevant information
(political situation, requirements.
facilities, food
distribution).
Terrain (bridges, routes, defensible terrain).
3-17
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
What reconnaissance critical tasks are conducted or

deleted?
• Tempo of the reconnaissance.
Stealthy or forceful.
Deliberate or rapid.
Aggressive or discreet.
• Engagement criteria (if any) both lethal and nonlethal.
What are the rules of engagement (ROE)?
What is the brigade’s fight? (What triggers the
commitment of brigade assets?)
What is a squadron fight? (What triggers the
commitment of squadron assets?)
What is a troop fight?
What weapon system is used to engage what target
type?
FOCUS
3-37. The focus of the reconnaissance allows the commander to
determine the priority of tasks and the specific critical tasks the troops
need to accomplish. It allows the squadron commander to narrow the
troop’s scope of operations to get the information that is most
important to squadron and brigade operations. In SSC operations the
squadron’s focus might be terrain-oriented or threat-oriented. In
stability operations, the squadron might be focused on local populace
sentiment or identifying local paramilitary leaders. While all critical
tasks have some degree of applicability in any given operation, certain
ones are more important for specific missions, and this has to be
clearly articulated at each level. Given a specified amount of time, the
troops accomplish their specified critical tasks then accomplish other
tasks as directed by the squadron commander.
3-38. The focus of the reconnaissance must be clearly linked to
CCIR, support targeting and/or RI. When determining the focus of
reconnaissance, planners/commander must endeavor to link what
information must be gained to answer CCIR. The purpose of
reconnaissance for the entire mission must first be linked to those
decisions the commander must make. Additionally, the focus can be
tied to supporting targeting (this may also be CCIR). Reconnaissance
then is focused to support detection of events that trigger targeting
(both lethal and nonlethal effects). This can be focused
reconnaissance that supports pulling infantry units to direct fire
engagements on the threat; it can be focused on information that
supports brigade indirect fires on the threat; it can be information
that supports triggering the use of an attached civil affairs (CA) team
to handle a civil disturbance. Finally, at a minimum, if not clearly
tied to CCIR and targeting, the reconnaissance focus must be
focused on additional RI. The squadron reconnaissance cannot afford
to have general focus so it collects all the data of an area. It must be
focused on IR that support C2 of the squadron/brigade. This is done
to fill voids in information and to support the commander’s COA.
Much like combat units tie their purpose of supporting (shaping)
3-18
units to the main effort (decisive) and the main effort to the mission,
the squadron must clearly link the focus of reconnaissance so the
squadron’s subordinate units know the purpose (why) of its
reconnaissance.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
TEMPO
3-39. The tempo of the reconnaissance allows the commander to
establish associated time requirements with planning time,
movement formations, and methods, such as dismounted or
mounted. The commander establishes the tempo by answering
several questions: Will the recce troops need to conduct stealthy or
forceful reconnaissance? Is the reconnaissance mission deliberate or
rapid? Is the reconnaissance aggressive or discreet? (See Figure 3-1.)
Figure 3-1. Tempo of Reconnaissance
3-40. Tempo can be described utilizing the following terms:

• Stealthy. Undetected, time-consuming dismounted
operations that minimize chance contact where the troops
might be observed.
• Forceful. Mounted faster-paced operations in which the
unit is prepared to engage the threat, and not as concerned
with being observed.
• Deliberate. Operations are slow, detailed, broad-based
operations, in which the troop accomplishes a number of
tasks.
• Rapid. Focus the troops on a few key pieces of information
required by the squadron commander.
• Aggressive. Implies broad-based engagement criteria.
• Discreet. Conducted with minimal engagement criteria.
3-41. The squadron commander must answer the questions relating

to tempo and articulate them to his subordinates.
ENGAGEMENT CRITERIA
3-42. Engagement criteria establish what the squadron/troops are
expected to engage and what they are expected to hand over to the
brigade. Conversely, by understanding what the brigade commander
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requires/expects the squadron to engage, coupled with his

understanding of the threat’s most likely COA, he is able to identify
the troop’s engagement criteria (lethal and nonlethal). This enables
troop commanders to focus certain weapons systems or to develop
engagement areas (EA) and plan for the destruction of specified
threat elements if encountered. This also pertains to how the troop is
to handle nonlethal contact by identifying engagement criteria
(tactical questioning) with civilians and/or factional leaders.
Additionally, it allows the troop commanders to anticipate bypass
criteria and to develop a plan to maintain visual contact with
bypassed threat positions. The squadron commander utilizes
surveillance troop assets (if not tasked organized to the recce troops)
to assist in maintaining contact and/or executing reconnaissance
handover to follow-on units.
3-43. Additional reconnaissance planning considerations are—
• Information received from higher.
• The overall focus for the reconnaissance mission.
• The AO.
• The brigade commander’s intent and CCIR.
• Infantry battalion CCIR. (This may translate to specified or
implied tasks to support follow-on infantry units.)
• Critical tasks to be accomplished.
• Task organization and attachments.
• Personnel and equipment capabilities and limitations.
• OPTEMPO.
3-44. Based on the above considerations, the squadron commander

determines—
• Reconnaissance focus.
• Reconnaissance tasks versus time and terrain constraints.
• Reconnaissance methods versus time and terrain
constraints.
• Specified and implied tasks.
• Critical tasks to be performed by subordinate units.
• Task organization, command and support relationships, and
the C2 structure.
• Actions on contact.
• Subordinate troop missions and sectors.
• Potential branches and sequels to the reconnaissance
operation.
• Communications plan (architecture and required support).
• Infiltration/exfiltration techniques of movement.
3-45. Available intelligence and collection assets at the joint and

national levels (see Chapter 6).
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
3-46. The squadron’s unique organization and technologically

advanced equipment allow it to conduct reconnaissance operations,
ideally, during stability operations and support operations and SSC.
However, the squadron does possess the combat power and ability to
quickly integrate additional combat multipliers and attachments to
conduct reconnaissance operations in an MTW. The squadron may
receive attachments in any type of conflict. However, during MTW they
must be expected and planned for. These assets may be task organized
to the troops (normally the recce troops) or retained under squadron
control. Attachments may include organic brigade assets,
armor/mechanized/cavalry units, artillery, rotary-winged aircraft, air
defense, additional intelligence teams, civil/public affairs teams,
engineer, additional CSS for augmentation forces, and psychological
operations (PSYOP) teams. The brigade commander may also task
organize one or all recce troops to battalions within the brigade.
Squadron internal surveillance assets, such as UAVs, GBS, and
chemical reconnaissance platoons or sections, can be task organized to
the recce troops or maintained under surveillance troop control.
NOTE: The brigade commander may take control of UAVs, chemical reconnaissance,
or GBS to more closely control those assets. However, this practice would
seriously degrade the squadron’s ability to conduct effective reconnaissance
and jeopardize its survivability. This also applies to the augmentation of
rotary-wing aviation assets.
RECONNAISSANCE METHODS
3-47. There are four methods for the employing reconnaissance assets
at squadron level—dismounted, mounted, aerial, and sensor. The
squadron commander may use any method or combination of methods
to accomplish the reconnaissance mission based on the factors of
METT-TC, the reconnaissance troop, and the higher commander’s
intent, guidance, and CCIR.
DISMOUNTED
3-48. Dismounted reconnaissance is the most secure, but time-
consuming method. This method permits the squadron to collect the
most detailed information about the terrain and threat within a given
zone, area, or along a route. It is used when other sensor assets have
triggered ground assets to conduct a more deliberate, thorough, “eyes
on” reconnaissance. The squadron commander may direct/expect
troops to execute dismounted reconnaissance when—
• Time is available.
• Detailed information is required.
• Contact is gained from surveillance troop assets or other
sensor contact.
• Stealth is required.
• Threat contact is expected or has been achieved through
visual means.
• Scout vehicles cannot move through an area because of
terrain or threat.
MOUNTED
3-22
3-49. Mounted reconnaissance permits the squadron to collect

adequate information about the terrain and threat in the least
amount of time given to execute the mission. It also allows the
squadron to transition more rapidly to another mission. This method
provides less security to the vehicles from the threat, particularly a
dismounted threat, and is not the stealthiest of all the methods. It is
used when other sensor assets have triggered ground assets to
conduct a more thorough “eyes on” reconnaissance.
3-50. The squadron commander may direct/expect troops to
execute mounted reconnaissance when—
• Time is limited.
• Detailed reconnaissance is not required, or the mounted
method affords the same opportunity to collect
information as the dismounted method.
• Threat locations are known (gained from other ISR assets).
• Distances require mounted movement.
AERIAL (UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE)
3-51. Aerial reconnaissance provides the squadron a low-risk
means of conducting reconnaissance to gain basic information in the
least amount of time. It is also the most flexible asset within the
squadron. A combination of aerial and dismounted/mounted
methods is the most effective. It is common to attach UAV from the
surveillance troop to ground recce troops to facilitate air-ground
coordination. This is done to support close reconnaissance with the
threat, to ensure scout survivability, and to facilitate target
acquisition. It may be necessary to push the ground control station
(GCS) forward to facilitate aerial reconnaissance in complex terrain or
to extend the distance of the UAV to maximize the stand-off of
ground elements and the threat. Complex terrain, adverse weather,
and threat deception/countermeasures can degrade the UAV’s
effectiveness. Whenever UAV operates within a ground recce troop’s
AO, both the surveillance troop commander and the recce troop
commander must be aware of joint security and logistics/support
requirements for the element of the surveillance troop operating in
the recce troop sector. This may be an “area support” relationship.
3-52. The squadron commander may maintain some or all of the
aerial reconnaissance assets under his control and may direct aerial
reconnaissance when—
• Time is extremely limited or information is required
quickly.
• Detailed reconnaissance is not required.
• Objective is at an extended range.
• Verification of a target is needed.
• Threat locations are known and extremely dangerous
(high risk) to ground assets.
• Threat locations are vague, but identified as high risk to
ground assets.
• Terrain (highly complex) and weather conditions are
favorable.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Specific, rapidly mobile, and/or high-payoff/value threat

vehicle(s) are suspected or previously viewed in the
squadron AO, e.g., SCUD missile or other transporter-
erector-launcher.
SENSOR
3-53. Sensor reconnaissance allows the squadron the flexibility to
economize reconnaissance assets. Sensors can be used to cover
areas where contact may not be expected, but likely, or used for
surveillance of areas that need to be covered over extended periods.
It may be necessary to push sensor assets forward to facilitate
ground reconnaissance or infiltration to extend the distance of the
surveillance to maximize the stand-off between ground
reconnaissance and the threat. It is common to attach sensor and
NBC platoon assets to forward ground recce troops to facilitate
ground reconnaissance. This is done to support close reconnaissance
with the threat, to ensure scout survivability and to facilitate target
acquisition. The squadron commander can also use sensors to
provide depth in the AO.
3-54. The squadron commander may maintain some or all of the
sensor reconnaissance assets under his control and may direct
sensor reconnaissance to—
• Conduct missions in a large AO.
• Survey a flank (assume risk).
• Conduct missions of an extended duration.
• Conduct NBC reconnaissance for WMD or contaminated
areas.
• Trigger (tip and cue) a more thorough ground or aerial
reconnaissance.
• Trigger reach-back (PROPHET triggers gaining more
information from Guardrail).
3-55. A combination of all methods is the most effective, providing
depth and redundancy throughout the AO. See Appendix G for more
information on the employment of surveillance troop assets.
SECTION III – FORMS OF RECONNAISSANCE
3-56. There are three forms of reconnaissance—zone, area, and

route. The squadron commander may be required to conduct several
forms of reconnaissance simultaneously throughout the AO. These
forms of reconnaissance may be conducted in the traditional sense
(focused on threat and terrain), or they may have an additional
multidimensional focus that includes society and infrastructure as
well as the threat and terrain. These forms are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
ZONE
3-57. Zone reconnaissance is the directed effort to obtain detailed
information concerning all threat forces, routes, obstacles, society,
3-24
infrastructure, and terrain within a zone defined by boundaries. A

zone reconnaissance is assigned when the situation is vague or when
information concerning cross-country trafficability is desired. It is
appropriate when previous knowledge of the terrain is limited or
when combat operations have altered the terrain. The
reconnaissance may be threat-oriented, terrain-oriented, society-
oriented, infrastructure-oriented, or a combination thereof (see
Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3). Additionally, the squadron commander
may focus the reconnaissance effort on a specific threat force, such
as the threat’s reserve.
3-58. Zone reconnaissance takes more time to execute than any
other reconnaissance mission. The assumption is there are many
voids in RI that need to be filled. The squadron commander must
ensure he has been given adequate time to accomplish the mission. If
the time available is not adequate, he seeks additional time,
reinforcements, or other systems to assist in the reconnaissance
effort. If necessary, the reconnaissance effort may be reduced to
gather specific critical information. Accelerating the reconnaissance
effort increases the risk assumed by the unit.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
3-26
Figure 3-2. Zone Reconnaissance in a Major Theater of

War (Threat-Oriented)
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3-3. Zone Reconnaissance in a Smaller-Scale

Contingency (Terrain-Oriented)
3-28
CRITICAL TASKS
3-59. Zone reconnaissance is a deliberate, time-consuming process;
therefore it must be focused. Certain tasks must be accomplished
during zone reconnaissance unless the squadron commander
specifically directs otherwise. Critical tasks serve as a guide to
indicate those tasks that are associated with zone reconnaissance.
These tasks are not a checklist or sequentially arranged. Some may
not be appropriate in all situations. Based on time and the
commander’s intent, the squadron commander may direct the troop
to reconnoiter for specific information only. IPB and CCIR often
indicate the critical information desired by the higher commander.
3-60. The primary tasks accomplished as part of a zone
reconnaissance are—
• Find and report threat forces within the zone.
• Determine the size, location, and composition of the
society demographics (such as race, sex, age, religion,
affiliation, education, or any significant social grouping).
• Reconnoiter the society to determine the regional, local,
and neighborhood situations.
• Reconnoiter terrain within the zone.
• Identify key municipal infrastructure that can affect
military operations (utilities, sewage, transportation [rail,
bus, subway, etc.], and communications).
• Inspect and classify all bridges within the zone.
• Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges within the
zone.
• Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, and
culverts.
• Locate and clear all mines, obstacles, and barriers in the
zone (within its capability).
• Locate a bypass around urban areas, obstacles, and
contaminated areas.
• Establish and maintain contact with local civilian and
military leadership.
• Determine the needs of the society to determine
operation/actions needed to support a friendly populace,
or to neutralize or gain support of a hostile or neutral
faction.
• Determine media activities.
• Clarify organizations and methods of operation for
terrorists, transnational groups, and ethnic centers of
power.
• Identify local populous allegiances to factions, religious
groups, or other organizations.
• Report reconnaissance information.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
3-61. Upon completion of the zone reconnaissance, the squadron

proceeds with any assigned follow-on mission. If no mission has been
assigned, the squadron provides security along the limit of advance
(LOA) or reconnaissance objective. If the squadron encounters threat
forces, it will conduct actions on contact.
3-62. See FM 3-20.971 for troop-level planning considerations.
EXAMPLE OF A ZONE RECONNAISSANCE
3-63. The brigade’s COA is to establish three battalion zones of
operation within the brigade AO. Within each AO, each the battalion
establishes a strike base, utilizing applicable base cluster defense
doctrine, around critical nodes to enhance force protection. One
protects the SBCT main command post (CP), one orients on defense
of the brigade support battalion (BSB), and the third provides force
protection to the squadron main CP.
Brigade Commander’s Guidance
3-64. The brigade commander tasks the squadron to conduct
reconnaissance from the aerial port of debarkation (APOD) to the
SBCT’s AO. The brigade needs to know—
• The best routes and the condition of those routes to enter
the AO.
• If the routes will be affected by the threat.
• The most advantageous positions to establish separate
maneuver battalion bases of operation.
• The social-demographic makeup of the area.
• Initial brigade graphics (see Figure 3-4).
• Brigade boundaries.
• NAIs to portray proposed maneuver battalion bases of
operation.
• APOD and attached brigade assembly area.
3-30
Figure 3-4. Initial Brigade Graphics
Squadron Planning
3-65. After receiving guidance, the squadron commander, S2, and
surveillance troop commander begin planning with the brigade staff to
synchronize the squadron’s plan with the brigade’s ISR plan that
results in the initial IPB products, including NAIs. Concurrently, the
squadron XO prepares the staff for the orders process. Actions for
preparation include—
• Acquiring initial brigade graphics (digital, through
Maneuver Control System [MCS]; and/or traditional).
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Terrain analysis.
• Updating intelligence information of the area.
• Identifying and coordinating for intelligence assists
available to support the mission (reach through brigade).
3-66. The squadron commander, S2, and surveillance troop

commander return to the squadron CP to start the MDMP in
accordance with FM 3-0 [FM 100-5].
3-67. The squadron commander directs the squadron’s efforts
within the brigade’s AO to locate and identify—
• Routes that enter the brigade AO.
• Threat that can affect the route.
• The threat’s activities.
• The social demographics of the AO.
• Local populace allegiances.
• Ethic centers of power.
3-68. The commander has established the tempo for the mission
initially as forceful, aggressive, and rapid from the LD to PL HAWAII.
This will transition to more stealthy, discreet, and deliberate
reconnaissance. Maintaining stealth is paramount to the success of
the squadron’s mission; therefore, the engagement criterion is that
troops will engage only in self-defense. Troops will destroy small
patrols within capability if they are detected by the threat. Anything
larger is handed over to the infantry for destruction. The troops are to
maintain contact with any threat identified until effective handover is
conducted with the lead infantry battalion or another brigade asset,
or the troop is ordered to break contact to maximize elements for
reconnaissance. Fires will be used in support of hasty attacks, high
explosive, and smoke only, to minimize dud ordnance along the
routes. Guided/precision munitions are available for tanks and other
armored threat vehicles.
3-69. The squadron tasks the surveillance troop to observe the
passage lanes with ISR assets to determine if the threat is planning
any operations against the squadron or brigade prior to or during the
passage. Additionally, the surveillance troop is tasked to conduct
zone reconnaissance forward of the recce troops, with a focus on the
route in each zone. The squadron assigns each troop a zone with a
route. Graphics are developed to include PLs and checkpoints to
complement the scheme of maneuver and facilitate C2.
3-70. The squadron commander tasks A and C troops to conduct a
zone reconnaissance from PL ARIZONA (LD) to PL NEVADA, (LOA).
He tasks B Troop to conduct a zone reconnaissance from PL
ARIZONA (LD) to limit of its boundaries. Each troop is focused on
providing information on the terrain, serviceability of each route, and
identifying all the threat that affects each route. The squadron
commander plans to halt all reconnaissance elements at PL HAWAII
to resynchronize reconnaissance efforts prior to entering the
brigade’s AO. On order, troops conduct multidimensional
3-32
reconnaissance of assigned NAIs to identify the threat in the area,

establish contact with local civilian leadership, determine primary
allegiances, and locate proposed brigade strike base locations to
facilitate the brigade’s occupation of the AO.
3-71. Squadron graphics include the following (see Figure 3-5)—
• The initial brigade graphics.
• Squadron and troop boundaries.
• NAIs to portray proposed maneuver battalion bases of
operation.
• APOD and attached brigade assembly area.
• Routes to AO with checkpoints.
3-33
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3-5. Squadron Zone Reconnaissance Graphics
3-34
Execution
3-72. The squadron conducts forward passage of lines (FPOL) with
the rapid deployment forces occupying defensive positions (securing
the APOD) and deploys along the LD. As the recce troops are
conducting FPOL, surveillance troop conducts aerial reconnaissance
of the passage lanes until the troops complete FPOL. The S2 requests
an intelligence update from higher prior to the squadron crossing the
LD. The surveillance troop commander shifts his ground surveillance
radar (GSR) and Improved Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor
System (IREMBASS) sensors to observe the squadron flanks and he
shifts the UAVs to reconnoiter forward of the recce troops as they
deploy along the LD in the formation they chose to cross the LD with
and reports readiness condition (REDCON) 1. The squadron
commander acknowledges and orders the troops to cross the LD,
once all the recce troops have reported REDCON 1. The recce troops
conduct the zone reconnaissance using a combination mounted and
dismounted reconnaissance within their assigned zones.
3-73. A Troop reports a point obstacle along Route (RTE) RED, with
an abandoned overwatch strongpoint fighting position. The
information is acknowledged and entered into Force XXI Battle
Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), All-Source Analysis System
(ASAS), and MCS. To maintain momentum, the squadron requests
engineer support to reduce the obstacle. The troop leaves a section in
contact with the obstacle to guide the engineers and provide local
security as they reduce the obstacle. A Troop maintains observation
with a squad and continues reconnaissance to PL IDAHO until
handover is complete. The obstacle handover is conducted between
his squad and the engineer platoon and the squad moves to rejoin
his recce platoon. B and C Troops conduct zone reconnaissance and
report information as it is acquired.
3-74. The surveillance troop conducts aerial reconnaissance of RTE
WHITE and identifies five threat personnel carriers (PC) north of
Checkpoint 19 oriented south. The report is sent via FBCB2 and the
B Troop command acknowledges the report. The surveillance troop
maintains reconnaissance until B Troop can maneuver scouts to gain
visual contact of the vehicles and obtain further information. B Troop
dismounts scouts to identify vehicle orientation, any supporting or
overwatching elements, and their intentions (defensive posture or
temporary positioning). The commander’s report confirms five
vehicles in an overwatch position without prepared positions. He
recommends maintaining scout observation and coordinating for an
armored gun system (AGS) platoon from the infantry company to
attack by fire. He identifies an attack-by-fire position to the south of
NAI 8 oriented northeast as he sends the graphics via FBCB2 in the
event the vehicles displace towards the other troops’ areas or start
moving south. The squadron commander agrees and orders the troop
commander to execute as the squadron CP contacts the infantry
battalion to begin coordination. The squadron commander halts
ground reconnaissance at PL HAWAII to allow troops to rest,
resupply, and conduct maintenance. When the squadron resumes
reconnaissance, the surveillance troop commander rotates aircraft as
the recce troops, at PL HAWAII, transition to multidimensional
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
reconnaissance into the brigade’s AO. The recce troops continue to

reconnoiter their assigned zones and treat each NAI as an area
reconnaissance.
3-75. A Troop infiltrates and establishes surveillance around NAI 1
and identifies and reports an insurgent training camp conducting
offensive type training. The information is acknowledged and entered
into FBCB2, ASAS, and MCS. The squadron CP coordinates for an
infantry platoon to pick up observation of the insurgent camp and
assigns A Troop the responsibility of conducting the handover. A
Troop maintains observation with a squad and continues
reconnaissance until handover is conducted between his squad and
the infantry platoon. A Troop reports the area in NAI 2 is suitable for
a brigade strike base and prepares to mark the area and reconnoiter
the routes leading in to and out of the area. The B Troop recce
platoon patrol assigned to conduct area reconnaissance of A Town
conducted tactical questioning of the local police chief, members of
the town, and business owners. They passed the information up to
the troop XO to enter into FBCB2. Their assessment is that the town
is clear of threat and the official position is friendly to the SBCT and
aligned goals and objectives. B Troop reports that A Town supports
US actions and the police force is willing and prepared to support US
operations. The troop commander also reports that shifting the route
around the west of the A Town would make the movement shorter
and easier to enter the strike base located in NAI 7. C Troop
determines that the small village in NAI 4 is a good position for the
last brigade strike base. The position provides good cover and
concealment, serviceable routes, and is defensible. The platoon that
enters the city in NAI 9 determines that the local populace is both
hostile and sheltering a company-sized or larger threat force. They
have determined this by contacting and assessing the local civilian
and military leadership and through detailed questioning to develop
an understanding of the local situation. C Troop identifies the city
predominantly supports the threat with supplies and personnel. The
squadron commander orders C Troop to maintain surveillance of NAI
5 and identify how much support and what type of support is going
into the city. The squadron CP updates brigade and requests a
PSYOP and CA team to deploy and assist the troop.
3-76. The squadron commander prepares and sends a detailed
report and initial recommendation based on the reconnaissance
effort up until this point to the brigade commander. The brigade
commander updates the squadron commander on progression of the
brigade’s plan and possible adjustments based on reports received
from the squadron and other assets. The squadron commander and
staff begin planning for the next phase of the operation.
AREA
3-77. An area reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed
information concerning the terrain, threat activity, society, and
infrastructure within a prescribed area of interest (AOI). It is a more
narrowly defined form of zone reconnaissance. These areas can
include facilities, such as water plants, weapon storage sites, political
headquarters, a village or town, or other areas, such as a suspected
assembly area, cache site, or an airport complex. The squadron can
3-36
conduct decentralized reconnaissance in multiple areas

simultaneously. The squadron commander can conduct area
reconnaissance by maneuvering elements through the sector or by
establishing stationary observation posts (OP) within and/or external
to the area. An additional planning consideration for area
reconnaissance is the method of getting to the area needing
reconnaissance. Tactical road march and conducting a zone
reconnaissance to the area are common methods. A method that the
squadron needs to consider is infiltration and exfiltration that is
discussed in Chapter 5.
CRITICAL TASKS
3-78. The primary tasks accomplished as part of an area
reconnaissance are—
• Find and report threat forces within the area.
• Determine the size, location, and composition of the
society demographics (such as race, sex, age, religion,
affiliation, education, or any significant social grouping).
• Reconnoiter the society to determine the regional, local,
and neighborhood situations.
• Reconnoiter terrain within the area.
• Identify key municipal infrastructure that can affect
military operations (utilities, sewage, transportation [rail,
bus, subway, etc.], and communications).
• Inspect and classify all bridges within the area.
• Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges within the
area.
• Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, and
culverts.
• Locate and clear all mines, obstacles, and barriers in the
area (within its capability).
• Locate a bypass around urban areas, obstacles, and
contaminated areas.
• Establish and maintain contact with local civilian and
military leadership.
• Determine the needs of the society to determine
operation/actions needed to support a friendly populace,
or to neutralize or gain support of a hostile or neutral
faction.
• Determine media activities.
• Clarify organizations and methods of operation for
terrorists, transnational groups, and ethnic centers of
power.
• Identify local populous allegiances to factions, religious
groups, or other organizations.
• Report reconnaissance information.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
EXAMPLE OF AREA RECONNAISSANCE

General Situation
3-79. The brigade is being deployed into a rapidly deteriorating
situation within the Cumberland Republic. The situation is complex
with Cumberland vying with the countries of Corbin and Berea for
control of the vital natural resource in Cumberland. The three
countries share a number of religious, ethnic and political groups. In
the past, Cumberland’s neighbors of Corbin and Berea have
indicated that they consider the natural resource to belong to the
region and not just to Cumberland. Factions within the country are
politically, ethnically, and religiously allied with neighboring Corbin
whose totalitarian regime has been strongly influencing unrest in
Cumberland during the past decade. Both Corbin and Berea openly
support insurgents within Cumberland, and have infiltrated
paramilitary forces across the international border (IB). Civil
disturbances, suicide and terror bombings, and ambushes or
assassinations of Cumberland officials have occurred. Corbin
threatens military action to support its insurgent activities (see
Figure 3-6). These disruptive activities and threats to the
democratically elected Prime Minister and cabinet prompted the
United States to initiate military operations to stabilize the situation.
3-38
Figure 3-6. Threat Situation
3-80. The SBCT mission is to attack to secure the critical natural

resource manufacturing facilities at Objective (OBJ) TIGER, O/O
search and attack to defeat threat forces within SBCT AO to assist in
the stabilization of the Republic. Due to the complex and rapidly
evolving situation, the SBCT commander’s plan includes DPs for
contingency plans if an attack is not immediately feasible upon
deployment. His initial CCIR focus on which contingency should be
executed upon completion of brigade reception, staging, onward
movement, and integration (RSOI) in theater. Key terrain in the AO
includes the airfield in OBJ LION, the town in OBJ TIGER, the APOD
and restrictive terrain vic OBJ DRAGON (see Figure 3-7).
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3-7. Stryker Brigade Combat Team Area of Operations
Brigade Concept
3-81. The SBCT conducts a phased deployment and RSOI within
the APOD, conducts battle handover with 307th Parachute Infantry
Regiment, and executes one of four maneuver options based on ISR
operations.
• Phase I: Deployment/RSOI. The SBCT conducts phased
deployment and RSOI to conduct ISR operations and
assist in APOD security operations as necessary. The
cavalry squadron (RSTA) and a reinforced infantry
company deploys to Cumberland. The remaining SBCT
elements follow per the deployment timeline. The SBCT
conducts ISR operations within the AO to answer the
commander’s CCIR and support the attack. The infantry
company is the SBCT reserve with planning priorities to
attack to enable reconnaissance elements to break
contact.
3-40
• Phase II: Attack. The SBCT executes one of four

contingency plans based on information provided by ISR
operations.
COA 1. SBCT attacks with one battalion to secure OBJ
TIGER, one battalion to secure OBJ DRAGON, and one
battalion secures the main supply route (MSR) to the
seaport of debarkation (SPOD).
COA 2. SBCT attacks with two battalions to secure
OBJ TIGER, with one battalion as reserve. O/O
reserve battalion secures OBJ LION.
COA 3. SBCT attacks with one battalion to secure OBJ
TIGER, one battalion to secure OBJ DRAGON, and one
battalion to secure OBJ LION.
COA 4. SBCT establishes defense to defeat Corbin
attack towards the APOD.
• O/O Phase III: Area Security. The SBCT conducts area
security operations to enable the Army of the Cumberland
Republic to restore its IB and stabilize the AO.
Brigade Commander’s Reconnaissance Guidance

3-82. The SBCT S2 completes his initial situational template based
on Corbin and Berea doctrinal templates, known compositions and
dispositions, and recent activities and trends (see Figure 3-8). The
commander issues his reconnaissance guidance to the Cavalry
Squadron commander and staff.
Reconnaissance Focus
3-83. The initial Phase I focus is society to identify immediate
threats to the SBCT deployment and RSOI operations. O/O the focus
shifts to the threat to enable the commander to select his COA or
develop an alternate one. The Phase II focus remains threat in
support of combat operations to determine compositions and
dispositions within the AO and enable the commander to execute or
refine his COA. O/O Phase III focus is society to identify influences
and paramilitary/criminal elements within the AO that can adversely
affect area security.
Reconnaissance Tempo
3-84. The Phase I tempo is rapid, forceful, and aggressive to provide
reconnaissance pull. Phase II tempo shifts to deliberate, stealthy, and
discreet. O/O Phase III tempo shifts to deliberate, forceful and
discreet.
Reconnaissance Engagement Criteria
3-85. Phase I, destroy single vehicles or section-size (2 to 6
personnel) patrols within capability if detected by the threat. Phase
II, engage only to break contact. O/O Phase III, engage in self-
defense or destroy section-sized mounted or dismounted elements in
accordance with the ROE.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3-8. Initial Situation Template
3-86. The SBCT commander develops the following PIR to support

his decision-making process:
• Will paramilitary forces or insurgents oppose or interdict
SBCT deployment and RSOI?
• Will the political nature of the civilian unrest in the town
north of APOD threaten the SBCT flank during combat
operations?
• What is the strength and composition of threat forces vic
OBJ TIGER? (This will determine if one or two battalions
are required for the attack.)
• Is the route (MSR) to the SPOD secure?
• Where are Corbin C2 nodes located vic OBJs DRAGON,
TIGER, and LION.
• Strength and composition of friendly and threat vic OBJ
DRAGON.
3-42
• Strength, composition, and direction of movement of

Corbin forces towards the IB.
• Location, strength, and activity of Berean forces along the
IB.
• Who are faction leaders? Who are the town mayors? In
what strength is the criminal element at work in the
towns?
• What ethnic and religious issues impact SBCT operations
in the vicinity?
Squadron Mission
3-87. The squadron deploys to the Republic of Cumberland and
conducts an area reconnaissance of the brigade AO to identify threat
composition and disposition in support of the brigade’s attack, O/O
screens along the international boundary.
Squadron Concept
3-88. The squadron commander decided to conduct the area
reconnaissance by assigning each recce troop an AO and keeping D
Troop(-) under squadron control (see Figure 3-9). During Phase I the
squadron initially uses a combination of zone, area, and route
reconnaissance to answer the SBCT commander’s PIR as soon as
possible and enable him to select a COA. Once the commander has
selected a COA, the squadron conducts area reconnaissance to
determine the composition and disposition of threat forces to enable
refinement and execution of the COA.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3-9. Squadron ISR Graphics
3-89. A Troop is the main effort. It conducts initial area

reconnaissance to determine immediate threats to SBCT deployment
and RSOI. O/O continues area reconnaissance focusing on OBJ
TIGER, Checkpoints 1 and 2 to determine the threat strength in this
area. Based on the results of this reconnaissance, the brigade
decides to commit one or two infantry battalions to the attack of OBJ
TIGER. A Troop has two GSRs attached for the operation.
3-90. B Troop conducts an area reconnaissance focusing on the
town vic Checkpoint 6 to identify societal influences within its AO.
O/O conducts a route reconnaissance of RTE CASHWELL to
determine threat strength and activities. On order conducts a screen
within its AO to provide early warning on the SBCT right flank during
combat operations. B Troop has one GSR attached for the operation.
3-91. C Troop initially conducts a zone reconnaissance to an LOA to
determine immediate threats to SBCT deployment and RSOI. O/O
conducts an area reconnaissance focusing on the town vic
Checkpoint 12 to identify societal influences within its AO. O/O
3-44
establishes a screen within its AO to provide early warning on the

SBCT left flank during combat operations. C troop prepares to
conduct a route reconnaissance of RTE RILING.
3-92. D Troop assists in the area reconnaissance by employing
IREMBASS at NAIs D4, D6, and D7 to provide early warning of threat
movement into the AO; flying UAV reconnaissance in NAIs 1, 2, and 3
to identify threat unit movements and large crowds; and focusing
PROPHET operations on the towns vic OBJ TIGER and Checkpoint 4
to locate threat C2 nodes.
3-93. Fires will be used in support of hasty attacks to break
contact, high explosive, and smoke only, to minimize dud ordinance.
Guided/precision munitions are available for tanks and other
armored threat vehicles.
ROUTE
3-94. A route reconnaissance is an operation focused on obtaining
detailed information on a specific route and all adjacent terrain from
which movement along that route could be influenced. The route is a
prescribed course from a point of origin to a specific destination, and
could be a road or axis of advance. Route reconnaissance is
conducted to ensure that the route is clear of obstacles and threat,
and that it will support the planned movement. Route
reconnaissance may be performed as a mission itself or as a task
during zone or area reconnaissance. Squadron should maximize the
synergistic effect of all its assets (HUMINT collectors, scouts, UAV,
GSR/PROPHET, NBC) as well as engineers when planning and
executing route reconnaissance.
3-95. The squadron as a whole seldom performs a route
reconnaissance. If contact is expected, a troop should be assigned
only one major route. If contact is unlikely, a troop may be assigned
two routes. The routes should be close enough together for the troop
commander to be able to maintain C2 and achieve security. See FM
3-20.971 for troop-level discussion.
CRITICAL TASKS
3-96. Certain tasks must be accomplished during route
reconnaissance unless the squadron commander specifically directs
otherwise. Based on time and the commander’s intent, the squadron
commander may direct the troop to reconnoiter for specific
information only. IPB and CCIR often indicate the critical information
desired by the higher commander. The critical tasks are—
• Reconnoiter and determine trafficability of the route.
• Find and report any threat that can influence movement
along the route.
• Reconnoiter routes approaching and inside urban areas.
• Reconnoiter lateral routes in the area of responsibility
(AOR).
• Inspect and classify bridges along the route.
• Inspect and classify overpasses, underpasses, and
culverts.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Reconnoiter defiles along the route; clear defiles of threat

and obstacles within its capability; or locate a bypass.
• Locate mines, obstacles, and barriers, and within its
capability, clear the route.
• Locate a bypass around built-up areas, obstacles, and
contaminated areas.
• Report route information.
3-97. If route reconnaissance is conducted, a route will have at a

minimum a start point (SP) and a release point (RP). Units will
reconnoiter the route out to threat direct-fire range or key terrain
that threat elements can use to influence the route. Determining
trafficability of a route requires the troop to determine the capability
or extent to which the terrain will bear traffic or permit continued
movement of a force. Modern roadway features are often difficult to
quickly evaluate in the process of route reconnaissance. Unless
directed, the troop does not conduct a deliberate engineer route
classification. In some cases, the squadron may be reinforced with
engineers to perform that mission, or the squadron may identify key
features for follow-on engineers to classify or obstacles to be cleared.
SECTION IV – SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
PURPOSE
3-98. Surveillance is the systematic observation of airspace or
surface areas by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other
means. The focus and tempo of the collection effort primarily comes
from the PIR derived from the brigade CCIR, the commander’s intent
and the specific (critical) areas in which information is needed.
Surveillance is gaining observation of activities, conducted by the
threat, factions, and/or local populace in a critical NAI. These
activities may be occurring or expected to occur. Surveillance may be
conducted as a stand-alone mission, or as part of a reconnaissance
mission (particularly area reconnaissance). Primarily surveillance is
static in nature, but some systems can perform this task while
moving (such as UAVs).
FUNDAMENTALS
3-99. Successful surveillance operations are planned and
performed with the following three fundamentals in mind—
• Maximize surveillance assets.
• Maintain continuous surveillance of all assigned NAIs.
• Report all information rapidly and accurately.
MAXIMIZE SURVEILLANCE ASSETS
3-46
3-100. Scouts are the “eyes and ears” of the commander. Previous
surveillance doctrine focused on surveillance as part of a
reconnaissance mission. This may still be appropriate in some
situations; but with the increasing likelihood of noncontiguous
operations and expansion of the brigade’s battlespace, surveillance
operations may be oriented in multiple directions over large areas.
One troop could be utilized in a highly visible checkpoint, another
conducts mounted surveillance of an intersection, while the third
troop conducts a covert surveillance mission of a suspected weapons
storage facility. In a situation such as this, most of the surveillance
troop assets should be task organized to the recce troops based on
the squadron’s analysis of METT-TC. The squadron may maintain
selected surveillance assets and must integrate all of its assets to
support surveillance operations.
MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS SURVEILLANCE OF ALL ASSIGNED NAMED AREAS OF
INTEREST
3-101. Once the surveillance of an NAI commences, surveillance
must be maintained until the mission is completed or terminated by
the higher commander. The commander must carefully plan all
available assets to ensure constant observation of all NAIs.
REPORT ALL INFORMATION RAPIDLY AND ACCURATELY
3-102. The brigade commander may base his battle planning and
tactical decisions on information obtained through the squadron’s
surveillance efforts. Intelligence loses its relevance as it ages. The
squadron must accurately report what it observes and report it in a
timely manner. Digitization speeds both the accuracy of the
intelligence information gathered as well as the timeliness with which
it can be sent. Using FBCB2 and FM, the squadron can receive and
transmit this vital combat information and intelligence in near-real
time.
CAPABILITIES
3-103. The squadron can—
• Conduct mounted, dismounted, aerial, and sensor
surveillance for extended periods of time.
• Conduct thorough surveillance of NAIs with a combination
of mounted, dismounted, aerial, and sensor assets.
• Man up to 36 short-term OPs simultaneously.
• Man up to 18 long-term OPs simultaneously.
• Conduct stealthy surveillance.
LIMITATIONS
3-104. The lightly armored vehicles of the squadron are severely
limited in their ability to survive direct or indirect fire engagements.
Threat compromise of unit positions can prove detrimental to both
the unit and mission. Proper discipline, dispersion, and camouflage
techniques will greatly reduce threat detection of squadron assets.
Ensuring the squadron has the appropriate task organization or
3-47
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
quick reaction force from brigade to get to the NAI or break contact if
compromised is also the key to survivability and mission
accomplishment.
SECTION V – SURVEILLANCE PLANNING
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
3-105. Like reconnaissance, the squadron can conduct surveillance
at all levels of conflict (stability operations and support operations,
SSC, and MTW) and in all terrain (open/rolling to complex/urban) to
provide the brigade with the SU it needs to execute decisive
maneuver within the battlespace. The optimum situations conducive
to successful squadron surveillance operations are stability
operations and support operations and SSC conflicts in
complex/urban terrain. The squadron can conduct surveillance in an
MTW, but will need to rely on augmentation to improve survivability,
and the tempo needs to be such that the squadron can set up
effective surveillance positions. In order for the squadron to conduct
effective surveillance, it must be deployed far in advance (time and
distance) of the brigade. Additional surveillance planning
considerations are as follows.
• Information received from higher—
• Brigade commander’s intent and guidance.
• Overall focus for the surveillance mission.
• Importance of NAIs.
• Duration.
• Tempo.
3-106. Considerations the squadron commander determines—

• Surveillance focus.
• Method of getting to and from area (such as
infiltration/exfiltration).
• Number of OPs available.
• Critical tasks to be performed by recce and surveillance
troops.
• Task organization and C2.
• Subordinate troop missions and sectors.
• Actions on contact/compromise.
3-48
• Displacement.
• Follow-on missions.
• Communications plan (architecture and required
support).
3-107. The squadron may receive attachments in any type of conflict.

It is definitely required in an MTW. These assets may be pushed
down to troop control or reserved for use at the squadron level.
Attachments may include engineers, artillery, rotary-wing aircraft, air
defense, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS),
additional intelligence teams, civil/public affairs teams, and PSYOP
teams. If attached to a heavy/light division, attachments may include
division cavalry/maneuver assets. The brigade commander may also
task organize one or all recce troops to battalions within the brigade.
Squadron internal surveillance assets, such as UAVs, GBS, and
chemical recce platoons or sections, can be tasked out among troops
or maintained under squadron control.
SURVEILLANCE METHODS
3-108. There are four methods for the conduct of surveillance at
troop level—dismounted, mounted, aerial, and sensor. The squadron
commander may use any method or combination of methods to
accomplish surveillance based on the factors of METT-TC, the higher
commander’s intent/guidance, and CCIR.
DISMOUNTED
3-109. Dismounted surveillance permits a troop to collect detailed
information against a fixed site or threat from a close proximity with
the reduced chance of detection by the threat. However, dismounted
reconnaissance is also the most time-consuming in terms of OP
preparation.
execute dismounted surveillance when—
• Stealth is a requirement.
• Detailed information is required.
• Surveillance target is a stationary threat, fixed site/area,
or terrain feature.
• Surveillance is required over an extended period of time.
• Scout vehicles cannot move through an area because of
terrain or threat.
• Security is the primary concern.
MOUNTED
3-111. Mounted surveillance permits the squadron to collect
adequate information on an NAI in the least amount of time. It also
allows the squadron to transition more rapidly to another mission.
This method provides less security to the vehicles from the threat,
particularly a dismounted threat.
execute mounted surveillance when—
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Surveillance is conducted for a short period of time.

• Threat is expected to be moving.
• Squadron needs to remain mobile/flexible.
• Threat contact is not likely.
• Stealth and security are not primary concerns.
3-50
AERIAL (UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE)

3-113. Aerial surveillance provides the squadron commander a low
risk means of conducting surveillance to gain basic information in
the least amount of time. It is also the most flexible asset at the
commander’s disposal. Complex terrain, adverse weather, and threat
deception/countermeasures can degrade the UAV’s effectiveness. A
combination of aerial and dismounted/mounted methods is the most
effective surveillance method.
3-114. The squadron commander may utilize aerial surveillance
when—
• Time is extremely limited or information is required
quickly.
• Extended duration surveillance is not required.
• Objective is at an extended range.
• Terrain restricts approach by ground units.
• Terrain (highly complex) and weather conditions are
favorable.
SENSOR
3-115. Sensor surveillance allows the squadron commander the
flexibility to economize his reconnaissance assets. Sensors can be
used to cover areas where contact may not be expected but likely, or
used for surveillance of areas that need to be covered over extended
periods. The squadron commander can also use sensors to provide
depth in the AO.
3-116. The squadron commander may utilize sensor surveillance
when—
• Squadron conducts missions in a large AO.
• Missions are of an extended duration.
• Detection of threat movement into NAI is desired.
3-117. A combination of all methods is the most effective approach to

surveillance and will effectively provide depth and redundancy
throughout the AO.
SECTION VI – RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER
3-118. Reconnaissance handover is the action that occurs between

two elements in order to coordinate the transfer of information
and/or responsibility for observation (reconnaissance and/or
surveillance) of potential threat contact, or the transfer of an
assigned area from one element to another. The term “element” is all-
inclusive of those involved in the handover, whether it is OP to OP
within the same platoon, sensors (such as GSR) to a recce platoon or
recce troop to infantry battalion.
3-51
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
3-119. Reconnaissance handover draws its origins from a World War II

term “connecting file” that facilitated the linking of units to prevent
seams between them. Reconnaissance handover shares many critical
tasks with battle handover—relief in place, linkup, and passage of lines.
Unlike battle handover, however, it does not imply the assumption of a
fight or being within direct fire range. Instead, it focuses on planning
for, preparing, and executing the passing of information, threat contact,
or an assigned area and the related responsibility for it from one
element to another.
3-120. This task provides the information connection, overlapping
communications, and commander’s focus (commander’s focus may
differ for each echelon) required when planning and executing
layered reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) with multiple assets.
Reconnaissance handover is normally associated with a designated
reconnaissance handover coordination point (RHOCP) or
reconnaissance handover line (RHOL) [PL]; it may be of a
sector/zone, NAI, TAI, and/or threat contact. Reconnaissance
handover can be visual, electronic, digital, analog, or any
combination of these.
CONSIDERATIONS OF RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER

3-121. R&S operations must be nested with higher, lower, and
adjacent units in order to provide a coordinated and integrated effort.
Planning for these operations includes coordinating reconnaissance
handover from ARFOR/division to brigade, brigade to squadron,
squadron to troop, squadron/troop to follow-on infantry battalion,
and so on to the lowest level. This includes coordination with
adjacent units/elements.
PLAN
3-122. Responsibility for the coordination of reconnaissance handover
normally occurs from higher to lower units. Planning for reconnaissance
handover may take place before an operation or may be conducted
during operations as part of a change of mission. When planning is
conducted before an operation, the completed plan is reviewed,
ensuring layered, redundant R&S using all available ISR assets. This
layered R&S is then analyzed to determine where and who may be
required to conduct reconnaissance handover. Once this is determined,
the locations and/or criteria for reconnaissance handover are
coordinated with higher headquarters as applicable. Pertinent control
measures related to reconnaissance handover (RHOL [PL] between units
or potential RHOCP to facilitate ground linkup) are then added with
other graphic control measures to aid in C2.
PREPARE
3-123. Coordination begins as reconnaissance handover requirements
between units are identified. The communications plan between the
units is then identified. The communications plan includes radio
frequencies, net IDs, Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
(EPLRS) needlines, host files required to conduct the linkup (if units are
from different maneuver control systems), and communications security
(COMSEC) variables for communications and establishment of the
tactical internet between the two forces. The SBCT or squadron
3-52
establishs recognition signals to prevent friendly troops from

exchanging fires. These signals may be pyrotechnics, armbands, vehicle
markings, panels, colored smoke, distinctive light patterns, and
passwords. The use of Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS)
and the SA provided by FBCB2 greatly enhance friendly recognition.
3-124. Indirect fires are coordinated and fire support information is
exchanged between units, to include assets available, fire support
coordination measures (FSCM), critical friendly zones (CFZ),
preplanned targets, final protective fires, and smoke missions.
3-125. ISR plans are exchanged allowing an understanding of how
higher IR requirements may fulfill the lower unit’s or passing unit’s
IR needs. For example, this will allow the brigade reconnaissance
assets to understand the follow-on battalion IR needs while still
remaining focused on the brigade’s requirements. This
understanding may lead to the transfer of vital information collected
by the brigade assets to the battalion during critical moments, such
as the reconnaissance handover of a threat target for destruction
(this is further emphasized in the example). The remarks block of the
collection matrix may also be used to identify established
reconnaissance handover coordination.
3-126. The criterion for target handover (engagement criteria) is
identified and coordinated. The element that will interdict if the
target exceeds the unit’s engagement criteria is identified. If follow-on
forces are identified to destroy the target (meets their engagement
criteria), an FPOL may need to be coordinated to support that unit’s
attack. The contact report of threat forces exceeding the engagement
criteria of the element/unit in contact may act as a trigger for the
follow-on force to initiate its movement to conduct FPOL.
3-127. Coordination is conducted to identify the transfer and/or
acceptance of C2 of elements between units as necessary. On-order
missions may be identified for elements/units to support
reconnaissance handover. An example of this would be a UAV tasked
to establish and maintain contact with a moving force while
reconnaissance handover of the force is being conducted from one
unit to another. The initial contact report may act as a trigger to
prepare the UAV for launch, allowing the supporting element/unit
(UAV crew) time to prepare. As reconnaissance handover becomes
imminent and final coordination begins, the UAV is launched to
support the reconnaissance handover. This level of coordination will
allow the UAV maximum time on station, ensuring redundant
observation during handover.
3-128. All elements/units must be prepared to transition to battle
handover in the event they are engaged by threat forces.
3-129. Rehearsals are of paramount importance before executing any
plan. During rehearsals, reconnaissance handover coordination is
confirmed and practiced to ensure clarity and understanding.
EXECUTE
3-130. Elements/units may conduct reconnaissance handover with
follow-on or security (stationary) forces, accept reconnaissance
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
handover from a forward force, or they may command and control

the handover.
3-131. When executing reconnaissance handover, liaison with a unit
may consist of collocating both units’ C2 nodes as well as attaching
scouts to the forward maneuver units to facilitate C2 and ISR
operations. Every effort should be made to establish a face-to-face
liaison. If a face-to-face linkup is not possible, establish a reliable digital
and/or voice linkup to exchange critical information. As the distance
closes between the forces, the requirement to maintain close liaison and
exchange information increases.
3-132. If face-to-face linkup is made at a RHOCP, final coordination
is completed and RI is exchanged. Confirmation is made to ensure
reconnaissance handover is complete as per specified criteria. If a
target is being handed over, the criteria should require the accepting
unit to acquire the target before handover is complete. The unit
conducting reconnaissance handover may then be required to
support the unit accepting the reconnaissance handover by
executing the responsibilities of the stationary unit while conducting
a forward passage of lines or relief in place. If follow-on forces are
conducting an attack, the unit conducting the reconnaissance
handover may facilitate the follow-on force’s attack by conducting
reconnaissance pull and by executing targeting, to include previously
coordinated indirect fires.
EXAMPLES OF RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER

3-133. As shown in Figure 3-10 (Part One), JSTARS identifies threat
forces moving into the squadron’s AO and preparing to cross the
RHOL previously established forward of the squadron. JSTARS
initiates reconnaissance handover to the squadron, through the
brigade, as the threat closes on the RHOL. The squadron then issues
a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to the GSR team in the area to shift
from its current area of surveillance to establish contact with the
advancing threat force. A warning order (WARNO) is also issued to
the UAV platoon and the scout team operating in the area directing
them to also establish contact with the threat force moving into the
AO. It is determined from initial reports that the threat falls into an
infantry battalion’s engagement criteria, and an intelligence
summary (INTSUM) is sent to the designated infantry battalion as
they prepare to maneuver on the threat force.
3-54
3-55
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3-10. Reconnaissance Handover (Part One)
3-134. Scouts and the UAV establish contact with the threat force
and initiate digital and electronic reconnaissance handover with the
designated infantry battalion (see Figure 3-10, Part Two). GSR
conducts reconnaissance handover with the scouts now maintaining
contact, and then shifts its focus back to its original area of
surveillance. The recce troop with the scouts that are maintaining
contact collocates its CP with the infantry battalion’s tactical CP (TAC
CP) to further facilitate reconnaissance handover; this includes the
exchange of fires information and coordination for the FPOL of the
attacking battalion. An INTSUM is sent to the infantry battalion, and
the battalion reconnaissance platoon moves to a designated RHOCP
(usually a designated contact point) to coordinate with the scouts
already in contact. As the battalion reconnaissance platoon
establishes contact with the threat force, they focus their efforts to
answer the battalion commander’s CCIR/IR to fill voids in the
battalion’s IPB and to support targeting. All ISR assets are prepared
to transition to battle handover in case direct fire contact occurs
between the ISR assets and the threat force. The squadron remains
oriented on the brigade R&S mission, but supports the attacking
battalion by isolating the threat force, facilitating reconnaissance
handover, and providing the information necessary to allow the
attacking battalion the ability to attack at its own time and place(s) of
choosing.
3-56
3-57
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3-10. Reconnaissance Handover (Part Two)
3-135. Reconnaissance handover continues with the attacking

infantry battalion as they are pulled to the threat force’s weak
point(s). As the attack occurs, ISR assets continue to support
through coordinated fires and isolation, reporting threat retrograde
and/or approaching reinforcements (see Figure 3-10, Part Three).
Figure 3-10. Reconnaissance Handover (Part Three)
3-58
3-136. Figure 3-11 (Parts One, Two, and Three) explain

reconnaissance handover of an urban area from the squadron to an
infantry battalion.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3-11. Reconnaissance Handover

of an Urban Area (Part One)
3-60
Figure 3-11. Reconnaissance Handover

of an Urban Area (Part Two)
3-61
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
3-62
Figure 3-11. Reconnaissance Handover of an Urban Area (Part Three)
3-63
Chapter 4
Security Operations
Security operations,
as defined in FM 3-90 CONTENTS
[FM 100-40], are Purpose, Fundamentals, and Planning
those operations Considerations ............................................ 4-3
Purpose ........................................................ 4-3
undertaken by a
Fundamentals .............................................. 4-3
commander to provide Planning Considerations ............................ 4-5
early and accurate Screen .............................................................. 4-7
warning of threat Critical Tasks ............................................... 4-8
operations, to provide Stationary Screen ........................................ 4-9
Moving Screen ............................................. 4-23
the force being Limited Visibility.......................................... 4-25
protected with time Area and High-Value Asset Security ............. 4-26
and maneuver space Route Security................................................. 4-29
within which to react Convoy Security.............................................. 4-32
to the threat, and to
develop the situation
to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force. Thus
for the cavalry squadron, reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition (RSTA), security operations are characterized by
conducting reconnaissance to reduce terrain and threat
unknowns, gaining and maintaining contact with the threat to
ensure continuous information, and providing early and accurate
reporting of information to the protected force.
The current patterns of operations stress fighting non-linear

battles over an increased area of operations (AO). Battalions will
operate farther apart and significant gaps will be present on the
battlefield. Given these conditions, the squadron will probably be
called on with increased frequency to perform security missions.
At the same time, the situational awareness (SA) of both the threat
and friendly forces that the squadron is expected to have will allow
security operations to be conducted with greater precision and
economy of force.
Security operations may be considered in terms of the degree of

security provided and the amount of combat power required.
Reconnaissance (recce) troops normally screen. The squadron
screens and can perform guard operations under certain
conditions with augmentation.
The squadron performs security operations as organized or

reinforced. Reinforcements may include antitank, assault gun,
tank and mechanized infantry units, attack helicopter units, close
air support (CAS), and intelligence acquisition systems. The
nature of the security mission and the threat situation determine
what reinforcements are needed. During security missions, the
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
squadron and troops may perform reconnaissance and offensive,

defensive, and retrograde operations. Synchronized aerial and
ground asset operations provide increased depth, flexibility, and
responsiveness in performing these missions.
Security is an essential part of all offensive and defensive

operations. The squadron provides security for the commander
along an exposed front, flank, or rear of the brigade or identified
battalion(s) where a threat may exist. The squadron may perform
security missions as part of a larger security force. Sustained
security operations will normally require the entire squadron.
Fragmenting the squadron should be avoided, but the squadron
has a greater capability to provide security simultaneously in
multiple areas. In some situations, individual troops may be
attached or placed under the operational control (OPCON) of a
maneuver battalion to perform specific security missions. In other
cases, the squadron may have a battalion scout or mobile gun
system (MGS) platoon attached or OPCON to it.
Surveillance is inherent and continuous in all security operations,

even if fighting. The focus is on providing information to the
protected force commander to prevent surprise, allowing him to
make decisions for maneuver and fires, and to provide reaction
time. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and ground scouts/sensors
are coordinated to synchronize their complementary capabilities.
Counterreconnaissance is also inherent in all security operations.

Counterreconnaissance is the sum of all actions taken at each
echelon to counter threat reconnaissance and surveillance efforts
throughout the depth of the AO. The focus is on denying the
threat any information about friendly operations, and on
destroying or repelling threat reconnaissance elements. In the
execution of counterreconnaissance, the squadron operates either
offensively or defensively.
Keeping the protected force abreast of the situation provides the

majority of the security to the brigade. This information will be
provided primarily through the Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and Army Tactical Command and
Control System (ATCCS), displaying both the friendly and threat
forces. Exchange of orders, intelligence reports, and graphics
using these systems may be quicker and more efficient in keeping
all forces synchronized; however, over extended distances or when
communication links are tenuous, liaison officers will be required.
The three primary missions under security operations are—
• Screen.
• Guard.
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__________________________________________________________ Chapter 4 – Security Operations
• Cover.
The squadron can effectively screen to provide early warning to the

brigade. As part of the brigade conducting a guard, the squadron
can screen and/or conduct reconnaissance (zone or area). The
squadron does the same missions, screen and reconnaissance, for
cover as part of a brigade or larger force. Refer to FM 3-20.95 [FM
17-95] for a detailed discussion on guard and cover missions.
Also outlined in this chapter are some highly specialized forms of

security operations designed to protect point or specific objectives.
These are normally conducted decentralized, with the recce troops
individually executing any one of the previously mentioned
operations. These operations are described as—
• Area and high-value asset security.

• Route security.
• Convoy security.
This chapter discusses the tactics, techniques and procedures

(TTP) as well as planning considerations for the execution of
security operations.
SECTION I – PURPOSE, FUNDAMENTALS, AND PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS
PURPOSE
4-1. The squadron performs security missions to provide
information about the threat and terrain, to prevent the main body
from being surprised, and to preserve the combat power of friendly
forces for decisive deployment. Critical information includes the size,
composition, location, direction, and rate of movement of the threat.
Terrain information focuses on obstacles, avenues of approach, and
key terrain features that impact the movement of either force. The
intent is to provide information that gives the main body commander
the reaction time and maneuver space necessary to effectively fight
the threat.
FUNDAMENTALS
4-2. Successful security operations are planned and performed
maintaining these five fundamentals:
• Orient on the main body.
• Perform continuous reconnaissance.
• Provide early and accurate warning.
• Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
• Maintain threat contact.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
ORIENT ON THE MAIN BODY

4-3. The security force operates at a specified distance or area that
provides the maximum standoff distance and early warning.
Movement of the security force is a fundamental part of the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan and must be
based on and integrated with the maneuver plan in order to keep the
security force oriented. The commander uses data feeds from UAVs,
ground troops/sensors, and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System (JSTARS) in addition to monitoring his digital displays to
maintain detailed SA. In these operations, the value of terrain held by
the security force lies in the protection it provides to the main body.
PERFORM CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE

4-4. Security comes in large part from knowing everything about the
threat and terrain within the assigned AO. Detailed knowledge of the
threat and the terrain provides a significant degree of security.
Reconnaissance operations must be continuous to provide the main
body commander the maximum information possible. Surveillance and
patrolling required in security use the same techniques as in
reconnaissance. If the security mission involves movement,
reconnaissance is necessary for both the squadron and the main body.
Air and ground operations are used to exploit the longer-range
observation capabilities of the UAV to gain the greatest flexibility and
extended depth.
PROVIDE EARLY AND ACCURATE WARNING

4-5. Information is security. It is also an element of combat power.
Early warning of threat activity provides the main body commander
the time and information needed to retain the tactical initiative and
to choose the time and place to concentrate against the threat.
Ground scouts, sensors, and UAVs are positioned to provide long-
range observation of expected threat avenues of approach. ISR assets
outside of the brigade cue the squadron to reposition scouts,
sensors, and UAVs to make contact with threat forces early in the
operation. Flexibility, depth, and redundancy are built into the
surveillance plan.
PROVIDE REACTION TIME AND MANEUVER SPACE

4-6. This fundamental embraces the intent of security operations.
The security force operates as far from the main body as possible,
consistent with the factors of METT-TC [mission, enemy, terrain and
weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations]. This distance provides the reaction time and
maneuver space required by the main body commander. It fights, as
necessary and if augmented, to gain adequate time and space for the
main body commander to maneuver and concentrate forces to meet
the threat.
MAINTAIN THREAT CONTACT
4-4
4-7. Unless otherwise directed, contact once gained is not broken.

Contact does not have to be maintained by the individual scout or
sensor that first makes it. The security force maintains contact as a
whole. Continuous information on the threat’s activities must be
gathered, and the threat must be prevented from endangering other
friendly forces. This requires—
• Continuous contact (preferably visual, electronic, and/or
sensor).
• Direct and indirect fires.
• Freedom to maneuver.
• Depth.
4-8. The squadron can conduct security operations across the full
spectrum of conflict (stability operations and support operations,
smaller-scale contingency [SSC], and major theater of war [MTW])
and in all types of terrain (open/rolling to complex/urban) to collect,
analyze, and provide intelligence information for the brigade, allowing
the brigade time to plan, prepare, and/or deploy against expected or
unexpected threat activities.
4-9. In order for the squadron to conduct effective security, the
brigade commander must issue guidance that contains at a
minimum:
• Focus.
• Tempo.
• Engagement/displacement criteria.
4-10. This guidance answers the three basic questions the

squadron commander needs to know to plan and execute his mission
and in turn provide essential guidance to the subordinate
commanders and staff. This is an extension of the commander’s
intent in the operations order (OPORD) and is meant to fully clarify
his intent.
FOCUS
4-11. The focus of the security operation allows the commander to
determine the specific critical tasks, and their priority, that the
squadron or troops need to accomplish. It allows the squadron
commander to narrow the troop’s scope of operations to get the
information that is most important to squadron and brigade
operations. Security operations are threat, terrain, and friendly unit
oriented. The focus should be defined around what the squadron is
protecting and why, or what the expected results of the security are.
Named areas of interest (NAI) provide a method of focusing the
squadron effort. NAIs link most likely threat activities to terrain
where those activities may occur. Given the NAIs, the troop
commanders, though still concerned with their entire area of
responsibility, can prioritize asset emplacement to provide the most
effective observation; for example, place observation posts (OP) to
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
observe primary threat avenues of approach and utilize ground

surveillance radar (GSR)/improved remotely monitored battlefield
sensor system (IREMBASS) for secondary or dismounted approaches.
TEMPO
4-12. The tempo of the operation allows the commander to establish
associated time requirements with planning and preparation time,
movement, and methods, such as dismounted or mounted OPs and
UAV rotation. Tempo can equate to the duration of the mission,
which affects whether short, long, or extended OPs are used. Tempo
can also relate to depth, especially in screening missions. The
amount of time allowed and availability of assets to establish depth
are related. Depth is also based on the threat’s ability to achieve a
rapid tempo.
NOTE: In some situations, a set time for the screen to end should not be established
as that may result in the screening force becoming engaged to a greater extent
than desired, or it may result in a premature collapse of the screen.
ENGAGEMENT/DISPLACEMENT CRITERIA
4-13. Engagement criteria establish what the troops are expected to
engage and what they are expected to hand over to the brigade.
Conversely, by understanding what the brigade commander
requires/expects the squadron to destroy, coupled with his
understanding of the threat’s most likely course of action (COA), he is
able to identify the troop’s engagement criteria. This enables troop
commanders to focus certain weapons systems or to develop
engagement areas and plan for the destruction of specified threat
elements if encountered. Displacement criteria are tied to
engagement criteria in that the squadron orders or establishes
displacement based on what the squadron can or cannot destroy, or
when the determined end state is met. The main body commander
should define what events, or triggers, will cause the screen to be
collapsed, such as a certain size force or specific element of the
threat formation reaching a given point. The squadron recce
commanders utilize surveillance troop assets to assist in maintaining
contact and/or executing hand over to follow-on units.
4-14. Additional security planning considerations are—
• Information received from higher.
• The overall focus for the security mission.
• The AO.
• The brigade commander’s intent and commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIR).
• Personnel and equipment capabilities and limitations.
• Operational tempo (OPTEMPO).
4-15. Based on the above considerations, the squadron commander

determines—
4-6
• His essential guidance.

• Critical tasks to be performed by subordinate units.
• Task organization, command and support relationships,
and the command and control (C2) structure.
• Subordinate troop missions and AO.
• Potential branches and sequels to the operation.
• Communications plan (architecture and required
support).
• Available intelligence and collection assets at the joint and
national levels (refer to Chapter 6).
4-16. The squadron’s unique organization and technologically

advanced equipment allow it to conduct security operations ideally
during security or support operations and the low-end SSC. However,
the squadron will need augmentation for the high end of SSC and MTW.
Augmentation for these situations must be expected and planned.
These assets may be task organized to the troops (normally the recce
troops) or retained under squadron control. Attachments may include
organic brigade assets, armor/mechanized cavalry units, artillery,
rotary-winged aircraft, air defense, additional intelligence teams,
civil/public affairs teams, engineers, additional CSS for augmentation
forces, and psychological operations (PSYOP) teams as outlined in
Chapter 6. While the squadron will normally function most efficiently as
a synergistic whole, circumstances of METT-TC may cause the brigade
commander to task organize one or all of the recce troops to battalions
within the brigade. Squadron internal surveillance assets, such as
UAVs, ground-based sensors, and chemical reconnaissance platoons or
sections, can be task organized among troops or maintained under
surveillance troop control.
SECTION II – SCREEN
4-17. The primary purpose of a screen is to provide early warning to

the main body. Based on the higher commander’s intent and the
unit’s capabilities, it may also destroy threat reconnaissance and
impede and harass the threat main body with indirect and/or direct
fires. Screen missions are defensive in nature and largely
accomplished by establishing a series of OPs and conducting patrols
to ensure adequate surveillance of the assigned sector. The screen
provides the protected force with the least protection of any security
mission. This mission is appropriate when operations have created
extended flanks, when gaps exist between major subordinate
maneuver units that cannot be secured in force, or when required to
provide early warning over gaps that are not considered critical
enough to require security in greater strength. This permits the main
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
body commander to maximize the security effort where contact is

expected.
4-18. The squadron normally conducts screen missions with just its
organic assets, but may be augmented with additional assets
dependent on the brigade commander’s intent or METT-TC.
Augmentation should be requested when assigned
counterreconnaissance as a task. Normally, the trace of the screen is
established within the range of main body artillery, but situations
can require operating beyond that range and may require that
artillery be allocated in direct support of the squadron.
4-19. Because a screen is defensive in nature, a screen may be
performed for a stationary force to the front, flank, or rear of the
main body. A screen is performed for a moving force to the flank or
rear of the main body. A screen mission is not performed forward of a
moving force. Zone reconnaissance is more suited for operations
forward of a moving force.
4-20. All screens are active operations. Stationary OPs are only one
part of the mission. Patrols, mounted and aerial reconnaissance, and
relocating OPs on an extended screen ensure that continuous
overlapping surveillance occurs. Inactivity in an immobile screen
develops complacency.
4-21. Depth is important in a screen. It allows for threat contact to
be passed from one element to another without displacing. Depth is
advantageous to—
• Prevent the threat from easily penetrating the screen.
• Prevent gaps from occurring when OPs displace or are
lost.
• Destroy threat reconnaissance elements without
compromising critical OPs.
4-22. Depth is achieved by positioning OPs, UAVs,

IREMBASS/GSR, PROPHET systems, and attached units between
the front line trace and rear boundary of the surveillance and/or
security. Note that when the term “screen line” is used, it describes
only the trace along which security is provided, not the linear
positioning of assets—depth is critical for success.
4-23. Displacement of the screen to subsequent OP positions is
event-driven. The approach or detection by a threat force, relief by a
friendly unit, or movement of the protected force dictates screen
movement. Collapsing of the screen, executed by well-rehearsed
security drills performed at the platoon and troop levels, provides
security and maintains contact for the squadron as it displaces. The
main body commander does not place a time requirement on the
duration of the screen unless the intent is to provide a higher level of
security to the main body or to provide a tentative time frame for
subordinate unit planning purposes.
CRITICAL TASKS
4-8
4-24. A screen mission has certain critical tasks that guide

planning. Critical tasks are not a checklist or sequential execution
guide. The level to which the critical task can be achieved is
dependent on the unit’s capabilities, the commander’s intent, and
METT-TC. To achieve the intent of a screen mission, the following
critical tasks are accomplished:
• Maintain continuous surveillance of all avenues of
approach that affect the main body’s mission under all
conditions. METT-TC may require continuous monitoring
of smaller avenues of approach.
• Destroy or repel all reconnaissance elements within
capabilities (counterreconnaissance).
• Locate the lead elements that indicate the threat’s main
attack prescribed in the threat’s order of battle based on
the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
• Maintain contact with the threat’s lead element while
displacing and reporting its activities.
STATIONARY SCREEN
MAIN BODY COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE
4-25. The main body commander should provide the squadron
commander with guidance containing the following considerations:
Augmentation
4-26. Augmentation is any additional assets the squadron unit
receives to conduct the mission. This may include ground maneuver
forces, aviation assets, artillery, air defense, engineers, or additional
logistical support. Augmentation from the brigade can include an
antiarmor platoon or company, an MGS platoon, a recce platoon, a
sniper squad(s), infantry company, or an engineer platoon. The
squadron can expect tanks, Bradleys, and attack aviation when
supporting heavy or light divisions. Refer to Chapter 6 for additional
support assets.
The General Trace of the Screen and the Time the Screen Must Be Established
4-27. A phase line (PL) placed along identifiable terrain graphically
indicates the trace. Consideration should be given to the amount of
early warning, range of indirect fires, desired main body maneuver
space, and fields of observation. When screening forward of the
brigade, this PL represents the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and
may be along or close to a coordinated fire line. Placing screening
forces beyond the trace line requires approval of higher
headquarters, and will usually require modification of fire support
coordination measures (FSCM).
The Width of the Screened Sector
4-28. The tasks required of a screening force are minimal compared
to other security missions. Therefore, the screening force may be
assigned a wide frontage. Depending on terrain and threat, each
recce troop can screen up to a nine-kilometer-wide sector, maintain
continuous surveillance of up to six battalion-size avenues of
4-9
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
approach, or establish up to twelve short-duration OPs. The

squadron can effectively cover a 30-kilometer frontage with the use of
surveillance troop assets. If the squadron is required to screen
beyond the capacity it can handle, the commander requests
reinforcements. Careful consideration must be given when assigning
UAVs or ground-based sensors their own terrain, since the ability to
execute the mission can be impacted by weather, station time, and
terrain. UAVs and ground-based sensors should be used to
complement ground forces and to provide extended depth, some
width, and increased flexibility to the operation.
The Force to be Screened
4-29. The squadron must understand the mission, purpose, and
commander’s intent of the unit it is screening. Knowing this
information allows the squadron commander to better focus the
troops and enhances initiative during execution.
The Rear Boundary of the Screening Force
4-30. The rear limit of the screening force is depicted as a
boundary. Responsibility for the area between the screened force and
the screening force rear boundary lies with the screened (main body)
force. This boundary reflects time and space requirements, clearly
delineates terrain responsibilities, and provides depth required by the
screening force. The boundary may also serve as a battle handover or
reconnaissance handover line to control passing responsibility for the
threat to the protected force.
Possible Follow-on Missions
4-31. To facilitate planning and future operations, the next likely
mission the screening force is to perform should be defined with
enough information to allow the commander to begin planning and
preparing for it. Providing this information also helps define the end
state of the screen mission.
SQUADRON COMMANDER’S CONSIDERATIONS
4-32. Given the brigade commander’s guidance, the squadron
commander considers the following areas:
The Initial Screen
4-33. The controlling headquarters establishes the initial screen
and is adjusted closer only with higher’s approval. Because the initial
screen often represents the FLOT, it is considered a restrictive
control measure. Coordination is required to move beyond the initial
screen to conduct aerial surveillance or ground reconnaissance. If
operations forward of the screen are required, an additional PL
should be established to designate the squadron limit of advance.
Key considerations in locating the screen are:
• Fields of observation from behind the screen.
• Requirements to observe specific NAIs or targeted areas of
interest (TAI).
• Range of main body artillery.
4-10
4-34. With permission, the squadron commander can adjust the

initial screen to best meet those considerations.
Movement to Occupy the Screen
4-35. Time and threat situation determine the method of occupying
the screen. There are primarily three methods available to occupy the
screen:
• Zone reconnaissance.
• Infiltration.
• Tactical road march.
4-36. If the situation is vague or more information is required on

the terrain between the main body and the screen and time is
available, the squadron will conduct a zone reconnaissance to the
screen. This method identifies any threat in the sector and
familiarizes the squadron with the terrain. It is time-consuming, but
provides the most security. See Chapter 3 for execution of zone
reconnaissance.
4-37. If the threat situation is vague, or the threat is known to be in
sector, and the intent is not to make contact with the threat prior to
occupying the screen, the squadron should conduct infiltration to get
to the screen. Infiltration provides the optimum level of stealth, but is
also time-consuming and less secure for the squadron, due to the
reduction of flexibility in massing combat power. If there is an
accurate picture of the threat situation or time is short, the squadron
may conduct a tactical road march to a position just short of the
screen. Chapter 5 discusses both infiltration and tactical road
march.
Control of Displacement to Subsequent Positions
4-38. The squadron commander uses PLs to control the operation.
Since displacement to subsequent positions is event-driven,
subsequent PLs serve to guide the troop commander’s initiative
during the mission. The squadron plan should define the event
criteria triggering displacement, and displacement should occur at
the platoon and troop levels.
Sectors for Subordinate Troops
4-39. The commander designates sectors for the subordinate recce
troops. Terrain responsibility for NAIs and TAIs goes with the sector.
Recce troops are normally deployed abreast with UAVs and/or
IREMBASS/GSR and PROPHET systems positioned to provide depth
for the squadron. Recce troops, though deployed abreast, will
position platoons, OPs, and/or augmentation to provide depth within
their sector. Reduced depth is the trade-off when screening extended
frontages. When forced to do so, the commander may have to assign
terrain to UAVs or sensors. This terrain should not be the high-speed
avenues of approach. Plans must include redundancy of coverage
and compensate for the absence of UAVs (i.e., adverse weather) by
adjusting ground OPs or positions.
Air and Ground Integration
4-11
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
4-40. UAVs may conduct surveillance forward, to the rear, or flanks

of the recce troops to add depth and extend the capabilities of the
ground screen. They may conduct surveillance along an exposed
flank of the squadron, assist in patrolling gaps between ground OPs,
augment surveillance of NAIs, and add depth within the sector along
subsequent screen. The concepts of battle handover or
reconnaissance are used within the squadron as aerial and recce
troops displace to subsequent OPs or positions. This ensures the
squadron maintains contact with the threat. UAVs can be used
under squadron control or tasked to subordinate troops. In either
case, integrating air and ground assets greatly enhances the
effectiveness of the screen.
Surveillance and Acquisition Assets
4-41. The squadron should plan the integration of surveillance and
acquisition assets to provide the earliest possible warning on the most
likely avenues of approach, using its organic assets and/or national
assets. The squadron can request through the brigade for national
assets to provide initial acquisitions (e.g., JSTARS or Guardrail moving
target indicator acquisition). These are used to cue organic assets such
as UAVs and ground observers to obtain more definitive intelligence and
continue tracking the threat. These assets can also be planned to cover
the squadron when it is collapsing the screen and is most vulnerable, or
to assist in regaining contact with the threat if contact is lost. If the
squadron is screening extended frontages, these assets can operate in
an economy-of-force role, conducting periodic surveillance on areas the
threat is less likely to use but still has the possibility of using. The
sensors organic to the squadron can be used under squadron control or
tasked to subordinate troops. In either case, integrating the sensors into
the plan greatly enhances the effectiveness of the screen (refer to Figure
4-1). In this example, two recce troops have UAVs OPCON to them to
help screen the most likely and most dangerous avenues of approach.
The remaining surveillance assets stay under the control of the
surveillance troop commander and are integrated into the screen along
less dangerous avenues of approach.
4-12
Figure 4-1. Screen Utilizing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Sensors
4-13
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Fire Planning
4-42. Fire planning integrates artillery; mortars (troop level); direct
fires; and if allocated, attack aviation and CAS. Planning starts with
the brigade’s fire support plan, which includes assigned essential fire
support tasks (EFST). The squadron provides bottom-up refinement
as required. The planning must consider the brigade commander’s
intent for the screen—if it is to report only, to disrupt, or to
destroy/delay specific elements of the threat’s formations. Targets
should be planned on likely approaches at choke points or areas
where the threat must slow down. Indirect and direct fires should be
planned in conjunction with any obstacles the squadron emplaces.
Engagement areas are planned to focus fires at points along the
likely threat avenues of approach where it is most possible to achieve
the desired effects. It is critical that the brigade clearly identify what
supporting artillery is available for the squadron, the command
relationship, their tactical mission, the communication/digital
linkages, and artillery positioning plans.
Mobility and Survivability
4-43. Engineers, if attached, may be available for specific tasks.
Typical engineer tasks are survivability, improvement of combat
roads and trails, and emplacement of situational obstacles.
Situational obstacles are those planned and possibly prepared, but
not executed until specific criteria are met. Therefore, units may or
may not execute situational obstacles, depending on the situation
that develops during the battle. They are “be prepared” obstacles and
provide the commander flexibility for emplacing tactical obstacles
based on battlefield development. FM 3-34.1 [FM 90-7] provides
specific considerations for planning situational obstacles. Generally,
Volcano is the most frequently used situational obstacles since they
can be rapidly and precisely emplaced with set destruct times. In
screen operations, situational obstacles can be used both to disrupt
and delay the threat (in conjunction with indirect and direct fires),
and to protect elements of the squadron.
Command and Control and Combat Service Support
4-44. In most instances, both the squadron tactical command post
(TAC CP) and main CP must be operational to support C2 over
extended distances and to maintain digital linkages with brigade
headquarters and its subordinate elements. Initial and subsequent
locations of the main CP must be integrated into the brigade’s
communication plan to ensure continuous mobile subscriber
equipment (MSE) connectivity if digital connectivity is to be
maintained. Combat service support (CSS) assets should be prepared
for operations extended in both time and space. Depending on the
threat situation and the length of supply lines, the squadron may
have to dedicate combat assets to securing logistical convoys.
Additionally, squadron assets operating well forward of or to the
flank of brigade may need to be supported by the closest infantry
battalion. This must be determined early in the planning process to
allow the infantry battalion time to plan for and position assets to
provide CSS to the squadron assets.
4-14
Planning Considerations
4-45. The staff also considers the following factors when developing
the squadron concept (see also FM 3-20.971 and FM 3-20.98 [FM 17-
98]). Listed are basic considerations at troop level:
• Mission.
• Squadron commander’s essential guidance.
• Orientation of the screen.
• Tasks for augmentation, such as UAVs; GSR/nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) sensors; antitank systems;
assault guns (refer to Chapter 6).
• Direct/indirect fire planning.
• Graphic control measures.
• Initial OP locations.
• Patrol requirements.
• Positioning C2/CSS assets.
• Coordination with friendly and supported unit.
SURVEILLANCE TROOP COMMANDER’S CONSIDERATIONS
4-46. The surveillance troop commander considers the following:
• UAV rotation plan.
• Army airspace command and control (A2C2)
planning/coordination.
• Positioning C2/CSS assets.
• Graphic control measures.
• Systems emplacement (when operating pure).
• Linkup with recce troops.
EXAMPLE OF A STATIONARY SCREEN

4-47. A threat force threatens to attack a strategic waterway by
securing a dam and two locks that are essential to the control of
international traffic and electricity in the local area. An airborne
battalion initial entry force has jumped into the area and secured a
nearby airfield. Lead elements of the brigade’s cavalry squadron
(RSTA), augmented with interpreters, arrive at the aerial port of
debarkation (APOD) 24 to 36 hours after “first wheels up.” The entire
brigade closed on the APOD within 96 hours to expand tactical
control of the AO and to defend strategic and key infrastructure
within its defensive sector against seizure by the threat force
advancing from the east.
4-48. The AO is characterized by severely restricted jungle with two
major waterways. One is the canal running north-south through the
center of the AO; the other is a river flowing east from the dam in the
northern portion of the sector. Key terrain includes the dam, the two
locks, a bridge over the waterway, and the airfield and village in the
southeast portion of the AO (refer to Figure 4-2).
4-15
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 4-2. Area of Operations
4-49. Strategic intelligence fed to the squadron via the brigade en

route indicates approximately two brigades of threat infantry moving
in dispersed formations through the jungle from the east. The threat
possesses some special operations forces (SOF), limited light
mechanized capability, sophisticated C2, and short-range air defense
artillery (ADA) capability. The threat is experienced, with highly
disciplined infantry, and equipped with hand-held antiarmor
weapons, machine guns, and heavy mortars.
4-50. The brigade’s mission is to defend in sector to prevent seizure
of key terrain and to allow the continued flow of international
maritime traffic and electricity to the local population.
Brigade Commander’s Guidance
4-51. The brigade commander tasks the squadron to conduct an
area reconnaissance of the sector (refer to Chapter 3 of this manual
for a discussion of area reconnaissance). On order, the squadron
transitions into a stationary screen oriented to the east and west to
identify threat infiltration from the east and any other asymmetrical
threats within the sector. The brigade commander gives the squadron
its focus, tasking it to determine—
• Location, movement, and destruction of threat
reconnaissance.
• Speed, direction, composition, and strength of threat
formations.
• Locations of high-payoff targets (HPT).
4-16
• Threat actions at decision points.

• Threat envelopments, breaching operations, and force
concentrations.
• Battle damage assessment (BDA).
• Movement of follow-on forces.
4-52. The brigade commander does not set a time (tempo) for the
screen to end; rather, he defines the events, or triggers, that will
cause the screen to be collapsed through the following
engagement/displacement criteria:
• Destruction of any threat light or motorized
reconnaissance.
• Destruction and/or harassment of HPTs.
• Displacement upon location of threat main body and
determination of its avenue(s) of approach.
Squadron Planning
4-53. After receiving guidance, the squadron commander, S2, and
surveillance troop commander begin planning with the brigade staff
to synchronize the squadron’s plan with the brigade’s ISR plan. This
results in development of IPB products, including NAIs.
Concurrently, the squadron executive officer (XO) prepares the staff
for the orders process. Some actions for preparation include—
• Acquiring initial brigade graphics (digital, through
Maneuver Control System [MCS]; and/or traditional).
• Conducting terrain analysis.
• Updating intelligence information of the area.
• Identifying and coordinating for intelligence assets
available to support the mission (reach-back through the
brigade).
4-54. The squadron commander, S2, and surveillance troop

commander return to the squadron CP to conduct the military
decision-making process (MDMP) process in accordance with FM 3-0
[FM 100-5] and Appendix A of this manual.
4-55. Within the brigade’s AO, the squadron commander directs the
squadron’s efforts to locate and identify—
• Threat reconnaissance forces.
• HPTs.
• Any threat activity within NAIs.
• Location and movement of the threat main body.
4-56. Once the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) are

identified, the squadron will coordinate with the brigade and the
military intelligence (MI) company to conduct link analysis and
ensure clarity in the threat order of battle, centers of gravity, and
intentions.
4-17
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
4-57. The squadron commander provides the recce troop

commanders with their focus, tempo, and engagement/displacement
criteria. These considerations are covered in the following discussion.
4-58. Focus. Focus of the operation covers the following:
• Location and destruction of all threat reconnaissance
forces.
• Location of HPTs.
• Continuous surveillance of all assigned NAIs.
• Location and movement of threat main body.
• Location of follow-on forces (if any).
4-59. Tempo. The main consideration for tempo of the operation is

that it will be more than 12 hours in length. This will be critical in
the establishment of dismounted OPs and Javelin ambush sites.
4-60. Engagement/Displacement Criteria. Considerations for
engagement and displacement criteria for the operation include the
following:
• Troops engage and destroy threat reconnaissance
elements of two motorized vehicles or less.
• If three or more vehicles are encountered, the recce
platoons conduct battle handover to pass the fight to the
brigade’s area defense.
• Troops will destroy and/or harass HPTs.
• Displacement will occur only when the threat main body
has been identified and its avenue of approach has been
determined.
• Battle handover with the brigade’s area defense will occur
at PL BRIDLE for A troop or PL STIRRUP for C troop.
4-61. The squadron commander also briefs his recce troops on the
following planning considerations:
• Coordination for UAVs and/or sensors to assist in depth
or to cover gaps in observation.
• Rehearsals of security drills, battle handover, passage of
lines, and CSS operations.
• Use of organic brigade artillery assets.
4-62. Squadron graphics given to each troop commander (refer to

Figure 4-3) include the following:
• Brigade graphics.
• Squadron/troop boundaries.
• NAIs and CPs to orient surveillance.
• Routes within the AO, with applicable CPs.
4-18
Figure 4-3. Operational Graphics
4-63. The squadron commander tasks A Troop to establish a screen

oriented east along PL SPUR to provide early warning for the
brigade’s 1st Battalion, located in the vicinity of the airfield and NAI
1. A Troop will maintain observation on NAIs 4 and 5, which have
been identified as likely avenues of approach for the threat main
body.
4-64. B Troop is tasked to conduct a zone reconnaissance between
PL STIRRUP and PL BRIDLE to discover any asymmetrical threats
that may have infiltrated the brigade’s sector. B Troop will focus on
the human intelligence (HUMINT) and terrain aspects of the area,
concentrating this reconnaissance on NAIs 1 and 2 and the area
around the dam. B Troop’s tempo initially is to be aggressive and
rapid to determine the societal and political atmosphere within the
brigade’s sector and confirm key terrain that was identified during
the squadron’s area reconnaissance. Finally, B Troop’s engagement
criteria are to destroy only confirmed SOF or paramilitary threats.
4-65. C Troop is tasked to conduct a screen oriented west along PL
SADDLE to provide early warning for the brigade’s 3rd Battalion,
located in the vicinity of the NAI 3. C Troop will maintain observation
on NAI 3, which has been identified as a possible avenue of approach
for follow-on forces (refer to Figure 4-4).
4-19
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 4-4. Troops Set for Screen and Reconnaissance
4-66. D Troop, the surveillance troop, is tasked with establishing a

PROPHET baseline to determine, by monitoring changes in signal
traffic, the likelihood that the threat to the east has initiated
movement against the brigade.
4-67. The IREMBASS/GSR teams are task organized to the recce
troops to provide depth to the screen as well as to serve as a link to
bridge any physical gaps that may exist in the screen. UAVs remain
under squadron control and support the recce troops’ mission by
conducting aerial reconnaissance of all NAIs to identify threat
vehicles/activities and to provide early warning. The NBC
reconnaissance platoon has been task organized to the recce troops
to perform NBC reconnaissance and assess any possible threat
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) usage.
Execution
4-68. The screen is established and continues through the day.
Approximately 45 minutes after sunset, the IREMBASS/GSR team
task organized to A Troop reports threat-mounted reconnaissance
movement in the vicinity east of NAI 4 and south of NAI 5. Each
contact involves two vehicles with possible dismounts. A Troop
acknowledges the report. Because the IREMBASS/GSR team
monitoring the contact south of NAI 5 is performing an economy of
force to cover a gap within the screen, A Troop must maneuver some
of its force. Based on war-gaming, the A Troop commander has
planned on taking an acceptable risk; he thus initiates movement of
A Section of his 2nd Platoon to confirm the IREMBASS/GSR team’s
4-20
report south of NAI 5. The squadron commander also reroutes a UAV

to the area to assist in maintaining contact. A Troop’s 1st Platoon,
observing NAI 4, reports contact with the threat reconnaissance in
that sector and maneuvers out of contact for a Javelin ambush. The
B Troop commander monitors the A Troop commander’s reports to
squadron and notifies his troop of the situation via FM and FBCB2.
4-69. As A Section, 2nd Platoon, A Troop maneuvers south to gain
contact, the IREMBASS/GSR reports that it has lost contact with the
threat reconnaissance, which is moving west. Minutes later, A
Section makes unexpected contact with one threat reconnaissance
vehicle. A Section executes a hasty defense and destroys the vehicle.
At approximately the same time, the UAV in the area makes contact
with the second threat vehicle and reports it moving toward the
brigade’s 2nd Battalion at Checkpoint 7. The squadron CP reports to
brigade and recommends battle handover with C Company, 2nd
Battalion, which is in the defense vicinity Checkpoint 7. Brigade
concurs. The UAV maintains contact until C Company gains contact
and destroys the threat reconnaissance vehicle (refer to Figure 4-5).
Meanwhile, A Section, 2nd Platoon returns to the screen.
Figure 4-5. Contact with Threat Elements
4-70. A Troop’s 1st Platoon executes its Javelin ambush, destroying

two threat reconnaissance vehicles but no dismounts. Based on
reports of possible dismounts and discussion with the brigade’s MI
company, the squadron S2 recommends that B Troop maximize use
4-21
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
of available assets in search of possible SOF or paramilitary

infiltration, concentrating on NAI 1 and the vicinity of Checkpoint 1.
4-71. At approximately midnight, national assets and HUMINT
teams from the squadron and the brigade’s MI company discover and
begin to clarify threat SOF intentions to attack the brigade main CP
(vicinity of the APOD) with a car bomb at before morning nautical
twilight (BMNT). It is also determined that threat SOF are attempting
to coordinate for civilian threat sympathizers to protest in the vicinity
of NAI 1 and 2 at approximately the same time to impede blue force
maneuver. The squadron CP reports to and coordinates with brigade
concerning this intelligence. It recommends the establishment of a
checkpoint to control traffic into and out of the area around the
airfield and the use of the brigade’s nonlethal effects coordination cell
(NLECC) to prevent civilian disruption of blue force operations. The
brigade concurs and decides to employ information operations. The
squadron commander tasks B Troop with the establishment of a
checkpoint at the entrance road to the airfield; he directs the CP to
update squadron graphics via FBCB2 to indicate that location as
Checkpoint 10. The B Troop commander acknowledges and reports
that 3rd Platoon will execute the checkpoint. (Refer to Figure 4-6.)
Figure 4-6. Establishment of Checkpoint at Airfield Entrance
4-72. At approximately 0300, the surveillance troop’s PROPHET

assets report increased signal traffic approximately 5 kilometers east
of PL SPUR. The squadron CP reports to brigade, and the squadron
commander sends two UAVs to attempt to confirm or deny threat
4-22
movement. Both UAVs arrive on station at approximately 0320 and

establish an overlapping surveillance pattern with negative threat
contact. At 0330, the UAV platoon leader reports the loss of
communications with one UAV for unknown reasons. The remaining
UAV has no visual vehicle contact. The squadron commander
determines that the loss of communications with the UAV is the
result of threat ADA. He tasks the UAV platoon leader to position the
remaining UAV in the vicinity of NAI 5 and has a third UAV launched
to assist in the surveillance of NAI 4. The squadron S2 informs the
squadron commander that he believes increased signal traffic has
marked the initial movement of at least a threat infantry brigade. He
believes the brigade will coordinate the attack with the suspected car
bomb and civilian disturbance at BMNT. The S2 also believes that
the squadron commander was correct in attributing the loss of the
UAV to threat ADA, which was in support of the threat infantry. At
this point, however, he is unsure of the threat’s primary objective.
The squadron commander concurs with this assessment and reports
to the brigade commander while the S2 conducts an intelligence
update via FM (on the squadron command frequency) and FBCB2.
4-73. At 0555, B Troop reports that its 3rd Platoon has observed a
white station wagon that, upon seeing Checkpoint 10, veered sharply
off the road and attempted to bypass. After the vehicle failed to stop,
3rd Platoon soldiers engaged the vehicle with light machine guns,
killing both of the occupants. In searching the vehicle, 3rd Platoon
discovered an unknown amount of explosives. The B Troop
commander has requested engineer support and cordoned off the
vehicle. At 0600, brigade informs the squadron CP that the NLECC’s
information operations have prevented groups of civilians from
massing in the vicinity of NAI 1 and 2. At the same time, the UAV
observing NAI 5 reports mass dismounted movement just east of NAI
5. A troop monitors the report, reports negative contact in either NAI
4 or 5, and continues to observe. The squadron CP reports to brigade
and conducts an FBCB2 update.
4-74. At 0605, A Troop reports visual contact with at least three
separate dismounted infantry companies, moving due west, in NAI 5.
A Troop also reports negative threat contact in NAI 4. The squadron
commander acknowledges the report and orders A Troop to initiate
displacement of its northern platoons, maintaining contact and
conducting battle handover at PL BRIDLE. The squadron CP reports
to brigade that the displacement criteria have been met and that A
Troop is initiating movement for battle handover. The squadron
commander then orders A Troop to maintain its screen of NAI 4 and
to maneuver during its displacement to screen from NAI 4 to the
vicinity of Checkpoint 7, providing flank security for 2nd Battalion of
the brigade. A troop continues its displacement as ordered, using the
UAV to assist in maintaining contact with the threat force. A Troop’s
XO coordinates battle handover with 2nd Battalion’s recce platoon.
The troop conducts battle handover at PL BRIDLE at 0630. (Refer to
Figure 4-7.)
4-23
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 4-7. Battle Handover and Displacement
4-75. The remainder of the squadron maintains its screen. Once

battle handover is complete, the squadron commander pushes the
UAV back out to NAI 5 to monitor for possible follow-on forces.
Finally, the squadron commander prepares and sends a detailed
report to the brigade commander based on the contact reports and
the actions of the squadron.
MOVING SCREEN
4-76. Given the nature of US Army doctrine and the capabilities of
the brigade, the majority of the operations undertaken will be
offensive, usually operating over extended distances. The same
planning considerations discussed above apply to a moving screen.
Emphasis may shift since the main body is moving. The squadron
may be required to conduct moving flank screens, and potentially
screen the rear of the brigade as it attacks. Screening the rear of a
moving force is essentially the same as a stationary screen. As the
protected force moves, the squadron occupies a series of successive
screens. Movement is regulated by the requirement to maintain the
time and distance factors desired by the main body commander.
UAVs or sensors may assume the screen during movement of ground
troops, or work to extend the areas of coverage.
4-77. The moving flank screen poses additional considerations. The
width of the screen sector is not as important as the force being
protected and the threat avenues of approach that might affect the
main body’s movement. The squadron screens from the front of the
lead combat element of the main body to the rear of the protected
4-24
elements (excluding front and rear security forces). The combat trains
moves with the squadron, and the field trains moves with the brigade
support battalion (BSB) in the main body.
4-78. There are three basic techniques for occupying the screen.
The technique, or combination of techniques, is determined by the
threat situation and the knowledge available on the threat, the
brigade commander’s intent, and the speed that the main body is
moving.
4-79. In the first technique, the squadron crosses the line of
departure (LD) separately from the main body and conducts a tactical
road march along a route of advance parallel to the main body. Scout
platoons occupy OPs as they reach them. This is the fastest but least
secure technique. UAVs are well suited to maintain contact with the
main body and to perform reconnaissance forward of the squadron.
Sensors can also occupy OPs and provide long-range surveillance of
threat avenues of approach. This technique is appropriate when the
main body is moving very quickly, the LD is not a line of contact, or
IPB indicates threat contact is not likely in the area through which
the squadron is moving.
4-80. In the second technique, the squadron crosses the LD
separately from the main body and conducts a zone reconnaissance
forward. Screen positions are occupied as they are reached. This
technique is slower, but provides better security to the squadron.
This technique is appropriate when the main body is moving slower,
the LD is not a line of contact, or IPB indicates threat contact is
possible in the squadron area.
4-81. In the third technique, the squadron crosses the LD with the
main body and conducts a zone reconnaissance out to the screen.
This technique provides the most security for the squadron and main
body, but requires more time. This technique is appropriate when the
main body is moving slowly, the LD is the line of contact, or the
threat situation is vague or expected.
4-82. These three methods are summed up in Figure 4-8 below.
Technique Threat Situation Tempo Line of Departure

One Not likely Rapid Separate from main body
Two Possible Moderate Separate from main body, zone

reconnaissance forward
Three Expected/Vague Slow With main body
Figure 4-8. Methods of Occupying the Screen
4-83. Because the squadron moves in one direction and orients in

another, C2 is challenging. Control measures must facilitate both
orientations. For example, PLs serve as on-order troop boundaries
and do not divide avenues of approach into the flank of the main
body. The squadron plans not only for the advance and initial screen
but also for a screen in depth back to the main body.
4-25
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
4-84. Movement along the screen is determined by the speed of the

main body, distance to the objective, and the threat situation.
Squadron movement centers on a designated route of advance. This
route is parallel to the axis of advance of the protected force and
large enough to accommodate rapid movement of the squadron and
to facilitate occupation of the screen. The route must be kept clear to
ensure rapid movement of the troop’s combat support (CS), CSS, and
C2 assets. The support elements should remain off the main route
unless moving, or travel on alternate routes in depth. Four basic
methods of movement may be used by both ground and aerial
reconnaissance assets (see Figure 4-9):
• Successive bounds.
• Alternate bounds by individual OPs.
• Alternate bounds by subordinate units (platoons or
troops).
• Continuous marching.
METHOD CONSIDERATIONS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

Successive Bounds Main body slow; By Most secure; Maintain Slowest method; Less
platoon or troop; maximum surveillance; secure during
Contact possible; Maintain unit integrity. simultaneous move;
Simultaneously or in may leave temporary
succession; Air screen gaps.
during ground move.
Alternate Bounds by Main body faster; By Very secure; Maintain Slow; Disrupt unit
OPs platoon or troop; maximum surveillance. integrity.
Contact possible;
Bound rear to front.
Alternate Bounds by Main body faster; By Fast; Good surveillance; May leave temporary
Units platoon or troop; Maintain unit integrity. gaps.
Contact possible;
Bound rear to front.
Continuous Marching Very fast main body; Fast; Maintain unit Least secure.
Perform as route integrity.
reconnaissance;
Contact not likely; Air
screen on flank.
Figure 4-9. Methods of Screen Movement
LIMITED VISIBILITY
4-85. Limited visibility conditions often occur during screen
missions. The squadron and troop commanders accommodate the
screen to limited visibility conditions as they occur. FBCB2,
enhanced night vision devices (NVD), and target acquisition systems
reduce the impact of limited visibility conditions, but the screen must
never be left with gaps when aircraft cannot fly or scouts cannot
observe. Ground OPs can be adjusted; night and thermal observation
devices employed; electronic surveillance devices and forward looking
infrared radar (FLIR) activated; and trip flares, sensors, and OPs
placed along dismounted avenues of approach. Depth in the screen
4-26
can facilitate acquisition of threat forces that may elude forward

elements. Patrols are closely coordinated to prevent misidentification
and incidents of fratricide. Rigorous sound and light discipline at
night prevents compromise and bypass of OPs by threat elements.
Although not preferred, indirect illumination is always planned as a
contingency.
SECTION III – AREA AND HIGH-VALUE ASSET SECURITY
4-86. Area security is a form of security that includes

reconnaissance and security of designated personnel, airfields, unit
convoys, facilities, main supply routes, lines of communications,
equipment, and critical points. Area security operations are
conducted to deny the threat the ability to influence friendly actions
in a specific area or to deny the threat use of an area for its own
purposes. This may entail occupying and establishing a 360-degree
perimeter around the area being secured, or taking actions to destroy
threat forces already present. The area to be secured may range from
specific points (bridges, defiles) to areas such as terrain features
(ridgelines, hills) to large population centers and adjacent areas. Area
security requires a variety of supporting operations that include
reconnaissance, security, defensive, offensive, stability, and support
tasks. An area security mission is usually conducted in an SSC
environment supporting stability operations and support operations,
and the squadron normally requires augmentation.
4-87. The squadron may conduct or task subordinate units to
conduct the following in support of squadron area security:
• Area, route, zone reconnaissance.
• Screen.
• Offense and defense tasks (within capability).
• Convoy security.
• High-value asset security.
NOTE: The squadron relies on the brigade to provide combat assets to perform offense
and defense actions if the threat situation dictates.
4-88. The squadron may conduct the following additional tasks in

stability operations and support operations:
• Liaison/negotiation.
• Joint military (civilian) commission meeting.
• Compliance inspections.
• Support presence operation (support troop/platoon
checkpoints, presence patrols, etc.).
• Deliver supplies or render humanitarian aid.
• React to civil disturbance.
• Plan/react to media.
4-27
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: See Appendix D for a more detailed discussion of troop missions supporting
stability operations and support operations.
4-89. An area security force neutralizes or defeats threat operations

in a specified area. It operates in an area delineated by the
headquarters assigning the area security mission. It screens,
reconnoiters, attacks, defends, and delays as necessary to
accomplish its mission. Area security operations may be offensive or
defensive in nature, focusing on the threat, the force being protected,
or a combination of the two. Commanders may balance the level of
security measures with the type and level of threat posed in the
specific area; however, all-around security is essential.
4-90. When conducting an area security mission, the area security
force conducts reconnaissance and security operations and attacks,
defends, and delays as necessary to accomplish its mission. The
recce troops prevent threat ground reconnaissance elements from
directly observing friendly activities within the area being secured.
They prevent threat ground maneuver forces from penetrating those
defensive perimeters established by the commander. The commander
can have his elements employ a variety of techniques such as OPs,
battle positions, ambushes, and combat outposts to accomplish this
security mission. His reserve enables him to react to unforeseen
contingencies. With the intelligence acquisition capability available,
the squadron will have the potential to be more offensive oriented,
conducting ambushes and preemptive strikes with greater precision
to maintain security, if such actions are within the brigade
commander’s intent and appropriate to the overall situation.
4-91. METT-TC determines the augmentation the squadron might
need in executing the mission. Particular consideration should be
given to the need for maneuver forces, engineers, and artillery.
Augmentation from the brigade can include an antiarmor platoon or
company, an MGS platoon, a recce platoon, a sniper squad(s),
infantry company, or an engineer platoon. The squadron can expect
tanks, Bradleys, and attack aviation when supporting heavy or light
divisions.
4-92. Proper IPB is vital to provide adequate security for the
assigned area. The factors of METT-TC and unit capability will
determine specific unit missions. Factors are as follows:
• The natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.
• Existing roads and waterways for military lines of
communication and civilian commerce.
• The control of land and water areas and avenues of
approach surrounding the area to be secured, extending
to a range beyond that of threat artillery, rockets, and
mortars.
• The control of airspace.
• The proximity to critical sites such as airfields, power
generation plants, and civic buildings.
4-28
4-93. Due to the possibility of commanders tying their forces to

fixed installations or sites, these types of security missions may
become defensive in nature. This must be carefully balanced with the
need for offensive action. Early warning of threat activity is
paramount in the conduct of area security missions and provides the
commander with time to react to any threat. Maximum use of
external collection assets (refer to Chapter 6) can reduce the
requirements placed on the squadron’s assets. Proper ISR planning,
coupled with dismounted/mounted patrols and aerial
reconnaissance, is key to successful operations.
4-94. A perimeter is established when a unit must secure an area
where the defense is not tied into an adjacent unit. Perimeters vary
in shape, depending on METT-TC. If the commander determines the
most probable direction of threat attack, he may weight that part of
the perimeter to cover that approach. The perimeter shape conforms
to the terrain features that best use observation and fields of fire.
4-95. Perimeters are divided into troop/platoon sectors with
boundaries and contact points. Mutual support and coordination
between defensive elements require careful planning, positioning,
and coordination due to the circular aspects of the perimeter. A
screen is established, integrating OPs, ground-based sensors (GBS),
UAVs, and patrols. MGS and antiarmor weapons systems are placed
to orient on high-speed avenues of approach. Javelin teams are best
employed in armor-restrictive terrain. UAVs and GBSs provide ISR
capabilities at extended distances from the perimeter. Figure 4-10
depicts a squadron conducting an area security of an urban area.
4-29
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 4-10. Squadron Conducting Area Security
4-96. Depth is provided through the use of subsequent fighting

positions and mobile reserves. The mobility and firepower of armored
forces will allow for rapid traverse of large areas and the ability to
quickly mass and destroy any threat penetration. The size of the
reserve depends on the tactical situation and forces available.
Immediate reaction to intelligence information or any type of attack is
vital. This reaction to accurate and timely intelligence may permit
destruction of threat elements prior to an attack on the area being
secured. Reaction operations or commitment of the reserve is simple,
planned, and rehearsed under all the employment conditions
possible.
4-97. CS and CSS elements may support from within the area being
secured or from another location, depending on the mission and
status of the unit, the type of transport available, the weather, and
the terrain.
SECURITY IV – ROUTE SECURITY
4-98. The squadron conducts route security missions to prevent

threat ground maneuver forces or unconventional forces from coming
within direct fire range of the protected route. Route security
4-30
missions are increasingly important and common, given the brigade’s

extended lines of communication and the increasing frequency that
units are executing peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions.
The squadron executes this mission as part of battlefield circulation
and will require augmentation during SCC or MTW conflicts. A route
security force operates on and to the flanks of a designated route.
Route security operations are defensive in nature and, unlike guard
operations, are terrain-oriented. A route security force prevents a
threat force from impeding, harassing, containing, seizing, or
destroying traffic along the route. To accomplish this task, the force
will perform the following functions:
• Conduct continuous mounted and dismounted
reconnaissance of the route and key locations along the
route to ensure the route is trafficable.
• Conduct presence patrols (refer to Appendix D).
• Conduct sweeps of the route at irregular intervals to
prevent emplacement of threat mines along the route.
• Identify sections of the route to search suspected threat
locations.
• Establish roadblocks/checkpoints along the route and
lateral routes to stop and search vehicles and persons on
the route and those entering the route.
• Occupy key locations and terrain along or near the route.
If possible, establish a screen oriented to prevent threat
direct fire weapons and observation from influencing the
route.
• Aggressively conduct ground and aerial
patrols/surveillance to maintain route security.
• Establish OPs (covert/overt) or ambushes at critical points
to watch for threat activity.
4-99. While route security is a mission commonly associated with

stability operations, support operations, and SSC conflicts, it may be
executed under MTW conditions as well. The situation determines
the degree of visibility the commander presents in the security
operation. In some situations, being highly visible in the execution of
the mission will add to the effectiveness of the operation. In other
situations, stealth and low-profile are essential for both force
protection and mission success. Subordinate recce troops may
conduct the following missions:
• Screen.
• Area, route, and zone reconnaissance.
• Compliance inspections.
• Establish traffic control points.
• Defend.
• Hasty attack.
4-31
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
4-100. The surveillance troop in the squadron may be task organized

to the recce troops or may conduct the following missions:
• Screen.
• Zone/area route reconnaissance.
4-101. Threat forces may try to sever supply routes and lines of
communication by various methods. Roads, waterways, and railways
may be mined; ambush sites can be located adjacent to the route
being secured; or bridges and tunnels can be destroyed by
demolitions. Due to the nature of this mission, very long routes may
be extremely difficult to secure; however, measures can be enforced
to reduce the effect of threat forces. Figure 4-11 depicts a squadron
conducting a route security mission.
4-102. Patrolling the route, mounted and/or dismounted, increases
the chances of detecting threat forces before they can effectively
emplace mines or demolitions, or establish ambushes or roadblocks.
Patrolling is performed regularly, but not in an established routine
manner. This precludes possible ambushes and helps detect threat
forces. Patrols can be covert or overt (used as a demonstration of
force or presence patrol) to deter threat actions. Patrols must be
aware of probable ambush sites and choke points where roadblocks
or mines and demolitions would be effective. Personnel conducting
patrols must be trained to detect mines and booby traps.
4-103. Patrols are organized with enough combat power to survive
initial threat contact. Recent threat activity provides guidance on the
organization of patrols. Patrols can be augmented with combat
engineers, infantry (both light and mechanized forces), military
police, or other assets, when available, to increase their combat
capability. Usually, lack of combat power prohibits a patrol’s ability
to deal with large threat forces; therefore, indirect fire plans and air
attack assets, when available, should be integrated into the patrol
plan.
4-32
Figure 4-11. Squadron Conducting Route Security
4-104. Roadblocks, checkpoints, and guard posts may be placed at

crucial choke points (such as bridges and tunnels) to effectively
prevent acts of sabotage to keep the route open and available to
friendly forces. Use the procedures below, as appropriate, to aid in
this effort.
• Stop and search vehicles and persons before they proceed.
• Do not allow vehicles to stop on or under bridges or in

tunnels.
• Maintain constant surveillance over critical checkpoints at
night by use of night vision equipment, integrating GSRs,
remote sensors, and UAVs to cover the immediate and
surrounding areas.
• Mine indirect approaches to sensitive areas to help lessen
the chances of a ground attack.
• Plan artillery fires to assist in defeating threat attempts to
influence the critical areas.
• Construct bunkers to protect OPs and to provide positions
from which to fight until reinforced.
4-33
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
4-105. UAVs can assist in securing the route by conducting aerial

reconnaissance, effectively covering large areas in a short time.
Additionally, UAVs can assist in maintaining the screen or perimeter
securing the route. Upon securing the route, sensors can be used in
surveillance of key avenues of approach or areas that do not require
continuous surveillance by scouts. This reduces the manpower and
logistical requirements on the squadron. Augmentation, such as
assault gun platoon or motorized infantry platoon/company, can be
used as a quick reaction force (QRF) to destroy threat ground forces
or to cut off threat escape routes.
4-106. Engineers help keep the route open and assist in locating and
clearing mines, clearing terrain at potential ambush sites, and
repairing damage to roads and trails. Engineers can also assist in
preparing defensive systems around critical areas and choke points.
SECURITY V – CONVOY SECURITY
4-107. Convoy security operations are conducted when insufficient

friendly forces are available to continuously secure lines of
communication in an AO. They may also be conducted in
conjunction with route security operations. A convoy security force
operates to the front, flanks, and rear of a convoy element moving
along a designated route. Convoy security operations are offensive in
nature and orient on the force being protected. A convoy security
mission has certain critical tasks that guide planning and execution.
To protect a convoy, the security force must accomplish the following
critical tasks:
• Reconnoiter the route the convoy will travel.
• Clear the route of obstacles or positions from which the
threat could influence movement along the route.
• Provide early warning and prevent the threat from
impeding, harassing, containing, seizing, or destroying the
convoy.
4-108. Convoy security operations are performed as a minimum by a

recce troop. Recce troops are organized to execute the basic
requirements of protecting a convoy due to the number of platoons in
the troop and the ability to use squadron assets within the
surveillance troop. The recce troop may be augmented with
surveillance troop assets, sensors, MGS platoons, engineers, and/or
military police. The convoy security force is organized into three or
four elements (see Figure 4-12):
• Reconnaissance element. The reconnaissance element
performs tasks associated with zone and route
reconnaissance forward of the convoy. It may perform
duties of the screen element.
4-34
• Screen element. The screen element provides early

warning and security to the convoy’s flanks and rear. It
may also perform duties of the reconnaissance element.
• Escort element. The escort element provides close-in
protection to the convoy. It may also provide a reaction
force to assist in repelling or destroying threat contact.
• Reaction force. Provides firepower and support to the
elements above to assist in developing the situation or
conducting a hasty attack. May also perform duties of the
escort element.
Figure 4-12. Squadron Conducting Convoy Security
4-109. Commanders plan and execute all movements of troops and

supplies as tactical operations. Convoy security operations are
conducted in high-risk areas that are not controlled by friendly
forces, medium risk areas where friendly forces operate but have
been frequented by unconventional forces, and low risk areas where
the friendly forces have control of the area. Due to the inherent
dangers of convoy operations, emphasis is on extensive security
measures. These security measures include the following:
• Secrecy when planning and disseminating orders, strict
noise and light discipline during movement, and varying
routes and schedules.
• Coordination with fire or aerial support units to ensure an
understanding of how that support is used to assist the
movement, both in enforcing preventive measures and in
conducting close, continuous support of combat
operations.
• Maneuver for counter ambush actions. This includes
contingency plans for immediate actions against an
ambush and use of formations, which allow part of the
4-35
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
column to be in position to maneuver against an ambush

force.
• Communications and coordination with supporting units
and units along the route, adjacent host-nation forces,
and higher headquarters, to include airborne radio relay.
• Coordination with the supported unit moving in the
formation to include C2, locations for leaders,
communications, medical support, and weapons systems.
• Questions asked of the local civilians along the movement
route for intelligence information, to include possible
threat ambush sites.
4-110. Convoy security missions generate unique requirements that

the commander and staff must take into account when formulating a
plan. The convoy security commander and his subordinates are
briefed on the latest information regarding the threat situation and
the area through which the convoy will pass. The commander
formulates his plans and issues his orders, to include commander’s
intent, assigning troops an element task (reconnaissance, screen,
escort, reaction), the movement formation, intervals between
echelons and vehicles, rate of travel, and detailed plans for actions
on contact. Immediate action drills must be identified and rehearsed
prior to movement and executed in case of contact (i.e., threat
ambush, obstacle, react to indirect fire).
4-111. A QRF may be maintained by the higher headquarters
command. The QRF will remain at readiness condition (REDCON) 1,
monitoring the progress of the convoy and ready to respond if the
convoy encounters a threat unit that is greater than the security
element’s capability. Threat forces must be convinced that ambushes
will produce a fast, relentless, hard-hitting response. The reaction
forces may have to be moved forward so they can respond quickly if
the convoy is moving a long distance.
4-112. Communications are vital to the success of movement.
Leaders plan FM and digital communications with convoy elements
and population centers in the areas along the route of movement to
ensure availability of support assets. Visual and sound signals are
prearranged. These signals include colored smoke, identification
panels, and whistles or horn signals. While limited, these
communications means are effective when prearranged signals and
responses are understood and rehearsed.
4-113. Units must ensure artillery and mortar support is planned to
support the entire route of movement. Units may have mortars
integrated into the escort element itself, or they may have indirect fire
support provided by artillery elements that are positioned along the
route. Coordination with effects cells that can provide fire along the
route of movement ensures that fire support teams (FIST) can enter
the FM voice or digital fire direction center (FDC) net, send routine
location reports, and request and adjust fires. Leaders must
coordinate call signs, frequencies, areas of employment, schedules of
movement, and target numbers prior to the convoy movement.
4-36
4-114. The surveillance troop can participate in the convoy security

operation by screening the convoy movement as the element moves
along the route of march with UAVs and by conducting surveillance
of lateral avenues of approach that may affect the convoy movement.
4-115. Air defense of the convoy must be addressed if an air threat is
possible. The convoy elements should review small arms air defense
procedures and establish orientation sectors. Air defense
reinforcements should be orchestrated into the movement and
defense plan. If the route falls under an existing air defense
umbrella, both short-range air defense (SHORAD) and high-to-
medium-altitude air defense (HIMAD), the squadron staff, along with
the controlling air defense headquarters, should make the
appropriate coordination.
4-116. Convoy security operations in an urban environment or built-
up area require different emphasis and techniques than those in
rural areas. The population density and characteristics of the area
may require the use of non-lethal weapons and the careful
application of lethal weapons. When applying minimum-essential
force to minimize loss of life and destruction of property, leaders
must conduct detailed planning, coordination, and control. Convoys,
whenever possible, should move through populated areas during
times that these areas are least congested and therefore less
dangerous to the security of the convoy. Convoy operations may
require assistance from military or local police and other government
agencies to secure the route prior to the convoy entering the built-up
area (see Chapter 7).
4-117. The squadron S4 and unit commanders must carefully plan
for CSS in convoy security operations. Fuel and maintenance
elements should be included in the convoy itself or prepositioned in
secure areas along the route. A detailed precombat inspection must
be performed to ensure that vehicles are full of fuel, preventive
maintenance checks and services (PMCS) has been performed, and
potential maintenance problems are eliminated before the convoy
starts movement. Casualty evacuation must be planned in detail
along the entire movement route. Coordination must occur and be
maintained between the convoy security force; the squadron aid
station; the squadron CP; the combat trains CP (CTCP), when
deployed; and designated units along the route to ensure immediate
medical support is available. Due to the possibility of operating over
extended distances from the squadron aid station, aero-medical
evacuation is the preferred means of evacuation and must be
planned and rehearsed in detail.
4-37
Chapter 5
Enabling Operations
Enabling operations are CONTENTS
specialized missions Movement ...............................................................5-2
Administrative Movement .................................5-2
that need to be planned Tactical Movement ............................................5-2
and/or conducted in Planning Considerations ..................................5-4
Assembly Areas .....................................................5-8
conjunction with on- Site Selection .....................................................5-9
going or future combat Quartering Party ................................................5-10
Occupation.........................................................5-11
operations to achieve or Security ..............................................................5-12
sustain tactical advan- Internal Activity..................................................5-12
tage. The fluid nature Departure............................................................5-12
Infiltration/Exfiltration ...........................................5-12
of the modern battle- Infiltration Planning...........................................5-12
field increases the Exfiltration Planning..........................................5-16
Linkup Operations .................................................5-17
frequency that the Forms of Linkup ................................................5-18
squadron is required to Planning .............................................................5-20
Preparation.........................................................5-22
plan and execute other Execution ...........................................................5-23
tactical operations. Relief Operations...................................................5-23
Planning .............................................................5-24
Digitization increases Exchange of Plans and Liaison Personnel .....5-25
the situational under- Sequence of Relief ............................................5-25
Passage of Command .......................................5-25
standing (SU) of leaders Reconnaissance ................................................5-25
at all levels during Security ..............................................................5-26
Movement Control .............................................5-26
these complex and Methods of Relief in Place ................................5-26
often decentralized Retrograde Operations .........................................5-27
Requirements of Retrograde Operations ........5-28
operations. This Forms of Retrograde Operations .....................5-29
chapter addresses Battle Handover and Passage of Lines ...............5-32
Battle Handover: Squadron and Above ...........5-33
several com-bat Battle Handover: Squadron and Below ...........5-34
operations that the Passage of Lines ...............................................5-34
NBC Defensive Operations ...................................5-40
squadron may be NBC Reconnaissance .......................................5-40
required to perform. Principles ...........................................................5-42
Actions Before, During, and After
These operations are an NBC Attack................................................5-44
considered a routine Use of Smoke and Obscurants ........................5-47
River Crossing Operations ...................................5-48
part of the combat Reconnaissance ................................................5-49
operations discussed in Crossing .............................................................5-50
Fire Support .......................................................5-50
preceding chapters; Follow-on Forces...............................................5-51
however, they are no Obstacle Breaching Operations ...........................5-51
Breaching Fundamentals..................................5-52
less important. Breaching Organization ....................................5-54
Operations in a Noncontiguous Environment ....5-58
5-1
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
SECTION I – MOVEMENT
5-1. Movement across the battlefield can be complex to execute

when considering heavy route congestion, battlefield debris, limited
route priority, converging forces, crossing unit boundaries, impassable
routes, threat ground or air interdiction, and various types of civilian
noncombatants. Army doctrine requires units to rapidly move on the
battlefield to concentrate combat power when and where needed. In a
noncontiguous environment, movement planning is paramount to safe
and successful repositioning of personnel and equipment from one
portion of the area of responsibility (AOR) to another. The successful
accomplishment of a mission is directly related to a unit’s ability to get
to specified locations on the battlefield, on time, and as a cohesive
unit.
5-2. This section discusses organizing and controlling movement of
the squadron. Movement involves the planning, routing, scheduling,
and control of unit movement over lines of communication. Movements
are classified as administrative or tactical.
ADMINISTRATIVE MOVEMENT
5-3. Administrative movements occur in the communications zone
to deploy or reposition forces. The S4 is responsible for planning these
movements. Administrative movements are normally controlled closely
by, and coordinated with, a movement control center responsible for
the communications zone. Administrative movement includes
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) activities
as a part of the brigade’s deployment into an area of operations (AO).
For discussion of deployment and RSOI, refer to Appendix E and FM 4-
01.8
[FM 100-17-3].
5-4. Movements are normally conducted as road marches. A road
march is characterized by the following factors:
• Unit relocation, when threat contact is not expected.
• Prescribed rates of march and intervals.
• Rapid movement.
• Security.
TACTICAL MOVEMENT
5-5. Tactical movement is the movement or maneuver to gain
contact with the threat or movement during which contact is
anticipated. In a tactical movement, elements are organized to facilitate
combat. Movement in the combat zone of corps or below is considered
tactical, as is movement in and around the AOR while conducting
stability or support operations. This movement is planned by the
G3/S3 and often precedes a combat operation. In rear areas these
movements are also coordinated with movement control centers. A
5-2
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 5 – Enabling Operations
higher degree of security is maintained during tactical movement

because of the increased risk of threat attack.
5-6. Movement may also be conducted by air, rail, or water. For

discussion of these means, see the references listed below.
• Air movement: FM 4-01.1 [FM 55-9] and FM 4-01.51
[FM 55-21].
• Air assault: FM 3-18.12 [FM 90-4]; also discussed in
detail in Chapter 6.
• Rail movement: FM 4-01.41 [FM 55-20].
• Water movement: FM 4-01.011 [FM 55-65].
TACTICAL ROADMARCH
Organization
5-7. Successful movements are well organized. The organization of
the unit for a road march is suited for inclusion in the unit standing
operating procedures (SOP) to delineate tasks and responsibilities.
Movement control is a key consideration in planning. The commander
and staff are involved in planning, supervising, and refining execution
of the movement. Both the commander and S3, however, will also be
concerned with plans for the tactical commitment of the unit once the
march objective is reached. The details of movement planning and
supervision are largely the responsibility of the XO who serves as the
movement control officer.
5-8. Units organize into march columns to conduct movement. A
march column includes all elements of a force using the same route for
a single movement under the control of a single commander. Whenever
possible, a unit marches in multiple columns over multiple routes to
reduce closing time. A large column may be composed of a number of
subdivisions, each under the control of a subordinate commander.
March columns are composed of four elements:
• Reconnaissance party.
• Quartering party.
• Main body.
• Trail party.
5-9. Reconnaissance Party. The reconnaissance party is normally

a reconnaissance (recce) platoon with operationally controlled (OPCON)
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) that are used prior to the start point of
the reconnaissance to gather information along the route of march and
surrounding terrain. This reconnaissance is used to refine the road
march plan. UAVs can also be used in conjunction with the
reconnaissance party to provide for early warning or increase the
tempo of the reconnaissance. The reconnaissance party moves out as
early as possible to reconnoiter the assigned route or routes and any
designated holding areas along the route. The reconnaissance party is
not considered part of the main body and moves by infiltration. The
designated reconnaissance party may be reinforced with engineers to
5-3
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
assist in minor mobility tasks or antitank/mobile gun system (MGS)

assets, dependent on the expected threat. The party is under the
control of the movement control officer. The movement control officer
instructs the reconnaissance party on information required, report
times, and mission upon completion of the reconnaissance.
5-10. The movement control officer must coordinate bypasses located
by the scouts as necessary. The reconnaissance party’s primary tasks
are—
• Determine route trafficability.
• Identify possible choke points.
• Identify and mark bypasses around obstacles; clear within
capabilities.
• Systematically report reconnaissance progress per unit
SOP.
• Establish traffic control points, as required.
5-11. Quartering Party. The quartering party is normally a

composite squadron organization consisting of the quartering parties of
the troops. The quartering party is used if the squadron is going to
occupy an assembly area upon arrival at the march destination. An
assembly area is often used after long marches to provide time for the
squadron to resupply, perform maintenance, and complete
preparations for the subsequent mission. Unit first sergeants (1SG)
normally control troop quartering parties, and the command sergeant
major (CSM) controls the squadron quartering party. En route refuel
on the move (ROM) may be required for a long march. Vehicles
comprising these points can move with the quartering party and drop
off along the route at holding areas or halt locations. The quartering
party normally follows the reconnaissance party and also moves by
infiltration. Paragraphs 5-28 through 5-30 of this chapter describe
quartering parties in more detail.
5-12. Main Body. The main body is composed of the bulk of the
squadron organized into serials and march units. A serial is a major
subdivision of a march column organized under a single commander
for planning, regulation, and control. The squadron is normally
considered a serial, even if moving by itself. A march unit is a
subdivision of a serial and is normally a platoon- or troop-size unit. It
moves and halts under the control of a single commander using voice,
visual signals, or digital communications. March units move as task
organized for the follow-on mission whenever possible.
5-13. Trail Party. The trail party is the last march unit in the
squadron serial. It is composed of elements of the combat trains under
the squadron maintenance officer. The trail party is prepared to
conduct repair and recovery of vehicles, medical aid and evacuation,
and unscheduled refueling. If a vehicle cannot be repaired or towed, it
is moved off the route and reported. The crew remains with the vehicle
with sufficient food and water. The squadron must subsequently
return to recover or coordinate for another unit to recover the vehicle.
Vehicles and soldiers are not abandoned along the route.
5-4
5-14. Movement is considered as either deliberate or hasty.
Deliberate movement occurs when plenty of time is available to plan
and prepare, resulting in a detailed and well-coordinated plan. This
typifies administrative movements or long tactical movements. Hasty
movement occurs when time is short. This typifies tactical movements,
often when the squadron is in receipt of a fragmentary order (FRAGO)
for a combat operation. Hasty movement normally does not involve
crossing corps, division, joint task force or national boundaries,
although the squadron can find itself moving across the parent unit
AO, especially in a noncontiguous/nonlinear environment.
5-15. Movement planning is heavily determined by backwards
planning. The mission following the movement drives the planning,
which includes establishment of movement completion times, pass
times, start point times, and organization of the unit for the march.
5-16. The march discipline necessary to execute a road march with
routine precision can only be attained by strict adherence to SOP. This
is particularly true for hasty movements. The unit SOP must provide
for the following:
• Reconnaissance party.
• March rate factors.
• Vehicle intervals.
• March unit gaps.
• March unit organization and order.
• Actions at halts.
• Security.
• Contingency plans for vehicle breakdowns, breaks in
columns, and lost vehicles.
• Communications.
• Trail party.
• Control measures.
• Road march tables and movement planning guides.
5-17. Planning for a road march is conducted like any other mission.
As the XO develops the concept he considers the following:
• Time available.
• Distance of the move.
• Current situation.
• Follow-on mission.
• Availability and condition of routes.
• Squadron task organization.
5-5
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Types, numbers, and characteristics of vehicles to move.

• Risk assessment/management.
5-18. When possible, road marches are conducted at night to reduce

vulnerability. Planning for night or limited visibility moves must
consider the varying capabilities of night observation equipment. Radio
listening silence is normally imposed.
5-19. Relationships between time and distance are the basis for
march planning. The planner must determine how far the column is to
travel (distance) and how long it will take to make the move (time). He
must know the space the column will occupy (length of column) on the
route as well as the time it will take to pass a point from the beginning
to the end of the column (pass time). He must also include in his
computations the safety factor of distance (road gap) or time (time gap)
that must separate march columns and their elements. Each term
used for distance has a corresponding term for time (See Tables 5-1, 5-
2, and 5-3).
Table 5-1. Length of Vehicle March Column

4 1 MU 5 MU 6 MU 7 MU 8 MU
VPK INTERVAL
VEHICLES 25 VEH 125 VEH 150 VEH 175 VEH 200 VEH
40 15 m 85 m 925 m 4.6 km 5.6 km 6.5 km 7.4 km
20 40 m 160 m 1.6 km 7.8 km 9.3 km 10.6 km 12.4 km
18 50 m 190 m 1.8 km 9.0 km 10.9 km 12.6 km 14.4 km
10 100 m 340 m 3.0 km 15.3 km 18.3 km 21.6 km 24.4 km
5 200 m 640 m 5.6 km 27.8 km 33.3 km 38.9 km 44.4 km
NOTE: Assumes one route, 10 m length per vehicle, one 200 m gap per movement unit (MU), and 25
vehicles per MU.
Table 5-2. Movement Conversion Table
MOVEMENT RATES (TIMES IN MINUTES)

DISTANCE
(km/h) 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000
RATE OF ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
MARCH
60 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
50 1.2 2.4 3.6 4.8 6 7.2 8.4 9.6 10.8 12
40 1.5 3 4.5 6 7.5 9 10.5 12 13.5 15
30 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
25 2.4 4.8 7.2 9.6 12 14.4 18.8 19.2 21.6 24
20 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
15 4 8 12 16 20 27 2/ 32 36 40
10 6 12 18 24 30 36 72 48 54 60
5 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120
MOVEMENT RATES REDUCED TO MINUTES
KILOMETERS PER
METERS PER MINUTE MILES PER HOUR KNOTS FEET PER SECOND
HOUR
60 1,000 38 33 55
50 830 31 27 46
40 666 25 27 46
30 500 19 16 28
5-6
25 416 16 13 23
20 333 13 11 18
15 250 9 8 14
10 164 6 5 9
5 83 3 3 5
1 16 .6 .5 1
5-7
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Table 5-3. Vehicle Pass Times
HEAVY DIVISION ON ONE ROUTE

RATE COLUMN LENGTH PASS TIME
40 kmph 301 km 7 hrs, 32 min
HEAVY DIVISION ON THREE ROUTES

RT 1: 40 kmph 136 km 3 hrs, 24 min
NOTE: Routes 1 and 2 serials (1 Bde, Div arty)
Routes 2 and 3 serials (1 Bde, Avn Bde, DISCOM)
BRIGADE ON ONE ROUTE (8 MU)

40 kmph 70 km 1 hr, 45 min
DIVARTY SERIAL ON ONE ROUTE (6 MU)
AVN BRIGADE OR DISCOM SERIAL ON ONE ROUTE (4 MU)
5-20. It is not always possible to conduct deliberate planning prior to

executing a unit move. The squadron must be able to plan and execute
a move based on verbal orders and adherence to SOP. A hasty
movement may reduce the opportunities for reconnaissance and
quartering party actions. The unit may pass through an attack position
instead of moving to an assembly area. The XO’s planning time is
driven by the mission execution time. He can quickly estimate the
movement time by using a movement planning guide and distance of
the move. Backward planning determines how much time is available
for planning and preparation for the move.
5-21. The movement planning guide is a valuable tool to use when
standardized movement factors must be altered to meet mission
requirements. The squadron prepares a series of tables for subordinate
march units, both organic and normal attachments. These tables
reflect the most common task organization to provide a ready
reference. They provide pass times based on different column intervals,
5-8
rates of march, and time gaps. These three variables provide the most
flexibility in adjusting movement times.
SECTION II – ASSEMBLY AREAS
5-22. An assembly area is a location in which a force prepares or

regroups for further action. As a rule it is secure from threat
interference. Preparations can include reorganization, resupply,
planning, issuing orders, maintenance, and rest. Even though being
behind friendly lines provides a degree of security, the unit always
occupies the assembly area in a manner to defend its area. The unit
must also be at a certain level of security and preparedness to execute
future missions (readiness condition [REDCON]/threat condition
[THREATCON] levels). See Table 5-4 for REDCON levels.
5-23. The nature of any particular assembly area is a reflection of the
tactical situation in which it occurs. Occupation may be hasty or
deliberate, of long or short duration. Occupation can occur after a long
move to complete preparations for combat. It can be very hasty after a
passage of lines to regroup or upon early entry into a theater of
operations. Occupation may be directed by a higher commander or
determined by the unit commander. Location and dimensions of the
area can also be dictated or at the commander’s discretion. All
assembly areas should be considered tactical assembly areas.
Table 5-4. Readiness Condition Level
REDCON LEVELS
LEVEL PREPAREDNESS SECURITY
• Ready to move on order
• All personnel alert 100% weapons systems
REDCON 1
• All equipment packed manned
• Vehicles loaded, engines running

• Ready to move in 15 minutes
• All personnel alert
REDCON 2 • Pull in operations and wire, take down 75% weapons systems manned
camouflage
• Vehicles started and running
• Ready to move in 30 minutes • 50% man weapons systems,
Ops, radio/phones
REDCON 3
• 50% crew/unit “stand down” for feeding
• Camo nets up
and rest and maintenance not requiring
• M8 alarm positioned and
disassembly operational
• Ready to move in 1 hour • Minimum weapons systems
manned to maintain security
• 75% of crew/unit “stand down” • Two men per troop size
REDCON 4 element conduct perimeter
patrols
• One man per vehicle on
weapon systems
5-9
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
5-24. Certain tasks are associated with planning, occupying, and

operating an assembly area. These tasks are largely a matter of SOP.
The circumstances in which the assembly area is occupied dictate to
what extent these tasks are performed. The tasks are as follows:
• Site selection.
• Occupation.
• Security.
• Internal activity.
• Departure.
SITE SELECTION
5-25. Site selection of an assembly area is governed by specific unit
requirements. The squadron can occupy one assembly area, or operate
out of separate troop/command and control (C2)/combat service
support (CSS) level assembly areas. Determination on what level
should occupy a site should include—
• The AO and squadron mission.
• The size of the area available to occupy.
• The level of threat and range of its indirect fire assets.
• The ability to secure the area.
• The operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the squadron
(multiple missions occurring simultaneously).
5-26. An assembly area should have the following characteristics:

• Concealment from air and ground observation.
• Cover from direct fire.
• Defensible positions.
• Openings for positioning UAV.
• Space for dispersion of vehicles, personnel, and
equipment.
• Good entrances and exits and adequate internal road or
trail network.
• Good drainage, slope, and soil conditions to support
vehicles, and equipment.
• Good locations for a landing zone (LZ) (see FM 3-04.113
[FM 1-113] or FM 3-04.114 [FM 1-114]).
5-27. The longer that occupation of the assembly area is planned or

anticipated, the more important these characteristics become. Figure
5-1 shows the layout of a consolidated squadron assembly area.
5-10
Figure 5-1. Consolidated Squadron Assembly Area
QUARTERING PARTY
5-28. Quartering parties are formed at troop level, and when
appropriate, at squadron level. They are a composite of subordinate
unit representatives. The squadron party also includes medics,
communications, and staff representatives. The 1SGs control troop-
level parties and the CSM controls the squadron party. The quartering
party provides for its own security.
5-29. Quartering parties have four responsibilities: reconnaissance (if
reconnaissance parties are not used), securing the area, organizing the
area, and guiding arriving units. During tactical unit movement, the
reconnaissance party can perform area reconnaissance as a follow-on
mission. The surveillance troop can deploy UAVs to perform
reconnaissance of the route to the assembly area and the assembly
area itself prior to or as part of the reconnaissance party’s operation.
The nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) platoon of the surveillance
troop can conduct NBC reconnaissance of the area in conjunction with
the quartering party prior to occupation of the assembly area by the
main body.
5-30. Area reconnaissance is performed to determine suitability of
the area. The quartering party also provides initial security of the area
until the main body arrives. The surveillance troop can assist the
quartering party secure the assembly area by conducting screening
missions with UAVs and surveillance of possible threat avenues of
approach. Organizing includes selecting and marking unit and vehicle
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
positions, improving and marking routes, and marking or removing

obstacles. Guide duties include meeting units at the release point and
leading them to positions.
OCCUPATION
5-31. A squadron assembly area can be organized by assigning
troops to sectors of the perimeter, by dispersing troops in their own
assembly area within the squadron area (as shown in Figure 5-2), or as
previously mentioned, units occupying separate assembly areas within
the AO.
NOTE: While the surveillance troop has its own assembly area, some of its assets may
be operating within another troop’s area, thus the presence and movement of
those assets must be coordinated between the troops, the S3, and the S2.
5-32. As units arrive, guides move them, without stopping, to unit

locations and vehicle positions. Organization of the area based on unit
order of march precludes congestion at the release point (see Section I
of this chapter). Once in position, units and vehicles make
adjustments. Positioning considerations are as follows:
• Dispersion and hide positions.
• Vehicles oriented/positioned to facilitate defense.
• CPs and trains centrally located for security, ease of
support, and road access.
• Mortars sited to provide fire support (recce troops).
• Communications by wire and/or messenger established
within troops and with squadron.
5-12
Figure 5-2. Squadron Assembly Areas
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SECURITY
5-33. An assembly area is not designated as a defensive position, but
the squadron or troop organizes it to detect and defeat a threat ground
attack. Security against air attack is best provided by passive
measures designed to conceal the unit from detection. Guards at all
entrances and exits control the flow of traffic. Observation posts (OP)
cover key terrain features and likely avenues of approach. Platoons
prepare fire plans and coordinate on the flanks. Patrols, sensors, and
surveillance devices augment security. Contact points for units assist
in coordination. Roads are the specific responsibility of subordinate
units. Fire support plans are prepared by the fire support team and
fire support element. Minimal use of radios reduce electronic
signature. Movement is confined to roads to preclude needless surface
disruption, leaving a visible aerial indicator. Unnecessary vehicle
movement is restricted. Noise and light discipline is strictly enforced.
REDCON level is established and adjusted based on mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and
civil considerations (METT-TC). Units must consider the location and
activities of surveillance troop assets operating within the AOR, and
coordinate with those assets for mutual security.
INTERNAL ACTIVITY
5-34. Actions in the assembly area follow SOP and requirements of
the situation. Planning, orders, resupply, reorganization, vehicle and
aircraft maintenance, weapons maintenance, and rest occur in
accordance with the established REDCON level. For pending combat
operations, precombat checks and inspections occur. For daily
operations, include conduct of stand-to per unit SOP. Reconnaissance
of routes out of the area is made to prepare for departure and initiation
of the follow-on mission.
DEPARTURE
5-35. Departing the assembly area is the first step of a mission and is
just as important as the mission itself. A progressive system of
increasing readiness, such as REDCON levels, ensures units are ready
to move when required without needlessly tiring soldiers and wasting
fuel for long waits. The assembly area is occupied with the follow-on
mission in mind to preclude congestion on departure. Routes from
subordinate unit locations are reconnoitered and timed. Subordinate
units designate a linkup point and units move to and through that
point based on their reconnaissance. Departure is usually conducted
under radio listening silence.
SECTION III – INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION
INFILTRATION PLANNING
5-36. Infiltration is a form of maneuver that entails movement
through or into an area occupied by a threat or a friendly force by
5-14
small groups or individuals at extended or irregular intervals in which

contact with the threat is avoided. The squadron infiltrates through the
AO to orient on the reconnaissance objective without having to engage
the threat or fight through prepared defenses. This form of maneuver is
slow and often accomplished under reduced visibility conditions. Aerial
reconnaissance provides additional security for the squadron by
locating threat positions and identifying routes on which to vector
ground elements to avoid threat contact. The squadron may have to
plan linkup for the entire squadron, or assist in the planning or
coordination of one or more troops conducting decentralized execution.
5-37. Infiltration is one of the most difficult missions for the
squadron to accomplish. To maximize the success of the infiltration
and enhance scout survivability, detailed knowledge of the terrain and
up-to-date information about the threat must be available. A detailed
terrain analysis can be conducted with the brigade S2 using the
capabilities of All Source Analysis System (ASAS), Digital Topographic
Support System (DTSS), and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and
Below (FBCB2). The analysis and control team (ACT) and ASAS
databases can provide details related to threat locations and
dispositions during infiltration planning, and UAVs can conduct
reconnaissance flights to support both planning and execution.
Passage of lines should be planned and incorporated into the unit’s
movement.
5-38. An infiltration plan, part of the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) operations order (OPORD), must give enough
time for preparation and movement. The amount of intelligence
information available during planning determines the risk involved in
conducting infiltration. The squadron commander selects the
appropriate routes and movement techniques based on these details:
• Mission.
• Terrain.
• Weather.
• Time available for movement.
• Follow-on mission.
• Likelihood of threat contact.
• Simplicity.
• Distance the squadron or troop must penetrate.
• Speed of movement.
• Population density and activity.
5-39. The infiltrating elements will most likely have to conduct a

forward passage of lines, which will require detailed forward passage of
lines coordination with the friendly units they are passing through.
Much of this detailed coordination should take place using FBCB2 as
well as face-to-face meetings. This will enhance situational awareness
between the two units and enable higher headquarters to better
coordinate the activities of adjacent friendly units to ensure they do not
compromise the element conducting the infiltration.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
5-40. Further considerations include—

• Size/task organization of infiltration unit.
• Method.
• Infiltration lane or zone.
• Communications.
• Fire support.
SIZE
5-41. The size of the infiltrating element depends on the assigned
mission, time available, the amount of cover and concealment, and the
acquisition capabilities of both friendly and threat forces. If the
reconnaissance force is tasked to gather a varied amount of
information over a fairly wide area, it may require a sizable force to
accomplish the mission. Conversely, if the threat has sophisticated
sensor technologies, then friendly reconnaissance units must seriously
consider limiting infiltration to the smallest element that can
successfully undertake the assigned mission. Other factors that may
impact on the size of the infiltrating force include communications
capabilities, navigation difficulties, and limitations on available routes.
Generally speaking, a smaller unit is able to make better use of
available cover and concealment.
METHOD
5-42. The squadron can move as a whole by infiltration or by
individual troops. Infiltration can be executed mounted, dismounted,
or a combination of the two. Dismounted scouts can infiltrate by foot,
vehicle, rotary-wing aircraft, or watercraft to the objective depending on
the availability of equipment and type of mission.
INFILTRATION LANE OR ZONE

5-43. The squadron may utilize single or multiple infiltration lanes or
zones, or assign them to subordinate units. The lanes/zones must
have sufficient width to allow the infiltrating elements to change their
planned routes to avoid unexpected threat contact. Moving the entire
unit on a single lane results in greater possibility of detection by the
threat and increases the amount of time it takes to arrive at the
designated location. Moving on one lane does increase the ability to
mass, if the follow-on mission requires. Moving on multiple lanes is the
preferred method. It is harder for the threat to detect patterns of
movement and small size elements.
Single-lane Infiltration
5-44. Infiltration on a single lane is the least desirable technique. It
requires all infiltrating groups to move at intervals in the same lane.
This technique is used only when METT-TC analysis supports the
identification of only one gap in the threat positions required to
accomplish the infiltration mission. The troop commander must
consider the number of vehicles to be infiltrated, the time available,
route concealment, and the vehicle time/distance interval that must be
5-16
used to prevent detection (see Figure 5-3). If surveillance troop assets

are operating within a given recce troop’s AOR, and they are tasked in
the ISR OPORD to accompany that recce troop during infiltrations, it is
the responsibility of the recce troop commander to ensure the
surveillance assets are accounted for in infiltration planning and
execution.
Figure 5-3. Single-lane Infiltration
Multiple-lane Infiltration
5-45. This is the preferred method of infiltration. The recce troop
infiltrates by multiple lanes when two or more gaps are found through
the threat defense (see Figure 5-4).
Figure 5-4. Multiple-lane Infiltration
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COMMUNICATIONS
5-46. C2 is greatly enhanced by FBCB2 for the decentralized
movements occurring during infiltration. Radio listening silence should
be enforced, except when the unit obtains information that the
commander has directed them to report immediately or when the
threat detects the reconnaissance element.
FIRE SUPPORT
5-47. Indirect fires are always planned, but only used by the recon
element if it makes contact, or if the commander employs fires at
another location to divert attention from the infiltration lane.
ACTIONS ON CONTACT
5-48. When reconnaissance elements infiltrate in multiple lanes, the
detection of one subordinate element may alert the threat and
compromise the entire mission. If detected, subordinate elements will
return fire, break contact, and report. If the reconnaissance unit
makes visual contact, but is not detected, it should continue the
mission. The commander’s intent must clearly state what the unit
should do upon contact with the threat.
EXFILTRATION PLANNING
5-49. Exfiltration is the removal of personnel or units from areas
under threat control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine
means. If the squadron infiltrates to conduct its mission, it may be
required to exfiltrate once the mission is complete. In other instances,
units within the squadron may be deliberately employed in a stay-
behind mode during brigade operations. Exfiltration should be planned
as carefully as infiltration, particularly if contact with the threat has
occurred during the mission. The commander must plan for
contingency measures should conditions force the reconnaissance unit
to conduct an unplanned exfiltration. If surveillance troop assets are
operating within a given recce troop’s AOR, and they are tasked in the
ISR OPORD to accompany that recce troop during exfiltrations, it is the
responsibility of the recce troop commander to ensure the surveillance
assets are accounted for in infiltration planning and execution.
5-50. The same planning considerations for infiltration should be
applied to exfiltration. Plans for extraction by applicable means (air,
ground, or water) should be made before the mission, with
contingencies covering possibilities such as loss of vehicles, evacuation
of sick and wounded personnel, and loss of communications.
Additional considerations include—
• Pick-up points.
• Methods of exfiltration.
PICK-UP POINTS
5-51. Exfiltration pick-up points for dismounts should be far enough
away from the OP to ensure the threat does not hear vehicle or
helicopter noises. Mountains, dense foliage, and other similar terrain
5-18
features can mask these noises. Movement routes are planned that put
ridgelines, rivers, and other restrictive terrain between the unit and
threat forces. Primary and alternate linkup points should never be on a
single azimuth leading away from the OP of an exfiltration route.
Exfiltration operations require additional time to build in a buffer
against unforeseen circumstances, such as inadvertent contact with
threat forces or unexpected restrictive terrain.
METHODS OF EXFILTRATION
5-52. Exfiltration can be accomplished via land, air, or water. In the
event that dismounted scouts are utilized in a stay-behind mode
(withdrawal or delay), exfiltration by land with its organic vehicles is
the most preferable method. Exfiltration by land is used when—
• Friendly lines are close.
• No other method is feasible.
• Areas along the route are largely uninhabited.
• Threat forces are widely dispersed.
• Threat forces are not conducting aggressive/active
counterreconnaissance and security.
• Terrain degrades threat ability to maneuver against
exfiltration unit.
5-53. Extraction by air or water is favored when the resources are

available and their use will not compromise the mission. These
methods are used when—
• Long distances must be covered.
• Time of return is essential.
• Cover and concealment are lacking.
• The threat does not have air or naval superiority.
• Heavily populated hostile areas obstruct ground
exfiltration.
5-54. The OPORD must also address contingencies and actions the
reconnaissance unit will take for both planned and unplanned
exfiltration.
SECTION IV – LINKUP OPERATIONS
5-55. A linkup is a meeting of friendly ground forces. One or both

forces may be moving. The threat normally separates the forces. The
squadron can participate in a linkup as part of a larger force or as one
of the forces involved. Linkup can occur in the following situations:
• Brigade deploys to assume positions or mission from the
forced entry unit.
• Advancing force reaches an objective that has been
previously seized by an airborne or air assault force.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• An encircled element breaks out to rejoin friendly forces.

• Converging friendly forces meet.
5-56. Positive control and SA must be maintained between both the
stationary and linkup force during linkup operations to prevent
fratricidal engagements. This is accomplished using the Army Battle
Command System (ABCS) and FM voice systems, as required, to share
situational awareness and combat information.
5-57. The signal officers of the two linkup units are integral to
successful linkup operations when both units are digitally equipped.
These officers must ensure that both primary and alternate forms of
communication are addressed during planning, and both manual and
digital systems used in support of the linkup operation are
synchronized and integrated into the linkup plan. Special
requirements related to digital operations must be identified. Examples
are—
• Exchange of unit internet protocol (IP) addresses.
• SINCGARS and EPLRS hop-set data.
• Communications security (COMSEC) requirements.
• Positioning of EPLRS position server links.
• Modifications to digital communications structure.
5-58. The squadron has certain missions to perform in support of a

brigade linkup. As part of a stationary force, the squadron can screen.
In that mission, the squadron may be the first unit to establish contact
with the approaching force. As part of a moving force, the squadron
performs reconnaissance for the main body to facilitate rapid
movement. If conducting the linkup on its own as the moving force, the
squadron performs the mission as zone reconnaissance. If speed is
paramount in making the linkup, certain reconnaissance critical tasks
can be deleted. Utilizing UAVs to reconnoiter routes or areas for
advancing units also helps increase the tempo of the reconnaissance.
FORMS OF LINKUP
5-59. Regardless of the purpose of the linkup, in execution, the
operation takes on one of two forms—moving and stationary or two
moving forces.
LINKUP OF A MOVING FORCE WITH A STATIONARY FORCE

5-60. To ensure the forces join without engaging one another, linkup
points are selected at locations where the axis of advance of the linkup
force intersects the security elements of the stationary force. These
points must be readily recognizable to both forces. Alternate points are
chosen in the event threat activities cause linkup at places other than
those planned. The number of linkup points selected depends on the
terrain and number of routes used by the linkup force. Personnel in
the linkup force must be thoroughly familiar with mutual identification
procedures and plans for rapid passage of lines. Stationary forces
assist in the linkup; they open lanes in minefields, breach or remove
5-20
selected obstacles, furnish guides, and design assembly areas. Use of

FBCB2 enhances coordination and responsiveness between executing
forces. (See Figure 5-5.)
FSCM
LINKUP OPERATIONS
EARLY STAGES
LINKUP FORCE
LINKUP
POINT
FSCM
LINKUP OPERATIONS
LAST STAGE
RFL
LINKUP FORCE
RFL
Figure 5-5. Linkup of a Moving Force with a Stationary Force
LINKUP OF TWO MOVING UNITS

5-61. Linkup between two moving units is one of the most difficult
operations to execute. It is normally conducted to complete the
encirclement of a threat force. Primary and alternate linkup points for
two moving forces are established on boundaries where the two forces
are expected to converge. As linking units move closer, positive control
must be coordinated to ensure they avoid firing on one another and to
ensure the threat does not escape between the two forces. Leading
elements of each force must have exchanged IP addresses and
COMSEC to conduct coordination during the linkup operation via the
digital net. FBCB2 enhances linkup operations as it provides a means
to exchange near real-time disposition of units, operations overlays
and control measures, and other reports to help reduce fratricide.
Units can track each other’s movement using FBCB2 when proper
digital communication procedures have been established. (See Figure
5-6.)
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 5-6. Linkup of Two Moving Units
ACTIONS FOLLOWING LINKUP

5-62. When the linkup is made, the linkup force may join the
stationary force or pass through or around to continue the attack. If
the linkup force is to continue operations with the stationary force, the
headquarters of both units should designate a single commander for
the overall force. Plans for these operations must be made in advance.
The squadron may immediately pass through the perimeter of the
stationary forces, be assigned objectives within the perimeter, or be
assigned objectives outside the perimeter, depending on the mission.
When a headquarters directs a linkup operation, it normally
establishes a restrictive fire line (RFL) for both forces. RFLs are
adjusted as one force moves toward the other until one RFL is
established between the forces when necessary, usually at the point
where the two forces plan to establish contact.
PLANNING
5-63. The headquarters directing the linkup establishes the
command relationship between the forces involved and the
responsibilities of each force. Normally both forces remain under the
control of the headquarters directing the linkup. If this headquarters
cannot adequately control the operation, responsibility is delegated to
one of the forces involved. Operational control (OPCON) is the normal
command relationship used. Often the moving unit is placed under
5-22
OPCON of the stationary unit, or the unit out of contact is placed

under OPCON of the unit in contact.
5-64. When possible, the commanders of the units involved establish
liaison. If the threat is between the forces conducting a linkup, this
liaison may not occur and coordination is then accomplished by radio
or through FBCB2. During the operation, the two units attempt to
maintain continuous radio contact with each other or the higher
headquarters. Prior to commencing a linkup operation, the
headquarters elements of the stationary force and the linkup force
must share situational awareness data, including:
• Digital graphic overlays consisting of:
Primary and alternate linkup points.
Checkpoints/waypoints information.
Unit disposition and activity (friendly and threat).
Location and types of obstacles.
Fire support coordination measures (FSCM), including
RFL.
Fire support plans.
• Manual/digital identification procedures.
• Manual/digital recognition signals.
• COMSEC procedures.
• Threat and friendly situation.
• Locations and types of obstacles.
• Fire support plans (especially RFL and coordinated fire
line [CFL]).
• Possible routes to the objective.
• Communications.
• Recognition signals.
• Contingency plans.
5-65. Every effort should be made to establish a face-to-face liaison.

If a face-to-face linkup is not possible, efforts should be directed
toward establishing a reliable digital and/or voice linkup to exchange
critical information. As the distance closes between the forces, the
requirement to maintain close liaison and exchange information
increases. Linkup operations frequently require a passage of lines.
Once through, the squadron moves to the linkup. The action is
characterized by speed, aggressiveness, and boldness. Threat forces
that threaten the successful accomplishment of the mission are
destroyed. Others are bypassed and reported.
5-66. The communication plan includes radio frequencies, net IDs,
EPLRS needlines, host files required to conduct the linkup (if units are
from different maneuver control systems), and COMSEC variables for
communication between the two forces. It must prescribe day and
night identification procedures, including primary and alternate
means. Visual signals, such as flares or panels, may be used during
5-23
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
daylight, and flashlights or infrared devices may be employed during

darkness. To prevent friendly troops from exchanging fires, recognition
signals must be established. They may be pyrotechnics, armbands,
vehicle markings, panels, colored smoke, distinctive light patterns, and
passwords. Using the battlefield combat identification system (BCIS)
and situational awareness via FBCB2 greatly enhances friendly
recognition.
5-67. Logistical requirements may be greater during linkup
operations than during other offensive actions. Additional
considerations for linkup operations include—
• Distance to the linkup.
• Time the objective area is to be held.
• Planned operations or movement out of the objective area.
• Resupply of the linkup force.
• Movement of support assets involved in the linkup.
• Whether follow-on units will secure lines of
communication.
5-68. Supply requirements for a linkup operation will likely exceed

the haul capability of the squadron; therefore, the S4 may have to
request additional vehicles or resupply by air. Supplies for the linkup
forces normally move by land transportation. However, when the
objective area is to be defended jointly by the linkup and airborne or
air assault force, supplies for the linkup force may be flown into the
objective area and stockpiled.
5-69. Evacuation of equipment and EPWs may create major
problems. If supply routes are open, normal evacuation procedures
apply. When ground routes are not secure, helicopters may be used for
evacuation of wounded while damaged equipment may be moved
forward with the linkup forces until a suitable opportunity for
evacuation is available.
PREPARATION
5-70. Due to the time-sensitive nature of the operation, the squadron
commander issues his order and attempts to at least walk the troop
commanders through the operation. He particularly stresses the
linkup and the coordination required to effect the linkup without
confusion. The squadron commander’s major concern is that his
leaders do not lose sight of their objective—the linkup.
5-71. The squadron fire support officer (FSO) ensures that his
counterpart force in the linkup operation, whether moving or
stationary, has the squadron’s fire support plan. Specifically, he
ensures all FSCMs are completely understood by both forces. Further,
if any control measures are changed during the operation, the
conditions and signals under which the change takes place must be
coordinated.
5-72. CSS elements organize as for any offensive operation; however,
they may hug the rear of the combat forces for security on the move up
5-24
to the linkup. They may carry additional supplies if required for the
other force. The S4 also ensures that each unit understands the main
supply route (MSR) and alternate MSR, to include traffic control. In
particular, he pushes as much materiel forward as possible during the
operation. This is because the squadron will expend resources during
the attack and any other mission that may occur after the actual
linkup.
EXECUTION
5-73. The initial conduct of the linkup is similar to a zone
reconnaissance, depending on the threat situation. Through the use of
digital intelligence information-gathering systems, the relationship of
friendly forces to threat forces should be clear. This allows the
squadron commander to better prepare or react to the current threat
situation. As the squadron begins its maneuver, it attempts to
establish and maintain contact with its corresponding friendly force.
Each force monitors the progress of the other, making adjustments to
the plan as necessary. For example, if the linkup force is unable to
travel at a speed commensurate with the plan, yet the breakout force is
making a very rapid advance, the location of the linkup point may be
moved closer to the linkup force. Similarly, FSCMs are also moved.
5-74. As the two forces draw closer, the momentum of the operation
slows to help prevent fratricide. The tradeoff may be that some threat
forces may slip between the two closing forces. Coordination signals
are used to identify each force as they approach the linkup point. The
forces should be able to monitor each other’s location via FBCB2 and
take the appropriate actions. If possible, the forces attempt to establish
contact on a designated FM frequency to control the actual linkup.
5-75. FSCMs are changed based on the progress of the forces and the
threat situation. An RFL is placed into effect to prevent fratricide
between the converging forces. Once the linkup has occurred, the fire
support units supporting the squadron and its linkup force are
organized in accordance with the higher headquarters plan for future
operations.
SECTION V – RELIEF OPERATIONS
5-76. A relief is an operation in which a unit is replaced by another

unit. The incoming unit assumes responsibility for the mission and
assigned sector or zone of action. A relief in place may be conducted
during reconnaissance, security, stability, support, offensive or
defensive operations during any weather or light conditions. During
combat, they are normally executed during limited visibility to reduce
the possibility of detection. During stability or support operations they
may be conducted during daylight and at times that best fit the social
environment (i.e., not during religious activities). Digitization is used to
enhance the planning and execution of relief operations. Prior to the
actual linkup of the incoming and outgoing units, the outgoing
commander should provide digital overlays to the incoming
commander outlining fire support; obstacles; threat situation; and
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
primary, alternate, and supplementary friendly positions.

Reconnaissance handover must be conducted to ensure all NAIs, TAIs,
and relevant information sources are transitioned to the incoming unit.
If used properly, digitization provides the incoming unit with a
complete common tactical picture of the AO.
5-26
5-77. A relief can be conducted for the following reasons:

• Reconstitute a unit that has sustained heavy losses.
• Decontaminate a committed unit.
• Rest a unit that has been in prolonged combat.
• Conform to a larger tactical plan.
• Assign a new mission to the relieved unit.
• Introduce a new unit into combat.
5-78. The squadron will most typically be the unit being relieved, for
either reconsolidation/reorganization, or to proceed with another
mission. When a maneuver unit relieves the squadron, the task
organization normally does not resemble that of the squadron very
closely. This is considered in determining the method of relief.
PLANNING
5-79. The primary purpose for a relief in place is to maintain the
combat effectiveness of committed elements. A relief in place should be
conducted during a lull in combat, if possible. The digital systems of
the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) enhance the planning and
facilitate synchronization of a relief in place. When used properly,
digital systems provide the tools to build a complete picture of the area
over which the incoming commander will assume control. As part of
the planning, coordination, and synchronization process, the incoming
and outgoing commanders should provide digital overlays to one
another outlining the following:
• Friendly situation.
• Threat situation.
• Fire support procedures and FSCMs.
• Friendly and threat obstacles by type and location.
• Primary, alternate, and supplementary friendly positions.
• Routes to/from the AO, to include checkpoints.
5-80. Planning considerations for a relief in place are below:

• Terrain management must be tailored to METT-TC and
planned carefully.
• Units are normally relieved at night or during periods of
limited visibility. A detailed reconnaissance by the
incoming unit is essential.
• The incoming unit must fit into and accept the general
defense plan of the outgoing unit.
• Combat support (CS) and CSS units should not be
relieved at the same time as the units they support.
• Procedures must be established for in-place CS and CSS
units to provide support for the relieving maneuver unit.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
5-81. The warning order for a relief in place must specify, at a

minimum, the time for commencing and completing the relief and the
priorities for use of routes involved.
5-82. As in the case of the linkup operations, the respective signal
officers of the relieved and relieving units are integral to the relief
operation and are responsible for the coordination and synchronization
of digital and analog communications procedures and systems to
ensure that communications are maintained. They must also ensure
that the relieved and relieving units are able to maintain both digital
and voice communications with their parent headquarters and
counterpart unit.
EXCHANGE OF PLANS AND LIAISON PERSONNEL

5-83. The incoming commander and staff are briefed by the outgoing
commander and staff to ensure that the relieving unit is thoroughly
familiar with the AO and existing plans of the relieved force.
Coordination between the two unit commanders and staffs is normally
effected through the exchange of liaison personnel who remain on-site
and provide assistance as needed until the incoming unit becomes
familiar with overall operations. This facilitates information exchange
and the command transition process. Additional face-to-face meetings
and the sharing of digitized overlays and/or free text messages
between liaison personnel complement this process.
SEQUENCE OF RELIEF
5-84. In determining the sequence of the relief, both commanders
should consider—
• Subsequent mission of the unit conducting the relief.
• Strength and combat efficiency of the unit presently in
place.
• Capability of the threat to detect and react against the
relief.
• Characteristics of the AO.
• Communications architecture.
PASSAGE OF COMMAND
5-85. The circumstances under which the incoming commander
assumes responsibility for the area must be clearly defined in the
OPORD. During the relief, the commander having responsibility for the
area, mission, and terrain management will exercise OPCON over all
subordinate units within his AO. Responsibility passes to the incoming
commander normally when digital/FM communications that will allow
effective C2 have been established and in excess of 50 percent of all
the units being relieved have been relieved.
RECONNAISSANCE
5-28
5-86. Commanders and staff officers of the incoming unit conduct a

thorough daylight reconnaissance. If possible, a relieving unit
reconnaissance element should include the commander, the S3, S2, a
liaison officer (LNO), the fire support officer, the troop commanders,
and representatives from the S1/S4 staff. As with other activities, the
commander determines who conducts reconnaissance based on the
situation. The relieved force commander should initially select and
transmit through FBCB2 at least two routes (ground or air),
checkpoints, and contact points for the incoming unit. The incoming
unit’s reconnaissance and liaison element with the main command
post (CP) or tactical CP (TAC CP) and trains must move to the relieved
unit’s location immediately upon receiving the order from higher
headquarters.
SECURITY
5-87. The conduct of a relief in place must be accomplished by the
most covert means possible to prevent the threat from learning that a
relief is taking place. The following security measures should be taken:
• Restrictions on the size of advance parties and
reconnaissance parties must be enforced.
• Communications during the relief are conducted digitally
to the maximum extent possible. A common FM voice net
must be established between the two forces.
• Operations security (OPSEC) is enforced throughout the
operation.
MOVEMENT CONTROL
5-88. Strict movement procedures must be established and
coordinated between the incoming and outgoing units. The movement
along the routes will be tracked through FBCB2, giving the
commanders positive control and a common picture of the movement
of both units. Coordination between units can be extensively executed
through the sharing of digital overlays. Information must include the
following:
• Routes and checkpoints to be used and priorities for their
use.
• Responsibility for traffic control.
• Location of assembly areas.
• Common use of transportation.
• Unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) locations and
responsibilities.
• Aid stations and hospitals.
5-89. Units conducting a relief in place also share mobility

information via digitized means or acetate overlays. If terrain and the
road network allow, relieved units should be assigned separate routes
and assembly areas to reduce congestion and to minimize
concentration of units.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
METHODS OF RELIEF IN PLACE

5-90. There are three basic methods of conducting a relief in place:
• One unit at a time.
• All units simultaneously.
• Occupying in-depth or adjacent positions.
ONE UNIT AT A TIME
5-91. Relieving one unit at a time is the most time-consuming, but
secure method. Relief proceeds by troop. Units are normally relieved in
place with the relieving unit assuming the relieved unit’s positions and
missions. This method is most common when units have similar
organizations or when occupied terrain must be retained. Subsequent
to relief, the assuming unit makes adjustments to positions. The
relieved units withdraw once they are relieved without waiting for other
units. This method requires detailed planning and coordination. Most
of the planning considerations previously discussed apply to this
method.
ALL UNITS SIMULTANEOUSLY

5-92. Relieving units simultaneously is a variation of the first
method. It is faster but less secure as all units are moving
simultaneously. Close coordination is required to prevent congestion.
Once command groups and combat trains are collocated, troops move
forward at the same time along designated routes. Relief occurs
simultaneously at each location. Relieved units withdraw immediately
upon relief. The withdrawing unit does not wait to form up battalion or
squadron march columns, but normally forms up at rally points
behind the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) in platoon columns
before moving out.
OCCUPYING IN-DEPTH OR ADJACENT POSITIONS

5-93. Relief by occupying positions in depth or adjacent to the
relieved unit is considered an area relief. It is appropriate when units
are dissimilar, when the relieving unit performs a different mission, or
when improved defensive terrain is away from the line of contact. This
method is also appropriate when the unit being relieved has been
chemically or radiologically contaminated. The squadron may
frequently conduct this type of relief. When possible, the relieving unit
should be able to place direct fires on the other unit’s FSCMs. The
relieved units withdraw one unit at a time or simultaneously and
conduct a rearward passage of lines through the relieving unit, if
appropriate.
5-94. In all three methods the normal sequence of relief is from rear
to front. Overlap always occurs with the relieved unit maintaining
communications, fire support, and positions until relieved. Due to the
noncontiguous, dispersed, and decentralized operations of the brigade
and squadron, relief will most likely occur one unit at a time or by area
relief with units withdrawing at different times.
5-30
NOTE: If the squadron can achieve interconnectivity with a digitized

incoming/outgoing unit, then collocating CPs may not be necessary.
SECTION VI – RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
5-95. Retrograde operations are organized movements away from the

threat. They are initiated by threat action or executed voluntarily to
draw the threat into a favorable situation (such as brigade or battalion
defensive positions or counterattack). The basic reason for conducting
a retrograde operation is to improve a tactical situation or to prevent a
worse one from occurring. The other reasons for conducting retrograde
operations are to—
• Gain time.
• Preserve forces.
• Maintain freedom of maneuver.
• Avoid decisive combat.
• Reposition forces on the battlefield.
• Permit the withdrawal of the squadron for use elsewhere.
5-96. When the brigade conducts retrograde operations, the

squadron may perform reconnaissance or screen missions (moving,
flank, or advance). The squadron may perform a retrograde operation
to break contact, avoid decisive engagement, draw the threat into a
prepared engagement area, or to cause the threat to extend itself.
FBCB2 facilitates decentralized execution during retrograde operations
by raising the leader’s situational awareness at all levels.
REQUIREMENTS OF RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

5-97. Most retrograde operations are difficult and inherently risky.
Retrograde operations are characterized by emphasis on the following
requirements during planning and execution:
• Maintain morale and leadership.
• Preserve freedom to maneuver.
• Conserve combat power.
• Slow the threat’s rate of advance.
• Ensure unity of effort.
5-98. These requirements take on varying degrees of significance

depending on the type of retrograde mission performed.
MAINTAIN MORALE AND LEADERSHIP

5-99. Maintenance of morale among soldiers is critical during
retrograde operations. Soldiers can quickly perceive movement to the
rear in the face of the threat as defeat or abandonment. Rumors can
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
start easily and must be suppressed. Leaders must be physically

present, display confidence in the plan, be in control on the battlefield,
and thoroughly brief subordinates on the plan and their roles.
Particular attention must be paid to evacuation of casualties. Soldiers
will not stay long on the battlefield if they think they will be left to the
threat.
PRESERVE FREEDOM TO MANEUVER

5-100. When executing these operations, the squadron must retain its
ability to maneuver. While a portion of the unit may become decisively
engaged, the commander cannot allow the entire unit to do so. He
must be prepared to free troops that can no longer extricate
themselves. This is most likely done with proper augmentation, or with
a reaction force from the brigade. The surveillance troop will enable the
squadron to move rapidly and provide rear security.
CONSERVE COMBAT POWER

5-101. Frequently, the purpose of a retrograde is to conserve
reconnaissance forces for use elsewhere. Commanders must strike a
balance between caution in preserving the force and risk-taking to
delay the attacker. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
provides analysis to determine where opportunities to strike the threat
exist and what the associated risks are. The commander then
structures the battlefield to reduce risk to an acceptable level.
SLOW THE THREAT’S RATE OF ADVANCE

5-102. The squadron must be able to assist the brigade as it buys time
to plan/prepare for a mission, position/reposition forces, or
reconsolidate and reorganize. Early destruction of reconnaissance
elements is critical to blind the threat commander. The squadron can
effectively assist the brigade by providing timely combat information.
Scouts and UAVs can assist with the integration of obstacles and
indirect fires to disrupt, turn, fix, or block the threat’s ability to
advance.
ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT

5-103. The commander develops a simple plan. Retrograde operations
are characterized by fluid, rapidly changing situations. A series of
independent small unit actions occur simultaneously across the front.
Subordinate commanders must have freedom of action. The squadron
commander ensures unity of effort through a clear intent, graphic
control measures that are not overly restrictive, and personal presence
at the decisive point.
FORMS OF RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

5-104. The squadron conducts two forms of retrograde operations:
withdrawal and retirement. Table 5-5 illustrates the relationships
between them.
5-32
Table 5-5. Forms of Retrograde Operations
OPERATION INTENT THREAT CONTACT

Withdrawal Disengage force. Free unit for use In contact.
elsewhere.
Break contact.
Retirement Move a force away from the threat. Not in contact.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
WITHDRAWAL
5-105. A withdrawal is an operation in which all or part of the
squadron breaks contact to conduct a new mission, or it is conducted
in accordance with the brigade commander’s displacement criteria. The
withdrawal may be assisted or unassisted and may or may not be
executed under pressure from the threat. In either case, digitization is
used to share critical combat information, synchronize the withdrawal,
and maintain situational awareness. The two types of withdrawal are
under threat pressure and not under threat pressure.
• Withdrawal with Threat Pressure. The unit depends on
fire and movement to break contact with an attacking
threat force and then withdraws. Preferably, the
withdrawal is not under heavy pressure. Heavy pressure
may force the unit to transition into a delay.
• Withdrawal without Threat Pressure. The unit depends
on speed of execution and deception. If the unit is not
under attack, then the withdrawal is not under pressure.
5-106. The squadron can withdraw unassisted or assisted, depending

on the assets available and the threat. In an unassisted withdrawal,
the squadron must use assets within its task organization to provide
security. The surveillance troop can assist by screening the rear of the
squadron to provide early warning and identify threat movement (such
as threat attempt to flank or separate the squadron from the main
body). An assisted withdrawal uses a security force provided by the
brigade to assist in breaking contact and to provide overwatch. The
withdrawing unit may then disengage and conduct a rearward passage
of lines or move to another AO. Prior to changing missions, the
squadron must conduct a battle handover to the brigade or a brigade
asset.
5-107. Planning considerations for a withdrawal enable troops to
withdraw to a designated assembly area to reconsolidate and
reorganize. Routes are assigned to each troop and checkpoints are
used to mark troop positions in the area. Before the withdrawal, if time
permits, the squadron conducts a thorough reconnaissance of the AO
and validates routes and control measures contained on the operations
overlay. Leaders designate assigned critical points along the route as
waypoints (start point [SP], release point [RP], checkpoints, and
assembly areas) and reconnoiter the entire route from the SP to
occupation of the assembly area. This serves to familiarize leaders with
the entire route, providing an opportunity to confirm its trafficability
and approximate movement time.
5-108. During a withdrawal a detachment left in contact (DLIC) assists
in the disengagement of other elements. The DLIC, normally a troop-
size unit task organized with surveillance troop assets (UAVs and
ground surveillance radars [GSR]), assumes responsibility for the
squadron sector, deceives the threat, and protects the movement of
withdrawing elements by fire and/or fire and movement.
5-109. In an unassisted withdrawal, the main body moves on
designated routes to the squadron assembly area in accordance with
priorities established by the commander. The DLIC repositions to cover
5-34
the entire squadron sector. They simulate normal activities to deceive

the threat into believing that defending forces are still in position. The
withdrawal is complete when the DLIC completes its movement to the
assembly area, rejoins the squadron, and the squadron main CP
completes battle handover with the brigade.
5-110. In an assisted withdrawal, the brigade tasks a maneuver
battalion to establish a security force and the squadron withdraws
behind it. When the order to withdraw is received, the security force
engages the threat with direct and indirect fire to enable the
withdrawing force to disengage, conduct a rearward passage through
the security force, and move to an assembly area as outlined above.
5-111. A withdrawal is conducted in three overlapping phases:
• Preparatory.
• Disengagement.
• Security.
Preparatory Phase
5-112. Planning, reconnaissance, and quartering party actions are
initiated. Critical planning concerns are forming the security force,
designating subsequent positions or assembly areas, and designating
withdrawal routes. Leaders conduct reconnaissance of routes and
subsequent positions. Movement can begin early for trains and CPs.
Disengagement Phase
5-113. Disengagement is breaking contact with the threat and moving
to a point where the threat can neither observe nor engage the
squadron by direct fire. Subordinate elements of the withdrawing unit
break contact and move to the rear. CS, CSS, and reserve elements
normally move first. Fire support assets cannot displace out of
supporting range. Movement must be rapid since the detachment left
in contact does not possess sufficient combat power to conduct a
defense against an attack. Units should use radio listening silence.
Units can occupy either new positions in depth or designated assembly
areas. As this movement occurs, the security force is activated, if
provided.
Security Phase
5-114. The DLIC comes from the squadron in an unassisted
withdrawal. The squadron commander determines composition of the
detachment. It must be able to detect, deceive, and engage the threat
on all avenues of approach with direct and indirect fires. The DLIC
performs the mission like a screen. As the main body disengages, the
DLIC shifts positions as necessary to accomplish its tasks. It is
frequently composed of a platoon-size force from each forward troop.
Mortars and other CS and CSS assets are part of the DLIC, as
necessary. UAV and GSR are normally included for enhanced security.
The DLIC, as a composite force, is normally commanded by the S3 and
troop detachments by the XOs. If the greatest threat lies on a single
avenue of approach, the unit on that avenue may be left in place and
augmented with small security elements from other units. The DLIC
assists the disengagement of other elements moving to the rear,
assumes responsibility for the entire sector, and performs deception
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
tasks as designated. When the rest of the force is set, the DLIC
disengages and moves to the rear to join the main body.
RETIREMENT
5-115. Retirements are organized rearward movements conducted by
units not in contact. A retirement is usually conducted at night and
planned identical to a night tactical road march. Daylight movement
should be conducted only if necessary or if the threat is incapable of
interfering. Contingency missions are assigned to the squadron or
troops in case the threat makes contact. Security and speed are
important considerations when planning a retirement. Commanders
conducting a retirement must emphasize OPSEC during movement.
Additional considerations pertaining to planning and executing a
retirement as part of a larger force are outlined in FM 3-90.2 [FM 71-2]
and FM 3-91.123 [FM 71-123].
SECTION VII – BATTLE HANDOVER AND PASSAGE OF LINES
5-116. Reconnaissance and security operations frequently begin or

end with a passage of lines. The squadron will either be the passing or
stationary force. A battle handover is a coordinated tactical operation
conducted between two units that transfer responsibility for fighting a
threat force from one unit to another. It sustains unity of effort and
protects the combat potential of both units. Battle handover and
passage of lines are critical components of transferring responsibility
for the battle between squadron and maneuver units while maintaining
continuity. FBCB2 and other digital systems assist the commander in
transferring responsibility by allowing him to more efficiently and
accurately monitor the position and movement of subordinate units.
5-117. A passage may be designated as a forward or rearward passage
of lines. Passage may occur when security forces withdraw through the
FEBA or when an attacking or exploiting force moves through forces in
contact.
5-118. Battle handover may occur during both offensive and defensive
operations. During defensive operations, it is normally coordinated in
advance so that it requires only minimum coordination when ordered
to occur. In the offense, it is often initiated by a FRAGO based on the
situation at hand. A clear SOP allows units to quickly establish the
necessary coordination to preclude a loss of momentum in the attack.
The control measures used are simple and standardized.
5-119. In the conduct of operations, ground and surveillance troop
commanders often pass a threat force in contact to one another.
Reconnaissance handover (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) governs
this process in terms of close coordination, fire support, and mutual
understanding of responsibilities. The troops do not go through the
structured process discussed in this section. This internal handover is
established in brigade and squadron SOPs for rapid execution with
minimum additional coordination.
5-36
BATTLE HANDOVER: SQUADRON AND ABOVE

5-120. The three key players involved in battle handover at squadron
and above are the stationary commander, the passing commander,
and their common commander. Each commander has certain
responsibilities. The common commander defines the location and time
for the handover, identifies any specific tasks, and monitors the
execution. The passing and stationary commanders coordinate
according to SOP and execute the handover. Until handover is
complete and acknowledged by the two commanders, the commander
in contact is responsible for the fight. Once battle handover is executed
in a forward passage of lines, the passing commander assumes tactical
control over the stationary force until passage is complete. In a
rearward passage, the stationary commander assumes tactical control
over the passing force until passage is complete.
5-121. Handover occurs along a line defined as the battle handover
line (BHL). This line is a phase line (PL) recognizable on the ground
forward of the stationary force. The common commander, in
consultation with both commanders, establishes the line. The
stationary commander has the major determination in the location of
the line. This line is forward of the FEBA in the defense or the forward
line of own troops (FLOT) in the offense. It is drawn where direct fires of
the forward combat elements of the stationary unit can effectively
overwatch elements of the passing unit until passage of lines is
complete. The area between the BHL and the stationary force belongs
to the stationary force commander. He may employ security forces,
obstacles, and fires in the area.
5-122. Coordination for battle handover normally flows from the
commander out of contact to the commander in contact. This
coordination overlaps with the coordination for the passage of lines
and the two should be conducted simultaneously. This coordination is
best established as SOP to facilitate rapid accomplishment.
Coordination normally includes using the following requirements:
• Establishing communications.
• Providing updates on both friendly and threat situations.
• Coordinating passage.
• Collocating C2.
• Dispatching representatives to contact points.
• Status of obstacles and routes.
• Fire support and CSS requirements.
5-123. For the engaged force, the most important task is to maintain
contact and continue the fight. The threat must continue to see the
level of activity that has been established. If the threat perceives that
the handover is occurring, it will most likely attempt to seize the
opportunity to destroy the friendly unit at a vulnerable moment.
5-124. In the brigade, passage of lines normally occurs at squadron
level. The brigade monitors progress and ensures coordination occurs
between the squadron and the maneuver units. The squadron is
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
required to conduct detailed coordination and to execute the passage.

Troops within the squadron may conduct passage with the squadron,
or do so on their own.
BATTLE HANDOVER: SQUADRON AND BELOW

5-125. The three key players involved in battle handover at squadron
and below are the initial unit/element in contact, the subsequent
unit/element that will receive the contact, and their common
commander. Each element has certain responsibilities. The common
commander ensures assets are available to maintain contact until
handover can occur, identifies any specific tasks, and monitors the
execution. The initial unit/element making contact notifies the
common commander and hands off the contact to the subsequent
unit/element identified by the common commander. The subsequent
unit/element maneuvers to gain visual contact and maintains contact
until it is able to continue the handover process or is ordered to break
contact. The commander’s essential guidance dictates when a unit
should break contact. FBCB2 greatly enhances the ability to track
targets for a faster and more reliable means of handover. Handover is
complete once the subsequent unit acknowledges it has positive visual
contact.
5-126. Coordination for handover should include—
• Ensuring communication/digital links are established.
• Providing updates on both friendly and threat situations.
• Target location, activity, and/or direction of movement.
• Brief description of terrain within the area of contact.
PASSAGE OF LINES
5-127. A passage of lines is a complex operation requiring detailed
coordination, extensive planning, and close supervision between units.
As such, the conduct of a passage of lines is a C2 challenge. The two
types of passage of lines are forward and rearward. The squadron uses
either method to move through friendly units to conduct its mission or
when mission is complete. The planning considerations are the same
as for battle handover, with these additional consideration and
coordination measures that need inclusion and integration at all levels
in the planning process:
• Exchange of intelligence information.
• Exchange of tactical plans.
• Exchange of SOPs.
• Arrangements for reconnaissance by elements of the
passing units.
• Security measures during passage.
• Selection of areas of passage and provisions for guides.
• Priorities for use of routes and facilities and provisions for
movement control. The passing unit must have priority.
5-38
• Time or circumstances when all responsibility for control

of the AO will be transferred.
• Fire support and other combat support to be provided by
the unit being passed.
• Exchange of liaison personnel at all levels.
• Collection and exchange of information on friendly
minefields and obstacles.
• Command relationship between passing unit and the unit
being passed concerning CS and CSS units, facilities, and
locations.
• Tactical cover and deception plans to retain secrecy and to
aid in maintaining and/or gaining surprise.
• Establishment of graphic control measures to ensure a
smooth and well-coordinated passage.
FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES
5-128. In a forward passage of lines, both the stationary and passing
unit commanders must know the passing unit’s objective. This allows
both commanders to focus their efforts on lanes through the stationary
unit, passage points, FSCMs, and zones or directions of attack. This is
particularly important if the stationary unit is required to provide
overwatching fires. The stationary unit and forward passing unit must
share digital overlays to share situational awareness about the AO and
threat actions.
5-129. Once the unit receives the order to conduct the passage, the
passing unit commander focuses on the reconnaissance. The
stationary unit receives the passing unit’s plan as a digitized
operations overlay that delineates routes to the contact points as well
as the location of the actual linkup site. The battalion/squadron
commander and staff of the passing unit meet representatives from the
stationary unit at designated contact points to conduct coordination.
5-130. FBCB2 allows the main CP and the squadron commander to
accurately track the movement of troops across multiple passage
lanes. By watching the progress of friendly icons on his display, the
commander can affect the synchronization of the passage and ensure
that adequate combat power is available to properly deploy once the
unit crosses the line of departure (LD).
5-131. There are two techniques used in forward passage of lines to
move through the passage points. In the first technique, the passing
force deploys in its maneuver formation to attack positions to the rear
of the FLOT and crosses the FLOT in a maneuver formation. This
technique is appropriate if there is adequate maneuver space for the
passing force to deploy effectively, and to deploy without disrupting the
stationary force positions. This technique also allows the passing force
to rapidly deploy once it crosses the FLOT.
5-132. In the second technique, the passing force may deploy after
crossing the FLOT. Using this technique, the passing force crosses the
FLOT in march column and then deploys into maneuver formations
prior to crossing the BHL. This technique may be required in more
restrictive terrain. If this technique is used, the FLOT should be
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
outside direct fire range of the threat to allow the moving force to
deploy without being fired upon.
5-133. In either of the techniques described, there will be stationary
unit scouts on or near the BHL. The passing unit may have their scout
platoon link up with stationary unit scouts and continue the mission,
or may have combat units deploy along the BHL to overwatch
movement of other units. The units on the ground at the BHL must
know the scheme of maneuver of the passing force so they can act
accordingly. (See Figure
5-7.)
Figure 5-7. Forward Passage of Lines
REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

5-134. Typically, a rearward passage of lines occurs within a defensive
framework in which the squadron is operating forward of the main
battle area (MBA). MBA forces are the stationary unit in a rearward
passage of lines and the reconnaissance (normally the squadron)
withdraws through them, handing off control of the fight at the BHL.
Digitization provides the commander and staffs of the moving and
stationary forces with enhanced SA through improved surveillance and
near real-time combat information on friendly and threat activity.
5-135. During the planning phase, the stationary force commander
designates a PL as the BHL that corresponds to the maximum effective
range of his direct-fire weapon systems. The stationary unit
commander also designates contact points (forward of the BHL),
passage points (along the FEBA), and lanes (into the rear of the MBA)
on his operations overlay using a precision navigation device and/or
the laser range finder. The main CP of the stationary unit enters the
5-40
radio net of the covering force and requests specific information

necessary to transmit digitized overlays.
5-136. During the execution of the rearward passage of lines, the main
CP of the stationary unit monitors the progress of the covering force
and prepares and forwards digitized updates of the threat overlay.
Successive updates posted to the threat overlay and superimposed
over the operations overlay allow leaders to visualize the relationship
between the threat, friendly units, and FSCMs. This technique
minimizes voice radio traffic on the squadron/battalion/task force (TF)
net, prepares defending units to support the withdrawal of the covering
force with direct and indirect fire, and raises the situational awareness
of MBA units.
5-137. The main CP of the MBA unit communicates on the command
net of the passing unit (through the exterior protocol gateways
coordinated by the squadron S6). In this way, the stationary unit
receives friendly and threat position updates as well as any digitized
tactical reporting sent by the covering force. This technique allows the
staff of the stationary unit to continuously monitor the tactical
situation. If it becomes necessary to assist the covering force in
breaking contact with the threat, digitized updates to the threat overlay
can be prepared and sent. This information allows maneuver
companies to anticipate the point on the battlefield where the threat
may appear so that fires are effectively massed.
5-138. Once the covering force area unit crosses the BHL and
responsibility for the fight is transferred to the MBA commander, the
main CP continues to track the movement of the passing unit until the
last vehicle along each route clears their designated passage points
and enters the appropriate passage lane.
5-139. Rearward movement can be conducted by exfiltration or by the
squadron as a whole, depending on whether the squadron is in contact
with the threat. (See Figure 5-8.)
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 5-8. Rearward Passage of Lines
5-42
5-140. The commander of the passing unit makes a tentative plan for
the conduct of the operation. While formulating the tentative plan,
consideration includes—
• Pertinent control measures related to the passage of lines
on the operations overlay (routes, passage lanes, passage
points, contact points, and BHL).
• Collocation of unit’s C2 vehicle with the stationary unit to
allow use of FBCB2 to update and distribute changes to
the plan.
• Task surveillance and/or ground troops to screen between
the threat and the passing unit to provide early warning
and protection to the main body.
• Ensuring the squadron signal officer (S6) coordinates FM
and EPLRS frequencies, IP addresses, COMSEC key, and
nets so the tactical internet is established to support
situational awareness.
5-141. Control measures normally used in a battle handover and
passage of lines are described in the following paragraphs.
• Assembly Area. An assembly area in the rear area of the
stationary unit allows the passing unit to conduct hasty
reorganization and emergency CSS actions. This assembly
area is temporary in nature.
• Battle Handover Line. The BHL is an easily identifiable
location where the stationary force assumes control of the
battle (used for a rearward passage of lines). This location
must permit the stationary force to engage the threat with
direct and indirect fire systems. It must be portrayed on
the operations overlay as a PL.
• Passage Points. Passage points should be concealed from
threat observation. Stationary unit guides may meet the
passing unit at the passage point.
• Passage Lanes. Passage lanes are established by the
stationary unit that allows the passing unit to move
quickly and uniformly through the stationary unit’s AO.
This could include passing through gaps in friendly
obstacles and moving near friendly engagement areas. The
passage lane begins at the passage point and ends at the
rear of the stationary unit positions. The passage is
considered complete when the moving unit exits the lanes.
• Passage Routes. Routes are not as restrictive as lanes.
Routes allow a passing unit to move more rapidly through
the stationary unit area. If a passage route is used in
conjunction with a passage lane, it begins where the
passage lane ends. The number of lanes/routes
designated will vary based on METT-TC considerations,
but as a general rule, multiple lanes/routes should be
planned to facilitate the rapid passage of the moving units
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
and to avoid unnecessary massing of units. The stationary

unit may escort the passing unit along the lane/route.
• Release Points. A well-defined point on a route at which
the elements composing a march column return under the
authority of their respective commanders; each one of
these elements continues its movement toward its own
appropriate destination.
• Infiltration Points. Units should plan infiltration points
for personnel not able to complete the passage with the
unit. The passing unit’s LNOs may remain located with
stationary unit CPs to serve as a point of contact for
infiltrating personnel/equipment. The key is that
personnel attempting to infiltrate must have some way of
contacting the stationary unit prior to attempting to cross
into friendly territory.
5-142. FBCB2 allows MBA and covering force commanders to

exchange precise information. The information exchange during battle
handover would include—
• Passage points.
• Obstacle overlays.
• Passage lanes for the rearward passage through the
obstacles.
• Operation graphics.
5-143. Additionally, FBCB2 units may increase tempo to enhance their

ability to deceive the threat as to the location of the MBA. Rapid
maneuver, closely coordinated through FBCB2 with indirect fires and
close air support (CAS), may allow the establishment of a series of
engagements designed to attrit, deceive, and channel the threat into
engagement areas. Improved situational awareness and thermal
imagery allow the extensive use of obscuration to degrade threat target
acquisition and improve force protection.
5-144. While conducting the passage of lines, the main CP of the
passing unit coordinates entry into the stationary unit’s command net
by FM voice. In the process, the passing unit requests pertinent
communications information necessary to establish digitized
communication with the stationary unit (such as receiver/transmitter
mode, channel, COMSEC variable, net IDs, EPLRS needlines, default
settings for the coordinating FBCB2 platforms).
5-145. The passing unit uses information contained in the digitized
operations and obstacle overlays received from the stationary unit to
plan and conduct physical reconnaissance. This procedure allows
reconnaissance activity to begin prior to, or concurrently with, the
collocation of CPs (the TAC CP from the passing unit and the main CP
of the stationary unit) from both units. Once the CPs are collocated,
the staffs from the respective units complete the planning and
coordination process. This process culminates in the formulation of
operations overlays that both units use to execute the passage.
5-44
SECTION VIII – NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL DEFENSIVE

OPERATIONS
5-146. NBC defense is the methods, plans, procedures, and training

required to establish defense measures against the effects of an attack
by NBC weapons and/or the ability to deter the use of such weapons.
NBC defense operations are performed to reduce casualties and
damage to equipment, and to minimize disruption of the mission.
These measures are continuous in nature and integrated throughout
all combat operations.
5-147. NBC force protection is accomplished by conducting
vulnerability analysis, IPB, cooperative NBC detection, and digital NBC
warning and reporting to avoid contamination. This reduces the
degradation of being in mission oriented protective posture (MOPP), the
logistics burden, and decrease in operational tempo due to
decontamination operations, and allows the squadron and brigades the
ability to maintain freedom of maneuver through improved situational
awareness.
5-148. The squadron uses individual protective equipment, collective
protection systems, and chemical and biological pretreatments to
increase survivability when it must operate in a contaminated
environment. Decontamination occurs through the brigade with corps
support assets. The NBC platoon in the squadron, as discussed in
Chapter 1, is instrumental in providing the NBC support for the
squadron and brigade in the areas of detection and avoidance.
NBC RECONNAISSANCE
TACTICAL ORGANIZATION
5-149. Organic to the surveillance troop in the RSTA squadron, the
NBCRS platoon is equipped with three nuclear, biological, and
chemical reconnaissance system (NBCRS) vehicles. The NBCRS has a
crew of four who are protected from NBC contamination by an
overpressure system. The NBCRS is capable of day or night operations,
in all geographical areas, in adverse weather, and under all types of
battlefield conditions. The NBCRS is a high-speed, highly mobile,
wheeled light armored reconnaissance vehicle capable of performing
NBC reconnaissance on primary, secondary, or cross-country routes
throughout the battlefield. The NBCRS is not a fighting vehicle. It is a
scarce resource and vulnerable to damage or destruction by enemy
fire, and must be protected by dedicated security elements.
EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES
5-150. The NBCRS platoon can be employed to operate as a pure
element or decentralized, depending on METT-TC factors, decentralized
to respond to asymmetrical threats over a large operating environment.
The NBCRS platoon normally operates as one of three configurations:
5-45
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
team, squad, or platoon. The RSTA squadron and infantry battalions

must be familiar with NBC reconnaissance techniques since
attachment of an NBC reconnaissance team, squad, or platoon is likely
to occur in an NBC threat environment.
5-46
Team Organization
5-151. The team is the normal organization for the RSTA squadron. In
this configuration, one NBCRS vehicle is paired with a security element
in each one of the three reconnaissance troops. This employment
method is a decentralized configuration designed to perform multiple
NBC R&S missions over vast areas. The organization facilitates NBC
reconnaissance and surveillance throughout the depth and width of
the brigade area of responsibility. This broadened R&S requirement is
achievable by planning and conducting a comprehensive vulnerability
and mission analysis and a coordinated IPB, by optimizing improved
C4ISR, and by integrating networked detectors and sensors into the
collection effort. Other potential team missions include surveillance of
key fixed sites such as airfields or ports. Regardless of the mission,
NBCRS vehicles require a security element or wingman to provide
conventional threat overwatch.
Squad Organization
5-152. A squad consists of two NBCRS vehicles and is the preferred
organization under most conditions, to include large area
reconnaissance, extended route reconnaissance, deliberate attacks,
and defensive operations. This configuration allows two NBCRS
vehicles to complement each other with their sensors in order to
maximize contamination avoidance and detection. When operating as a
pair, the squad can quickly find bypass routes around contamination
to avoid loss of maneuver force momentum or locate an
uncontaminated route. The third NBCRS in the squad configuration
can be used for NBC surveillance operations oriented on NAIs
developed during the IPB process as an integral part of the overall
intelligence collection effort or providing overwatch on key fixed sites.
Platoon Organization
5-153. The platoon configuration consists of all three NBCRS vehicles
operating in unison. This configuration is rarely formed with NBCRS in
the RSTA squadron since it provides little flexibility to the RSTA and
SBCT commanders. However, this configuration may be necessary
when larger contaminated areas or locations require extensive marking
or surveillance.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

5-154. Some significant limitations exist with respect to area coverage,
staff planning, and organic decontamination capabilities. The size of
the AO in which the squadron is expected to operate presents a
challenge to the ability of the platoon to provide full coverage. Any
determined effort by an adversary to employ NBC capabilities against
the squadron will require chemical staff and chemical unit
augmentation. Security for NBCRS assets is always a concern and
proper coordination and planning must occur to prevent fratricide.
5-155. In determining how, when, where, and what size element to
employ, commanders and staffs must consider the advantages and
disadvantages of employing a specific size element and how it relates to
mission accomplishment. The following paragraphs highlight the
advantages and disadvantages of M93A1 NBCRS.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
5-156. Advantages of M93A1 NBCRS include:

• NBC recon and survey conducted on the move.
• Vehicle capable of keeping up with maneuver forces.
• Greater mobility allows greater area coverage.
• NBC recon mission conducted without exiting the vehicle.
• All known chemical warfare agents detected and
identified.
• Overpressure system, which allows crews to operate in
contaminated environment without masking.
• Location data provided to better delineate contamination.
• Vehicle swim capability ready with little preparation.
• Vehicle air conditioner, which allows the vehicle’s
identification and detection equipment to operate under
extreme conditions.
• Vehicle marking system, which allows contamination to be
marked without exposing the crew.
• Ability to store data on unknown suspected chemical
agents.
5-157. Disadvantages of the M93A1 NBCRS include:

• Vehicle not readily recognizable as friendly.
• Specialized maintenance support requirements.
• Fifteen to 20 minutes required to initially prepare on-
board chemical detection equipment (MM1) for operation.
• Vehicle restricted by rough terrain; maintains greatest
mobility over level terrain.
PRINCIPLES
5-158. Three principles guide NBC defense. They are—
• Contamination avoidance.
• Protection.
• Decontamination.
COMTAMINATION AVOIDANCE
5-159. Understanding the NBC environment in the battlespace
provides identification of the current NBC hazards in air, water, or on
land; personnel, equipment or facilities; and the physical state of the
hazard (gas, liquid, or solid). This situational awareness promotes safe
contamination avoidance measures since hazards are identified and
located. Contamination avoidance allows the force to move around
hazards or relocate prior to hazard arrival. Detection and identification
is accomplished by integrated cooperative detection methods. This
includes the NBC platoon in the squadron, with point, standoff, and
remote sensing capabilities; unit-level and platform point detection. To
survive and accomplish the mission, individuals and units must take
5-48
precautions to
avoid or minimize effects of initial and residual NBC hazards. The four
steps to contamination avoidance are—
• Passive defense measures.
• Warn and report NBC attacks.
• Locate and identify NBC hazards.
• Limit exposure to NBC hazards.
5-160. The NBC platoon conducts precise detection and identification

with the M93A1 NBCRS. This vehicle is equipped with a mobile mass
spectrometer (MM1), radiation detection unit (ASG1), autonomous
navigation system (ANAV), and other detection and identification
equipment giving users the capability to travel at optimum speeds
while checking for NBC contamination. See FM 3-11.19 [FM 3-19] for a
detailed discussion of M93A1 NBCRS tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP).
5-161. The NBC reconnaissance platoon provides a special
reconnaissance capability to the RSTA and SBCT commanders. The
platoon locates and identifies life-threatening chemical and radiological
contaminants. NBC reconnaissance is the active contamination
avoidance measure that provides commanders with information on
NBC hazards in an area of operations. This ultimately contributes to
the development of an NBC common operational picture (COP) and an
improved situational awareness and understanding for more informed
command decisions.
PROTECTION
5-162. Protecting the force prevents NBC casualties through reducing
the threat, contamination avoidance, and physical protection. Physical
protection provides the brigade with individual and collective
protection for a contamination-free environment for personnel and
equipment. The brigade will employ NBC collective protection systems
and NBC overgarments to enhance survivability of the brigade.
Through effective threat analysis, the brigade will initiate chemical and
biological agent pretreatment prior to deployment to provide an
effective defense against the physiological effects of the agents. See FM
3-11.4 [FM 3-4].
DECONTAMINATION
5-163. Sustaining the force following NBC contamination involves
decontamination. Decontamination is the process of making a person,
object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making
harmless, or by removing chemical or biological agents or radioactive
material clinging to or around it. Decontamination stops the erosion of
combat power and helps the unit avoid casualties. The three types of
decontamination are immediate, operational, and thorough.
Operational decontamination will be conducted with decontamination
assets organic to the forward support companies. The squadron will
5-49
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
conduct immediate decontamination without augmentation. Thorough

decontamination will be accomplished from chemical unit
augmentation from corps-level assets.
5-50
ACTIONS BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER AN NBC ATTCK

5-164. All soldiers must understand the concepts of NBC defense and
the skills necessary to survive an attack. Individual soldiers must be
able to survive in order for the unit to survive and continue operations.
Individuals are responsible for—
• Recognizing hazards and taking cover.
• Using protective measures and MOPP gear.
• Knowing avoidance measures, first aid, and
decontamination.
5-165. Squadron and troop commanders, assisted by the NBC platoon

specialists, assess unit status, integrate NBC considerations in
planning, and designate and train special purpose teams. These
special purpose NBC teams include the following:
• Chemical agent detection teams.
• Radiological survey and monitoring teams.
• Decontamination teams.
BEFORE THE ATTACK
5-166. The best defense is to avoid becoming a lucrative target. If
contamination cannot be avoided, then its effects must be reduced.
Passive avoidance measures are not a direct reaction to threat NBC
attack. These measures listed below are already considered in the
course of other operations, but contribute to NBC attack avoidance.
• Dispersion.
• Concealment.
• Camouflage.
• Detection and bypass of contaminated areas.
• COMSEC.
• OPSEC.
5-167. Leaders and NBC personnel conduct vulnerability analysis to

determine the risk of attack then incorporate appropriate protective
measures. Protective measures must not unnecessarily degrade the
effectiveness of the squadron. Protective measures are also used when
contamination cannot be avoided. These protective measures include
the following:
• Position improvement.
• Assuming higher MOPP levels (see Table 5-6).
• Using collective protection systems.
• Protecting equipment and supplies.
• Positioning alarms.
• Alerting unit NBC teams.
5-51
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Table 5-6. MOPP Levels
MOPP
MOPP LEVELS COMMAND
EQUIPMENT
MOPP
MOPP ZERO MOPP 1 MOPP 2 MOPP 3 MOPP 4 MASK ONLY
READY
1
Mask Carried Carried Carried Carried Worn Worn Worn
2 3 1 1 1
Overgarment Ready Available Worn Worn Worn Worn
2 3 3
Vinyl overboot Ready Available Available Worn Worn Worn
2 3 3 3 3
Gloves Ready Available Available Available Available Worn
Helmet Protective 2 3 3
Ready Available Available Worn Worn Worn
Cover
Chemical
2 3 4 4 4 4
Protective Ready Available Worn Worn Worn Worn
4
Undergarment
1
In hot weather coat or hood can be left open for ventilation.
2
Must be available to the soldier within two hours. Second set available in 6 hours.
3
Within arm’s reach of soldier.
4
The chemical protective undergarment is worn under the battle dress uniform (primarily applies to special operations
forces personnel and armor vehicle crewmen).
5-168. Protective measures against biological weapons are the most

difficult to take. These measures include the following:
• Complete immunizations prior to conflict.
• Proper personal hygiene on a continuous basis.
• Proper field sanitation.
• Proper preparation of foods.
• Avoiding unapproved local foodstuffs and water sources.
• Good physical conditioning.
DURING THE ATTACK

5-169. The attack can take several forms. These include direct attack,
downwind hazard from attack elsewhere, entering a minefield with
chemical mines, or inadvertently entering a contaminated area.
Individual soldiers react immediately to protect themselves against
contamination or initial nuclear effects. Before chemical weapons
usage is confirmed, soldiers will don the mask only when there is a
high probability of a chemical attack. High probability chemical attack
indicators are as follows:
• Chemical alarms sounding.
• Positive reading on chemical agent detector paper or on
chemical agent monitor.
• Soldiers experiencing symptoms of chemical agent
poisoning.
• Visual or vocal alarms indicating attack.
5-170. Upon initiation of chemical warfare, commanders must decide

whether their personnel should automatically mask upon other
5-52
possible indicators of chemical use. These indicators include threat

artillery or rocket attacks and smoke operations.
5-171. If intelligence sources identify possible threat biological agent
use, including toxins, the commander may again institute automatic
masking. Troops automatically mask for conditions that may signal
biological attack such as smoke, spray, mist, presence of dead
animals, or insect vectors. Since some toxins will attack the skin,
protective clothing should be worn.
5-172. Commanders establish and continually assess the automatic
masking policy as the situation and mission change. Individual
reaction is the first step of unit response. Additional reactions are also
standardized in SOP and include the following:
• Sound alarms.
• Assume MOPP 4 as soon as possible.
• Treat casualties.
• Send reports.
• Identify the agent.
• Initiate decontamination.
5-173. The mission must continue, even though degraded. The threat
often employs chemicals to disrupt the defense as part of an attack.
The troop or squadron cannot become so involved in responding to the
attack that it stops the mission underway. Training, SOP, and
discipline are the foundation of continued combat effectiveness.
AFTER THE ATTACK

5-174. Following the attack or inadvertent exposure, actions initiated
during the attack continue. The alarm is passed throughout the
squadron with emphasis on units downwind of the attack. Other
squadrons react as necessary. NBC-1 reports are prepared and sent.
Additional information is sent as updates to avoid delay in the initial
report. Perform first aid (self aid, buddy aid, or combat lifesaver). Agent
identification is initiated to determine decontamination requirements
and to allow unmasking as soon as possible.
5-175. Decontamination proceeds as soon as the situation allows (see
Table 5-7). Immediate decontamination is the immediate neutralization
or removal of contamination from exposed portions of the skin and
critical equipment surfaces. Soldiers perform this decontamination
without supervision, using individual equipment and vehicle
decontamination apparatus. Operational decontamination is the
actions of teams or squads within the squadron to reduce the spread of
contamination on people or equipment and possibly allow temporary
relief from MOPP 4. Operational decontamination occurs as far forward
as the situation allows. Thorough decontamination operations
decontaminate clothing and equipment so soldiers can perform their
mission with individual and respiratory protection removed. Thorough
decontamination takes detailed planning and outside assistance from
either a division or corps.
5-53
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Table 5-7. Decontamination Techniques
LEVEL BEST START TIME DONE BY TECHNIQUE GAINS MADE

Before 1 minute Individual Skin decon Stops agent from
penetrating
Immediate Within 15 minutes Individual or Crew Personal wipedown
Operator spraydown
Within 6 hours Unit MOPP gear exchange Possible temporary
relief from MOPP4;
Operational Squadron Crew or Vehicle washdown limit liquid agent
Decon Squad spread
When mission allows Unit Detailed troop decon Probable long-term

Thorough reconstitution MOPP reduction with
DIV/REGT Decon PLT Detailed equipment
minimum risks
decon
5-176. Operating in a nuclear environment requires continuous or

periodic monitoring as necessary. A reconnaissance mission may be
assigned for the purpose of conducting a radiological survey.
Radiological survey information is forwarded as an NBC-4 report.
Exposure must be closely monitored and reported. Radiation exposure
is determined by the cumulative dose or radiation history of the unit
maintained by platoon or section on a radiation exposure guide.
Excessive exposure of units may force commanders to move or relieve
units. Acceptable levels of exposure are determined for the operation
and expressed as degrees of exposure risk—negligible, moderate, and
emergency. Fallout decontamination is accomplished by brushing or
wiping the contaminated dust off clothing and equipment. Do not use
masks to protect against fallout particles; use a damp cloth held over
the nose and mouth. This method is generally preferable to masking to
avoid trapping contamination in the mask filter.
5-177. When the squadron receives a strike warning (STRIKWARN)
message, actions are initiated to minimize the effects of the friendly
strike. These actions are established in SOP (and common task
manuals) and the warning must be disseminated to every element of
the squadron. Each crew prepares its vehicle or position for the attack.
USE OF SMOKE AND OBSCURANTS

5-178. Projected smoke assets to counter visual, infrared and
millimeter wave (MMW) threats include artillery, mortar, and horizontal
technology integration (HTI) vehicle-mounted grenade launcher
systems (brigade level). When facing a robust threat, a dual purpose
smoke/decontamination company from corps augmentation will
provide large area, long duration smoke and obscurants to enable the
squadron to conduct effective concealment or deception operations.
Deception operations combined with concealing smoke and obscurants
deny the threat commander an exploitable opportunity to use weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and can be used to selectively blind his
RSTA assets. Screening of visual, infrared, or MMW will degrade
opponent target acquisition capabilities.
5-54
SECTION IX – RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS
5-179. The squadron participates in three types of river crossings:

hasty, deliberate and retrograde. It participates in deliberate and
retrograde river crossings only with the SBCT, but can conduct hasty
river crossings independently. While supporting the SBCT during
deliberate and retrograde crossings, the squadron will conduct
reconnaissance or screening operations as directed. (For a detailed
explanation of deliberate and retrograde water crossings, see FM 3-
34.13 [FM 90-13] and
FM 3-90.3 [FM 71-3].)
5-180. When necessary, the squadron will conduct hasty water
crossings during reconnaissance operations to assist the brigade in
maintaining momentum. Hasty water crossings are decentralized
operations across inland bodies of water such as canals, lakes, or
rivers. The approach to the water obstacle is made rapidly on a broad
front whenever possible. Hasty crossings using captured bridges or
fords are the product of rapid maneuver. These operations include
crossings by tactical bridging or by fording vehicles. The optimum
situation is to secure bridges intact before the threat can destroy them.
Figure 5-9 shows the graphic control measures for river crossing
operations.
5-181. Hasty water crossings are characterized by—
• Speed, surprise, and minimum loss of momentum.
• Decentralized operations with organic, existing, or
expedient resources.
• Weak (or no) threat defenses on both banks.
• Minimum concentration of forces.
• Quick continuation of the operation.
5-182. Although the crossing is termed hasty, detailed planning

ensures that fire support and crossing means are available when the
force arrives at the water obstacle. Hasty crossings are feasible when
the site is lightly defended, when crossing means are readily available,
and when fire support is sufficient. Once the sites have been scouted,
information is normally passed back to the main CP, which sends this
information out digitally to all subordinate and higher units.
5-183. Crossings are not entirely dependent on the seizure of bridges
or fords. Normally, UAVs and/or ground scouts cross first to establish
security on the far side to protect the crossing of the remainder of the
command.
FM 3-90.2 [FM 71-2] contains a detailed discussion of hasty water
crossings.
5-55
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
TCP
PL REAR 1
PL REAR
A tta c k p o s itio n
G re en 34
2 -3 k m RP
C r o s s in g A r e a
ERP G reen
RP 4
S ite G r e e n 3 H o ld in g
(R a ft) A re a
S ite G r e e n 2
R IV E R
R IV E R C e n te r lin e C e n te r lin e C e n te r lin e (s w im )
W est M id d le E ast
TCP
2 (E n g in e e r T r a ffic O n ly )
TCP 5
TCP ERP
EEP
G reen 35 1
2 -3 k m 3
ERP
1 ALT
TCP C a ll-fo r w a r d
6 a re a G re e n 2 1
C a ll-fo r w a r d
a re a G re e n 3 3
TCP
7
(E n g in e e r T o S ite G r e e n 1
T r a ffic
O n ly )
H o ld in g
TCP a re a G re e n 3 2
3
RL A PPLE R L A PP LE
8 TCP
TCP
2 ERP 9
S ta g in g a r e a G r e e n 3 1
Figure 5-9. River Crossing Control Measures
RECONNAISSANCE
5-184. Air or ground reconnaissance normally encounters the obstacle
first. Reconnaissance is immediately conducted to determine the
following:
• The width and depth of the waterway.
• Water velocity.
• Possible entry and exit points and their conditions.
• Waterbed soil type and condition.
• The threat situation on the far bank. This task is well
suited to the UAVs.
5-56
• Security is established before the troop or squadron

begins crossing in force, to include far bank security by
ground scouts to provide early warning and to secure the
site from threat observation (augmentation necessary if
threat is identified) and local security at the crossing site.
• Overwatch is positioned on the near bank as
reconnaissance begins.
• Mortars and artillery are positioned to provide suppressive
and screening fires.
• The commander and FSO are positioned forward.
• Waiting units remain dispersed during reconnaissance
and the crossing.
CROSSING
5-185. Upon completion of reconnaissance and establishment of
security, the squadron begins crossing by troop. Crossing sites
selected must accommodate the least capable vehicles in the troop or
the commander runs the risk of separated forces. If an armored vehicle
launched bridge (AVLB) is available, it is positioned well forward in a
hide position, but does not come forward until the scouts have selected
the bridging site. The troop does not delay at the crossing site to
improve it for other squadron assets. Site capability is reported to the
squadron for the commander’s decision for continued use or engineer
improvement. As the crossing begins, the troop commander staggers
movement of subordinate units to preclude bunching up at the
crossing site.
FIRE SUPPORT
5-186. Fire support is required to suppress known or suspected threat
overwatching the water obstacle. Mortars are positioned to provide
support as the reconnaissance of the obstacle begins. The FSO is
positioned to observe the crossing site and to manage the fire support
effort. Smoke is planned to screen the crossing, but used only if
necessary. Figure 5-10 shows an example of the squadron conducting
a hasty river crossing.
5-57
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 5-10. Squadron Conducting Hasty River Crossing
FOLLOW-ON FORCES
5-187. The troop is not required to improve a crossing site for follow-on
forces of the squadron or main body. Crossing sites that may be used
by other forces are marked by the troop. The squadron is not
responsible for crossing site improvement; it will rely on the brigade to
enhance crossing sites.
SECTION X – OBSTACLE BREACHING OPERATIONS
5-188. Based on the role of the squadron, it should only breach in a

very permissive or low threat environment with proper engineer
augmentation. An obstacle is any physical characteristic of the terrain,
natural, man-made, or cultural that impedes the mobility of a force. The
effectiveness of an obstacle is enhanced considerably when covered by
fire. Obstacles can include abatis, antitank ditches, blown bridges,
built-up areas, minefields, rivers, road craters, naturally existing
terrain, and wire. They are classified as either existing or reinforcing.
• Existing obstacles are any natural or cultural attributes of the
terrain. Existing obstacles affect ground and some low-level
air movement. Existing obstacles are treated as if overwatched
when initially encountered until the presence of the threat is
determined.
• Reinforcing obstacles are specifically constructed, emplaced,
or detonated to tie together, strengthen, and extend existing
obstacles. These obstacles directly attack the ability to
5-58
maneuver, mass, and reinforce and are designed to produce a

specific effect, such as block, fix, turn, or disrupt.
5-189. Battlefield clutter, such as abandoned minefields and destroyed
vehicle hulks, are not categorized as obstacles, but pose a serious
threat in stability operations, support operations, and SSCs due to
their sparse, scattered, unpredictable, and random placement within
the AO.
5-190. The threat employs obstacles to attrit, slow, disorganize, and
canalize the attacker. They may be used alone, but are normally
covered by preplanned fire concentrations. Existing and reinforcing
obstacles are integrated to support the defense. The threat plans
obstacles to confine the attacker within fire sacks and to make the
employment of the reserve easier. Minefields may be used to protect
the flanks of a force or to support a counterattack by the reserve
against a penetration.
5-191. IPB provides situational templates that indicate known,
suspected, and probable locations of obstacles supporting a threat
defense. This information is essential in evaluating the nature of any
obstacle encountered during a mission. Effective reinforcing obstacles
are often encountered when operating across terrain used in previous
operations. IPB may also provide this information.
5-192. Reconnaissance of the obstacle is key to identify the
composition, depth, width, and threat. This information is necessary in
determining whether bypass is possible, the squadron is capable of
breaching, where to breach, terrain best suited in providing support of
the breach, and whether further assets are needed to breach. The
commander’s intent and METT-TC greatly influence the decision on
breaching an obstacle.
5-193. Obstacle breaching is a combination of tactics and techniques
used to project the maneuver forces to the other side of an obstacle. If
the mission and situation permit, the first choice of the squadron is to
seek a bypass. This is particularly true for large built-up areas that are
known to have a sizable threat force within, that can quickly fix the
unit.
BREACHING FUNDAMENTALS
5-194. Suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault (SOSRA) are
the breaching fundamentals that must be applied to ensure success
when breaching against a defending threat. These fundamentals will
always apply but may vary based on the specific situation (METT-TC).
SUPPRESS
5-195. Suppression is a tactical task to employ direct or indirect fires
or electronic attack on threat personnel, weapons, or equipment to
prevent or degrade threat fires and observation of friendly forces. The
purpose of suppression during breaching operations is to protect
forces reducing and maneuvering through an obstacle.
5-196. Effective suppression is a mission-critical task during any
breaching operation. Suppressive fires in sufficient volume serve to
secure the reduction area. Successful suppression generally triggers
the rest of the actions at the obstacle. FSCMs are used to ensure that
5-59
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
all fires are synchronized with other actions at the obstacle. Although
suppressing the threat overwatching the obstacle is the mission of the
support force, the breach force should have the capability to provide
additional suppression against the threat that the support force cannot
effectively suppress.
OBSCURE
5-197. Obscuration must be employed to protect forces conducting
obstacle reduction and the passage of assault forces. Obscuration
hampers threat observation and target acquisition and conceals
friendly activities and movement. Obscuration smoke deployed on or
near the threat’s position minimizes its vision. Screening smoke
employed between the reduction area and the threat conceals
movement and obstacle-reduction activities. It also degrades threat
ground and aerial observation. Obscuration can also be done utilizing
electronic measures. Obscuration must be carefully planned to provide
maximum degradation of threat observation and fires, but it must not
significantly degrade friendly fires and control.
SECURE
5-198. Friendly forces secure the reduction area to prevent the threat
from interfering with obstacle reduction and the passage of the assault
force through the lanes created during the reduction. Security must be
effective against outposts and fighting positions near the obstacle and
against overwatching units, as necessary. Fires isolate or occupation
must secure the far side of the obstacle before any effort to reduce the
obstacle is attempted. The higher headquarters of the attacking unit
has the responsibility to isolate the breach area by fixing adjacent
units, attacking threat reserves in depth, and providing counterfire
support.
5-199. Identifying the extent of the threat’s positions is critical before
selecting the appropriate technique to secure the point of breach. If the
threat controls the point of breach and cannot be adequately
suppressed, the force must secure the point of breach before it can
reduce the obstacle.
5-200. The breach force must be resourced with enough maneuver
assets to provide local security against those forces that the support
force cannot sufficiently engage. Elements within the breach force that
secure the reduction area may also be used to suppress the threat
once reduction is complete.
REDUCE
5-201. Reduction is the creation of lanes through or over an obstacle
to allow an attacking force to pass. The number and width of lanes
created varies with the threat situation and the composition and
scheme of maneuver of the assault force. The lanes must be sufficient
to allow the assault force to rapidly pass through the obstacle. The
breach force will reduce, proof (if required), mark, and report lane
locations and the lane-marking method to higher headquarters.
Follow-on units will further reduce or clear the obstacle when required.
Reduction cannot be accomplished until effective suppression and
obscuration are in place, the obstacle has been identified, and the
5-60
point of breach is secure. Obstacle reduction techniques are discussed

in FM 3-34.2 [FM 90-13-1].
ASSAULT
5-202. A breaching operation is not complete until—
• Friendly forces have assaulted to destroy the threat on the
far side of the obstacle that is capable of placing or
observing direct and indirect fires on the reduction area.
• Battle handover with follow-on forces has occurred, unless
no battle handover is planned.
• The size of the assault force determines the number of
lanes initially created.
BREACHING ORGANIZATION
5-203. The squadron commander organizes the squadron to
accomplish SOSRA quickly and effectively. This requires him to
establish support, breach, and assault forces with the necessary assets
to accomplish their missions (see Table 5-8). Usually these forces
should be designated for any type mission either in the OPORD or
through SOP. Identification of these forces, even when obstacles are
not expected, will aid the force during its transition to breaching
operations.
Table 5-8. Relationship between Breach Organization and Breach Fundamentals
BREACHING BREACHING
RESPONSIBILITIES
ORGANIZATION FUNDAMENTALS
Support Force Suppress. Suppress threat direct fires systems covering the
Obscure. reduction area.
Control obscuring smoke.
Prevent threat forces from repositioning or
counterattacking to place direct fires on the breach
force.
Breach Force Suppress (provides additional Create and mark the necessary lanes in an
suppression). obstacle.
Obscure (provides additional Secure the near-side and the far-side of an obstacle
obscuration in the reduction and defeat forces that can place immediate direct
area). fires on the reduction area.
Secure (provides local security). Report lane status/location.
Reduce.
Assault Force Assault. Destroy the threat on the far side of an obstacle that
Suppress (if necessary). is capable of placing direct fires on the reduction
area.
May assist the support force with suppression if the
threat is not effectively suppressed.
Be prepared to breach follow-on and/or protective
obstacles after passing through the reduction area.
SUPPORT FORCE
5-204. The support force’s primary responsibility is to eliminate the
threat’s ability to interfere with a breaching operation. It must—
• Isolate the reduction area with fires.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Mass and control direct and indirect fires to suppress the

threat and to neutralize any weapons that are able to
bring fires on the breach force.
• Control obscuring smoke to prevent threat-observed direct
and indirect fires.
5-205. Suppression is critical for a successful breaching operation;

therefore, allocation of adequate forces to the support force is essential.
The commander must allocate enough direct- and indirect-fire systems
to the support force to allow it to accomplish its missions. When
resourcing the support force, consideration must be given to the losses
it will receive as it fights its way into its support by fire (SBF) position.
To increase the survivability of the support force, the commander may
establish critical friendly zones (CFZ) in support of the support force
once it has occupied its SBF positions. A CFZ is an area, usually a
friendly unit or location, that the maneuver commander designates as
critical in order to protect an asset whose loss would seriously
jeopardize the mission. Covered by a radar sector, the CFZ supports
counterfire operations by providing the most responsive submission of
targets to the fire support system when rounds impact inside the CFZ.
For more detailed information on CFZs, see
FM 3-09.12 [FM 6-121].
5-206. The support force must seize an SBF position, seeking
maximum protection from the terrain. If possible, the support force
should follow a covered or concealed route to the SBF position, take up
its assigned sectors of fire and observation, and begin to engage the
threat. It may have to make some adjustments to its direct-fire plan if
the situation dictates. Observation is particularly critical. Artillery
observers with the support force may initially bring indirect fires on
threat positions to fix and suppress the threat. The support force
adjusts the artillery-delivered obscuring smoke primarily if it is
ineffective in order to protect the breach and assault forces as they
approach the reduction area.
5-207. The support force suppresses the threat to eliminate effective
fires on the breach force. Smoke and terrain are used to assist in
isolating the force under attack. Suppression requires the commander
to mass enough overwatching direct fires to protect the breach force.
5-208. The support force should have reduction assets to reduce the
impact that unexpected obstacles or scatterable minefields have on its
approach to and occupation of SBF positions. Failure to provide
reduction assets may greatly impact on synchronizing the entire
breaching operation. As a technique, a unit may create a mobility
reserve that supports the main effort throughout the operation.
Initially, the mobility reserve may support the support force until it has
seized its SBF positions and then shift its support to the breach or
assault force.
BREACH FORCE
5-209. The breach force’s mission is to assist in the passage of the
assault force by creating, proofing (if necessary), and marking lanes per
unit SOP. The breach force should be a combined arms force. It should
5-62
include engineers, reduction assets, and enough maneuver forces to

provide additional suppression and local security. The breach force
may apply portions of the following breaching fundamentals as it
reduces an obstacle:
• Suppress. The breach force must be allocated enough
maneuver forces to provide additional suppression against
various threats, to include
Threat direct-fire systems that cannot be effectively
observed and suppressed by the support force due to
the terrain or the masking of the support force’s fires
by the breach force as it moves forward to reduce the
obstacle.
Counterattacking and/or repositioning forces that
cannot be engaged by the support force.
• Obscure. The breach force employs vehicle-mounted
smoke systems and smoke pots, if necessary, for self-
defense and to cover lanes while the assault force is
passing.
• Secure. The breach force secures itself from dismounted
threat forces providing close-in protection of the obstacle.
The breach force also secures the lanes through the
tactical obstacles once they are created to allow safe
passage of the assault force.
• Reduce. The breach force performs its primary mission of
reducing the obstacle. To support the development of a
plan to reduce the obstacle, the composition of the
obstacle system must be an intelligence requirement.
• Assault. The breach force assaults through the point of
breach to the far side of an obstacle and seize the
reduction area.
5-210. The breach force is composed of two subordinate elements: a

security element and a reduction element. The security element is
composed primarily of maneuver forces and will normally be
responsible for providing additional suppression, obscuration, and
local security. The reduction element is composed primarily of
reduction assets (mine clearing blade [MCB], mine clearing line
charges [MICLIC], AVLBs, armored combat earthmovers (ACE), and
dismounted engineers, and/or scouts). It normally is responsible only
for reducing the obstacle.
5-211. The breach force must be able to deploy and begin reducing the
obstacle as soon as threat fires have been suppressed and effective
obscuration is achieved. It can expect threat artillery fires within a
matter of minutes. CFZs should be activated at the point of breach
before the commitment of the breach force.
5-212. Engineers within the breach force are allocated with the
reduction assets necessary to clear mines, nonexplosive obstacles, and
small gaps. Scouts, engineers, UAVs or other reconnaissance assets
are also capable of finding local bypasses or existing lanes in the
obstacle system.
5-63
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
5-213. The commander allocates reduction assets based on the

number of lanes required, the terrain, and the type of obstacle. The
breach force must be capable of creating a minimum of one lane for
each assault element.
5-214. After the breach force has reduced the obstacle and passed the
assault force through, the breach force may be required to hand over
the lane to follow-on units. At a minimum, the lanes must be marked
and their locations and conditions reported to higher headquarters and
follow-on units as prescribed in the unit’s SOP.
5-215. The commander also masses his engineers and reduction
assets to reduce the obstacle. The breach force is organized and
equipped to use several different reduction techniques in case the
primary technique fails (a key vehicle is destroyed or casualties render
dismounted engineers ineffective). Additional reduction assets are
present to handle the unexpected. Normally, 50 percent more
reduction assets than required for obstacle reduction are positioned
with the breach force.
5-216. The breach force masses reduction effort against the obstacle to
ensure it will successfully create enough lanes. It attempts to
simultaneously create as many lanes as necessary to ensure the rapid
passage of the assault force through the obstacle system. This may
require the breach force to simultaneously use a combination of
mechanical, explosive, and manual techniques. The commander must
carefully plan and synchronize the creation of additional lanes to
reduce the potential for fratricide with assaulting troops. The distance
between the lanes depends on the threat, the terrain, the need to
minimize the effects of threat artillery, the direct-fire plan of the
support force, C2, and reduction site congestion.
ASSAULT FORCE
5-217. The assault force’s primary mission is to destroy the threat and
seize terrain on the far side of the obstacle to prevent the threat from
placing direct fires on the created lanes. The assault force may be
tasked to assist the support force with suppression while the breach
force reduces the obstacle.
5-218. The assault force must be sufficient in size to seize the point of
penetration. Combat power is allocated to the assault force to achieve a
minimum of a 3 to 1 ratio on the point of penetration. In a breaching
operation, particularly squadron/TF and above, the assault force
normally maneuvers as a separate force attacking through a reduced
obstacle. However, breach and assault assets may maneuver as a
single force when conducting lower-level breaching operations at troop
level.
5-219. Direct FSCMs are essential, since both the support and breach
forces may be firing on the threat when the assault force is committed.
Suppression of overwatching threat positions must continue and other
threat forces must remain fixed by fires until the threat has been
destroyed. The assault force must assume control for direct fires on the
assault objective as the support and breach force’s fires are shifted.
5-64
5-220. Achieving necessary mass for the assault requires the breach
force to open enough lanes through the obstacle to permit rapid
passage and the buildup of forces on the far side. A mounted unit
requires one lane per assaulting unit. A dismounted assault force
requires one lane for each leading assault platoon. The tactical
situation may require additional lanes to quickly pass a large assault
force through the obstacle to achieve a sufficient combat power ratio.
5-221. The principle of mass influences the selection of the point of
breach; the task organization of the support, breach, and assault
forces; and the integration of engineers in force movement or attack
formations.
5-222. The need to generate enough mass and the maneuver space
available strongly influences which echelon can conduct the breaching
operation. A troop generally cannot simultaneously mass sufficient
fires, reduce the obstacle, and also assault the far side unless it is a
simple obstacle lightly defended. The squadron should have a combat
power ratio of at least 3 to 1 in order to reduce an obstacle
overwatched by a threat.
5-223. Breaching is conducted by rapidly applying concentrated
effects at a point to reduce the obstacle and penetrate the defense.
Massed combat power is directed against the threat’s weakness. The
location selected for breaching depends largely on the weakness in the
threat’s defense where its covering fires are minimized. If friendly
forces cannot find a natural weakness, they create one by fixing the
majority of the threat force and isolating a small portion of it for attack.
The squadron cannot breach complex obstacles covered by direct or
indirect fires without augmentation to fill the role of either the breach
or assault force.
SECTION XI – OPERATIONS IN A NONCONTIGUOUS ENVIRONMENT
5-224. The various missions that occur in stability operations, support

operations, and SSCs conducted in the 50 x 50-kilometer brigade AO
(100 x 100 if augmented) may require the squadron to conduct
decentralized execution of missions. In certain situations, the
squadron may best accomplish its mission by employing subordinate
troops independently.
5-225. If the squadron is covering dispersed areas, ground troops may
operate out of their own assembly areas in their specified AO. In a
noncontiguous environment, a troop or the squadron may collocate
their assembly areas with the maneuver battalions and conduct
separate operations in the maneuver battalion’s AO. Facilitating the
movement of forces through the rear area may require only the support
of a troop. If movement is to include support of a subsequent
operation, then this becomes a squadron mission. Area damage
control, likewise, can be performed by the ground troop in the area.
When troops are operating independently, they still perform missions
according to the principles outlined throughout this manual. C2 is still
5-65
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
exercised by the squadron and service support is provided to the

troops.
5-226. When elements of the squadron are assigned missions that
overlap a maneuver unit’s AO, it is imperative that the recce troop
commander or leader integrate and synchronize his operations with
that of the maneuver unit. At a minimum he should share the
following:
• Patrol and movement routes (primary and alternate).
• Checkpoint data.
• Friendly and threat unit locations.
• Identification and recognition procedures.
• FSCM.
• Known obstacle types and locations.
• Mortar firing positions.
• Communications (signal operating instruction [SOI]
information, FBCB2 IP addresses).
• Mission information.
5-66
Chapter 6
Combat Support
The squadron employs CONTENTS
combat support (CS) and Relationships and Responsibilities .................... 6-2
fire support to enhance Employ Fires ......................................................... 6-3
Components ...................................................... 6-4
the effectiveness of Fire Support Assets and Capabilities ............. 6-4
squadron operations. Target Acquisition ............................................ 6-7
Effects-Based Fires .......................................... 6-12
Examples include using Fire Support Planning, Coordination,
engineers to collect and Execution ............................................... 6-13
obstacle intelligence Close Air Support Operations.......................... 6-17
Joint Air Attack Team Operations ................... 6-20
(OBSTINTEL) during a Army Airspace Command and Control ............... 6-21
zone reconnaissance, or Airspace Control Order .................................... 6-22
employing artillery fires Army Airspace Command and
Control Overview .......................................... 6-23
and other effects, to Air Force Command and Control..................... 6-27
facilitate infiltration. Airspace Control Measures ............................. 6-28
Army Aviation Support ......................................... 6-30
Some of the squadron’s Organization ...................................................... 6-30
CS is task organized Principles of Aviation Employment ................. 6-30
with the squadron from Characteristics of Attack Helicopters ............. 6-31
Characteristics of Utility and
Stryker Brigade Combat Cargo Helicopters ......................................... 6-32
Team (SBCT) assets, Planning Operations with Army
such as the engineer Aviation Assets ............................................. 6-33
Aviation Missions.............................................. 6-34
company or the military Aviation Capabilities and Limitations ............. 6-35
intelligence (MI) Air Cavalry Support .......................................... 6-36
Attack Helicopter Support................................ 6-50
company. In some cases Assault and Cargo Helicopter Support ........... 6-63
other CS assets from Joint Air Attack Team ....................................... 6-74
higher echelons of Intelligence and Electronic Warfare .................... 6-84
SBCT Intelligence and Electronic Warfare ..... 6-84
command, such as air Division/ARFOR Intelligence and
defense artillery (ADA) Electronic Warfare ........................................ 6-98
NBC Support ......................................................... 6-98
and nuclear, biological, SBCT/Squadron Assets.................................... 6-98
and chemical (NBC), may Decontamination Support ................................ 6-98
also be task organized Engineer Support.................................................. 6-99
Organization ...................................................... 6-99
with the squadron. In Support Capabilities ......................................... 6-101
addition to organic Combat Engineer Employment........................ 6-103
mortars, the squadron Reconnaissance Operations Support............. 6-104
Security Operations Support ........................... 6-105
plans for and employs Role of Engineers Fighting as Infantry ........... 6-106
fire support from the Air Defense Artillery Support ............................... 6-106
Passive Air Defense.......................................... 6-106
SBCT artillery battalion, Active Air Defense ............................................ 6-107
and external sources Air Defense Command and Control ................ 6-107
such as close air support Planning and Employment ............................... 6-108
Signal Support ...................................................... 6-110
(CAS) and naval gunfire Organization and Functions ............................ 6-111
(NGF). Squadron Brigade Signal Company C4ISR Functions.... 6-115
Squadron Augmentation .................................. 6-117
planners must National and Joint Intelligence Assets ............... 6-117
understand the unique Central Intelligence Agency ............................. 6-120
capabilities and Department of Defense..................................... 6-120
Non-Defense Intelligence Elements ................ 6-125
limitations of these
assets in order to
effectively integrate them
6-1
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
into squadron operations. This integration begins during squadron

planning and continues through rehearsals and execution. The
addition of digital command, control, and communications (C3)
systems enhances the commander’s ability to integrate these
assets into the squadron’s scheme of maneuver.
SECTION I – RELATIONSHIPS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
6-1. CS units support the squadron under established command

or support relationships. These relationships define the
responsibilities of both commanders and leaders and the authority of
the unit commander over the supporting unit. Figure 6-1 illustrates
these relationships.
DIRECT GENERAL
FUNCTION ATTACHED OPCON
SUPPORT SUPORT
Under command/control of– Squadron Squadron Parent Unit Parent Unit
Commander Commander
Task organized by– Squadron Parent Unit Parent Unit Parent Unit
Receives missions, tasks, and Squadron Squadron Squadron Parent Unit
priorities from–
Positioned by– Squadron Squadron Direct Support Parent Unit1
Unit
Commander1
Maintains communications and Squadron Squadron and Squadron and Parent Unit
liaison with– Parent Unit Parent Unit
Receives Combat Service Squadron2 Parent Unit3 Parent Unit3 Parent Unit
Support (CSS) from–
1
With specific approval of the squadron commander if within the squadron area of operations.
2
The squadron provides CSS requirements beyond the capability of the parent unit after specific request
and coordination between the squadron and parent unit are made.
3
Attached element brings an appropriate slice of CSS equipment and personnel to supplement squadron
assets.
Figure 6-1. Command and Support Relationships
6-2. The squadron commander, with the assistance of his staff, is

responsible for the integration and synchronization of all available CS
with available combat assets to accomplish the assigned mission.
Digitization of maneuver and CS units affects the way in which the
commander decides to employ his CS assets. The commander must
consider differences in digital configurations between maneuver and
CS elements as well as the ability of these systems to interface with
one another. These considerations ultimately dictate the
relationships and responsibilities for attached CS assets.
6-3. The commander or leader of the CS unit may serve in a dual
role. He serves as the unit leader and may also be a special staff
6-2
_____________________________________________________________ Chapter 6 – Combat Support
officer. During planning and preparation for the mission, he provides

assistance, advice, and recommendations on the employment of his
unit to the commander and staff. During execution, he leads his unit
in the assigned mission as directed by the commander while
retaining his advisory role.
6-4. The squadron commander may retain control of CS elements
at squadron level or delegate support to subordinate troops. He
retains control by specifying tasks to these units and by assigning
priority of support to subordinate troops and attached company
teams. This technique improves, enhances, and develops centralized
control and flexibility, when required, and provides clear guidance to
the CS leader. In some circumstances, the mission may be best
accomplished by delegating support and/or security of the CS unit to
a troop commander. In doing so, the squadron commander cannot
designate a more restrictive relationship than that for the squadron
itself. If squadron control is adequate for the mission, the squadron
commander should avoid unnecessarily burdening subordinate
commanders with additional C2 responsibilities.
SECTION II – EMPLOY FIRES
6-5. Applying superior combat power at decisive times and places

determines the outcome of battles. Commanders use all available
combat and CS assets to enhance the capabilities of their maneuver
units. Commanders also use these assets to weight their main effort.
Knowing the capabilities of the available assets, assigning them
appropriate missions, and synchronizing their operations are
essential to the application of superior combat power.
6-6. Maintaining a focus when using fire support assets is a
constant challenge for the squadron commander and his staff. When
effectively integrated and combined with maneuver forces, fire
support assets are tremendous combat multipliers. Throughout any
operation, fires must be continually directed and concentrated on the
essential tasks assigned by the SBCT and squadron commanders.
The primary technique used to maintain a strong focus of fires is the
essential fire support tasks (EFST). EFSTs must be accomplished in
accordance with the commander’s guidance. Failure to achieve an
EFST may require the commander to alter his tactical or operational
plan. An in-depth discussion of EFSTs is included later in this
chapter.
6-7. Fire support planning and coordination exists at all echelons
of command and encompasses careful integration of all available
attack systems. Fire support by definition is “fires that directly
support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operation forces to
engage threat forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of
tactical and operational objectives” (Joint Publication [JP] 3-09). Fire
support assets include field artillery (FA), mortars, CAS, naval
surface fire support (NSFS), and intelligence and electronic warfare
(IEW). These assets support operations by disrupting, delaying,
diverting, limiting, and destroying threat forces. Lethal means,
6-3
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
nonlethal means, or combinations of both are employed to

accomplish this support. Lethal fire support means include FA,
mortars, NSFS, and air support. Nonlethal means include IEW,
illumination, smoke, communications jammers, and psychological
operations (PSYOP). The squadron commander and his fire support
officer (FSO) must know the capabilities and limitations of the
systems available.
COMPONENTS
6-8. The fire support system is a collective body of target
acquisition and attack systems (lethal and nonlethal), command and
control (C2) and coordination systems and facilities, technical
support (meteorological and survey), and the personnel required to
provide and manage fire support. ADA and engineer assets may also
become important components of the fire support system.
6-9. Application of lethal and nonlethal effects is essential in
defeating the threat’s ability to fight and win. A variety of means are
used to accomplish this throughout the depth of the battlefield. The
characteristics of the future battlefield will certainly challenge the
commander’s ability to efficiently and effectively employ limited
numbers of sophisticated acquisition and attack systems against a
diverse target array.
FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES

FIELD ARTILLERY
6-10. As part of its unit basic load, an FA battalion has several
different munitions available to support the squadron. It has lethal
munitions such as high explosive (HE), dual purpose improved
conventional munitions (DPICM), Copperhead, white phosphorous
(WP), and scatterable mines (area denial antipersonnel mine
[ADAM]/remote antiarmor mine system [RAAMS]). It also has
nonlethal munitions that include smoke and illumination. Table 6-1
lists some capabilities of the various munitions.
Table 6-1. Field Artillery Capabilities
CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS
MAX RANGES (M198) FPF WIDTH RATES OF FIRE
HE/DPICM ERDPICM RAP SUSTAINED MAX
18,100 28,400 30,000 400M Varies 4 rounds/min
ILLUMINATION
RATE OF FIRE
MAX RANGE BURN TIME ILLUM DIAMETER
CONTINUOUS ILLUM
17,500 2 minutes 1 round/min 1,000m
SMOKE
TIME TO BUILD AVG BURN TIME
TYPE
EFFECTIVE SMOKE (MINUTES)
WP 30 Seconds 1 to 1 1/2
6-4
SMOKE 30 Seconds 5 to 10
6-11. In addition to the cannon units that support the squadron,

multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) elements may provide either
rocket or missile fires. Unlike cannon artillery, MLRS units do not fire
a variety of munitions. They do not employ special munitions such as
smoke, illumination, or WP. The maximum range of MLRS rockets is
32,000 meters. The planning range for MLRS missiles in the Army
tactical missile system (ATACMS) is 100,000 meters. Both of these
munitions are DPICM.
AVIATION DIRECT FIRES AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

6-12. The squadron may require aviation direct fires on the
battlefield. Aviation direct fires refer to air action taken by rotary-
wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to
friendly ground forces. In most cases, Army attack helicopters
provide this support. This support can be preplanned or provided on
request on an immediate or emergency basis. Both types of aviation
direct fires represent a powerful battlefield asset, capable of
destroying threat elements of varying sizes, including large armor
formations. Refer to the discussion of Army aviation support,
including aviation direct fires, in Section IV.
6-13. The US Air Force (USAF), US Navy (USN), and US Marine
Corps (USMC) provide the Army with fixed-wing or rotor-wing air
support. They provide the following five types of air support:
• CAS.
• Combat air reconnaissance.
• Tactical airlift.
• Electronic combat.
• Air interdiction.
6-14. CAS is defined as air attacks on hostile surface forces that are in
close proximity of friendly troops. CAS can be employed to blunt a
threat attack, support the momentum of the ground attack, or provide
cover for friendly movements. For best results while avoiding mutual
interference or fratricide, aircraft are kept under “detailed integration”
(part of the USAF’s combat air system). Until the USAF achieves air
superiority, competing demands between CAS and counter-air
operations may limit sorties apportioned for the CAS role. Nomination of
CAS targets is the responsibility of the commander, air liaison officer
(ALO), and S3 at each level.
6-15. Tables 6-2 and 6-3 depict the aviation assets that are most
likely to be available to support the cavalry squadron
(reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition [RSTA]). USAF
and USMC aircraft are listed within the same charts to save space.
6-16. USAF and USMC personnel are the primary means for
requesting and controlling their respective service’s aircraft. However,
if no personnel augmentation by the other services is available, then
6-5
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
the organic fire support personnel are the primary means for
coordinating and controlling CAS aircraft.
6-6
Table 6-2. Fixed-Wing Aircraft

AIRCRAFT SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS (TYPICAL MUNITIONS)
AV-8B1 USMC, USN VSTOL CAS aircraft; subsonic; typical load 4,000 lbs; maximum
load 9,200 lbs; 25-mm Gatling gun.
A-10 or O/A-10 USAF, USAF Specialized CAS aircraft; subsonic; typical load 6,000 lbs;
1
Reserve, USAF maximum load 16,000 lbs; 30-mm gun.
National Guard
F-15E USAF Multirole aircraft; priority is air-to-ground; supersonic; maximum
load 24,500 lbs; 20-mm cannon with 512 rounds.
F-16 1 USAF, USAF Multirole aircraft; complements the F-15 in an air-to-air role;
Reserve, USAF most accurate air-to-ground delivery system in the inventory;
National Guard supersonic; typical load 6,000 lbs; maximum load 10,500 lbs.
F/A-18 1 USN, USMC Multirole fighter; wide variety of air-to-surface weapons; typical
load 7,000 lbs; maximum load 17,000 lbs; 20-mm gun mounted
in the nose and air-to-air missiles.
AC-130 1 USAF, USAF Specialized CAS/RACO aircraft; propeller driven; two models.
Reserve The A model is equipped with two 40-mm guns, two 20-mm
guns, and two 7.62-mm miniguns. The H Model is similar,
except it has no 7.62 miniguns and one of the 40-mm guns is
replaced with a 105-mm howitzer. Both models have advanced
sensors and target acquisition system including forward-looking
infrared and low-light TV. Weapons employment accuracy is
outstanding. This aircraft is vulnerable to threat air defense
systems and must operate in a low ADA threat environment.
1
Aircraft with FM communications.
NOTE: Typical load is average load for typical support mission; maximum load is the amount the aircraft
can carry in an ideal situation.
Table 6-3. Rotary-Wing Aircraft

Aircraft Type* TOW Hellfire 2.75” 5” Zunni .50 caliber 20-mm 30-mm
(70-mm) Rockets Machine Gun Cannon Chaingun
Rockets (rounds) (rounds) (rounds)
AH-1** *** NG 8 76 750
AH-1W USMC 8 8 76 16 750
AH-1Z USMC 8 76 16 750
AH-64A/D 16 76 1,200
OH-58D*** 4 14 500
Max Range 3,750 8 km 8 km 8 km 2 km 2 km 4 km
meters
NOTES: * Numbers in each column indicate the maximum load for each system. The total amount of
ordnance carried will vary based on METT-TC and selected weapon configuration.
** The AH-1 uses the TOW missile as its armor engagement weapon instead of the Hellfire
missile.
*** One weapon system per side for Hellfire and/or TOW and 2.75-inch rocket.
NG – National Guard USMC – US Marine Corps
NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT

6-17. Destroyers and cruisers are the predominant ships used in
NGF roles. Both ships utilize 5-inch guns to provide fires. The
squadron normally receives augmentation from the Marines to
conduct NGF missions. Table 6-4 provides NGF data for the available
types of munitions.
6-7
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Table 6-4. Naval Gunfire Capabilities
AMMUNITION RANGE
High Explosive Full charge: 23,127m; Reduced charge: 12,200m
Illumination Full charge: 23,127m; Reduced charge: 12,200m
White Phosphorous Full charge: 23,127m; Reduced charge: 12,200m
TARGET ACQUISITION
6-18. Target acquisition assets are target-producing systems. They
gather targeting information and targets by using all available means.
These means include, but are not limited to, radar, army aviation,
IEW, observers, and frontline troops. Some of the assets available
are—
• AH-64A/D and OH-58D helicopters.
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV).
• Fire Support Teams (FIST).
• Scouts.
• AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 radars (see Table 6-5).
Table 6-5. Radars
RANGE SCAN EMPLACEMENT DISPLACEMENT GENERAL

1 2 2
(METERS) SECTOR TIME TIME LOCATION
MIN MAX MIN MAX
AN/TPQ-36 750 14,000, 230 1,600 20 minutes 10 minutes 3-6 km
arty/ mils mils1 behind the
18,000 FLOT
mortar;
24,000
rockets
AN/TPQ-37 3,000 30,000 300 1,600 30 minutes 15 minutes 8-12 km
arty; mils mils behind the
50,000, FLOT
rockets
1
Can scan 6,400 mils by using extended azimuth search function; however, this is not common practice.
2
Time does not include set-up or take-down of camouflage systems.
6-19. In addition to the necessary knowledge regarding radar

capabilities and limitations, the FSO and squadron staff should have
a full understanding of the various radar zones. This understanding
is essential because, during the planning process, the FSO will
recommend radar zones to the commander. By doing this, the FSO is
essentially focusing the supporting radars and artillery on the
squadron’s target acquisition priorities.
6-8
SECTORS OF SEARCH
6-20. Sectors of search are the areas on the battlefield where radars
focus their target acquisition capabilities. The sectors of search are
determined during the decide function of the targeting process on the
basis of a thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
During the decide function, decisions are made concerning what
targets should be acquired and attacked, where and when targets are
likely to be found, and who can locate them. Doctrinal employment
considerations, in conjunction with templates and intelligence
produced in the IPB process, dictate the areas in which the radar
searches should be focused. The location of friendly boundaries and
fire support coordination measures (FSCM) may also affect the
assignment of sectors of search.
ZONES
6-21. Zones are a means of prioritizing radar sectors of search into
areas of greater and lesser importance. A zone is a geometric figure
placed around an area that designates it as more or less important
than other areas. There are four types of radar zones: critical friendly
zones (CFZ), call-for-fire zones (CFFZs), artillery target intelligence
zones (ATIZ), and censor zones (CZ). The targets developed by the
radar are prioritized according to the zone where the threat firing
unit is located or fired into. The zone priorities for location
identification, from highest to lowest, are—
• Locations of weapons firing into a CFZ.
• Weapons firing from a CFFZ.
• Weapons firing from an ATIZ.
Critical Friendly Zone

6-22. The CFZ provides for the most responsive submission of
targets to the fire support system. A CFZ is an area, usually a
friendly unit or location, that the commander designates as critical. It
is used to protect an asset whose loss would seriously jeopardize the
mission. When the radar’s computer predicts that a threat artillery or
mortar round will impact in a CFZ, the location of the weapon that
fired the round will be reported by the computer in precedence ahead
of all other detections. Any location of a weapon firing into a CFZ will
result in an immediate call for fire unless it is manually overridden
by the radar operator.
Call-For-Fire Zone
6-23. A CFFZ designates a search area forward of the forward line
of own troops (FLOT) that the commander wants suppressed,
neutralized, or destroyed. An area designated as a CFFZ would likely
be on a suspected threat artillery position and is closely tied to
information developed during the IPB process. A CFFZ provides the
second most responsive request for fire generated by the radar.
6-9
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Artillery Target Intelligence Zone

6-24. An ATIZ is an area in threat territory that the commander
wishes to monitor closely. Any weapons acquired in this zone will be
reported ahead of all target detections except CFZ and CFFZ, but the
detections will only result in a target report, not a request for fire.
Censor Zone
6-25. A censor zone is an area from which the commander wishes
to ignore all target detections. Censor zones must be used very
judiciously, since the computer does not report to the operator a
round originating from a censor zone. A censor zone may be used to
ignore a friendly artillery position that, because of its aspect angle to
the radar, could be detected as threat artillery. This situation could
occur when an uneven FLOT exists or when friendly units are in
threat territory. A censor zone may also be used when artillery fires
in support of rear operations.
TARGETING
6-26. Targeting is a command responsibility that requires
participation of key members of the squadron staff. The commander
establishes the environment that determines the quality of the
targeting effort, and targeting often determines the commander’s
success or failure. Locating, identifying, classifying, tracking, and
attacking targets and then assessing battle damage with limited
sensor assets and attack systems are difficult tasks. Competition for
assets is intense. Many intelligence systems are capable of
situational development, target acquisition, and battle damage
assessment (BDA), but may not be able to do them at the same time.
Detailed guidance thorough planning, particularly for ISR, and
disciplined execution prevent unnecessary redundancy and make the
most of available combat power. Successful targeting requires that
commanders and their staffs possess—
• An understanding of the functions associated with the
targeting process.
• The knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of
organic and supporting target acquisition and attack
systems.
• The ability to synchronize battlefield effects both
horizontally (within their own command posts [CP]) and
vertically with higher and lower echelons.
• The targeting effort is a continuous and integral part of
the military decision-making process (MDMP) cycle. The
commander enhances the targeting effort by organizing
his primary operations, intelligence, and fire support
advisors into an informal targeting team.
Targeting Terms
6-27. The following terms define the targeting process and the
classification of targets.
6-10
• Targeting. This is a process to select, detect, and

prioritize targets, match appropriate action
(lethal/nonlethal), and assess the resulting effects based
on the commander’s guidance and intent. The objective is
to attack the right target at the right time with the most
appropriate delivery system (lethal, nonlethal, or a
combination of both), creating the desired effect to achieve
a specified purpose while minimizing negative collateral
effects (secondary or tertiary).
• Target. This is an area, complex, installation, force,
equipment, capability, function, or behavior that is identified
for possible action to support the commander’s guidance
and intent.
• Time-sensitive target (TST). This is a target requiring an
immediate response because it poses (or will soon pose)
an immediate danger to friendly forces or is a highly
lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity.
• High-value target (HVT). This is an asset the threat
commander needs for the successful completion of his
mission.
• High-payoff target (HPT). This is an asset whose loss to
the threat will contribute to the success of the friendly
course of action (COA).
• Combat assessment. This is the process used to
determine the effectiveness of force employment during
military operations. It is composed of three elements:
BDA, munitions effects assessment (MEA), and reattack
recommendation.
6-28. The objectives of targeting must be clearly articulated and

easily understood. They must also focus on threat capabilities that
could interfere with friendly objectives. There are several targeting
terms used to describe the desired outcome of attacks on threat
capabilities. These terms are not mutually exclusive and actions
associated with one objective may also support other objectives. (For
an in-depth discussion on targeting objectives, refer to FM 3-60 [FM
6-20-10].) Additionally, these terms should not be confused with
those associated with the effects of fire, which are harass, suppress,
neutralize, and destroy. The five most common and predominantly
used targeting terms are—
• Limit – Cause the threat force to shift to another
approach or isolate a defender.
• Disrupt – Force the threat into ineffective tactical
dispositions; degrade movement, material, forces, and
supplies.
• Delay – Alter arrival time of threat forces or slow defensive
preparations.
• Divert – Tie up critical threat resources.
• Destroy – Ruin the structure, organic existence, or
condition of the objective.
6-11
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Functions of the Targeting Process

6-29. The decide-detect-deliver-assess targeting process defined in
FM 3-60 [FM 6-20-10] is integral and essential to effective fires and
effects coordination. Targeting is performed as a component of the
MDMP (see Table 6-6), rather than as a separate process or a
substitute. Targeting does not stop with planning; it continues
throughout the preparation and execution of a mission.
6-12
Table 6-6. Military Decision-Making Process Actions in the Targeting Process
MDMP ACTIONS TARGETING RESULTS

Mission Analysis - Identify high-value targets by critical event
- Identify fire support capabilities
- Review Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) database
Course of Action (COA) - Determine where to find and attack essential fire support task (EFST)
Development formations
- Nominate high-payoff targets (HPT)
- Specify concept of fires
- Specify tentative positions, triggers, and fire support coordination measures
(FSCM)
- Develop tentative assessment plan
- Develop tentative observation plan
COA Analysis - Develop detailed scheme of fires
- Specify final triggers, positions, FSCMs, and observer plan
COA Comparison - Identify advantages and disadvantages of each COA
- Recommend COA
Orders Production - Conduct final staff coordination
- Prepare portions of the order
- Assist in issuing the order
6-30. Decide. Target value analysis (TVA) is conducted during IPB

to identify HVTs; the results are presented to the commander during
mission analysis. When providing guidance and intent following the
mission analysis briefing, the commander drives and focuses the
decide function by articulating his desired effects against HPTs and
the intended purpose. During COA development and analysis for a
mission, the battle staff completes the decide function by
determining how and where to detect and track the target, what
available delivery platform/asset (lethal/nonlethal) can best achieve
the desired effects, and how to assess the effects delivered.
Information operations targets are human factors (e.g., adversary
commanders and troops), communications link nodes (e.g., courier,
cable, fiber optic), information system nodes (e.g., processors), the
adversary intelligence system, and adversary offensive information
operations capabilities. When deciding on the most appropriate
method to acquire targets and to deliver fires and effects against
them, consideration must be given to potential secondary or tertiary
collateral effects, such as collateral damage or an adverse media
reaction, that may be counter to the overall outcome. Additionally,
the current rules of engagement (ROE) must be considered; in some
cases, a legal assessment is required. These considerations may
influence the selection of the method of engagement and/or result in
restrictions limiting the application of fires and effects in some
manner.
6-31. Detect. Detection is an essential execution function
performed by the full range of sensors available. Sensor tasking and
management are critical in providing timely and precise acquisition,
6-13
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
tracking, and redundancy. In some situations, handover (see

discussion of reconnaissance handover in Chapter 3) of a target from
one sensor to another may be required to continue to track and
ultimately engage targets and assess the effects delivered. The
SBCT’s strength, and hence the squadron’s, is the robust, human-
based sensor capability provided by the recce troops,
counterintelligence (CI) human intelligence (HUMINT) teams, FISTs,
and forward observers, coupled with the electronic and optical
sensors ranging from UAVs to counterfire radars. Detection can also
result from reports by civil affairs and PSYOP teams, if available.
These assets must be linked to the SBCT fires and effects
coordination cell (FECC) and the squadron fire support element (FSE)
to enable the entire SBCT to effectively focus fires and effects to
achieve the commander’s desired effects and their purpose.
6-32. Deliver. Delivery is the application of lethal/nonlethal
attack/action by platforms or systems to create the desired terminal
effects against targets. This is a combination of tactical and technical
solutions and may include both lethal and nonlethal delivery.
6-33. Assess. The assess function is essential in accomplishing
three objectives: first, to determine if the desired effect was applied
against the target; second, to determine if the effect achieved the
intended purpose; and third, to identify any negative collateral
effects. Failure to achieve the purpose may result in reattack, a
change in method, or an adjustment to the scheme of maneuver.
Linkage of real and near-real time direct sensors (human and/or
electronic) to the fires and effects coordination system is essential to
effectively acquire, track, and attack targets and accurately assess
the effects. Human-based sensors such as STRIKERs, the recce
troops, FSEs, and FISTs provide a vital assessment capability. Effects
assessment consists of both combat assessment (BDA, MEA, and
reattack recommendation) and nonlethal effects assessment. Effects
assessment is a significant challenge. Nonlethal effects assessment is
likely to be more difficult to perform and may require more time to
conduct. Nonlethal effects assessment could include populace
perceptions provided by CI HUMINT teams and civil affairs teams
(CA), delayed reaction in adversary decision making, capture of
prisoners of war, lack of adversary electronic signatures, and public
opinion.
EFFECTS-BASED FIRES
6-34. Effects-based fires for the SBCT, and hence the squadron,
employ a derivative of the EFST methodology. This approach develops
essential fires and effects tasks (EFET) to focus full-spectrum effects
against an HPT within the battlespace to achieve a desired effect and
purpose. This methodology enables the commander to focus his
limited fires and effects assets in the most agile and efficient manner
while preserving the adaptability to adjust to the demands of a highly
frictional battlefield. An EFET is defined as an application of fires and
effects required to support a combined arms COA; failure to achieve
an EFET may require the commander to alter his tactical plan. A
complete EFET consists of a task (effect), purpose, method, and
assessment. The task is the effect (what) that the commander desires
6-14
to apply against the target. The purpose (why) is the combined arms
outcome desired as a result of applying the effect. The method
consists of acquisition/tracking, delivery of effects (lethal/nonlethal)
and restrictions. Assessment is essential to determine if the desired
effect was created and the purpose achieved. Achievement of the
purpose equals end state for the EFET. The decide-detect-deliver-
assess targeting process is employed during this approach.
FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING, COORDINATION, AND EXECUTION

6-35. The integration of fire support into the maneuver operation is
a decisive factor in the success of the battle. The maneuver
commander is responsible for the entire operation, including the fire
support plan. The FSO is responsible for advising the commander on
the best use of available fire support resources, for developing the fire
support plan, for issuing the necessary orders, and for implementing
the approved fire support plan. The following discussion covers many
of the factors the commander and his fire support personnel must
consider in planning, coordinating, and executing the squadron’s
missions.
6-36. With the onset of numerous asymmetric threats and the
possibility for multiple, simultaneous engagements in a relatively
short time period, it is imperative that the squadron effectively
employ fire support assets. One of the squadron commander’s
greatest challenges is effectively synchronizing and concentrating all
available assets at the critical times and places. The planning and
coordination process begins with mission receipt and never stops.
The commander, executive officer (XO), S3, S2, and FSO interact
throughout planning and execution of the mission to ensure the
necessary support is continually provided. As the squadron
commander develops his plan for employment of his forces, he and
the FSO plan for the best use of fire support resources by
determining the following:
• Fire support assets that will be tasked to weight the effort
of specific subordinate units.
• Targets to attack.
• Fire support means to use.
• Desired target effects.
• Priorities for engaging targets.
6-37. Fire support planning must be a critical part of the ISR plan
since the squadron, moving out to confirm or deny the commander’s
CCIR while brigade operational planning still continues, will require
such support early.
6-38. The commander must ensure that he clearly states his intent
for fire support and that the fire support plan is developed
accordingly. All available fire support assets must be considered so
that each phase of the commander’s plan will be supported by the
6-15
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
fire support plan. The FSO must ensure that he understands the
commander’s requirements for fire support. The following list covers
several areas that the commander must coordinate with the FSO:
• Scheme of maneuver. This includes the area of
operations (AO), timing of advance, rate of movement,
passage of lines, and Army aviation in sector.
• Priority of fires. This identifies which unit has priority of
artillery fires.
• Critical targets. These are targets that, if not fired upon,
will seriously impede mission accomplishment (based on
EFET).
• Priority targets. These are identified, along with how long
they will be in effect.
• CAS. The commander and FSO, in coordination with the
forward air controller (FAC), determine what is available,
when it is available, and how it will be used (including
target selection and desired effects).
• FSCMs. These are the existing or proposed permissive or
restrictive control measures established by higher
headquarters or the SBCT itself.
• Ammunition restrictions. These place limitations on the
use of smoke, improved conventional munitions, or other
ammunition (including established controlled supply rates
[CSR]).
6-39. The fire support plan outlines how both lethal and nonlethal
fire support assets will be used to complement both the IRS plan and
the scheme of maneuver. It provides instructions and guidance for
executing those fires. It ranks targets in priority order, matches them
with the available fire support systems, eliminates duplication with
SBCT targets, and allows fires to be executed quickly and without
specific direction from the commander. A squadron fire support plan
should include—
• The general concept of how fires will support the
operation.
• A target list that includes locations where fires are
expected or likely to be used. Known threat locations
should be carefully targeted.
• Priority of fires.
• Priority targets.
• Allocation of priority targets and final protective fires
(FPF), if available.
• Execution matrix.
• Required airspace coordination areas (ACA).
• FSCMs.
6-40. The fire support plan is developed by the FSO with assistance
and input from the FAC, troop FSOs, S2, and S3. It is constantly
6-16
refined and/or modified as the operation continues. This provides the

most responsive fires to the squadron wherever they are needed. At
squadron level, the FSO disseminates the fire support plan through
the squadron operations order (OPORD). This plan usually contains
all the elements listed above, and it is modified as troop fire plans are
received. Updated fire plans are sent back to FISTs and disseminated
to the appropriate units/agencies.
COORDINATION CONSIDERATIONS
6-41. The squadron FSO, as part of his coordination, should
conduct the following actions:
• Ensure that the FA battalion fire direction center (FDC),
each troop mortar section, and any other supporting
elements have the correct fire support plan.
• Conduct fire support rehearsals prior to every operation.
• Keep the SBCT FECC and the supporting FA units
informed of the tactical situation.
• Select the appropriate fire support means to engage
targets throughout the course of the operation.
• Ensure the squadron commander and S3 are kept
informed regarding the status of all fire support assets.
• Modify the fire support plan as necessary to react to
battlefield changes and ensure changes to the plan are
disseminated.
• Coordinate requests for additional fire support if needed.
• Monitor execution of the fire support plan throughout the
operation.
6-42. The squadron FSO must ensure that the fire support plan
remains supportable. He must immediately inform the squadron
commander if there is not enough fire support allocated to make the
plan work or if circumstances dictate changes in the plan. To
accomplish this, the FSO must keep abreast of the tactical situation
and coordinate all fire support affecting his zone. He must ensure
that fires do not jeopardize soldier safety, interfere with other fire
support means, or disrupt adjacent unit operations.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
6-43. To provide the squadron with the necessary support during
all types of operations, the FSE must be prepared to conduct
additional planning and coordination specific to the type of operation
he expects the squadron to execute. The following discussion
provides fire support guidelines and considerations for the four types
of operations the squadron may conduct (offensive, defensive,
stability, support).
Offensive Operations
6-17
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
6-44. The following actions and considerations apply for fire

support planning, coordination, and execution when the squadron
conducts offensive operations:
• Determine when and how to shift priorities of fires.
• Identify the trigger for shifting priorities of fire.
• Plan fires en route to the line of departure (LD)/line of
contact (LC).
• Plan fires to support hasty defense if the attack stalls.
• Plan fires in support of assembly areas.
• Plan fires from the LD/LC to the objective.
• Provide priority of fires to lead elements.
• Consider smoke to limit threat observation of friendly
elements.
• Consider smoke in support of breach sites.
• Plan fires on exposed flanks to disrupt threat
counterattacks.
• Consider task organization of observers to ensure all
critical targets are observed.
• Consider preparatory fires.
• Plan fires on the objective.
• Plan fires to divert, delay, or limit threat reinforcement
and resupply.
• Plan fires to suppress threat direct fire weapons.
• Consider the use of smoke to screen or obscure friendly
forces.
• Plan signals for shifting fires.
• Plan fires in support of a hasty defense upon successful
attack of the objective.
• Plan fires beyond the objective.
• Plan fires on likely counterattack avenues of approach.
• Plan fires to disrupt or delay threat retreat.
Defensive Operations
conducts defensive operations:
• Mass fires on threat direct and indirect fire systems.
• Attack threat forces that have penetrated the defensive
area.
• Plan fires to impede threat reserves.
• Plan suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) in support
of CAS missions.
• Plan for priority of fires.
6-18
• Plan fire support early and throughout the defensive

sector.
• Plan fires forward of the MBA.
• Consider augmenting forward units with observers and
laser devices.
• Plan counterreconnaissance fires.
• Plan fires to force the threat commander to deploy his
forces early.
• Position observers on templated avenues of approach.
• Plan fires on key choke points.
• Plan FASCAM and smoke to separate lead elements from
follow-on forces.
• Plan fires to disrupt threat preparation activities.
• Plan fires throughout the MBA mass to disrupt, delay, and
destroy the threat.
• Plan fires on key obstacles and assign redundant
observers to support execution of the fire plan.
• Know the engineer obstacle plan and types of obstacles.
• Consider the terrain when targeting obstacles.
• Consider the use of smoke to support the obstacle plan.
• Plan fires in support of engagement areas (EA).
• Use fires to canalize the threat.
• Plan groups and series for simultaneous engagements.
• Mass fires in EAs.
• Plan coordinated attacks with air support.
• Consider use of special munitions (illumination, smoke,
Copperhead).
Stability Operations and Support Operations

conducts stability operations and support operations:
• Ensure fires are in strict accordance with ROE. Nonlethal
fires may be the primary means in these types of
operations.
• Plan and rehearse the clearance of fires drill.
• Plan for use of radars.
• Plan for use of precision munitions to limit collateral
damage.
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS

6-47. CAS missions are broken down into two types: preplanned or
immediate. To help ensure proper integration and planning of all CAS
6-19
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
missions, the commander should collocate all of his fire support

personnel, including representatives from the other services.
TYPES OF CAS MISSIONS

6-48. Preplanned CAS is generally requested 72 hours in advance.
Preplanned requests normally do not include detailed target
information because of the lead time for the mission. However, these
requests must include potential targets, the desired effects, proposed
times, and a general priority. Preplanned CAS is categorized as
follows:
• Scheduled mission. This entails CAS strikes on a
planned target at a planned time (time on target [TOT]).
• Alert mission. This entails CAS strikes on a planned
target or target area executed when requested by the
supported unit. Usually, this mission is launched from a
ground alert (scramble), but it may be flown from an
airborne alert status. Alert (on-call) CAS allows the ground
commander to designate a general target area within
which targets may need to be attacked. The ground
commander designates a conditional period within which
he will later determine specific times for attacking the
targets.
6-49. Immediate CAS requests are used for air support mission
requirements that were identified too late to be included in the
current air tasking order (ATO). These requests usually arise from
situations that develop once the battle has commenced. If there are
no immediate CAS sorties available and HPTs have been identified,
then preplanned CAS will be diverted to engage those targets.
6-50. Both types of CAS missions have specific request channels.
Preplanned requests are sent via Army channels. Immediate requests
are sent via USAF channels. For preplanned missions, the requests
are submitted to the fire support cell. The commander, S3, ALO, and
FSO at each echelon evaluate all CAS requests; coordinate such
requirements as airspace, fires, and intelligence; consolidate the
requests; and if approved, assign a priority of precedence to their
requests. The S3-Air then forwards approved requests by Army
communications nets to the next higher echelon. The fire support cell
of the corps main CP makes the final consolidation and approves
preplanned requests for tactical air support. The requestor is notified
of approval or disapproval at each level. The tactical air control
center does the necessary planning and includes the mission in the
ATO for execution. Requests for CAS that do not reach the tactical air
control center in time for inclusion in the ATO are treated by the air
support operations center (ASOC) the same as immediate requests.
CAS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

6-51. CAS mission success is directly related to thorough mission
planning based on the following factors and considerations:
6-20
• Weather. Does the weather favor the use of aircraft? What

is the forecast for the immediate future? Weather is one of
the most important considerations when visually
employing weapons; it can hinder target identification and
degrade weapon accuracy.
• Target acquisition. Targets that are well camouflaged,
small and stationary, or masked by hills or other natural
terrain are difficult to identify from fast-moving aircraft.
The use of marking rounds can enhance target
identification and help ensure first-pass success.
• Target identification. This is critical if CAS aircraft are to
avoid attacking friendly forces by mistake. It can be
accomplished by providing a precise description of the
target in relation to terrain features easily visible from the
air. Smoke and laser devices can also be used for marking
purposes.
• Identification of friendly forces. Safe means of friendly
position identification include mirror flash, marker panels,
and direction and distance from prominent land features
or target marks.
• General ordnance characteristics. What types of targets
are to be engaged, and what are the desired weapon
effects?
• Final attack heading. Choice of the final attack heading
depends upon considerations of troop safety, aircraft
survivability, and optimum weapon effects. Missiles or
bombs are effective from any angle. Cannons, however,
are more effective against the sides and rear end of
armored vehicles.
• Troop safety. This is a key consideration in using CAS.
The primary cause of friendly fire on friendly troops is
misidentification of those troops as threat forces.
• SEAD. SEAD is required based on the capabilities of the
aircraft and presence of threat air defense systems in the
target area.
• CAS and artillery integration. Army artillery and combat
air power are complementary. Because artillery support is
more continuous and faster to respond than CAS, CAS
missions must be integrated with artillery so that limited
firing restrictions are imposed. The ACA is the FSCM used
to accomplish this integration (refer to the following
discussion).
AIRSPACE COORDINATION AREA

6-52. As noted, an ACA is a means of providing airspace for the
relatively safe travel of aircraft and for facilitating the simultaneous
attack of targets near each other by multiple fire support assets.
ACAs are classified as either formal or informal. This classification is
based on the amount of time available and the level of control
desired.
6-21
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
6-53. A formal ACA is a three-dimensional block of airspace that

provides lateral and altitude separation between aircraft and other
fire support assets. It is designed to be in effect for a relatively longer
period of time than an informal ACA. The formal ACA is established
at SBCT or higher headquarters; however, it has extremely limited
usefulness at SBCT and below because of the extensive coordination
required.
6-54. Informal ACAs are most often used and are the preferred
method. An informal ACA can be established at task force or higher
and normally is not depicted on charts or maps. Informal ACAs are
established by using one of four standard separation plans: lateral,
altitude, timed, or lateral and altitude. Informal ACAs are normally in
effect for very short periods of time. Usually, the time period is only
long enough to get aircraft into and out of the target area. FM 3-09.4
[FM 6-20-40] discusses the four standard separation plans and
coordination procedures for informal ACAs.
NIGHT CAS OPERATIONS

6-55. The capabilities of CAS aircraft employed at night are very
limited. The two most important requirements of a night CAS
operation are—
• Identification of the threat or target.
• Positive marking of friendly unit locations.
6-56. The ground maneuver commander should rely on his own
Army assets to accomplish the marking and illumination
requirement. Although flares released from airborne FACs, other CAS
aircraft, or “flare ships” can effectively illuminate target areas,
artillery- and mortar-fired illumination are normally preferred due to
the continuous capabilities of a sustained rate of fire.
6-57. Marking of friendly unit locations improves safety and can
also provide target area references. Tracers and radar beacons can
serve both purposes. If safe separation is a factor, friendly unit
marking is critical. Fired into the air, 40-mm illumination grenades
and flares are effective, but they may be useful to the threat as well.
Flares used during limited visibility operations can create the “milk-
bowl” effect, making it more difficult for a CAS aircraft to find its
target. When used under a low cloud ceiling, flares can also highlight
the aircraft against the cloud cover. Strobe lights are very good night
markers. They are commonly used with blue or infrared (IR) filters
and can be made directional by the use of any opaque tube. In
overcast conditions, strobe lights can be especially useful. Aside from
the obvious security considerations, almost any light that can be
filtered or covered and uncovered can be used for signaling aircraft.
JOINT AIR ATTACK TEAM OPERATIONS

6-58. A joint air attack team (JAAT) operation incorporates aviation
assets and ground attack systems. It is a combination of scout and
attack helicopters and tactical fixed-wing aircraft, supported by FA,
operating together to attack a single HVT or target array. This highly
6-22
mobile and lethal tank-killing force can engage the threat well
beyond the range of ground antitank weapons. JAAT missions can
significantly increase the lethality of combined arms operations. They
can be employed during any operation and are especially useful to
counter threat airmobile operations. JAAT elements may operate
either integrated into close operations or independently of ground
units.
6-59. Planning for a JAAT operation is a complex process requiring
detailed coordination among the commander, S3, FSO, ALO, S3-Air,
and attack helicopter battalion (ATKHB) commander (see FM 3-09.33
[FM 90-21]). The scheme of maneuver must integrate all JAAT
elements, including CAS and fire support, to the maximum extent
possible. Planning considerations include—
• Nature of the target, including type, size, activity, and
priority.
• Threat avenues of approach.
• Air threat, including type and location.
• Fire support coordination, including locations and
azimuths of fire of friendly assets that can support the
operation.
• Airspace control.
• Laser codes.
• Electronic warfare (EW) considerations.
• Downed aircraft procedures, including search and rescue.
• Emergency procedures.
• Weapons load.
• Target marking options.
• Ingress/egress routes.
• Provisions for SEAD.
• Communications.
• Current ground tactical plan.
• Contact points/initial points.
• Weather.
6-60. Although JAAT assets may be requested and planned for, the
SBCT commander must be prepared to execute his maneuver plan
without some or all of the JAAT components.
SECTION III – ARMY AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL
6-61. The Army airspace command and control (A2C2) process

consists of those actions that ensure the synchronized use of
airspace and enhance the C2 of all forces using airspace. The
objective of A2C2 is to ensure the most effective employment of
combat power by those airspace users whose unrestricted use of
6-23
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
airspace might result in the loss of friendly air assets. Conversely,

A2C2 must integrate air assets in ground operations without unduly
inhibiting the use of ground-based assets. JP 3-52, FM 3-52 [FM
100-103], FM 3-52.1 [FM 100-103-1], and FM 3-52.2
[FM 100-103-2] discuss A2C2 in more detail.
6-62. Direct information access is required to input and receive
information from joint, multinational, and interagency forces
contributing to the overall operational effort. A2C2 elements must be
integrated into the airspace control authority’s decision cycle. Army
and joint users of the airspace are subordinate to the joint forces
commander. Their requirements, with respect to airspace, are
coordinated in the development of the airspace control plan (ACP)
and incorporated in the airspace control order ([ACO], see Figure 6-
2).
Figure 6-2. Airspace Control Order Cycle
AIRSPACE CONTROL ORDER

6-63. While the ACP provides the general guidance on the airspace
control function, the ACO institutes the airspace control procedures
for specified periods of time. Normally, the ACO is published and
distributed daily. It contains modifications to the guidance and/or
procedures found in the ACP and activates/deactivates procedural
control measures, including identification, friend or foe (IFF)
procedures, for that time period.
6-24
AIRSPACE CONTROL ORDER DEVELOPMENT

6-64. The procedures for the development of the ACO are included
in the ACP. Normally, component commanders consolidate,
deconflict, and forward their airspace requests to the airspace control
authority’s joint airspace control center (JACC) by a specified time for
further consolidation with other theater-wide inputs. The JACC then
integrates all inputs, resolves any conflicts between the components,
and prepares the ACO for distribution. If the joint forces commander
delegates airspace control authority (ACA) to the component
commanders in the ACP, he may additionally task the component
commanders to generate an ACO for providing the continuity along
sector boundaries and ensuring the integration of each sector
authority’s ACO within the guidelines established in the ACP.
6-25
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
AIRSPACE CONTROL ORDER DISTRIBUTION

6-65. Two important considerations in the effectiveness of the ACO
are timing and the means of dissemination. The ACO cycle must be
tied to the ATO cycle because many of the airspace measures in
effect at any time will be tied to activities outlined in the ATO. If tied
to the ATO, the same timing that is required for inputs to the ATO is
required for preplanned airspace control requests. In a small AO, this
method may be convenient and efficient. In a larger AO, adding the
ACO to the ATO may produce a document that is cumbersome and
unwieldy.
6-66. If the ACO is published separately, a “not later than”
suspense will be established to allow sufficient time for adequate
processing and deconfliction of requested airspace measures. ACO
publishing and suspense times should be included in the ACP or the
ATO’s “general remarks” section. Whatever means are used, it is
important that the airspace users receive pertinent airspace
information as soon as possible to include it in their mission
planning efforts.
AIRSPACE CONTROL ORDER EXECUTION

6-67. Clear, simple instructions in the ACO provide the basis for its
decentralized execution, minimizing the impact on operations while
maximizing the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace in the
combat zone. This unimpeded flow of essential information to the
component operational units and control elements provides the
airspace users with a guide to follow and gives each control, or
airspace management, element the means to regulate the airspace
control function and resolve real time conflicts.
ARMY AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL OVERVIEW
ARMY AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION

6-68. The A2C2 organization, shown in Figure 6-3, is composed of
staff elements at each command echelon from squadron through
theater army. It includes ADA elements, fire support coordination
(FSCOORD) elements, Army air traffic service (ATS) facilities, and
airspace control liaison personnel. The A2C2 element is located
within the CP established at each tactical echelon. Only theater,
corps, and division have dedicated A2C2 elements to accomplish
A2C2 tasks. The SBCT and squadron must establish an A2C2
element with their organic personnel.
6-26
Figure 6-3. Army Airspace Command and Control System
ARMY AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION

6-69. Establishing most airspace control measures (ACM) requires
the approval of the ACA. Army commanders inform the ACA of their
requirements through the operational chain. The use of the US
message text format (USMTF) facilitates and standardizes the process
of requesting the establishment of ACMs. Airspace request formats
outline the necessary information, to include location, lateral and
vertical limits, and time frame during which the measure is to be
enforced.
6-70. The actual UAV airspace deconfliction and coordination
process begins at the squadron. The squadron commander and
surveillance troop commander identify the operating area to be
covered by the UAV and pass this information to the SBCT and UAV
platoon. With the mission area and launch and recovery site
identified, the UAV platoon leader requests the appropriate control
measures. The surveillance troop commander will be involved with
this process to ensure mission-specific needs are met. Once control
measures have been approved, the mission is executed. If a mission
has been executed and a UAV blanket has not been established,
airspace requirements can still be met. It will require intense
coordination between the A2C2 element and appropriate airspace
6-27
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
control agencies such as the ASOC, the Airspace Control Center

(ACC), and the Direct Air Support Center (DASC).
6-71. The surveillance troop commander and CP support the UAV
operation, accomplish deconfliction procedures, and update UAV
status. They forward this information to the squadron, which in turn
sends it to the SBCT. The following planning considerations are
helpful in designing A2C2 measures:
• Maximize control through use of ACMs. These measures
reserve the airspace and control the actions of specific
airspace users.
• Exercise positive control through means such as IFF and
identify and locate airspace users. In addition, continuous
communications must be maintained with airspace users.
• Ensure the scheme of maneuver and commander’s intent
determine and govern the design of the control measures.
• Establish controls that provide maximum freedom
consistent with the degree of risk acceptable to the
commander and are easily recognizable by airspace users
and ground-based weapons crews.
• Ensure temporary ACMs are within the AO and that of the
requesting echelon.
ARMY AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENTS BY ECHELON
6-72. All A2C2 elements form a vertical and horizontal channel for
the coordination and synchronization of airspace control
requirements and dissemination of operations plans (OPLAN) and
OPORDs. Primary tasks of the A2C2 elements include—
• Developing and coordinating airspace control standing
operating procedures (SOP), OPLANs, and annexes.
• Coordinating and integrating airspace user requirements
within the AO.
• Coordinating with other services and adjacent units on
integrating airspace use within the AO.
• Identifying and resolving airspace user conflicts.
• Approving, staffing, and forwarding requests for special
airspace use to the next higher headquarters.
• Maintaining A2C2 information displays and maps.
A2C2 at SBCT and Squadron Level
6-73. The Air Defense Airspace Management (ADAM) Cell is the
element that will conduct A2C2 for the SBCT. Because there is no
formalized A2C2 element at the squadron level, the staff performs
A2C2 by extracting information from various sources. The squadron
commander should form a squadron A2C2 element from the S3-Air,
the FSO, the ALO, or the surveillance troop commander or
representative. The Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS)
enhances A2C2 planning and execution with the ability to graphically
display and rapidly transmit A2C2 control measures to all relevant
headquarters for approval and implementation in the ACO. The TAIS
6-28
has a web feature that allows any system with an Internet browser
and is connected on the Internet to submit ACMRs directly to it for
ACO submissions. All other Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS)
have the ability to pull up the AOC using the Joint Mapping Tool Kit
and display any of the ACOs that the TAIS has enabled. This can be
accomplished during the normal planning process and, as required,
during the execution of operations.
A2C2 at Division Level
6-74. The division A2C2 organization within the division’s main CP
and tactical CP (TAC CP) is similar to that at corps level. The
division’s primary focus is on the conduct of battles and
engagements in the forward portion of the combat zone (division rear
boundary and forward). Therefore, airspace control tasks are
required to synchronize all airspace users of the combined arms
team and supporting services during the close battle. The difference
in geographical orientation (forward versus rear) results in minor
differences in the airspace control procedures employed and the
degree of coordination required. The organization of division A2C2
assets are:
• Division Main CP. In the division main CP, the A2C2
element includes the G3-Air; ADA element; aviation
element; ATS liaison element, as required; FSE; division
G2 section; G4 section, as required; ALO; and air and
naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO).
• Division TAC CP. In the division TAC CP, the A2C2
element includes a G3 officer as chief, assisted by an FSO,
G2 representative, aviation representative, ADA
representative, and a fighter liaison officer (FLO).
A2C2 at Corps Level
6-75. The corps A2C2 organization supports future operational
planning, conducts current operations, and performs specified
functions for the corps’ main, tactical, and rear CPs as outlined
below.
• Corps Main CP. In the corps main CP, the A2C2 element
collocates with the FSE. It is the focal point for all
airspace control activities related to corps rear area
operations and deep operations and for planning of future
operations. The A2C2 element works for the G3, but is
normally supervised by the G3-Air. The main CP A2C2
element consists of, but is not limited to, the ADA
element; aviation element; ALO; FSE; the ATS unit
assigned to the corps; corps analysis and control element
(ACE), as required; the G4 section, as required; and the
ANGLICO. Personnel from these elements and sections
perform two separate tasks. First, they perform their
primary staff functions. Second, they assist in
synchronizing airspace requirements of their parent units
with airspace users of the combined arms team and
supporting services.
6-29
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Corps TAC CP. In the corps TAC CP, the A2C2 element
performs airspace management activities and supports close
operations with the A2C2 element at the main CP. The A2C2
elements at both TAC CP and main CP maintain close
coordination to ensure that airspace requirements generated
by changes to the tactical situation are met in a timely and
effective manner. The corps A2C2 element representatives at
the TAC CP consist of an FSO, aviation officer or
noncommissioned officer (NCO), ADA officer or NCO, and an
ALO. The FSO or aviation officer will serve as the element
chief.
• Corps Rear CP. The corps rear CP receives airspace
support from the A2C2 elements at the main CP.
A2C2 at Theater Army Level
6-76. The theater army A2C2 organization supports operational
planning, conducts current operations, and performs specified
functions for the theater army CP. The A2C2 elements are the focal
point for all airspace control activities related to theater army rear
and deep operations, as well as planning for future operations. The
A2C2 element works for the G3, but is normally supervised by the
G3-Air.
A2C2 and the Battlefield Coordination Detachment

6-77. The battlefield coordination detachment integrates the Army’s
airspace requirements into the ACO and keeps the ACA informed on
Army-related airspace activities. When the ACO becomes effective,
the Control and Reporting Center (CRC) becomes the primary facility
responsible for its execution. Deconfliction at this point is normally
handled by the CRC with assistance from the A2C2 element.
AIR FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL

6-78. For joint operations, the Air Force component commander is
normally designated the joint forces air component commander
(JFACC). Because of the integrated relationship between ACMs and
air defense operations, the duties of the area air defense commander
and the ACA normally should be performed by the same person, who
may also be the JFACC. He executes his responsibilities in
accordance with the objectives of the joint forces land component
commander (JFLCC). As the ACA, he fulfills his responsibilities
through the integrated airspace control system. This system is
structured around the theater air control system (TACS) and Army
air ground system (AAGS).
6-79. Subject to the authority and approval of the Joint Forces
Commander (JFC), the ACA develops procedures for airspace control
and coordination within the assigned airspace control area. The ACA
develops the ACP and, once it is approved by the JFC, publishes it to
all users. The ACP is implemented through a cyclic ACO. The ACO
provides details of the approved request for ACMs and is published
as Part 10 of the ATO. Based on policy in the ACP, Army
commanders submit their requests for ACMs through the operational
6-30
chain shown in Figure 6-4. The USAF C2 structure is designed to

integrate with Army C2 to provide timely support to operations.
Within this structure, personnel, organizations, and facilities are
required to maintain airspace management. This overview only
focuses on joint operations where the ACC is designated as the
JFACC.
Figure 6-4. Army Airspace Request Channels
AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES

6-80. ACMs are published daily in the theater ACO. In some cases,
certain control measures within the squadron’s AO may remain fairly
constant from day to day; some will be part of the division’s SOP,
depending on the situation. These ACMs are different from, yet
closely related to, FSCMs and air defense control measures that may
or may not appear in the ACO. ACMs are broadly divided into joint,
Army, and special purpose airspace categories. Joint and Army
control measures are explained below.
JOINT AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES

6-81. The following are recognized joint ACMs:
• Coordinating Altitude. The coordinating altitude is a
procedural method to separate fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraft by determining an altitude below which fixed-wing
aircraft normally will not fly, and above which rotary-wing
aircraft normally will not fly. The coordinating altitude
may include a buffer zone for small altitude deviations
and extend from the forward edge of the communications
zone to the FLOT. In specific theaters of operations, the
6-31
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
coordinating altitude may be extended to the forward limit

of the ground commander’s AO. Aircraft that need to pass
through the coordinating altitude for operational
requirements coordinate with the appropriate Army or
USAF controlling agency before they penetrate the
coordinating altitude. If the squadron commander
requires more or less airspace to conduct operations, he
may request a change to the coordinating altitude through
the division A2C2 element at TAC CP or the main CP to
the ACA.
• High-Density Airspace Control Zone (HIDACZ). A
HIDACZ is a defined area of airspace that allows a
commander to restrict a volume of airspace from users not
involved with his operations. It is requested by a
maneuver commander, normally division and above. The
requesting authority normally controls access to air
defense weapons control status (WCS) within the HIDACZ.
• Restricted Operations Area (ROA) and Restricted
Operations Zone (ROZ). The ROA and ROZ are
synonymous terms for defining a volume of airspace set
aside for a specific operational mission or requirement.
These areas and zones restrict some or all airspace users
until termination of the mission. The airspace is normally
used for such functions as drop zone (DZ) or landing zone
(LZ) activity, search and rescue operations, and UAV
launch and recovery sites. Controlling authority
requirements for the ROA/ROZ are similar to those
required for a HIDACZ.
• Minimum Risk Route. A minimum risk route is a
temporary corridor of defined dimension recommended for
use by high-speed, fixed-wing aircraft that present
minimum known hazards to low-flying aircraft transiting
the combat zone. Minimum risk routes normally extend
from the corps rear boundary, across the FLOT, to the fire
support coordination line (FSCL). Low-level transient
routes are synonymous with minimum risk routes. The
Army submits proposed minimum risk routes to the ACA
for approval.
• Standard Use Army Aircraft Flight Routes (SAAFR).
SAAFRs are established below the coordinating altitude to
allow the Army commander safe movement of his aviation
assets performing CS and combat service support (CSS)
missions. Although jointly recognized, these routes do not
require ACA approval. SAAFRs are normally located in
corps and division rear areas, but may be extended to the
FSCL to support logistics missions or cross-FLOT
missions.
ARMY-SPECIFIC PROCEDURAL MEASURES

6-82. Army aviation operations rely on freedom of movement to and
from the forward area and lean heavily toward procedural, rather
than positive, control. In addition to joint ACMs, Army aviation has
6-32
developed specific measures to support its operational requirements.

These measures are outlined below.
• Air Corridor. An air corridor is a restricted air route of
travel specified for use by friendly Army aircraft and
established to prevent friendly forces from firing on
friendly aircraft. An air corridor is more temporary in time
than is an SAAFR and may be used to provide aircraft
with protection from friendly fires when operating in deep
missions across the FLOT.
• Air Axis. An air axis, similar to a ground axis of advance,
is assigned for control to graphically depict a
commander’s intentions. The air axis should be used in
conjunction with a procedure that provides protection for
the route of flight (e.g., an air corridor).
• Air Control Point or Aerial Checkpoint. An air control
point or aerial checkpoint is a predetermined point on the
ground used as a means of coordinating or controlling
friendly Army aircraft movement.
• Start Point (SP) and Release Point (RP). The SP and RP
are predetermined points on the ground used to initiate a
control procedure (SP) or to terminate the conduct of a
control procedure (RP).
• Battle Position (BP). A BP is a defensive location oriented
on a most likely threat avenue of approach from which a
unit may defend or attack. A unit assigned a BP is located
within the general outline of the BP. A BP does not
constitute an ACM; it should be used in conjunction with a
joint or other Army ACM.
SECTION IV – ARMY AVIATION SUPPORT
6-83. The aviation brigade has the mission to find, fix, and destroy
threat forces using fire and maneuver to concentrate and sustain
combat power at the critical time and place. Aviation brigade assets
can also provide timely reconnaissance and intelligence throughout
the squadron area and can conduct air assault and air movement
operations. With its capabilities, including planning and conducting
maneuver operations, the aviation brigade plays a significant role in
the success of the squadron’s mission. The aviation brigade can
conduct missions either as an aviation-pure force or as a task-
organized force.
ORGANIZATION
6-84. Aviation brigades are assigned from echelons above corps
through division level. Although their missions are basically the
same, the organizations differ based on their higher headquarters,
locations, and specific missions. Organization of aviation units in
support of the RSTA squadron and the SBCT will be designed,
tailored, and configured for specific operational support based on
6-33
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
mission guidance and for the specific theater in which it operates.

The organization could be any combination of attack,
reconnaissance, assault, lift, fixed-wing, and maintenance units.
PRINCIPLES OF AVIATION EMPLOYMENT

6-85. The principles and guidelines for employment of aviation assets
differ from those for typical ground maneuver forces. In general,
aviation forces—
• Fight as an integral part of the combined arms team.
• Exploit the capabilities of other branches and services.
• Capitalize on intelligence-gathering capabilities.
• Suppress threat weapons and acquisition means.
• Exploit firepower.
• Exploit mobility.
• Exploit surprise.
• Mass forces.
• Use terrain for survivability.
• Displace forward elements frequently.
• Maintain flexibility.
• Exercise staying power.
CHARACTERISTICS OF ATTACK HELICOPTERS

6-86. The capabilities of the various weapon systems carried by
attack helicopters give the squadron a high degree of flexibility and
firepower. The squadron may receive support from the aircraft
covered in the following discussion. Refer to Table 6-7 for a summary
of attack helicopter weaponry and capabilities.
AH-1 COBRA
6-87. The AH-1 Cobra is a single-engine, tandem-seat, two-bladed
attack helicopter. Its crew consists of two rated aviators. The pilot
occupies the rear cockpit, and the copilot-gunner occupies the front
cockpit. The AH-1 is essentially a daytime weapons platform due to
the inability to fire and track the TOW missile at night. Some Cobras
have been modified with a terminal night sight called C-NITE (Cobra
night). This system allows the gunner to thermally track the TOW
missile at night through the thermal sight unit (TSU). See FM 3-
04.112
[FM 1-112] for a detailed explanation of the aircraft.
AH-64A APACHE
6-88. The AH-64A is a twin-engine, tandem-seat, four-bladed attack
helicopter with a crew of two rated aviators. The pilot occupies the
rear cockpit, and the copilot-gunner occupies the front cockpit. The
aircraft has day, night, and limited adverse weather fighting
capabilities. The aircraft is equipped with a laser
rangefinder/designator (LRF/D). The LRF/D is used to designate the
firing of a Hellfire missile and provides range to target information for
6-34
the fire control system. See FM 3-04.112 [FM 1-112] for a detailed
explanation of the aircraft.
AH-64D LONGBOW APACHE

6-89. The AH-64D is a variant of the AH-64A. The AH-64D is
designed to provide increased effectiveness over the capabilities of
the AH-64A while greatly reducing the AH-64A’s limitations. The AH-
64D has several key improvements, including the fire control radar,
radio frequency Hellfire (fire-and-forget) missile system, digital
communications, and other significant features. The day, night, and
limited adverse weather fighting capabilities of the AH-64A are
significantly enhanced in the AH-64D. See FM 3-04.112 [FM 1-112]
for a detailed explanation of the aircraft.
OH-58D KIOWA WARRIOR
6-90. The OH-58D is a single-engine, single-rotor, four-bladed
armed reconnaissance helicopter. The crew consists of two rated
aviators. The pilot occupies the right seat, while the copilot occupies
the left seat to operate the aircraft’s systems. The aircraft has a laser
range finder designator (LRF/D), digital communications, airborne
video tape recorder, and is day, night, and limited adverse weather
capable. See FM 3-04.114 [FM 1-114] for additional information.
AH-1W (USMC)
6-91. The AH-1W is a twin-engine, tandem-seat, single-rotor, two-
or four-bladed CS and attack helicopter equipped with forward-
looking IR (FLIR), laser designation, and closed circuit day television
(CCDTV). The aircraft has day, night, and limited adverse weather
fighting capabilities.
Table 6-7. Attack Helicopter Weapons Suites
Aircraft Using Laser Capability Marking Other

Ordnance
M/D/S Service Capability Systems
Track Designate
AH-1 US Army TOW YES NO WP Rockets NVG
2.75” rockets
20 mm
AH-1W/Z USMC Hellfire, TOW NO YES WP Rockets NVG
Sidewinder Laser CCDTV
Sidearm FLIR (with
2.75” and 5” rockets organic CCDTV
system)
20 mm
GPS DVO
AH-64A/D USA Hellfire, 2.75” rockets YES YES WP Smoke NVG
30-mm chain gun Laser FLIR
Stinger GPS
DTV
OH-58D USA Hellfire NO YES WP Smoke NVG
2.75” rockets Laser TIR
.50 caliber, Stinger GPS
DTV
6-35
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
CHARACTERISTICS OF UTILITY AND CARGO HELICOPTERS
UH-1H IROQUOIS
6-92. The UH-1H is a single-engine, single-rotor helicopter. Primary
mission capability of the helicopter is air movement of supplies and
personnel. Secondary missions include stability operations, support
operations, air assault, and C2 operations under day, night, visual,
and instrument conditions. The aircraft has an external load
capability of 4,000 pounds. The aircraft can carry up to 11 combat-
loaded troops. See FM 3-04.113 [FM 1-113] for a detailed explanation
of the aircraft.
UH-1N (USN)
6-93. The UH-1N is a twin-engine, single-rotor helicopter employed
by the Marine Corps in a combat utility role. The UH-1N’s missions
include command and control; armed escort, FAC(A) (control,
coordinate, and provide terminal guidance for supporting arms, to
include close air support, artillery, mortars, and naval surface fire
support); combat assault transport of troops, supplies, and
equipment; armed reconnaissance; and CASEVAC while maintaining
the ability to operate from amphibious shipping and austere bases
ashore as required during night and under adverse weather
conditions at extended ranges. The UH-1N can carry 1,500 pounds of
cargo, troops, or ordnance. It is equipped with three ARC-210 radios,
capable of HaveQuick, SINCGARS, and SATCOM; third generation
FLIR with laser range finder and 8-mm recording/playback
capability. See MCWP 3-24 for more information on the aircraft.
UH-60A/L BLACK HAWK
6-94. The UH-60A/L is a twin-engine, single-rotor helicopter.
Primary mission capability of the helicopter is air assault and air
movement. Secondary missions include stability operations, support
operations, combat search and rescue (CSAR), C2 platform, casualty
evacuation (CASEVAC), and Air Volcano (mine setting) during day,
night, visual, and instrument conditions. External load capability for
the aircraft is 8,000 pounds for the UH-60A and 9,000 pounds for
the UH-60L. The aircraft can carry 11 troops with seats installed, 16
troops carrying rucksacks with seats removed, and 20 troops not
carrying rucksacks with seats removed. See FM 3-04.113 [FM 1-113]
for a detailed explanation of the aircraft.
CH-47D CHINOOK
6-95. The CH-47D is a twin-engine, tandem-rotor helicopter
designed for transportation of cargo, troops, and weapons during
day, night, visual, and instrument conditions. The maximum single
load that can be suspended as a tandem load from the forward and
aft hooks is 25,000 pounds. Troop-carrying arrangements can
accommodate up to 31 fully equipped ground troops or 24 litters. See
FM 3-04.113 [FM 1-113] for a detailed explanation of the aircraft.
CH-53E (USMC)
6-36
6-96. The CH-53E is a three-engine, single-rotor helicopter

day, night, visual, and instrument conditions. Internal payload is 37
to 55 troops and 20,000 pounds of cargo. See MCWP 3-24 for
additional information.
CH-46E (USMC)
6-97. The CH-46E is a twin-engine, tandem-rotor cargo helicopter
with a 4,300-pound payload and the capacity to carry 18 troops. See
MCWP 3-24 for additional information.
PLANNING OPERATIONS WITH ARMY AVIATION ASSETS

6-98. Planning considerations for operations that include aviation
assets are similar to those of any tactical operation. The two primary
factors are the higher commander’s intent and the factors of mission,
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, and civil considerations (METT-TC); but others, such as
CSS and risk analysis, must be integrated from the start. Two
specific areas in the planning process are of critical importance to the
squadron: request procedures for aviation support and the
integration of aviation and ground forces.
6-99. The squadron will request aviation support through S3
channels using its parent unit’s SOP. In virtually all cases, aviation
assets will be tasked organized to the squadron.
6-100. Integration of the combat power of aviation and ground
maneuver forces is extremely important because air and ground
forces do not always attack along the same axis or have identical
objectives. The planning for such operations must capitalize on the
strengths of each combat system. In whichever role the aviation
assets are used, the plan must be all-encompassing and ensure
coordination of effort.
6-101. Successful employment of aviation assets is possible only if
they are able to communicate with the other members of the
combined arms team. The primary means of communications with
helicopters is FM multichannel secure. To help reduce the load on
the FM radios, all helicopters have UHF and VHF radios. See Table 6-
8 for the number and type of radios in Army rotary-wing aircraft.
Table 6-8. Number and Type of Radios
AIRCRAFT TYPE FM VHF UHF HF

AH-1 1 1 1
AH-64A ** 1 (2) ** 1 (0) 1
AH-64D 2 1 1
CH-47D *** 0, 1, 2 *** 2, 1, 0 1 *1
OH-58C 2 1 1
OH-58D 2 1 1 *1
6-37
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
UH-1 2 1 1
UH-60 2 1 1
NOTES: * The HF listed above is not currently installed, but the wiring and mounts
exist.
** Configuration is 2 FM and 0 VHF, or 1 FM and 1 VHF.
*** Configuration is 2 FM and 0 VHF, or 1 FM and 1 VHF, or 0 FM and 2
VHF.
AVIATION MISSIONS
COMBAT MISSIONS
6-102. Aviation maneuver forces engage in destroying threat forces
by direct fire, indirect fire, and standoff precision weapons in joint
and combined arms missions. These aviation combat missions
include—
• Reconnaissance.
• Security.
• Attack.
• Air assault.
• Special operations.
• Theater missile defense.
• Support by fire.
COMBAT SUPPORT MISSIONS

6-103. Aviation CS missions, which cover the operational support
and sustainment provided to forces in combat by aviation units,
include—
• Command, control, communications, and intelligence
(C3I).
• Air movement.
• EW.
• Aerial mine warfare.
• CSAR.
• Air traffic service.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MISSIONS
6-104. Aviation CSS, the assistance provided by aviation forces to
sustain combat forces, includes—
• Aerial sustainment.
• CASEVAC.
AVIATION CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
CAPABILITIES
6-38
6-105. The aviation brigade conducts combat, CS, and CSS in

combined arms, joint, and multinational environments. It
significantly influences combat and noncombat missions by—
• Conducting day, night, and limited visibility combat, CS,
and CSS operations across the entire length and width of
the battlefield.
• Weighting the combat power of the theater, corps,
division, or brigade/regiment commander by rapidly
maneuvering forces to achieve mass at the critical time
and place.
• Shaping the battlespace by providing near-real time
intelligence on the threat’s location, disposition, strengths,
and intentions throughout the AO.
• Influencing the tempo of friendly and threat operations.
• Conducting JAAT operations.
• Conducting SEAD.
• Conducting air combat operations.
6-39
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
LIMITATIONS
6-106. Aviation brigades also are subject to some operational
limitations, to include—
• The effects of weather and obscuration on observation,
acquisition, and engagement ranges of combat systems as
well as on the employment of all aviation forces.
• Limited capability to secure unit assembly areas.
AIR CAVALRY SUPPORT

6-107. Air cavalry may be operationally controlled (OPCON) to the
squadron to augment squadron, troop, or platoon operations. Recce
troops and platoons in the squadron must therefore establish a close
working relationship with air cavalry troops. (See Figure 6-5 for an
air cavalry troop organization.) Through its mobility and speed, air
cavalry gives the ground commander added flexibility, increasing the
speed with which reconnaissance is conducted. Refer to FM 3-20.95
[FM 17-95] and
FM 3-04.114 [FM 1-114] for doctrine on air cavalry operations.
Figure 6-5. Air Cavalry Troop Organization
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
6-108. The aeroscout platoon consists of four aircraft, led by a
lieutenant. Its primary mission is conducting armed reconnaissance
and surveillance.
6-109. The primary aircraft in air cavalry units is the OH-58D Kiowa
Warrior. This helicopter provides the maneuver commander with a
versatile platform; it can be armed with various weapon systems and
is suitable for employment in numerous types of situations and
operations.
6-110. The aircraft features a stabilized mast-mounted sight (MMS)
with a low-light TV system, thermal imaging system (TIS), and
LFR/D. The aircrew of the Kiowa Warrior can detect a heat source in
day or night conditions at a range up to 15 kilometers and is capable
6-40
of providing laser designation of targets for laser-guided munitions.

Table 6-3 identifies the aircraft’s armaments and ranges.
NOTE: The Kiowa Warrior’s detection and identification capabilities and its maximum
operational and weapons ranges can be significantly affected by such factors
as terrain, weather, and crew experience.
AIR-GROUND INTEGRATION IN AIR CAVALRY OPERATIONS

6-111. To ensure effective integration, commanders and staffs must
consider some basic fundamentals for air-ground integration. These
fundamentals provide the framework for enhancing the effectiveness
of both air and ground maneuver assets. In all cases, the cavalry
commander must employ air cavalry assets as a maneuver force.
This basic premise, when coupled with the fundamentals of air-
ground integration, will ensure air cavalry is synchronized in the
squadron operation. The fundamentals are—
• Understanding capabilities and limitations of air and
ground elements.
• Use of SOPs.
• C2.
• Maximizing available assets.
• Employment methods.
• Synchronization.
Capabilities and Limitations

6-112. Each element (air and ground) brings unique capabilities and
limitations to the cavalry commander. Integration starts at
homestation with the implementation of effective SOPs, habitual
relationships, and air-ground team training; it continues throughout
planning, preparation, and execution of the operation. The
capabilities and limitations for the employment of air cavalry with
ground cavalry are listed below.
• Air Cavalry Capabilities. The air cavalry’s capabilities
are—
Terrain independent maneuver.
Addition of speed, agility, and depth to operations.
Increased tempo of operations.
Digital connectivity.
Enhanced optics.
Elevated observation platform.
Video reconnaissance.
Long-range direct fire capability.
Precision munition guidance.
Enhanced fire support capabilities.
Enhanced night survivability and capabilities.
6-41
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Air Cavalry Limitations. The air cavalry’s limitations

are—
Degraded limited visibility capabilities.
Lack of detailed reconnaissance.
Limited station times.
Crew endurance.
Aircraft maintenance requirements.
Inability to hold terrain.
Increased Class III/V requirements.
Forward arming and refueling point (FARP)
survivability.
Weather limitations.
Assembly area survivability.
Reaction time from decreased readiness condition
(REDCON).
Survivability in close operations.
• Ground Cavalry Capabilities. The ground cavalry’s
capabilities are—
Ability to hold terrain.
Detailed reconnaissance.
Continuous operations.
Self-supporting.
C2 organization.
Firepower and protection.
Organic fire support (mortars).
• Ground Cavalry Limitations. The ground cavalry’s
limitations are—
Terrain restrictions.
Movement (visibility/obstacles).
Responsiveness over distances.
Limited breach capabilities.
Limited long-range acquisition.
Standing Operating Procedures

6-113. To ensure standardization throughout the squadron, SOPs
must be established to provide a common basis for the integration of
air-ground operations. The SOP may include, but is not limited to—
• Common terminology.
• Conditions for air-ground team employment.
• Specialized task organizations.
• Roles and responsibilities for planning and preparation.
• Air-ground coordination checklists.
6-42
• Battle handover checklists.

• Air passage of lines procedures.
• Antifratricide markings and procedures.
• Clearance of fires procedures.
• Liaison requirements.
• Reporting.
• Communications architecture.
• Movement techniques.
• Actions on contact drills. These include indirect fires,
observation, direct fires from inferior force, direct fires
from superior force, fixed-wing, rotary-wing, civilians, and
noncombatants.
• Battle drills. These include breach operations, close
reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, fix and bypass,
zone reconnaissance, area reconnaissance, route
reconnaissance, screen operations, hasty attack.
Command and Control

6-114. The commander must define the control of the air and ground
operation. The two methods of control are squadron control and air-
ground team control. Under both methods, control normally rests
with the commander who owns the terrain the operation is covering.
6-115. Squadron control. The normal method of C2 for air cavalry
assets is to retain them under squadron control. The air cavalry
troop (ACT) commanders operate on the squadron command net and
may coordinate detailed actions with the recce troop on the air or
ground troop command net. The squadron commander ensures the
focus of the ACTs remains synchronized; he clarifies coordination
and issues orders to each troop as necessary. However, this method
should not preclude cross-talk and coordination between recce and
air cavalry troops. The level of cross-talk and coordination for each
type of operation may be outlined in the squadron SOP or OPORD.
6-116. Advantages and disadvantages of squadron control are METT-
TC dependent. Advantages may include—
• Enhanced situational awareness at the squadron level.
• Additional flexibility that allows the squadron commander
to focus combat power as the situation develops.
• Enhanced knowledge of the logistical status of the ACT at
the squadron level.
• Reduced C2 requirements for the ground troop
commander.
• Streamlined reporting and fire support requests.
• Reduced planning, liaison, and rehearsal requirements at
the troop level.
• Increased tempo of squadron-level operations.
6-43
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Ease in establishing and executing the squadron-level

A2C2 plan.
6-117. Disadvantages of squadron control may include—

• Less situational awareness below the troop level.
• More difficult air and ground synchronization at the troop
level.
• Higher potential for fratricide.
• More difficult clearance of direct and mortar fires.
• More difficult air passage of lines.
• Increased difficulty in close reconnaissance and target
handover.
• Increased traffic on the squadron command net.
6-118. Air-ground team control. The second method of C2 is the

formation of air-ground teams. This is normally a temporary
relationship to deal with a specific situation. OPCON is the command
relationship used. Air-ground team formation is best employed when
decentralized troop operations are required. Operations that may be
enhanced by the formation of air-ground teams include route
reconnaissance, area reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force,
movement to contact as an advanced guard, feints, raids, screens,
and area security. Based on METT-TC, control may be with either the
ground or air cavalry commander.
6-119. Control by the air cavalry troop is appropriate when—
• Air cavalry owns the battlespace, with only limited ground
cavalry assets in the area.
• The ground troop commander or CP is not in position to
exercise control.
• The air cavalry troop commander has better situational
awareness.
• The operation is of limited duration.
6-120. Control by the ground cavalry troop is appropriate when—

• Ground cavalry owns the battlespace, with only limited air
cavalry assets in the area.
• The ground troop commander or CP is in position to
exercise control.
• The ground cavalry troop commander has better
situational awareness.
• The operation is of longer duration.
6-121. The advantages and disadvantages of forming air-ground

teams are METT-TC dependent. Advantages may include—
• Enhanced situational awareness below the troop level.
6-44
• The squadron commander’s ability to weight the main

effort.
• Enhanced close reconnaissance and security operations.
• Decentralized operations.
• Streamlined clearance of direct and mortar fires in the
close fight.
• The recce troop’s enhanced ability to observe mortar fires.
• Reduced traffic on the squadron command net.
• Air cavalry’s ability to provide enhanced C2 for the recce
troop over extended distances.
• Enhanced response for downed aircraft in the close fight.
• Greater security for the ACTs during day close
reconnaissance and security missions.
6-122. Disadvantages of air-ground teams may include—

• Reduced situational awareness of ACT assets at the
squadron level.
• Limited ability for the squadron commander to reorient air
cavalry assets.
• Increased time required to clear artillery fires.
• Limited knowledge of the logistics status of the ACT’s
FARP requirements.
• More difficult squadron-level A2C2.
• Increased C2 and liaison requirements at troop level.
• Limited ability for the ACT to add depth and tempo to
squadron operation.
Maximizing Available Assets

6-123. ACTs are not sufficiently manned and equipped to effectively
conduct independent, sustained 24-hour operations. Intelligence
must drive maneuver; the commander’s intent and the IPB process
focus the employment of the ACTs. ACTs should be employed at the
platoon or troop level to ensure they have sufficient combat power
and C2 to achieve the squadron commander’s intent. Attempting to
maintain a 24-hour presence with air cavalry assets may negate
many of the ACT’s capabilities and result in their being piecemealed
into the fight.
Employment Methods
6-124. Squadrons have two options for the employment of the ACTs.
The first option is to employ troops simultaneously, with separate
AOs. The second option is to employ the ACTs sequentially, with the
same or different AOs. In either option, the ACTs may be retained
under squadron control or task organized with recce assets as air-
ground teams.
6-45
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
6-125. Simultaneous Operations. The squadron commander

employs simultaneous operations when—
• The squadron is covering extended distances or a larger
AO.
• The squadron must orient in multiple directions.
• The operation is of limited duration.
• IPB allows the commander to focus ACTs at the decisive
point and time.
• Maximum reconnaissance forward is required.
• Maximum security is required to provide early warning
and reaction time for the squadron.
• The threat requires the ACTs to operate primarily at night
for survivability.
6-126. Sequential Operations. The squadron commander employs
sequential operations when—
• The AO is smaller.
• The squadron is oriented in a single direction.
• The operation requires extended coverage in time.
• IPB does not allow the commander to focus ACTs at the
decisive point or time.
• Maximum reconnaissance or security forward is not
required.
• ACTs are held as a squadron reserve or required for
follow-on operations.
Synchronization
6-127. The integration of air cavalry into the decision-making
process is an important and unique aspect of staff planning. The
employment of air cavalry may be the significant difference between
COAs presented to the commander. In development of COAs, air-
ground synchronization should be planned along the guidelines
covered in the following paragraphs.
6-128. Intelligence. Intelligence must drive the maneuver plan.
Effective IPB will often make it obvious how and when to employ air
cavalry assets. To provide the commander with a clear picture of
when and where to employ air cavalry, the IPB process should
answer five fundamental questions:
• Where is the threat currently located?
• Where is the threat going, and what are his repositioning
criteria and routes?
• Where can we best acquire or engage the threat?
• When will the threat be there?
• What threat weapon systems can affect air cavalry assets?
6-46
6-129. Answering the questions above will allow the commander and
staff to—
• Designate reconnaissance objectives and focus.
• Determine priority intelligence requirements to facilitate
employment of the air cavalry.
• Develop an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) plan with depth and redundancy.
• Determine required combat multipliers (lethal and
nonlethal SEAD), air-ground team task organization, and
ACT weapons configurations.
• Determine bypass and engagement criteria.
• Determine REDCON levels and employment timelines or
triggers.
• Determine holding area locations, forward assembly area
locations, and FARP locations.
• Focus on developing a plan that pits the ACT’s capabilities
against threat weaknesses.
6-130. Maneuver. Air cavalry troops should be employed with many

of the same considerations as the recce troop. ACTs fight as
maneuver forces in platoon or troop strength. This provides sufficient
combat power for maintaining threat contact, actions on contact,
FARP rotations, and developing the situation. It also ensures
continuous and seamless C2. Standard maneuver graphics,
movement techniques, and reporting requirements enhance air-
ground integration and ease the planning requirements at the
squadron level. As with recce troop assets, guidance and planning
considerations for the air cavalry will vary based on the mission,
commander’s intent, and other METT-TC requirements. Figures 6-6
through 6-11 illustrate tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for
integrated reconnaissance and security operations. Maneuver
planning considerations for the employment of air cavalry in
reconnaissance and security operations include the following:
• Reconnaissance operations. Reconnaissance is an
inherent task in all missions conducted by ACTs. Early
development and integration of the ACTs in the squadron
ISR plan allow parallel planning and ensure assets are
available to meet the commander’s intent. A clear and
realistic task and purpose, as well as engagement criteria,
are essential to ensure the ACTs remain focused on the
reconnaissance objective. Normally, air cavalry is
primarily force-oriented and employed ahead of ground
forces. This will facilitate rapid movement of recce troops
and exploit the capability of air cavalry to increase the
tempo of squadron operations. At the same time, however,
ACTs must be deliberate in executing movement
techniques and in maximizing stand-off acquisition
capabilities. When task organizing air-ground teams, the
commander delineates employment constraints or
restrictions to ensure the ACTs are employed within his
6-47
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
intent. These constraints and restrictions may be outlined

in the unit’s SOP, OPORD, or verbal guidance from the
squadron commander.
• Security operations. During security operations, the
ACT’s main role is still reconnaissance. This
reconnaissance effort is focused on providing the
squadron early warning, reaction time, and maneuver
space. ACTs should be employed with sufficient distance
forward or to the flank of ground forces to provide the
maximum reaction time, normally within the range of
supporting indirect fires. In unique situations, ACTs may
be employed in the attack role to conduct hasty or
deliberate attacks to destroy threat reconnaissance and
security forces. However, the loss of the ACTs in the
reconnaissance role often outweighs the advantages of
employing them in the attack helicopter role. In the
reconnaissance role, ACTs should maximize the use of
indirect fires (mortars, artillery, and CAS) as well as target
handover to attack helicopters or recce troops to meet the
commander’s intent for threat destruction. This reduces
the risk of ACTs becoming decisively engaged and losing
mission focus.
6-48
AIR-GROUND INTEGRATION
ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
6
- As an AGT, a GCT, and an ACT
conduct coordinated route NAI A1
reconnaissance operations
- The ACT establishes a platoon

boundary to separate the zone.
- The ACT operates with two ACTM

conducting bounding overwatch with
the commander’s team back. 5 4
- Checkpoints, NAIs, and PLs are used
to identify critical reconnaissance PL JACK
objectives and to control maneuver.
- ACTMs reconnaissance adjacent

terrain/ routes, BUAs, ford sites, provide
security, and assist the maneuver of
the ground scout platoons. The ACTMs 3
are operating on the ground platoon
internal networks. 2
- The ACT commander cross talks with the GCT
commander on the GCT command network to
coordinate the reconnaissance effort. The ACT
commander conducts face-to-face cross talk (as
required) and assists the GCT commander with C2.
- The ACT is primarily force oriented, focused on

security and hasty route reconnaissance, while the
GCT conducts a deliberate route reconnaissance.
PL BOB ... .. ...
- The ACT provides far side security, locates
bypasses, and provides early warning to the GCT at
1
chokepoints and obstacles.
- During actions on contact the ACT conducts

target handover to the GCT and develops the
situation to the flanks and forward of the GCT.
- To maintain tempo and maximum reconnaissance

forward, the ACT commander’s team temporarily
relieves forward ACTM’s for FARP rotation. As the
commander’s team rotates to the FARP, the senior
platoon leader takes over C2 for the ACT.
... ...
- GCT mortar section positions in the center of the zone to
provide suppressive fires for the forward ACTMs.
Figure 6-6. Air-Ground Integration – Route Reconnaissance
6-49
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
AREA RECONNAISSANCE ..
TECHNIQUE #1 8
- As an AGT, a GCT, and an ACT 9
conduct a coordinated area
reconnaissance of OBJ CAT.
- PLs, checkpoints, and PL KILL 7

screen lines are used to
control movement and
focus the reconnaissance
and security effort.
OBJ CAT 6
- The ACT first conducts a hasty route
reconnaissance of the GCTs route of
march to the objective. The ACTs initial
focus is to get the GCT to the objective
quickly, without losses.
- At PL Hit ACTM 1 bounds forward to

conduct a force oriented reconnaissance 5
of the area. Once ACTM 1 clears the area,
4
ACTM 2 bounds along the flank to
establish a screen on the farside of the
objective. Based on METT-T the screen is
placed to provide early warning and 3
reaction time while the GCT executes the
area reconnaissance. ACTMs report on
the ACT command network. The ACT ACTM 1
commander cross talks on the GCT
command network.
- ACTM 3 (ACT CDR’s TM) continues to
conduct hasty route reconnaissance to
facilitate the continued movement of the
GCT to objective. 2
- As the GCT closes on the area reconn-
aissance objective, ACTM 3 assumes over-
watch of the objective. ACTM 1 starts the
FARP rotation or moves to the screen line PL HIT ACTM 3
to assist ACTM 2.
- If contact is made on the screen line, ...

...
ACTM 2 reports, maintains contact, and
develops the situation. Based on METT-T, ACTM 2
ACTM 2 may engage with indirect fires
(mortars/ artillery), direct fires, or conduct
target handover to the GCT or another
ACTM.
..
- Upon completion of the area reconnaissance, the
AGT departs the area on a different route. The ACT
continues to conduct route reconnaissance and
1
...
screens to protect the GCT during movement.
...
Figure 6-7. Air-Ground Integration – Area Reconnaissance
(Technique 1)
6-50
AREA RECONNAISSANCE ..
TECHNIQUE #2
8
- As an AGT, a GCT, and an and ACT
9
conduct a coordinated area reconn-
aissance of OBJ CAT.
PL KILL 7
- PLs, checkpoints, and screen
lines are used to control movement
and focus the reconnaissance and
security effort.
- The ACT first conducts a hasty route

reconnaissance of the GCTs route of
OBJ CAT 6
march to the objective. The ACT uses a
“V” formation, 2 ACTMs up, 1 ACTM back.
The ACTs initial focus is to get the GCT to
the objective quickly, without losses.
- At PL Hit, ACTM 1 and 2 bound forward to

conduct a force oriented reconnaissance of
the area. After the area is cleared, ACTM 1 5
bounds along the left flank and ACTM 2 4
bounds along the right flank to establish a
screen on the farside of the objective. Based
on METT-T the screen is placed to provide
early warning and reaction time while the
GCT executes the area reconnaissance. 3
ACTMs report on the ACT command
network. The ACT commander cross talks on
ACTM 1
the GCT command network. ACTM 2
- ACTM 3 (ACT CDR’s TM) continues to
conduct hasty route reconnaissance to
facilitate the continued movement of the
GCT to objective.
- As the GCT closes on the area

reconnaissance objective, ACTM 3 assumes
2
overwatch of the objective. ACTMs 1 and 2
conduct team FARP rotations. ACTM 3
conducts team internal FARP rotation.
PL HIT
- If contact is made on the screen line ACTM 1
or ACTM 2 reports, maintains contact, and
develops the situation. Based on METT-T, ACTM 3
ACTM 1 or ACTM 2 may engage with indirect
fires (mortars/ artillery), direct fires, or conduct
target handover to the GCT or another ACTM.
...
The out of contact ACTM on the screen
displaces to maintain contact in-depth. ...
- Upon completion of the area reconnaissance
the AGT departs the area on a different route. The
..
...
ACT continues to conduct route reconnaissance
and screens to protect the GCT during 1
movement.
...
Figure 6-8. Air-Ground Integration – Area Reconnaissance

(Technique 2)
6-51
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 6-9. Air-Ground Integration – Zone Reconnaissance

(Technique 1)
6-52
Figure 6-10. Air-Ground Integration – Zone Reconnaissance

(Technique 2)
6-53
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
STATIONARY FLANK SCREEN
BHOL
- An ACT and GCT conduct a coordinated
stationary screen of the right flank of the
main body. 6
11
- The ACT establishes OPs, team
boundaries, and other control measures
2
to facilitate C and depth to the screen
line.
ACTM 1
- The ACT operates with 3 ACTMs set in OPs
to maintain maximum eyes forward and
provide security within the team. OPs are not 5
placed linearly along the screen, but placed 10
in-depth to allow contact to be maintained
with enemy force and to cover multiple
avenues of approach. ACTM integrity is
maintained to facilitate security and
reconnaissance through the depth of the
... CDR
sector.
- The ACT commander operates independent

9 ..
of the ACTMs, when possible, positioning
2
himself where he can best C the troop,
coordinate with the GCT, and pass
3
intelligence to squadron.
- The rear boundary of the ACT is established

as a battle handover line to facilitate rapid ACTM 2 4
target handovers to the GCT without losing
enemy contact.
8
- ACTMs conduct internal relief on station
to maximize reconnaissance forward.
FARPs should be positioned as close to the
..
..
screen as METT-T allows to minimize FARP
turn around times.
- The GCT positions scout sections in-depth to

provide redundant coverage in-depth and to
facilitate battle handover to the two tank
platoons, which are defending BPs.
- The two tank platoons defend BPs to destroy 2

enemy reconnaissance forces that penetrate the
...
ACT and ground scout platoon screens.
- Based on the SCO’s engagement and bypass

criteria, the ACT should maintain contact with
ACTM 1
enemy forces and conduct target handovers for
destruction by the GCT. This allows the ACT to 7
maintain the screen without being decisively
engaged.
1
Figure 6-11. Air-Ground Integration – Stationary Flank Screen
6-54
6-131. Fire Support. Fire support coordination is critical to ensure

the commander’s EFSTs are accomplished and to expedite clearance
of fires. The squadron FSO must ensure ACTs are integrated into the
fire support observer plan. ACTs can facilitate long-range, accurate,
and timely indirect fires through the use of the MMS and onboard
digital capabilities. When task organized in air-ground teams, ACTs
should be integrated into the recce troop fire support plan for
observing troop mortar and artillery fires. To facilitate clearance of
fires, the air-ground team commander and FIST must maintain
situational awareness on the location of all air and ground assets.
Standard maneuver control measures and FSCMs, as well as
accurate situation reports (SITREP), will speed this process.
6-132. During air-ground team operations, the squadron FSO may
have less situational awareness on the location of all ACT assets
operating on the battlefield. This may require clearing each of the
grids fired, within the air-ground team sector or zone, to reduce the
chance of fratricide. ACTs normally process all of their fires directly
through the squadron FSO when engaging targets beyond the
coordinated fire line (CFL). If targets are being engaged short of CFL,
the ACT should process the call for fire through the recce troop FIST.
6-133. To enhance survivability in the employment of ACTs, the FSO
should consider planning and executing lethal and nonlethal SEAD.
Based on METT-TC, SEAD may be used to suppress, destroy, or
deceive threat air defense systems to facilitate the ACT’s maneuver
plan. Localized and/or complementary SEAD may be an EFST for the
squadron commander. Localized SEAD must be event-driven and
should be war-gamed to ensure the desired effect can be achieved
based on target location, volume of fire, and timing. Complementary
SEAD is a continual process of engaging air defense systems as they
are identified throughout the AO.
6-134. Mobility and Survivability. ACTs can assist in identifying
obstacles and setting the conditions for breaching (suppress,
obscure, secure, reduce [SOSR]). Based on sensor conditions, the
OH-58D MMS and video image cross-link (VIXL) capability can be
used to identify obstacle makeup, complexity, and potential
bypasses.
6-135. If a bypass is not available, the ACT may be used to help set
the conditions for a breach. Although ACTs have limited firepower,
they may be used to provide suppression during the first phase of
SOSR. During the obscuration phase, ACTs can assist the recce
troop FIST with adjusting artillery- and mortar-delivered smoke.
During the secure and reduction phases, ACTs can provide a screen
or overwatch position on the far side of the obstacle to identify
and/or destroy repositioning threat forces.
ATTACK HELICOPTER SUPPORT

6-136. The ATKHB conducts attack, reconnaissance, and security
operations that complement the operations of other maneuver forces.
When effectively integrated in the tactical maneuver plan with other
maneuver units, the battalion is a valuable combat asset for the
supported unit commander. Its capabilities enable him to mass
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combat power rapidly at the decisive time and place to affect the
battle’s outcome, striking the threat where and when he is most
vulnerable.
6-137. An ATKHB seldom fights alone; it is normally employed with
other maneuver, CS, CSS, and joint forces in a combined arms team.
This team surprises and overmatches the threat at the point of
attack. The attack helicopter unit may conduct its attack out of
physical contact with other friendly forces but synchronized with
their scheme of maneuver; it may also be employed in direct contact
with friendly forces.
6-138. ATKHBs are assigned to divisional aviation brigades, corps
attack helicopter regiments, and divisional aviation brigades. They
give the commander a highly mobile, 24-hour-a-day antiarmor
capability. It is important to remember that ATKHBs are maneuver
units, not CAS or fire support units. Therefore, they must be
integrated into the commander’s tactical plan along with his other
maneuver units.
6-139. The ATKHB has the mission to destroy or disrupt massed
threat armor and mechanized forces using aerial firepower, mobility,
and shock. It can also destroy threat helicopters that pose an
immediate threat and conduct JAAT operations with CAS and FA
assets. The ATKHB cannot conduct missions that require the
occupation of terrain. It can, however, deny the threat use of that
same terrain for a limited time by employing organic and supporting
fire.
ATTACK HELICOPTER MISSIONS

Movement to Contact
6-140. During a movement to contact, attack helicopters from the
ATKHB will be critical to the success of the advance forces and the
main body of the ground maneuver unit. As part of the advance
guard, the ATKHB can destroy forward threat elements and contain
bypassed threat units. Its mobility and firepower will permit the
maneuver commander to overwhelm the threat and maintain the
initiative.
Hasty Attack
6-141. During a hasty attack, attack helicopters have the speed and
firepower necessary to shock and overwhelm the threat and seize the
initiative. Employed independently, the ATKHB is least effective when
attacking strongly held, fortified defensive positions because of its
lack of staying power and inability to hold terrain. It can, however,
provide heavy and effective suppressive fires when attacking with
ground maneuver forces.
Deep Battle Attack
6-142. ATKHBs are ideally suited for deep battle operations because
of their speed, mobility, flexibility, and firepower. At division level,
they may be the commander’s only means of influencing the deep
battle. The ATKHB can participate in several different deep attack
missions. The most common are an operation of limited duration, an
6-56
operation to secure a deep objective, and an operation to continue

the attack.
6-143. An operation of limited duration resembles a raid. The ATKHB
penetrates threat territory to delay, disrupt, or destroy a known
target. Once the mission is finished, the attack force withdraws. An
operation to secure a deep objective is a deliberate attack with the
goal of occupying a specific area in threat territory. This is a
combined arms mission, with the ATKHB part of the force. An
operation to continue the attack is similar to exploitation. The
ATKHB operates as part of a larger force and attacks withdrawing or
counterattacking threat forces before their arrival in the objective
area. Despite the defensive nature of the higher headquarters
mission, the ATKHB’s missions are offensive in nature.
Covering Force Area
6-144. The ATKHB is the primary force that allows the covering force
commander to fight his battle aggressively and maintain the offensive
spirit. Due to its speed and agility, the ATKHB can rapidly respond
and concentrate its firepower throughout the covering force area. The
ATKHB is normally employed in hasty attacks from forward assembly
areas on targets that are well forward in the covering force area. In
the division area, the ATKHB is the primary long-range killer in the
aviation brigade. Missions normally assigned to the ATKHB include
attacking follow-on forces, overwatching the movement of ground
forces, and acting as a blocking force.
6-145. The reason to attack follow-on forces is self-explanatory; the
commander decides that he must destroy or disrupt a threat follow-
on force to ensure the success of his own operation. Overwatching
the movement of ground forces can involve a variety of different
missions. An example is relieving a battalion task force to allow it to
maneuver to a subsequent BP by denying the threat the ability to
maneuver over certain terrain. The ATKHB can also overwatch battle
handover from the covering force to the MBA forces. The ATKHB can
act as a blocking force. This allows the covering force commander to
protect a threat penetration point while he maneuvers his ground
units to blunt the penetration.
Main Battle Area
6-146. In the MBA, the ATKHB can be used to destroy threat lead
elements entering the main AO. It can also attack and destroy follow-
on forces that are capable of influencing the threat’s main effort. The
ATKHB should be employed as soon as this main effort has been
identified. The ATKHB also can be held in reserve by the division or
committed as an independent force against threat forces that have
bypassed or penetrated MBA forces. Another option is to assign the
ATKHB OPCON to a ground maneuver brigade to give it additional
combat power. Employment techniques are the same as those used
in the covering force area.
Rear Battle Area
6-147. When used in the rear battle area, the ATKHB is best
employed as a rapid reaction force. With its mobility and short
reaction time, it should be assigned on-order missions to support the
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rear area. It can react rapidly to a threat air assault in the corps or
division rear area and contain or destroy threat forces once they are
in the rear area. To ensure success, it is important to remember that
many AOs require close coordination between artillery, CAS, and
attack helicopter units.
6-58
Raid
6-148. The ATKHB is the ideal unit for conducting a raid. The
mission is short in duration and requires speed, flexibility, and
audacity. The following are considerations related to planning and
conducting a raid with attack helicopters:
• A well-defined objective is required.
• The mission must be of short enough duration to be
accomplished on one fuel load.
• Multiple routes must be available for aircraft.
• Air-to-air security must be emphasized.
• Actions at the objective should be fast-paced and provide
for massed fires.
• Attack helicopters are best suited for raids against moving
targets.
Exploitation
6-149. In the exploitation, the ATKHB is employed as part of a larger
force. It allows the exploiting force to strike the threat’s flanks and
rear area to disrupt his withdrawal and reorganization. The ATKHB
operates as in a movement to contact, moving behind the ground
force, ready to strike early in the fight. In addition, attack helicopters
can effectively interdict and harass retreating threat armored forces.
Pursuit
6-150. The ATKHB’s speed, mobility, and firepower make it an ideal
force for a pursuit. It can maneuver deep to outflank and contain
retreating forces and quicken the disintegration of the threat’s will to
fight. By “phasing” its three attack helicopter companies (one
company in battle, one company en route to the battle area, and one
company en route to or at the FARP), the ATKHB can place
continuous pressure on the withdrawing threat force.
AIR-GROUND INTEGRATION IN ATTACK HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

6-151. The hasty attack in the close fight typically lacks proper
coordination between air and ground elements to ensure mission
success. Effective coordination between ground maneuver units and
attack aviation assets will maximize the capabilities of the combined
arms team while minimizing the risk of fratricide. The key to success
for enhancing air-ground coordination and the subsequent execution
of the tasks involved is a set of standardized techniques and
procedures. The end state is a detailed SOP between air and ground
maneuver units that addresses hasty attacks in a close combat
situation.
6-152. Effective integration of air and ground assets begins with the
ground maneuver brigade. When the aviation brigade or task force
receives a mission to provide assistance to a ground unit engaged in
close combat and planning time is minimal, the initial information
provided by the brigade in contact should be sufficient to get the
aviation attack team out of the aviation tactical assembly area to a
holding area for direct coordination. The attack teams employed in
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this procedure will be placed under OPCON of the squadron in

contact. This procedure contains five major steps:
• SBCT planning requirements.
• Squadron close fight SITREP.
• Attack team check-in.
• Employment of aviation direct fires.
• BDA/reattack.
6-153. The following discussion of this procedure includes sections

on aviation employment considerations and maneuver SBCT liaison
officer (LNO) coordination requirements, all of which are pertinent to
the employment of attack aviation in the close fight.
NOTE: The aviation close fires TTP are emerging concepts and should not be quoted as
approved doctrine until otherwise notified. The recommended aviation close fires
TTP should be used as a guide, not as the only method of conducting this kind
of mission.
Step 1 - SBCT Planning Requirements

6-154. The maneuver SBCT, through its aviation LNO, provides the
necessary planning requirements to the aviation brigade
headquarters (see Figure 6-12). The initial planning and information
to be passed to the aviation brigade headquarters includes the
location of the holding area along with an air axis, route, or corridor
for entry and exit through the SBCT and battalion sector.
6-155. The holding area should be in the sector of the squadron
involved in close combat. The holding area may be a concealed
ground position or an aerial holding area that allows for final
coordination between the attack team leader and the ground unit
leader before the attack begins. It must be located within FM radio
range of all units involved. Alternate holding areas, along with
ingress and egress routes, must be designated if occupation is
expected to last longer than 15 minutes.
6-156. The SBCT also provides the call signs, frequencies, Single
Channel Ground-Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) Hopsets,
and/or communications security (COMSEC) information regarding
the battalion in contact. If the unit is SINCGARS-equipped, the
attack team must also have the common “time,” which may be taken
from the global positioning system (GPS). In addition, the SBCT
provides a current situation update for its AO and, specifically, for
the supported battalion’s AO. This will include a recommended EA,
which will allow for initial planning for BPs or attack-by-fire
(ABF)/support-by-fire (SBF) positions and possibly could prevent
unintentional overflight of threat positions.
6-60
The minimum brigade planning requirements are—
• Current situation, to include friendly forces location and situation, threat situation
highlighting known air defense artillery threat in the area of operations (AO), and
tentative engagement area coordinates.
• Brigade/squadron-level graphics, updated via Maneuver Control System or radio
communications. The update should include critical items, such as limit of advance,
fire control measures, and base maneuver graphics, to integrate better into the
friendly scheme of maneuver.
• Fire support coordination information, such as location of direct support artillery and
organic mortars, call signs, and frequencies.
• Ingress/egress routes into the brigade AO. This includes passage point into sector
or zone and air routes to the holding area.
• Holding area for face-to-face coordination between the attack team and the
battalion in contact. A holding area equates to an assault position. It must be large
enough to accommodate the number of aircraft assigned to the mission and out of
range of threat direct fire systems. It should also be out of threat mortar range.
• Call signs/frequencies of the battalion in contact down to the company in contact.
Air-ground coordination must be done on command frequencies to provide
situational awareness for all elements involved.
• Single Channel Ground-Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) time hack.
Figure 6-12. Minimum Stryker Brigade Combat Team Planning Requirements
Step 2 - Squadron Close Fight SITREP

6-157. En route to the holding area, the attack team leader contacts
the squadron on its FM command net to receive a close fight SITREP
(see Table 6-8). This SITREP verifies the location of the holding area
and includes additional coordination. The attack team leader receives
an update from the squadron on the threat and friendly situations.
The squadron also verifies frequencies and call signs of the unit in
contact. By this time, the squadron has contacted the recce troop
commander to inform him that attack aviation is en route to conduct
a hasty attack.
6-158. The squadron close fight SITREP includes—
• Threat situation, focusing on ADA in the AO, type of
threat vehicles/equipment, position (center mass), and
direction of movement. If threat forces are dispersed,
provide a front line trace.
• Friendly situation, including location of the unit in
contact, its mission, and the method of marking its
position.
• Call sign/frequency verification.
• Holding area verification, if face-to-face coordination is
used. A sign-countersign must be agreed upon, such as
using a light/heat source to provide a recognizable
signature answered by either aircraft IR lights or visible
light flashes to signify which aircraft to approach.
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NOTE: Table 6-9 shows simulated radio traffic as an example of what may occur
during this step.
Table 6-9. Example Close Fight Situation Report
ATTACK TEAM CAVALRY SQUADRON (RSTA)

“Bulldog 06, this is Blackjack 26, over.”
“Blackjack 26, this is Bulldog 06, L/C, over.”
“Bulldog 06, Blackjack 26 en route to HA at grid
VQ 98454287, request SITREP, over.”
“Blackjack 26, this is Bulldog 06, threat situation
follows, Hardrock 06 is taking direct fire from a platoon-
size armor element at grid VQ 96204362, Hardrock 06
elements are established on PL Nevada center mass
VQ 96000050, holding area VQ 94004000 expect radio
coordination only, contact Hardrock 06 on FH 478,
over.”
6-159. Upon receiving the required information from the squadron,

the attack team leader changes to the recce troop’s FM command net
to conduct final coordination before ingressing on attack routes to
BPs or ABF/SBF positions (refer to Table 6-10). Coordination begins
with the recce troop commander and ends with the leader of the
lowest-level unit in contact (recce platoon).
6-160. Regardless of which key leader the attack team leader
contacts for coordination, the recce troop command net is the most
suitable net on which both air and ground elements can conduct the
operation. It allows all key leaders on the ground, to include the FIST
chief, and the attack team leader and his attack crews to
communicate on one common net throughout the operation.
Operating on the command net also allows the attack team to
request responsive mortar fire for either suppression or immediate
suppression of the threat. The AH-64 and the AH-1 Cobra are limited
to only one FM radio because of the aircraft configuration. The OH-
58 is dual-FM capable, which allows the attack team leader to
maintain communications with the troop as well as its higher
headquarters or an FSE.
Table 6-10. Example Radio Frequency Change
ATTACK TEAM RECCE TROOP

“Hardrock 06, this is Blackjack 26 on FH 478, over.”
“Blackjack 26, this is Hardrock 06, L/C, over.”
Step 3 - Attack Team Check-in

6-161. Upon making initial radio contact with the ground maneuver
unit in contact, the attack team leader executes a check-in (see Table
6-11). The attack team provides a succinct check-in consisting of the
following:
6-62
• Present aircraft location, which is normally the attack team

ground or aerial holding area. In the event a ground holding
area is not used due to METT-TC considerations, the attack
team will select and occupy an aerial holding area within FM
communications range until all required coordination is
complete.
• Attack team composition.
• Munitions available (armament load and weapons
configuration).
• Total station time.
• Night vision device (NVD) capability.
6-162. The attack team leader and ground unit’s key leaders must
consider the effects on friendly forces of the various weapons carried
by the attack aircraft prior to target selection and engagement.
Selection of weapon systems and munitions for a given engagement
is METT-TC dependent. Point target weapon systems, such as Hellfire
or TOW, are the preferred systems for engaging armor or hardened
targets in the close fight. The gun systems and the 2.75-inch rockets
are the preferred system/munition for engaging troops in the open
and soft targets, such as trucks and trenchworks. These area fire
weapon systems pose a danger to friendly soldiers who may be in the
lethality zone of the rounds or rockets. In this case, the leader on the
ground must be very precise in describing the target he wants the
aircraft to engage.
Table 6-11. Example Check-In Transmission

“Hardrock 06, Blackjack 26 is currently holding
at grid VQ 98454287, 2 Kiowa Warriors with 450
rounds of .50 cal, 2 Hellfires each, half hour
station time, all aircraft are NVG and FLIR
capable, over.”
“Blackjack 26, Hardrock 06, stand by, over.”
“Blackjack 26, roger.”
Step 4 – Employment of Aviation Direct Fires

6-163. As noted earlier, there are two methods of coordinating and
employing aviation direct fires. Aviation direct fires can be
preplanned, using a face-to-face coordination method, or conducted
as immediate, using only radio communications. Face-to-face
coordination between the commander in contact and the attack team
leader is preferred, but METT-TC will dictate the method of
coordination. A major benefit of face-to-face coordination is that the
attack team can talk to the ground commander with a map available
and integrate into the ground scheme of maneuver. This also
provides an opportunity for members of the attack team to update
their maps with the maneuver squadron’s latest graphics.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
6-164. The checklist for preplanned aviation direct fires should

cover—
• Threat situation, including specific target identification.
• Friendly situation, including location and method of
marking friendly positions.
• Planned EA, BPs, and/or ABF/SBF positions.
• Ground maneuver mission and scheme of maneuver.
• Attack aircraft scheme of maneuver.
• Fire coordination and fire restrictions.
• Map graphics update.
• Method of designating targets.
6-165. Requests for aviation direct fires should include—

• Friendly location (usually the individual/unit requesting
support).
• Heading to target (magnetic).
• Distance to target (kilometers).
• Target description.
• Target coordinates.
• Target designation method.
• Remarks as necessary.
• Restrictive fire control measures.
• Threats such as ADA.
• Clearance for fires authority.
6-166. Preplanned Aviation Direct Fires. When employing
preplanned aviation direct fires, the recce troop commander and attack
team leader meet at the holding area and plan their attack after the
flight check-in is received. To be considered preplanned, certain
elements of coordination, noted previously in the preplanned aviation
direct fires checklist, must be completed at the holding area. The target
must be identified and its activity explained. The friendly force’s
positions must be identified on a map, with a method of visually
marking those positions passed on to the attack team. If not previously
done, the EA must be verified or defined. After defining the EA, the
attack team leader will establish BPs and/or ABF/SBF positions. The
scheme of maneuver for the ground elements must be explained,
including the commander’s intent, and description of what is
considered the decisive point on the battlefield. With that information,
the attack team will provide a supporting scheme of maneuver.
Existing or required fire control measures must be planned for and
employed to minimize the potential for fratricide. Then key maneuver
graphics that are required to support or understand the scheme of
maneuver are passed between the ground commander and attack team
leader. A method of designating targets, such as laser pointers or
tracers, will also be discussed. After completing this coordination, the
synchronized attack plan can be executed. Targets of opportunity will
be attacked on a case-by-case basis using the request for immediate
6-64
aviation direct fires. Consideration of the time available for this

planning is critical; ground and air commanders accept increased risk
of holding area compromise if the position is maintained for greater
than 15 minutes. METT-TC will dictate the extent of preplanning that
may be accomplished and the length of time the holding area may be
occupied.
6-167. Immediate Aviation Direct Fires. Use a request for aviation
direct fires, outlined earlier in this discussion, when employing
immediate aviation direct fires (see Table 6-12). With immediate
aviation direct fires, portions of the preplanned aviation direct fires
checklist are omitted to provide fires in a timely manner. A basic
update is provided and the attack aircraft are called forward from
their ground or aerial holding area with the request for aviation direct
fires. Whether the attack team uses a ground or aerial holding area
will be dictated by its abilities to maintain FM communication with
the ground element in contact. Once the flight check-in has been
received, the ground maneuver leader provides a situation update,
METT-TC permitting, containing essential elements from the
preplanned aviation direct fires checklist. The attack team maintains
position at an aerial holding area or within a ground holding area.
The ground maneuver leader succinctly outlines the concept of his
ground tactical plan. This includes updates on threat composition,
disposition, and most recent activities, particularly the location of air
defense weapons. He also provides an update on the friendly
situation, to include the composition, disposition, and location of his
forces and supporting artillery or mortar positions. After providing
this information, the ground maneuver leader uses the aviation
direct fires request format for attack and for subsequent reattacks.
NOTE: Before requesting aviation direct fires, the ground commander should brief
essential elements via radio as a SITREP.
Table 6-12. Request for Aviation Direct Fires

“Blackjack 26, Hardrock 06, stand by for update,
friendly platoon in contact located at VQ 96000050,
marked by IR strobes, threat platoon-size armor
element is 800 meters due north, there has been
sporadic heavy machine gun fire and main tank gun
fire into our position, fire appears to be coming from
road intersection vic VQ 96204362, negative
knowledge on disposition of threat ADA, I’ll be handing
you down to Hardrock 16 for the aviation direct fires
request, over.”
“Hardrock 06, Blackjack 26, good copy,
standing by at HA for aviation direct fires
request, over.”
“Roger, Blackjack 26, Hardrock 16, request follows,
friendly location VQ96000050, 360 degrees to target,
800 meters, 2 T-80s at the road intersection, target
location VQ96000850, PAQ-4 spot on, no friendlies
north of the 00 grid line, low wires directly over our
position, over.”
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6-168. After receipt of a request for aviation direct fires, the attack
team leader then informs the ground unit leader of the BP, ABF/SBF
position, or the series of positions his team will occupy to gain the
best possible observation and fields of fire into the EA or target area.
The BP or ABF/SBF position is a position from which the attack
aircraft will engage the threat with direct fire. It includes a number of
individual aircraft firing positions. It may be preplanned or
established as the situation dictates. Size will vary depending on the
number of aircraft using the position, the size of the EA, and the type
of terrain. The BP or ABF/SBF position is normally offset from the
flank of the friendly ground position, but close to the position of the
requesting unit to facilitate efficient target handover. This also
ensures that rotor wash, ammunition casing expenditure, and the
general signature of the aircraft do not interfere with operations on
the ground. The offset position also allows the aircraft to engage the
threat on its flanks rather than its front and reduces the risk of
fratricide along the helicopter gun-target line.
6-169. The attack team leader then provides the ground maneuver
unit leader with his concept for the team’s attack on the objective.
This may be as simple as relaying the direction from which the
aircraft will be coming or the attack route, time required to move
forward from their current position, and the location of the BP. Only
on completion of coordination with the lowest unit in contact does
the flight depart the holding area for the BP. As the attack team
moves out of the holding area, it uses nap of the earth (NOE) flight
along attack routes to mask itself from ground threat observation
and threat direct fire systems. The attack team leader maintains FM
communications with the ground unit leader while he maintains
internal communications on either his very high frequency (VHF) or
ultra high frequency (UHF) net (see Table 6-13).
Table 6-13. Example Transmission During Attack

“Hardrock 16, Blackjack elements will attack from the
southeast, turn on IR strobes at this time, we will
establish a BP west of your position 50 meters,
over.”
“Blackjack 26, Hardrock 16, strobes on at this time,
over.”
“Roger, Hardrock, Blackjack has your position, en
route for attack 30 seconds, over.”
“Hardrock 16, roger.”
“Hardrock 16, Blackjack 26, engagement complete,
two T-80s destroyed, over.”
“Blackjack 26, Hardrock 16, roger two T-80s
destroyed, end of mission, out.”
NOTE: This scenario was written without friction, as though in perfect conditions.
Grid locations may be difficult for the ground maneuver element to determine,
6-66
depending on the intensity of the ongoing engagement. Actual FM

communications between the ground and air may not work this well.
Step 5 - Battle Damage Assessment/Reattack

6-170. After completing the requested aviation direct fires, the attack
team leader provides a BDA to the ground maneuver commander.
Based on his intent, the ground maneuver commander will determine if
a reattack is required to achieve his desired end state. Requests for
aviation direct fires can be continued until all munitions or fuel is
expended. Upon request for a reattack the attack team leader must
consider the effects on duration and strength of coverage he can provide
the ground maneuver commander.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR ATTACK HELICOPTER OPTICS
6-171. All aircrew and ground maneuver leaders should understand
the strengths and weaknesses of available aviation sensors when
employed with target-marking equipment. This discussion addresses
several factors operators should consider when designating targets
for varied aviation optics. The equipment covered includes target-
marking devices, night-vision goggles (NVG), FLIR, TIS, television
(TV)/electro-optical (EO), electronic beacons, and laser designators.
TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND FRIENDLY POSITION MARKING
6-172. Marking of friendly positions and targets is an indispensable
aspect of planning that must be considered thoroughly regardless of the
time available to the ground and air commanders. The proximity of
friendly forces to targets requires positive identification and makes
marking of friendly units and targets critical. The ability of the aircrews
to easily observe and identify ground signals and marking methods is a
key factor in reducing fratricide and maximizing responsive aerial fires.
The signals, marking methods, or combination of these means must be
based on items commonly carried by ground maneuver units, must be
acquirable by the night vision or thermal imaging systems on the
aircraft, and must be recognizable by the aircrew.
6-173. Air and ground crews must work together to determine all
required identification and marking procedures before starting a
mission. Accurate and detailed maps, charts, or imagery will help to
orient aircrews on the friendly scheme of maneuver. Aircrews then
continue to work closely with the ground forces to positively identify
friendly positions. Signaling and marking procedures must be clearly
understood, and all participants must be issued the appropriate
devices. The methods employed must be adapted to the conditions
prevalent at the time.
6-174. Visual signaling or marking of positions helps aircrews to
determine the disposition of friendly forces. Often, the simplest methods
are the best. Traditional signaling devices such as flares, strobes, and
signaling mirrors may be quite effective. Target marking or orientation
on threat positions may also be accomplished by signaling. Common
techniques include the use of smoke, laser pointers, or tracers. Other
devices are available to aid in the recognition of friendly forces and
equipment where the fluid tactical situation—intermingling of forces in
the close fight—may make identification difficult. The use of glint tape,
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
combat identification panels (CIP), and IR beacons can assist in the

clear identification of friendly ground forces, although ground lighting,
thermal contrast, and intermediate obstructions influence the
effectiveness of these devices.
6-175. Signaling and marking methods are limited only by the
creativity of the ground forces and aircrews (see Table 6-14).
Commanders may use this table as a reference, but should not limit
themselves to only these methods.
6-176. Time permitting, attack aircraft may input a target grid into the
aircraft GPS or inertial navigation system (INS); this will provide fire
control cues (range, heading, time) to the target, aiding in quicker target
acquisition and helping to distinguish friendly forces from the threat.
Because aviation direct fires missions may be “danger close” with short
firing ranges, aircrews should anticipate minimum tracking time and
thus minimum time to optimize their sensors.
6-177. Aircrews must positively identify targets and friendly positions
prior to firing. Positive air-to-ground communications are essential to
coordinate and authenticate signals and marking methods before the
engagement begins.
6-68
Table 6-14. Target and Friendly Marking Methods

DAY/ FRIENDLY TARGET
METHOD ASSETS REMARKS
NIGHT MARKS MARKS
SMOKE D/N All Good Good Easily identifiable, may compromise friendly
position, obscure target, or warns of fire support
employment. Placement may be difficult due to
structures.
SMOKE (IR) D/N All/ Good Good Easily identifiable, may compromise friendly
NVD at position, obscure target, or warn of fire support
Night employment. Placement may be difficult due to
structures. IR reflective smoke greatly
enhances night marking.
ILLUM GND D/N All N/A Good Easily identified, may wash out NVDs.
BST
SIGNAL D All Good N/A Avoids compromise of friendly location.
MIRROR Dependent on weather and available light and
may be lost in reflections from other reflective
surfaces (windshields, windows, water, etc.).
SPOTLIGHT N All Good Marginal Highly visible to all. Compromises friendly
position and warn of fire support employment.
Effectiveness is dependent upon degree of
urban lighting. May wash out NVDs.
IR N All NVD Good Marginal Visible to all with night-vision goggles (NVG).
SPOTLIGHT Less likely to compromise than overt light.
Effectiveness dependent upon degree of urban
lighting.
IR LASER N All NVG Good Marginal Effectiveness dependent upon degree of urban
POINTER lighting.
(< 0.4 watts)
IR LASER N All NVD Good Good Less affected by ambient light and weather
POINTER conditions. Highly effective under all but the
(>0.4 watts) most highly lit or worst weather conditions.
IZLID-2 is the current example.
VISUAL N All Good Marginal Highly visible to all. Risk of compromise is high.
LASER Effectiveness dependant on degree of urban
lighting.
LASER D/N PGM or N/A Good Highly effective with PGM. Very restrictive laser
DESIG- LST acquisition cone and requires line of sight to
NATOR equipped target. May require precoordination of laser
codes.
TRACERS D/N All N/A Marginal May compromise position or be difficult to
distinguish from other gunfire. During daytime
use, it may be more effective to kick up dust
surrounding target.
ELEC- D/N See Excellent Good Ideal friendly marking device for AC-130 and
TRONIC remarks some USAF fixed-wing (not compatible with
BEACON USN or USMC aircraft). Least impeded by
urban terrain. Can be used as a target
reference point for target identification.
Coordination with aircrews essential to ensure
equipment and training compatibility.
STROBE N All Marginal N/A Visible by all. Effectiveness depends on degree
of urban lighting.
STROBE N All NVD Good N/A Visible to all NVDs. Effectiveness depends on
(IR) degree of urban lighting. Coded strobes aid in
acquisition.
FLARE D/N All Good N/A Visible by all. Easily identified by aircrew.
FLARE (IR) N All NVD Good N/A Visible to all NVDs. Easily identified by aircrew.
(table continues)
6-69
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Table 6-14. Target and Friendly Marking Methods (Continued)
DAY/ FRIENDLY TARGET

METHOD ASSETS REMARKS
NIGHT MARKS MARKS
GLINT/IR N All NVD Good N/A Not readily detectable by threat. Very effective
PANEL except in highly lit areas.
COMBAT ID D/N All FLIR Good N/A Provides temperature contrast on vehicles or
PANEL building. May be obscured by urban terrain.
VS-17 D ALL Marginal N/A Only visible during daylight. Easily obscured by
PANEL structures.
CHEMICAL D/N ALL Poor N/A Easily masked by urban structures and lost in
HEAT FLIR thermal clutter. Difficult to acquire; can be
SOURCES effective when used to contrast cold
background or when aircraft knows general
location.
SPINNING N ALL Marginal N/A Provides distinct, unique signature. May be
CHEM- obscured by structures. Effectiveness
LIGHT dependent upon degree of urban lighting.
SPINNING N ALL NVD Marginal N/A Provides unique signature. May be obscured by
CHEM- structures. Effectiveness dependent upon
LIGHT (IR) degree of urban lighting.
TELEVISION/ELECTRO-OPTICAL
6-178. TV/EO sensors are subject to many of the same limitations as
the naked eye, particularly TVs without low-light capability. Aircrews
may not be successful in acquiring a target and achieving lock-on if
smoke, buildings, or other factors repeatedly interrupt their line of
sight (LOS). TV/EO resolution is typically not sufficient at medium
and extended ranges to discriminate between a friendly position or a
target and its surrounding urban features. Ground personnel may
need to use more aggressive and overt means of identifying their
position and that of the target if TV/EO sensors are to identify, track,
and engage targets.
LASER DESIGNATION
6-179. A major challenge for a gunner in a moving aircraft is
achieving and keeping LOS with a target or friendly position. Laser
designation requires uninterrupted LOS to identify and engage a
target. Helicopters may use hover capabilities, but only in the most
permissive environments. This may mean the lasing platform has to
be very near the target, often within danger-close or weapon-arming
distances, to keep the spot on the target until ordnance impact.
Smoke from burning vehicles or other fires may drift across the laser-
to-target line, causing laser dispersion.
6-180. If the supporting sensor cannot see a target, then the laser
cannot effectively mark the target. A rule of thumb, if you detect a
target with a visual sensor and consistently determine a range to it
with a laser range finder, then you can likely designate it
satisfactorily for a laser-guided weapon.
ASSAULT (UTILITY) AND CARGO (LIFT) HELICOPTER SUPPORT
6-70
6-181. The utility helicopter is a general-purpose aircraft with limited

carrying capability. It is used for such missions as transport of
troops, cargo, or medical patients. The Army utility helicopter is the
UH-60 Blackhawk. The Blackhawk can carry 8,000 pounds of cargo
internally, externally, or a combination of both.
6-182. The cargo helicopter has the capacity for carrying loads of
greater weight and size than those carried by the utility helicopter.
The cargo helicopter can lift heavy, oversized loads, such as artillery
weapons and ammunition. It can recover downed aircraft or vehicles.
The US Army cargo helicopter is the CH-47D Chinook. It can carry a
maximum external load of 26,000 pounds.
CAPABILITIES
6-183. While conducting combat, CS, and CSS operations, the utility
and cargo helicopter unit significantly influences the squadron
commander’s fight by—
• Conducting day, night, and limited visibility combat, CS,
and CSS operations across the entire length and width of
the battlefield and in stability operations and support
operations.
• Conducting operations against a threat force from
multiple directions.
• Influencing the tempo of friendly operations.
• Rapidly moving tactical units over great distances during
close, deep, and rear operations.
• Bypassing threat positions, barriers, and obstacles to
achieve surprise.
• Enhancing the C3 process.
• Moving large amounts of supplies and equipment to
sustain combat operations.
• Moving critical repair parts quickly to increase the combat
power of the force.
• Emplacing Volcano minefields to disrupt, delay, turn, or
block threat forces.
• Conducting operations beyond the FLOT.
• Providing CSAR coverage in the AO.
• Conducting CASEVAC and personnel replacement
operations (transporting replacements forward).
• Providing refueling capabilities using Fat Hawk/Fat
Cow/jump FARPs (discussed later in this section).
LIMITATIONS
6-184. Utility and cargo helicopter units are subject to operational
limitations that the commander must consider when planning their
employment. These limitations are as follows:
6-71
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Extreme environmental effects (temperature, altitude) may

reduce the capabilities of the aircraft to perform the full
range of missions.
• The unit has limited capability to secure unit assembly
areas with organic assets.
• Missions require adequate planning and coordination time
to fully capitalize on utility and cargo helicopter assets.
• The unit may be subjected to inadequate CS/CSS because
of its extended range of operations and limited organic
logistics support.
• Terrain may limit the availability of adequate pickup zones
(PZ) and LZs.
• Helicopters require large amounts of fuel (Class III) and
repair parts (Class IX).
• Some units can provide a limited number of aircraft to
support a large combat force.
• Battlefield obscuration (smoke, dust) can have a
detrimental effect on utility and cargo helicopter
operations.
• Helicopters require extensive maintenance support for
extended operations.
AIRCRAFT-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
6-185. The purpose of this information is to highlight aircraft
characteristics and planning considerations for utility and cargo
aircraft. It is not designed to cover all aircraft characteristics, but
focuses on those deemed critical in the planning of successful utility
and cargo helicopter operations.
UH-60A/L
6-186. The UH-60A/L is a twin-engine, single-rotor helicopter.
Primary mission capability of the helicopter is air assault and air
movement. Secondary missions include stability operations and
support operations, CSAR, C2 platform, CASEVAC, and air Volcano
(mine setting) during day, night, visual, and instrument conditions.
The aircraft is approximately 65 feet long with an approximate main
rotor span of 54 feet. Maximum gross weight for both the UH-60A
and the UH-60L is 22,000 pounds. (With an external load exceeding
8,000 pounds, the maximum gross weight is 23,500 pounds.)
Maximum airspeed is 193 knots with a normal cruise speed of 130
knots. However, the speed for any mission will vary greatly depending
on load configuration (internal or external), time of day, weather
conditions, and METT-TC. The minimum crew for tactical missions is
four—two pilots and two crew chiefs. It is essential that two crew
chiefs be used when conducting air assault, NVG operations, and
sling loads.
6-187. Capabilities of the UH/60A/L include the following:
6-72
• The UH-60A cargo hook can carry external loads up to

8,000 pounds. The UH-60L cargo hook can carry external
loads up to 9,000 pounds.
• With seats installed, the UH-60A/L can carry up to 11
combat-loaded troops. With seats removed, the UH-60A/L
can carry up to 16 combat-loaded troops or up to 20
troops without full combat load.
• Aircraft internal loads can be up to the maximum gross
weight, with limitations of aircraft space and prohibition of
loads exceeding 300 pounds per square foot.
6-188. Limitations are that UH-60A/L endurance is 2.5 hours

without external fuel tanks and 5.0 hours with external fuel tanks.
Its combat radius is approximately 225 kilometers.
CH-47D
6-189. The CH-47D is a twin-engine, tandem-rotor helicopter
day, night, visual, and instrument conditions. The aircraft fuselage is
approximately 50 feet long. With a 60-foot rotor span on each rotor
system, the effective length of a CH-47D (with blades turning) is
approximately 100 feet from the most forward point of the forward
rotor to the most rearward point on the aft rotor. Maximum gross
weight is 50,000 pounds. Maximum airspeed is 170 knots with a
normal cruise speed of 130 knots. However, speed for any mission
will vary greatly depending on load configuration (internal or
external), time of day, weather conditions, and METT-TC. The
minimum crew for tactical operations is four—two pilots, one flight
engineer, and one crew chief. For more complex missions, such as
NVG operations and air assaults, commanders may consider using
five crew members, adding one additional crew chief.
6-190. For use of the cargo hooks (external load), the following are
structural limitations only:
• The structural limit of both forward and aft hooks is
17,000 pounds.
• The maximum single load that can be suspended as a
tandem load from the forward and aft hooks is 25,000
pounds.
• The center cargo hook is limited to a maximum load of
26,000 pounds.
6-191. The following limitations apply to the CH-47D:
• Its endurance is 2.5 hours without extended range fuel
supply (ERFS) tank(s) and 4.0 hours with one ERFS tank
installed.
• Its combat radius of the CH-47D is approximately 225
kilometers. The aircraft’s combat radius with one ERFS
tank installed is approximately 350 kilometers.
• The aircraft cannot be started or shut down in winds
(including gusts) in excess of 30 knots.
6-73
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
6-192. External Load Configuration. Consideration must be given

to the advantages and disadvantages of any particular external load
configuration. For example, while it is generally true that a tandem
load will ride better and permit a higher airspeed, it is also true that
a tandem load usually requires ground personnel to attach the load
to the aircraft. All appropriate references must be researched to
ensure compliance with any directives regarding load configuration;
for example, many loads allow center hook or tandem hook
attachment.
6-193. Troop Load Configuration. Troop seating arrangements for
up to 31 fully equipped ground troops are provided in the CH-47.
This is broken down into 10 three-man seats and 3 one-man seats.
This total number varies greatly due to the configuration of the
aircraft’s interior and the amount of gear carried by the troops. For
example, the aircraft may be equipped with a single ERFS tank, or
the troops may be required to carry additional survival equipment
due to extreme weather. These factors require extensive
consideration before committing a specific number of aircraft with a
specific allowable cargo load (ACL) to a given mission. Additionally,
the troop commander’s jump seat may be available, but is unwieldy
and time-consuming to use. Troops are normally loaded and
unloaded through the lowered aft cargo door and ramp.
6-194. Litter Installation. The CH-47D can carry up to 24 litters.
These are configured in six tiers of four litters each. In this 24-litter
configuration, it may be possible to leave the 3 one-man seats in
position. It is not necessary to remove the troop seats to install the
litters.
6-195. Cargo Load Configuration (internal). The dimensions of the
cargo compartment are 366 inches long, 90 inches wide, and 78
inches high. These dimensions are uniform throughout the cargo
compartment. However, there are some restrictions when fitting
items through the two doors (see TM 55-1520-240-10). This same TM
should be referenced for detailed information on tie-down points.
6-196. Helicopter Internal Cargo Handling System (HICHS).
CH-47D units have the necessary equipment for four aircraft to be
equipped with HICHS. This system provides for quick loading,
securing, and unloading of palletized cargo. The system generally
uses either the 463L pallet (up to three simultaneously) or warehouse
wooden pallets (up to 10, depending on size). While cargo can be
carried without the use of the HICHS, this system expedites the
loading and unloading process.
6-197. Winch/hoist System. The CH-47D is equipped with a 3,000-
pound capacity, hydraulically operated winch that can be employed
in either of two modes. For the purpose of loading and unloading
cargo internally, this system is used in the CARGO mode. This mode
permits the winching of cargo up to 3,000 pounds on a straight-line
pull, or up to 12,000 pounds with the aid of pulley blocks. The
remaining mode, described as the RESCUE mode, permits the use of
this system as a rescue hoist (up to 600 pounds) and is not used for
cargo loading.
6-74
UH-IH
6-198. The UH-IH is a single-engine, single-rotor helicopter. Its
primary mission capability is air movement of supplies and
personnel. The aircraft is approximately 57 feet long with a 48-foot
main rotor span. Maximum gross weight is 9,500 pounds. Maximum
airspeed is 112 knots with a normal cruise speed of 100 knots.
However, the speed for any mission will vary greatly depending on
the load configuration, time of day, weather conditions, and METT-
TC. The minimum crew for tactical operations is three—two pilots
and one crew chief. The aircraft can be operated in instrument
meteorological conditions (IMC).
6-199. Capabilities of the UH-IH include the following:
• Cargo hook can carry external loads up to 4,000 pounds.
• With seats installed, the UH-IH can carry up to 11
combat-loaded troops.
• Aircraft internal loads can be up to the maximum gross
weight, with limitations of aircraft space and prohibition of
loads exceeding 100 pounds per square foot.
6-200. Limitations include:

• Endurance is approximately 2.5 hours without auxiliary
fuel tanks and approximately 6 hours with auxiliary fuel
tanks. (NOTE: The auxiliary fuel tanks on the UH-IH are
mounted internally, which reduces the passenger and
cargo capacity of the helicopter.)
• The aircraft cannot be started with winds in excess of 30
knots or a gust spread of 15 knots or greater.
AERIAL RESUPPLY
6-201. Aerial resupply operations provide the squadron commander
with a flexible, responsible means to resupply his force. Although
limited by weather and threat air defense systems, aerial resupply
enables the commander to bypass congested supply routes,
destroyed bridges, and most terrain obstacles to deliver supplies
where they are most needed. At brigade level and below, aerial
resupply is generally confined to helicopters.
6-202. Helicopter resupply assets are limited. Internal to the division,
the combat aviation company of the aviation brigade provides the
only organic utility helicopter support. Aerial resupply support is
normally provided by corps aviation assets. Requests for support are
normally routed through the division G3 for action.
6-203. Close coordination must occur between all players in the
aerial resupply operation. The entire mission is reviewed and all
limitations and problem areas resolved. If a particular problem
cannot be resolved, another mode of transport should be considered
for the item of equipment that presents the problem.
6-204. Planning for aerial resupply must consider many factors,
including these:
6-75
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Type/amount of cargo to be carried.

• Helicopter assets available.
• Sling/cargo net/cargo container requirements.
• Ground crew training requirements.
• Selection of the PZ/LZ.
• Integration into the tactical plan.
• Priorities of cargo/unit resupply.
6-205. The selection of a usable PZ or LZ is extremely important.

Logistical and tactical considerations must be analyzed and taken
into account to ensure that the PZ or LZ is placed at the right spot to
support the ground unit. The area must also be accessible to the
aircraft that are going to use the sites. The final decision as to PZ/LZ
acceptance will be made by the commander of the helicopter
company, his designated LNO, or Pathfinder-qualified NCO/officer.
6-206. As a general rule, the PZ/LZ must provide for adequate
aircraft separation, load/passenger avoidance and obstacle
avoidance (see helicopter landing sites below). It must have no
obstructions such as trees, stumps, bushes, or man-made objects
that could cause damage to the helicopter rotor systems or the load
itself. The number of aircraft that will be using it at one time must be
considered along with its use after dark. If night resupply is
scheduled, a larger area is normally needed.
HELICOPTER LANDING SITES

6-207. Table 6-15 shows the recommended minimum distances
between landing points within a landing site. These distances are
measured from center of load to center of load.
Table 6-15. Minimum Distances Between Landing Points
DAY DISTANCES
UH-60 and like aircraft 50 meters
CH-47 and like or unknown aircraft 100 meters
NIGHT
UH-60 and like aircraft 75 meters
CH-47 and like or unknown aircraft 150 meters
NOTES: Minimum planning distances include distances between loads

during external load operations (slingload operations).
Height of ground/rooftop obstructions must not exceed 18
inches.
Surface Condition
6-208. The surface condition should be solid enough to prevent a
helicopter or load from sinking into the ground. Blowing dust, sand,
gravel, or loose debris can cause damage to people as well as
6-76
equipment or aircraft. The high winds produced by helicopters, sand,

and snow can cause “brownout or whiteout” conditions, which can
temporarily blind aircrews and ground support personnel. If the site
has a slope of 15 degrees or more, a helicopter cannot land on it.
Obstacles can be no more than 18 inches tall. Immovable obstacles
must be clearly marked with a secured VS-17 panel, red chemlite,
etc.
Approach/Departure Direction
6-209. When carrying an external load, it is preferred that
helicopters use gradual approach and departure angles (not a vertical
ascent or descent). The avenues of approach and departure for a
PZ/LZ should be over the lowest obstacle in the direction of the
prevailing winds. Arrival and departure obstacle clearance and wind
direction are especially important when visibility is reduced.
Site Preparation
6-210. The unit receiving the supplies is responsible for preparing
the LZ. In addition to general PZ/LZ responsibilities, specific tasks to
be accomplished are—
• PZ/LZ security.
• Recovery and assembly of equipment and supplies.
• Limited weather observations such as wind velocity,
direction, cloud cover, visibility, and approximate ceiling.
• Detailed NBC monitoring and survey, if required.
Sling-Load Missions
6-211. There are normally three different elements involved in a
sling-load mission: the supported unit that requested the mission,
the aviation unit that will provide the aircraft, and the receiving unit
that is having the cargo delivered. These elements have the following
responsibilities and functions:
6-212. Supported Unit. The supported unit is responsible for—
• PZ selection and control.
• Requisitioning of all equipment needed for sling-load
operations, to include the slings, A-22 bags, cargo nets,
and containers.
• Storage and maintenance of all sling-load equipment.
• Providing a sufficient number of trained ground crews to
rig and inspect all the loads, guide in the helicopters,
hook up the loads, and clear the helicopters for departure.
• Securing and protecting sensitive items of supply and
equipment.
• Providing load derigging and disposition instructions to
the receiving unit.
6-77
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Providing disposition instructions to the receiving and

aviation units for the slings, A-22 bags, cargo nets, and
containers.
6-213. Aviation Unit. The aviation unit is responsible for—

• Establishing coordination with the supported unit and
appointing an LNO who is thoroughly familiar with the
capabilities and limitations of his unit’s assigned aircraft.
• Advising the supported unit on the limitations as to the
size and weight of the loads that may be rigged.
• Advising the supported unit on the suitability of the
selected PZ/LZ.
• Providing assistance for the recovery and return to the PZ
of the slings, A-22 bags, cargo nets, and containers as
required by the supported unit.
• Arranging for the aircraft to be at the PZ on schedule.
• Establishing safety procedures that will ensure uniformity
and understanding of duties and responsibilities between
the ground crew and flight crew. One such procedure
would be the direction in which the ground crew would
move away from below the helicopter after hookup. If the
ground crew moves from the aircraft in the same direction
that the aircraft moves, injury could result. Each PZ is
different as to its shape and obstacle. The pilot must know
what direction to go if he has to set the aircraft down in an
emergency so as not to hit the ground crew.
6-214. Receiving Unit. The receiving unit is responsible for—

• Selecting and controlling the LZ.
• Training available ground crews to guide the aircraft in
and derig the load.
• Coordinating with the supported (sending) unit for the
control and return of that unit’s slings, A-22 bags, and
other items.
• Preparing, coordinating, and inspecting backloads (such
as slings and A-22 bags) and having them ready for
hookup or loading when the aircraft comes in.
FORWARD ARMING AND REFUELING POINT OPERATIONS

6-215. A viable refueling and rearming option to the squadron is the
establishment of a FARP using UH-60s and CH-47s in the Fat
Hawk/Fat Cow mode. A FARP, Fat Cow, or Fat Hawk operation
should not be considered for routine fuel and ammunition resupply.
They should be used for emergency situations only. FM 3-04.111 [FM
1-111] provides complete details on FARP operations.
6-216. A FARP can be used by the squadron as a temporary arming
and refueling facility that is organized, equipped, and deployed by an
aviation unit commander to support the squadron’s mission. The FARP
6-78
provides fuel and ammunition resupply for the squadron when it is

conducting cross-FLOT operations. The fluid situation of the battlefield
demands that it be austere, transitory, and able to support specific
mission objectives. The FARP is a lucrative target and must be secured
with squadron assets. Threat observation and engagement must be
prevented. The FARP is operated and organized according to the
factors of METT-TC.
6-217. The utility or cargo helicopter’s ability to move combat assets
quickly throughout the battlefield makes it a unique and valuable
resource to the maneuver commander. However, there are
advantages and disadvantages to using UH-60s and CH-47s for
refueling and/or rearming.
6-218. Advantages of aerial FARP operations include—
• Easy access for the supported unit.
• Extended range due to ERFS.
• Rapid repositioning capability.
• Ability to be inserted into areas inaccessible to ground
vehicles (rough terrain, cross-FLOT).
6-219. Disadvantages of aerial FARP operations—
• Noncrashworthy fuel systems (ERFS).
• No ballistic protection (ERFS).
• Reduced single-engine capability for the UH-60 and CH-
47.
• Limited utility in adverse weather conditions.
• Requirement that aircraft must shut down to the auxiliary
power unit (UH-60).
• Limited FARP security (especially cross-FLOT).
CH-47D FARP (Fat Cow)

6-220. The CH-47D is the primary aircraft used for the air-
transportable FARP. The CH-47D has the capability to transport and
to pump up to 2,320 gallons of JP8 fuel. This fuel is contained in up
to four 600-gallon, noncrashworthy tanks; each 600-gallon tank has
only 580 gallons usable. The respective total load is 580, 1,160,
1,740, or 2,320 gallons, depending on the number of tanks carried
by any one CH-47D aircraft.
6-221. Each CH-47D is a complete package by itself, with no
additional aircraft required (see Figure 6-13).
6-79
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 6-13. CH-47 Forward Arming and

Refueling Point Site
UH-60 FARP (Fat Hawk)

6-222. The UH-60 has become a viable tool in FARP operations with
the employment of the Fat Hawk system, which configures the
Blackhawk for refueling and rearming. The Fat Hawk consists of a
UH-60 with the ERFS, a micro-FARE [forward area refueling
equipment] system to pump fuel, two fuel handlers, and ammunition.
The type of ammunition carried by the aircraft will be METT-TC
dependent. The ERFS allows the UH-60 to carry either 230-gallon or
450-gallon external fuel tanks, so the amount of fuel available for the
refueling operation is dependent on the aircraft configuration.
Additionally, aircraft configuration will affect the amount of
ammunition that the UH-60 can carry (based on weight).
6-223. The system operates from the micro-FARE system carried
aboard the aircraft. Once set at the refueling point, the fuel handlers
will set up the pumps and hoses and prepare for refueling
operations. On the UH-60, refueling occurs by pumping fuel out of
the main fuel tanks, which are replenished by fuel transfer from the
external tanks. Disadvantages of the Fat Hawk are that fuel transfer
occurs at a slower rate than fuel pumping and the aircraft must shut
down to idle for refueling operations. As a result, delays may occur
6-80
between vehicle refueling to allow the UH-60 to replenish the main

fuel tanks.
6-224. Other particulars of the UH-60 include the following:
• Removing excess seats allows room for the FARP
equipment and ammunition. Aircraft load configuration is
based on METT-TC.
• Personnel requirements consist of two crew chiefs per
aircraft, three fuel handlers (single-point refueling) or four
fuel handlers (dual-point refueling), three rearming
personnel, combat lifesaver or medic, and security
personnel (as required based on METT-TC).
• A minimum of two aircraft should be used for the most
efficient and rapid operation.
6-225. Figure 6-14 shows the single-point and dual-point UH-60

FARPs.
6-81
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 6-14. UH-60 Forward Arming and

Refueling Point Sites
JOINT AIR ATTACK TEAM

6-226. JAAT is not a mission in itself. It is an engagement technique
used to increase the effectiveness of offensive or defensive operations
by combining the target acquisition and firepower of fixed-wing
aircraft with the target acquisition, designation, and suppression
capabilities of Army aircraft. Indirect FA fires or NGF, along with
direct fire from ground forces, should also be employed to increase
the survivability of all JAAT players. The attack may be against a
single threat element or against several threat elements within a
specified area. An ACT is frequently called upon to participate in a
JAAT mission while conducting its assigned missions. For an ACT,
JAAT is conducted as a normal attack mission with the additional CS
of tactical aircraft (TACAIR). The addition of TACAIR gives both the
air cavalry team (ACTM) and TACAIR team greater survivability while
6-82
simultaneously increasing their firepower and complicating the

threat’s countering attack. JAAT can be used to support the ground
commander’s maneuver scheme or can be tasked to support air or
maritime commanders’ objectives.
6-227. While procedures are in place to help orchestrate operations
in which several different types of fire support are synchronized,
JAAT missions work best when helicopter pilots and fixed-wing pilots
communicate in plain language, “attack pilot to attack pilot.”
Detailed attack synchronization is sometimes necessary; however,
the most valuable attribute of a JAAT is the capability to overwhelm
the threat by applying an enormous amount of firepower in a
relatively short amount of time. All coordination measures and
communications should ensure this capability is maintained, at the
same time minimizing the potential for fratricide and maximizing the
survivability of the JAAT participants.
6-228. New systems fielded on helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft
enable JAATs to occur anytime, day or night, and anyplace on the
battlefield. AH-64 systems include NVGs and a FLIR. OH-58D
systems include NVGs and a TIS. A/OA-10 pilots are now equipped
with NVGs as well as IR pointers and may carry IR and white light
flares. Some F-16s are equipped with low-altitude navigation and
targeting infrared for night operations (LANTIRN) pods and NVGs.
F/A-18 and AV-8 aircraft may be equipped with a FLIR and/or
targeting pod and their pilots will usually be equipped with NVGs.
The night capability these systems provide make night JAAT
operations particularly effective.
COMPOSITION
6-229. The JAAT is composed of both ground and air commanders,
attack helicopters, TACAIR, and a FAC. These elements and their
responsibilities and duties are explained in the following paragraphs.
Commander
6-230. The ground maneuver force commander is responsible for the
ground and airspace below the coordinating altitude where the
supported commander must synchronize the JAAT into the battle
and bring its combined fires into play at the decisive moment. To
plan and coordinate the JAAT, ground force commanders use their
S3, tactical air control party (TACP), FSO, and the squadron
commander or his ALO. Air commanders may use the FAC-Airborne
(FAC-A), TACP, ASOC, air operations center (AOC), wing ground LNO,
and/or the squadron commander.
Attack Helicopters
6-231. The attack helicopter portion of the JAAT consists of OH-58D
Kiowa Warriors in the divisional cavalry squadron (DCS) and both the
AH-64 Apache and the Kiowa Warrior in the regimental aviation
squadron (RAS). Except for the additional planning and coordination
necessary for a joint operation, the unit will conduct the JAAT
operation as they would a normal attack mission. During the JAAT
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
operation, the ACTM air mission commander (AMC) will plan the
operation, coordinate the attacks in the EA, and provide SEAD for
attacking TACAIR and armed helicopters. Although the ACTM will
provide suppressive fires against threat air defense, the primary
armor killers are TACAIR. The size of the JAAT depends on the
squadron commander’s analysis of the factors of METT-TC and the
number of TACAIR sorties allocated.
Tactical Aircraft
6-232. TACAIR that can perform CAS are the USAF A/OA-10 and F-
16; USN F/A-18; and USMC AV-8 and F/A-18. However, other
TACAIR may be employed. JAATs will normally be formed with USAF
participants. However, USN and USMC assets may be available in
some cases. The use of TACAIR significantly increases the combat
power of the ACT or ACTM by virtue of the large and varied ordnance
payloads available.
6-233. The USAF A/OA-10 provides the most flexible support to
JAATs and has several advantages over other aircraft. A/OA-10s
were specifically designed for and dedicated to the CAS mission.
A/OA-10 pilots have trained extensively with Army units in CAS and
JAAT employment TTP. Their night attack capabilities have increased
due to the fielding of NVGs and associated equipment. The A/OA-10
has extensive loiter and multipass capabilities and can react quickly
to a changing attack plan. Other TACAIR assets do not normally
possess the extended loiter capability of the A/OA-10, but are very
capable due to their LANTIRN and/or their targeting pods, FLIRs,
and/or NVGs.
6-234. The use of aircraft other than A/OA-10s may require more
coordination between the FAC and the ACT commander because they
may not be as fully trained in JAAT TTP.
Forward Air Controller

6-235. The FAC (airborne) will hand off fixed-wing aircraft to the
JAAT AMC, who will control the JAAT from the initial point inbound.
The battle captain is the on-scene commander for the execution of
the JAAT. The TACAIR flight lead will control employment of the
flight. The FAC (airborne) can help locate targets and threats (threat
dependent) prior to or during the JAAT mission.
FIRE SUPPORT IN JOINT AIR ATTACK TEAM OPERATIONS

6-236. Indirect fire support is used when available; it can greatly
enhance the survivability of the aircraft as well as maximize the
destruction of the threat. Fire support is normally used to begin the
attack, suppress or destroy threat air defense, force armored vehicles
to deploy, and create confusion within the C2 of the element under
fire.
6-237. The squadron commander may use his FSO to conduct fire
support planning to support the JAAT. The FSO must work closely
with the USAF TACP located at a ground maneuver brigade, aviation
6-84
brigade, division, or corps headquarters so that fire support will fit

smoothly into the plan. Once the JAAT mission begins, the ACT
commander or ACTM AMC works directly with the FSO to coordinate
fire support.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Mission Planning
6-238. Because each member of the JAAT retains his own C2 system,
mission planning must be a coordinated effort. Constant coordination is
required between the ground maneuver commander, aviation
commander, TACAIR flight lead/ALO/FAC, and FSO. As elements of the
mission change, all members must be informed so that they can adjust
their plans accordingly. Success of the JAAT operation depends on the
proper synchronization of assets and how well each member of the
JAAT understands the operation. JAAT operations may be preplanned,
immediate, or spontaneous. ATKHBs will normally be designated to
execute preplanned JAAT. DCSs and RASs can expect to execute
immediate or spontaneous JAAT during both reconnaissance and
security operations.
6-239. Preplanned. A preplanned JAAT operation is used when time
is available to request CAS in the normal planning cycle (usually 36
hours). The preplanned request is drafted by the FSO in coordination
with the TACP and processed through Army channels to the AOC.
The AOC processes the request according to priorities selected by the
joint force commander. Approved preplanned JAATs will appear in
the ATO with the number of sorties, times, and ordnance.
6-240. Immediate. An immediate request for CAS is used when time
is not available to process the request within the normal planning
cycle. An immediate CAS request should be submitted as soon as the
need is recognized. For example, if it is 1000 hours and a JAAT is
planned for 2300 hours, the immediate request for CAS will be
placed as soon as possible to allow TACAIR coordination and
planning to begin. An immediate CAS request is transmitted by the
appropriate echelon TACP over the USAF air request net directly to
the ASOC collocated at the corps main CP. Intermediate-level TACPs
monitor these requests and advise their respective commanders.
Intermediate echelon commanders may direct their assigned TACP to
disapprove the request using the air request net if other assets are
available or they otherwise do not support the request. Silence by
intermediate-level TACPs for a specified amount of time (normally 10
minutes) is considered approval. Following approval by the corps
FSE, the ASOC coordinates with the AOC to fulfill the requirement.
6-241. Spontaneous. A spontaneous JAAT operation occurs when all
members of the team are available but no time is available to plan and
coordinate. To be successful, spontaneous JAAT operations depend on
effective unit SOPs, training, and communications. A successful JAAT
operation is possible any time pilots are able to coordinate actions by
talking with each other. A common JAAT frequency that can be used
by the team members is a critical aspect of a spontaneous JAAT
operation and should be included in signal operating instruction (SOI)
and USAF ATOs. A common JAAT frequency will allow the ACTM to
communicate and coordinate its attacks with the CAS aircraft in a
minimal amount of time.
Sequencing
6-242. A well-orchestrated JAAT operation will normally require a
number of radio calls to ensure success. To reduce radio traffic to a
6-86
minimum, a preplanned method of coordinating JAAT activities is

often used. Two methods are provided as examples.
6-243. JAAT Clock Method. The JAAT clock is the best known and
most widely used method of controlling JAAT operations (see
Figure 6-15). It is a method of sequencing the engagement based on
time. To initiate the JAAT, the ACTM updates the target information
and issues the TACAIR a time hack (three minutes is the most
common) that starts the JAAT clock. The time hack serves as the
TOT for the TACAIR. TACAIR will have ordnance impact or be over
the target when the JAAT clock runs out. The ACTM can employ fires
throughout the JAAT clock, except during a safety buffer (normally
30 seconds) prior to the TOT. This safety buffer ensures that residual
ordnance effects of the impacting rounds do not endanger TACAIR.
The ACTM employs additional fires, as required, to suppress the
threat during the TACAIR egress. A reattack can be either immediate
or based on an abbreviated clock. An example of a typical
engagement follows:
• The ACTM AMC coordinates the attack and then calls,
“Three minute hack. Ready, ready, hack.”
• The TACAIR lead responds with “Good hack.”
• The ACTM AMC engages the target with indirect fires, as
required, to suppress the threat.
• TACAIR departs the initial point, as required, to meet the
three-minute TOT.
• The ACTM AMC ensures that “check fire” is executed on
all indirect fires at the required time. This time is
calculated by subtracting the required safety buffer (30
seconds) and the artillery time-of-flight (10 seconds) from
the TOT (3:00 - 0:40 = 2:20). The AMC may continue to
suppress threat elements with direct fire weapons using
visual separation.
• TACAIR engages the target at the three-minute mark.
• The ACTM issues either “reattack” or “return to initial
point” to TACAIR and suppresses the threat with direct
fire to cover the TACAIR egress.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 6-15. Joint Air Attack Team Clock

6-244. JAAT Sequence Card Method. The JAAT sequence card
consists of a number of different attack sequences and should be
provided to all those likely to be involved in a JAAT operation (see
Figure 6-16). The option to be used for any specific attack would be
broadcast by the JAAT controller giving the letter code, a number, and
an H-hour. The letter code refers to the type of attack and the number
to the length of time of the artillery bombardment. For example, if the
controller orders “KILO 3 at 1232 hours,” the attack will begin at 1232
hours, with an artillery bombardment for 3 minutes followed at 1235
(1232 + 3 minutes) by armed helicopters and then the TACAIR at 1237.
The artillery then engages (rounds on target) at 1240, until given
“check fire” by the artillery observer. From the single call, all JAAT
players can work out their involvement and plan accordingly. The
format of the card is variable and can be constructed or amended to
meet different situations as required.
Figure 6-16. Joint Air Attack Team Sequence Card
6-88
EMPLOYMENT METHODS
6-245. Employment of the JAAT depends on the factors of METT-TC.
The method of employment is decided as early as possible so that
attacking assets can be coordinated. The two basic employment
methods are sector attacks and combined attacks. Sector attacks allow
each element of the JAAT to attack within a specified sector. Combined
attacks occur when JAAT elements mass their fires by attacking in the
same sector.
Sector Attacks
6-246. Sectors work best when easily recognizable terrain such as
roads, rivers, ridgelines, or tree lines are used. Sectoring the target
reduces targeting deconfliction and provides flexibility to each weapon
system in prioritizing the targets within the designated sector. The three
types of sector attacks are sector-simultaneous, sector-sequential, and
sector-random.
6-247. Sector-simultaneous. During sector-simultaneous attacks,
each element maneuvers to attack within its assigned sector to
engage targets simultaneously with other JAAT elements. All aircraft
must coordinate ordnance fans to avoid fratricide.
6-248. Sector-sequential. During sector-sequential attacks, each
element maneuvers within its assigned sector to attack in a
predetermined sequence. This sequence may range from several
seconds to several minutes. This option reduces the ordnance fan
coordination problem and facilitates covering fire for each succeeding
element.
6-249. Sector-random. During sector-random attacks, each element
maneuvers to attack within its assigned sector and engages targets at
will. All elements must coordinate ordnance fans and ensure fratricide
avoidance.
Combined Attacks
6-250. Combined attacks usually involve helicopters and TACAIR,
using approximately the same avenue of approach to the target.
Combined attacks typically provide good mutual support between the
different elements but require more coordination and are more
predictable to the threat after the initial attack. The three types of
combined attacks are combined-simultaneous, combined-sequential,
and combined-random.
6-251. Combined-simultaneous. During combined-simultaneous
attacks, all elements engage targets in the same sector and attack
simultaneously. All elements must coordinate ordnance fans and
ensure fratricide avoidance. Combined-simultaneous attacks maximize
destruction of the threat and are the simplest to control. This is an
excellent control method when FA fires are not available or when
elements can use maximum ordnance elevation for deconfliction of
airspace.
6-252. Combined-sequential. During combined-sequential attacks,
all elements engage targets in the same sector and attack in a
predetermined sequence. This sequence may range from several
seconds to several minutes. This option reduces the ordnance fan
6-89
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
coordination problem and facilitates covering fire for each succeeding

element. Use of the JAAT clock method is an example of a combined-
sequential attack.
6-253. Combined-random. During combined-random attacks, all
elements engage targets in the same sector and attack at will. Once
again, all elements must coordinate ordnance fans and ensure
fratricide avoidance because attacks may inadvertently be
simultaneous.
CONDUCT OF JAAT OPERATIONS

6-254. After receiving the JAAT mission, the squadron will conduct
mission analysis in as much detail as time allows. Planning,
coordination, analysis, and rehearsals are conducted to ensure
success.
6-255. Upon departing the holding area, ACTMs move forward to
reconnoiter the target area. They verify BPs, avenues of approach,
obstacles, and potential EAs that have not been already identified. If
the threat has already entered the EAs, ACTMs maintain contact and
attempt to locate the threat’s air defense systems.
6-256. ACTMs should establish contact with the unit providing
indirect fire support during reconnaissance. This contact should
continue throughout the mission, with the ACTMs serving as the FSE
on the battlefield during the JAAT. Careful consideration should be
given to using artillery prior to direct fire engagements with attack
helicopter and TACAIR assets. Obscurants generated by the
impacting rounds may interfere with laser range finders and
designators, degrading the effectiveness of precision-guided
munitions.
6-257. In preplanned JAAT operations, the arrival of the armed
helicopters should coincide with the arrival of the TACAIR at the
initial point. This is the most difficult part of a JAAT operation. The
aviation commander must attempt to maintain the flow of all the
assets into the battle in various combinations without piecemealing
the force. As the armed helicopter arrives in the BP, the platoons
take up their positions and begin their attack according to the
commander’s scheme of maneuver. A portion of the ACT and/or
ATKHB will most likely begin the attack by engaging air defense
targets identified by the ACTMs during their reconnaissance. The
ACTM that is assigned to SEAD and security is determined by the
local threat. The remainder of the troop attacks in sector according to
squadron and/or troop attack priorities.
6-258. When the TACAIR flight leader arrives in the battle area, he
contacts the ALO and/or FAC. He gives the ALO and/or FAC his call
sign, mission number, available ordnance, and loiter time. The ALO
and/or FAC, ACT commander, or ACTM AMC (if the ALO and/or FAC
is not available) passes the target information to the TACAIR flight
lead. The ACT commander and/or AMC, the ALO, and the TACAIR
flight lead must maintain effective communications.
6-259. TACAIR usually enters the target area in a flight of two. The
flight leaves the initial point using low-altitude tactical navigation
6-90
techniques. This maximizes terrain masking (when TACAIR is

operating low) or use of a variety of formations with an altitude stack
between aircraft, if the situation permits medium altitude operations.
The flight leader contacts the ALO and/or FAC or the ACT and/or
ATKHB commander for an update on friendly and threat activities. In
addition to receiving an update on the situation, the TACAIR flight
leader should also give an inbound call. This call is expressed in
units of time, such as “30 seconds.” The ACT commander and/or
AMC uses this call as his signal to adjust the fires and coordinate the
battle.
6-260. As TACAIR attacks, the ACT commander and/or AMC
observes their attack. Then directly or through the ALO and/or FAC,
the ACT commander and/or AMC adjusts the TACAIR’s subsequent
attacks by using cardinal headings and distances from the last
impacts. The ACTM can use its lasers to mark targets, the center
mass of the target array, and boundaries of the sector or designate
targets for USAF-delivered precision munitions. The use of lasers
increases the speed and security of the attack and reduces the
amount of communications necessary between the ACTM and the
TACAIR flight.
6-261. The communications link between members of the JAAT is
critical. The ACTM and the TACP or headquarters must coordinate the
frequencies to be used and the word of the day, or “Mickey,” (as well as
who will transmit it and to whom) before TACAIR arrives at the initial
point.
Advanced Helicopter Capabilities
6-262. The AH-64 and OH-58D give the JAAT the capabilities
discussed below.
6-263. Communications. As noted, communications are the key to
effective JAAT operations. The HaveQuick radio system on the AH-
64, OH-58D, and TACAIR allow jam-resistant, nonsecure frequency
hopping communications with ALO/FAC and TACAIR elements. The
armed helicopters and the TACP must coordinate the frequencies to
be used before the TACAIR arrives at the initial point. They should
use the TACAIR check-in briefing format below to coordinate the
voice frequencies, digital data frequencies, and laser codes between
the TACAIR and armed helicopters (see Figure 6-17).
6-91
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
(Aircraft Transmit to Controller)
Aircraft* ____________________ this is _____________________________________________________

(Controller Call Sign) (Aircraft Call Sign)
1. Identification/Mission Number ____________________________________________________________
NOTE: Authentication and appropriate responses suggested here. The brief may be abbreviated for
brevity or security (“as fragged” or “with exception”).
2. Number and type of aircraft: ______________________________________________________________
3. Position and altitude: ___________________________________________________________________
4. Ordnance: ___________________________________________________________________________
5. Play time: ___________________________________________________________________________
6. Abort code: __________________________________________________________________________
Figure 6-17. Sample Format of a Tactical Aircraft Check-In Briefing

6-264. Laser Designation. The AH-64A/D and OH-58D laser
designator can mark sectors, targets, and threat positions for TACAIR
equipped with proper sensing devices. The FAC is responsible for
coordinating the laser code used.
Advanced Tactical Aircraft Capabilities
6-265. Communications. TACAIR and FAC aircraft are equipped
with jam-resistant, nonsecure frequency hopping communications
via the Have Quick II radio. Depending on the specific aircraft, they
are also equipped with a variety of other communications systems
(VHF-AM and VHF-FM, additional UHF radio, and data link).
6-266. Precision Munitions. Precision munitions offer improved
effects on the targeted threat force. Laser-guided munitions can
destroy bridges and other priority targets while affording TACAIR
greater survivability. The IR and optically guided versions of the
Maverick missile provide precision kill capability against hard and
moving targets.
Joint Air Attack Team Briefings
6-267. Forward Air Controller Briefing. If the FAC is available to
brief the CAS aircraft, the following attack briefing items are used by
the AMC:
• Distance and/or direction reference.
• Specific target identification.
• Specific threat identification.
• Specific friendly identification.
• Specific attack restrictions.
• FAC position.
• Final clearance.
6-92
6-268. Nine-line Briefing Format. When briefing the JAAT mission

to TACAIR in the absence of the FAC, the AMC will provide the
briefing in the nine-line format, which is illustrated in Figure 6-18.
Omit data not required. Do not transmit line numbers. Units of measure are standard unless otherwise
specified. The asterisk (*) denotes minimum essential in limited communications. Bold denotes readback
items when requested.
Terminal Controller: “____________________, this is __________________________________________“

(Aircraft Call Sign) (Terminal Controller)
*1. Initial Point/Battle Position (BP): “ _____________________________________________________“
*2. Heading: “ ________________________________________________________________“ (magnetic)
Offset: “ _____________________________________________________________________ “ (Left/Right)
*3. Distance: “ _________________________________________________________________________“
Initial point-to-target in nautical miles/BP-to-target in meters)
*4. Target Elevation: “________________________________________________________ “ (in feet MSL)
*5. Target Description: “_________________________________________________________________“
*6. Target Location: “ ___________________________________________________________________“
(Latitude/Longitude or Grid Coordinates or Offsets of Visual)
7. Type Mark: ”____________________” Code: “ _____________________________________________“
(WP, Laser, IR, Beacon) (Actual Code)
Laser to Target Line: “ ____________________________________________________________ “ Degrees
*8. Location of Friendlies: “ ______________________________________________________________“
Position Marked by: “_____________________________________________________________________“
*9. Egress: “ _______________________________________________________________________“
In case of a beacon request, insert beacon bombing chart line numbers here.
Remarks (As Appropriate): “ _______________________________________________________________“
(Threats, reactions, danger close, attack clearance, SEAD, abort codes, hazards)
NOTE: For AC-130 employment, lines 5, 6, and 8 are mandatory briefing items.
Remarks should also include detailed threat descriptions, marking method of friendly locations (including
magnetic bearing and distance in meters form the friendly position to the target, if available), identifiable
ground features, danger close acceptance.
Time on Target: “________________________________________________________________________“
or
Time to Target: “Standby _______________ plus ________________________________________ Hack.”
Figure 6-18. Nine-Line Joint Air Attack Team Briefing Format
SECTION V – INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE
6-93
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
6-269. The IEW system produces both combat information and

intelligence. Combat information is unevaluated data gathered by or
provided directly to the tactical commander that, because of its
highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be
processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user’s
tactical intelligence requirements. Intelligence is the product
resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and
interpretation of all available information concerning a threat force,
foreign nation, or AO. Intelligence is immediately or potentially
significant to military planning and operations. The IEW system
supports the commander by accomplishing six major functions:
• Indications and warning.
• IPB.
• Situation development.
• Target development and support to targeting.
• Force protection.
• BDA.
6-270. The squadron is a critical component of the SBCT all-source

intelligence systems (ASIS). The squadron is both a consumer and a
collector of information. During planning, the squadron uses IPB
products to assist in planning the assigned mission. During
reconnaissance and security operations, it provides fresh combat
information both to the higher commander and to the IEW system.
As the SBCT commander’s eyes and ears, the squadron feeds his
information needs. The SBCT S2 may clarify these needs with
information requirements specifying those items of information
regarding the threat and his environment that need to be collected
and processed. The SBCT S2 should understand the capabilities and
limitations of the squadron and develop a special relationship with
the squadron commander to facilitate the flow and use of combat
information. The squadron has a unique capability in the
surveillance troop, which provides SBCT-level IEW systems organic
to the squadron. See Chapter 1 and Appendix G for further
information on the surveillance troop.
SBCT INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE

6-271. The entire intelligence team (S2, MI company, sensors, and
collectors) provides timely, relevant, accurate, and synchronized ISR
support to the commander, staff, and subordinates during the
planning, preparation, and execution of multiple, simultaneous
decisive actions on a distributed battlefield. Paramount to providing
this support is development of a common understanding or
operational picture of the threat and the environment through the
coordinated actions of all the SBCT’s ISR assets. This picture forms
the SBCT’s basis for planning, decisions, and tasks to subordinate
units.
CAPABILITIES
6-94
6-272. The SBCT conducts centralized planning and decentralized

execution of operations that are characterized by rapid mobility,
precision fires and maneuver, and decisive actions over an extended,
noncontiguous AO dominated by complex terrain and urban settings.
The planning and decentralized execution of these operations
demand continuous tactical- and operational-level IPB to help
commanders understand the context of emerging information and its
relationship (cause and effect) within the overall framework of
mission and operations. The nature of the operational environment
requires the SBCT to have enhanced situational awareness to
anticipate threat actions and identify opportunities for the decisive
employment of the SBCT’s combat power. To facilitate precision
maneuver and fires, the SBCT’s targeting capability requires timely,
relevant, accurate, and predictive targeting data and intelligence on
conventional and asymmetric threats to the SBCT’s systems and
organizations. In addition, entry operations (early or permissive)
require rapid and detailed IPB products, the ability to locate and
engage threat mobile reserves and fire support systems, and
situational awareness well beyond the close combat area.
6-273. MI support for the operations described above includes the
following:
• Planning and executing ISR operations.
• Analyzing and presenting intelligence to support timely
situational understanding and force protection.
• Supporting the decide, detect, deliver, and assess
functions of the targeting process.
• Providing intelligence, CI, and EW support to information
operations.
6-274. The SBCT’s S2 and ISR assets provide the following

capabilities in the framework of the intelligence process (a discussion
of each capability follows):
• Plan and direct.
• Collect.
• Process and produce.
• Disseminate.
• Present.
Plan and Direct
6-275. The SBCT S2 and ISR assets perform the following tasks
during the plan and direct phase of the intelligence process:
• Develop ISR tasks in accordance with the SBCT
commander’s intent and critical information requirements
(CCIR).
• Accept and integrate external ISR planning and execution
elements to improve support to situational awareness and
targeting.
6-95
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Assist the brigade S3 to synchronize organic, supporting,

and augmenting ISR assets into the SBCT’s ISR effort.
• Assist the SBCT S3 to create the brigade’s ISR plan.
• Conduct parallel planning while dynamically tracking and
adjusting the overall collection effort for organic and
supporting ISR resources.
• Maintain knowledge of external collection resources and
capabilities and request support from these assets
through use of organic communications and processing
systems.
• Maintain a multilevel security intelligence
communications and processing architecture, using
digital and analog communications systems, to facilitate
operations in a joint and multinational environment.
• Identify critical named areas of interest (NAI) that focus
reconnaissance efforts in support of the SBCT
commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
Collect
during the collect phase of the intelligence process:
• Coordinate and assemble reporting assets and time-
sensitive information from joint, interagency,
multinational, and commercial collection resources.
• Configure sensor payloads of organic and nonorganic
collection platforms.
• Collect weather information from military and commercial
sources.
• Fuse vertical and horizontal combat information, targeting
data, and intelligence from organic, supporting, joint,
multinational, and interagency organizations.
• Receive and process broadcast downlinks from organic
and theater assets.
• Maintain multilevel security intelligence databases that
safeguard intelligence sources and permit authorized
access to unprocessed data.
• Provide capability to develop, transmit, and store graphic
products with supporting data.
Process and Produce
during the process and produce phase of the intelligence process:
• Develop the threat portion of the common operational
picture (COP) of the SBCT AO and area of interest (AOI)
through the distributed analysis and fusion of combat
information and multidisciplined intelligence using
collaborative analytic, development, and visualization
tools.
6-96
• Exchange the results of analysis, discuss issues with

external regional experts, and develop a common
understanding of the situation by fusing external collection
and analysis products using collaborative tools such as
desktop video teleconferencing and electronic whiteboards
resident on analyst workstations.
• Access, focus, and tailor the broader technical and
analytic products from national and theater analytic
centers to meet the SBCT’s intelligence needs.
• Conduct continuous IPB and near-real time all-source
analysis of threat information where it resides to eliminate
latency and loss of context and to support situational
understanding, targeting, and force protection.
• Conduct trend and pattern analysis during IPB, target
development, and support to information operations as a
means of providing predictive intelligence support to future
operations.
• Using organic communications and processing systems,
access existing databases, products, and analytic
expertise resident in service, joint, and national
surveillance and reconnaissance resources. These split-
based operations and reachback capabilities help to
facilitate collaboration, task sharing, and access to higher
echelon databases, IPB products, and focused analysis.
Split-based operations allow the SBCT to have a portion of
the ISR analytic element remain outside the operational
area to support a CP or C2 node.
• Access national weather analysis to produce weather-
effects products in support of current and future
operations.
Disseminate
during the disseminate phase of the intelligence process:
• Develop and employ secure, redundant, dedicated broad-
bandwidth communications with multilevel security
capability that enables the exchange of analytic findings
and meta-data.
• Collaborate with and disseminate information to internal
and external ISR elements in real time over an expanded
battlespace.
• Receive broadcast intelligence that provides indications,
warning, and location information of electronic emitters.
• Receive near-real time updates on weather, terrain, and
threat activities from a supporting ACE. This includes the
ability to receive threat situation displays, written
updates, video, and imagery to support en route mission
planning and adjustments to the plan.
6-97
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Dynamically update the situation from sensors, collectors,

and processors organic to the SBCT to provide a higher
degree of fidelity of the battlespace.
• Provide intelligence and analysis to all elements within the
SBCT, to include all elements of the squadron.
Present
6-279. The SBCT S2 and ISR assets perform the tasks that follow
during the present phase of the intelligence process.
• Develop presentations of the COP, including the current
threat situation and threat intent, to facilitate situational
understanding. The presentation uses supporting
information including imagery, video, or screen captures
(meta-data) to reinforce the presented analysis.
• Provide a near-real time visualization of the SBCT
commander’s battlespace across all ISR capabilities.
SBCT S2 SECTION
6-280. The S2 section consists of the S2, an operations team, and a
plans team. The S2 section supports the SBCT’s preparation for and
execution of operations. Supported by the MI company, it develops
and maintains IPB products using its organic personnel and
equipment; it is augmented by the MI company’s analytic assets and
capabilities to access joint and national intelligence centers. The S2
section also establishes connectivity and relationships with
intelligence activities, such as the theater army ACE, that possess
specific information on the terrain and weather conditions, order of
battle information, and cultural data on the people, religion, politics,
language, economics, and history. These assets assist the S2 section
in developing the initial intelligence estimate.
6-281. The S2 section connects with the deploying higher Army
Forces (ARFOR) and joint force headquarters to receive and update
intelligence estimates and other planning products. It establishes an
intelligence architecture that links the SBCT to organic and
supporting ISR organizations. The section operates in a multilevel
security environment that facilitates the exchange of information
between commanders and intelligence activities of joint, interagency,
and multinational organizations. The S2 develops the requirements
for and directs the activities of the MI company to analyze and fuse
the bottom-up information with top-down intelligence and downlinks
that result in the visual representation of the weather, terrain, and
threat situations. The SBCT S2’s ISR architecture and support
relationships expand and contract as the operation progresses, but
remain responsive to the rapid flow of combat information, targeting
data, and intelligence.
SBCT S2
6-282. As the SBCT’s senior intelligence officer and the primary
intelligence staff officer, the S2 is responsible for ensuring the
complex ISR operations described above satisfy the SBCT
commander’s CCIR (PIR in particular) and those of his subordinates.
The SBCT S2 understands the intelligence architecture, the
6-98
capabilities of organic ISR assets, the intelligence collection

capabilities at echelons above SBCT, and the functions of automated
intelligence systems. The S2 focuses and integrates, through virtual
and physical collaboration, these internal and
external collection capabilities to satisfy the information requirement
of the SBCT. Some of the SBCT S2’s specific responsibilities are—
• Assist the S3 to translate the SBCT commander’s intent,
concept of operations, and CCIR into intelligence guidance
and ISR tasks for subordinate staffs and units.
• Provide the commander and staff with assessments of
threat capability and intentions as they relate to the SBCT
and its mission.
• Advise the commander and S3 on all MI operations and
ISR planning.
• Serve as the SBCT’s senior analyst and target developer.
• Represent the SBCT ISR requirements at senior-level
coordination forums held outside the SBCT.
• Serve as final authority within the SBCT for changes to
the order of battle and database.
SBCT S2 Operations Team
6-283. The SBCT S2 operations team is responsible for threat
situational development and presentation in support of the SBCT’s
current operation. The team focuses primarily on the SBCT’s AO and
the current fight or operation. The operations team uses automated
collaborative tools to continuously integrate the products from
subordinate S2s, the MI company, and supporting ISR organizations
into an up-to-date common threat picture that can be presented to
the commander regardless of his position on the battlefield. The S2
plans team and the MI company assist the S2 operations team in
recognizing and alerting the command to threat COAs, capabilities,
or intents. Other specific tasks and responsibilities of the S2
operations team are—
• Maintain the threat portion of the current situation
overlay and the intelligence portion of the SBCT’s COP for
dissemination to all Army Battle Command Systems
(ABCS).
• Present the current threat situation and projected threat
COAs along with the supporting meta-data (from such
sources as UAV video, Land Warrior imagery, moving
target indicator [MTI], and synthetic aperture radars
[SAR]).
• Assist in identifying opportunities for friendly branches
and sequels by monitoring the current situation and
identifying when the planning assumptions for the threat
begin to diverge from the current assessment.
• Control the dissemination of intelligence products from
the SBCT to the higher, subordinate, and adjacent units.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Recommend adjustments to the commander and staff to

the SBCT’s ISR plan based on identified gaps in ISR
coverage and reporting.
• Receive, evaluate, and act upon intelligence and combat
information from subordinate and adjacent units.
• Conduct horizontal integration with the other SBCT staff
members during the execution of operations.
• Dynamically modify or change the automated IPB and
decision support template (DST), as needed, after
receiving those products from the S2 plans section.
• Integrate updated weather data into current situation
products and the DST during operations.
• Track battle damage, and prepare and present estimates
of threat combat effectiveness.
• Assume specific S2 planning responsibilities, by
exception, based on the SBCT S2’s direction.
6-100
SBCT S2 Plans Team

6-284. The S2 plans team is responsible for threat COA development
and war-gaming. The team works with the SBCT S3 planner and
other staff to prepare for future operations. The team uses the IPB
products from higher headquarters and refines them to develop and
present threat COAs during staff planning. The team works with fire
support planners to select and prioritize HVTs for targeting as HPTs.
The S2 planner, with the support of the MI company, writes the
intelligence estimate and the intelligence portions of the SBCT
OPORD. The team refines and updates its planning products
throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of the SBCT’s
operations. The S2 plans team works closely with the S2 operations
team to ensure continuity in the S2 section’s assessment of current
and future threat operations. The team’s focus is METT-TC
dependent, but generally extends beyond immediate AO to the
SBCT’s AOI and includes asymmetric aspects of threat capabilities.
The S2 plans team must—
• Think Red! The team develops and presents threat COAs
as well as an assessment of the friendly force from the
threat commander’s perspective.
• Monitor the current situation to continually assess the
impact of threat operations on future COAs.
• Wargame threat COAs against friendly COAs during staff
planning and decision making.
• Assist the SBCT’s fire support planner in identifying
threat HVTs and potential HPTs for both lethal and
nonlethal attack.
• Produce and disseminate the intelligence estimate to the
SBCT staff at a predetermined time according to the
commander’s guidance and METT-TC.
• Conduct detailed horizontal planning and collaboration
with other SBCT staff members.
• Develop the threat force situation paragraph of the
OPORD.
• Assume specific S2 operational responsibilities, by
exception, based on the SBCT S2’s direction.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY

6-285. The MI company consists of a small headquarters element, an
ISR analysis platoon, an ISR integration platoon, a tactical HUMINT
platoon, and a squadron weather officer (SWO). The company
provides ISR analysis and integration support to the SBCT S2
section. It has the additional capability to coordinate and execute
tactical HUMINT operations. In all actions, the SBCT commander’s
CCIR, as articulated in his PIR, drive the ISR integration effort.
Optimized for the smaller-scale contingency (SSC) environment, the
MI company provides the SBCT commander with the organic
capability to plan and execute ISR operations in one of the military’s
most complex and challenging operational environments. The
company’s organization is illustrated in Figure 6-19.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Military
Military Intelligence Company
Company
ISR-TA
ISR-TA Architecture
Architecture
TUAV
JSTARS Ntl/Theater
Platforms
IBS NIMA
DIA
U2 SIPRNET DHS
(TRAP NGIC
TADIXS-B NSA
COL
TIBS SCI JWICS INSCOM
TRIXS)
GRCS -
connectivity
CGS
via SIPRNET
TROJAN SPIRIT
CCS
ARFOR HQ ACE
HUMINT
UAV RVT TROJAN SPIRIT

Imagery MASINT
ASAS-RWS
DTES/MIES/
ASAS-A/S ASAS-S/S MITT/FAST
ISR Plans ACUS
Team ASAS-RWS
C
HUMINT-RWS TUAV
O
L. TROJAN SPIRIT
ASAS-RWS ASAS-RWS ASAS-RWS AFATDS Q-36
S2/ACT (-)
L Imagery WS II
A
RWS RWS RWS RWS
ASAS-RWS N
ISR INTEGRATION OOO
RSTA Squadron S2
II
TEAM
JDISS ASAS-RWS ASAS-RWS OOO GCS
MULTI-SENSOR
LAV/MAV
Military Intelligence Company provides:

• Maintains organic reachback for linkage to ARFOR (theater, • Conducts single, all source and cross-BOS analysis - provides
joint and national analysis, products and databases). relevant and timely threat situation awareness.
• Conducts dynamic retasking of assets to support Now Battle • Fuses distributed analytic products to provide input into overall
visualization and targeting. Common Relevant Operating Picture.
• Maintains organic ability to store and exploit preprocessed • Provides planning and execution of ISR activities to support
SIGINT and IMINT products commander’s intent.
Figure 6-19. Military Intelligence Company
ISR Analysis Platoon

6-286. The MI company’s ISR analysis platoon conducts the threat
analysis, situation development, target development, and BDA in
support of the SBCT S2 section. The ISR analysis platoon consists of
the situation development team, disposition development team,
target development team, imagery analysis team, and database
management team. The platoon gathers, analyzes, and fuses
information from multiple echelons and sources to produce
intelligence products that meet the SBCT commander’s decision
making and planning requirements. The platoon uses combat
information, targeting data, and intelligence from all of the SBCT’s
ISR resources (combat, CS, and CSS) to develop an accurate and
timely intelligence assessment of the threat and the environment.
6-287. The ISR analysis platoon has the organic processing and
communications systems to collaborate with external analytic
elements, the SBCT S2 section, subordinate battalion S2s, and the
ISR integration platoon to continuously update and refine the threat
portion of the SBCT’s COP. The platoon pulls and receives
intelligence and other relevant information from nonorganic ISR
organizations to enhance the analysis and reporting of organic ISR
assets.
6-288. The joint deployable intelligence support system (JDISS)
allows the ISR analysis platoon to access, focus, and tailor the
broader technical and analytical products from national and theater
analysis centers to meet the SBCT’s intelligence needs. Through the
6-102
JDISS, the platoon can gain access, using organic communications

and processing systems, to existing databases, products, and
analytic expertise resident in service, joint and national surveillance
and reconnaissance resources. These split-based operations and
reachback capabilities facilitate collaboration, task sharing, and
access to higher echelon databases (virtual databases in the future),
as well as to IPB products and focused analysis. The JDISS terminal
also allows the platoon to leverage national weather centers to
produce weather effects products that support current and future
operations.
6-289. Situation Development Team. The situation development
team of the ISR analysis platoon develops the current threat picture
for the COP of the SBCT AO and AOI. It does this through the
distributed analysis and fusion of combat information and
multidisciplined intelligence using collaborative analytic,
development, and visualization tools. The S2 operations team uses
the situation development team’s current situation picture, coupled
with the S2 plans team’s planning product, to verify predicted threat
COAs and intentions. The situation development team works with the
analysis platoon’s disposition development team and the ISR
integration platoon to ensure all elements are aware of the current
threat situation.
6-290. Disposition Development Team. The threat disposition
development team of the ISR analysis platoon develops a common
understanding of the current and future situation. To do this, the
team fuses external collection and analysis products using
collaborative tools such as desktop video teleconferencing and
electronic whiteboards resident on analyst workstations. The team
exchanges the results of analysis and discusses issues with external
regional experts to enhance its products and its support to the S2
plans team. The disposition development team conducts continuous
IPB and near-real time all-source analysis of threat information,
wherever it resides, to eliminate latency and loss of context in
support of situational understanding, targeting, and force protection.
The team also conducts trend and pattern analysis as a means of
providing predictive intelligence support to future operations.
6-291. Target Development Team. The target development team of
the ISR analysis platoon conducts target development and BDA in
support of the SBCT S2 section and the SBCT’s FSE. The team serves
as the intelligence focal point for target development during the
execution of operations by working directly with the FSO to execute
targeting missions and coordinate changes. The team uses the
intelligence and staff planning products developed within the ISR
analysis platoon and the S2 plans team to identify HVTs. Target
development requires the team to receive and process information on
threat forces, facilities, and capabilities; place it an accessible
database; and present it in graphic format. The team then
disseminates this information to other elements within the MI
company, to the S2 section, and to the SBCT CP to facilitate
development and execution of the SBCT’s fire support plan.
6-292. The target development team develops the most accurate BDA
possible by accessing multiple sources and the results of all-source
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
analysis. This requires the team to conduct extensive coordination

with the S2 section, the FSE, and other teams within the MI
company. Effective BDA also requires that common procedures and
methodology be established to synchronize and integrate Army BDA
with that at joint and national levels. Success in the BDA process
and the combat assessment function of the targeting process are
achieved when the commander has the information necessary to
quickly make decisions about COAs and fire support.
6-293. Imagery Analysis Team. The imagery analysis team develops
tailored imagery products to support ISR analysis, target
development, and S2 presentations. The team maintains the imagery
product library and retrieves imagery products from multiple sources
to satisfy the SBCT’s imagery requirements. The imagery analysis
team in the ISR analysis platoon may coordinate with the terrain
analysis team in the maneuver support cell of the SBCT for tactical
decision aids and mapping products.
6-294. Database Management Team. The database management
team maintains the technical health of the ISR analysis platoon’s All-
Source Analysis System (ASAS) correlated database. The team
receives and processes incoming data. It updates database files
based on the direction of the disposition development team’s senior
analyst. The database management team exports portions of the
database to subordinate S2s and other intelligence activities as
required.
ISR Integration Platoon
6-295. The MI company’s ISR integration platoon conducts ISR
requirements management; HUMINT planning, deconfliction, and
collection; and multisensor visualization for the SBCT commander
and staff in support of the SBCT S2 section. The platoon consists of
the ISR management team, the S2X team, and the common ground
station (CGS). This organization allows continuous and dynamic
control of the SBCT’s ISR assets, with special capabilities to direct
tactical HUMINT operations through the S2X and access nonorganic
sensors via the CGS.
6-296. The TROJAN SPIRIT system is organic to the signal company
but is under OPCON of the ISR integration platoon during
operations. It is manned by intelligence analysts from the platoon
who can access this dedicated multilevel, high-capacity
communications link between SBCT CPs, national centers, and other
intelligence organizations outside the SBCT’s AO. They use TROJAN
SPIRIT to pull intelligence products, receive and analyze routed direct
downlinks, and access external databases to fuse with organically
collected information. The ISR integration platoon also has access to
UAV imagery and the joint worldwide intelligence communications
system (JWICS) through the JDISS.
6-297. ISR Management Team. The ISR management team assists
the SBCT S3 in developing, monitoring, and dynamically adjusting
the SBCT’s ISR collection effort. It participates in the SBCT staff war-
gaming and synchronization session to extract ISR requirements that
answer the commander’s decision making and targeting needs. The
team also works closely with the S2 operations team to identify
6-104
shortcomings in current and near-term ISR support. Using ISR

requirements for both current and future operations, the team
recommends ISR collection plans, orders, and positioning of ISR
assets to deliver combat information, targeting data, and intelligence
to the commander and staff.
6-298. By simultaneously monitoring the current situation and
future planning, the ISR management team can rapidly recognize and
recommend redirection of ISR assets to respond to situations that
diverge significantly from the assumed threat COAs that led to the
current concept of maneuver, fires, or information operations.
Collaboration between the ISR management team, the S2 section, the
squadron S2, the squadron S3, and the SBCT S3 is essential to the
synchronization of the ISR effort and presentation of the most
current intelligence possible to the SBCT commander and staff. Some
specific ISR management team tasks are to—
• Develop and recommend PIR for the SBCT commander’s
approval.
• Develop specific information requirements (SIR) for each
PIR.
• Develop multidiscipline, multiechelon, and cross-
battlefield operating system (BOS) specific orders and
requests.
• Assist the S3 in coordinating the development and
inclusion of ISR tasks into Paragraph 3 (Execution) of the
OPORD.
• Maintain the ISR collection plan in Annex B (Intelligence)
of the OPORD.
• Coordinate the development and dissemination of Annex L
(ISR) of the OPORD.
• Manage requests for information (RFI) to ARFOR, JTF, or
higher echelon intelligence organizations.
• Provide technical control of selected ISR assets.
• Provide the capability to accelerate ISR collection to detect
and assess the effects of targeting on selected HPTs.
• Receive and display UAV video.
• Ensure the intelligence architecture supports
collaboration, timely tasking and reporting, and
multimedia presentation of ISR data.
6-299. S2X Team. The S2X team provides the ISR integration
platoon with a dedicated mission management function for tactical
HUMINT collection, a critical intelligence capability in SSC
operations. The S2X ensures that the HUMINT collection, analysis,
and dissemination effort is conducted in concert with the
commander’s requirements and that the intelligence is delivered
when needed, in a usable format, and in time to influence his
decision making. Working in conjunction with the ISR management
team, the S2X develops HUMINT SIR, orders, and RFIs based on the
SBCT’s commander’s PIR. It works closely with the G2X at the
6-105
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
ARFOR and J2X at the JTF to ensure that HUMINT efforts within the
theater are complementary and supportive of the SBCT commander’s
intelligence requirements. For subordinate CI agents and HUMINT
collectors, the S2X provides collection focus, technical support, and
technical control. It also provides tactical HUMINT support to
situation development, information operations, and force protection.
Other specific tasks for the S2X team are—
• Synchronize the HUMINT collection effort in the SBCT’s
AO.
• Manage source registration and deconfliction.
• Manage the intelligence contingency fund and source
incentive program.
• Access the national source database through the
migration defense intelligence threat data system (MDITS).
• Access national and theater HUMINT reports and
products through the supporting ARFOR ACE.
• Provide HUMINT link and pattern analysis support to the
ISR analysis platoon.
Common Ground Station

6-300. The CGS provides the SBCT with a fully adjustable,
deployable, mobile, and responsive intelligence processing capability.
The CGS can receive and store secondary imagery. It is capable of
providing full imagery, message, and analytical interface with the
ASAS. The processing system allows its operators to maintain and
manipulate related IEW databases as well as display threat situation,
sensor data, and database information in a graphic format. The
communications components of the CGS enable the system to
simultaneously receive, process, and display data (annotated
imagery, text, graphics) from multiple tactical, operational, and
strategic collection assets. Sensor links and connectivity available
through the CGS include—
• Joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS)
MTIs.
• JSTARS synthetic aperture radar imagery.
• USAF U2 electronic MTI.
• USAF RC-135 signal intelligence (SIGINT) reporting via the
joint tactical terminal.
• Guardrail common sensor SIGINT reporting via the joint
tactical terminal.
Tactical HUMINT Platoon

6-301. The MI company’s tactical HUMINT platoon is organized to
take advantage of the robust HUMINT collection environment in
which the SBCT operates. In conjunction with squadron assets, the
platoon conducts HUMINT collection and exploits documents in
support of the commander’s information requirements in the SBCT’s
6-106
AO. The tactical HUMINT platoon consists of two human operations

control (HOC) teams and eight tactical HUMINT teams.
6-302. HOC Teams. The platoon’s two HOC teams conduct these
tasks:
• Provide technical guidance to the tactical HUMINT teams
operating in direct support of the SBCT’s maneuver
battalions.
• Coordinate HUMINT collection requirements and
operations of supported units with the S2X team.
• Augment the ISR integration platoon’s S2X team when not
controlling HUMINT teams in direct support.
6-303. Tactical HUMINT Teams. The tactical HUMINT teams

provide general support to the SBCT or direct support to subordinate
units based on METT-TC. In general support, the teams respond
directly to tasking and mission guidance from the S2X team. In direct
support, the teams respond to tasking and mission of the HOC.
Regardless of support relationship, the tactical HUMINT teams report
all operational information, to include source data, directly or via the
HOC to the S2X team in the ISR integration platoon. The teams use
interrogation, debriefing, and elicitation techniques, as applicable, as
well as a limited document exploitation capability to collect
actionable combat information. These HUMINT collection techniques
support current and future operations through—
• Low-level source operations.
• Interrogation of detained persons and enemy prisoners of
war.
• Debriefing of displaced persons, refugees, and local
civilians.
• Debriefing of US, allied, or coalition military personnel.
• Exploitation of foreign document.
• Liaison with local law enforcement and foreign military
security and intelligence services.
• Conduct of force protection source operations.
• Collection and dissemination of hand-held digital imagery.
Leadership and Manning

6-304. The MI company is commanded by an O4 35D and is
supported by a staff consisting of one O3 35D and an E8 96Z. The
commander supervises the operations of the ISR analysis platoon
and ISR integration platoon. The company relies on the SBCT
headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) for administrative
and logistics (A/L) support. The squadron may receive augmentation
from the MI company when conducting multidimensional
reconnaissance in a large or densely populated AO.
6-107
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
6-305. ISR Analysis Platoon. ISR analysis personnel consist of one

officer (O2 35D), one warrant officer (CW2 350B), 10 NCOs, and 15
enlisted soldiers.
6-306. ISR Integration Platoon. This platoon is composed of one
officer (O3 35D), one warrant officer (CW3 350B), six NCOs, and one
enlisted soldier.
6-307. Common Ground Station. The CGS is manned by two NCOs
and four enlisted soldiers.
6-308. S2X Team. The S2X team is led by two officers (O4 35F and
O3 35E), with two warrant officers (CW3 351B and CW3 351E) and
two NCOs.
6-309. Tactical HUMINT Platoon. This platoon consists of two HOC
teams, each consisting of one warrant officer (CW2 351B) and two
NCOs, and a tactical HUMINT section consisting of two tactical
HUMINT teams of four people each (4 NCOs and 4 enlisted personnel
per team). Language capability is an augmentation requirement; the
platoon has reserved spaces for the linguists to ride.
6-310. USAF Weather Team. A USAF weather officer and a weather
NCO staff the weather team. They provide detailed, tailored weather
forecasting (including support for UAV operations) using organic and
external weather sources. This information helps the SBCT
commander and staff to understand the impact of weather on current
and future operations.
6-311. Combat Service Support. The MI company relies on support
from the SBCT’s HHC company and forward support battalion (FSB)
for all CSS, including maintenance, personnel, and logistical support.
6-312. Other Battlefield Operating Systems. The MI company is
linked with all BOSs within the SBCT. A clear understanding of the
battlespace requires integration of a variety of ABCS systems
(Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System [AFATDS], Maneuver
Control System [MCS], Combat Service Support Control System
[CSSCS], Air and Missile Defense Workstation [AMDWS], and Force
XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below [FBCB2]). Effective
battlespace awareness depends on the integration of all aspects of
the operation in an understandable, contextual, and presentable
display that allows the commander and analysts to quickly grasp the
current situation. Interoperability and sharing of information is a
critical capability.
Limitations
6-313. Limitations of the MI company include the following:
• Linguist Support. The MI company relies on a force pool
of linguists to support requirements based on the
operational environment. The linguists must be identified,
trained, tracked, and placed on call for insertion in 24 to
48 hours as the situation dictates. Linguistic
requirements include translation, tactical HUMINT, and
SIGINT operations. Linguists will also be pushed down to
6-108
the squadron to equal the number of HUMINT collectors

at the troop level (the optimum number is 36).
• UAV Support. The lack of a UAV ground control station
(GCS) in the SBCT headquarters and MI company
eliminates the ability to fly two aircraft simultaneously
and requires that the SBCT CP locate within 40 kilometers
of the UAV flight track to receive the video.
Risks and Mitigation

6-314. Reliable communications (both internal to the SBCT and
external to higher headquarters and theater/joint/national
organizations and agencies) are absolutely essential if the MI
company is to provide effective analytical support. Communications
are essential to the MI company’s ability to collect, process, analyze,
and disseminate combat information and intelligence. Mitigation of
this requirement is achieved through the use of TROJAN SPIRIT.
6-315. The SBCT is heavily reliant on the ARFOR for the
preprocessing of SIGINT information and for direct downlinks from
airborne platforms.
DIVISION/ARFOR INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE

6-316. IEW assets organic to the squadron and SBCT mirror assets
at division and corps level, with the only difference being that
division/corps/ARFOR assets are more numerous. Depending on the
intelligence requirements, assets can be pushed down to the
squadron level to augment the ISR collection plan. The squadron
employs the additional assets in the same manner as its organic
surveillance troop assets, as discussed throughout this manual. The
division/corps/ARFOR IEW assets may be operating within the
SBCT’s battlespace to provide general/area support or as part of the
higher unit’s ISR plan. The squadron S2 must be aware of the assets
that are employed in the area and of any additional support that may
be available. When the situation dictates, the S2 automatically
requests support from available assets.
SECTION VI – NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL SUPPORT
6-317. This section discusses support available from the division or

corps NBC assets. Chapters 1 through 5 and Appendix B cover in
detail the employment of the organic NBC platoon in the squadron.
The division and corps chemical units may provide decontamination,
additional reconnaissance, and smoke support to the squadron
based on their support relationships with the SBCT and the location
of their AO.
STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM/SQUADRON ASSETS

6-318. The SBCT has no other NBC assets other than what is organic
to the surveillance troop in the cavalry squadron (RSTA) and the
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
SBCT chemical battlestaff. The SBCT and the RSTA chemical

battlestaffs will use decision support tools embedded in joint warning
and reporting network (JWARN) to plan NBC defense, provide battle
tracking during SBCT and RSTA operations, and gain and maintain
NBC situational awareness. Cooperative detection assets must be
used together with the commander and his battlestaff’s judgment,
experience, and intuition to enhance the NBC visualization of the
battlefield. The chemical battlestaff assists the commander in the
orchestration of NBC defense through the integration of the
principles of contamination avoidance, protection, and
decontamination.
6-319. The JWARN, residing in the MCS or used as a stand-alone
system, provides the SBCT and squadron chemical staff with an
enhanced automated NBC reporting system. This provides the
squadron with near-real time warning and contamination/hazard
area locations.
DECONTAMINATION SUPPORT
6-320. The squadron receives support from a divisional or corps NBC
company decontamination platoon when thorough decontamination
is required. Thorough decontamination is normally required after
contamination with a persistent agent or prolonged exposure to other
agents. It requires detailed planning and extensive manpower and
equipment resources. It is conducted in a forward area to limit
contamination spread, but in an area that will be out of likely contact
with the threat throughout the operation.
6-321. The squadron may be relieved by other units to conduct
thorough decontamination. Decontamination may proceed by troop,
or the entire squadron may move to the decontamination site. If the
decontamination proceeds by troop and the squadron remains
committed in a mission, the decontamination unit may be placed
under OPCON of the squadron. More often, the affected troop or the
entire squadron moves to the established site and conducts thorough
decontamination under division control. This method permits the
most effective and expeditious use of decontamination assets.
SECTION VII – ENGINEER SUPPORT
6-322. Combat engineers increase the combat power of maneuver

units by accomplishing mobility, countermobility, and survivability
tasks. They are integrated with the commander’s maneuver and fires
to afford or enhance opportunities for the commander to successfully
accomplish the mission. Additionally, they perform reconnaissance
and infantry combat missions when required.
ORGANIZATION
6-323. The engineer company organic to the SBCT is ideally suited
for integration into the maneuver operations at all levels. It is an agile
6-110
organization that assures the freedom to maneuver on the battlefield

within the combined arms team framework. Its structure and
operational characteristics enhance force momentum and lethality
and increase the synchronization of engineer actions within the
battlespace. The company consists of a company headquarters, three
combat mobility platoons, and a mobility support platoon (see Figure
6-20). The company can be organized to operate as an engineer pure
element or task organized with platoons operating in support of
maneuver forces. The squadron can expect to receive engineer
reconnaissance teams and/or squad/platoon-level mobility elements.
Figure 6-20. Engineer Company
ENGINEER COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

6-324. The company headquarters exercises C2 of the unit’s tactical
employment and administrative operations when it is operating pure.
The company headquarters includes the commander, operations
officer (also known as the XO), first sergeant (1SG), operations NCO,
supply sergeant, NBC sergeant, two communications specialists, two
drivers, and four combat medics. The communications specialists
and the medics are task organized to provide support to the platoons.
6-325. The engineer company commander advises the RSTA and
SBCT commanders on aspects of engineer support to organizations
and provides input to the MDMP. He integrates and synchronizes the
mobility, countermobility, and survivability BOS.
COMBAT MOBILITY PLATOON
6-111
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
6-326. The combat mobility platoon is normally the lowest-level

engineer unit that can effectively accomplish independent missions
and tasks. It is a basic unit capable of maneuvering during combat
operations, and it can fight as part of the engineer company or as
part of the maneuver company team. It consists of a platoon
headquarters section and three eight-man combat engineer squads.
On the battlefield, the combat mobility platoon can facilitate rapid
and frequent movement. It frequently receives augmentation in the
form of special equipment from the mobility support platoon. The
engineer squads can be task organized for specific missions such as
engineer reconnaissance missions, although this reduces their ability
to provide mobility support. Specific platoon equipment includes an
interim armored vehicle (IAV) with mountable rollers/blades. The
eight-man sapper squad is the minimum force required to provide
effective dismounted maneuver support; each squad has associated
engineer equipment, demolitions, and weapons.
MOBILITY SUPPORT PLATOON

6-327. The mobility support platoon consists of a platoon
headquarters section and three equipment based mobility sections.
Like the combat mobility platoons, the mobility support platoon is
not organized to operate independently in the offense. Each mobility
section is structured for mobility missions, focused on reducing
threat obstacles and fortifications that inhibit friendly maneuver. The
platoon provides the commander with specialized equipment
capabilities to weight the main effort. Each section has in-stride
breaching, gap-crossing, and obstacle reduction capabilities, as well
as specialized vehicle-mounted tools and heavy blades. The same
task organization and equipment required for mobility operations
provide a limited capability for countermobility, survivability, and
engineering.
SUPPORT CAPABILITIES
MOBILITY
6-328. Mobility operations maintain the freedom of movement for
maneuver units and critical supplies. Engineers accomplish this by
reducing the effects of existing or reinforcing obstacles, by providing
gap crossings, and by constructing and maintaining combat roads
and trails. Engineers often support a squadron during
reconnaissance by performing mobility tasks in support of the
movement or maneuver of follow-on forces. Construction and
maintenance of routes are accomplished to the extent necessary to
support the momentum of the squadron and SBCT. Improvement of
existing routes is the first choice, with construction of short bypasses
second. Movement of service support assets must also be considered
when constructing combat roads and trails since these assets require
the highest degree of mobility support.
COUNTERMOBILITY
6-112
6-329. Countermobility operations are those operations that attack

the threat’s ability to maneuver. This is accomplished by enhancing
existing natural impediments to movement with planned obstacles.
Obstacles are classified as either existing or reinforcing. Existing
obstacles are those natural or cultural restrictions to maneuver that
are part of the terrain when the battle begins. Reinforcing obstacles
are specifically constructed, emplaced, or detonated to tie together,
strengthen, and extend existing obstacles. Existing restrictions can
often be rapidly turned into effective obstacles with minimal effort.
Each obstacle or group of obstacles is emplaced to achieve a specific
effect (block, fix, turn, disrupt) on the threat.
6-330. The two types of reinforcing obstacles are tactical and
protective. Tactical obstacles are placed to achieve one of the desired
effects on threat maneuver (block, fix, turn, disrupt) and are
generally within or at the front of an EA. Maneuver units may assist
engineers in emplacing tactical obstacles when speed is essential or
engineer assets are limited. Protective obstacles are placed close to
friendly positions to provide unit security. Typically, maneuver units
without engineer support emplace them. Protective obstacles
normally can be placed outside planned obstacle zones and belts
unless otherwise specified by higher headquarters or if the obstacles
are not intended to be recovered.
6-331. FASCAM gives the commander a rapid, flexible, and effective
means of delaying, canalizing, harassing, or wearing down threat
forces. FASCAM provides a method of emplacing obstacles to support
contingencies or unforeseen situations. As with any reinforcing
obstacle, it is integrated into the obstacle plan and supports the
scheme of maneuver. FASCAM is normally employed as a situational
obstacle; that is, it requires detailed planning and a trigger or
decision point that determines when the minefield is executed. These
triggers depend on the desired obstacle effect and the delivery system
employed. Delivery systems include fixed-wing TACAIR (Gator),
rotary-wing aircraft (Air Volcano), ground (Volcano delivered by 5-ton
truck, heavy expanded mobile tactical truck (HEMTT), or M548
tracked cargo vehicle), tube artillery (ADAM/RAAMS), and man-pack
(MOPMS). Each system has its own set of self-destruct times,
emplacement authorities, and associated risks. Consult FM 3-34.32
[FM 20-32] for details.
6-332. The following considerations govern obstacle employment:
• Observe restrictions imposed by higher headquarters.
• Integrate obstacle employment into the scheme of
maneuver.
• Cover obstacles by observed fires, both direct and indirect.
• Integrate reinforcing obstacles with existing obstacles.
• Employ obstacles in depth.
• Employ surprise.
• Guard obstacles to prevent stealth breaching or
infiltration by the threat.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• The responsible maneuver commander and the emplacing

engineer must do final siting of obstacles on the ground.
SURVIVABILITY
6-333. Survivability operations entail the development and
construction of protective positions to reduce the effectiveness of
threat weapon systems. Engineers construct survivability positions
for C2 elements and for critical equipment and supplies. They dig
individual and crew-served weapon positions and vehicle fighting
positions and may provide cover for personnel and vehicles. The most
extensive survivability effort is expended in the defense. There is
seldom enough time or equipment for the engineers to do all the
tasks desired; therefore, soldiers, vehicle crews, and units must do
all they can to prepare their own survivability positions. The
squadron commander designates the priority for engineer effort in
survivability work. The amount of time available and the level of
threat determine the amount of resources the squadron can invest in
increasing survivability. The maneuver battalions and SBCT
headquarters may get the priority of engineer survivability support.
Squadron priorities should list CPs (combat trains command post
[CTCP], field trains command post [FTCP]) and high value assets
(TROJAN, GCS) as top priorities.
COMBAT ENGINEER EMPLOYMENT

6-334. The squadron may receive an engineer squad or platoon from
SBCT or a combat engineer platoon from the division or corps
combat engineer brigade. This platoon is often task organized with
mobility and countermobility equipment from the engineer company.
In some missions where facilitating the movement of other forces is
critical, more engineers may be assigned to initiate mobility tasks at
the earliest possible moment. When engineers are limited, they are
best employed under squadron control to keep their efforts focused
where most critical. The squadron commander specifies priority of
effort for engineer tasks. During countermobility operations, priority
can also be specified to designated portions of the obstacle plan.
ENGINEER MISSIONS
6-335. The engineer unit may be placed in a supporting relationship
with a specific subordinate ground troop for an operation in which
this arrangement best accomplishes the mission. Squadron units
provide security to engineers as they work on their tasks and are
prepared to provide CSS as well. These actions ensure the engineer
effort is focused. The engineer company commander or platoon leader
can best manage the collective effort of the entire company/platoon
and supporting equipment, using them as needed to accomplish the
commander’s intent. Reconnaissance missions may, on occasion,
require an engineer platoon to delegate squads to troops or scout
platoons.
6-336. As the troops and engineer platoons identify assigned
obstacles and mark survivability positions, they use on-board
6-114
position location devices and FBCB2 to verify the start point, end
point, and turn points along the length of the obstacle. In addition,
they annotate the location of unit-emplaced protective obstacles and
transmit the updated obstacle overlay back to the main CP for
consolidation.
EMPLOYMENT METHODS
6-337. For mobility, countermobility, and survivability support,
engineers may be tasked organized to support the maneuver effort
using one of three methods. The first method is to be attached or
OPCON to the squadron. Method two is to operate pure, and the final
method is to be task organized to the maneuver battalions. Table 6-
16 outlines considerations for these methods. Additional guidance on
engineer employment may be found in FM 3-34.1 [FM 90-7].
6-115
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Table 6-16. Engineer Employment Timeline
Method Task Organization Coordination Benefits/Limitations

1 Attached/operational control • Requires battle handover + Close coordination and
(OPCON) to squadron of information handover occurs
• Reports to and receives + Added security for
tasking from engineers
squadron/troop
2 Pure, under brigade control • Requires battle handover + Engineer company
of information from commander assigns
squadron missions and employs
company
• Reports to and receives
tasking from brigade - Provides own security
3 Attached/OPCON to • Requires battle handover + Direct support provided to
maneuver battalion of information from maneuver battalions
squadron or other assets - Added security for
to battalion engineers
• Reports to and receives
tasking from maneuver
battalion/company
Method 1
6-338. In method 1, the squadron receives the engineer element and
either task organizes it down to troop level or keeps it under
squadron control. The size of the element and the mission will
influence the method of control. Engineers reconnoiter and/or reduce
obstacles identified by the squadron’s reconnaissance elements.
Close handover is required between reconnaissance elements and
engineers (see Chapter 5). FBCB2 facilitates the handover process.
Method 2
6-339. In this method, the engineers operate pure, under SBCT
control. The engineer company provides support to the squadron and
maneuver battalions as directed. The squadron reports its
requirements to the SBCT. It coordinates closely with the engineer
company headquarters to hand over obstacles identified during
squadron reconnaissance and/or to identify areas that may require
engineer countermobility efforts.
Method 3
6-340. When the engineers are task organized to maneuver
battalions, they maneuver with the battalions and provide mobility
and countermobility support in relation to obstacles identified by the
squadron, the battalion scout platoons, or other intelligence assets.
RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS SUPPORT

6-341. During reconnaissance operations, priority of effort is
normally mobility, countermobility, and survivability. Priority of
mobility effort is the designated route the squadron or follow-on
forces travel.
6-116
6-342. The following tasks guide the employment of engineers during

reconnaissance or offensive security missions. Engineers—
• Normally move well forward with or immediately behind a
lead ground troop.
• Supplement troop route reconnaissance by reconnoitering
specific roadway features that are damaged or require
more technical engineer analysis.
• Create bypasses around obstacles.
• Reduce obstacles beyond troop capability. Every obstacle
encountered during a reconnaissance mission may not
require reduction by the engineers supporting the
squadron. Those that may significantly affect the mission
of follow-on forces deserve attention. Others are marked
and reported. Main body engineers must be prepared to
supplement the efforts of the squadron’s engineers by
improving breaches and conducting breaches of other
obstacles.
• Emplace tactical bridging.
• Improve ford sites.
• Improve embankments at swim sites.
• Emplace protective minefields on exposed flanks.
• Construct combat trails.
SECURITY OPERATIONS SUPPORT

6-343. During security operations, priority of effort is normally
countermobility, survivability, and mobility. The following tasks guide
employment of engineers during defensive security missions.
Engineers—
• Begin work as early as possible and operate continuously
throughout the mission within constraints imposed by
crew rest and equipment maintenance.
• Task specific pieces of engineer equipment to construct
survivability positions while obstacles are being emplaced.
• Prioritize countermobility effort to specific portions of the
obstacle plan, normally starting in the forward areas and
working back.
• Ensure tanks, cavalry fighting vehicles (CFV), mortars,
and Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicles (BSFV) are placed in
improved fighting positions as time and situation permit.
Scout observation posts (OP) seldom require survivability
positions.
• Emplace tactical bridging to improve mobility of squadron
assets in sector.
• Build combat trails to support the execution of reserve
contingencies and troop displacements.
6-117
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Emplace hasty obstacles during the mission in support of

squadron fragmentary orders (FRAGO).
• Create bypasses around obstacles created by battle
damage during the mission.
ROLE OF ENGINEERS FIGHTING AS INFANTRY

6-344. Combat engineers prepare to fight as infantry as a secondary
mission; however, the decision to employ an engineer unit as infantry
is made only in critical circumstances. Using engineers as infantry
must be weighed against the loss of their greater capabilities as a
combat multiplier performing their primary missions. Their combat
capabilities are limited to their organic weapons. Squadron
commanders should not develop a plan that hinges on supporting
engineers fighting as infantry. When engineers are forced to fight
during their normal missions, the squadron must support them with
maneuver units and fire support.
SECTION VIII – AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY SUPPORT
6-345. Air defense encompasses all measures designed to nullify or

reduce the effectiveness of a threat attack or surveillance by aircraft,
theater missiles in flight, or UAVs. Air defense measures reduce the
possibility of attack by making the squadron a less detectable and
lucrative target. In the event of attack, air defense counters the
threat by destroying aircraft or disrupting the attack. Air defense
involves both passive and active measures.
6-346. The SBCT has no organic air defense assets. ADA assets must
be augmented from a supporting division, corps, or ARFOR. They will
rely on the use of the USAF to reduce the threat. Joint doctrine
employs USAF assets to attain air superiority and then to reduce the
risk of hostile aircraft engaging friendly units prior to and during
ground units’ deployment.
PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE

6-347. Passive air defense, the squadron’s best defense against
hostile aircraft, includes all measures, other than active air defense,
taken to minimize the effects of hostile air action. All cavalry units
are responsible for these measures, which are continuous in nature
and suitable for unit SOPs. A pilot moving at high speed, often low to
the ground to avoid high-altitude air defense systems, will have
difficulty detecting a target that is not obvious. If he has detected the
target, passive measures make his attack more difficult. Passive
measures include the following:
• Cover and concealment for stationary vehicles.
• Camouflage to conceal exposed vehicles or reflective
surfaces.
• Covered and concealed routes during movement.
6-118
• Vehicle dispersion when stationary and moving.

• Concealment of track and wheel marks and terrain
disturbances around stationary positions.
• Prepared positions for stationary vehicles or elements.
• Not engaging a passing fixed-wing aircraft unless it assumes
an attack profile.
• Establishing and maintaining air guards and an air
warning system in the squadron.
• Establishing drills to execute immediately upon air attack.
ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE

6-348. Active air defense is direct defensive action taken to destroy
threat air platforms or to reduce their effectiveness. It includes the
use of organic weapons and supporting ADA systems. While the first
line of defense against threat aircraft is the constant application of
passive air defense measures, the squadron must be prepared to
actively engage air threats. Engagement can be by volume fire, using
all available weapons to put up a curtain of massed fire (“curtain of
steel”) through which the aircraft flies. The techniques for controlling
this fire depend on weapons available and type of aircraft. When
engaging helicopters involved in reconnaissance or air assault
operations, precision engagement by appropriate weapons can be
used.
6-349. The squadron may receive both incidental and direct
protection from ADA units. Collateral protection is provided when the
squadron is operating under the protection of high-to-medium-
altitude air defense (HIMAD) systems providing area coverage. The
nature of reconnaissance and security operations may take the
squadron out from under HIMAD coverage. For close protection,
either to complement HIMAD or when the squadron is outside
HIMAD protection, the squadron may receive support from short-
range air defense (SHORAD) systems. These are tracked, wheeled,
and man-portable missile systems from a division or corps air
defense battalion. A platoon of BSFVs (BSFV or BSFV-E) or
Linebackers, if available, may be sent to support the squadron.
6-350. Ultimately, positioning of ADA assets is determined by the
factors of METT-TC and the squadron commander’s priorities. The
ADA platoon may be task organized to provide direct support to the
squadron or task organized into sections to support individual
troops. In either case, the ADA leader must retain the flexibility to
mass ADA assets at the critical time and place on the battlefield to
defeat the air threat. They can support the squadron using any of the
command and support relationships discussed earlier in this
chapter.
AIR DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL

6-351. Air defense warning procedures provide measures to alert,
prepare, or increase unit readiness for air attack. Air defense
warnings for these purposes are commonly issued throughout the
6-119
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
SBCT. They specify a degree of air attack probability (red, yellow, or

white) describing the commander’s evaluation of the general state of
the probable air threat; they apply to the entire AO. The three
warning levels are outlined later in this section. Any commander may
issue a higher level of warning, but not a lower level. Raising the level
of air defense warning should be based on actual threat observations
or intelligence of threat activity rather than a threat template.
6-352. The chain of command must ensure that every soldier knows
the current air defense warning. Air defense warnings will be sent out
on air defense command nets and early warning nets at every level.
6-353. While air defense warnings describe the probability of hostile
air action over the entire theater of war or operations, local air
defense warnings tell with certainty what the air threat is for a
specific part of the battlefield. Air defense units use local air defense
warnings to alert units to the current state of the air threat. See
Table 6-17 for the three local air defense warnings.
Table 6-17. Local Air Defense Warnings
LOCAL AIR DEFENSE WARNINGS MEANING

Dynamite Air platforms are in-bound or are attacking now. Response is
immediate.
Lookout Air platforms are in the area of interest but are not in-bound,
or are in-bound but there is time to react.
Snowman No air platforms pose a threat at this time.
6-354. Local air defense warnings do more than describe the current
level of air threat in the immediate area. They also require specific air
defense reactions from receiving units. Unit commanders must
establish in their tactical SOP what they want their units to do when
a local air defense warning is received.
6-355. Air defense control is exercised by ROE that delineate the
circumstances under which weapons can fire at an aircraft. The
SBCT commander establishes the rules to provide the degree of
centralized control required. These rules allow for decentralized
execution. Subordinate commanders can issue more restrictive ROE
than those imposed by the SBCT commander, but not more
permissive ones. The right of self-defense is always preserved. For the
squadron, the critical ROE are as follows:
• Hostile criteria. Hostile criteria describe the conditions
under which an aircraft may be identified as hostile for
engagement purposes. Examples include speed, altitude,
heading, release of projectiles, or other requirements
within specified volumes of airspace. At squadron level,
these criteria include visual recognition of specific threat
characteristics or hostile acts.
• Weapons control status. WCS describes the degree of fire
control imposed (hold, tight, or free) on air defense
6-120
weapons. Refer to the discussion of these levels later in

this section.
PLANNING AND EMPLOYMENT

6-356. ADA employment is governed by four basic principles: mass,
mix, mobility, and integration. Considering these principles, the
normal method of employing supporting ADA is under the centralized
control of the ADA leader at squadron level. Occasionally, ADA
squads and/or teams may be delegated to troop commanders if the
factors of METT-TC so dictate. The ADA leader is integrated into the
FSE as a special staff officer.
6-357. The S2 and ADA representative determine air avenues of
approach and air attack threats during IPB. The squadron
commander or the S3 provides the ADA officer with the commander’s
intent, scheme of maneuver, and priorities of protection. The ADA
officer recommends initial allocation of ADA assets and scheme of
maneuver based on this guidance. Priority is normally given to those
elements of the squadron at greatest risk of attack because of
criticality, vulnerability, recoupment, and threat. These high-risk
elements can include the following:
• Trains.
• CPs.
• Logistic elements (such as LOGPACs).
• Squadron assembly areas.
6-358. Based on the commander’s guidance, the ADA leader

formulates the ADA plan. He coordinates the plan with the FSE and
troop commanders. Weapons are positioned considering the following
guidelines:
• Balanced fires.
• Weighted coverage against the most likely approach.
• Early engagement.
• Defense in depth.
• Mutual support.
• Overlapping fires.
• Observation and fields of fire.
6-359. ADA weapon systems can consume large quantities of

ammunition. Class V resupply should be well forward with the
squadron combat trains. These supplies may be carried on vehicles
provided by the ADA unit or on organic squadron vehicles.
6-360. In the absence of ADA assets, passive air defense measures
should be employed under decentralized control. At a minimum, the
commander needs to establish the air defense warning status and
WCS. Refer to Table 6-18, which illustrates the relationship of these
control methods.
6-361. The air defense warning status entails the following levels:
6-121
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• White – attack by hostile aircraft and/or missiles is

improbable.
• Yellow – attack by hostile aircraft and/or missiles is
probable.
• Red – attack by hostile aircraft and/or a missile is
imminent or is in progress.
6-122
6-362. The air defense WCS entails the following levels:

• Weapons hold – fire only in self-defense or in response to
a formal order (most restrictive).
• Weapons tight – fire only at targets recognized as hostile.
• Weapons free – fire at any target not positively recognized
as friendly.
Table 6-18. Air Defense Warnings Status and

Weapons Control Status
SECTION IX – SIGNAL SUPPORT
6-363. The SBCT has an organic signal company that supports the
SBCT’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network (see Figure 6-21).
The SBCT signal company (BSC) deploys, performs, and installs,
operates, and maintains (IOM) for the SBCT’s C4ISR support
network. The BSC also provides the S6 staff. In the execution of its
mission, the BSC establishes networks that support SBCT operations
and integrate with division ARFOR, JTF, or theater networks. The
BSC provides reachback connectivity to ARFOR headquarters, range
extension of the SBCT’s signal services, network management of all
organic assets, and establishment of primary CP voice/video
capabilities. It also performs limited, critical signal electronic
maintenance.
6-123
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Company Headquarters
3/3/20/26
Cmd Section Ntwk Mgmt Section S6 Section
2/0/4/6 0/2/6/8 1/1/10/12
1/0/44/45 Transmission Switching 1/0/16/17

Platoon Platoon
1/0/1/2 1/0/1/2
TACSAT Trojan Spirit WIN POC Electronic

Section Section Switch Section Maintenance Section
0/0/13/13 0/0/10/10 0/0/9/9 0/0/6/6
Tactical
Communications
0/0/20/20 Section
0/0/1/1
EPLRS/NCS EPLRS/SINCGARS
Team Retrans Teams
0/0/8/8 0/0/11/11
Figure 6-21. Stryker Brigade Combat Team Signal Company
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

6-364. The BSC consists of the headquarters, the switching platoon,
and the transmission platoon. The switching and transmission
platoons collectively deploy and operate the SBCT switching and
transmission systems to provide voice, data, and network installation
and management. Together, these elements provide the wideband
communications system, tactical internet (TI) backbone, and network
management for the SBCT. The BSC commander is also the SBCT
S6.
HEADQUARTERS
6-365. The headquarters contains the command section, the network
management (NM) section, and the S6 section. Refer to Figure 6-22.
6-124
Brigade Signal Company

Company Headquarters
Cmd Section Ntwk Mgmt Section
2/0/4/6 0/2/6/8
GR Description MOS GR Description MOS
O4 Bde S6/Commander 25A W3 Wide Area Network Manager 250N
O3 Ops Officer 25A W2 LAN/TI Manager (IA Level 3) 251A
E8 First Sergeant 31W E8 Tele Comm Ops Chief 31W
E5 Supply NCO 92Y E7 Tele Comm Ops Supv 31W
E4 Pers Spec 75B E6 Switch Systems NCO 31F x2
E4 Driver 31U E5 Info Sys NCO 74B
E4 Info Sys Oper 74B
WIN MGMT SYS

With
Extension
Brigade S6 Section GR Description MOS

1/1/10/12 O3
W3
Automation Off
Information Sys Tech (IA Level 3)
53A
251A
E8 Senior Signal NCO 31U
With
Extension E7 Transmission/Frequency NCO 31WD9
E7 IA Manager 74B
S6 E7 BDE COMSEC Manager 74C
E5 Sig Sys Spt NCO 31U
E4 BVTC Specialist 25V
E5 Information System NCO 74B
E4 Information System Spec 74B
E4 Comm Systems Maintainer 31U
E3 Information Sys Spec 74B
AS OF 041015NOV99
Figure 6-22. Signal Company Headquarters
6-366. The NM section executes IOM functions of the SBCT’s signal

network. Using the warfighter information network management
system (WIN MS) and local area network (LAN)/TI automated
management tools, the NM section is capable of configuring,
managing, and controlling the Area Common User System (ACUS), TI,
and limited adjacent LANs. With these tools, the section also can
perform frequency management and COMSEC functions for all three
elements of the SBCT’s C4ISR support network (ACUS, TI, and
combat net radio [CNR]). The NM section performs coordination of
airborne RETRANS operations and extension of network connectivity
through ground and satellite assets.
6-367. The NM section performs information assurance functions
and serves as the center of signal C2 operations. It is central to the
integration of coalition force elements into the SBCT data network.
Special consideration must be given to the handling of sensitive (i.e.,
NOFORN [not releasable to foreign nationals/governments/non-US
citizens]) information. Appropriate safeguards must be employed to
allow data communications with the coalition unit while preventing
release of restricted information outside the “US enclave.” This is an
extremely challenging task and must receive high-level oversight and
monitoring.
SWITCHING PLATOON
6-368. There are three distinct sections within the switching platoon:
the warfighter information network section and the electronic
maintenance section.
6-125
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Warfighter Information Network Section

6-369. The switching platoon maintains two warfighter information
network–tactical proof of concept (WIN-T POC) switching assemblages
(as illustrated in Figure 6-23). These systems serve to provide the
nucleus for voice, video, and data services to the SBCT main CP,
command group, and FSB brigade support battalion (BSB). The main
CP and BSB are supported by collocated WIN-T POC systems. To
enhance mobility and reduce the CP footprint, the command group is
supported by C4ISR support network services from either the main
CP or the BSB.

Switching Platoon
1/0/16/17
GR Description MOS
O2 Platoon Ldr 25A

E7 Platoon Sergeant 31W
WIN POC Switching Section

E7 Network Ops Chief 31W
E6 Switch Tm Chief 31F x2
E4 Switch Opr 31F x4
E5 Radio Opr 31R x2
ELM Section
E7 Section Chief 35W
ELM Contact Tm
E5 Signal Repair NCO 35E
E4 Signal Equip Repairer 35E
ELM Facility
E5 Microwave Repair NCO 31P
E5 Switch Repair 31F
E4 Switch Repair 31F
AS OF 041015NOV99
Figure 6-23. Switching Platoon
Electronic Maintenance Section

6-370. The switching platoon maintains limited electronic
maintenance capabilities to ensure timely repair of critical elements
of the C4ISR support network. The team is organized into two
components—contact support and environmentally sheltered test
equipment for bench operations. This austere team is designed for
priority repair of the ACUS, TI, and combat net radio–voice (CNRV)
systems. The maintenance section maintains war reserve stockage
kits (WRSK), essentially a non-demand supported prescribed load list
(PLL). The WRSK provides the electronic maintenance (ELM) contact
team with an ability to “fix forward.” This is an essential capability
given the lack of communications assemblage redundancy and the
limited availability of critical repair parts. The ELM team also has a
high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV)-mounted
6-126
maintenance facility where repairs can be performed on equipment

requiring a clean environment. The facility also houses specialized
test equipment that cannot be easily hauled around the battlefield in
a HMMWV.
TRANSMISSION PLATOON
6-371. The four sections in the transmission platoon are the tactical
satellite (TACSAT) section, the enhanced position location reporting
system (EPLRS) section, the TROJAN SPIRIT section, and the TI (see
Figure 6-24).

Transmission Platoon
1/0/44/45
GR Description MOS
Platoon HQs
O2 Platoon LDR 25A
E7 Platoon Sergeant 31W
TACSAT Section
E6 SATCOM OPS NCO 31S
Satellite Teams
E5 SATCOM Team Chief 31S x3
E4 SATCOM Oper 31S x6
E3 SATCOM Oper 31S x3
Tactical Communications Section

E6 Section Chief 31C
EPLRS/NCS Teams
E5 NCS Team Chief 31C x2
E4 NCS Opr 31C x4
E4 NCS Maintainer 31CT1 x2
EPLRS (EGRU) /SINCGARS RETRANS Teams

E5 EGRU Team Chief 31C x4
E4 EGRU Opr 31C x4
E5 RETRANS Team Chief 31U
E4 RETRANS Opr 31U
E3 RETRANS Opr 31U
TROJAN SPIRIT Section

E6 Section Chief 96B
E5 INTEL Systems Team Chief 96Bx3
E4 INTEL Systems Analyst 96Bx3
E3 INTEL Systems Analyst 96Bx3
AS OF 041015NOV99
Figure 6-24. Transmission Platoon
Tactical Satellite Section

6-372. The TACSAT section is composed of three TACSAT
assemblages to support beyond-line of sight (BLOS) connectivity to
support the main CP, command group, and BSB locations. The
transmission systems are characterized by high bandwidth, high
mobility, and quick installation to support the OPTEMPO of SBCT
operations. Each system maintains the interface capability to
terminate WIN-T POC circuits, to provide data and battlefield video
teleconference (BVTC) connectivity to host equipment, and to
interface with special circuits such as the defense switched network
(DSN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) circuits, and
commercial gateways. This capability provides the means to extend
WIN-T POC switching services to the command group. The TACSAT
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section provides the primary means to connect the SBCT’s C4ISR

network to the division, ARFOR, JTF, and/or sanctuary locations.
6-128
Enhanced Position Location Radio System Section

6-373. The EPLRS section contains two components. First, the two
net control station (NCS) teams provide the required network control
and configuration to maintain the EPLRS portion of the TI. Second,
the four EPLRS relay teams serve to provide range extension and
data reconstitution of EPLRS data traffic. When airborne RETRANS
services are present, the EPLRS RETRANS teams will collocate with
the three combined arms maneuver battalions (CAMB) and squadron
to provide full-time RETRANS (with higher-gain, mast-based
antennas), positioning data, and reconstitution of EPLRS digital
traffic. Should airborne RETRANS not be available, the EPLRS assets
may be placed at distant RETRANS sites, but this will require the
commitment of force protection assets. The EPLRS relay teams’
RETRANS mission is critical to SBCT C2 and situational
understanding in the absence of airborne RETRANS assets. These
teams also combine SBCT SINCGARS retransmission capabilities
with the SPITFIRE radio (single channel TACSAT) to provide the
ability to extend the SBCT’s voice radio nets beyond LOS limitations.
This capability may be used to link the mobile command group to
any subordinate SBCT element. It may also be used to provide a
limited data transfer capability.
TROJAN SPIRIT Section

6-374. The TROJAN SPIRIT section provides the organic,
nonterrestrial reachback capability required to access ARFOR,
theater, joint, and national analytic products. It also provides the
opportunity for analytic collaboration internal (with the squadron)
and external to the SBCT.
Tactical Internet Section

6-375. The TI employs EPLRS/SINCGARS RETRANS capability.
RETRANS capabilities in the SBCT’s subordinate units remain under
the control of the respective unit commander. This provides the
commander with the flexibility he needs to employ RETRANS as the
tactical situation and unit dispersion dictate. Both the TI and CNRV
rely upon external airborne RETRANS assets for full coverage of the
SBCT’s battlespace. Unmanned airborne RETRANS provides
dedicated voice, data, and TI range extension between SBCT main CP
and dispersed CPs, isolated enclaves, and deep sensors. Airborne
RETRANS is the preferred option since it reduces the need to deploy
isolated ground relay teams and overcomes ground line-of-sight
restrictions. The BSC and other SBCT units maintain CNRV/TI
RETRANS assets to fulfill this mission in the absence of airborne
RETRANS assets. Terrestrial RETRANS provides a secondary organic
capability.
BRIGADE SIGNAL COMPANY C4ISR FUNCTIONS

6-376. The BSC maintains organic assets for the establishment of
the SBCT’s C4ISR network. This network is composed of three
subnetworks that seamlessly connect to provide information transfer
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between SBCT operational facilities. The three subnetworks overlap

by echelon (refer to Table 6-19) to provide survivability and
robustness of the network without forcing equipment redundancy.
Table 6-19. Network Overlap by Echelon
Area Common User Tactical Internet (TI) –

Combat Net Radio –
SBCT Element System (ACUS) - voice, data (EPLRS/
Voice (CNRV) – voice
video, data SINCGARS
SBCT Main CP X X X
Command Group X X X
FSB X X X
Cavalry Squadron X X
(RSTA)
CAMB (x 3) X X
6-377. The first subnetwork is the SBCT’s ACUS, which provides

telephone, data, collaborative planning, and BVTC services to the
SBCT main CP, command group, and FSB BSB.
6-378. The second subnetwork, the TI, provides data connectivity to
support the squadron and the CAMB elements. Additionally, the TI
extends to forward operational elements to transfer primarily
situational understanding and JVMF messages.
6-379. The third subnetwork, the SBCT’s CNRV data system, extends
throughout the SBCT battlespace to execute C2 of warfighter forces.
6-380. The SBCT’s ACUS network relies on organic multichannel
TACSAT to achieve extension of the SBCT network to ARFOR
headquarters. Connectivity to the JTF and reachback
communications to the sustaining base is achieved through the
ARFOR. Direct access is possible through other capabilities, such as
the single channel TACSAT (SPITFIRE) and TROJAN SPIRIT, to
provide alternative means and prevent a single point of failure.
Multichannel TACSAT provides support for higher bandwidth voice,
video, and data applications. Single channel TACSAT provides a
secondary means of ARFOR, JTF, and reachback communications to
provide lower bandwidth, highly survivable voice/data capabilities.
Global broadcast service receiver terminals at SBCT and battalion
CPs and in the TROJAN SPIRIT network provide the SBCT with
additional high bandwidth capabilities such as imagery, logistics
data, and digital map information.
LIMITATIONS/RISKS
Bandwidth Availability
6-381. As a limitation, the SBCT’s TI and CNRV network support the
squadron and the three CAMBs (voice and data C2 only). Due to their
heavy equipment and personnel density, the squadron and battalions
do not have the SBCT ACUS network switching and TACSAT
capability required for tactical telephone service and traditional
6-130
BVTC. Collaborative planning for the squadron will center on voice

conferencing via CNRV, shared whiteboard sessions, and
development of a COP. The squadron can mitigate these limitations
to some extent through use of the TROJAN SPIRIT satellite system.
Airborne Retrans Capability

6-382. To provide force protection of isolated organic retrans sites,
the SBCT relies on airborne TI/CNRV retrans assets to connect its
units across a dispersed battlespace of rugged and urbanized terrain.
This capability is accomplished through the Global Hawk system,
UAV retrans, USAF mission retrans, or heliborne retrans. As an
organic mitigation, the SBCT maintains retrans sections for
SINCGARS CNRV, TI, and EPLRS TI. These teams are
multifunctional. SINCGARS teams normally serve as multiradio CP
support elements, and the EPLRS teams are required for network
technical maintenance. Yet, if needed in the absence of airborne
retrans, these assets could be employed to link together the SBCT’s
TI and CNRV networks. Another organic solution in the absence of
CNRV/TI retrans is the use of single channel TACSAT and
commercial satellite and/or cellular phone capability. As an Army-
level mitigation, the SBCT requires the development of the UAV
retrans programs such as Global Hawk and UAV.
SQUADRON AUGMENTATION
6-383. Due to dispersed and decentralized operations, the squadron
staff must pay particular attention to the communications
requirement of the squadron. Mountainous and urban terrain poses
unique communication challenges for the squadron to overcome.
Requesting assets from the transmission platoon of the BSC can
greatly improve the squadron’s internal and/or external
communications. The electronic maintenance section of the BSC is
the primary unit for maintenance on the majority of the squadron’s
communication systems, especially for TROJAN SPIRIT. The BSC will
normally operate in or around the SBCT main CP.
SECTION X – NATIONAL AND JOINT INTELLIGENCE ASSETS
6-384. At the joint and national levels, a multitude of intelligence

assets are available to the squadron for use throughout the full
spectrum of operations. Some information, such as JSTARS
intelligence, can be transmitted directly to the squadron through
ASAS, TROJAN SPIRIT, or TROJAN SPIRIT LITE or received from the
SBCT. This information can be transferred down to platoon level
using FBCB2 or radio transmission.
6-385. The intelligence community consists of thirteen agencies
whose primary mission is to provide intelligence in the name of
national security. All but two of these agencies (Naval intelligence
and the Department of the Treasury) are able to provide vital combat
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
information and/or intelligence that can enhance the squadron’s

situational awareness and eventual understanding within its AO. In
the current operational environment, the emphasis of the intelligence
community is on ensuring that coordination and dissemination of
intelligence products are done in a timely manner so their
information/intelligence is relevant to the user. The intelligence
community provides connectivity and coordination of national- and
joint-level agencies to deliver appropriate and timely intelligence to
the units in the field that need it. Figure 6-25 illustrates the
members of the intelligence community. The linking of these
capabilities is done through the tactical exploitation of national
capabilities (TENCAP).
Figure 6-25. Intelligence Community
6-386. In most cases, the squadron will not have direct tasking
authority for any of these intelligence community assets. It can,
however, send RFIs through the SBCT S2. The S2 will forward the
request once it is received or incorporate the request into the SBCT’s
ISR plan to make use of the assets. These intelligence assets are
especially important prior to or during the conduct of
multidimensional reconnaissance. The background and/or current
6-132
information/intelligence these assets provide are invaluable to the

squadron. Figure 6-26 shows the typical levels at which national and
joint assets are managed.
Figure 6-26. Levels of Intelligence Asset Management

6-387. The remainder of this section discusses the primary agencies
within the intelligence community that can directly or indirectly
support the squadron’s mission. The equipment described within
each section is not an all-inclusive list, but covers some of the major
assets used in the collection of information and production of
intelligence.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
6-388. Further information on the intelligence community and assets

can be found at the following Internet addresses:
• http://www.cia.gov/ic/index.html (intelligence
community).
• http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/index.html
(intelligence assets).
• http://www.fas.org/irp/program/index.html (intelligence
systems).
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6-389. The mission of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which is
an independent member of the intelligence community, is to support
the President, the National Security Council, and all officials who
make and execute US national security policy by—
• Providing accurate, comprehensive, and timely foreign
intelligence on national security topics.
• Conducting defense intelligence activities, special
activities, and other functions related to foreign
intelligence and national security as directed by the
president.
6-390. To accomplish its mission, the CIA engages in research,

development, and deployment of high-leverage technology for
intelligence purposes. As a separate agency, the CIA serves as an
independent source of analysis on topics of concern and works
closely with the other organizations in the intelligence community to
ensure that the intelligence consumer, such as the SBCT or
squadron commander, receives the best intelligence possible.
6-391. The CIA has multidisciplinary centers to address high-priority
issues such as nonproliferation, counterterrorism, CI, international
organized crime and narcotics trafficking, environmental concerns,
and arms control intelligence.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6-392. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which is headed by a
three-star military officer, is a designated CS agency and is the senior
MI component of the intelligence community. The DIA is staffed by
civilian agents and military personnel.
6-393. The DIA’s primary mission is to provide timely, all-source
military intelligence to the nation’s warfighters (Army, USN, USMC,
and USAF) and to the decision makers and policymakers of the US
department of defense (DoD). Intelligence support for operational
forces encompasses a number of areas and challenges. Key areas of
emphasis include—
• Targeting and BDA.
6-134
• Weapons proliferation (monitoring WMD and arms control

treaties).
• Warning of impending crises.
• Support to stability operations.
• Maintenance of databases on foreign military
organizations and their equipment.
• Support to UN operations and US allies.
6-394. In carrying out these missions, DIA coordinates and

synthesizes MI analysis for defense officials and military commanders
worldwide, working in close concert with the intelligence components
of the military services and the US unified commands.
6-395. New technical intelligence collection systems have provided
greater access to foreign military information. New software and the
ability to share databases have allowed analysts to contrast,
compare, and compile information quickly and efficiently. Perhaps
most important, an improved communications network has enabled
efficient, rapid transmission of intelligence to and from military forces
around the globe.
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

6-396. The National Security Agency (NSA) plans, coordinates,
directs, and performs highly specialized foreign SIGINT and
information security (INFOSEC) functions. The NSA is also a CS
agency of the DoD. In a tumultuous world area, it makes crucial
contributions to ensure an informed, alert, and secure environment
for US warfighters and policymakers.
6-397. The ability to understand foreign communications while
protecting our own—a capability in which the US leads the world—
confers a unique competitive advantage. The skill to accomplish this
is cryptology, the fundamental mission and core competency of NSA.
6-398. The NSA’s SIGINT mission allows for an effective, unified
organization and control of all the foreign signal collection and
processing activities of the US. The SIGINT role includes interception
and analysis of foreign electromagnetic signals—many of them
protected by codes, ciphers, and complex electronic
countermeasures—to produce intelligence information for decision
makers and military commanders. To accomplish this mission, the
NSA became the nation’s cryptologic organization and is one of the
most important centers of foreign language analysis and research
within the US government.
6-399. The NSA’s INFOSEC mission involves protecting all classified
and sensitive information that is stored or sent through US
government equipment. INFOSEC professionals go to great lengths to
make certain that Government systems remain impenetrable. This
support spans from the highest levels of US government to the
individual warfighter in the field.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
ARMY INTELLIGENCE
6-400. The US Army has undertaken an important transformation,
shifting away from the Cold War and moving beyond the Industrial
Age into the Information Age. As part of this transformation,
intelligence is
6-136
being fully integrated into the force at every level. The conduct of
successful operations requires that—
• Intelligence flows seamlessly from national systems to
tactical operations.
• It supports warfighting commanders at each echelon.
• It can be communicated within seconds.
6-401. Army intelligence is prepared to meet the full range of foreign

ground force intelligence requirements generated by commanders at
every level across the spectrum of operations. Based on doctrinal
concepts, Army assets provide commanders with the capability to
communicate with and receive intelligence from many intelligence
agencies. Concurrently, the Army provides numerous unique
intelligence assets and analytic organizations critical to mission
success.
6-402. Army intelligence force structure is designed to provide
timely, relevant, accurate, and synchronized IEW support to tactical,
operational, and strategic commanders across the range of joint
military operations. To support military force power projection during
contingency operations, the Army’s Intelligence and Security
Command (INSCOM) provides personnel and tactically tailorable
deployment packages in support of warfighters worldwide.
6-403. From INSCOM to the intelligence staffs that support
maneuver battalions, Army intelligence structure is designed, and its
personnel are equipped, trained, and prepared, to provide military
commanders with unique capabilities and a balanced flexible force
that can be tailored to meet any contingency.
Joint Support
6-404. At joint level, special operations forces (SOF) are commonly
used for HUMINT. The A-Teams within the SOF specialize in
reconnaissance. The team consists of 12 personnel. Special
Operations Command coordination elements are normally placed at
the operational and tactical levels.
Corps Support
6-405. The Army has a robust intelligence structure that supports
tactical-level warfighters. At corps level, the commander’s senior
intelligence officer, the G2, and an organic MI brigade provide
intelligence support. The MI brigade provides support across the full
range of intelligence and CI disciplines and functions.
6-406. Assets within the corps and MI brigade include—
• UAVs (see Appendix G).
• Guardrail system (see Appendix F).
• EH-60 Quickfix (see Appendix F).
• Long-range surveillance company (LRSC). This company
has the primary mission to maintain surveillance for a
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
specified period or until the required information is

collected and to conduct limited reconnaissance to answer
the corps commander’s CCIR. Additional capabilities
include:
Conducts target acquisition and BDA missions.
Can deploy six surveillance teams for up to seven
days, using highly-developed infantry and Ranger
skills to infiltrate threat-controlled areas and exfiltrate
with or without assistance.
Operating range of 200 kilometers.
Under direct C2 of the corps commander, who
normally delegates the tasking authority to the G2.
Division Support
6-407. The division intelligence structure provides collection assets
and analytic organizations that meet the division and brigade
commanders’ intelligence needs. The MI battalion at division provides
the commander with an organic collection and analytic capability.
SBCT/Battalion Support
6-408. The intelligence structure at the maneuver battalion and
SBCT is simple, small, and standardized. Both elements have small
intelligence staffs designed to support commanders with the
expedited distribution of combat intelligence. The SBCT is also
augmented with a direct support MI company. The primary
reconnaissance asset for a SBCT is the SBCT reconnaissance troop.
The troop consists of two scout platoons (six HMMWVs per platoon)
and one STRIKER platoon (six HMMWVs).
AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE

6-409. The USAF ISR mission focuses on ensuring the US military
team attains superiority in the flow of information in the air and in
space. This entails the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend
information while denying the adversary the ability to do the same.
To do this, USAF ISR, in partnership with the other military services
and national intelligence agencies, delivers intelligence information
when, where, and how it is needed. The Operations Support Central,
part of USAF Information Warfare Center, is a 24-hour source of
information and assistance to forces deployed around the world.
6-410. To meet national-level intelligence requirements, the USAF
operates worldwide ground sites and an array of airborne platforms
such as the U-2, the RC-135, and UAVs. As members of the joint
team, USAF intelligence professionals work in the unified commands’
intelligence centers; USAF personnel and resources are embedded in
each unified command’s air component.
MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE
6-138
6-411. The primary focus for Marine Corps intelligence (MCI) is to

support Marine and naval operations. Depending on the AO, the
intelligence produced by MCI may indirectly support the squadron.
Marine units such as force reconnaissance or Marine expeditionary
units (MEU) may be able to relay reconnaissance information to the
squadron. This is especially true if the Marines were previously in the
area; for example, as a forced entry unit.
6-412. The mission of Marine force reconnaissance units is to
conduct pre-assault and distant post-assault reconnaissance in
support of a landing force. These elements accomplish their missions
through various types of reconnaissance:
• Zone reconnaissance to obtain information on all routes,
obstacles, terrain, and threat forces within certain
boundaries.
• Real-time information through surveillance of AOIs.
• Photographs and sketches to provide accurate visual aids
describing areas and threats.
6-413. In addition, force reconnaissance elements possess the

capability to perform the following tasks:
• Engage the threat.
• Implant sensors.
• Capture selected prisoners.
• Conduct initial terminal guidance operations.
• Conduct specialized terrain reconnaissance.
• Conduct special missions requiring the use of entry
capabilities.
6-414. An MEU is usually the first on scene when Marines are

involved in an operation. The MEU is normally built around a
reinforced battalion, a composite aircraft squadron, and an MEU
service support group, totaling about 2,200 in the unit.
6-415. The ground combat element (GCE) is the battalion landing
team (BLT), an infantry battalion reinforced with artillery,
amphibious assault vehicles, light armored reconnaissance assets,
and other units as the mission and circumstances require.
6-416. The aviation combat element is a Marine medium helicopter
squadron augmented with four types of helicopters into a composite
squadron. These units include CH-53E Super Stallions, CH-46E Sea
Knights, UH-1N Hueys, and AH-1W Super Cobras. Aviation combat
element assets may also include fixed-wing aircraft, such as the AV-
8B Harrier jet.
NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY

6-417. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) provides
timely, relevant, and accurate imagery, imagery intelligence, and
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
geospatial information in support of military, national-level, and civil

users. NIMA’s objectives are to—
• Provide information that allows a common reference
framework for planning, decisions, and actions.
• Give warfighters ready access to the databases of imagery,
imagery intelligence, and geospatial information that US
assets acquire or produce.
• Tailor information to best benefit the user’s specific
requirements.
• Acquire or create the information that gives the advantage
to the user.
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

6-418. The mission of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is to
ensure that the US has the technology and space-borne assets
needed to assure US global information superiority. This mission is
accomplished through the operation of the nation’s intelligence
satellites, which it also designs and builds. The NRO’s assets collect
intelligence to support such functions as—
• Indications and warning.
• Monitoring of arms control agreements.
• Military operations and exercises.
• Monitoring of natural disasters and other environmental
issues.
6-419. The Operational Support Office within the NRO orchestrates

and delivers tailored support to DoD, national, and other approved
users of NRO products.
NON-DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

6-420. The mission of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is to
uphold the law through the investigation of violations of federal
criminal law; to protect the US from foreign intelligence and terrorist
activities; and to provide leadership and law enforcement assistance to
federal, state, local, and international agencies. Among the FBI’s
programs and missions are four areas in which it can directly or
indirectly support the squadron.
Counterterrorism Center
6-421. The staff at the Counterterrorism Center, which is located at
FBI headquarters, consists of FBI personnel and representatives of
18 other federal agencies, including DoD, Department of Energy,
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), CIA, Customs
Service, Secret Service, and Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS). The center collects, analyzes, and disseminates critical
6-140
information and intelligence to proper authorities to combat

terrorism on three fronts:
• International terrorism operations, both within the US
and in support of extraterritorial investigations.
• Domestic terrorism operations.
• Counterterrorism relating to both international and
domestic terrorism.
6-422. The center has a national threat warning system that allows
the FBI to instantly distribute important bulletins.
Disaster Squad
6-423. The nucleus of the Disaster Squad consists of the FBI
Laboratory’s latent fingerprint specialists. Over the past 50 years, the
squad has assisted in examining more than 7,200 victims in over
175 disasters. Of these, 4,150 were positively identified through
fingerprints, palm prints, and footprints. Recent incidents requiring
Disaster Squad assistance include the Oklahoma City bombing; the
bombing of a US military housing facility in Dharan, Saudi Arabia;
and the bombing of US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania.
Rapid Response Team

6-424. The team is a pool of special agents and support personnel
who are deployed to provide on-site automation services for major
cases and crises. They automate investigations by entering all
pertinent case facts into one database. The information may then be
sorted, filtered, and analyzed to assist with investigations and case
management. The Rapid Response Team has been active in many
investigations, including the bombing of the World Trade Center, the
Montana Freemen standoff, and the embassy bombings in Africa.
Regional Drug Intelligence Squads

6-425. These multiagency information-gathering groups are located
in eight geographic regions, all key US transshipment centers for
illegal drugs. Squad members seek information about the most
serious drug-trafficking organizations operating in their areas,
including composition, scope, magnitude, internal/external
dynamics, and drug-trafficking patterns. Once collected, the
information is analyzed and provided to the applicable users. The
intelligence information uncovered by these squads is often used to
predicate major drug investigations.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
6-426. The State Department is responsible for the conduct of foreign
policy and oversight of all US government activities overseas,
including agencies such as the CIA, NSA, FBI, Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), and Department of Justice.
6-427. The foreign policy mission is conducted by approximately
22,000 employees in both civil service and foreign service, including
6-141
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
foreign service nationals, in the 162 countries where the US is

represented by embassies and consulates. Within the State
Department headquarters, the mission is coordinated and managed
through six regional bureaus, each with responsibility for a specific
geographical area of the world. Domestic offices support regional
bureaus and overseas posts with program management and
administrative expertise in economics, intelligence, and human
rights.
6-428. In each embassy, the chief of mission (usually an
ambassador) is responsible for coordination and management of all
US government executive branch programs and activities in the host
country.
6-429. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is the State
Department’s primary source for interpretive analysis of global
developments. In providing the secretary and other key decision
makers with expert, independent foreign affairs analysis, INR draws
on all-source intelligence, diplomatic reporting, and interaction with
US and foreign scholars. INR responds rapidly to policy priorities,
providing early warning and in-depth analysis of events and trends
that affect US foreign policy and national security interests.
6-430. The INR focuses on issues bearing on US national security,
economic well-being, and promotion of democracy, including—
• Reform and stability in Russia and other former
communist states.
• Economic challenges from competitors.
• Evolving trade relationships.
• Global issues such as—
Environment.
Human rights.
Terrorism.
Weapons.
Military technology proliferation.
Stability operations.
International organizations and agreements.
Conflict zones (such as the Balkans, Africa, the Middle
East, and the Korean peninsula).
6-431. The INR coordinates the handling of issues that arise in the
course of—
• Intelligence.
• Security.
• Counterintelligence.
• Investigations.
• Special operations.
6-142
6-432. Finally, the INR develops intelligence policy for the

Department of State. It ensures that intelligence activities abroad are
in harmony with US policy and that collection resources and
priorities are in accord with US diplomatic interests and
requirements. The INR also coordinates with the national security
community on intelligence sharing and requirements and evaluation
for collection in all intelligence disciplines.
6-143
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
6-433. The Department of Energy’s foreign intelligence program is a
component of the intelligence community. The department focuses its
intelligence activities on these substantive areas:
• Nuclear proliferation.
• Nuclear weapons technology.
• Fossil and nuclear energy.
6-434. The department’s intelligence missions include the following:

• Provide timely, accurate, high-impact foreign intelligence
analysis.
• Detect and defeat foreign intelligence services whose aim
is to acquire sensitive information on the department’s
programs, facilities, technology, and personnel.
• Provide technical and analytical support.
• Cooperate with the Department of State in overtly
collecting information with respect to foreign energy
matters.
6-144
Chapter 7
Squadron Urban Operations

CONTENTS
Urban environments Components of the Urban Area.................. 7-2
include some of the Terrain....................................................... 7-2
world’s most difficult Infrastructure............................................ 7-5
Social ........................................................ 7-7
terrain in which to Threat Urban Operations ............................ 7-7
conduct military Threat Operations Principles .................. 7-7
operations. Urban Threat Tactics........................................... 7-11
terrain confronts SBCT’s Role in Urban Operations.............. 7-14
Fundamentals........................................... 7-14
commanders with a Offensive Operations............................... 7-16
combination of Defensive Operations .............................. 7-17
difficulties rarely found Planning ....................................................... 7-18
in other environments. Collect and Analyze Existing
Intelligence............................................ 7-18
Cities vary immensely Determine Reconnaissance and
depending on their Surveillance Objectives ....................... 7-26
history, the cultures of Plan Infiltration/Exfiltration Routes ........ 7-27
their inhabitants, their Synchronize Aerial and Ground
Reconnaissance Plans......................... 7-27
economic development, Develop Communications and
the local climate, Sustainment Plan ................................. 7-28
available building Coordinate for Fire Support .................... 7-28
materials, and many Coordinate for Helicopter Support ......... 7-29
Continue Improving Urban
other factors. This Operations Sketch................................ 7-32
variety exists not only Execution ..................................................... 7-37
among different cities Approach the Urban Area........................ 7-37
but also within any Enter the Urban Area ............................... 7-39
Define the Objective................................. 7-39
particular urban area. Assist in Isolation .................................... 7-40
Although urban areas Pull the Brigade........................................ 7-42
throughout the world
possess similar characteristics, no two cities are alike. However,
their societal characteristics contribute most significantly to their
uniqueness and complexity. The urban environment, like all
environments, is neutral and affects all sides equally. The side
that can best understand and exploit the effects of the urban area
Instability in Karachi, Pakistan

Karachi, Pakistan, is the country’s financial center and only
seaport, and it has the highest concentration of literate people.
Karachi is also the cultural center of Pakistan, and thus connected
to many people and places throughout the country. In 1992, the
bombing of the Babri Masid Mosque added to the cultural and
religious rivalry that spread across the national border into many
Indian cities. Of the 1,500 who died in conflicts and riots, almost 95
percent died in urban areas. The violence struck Ahmedabab and
Bombay most seriously, with acts of murder, gang rapes, and
arson occurring months after the destruction of the mosque.
7-1
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
has the best chance of success.
Throughout history, military planners have viewed cities as

centers of gravity and sources of national strength. Cities are
population centers; transportation and communication hubs; key
nodes of industrial, financial, and information systems; seats of
government; and repositories of wealth. Because the US has
worldwide interests that directly relate to global security,
deployments into urban environments will most likely become
more frequent in order to neutralize or stabilize extremely volatile
political situations, defeat a threat force that has sought
protection afforded by urban terrain, or to provide assistance to
allies in need of support. RSTA units are the essential element
needed to provide real time information and situational
understanding (SU) to defeat threat forces in the urban
environment. This chapter will provide the tools necessary for
planning and executing missions in an urban environment.
SECTION I – COMPONENTS OF THE URBAN AREA
7-1. Whether a modern metropolis or a developing world

shantytown, each urban environment has identifiable components
that are constantly changing and interacting. The urban environment
is composed of three essential components: terrain, infrastructure,
and social (see Figure 7-1). Commanders should not view these as
linear or sequential, but rather as overlapping and interdependent. A
thorough analysis of these components contributes to commanders’
SU and allows them to develop courses of action (COA) that gain
information against threat centers of gravity and potentially lessen
costly close-combat engagements. A thorough understanding of the
urban area and its components requires extensive intelligence, which
is the primary mission of the cavalry squadron, reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) in urban operations.
7-2
___________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Squadron Urban Operations
Figure 7-1. Urban Components
TERRAIN
7-2. The terrain component is the most basic and easily
recognizable aspect of an urban area. However, truly understanding
it requires comprehending its multidimensional nature, types of
urban terrain, and size. The infinite ways in which these factors can
be combined makes it impossible to describe a “typical” city. Yet,
these elements provide a framework for understanding the terrain
component of the urban environment.
MULTIDIMENSIONAL NATURE
7-3. Urban terrain presents an extraordinary blend of horizontal,
vertical, interior, exterior, and subterranean forms superimposed
upon the landscape’s natural relief, drainage, and vegetation. While a
city may appear dwarfed by the surrounding countryside, the surface
area of an urban environment is usually many times that of a
similarly sized portion of natural terrain. Additionally, the conduct of
urban operations can radically alter the physical nature of the terrain
in ways not experienced in other environments. Some buildings may
be destroyed either through combat or natural disasters, eliminating
reference points and leaving large piles of rubble. Urban operations
may cause uncontrollable fires or the loss of electricity. A loss of
electrical power can cause flooding (especially in subterranean areas)
by shutting down pumping stations. The likely presence of hazardous
materials may create additional obstacles. In addition, the physical
environment can dramatically affect the conduct of urban operations.
The four physical dimensions that must be considered are described
below.
Airspace over the City
7-4. As in other environments, the air provides a rapid avenue of
approach in urbanized areas. Aerial assets can be used for
observation and reconnaissance, aerial attack, or high-speed
insertion and extraction of soldiers, supplies, and equipment. While
obstacles such as rubble do not affect aerial assets, buildings of
varying height and the increased density of towers, signs, and power
lines limits lower altitude maneuverability. They are also vulnerable
to man-portable surface to air systems, antitank (AT) weapons, and
small arms weapons. The UAV is the squadron’s primary tool
operating in the airspace over a city.
7-3
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Buildings
7-5. Buildings provide cover and concealment; limit or enhance
observation and fields of fire; and restrict, canalize, or block
movement. Buildings also provide excellent concealed locations for
snipers and air defense artillery (ADA) or AT crews. The building level
enables top-down attacks against the weakest points of armored
vehicles and unsuspecting aircraft. The recce soldier on the ground is
the squadron’s primary reconnaissance asset in checking buildings.
Streets
7-6. Highways, streets, and sidewalks provide avenues of approach
and the means for rapid ground advance. However, forces moving
along streets are often canalized by the buildings and have little
space for off-street maneuver. As such, obstacles on urban streets
are usually more effective than those on roads in open terrain since
entering and transiting buildings are often the only means of bypass.
While ground surveillance radar (GSR) and measurement and
signature intelligence (MASINT) (sensors) provide some
reconnaissance capability on streets, it is still the dismounted scout
who is primary.
7-4
Subterranean Systems
7-7. Subterranean systems found in the urban area can serve as
the avenues of approach. They include subways, sewers, cellars, and
utility systems. All sides can use subterranean systems to maneuver
against the rear or flanks of their adversary and to conduct
ambushes and sustainment operations.
TYPES OF URBAN TERRAIN

7-8. The urban area is classified into six types of urban terrain as
described in Field Manual (FM) 2-01.3 [FM 34-130]. Table 7-1 shows
a brief definition.
Table 7-1. Six Types of Urban Terrain
LAYOUT (TYPE) DEFINITIONS

Dense, random Typical old inner city pattern with narrow winding streets radiating from a
construction central area in an irregular manner. Buildings are closely located and
frequently close to the edge of a roadway. (Boston, Nuremberg, Jerusalem,
Cairo, Hong Kong, San Francisco)
Closed-Orderly block Wider streets generally form rectangular patterns. Buildings frequently form a
continuous front along the blocks. Inner-block courtyards are common.
(Washington, DC; Moscow; Paris; London; Brasilia)
Dispersed Residential Normally contiguous to closed-orderly block areas in Europe. The pattern
Area consists of row houses or single-family dwellings with yards, gardens, trees,
and fences. Street patterns are normally rectangular or curving. (Baltimore,
Frankfurt).
High-Rise Area Typical of modern construction in larger cities and towns. It consists of multi-
storied apartments, separated open areas, and single-story buildings. Wide
streets are laid out in rectangular patterns. These areas are often contiguous
to industrial or transportation areas or interspersed with closed-orderly block
areas. (New York, Hong Kong, Seattle, Los Angeles)
Industrial Transportation Generally located on or along major rail and highway routes in urban
complexes. Older complexes may be located within dense, random
construction or closed-orderly block areas. New construction normally consists
of low, flat-roofed factory and warehouse buildings. High-rise areas providing
worker housing is normally located adjacent to these areas throughout the
orient. Identification of transportation facilities within these areas is critical.
These facilities, especially rail facilities, pose significant obstacles to military
movement. (Seoul, Kaiserslautern, Amsterdam, Hong Kong, Shanghai)
Permanent or Fixed Any of several different types and may be considered as isolated forts such as
Fortifications and Other the Hue Citadel and the German fortifications that surrounded Metz or as part
Military Installations of a fortified line (Siegfried and Maginot Lines). While most such fortifications
are found in Western Europe, a number can be found in the Balkans, Middle
East, Asia, Africa, and South America. Those in the US were mostly of the
coast defense type. Permanent type fortifications can be made of earth, wood,
rock, brick, concrete, steel-reinforced concrete, or any combination of the
above. Some of the latest variants have been built underground and employ
heavy tank or warship armor; major caliber and other weapons; internal
communications; service facilities; and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
overpressure systems. This category also includes other military installations
(examples, Camp Lejeune, Fort Huachuca, Travis Air Force Base, and Norfolk
Navy Base).
7-5
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
SIZE
7-9. Urban areas are classified into the following categories in
relation to size—
• Villages – population of 3,000 or less.
• Strip areas – urban areas built along roads connecting
towns or cities.
• Towns and small cities – population up to 100,000 and
not part of a major urban complex.
• City – population over 100,000 to 1 million.
• Metropolis with associated urban sprawl – population over
1,000,000 to 10,000,000 covering hundreds of square
kilometers.
• Megalopolis – population over 10,000,000.
7-10. These categories are useful to establish commonality and

standardize terms that shape ideas, discussion, and concepts. The
lower population levels of towns and villages usually suggest
homogeneity among the inhabitants. Homogeneity or uniformity can
mean that consensus or compromise is easier to achieve because
there are fewer opposing viewpoints. Given this homogeneity, effects
of change are more certain and often easier to determine. However,
similar does not mean identical. If major social divisions do exist,
either physical or ideological, generally the smaller the urban area,
the easier it will be for commanders to determine those divisions and
their fundamental causes.
INFRASTRUCTURE
7-11. Urban structures are those physical and cyber-based systems
that support the inhabitants and their economy and government.
Targeting or controlling vital parts of the infrastructure can deter or
isolate threat aggression. Targeting any portion of the urban
infrastructure can have a cascading effect (either intentional or
unintentional) on the other elements of the infrastructure. The
commander can gain a tactical advantage using precision munitions,
electronic disruption of communications, or intelligence on essential
facilities or structures. Commanders must look beyond the
immediate tactical situation and understand the effects that the
destruction of any of these elements may have on future operations
and the inhabitants of the urban area. The squadron determines
what infrastructure in the urban area can provide commanders with
essential logistics and CSS assets and also assess what the initial
expenditure of time and resources may be necessary to support
operations within the urban area (see Figure 7-2). The following
paragraphs list examples of infrastructure components.
7-6
Communications
and
Information Energy
Human
Services
Commerce
Transportation
and
Distribution
Figure 7-2. Urban Infrastructure
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION

7-12. The system of telecommunications that includes telephones,
cellular telephone towers, radios, computers and television,
newspapers, and other forms of written communication as well as
human interaction provides the medium for conveying information.
Perhaps more than any other element of the infrastructure,
communications and information link all the other elements together
in an interdependent system of systems.
TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION

7-13. This element of the infrastructure includes the vast network
of highways, rail lines, ports, and airports and provides the physical
linkage throughout the entire infrastructure.
ENERGY
7-14. This system provides the power to run the urban area and
consists of the industries that produce and distribute electricity, oil,
and natural gas.
COMMERCE
7-15. This includes business centers and outlying industrial and
agricultural areas as well as environmentally sensitive areas.
HUMAN SERVICES
7-7
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
7-16. Includes hospitals, water supply systems, waste and

hazardous material storage and processing, emergency services, and
governmental services.
SOCIAL
7-17. The center of gravity during an urban operation, particularly
stability and support operations, may be the civilian inhabitants
themselves. The side that gains the support of the population retains
innumerable advantages. To gain or retain the support of the
population, commanders must understand its social and political
characteristics. With this understanding, commanders can
implement programs, or take direct action to maintain support of a
friendly populace, neutralize, or gain the support of hostile or neutral
factions. Some critical aspects of the social component include—
• Demographics.
• Ethnic and cultural information.
• Historical background.
• Political and religious conflicts.
• Customs and behaviors.
• Criminal activity.
SECTION II – THREAT URBAN OPERATIONS
7-18. The squadron will most likely face threats that are supported
by weak national economies and infrastructures seeking to achieve
regional objectives that challenge US national objectives. Trends
indicate an increasing availability and integration of more
sophisticated technology and unorthodox operational approaches by
potential opponents focused on the diversity and time sensitivity of
humanitarian issues. Offsetting their inherent weaknesses, threat
forces will seek advantage in urban and restrictive terrain to remain
dispersed and decentralized, adapting their tactics to provide them
the best success in countering a US response. Threats, in addition to
conventional forces, may consist of—
• Unconventional forces.
• Paramilitary forces.
• Militia and special police organizations.
• Organized criminal organizations.
• Local civilians.
THREAT OPERATIONS PRINCIPLES

7-19. Threat actors may employ several key operational principles
to oppose Army forces in an urban environment (see Figure 7-3).
These principles are particularly effective in an urban environment
due to the proximity of airfields and ports to urban areas, the
constraining effects of urban areas on technological advantages, the
potential moral dilemmas created by large numbers of civilians, and
7-8
the high costs in time, manpower, and material often involved in

urban operations.
Oppose Entry into Theater
Neutralize Technology Overmatch
Control the Tempo
Change the Nature of the Conflict
Allow No Sanctuary
Figure 7-3. Threat Operational Principles
OPPOSE ENTRY INTO THEATER

7-20. The Army is not located in all the areas of the world where
future regional conflicts may be fought. Therefore, the Army must
have the capacity to project and sustain combat power over long time
spans and distances. This leaves Army forces vulnerable in a phased-
entry into theater, through lack of either mature theater support or
unsuitable composition of early entry forces. Denying entry and
simultaneous operations in and extending out of the theater is the
easiest manner of preventing the massing of combat power.
7-21. The threat may attack Army forces anywhere on the
battlefield, at overseas bases, at home stations, and even in military
communities. These attacks seek to disrupt force projection
operations. Opponents may attack aerial ports of embarkation
(APOE) and aerial ports of debarkation (APOD), seaports of
embarkation (SPOE), and seaports of debarkation (SPOD). These
attacks may feature coordinated operations between police,
paramilitary, special purpose, guerilla forces, mercenaries, terrorists,
and conventional forces with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to
present a nonlinear, simultaneous battlefield.
7-22. Deployment facilities such as airfields and ports frequently
exist as components of larger urban areas, and the threat may use
the complex and concealing nature of those areas as a base to launch
attacks on, and otherwise disrupt, deployment operations.
NEUTRALIZE TECHNOLOGY OVERMATCH

7-23. High visibility or unique systems employed by the US offer
exponential value in their destruction in the information and
psychological arena. Such attacks are not always linked to maneuver
or ground objectives. High visibility systems that may be identified by
7-9
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
the threat for destruction would be stealth aircraft, M1A2 main battle
tank (MBT), Apache Longbow helicopter, TPQ-36/37 Firefinder radar,
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) or Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, or Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS). These systems are recognized as premier
items in their categories, and losses among these items would
undermine morale, degrade operational capability, and erode
confidence in those weapon systems. The Army has made
considerable investments in command and control and plans to fight
future wars with information superiority. The threat will invariably
seek to suppress/degrade these systems. Proliferation of advanced
antitank guided missiles (ATGM) in the hands of line infantry or
insurgents in urban areas could jeopardize armored systems. The
TPQ-36/37, ATACMS, and ground terminals for UAVs could be
targeted by threat special operations forces (SOF) aided by the
civilian population and commercial intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems.
7-24. Force-on-force battles will occur at a time and place of the
threat’s choosing. The threat may offset US air, ISR operations, and
other technological advantages by contesting US objectives in urban
areas where he can achieve sanctuary from our effects. These fights
may involve decentralized maneuver, precision fires, and
simultaneous operations involving unconventional and special
purpose forces (SPF). Threat forces will plan and conduct operations
as opportunities present themselves. In urban areas, infantry
formations will often follow this pattern, mixing (or blending in) with
the civilian population as a method of concealing a light infantry
force.
7-25. The threat may also have the capability of using human
intelligence (HUMINT) assets to a greater degree and more effectively
than the Army, gaining intelligence through civilians or local workers
contracted by the Army for base operation purposes. Cellular
telephones may be distributed to essential information nodes as a
backup communication means to provide redundancy. The threat
may make use of commercial systems intertwined with legitimate
civilian users, making it unpalatable to prevent threat use of these
assets.
CONTROL THE TEMPO

7-26. The threat may also attempt to vary the tempo of operations
to suit his situation at any point in time. Prior to (or during) the
initial phases of entry into the theater, they may attempt to create a
high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) to take advantage of the
weaknesses inherent in power projection operations and coalition
actions, such as the long time periods required for decision making.
As the efforts are ongoing to deny entry, heavier conventional forces,
exploiting US phased deployment, may attack initial-entry light
forces. The threat may enjoy the initiative early in most conflicts,
using the surprise inherent in conflict initiation (a no-notice attack).
The pace of construction of fortified areas and camouflage, cover,
concealment, and deception (C3D) measures may often be increased
7-10
to prepare the urban battlefield in a manner advantageous to the

threat.
7-27. If the conflict cannot be ended quickly, the threat may utilize
the preparation made in the initial high-tempo period in prolonging
the event, aiming to take advantage of US lack of commitment over
time. The preferred tactic would be the ambush as a means of
avoiding decisive combat with superior forces. These operations may
not always be linked to maneuver or ground objectives, instead
attempting to inflict mass casualties or destroy flagship systems,
both of which may reduce the US will to continue the fight.
7-28. Urban operations, by their very nature, dictate slow offensive
action. The threat may make maximum use of this characteristic by
contesting possession of key urban complexes and forcing the US to
fight for every block and street corner.
CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

7-29. The threat recognizes the strengths and weaknesses of their
adversary and adjusts their tactics accordingly. The threat may
exploit ambiguous political-military objectives to limit the nature of
operations and attempt to change the nature of the conflict to one
that exploits their capabilities while reducing those of the US. For
example, the switch in tactics from maneuver warfare to ambush
techniques in the face of growing US coalition combat power is a
change in the nature of operations. By attempting to change the
nature of the conflict once the US initial force package is announced
or deployed, they may hope to make the deployed force inappropriate
to the threat or environment. US adversaries have intently studied
the US focus on limiting factors with respect to the application of
rules of engagement (ROE). Opponents may attempt to operate
outside the limits of our ROE and influence the establishment of
more restrictive ROE through information operations that attack
national will and coalition sensitivities. The introduction of a terrorist
threat to US civilians or soldiers not directly connected to the
intervention could be used as a device to change the fundamental
nature of the conflict.
7-30. The threat may have a different criterion for victory, one
where “a stalemate is good enough.” They may stand willing to
sacrifice excessively large numbers of soldiers or civilians to achieve
victory. Their definition of victory may not require a convincing
military performance, for example, calling on inflicting numerous
casualties on Army forces. A secondary US interest may equate to
national survival on the part of a threat, and so the nature of the
operation may be perceived differently in the US than it is among the
threat population and political elite.
7-31. Key to the threat’s view of urban operations is their knowledge
of the gains involved in manipulating the civilian populace. Knowing
our reluctance to cause noncombatant casualties and collateral
damage, the threat may operate in areas containing civilians and
essential facilities to force the Army to restrict its use of massed or
nonprecision firepower.
7-11
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
ALLOW NO SANCTUARY
7-32. Army forces may be denied safe haven during deployment and
throughout every phase of urban operations. The resultant drain on
manpower and resources to provide adequate force protection
measures may result in reduced strategic, operational, and tactical
means to conduct war and an erosion of national will to sustain
conflict. Terrorism may be one of the tactics used to deny sanctuary
to Army forces, attacking Army forces anywhere, particularly in
urban areas. The threat may employ state sponsored or independent
terrorists, well equipped, armed, and motivated for this mission.
These attacks seek to disrupt force protection operations.
Additionally, they may feature coordinated operations between police,
paramilitary, special purpose, guerilla forces, mercenaries, and
conventional forces to present non-linear, simultaneous threat
operations conducted throughout the depth of the urban area of
operations (AO), to include WMD and the means of delivery of those
weapons.
7-33. These forces are equipped with small arms, mortars, machine
guns, anti-armor weapons (possibly two to three times the number
possessed by past adversaries), and mines to very capable
mechanized and armored forces equipped with current generation
equipment. These approaches seek to counter the technological and
numerical advantages of US joint systems and forces, and to exploit
constraints placed on US forces due to cultural bias, media presence,
ROE, rules of interaction (ROI), and distance from the crisis location.
The urban environments are generally characterized by weak
infrastructure, especially roads, bridges, rail, airport, and seaport
facilities. Urban environments also provide many passive dangers
such as disease from unsanitary conditions and psychological
illnesses.
7-34. Within this environment, most threats are not capable of long-
term, sustained, high-tempo combat operations. They are capable of
limited duration and limited objective operations such as destruction
of a weaker force, seizure of an area or region, or seizure of an urban
area. Forces in this environment are capable of long term, sustained
unconventional terrorist and guerilla operations. Compounding this
threat is the potential for transnational or non-state actors to openly
oppose the goals and actions of US forces. These elements can
include individual or organized criminal factions, religious groups,
and ethnic entities. These groups may employ terrorism against the
populace under US protection or against US forces in the region.
THREAT TACTICS
7-35. While the active threats will vary widely, many techniques will
be common to all (see Figure 7-4). The following paragraphs are sets
of tactical tenets that may be used against US forces in the urban
environment.
7-12
Use
Usethe
thePopulation
Populationto
toAdvantage
Advantage
Win
Winthe
theInformation
InformationWar
War
Manipulate
ManipulateKey
KeyFacilities
Facilities
Use
UseAll
AllDimensions
Dimensions
Employ
EmployUrban-Oriented
Urban-OrientedWeapons
Weapons
Engage
Engagethe
theEntire
EntireForce
Force
Focus
FocusAttacks
Attackson
onService
ServiceSupport
Support
and Unprotected Soldiers
and Unprotected Soldiers
Figure 7-4. Urban Threat Tactics
USE THE POPULATION TO THEIR ADVANTAGE

7-36. Threat forces will use the population to provide camouflage,
concealment, and deception for their operations. Guerilla and
terrorist elements will look no different than any other member of the
community. Even conventional and paramilitary forces will often
adopt a civilian look to confuse friendly forces. The civil population
will also provide cover for threat forces, enhancing their mobility in
proximity to US positions. Threat forces will take advantage of US
moral responsibilities and attempt to make the civil population a
burden on our logistical and force protection resources. The civilian
population will also serve as a key intelligence source for threat
forces. They will attempt to use civilians with access to US bases or
perimeters to gain information on dispositions, readiness, and intent.
WIN THE INFORMATION WAR
7-37. Threat forces will take advantage of the media presence to
turn the sentiments of other countries against US forces. Video
cameras, media reporters, Internet websites, and cellular phones are
examples of tools the threat will use to persuade popular opinion.
MANIPULATE KEY FACILITIES

7-38. Threat forces will identify and use key facilities to shape the
AO in their favor. Telecommunication sites, water treatment plants,
and power generation and transmission sites are typical facilities
threat forces will target to gain a position of advantage against US
forces.
7-13
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
7-14
USE OF ALL DIMENSIONS

7-39. Threat forces will use all dimensions of the urban
environment to attack US forces. Rooftops and tall buildings afford
the threat with vantage points and ambush positions that exceed
many weapons’ maximum elevation. Top attack positions allow the
threat to strike at vehicle vulnerable points and use enfilading fire
against exposed, dismounted soldiers. Basement and other
subterranean areas provide covered and concealed positions that
allow access throughout the AO. Many positions will be below
minimum depression elevations of vehicles.
EMPLOY URBAN-ORIENTED WEAPONS

7-40. Whether they are purpose-built or adapted, many weapons
may have greater than normal utility in an urban environment while
others may have significant disadvantages. Urban threat weapons are
much like the nature of urbanization and the urban environment:
inventive and varied. Small, man-portable weapons, along with
improvised munitions, will dominate the urban environment. Figure
7-5 lists examples of threat weapons favored in urban operations.
Weapons
Weaponswith
withno
nominimum
minimum Mortars.
Mortars.
depression
depressionor
ormaximum
maximum
elevation.
elevation.
Sniper
Sniperrifles.
rifles.
Grenade
Grenadelaunchers Machine
launchers Machineguns.
guns. Grenades.
Grenades.
(automatic
(automaticand
andrifle-
rifle-
mounted).
mounted).
Flame
Flameand
andincendiary
incendiaryweapons.
weapons.
RPGs
RPGsand
andother
othershoulder-fired
shoulder-fired Riot
Riotcontrol
controland
and
ATGMs.
ATGMs. tranquilizer
tranquilizergases.
gases.
Weapons
Weaponswith
withlittle
littleor
ornonobackblast
backblast Mines
Minesand
and
(gas-metered,
(gas-metered,soft
softlaunch,
launch,etc.)
etc.) boobytraps.
boobytraps.
Figure 7-5. Favored Threat Weapons
ENGAGE ENTIRE FORCE

7-41. Threat forces may “hug” high-tech conventional forces
operating in an urban area to avoid the effects of high-firepower
standoff weapon systems. Additionally, they may attempt to keep all
or significant portions of Army forces engaged in continuous
operations to increase their susceptibility to stress-induced illnesses.
Urban operations, by their nature, produce an inordinate amount of
combat-stress casualties, and continuous operations exacerbate this
problem. Threat forces that employ this tactic often maintain a large
reserve to minimize the psychological impacts on their forces.
7-15
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
FOCUS ATTACKS ON SERVICE SUPPORT AND UNPROTECTED SOLDIERS

7-42. Threat forces may prey on soldiers poorly trained in basic
infantry skills. Ambushes may focus on these types of soldiers
conducting resupply operations or moving in poorly guarded convoys.
Urban operations are characterized by the isolation of small groups
and navigational challenges, and the threat may use the separation
this creates to inflict maximum casualties even when there is no
other direct military benefit from the action.
7-43. The most dangerous potential threats will remain those who
have the capacity to prosecute full-scale combat actions escalating to
a major theater of war (MTW). WMDs will be present and used where
possible. SOF, state-controlled terrorist organizations, paramilitary
and guerilla forces will be a part of a strategy of simultaneous,
distributed operations both inside and outside of the AO. Mines and
unexploded ordnance will be used to demoralize and hamper US
forces.
SECTION III – STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM’S ROLE IN URBAN

OPERATIONS
7-44. The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) commander and

staff will apply the following tactical fundamentals when conducting
urban operations. The squadron commander and staff need to
understand these fundamentals and ensure that they are supported
while conducting urban operations. It is important to note that the
squadron provides the SBCT with unique capabilities to apply the
first four fundamentals.
FUNDAMENTALS
CONDUCT AGGRESSIVE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS

7-45. In order to develop an effective COA, the SBCT commander
and his staff must initiate aggressive reconnaissance and
surveillance operations. Urban operations require significant
HUMINT reconnaissance because sensors and other technological
devices may not be as effective in such environments.
Reconnaissance and surveillance operations can augment other
intelligence systems with stealthy surveillance teams, tactical
questioning of noncombatants, and reconnaissance of key terrain
and avenues of approach. Using digital devices, the staff can develop
urban maps that include a common reference system (such as
numbering buildings) to assist subordinate units with command and
control (C2).
UNDERSTAND THE HUMAN DIMENSION

7-46. The human dimension of the urban environment often has
the most significance and greatest potential for affecting the outcome
of operation. The SBCT commander must carefully consider and
7-16
understand how to influence the allegiance and morale of a civilian

population that may decisively affect operations. The SBCT
commander must assess the attitudes, culture, and factional
allegiances present in the urban environment when planning his
COA. The brigade S2 and the S2X are key staff that help the
commander with this important dimension.
SEPARATE NONCOMBATANTS FROM COMBATANTS

7-47. Promptly separating noncombatants from combatants
facilitates operations by reducing some of the restrictions on
firepower and enhancing force protection. Using psychological
operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) units, the SBCT can
diminish some of the threat’s asymmetrical advantages. This
important task becomes more difficult when the adversary is an
unconventional force that can mix with the civilian population. The
SBCT commander should also consider coordinating with private
voluntary organizations (PVO) and nongovernmental organizations
(NGO) if large numbers of refugees are expected.
CONDUCT CLOSE COMBAT

7-48. Urban operations require closing with the threat and
decisively defeating him. Close combat in urban operations is
resource intensive, requires properly trained and equipped forces,
and has the potential for high casualties. The SBCT must use close
combat as its decisive operation only after shaping the urban area
through aggressive ISR, isolation, and the use of precision fires.
AVOID THE ATTRITION APPROACH

7-49. Urban operations that use linear and methodical COAs based
on firepower normally result in high casualties and significant
collateral damage. Threat forces tend to encourage this approach to
lengthen the operation, expend US resources, and challenge our will
to sustain attritional engagements. Commanders should only
consider this approach when attempting to gain contact or fix threat
forces as part of a larger operation.
CONTROL WHAT IS ESSENTIAL

7-50. Many urban areas are too large to be completely occupied or
even effectively controlled by either friendly or threat forces. The
SBCT focuses its efforts on controlling only those areas that are
essential to mission accomplishment. At a minimum, this requires
control of terrain whose possession or control provides a marked
advantage. In the urban environment, key terrain may be determined
by its functional, political, or social significance. By controlling what
is essential, the SBCT commander can concentrate combat power
where it is needed. This decision implies risk in those areas where he
chooses not to control in order to mass overwhelming combat power
in other areas.
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FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
MAXIMIZE EFFECTS WITHOUT UNNECESSARY COLLATERAL DAMAGE

7-51. By employing the ISR, the SBCT commander develops
situational understanding of the urban AO. Through his situational
understanding, the SBCT commander refines his visualization and,
with his staff, develops COAs that maximize lethal and nonlethal fires
and effects without inflicting unnecessary collateral damage. The
SBCT commander determines firepower restrictions that will still
allow for mission accomplishment, and he then compensates for
them through nonlethal effects, such as information operations.
TRANSITION CONTROL
7-52. Urban operations must be planned to accomplish assigned
missions in the most expeditious manner. The end state of urban
operations is the transfer of control to civilian or other agency
control. The SBCT must thoroughly develop a transition plan that
ensures the restoration of peaceful conditions and avoids further
disruption to stability within the AO.
7-53. A framework used to visualize and conceptualize urban
operations is—
• Assess.
• Shape.
• Dominate.
• Transition.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
7-54. During offensive operations, the SBCT commander seeks to—
• Synchronize fires and effects (lethal and nonlethal), and
information operations.
• Isolate the threat force.
• Destroy high-payoff targets (HPT).
• Use close combat, when necessary, against the threat.
ASSESS
7-55. The squadron primarily assesses the urban environment by
conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to
determine what may be decisive. (See FM 2-01.3 [FM 34-130] for
detailed information on urban IPB.) The squadron also conducts an
analysis of existing intelligence and results of previous operations
that impact current operations and initiates aggressive
reconnaissance and surveillance as soon as allowed by the ROE. This
normally consists of conducting area and route reconnaissance to
identify what may be decisive components of the urban area and
threat.
SHAPE
7-18
7-56. The SBCT normally shapes the AO through isolation. Isolation

seals off (both physically and psychologically) a threat from his
sources of support; it denies him freedom of movement, and prevents
his unit from having contact with other threat forces. The squadron
may assist in the task of isolating the periphery of urban areas. The
SBCT will isolate the urban area through the use of a combination of
maneuver units and ISR assets coordinated and synchronized
through the C2 system.
DOMINATE
7-57. The SBCT uses the combined arms capability of its infantry
battalions to dominate the urban environment (which consists of
terrain, infrastructure, and society) consistent with the ROE, to
defeat or destroy the threat at decisive points and achieve the desired
end state of the mission. Domination is achieved when all mission
requirements are met and preeminent military control over the
threat, geographical area, or population is established. The squadron
conducts aggressive ISR operations to enable the SBCT to maximize
the use of its combined arms capability. While this may take the form
of squadron assets screening approaches to the brigade AO, it may
also involve recce troops doing detailed urban reconnaissance in
advance of infantry battalions in deliberate reconnaissance.
TRANSITION
7-58. During transition, the squadron conducts ISR operations
consistent with the mission end state and ROE to assist the brigade
as it transitions from combat operations to stability (or support)
operations in order to return the urban area back to civilian control.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
7-59. The SBCT may be tasked to defend an urban area for various
reasons, to include protecting political institutions and economic
infrastructures, protecting an urban population, or shaping
conditions for decisive offensive operations.
ASSESS
7-60. In assessing the urban area for defense, the SBCT
commander uses the squadron to conduct an aggressive ISR
operation to determine the composition and intentions of the threat.
The threat may intend to seize objectives within the city using speed
and firepower to overwhelm defending forces, or it may begin by
isolating the urban AO and its defenders. This assessment
determines what needs to be accomplished to prevent the isolation of
the brigade. Additionally, the squadron assesses the defensive
qualities of the urban environment. This is normally conducted as an
area reconnaissance; the squadron will transition to a screen to
assist with shaping the battlespace.
SHAPE
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FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
7-61. The goal of shaping operations is to prevent isolation and set

the conditions for separating attacking forces in space and time. The
squadron employs lethal and nonlethal fires and effects to force the
threat to commit considerable resources, especially time, in
attempting to isolate the AO. The squadron normally conducts
screening operations to assist in shaping the battlespace.
7-20
DOMINATE
7-62. Dominating the urban area in a defensive operation requires
decisively defeating the threat’s attacks. Domination translates into
denying threat efforts to control the vital functions and critical
infrastructure of the urban area. The SBCT employs precision
indirect fires synchronized with direct fires from covered positions,
oriented against selected avenues of approach and engagement areas.
The squadron will control precision fires on selected targets using
scouts and UAVs to separate threat forces in contact from reinforcing
forces. Additionally, the squadron may help direct the brigade’s
mobile counterattack force on threat formations or locations.
TRANSITION
7-63. At the conclusion of a successful defense, the SBCT
consolidates and reorganizes in preparation for offensive operations.
The same considerations for transition that were discussed in
offensive operations apply to transition in the defense (see paragraph
7-60).
SECTION IV – PLANNING
7-64. Elements of planning are shown below as a guide for planning

urban reconnaissance operations.
• Collect and analyze existing intelligence.
• Determine reconnaissance and surveillance objectives.
• Plan infiltration and exfiltration routes.
• Synchronize aerial and ground reconnaissance plans.
• Develop communications and sustainment plan.
• Coordinate for fire support.
• Continue improving urban operations sketch.
COLLECT AND ANALYZE EXISTING INTELLIGENCE

7-65. As discussed in Chapter 2, the squadron conducts planning
simultaneously with the SBCT. The squadron collects and analyzes
information with the purpose of allowing the SBCT to gain an
understanding of the AO and select the most advantageous COA.
However, urban operations require time to develop situational
understanding. HUMINT will be a major contributor of information;
however, time requirements for locating sources and corroborating
information must be taken into consideration.
7-66. Crucial to planning urban operations is urban IPB (see FM 2-
01.3 [FM 34-130] for detailed information on urban IPB). Urban IPB
will involve numerous agencies, some of which are not only external
to the Department of Defense, but the US Government as well such
as NGOs, international agencies (IA), and PVOs. The squadron must
have the technical capability and operational expertise to use multi-
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FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
source information and intelligence fusion, rapid analysis, and

dissemination down to the lowest possible level in the chain of
command. The squadron identifies all relevant forces, their strengths
and critical vulnerabilities, and be able to identify the critical nodes
of the urban areas that may provide leverage if controlled. The IPB
process must also take into account special considerations of the
urban components, such as cultural mapping in the social
component and the location of industrial or other sites that may pose
hazardous materials (HAZMAT) implications in addition to WMD in
the infrastructure component. Aerial and space sensors will prove
vital in this effort; however, there will be extensive requirements for
HUMINT to determine or corroborate information.
7-67. Urban IPB must consider the impact of the noncombatants,
whose presence in the urban area may be substantial and dynamic.
Determining the ethnic and religious composition of the population,
and if possible their intent—to flee or remain in the urban areas—
may prove crucial. Early consideration may be given to the
establishment of a limited civil military operations center (CMOC) to
plan and prepare to deal with noncombatants, NGOs, IAs, and PVOs.
Human behavior is difficult to control on a mass scale; to do so with
persons of a different culture under the strains of conflict can be
nearly impossible. The squadron will rely heavily on their HUMINT
and counterintelligence (CI) soldiers to assist in sorting out
combatants and noncombatants, and, thus, will work closely with the
brigade S2 and S2X.
7-68. Analyzing the information gained on the civilian populace will
be an important factor in recommending COAs for the brigade. The
squadron commander analyzes the information collected and
assesses what actions are necessary to control the impact of civilians.
Various options that the commander can recommend to higher are
screening civilians, prohibition of unauthorized movement, diverting
or controlling refugee movements, and evacuation.
URBAN RECONNAISSANCE
7-69. As part of area reconnaissance, the squadron will conduct
reconnaissance of urban areas during some missions. The squadron
will need to focus its reconnaissance to provide information about the
urban area to support the commander’s COA. This information may
be directly linked to the commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIR) or may support triggers established in his COA
(targeting lethal and nonlethal effects). The following is an example of
specific information requirements (SIR) given to reconnaissance
(recce) troops for the Urban Assessment Report (see Figure 7-6, parts
one through four). This form can be tailored and is not all-inclusive.
The squadron should develop similar SIR for each mission for
HUMINT collection. This form provides an example of SIR that
support society and infrastructure requirements as well as the
traditional threat and terrain.
7-22
Figure 7-6. Example Scout Report that Supports Information

Requirements for Urban Areas (Part One)
7-23
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________

Requirements for Urban Areas (Part Two)
7-24

Requirements for Urban Areas (Part Three)
7-25
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________

Requirements for Urban Areas (Part Four)
URBAN MAPPING
7-70. Prior to entering an urban environment, the squadron
develops urban operations sketches (see Figures 7-7 and 7-8). Units
should attempt to gain access to city planner or civil engineer maps
7-26
to provide detailed information of the urban area. The urban

operations sketches will include a reference system to identify
buildings and streets. Naming conventions should be simple, allowing
for ease of navigation and orientation in the urban environment (odd
number buildings on left side of street, even numbers on right).
Street names should not be used as references as the signs can be
missing or changed to confuse friendly forces. Initial map and aerial
photograph reconnaissance are conducted to pinpoint key terrain
and other important locations that can be identified in the AO. These
areas are described below.
• Safe havens—
Hospitals.
Police stations.
Embassies.
Other (friendly) facilities.
• Hazardous areas—
Construction sites.
Dangerous intersections.
Bridges.
Criminal areas.
• Major terrain features—
Parks.
Industrial complexes.
Airports.
7-27
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 7-7. Initial Photo Reconnaissance of

Urban Area of Operations
7-28
RIVER
CITY
HALL
12 15
13
10
8 11
9
6
4 7
2 HOSPITAL 3
Figure 7-8. Urban Operations Sketch

7-71. Each soldier must have an understanding of the sketch and
reference system as individual vehicles and squads may execute
urban reconnaissance operations. The sketch also facilitates control
in tracking units with greater detail and obtaining precise location
updates throughout operations. The squadron will create overlays for
urban sketches, as most maps do not show the level of detail
necessary to obtain situational awareness (SA). The sketches are
confirmed and given more detail until the squadron conducts battle
handover to SBCT elements. The squadron consolidates sketches and
develops an urban map with overlays for the brigade to be used by
their leaders and soldiers.
7-29
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
DETERMINE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE OBJECTIVES

7-72. From the understanding gained through analysis of existing
intelligence, the squadron begins to identify ISR objectives based on
the mission assigned by the SBCT.
7-73. The information requirements (IR) given to the squadron from
the SBCT may be complex, detailed, and extensive. The ability of the
brigade commander to understand the battle space and accurately
assess information regarding the terrain and the presence of friendly,
threat, and noncombatant personnel is vital in developing ISR
objectives.
NOTE: The squadron not only answers IR of the SBCT but of higher-level commanders
as well (such as JTF, ARFOR).
7-74. The considerations to develop IR and intelligence

requirements will be unique in the urban environment and place
greater demand of HUMINT and imagery intelligence (IMINT) sources.
The squadron must weigh the IR assigned to the time available to
accomplish the mission in developing its objectives. IR, such as the
following, help the squadron define its ISR objectives:
• Where are the threat’s critical C2 nodes located?
• What is the threat’s most likely/dangerous COA?
• What is the status of the key lines of communication
(LOC) leading into and within the urban area (both above
ground and underground)?
• Where are the diplomatic embassies and missions located
within the urban area?
• Would isolation cause the threat to withdraw from the urban
area?
• What is the location and status of tunnels within the urban
area?
• Has the deployed threat force had any training on urban
operations?
• What are the likely threat withdrawal routes and
chokepoints?
• What are the potential vulnerabilities to the infrastructure
facilities?
• Where are the cross-mobility corridors located within the
urban area?
• Where are the cultural, political, or symbolic facilities
located?
• How many American citizens and third country nationals
need to be extracted?
• Are any American citizens or third country nationals being
detained against their will? If so, where?
• How do locals (by faction) view us?
• What is the availability of maps and charts for the AO or
area of interest (AOI)?
7-30
• What are the locations and status of hospitals and key

personnel?
• Are there obstacles impeding movement along the routes to
and from assembly areas?
• How will the national criminal enterprise oppose us?
7-75. The example IR listed demonstrate the need for detailed

information collection planning. The key to successful urban
reconnaissance is gathering information from outside the urban area
and refining objectives as the squadron approaches the area. This
“peeling back the onion” or layered reconnaissance approach, though
time consuming, will significantly increase the ability to gain
situational understanding while reducing potential threats to soldiers
and assets.
7-76. The most effective asset of the surveillance troop during urban
operations is the UAV because of its ability to provide real time
situational awareness within the urban area. GSR and Improved
Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (IREMBASS) are
important sensors on the outskirts of urban areas, but their
effectiveness is limited within the urban area because of the density
of structures, noncombatants, and activity in the city. UAVs should
be task organized to the recce troops to enable the timely and
accurate reconnaissance of objectives and routes within the area. The
commander must ensure UAVs are available and employed during
the squadron’s most vulnerable phase—entering the urban area. The
presence of US forces entering an urban area for the first time will
draw much attention from threat and noncombatants alike. UAVs
can also be employed to detect gathering crowds, movement of threat
forces, emplacement of obstacles, and existing obstacles giving the
squadron time to maneuver out of contact, develop the situation, and
conduct reconnaissance on its own terms. The aerial and ground
reconnaissance plans must be synchronized to allow for proactive
decision making by the squadron much like a fire support plan
enhances a maneuver force.
PLAN INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION ROUTES

7-77. The squadron approaches the urban area using infiltration
techniques to allow it to orient on the reconnaissance objective without
having to engage the threat or fight through prepared defenses. The
squadron will infiltrate surveillance teams to establish urban OPs to
conduct surveillance or target acquisition on identified objectives or
AOIs. Care must be taken in selecting the positions for the teams as
they may be required to remain during SBCT operations. The squadron
also plans exfiltration routes for these teams if they are to leave the area
during the conduct of the operation. The squadron plans this infiltration
and exfiltration in accordance with the guidelines in Chapter 5. The
squadron transitions to a combination of zone and route reconnaissance
operations as required.
SYNCHRONIZE AERIAL AND GROUND RECONNAISSANCE PLANS

7-78. During urban operations it is most effective to task organize the
surveillance troop’s assets to the recce troops. Doing so will allow the
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FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
recce troop commanders to control the employment of UAVs and keep

their use synchronized with recce troop operations. If the squadron
chooses to maintain control of the surveillance troop assets it must
ensure that the employment of the UAVs supports the actions of the
recce troops and that the recce troops have direct access to the
information being collected.
DEVELOP COMMUNICATIONS AND SUSTAINMENT PLAN

7-79. Communications in the urban environment require detailed
planning that will allow units freedom of movement while maintaining C2
at the squadron level. Terrain is identified along the approach route and
in the urban AO that supports line of sight (LOS) communications.
Retransmission (retrans) sites are then established on supporting terrain
or structures to facilitate C2 during the units’ initial entry into the urban
area. The squadron also plans for determining the communication
capabilities of SBCT communications equipment (FM, satellite commo,
global positioning system [GPS]). This is discussed later in the chapter.
7-80. The squadron must plan for redundant communications because
of the effects of urban terrain. Manmade structures can create problems
for single-channel radios. These structures inhibit LOS radio
communications by absorbing or reflecting transmitted signals. However,
the urban environment may have exploitable advantages such as the
availability of electrical power and commercial telecommunications
networks. Electrical power generation stations and other emergency
power systems are normally found in protected structures and are
probably usable. Enclosed areas offer excellent concealment and
protection of communications and other C2 support equipment.
Extensive commercial communications networks, composed of miles of
underground protected cable connecting central telephone exchanges, are
likely to be available, as well as a multitude of public service radio nets
(such as police, fire, civil defense, taxi). These systems have existing
antennas and retransmission stations. To communicate effectively and
continuously, leaders must minimize limitations imposed by the urban
environment and maximize the advantage of existing civil
communications.
7-81. The squadron plans sustainment operations so that recce units
are resupplied prior to entering the urban area. Casualty evacuation and
vehicle recovery are the main logistical functions that should occur within
the urban area due to security considerations of the limited support
vehicles and supplies available. The squadron plans a reconnaissance
limit of advance outside the urban area to ensure that units are
resupplied and prepared to conduct continuous operations within the
urban environment for a minimum of 72 hours.
7-82. In developing the urban reconnaissance plan, the squadron
should task recce units to identify potential logistic release points (LRP)
that require limited forces to secure. Warehouse facilities in industrial
transportation areas, stadiums, and schools in dispersed residential areas
are examples of possible LRPs. If the squadron is tasked to conduct
sustained operations or transition to stability operations, LRPs can be
expanded into logistical sites or bases.
COORDINATE FOR FIRE SUPPORT
7-32
7-83. The squadron must consider numerous factors when

coordinating and planning targets that will support operations in an
urban environment. The most likely mission that must be planned is
targets that will support disengagement from unexpected contact. The
following are some fire support considerations for urban operations.
They are by no means all inclusive.
• Who controls each fire support asset?
• Have the fire plan and observer plan been exchanged with
adjacent units?
• Has the observer plan been developed, to include observation
posts (OP) in buildings, location of laser designators, and
overwatch of trigger points?
• Has location of hazardous sites been identified; both above-
and below-ground fuel and industrial storage tanks, gas
distribution lines, etc., and any other area where incendiary
effects of detonating artillery and mortar rounds will start
fires?
• Has the general construction or composition of buildings and
road surfaces been identified (may impact the type of
munitions used)?
• Where does building masking, overhead power lines, or
towers degrade GPS and compass functioning?
• Will obscurants and illumination favor friendly or threat
units?
• Will buildings or structures require fire support personnel to
carry/use equipment not normally carried (e.g., field
expedient antennas, climbing rope, wire gloves, axes or
sledgehammers)?
• What are the requirements for radar coverage? Does there
need to be radar zones established? If so, where? For how
long?
7-84. In addition to the use of conventional munitions, precision-

guided munitions (PGM) must also be carefully considered. The
biggest consideration for using PGMs is that some sort of laser or
infrared designator equipment must be available. In the event these
assets are not available, personnel augmentation may be required
from the SBCT.
COORDINATE FOR HELICOPTER SUPPORT
ATTACK HELICOPTERS
7-85. Cavalry units may be supported by a variety of attack
helicopters ranging from fully modernized AH-64Ds to lightly armed
but agile
OH-58Ds. Regardless of the specific type of attack helicopter
available, the same missions and tasks can be accomplished due to
the inherent flexibility of Army aviation units. Because of the
increased risk of small arms and MANPAD engagements, aviation
7-33
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
forces normally support urban operations by operating away from

built-up areas (i.e., isolation of objective). However if the risk analysis
determines that the payoff is higher than the risk, aviation forces can
be employed in and around the urban area.
Common Missions
7-86. The most common missions assigned to attack helicopters
during urban operations are the following:
• Escort of troop-carrying aircraft during air assaults.
• Overwatch and support attacks integrated with the
ground commander’s maneuver.
• Interdiction and destruction of threat armored vehicles
moving against friendly forces.
• Isolation of urban objectives.
• Reconnaissance.
• Security of friendly locations.
• Convoy escort duty.
• Precision engagement of hardened point targets.
• Participating in show of force operations.
• Escorting NEO mission aircraft.
Other Missions
7-87. In addition to the missions listed above, attack helicopters
may be called on to perform some additional, nontraditional roles
during urban operations. This is particularly true during support
operations or stability operations in urban areas. Additional missions
may include the following:
• Assisting, for limited periods, in the control and
coordination of fires with the maneuver of ground forces.
• Providing limited relay of radio messages from isolated
ground units.
• Marking or identifying specific buildings and areas by
smoke, fires, or targeting lasers.
• Videotaping routes or objectives for later analysis by
ground commanders.
• Providing navigational and directional assistance to
ground units.
• Providing limited area illumination by infrared or white
light using either on-board sources or illumination
rockets.
• Providing counter-sniper and counter-mortar armed
reconnaissance patrols around friendly unit locations.
Considerations for Attack Helicopter Employment

7-88. Weapons use may be limited by the short arming/slant
ranges within the urban area. Precision weapons, such as TOW and
Hellfire missiles, require about 500 meters minimum range to reliably
7-34
arm and stabilize on the intended target. Often, fire from longer
ranges actually improves accuracy. In urban structures, the shaped
charge of the Hellfire produces less damage and over-pressurization
than the TOW’s high explosive round. Window engagements are
generally not recommended, since the missile will usually impact the
far wall of the structure, expending its blast energy away from the
structure. Missile impact on the facing structure will normally cause
over-pressurization inside the structure (in the vicinity of impact) as
well as secondary fragmentation of wood/concrete, which can
neutralize or stun occupants in the vicinity of the impact. Extensive
use of precision weapons by several units in close proximity may
cause coordination problems with target identification and
designation.
7-89. Laser designation by both ground and aerial systems may be
degraded by the large expanses of polished, flat reflective surfaces
common in many urban areas. High volumes of smoke and dust
associated with burning buildings and urban combat can prevent
accurate laser designation required for precision engagements.
7-90. Aircraft cannon fire against buildings can be devastating.
These fires provide excellent suppression and can drive threat forces
away from firing positions or fix the threat in place until ground
maneuver forces can destroy him. Threat positions that have been
struck by fire can normally be reoccupied quickly by the threat.
Ricochets from these rounds are common in urban structures. They
can cause additional collateral damage and pose a danger to nearby
friendly forces.
7-91. Target identification and marking may be difficult because of
heavy smoke and dust rising from urban fires and explosions. Some
smoke from fires in industrial areas may be highly toxic or irritating.
Pilots may have to don chemical protective equipment that hinders
target detection and engagement. Friendly unit locations and
personnel can be marked with colored panels, glint tape, strobe
lights, and colored smoke. Targets can be marked with infrared laser
pointers, such as the GCP-1 Ground Commander
Pointer/Illuminator, colored M203 smoke rounds, M203 or mortar
flares burning on the ground, or tracer fires. In some situations,
improvised spotlights can also be used.
7-92. While fire from stationary positions is more accurate, running
fire is normally safer for the aircraft due to threat ground fire. If
possible, ground commanders should avoid directing pilots along a
gun-target line that passes over friendly troops. Gun-target runs that
are perpendicular to the friendly unit’s front are normally best.
7-93. 2.75 rockets (area fire) with HE warheads have a burst radius
in excess of 50 meters and are effective in the destruction of C4
structures, thin-skinned vehicles, ADA, and damaging/breaching
concrete and wood structures. However, when fired in pairs or more,
the rockets have a large dispersion pattern and pose a potential
accuracy and fratricide issue.
ASSAULT AND LIFT HELICOPTERS
7-35
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
7-94. Cavalry units may be supported by a variety of assault or lift

helicopters, normally the UH-60 to CH-47. These assets can be
crucial for the flexible and responsive movement of troops and
supplies and for C2.
Common Missions
7-95. The most common missions assigned to assault/lift
helicopters during urban operations are the following:
• Air assaults
• CASEVAC/MEDEVAC.
• Air movement of troops and supplies.
• Emplace logistical resupply points.
• Conduct C2 operations.
• Conduct NEO.
• Conduct EW operations.
• CSAR.
• Emplace Volcano mines.
Other Missions
7-96. In addition to the missions listed above, assault/lift
helicopters may be called on to emplace large/heavy obstacles
(abandoned vehicles, concrete dividers, etc).
7-36
AIRCRAFT POWER LIMITATIONS AND TIME ON STATION

7-97. The need to deliver hovering fires from temporary battle
positions may require the aircraft to carry less than a full load of
munitions or fuel. This is especially true in hot climates and high
altitudes. Reduced loads mean more frequent trips to forward arming
and refueling points (FARP) and less time on station. Long route
distances during air movements may require the establishment of
FARPs along the route prior to operations. Climate will also affect the
number of troops or amount of supplies the aircraft can transport.
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
7-98. From the ground unit perspective, helicopters are most effective
when they operate under the OPCON of the ground unit commander
closest to the threat. Doctrinally, the cavalry squadron is the lowest
level granted formal OPCON of helicopters. During attack helicopter
operations, the squadron commander is rarely able to identify the
precise location of threat forces or to coordinate aerial fires with
friendly squad and platoon maneuver. He often must pass the
responsibility for close coordination of attack helicopter fires to the
company/troop commander or platoon leader on the scene. This
ground maneuver leader can direct the efforts of only a few aircraft at a
time. It may be more effective for the aviation unit to retain control of
its individual aircraft and operate by continuously rotating attack
helicopter elements into the battle area where they then coordinate
their attacks with the ground commander’s maneuver. Generally, the
smaller and more decentralized the combat actions, the better it is to
have armed aircraft coordinate directly with the small-unit leader on
the ground. The larger, more centralized the combat action, the better
it is to retain control of armed aircraft by the aviation headquarters.
Whichever command and support relationship is chosen, both the
ground and the aviation headquarters must understand what is
expected of the other. Close liaison and clear/concise verbal
communications are important.
CONTINUE IMPROVING URBAN OPERATIONS SKETCH

7-99. The squadron confirms and updates urban sketches during
planning and execution of urban operations. These sketches are critical to
the SBCT for C2, as most maps do not provide the level of detail
necessary to conduct tactical operations. Specifically, the squadron
assesses entry routes that the SBCT could use in support of offensive
operations. Included with the sketches are overlays that categorize
sections of the urban area by ethnicity, religious affiliation, and other
prevailing characteristics that could affect operations (see Figures 7-9
through 7-12). Prior to reconnaissance or battle handover, the squadron
consolidates the sketches and creates an urban map with overlays for the
SBCT.
7-37
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
RIVER
CITY
HALL
12 15 X-faction controlled with
mixed opinions on US
Government 13
10 and business presence.
district. Y-faction controlled
and anti-US opinions.
8 11
9
6
4 7
2 HOSPITAL 3
Wealthy neighborhood
very pro-US.
LEGEND:
HOSTILE NEUTRAL FRIENDLY
Figure 7-9. Example of Population Status Overlay
7-38
RIVER
CITY
HALL
12 15
13
10
8 11 6
9
6
4 7
5 5
4
2 HOSPITAL 3
1 2 3
LEGEND:
1 Dismounted approach
2 4 Wheeled-capable approach
3 5 6 Wheeled & tracked capable approach
Figure 7-10. Avenues of Approach in the Urban Area
7-39
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
E
RIVER
CITY
HALL
12 15 E
13 E
10
8 11
9
6
4 7
E
E
5
E 2 HOSPITAL 3
LEGEND:
8 ft. diameter sewage lines Subway
4 ft. diameter sewage lines E Entrance
Figure 7-11. Sewer and Subterranean Overlay
7-40
RIVER
CITY
HALL
12 15
13
10
8 11
9
6
4 7
2 HOSPITAL 3
LEGEND:
KNOWN THREAT AREA OF LIKELY

LOCATIONS DEMONSTRATION
Figure 7-12. Threat Overlay
7-41
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
SECTION V – EXECUTION
7-100. Elements of the execution phase are listed below.

• Approach the urban area.
• Enter the urban area.
• Define the objective.
• Assist in isolation.
• Pull the brigade.
APPROACH THE URBAN AREA

7-101. Actions during the approach—
• Conduct reconnaissance.
• Collect information on urban area and objective.
• Identify routes for SBCT.
• Identify friendly, neutral, and hostile areas in AO.
• Identify areas requiring CI, CA, or PSYOP support.
7-102. The squadron’s approach to the urban area consists of a

combination of zone and route reconnaissance. The squadron collects
information on all components of the urban area starting outside of
the urban area. Depending on the time available, the recce troops
determine the urban situation progressively from the surrounding
area toward the city (see Figure 7-13). The squadron refines
objectives and routes as it gains and analyzes information. The
squadron sets reconnaissance limits of advance outside the urban
area to ensure units do not prematurely enter the urban area until
the SBCT quick reaction force is in position to support the squadron.
UAVs are employed to conduct aerial reconnaissance of routes and
objective areas. UAVs are focused on unit entry points to determine
threat situation, such as obstacles in the urban area, ambush
positions on rooftops, or movement of personnel and vehicles as recce
units approach. As discussed earlier, the aerial and ground
reconnaissance plans must be synchronized to be effective.
7-42
LO
A
GR
AN
T
NAI
6
PL NAI
MEADE NAI 8
7
TUAVs perform
recon of routes
and NAIs.
DO BJ
I5
G
O
NA
I
NA 4
PL D
M
cC RE
LE RT A NAI
LL B 3
AN
E EN
NAI
RT G R
1 B C
“Peeling back the onion”

troops conduct M-D MI
recon gaining infor-
mation from outside to
inside.
NAI
L D H OO K 2
ER
Figure 7-13. Approach to the Urban Area

7-103. The systematic method of approaching the urban area is
necessary to gain sufficient information for the SBCT to maneuver
out of contact. The squadron “peels back the onion” of the AO
through multidimensional reconnaissance as discussed earlier in the
manual. The squadron not only gathers information of the urban
objective area but also the entire AO for the SBCT. Identifying areas
that are friendly, neutral, or hostile to US forces will influence SBCT
COAs. The squadron recommends CI, CA, or PSYOP support in areas
that are critical to the SBCT. Mobility corridors, approach routes, and
assault positions are but a few examples of the squadron’s
requirements to pull the SBCT to the urban area out of contact. The
ability of the SBCT to move unhindered to the urban area is
paramount to successful urban operations.
7-43
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
ENTER THE URBAN AREA

7-104. Actions during entry into urban areas—
• Employ dismounted surveillance teams.
• Conduct multidimensional recon.
• Identify entry routes for the SBCT.
• Coordinate quick reaction force support from SBCT.
7-105. Entering the urban area is a deliberate phase of urban
operations. The squadron is most vulnerable when entering the urban
area, as reconnaissance teams’ strength is limited. Sensor surveillance
capabilities are severely degraded by the urban terrain and sensor
teams require security augmentation when operating within the urban
area. As discussed earlier, the presence of US soldiers in the urban area
for the first time will attract much attention. It is vital that information
gained during the approach has been disseminated to the lowest level of
recce soldiers so that hazardous areas are avoided or approached with
caution. The squadron ensures that all coordination with the SBCT’s
quick reaction force is conducted and the unit is in position prior to
entering the urban area.
7-106. Prior to employing reconnaissance teams, the squadron will
infiltrate surveillance teams. These teams will establish urban OPs to
conduct surveillance or target acquisition on identified objectives or
AOIs. Care must be taken into selecting the positions for the teams
as they may be required to remain during SBCT operations. Fire
support coordination measures (FSCM), particularly no fire areas
(NFA), are essential to the survival of surveillance teams in the urban
environment and are coordinated with the SBCT and joint forces. If
positions cannot be established because of the threat level, the
squadron requests the SBCT to coordinate for SOF or other agencies
to conduct covert operations on the target or area.
7-107. When surveillance positions are established, the squadron
begins entering the urban area. The first asset employed is the UAV. The
UAV reconnoiters routes, rooftops, suspected threat positions or
infrastructure, and other areas that may impact the mission. From the
information collected by UAVs, the commander decides whether to
continue on with planned recce troop movement or use an alternate
route or COA into the urban area. SA is vital during this phase because
the urban AO is constantly changing with the movement of
noncombatants, threat, and effects on terrain by US or threat forces.
Depending on the level of threat, recce troops conduct multidimensional
reconnaissance throughout their AO collecting information on the
objective area without physically entering the objective. The squadron
must not become decisively engaged or compromised to the point where
the SBCT has to be prematurely deployed.
DEFINE THE OBJECTIVE

7-108. Actions when defining the objective—
• Determine threat disposition and composition.
• Determine civilian disposition.
7-44
• Identify physical boundaries of objective area.

• Identify key terrain and positions.
7-109. Once in the urban area, the squadron defines the objective area
for the SBCT. Reconnaissance conducted by recce troops is focused on
threat disposition and composition and the physical boundaries of the
objective. In order to accurately define the objective, it is imperative that
all RSTA units understand the brigade commander’s intent. Civilian
disposition throughout the urban AO is constantly monitored and
assessed by the squadron to determine how noncombatants will
influence SBCT operations. Depending on the threat level, squadron
units do not enter the objective area to avoid becoming decisively
engaged. UAVs perform continuous reconnaissance of the objective area
and urban AO to ensure RSTA units are not surprised by repositioning
or overwhelming forces.
7-110. The squadron will identify key terrain and positions within the
urban area in support of SBCT operations. These areas and positions
consist of—
• Command post (CP) locations.
• Retransmission sites.
• Mortar firing points.
• Support by fire positions.
• UAV recovery and launch areas.
• Landing zones (LZ) and pickup zones (PZ).
• Obstacles.
• Heavily trafficked areas by noncombatants (both vehicle
and pedestrian).
• HAZMAT areas.
• Approach and entry routes.
• Assault positions.
• Objectives.
• Friendly locations (including those RSTA elements
remaining during SBCT operations).
• Threat locations.
7-111. The squadron’s reconnaissance is also focused on the
communications architecture needed to operate within the urban
environment. The SBCT requires an extensive C2 architecture to
coordinate the maneuver and sustainment of its forces. The squadron
signal officer (S6) determines capabilities and limitations of SBCT
communications equipment during multidimensional reconnaissance of
the urban area. Due to the vastness of most urban areas, the squadron
S6 develops IR for recce troops operating in areas that his section
cannot reconnoiter. The S6 then creates an overlay with communication
zones according to their capabilities, recommended retransmission sites,
existing telecommunication sites and antennas, and recommended C2
locations.
ASSIST IN ISOLATION
7-45
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
7-112. Actions during isolation—

• Conduct screen for SBCT.
• Conduct target acquisition.
• Employ precision fires.
7-113. Most urban areas are too vast to completely isolate without
committing a large number of units. The RSTA squadron uses its
numerous capabilities to assist the SBCT in isolating the objective
and urban areas prior to the commencement of SBCT operations.
While some RSTA units continue to conduct multidimensional
reconnaissance to isolate the objective within the urban area, the
remainder of the squadron focuses on isolation outside of the urban
area (see Figure 7-14).
LO
A
G TUAVs monitor
RA urban area and
NT MI farside approaches.
NAI
6
PL NAI
MEADE NAI 8
S
7
S
S
D BJ
I5
G
2
O
O
S
NA
I
Checkpoints are NA 4 5 GSRs and
used to gain sensors cover
information areas that RECCE
during isolation. 3 troops cannot.
4
PL D
M
cC RE
LE RT A NAI
LL B 3
AN
EN E
NAI
RT GR
1 B C
NAI
LD HOO 2
K ER
Figure 7-14. Isolation of Urban Area of Operations

7-114. Isolation involves seizing or controlling (physically or
psychologically), terrain that dominates an area so that the threat
cannot supply or reinforce its defenders. A goal of isolation is to take
the advantage of interior lines away from the threat. From
7-46
information gained throughout the squadron’s mission, screens are

deployed in key locations. Screens are essential to control or deny
movement on to SBCT routes by noncombatants or threat forces.
Checkpoints are established on major routes in and out of the urban
area (see Figure 7-14). A vital function performed at checkpoints is
tactical questioning. Valuable information on the urban situation is
gained from noncombatants fleeing the area as well as individuals
trying to enter the urban area. The squadron also may request Sniper
augmentation from the SBCT to infiltrate with surveillance teams and
assist in isolation of the objective area. Snipers provide both the
physical portion of isolation and the psychological effects as threat
forces lose confidence in their ability to move freely in the urban area.
7-115. The surveillance troop is critical in covering the gaps left
around the AO. GSR and IREMBASS provide long-range detection for
the squadron. UAVs and recce units are used to investigate
significant movements detected by the sensors. The squadron uses
the combination of HUMINT and sensors to isolate with the intent of
not becoming decisively engaged. When targets are acquired, the
squadron employs precision fires or nonlethal effects to maintain
security for the SBCT and the integrity of screen forces. The precision
fires can come from a variety of sources such as artillery, air or naval
gunfire. PSYOP, CA, and CI teams employ nonlethal effects during
the isolation phase. The squadron coordinates necessary support
through the SBCT.
PULL THE BRIGADE

7-116. Actions when pulling the brigade include conducting linkup
with the brigade and conducting reconnaissance or battle handover.
7-117. The squadron conducts linkup with SBCT forces at contact
points along assigned routes. Normally, task force scouts will link up
with squadron units. Recce soldiers will guide the SBCT element to
the urban area. The recce team provides an orientation of the AO that
consists of, but is not limited to—
• Approach and entry routes.
• Assault positions (foothold).
• CP locations.
• Key terrain.
• Threat and civilian disposition.
• Objectives.
• Hazards and obstacles.
• Battle positions (BP).
• Friendly locations (including those RSTA elements
remaining during SBCT operations).
7-118. The recce element will provide a copy of any urban sketches
and overlays that will assist the SBCT element in orienting and
controlling their forces upon entry into the urban area. At a
predetermined time or location given by the SBCT, the squadron
conducts battle handover to the SBCT. At this time, the squadron
updates any map corrections, gives a battlefield update brief to
7-47
FM 3.20-96 ____________________________________________________________________________
ensure the SBCT has situational understanding, and makes final

recommendations prior to the SBCT initiating urban operations.
7-48
Chapter 8
Combat Service Support/Sustainment

The squadron and its CONTENTS
parent unit, the Stryker Fundamentals........................................................ 8-1
brigade combat team CSS Principles .................................................. 8-2
CSS Characteristics.......................................... 8-13
(SBCT), have a reduced Tactical CSS Functions .................................... 8-14
combat service support Brigade Support Battalion ................................... 8-16
Headquarters and Distribution Company....... 8-17
(CSS) footprint in Forward Maintenance Company...................... 8-22
comparison to some Brigade Support Medical Company ................ 8-32
other types of CSS Company – Augmentation ....................... 8-43
Brigade Support Area....................................... 8-44
organizations. However, Squadron Organization ........................................ 8-46
CSS functions such as Support Areas ................................................... 8-46
maintenance, combat Trains ................................................................. 8-46
CSS Planning ........................................................ 8-51
health support, supply, Supporting Reconnaissance Operations ....... 8-53
and human resources Supporting Security Operations...................... 8-54
Trains and Logistics Package Operations ......... 8-55
support are critical to Command and Control ..................................... 8-55
squadron mission Reports .............................................................. 8-58
accomplishment. LOCPAC Resupply............................................ 8-60
CSS for Attachments/Detachments................. 8-61
Convoy Survivability......................................... 8-62
Supply and Transportation .................................. 8-66
Supply ................................................................ 8-66
Transportation................................................... 8-71
Maintenance .......................................................... 8-72
Unit Maintenance .............................................. 8-72
Controlled Exchange ........................................ 8-74
Cannibalization ................................................. 8-74
Battle Damage Assessment and Repair ......... 8-75
Recovery and Evacuation ................................ 8-75
Communications Security Maintenance ......... 8-75
(Contents continued next page)
SECTION I – FUNDAMENTALS
8-1. The CSS system will be challenged to sustain the squadron in the
fast-paced, nonlinear, operations over a large battlespace. The CSS
structure throughout the SBCT is extremely austere, allowing for quicker
deployability and the reduction of the support footprint in the area of
operations (AO). This austere structure forces the SBCT to employ the
latest advances in CSS, command and control (C2), and situational
understanding to enable it to effectively support the squadron. The CSS
structure will be significantly challenged to support the squadron’s wide-
ranging, and in some situations, decentralized missions.
8-2. CSS planning begins early in the squadron’s planning process.
In some situations CSS planning begins before mission receipt, as part
of the ongoing process of refining the squadron CSS estimate.
8-1
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: Squadron staff estimates are less structured than the staff estimates done at
higher echelons of command.
8-3. CSS planners
CONTENTS (Continued)
use data available from Field Services ........................................................8-75
Force XXI Battle Food Preparation...............................................8-75
Command Brigade and Mortuary Affairs.................................................8-75
Laundry, Shower, and Clothing
Below (FBCB2) and Light Textile Repair................................8-76
logistics report Force Provider ...................................................8-76
messages and Personnel Support ................................................8-76
personnel status Personnel Services Support.............................8-76
Systems..............................................................8-78
messages to identify Planning Operations .........................................8-79
equipment and Communications ...............................................8-82
personnel issues that Religious Support .............................................8-82
Finance Support ................................................8-82
can impact planned or
Public Affairs .....................................................8-82
ongoing operations. Postal Support...................................................8-83
The squadron CSS Legal Support ....................................................8-83
staff must be proactive Enemy Prisoners of War ...................................8-84
Combat Health Support ........................................8-85
in identifying and Squadron Medical Platoon ...............................8-86
solving CSS issues Combat Lifesavers ............................................8-87
by— Medical Evacuation ...........................................8-87
Combat Health Logistics ..................................8-89
• Using Medical Force Protection..................................8-90
Reconstitution .......................................................8-91
FBCB2 and Reorganization ..................................................8-91
other Army Regeneration .....................................................8-91
Battle Planning .............................................................8-92
Command SOP.....................................................................8-92
Mission Planning...............................................8-93
Systems
(ABCS) to
maintain
CSS situational understanding.
• Working closely with higher headquarters CSS staff to
resolve CSS problems.
• Establishing CSS priorities that conform to mission
requirements.
• Recommending CSS-related commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIR).
• Ensuring the commander is apprised of critical CSS
issues.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PRINCIPLES

8-4. The keys to successful CSS are responsiveness and economy—
getting the force what it needs to initiate, sustain, and extend
operations while expending as few resources as possible and
minimizing the CSS footprint. It is these critical factors that steer the
CSS system along three guiding and interrelated principles:
• Force agility.
• Velocity of CSS.
• Situational understanding.
8-2
___________________________________________Chapter 8 – Combat Service Support/Sustainment
8-5. SBCT CSS doctrine, force structure, training, and technological

improvements are geared toward these principles.
8-3
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
FORCE AGILITY
8-6. An agile CSS force is always planned and developed within a
joint/multinational/interagency context. Just as the Army conducts
operations as part of a joint and normally multinational force, so does
it plan and execute CSS within that environment. This allows the
overall CSS force to be as economical and efficient as possible.
8-7. The CSS force seeks to maximize efficiency and responsiveness
through a number of methods. First, it is built around the optimal mix
of active component, reserve component, Department of the Army (DA)
civilians, and contractors. Though they involve a number of risks,
contractors and DA civilians are playing an ever-increasing role in CSS
for a number of reasons. The use of contractors may be more
responsive. Also, use of contractors and DA civilians may enhance the
commander’s ability to stay within force caps for given operations and
allow military personnel to maximize effectiveness in hostile conditions
where risks associated with using civilians is unacceptable to the
commander.
8-8. An agile force also relates to the growing seamless nature of the
Army’s CSS structure. Elements of the strategic base, such as the US
Army Materiel Command (AMC) logistics support element and the US
Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, deploy to AOs and are
integrated into the overall CSS force to provide support at the
operational, and in certain scenarios, even the tactical level.
8-9. An agile force structure is one that has a relatively small
footprint, and does not encumber the maneuver commander with large
stockpiles of supplies or large numbers of CSS personnel on the
ground. The key to agility is to place on the ground only those CSS
assets that are truly needed, no more and no less. Other aspects of a
flexible, deployable CSS force are modular and tailorable force
packages, split-based operations, reach capabilities, maintenance
initiatives, and the use of contractors in lieu of force structure.
Modular/Tailorable Force Packages
8-10. Modularity involves company-level force structure designs in
which each major company subelement has a cross-section of the total
company’s capabilities. This allows individual modules to provide a
support or C2 function while still allowing the remainder of the unit to
be operational. Modular units will provide support at echelons above
brigade (EAB) or as augmentation to the brigade support battalion
(BSB). When modular functional or multifunctional companies with
multifunctional platoons, teams, or sections are used to create tailored
force packages, they can reduce the CSS footprint in an AO. CSS
organizations and units are customized through the use of modular
units and sub-units (platoons, teams, or sections) to produce the
required CSS capabilities without adding unnecessary, redundant, or
nonvalue-adding elements to the task organization. The operational
commander uses the modular force structure at his disposal to create
customized CSS in tailorable force packages to meet requirements.
8-4
Split-Based Operations
8-11. Split-based operations refer to performing certain CSS
administrative and management functions outside of the AO, whether
in a secure location in the communications zone, an intermediate
staging base, or even at home station. If the automated and
communication systems networks are adequate, some personnel and
materiel or distribution management functions can be performed by
soldiers or civilians who may not have to deploy to the AO, thus
helping to minimize strategic lift requirements, the CSS footprint in
theater, and support requirements for forces in theater.
Reach Capabilities
8-12. Reach capabilities also minimize the CSS footprint in the AO.
CSS reach operations involve the deliberate positioning of stocks and
units/capabilities dedicated for a specific operation. These stocks
and/or units may be positioned at home station, an intermediate
staging base, or other location within the theater outside the AO. The
purpose of identifying and positioning reach units and CSS resources
is to increase responsiveness of support and sustainability of the force.
This method, which is key to early support of the SBCT, may be used
for any force. It involves a risk analysis and ultimate decision by the
commander as to what support capabilities must be on hand in the AO
and what can be deferred until positioned capabilities become available
to provide support.
Maintenance Initiatives
8-13. A number of maintenance initiatives will also increase the
agility and economy of the CSS force. The shift to a “replace
forward/fix rear” system reduces the requirement for extensive repair
facilities, tools, and personnel to be pushed forward. In addition, the
multi-capable maintainer has a broad, but shallow range of skills
designed to enable him to replace line replaceable units (LRU) or
modules to rapidly return a vehicle to mission capable status. Finally,
combining organizational and direct support (DS) maintenance
maximizes economy in forward maintenance elements.
8-14. Replace forward/fix rear is a maintenance conservation
concept for replacing LRUs or modules instead of attempting to repair
the LRUs or modules by leveraging advanced prognostic and diagnostic
tools, support equipment, and training. The LRUs or modules are then
retrograded to higher levels of maintenance for repair and return to the
distribution system. Lean, modular, and enabled maintenance units
focused on maximizing combat power characterize field maintenance
operations. The velocity at which future field maintenance operations
must be performed, distributed operations, the capabilities of
battlefield distribution, and expected gains in diagnostics facilitate our
ability to fix equipment forward through the replacement of LRU or
component assemblies.
• Replace forward means a soldier performs on-system
maintenance. “On system” refers to replacing components
8-5
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
or subcomponents at the point of repair, breakdown site,

or maintenance collection point.
• Fix rear means that soldiers perform “off-system”
maintenance. Off-system maintenance refers to those
actions taken to return components or subcomponents of
weapon systems to serviceable condition. These actions
take place at designated places throughout the battlefield.
EAB maintenance units may have the capability to repair
certain LRUs and/or assemblies for major weapon
systems they support.
8-15. The combination of organizational/DS maintenance means

unifying organizational and DS level maintenance responsibilities and
capabilities into one organization, the forward maintenance company
(FMC), to focus maintenance leadership, management, technical
expertise, and assets ensuring maintenance can be planned, allocated,
and swiftly executed when and where needed to satisfy the
commander’s requirements.
8-16. Efficiency in maintenance management and effectiveness of
maintenance operations are maximized when unit and DS
maintenance operations are collapsed into one level. This concept
eliminates the loss of time and loss of job continuity associated with
the transition of unit level job orders to DS job orders and vice versa.
Consolidated maintenance enables a greater capability to dispatch
more effective maintenance capabilities due to centralized control and
access to more capabilities. The concept pools maintenance assets
under the maintenance control officer (MCO). Enablers such as the
forward repair system (FRS) and advanced diagnostics and prognostics
give the combat repair teams (CRT) the ability to execute this concept.
The CRTs have the right people with the right tools and test equipment
to provide field maintenance on the battlefield and rapidly return
combat systems to the fight.
Contractors
8-17. The following paragraphs address the use of contractors on the
battlefield. Lessons learned from military operations throughout our
history indicate that contracting and outsourcing can be effective force
multipliers. Contracted capability can extend existing Army capabilities
and provide alternative sources of supplies and services. Use of
contractors may reduce the personnel, equipment, and supplies that
must be deployed to support a specific operation. Contractors do not
replace force structure; they augment Army capabilities and provide an
additional option for meeting support requirements.
8-18. To the extent they are used, contractors will be incorporated
into the force structure as force multipliers, but they will not displace
military assets within that force structure. Their use may reduce the
size of the Army force required to support a specific operation, but they
will not permanently replace force structure. The Army can use
contractors to bridge gaps between required capabilities and actual
force structure available within the theater of operations. Contractors
may be employed, subject to mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
8-6
troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations

(METT-TC), throughout the AO and in virtually all conditions.
Contracting by the BSB will tie in with the overall joint/Army force
contracting plan for the AO.
8-19. Contractors and their role and function on the battlefield are
categorized in Field Manual (FM) 4-100.2 [FM 100-10-2] and in
FM 3-100.21 [FM 100-21] as theater support, external support, and
system.
8-20. Theater Support Contractors. Theater support contractors
support deployed operational forces under prearranged contracts or
under contracts awarded within the mission area, by contracting
officers serving under the direct contracting authority of the theater
Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC). Theater
support contractors provide goods, services, and minor construction,
usually from the local vendor base, to meet the immediate needs of
operational commanders.
8-21. External Support Contractors. External support contractors
provide deployed operational forces with support that is separate and
distinct from either theater support or systems contractors. They may
be prearranged contracts or contracts awarded during the contingency
itself to support the mission. Contracting officers who award and
administer external support contracts retain unique contracting
authority deriving from organizations other than the theater PARC or
systems offices under program managers (PM) or the AMC.
8-22. System Contractors. Systems contractors support deployed
operational forces under prearranged contracts awarded by PMs and
AMC. They support specific materiel systems throughout the system’s
life cycle during both peacetime and contingency operations. The
systems include, but are not limited to, weapon systems, aircraft, C2
infrastructure, and communications systems.
VELOCITY OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
8-23. The key to allowing this economical and deployable force to be
responsive to the needs of Army forces and other supported elements
of the joint/multinational force is the velocity associated with a
distribution-based CSS system. Distribution includes all the actions
performed to deliver required resources (units, materiel, personnel,
and services) to, from, and within a theater. A distribution-based CSS
system includes—
• Visibility.
• Management.
• Transportation of resources flowing through the CSS
system.
• Automation and communications.
• Physical and resource networks of the distribution
system.
8-24. Critical aspects of a distribution-based system include—

• Centralized distribution management.
8-7
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Distribution-based CSS system.

• Surge capability.
• Unity of command.
• Increased velocity.
Centralized Distribution Management
8-25. The Army is creating distribution management centers at each
echelon from echelons above corps to the division to manage the
Army’s role in theater distribution. It is critical that a central manager
have integrated end-to-end visibility and control of the Army’s piece of
the distribution system capacity and distribution pipeline flow in order
to maximize its efficiency.
8-26. The distribution managers at each echelon leverage information
technology to coordinate, prioritize, and synchronize material
management and movement control operations to maximize the
distribution pipeline’s capability to throughput units and follow-on
sustainment. Centralized distribution management is essential to
efficient and effective distribution system operations.
8-27. Centralized distribution management relies extensively on
situational understanding for success. Joint Publication (JP) 4-01.4
and FM 4-01.4 [FM 100-10-1] discuss distribution. A tactics,
techniques, and procedures manual for distribution management
centers is on the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM)
homepage at:
http://www.cascom.lee.army.mil/multi/battlefield_distribution/distrib
ution_management_center/Guide_to_Distribution_Management_Cente
rs/doc.
Distribution-Based Combat Service Support System
8-28. This system leverages advanced planning and optimization
tools to forecast requirements, plan and control distribution
operations, and obtain visibility of in-transit stocks, combined with
limited stocks at storage locations, and velocity and speed of
distribution to support and sustain Army operations. Distribution-
based CSS leverages information, force structure designs,
technological enablers, and C2 relationships to provide a system
capable of delivering the “right stuff, at the right time, to the right
location.” The distribution-based CSS system does not eliminate the
need for or the use of stockpiled inventory. Distribution-based CSS
uses anticipation and visibility of the inventory moving through the
distribution pipeline, in effect making the distribution pipeline into
another warehouse, to limit, but not eliminate, stockpiled inventories.
Surge Capability
8-29. Surge capability is the ability to mass CSS resources at a point
and time on the battlefield to weight the battle with CSS by maximizing
combat power at the decisive point as determined by the supported
commander. Surge capability is enabled by flexible, modular
organizational capabilities and by fused CSS and operational
information. Surge capability may often be employed to mass tailored
CSS resources as various supported units pass through the different
stages of the halt, move, combat continuum.
8-8
Unity of Command
8-30. Unity of command for CSS enhances surge capability. CSS
commanders may, for example, surge maintenance assets to meet
priority readiness, surge fuel assets prior to a counterattack, or surge
other commodities to make up for disruption in the lines of
communication (LOC) from corps. In practice, at the tactical level, a
support battalion commander may, because he has centralized
command and control over many of the SBCT’s CSS assets,
compensate for anticipated or realized shortfalls by cross-leveling or
redirecting idle or under-utilized assets from other SBCT support
assets. He may direct other units within the SBCT if CSS requirements
exceed the FMC’s capabilities. If additional required support is not
available at the brigade level, the commander may call upon higher
echelons within the CSS C2 structure for support. Higher echelon CSS
commanders enjoy the same surge capabilities with centralized C2
over CSS assets.
Increased Velocity
8-31. Increased velocity refers to the time required to move supplies,
equipment, and capability from the strategic base through the
distribution system to the end user. Time is critical for a force
projection Army. Increased velocity has made reductions in the CSS
battlefield footprint, in terms of personnel, equipment, and supplies
possible. The increased velocity concept relies on effective C2 provided
by unity of command coupled with situational understanding. The
following key principles relate directly to increased velocity:
• Maximum use of throughput.
• Minimizing load handling.
• Configured loads.
• Scheduled delivery.
• Time definite delivery (TDD).
• Velocity management.
8-32. Maximum Use of Throughput. This is throughput distribution

that bypasses one or more echelons in the system to minimize
handling and speed delivery. A distribution-based CSS system
emphasizes the use of containerization, to include palletization and
packaging (within material handling equipment constraints), to
accommodate the support to the AO and improve velocity. Velocity is
achieved by the throughput of resources from the sustaining base to
tactical-level support organizations as much as possible. Throughput
to AOs is the leveraging of configured loads, containerization,
information, force structure design, technological enablers, and C2
relationships to deliver sustainment from the operational level directly
to the customer or its DS unit; bypassing intermediate, general
support (GS) or DS units. Whenever possible, national strategic-level
CSS elements will use throughput to prepare resources for direct, time
definite delivery to a supply support activity/tactical assembly area in
an AO. Velocity is achieved by the throughput of resources from the
sustaining base to tactical-level support organizations. Direct
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
throughput relies on unity of command and situational understanding.

Resources will be throughput from EAB to the BSB.
8-33. Minimizing Load Handling. This is leveraging configured
loads, containerization, information, force structure design,
technological enablers, and C2 relationships in order to reduce the
number of times sustainment is handled by multiple echelons and
support units between the strategic provider and the ultimate
customer. In the SBCT, the goal is to minimize material handling,
transloading, and storage requirements to improve velocity throughout
in the distribution pipeline. New transportation technology, such as
the palletized loading system (PLS), load handling system (LHS),
container roll-in, roll-out platforms (CROP), and the “slip sheet,” can
significantly reduce handling requirements over break-bulk methods.
For example, with full off-road capabilities, and no material handling
equipment requirements for loading or off-loading flatracks of supplies,
both the PLS and LHS are capable of delivering configured loads
directly from EAB to the end user (see Figure 8-1).
8-34. Configured Load. This is a single or multi-commodity load of
supplies built to the anticipated or actual needs of a consuming unit,
thereby facilitating throughput to the lowest echelon, METT-TC
dependent. Whenever and wherever possible, configured loads will
leverage the efficiencies of containerization and capabilities of CROP
platforms. Configured loads are not, by definition, combat loads or
basic loads, though it is likely they may contain individual items that
comprise all or part of either.
8-35. Configured loads of all types are an essential element of
distribution-based CSS. Successful implementation of configured loads
requires situational understanding and the ability to make appropriate
forecasts at various points on the planning time continuum. The intent
of configured loads is to—
• Increase throughput.
• Minimize handling.
• Reduce the logistic footprint.
• Physically speed the flow of supplies to the consumer.
8-10
Figure 8-1. Transportation Handlers
8-36. The three types of configured loads are explained as follows:

• Strategic Configured Load. A strategic configured loan
(SCL) is a configured load built outside of the theater of
operations in the continental US (CONUS), or sanctuary,
to anticipated requirements of a consuming unit. Strategic
configured loads will leverage the robust capabilities of the
sustaining base to conduct resource-intensive
configuration missions, thereby minimizing the CSS
footprint in a theater of operations that would otherwise
be required to perform those missions. It is essential that
these loads be configured to suit the needs of the
consuming unit and not merely for the convenience of the
source of supply or the distribution system. Typically,
SCLs will not be built for a specific named unit or
destination, but rather for a “type unit” conducting a
particular “type” mission in the theater of operations. In
addition, replenishments for consolidated supply support
activities (SSA) should be SCLs in which case the loads
are configured to meet the combined expected demands of
that consolidated SSA’s customers. This replenishment
philosophy is applicable to any commodity. The
distribution manager at the operational level will use
information in the operational plan (task organizations,
phases, postures, etc.) to anticipate the quantity and type
of SCLs that are likely to be required throughout the
planning process. These requirements must be
communicated to the sustaining base with enough lead
time to take full advantage of the use of strategic sealift.
In most cases, because of their anticipatory nature, SCLs
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
will not exactly meet a consuming unit’s requirement, but

rather satisfy the unit’s needs to a reasonable confidence
level. Accordingly, SCLs cannot be the sole source of
replenishment for most customers. Consumption and
equipment usage data must be collected over time to
continuously obtain information with which to make more
accurate forecasts of SCL configurations and
requirements.
• Mission Configured Loan. A mission configured load
(MCL) is a configured load with all of the characteristics of
an SCL except that it is built inside a theater of operations
for a specific mission, unit, or other purpose (e.g., an
artillery raid, emergency resupply, etc.). An MCL is
normally configured using resources (personnel,
equipment, and supplies) found at an intermediate staging
base or in a hub in the corps or theater area, if
established. Occasionally, an MCL may be configured from
retrograde materiel not consumed from a previously
distributed SCL (doing so may reduce the demand for
SCLs in the strategic pipeline). It will not normally be
configured from one or more SCLs.
• Unit Configured Load (UCL). A UCL is a configured load
built to the known requirements of a consuming unit.
These loads are normally built in a corps forward hub for
a specific consuming unit. UCLs are built in response to
actual requisitions or as determined by the BSB support
operations officer (SPO) as materiel needed to satisfy
immediate requirements (e.g., Class IX for a CRT). The
UCL will most likely be the logistics packages (LOGPAC)
delivered to the squadron and/or troops.
8-37. Scheduled Delivery. This involves movement of resources from

the supporting organization to the supported units at agreed-upon
time intervals. Distribution managers at each echelon coordinate with
the supported unit to establish scheduled delivery times for routine
replenishment. Generally, this would include items such as bulk fuel,
ammunition, and operational rations. The quantities delivered differ
based upon the supported unit’s operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and the
distribution system’s ability to respond. Items that maneuver units
request may also be sent on scheduled delivery runs, provided time
definite delivery standards (see below) are achieved. Scheduled
deliveries facilitate scheduling main supply route (MSR) use, receiving
operations at the supported units, and synchronization of effort
throughout the distribution system.
8-38. Time Definite Delivery. This is a commitment between the
CSS manager and the supported commander and specifies order-ship
times within which specified commodities requested by the supported
unit must be delivered. The commander responsible for both the
supporting and supported organizations establishes the TDD as part of
the distribution plan. TDD parameters are normally expressed in terms
of hours or days for each major commodity. Establishing order-ship
times involves making trade-offs between responsiveness and the
8-12
length of LOCs. If the commander wants to establish shorter TDD

schedules, he has to accept larger stockage levels forward on the
battlefield and/or shorter LOCs with an accompanying loss of flexibility
and agility. The TDD for Class III(B) resupply from EAB to a BSB
supply point may be established at 18 hours. This TDD is based upon
the Army Forces (ARFOR) commander’s operational plans, METT-TC
situation and constraints, the supported unit’s requirements and
desires, and overall corps concept of support. If the BSB requires a
Class III(B) delivery other than its normal scheduled delivery, the
BSB’s commander and planners know that they can expect delivery
within 18 hours of their request and can plan accordingly. The TDD is
directly linked to both situational awareness and an agile CSS force
structure.
8-39. Velocity Management. This is a related initiative associated
with speed of the CSS system. It is a management program aimed at
improving Army CSS processes. Instead of looking at functions,
velocity management looks at processes, for example, the processes of
ordering and receiving a spare part or repairing a piece of equipment.
Processes cut across CSS functions. The goal is to get support to the
unit more quickly by streamlining processes while also seeking to
improve quality and lower costs.
SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
8-40. The final factor that enables an agile CSS force to focus a
distribution-based system to responsively meet the needs of the
operational commander is situational understanding. Situational
understanding is the complete understanding of the friendly situation,
the threat situation, and the CSS situation through the use of
advanced, seamless information technology. Key elements of
situational understanding are discussed below.
8-41. Situational understanding is the ability to identify CSS and
operational data at all echelons in near-real time to provide
commanders and CSS managers the same battlefield picture.
Leveraging force structure designs, advanced automation, information,
and communications capabilities are key to fusing operational and
CSS data to create situational understanding of the battlefield, which
in turn facilitates optimal CSS operations. This applies to both tactics
and CSS and to commanders and CSS personnel at all echelons from
the tactical to the strategic level. Commanders and distribution
managers at all levels must have access to the same information at the
same time in order to have unity of command and unity of effort. The
seamless information network combined with in-transit visibility and
integrated Standard Army Management and Information System
(STAMIS) provide a common operational picture (COP).
8-42. An integrated STAMIS is one that incorporates multiple types of
functionality within a single system and can share database
information between functionalities. Global Combat Service Support-
Army (GCSS-A) is an example of an integrated STAMIS. It will have
interfaces with other CSS automated systems in order for users to have
access to the maximum amount of information with the minimum
amount of data entry.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
8-43. A seamless information network is the ability to autonomously

exchange large volumes of information across data platforms such as
GCSS-Army and Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS),
and between multiple echelons of command from the tactical to the
strategic level. A seamless information network is defined as an
autonomous data exchange between systems and levels of command.
It provides the fusion of operational and CSS data. A seamless
information network provides the COP and in-transit visibility that
makes distribution-based CSS operations and split-based operations
possible. It also enhances the security of CSS assets by providing
situational understanding of the threat situation and friendly situation
across levels of command as well as across battlefield operating
systems.
8-44. Timely and accurate asset visibility information is necessary to
distribute assets on time, which maintains the critical confidence in
the distribution system. Visibility begins at the point where resources
start their movement to the AO, wherever that point is. The
information is digitized and entered into CSS information systems.
Critical to visibility is the capability to dynamically update that source
data with updates from subsequent CSS systems as to the status of
that resource until it arrives at its ultimate destination.
8-45. In-transit visibility is the leveraging of advanced automation,
information, and communications capabilities to track cargo and
personnel while en route from origin to destination. In-transit visibility
is the most essential component of distribution management. In fact,
distribution managers dedicate most of their work to gaining and
maintaining visibility of all the various assets, processes, and
capabilities throughout the distribution pipeline. As summarized from
FM 4-01.4
[FM 100-10-1], “Visibility is a positive indicator that the distribution
pipeline is responsive to customer needs.” Experience has shown that
Army leaders must be confident in the supporter’s ability to sustain
them. Timely and accurate visibility information provides logisticians
necessary information to distribute assets on time, thus maintaining
high confidence levels. Visibility is based on a continuum of CSS data
from the sustainment base into and through the distribution processes
of the distribution system (factory to foxhole). Visibility must begin at
the point where materiel starts its movement to the theater of
operations, be that a depot or commercial vendor or a storage facility in
another theater or war reserve stockpile. The information must be
digitized and subsequently entered into the necessary CSS information
systems. The next critical element to visibility is the capability to
dynamically update that source data with updates from subsequent
CSS systems as to the transport, storage, maintenance, or supply
status of that particular item/shipment until it is received at the
ultimate consumer location. The information must be accessible to all
users regardless of the service or echelon of command requiring the
data.
8-46. Near-real time information is the ability to autonomously
exchange large volumes of information within an information network
as the data is created at the point of origination. Near-real time refers
to the ability to capture events in the information network as they are
8-14
happening, allowing the logistician to act almost immediately to the

changing situation.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CHARACTERISTICS

8-47. Sustainment enables the squadron commander to accomplish
the wide range of tasks he may be assigned. The logistics tail must not
needlessly inhibit the operations of the squadron. To meet this
challenge, CSS leaders are guided by five imperatives when planning or
executing:
• Anticipation.
• Integration.
• Continuity.
• Responsiveness.
• Improvisation.
8-48. CSS leaders must not only support the ongoing operation but
also anticipate future events and requirements. The S4 must anticipate
the needs of the unit as an operation is occurring, coordinate to push
support forward, keep the commander abreast of CSS status and
capabilities, and keep the support echelons informed of requirements.
If the CSS system becomes reactive, support will be too late. The S4
must immediately begin planning when he receives the warning order
(WARNO) and fragmentary orders (FRAGO). He must determine
support requirements, coordinate changes to support relationships,
and alert the supporting units to new trains positions to maintain the
flow of support.
8-49. Commanders and staffs must integrate CSS into the planning
process. At troop level the commander, executive officer (XO), and the
first sergeant (1SG) do this. At squadron level, the S4 has staff
responsibility and works with the squadron commander, XO, S3, and
headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT) commander to ensure
integration occurs. CSS leaders must identify sustainment problems
during the estimate process and before the operation starts.
Discussing CSS in maneuver and in fire support rehearsals is a highly
recommended method to ensure the CSS plan is integrated and all
planners and executors outside of the CSS arena (commanders, battle
captains, S2, etc.) know of the plan.
8-50. Sustainment efforts are continuous. CSS is never in reserve.
Support is continuous during preparations before an operation begins,
during the operation, and afterwards as the squadron reconstitutes or
prepares for another mission. Operator and organizational
maintenance and repair work is done whenever the opportunity exists.
Repairing and returning damaged equipment to the fight requires early
diagnosis and identification of faults and is done as far forward as
possible. Vulnerability and limited cross-country mobility of CSS
vehicles dictate the predominant use of road and trail networks.
Continuous CSS operations require careful personnel management to
provide sustained effort. Local security, routine details, and operator
maintenance all compete for time with CSS operations. Fatigue can
8-15
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
quickly degrade the effectiveness of soldiers who must simultaneously

provide continuous support to the squadron and maintain their own
equipment. Carefully planned and strictly enforced rest plans help to
ensure continuous support.
8-51. Responsiveness is the ability to meet changing or unforeseen
requirements on short notice. The CSS system must be as agile as the
maneuver system to allow the commander to successfully seize
opportunities or exploit tactical success.
8-52. Improvising is essential as CSS leaders seek to solve significant,
often unanticipated problems. These problems may be caused by
threat action against the support system, mass casualties and
destruction of maneuver assets, environmental conditions of the AO, or
disruptions of C2. Normal operating procedures may be suspended
and extraordinary measures taken to overcome the problem. Agility,
initiative, and ingenuity on the part of CSS leaders are essential.
8-53. These imperatives should be encompassed in standing
operating procedures (SOPs) as they establish the focus for
organization and operations of the CSS system. FM 3-0 [FM 100-5] and
FM 4-0
[FM 100-10] provide background on these imperatives.
TACTICAL COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

8-54. Tactical CSS involves six essential functions: manning, arming,
fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems.
8-55. Manning involves the personnel support activities that ensure
the commander has the personnel required to accomplish the mission.
It involves the management of personnel readiness, replacements, and
casualties. Personnel managers coordinate with materiel and
movement managers and with medical and mortuary affairs systems to
ensure the right people are where they need to be at the right time.
8-56. Arming the squadron is important to ensure the squadron can
protect itself when it physically contacts a threat force. Maintaining the
unit basic load (UBL) of ammunition according to load plans on all
combat and support vehicles within the squadron is key to ensuring it
is properly armed. The arming system must be able to meet the needs
of the squadron through integration of supply, transportation, and
maintenance functions.
8-57. Fueling is the provision of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL)
to the squadron. Tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in the
surveillance troop provide a unique challenge due to its atypical fuel
usage (motor gasoline [MOGAS]). Due to the BSB’s limited ability to
distribute fuel to the squadron, maintaining POL UBL according to
vehicle load plans will ensure the squadron has adequate fuel. All
operations depend on movement of personnel, equipment, and
supplies as well as the operation of equipment. Those activities are
possible if logisticians are able to accurately forecast and effectively
provide the fuel to meet the squadron’s needs when required.
8-58. Fixing the force is a vital component of ensuring maximum
availability of scarce equipment to the commander. Fixing entails
8-16
maintaining, recovering, repairing, and evacuating equipment. The

BSB’s ability to conduct maintenance is limited to battle damage
assessment and repair (BDAR), controlled substitution, extremely
limited component replacement, and the use of any available floats. It
also has limited communications, missile, LRUs, electronics, and
power generation repair. Operator preventive maintenance checks and
services (PMCS) cannot be stressed enough, and are essential to
sustaining equipment and maintaining the squadron’s operational
readiness. Prompt recovery and repair by maintenance personnel and
the operators are critical to keep systems operational and to reduce
turnaround time. Battle damage assessment (BDA) and evacuation
keep the squadron effort focused within its capabilities and recoverable
equipment in the support system. Managing the limited repair parts is
another critical part of fixing.
8-59. Moving is inherent in all operations. Moving the force
specifically relates to the planning and execution of the movement of
soldiers, equipment, and supplies to and from the squadron. It
includes movement within the squadron as well as to and from the
support echelons. The limited transportation assets and the road
networks they use must be managed with maximum efficiency. All
vehicle movements should be planned in advance to ensure time and
cargo space are maximized, to include tactical and support vehicles.
8-60. Sustaining soldiers involves the provision of a wide range of
services and supplies. Quality of life for the soldier is a command
responsibility. It has a considerable effect on the soldier’s readiness
and willingness to conduct missions. It is associated with all the
services that directly ease his personal concerns, including personnel
service, combat health, field service, and general supply support.
Quality of life also depends on the knowledge that a soldier’s family is
receiving care. Soldier sustainment involves the systems listed below.
FM 3-0 [FM 100-5], FM 4-0 [FM 100-10], and FM 4-93.1 [FM 63-1]
discuss these systems in detail.
• Personnel services support. This support enhances soldier
performance by providing services that bolster his morale
and his sense of well-being. Specific functions include
personnel services, religious support, legal service
support, finance services, and resource management.
• Combat health support (CHS). CHS provides a continuum
of health care from all locations throughout a theater to
the CONUS base.
• Field service support. This consists of a variety of
capabilities designed to provide essential services and to
enhance a soldier’s quality of life during operations. It
includes food preparation, water purification, mortuary
affairs support, airdrop support, laundry and shower
services, and clothing and light textile repair.
SECTION II – BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION
8-17
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
8-61. The BSB provides DS to the squadron by providing the

maintenance and support sections (see Figure 8-2). The BSB
commander is the SBCT commander’s single CSS operator. The
battalion staff manages sustainment operations through both digital
and analog communications. Due to the SBCT’s reduced CSS assets,
augmentation from either a division or corps is required for continuous
operations or major deployments over 72 hours. The BSB includes
three organic companies and one augmented company from a division
support commander (DISCOM) if operating under a division, which
consolidates organizational and DS CSS elements.
• Headquarters and distribution company (HDC).
• FMC.
• Brigade support medical company (BSMC).
• Combat service support company (CSSC) (augmented).
Figure 8-2. Brigade Support Battalion Organization
8-62. The following paragraphs will briefly discuss the functions of

the major elements in the BSB. For greater discussion refer to
FM 4-93.1 [FM 63-1].
8-18
HEADQUARTERS AND DISTRIBUTION COMPANY

8-63. The HDC (see Figure 8-3) provides all classes of supply,
excluding perishable Class VIII for the squadron (those items provided
by or through the BSMC), utilizing supply point distribution. The HDC
contains the primary C2 elements for SBCT’s CSS operations.
8-64. The elements of the HDC are—
• BSB headquarters.
Command and staff section.
Company headquarters section.
Support operations/distribution management center
(DMC).
• Transportation platoon.
• Fuel and water support platoon.
Fuel support section.
Water support section.
• Supply support platoon.
Supply support section.
Repair parts section.
Ammunition transfer point (ATP) section.
Figure 8-3. Headquarters and Distribution Company Organization
BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION HEADQUARTERS SECTION

8-65. The primary elements in the headquarters section are the
command and staff section, the support operations section, and DMC.
The command and staff section supervises and coordinates the
8-19
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
activities of the subordinate units and advises the SBCT commander

on issues relating to CSS. While the command and staff section
provides mostly battalion internal support, the support operations
section and DMC coordinate CSS for the units external to the BSB.
Command and Staff Section
8-66. The BSB commander commands all units organic or attached
to the battalion and has C2 of all elements in the brigade support area
(BSA) for security and terrain management. The battalion staff
primarily plans and coordinates activities internal to the support
battalion.
Support Operations
8-67. The SPO is the principal staff officer for coordinating CSS to the
supported units and is the primary interface between the support
battalion and the squadron. The SPO collocates with the SBCT S1/S4
in the SBCT rear CP. Duties of the SPO include—
• Coordinate and direct external support requirements.
• Provide technical expertise to the squadron.
• Synchronize support requirements.
• Plan and monitor support operations and make necessary
adjustments to ensure support requirements are met.
• Request and coordinate with DISCOM/Corps Support
Command (COSCOM) SPO for assets or augmentation.
Distribution Management Center

8-68. The DMC serves as the distribution management support
element for the BSB. It synchronizes operations within the distribution
system to maximize throughput and follow-on sustainment and
ensures priorities are executed in accordance with directives. The
DMC’s additional activities include—
• Synchronizing the operations of the BSB’s elements,
including limited contracting, medical logistics, and
transportation.
• Planning and coordinating all mortuary affairs.
• Monitoring daily battle loss reports to anticipate
requirements.
• Working closely with the SPO to become the “fusion
center” for distribution-related activities.
8-69. The BSB’s distribution capability is very limited. Maximum use

of regionally available commercial, joint, and intra-theater airlift assets
(i.e., locally available trucks and C-130s) are required for sustained
operations. The BSB’s distribution manager synchronizes delivery
schedules with the squadron to minimize the offload/upload time.
With FBCB2, CSSCS, and the movement tracking system (MTS) control
station to manage long haul sustainment, the distribution manager
can give specific coordinating instructions to vehicle operators without
having to rely on manned control points. The BSB movement manager
8-20
also transfers information between the SBCT S4 and the squadron

S4/HDC to schedule and synchronize transportation requirements
within or in direct support of squadron operations.
TRANSPORTATION PLATOON
8-70. The transportation platoon (Figure 8-4) provides limited
transportation support and distribution to the squadron and battalions
in the SBCT. Their priorities are coordinated with the SBCT S4.
Transportation Platoon
Transportation Platoon Headquarters
Distribution Team
Figure 8-4. Transportation Platoon Organization
8-71. The capabilities of the platoon include—

• Transport Class I, II, III, IIIP, IV, V, VI, and IX supplies to
the squadron, and in some situations, the troop level.
• Fourteen primary cargo vehicles (HEMTT [heavy expanded
mobile tactical truck]-LHS) equipped with FBCB2 and an
MTS.
• Fourteen PLS trailers and 28 CROPs.
• Transport up to 308 short tons (STON) in one lift
(estimated one day of supply for the SBCT is 195 STONs).
8-72. Limitations include—

• Heavily tasked assets due to lack of transportation at
squadron/battalion level.
• Reliance on host nation and/or commercial support for
transportation between the aerial port of debarkation
(APOD) and the BSB.
• Limited internal security.
• No capability to transport troops.
FUEL AND WATER SUPPORT PLATOON

8-73. The mission of the fuel and water support platoon
(Figure 8-5) is to provide retail fuel (Class IIIB) and potable water to the
squadron and battalions.
8-21
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Headquarters and Distribution Company

Fuel and Water Support Platoon
Headquarters Water Support Fuel Support

Section Section Section
Figure 8-5. Fuel and Water Support Platoon Organization
8-74. The capabilities of the platoon include—

• Fourteen HEMTTs for fuel (35,000 gallons).
• Six HEMTTs for water (15,000 gallons).
• Receive, store, and issue up to 50,000 gallons of fuel.
• Maintain one tactical water purification system, one
lightweight water purifier, and one 2,000-gallon capacity
LHS water tank rack.

• Eighteen fuel handlers/14 vehicles, which equates to one
man per vehicle.
• Limited 24-hour operations.
SUPPLY SUPPORT PLATOON

8-76. The supply support platoon (Figure 8-6) receives, stores, and
issues Class I, II, IIIP, IV, V, VII, IX, and bottled water supplies,
including purifying and providing bulk water.
Supply Support Platoon
Ammunition
Supply Support Repair Part
Transfer Point
Section Section
Section
Figure 8-6. Supply Support Platoon Organization
8-77. The capabilities of the supply support platoon include—

• Up to three retail water distribution points.
• Up to 5,000 gallons of bulk purified water daily.
• Store up to 22,500 gallons of bulk purified water.
• Limited general supply storage.
8-22
• Distribute 138 STONs of Class V per day from the ATP.

• Receive, store, and issue the SBCT’s authorized stockage
list (ASL) of Class IX.

• No ration refrigeration capability.
• May require a bulk water contract.
• Limited bulk water distribution to the squadron and
battalions.
• Class IV limited to barrier and survivability materiel only.
• Cannot receive Class V that is not preconfigured into
combat configured loads (CCL).
8-79. The brigade ammunition officer (BAO) establishes and operates

the ATP (Figure 8-7), which is resident in the supply support platoon of
the HDC. In addition, the BAO—
• Coordinates ammunition activities with both higher and
supported ammunition personnel/S4s.
• Monitors and cross-levels stocks.
• Monitors supply status data/accountability on munitions
stock at the ATP.
• Provides technical assistance and monitors ammunition
surveillance.
• Consolidates SBCT ammunition requirements.
• Validates ammunition requests.
8-80. The ATP receives and stores ammunition for the SBCT. A small
section, with a total of three HEMTT-LHSs, mans the ATP. The ATP
can, on a daily basis, perform the following functions:
• Receive 62 STONs.
• Store 14 STONs.
• Issue 62 STONs.
8-23
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-7. Ammunition Transfer Point Organization
8-81. The ATP personnel are responsible for—

• Class V compatibility.
• Safety.
• Accountability.
• Emergency destruction of Class V.
• Relocating the ATP (BSB transportation assets will assist
the ATP section, if required, to relocate).
8-82. Due to the limited assets, the ATP section does not deliver
Class V, build a large amount of configured loads, or conduct fire
fighting.
FORWARD MAINTENANCE COMPANY

8-83. The FMC provides all maintenance support for the SBCT
excluding medical and automation (support assets for those areas are
provided by the BSMC and brigade signal company/signal officer [S6],
respectively). The FMC can perform the following repairs, though
somewhat limited in numbers to support the entire SBCT:
• Automotive.
• Armament.
• Missile.
• Communications.
• Special devices.
• Power generation.
• LRU.
8-24
8-84. Support is provided by—

• Field maintenance (organizational and DS).
• Management of maintenance supply spares (prescribed
load list [PLL] and shop stock).
• Resupply of Class IX and Class VII from EAB on a daily
basis, unless directed otherwise by higher headquarters.
8-85. Augmentation is required to accomplish more than 45 percent

of the anticipated workload. The company relies on the HDC for
movement and distribution management of repair parts and major end
items. The primary methods of returning systems to a mission capable
status are through the use of combat spares, BDAR, controlled
substitution, cannibalization, and Class VI spares. The BSB
commander or delegated representative approves Class VII exchanges
for critical SBCT assets determined by the SBCT commander.
8-86. The FMC consists of (see Figure 8-8)—
• Headquarters section.
• Maintenance control, recovery, and classification platoon.
Maintenance control section.
Recovery section.
Classification section.
CRTs – five total (one per squadron and battalions).
• Automotive repair platoon.
• Maintenance support platoon.
Platoon headquarters.
Armament repair section.
Ground support section.
Missile/electronic section.
8-25
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-8. Forward Maintenance Company Organization
FORWARD MAINTENANCE COMPANY HEADQUARTERS SECTION

8-87. The headquarters section locates in the BSA where it provides
C2 for all assigned or attached FMC personnel and coordinates for the
company internal support.
MAINTENANCE CONTROL, RECOVERY, AND CLASSIFICATION PLATOON
Maintenance Control Section

8-88. The maintenance control section provides the control,
coordination, and overall supervision of the maintenance shops, unit
maintenance area, CRTs, and maintenance support teams (Figure 8-9).
The maintenance control officer ensures the section accomplishes its
mission and serves as the primary coordinator for the maintenance
effort. He also dispatches maintenance support teams to provide
forward support and creates CRTs tailored to support task-organized
maneuver elements.
8-89. In additional to the maintenance control officer, the section
includes the following personnel:
• Maintenance control sergeant.
• Two equipment recovery/parts sergeants.
• Two equipment recovery/parts specialists.
8-26
Figure 8-9. Maintenance Control Section
8-90. The section performs and is responsible for—

• Job ordering.
• Equipment accountability.
• Quality control.
8-91. The maintenance control section is unable to conduct the

following functions:
• Daily dispatching.
• Ordering non-deadline parts until augmentation is
emplaced.
• Licensing drivers.
Recovery Section
8-92. The recovery section (Figure 8-10) provides recovery support to
all elements of the SBCT, to include recovery of the—
• HEMTT.
• High mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV).
• Medium and light-wheeled vehicles, to include trailers.
8-27
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-10. Recovery Section
8-93. The recovery section will perform recovery operations at the

breakdown site, or from an intermediate coordinated location within
the battlespace, depending on METT-TC and the availability of recovery
assets. The recovery section accomplishes its mission by performing—
• Damage assessment.
• Initial damage classification.
• Minor cutting necessary to make a disabled vehicle
moveable.
• Recovery of battle damaged equipment to the BSA.
• Recovery of non-repairable damaged equipment to the
collection and classification section for further
classification or cannibalization for combat spares.
• Recovery of components and major assemblies from
vehicles not capable of recovering to the BSA.
Classification Section
8-94. The classification section classifies inoperative and damaged
equipment according to condition codes. The classification is made in
accordance with the technical manuals, bulletins, and directives from
higher headquarters. The inspection normally occurs in the BSA, after
either the recovery section or CRT recovers the item. The primary
function of the section is to identify the extent of repairs required and
to determine whether the item is worth repairing and where repairs
can be accomplished. The section then determines the proper
disposition of the item.
8-28
Combat Repair Team

8-95. The squadron and battalion’s first level of maintenance support
comes from the CRT (Figure 8-11). It is organized to provide field
maintenance for all combat platforms organic to the recce
(reconnaissance) troops. The CRT operates under the operational
control of the squadron S4 and performs repairs as far forward as
possible. The focus of the CRT is to perform limited on-site
maintenance and return disabled equipment to service.
Figure 8-11. Combat Repair Team
8-96. CRT emphasis is placed on—

• Troubleshooting.
• Diagnosing malfunctions.
• Fixing the equipment by component replacement.
8-97. The CRT performs the following functions:

• Diagnostics.
• On-system replacement of LRUs and secondary
components.
• Minor repair and replacement (drive belts, hoses, tires).
• Electrical repair.
• Quick welding and cutting.
• Controlled substitution as directed by the squadron
commander or designated representative.
8-29
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Vehicle recovery from the troop to the combat trains area.

8-98. The CRT carries a limited amount of the following:
• Combat spares.
• Assembled replacement tires.
• Class IIIP.
8-99. If repairs are beyond the capability or resources of the CRT or

are limited by METT-TC, the equipment is recovered to the BSA for
additional maintenance or disposition. The CRT notifies the
maintenance control section (MCS) on equipment status, and the MCS
directs assets from the recovery section to recover the disable vehicle to
the wheeled vehicle repair platoon in the BSA for continued
maintenance or the MCS/collection and classification section for
further classification and disposition.
AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR PLATOON

8-100. The automotive repair platoon provides field maintenance for
the organic wheeled vehicles in the SBCT from within the BSA (Figure
8-12). The automotive repair platoon provides back-up maintenance to
the CRTs and employs the “replace forward/fix rear” maintenance
philosophy. There are primarily three ways a disabled vehicle can
make it to the repair platoon:
• A recovery section wrecker.
• A CRT wrecker.
• Like vehicle self-recovery by the squadron.
Figure 8-12. Automotive Repair Platoon Organization
8-30
8-101. The automotive vehicle repair platoon performs maintenance

by—
• Troubleshooting vehicle equipment and components.
• Expedient welding (non-structural welding).
• Major component replacement.
• Secondary component replacement.
• LRU replacement.
• Tire replacement and repair.
• Removing/replacing parts obtained from controlled
substitution or cannibalization.
• Maintaining a limited amount of combat spares (PLL and
shop stock).
8-102. Maintenance is expedited and simplified by leveraging

diagnostics/prognostics technology to diagnose major component
failure and then replacing bad defective components. Nonrepairable
vehicles are recovered to the classification section, where they are
further classified and evacuated out of the BSA or used at the
cannibalization point for combat spares.
MAINTENANCE SUPPORT PLATOON

8-103. The maintenance support platoon consists of a headquarters
and three sections:
• Platoon headquarters.
• Armament repair section.
• Ground support equipment repair section.
• Missile/electronic repair section.
Platoon Headquarters
8-104. The platoon headquarters coordinates the activities of the
platoon with platoons of the FMC.
Armament Repair Section

8-105. The armament repair section provides field maintenance
support to all of the SBCT units. The MCS makes the determination on
dispatching an armament maintenance support team (MST) to make
forward repairs or have the equipment evacuated to the BSA. If the
MST is deployed and it cannot repair the equipment on site, it will
initiate evacuation procedures. When equipment is evacuated to the
BSA, the armament section will attempt to repair the fault. If the fault
cannot be fixed, the MCS will recommend one or more of the following:
• Class VII exchange.
• Controlled substitution.
• Cannibalization.
• Evacuation to higher maintenance.
8-31
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
8-106. If an item is repaired, it will be returned to the squadron. If it is

evacuated, a replacement is ordered and proper equipment property
accounting is adjusted.
8-107. The armament repair section can repair the following types of
equipment:
• Armament.
• Turret.
• Fire control systems.
• Small arms.
• Artillery/mortar systems.
Ground Support Equipment Repair Section

8-108. The ground support equipment repair section primarily works
from the BSA and provides field level maintenance for all the SBCT’s
equipment such as—
• Nonvehicular environmental control.
• Engineer equipment.
8-109. Power generation personnel perform limited maintenance on

POL and water purification pump engines. The section relies heavily on
Class VII combat spares to maintain equipment.
Missile/Electronic Repair Section
8-110. The missile/electronic repair section provides field
maintenance to the SBCT missile and electronic equipment/weapon
systems. The section has two distinctly separate missions. Support
maintenance for electronic systems is aligned to the base shop, with
limited ability for repair forward of the base, while missile support
maintenance requires contact and BSA operations.
8-111. The base shop consists of two shops—one improved contact
support set mounted on a medium tactical vehicle (MTV) 5-ton cargo
with a 15-kilowatt generator, and one night-sight maintenance facility
mounted on an MTV 5-ton cargo. The base shop does the following:
• Inspect/diagnose faults.
• Classify item for repair or evacuation.
• Perform night-sight alignments with minor repairs.
8-112. Missile Support. The missile support mission has limitations

based on manpower, equipment, and Class IX. DS scheduled
maintenance will not be performed. Unless time permits or personnel
and equipment are augmented, the following tasks are not performed:
• Annual verification of optical sights.
• TOW II weapon system 180-day verification.
• Major LRU repairs.
8-32
8-113. Electronic Maintenance. All electronic maintenance repairs

are METT-TC dependent. Maintenance support for electronic
equipment within the SBCT will be performed at the communications
and electronics (C&E) shop and through a radar MST (Figure 8-13).
The C&E shop consists of four subordinate sections:
• Radio/COMSEC: utilizes an ASM-146 electronic shelter
mounted on an MTV 5-ton cargo truck. This shop
conducts maintenance on supported radio and ancillary
equipment (i.e., Single Channel Ground-Airborne Radar
System [SINCGARS]).
• Radar: utilizes an ASM-146 shelter, but on occasion will
be required to perform contact operations forward of the
BSA.
• Special devices: performs maintenance on night vision
devices from an ASM-146 shelter.
• Computer: The S6 section uses an ASM-147 shelter for
maintenance repair on automation systems. Computer
repair personnel will perform diagnostic and
troubleshooting methods on certain STAMIS warranty
computer systems. The location of the computer section
will vary (BSA or SBCT tactical operations center [TOC])
depending on unit SOP.
Figure 8-13. Electronic Maintenance Section Organization
8-114. The C&E shop is responsible for—

• Diagnostics.
• Troubleshooting.
• Maintenance for supported electronic systems.
8-33
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
8-34
8-115. C&E maintenance repairs consists of—

• Circuit card assembly.
• Modular and single component replacement to determine
if immediate repairs can be performed.
• Limited on-site maintenance based on priority of repair.
8-116. Inoperable equipment is reported to the FMC MCS. The MCS

will dispatch a radar MST (radar repair personnel, HMMWV, and
individual tool kit) to the squadron. The MST will conduct
inspection/diagnosis, repairs, and major modular replacements.
Unserviceable subassemblies or equipment requiring more time-
consuming maintenance and resources will be evacuated to the BSA
and higher, if necessary.
BRIGADE SUPPORT MEDICAL COMPANY

8-117. The BSMC provides Echelon II CHS to all units in the SBCT.
The company also provides Echelon I CHS to all units without organic
medical support (See Figure 8-14 for echelons/levels of medical care).
This care is predominantly done from within the BSA. Some of the
primary functions of the company are—
• Treatment of nonbattle and trauma injuries, fatigue, and
disease.
• Routine sick call, triage of mass casualties, and
preparation for further evacuation of non-return to duty
personnel.
• Ground ambulance evacuation from the BSA and
designated collecting points.
• Emergency and sustaining dental care.
• Medical laboratory and radiology services up to Echelon II
capabilities.
• Patient holding for up to 20 patients pending evacuation
or who will return to duty within 72 hours.
• Limited reinforcement to the squadron/battalion’s medical
platoons.
• Class VIII resupply and medical equipment maintenance
for the squadron/battalion’s medical platoons.
• Blood management.
• Combat stress control.
• Reconstitution/regeneration of supported medical
platoons.
8-35
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Echelon of Care
Echelon I (Level I)
a. The first medical care a soldier received is provided at this echelon. This echelon of care includes the following:
immediate lifesaving measures, disease and nonbattle injury prevention, combat stress control preventive measures,
casualty collection, evacuation from support units to supporting medical treatment.
b. Major emphasis of treated is placed on those measures necessary to stabilize and allow for the evacuation of the
patient to the next echelon of care. These measures include: maintain the airway, stop bleeding, prevent shock, protect
wounds, immobile fractures, and other emergency measures as indicated. Those patients not required a higher level of
care are returned to duty.
c. Medical care is provided by an individual (self-aid, buddy aid, combat lifesaver, or combat medic) or by personnel
in a treatment squad.
Echelon II (Level II)

a. This echelon of care include the following: Evacuating patients from Echelon I and providing care at the clearing
station. The casualty is examined; wounds and general status are evaluated; and is treated and returned to duty or
priority for continued evacuation is determined.
b. This echelon of support duplicate Echelon I and expands services available by adding dental, laboratory, x-ray,
and patient holding capabilities. Emergency care, including beginning resuscitation procedures, is continued. (No
general anesthesia is available.) If necessary, additional emergency measures are instituted. Those patients who can
return to duty within 24 to 72 hours are held for treatment.
Echelon III (Level III)

a. This echelon of care includes: evacuating patients form support units; providing care for all categories of
casualties in a medical treatment facility with the proper staff and equipment; provides support on an area bases to
units without organized medical units.
b. This echelon expands the support provided at Echelon II. Casualties who are unable to tolerate and survive
movement over long distances will receive surgical care in a hospital as close to the rear boundary as the tactical
situation will allow. Echelon III characterizes the care that is provided by units such as: mobile army surgical hospitals;
combat support hospitals, and evacuation hospitals. Echelon III units may locate in offshore support facilities or third
country support bases.
Echelon IV (Level IV)

This echelon of care includes: treating casualties in a general hospital and other higher-level facilities staffed and
equipped for general and specialized medical/surgical care. It provide further treatment to stabilize those patients
requiring evacuation to the continental US. Providing area health service support to soldieries within the rear areas.
Zone of Interior (ZI) (Level V)

In ZI health service support, the casualty is treated in ZI hospitals staffed and equipped for the most definitive care
available with the US Army Medical Department (AMEDD) health service support system. Hospitals in the continental
US based represent the final level of health service support.
Figure 8-14. Echelons of Medical Care
8-118. With augmentation (forward support team [FST] from higher) or

collocation with an FST, the BSMC can conduct surgical
resuscitation/stabilization.
8-119. The BSMC is organized as follows:
• Company headquarters.
Command element.
Supply element.
Operations and communications element.
• Preventive medicine (PVNTMED) section.
• Mental health section.
• Medical treatment platoon.
Platoon headquarters.
Treatment squad (includes two treatment teams).
8-36
Area treatment squad (includes two treatment teams).

Area support squad.
Patient holding squad.
• Ambulance platoon.
GS squad.
DS squad.
8-120. Figure 8-15 shows the organization of the BSMC.
Figure 8-15. Brigade Support Medical Company Organization
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS
8-121. The headquarters provides C2 for the company and other
medical augmentation. It also provides general and medical
supply/resupply to its organic and augmented elements. Figure 8-16
shows the organization of the headquarters platoon. The headquarters
platoon can support the squadron/battalion’s medical platoons in the
following two ways:
• Class VIII resupply.
• Medical equipment repair.
8-122. The combat health logistics (CHL) element within the

headquarters, under the supervision of the medical logistics sergeant
(MEDLOG SGT), establishes the CHL distribution point and manages
Class VIII a/b (blood products). The MEDLOG SGT also supervises the
activities of the medical maintenance element.
8-37
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-16. Brigade Support Medical Company Headquarters Organization

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE SECTION
8-123. The PVNTMED section (Figure 8-17) provides medical force
protection. It is responsible for ensuring the preventive medicine
measures are implemented to protect personnel against food, water,
and vector-borne diseases, as well as environmental injuries (e.g., heat
or cold injuries). The section provides advice and consultation in the
areas of—
• Environmental sanitation.
• Epidemiology.
• Entomology.
• Sanitary engineering services.
• Pest management.
8-38
Figure 8-17. BSMC Preventive Medicine Section

8-124. The brigade surgeon will normally task this section. The
squadron S4 or medical platoon leader can request services when
deemed necessary. Common examples of the use of this section are—
• Monitoring/inspecting potable water supplies and
containers.
• Food inspections.
• Monitoring the status of unit’s preventive medicine
measures.
• Ensuring adequate unit field sanitation methods are used.
MENTAL HEALTH SECTION

8-125. The mental health section (Figure 8-18) consists of a behavioral
science officer and a mental health specialist. This section provides
training and advice in the following areas:
• Control of stressors.
• The promotion of positive combat stress behaviors.
• Identification, handling, and management of misconduct
stress behavior and battle fatigue soldiers.
8-126. It also provides stress control training for the squadron and
battalions. The section normally operates within the SBCT clearing
station in the BSA, but it is mobile and can provide its service down to
the squadron level.
8-39
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-18. Brigade Support Medical Company Mental Health Section
MEDICAL TREATMENT PLATOON

8-127. The medical treatment platoon (Figure 8-19) operates the SBCT
clearing station in the BSA. It receives, triages, treats, and determines
the disposition of patients based upon their medical condition. The
platoon is also the alternate command post (CP) for the BSMC. The
platoon also provides professional services in the areas of—
• Minor surgery.
• Internal medicine.
• General medicine.
• General dentistry.
• Diagnostic laboratory and radiological services.
• Patient holding support.
8-40
Figure 8-19. Medical Treatment Platoon Organization
Treatment Platoon Headquarters

8-128. The treatment platoon headquarters, illustrated in Figure 8-20,
directs, coordinates, and supervises platoon operations based on the
CHS plan. The headquarters directs the activities of the clearing
station and monitors the following:
• Class VIII supplies.
• Blood usage.
• Inventory levels.
8-129. The headquarters is responsible for supervising the treatment

platoon support requirements that include—
• Coordinating the movement of treatment teams that are in
DS of other units.
• Working with triaging patients to the FST.
• Updating patient accounting and medical records
reporting.
8-41
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-20. Treatment Platoon Headquarters Organization
Treatment Squad
8-130. The treatment squad (Figure 8-21) provides emergency and
routine sick call treatment for all SBCT personnel. The squad is
deployed in support of combat support (CS)/CSS units, ambulance
exchange points (AXP), and when required, to reinforce the maneuver
medical platoons. The squad has the capability to split into two
independent treatment teams for limited periods of time to provide
better coverage.
8-42
Figure 8-21. Treatment Squad Organization
8-43
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Area Treatment Squad

8-131. The area treatment squad (Figure 8-22) along with the area
support squad and patient holding squad form the SBCT clearing
station. The area treatment squad is the base medical treatment
element of a clearing station. It provides routine sick call services and
initial resuscitative treatment for supported units on an area basis.
The squad is not used to reinforce or reconstitute other medical units
and is not normally used on the area damage control team.
Figure 8-22. Area Treatment Squad Organization
Area Support Squad

8-132. The area support squad (Figure 8-23) includes the dental and
diagnostic support elements of the clearing station. It provides Echelon
II medical treatment. The area support squad is normally staffed with a
dental officer, a dental specialist, a medical laboratory sergeant and
specialist, and an X-ray sergeant and specialist. The dental officer
supervises the activities of the area support squad. The diagnostic
element is composed of a medical laboratory and has field X-ray
capabilities.
8-44
Figure 8-23. Area Support Squad Organization
Patient Holding Squad

8-133. The patient holding squad (Figure 8-24) operates the patient
holding facility of the SBCT clearing station. The holding facility is
staffed and equipped to provide care for up to 20 patients. Normally,
only the patients awaiting evacuation or with minor injuries are placed
in the patient holding area. The patient holding squad works under the
direct supervision of an attending physician. The medical-surgical
nurse assigned to the patient holding squad provides nursing care
supervision and is responsible for the operation of the holding facility.
Patients held at this facility are not counted as hospital admissions. If
recovery is not expected within 72 hours, the patients are sent to a
higher-level (Echelon III) hospital for admission.
8-45
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-24. Patient Holding Squad Organization
AMBULANCE PLATOON
8-134. The ambulance platoon shown in Figure 8-25 performs ground
evacuation and en route patient care for supported units. The
ambulance platoon consists of a platoon headquarters, a DS
evacuation section, and a GS evacuation section. The platoon employs
five ambulance squads (ten ambulance teams). It locates with the
treatment platoon for mutual support. Each ambulance team carries a
medical equipment set designed for medical emergencies and en route
patient care. Ambulances either deploy forward to support the unit aid
stations or to AXPs.
Figure 8-25. Ambulance Platoon Organization
8-46
8-135. The DS and GS ambulance squads (Figures 8-26 and 8-27) are
the primary evacuation elements in the platoon. The squads provide
ground ambulance evacuation support for—
• Each of the maneuver units.
• Elements in the BSA.
• Units receiving area medical support from the BSMC.
8-136. Patients are evacuated from the squadron/battalion’s aid

stations to the BSA, or from the treatment squad/team’s locations
back to the clearing station. Further medical evacuation to Echelon III
hospitals is the responsibility of the next higher echelon.
Figure 8-26. Direct Support Ambulance Squad Organization
8-47
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-
27.
General
Support
Ambulan
ce Squad
Organiza
tion
COMB
AT
SERVI
CE
SUPPO
RT
COMP
ANY –
AUGM
ENTAT
ION
8-137. Due to the BSB’s reliance on augmentation to fully support the
SBCT, the CSSC was designed to package the augmentation into a
single viable unit (see Figure 8-28). It has 293 personnel and is organic
to the main support battalion in the DISCOM of each division that has
an assigned SBCT.
Figure 8-28. Combat Service Support Company Organization

8-138. The company will not initially deploy with the SBCT, but is
expected to arrive within 97 days from the SBCT’s initial deployment.
The CSSC gives the SBCT the ability to—
8-48
• Provide supply distribution down to troop/company level.

• Cook T or A rations.
• Increase maintenance capabilities forward.
BRIGADE SUPPORT AREA

8-139. The BSB forms the BSA. The BSA consists of the subordinate
companies of the BSB and the field trains of all the maneuver
battalions. The support battalion commander is the overall officer in
charge (OIC) of all elements within the BSA. The main CP in the BSA is
the BSB CP. The SBCT S1 and S4 personnel locate with the BSB CP as
the SBCT rear CP. The SBCT rear CP provides the SBCT commander
overall staff supervision of support assets supporting the SBCT. The
BSB CP includes the SPO and normally sets up next to the support
operations section. The collocation provides the SBCT S1/S4 and the
SPO current information on the CSS status in and for the SBCT. The
BSB CP provides CSS to support the tactical mission by—
• Anticipating CSS requirements.
• Requesting supplies and assets.
• Coordinating with higher and supported elements.
• Integrating all of the CSS assets to support the mission.
8-140. Staff coordination occurs between the HHT

commander/squadron S1/S4s, the SBCT S1/S4, and the SPO. FBCB2
and CSSCS allow for the connectivity and visibility of assets and
support for current and future operations.
8-141. Listed are some common elements or services found in the
BSA:
• BSB CP.
• SBCT rear CP.
• FMC CP.
• Squadron field trains CP (FTCP) and combat trains CP
(CTCP (+)).
• Points for each class of supply (augmentation dependent
for Class VI and VIII).
• Water point.
• ATP.
• Mortuary affairs collection point.
• Maintenance shops.
• Brigade support medical company.
• Medical clearing station.
• Squadron/battalion trains.
• Enemy prisoner of war (collection point).
• Military intelligence (MI) team.
• Forward signal platoon (-).
8-49
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Engineers.
• Field artillery.
8-142. If augmented as such, these elements may also be in the BSA:

• Aviation elements.
• Military police (MP) platoon.
• Smoke platoon.
• Decontamination platoon.
8-143. In addition to these elements, the BSA may include a number

of other EAB elements, which have been requested as augmentees,
such as—
• Nondivisional maintenance teams.
• Corps artillery battalions.
• Air or ground evacuation elements.
• Finance detachment.
• Non-divisional engineer units.
8-144. Based on the tactical situation and CSS requirements, the BSB
may organize a tailored forward logistics element to push critical
supplies and services to a designated unit or location, such as the
SBCT TOC, or the squadron combat trains or field trains (if forward of
the BSA). Another option is to establish another CSS node outside the
BSA to employ modular support such as the forward repair elements,
recovery capability, and critical assets such as Class III and V closer to
support the SBCT.
FM 4-93.1 [FM 63-1] addresses siting and security of the BSA.
8-145. If the squadron is operating within the support distance of the
BSA, the squadron field trains may collocate with the BSB in the BSA.
This facilitates support by the BSB, eases communications
requirements, simplifies security requirements, and reduces the need
for additional coordination with the SBCT for terrain. When collocating
with the BSB, the field trains fall under the operational control of the
BSB commander for movement, security, terrain management, and
synchronization of sustainment activities. The HHT commander
establishes close liaison with the BSB staff. The positioning needs of
the squadron must be clearly communicated to and coordinated with
the BSB. The squadron field trains must be positioned near the exit
points of the BSA in case it moves forward to better support the
squadron. When leaving the BSA, the HHT commander must inform
the BSB commander or the SBCT rear CP when the field trains are
leaving, and an estimated time it will return. If the squadron is
operating at extended ranges from the BSA, the squadron field trains is
positioned between the BSB and the squadron to better facilitate
support.
8-50
SECTION III – SQUADRON ORGANIZATION
SUPPORT AREAS
8-146. A support area is a designated area in which CSS elements,
some staff elements, and other elements locate to support a unit.
Trains are located in support areas. Types of support areas include the
following:
• BSA.
• Squadron support area.
TRAINS
8-147. The basic CSS tactical organization is the trains. Trains are any
grouping of personnel, vehicles, and equipment organic or attached to
a unit that provides CSS. Trains are under unit control and can be
employed in two basic configurations: In one location as unit trains, or
in echeloned trains. Echeloned trains are normally organized into troop
trains, squadron CTCP, unit maintenance collection point (UMCP),
medical aid station, and squadron field trains. Echeloned trains are
best used when the squadron is operating over extended distances
from the SBCT, and/or dispersed throughout the AO. Unit trains at the
squadron level are appropriate when the squadron is consolidated,
during reconstitution, and during major movements.
TROOP TRAINS
8-148. Troop trains provides CSS for the troop during combat
operations. The troop organizes its organic and attached CSS assets
into troop trains and squadron combat trains. The troop trains
includes the 1SG and medical aid/evacuation teams. The supply
sergeant and the armorer and will collocate with the squadron combat
trains and UMCP and are under operational control (OPCON) to the
CSS OIC in that area. The supply sergeant may collocate in the field
trains if it facilitates LOGPAC operations. The 1SG directs movement
and employment of the troop trains. He receives logistical reports
directly from the platoon sergeants or through the troop CP,
coordinates logistical matters with the XO, and assists the XO in
ensuring the troop is logistically ready for battle. During operations,
the 1SG coordinates and directs the evacuation of casualties and
equipment to designated troop or squadron logistics release points
(LRPs), which are graphically depicted by checkpoints; leads the troop
LOGPAC forward from the LRP to resupply the troop and then leads it
back to the LRP; and organizes the LOGPAC to conduct troop resupply
operations. Depending on METT-TC, platoon sergeants may assume
the 1SG’s role for their platoon and may have to coordinate with the
CTCP for the platoon’s logistical support.
8-149. The troop trains may be collocated with the troop CP or operate
separately under the control of the 1SG. Threat situation and distances
between the platoons are some of the major determining factors. The
troop trains may also consolidate or coordinate with an infantry
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
battalion trains or CP, if locations and distances allow for collocation.

This method alleviates stress on the squadron’s limited CSS assets and
maximizes the BSA’s assets. Refer to FM 3-20.971 for further
discussion of troop trains.
SQUADRON TRAINS
8-150. Squadron trains consists of two types: combat trains and field
trains.
Combat Trains
8-151. There may be no need or requirement for a logistical combat
trains or CTCP for the cavalry squadron (RSTA) during some types of
operations. Sustainment of the squadron is achieved through
situational understanding of not only the COP but also the logistical
operational picture. Theoretically, sustainment in the squadron is no
longer a routine LOGPAC-type operation. Sustainment is achieved
through anticipation, planning, and coordinating for requirements well
in advance of the need for supply. LOGPAC operations however remain
the vehicle for the delivery, but occur only when needed.
8-152. The elements that made up the CTCP may operate collocated
with the FTCP (see Figure 8-29), or in the S4’s case, at the squadron
main CP. In some situations the squadron will establish a CTCP to
accomplish a specific logistical task. Situations that may dictate the
need for a CTCP include:
• As part of a BSB forward logistical element operation.
• During periods of supply or resupply of major end items.
• During reception, staging, onward movement, and
integration (RSOI) operations.
• As required by METT-TC.
8-153. The CTCP consists of the squadron S1 and the S1 operations

center. The S1 is the OIC of the CTCP and normally operates collocated
with the FTCP to facilitate coordination between materiel and
personnel replacement. As required, the CTCP may be echeloned
forward to serve in the traditional CTCP role. Depending on the
situation, the CTCP may be manned by both the S1 and the S4 under
this configuration. The squadron aid station includes the squadron
surgeon, the physician’s assistant (PA). The UMCP consists of the
combat repair team. The UMCP is the location where major or difficult
maintenance is performed.
8-52
Figure 8-29. Combat Trains Command Post
Field Trains
8-154. The squadron field trains (Figure 8-30) is the primary direct
coordination element between the squadron and the BSA. Field trains
consists of the CSS elements required to respond to continuous
support operations. Field trains includes those assets not located with
the combat trains and higher echelon support teams of the BSB. It will
normally consist of the HHT commander; XO; 1SG; nuclear, biological,
and chemical (NBC) noncommissioned officer (NCO); supply sergeant;
and S1 personnel. The field trains personnel facilitate the movement of
service support from the BSB to the squadron AO by ensuring that
LOGPACs are organized and configured per the unit’s requests and
that the LOGPACs make it forward to the LRP and back to the BSA.
8-155. The field trains may collocate with the BSA, operate
independently between the BSA and combat trains, collocate with the
squadron trains, or with the nearest trains of the infantry battalions.
Field trains location is determined by the level and capabilities of the
threat and the distances between the forward elements of the
squadron and the BSA.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-30. Squadron Field Trains Organization
TRAINS SITING REQUIREMENTS

8-156. All CSS areas have similar considerations, to include—
• Cover and concealment (natural terrain or man-made
structures).
• Room for dispersion.
• Level, firm ground to support vehicle traffic and CSS
operations.
• Suitable helicopter landing site (remember to mark the
landing site).
• Good road or trail networks.
• Good routes in and out of the area (preferably separate
routes going in and going out).
• Access to lateral routes.
• Positioned along or good access to the main supply route.
• Positioned away from likely enemy avenues of approach.
8-157. The trains should not be considered a permanent or stationary

support area. The trains must be mobile to support the squadron
when it’s moving and should change locations frequently, time and
terrain available permitting, under the following conditions:
• To avoid detection caused by heavy use or traffic in the
area.
• When area becomes worn by heavy use, e.g., wet and
muddy conditions.
• Security becomes lax or complacent due to familiarity.
TRAINS SECURITY
8-158. All support elements organize and prepare to defend
themselves against an air or ground attack. They normally occupy
8-54
areas that have been secured by maneuver elements of the troop or

squadron. The security of the trains at each echelon is the
responsibility of the individual in charge of the trains. The best defense
is to avoid detection.
8-159. The following are some considerations for trains security:
• Select good trains sites that use available cover,
concealment, and camouflage.
• Utilize strict movement and positioning discipline as well
as noise and light discipline to prevent detection.
• Establish a perimeter defense as in an assembly area:
Establish observation posts and patrols.
Position weapons (small arms, machine guns, and
antitank weapons) for self-defense.
Plan mutually supporting positions to dominate likely
avenues of approach.
Prepare a fire plan and make sector sketches.
Identify sectors of fires.
Emplace target reference points (TRP) to control fires
and for use of indirect fires.
Integrate available combat vehicles within the trains
(i.e., vehicles awaiting maintenance or personnel) into
the plan, and adjust the plan when vehicles depart.
Conduct rehearsals.
• Establish rest plans.
• Identify an alarm or warning system, which would allow
for rapid execution of the defense plan without further
guidance (normally included in an SOP).
• Designate a reaction force. Ensure the force is equipped to
perform its mission. The ready reaction force must be well
rehearsed or briefed on—
Unit assembly.
Friendly and threat force recognition.
Actions on contact.
Delaying operations.
Call for fire (artillery, mortars, rotary, or close air
support).
Patrolling (refer to FM 3-20.98 [FM 17-98]).
Small unit tactics.
Individual and crew-served weapons, antitank
weapons, mines, pyrotechnics, vehicle weapons
systems and operations, night vision devices, global
positioning systems, familiarization, and operations.
Conduct of rehearsals.
Anti-fratricide measures.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Challenge and password (to include running

password).
Signals (visual and audio).
Troop-leading procedures.
Time-distance factors (threat avenues of approach).
EPW procedures.
• The ready reaction forces must possess—
Friendly obstacle plan.
Friendly sector sketch.
Preplanned fires—field artillery/mortar/attack
helicopter/CAS.
Medical evacuation procedures.
• The ready reaction forces must be briefed on—
Specifics of mission.
Communication procedures.
Special requirements/rules of engagement.
Completion of mission.
Quick recovery and reports.
Debriefing procedures.
8-160. FM 4-93.1[FM 63-1] outlines further security measures for a

base or trains security.
SECTION IV – COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PLANNING
8-161. CSS planning is the primary responsibility of the squadron S4

and the troop XO/1SG. It is fully integrated into all operations
planning with the concept of logistics support synchronized with
operations. CSS planning is continuous and concurrent with ongoing
support execution, and is conducted to ensure support during all
phases of an operation. The SOP should be the basis for squadron CSS
operations with planning conducted to determine specific requirements
and to prepare for contingencies. Squadron and troop orders should
address only specific support matters for the operation and any
deviations from SOP.
8-162. To provide effective support, CSS planners and operators must
understand the mission statement, intent, and concept of the
operation. The S4 is responsible for producing paragraph 4 of the
OPORD, which should include the following:
• Squadron commander’s priorities.
• CSS overlay.
• Supply routes.
• Logistic release points.
8-56
• Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) points.

• Maintenance collection points.
• Class III/Class V resupply during the mission, if
necessary.
• Movement criteria.
8-163. To predict support requirements, CSS planners must
determine the following:
• Type of support required.
• Quantities of support required.
• Priority of support, by type and unit.
8-164. With these support requirements determined, CSS planners

assess the following information:
• CSS resources available (organic and supporting).
• Status of the CSS resources (location, maintenance, and
personnel status).
• Time that CSS resources will be available to the squadron
and troop.
• How resources will be available.
8-165. With this information, planners develop the support plans for
the operation. Several planning tools are available. The logistics
estimate described in FM 5-0 [FM 101-5] is the formal, detailed process
of CSS planning, and is used when time is available. Frequently at
squadron level and normally at troop level, CSS planning is more
informal. It is normally formulated in terms of the following
considerations:
• The current and projected unit status of maintenance,
supply, and transportation.
• Quantities and types of logistics needed to support the
operation.
• How it will be transported to where it is needed.
• When it must be on hand.
• The external support needed.
• The displacement of CSS assets, if required.
• How requirements can be met.
• Host nation support available.
• Shortfalls and impact on the operation.
• Prioritizing the supportability of each course of action
(COA).
• Availability of CHS, to include medical evacuation and
treatment.
• NBC decontamination capabilities and contamination
considerations.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Maintaining communications between maneuver and

support command centers.
8-166. The information to address many of these considerations

should be readily available to CSS planners to facilitate rapid planning,
and should be resident in the digitized CSSCS, and GCSS-A, Defense
Integrated Human Resources System (DIMHRS) with smart card,
Medical Communications for Combat Casualty Care (MC4), and
FBCB2. In addition, CSS operators maintain status charts and books,
receive updated status reports when a WARNO is issued, use
established planning factors and data tailored for their unit, and use
the procedures and organizations explained in the SOP. This data is
supplemented by actual operational experience.
8-167. Emerging CSS doctrine hinges on the ability of the division and
major subordinate commands to forecast requirements using CSSCS,
then use tailored resupply packages to be pushed from the SBCT.
SUPPORTING RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

8-168. Maintaining the momentum of the operation is the overriding
consideration in supporting reconnaissance. There are certain general
considerations that guide planning and preparation. The emphasis on
any particular consideration varies with the mission assigned.
Emphasis, priorities, and requirements may also shift as the operation
is underway. The availability of adequate supplies and transportation
to sustain the operation becomes more critical as the operation
progresses since MSRs lengthen, communications become strained,
and requirements for repair and replacement of systems increase.
8-169. Planning considerations in support of reconnaissance are listed
below.
• Echelon squadron trains; combat trains remain mobile.
• Position a portion of each essential CSS asset (such as
ammunition, POL, medical, and maintenance) in the
combat trains, UMCPs, or medical aid stations.
• Consider the use of blivets for fuel and water, and caching
of other classes of supply.
• Ensure basic loads remain replenished.
• Plan for an increased consumption of POL.
• Recover damaged vehicles only to the squadron MSR for
quicker identification by unit or organizational
maintenance personnel.
• Use push packages of preplanned and preconfigured
essential logistics items.
• Plan for increased vehicular maintenance, especially when
operating over rough terrain.
• Keep the repair team (CRT) and support teams well
forward.
• Request unit distribution at forward locations.
8-58
• Request additional CSS assets from SBCT to support

attachments or extended operations.
• Plan use of airlift and airdrop for resupply.
• Use captured threat supplies and equipment; particularly
support vehicles and POL. POL must first be tested for
contamination. Vehicles must be well marked to prevent
misidentification and engagement by friendly units.
• Test natural water sources before using.
• Suspend most field service functions, such as clothing
exchange, bath, and laundry.
• Select supply routes, LRPs, and subsequent trains
locations for the entire operation, and plan alternate
routes and means. If a chemical threat exists, plan for
alternate routes, collection points, and aid stations for
evacuation of chemically contaminated casualties and
equipment.
• Plan and coordinate EPW operations. Anticipate greater
numbers of EPWs.
• Plan for increased casualties, combat health logistics
(Class VIII supplies and equipment) requirements, and
mortuary affairs; use of patient collecting points and
AXPs; and augmentation of medical treatment elements.
• Upload logistics required for the operation in advance
when possible.
• Plan for longer transportation and turn-around times as
the length of the MSR increases.
• Plan for trains and convoy security (include direct/indirect
fire planning and escorts if available).
SUPPORTING SECURITY OPERATIONS

8-170. Security operations can be dynamic in nature, involving
substantial maneuver. As they become more dynamic, certain planning
considerations for reconnaissance apply. The most important
consideration for security operations is best use of available
preparation time and front-loading of the CSS effort. As with
reconnaissance, emphasis on any particular consideration varies with
the mission assigned and shifts during mission execution. Planning
considerations include the following actions:
• Plan for increased use of Class IV and Class V.
• Preposition limited amounts of ammunition, POL, and
barrier material in centrally located forward positions and
on subsequent positions in depth.
• Request additional CSS from SBCT for attachments.
• Consider the additional transportation requirements for
movement of Class IV and pre-positioned stockpiles.
• Use push packages of critical supplies on a scheduled basis.
Continue routine resupply until the using unit requests
otherwise.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Resupply during limited visibility to reduce the chance of

threat interference.
• Prepare to conduct immediate resupply on short notice
well forward during lulls in the battle or as required.
• Use MSTs well forward.
• Echelon CSS assets in depth. Plan displacement of these
assets so uninterrupted support continues.
• As missions become more dynamic in execution, increase
the mobility of forward support assets to maintain pace with
the unit.
• Select main supply routes that do not interfere with
movement of units or a reserve force while also planning
for alternate routes and means.
• Plan engineer mobility operations to maintain main supply
routes.
• Plan displacement of support assets and supplies early to
keep routes open. Nonessential CSS assets should move
as early as possible.
• Limit forward flow of supplies except to those essential for
the operation.
• Plan destruction of supplies and equipment (except
medical) that cannot be evacuated.
• Plan alternate means of evacuation for casualties.
• Emphasize recovery and evacuation of equipment over
forward repair to preclude loss to the threat. Use available
vehicles to tow disabled vehicles.
• Plan for trains and convoy security (include direct/indirect
fire planning and escorts if available).
SECTION V – TRAINS AND LOGISTICS PACKAGE OPERATIONS
8-171. The tactical organization of CSS elements is tailored to the

mission, but adheres to fundamental organizational tenets. CSS
organization and operations are largely suitable for inclusion in
squadron and troop SOPs. Standard methods of organizing the effort
and accomplishing CSS allow planning to focus on the requirements of
the current situation and facilitate execution by dispersed support
elements.
COMMAND AND CONTROL

8-172. The environment of squadron logistics is very different from the
environment of other maneuver units and is characterized by longer
distances, more dispersion, frequently decentralized execution, and
fluid situations. Because of this, staff planners must be careful not to
use task force or SBCT planning factors when computing logistics
requirements for the squadron. Also, the squadron must be fully
supported by the area common user (ACU) network and be able to send
data traffic by radio, if necessary.
8-60
8-173. CSS planning and execution is best supported by a CSS

graphics overlay. An overlay reduces length of radio transmissions and
provides a clearer picture of how CSS supports the maneuver plan.
Graphic control measures at a minimum should include—
• MSRs (main, alternate, contaminated).
• LRPs.
• Trains/CP locations.
8-174. A useful method for CSS planners is identifying where support
assets should best be utilized throughout the squadron’s AO, and
place LRPs depicting those points on the overlay. Near MSRs, at
crossroads, or in close proximity to water (lakes, ponds, reservoir) are
some likely areas to place LRPs. Movement of CSS assets and CSS
functions are based on primarily three methods:
• On order.
• Triggered by events.
• Triggered by distance between CSS assets and the
supported elements.
8-175. The use of checkpoints or LRPs control the movement of assets
and specify what functions will occur at the checkpoint. Functions at
checkpoints are activated or turned off based on the three methods,
which are incorporated into the operations order (OPORD) or SOP.
Figure 8-31 illustrates operations.
8-61
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-31. Example of Combat Service Support Graphics on a Maneuver Overlay

RESPONSIBILITIES
8-176. Command and control of squadron logistics must be tailored to
METT-TC, operational intensity, abilities of key personnel, and the
personality of the commander. Normally, the method used is as
described below and illustrated in Figure 8-32. The squadron may use
a slightly different method than the one described.
8-177. The S4, in conjunction with the S1, is responsible for all CSS
planning and execution. The S4 also runs the squadron combat trains
and is directly responsible for maintenance operations. This provides
good access to the LRPs and the UMCP as well as good
communications with subordinate units.
8-62
8-178. The HHT commander runs the field trains and is the primary
face-to-face link between the squadron and the BSB. The HHT 1SG
supports the field trains and ensures that the LOGPAC reaches, at a
minimum, the LRP.
CTCP
CRT
OPS SGM
CO/XO/1SG
Figure 8-32. Squadron Logistics Command and Control
LOGISTICS COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES

8-179. CSS C2 facilities are the FTCP and the CTCP. The CTCP may be
collocated with the FTCP, or it may be echeloned forward at the
squadron main CP or other unit trains.
LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONS
8-180. At troop level, there is normally no dedicated FM voice
administrative/logistics (A/L) radio net. Logistical reports and requests
for support are sent on FBCB2 to the 1SG and/or the troop CP. The
1SG receives digital reports, coordinates with the troop XO as
8-63
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
necessary, consolidates the platoon log status reports, then forwards

the reports to, and coordinates with, the squadron CTCP. The 1SG
requests items that are not included or are in greater amount than
what the troop will receive in the standard LOGPAC push package,
unless the items are needed sooner than the scheduled LOGPAC time.
In lieu of digitized reporting, logistics reports are sent via FM voice on
the troop command net to the CP, with the 1SG eavesdropping on the
command net. The troop CP maintains CSS status and coordinates
with the CTCP when the first sergeant is preoccupied. The 1SG
conducts detailed coordination with platoon sergeants on FBCB2,
platoon nets, or face to face when required to keep the command net
clear.
8-181. At squadron level, the CTCP operates the A/L net. This net is
used for squadron CSS operations. Troop 1SGs and XOs use the net to
submit reports and requests for support. Troop 1SGs have the ability
to send FBCB2 reports to the CTCP, enhancing the precision and
speed that the information can be passed. The CTCP has the capability
to pass digital information using FBCB2. The CTCP fills requests from
what is available from the combat trains, and then sends the request
via FM or FBCB2 to the trains. The HHT commander or XO sends the
request to the BSB and coordinates for the pick-up and transportation
of the supplies. CSS functionality on FBCB2 gives the combatant a
clear picture of the current CSS situation at his echelon of command
and at subordinate levels for operational planning and execution. It
also provides the logistician a better view of the CSS situation
throughout the battlefield as well as an enhanced capability to provide
synchronized support to supported units. All CSS leaders and sites
also operate on the net to respond to requests and to coordinate CSS
execution. The FBCB2, CSSCS, and the admin/log net are used to
control movement of support assets during displacement and
movement of LOGPACs until turned over to 1SGs at LRPs. Chapter 2
discusses these facilities and communications nets in greater detail.
REPORTS
8-182. SOPs should establish report formats, reporting times, and FM
voice brevity codes to keep logistics nets manageable. As mentioned
before, FBCB2 provides CSS functionality by having logistics situation
reports (LOGSITREP), personnel situation reports (PERSITREP),
logistical call for support and logistics task order messaging,
situational awareness, and task management capabilities. This
functionality affects the synchronization of all logistics support on the
battlefield between the supported and the supporter.
8-183. Units send logistics reports in two channels. Detailed
information may now be sent both to the supporting logistics element
and the higher tactical CP. Alternatively, detailed FM voice reports are
sent to the supporting logistics element while a summarized status in
each general category is given to the higher tactical CP using a brevity
code. Battle and other loss reports update the original baseline data.
The S4 ensures that lengthy, repetitive reports are minimized and that
large quantities of numerical data are sent only via FBCB2 if at all
possible. Routine reports should be limited to a summary of those
items changing during the reporting period. All reports can be
8-64
delivered by messenger and should also function as requests when

possible. Immediate reports are submitted as necessary. Platoons and
troops should report on-hand quantities. Squadron logisticians should
analyze the on-hand quantities, and based on knowledge of future
operations, request the appropriate amount of supplies to accomplish
the mission for the given time period. The minimum supply amounts
requested should be sufficient to return all elements to full basic load
status.
8-184. Commanders must know the logistical status of their maneuver
units at all times. Squadron CPs normally track status of subordinate
units by a code, allowing the commander to quickly assess the combat
capability of the unit (e.g., green – 80-100 percent; amber – 60-80
percent; red – 40-60 percent; or black – < 40 percent), which
represents percentage of combat power, fuel, ammunition, personnel
(see Figure 8-33).
FTCP
Brigade
S4
DISCOM
CTCP SPO
Figure 8-33. Combat Service Support Reports
LOGISTICS PACKAGE RESUPPLY

8-185. The most efficient resupply of forward squadron units is
accomplished by LOGPAC. The HHT commander and XO organize
LOGPACs in the field trains. The S4 plans and coordinates the
operation to ensure that LOGPACs contain requested or required
supplies. Additionally, the S4 determines which LRP best supports the
8-65
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
mission and notifies all units. LOGPACs are normally organized at

least once a day for routine resupply. Troop and attached company
team supply sergeants control the LOGPAC for their unit. A habitual
LOGPAC organization facilitates operations and allows direct
coordination by the supply sergeant as necessary. The HHT XO’s
vehicle is FBCB2-equipped, while selected cargo and fuel vehicles have
position/navigation devices or a movement tracking system.
8-186. LOGPACs are normally organized for the units below.
• Each troop and attached company team.
• Main CP (includes command group and tactical CP [TAC
CP]).
• Combat trains, including immediate resupply vehicles.
8-187. Attached combat support units may have a separate LOGPAC if

CSS assets are provided by its parent unit. If not, they resupply from
squadron LOGPACs. Prior coordination by the S4 is necessary to
ensure the designated LOGPAC is augmented with additional assets to
handle the increased requirements. The S4 ensures no organic or
attached unit is left unsupported. The S4 monitors the service support
provided by parent units to DS or OPCON units. The HHT XO remains
prepared to organize unscheduled LOGPACs to provide immediate or
supplementary resupply. This LOGPAC may be for a specific unit or for
replenishing the stocks held in the combat trains.
8-188. LOGPACs normally consist of the following:
• The troop or company team’s supply truck controlled by
the supply sergeant. The supply truck contains the Class I
rations for the unit, normally for the next 24-hour period,
and the unit water trailer. Additionally, the supply
sergeant brings replacement soldiers, incoming mail,
Class II supplies requested by the 1SG, and Class IX parts
or other maintenance items requested by the maintenance
sergeant.
• POL trucks. Bulk fuel and packaged POL products are on
these vehicles.
• Ammunition trucks. These vehicles contain a mix of Class
V for the unit’s weapons. Demolitions and mines are also
included. The squadron SOP normally establishes a
standard LOGPAC load of munitions. The S4 uses reports
by unit first sergeants or other users to adjust the
standard loads.
• Additional trucks as necessary to carry supplies or
replacement soldiers.
• Escorts if a mission is not simultaneously occurring (in
most situations there should not a mission occurring
simultaneously).
8-189. Once LOGPACs are formed, the HHT XO moves them forward
as a march unit to the LRP. At the LRP, troop 1SGs or their
representatives assume control of the LOGPAC. Alternatively, the
supply sergeant leads the LOGPAC to a site coordinated previously
8-66
with the first sergeant. The S4 or HHT commander or a representative

should be present at the LRP to monitor the operation, coordinate with
unit 1SGs and HHT XO, receive hardcopy logistics reports, and deliver
CSS situation updates. Transition of control at the LRP should be
smooth and without delays. LOGPACs for the main CP and combat
trains may be met by the HHT 1SG either at an LRP or in the field
trains. The S4 ensures all units or elements with a designated LOGPAC
have been notified. Upon completion of resupply operations, units
return the LOGPAC vehicles to the LRP. They are formed by the HHT
XO or designated representative for movement to the rear and
preparation for the next resupply. The squadron should identify
LOGPAC turn-around times in their SOP and subordinate units should
not delay returning a LOGPAC to the LRP by the established time.
Supply sergeants must know the location of the field trains and be
prepared to guide their LOGPAC to that location.
8-190. Two basic methods of resupply may be used at the unit level.
Use tailgate issue when units are in static positions and the supporting
LOGPAC element moves from vehicle to vehicle. Maneuver vehicles
require little or no movement. The main CPs are normally resupplied
by this method. Use service station resupply during most tactical
operations when units are moving or temporarily halted. Unit elements
move to the designated site for resupply. The troop XO selects general
LOGPAC sites based on the overall situation, but the first sergeant
makes the final positioning determination. A good site should provide
the following features:
• Cover and concealment.
• Proximity to platoons or elements being resupplied.
• A road or trail network that supports the LOGPAC vehicles
and tactical vehicles.
• Room for dispersion.
• Reduction of thermal signatures.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FOR ATTACHMENTS OR DETACHMENTS
ATTACHMENTS
8-191. When a maneuver company team is attached to the squadron,
the necessary combat service support is also attached. This slice is
established by SOP and should be coordinated in advance. It normally
consists of medical, maintenance and recovery, and supply support for
Class III, V, and IX. Class I support is coordinated on a case-by-case
basis. A CSS slice may be attached to the squadron and these assets
may be used in the manner that best supports the overall mission.
This is particularly true when the attached company is task organized
within the squadron. Generally speaking, these assets form the combat
trains and LOGPAC for the attached company. When attached, these
assets as well as the company should arrive fully uploaded and ready
to provide support. Platoon-level attachments, unless unique to
squadron systems, can be supported by the squadron with little to no
adjustments. When receiving attachments, there is some basic
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
information CSS planners should receive or obtain from the sending

unit’s S4 to anticipate how to support. Some considerations are—
• Number and type of vehicles, personnel (military
occupational specialty [MOS]), and weapon systems at full
strength.
• Current status/strength.
• When attachment is effective and for how long.
• What support assets are coming with the attachment.
• When and where will linkup occur, and who is responsible
for linkup.
DETACHMENTS
8-192. It is likely that the squadron will detach troops to either the
SBCT or battalion for certain missions. The same considerations that
apply to receiving attachments should be applied to sending out
detachments. Troop-level detachments should deploy with the
appropriate level of support, to include maintenance, Class III and V
resupply, and medical, based on how long the troop will be detached.
The S4 should send the following information to the receiving unit’s
S4:
• Number and type of vehicles, personnel (MOS), and
weapon systems at full strength.
• Current status/strength.
• When detachment is effective and for how long.
• What support assets are coming with the detachment.
• When and where linkup will occur and who is responsible
for linkup.
8-193. If a troop is attached to the squadron, but is operating a

considerable distance from the squadron’s CSS assets, it should be
supported as if it were detached.
8-194. Reports need to reflect the addition or subtraction of units if
the attachment/detachment is effective for over 24 hours. This allows
the cycle to remain relatively constant as task organizations change.
CONVOY SURVIVABILITY
8-195. The convoy should only be halted when the artillery
concentration is ahead of the convoy. The convoy commander should
look for an alternate route around the impact area and the convoy
should remain prepared to move out rapidly. The mission or terrain
may require the convoy to continue. If this is the case, increase speed
and spread out to the maximum extent the terrain will allow. Avoiding
the impact area, increasing speed, wearing protective equipment, using
the vehicle for protection, and increasing dispersion can reduce
casualties.
8-68
SNIPER FIRE
8-196. Take extreme caution when sniper fire is received to ensure that
return fire does not harm friendly troops or civilians in the area. The
best actions are passive. Ensure all personnel wear Kevlar helmets and
available body armor at all times. Vehicles should move through the
area without stopping. Escort personnel should notify the march
element commander by a prearranged signal, like a smoke grenade
thrown in the direction of fire, and use long-range fire to locate and
destroy the sniper if in a free-fire zone. Prevent convoy personnel from
random firing by designating personnel to return fire. The convoy
commander may order additional fire or supporting forces into the area
to destroy, capture, or drive off the sniper. Convoy personnel should be
aware that the threat frequently uses a heavy volume of fire to slow
down a convoy before an ambush. Remember all details so the incident
can be reported to higher headquarters.
AMBUSH
8-197. This paragraph provides guidance in developing and employing
counter-ambush tactics and techniques. The very nature of an
ambush, a surprise attack from a concealed position, places an
ambushed unit at a disadvantage. Combat situations may prevent a
convoy from taking all the measures necessary to avoid being
ambushed. Therefore, a convoy must take all possible measures to
reduce its vulnerability. These are passive measures supplemented by
active measures taken to destroy or escape from an ambush. For
information on the types of ambushes, see FM 3-21.75
[FM 21-75]).
8-198. No single defensive measure, or combination of measures, will
prevent or effectively counter all ambushes in a situation. The
effectiveness of counter-ambush measures is directly related to the
state of training of troops and the leadership ability of the leaders.
8-199. Take the following actions to avoid an ambush:
• Select the best route for your convoy.
• Conduct map (digital) reconnaissance.
• Conduct ground reconnaissance.
• Conduct aerial reconnaissance.
• Obtain current intelligence information from the All-
Source Analysis System (ASAS) and UAVs.
• Use operations security (OPSEC) to deny the threat
foreknowledge of the convoy.
• Do not present a profitable target.
• Never schedule routine times or routes.
8-200. Take the following actions to reduce the effectiveness of

ambushes:
• Harden vehicles.
• Cover loads.
• Space prime targets throughout the convoy.
8-69
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Wear protective clothing.

• Use assistant drivers.
• Carry troops and supplies.
• Use prearranged signals to warn the convoy of an
ambush.
• Coordinate for escort vehicles.
• Thoroughly brief all convoy personnel on immediate action
drills.
• Practice immediate action drills.
• Maintain the interval between vehicles.
• Move through the kill zone, if possible.
• Stop short of the ambush.
• Do not block the road.
• Rapidly respond to orders.
• Aggressively return fire.
• Counterattack with escort vehicles.
• Call for artillery support.
• Call in tactical air (TACAIR) support.
• Call for the reserve force.
8-201. In the event of ambush during night convoy operations under

blackout drive, turn on service drive lights and increase speed to clear
the ambush area. Be aware that drivers wearing night vision goggles
will be temporarily blinded when service drive is turned on.
ROAD NOT BLOCKED
8-202. Guerrillas are seldom able to contain an entire convoy in a
single kill zone. This is due to the extensive road space occupied by
even a platoon-size convoy and because security or lack of available
forces may limit the size of the ambushing force. More often, part of a
convoy is ambushed—either the head, the tail, or a section of the main
body. The part of the convoy in the kill zone and receiving fire must
exit the kill zone as quickly as possible if the road to the front is open.
Vehicles disabled by threat fire are left behind, or if blocking the road,
pushed out of the way by following vehicles. Armored escort vehicles
must not block convoy vehicles by halting in the traveled portion of the
road to return fire.
8-203. Vehicle drivers must increase the distance between vehicles to
reduce the number of vehicles in the kill zone. Vehicles that have not
entered the kill zone should stop and personnel dismount, take up a
good defensive position, and await instructions. Since escort vehicles
may have left the road to attempt to overrun a hostile position,
elements of the convoy should not fire on suspected threat positions
without coordinating with the escort forces.
8-204. Other actions that convoy personnel can take to neutralize the
ambush force include—
8-70
• Call for artillery fire on threat positions.

• Call for gunship or tactical air or army aviation fire on
threat positions.
• Direct gun trucks and other vehicles mounted with
weapons to lay down a heavy volume of fire on the
ambush force.
• Call for reaction forces.
• Direct all non-driving personnel to place a heavy volume
of fire on enemy forces as rapidly as possible as vehicles
move out of the kill zone.
8-205. A motor transport convoy with a limited escort is seldom able to

defeat a hostile force and should not attempt to do so. Normally, a
transport unit will not deploy to attack a hostile force unless it is
necessary to prevent destruction of the convoy element. It relies on
supporting air, artillery, escorts, and reaction forces.
ROAD BLOCKED
8-206. When an element of a convoy is halted in the kill zone and is
unable to proceed because of disabled vehicles, a damaged bridge, or
other obstacle, personnel will dismount, take cover, and return a
maximum volume of fire on threat positions. When dismounting, exit
the vehicle away from the direction of threat fire. Security/escort
troops from vehicles that have passed through the ambush area
dismount and lay down a base of fire on the ambush position. Reaction
forces should be called in as soon as the ambush attack is launched.
When a security escort is provided and a combat emergency arises, the
escort commander has operational control of the security element to
attack and neutralize the hostile force. Normally, the security force will
take action to neutralize the ambush while the convoy escapes from
the kill zone. In an ambush situation, immediate reaction and
aggressive leadership are essential to limit casualties and damage to
vehicles, cargo, and personnel. If immediate air or artillery support is
available, personnel will be restricted to a specified distance from the
road to avoid casualties from friendly fire. In this situation, personnel
in the kill zone establish a base of fire, while others take up defensive
positions away from their vehicles and wait while supporting fire is
called in on the threat positions. Fire in the kill zone may be from only
one side of the road with a small holding force on the opposite side. To
contain the convoy element in the kill zone, mines and booby traps are
frequently placed on the holding force side. The security escort must
take care in assaulting the main ambush force as mines and booby
traps are commonly used to protect its flanks.
8-207. When the threat is dislodged, the road must be cleared and
convoy movement resumed as soon as possible. Wounded personnel
are evacuated using the fastest possible mode. When disabled vehicles
cannot be towed, their cargo should be distributed among other
vehicles if time permits. When it is not feasible to evacuate vehicles
and/or cargo, they will be destroyed upon order from the convoy
commander. If at all possible, radios and other critical items will be
recovered before the vehicles are destroyed. Under no circumstances
will they be allowed to fall into threat hands.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

8-208. Mines and booby traps are frequently part of an ambush.
Command-detonated mines are often used to start an ambush. Mines
will also be planted along the shoulder of the road for harassment and
interdiction. A booby trap system may be used against personnel in
vehicles and could consist of hand grenades. Claymore mines or
artillery shells may be suspended from trees and command-detonated
when a vehicle passes.
8-209. The following guidelines are effective in decreasing damage by
mines in convoy operations. They are also effective for LOGPAC
operations.
• Track the vehicle in front.
• Avoid driving on the shoulder of the road.
• Whenever possible, do not run over foreign objects, brush,
or grass in the road.
• Avoid fresh earth in the road.
• Watch local national traffic and the reactions of people on
foot. (They will frequently give away the location of any
mines or booby traps.)
• When possible, arrange for the engineers to sweep the
road immediately before the convoy is scheduled to move
over it.
• Use heavy vehicles such as tanks to explode small mines
when deployed in front of the convoy.
• Wear protective equipment.
SECTION VI – SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION
SUPPLY
8-210. Supplies are grouped into ten classes for supply management
and planning (see Figure 8-34). Resupply operations are based on
these classes.
SUPPLY CLASS DEFINITION

Subsistence items.
I
Items of equipment other than principal items.
II
Petroleum, oil, and lubricants.
III
Construction and barrier materials.
IV
Ammunition.
V
Personal demand items normally sold through exchanges.
VI
8-72
Major end items.

VII
Medical material.
VIII
Repair parts and components. Class IXA is aviation peculiar.
IX
Material to support nonmilitary programs.
X
MISC Water, maps, captured material, and salvage material.
Figure 8-34. Classes of Supply

8-211. Daily support is based on supply point distribution, which is a
method of distributing supplies to the squadron at a supply point,
railhead, or truckhead, leaving it to the squadron to move the supplies
to the squadron area using internal or augmented transportation.
Requirements will be determined, submitted, tracked and accounted
for utilizing CSSCS and FBCB2. Optimum support will occur by
tracking supply status, anticipating demand, requisitioning supplies,
tailoring supply packages and pushing supplies forward to meet the
demand. This precludes stockpiling or transporting supplies that may
or may not be used or needed.
8-212. Troops monitor supply usage and send daily reports to the S4.
The S4 consolidates the reports and submits a report to the CTCP and
the HHT commander (FTCP). The FTCP ensures requests are
submitted and verifies receipt of requested or necessary supplies.
Supplies should be replenished based on the difference between the
on-hand quantities and the UBL. The optimum goal is that units
maintain UBL at all times. This facilitates the ability to anticipate CSS
based on a steady constant, rather than mission dependent. Utilization
of the LOGPAC, discussed in Section V, will be the primary means of
delivering supplies from the trains to the troops, when the BSB is
unable to configure loads down the troop level.
CLASS I
8-213. Subsistence is issued based upon unit daily strength reports.
The troop 1SG consolidates all headcount/personnel information and
transmits a LOGSITREP via FBCB2 to the CTCP with information
copies to the troop commander and XO. The CTCP consolidates the
reports in CSSCS, and in turn sends an action message to the FTCP
and SPO of the BSB. Rations are broken down into daily squadron lots
at the distribution point and picked up by the HHT XO for
incorporation into the LOGPAC.
8-214. The SBCT will deploy with three days of operational rations
(meals, ready-to-eat [MRE]) as UBLs with additional MREs delivered in
increments to the BSB 48 hours after APOD closure. Increments may
be as small as 1 to 3 days of supply, based on the factors of METT-TC.
Based on commander’s guidance after deployment, A-rations may be
available through regional commercial contractors as approved by US
Army Veterinary Services or through the Logistics Augmentation
Program (LOGCAP). The BSB does not have organic food service
capabilities until attachment of the CSSC.
CLASS II, III (PACKAGED)
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
8-215. These supplies are provided by the BSB FMC and are
maintained as part of the SBCT’s authorized stockage list. The
squadron’s supply sergeants maintain, at a minimum, a three-day
supply of small items for immediate issue such as TA-50, NBC
protective equipment, and general supplies. Vehicles also carry a small
amount of commonly used packaged petroleum products for
immediate use. These loads are established in the squadron SOP.
Emergency requirements beyond the BSB capabilities will be locally
procured. The S4 submits requests for replenishment of these supplies
to the BSB via FBCB2 or CSSCS.
8-216. Supplies are distributed from the supporting distribution point
to the FTCP. Supplies are provided from the SBCT distribution point
(normally within the BSA) to the squadron. They are carried forward
with the next LOGPAC or immediately as required. Class II/III (P)
products are brought forward by the HDC transportation assets
escorted with FTCP personnel.
CLASS III (BULK)
8-217. The SBCT’s primary means of fuel support is through the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) regional contracts and/or DLA wartime
reserve stocks. The option of bladder bird C-130s, KC10, or wet-wing
operations is used when regional contracted fuel support cannot be
established early enough to support requirements. The HDC Class III
platoon transports fuel forward to the squadron. Retail support is
primarily supply-point based, with limited forward distribution
capability to the squadron and SBCT units.
8-218. The S4 forecasts requirements for the squadron based upon
the current or upcoming mission. He uses available planning data,
reports on FBCB2 from the troops, and operational experience to make
the forecast. These forecasts and reporting times are established in the
SBCT SOP. The S4 determines if the standard push package will meet
the forecasted requirements and orders more Class III based on
whether the standard package is enough to meet the forecasted
amount. The S4 can request to keep up to two HEMTTs at the CTCP to
maintain a fuel point to better accommodate the needs of the squadron
and reduce the amount of vehicle movement for the drivers. The
forecast is submitted through the HHT and the SBCT S4 to the BSB
CTCP, or directly to the BSB SPO for immediate or emergency
situations. The forecast is SOP dependent, but is normally for the 72-
hour period beyond the next day, or out to 96 hours.
CLASS IV
8-219. Limited Class IV barrier material for unit defense will be
included in UBLs, which tactical vehicles mount, primarily for
constructing hasty protective obstacles. The S4 will request additional
items to the BSB CTCP depending on upcoming missions. Requests
must be requested as soon as the S4 identifies the items are needed to
provide the BSB time to procure the Class IV. The BSB will procure
items required beyond UBL (e.g., for hasty/deliberate barriers) by local
procurement, or will ship it in via air/sea LOCs. The supply sergeant
or additional support vehicle assets bring Class IV products forward.
Intensively managed barrier materials may be delivered without delay
8-74
as far forward as possible, even up to the actual construction site or

the combat trains.
CLASS V
8-220. The squadron S4 determines ammunition resupply
requirements based on information provided in the LOGSITREP from
the troops and guidance received from the squadron commander and
S3. The S4 consolidates the entire squadron ammunition requirement,
consolidates the ammunition request, and passes that request through
the HHT commander and BSB CTCP to the BSB SPO via FBCB2,
CSSCS, FM/AM, or hardcopy. The SPO ensures the BAO receives the
request. The BAO determines if on-hand stocks in the ATP are
sufficient. The squadron S4 will use the CSSCS Class V ATP Report
(CS-5-005) to determine those commander’s tracked item list (CTIL)
items that require special attention, such as immediate resupply.
When required, the squadron commander will cross-level within troops
or throughout the squadron to meet mission requirements. The
squadron S4 also reports the unit’s on-hand quantities of ammunition
by nomenclature, any critical shortages of ammunition, and any
forecasted changes in ammunition requirements in the squadron’s
SITREP to the SBCT S4.
NOTE: Until ammunition requests are fully automated, the squadron S4, HHT
commander or XO prepares DA Form 581, Request for Issue and Turn-in of
Ammunition, submitted by the squadron FTCP at the ATP. There are no
changes in current supply procedures for this requirement. Ammunition and
explosives are accounted for and provided proper physical security at all times.
8-221. Supply point distribution is the normal method of distributing

ammunition. If the squadron or SBCT is operating under a division or
corps, the ammunition storage areas and supply points (theater
storage areas, corps storage areas, ammunition supply points [ASP],
ATP) will support the squadron or SBCT on an area support basis.
They are established as close to the using units as practicable. When
terrain, road network, and the tactical situation permit, the ASP is
located in division areas. Whether the ASP is in the corps or division
area, the corps is responsible for receiving, storing, and issuing the
ammunition. (See
FM 3-20.95 [FM 17-95] for more information on how a division or
corps will support the squadron.)
CLASS VI
8-222. Sundry packs are only available through local procurement.
CLASS VII
8-223. Class VII supplies are provided by the FMC located in the BSA.
These items are intensively managed and are normally command
controlled. Class VII replacement is based on losses reported through
command channels to the SBCT operations officer and logistics officer
per unit SOP. This permits the commander to remain apprised of the
operational status of subordinate commands and to direct the
distribution of items to those units having the most critical need
(commander will usually delegate the function to the XO). Weapons
systems, such as medium armored vehicles, are intensively managed
8-75
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
by weapon system replacement operations (WSRO), as discussed in

paragraphs 8-227 and 228. The SBCT is highly dependent on Class VII
resupply for maintenance as well as catastrophic damage replacement.
8-224. The CTCP monitors weapon system status as reported by the
troops. They forward logistics reports periodically to the FTCP and
CTCP. These reports serve as requisitions to the SBCT for both
personnel and equipment. The primary linkup point for crew and
vehicle is at the BSA.
8-225. The ready to fight concept provides the squadron with fully
operational replacement weapon systems. This system provides ready
to fight weapon systems without crews to be picked up in the BSA at
the Class VII point. Coordination must occur with the maintenance
management officer, the SBCT S4, S1, and SPO to verify the status of
combat vehicles being repaired in DS/organizational maintenance
elements and the number of crewmembers with combat vehicles.
Replacement crewmembers could join a combat vehicle at the
maintenance site and assist in expediting maintenance.
8-226. Prior to accepting the vehicle, crews should ensure the vehicle
is functional, to include test firing the weapon systems. Preferably this
is done in the BSA to facilitate further repairs if needed. If not
established, the field trains personnel should identify an area vicinity
of the BSA for test firing and zeroing/boresighting weapons. CTCP
personnel should also consider identifying a firing area. The BSB HDC
may deliver some large Class VII items directly to the squadron combat
trains or troop site where the vehicle is disabled. The squadron S3
allocates weapon systems to troops based on recommendations from
the S4 and the tactical situation. The S4 develops his recommendation
based on the status of each troop.
CLASS VIII
8-227. The BSMC in the BSA provides medical equipment repair and
Class VIII resupply to the squadron’s medical platoon via routine
LOGPAC operations, unless there is an immediate need. At troop level,
the platoon medics need to periodically check their medical equipment
sets (MES) and the combat lifesavers bag to ensure contents are not
expired or need replenishing. The platoon medics report daily status to
the troop’s senior medic, who then reports the information to the CTCP
and/or aid station. The aid station consolidates a request and forwards
it to the CTCP. The request is then sent the FTCP and CTCP. The CTCP
informs the BSMC who fills the request.
8-228. Due to the limited supplies of Class VIII, it will normally not be
formed into a standardized push package. Medics and combat
lifesavers are responsible for maintaining their MESs. The S4 should
expect to order Class VIII supplies after every mission and periodically
during long deployments.
8-229. To prevent unnecessary depletion of blankets, litters, splints,
and other equipment, the receiving medical facility exchanges like
property with the squadron when it accompanies the patient.
CLASS IX
8-76
8-230. The FMC provides Class IX and maintenance support to the

squadron. The SBCT will deploy with sufficient ASL items and combat
spares to sustain limited maintenance operations. Class IX repair parts
are prioritized based on the commander’s priority of maintenance.
Critical requirements will be delivered by airdrop as far forward as
tactically possible.
8-231. A consolidated PLL is maintained in the squadron. The S4 has
the option to place both PLL trucks in the CTCP, FTCP, or echeloned
with one in the UMCP, and one in the FTCP. The preferred method is
to maintain as much PLL as far forward as possible in the CTCP. The
PLL is supplied by demand to fill authorized stockage lists.
8-232. The CRT members will carry selected high usage parts on their
combat vehicles. Repair parts are sent forward daily with LOGPACs.
Critical repair parts can be brought forward immediately by the field
trains support section. Maintenance and Class IX flow are discussed in
a later section.
CLASS X
8-233. These items are locally procured by the BSB as needed. The
SBCT commander will establish the limits on what and how much the
squadron can procure.
MISCELLANEOUS
Water
8-234. The BSB can support drinking water requirements at the rate
of two gallons per man per day. The primary water source is bottled
water through regionally available contract sources. The headquarters
and distribution company (HDC) can receive, store, and distribute
7,500 gallons of water. For emergency purposes only, the HDC has one
lightweight water purifier that can purify up to 3,000 gallons in 20
hours. The squadron will maximize the use of water buffaloes and five-
gallon containers. The supply sergeants will maintain buffaloes at the
combat trains and refill when the configured loads are brought forward
from the BSA. Refilling of five-gallon containers occurs during
squadron and troop LOGPAC operations. Normally a one-for-one
exchange (empty container for a full one) is conducted with the
containers and the supply sergeant refills the containers at the combat
trains. If the supply sergeant is in the field trains, water buffaloes are
filled prior to moving forward with the BSB transportation assets.
Maps
8-235. The FMC maintains maps in the BSB. The squadron requests
maps through the S4 to SBCT S4. When delivered, they are
transported forward on unit LOGPACs. Critical maps may be delivered
by air, if necessary, to initiate an operation. The S2 determines map
requirements for the squadron and requests classified maps or
specialty products (digitally produced items such as contour/IV maps)
through G2 channels.
Captured/Salvaged Material
8-77
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
8-236. The squadron S2 must first classify this material. If classified,

the material will be handled and transported to the BSA for further
analysis and security via the military intelligence network within the
SBCT. If deemed unclassified, the material will be evacuated to the
combat trains or field trains and stripped for all useable items (i.e.,
repair parts). If major end-items are useable (i.e., trucks/vehicles), they
will be sent to the BSA for use in the rear support areas. SBCT SOP
will establish identification markings that include a number
registration system of captured/salvageable end-items and list in daily
reports (FBCB2 free-text or by radio) the end-items used in support of
the SBCT to prevent fratricide or infiltration by the threat utilizing like
vehicles.
TRANSPORTATION
8-237. The SBCT uses centralized control of transportation platforms
to enable synchronized movement management of CSS assets.
Assistance from EAC elements includes theater, US Transportation
Command, DLA, AMC, installation, and other Department of Defense
(DoD) agencies to maximize throughput from either continental US or
intra-theater locations. Transportation operations in the SBCT are
characterized by a combination of transportation enablers to increase
expediency and minimize load handling. These systems include
flatrack and/or CROP exchange at the SBCT and squadron support
areas. Transportation managers coordinate efficient flatrack/CROP
exchange and maximize flatrack load capacity for return trip
operations. The movement manager (BSB support operations) tracks
all DS transportation assets in the BSA. Using a combination of the
Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement
System II (TC-AIMS II), MTS, CSSCS, and FBCB2, the movement
manager can rapidly respond to requests from the squadron S4 for
transportation by tracking and redirecting transportation assets.
8-238. The support section from the BSB is the squadron’s major
transportation assets. When large, numerous, or extended line hauling
of supplies is required, particularly between support sites, the
squadron should request support from the SBCT. The unique service
support requirements and operations of the squadron make this
support request more common than for any other maneuver battalion
in the SBCT. The HDC normally provides additional transportation
assets. Selected vehicles in the squadron and the BSB have part
number (P/N) or movement tracking systems to enhance C2 and
extended range operations. Utility aircraft, if available, may be placed
under operational control of the squadron to perform aerial resupply.
SECTION VII – MAINTENANCE
UNIT MAINTENANCE
8-239. The SBCT uses consolidated organizational and DS
maintenance. The organic maintenance capability of the SBCT is
extremely limited. The FMC provides diverse maintenance capabilities
(vehicles, weapons, missile, communications, special devices, power
8-78
generation and LRU repair), but is minimally manned to provide

support for the entire SBCT. The FMC will require augmentation as
operations intensify, especially in major theater of war (MTW)
operations, where organic capability equates to about 30 percent of the
workload. The primary methods of returning systems to a mission
capable status are through the use of combat spares, BDAR, controlled
substitution, and Class VII floats.
8-240. The SBCT will be dependent on higher-level maintenance
assets or contractors to provide scheduled maintenance and the
majority of unscheduled maintenance. The BSB will require this
augmentation to keep the SBCT at an operational rate of greater than
90 percent. Vehicles that cannot be returned to a mission capable
status in the AO will be stripped of useable parts and sent to a
sustainment maintenance facility. Float vehicles will flow into the
APOD over time to replace stripped vehicles.
8-241. Vehicle crews and equipment operators must perform PMCS.
The CRT performs diagnosis, makes minor adjustments and repairs,
and repairs end items by exchange. The squadron S4 manages
maintenance with the assistance of the CRT motor sergeant. The
UMCP must not become a mass collection point of vehicles. If a vehicle
cannot be rendered mission capable within a reasonable amount of
time (determined by unit SOP and METT-TC), controlled exchange
should occur and coordination for evacuation of non-mission capable
(NMC) vehicles to the BSA should begin. This will maintain the mobility
of the UMCP to support the squadron at extended ranges or during
missions such as reconnaissance.
8-242. METT-TC dictates the level of repairs (i.e., if time, tools, test
equipment, and repair parts are available, the repair is completed on
site). However, most support during combat will be BDAR, diagnostics,
and on-site system maintenance through the replacement of LRUs.
Emphasis is placed on replacement versus repair. Figure 8-35 outlines
the maintenance flow from operator up to the BSB. The process can be
accelerated for battle-damaged equipment (Figure 8-36).
8-79
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-35. Maintenance Flow from Operator to

Brigade Support Battalion
8-80
Figure 8-36. Accelerated Maintenance for

Battle-damaged Equipment
CONTROLLED EXCHANGE
8-243. Controlled exchanged is the removal of serviceable parts from
an NMC vehicle to install on a vehicle that can be more quickly or
easily rendered mission capable. The squadron commander has the
authority to direct controlled exchanges, but normally delegates the
authority to the squadron XO or S4. At troop level, the troop
commander has the authority to internally conduct controlled
exchange with his organic vehicles. Controlled exchanges must be
closely monitored and tracked. Controlled exchange is performed on
site or at the UMCP.
CANNIBALIZATION
8-244. Cannibalization is the authorized removal for reuse of parts or
components from uneconomically repairable or disposable end items
or assemblies. It is a supply source for authorized low mortality or
difficult to obtain repair parts, components, and assemblies. It is a
source for high priority items when delivery cannot be made by the
required delivery date. It is performed in strict compliance with the
SOP and in close coordination with maintenance support team
personnel. The authorization process is the same as for controlled
8-81
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
exchange, and it also must be closely monitored. Cannibalization is a

major source of repair parts in a combat environment and should be
aggressively used to keep the maximum number of combat systems
operational.
BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND REPAIR

8-245. BDAR is the first step in returning disabled equipment to the
battle. BDAR is the act of inspecting battle damage to determine its
extent, classifying the type of repairs required, and determining the
maintenance activity best suited to accomplish the repair. BDAR is
accomplished at each point in the echeloned maintenance system. If
essential repairs cannot be made at the breakdown site, further
recovery to the UMCP or directly to the BSA is made.
RECOVERY AND EVACUATION

8-246. The squadron is responsible for recovering its own and
attached unit’s damaged equipment. If the vehicle is repairable, the
troop trains recovers it to the UMCP, nearest MSR, or LRP based on
SOP or the OPORD. The use of FBCB2 enables recovery vehicles to
identify the exact location of the inoperable piece of equipment. When
the decision is made to repair the equipment at the BSA, either
recovery or evacuation is used. If squadron recovery assets are
overloaded, recovery support can be coordinated with the BSA to
preclude excessive repair delays. Equipment that cannot be repaired at
the BSA support unit is normally evacuated and replaced with a float
(if available).
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MAINTENANCE

8-247. COMSEC equipment is evacuated through normal Class VII
channels to the signal company or BSB. All DS maintenance is
performed in the BSA.
SECTION VIII – FIELD SERVICES
8-248. Field services include food preparation; mortuary affairs;

laundry, shower, and clothing and light textile repair; force provider;
and water purification (see the “Headquarters and Distribution
Company” paragraph in Section II for water purification information).
FOOD PREPARATION
8-249. The SBCT and squadron have no assets to prepare food other
than the augmented CSSC. MREs are the primary foodstuff, until the
SBCT is augmented with food service assets. Based on the SBCT
commander’s guidance after deployment, A-rations may be available
through regional commercial contractors as approved by US Army
Veterinary Services or through the Logistical Civil Augmentation
Program.
8-82
MORTUARY AFFAIRS
8-250. The BSB has limited mortuary affairs capability and cannot
process contaminated remains. Augmentation will come from the
mortuary affairs company, echelons above division. Squadron units
recover and establish tentative identification of remains vicinity of the
combat trains (ensure separated from the aid station). The combat
trains processes (ensuring Department of Defense [DD] Form 565,
Statement of Recognition, for all remains, and/or a Statement of
Incident are completed), then transports or coordinates for the
transport of the remains and effects to the mortuary affairs collection
point determined in the SBCT OPORD. Once the remains are
processed, they are placed in refrigeration.
LAUNDRY, SHOWER, AND CLOTHING AND LIGHT TEXTILE REPAIR

8-251. These assets are not organic to the SBCT and will be either
augmented from a supporting division/corps, or locally contracted. The
SBCT SOP will establish how these facilities and services can be
requested and utilized. (Refer to FM 4-93.1 [FM 63-1] for further
discussion.)
FORCE PROVIDER
8-252. For extended operations (120 days or more) a force provider
package will be considered to provide support to the soldiers of the
SBCT. Assets to establish and operate the force provider facilities are
external to the SBCT. It can provide environmentally controlled
billeting; fuel storage; laundry; modern latrines; showers; food service;
MWR facilities; first aid; water/waste distribution; and power
generation. The army’s force provider is a modular system, principally
designed to provide the front-line soldier with a brief respite from the
rigors of a combat environment. The system’s cadre will need to be
reinforced to provide effective support.
SECTION IX – PERSONNEL SUPPORT
8-253. The SBCT and squadron S1 sections provide personnel

services, postal services, morale support, strength management, and
administrative services (legal, awards, promotions, evaluations,
reassignments, and pay), MWR support, and Red Cross coordination.
Special staff officers handle the others.
8-254. The S1 accomplishes these tasks both at the CTCP and FTCP
with the assistance of the field trains personnel.
PERSONNEL SERVICES SUPPORT
GENERAL
8-255. SBCT and battalion S1s provide their respective commanders
an organic capability for critical personnel functions and services to
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
the soldiers in his command. The S1 provides the critical wartime

functions of personnel accounting/strength reporting and casualty
reporting. These functions must be conducted starting at the lowest
level in the squadron for accurate accounting and replacement of
personnel. These functions are conducted using the Tactical Personnel
System deployed database and Army Casualty Information Processing
System, respectively. The personnel module of CSSCS is the
programmed enabler for the squadron S1.
PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT
8-256. Units will receive replacements through the predictive manning
process, verified by strength information within FBCB2 systems, and
allocated by the unit commander. This differs from the current
process, which consists of detailed deliberate and hasty strength
reports and by-name accounting. The digitized manning process within
the tactical command net will report strength information upon source
input.
MANNING TASKS
8-257. Manning tasks of predicting, resourcing, monitoring, assessing,
and adjusting are supported by FBCB2.
8-258. Predicting is the process of anticipating the number, grade, and
skill of personnel resources required to sustain the battlefield
functional area and execute operational plans. The responsible S1
must complete a loss estimate based on the threat and friendly force
capabilities. This estimate provides planning parameters for
replacements, medical facility requirements and graves registration
assets.
8-259. The SBCT S1 will use the Force XXI manning system (FMS) to
anticipate casualties. FMS uses the gross loss estimate within the
Logistics Processor External - Medical Module (LPXMED) and stratifies
them to grade and MOS to anticipate replacement requirements.
8-260. Resourcing brings units to their required strength according to
the commander’s priorities. It occurs at every echelon of command,
even at crew level when a squad leader augments a crew with a few
soldiers to provide a special capability. The S1/S4 must work closely to
provide commanders combat power visibility. The S1 must properly
identify the status of available personnel resources, and then
recommend plans for the proper allocation of available resources
within the commander’s guidance. This allocation includes current and
future personnel.
8-261. Monitoring gathers unit strength data on a real-time basis
through digitized systems and communications. Digitization eliminates
the requirement for unique personnel reporting systems by having the
capability of absorbing personnel information from tactical
communications.
8-262. The task of digitized strength monitoring starts with
establishing the strength baseline. Through the manifest process, FMS
creates the deployed database, which establishes the personnel
8-84
strength baseline. After establishing the personnel strength baseline,

the S1 maintains accountability by getting updates from unit 1SGs.
8-263. Assessing compares current unit strength data to personnel
capabilities required to maintain operational success/OPTEMPO. It
starts by determining the elements of required personnel combat
power for mission accomplishment. The S1 must then match the
current assets with projected losses and replacements to recommend
the best COA to properly resource units. The squadron S1 will assess
unit personnel combat power through the FMS. The assessment
process is not complete until the S1 coordinates with the S4 to provide
commanders the best view of available combat power.
8-264. Adjusting consists of packaging, positioning, and dispatching
replacements to deliver them when needed. Commanders direct the
proper adjustment of personnel assets to accomplish pending
missions. The commander may accomplish this through assignment or
cross-attachment. The S1 and S4 must coordinate the proper
matching of personnel and equipment during the adjustment process.
SYSTEMS
PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT CONTROL SYSTEM

8-265. The Personnel Service Support Control System (PSSCS) is the
overall architecture of systems that handles battlefield personnel data
and performs the manning function at the tactical level. It leverages
data in the FBCB2 to provide unit readiness status on a near-real time
basis. The software manifests personnel by reading bar codes on
identification cards. It includes a loss estimator and stratification
program to identify replacements required for anticipated shortfalls.
The system absorbs personnel data from tactical communications
within the ABCS.
8-266. As the system absorbs personnel information from variable
message format (VMF) messages, it adjusts strength figures. It has roll-
up capability for the commander. The system may also account for
civilians and for joint and allied forces. These system capabilities give
the squadron S1 the accurate, timely, and useful personnel
information the commander needs for manning. The S1 anticipates
personnel shortages and prepositions replacements based on the
commander’s intent. He provides the commander with personnel
strength readiness information early enough to influence the tactical
decision-making process.
8-267. The PSSCS includes either the DIMHRS with smart card or the
Real-Time Automated Personnel Identification System (RAPIDS), and
the FMS.
DEFENSE INTEGRATED MILITARY HUMAN RESOURCES SYSTEM WITH SMART CARD

8-268. The DIMHRS provides personnel management and asset
visibility information during peacetime, mobilization, deployment, and
demobilization. It allows commanders and personnel managers to
8-85
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
make accurate and timely decisions on the management of personnel

resources.
8-269. The smart card, the multi-technology automated reader card
(MARC), contains a computer chip, bar code, magnetic strip, and
printed information. Scanners rapidly read the information stored on
the card to account, process, or assess deployment criteria. The card
supports the following tactical functions:
• Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP). Inserting the card into
an integrated circuit chip reader (ICCR) determines if the
soldier meets deployment criteria (medical, dental,
personnel, legal, etc.). The ICCR contains separate
deployment criteria for different contingency locations.
• Manifesting. A scanner reads the soldier’s social security
number (SSN) from the MARC bar code and identifies the
soldier’s prepositioned record as deployed. The
manifesting process creates the deployed database, which
is the baseline for strength reporting.
• Medical treatment. The card can store medical
information. When a medic or doctor treats an individual,
they enter the treatment on MARC. As the patient goes
through different treatment levels, caregivers read their
MARC to determine the previous care given to the soldier.
REAL-TIME AUTOMATED PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM

8-270. RAPIDS is the new DOD identification card. It can display
limited MARC functionality when MARC is unavailable.
FORCE XXI MANNING SYSTEM

8-271. FMS is a software prototype designed to demonstrate personnel
functionality desired within CSSCS. It includes a personnel database
as well as casualty estimation and stratification software. The system
consists of a notebook computer with printer. It is a stand-alone
system with no connectivity to FBCB2 or CSSCS. FMS uses data from
MARC to move records to the deployed database during manifesting.
This new system will operate at squadron level and above. It will
provide by-name accounting for deployed personnel. Manning features
planned within FMS include—
• Manifesting: FMS identifies personnel records using
MARC/RAPIDS readers.
• Personnel accounting: Personnel accountability system
(PAS) is the foundation to build the FMS database. FMS
will account for civilians, other service members, or allies.
• Loss estimate: The LPXMED software in FMS provides
automated casualty estimating based on the division/unit
database, scenario, and threat capabilities.
• Casualty stratification program: Automated personnel
planning software in FMS will take the raw loss estimate
8-86
produced by LPXMED and generate probable grade and

MOS based on the unit assigned strength.
• Flexibility of data extraction: FMS is a program that is
flexible enough to allow ad hoc queries.
PLANNING OPERATIONS
8-272. The squadron S1 conducts PSS planning to ensure continuous
support during all operational phases, develops the PSS plan
concurrently with the tactical plan, and adds to the automated
operations overlay in FBCB2 for use by digitally equipped units.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
BEFORE OPERATIONS
Predictive Manning
8-273. Manning is critical to operational success. During the planning
process, the S1 war-games different COAs and identifies replacement
requirements based on the commander’s priorities. The commander’s
priorities should include the preferred method of replacing soldiers
(individual, team, and crew) within their units.
Tips for the S1 before the Battle

8-274. Typically, the S1 section operates from one location. The S1
collocates with the FTCP. This allows cross-training of personnel and
makes continuous operations easier. Additionally this facilitates
coordination between the squadron and the BSB. The S1 monitors the
battle and, in particular, personnel status. Tips for the S1 include—
• Establish criteria and standard for using automated
personnel status reporting.
• Develop a plan to integrate personnel daily summary
reports of non-digitized units.
• Plan to conduct replacement operations for the unit’s
primary combat MOS.
• Coordinate morale welfare and recreation.
• Coordinate with the chaplain for religious services.
• Coordinate with the medical clearing station for return to
duty of squadron personnel.
• Suggested FM voice radio nets to track:
Squadron command net.
Squadron A/L net.
SBCT A/L net.
Division rear operations net.
NOTE: Doctrine for control of the division rear area is under significant revision.
Communications architecture is not yet defined.
DURING OPERATIONS
Casualty Reporting/Strength Reporting
8-275. As casualties occur, the nearest observer informs the troop
1SG via the most expedient method available (e.g., free-text within
FBCB2, FM voice) per troop/squadron SOP. The 1SG submits a duty
status change on all casualties using FBCB2 (PERSITREP). FBCB2
sends these reports directly to the CTCP and squadron TOC. Slice
elements report to the supported unit for action; an information copy
goes to the parent unit for administrative use. Casualties are taken to
the squadron casualty collection points for classification of injury type
(routine, urgent, return to duty) and evacuation back to the BSA.
8-88
Medical/Personnel Accounting
8-276. When a soldier becomes a casualty, the unit medic records
medical treatment on the soldier’s DA Form 1156 or MARC. The BSMC
reads the soldier’s MARC when they admit the soldier and download
the MARC manifest report to the BSMC computer. The admissions
clerk transmits the admissions/discharges (SSN and duty status code)
through wireless local area network modems. The S1 electronically
receives the message and updates the soldier’s patient tracking status.
In this manner, S1s can identify a casualty’s location and properly
account for them. This accountability capability provides commanders
a near accurate picture of their forces and personnel combat power.
Personnel Accountability
8-277. FMS maintains three status areas: real world, mission capable,
and exercise status. The real world database accounts for all personnel
actually deployed on an exercise or on an actual mission. The exercise
status database maintains exercise accountability (exercise kills,
wounded, etc.) for training purposes. All personnel entering or
departing the exercise box will process through the squadron S1
representative to maintain an accurate, real world accountability of all
deployed personnel. They read the person’s ID card through a scanner
and enter a duty status. The squadron S1 periodically obtains a
download of this file to update FMS. Upon redeployment, the S1
creates the appropriate manifest reports using MARC and FMS.
AFTER OPERATIONS
Replacement Operations
8-278. The squadron S1 reviews updated personnel strength figures
through FMS and assists in reorganizing or reconstituting units based
on the commander’s assessment from FMS strength data. The S1 also
uses FMS information to decide where to return soldiers to duty or
assign replacements. The S1 can view individual soldier information in
FMS and uses by-name accountability to monitor his manning
requirements. Standard Installation/Division Personnel System
(SIDPERS) will eventually provide data to CSSCS and additional
updates to FMS and strategic assignment systems.
8-279. CSSCS includes summary data only, and not personnel data
such as name and SSN. The S1 depends on his FMS database for
detailed personnel data. Future versions of CSSCS will receive updated
status of those personnel assets listed on the CSSCS tracked items list
from SIDPERS. CSSCS reports will be derived from an interface with
SIDPERS at brigade level, so the information the squadron S1 has may
be more current than what is reported on CSSCS. CSSCS also has a
COA capability so the S1/S4 can recommend the best COA to the
commander.
Tips for the S1 after the Battle
8-280. Tips for the S1 after the battle include—
• Plan to receive digital reports from troops shortly after
battle.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Plan to have reports to SBCT S1 within one hour after

battle.
• Verify/reconcile personnel data system (PDS) data with
the S4 and senior medic or PA.
• Ensure the HHT commander knows where and when
replacements are due in by sending him an advance
arrival report.
• Coordinate requirements with the S4 for mortuary affairs
items for squadron personnel.
• Ensure proper next of kin notification procedures are
followed.
• Monitor mortuary affairs activities and reconcile casualty
reports.
• Determine total transportation requirements for losses,
replacements, and submit transportation request to the
S4.
• Coordinate and supervise postal operations.
• Coordinate with the medical clearing station for return to
duty of squadron personnel.
• Collect combat-critical personnel information from units
and the medical platoon for database update.
COMMUNICATIONS
8-281. The CTCP is the net control station for the squadron A/L net.
See Chapter 2 for more information.
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
8-282. The unit ministry team (UMT), consisting of a chaplain and
chaplain assistant, provides religious support operating from the
combat trains. UMTs ensure DS, GS, and denominational religious
support. UMTs are dedicated to delivering religious support far forward
to meet the spiritual needs of soldiers in combat. Religious support
includes performing/providing sacraments, rites, ordinances, and
worship services; pastoral care and counseling; battle fatigue ministry;
and special services and ministrations.
FINANCE SUPPORT
8-283. The SBCT S1 and attached finance support teams/detachment
will provide finance support.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
8-284. The SBCT public affairs officer (PAO) provides information
(public affairs) support for soldiers and commanders in wartime. The
media has greater access to combat zones and deploy closer to actual
conflicts than in previous conflicts. American public opinion and
politics greatly affect conduct of current and future operations. Rules
of engagement and guidance from the SBCT PAO and commander
8-90
dictate what soldiers will say when approached from the media. The S1
should manage and escort or arrange for escort for all media personnel
in the squadron AO.
POSTAL SUPPORT
8-285. Postal support is provided by the DS postal platoon that
supports the division. Division postal personnel pick up incoming mail
from the corps GS postal detachment. They separate the mail by
battalion/squadron-level organizations. It is either picked up by the
designated squadron mail clerk or sent forward to him in the field
trains. Outgoing mail is exchanged at the same time. The squadron
mail clerk receives and sorts the mail by current task organization and
distributes it to the unit supply sergeant (assistant mail clerk) who
delivers it to the 1SG, platoon sergeant, or to the soldier himself
(accountable mail) during LOGPAC resupply.
LEGAL SUPPORT
8-286. The SBCT uses an organic legal team identified as the brigade
operational law team (BOLT), which is illustrated in
Figure 8-37. The BOLT provides legal support in operational law and
the core legal disciplines, which are—
• Military justice.
• International law.
• Administrative law.
• Civil law (contract, fiscal, and environmental law).
• Claims.
• Legal assistance.
Figure 8-37. Brigade Operational Law Team Organization
8-91
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
8-287. The BOLT consists of a Judge Advocate and a legal specialist

with no dedicated transportation assets. Duties are mainly performed
in the SBCT main CP or TAC CP. Duties include—
• Legal advice during all phases of the military decision-
making process (MDMP).
• Legal review of all SBCT operational plans, concept plans,
rules of engagement (ROE), directives, and policies.
• Legal advice and assistance in the interpretation, drafting,
and training of ROE.
• Legal advice regarding effects coordination, targeting,
information operations, civil affairs, and civil-military
operations.
8-288. FM 4-93.1 [FM 63-1] provides a detailed discussion of the types

of law and outlines specific duties of the Judge Advocate and specialist
for each area of law.
8-289. The BOLT conducts its duties upon request from the squadron
commander or staff, but the squadron may be required to provide
transportation for them. The team is especially useful, during
multidimensional reconnaissance and with human intelligence
(HUMINT) collectors.
ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR

8-290. Scouts or other soldiers capturing documents and EPWs report
immediately and coordinate a linkup with the 1SG to turn the items
and prisoners over to him. HUMINT collectors at the platoon level may
be the first level of interrogation. The 1SG moves them to the combat
trains and turns them over to the S1, who plans and coordinates EPW
operations, collecting points, and evacuation procedures. EPWs are
evacuated from the squadron area as rapidly as possible. Prisoners
may be evacuated to the vicinity of the combat trains or UMCP for
processing and subsequent interrogation by squadron or SBCT MI
personnel. Crews of vehicles undergoing repair or unoccupied
mechanics are used as guards. Prisoners are then moved to the EPW
collecting point in the BSA on returning LOGPAC vehicles or by
transportation coordinated by the S4. As necessary, the S2 reviews
and reports any documents or information of immediate value. The S4
coordinates evacuation of large amounts of threat equipment. See
Figure 8-38 for an illustration of handling EPWs.
8-92
Figure 8-38. Handling Enemy Prisoners of War
SECTION X – COMBAT HEALTH SUPPORT
8-291. In addition to the BSMC as in Section II, the SBCT’s higher

headquarters can provide a forward surgical team (Figure 8-39). This
team is comprised of 20 personnel and two operating tables and has
the capability to split into smaller forward surgical elements for
deployment in support of the squadron medical platoon, or to collocate
with the BSMC. The squadron aid station (SAS) is also capable of
receiving a surgical element. The forward surgical element provides
enhanced surgical stabilization under circumstances in which the
squadron is conducting isolated operations and immediate evacuation
is not possible due to unsecured LOCs. Collocating a forward surgical
element with the SAS provides an immediate surgical intervention
capability far forward of the BSA. The surgical element provides the
BAS with the capability to stabilize and hold casualties for an
8-93
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
additional 8 to 12 hours prior to evacuation. This allows time for the

planning and execution of secure evacuation operations in order to
move seriously injured patients over unsecured LOC. Casualties are
moved to the BSMC, or preferably, to the supporting Level III hospital.
Along with the forward surgical team, a three-man team from the
medical detachment, telemedicine, will be inserted into the SBCT AO.
The BSMC is also capable of receiving an early entry module from a
combat support hospital, which permits the BSMC to perform the role
of a static Level III facility.
Figure 8-39. Forward Support Team Organization
SQUADRON MEDICAL PLATOON

8-292. The medical platoon is the focal point of CHS for the squadron.
It is organized to support the troops; acquire, treat, and evacuate
casualties; and coordinate further evacuation as necessary. The S1,
S4, and squadron surgeon plan CHS.
8-293. The SAS provides trained personnel to stabilize patients for
further evacuation, provides emergency lifesaving and limb-saving
treatment, and treats minor wounds or illness for return to duty. The
SAS can operate two treatment teams for a limited time. Based on the
mission, the SAS may operate a forward and a main aid station or
consolidate under a single aid station. When echeloned, the aid
stations are limited in their capabilities primarily to triage,
stabilization, and preparation for evacuation. This is the normal
configuration during combat operations. The aid stations may also
position laterally to cover a large frontage. The main aid station has the
capability of manning a chemical casualty aid station during NBC
operations. The physician’s assistant and surgeon position themselves
where they can best support CHS operations. The primary
8-94
responsibility of the senior medical NCO is to coordinate and supervise

casualty evacuation, Class VIII resupply, and support for the aid
stations, and to assist in CHS tactical planning. He moves between the
two aid stations, coordinating evacuation and movement of the aid
stations. When not deployed, the aid station is normally consolidated
with the CTCP.
8-294. Aid and evacuation teams are attached to troops on a habitual
basis. They support the troop with treatment and evacuation to the
SAS. Units with area support responsibility are included in the
planning process, and additional assets are allocated to the area
supporting medical company to compensate for the additional casualty
load. Under normal circumstances, ambulance support is pushed
forward with the field trains to assist in casualty evacuation. Maximum
use of aerial evacuation (when available) for litter-urgent patients
should be planned and exercised.
COMBAT LIFESAVERS
8-295. Combat lifesavers and buddy aid are crucial in sustaining CHS.
This is the first level of aid an injured soldier will receive, and is proven
in saving lives. Combat lifesavers receive additional training above the
basic first-aid level and provide enhanced first aid to battlefield
casualties before the arrival of the combat medic. Squadrons should
have one soldier qualified as a combat lifesaver in each vehicle/crew.
MEDICAL EVACUATION
8-296. The key to the CHS plan is the medical evacuation plan. The
S1/S4 must plan medical evacuation from the troop aid stations all the
way back to the BSMC in the BSA. The S4 must coordinate with the
SBCT S4 for AXPs, and post them to his support graphics in FBCB2.
He coordinates for any available ambulance support from the BSB.
Internal vehicles for mass casualty evacuation are identified and
positioned forward. The S4 tracks active and inactive AXPs and
disseminates that information to the main and forward aid stations
and to the squadron CP. As casualties occur, the S4 directs assets to
assist with casualty evacuation. Recovery responsibility does not end
until casualties are transferred at the AXP or are transported to the
BSMC in the BSA. Medical evacuation beyond the SAS is the
responsibility of the BSMC. Patients are evacuated no further to the
rear than their condition requires and returned to duty as soon as
possible. Medical evacuation outside the squadron may be
accomplished by ground or air means. Aeromedical evacuation out of
the squadron is used to the maximum extent possible. Ground
ambulances are used only for those patients who cannot be evacuated
by air. FBCB2 can significantly improve casualty evacuation times by
its ability to display all aid stations in an area. Crews need to know the
bumper numbers of all unit aid stations to facilitate locating them in
FBCB2. Casualties should be evacuated to the nearest aid station, not
necessarily a squadron aid station. Figures 8-40 and 8-41 show the
procedure for reporting and evacuating casualties, based on whether
the soldier is wounded or killed.
8-95
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-40. Reporting and Evacuating Casualty Procedure

for Wounded in Action
8-96
Figure 8-41. Reporting and Evacuating Casualty Procedure

for Killed in Action
COMBAT HEALTH LOGISTICS

8-297. The BSMC has limited Class VIII/blood management
capability. During deployment, lodgment, and early build-up phases,
medical units operate from planned prescribed loads and from existing
prepositioned war reserve material identified in applicable contingency
plans. The BSMC will deploy with supplies to support a 72-hour self-
sustainment mission within the SBCT (support for the squadron is
included). Resupply of the BSMC is conducted by electronic
requisitions sent to the medical logistics management center (MLMC),
operating in the AO. The MLMC will send release orders for material to
the appropriate medical logistics activity. Class VIII resupply occurs via
the battlefield distribution system under the direction of the
distribution management team. Unique to the SBCT is the range and
8-97
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
complexity of medical logistics support. Corps-level CHS (surgery,

hospitalization, intensive care, extensive blood usage) within the SBCT
footprint will result in a significant increase in the variety and urgency
of medical supplies and equipment. Priority of transportation of critical
Class VIII material will have to be recognized and supported
throughout the distribution pipeline. Blood support to the operation
will follow the same procedures.
8-298. The squadron conducts combat health logistics as discussed in
the Class VIII paragraph of Section VI.
MEDICAL FORCE PROTECTION

8-299. More soldiers are lost in combat due to illness, disease, and
nonbattle injury than to combat wounds. Maintaining the health and
fighting fitness of soldiers is a responsibility of all leaders.
Commanders reduce the threat by emphasizing preventive measures.
All surgeons and combat medics in the squadron support leaders in
the areas of hygiene, sanitation, and counseling and in the treatment
of stress and battle fatigue.
8-300. The BSMC medical force protection assets include—
• Preventive medicine.
• Combat stress control.
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE
8-301. Rules of hygiene should be established in SOP and observed
daily to prevent the spread of disease. Soldiers should wash and
change undergarments daily. Proper clothing and inspections prevent
cold and hot weather injuries. Immunizations must be current. Field
sanitation is important to prevent the spread of debilitating diseases.
Only approved or tested water sources should be used. Utensils used
for eating must be properly cleaned before reuse. In static situations,
soldiers use slit trenches or latrines; at other times they use cat holes.
All must be covered up after use to prevent the spread of disease.
8-302. Rest is extremely important. The effects of sleep degradation
are disastrous to unit missions and personnel. Sleep plans must be
practiced and established in SOP. When possible, soldiers should sleep
outside vehicles to allow them to fully stretch out and get the full
benefit of at least four hours of continuous sleep.
8-303. Safety is a continuous requirement to prevent accidents that
injure soldiers. The combat environment is full of risks associated with
vehicles, weapons, stress, and fatigue. Attention to detail can slip on
matters that do not directly affect combat. Safety is inherent in
following proper equipment and weapons operating procedures. SOPs
incorporate safety concerns in establishing procedures for assembly
areas and other locations of troop concentrations. Leaders enforce
proper equipment-operating procedures and SOP safety items
continuously.
8-304. PVNTMED assets at brigade level consist of a two-man team:
an environmental science officer and a PVNTMED specialist.
8-98
PVNTMED provides medical force protection through technical advice

to the commander and ensures the health of the SBCT by performing
sanitary inspections of food service, field sites, latrine, bathing and
other activities; coordinating and overseeing medical surveillance, to
include early recognition of potential epidemics or biological warfare
agent employment; and monitoring field water supplies, to include
sample collection for potential NBC contamination.
8-305. Leaders at all levels within the squadron have the responsibility
to ensure personal hygiene is conducted. The squadron S1 ensures
PVNTMED occurs by establishing a PVNTMED SOP and requesting
periodic or frequent inspections from the BSB’s PVNTMED team.
COMBAT STRESS CONTROL

8-306. These assets include a behavioral science officer and a mental
health specialist. CSC focuses on medical force protection aspects of
treatment and prevention of combat stress, to include the rapid
reversal of dysfunctional stress reactions (battle fatigue). These medical
force protection capabilities are essential to enhancing soldier
survivability across the spectrum of battlefield contingencies through
continual health hazard assessment and minimizing disease and
injury.
8-307. The squadron chaplain performs CSC services by unit request
or by conducting frequent visits to all the troop areas and identifying
soldiers who are stressed. The BSB’s mental health team can also
provide the same type service (see BSB in Section II).
SECTION XI – RECONSTITUTION
8-308. The intensity of combat can result in substantial losses in the

mission capability of the squadron. Reconstitution consists of those
actions taken to return it to an acceptable level of combat effectiveness,
and includes actions necessary to maintain or restore the morale of the
soldier. Reconstitution is best accomplished in an area not under
immediate threat contact. Reconstitution actions are either
reorganization or regeneration, depending on the nature of losses
suffered. Commanders will most often execute them in combination.
The decision to reconstitute rests with the commander, and is based
on the tactical situation.
REORGANIZATION
8-309. Reorganization restores combat effectiveness by cross-leveling
assets internally. This may be done within platoons and troops to
produce balanced and effective, but reduced strength, units. Units do
this as a matter of SOP during consolidation and reorganization
phases of combat operations. Reorganization also includes the
formation of composite units, resulting in fewer, but full strength,
units. These actions are part of SOP that also designate who has
8-99
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
authority to consolidate subordinate units. Reorganization is initiated

throughout a conflict and as often as practicable.
REGENERATION
8-310. Regeneration is the rebuilding of a squadron to a specified level
of combat effectiveness through large-scale replacement of personnel,
equipment, and supplies. This process is initiated when losses are too
substantial to regain combat effectiveness through reorganization. Unit
regeneration consists mainly of two major subtasks—repair or
replacement of critical equipment and replacement of critical personnel
losses. Equipment comes from the Class VII resupply system or the
maintenance system. Personnel come from the replacement or medical
channels. SBCT or higher normally controls regeneration of the
squadron.
8-311. The regeneration should be planned as any other tactical
operation. Normally, regeneration of the squadron takes place in an
assembly area in the BSA. Coordination should be made for as many
regeneration resources as possible to be in the assembly area before
the squadron arrives. The S4 has staff responsibility for regeneration,
and the SBCT S4 is the principal executor. The WSRO system will be
used extensively. The squadron must maintain security of its assembly
area during reconstitution. Just as important, however, is the need to
maintain or reconstitute the mental well-being and fighting spirit of the
soldier. Units should make an extraordinary effort to administer to
these needs during this time.
8-312. The squadron commander establishes the sequential priority of
the order that subordinate units get regenerated. The availability of
systems, vehicles, and personnel determines the priority of fill.
8-313. The time to complete regeneration varies with the situation. The
controlling headquarters designates to the CSS planners a specific
time frame that regeneration should be completed. Time for a unit to
train is essential to reestablish cohesion and teamwork. During
regeneration, it may be necessary to use a combination of
reorganization and regeneration techniques. Commanders should
maintain the integrity of squads, crews, and sections as much as
possible.
8-314. Units may be issued with equipment from theater stocks that is
slightly different from original equipment or from equipment called for
by TOE. Tasks such as crew drills, boresighting, zeroing, and
adjustments in tactics should be trained as much as possible given the
time available.
PLANNING
8-315. Reconstitution operations should be planned as any other
operation. The commander plays the most crucial role in reconstitution
planning. He assesses combat effectiveness and, in line with the higher
headquarters plan, establishes the intent, concept, priorities, and
criteria (time and effectiveness) of the reconstitution.
8-100
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

8-316. SOPs form the basis of efficient reconstitution efforts. SOPs
should address the functions below:
• Assessment procedures, standards, and responsibilities.
• Battle rosters allowing for cross-training/alternate duties
and contingency manning.
• Procedures to reestablish C2.
• Reorganization procedures, criteria, and priorities.
MISSION PLANNING
8-317. Commanders routinely include actions in the mission plan to
reduce the impact of the mission and to preserve their force. In some
operations, commanders plan to conduct reconstitution at a specific
point during the operation. The commander and staff should address
the following functions in the plan:
• Assessment methods.
• Transition from combat operations to reconstitution.
• Security of the reconstitution site.
• Movement control of traffic to the reconstitution site.
8-101
Appendix A
MDMP Process/OPORD Guide

This appendix includes CONTENTS
tactics, techniques, and Military Decision-Making Process ............. A-1
procedures (TTP) for the Information Systems Enrichment to
squadron’s military the MDMP.............................................. A-3
Planning in a Time-Constrained
decision-making process Environment ......................................... A-3
(MDMP) and an OPORD Intelligence Preparation of the
guide. It is a tool for the Battlefield ................................................. A-4
commander and staff to Define Battlefield Environment............... A-5
integrate digital tools Define Battlefield Effects ........................ A-5
Evaluate the Threat.................................. A-5
into the process, Determine Threat COAs .......................... A-5
introduce collaborative Squadron Military Decision-Making
and parallel planning Process..................................................... A-6
techniques into the OPORD Briefing Format.............................. A-17
MDMP, and identify Squadron Orders Guide.............................. A-19
Warning Order.......................................... A-19
specific commander and Operation Order ....................................... A-19
staff responsibilities ISR Overlay Order .................................... A-35
during the process. Tasking Matrix.......................................... A-37
FM 5.0 [FM 101-5] is the Fragmentary Order .................................. A-39
standard for the MDMP.
SECTION I – MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
A-1. The complex nature of Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT)

operations, which includes gathering information on adaptive threat,
integrating a wide variety of information collection systems, and ensuring
information is passed in a timely manner, mandates the need for
thorough and detailed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
planning. The squadron’s mission planning is intertwined with the SBCT
MDMP and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) processes. The
degree of latitude that the squadron commander has in planning missions
depends on the specific mission and tasks assigned by the SBCT. The
squadron commander may have less freedom of action and greater
constraints in planning reconnaissance and surveillance operations than
in planning security operations. The MDMP process described in this
appendix focuses on reconnaissance and surveillance operations planned
by the SBCT and executed by the squadron.
A-2. The brigade commander will designate an ISR planning team, led
by the brigade XO, which includes (as a minimum) representatives from
the S2, S3, S4, S5 (civil affairs [when assigned]), and S6 (signal) sections;
fire support element (FSE); Army airspace command and control (A2C2)
cell; the cavalry squadron (RSTA) commander, XO, S3, or designated
representatives; and the supporting military intelligence (MI) company
commander or XO. A key contribution of the squadron commander and
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FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
staff to the brigade ISR planning is knowledge of what squadron

intelligence assets (i.e., sensors) are available as well as their
capabilities/limitations in acquiring needed intelligence. As the SBCT
continues its MDMP, the squadron commander, XO, S3, or designated
representative participates in all activities of the brigade MDMP. When
operational considerations warrant, the brigade commander may delegate
the responsibility for ISR planning to the RSTA squadron commander,
with the brigade staff providing assistance as required.
A-3. The MDMP revolves around an established, proven analytical
procedure. Commanders and staffs use the decision-making process to
select a course of action (COA) and develop an OPLAN, OPORD, or
FRAGO that implements it. It is a dynamic, continuous, and sequential
process that allows the commander and his staff to examine the
battlefield and reach logical decisions.
A-4. The MDMP has seven
steps. Each step builds upon the
outputs from previous steps. 1. Receipt of the mission.
Consequently, errors committed 2. Mission analysis.
early in the process will impact 3. Course of action development.
on later steps. Staff estimates are 4. Course of action analysis.
continuous and, along with 5. Course of action comparison.
database updates, provide 6. Course of action approval.
important inputs to the MDMP. 7. Orders production.
Estimates and database updates
support the planning process as well as successful mission execution. The
squadron mission planning process, while generally following the MDMP, is
tailored to incorporate ISR planning considerations. Since the SBCT directs
the ISR planning process, the squadron does not develop courses of action.
It develops, analyzes, and selects a scheme of support that implements the
SBCT ISR order or directive. A full discussion on implementing the MDMP
in squadron operations is provided in Section III.
A-5. As part of initiating MDMP, the commander determines whether
to initiate collaborative and/or parallel planning.
A-6. Collaborative planning occurs when the commander and staffs of
the higher and lower headquarters work together on the plan, facilitated
by information systems (INFOSYS) that allow real-time exchange of data,
voice, and video. Collaborative planning done early in the process can
greatly improve the subordinates’ understanding of the upcoming
operation. This, in turn, requires aggressive coordination, integration, and
assessment of plans at all levels, both vertically and horizontally.
Collaborative planning between the SBCT and the squadron is the norm.
A-7. Digitization and the ability to quickly transmit orders and update
subordinates have greatly enhanced the ability of subordinates to initiate
parallel planning. Parallel planning allows each echelon to make
maximum use of time available and requires significant interaction
between echelons. During parallel planning several echelons will be
working their MDMP concurrently, which is essential to speed up the
process for subordinate units and allow them maximum time to conduct
their own planning. Parallel planning relies on accurate and timely
warning orders and on sharing information between echelons as it
A-2
________________________________________________Appendix A – MDMP Process/OPORD Guide
becomes available. Parallel planning between the squadron and its

subordinate troops and attached units is the norm.
A-8. Collaborative and parallel planning must be used judiciously.
While both are powerful tools, they are not appropriate for all planning.
They are most appropriate when time is scarce and a limited number of
options are being considered. They are particularly useful when the
commander and his staff can benefit from the input of subordinate
commanders and staffs. They are not appropriate in cases where the staff
is working a large number of COAs or branches and sequels, many of
which will be discarded. Involving subordinates in this instance will
waste precious time working options that are later discarded. They are
also not appropriate in many cases during on-going operations where
extended planning sessions will take commanders and staffs away from
conducting current operations. As a rule of thumb, if the commander is
directly involved in time sensitive planning, collaborative planning is
appropriate. The decision to conduct collaborative planning is the
commander’s, not the staff’s. Only the commander can commit
subordinate commanders to using their time for collaborative planning.
The goal of collaborative and/or parallel planning is anticipatory
decisions and pre-emptive actions that allow the SBCT and the squadron
to operate faster than the threat.
INFORMATION SYSTEMS ENRICHMENT TO THE MDMP

A-9. Army digitized INFOSYS enhance both the science and the art of
war. Coupled with information management, INFOSYS provide
commanders and staffs with a better understanding of their battlespace.
Information is collected more effectively; processed faster and more
accurately; stored in a manner that provides instant access through
distributed databases; displayed in a more useable, tailorable, and
current format; and disseminated to the right place faster, with fewer
errors and less lag time than analog systems. This includes the ability to
access analytical expertise and databases through reachback to service,
national, and civilian institutions. It also includes the ability to create
virtual staffs. Virtual staffing, bringing together organic and nonorganic
elements independent of locations in or out of the area of operation (AO),
can be used to develop and update the staff database and refine the COAs
and the plan. These INFOSYS and information management make
estimates more accurate, complete, and current than was possible with
analog systems. Creating and maintaining a current, complete common
operational picture (COP) is essential to the MDMP. It is the foundation
for all estimates.
PLANNING IN A TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT

A-10. The MDMP may be abbreviated when there is insufficient time for
its thorough and comprehensive application. Products and analysis
developed during a previous full MDMP should be used if METT-TC
factors have not significantly changed. The most significant factor to
consider is time. It is the only nonrenewable, and often times most
critical, resource.
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FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
A-11. There are four primary techniques to save time.
• Commander increases his involvement, making decisions

during the process without waiting for detailed briefings after
each step.
• Commander provides direct guidance, limiting options that
must be considered.
• Commander limits the number of COAs developed and war-
gamed.
• Commander maximizes parallel and collaborative planning.
SECTION II – INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
A-12. IPB is a critical element of the decision-making process. It is a

systematic, continuous process of analyzing the effects of the threat and
the environment on the unit. It is a dynamic process, driven by the
commander, that continually integrates new information into the unit’s
operational framework.
A-13. IPB identifies facts and clarifies assumptions about the threat
and the battlefield environment. The commander uses the IPB process to
analyze the threat, weather, and terrain to determine and evaluate the
threat’s capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable COAs. The resulting
information serves the following purposes:
• It facilitates planning and development of potential friendly

COAs for the operation.
• It provides the basis for directing and synchronizing the
reconnaissance and surveillance effort.
• It helps the commander to selectively apply and maximize his
combat power at critical points in time and space on the
battlefield.
A-14. IPB in the squadron

is normally led by the S2 with
1. Define the battlefield environment.
other staff sections and
2. Define the battlefield effects.
subordinate commanders and
3. Evaluate the threat.
staffs providing information
4. Determine threat courses of
and analysis as required. The
action.
S2 will use the SBCT and
higher headquarters
intelligence products as a starting point for the IPB. If the SBCT is
currently involved in an operation, the IPB products developed for that
mission may be updated and refined to reflect the current METT-TC
factors. IPB is a four-step process. A discussion of each step is below.
A-4
STEP 1 - DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

A-15. This step focuses the requirements of the initial ISR effort. During
this step, the commander and staff use the results of the brigade IPB and
its own analysis to------
• Identify battlefield characteristics, such as terrain and

weather, that will influence friendly and threat operations
and require evaluation through the IPB and ISR processes.
• Establish the area of interest (AOI) to focus the IPB analysis
and the ISR effort.
• Identify gaps in current intelligence holdings that become the
initial information requirements.
STEP 2 - DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS
A-16. This step identifies general limitations that the environment
imposes on friendly and threat forces as well as the tactical opportunities
it offers. IPB products refined during this step focus on these effects. They
include, but are not limited to, the following:
• Population status overlay.

• Overlays that depict the military aspects and effects of terrain
(such as the factors of OCOKA).
• Weather analysis matrix.
• Integrated staff products such as the modified combined
obstacle overlay (MCOO).
• General statements defining how the environment will affect
friendly and threat operations.
STEP 3 - EVALUATE THE THREAT
A-17. This step includes analysis of current intelligence holdings to
determine how the threat normally organizes for and conducts combat
operations. The results are portrayed using threat models that depict how
the threat fights; these are the only products associated with this step.
Although they usually emphasize graphic representation of the threat
situation (such as doctrinal templates with high-value targets), threat
models sometimes entail use of matrices, simple narrative descriptions,
and depictions of threat obstacle systems. The RSTA squadron staff
supports the SBCT S2 in developing and/or refining the threat model that
will be used during the next IPB step.
STEP 4 - DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

A-18. This step integrates the results of the first three steps of IPB into
a meaningful summary of likely objectives and COAs available to the
threat. IPB products, which are valid only if the SBCT commander
establishes a solid foundation during the first three steps, include the
following:
• Models that depict the threat’s available COAs. These are

normally produced in the form of situation templates. They
may include associated matrices and/or text descriptions.
• Event templates and related matrices to focus the ISR effort.
A-5
FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
A-19. These products, along with the SBCT commander’s ISR planning
guidance and higher headquarters ISR tasks, form the basis for the RSTA
squadron’s mission planning.
SECTION III – SQUADRON MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
A-20. The squadron initiates its MDMP simultaneously with the SBCT
MDMP since it is required to provide information to support the brigade’s
planning and decision making. The squadron plans collaboratively with
the SBCT. Once the brigade’s initial ISR collection plan and commander’s
critical information requirements (CCIR) are developed, they become the
basis for the squadron OPORD. The collaborative planning technique will
be employed between the squadron and the SBCT staff.
A-21. The squadron may receive its mission in several different ways,
depending on operational conditions, the SBCT tactical SOP, or the SBCT
commander’s guidance. The squadron can receive a mission verbally or
through the maneuver control system (MCS) in the form of a WARNO,
FRAGO, or OPORD. The commander may also begin the MDMP by
anticipating a new mission based on his analysis of the current and
projected tactical situation.
A-22. Anticipating a mission stems from situational understanding and
the ability of the commander, his staff, or both, to anticipate what to do
next. INFOSYS facilitate mission anticipation by providing a COP that
allows the commander to see the same things his subordinates and his
higher headquarters see. Applying judgment to this expanded view of the
battlespace makes it easier for the commander to anticipate both threat
actions and appropriate friendly actions, or to determine where
unforeseen opportunities for mission accomplishment are.
A-23. The squadron MDMP steps are outlined in Figure A-1.
A-6
STEP 1. RECEIVE THE MISSION

a. Squadron commander directs S3 section to alert staff of pending mission. Staff begins
preparation for mission analysis by gathering necessary tools, to include—
(1) SBCT initial ISR planning guidance.
(2) Higher headquarters plan or orders with graphics, if available.
(3) Maps of area of operations.
(4) Own and higher headquarters SOP.
(5) Existing staff estimates.
(6) Existing IPB products.
b. Based on SBCT initial planning guidance, squadron commander and staff perform a quick initial
assessment to review or determine the following:
(1) SBCT ISR focus, tempo, engagement criteria, and acceptable risk to ISR units, elements,
and assets.
(2) SBCT ISR WARNO or WARNO issued following SBCT mission analysis.
(3) Time available from mission receipt to mission execution.
(4) Time needed to plan, prepare, and execute mission for own and subordinate units.
(5) IPB.
(6) Staff estimates available to support planning.
(7) Ambient light requirements for planning, rehearsals, and movement.
c. Squadron commander issues initial ISR planning guidance based on SBCT commander’s initial
ISR planning guidance. Guidance includes—
(1) Hasty or deliberate planning process.
(2) Initial time allocation.
(3) Liaison officers (LNO) to dispatch.
(4) Initial reconnaissance guidance (focus of reconnaissance, tempo, engagement criteria).
(5) Reconnaissance to start (UAV, emplacement of sensors, ground reconnaissance).
(6) Authorized movement.
(7) Information to be obtained from reachback sources (intelligence agencies, additional
requests for information).
(8) Additional tasks for the staff.
d. Squadron S3 section issues WARNO to subordinate and supporting units, including as a

minimum—
(1) Type and time of operation.
(2) Area of operation.
(3) Initial timeline.
(4) General threat situation.
(5) General friendly situation.
(6) Attachments/detachments.
(7) Security, movement, and/or reconnaissance to initiate.
e. Squadron commander, XO, S3, or designated representatives participate in the SBCT ISR
mission analysis. The analysis identifies—
(1) Higher headquarters scheme for ISR operations and focus, tempo, and engagement
criteria.
Figure A-1. Squadron MDMP Steps
A-7
FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
(2) Specified and implied SBCT ISR tasks assigned by higher headquarters, including target
acquisition or battlefield damage assessment (BDA) requirements.
(a) Specific orders and requests for information from higher headquarters that require
SBCT assets to collect.
(b) Information requirements based on CCIR.
(c) Request for information from SBCT subordinate units or adjacent units.
(d) Target acquisition or BDA requirements.
(e) Constraints placed on reconnaissance.
(f) High-value targets (HVT).
(g) Objectives for reconnaissance from event template or as specified in higher
headquarters order.
(h) Priority information requirements (PIR).
(i) Risk assessment.
(j) Higher headquarters reconnaissance focus and tempo.
(3) Products from the SBCT initial IPB.
(a) Analysis of the AO.
(b) MCOO.
(c) Approved threat courses of actions (COA).
(4) For each approved theat COA, determine the—
(a) SBCT named area of interest (NAI) and information requirements (IR) to confirm or
deny each threat COA.
(b) IR for each NAI; compare and modify based on PIR and existing IR.
(c) NAIs that can be combined or revised to confirm or deny multiple threat COAs.
(d) Refinements to designated NAIs and adjustments to respective IR and collection
times.
(5) Results of analysis (NAI, PIR, and IR) are recorded on tasking matrix and/or
reconnaissance scheme of support worksheet.
f. Squadron commander, XO, S3, or designated representatives participate in the SBCT ISR
scheme of support development.
(1) Determines tactical risk based on focus, tempo, engagement criteria, and/or displacement
criteria.
(2) Identifies and adds additional NAIs and IR for threat branch and/or sequel.
(3) Identifies infiltration/exfiltration requirements.
(4) Allocates and arrays forces and assets.
(5) Assigns tasks based on the concepts of—
(a) Cuing, which involves using one or more sensor systems to provide data that directs
collection by other systems.
(b) Redundancy, which involves tasking several identical assets to cover the same
target.
(c) Mixing assets to provide complementary coverage from multiple sensors.
(d) Integrating new requirements into planned or on-going missions.
(6) Identifies, assigns, and synchronizes supporting tasks for maneuver units.
(7) Develops scheme for combat support (CS).
(8) Determines command and control (C2) relationships.
(9) Determines reconnaissance handover procedures.
Figure A-1. Squadron MDMP Steps (Continued)
A-8
g. SBCT ISR planning team, with participation of the squadron commander, XO, S3, or designated
representatives, analyzes ISR scheme of support by conducting a hasty war game.
(1) Confirms suitability, feasibility, and acceptability based on focus, tempo, and engagement,
and/or displacement criteria to support mission and obtain information requirements.
(2) War-games scheme of support against each threat COA.
(3) Verifies that all NAIs and information requirements confirm/deny the threat COA based on
the PIR and SBCT scheme of maneuver.
(4) Adjusts and shifts ISR assets to account for losses, alternate threat COAs, branches,
and/or sequels.
(5) Confirms exfiltration, evacuation, and/or emergency resupply procedures.
(6) Records results of war game.
(7) Addition/deletion/modification of NAIs and/or information requirements.
(a) Adjustments to maneuver and fires.
(b) Modifications to task organization.
(c) Shifts in command and control relationships.
(d) Adjustments to force protection and/or control measures.
(e) Modifications to service support plan.
(8) SBCT S3 should brief the results of the ISR war game to the SBCT commander who—
(a) Approves ISR scheme of support.
(b) Provides additional planning guidance, if necessary.
h. The SBCT ISR planning team, with participation of the squadron commander, XO, S3, or
designated representatives, develops a draft ISR plan that includes, as a minimum—
(1) SBCT mission.
(2) Commander's intent for ISR operations.
(3) Initial CCIR.
(4) Unit AO.
(5) Reconnaissance instructions.
(a) Initial focus, tempo, and engagement criteria.
(b) Initial ISR tasking matrix.
(c) Initial ISR overlay that includes the following, as applicable—
1. Friendly boundaries and phase lines (PL).
2. Reconnaissance handover line(s).
3. NAIs and targeted areas of interest (TAI).
4. Limits of advance (LOA) and limits of reconnaissance (LOR).
5. Counterreconnaissance AOs for all units.
6. Fire support coordination measures (FSCM).
7. Graphics depicting zone, area, or route reconnaissance.
8. Routes, start points (SP), release points (RP), and checkpoints.
9. Passage points.
10. Contact points.
11. Infiltration/exfiltration lanes.
12. Primary and alternate observation posts (OP) locations.
A-9
FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
13. Ambulance exchange points and logistic release points.

14. Planned or existing friendly obstacles.
15. Scan sectors for sensors.
16. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight paths.
17. Retransmission site locations.
(d) Threat situation template (SITEMP) that includes the following:
1. Locations of known and suspected threat locations.
2. Suspected threat boundaries.
3. Threat COAs for the main body with timed phase lines (TPL).
4. Likely threat reconnaissance and infiltration routes with TPLs.
5. Likely threat OPs and patrols.
6. Threat artillery range fans.
7. Known and templated obstacles.
(6) Revised timeline, to include last time that information is of value.
i. SBCT ISR planning team, with the assistance of the squadron staff, produces ISR order, after
approval of ISR plan by the SBCT commander, which is distributed IAW the unit SOP. The ISR order may
be a separate document or incorporated into an SBCT WARNO.
STEP 2. MISSION ANALYSIS
a. The squadron commander and staff conduct a thorough analysis of the SBCT ISR order.
(1) Reviews the common operational picture, including both the friendly situation and the
threat situation.
(a) The S2 updates the FBCB2 threat entity data.
(b) The S3 updates the friendly locations for units not equipped with digital location
reporting systems.
(c) The S1/S4 updates the current and projected status of subordinate unit’s
maintenance, supply, and personnel through combat service support control system (CSSCS) and FBCB2
logistic reports.
(2) S2 section distributes all intelligence products to subordinates as soon as they are usable,
even if only partially complete.
(3) ISR tasks assigned by the SBCT are analyzed to determine specified, implied, and
essential squadron tasks.
(4) Constraints and restrictions are identified.
(5) Current squadron task organization, support relationships, and unit status are examined to
determine required changes and additional resources needed for mission success.
(6) Accident risk hazards are identified and an initial assessment of risk for each hazard is
performed.
b. If time permits, a mission analysis briefing is conducted IAW the unit SOP to synchronize staff
planning.
c. Commander designates CCIR based on input from the staff.
A-10
d. Commander develops restated mission and intent with input from the staff.
(1) Key tasks: Tasks that must be performed or conditions that must be met to achieve the
stated purpose.
(2) Purpose: Only needed if the purpose in the mission statement is not clear.
(3) End state: Reference friendly, location, and threat.
e. Commander issues planning guidance, which may include—

(1) Essential tasks supporting mission accomplishment, including priorities for all elements
and how he envisions their support of his concept.
(2) Specific COAs to consider and priority for addressing them.
(3) CCIR.
(4) Risk hazard guidance.
(5) Deception guidance.
(6) Fire support guidance.
(7) Mobility and countermobility guidance.
(8) Security measures to be implemented.
(9) Additional specific priorities for CS/CSS.
(10) Timeline.
(11) Type of order to issue.
(12) Type of rehearsal to conduct.
f. Squadron S3 section issues WARNO to subordinate and supporting units, including, as a

minimum—
(1) Restated mission.
(2) Commander’s intent.
(3) Unit’s AO (i.e., sketch, overlay, or some other description).
(4) CCIR.
(5) Risk hazard guidance.
(6) Reconnaissance to be initiated by subordinate units.
(7) Security measures.
(8) Deception guidance, based on essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).
(9) Mobility and countermobility guidance.
(10) Specific priorities.
(11) Timeline.
(12) Guidance on rehearsals.
STEP 3. COA DEVELOPMENT
a. For each specified, implied, and/or essential ISR task, the squadron staff uses a four-step
process to develop at least one COA based on the commander’s planning guidance, unless the SBCT ISR
order or squadron commander has already directed a course of action for the task. The staff considers the
following for each course of action:
(1) Type and duration of the operation.
(2) Focus, tempo, and engagement criteria.
(3) Threat counterreconnaissance and countersurveillance capabilities and limitations.
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FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
(4) Capabilities, limitations, logistic requirements, and status of subordinate units.

(5) Ramifications of friendly tactical operations (long movements, defenses, preparatory fires,
and/or obstacle construction) and reconnaissance operations (Air Force, Army Aviation, and/or adjacent
units).
(6) Command, control, and communications requirements.
(7) Resupply and maintenance requirements, especially Class III, V, and IX.
(8) Higher headquarters and adjacent friendly unit support required.
b. Step 1 - Array the initial forces.

(1) Determine area of operation (usually directed by higher headquarters), including the
proposed forward edge of the battle area (FEBA)/boundary/LOA for a screen or a line of departure
(LD)/zone for the reconnaissance. Look closely at the terrain.
(2) Determine the force necessary to locate, identify, track, and defeat each threat element.
(3) Determine the ratio of friendly forces required, considering:
(a) Risk.
(b) Size of threat to be identified.
(c) Duration of mission.
(d) Ability to infiltrate/exfiltrate.
(e) Initiative.
(f) Surprise.
(g) Logistics.
(h) Tempo of operation.
(4) Determine size of unit to be arrayed based on avenues/areas and capabilities of assets.
(a) Reconnaissance of up to nine routes simultaneously.
(b) Reconnaissance or surveillance of up to 18 designated areas simultaneously (OPs or
dismounted patrols).
(c) Sensor NAI/TAI coverage: measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) – 5
designated areas; signal intelligence (SIGINT) – 3 designated areas for line of bearing (LOB) or one for
direction finding; imagery intelligence (IMINT) – 2 areas; NBC-R – 3 designated NAIs.
(5) Place all friendly reconnaissance and surveillance assets using the shorthand unit
symbols found in FM 1-02 [FM 101-5-1].
(6) Develop the deception story, including location and movement of units, which is
information presented to threat intelligence systems to cause him to execute the action stated in the
commander’s deception guidance.
(7) Make the initial array of forces at the end state to verify everyone understands what they
will look like upon mission completion.
c. Step 2 - Develop the scheme of maneuver.

(1) Define the initial array of forces using the terrain and graphic control measures. A finger
placed anywhere within the commander’s AO should be in a subordinate’s AO.
(2) Covert generic units to specific types of units: ground troops with attached surveillance
assets, surveillance troop, attached light infantry, mechanized infantry, or armor.
(3) Identify the initial set of battlefield operating systems (BOS).
(4) Begin writing the COA statement.
(5) Identify critical events and phases of the operation.
(6) Address the battlefield organization.
A-12
(7) Identify reconnaissance handover locations to support squadron reconnaissance,

handover from lead and adjacent elements, and handover to follow-on infantry units.
(8) Develop the concept of fires.
(9) Identify priorities for CSS units.
(10) Identify obstacle effects.
d. Step 3 - Determine command and control.

(1) Assign headquarters to groupings of forces to create the task organization.
(2) Establish graphic control measures (boundaries, axes of advance, NAIs, TAIs, objectives,
OP locations, phase lines, and other measures as necessary).
e. Step 4 - Prepare COA statement and sketch. The sketch should include—
(1) Unit boundaries.
(2) Unit movement formations.
(3) FEBA or LD/LC (line of contact), phase lines, LOAs, coordinated fire lines (CFL), restricted
fire lines (RFL).
(4) ISR graphics: NAIs, TAIs, and decision points (DP).
(5) Routes and ground and air avenues of approach (movement).
(6) Tactical assembly areas, battle positions, engagement areas, objectives, support-by-fire
(SBF)/attack-by-fire (ABF) positions.
(7) Obstacles and control measures.
(8) Fire support coordination measures: Indirect targets and target numbers.
(9) Designation of main and supporting efforts using composite graphics, task and purpose,
generic headquarters.
(10) Location of command posts.
(11) Threat known or templated locations.
(12) Terrain features.
(13) Witness marks: Top right; bottom left.
(14) Label COA 1, COA 2: On top.
(15) Direct fire control measures: Target reference points (TRP).
(16) Threat information: Major weapon system ranges, locations dashed or solid, phases of fire,
obstacles, timed-phase lines, decision points.
(17) Societal/Infrastructure information: Factional leader location, key infrastructure,
demographics (friendly zones, neutral, hostile).
STEP 4. COA ANALYSIS (WAR GAME)

The battlefield planning and visualization (BPV) tool, which is part of the ABCS software available to the
squadron, may assist the staff in analyzing courses of action. Regardless of the technique used, detailed
notes should be kept of the analysis. These notes can be used to draft the OPORD maneuver paragraph,
which is developed from the recording method. For each critical event, know the start position for each BOS
element. COA analysis has eight steps.
a. Step 1: Gather the tools:
(1) Staff estimates.
(2) Two map displays. One is higher headquarters graphics and event template. The other is
the threat SITEMP and ISR overlay. The event template will turn into the decision support template as
decision points and TAIs are added. SunForm® whiteboard sketches can be used to record the results of
the analysis.
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FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
(3) Recording method: Sync matrix or sketch note (modified sync matrix). An example follows.
Phase of Operation
Est Start-Stop
Blue Resolution/ Branch/ Branch/
BOS Synch Blue Set Red Action
Mitigation Sequel Sequel
SBCT Mission
SBCT Maneuver
Decision Points
Recon/ Security
Focus
Primary NAI/TAIs
EAB Intel Assets
Maneuver
Lethal Effects
Nonlethal Effects
CSS
Command/ Signal
Tactical/ Safety Risk
RFIs/Issues/
Required
Coordination
(4) Two threat COA sketches (each sketch has terrain, higher headquarters graphics, and
commander’s COA maneuver graphics. No assets or units depicted. Add control measures as the war
game progresses. The map recorder is the specific plotter.
(5) Means to post friendly and threat assets/units on the sketches.
(6) Blank overlays: One for each COA with higher headquarters graphics. One for updating
COA graphics during war gaming. Hopefully, it will become the operations graphics.
(7) Graphic aids: Smoke, chemical, FASCAM, artillery, obstacles. Have extra graphic icons.
(8) Planning references: Force ratio tables, movement tables, aircraft endurance rates, and
calculator.
(9) Mission, intent, and concept one and two levels higher posted.
(10) COA statements posted.
(11) Recorder for sync matrix.
(12) Recorder for issues/notes.
(13) Friendly and threat forces available charts posted.
(14) Additional items to post: Evaluation criteria, high-payoff target list (HPTL), decision support
matrix (DSM), close air support (CAS) battle drill, sync matrix, issues/notes, CCIR, risks, assumptions,
critical events.
b. Step 2: List all friendly forces (reference forces availability chart): Combat, CS, and CSS units
that can be committed. Include electronic warfare (EW), PSYOP, deception, OPSEC, and smoke. Add
graphics for all assets. This is one of the most important steps.
c. Step 3: List assumptions. Review list to ensure validity and necessity. Address tactical timeline,
terrain, and weather.
d. Step 4: List last known critical events and decision points. Decision points are linked to critical
events, which are linked to NAIs and TAIs.
A-14
e. Step 5: Determine evaluation criteria: Commander’s guidance and intent, doctrinal

fundamentals, principles of war. This is used to measure the relative effectiveness/efficiency of one COA to
another.
f. Step 6: Select the war-game method: Belt, box, avenues in depth.
g. Step 7: Select a method to record and display results: Sync matrix, whiteboard, or modified
sync matrix. This record allows the staff to build task organization and sync activities and develop the DST.
h. Step 8: War-game the battle and assess the results. Analyze each critical event by identifying
the tasks the force must accomplish one echelon down, using assets two echelons down. Follow the cycle
of action (events initiated by the side with the initiative, usually the offense), reaction, counteraction; identify
the need for any branches (be-prepared missions during the operation) to the plan. Identify TAIs, HVTs, and
high-payoff targets (HPT). Begin the decision support template (DST) and decision support matrix (DSM).
(1) The XO briefs the participants on their role and the sequence of the war game (action-
reaction-counteraction). The briefing may follow the sequence listed below:
(a) XO begins briefing by conducting roll call and orienting the participants to the
analysis tools (maps, status charts, synch matrices, etc.) related to the COA that are present. He then
identifies the—
1. Recorder for issues, notes, and charts (DSM, assumptions, risks).
2. Recorder for the synch matrix.
3. Individual who will update the map/display.
(b) The XO briefs the sequence and rules that will be followed:
1. The sequence we will follow is action, reaction, and counteraction by BOS.
2. The rules are no side bar conversations; everyone takes notes on their BOS
issue to discuss during their BOS time; the recorder will sound off with the next topic when he is ready; and
the XO has the final say on all disagreements.
3. The timekeeper is ________ and we will go no longer than______.
(2) S3 orients the participants on the display/COP and the friendly forces.
(3) The S2 presents the threat overview and initiates the war game by executing the threat
first action, HVTs, location, and triggers.
(4) The S3 presents the reaction to the threat COA.
(5) War-game each friendly COA against threat COA to culminating points that are directly
linked to decision points and branch plans. Track combat power on the composition graphics as losses are
war-gamed. S2 briefs action, HVTs, location, and triggers.
(6) War-game the selected COA against all other threat COAs to identify branch plans driven
by PIR. Prepare a fill-in-the-blank branch plan FRAGO.
i. War-game results are recorded:
(1) Refine and modify the COAs, to include branches and sequels.
(2) Identify strengths/weaknesses of each COA.
(3) Refine location/timing of decision points.
(4) Refine event template/matrix.
(5) Refine task organization.
(6) Identify tasks to subordinate commanders.
(7) Allocate reconnaissance, surveillance, combat, CS, and CSS assets.
(8) Develop sync matrix and DST: Indicates when and where a decision may occur.
(9) Estimate the duration of each critical event as well as the operation.
(10) Identify location and commitment of reserve.
(11) Integrate the targeting process, to include the HPTL.
(12) Project friendly and threat losses. Intuitive process and mission force ratios are the basis
(i.e., you lose three; I lose one). (NOTE: The BPV tool performs these calculations automatically.)
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FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
(13) Identify likely times and areas the threat may use weapons of mass destruction.
(14) Identify location of commander and CPs.
(15) Determine requirements for infiltration, deception, and surprise.
(16) Develop fire support, mobility/survivability, air defense artillery (ADA), information
operations, and CSS plans and graphics.
(17) Develop the intelligence collection and dissemination plan tied to reachback requirements.
(18) Refine and identify decision points, NAIs, TAIs.
(19) Refine CCIR and integrate into the IR order.
(20) Refine C2 requirements, to include control measures.
(21) Determine movement times and tables.
(22) Identify hazards, assess risks, and develop measures to reduce those risks.
j. Following the war game, the XO may conduct a war-game briefing to ensure all participants
have a common understanding of changes or modifications to the COAs.
k. The targeting conference follows the war game. Participants should be XO, S2, S3-air, ALO,
ADO, FSO. Identify triggers.
STEP 5. COA COMPARISON
a. The staff compares the COAs based on the approved evaluation criteria.
b. The staff recommends a COA.
c. The recommended COA is briefed to the squadron commander IAW the SOP.
STEP 6. COA APPROVAL
a. Commander approves: May refine his intent, issue guidance on reconnaissance focus, tempo,
engagement criteria, CS, CSS, orders preparation, and rehearsals. May modify a COA.
b. If this happens, the staff must develop and war-game the new COA.
c. Based on approved COA, the staff prepares and issues WARNO which provides:
(1) Essential information subordinates need to refine their plans.
(2) Higher headquarters and the issuing headquarters mission statement.
(3) Refined commander’s intent.
(4) Specified type of OPORD.
(5) Specified type of rehearsal.
(6) High-payoff target list.
(7) Required maps.
(8) Threat/society situation and any significant intelligence events.
(9) Orders for preliminary action, reconnaissance, and surveillance.
(10) Coordinating instructions.
(11) Service support instructions: Any necessary special equipment and/or movements.
STEP 7. ORDERS PRODUCTION
a. Based on the approved COA, the staff prepares the OPORD IAW the squadron commander’s
guidance and the unit SOP.
b. The commander reviews and approves the OPORD before the staff distributes it IAW unit SOP.
c. The commander may direct that the staff brief the OPORD to the subordinate unit commanders
before it is disseminated. A format for this briefing is provided below.
d. Following the OPORD briefing or dissemination, the commander may conduct backbriefs with
the subordinate unit commanders.
A-16
SECTION IV – OPORD BRIEFING FORMAT
A-24. This section provides a format to assist squadron personnel in

briefing operations orders.
A-25. The following information outlines items and procedures for a
successful, informative OPORD briefing.
• Posted Items:
Higher’s and squadron graphics: OPs map board.
Threat SITEMP: Intelligence map board.
Phase or critical event sketches: 1 x butcher paper = entire
op, 1 x butcher paper = actions on objective.
Agenda.
Mission, intent, and concept two levels up.
Mission, intent, and concept one level up.
Commander’s intent.
Commander’s reconnaissance guidance (focus/tempo/
engagement criteria).
Tactical timeline: Friendly and threat, indicate day and
night.
CCIR chart:
Task organization:
Issues/notes by recorder: Butcher paper.
Wind direction on map board and sketches.
Threat task organization chart.
Weather/Light Chart.
Mission.
Assumptions.
Obstacle matrix (only if needed).
Slant report, to include vehicle/aircraft status of attached
and OPCON units.
• XO begins briefing: Higher’s graphics are posted.
Ensure personnel and charts are organized around the
map: Briefers on one side organized in the order they will
brief. Use BOS/name plates. Organize charts around the
map/sketch. Think about the logical flow.
Conduct roll call: Identify personnel to attend the brief.
The purpose is to brief OPORD # ________. (State mission.)
References we will use throughout this briefing are ______.
(Identify everything you will reference.)
Products you should have in front of you are ______.
(Identify all your handouts.)
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FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
Time zone used throughout this operation is ______. (Zulu

time should be used whether the operation crosses several
or remains in one time zone.)
The recorder for issues/notes is ______. (Identify by name.)
Backbriefs will follow 15 minutes after the order. The
format is ______. (State task organization, commander’s
intent, commander’s essential guidance, specified tasks,
the threat, mission, concept, questions.)
The outline is ______. (Identify and give the audience time
to review it.)
ISR data used in this OPORD is _____ hours/minutes old,
or the last ISR input of data to the OPORD was at _____
hours Zulu.
I will now orient you to the ______ (map, sketch, terrain
model): North, wind, and your location. (Orient all
references at this time.)
Our AO is ______. (Identify boundaries, cities, major roads,
cities, and rivers and anything else significant [control
measures]).
Our AOI is ______. (Explain why.)
Task organization is as follows ______. (Review each
element.)
Each briefer will ask for questions.
I will be followed by __________. (See Figure A-2.)
Figure A-2. Sample Briefing Agenda
A-18
SECTION V – SQUADRON ORDERS GUIDE
A-26. The squadron has several tools to use in developing and

disseminating orders. Both MCS and FBCB2 have a preformatted order.
WARNING ORDER
A-27. Upon receipt or discovery of a new mission, the commander and
his staff will perform a quick analysis of the nature of the operation and
issue a WARNO. The WARNO includes general information on the
situation, task organization, and nature of the operation. From this the
troop commanders formulate their WARNOs and issue them to their
units. ISR operations can commence with the information provided in the
initial WARNO. The squadron normally issues a WARNO at the end of
mission analysis. This WARNO includes the restated squadron mission,
commander’s intent, CCIR, and detailed guidance on the conduct of
immediate ISR operations. Another WARNO may be issued once the
commander has decided on a COA for the squadron operation. It includes
details needed by subordinate units to refine their plans and provides
guidance on OPORD issuance and rehearsals.
OPERATION ORDER
A-28. The key to ISR operations is to get assets in position as soon as
possible, allowing them to provide the commander as much information
and detail as early as possible. As the brigade’s maneuver forces are
conducting their consolidation/reorganization from the current operation,
the squadron may initiate its next ISR operation. This technique allows
the brigade to move the squadron as early as possible while providing
subordinate units the information needed to initiate planning.
A-29. The squadron OPORD is normally issued after completion of the
brigade’s mission analysis, once the brigade has developed its ISR plan. The
OPORD should include the commander’s guidance, NAIs, PIR/CCIR, location of
critical OPs, and tasking requirements for specific assets (collection matrix). The
MCS and FBCB2 systems have OPORD tools that provide automatic
formatting and almost instantaneous distribution to everyone in the unit.
A-30. Characteristics of a good operations order include simplicity,
brevity, completeness, coordination, and flexibility. The following
techniques should be incorporated into the unit order SOP:
• Show all paragraph headings on written orders. A paragraph

heading with no text will state ‘‘None,’’ ‘‘See Annex ___,’’ or
‘‘See Overlay ___.’’
• Use abbreviations, except for joint or combined operations, to
save space and time if not confusing.
• Describe locations or points on the ground using the military
grid reference system.
• Designate directions one of three ways:
Using two locations or places.
A point of the compass.
A magnetic, grid, or true bearing.
A-19
FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
• When a place or feature on a map is mentioned for the first

time in an order, print the name in capital letters and show
its grid coordinates in parenthesis after it.
• When a control measure, such as a contact point or supply
point, is used for the first time in an order, print the name or
designation of the point followed by its grid coordinates in
parenthesis.
• Describe areas by naming the northernmost (12 o’clock) point
first and the remaining points in clockwise order within the
tactical assembly area or assembly area.
• Describe BPs/OP positions from left to right and from front to
rear, facing the threat.
• Use compass points to describe flanks, rather than right or
left of the friendly force (adjacent units).
• Always add compass points for clarity when describing a
route.
• Designate trails, roads, and railroads by the names of the
places near their locations.
• Describe riverbanks using cardinal directions or as either
near or far in crossing operations.
• Describe boundaries and phase lines by easily distinguishable
terrain features.
• When the boundary is between units, identify who has
responsibility for it by stating inclusive or exclusive to the
unit. (For example, 1st Bn, exclusive of CROSSROAD
LB621352.)
• During the AO/AOI brief, list boundaries and phase lines in
the order from left to right or front to rear facing the threat.
• Establish an SOP for naming. For example, colors for
objectives and cavalry commanders for phase lines.
• Place classification markings at the top and bottom of each
page if the order or plan is prepared using the MCS or FBCB2
free text message tool. If the entire plan or order is
unclassified, no classification markings are required.
• When using a time event other than days, spell it out (D + 3
months); use the same technique for H-hour.
• Include the time zone suffix in the heading data and in the
mission statement. Use the 24-hour clock system of four digits
and the time zone suffix. Use the local time suffix. For
operations across several time zones, use ZULU time. Express
dates in the sequence day, month, and year (6-9 August 2002).
• For nonelectronic overlays (paper or acetate):
Number pages consecutively, beginning on the first page.
Center the security classification at the top and bottom of
the overlay.
Place the title of the overlay in the upper left margin below
the classification.
A-20
Place the map reference of the overlay in the upper left

corner below the title.
Place two map reference points on opposite corners of the
overlay, bottom left, and top right.
Provide a coordinate appendix with the overlay: List of C2
points, unit locations, etc.
When storing overlays, roll or fold so that the marginal
data (classification, title, map reference) is visible on the
outside.
A-31. An annotated format for a squadron OPORD is shown in

Figure A-3.
A-32. The squadron may also be directed to write all or part of Annex L
(Reconnaissance and Surveillance) to the SBCT OPORD. The annex
provides the overall reconnaissance objective and details how
reconnaissance assets operate in conjunction with the rest of SBCT. An
annotated Annex L format is shown in Figure A-4 on page A-32.
A-21
FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
OPERATION ORDER AND PLAN (OPORD/OPLAN)

Copy _____ of _____copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number
OPERATION PLAN (ORDER) (Number) (Code Name)
References: What map sheet, charts, datum, or other documents are required to understand the order.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan (Order): Use ZULU for operations spanning more than one
time zone.
Task Organization: One level down pure, task organized two levels down. Include BOS that are task
organized; i.e., engineer, ADA, and intelligence assets. List major systems. Ensure units are sequenced
properly: type, size, numerically, alphabetically. Date-time group when task organization is effective.
1. SITUATION: Post higher’s SITEMP with higher’s graphics.
a. Enemy Forces: Provide references.
b. Friendly Forces: Orient, read, and reference.
(1) Two levels higher mission:
(2) Two levels higher intent:
(3) Two levels higher concept of the operation:
(4) One level higher mission:
(5) One level higher intent:
(6) Commander’s reconnaissance guidance (focus, tempo, engagement criteria):
(7) One level higher concept of the operation:
(8) Flank units: Units that have a bearing on the issuing headquarters. Identify using
cardinal directions.
(9) Reserve unit: Purpose and any planning guidance and any be-prepared
missions/tasks.
(10) Units supporting higher headquarters:
c. Attachments / Detachments: When not addressed in task organization, by phase.
d. Assumptions.
2. MISSION: who, what, where, when, why. No more than two O/O missions. Reference graphics.
3. EXECUTION: Squadron and below has one main effort per mission. O/O mission can change.
Intent: Key tasks, purpose, and end state.
• Key Tasks: Those that must be performed or conditions that must be met to achieve
the purpose. Not tied to a specific COA. The operation’s tempo, duration, effect on
the threat, and terrain that must be controlled are examples of key tasks.
• Broader purpose, if needed, to expand on the purpose in the mission statement.
• End state: Commander’s vision of end state. Include relation of friendly, threat,
(civilians) and terrain / location. Define the task in the mission statement.
Figure A-3. OPORD Format
A-22
a. Concept of the Operation: Must be understood two levels down.

• The purpose of this operation is: State your purpose first and then next higher’s
purpose.
• Commander’s reconnaissance guidance: The focus of this operation is ______. The
tempo of the operation is _______. The engagement criteria are ______ (what is a
squadron fight, what is a troop fight, what size threat or event will cause the
commitment of the brigade assets).
• We will accomplish this by conducting a ____ (form of maneuver or defensive pattern
and the general pattern of forces).
• This will be a _____ phase operation.
• State when each phase begins and when it ends: Phase I begins when _____. Phase I
ends when ______. Phase II begins when ______. Phase II ends when ______.
Continue until you have defined each phase. The operation does not have to be
phased.
• State commander’s reconnaissance guidance for each phase if there is a change.
• The decisive point to this operation is_______. (The point at which you will accomplish
your purpose.)
• At the decisive point __________.
• Deep operations task and purpose by unit/asset:
• Reconnaissance Operations: Include any reconnaissance and surveillance that
supports the squadron’s maneuver.
• Security Operations: Identify the unit and task: Screen or Guard. Generally a security
operation begins when a reconnaissance operation culminates in surveillance on an
NAI.
• Identify each maneuver unit (recce troop, surveillance troop, mobile gun system,
infantry, etc.) main effort or supporting effort, with their task, purpose, and location
(x 2).
• Identify the reserve location at the decisive point and its be-prepared missions.
• Indirect fires essential fire support tasks (EFST), purpose, location (x 2), and priority of
fires (POF) at the decisive point for each asset.
• Rear operations task and purpose by unit / asset:
• Significant to this operation is ________. (List all critical events.)
• List any be-prepared missions, branches, and/or sequels.
(1) Maneuver: Discuss branch plans and sequels after the maneuver paragraph.
Reference them in CCIR with parenthesis indicating Branch Plan ______. By phase, fires will include
EFST/task, purpose, system, POF, triggers, and target numbers. For a security operation, ensure engineers
are briefed at the end of each phase on the following: engineer personnel task, purpose, priority of effort
(POE) and priority of support (POS); engineer equipment task, purpose, POE, and POS; FASCAM
employment; and any restrictions. Think of each task and explain subordinate’s actions in broad terms. In
reconnaissance, this may include line of departure, passage of lines, movement throughput, breach/bypass
operation, actions on the reconnaissance objective, consolidate and reorganize, and any be-prepared
missions. In security, this may include occupation, battle handover, counterreconnaissance, defense,
displacement, brigade counterattack, consolidate and reorganize, and any be-prepared missions.
• Phase I (what is it) begins when _________.

• Phase I ends when _________.
Figure A-3. OPORD Format (Continued)
A-23
FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
The following information pertains to maneuver paragraph.

• Begin each phase with how the phase begins, explain it, and end each phase with
how it ends.
• Within each phase address the battlefield organization. Critical BOS, if needed.
• Fires will include EFST, purpose, system, location (x 2), POF, observer and alternate,
triggers, target numbers, HPTs, FSCMs (CFZs/CFLs).
• Only give task and purpose in phases where needed; i.e., the movement phase does
not require task and purpose. You will give the order of march, the movement
technique, and the movement formation. Explain the operation addressing the
battlefield organization.
• Discuss sequentially and how the units move; i.e., order of march, formation, and
technique within the battlefield organization.
• Deep and rear fights are generally brigade (squadron) and higher.
• Deep assets include EW (C&J), UAV, ADA teams, STRIKERs, long-range
surveillance detachment, Special Forces, and any reachback assets supporting the
brigade and squadron.
• ISR assets include recce elements, HUMINT, GSR, STRIKERs, FISTs, ADA teams.
• Rear assets include MPs.
(2) Fires: Always plan for smoke and illumination; reference fire support overlay/target
list. Do not brief if briefed during maneuver.
(a) Commander’s guidance for fires: In general terms.
The following information is by phase.
• Phase 1: (what is it) Fires: In each phase, brief task, purpose, method, and effects for
each task.
• EFST/task: State the EFST for this phase or state there are no EFSTs for this phase,
or state the tasks for this phase, if any. The tasks are disrupt, divert, limit, destroy,
delay, and damage.
• Purpose: How it relates to maneuver, what the effect will accomplish.
• Method:
System: CAS, FA, mortars.
Observer: primary and alternate.
Triggers: initiate, lift, and shift.
Target numbers: higher and lower.
(b) Scheme of fires and effects:

(3) ISR: State task and purpose of each NAI, who is responsible, triggers/time, and how
it is linked to squadron CCIR and the brigade CCIR. Refer to the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S)
overlay and identify NAIs using the R&S matrix. The event template drives the R&S plan and is the basis
of the five-paragraph squadron OPORD. The R&S overlay contains NAIs, assets, R&S LOA, positions of
sensors, routes to and from locations, and purpose. This would be the time to lay out the collection (ISR)
plan so all can see the synchronization of the collection effort.
A-24
(4) Intelligence: Describe the POE for each phase: Situational development, targeting,
and/or BDA. Describe the POS: units, assets include GSR, STRIKER, GLD, scouts (LRAS3), Q36, Q37,
HUMINT, CI teams, REMBASS, UAV, Avenger, others by phase.
PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III PHASE IV PHASE V

POE
POS
(5) Engineer: For each phase, personnel (Sappers), equipment, FASCAM

employment, and restrictions. Do not brief if briefed during maneuver. If all assets are task organized,
just give the POE, POS, FASCAM employment, and any engineer restrictions.
(a) Task organization:
(b) Phase ___:
• Engineer Personnel: Sappers.

Task and Purpose:
POE: Higher and lower. Mobility, survivability.
POS: Higher and lower. To what unit?
• Engineer Equipment: Assault and obstacle.
Task and Purpose:
POE: Higher and lower. Mobility, survivability.
POS: Higher and lower. To what unit?
(c) FASCAM employment:
(d) Engineer employment restrictions:
(6) Air Defense: By phase.
(a) Task Organization:
(b) Task and Purpose:
(c) POE: To which air avenue of approach; rotary or fixed wing?
(d) POS:
(e) Local ADA Warning (Snowman/White, Lookout/Yellow, Dynamite/Red) and
weapons control status (WCS) (free, tight, hold).
(7) Information Operations:
b. Tasks to Maneuver Units: State be-prepared tasks here. These tasks can be specified or
implied. Ensure all elements are listed. Always state task and purpose as best as possible. Units must
be listed in the same sequence as in task organization.
(1) Troop A:
(2) Troop B:
(3) Troop C:
(4) Troop D:
(5) HHT:
A-25
FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
c. Tasks to Combat Support Units: These tasks can be specified or implied. State as task
and purpose as much as possible. Do not task if task organized.
(1) Intelligence: (Intelligence assets attached to the squadron.)
(2) Engineer:
(a) Engineer units, priorities of work.
(b) Environmental considerations.
(3) Fire Support: Include fire support information here rather than in an annex.
(a) Air Support: Allocation of CAS sorties.
(b) Field Artillery Support: Priorities (counterfires/interdiction), organization for
combat, command and support relationships if not clear in task organization.
(c) Naval Gun Fire Support.
(d) Fire Support Coordination Measures.
(4) Air Defense:
(a) Organization for combat.
(b) Missions.
(c) Priorities for protection.
(5) Signal:
(b) POE.
(c) POS.
(d) Priority of work.
(6) NBC:
(b) POE.
(c) POS.
(d) Priority of work.
(e) Tasks to decontamination or smoke units.
(7) Provost Marshal:
(8) Psychological Operations:
(9) Civil Military:
(10) Other: As required.
d. Coordinating Instructions: Applies to two or more units. Many determined during war
game. Think by phase if it applies. Highlight key things during the brief. The first five are mandatory.
(1) Time or condition when a plan or order becomes effective:
A-26
(2) CCIR: All CCIR are linked to a decision or answer higher’s CCIR. Identify by phase
and assign a number to link with the DST. May have a separate CCIR chart listing higher’s CCIR.
Identified on the DSM as P1, E1, F1, etc, under criteria.
• PIR: Linked to targeting or a maneuver branch plan or sequel, e.g., P1, P2.
• EEFI: Linked to force protection, security (counterreconnaissance), or
deception. If any measures fail, a branch plan is needed, e.g., E1, E2.
• FFIR: Linked to culmination that generates the commitment of the reserve, add
assets, or a branch plan, e.g., F1, F2.
(3) Risk reduction control measures: Identify hazards, preventative measures for those
hazards, acceptable risk. MOPP level, OEG, vehicle recognition signals, fratricide prevention measures.
Tactical Risks are threat related and Accident Risks are friendly, terrain, and weather related.
(4) Rules of engagement (ROE): Can be within own annex. Is IAW the Laws of War,
ADA warning, and WCS.
(5) Environmental Considerations: Digging next to water sources, fuel spills, etc.
(6) Movement: By phase if not addressed in the maneuver paragraph. Route or axis to
end of mission, order of movement, movement technique, movement formation, routes, SP and RP
times and locations, rate of march, catch-up speed. Add compass directions when describing routes.
(7) Engagement Priority: By weapon system.
(8) Engagement Criteria/Triggers: Direct fire weapons only. When and where, if not in
the maneuver paragraph.
(9) Bypass Criteria:
(10) Displacement Criteria: Favorable/unfavorable.
(11) Timeline: LD, screen NLT, earliest time of move, (maneuver, CSS, and fires
rehearsals), LOGPAC, backbriefs, boresight complete, PCCs complete, PCIs complete, wake up and
stand-to, occupation of staging area, intelligence updates, BUBs, OPORDs planning and rehearsals one
level down complete, target list, commander’s huddle, control measures, reconnaissance of LD,
quartering party, occupy, CP rehearsal, task organize effective, reconnaissance set, SP tactical
assembly area (TAA), commander’s rest, XO’s rest, movement to TAA, receive engineers, etc.
(12) Priorities of Work:
(13) Actions on Contact: Based on the eight forms of contact (see Chapter 1). During the
tactical road march, etc.
(14) EPWs: Handling: 5S—search, segregate, silence, speed, safeguard.
(15) Civilians: Handling.
(16) Passage of Lines: Lane name and location, passage point number and location,
recognition signals, and vehicle markings.
(17) As Required:
4. SERVICE SUPPORT: Brief by phase: Asset location, POS, and highlights.
a. Support Concept (SAFFMM): Brief the concept of support in general terms before,
during, after: Important things to include during each phase.
(1) Before Phase: Prior to LD of main body, include the reconnaissance fight. Discuss
the location of trains, LOGPAC operations, POS, and any highlights.
(a) Sustain: Echeloned or consolidated support, location of trains, ration cycle,
priority of support, order of movement during resupply. Last LOGPAC time and type.
(b) Arm: Prestock guidance, priority.
A-3. OPORD Format (Continued)
A-27
FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
(c) Fix/Maintenance: Critical shortages, priority.

(d) Fuel: Priority.
(e) Manning/MEDEVAC: Priority for replacements, personnel shortages, and
strength reports.
(f) Move/Transportation: Main supply route (MSR), supply route security, priority
of movement (reference cardinal direction), alternate supply route (ASR).
(g) Decontaminate:
(h) Task to CSS Units: HHT cdr, HHT XO, medical platoon, CTCP, maintenance
element, and NBC section.
(2) During Phase: LD to consolidation and reorganization; break this phase into the
phases of the operation.
(a) Sustain: Echeloned or consolidated support; location of support elements
(FLE, trains) and what it contains; priority of support; emergency resupply location and what’s available;
destruction criteria; resupply type: LRP, tailgate, or service station; priority of transportation; evacuation
priority; LOGPAC; order of movement during resupply. Discuss collection points lower; exchange points
higher.
(b) Arm: Prestock guidance, controlled supply rate per weapon system,
emergency Class V locations and how to get it.
(c) Fix: Maintenance repair timeline, evacuation vehicles begin attack with POS
units, then reposition at the exchange points after first evacuation.
(d) Fuel: Conduct of ROM or hot refuel, emergency Class III location and how to
get it.
(e) Manning: Priority for replacements, aeromedevac instructions, CASEVAC
instructions, KIA evacuation instructions, contaminated KIA evacuations instructions. Evacuation
vehicles begin attack with the POS unit.
(f) Move: MSR, ASR, supply route security, priority of movement (reference
cardinal direction), and dirty route.
(g) Decon:
(h) Task to CSS Units: HHT cdr/XO, medical platoon, CTCP, maintenance
platoon, NBC section.
(3) After Phase: Consolidation and reorganization.
(a) Sustain: Echeloned or consolidated support; location of support elements
(FLE, trains) and what it contains; priority of support; resupply type: LRP, tailgate, or service station;
priority of movement (reference cardinal direction); evacuation priority; LOGPAC; order of movement
during resupply; execution of first LOGPAC.
(b) Arm: Priority of resupply.
(c) Fix: Priority.
(d) Fuel: Conduct of ROM or hot refuel. Priority.
(e) Manning: Priority for replacements, aeromedevac instructions, CASEVAC
instructions, KIA evacuation instructions, contaminated KIA evacuation instructions.
(f) Move: MSR, supply route security, priority of movement, dirty route.
(g) Decon:
(h) Task to CSS Units: HHT cdr/XO, medical plt, CTCP, maintenance plt, NBC
section.
A-28
b. Scheme of Support Execution Matrix:
PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III PHASE IV PHASE V REMARKS

Trigger that
Trigger that Trigger that Trigger that Trigger that
sends you
TRIGGER sends you to sends you to this sends you to sends you to
to this
this phase. phase. this phase. this phase.
phase.
Collect
CCP/MCP # / GRID
lower /
AXP/MXP # / GRID
exchange
higher
EPW Down
PT / GRID
wind of
CTCPMSR/ LOC
AS1 / LOC MAS
AS2 / LOC FAS
Think
UMCP / LOC
water
andLRP # / GRID
wind,
DECON SITE # / GRID
down
windLCP
of #, GRID, CONTENTS
MSR.
Class 4 & 5 pts
BDE establishes
Mine Dumps:
MSR
ASR
DIRTY ROUTE
BSA
FLE
EVAC SQDs
TREAT SQDs
POS: List units
c. Material and Services: Refer to Annex I (Service Support).

d. Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization: Refer to Annex I (Service Support).
e. Personnel Support: Refer to Annex I (Service Support).
f. Civil Military: Refer to Annex I (Service Support).
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Command:
• Chain of command: Higher’s and yours.
• Other.
C2 locations by
Phase: Give PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III PHASE IV PHASE V REMARKS
Grids C2 Assets
CDR
CP
TAC
HIGHER CDR
RETRANS
A-29
FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
b. Signal:
• SOI ___ in effect.
• GPS time in effect.
• COMSEC guidelines and radio communications restrictions.
• Code words.
• Visual and pyrotechnic signals: For example, red smoke marks the friendly line of own
troops for CAS.
• Methods of communication by priority.
• Time to change frequencies.
• Retrans in effect:
• Challenge/Password:
• Hopset series_____.
• Radio Frequencies: as needed.
• Required reports, formats, and time to submit.
• Review issues / notes:
• Time now:_____: Synchronize watches.
• Backbriefs in 15 minutes.
• Next hard time.
• Questions.
ACKNOWLEDGE: Instructions for the acknowledgment of the plan or order by addressees.
NAME (Commander’s last name)
RANK (Commander’s rank)
(Original signed; copy remains in the HQ file)
OFFICIAL: If not signed by the commander, authentication is required by the preparing staff officer
(name and position).
ANNEXES: (Doctrinal reference FM 5-0 [FM 101-5].)
DISTRIBUTION: Those who are to receive the order.
NOTE: The security classification must appear centered at the top and bottom of each page.
A-30
ANNEXES:
Annex A Task Organization
Annex B Intelligence
Appendix 1 Weather and Terrain
Tab A Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay
Appendix 2 Threat Most Probable COA Situation Template
Appendix 3 Threat Most Dangerous COA SITEMP
Appendix 4 Threat Order of Battle
Appendix 5 Threat Doctrinal Composition
Appendix 6 Threat Most Probable COA Task Organization
Annex C Operations Overlay
Annex D Fire Support
Appendix 1 HPT List/Tgt Sync Matrix
Appendix 2 Target List
Appendix 3 Field Artillery Support Plan
Appendix 4 Target Number Assignments
Annex E Rules of Engagement
Annex F Engineer
Appendix 1 Obstacle Overlay
Tab A Obstacle Matrix
Tab B Threat Engineer Capabilities
Appendix 2 Survivability Matrix
Appendix 3 Threat Engineer Assets
Appendix 4 Report Formats/Obstacle and Lane Marking SOP
Annex H Signal
Annex I Service Support
Appendix 1 Service Support Overlay
Appendix 2 Traffic Circulation and Control
Tab A Traffic Circulation (Overlay)
Tab B Road Movement Table
Tab C Highway Regulations
Appendix 3 Personnel
Appendix 4 Legal
Appendix 5 Religious Support
Annex J Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
Annex O Army Airspace Command and Control
Annex P Information Operations
Annex Q Civil Military Operations
Annex R Public Affairs
Annex T Electronic Warfare
A-31
FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
ANNOTATED FORMAT FOR ISR ANNEX TO

OPERATION ORDERS AND PLANS
ANNEX L (INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE) TO OPERATION ORDER

NO_______
1. SITUATION.
2. MISSION.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of ISR operation. State the overall reconnaissance objective. A clear focus for
reconnaissance helps units and staff pinpoint the exact ISR tasks that need to be accomplished in
support of the commander’s intent. ISR operations are focused on three areas. First, ISR must always
be focused on CCIR; this ensures ISR provides the necessary information that supports the
commander’s decision making. Second, ISR focus must support targeting (triggers to maneuver, direct
and indirect fires, both lethal and nonlethal). Third, ISR operation may focus on voids in relevant
information. State the focus of ISR (reconnaissance objective) in clear, simple terms.
The concept of ISR operations describes how commanders see the ISR actions of subordinate
units and assets fitting together to support his decision making. The concept of ISR operations
expresses how each element of the force will cooperate to accomplish the ISR mission and how it is tied
to supporting the unit’s overall operation. State the overall ISR plan, with tasks and purposes that clearly
focus ISR units and assets. At a minimum, the description includes the ISR scheme of maneuver,
concept of fires, intelligence, and intelligence reach that support ISR execution. State the form of
maneuver reconnaissance and surveillance forces will use to get to the assigned area (infiltration,
penetration of threat security zone, passage of lines, and so on). The concept of ISR operations focuses
on the method by which the operation synchronizes the battlefield operating systems (BOS) to support
reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Because ISR operations are continuous, the initial ISR order
may support commander’s planning decisions. Subsequent ISR orders will support the base plan and its
associated branches. Lastly, the order sets the conditions for future operations (transition operations.)
The commander uses this subparagraph when he feels he must supply sufficient detail to ensure
appropriate action by subordinates in the absence of additional communications or further instructions.
The concept statement should be concise and understandable.
The concept describes—
• The employment of major maneuver elements in an ISR scheme of maneuver.

• Essential fire support tasks or “scheme of fires” supporting the ISR operations.
• The integration of other major elements or systems within the operation. These include
higher, adjacent, and joint ISR units and asset. What intelligence reach supports ISR
operations. The integration of security elements, intelligence assets, engineer assets, and
air defense.
•Any be-prepared missions. These should address, at a minimum, how the ISR units
support transition. Because ISR operations are continuous, anticipating transition
operations are extremely important to prepare for the next operation.
NOTE: Depending on what the commander considers appropriate, the level of command, and the
complexity of any given ISR operation, the following subparagraphs are examples of what
may be required within the concept of operations.
(1) Maneuver. State the scheme of maneuver derived during the planning process. Be
sure this paragraph is complemented by the graphical depiction of the ISR (R&S) and operation overlay.
It must address the decisive and shaping operations, to include security operations. This paragraph and
the ISR and operations overlay should be complementary, clarifying, rather than duplicating, each other.
Do not duplicate information to be incorporated into unit subparagraphs or coordinating instructions.
Refer to Annex C (Operations) or the base OPORD if required.
Figure A-4. Annotated Annex L Format
A-32
(2) Fires. Clarify scheme of fires to support the overall ISR concept. This paragraph
should state which ISR unit is the main effort and has priority of fires, to include stating purpose of,
priorities for, allocation of, and restrictions for fire support. Refer to Annex D (Fire Support) if required. If
the fire support annex is the only one referenced, show it after “(2) Fire Support.” Refer to appropriate
annexes as required. When referencing other annexes, identify them within the subparagraph where
appropriate.
(3) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. State the ISR support from higher,
adjacent, and joint units and assets that contribute to the ISR operation.
(4) Intelligence. State the intelligence system concept supporting the ISR plan. Describe
the priority of effort among situation development, targeting, and battle damage assessment. Describe
the priority of support to maneuver units and the priority of counterintelligence effort. Refer to Annex B
(Intelligence) if required.
(5) Engineer. Clarify the scheme of engineer support to the ISR plan, paying particular
attention to the integration of engineer assets and obstacles. Indicate priority of effort and provide
priority of mobility and survivability aspects as appropriate. Delegate or withhold authority to emplace
obstacles. Refer to Annex F (Engineer) and other appropriate annexes as required.
(6) Air and Missile Defense. State overall concept of air and missile defense in support of
the ISR operation. Include considerations of potential Air Force counterair support as well as the actual
contribution of dedicated air defense (AD) units. Establish priority of air defense for general support
units and provide AD weapons status and warning status. State clearly how ISR assets support AD.
Refer to Annex G (Air Defense) and other appropriate annexes as required.
(7) Information Operations. State overall concept of information operations in support of
ISR operations. Establish priority of support and refer to Annex P (Information Operations) and other
appropriate annexes as required.
b. Tasks to maneuver units. Clearly state the tasks and purposes for each maneuver unit
supporting ISR execution that reports directly to the headquarters issuing the order. State the
reconnaissance objective for the unit. How the unit will get to its assigned area (routes, passage points,
infiltration lanes, and so on). Use a separate subparagraph for each maneuver unit. Specific collection
tasks (PIR with indicators) and where to look (NAIs) as identified in the reconnaissance and surveillance
plan matrix. Only state tasks that are necessary for comprehension, clarity, and emphasis. Place tactical
tasks that affect two or more units in subparagraph 3d.
c. Tasks to combat support units. Use these subparagraphs only as necessary. How the
unit will get to its assigned area (routes, passage points, and so on). Clearly state the tasks and
purposes for each CS unit that supports ISR execution. Use CS subparagraphs to list only those
specific tasks that CS units must accomplish, but are not specified or implied elsewhere.
(1) Intelligence. Annex B (Intelligence). If not clear in the task organization, address the
function or support roles of organic or attached military intelligence units.
(2) Engineer. Annex F (Engineer). If not in the task organization, list organization for ISR
combat operations. Assign priorities of effort and support. Address functions or support roles of organic
or attached engineer units if it is not clear in task organization. Clearly state any reconnaissance task
needed to support ISR operations. If not addressed in unit SOPs, establish priorities of work.
(a) Engineer units, priorities of work.
(b) Environmental considerations.
(3) Fire Support. Refer to Annex D (Fire Support). A fire support annex is usually
published at division and corps levels. At brigade and lower, include fire support information here rather
than in an annex. Clearly state any reconnaissance or surveillance task needed to support ISR
operations (target acquisition radar, Colts, etc.).
(a) Air support. State allocation of close air support sorties, air interdiction sorties
(corps), and nominations (division). Show tactical air reconnaissance sorties here.
(b) Field artillery support. Cover priorities such as counterfires or interdiction. State
organization for combat, to include command and support relationships only if they are not clear in task
organization. Ensure that allocation of fires supports the commander’s concept. At brigade and lower,
most of the fire support information is contained in a matrix format in the fire support annex.
Figure A-4. Annotated Annex L Format (Continued)
A-33
FM 3-20.96 ___________________________________________________________________________
(c) Naval gunfire support.

(d) Fire support coordinating measures.
(4) Air and Missile Defense. Annex G (Air and Missile Defense). Clearly state any
reconnaissance or surveillance task needed to support ISR operations (Sentinel radar, etc.). Address
the following for organic and attached AD units if not addressed in unit SOPs:
(b) Missions.
(c) Priorities for protection.
(5) Command, Control, Communication, and Computer (C4) Operations. If not in the
task organization, list organization for combat. Assign priorities of effort and support. Address functions
or support roles of organic or attached signal units if it is not clear in task organization. Clearly
demonstrate how C4 supports ISR operations (necessary retrans, etc.). Establish priorities of work if not
addressed in unit SOPs. Refer to Annex H (C4 Operations).
(6) NBC. Annex J (NBC). If not in the task organization, list organization for combat.
Assign priorities of effort and support. Address functions or support roles of organic or attached
chemical and smoke units if it is not clear in task organization. Establish priorities of work if not
addressed in unit SOPs. Clearly state any reconnaissance or surveillance task needed to support ISR
operations (NBC recon platoon, etc.).
(7) Provost Marshall. Annex K (PM). Assign priorities of effort and support. Establish
priorities of support to enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations. Clearly state any reconnaissance or
surveillance task needed to support ISR operations.
(8) Civil-Military Operations. Refer to Annex Q if used.
d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Time or condition when a plan or an order becomes effective.
(2) Commander’s critical information requirements. List only here. Do not list in Annex
B (Intelligence).
(a) Priority intelligence requirements. (List the indicators to the PIR and related
NAIs if not in Annex B or the ISR (R&S) matrix.)
(b) Friendly forces information requirements.
(3) Risk reduction control measures. These are measures unique to this operation that
are not listed in unit SOPs. These measures include mission-oriented protective posture, operational
exposure guidance, troop-safety criteria (corps only), vehicle recognition signals, and fratricide
prevention measures.
(4) Rules of engagement (ROE). Refer to Annex E (Rules of Engagement), if required.
(5) Environmental considerations.
(6) Force protection.
(7) Any additional coordinating instructions.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Address service support in the areas shown below as needed to clarify the
service support concept to ISR. Refer to annexes, if required. Subparagraphs can include—
a. Support concept. State the concept of logistics support to provide non-CSS commanders
and their staffs a visualization of how the ISR operation will be logistically supported. This could
include—
• A brief synopsis of the support command mission.
• Support command headquarters or support area locations, including locations of the
next higher logistic bases if not clearly conveyed in the CSS overlay.
A-34
• The commander’s priorities of support.

• Units in the next higher CSS organization supporting the unit.
• The use of host nation support.
• Significant or unusual CSS issues that might impact the overall ISR operation.
• Any significant sustainment risks.
• Unique support requirements in the functional areas of manning, arming, fueling,
fixing, moving, and sustaining the soldier and his systems.
• The support concept organized into a framework based on ISR phasing, or presented
as before, during, and after operations format.
b. Material and services.

c. Medical evacuation and hospitalization (air and ground).
d. Personnel service support.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Command.
b. Signal.
• State specifically to whom collected information is reported and on what nets.

• State retransmission plan to support the operation.
Appendixes:
• ISR (R&S) collection matrix

• ISR (R&S) overlay
ISR OVERLAY ORDER

A-33. The ISR overlay order depicts the mission in graphic form (see
Figure A-5). The overlay order consists of two parts. The first part is the
graphic display of deployed or planned deployment of squadron assets.
The second part is the marginal data consisting of the legend,
administrative data, specific instructions to each asset, and the
distribution list (refer to FM 5-0 [FM 101-5] for specifics). Most of the
overlay graphics and symbols can be extracted from FM 1-02
[FM 101-5-1].
A-35
Appendix B
Force Protection
Force protection is one CONTENTS
of the four primary Risk Management ........................................ B-1
elements that combine Identify Hazards ....................................... B-1
to create combat power. Assess Hazards to Determine Risks ...... B-3
Develop Controls and Make
The primary objective of Risk Decisions...................................... B-3
force protection is to Implement Controls ................................. B-5
help units protect their Supervise and Evaluate........................... B-5
combat power through Fratricide ...................................................... B-7
Risk Identification and
accident prevention, Preventive Measures............................ B-7
enabling them to win Fratricide Risk Considerations
the battle quickly and (OPORD Format)................................... B-10
decisively, with
minimum losses. This
appendix will focus on two aspects of force protection: safety or
risk management, and the avoidance of fratricide. Risk is the
chance of injury or death for individuals and damage to or loss of
vehicles and equipment. Risks, and/or the potential for risks, are
always present in every combat and training situation the
squadron faces. Risk management must take place at all levels of
the chain of command during each phase of every operation; it is
an integral part of all tactical planning. The squadron commander,
troop commanders, staff, and all soldiers must know how to use
risk management, coupled with fratricide reduction measures, to
ensure that the mission is executed in the safest possible
environment within mission constraints. For additional
information on risk management, refer to FM 5-19
[FM 100-14].
SECTION I – RISK MANAGEMENT
B-1. There are five steps of risk management. Leaders, to include

the staff, must always remember that the effectiveness of the process
depends on situational awareness. They should never approach risk
management with “one size fits all” solutions to the hazards their
unit will face. They must consider the essential tactical and
operational factors that make each situation unique.
STEP 1 – IDENTIFY HAZARDS

B-2. A hazard is a source of danger. It is any existing or potential
condition that could result in injury, illness, or death of personnel;
damage to or loss of equipment and property; or some other form of
B-1
1
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
mission degradation. Hazards arise in both tactical and training

operations.
B-3. The leaders must identify the hazards associated with all
aspects and phases of the mission, paying particular attention to the
factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Risk
management must never be an afterthought; leaders must begin the
process during military decision-making process, or troop-leading
procedures for troop and below, and continue it throughout the
operation.
B-4. Figure B-1 lists possible sources of risk the squadron might
face during a typical tactical operation. The list is organized
according to the factors of METT-TC.
SOURCES OF BATTLEFIELD RISK

MISSION
• Duration of the operation.
• Complexity/clarity of the plan. (Is the plan well developed and easily
understood?)
• Proximity and number of maneuvering units.
ENEMY
• Knowledge of the threat situation.
• Threat capabilities.
• Availability of time and resources to conduct reconnaissance.
TERRAIN AND WEATHER
• Visibility conditions, including light, dust, fog, rain, snow, and smoke.
• Precipitation and its effect on mobility.
• Extreme heat or cold.
• Additional natural hazards (broken ground, steep inclines, water
obstacles).
TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE
• Equipment status.
• Morale.
• Experience the units conducting the operation have working together.
• Soldier/leader proficiency.
• Soldier/leader rest situation.
• Degree of acclimatization to environment.
• Impact of new leaders and/or crewmembers.
• Friendly unit situation and NATO or multinational military actions
combined with US forces.
TIME AVAILABLE
• Time available for planning and rehearsals.
• Time available to conduct the mission.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
• Applicable rules of engagement and/or rules of interaction.
• Potential stability and/or support operations involving contact with
civilians (such as noncombatant evacuation operations, refugee or
disaster assistance, or counterterrorism).
B-2
2
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Force Protection
• Potential for media contact/inquiries.

• Interaction with host nation or support from other participating nations.
Figure B-1. Examples of Potential Hazards
B-3
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
STEP 2 – ASSESS HAZARDS TO DETERMINE RISKS

B-5. Hazard assessment is the process of determining the direct
impact of each hazard on an operation (in the form of hazardous
incidents). Use the following steps:
• Determine which hazards can be eliminated or avoided.
• Assess each hazard that cannot be eliminated or avoided
to determine the probability that the hazard can occur.
• Assess the severity of hazards that cannot be eliminated
or avoided. Severity, defined as the result or outcome of a
hazardous incident, is expressed by the degree of injury or
illness (including death), loss of or damage to equipment
or property, environmental damage, or other mission-
impairing factors (such as unfavorable publicity or loss of
combat power).
• Taking into account both the probability and severity of a
hazard, determine the associated risk level (extremely
high, high, moderate, and low). Figure B-2 summarizes
the four risk levels.
• Based on the factors of hazard assessment (probability,
severity, and risk level as well as the operational factors
unique to the situation), complete the risk management
worksheet. Figure B-3 shows an example of a completed
risk management worksheet.
RISK LEVEL MISSION EFFECTS

Extremely high (E) Mission failure if hazardous incidents occur in execution.
High (H) Significantly degraded mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards.
Not accomplishing all parts of the mission or not completing the mission to
standard (if hazards occur during mission).
Moderate (M) Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards.
Reduced mission capability (if hazards occur during the mission).
Low (L) Expected losses have little or no impact on mission success.
Figure B-2. Risk Levels and Impact on Mission Execution
STEP 3 – DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS
DEVELOPING CONTROLS
B-6. After assessing each hazard, develop one or more controls
that will either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability
and/or severity) of potential hazardous incidents. When developing
controls, consider the reason for the hazard, not just the hazard by
itself.
MAKING RISK DECISIONS

B-7. A key element in the process of making a risk decision is
determining whether accepting the risk is justified or, conversely, is
unnecessary. The decision maker must compare and balance the risk
B-4
4
against mission expectations, then decide if the controls are

sufficient and acceptable and whether to accept the resulting
residual risk. If the risk is determined unnecessary, the decision
maker directs the development of additional controls or alternative
controls; as another option, he can modify, change, or reject the
selected course of action (COA) for the operation.
Figure B-3. Example Risk Management Worksheet
B-5
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
STEP 4 – IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

B-8. Controls are the procedures and considerations used to
eliminate hazards or reduce their risk. Implementing controls, the
most important part of the risk management process, is the chain of
command’s contribution to the unit’s safety. Implementing controls
includes coordination and communication with appropriate superior,
adjacent, and subordinate units and with individuals executing the
mission. The squadron commander must ensure that specific
controls are integrated into operations plans (OPLAN), operations
orders (OPORD), standing operating procedures (SOP), and
rehearsals. The critical check for this step is to ensure that controls
are converted into clear, simple execution orders understood by all
levels.
B-9. If the leaders have conducted a thoughtful risk assessment,
the controls will be easy to implement, enforce, and follow. Examples
of risk management controls include the following:
• Thoroughly brief all aspects of the mission, including
related hazards and controls, and ensure that
subordinates know the plan.
• Allow adequate time for rehearsals at all levels.
• Drink plenty of water, eat well, and get as much sleep as
possible (at least 4 hours in a 24-hour period).
• Enforce speed limits, use of seat belts, and driver safety.
• Establish recognizable visual signals and markers to
distinguish maneuvering units.
• Enforce the use of ground guides in assembly areas and
on dangerous terrain.
• Limit single-vehicle movement.
• Establish SOPs for the integration of new personnel.
STEP 5 – SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE

B-10. During mission execution, it is imperative for leaders to
ensure that risk management controls are properly understood and
executed. Leaders must continuously evaluate the unit’s
effectiveness in managing risks to gain insight into areas that need
improvement.
SUPERVISION
B-11. Leadership and unit discipline are the keys to ensuring that
effective risk management controls are implemented. All leaders are
responsible for supervising mission rehearsals and execution to
ensure standards and controls are enforced. In particular,
noncommissioned officers must enforce established safety policies as
well as controls developed for a specific operation or task. Techniques
include spot checks, inspections, situation reports (SITREP),
confirmation briefs, and supervision.
B-12. During mission execution, leaders must continuously monitor
risk management controls to determine whether they are effective
B-6
6
and to modify them as necessary. Leaders must also anticipate,

identify, and assess new hazards. They ensure that imminent danger
issues are addressed on the spot and that ongoing planning and
execution reflect changes in hazard conditions.
EVALUATION
B-13. Whenever possible, the risk management process should also
include an after-action review to assess unit performance in
identifying risks and preventing hazardous situations. Leaders
should then incorporate lessons learned from the process into unit
SOPs and plans for future missions.
B-14. The squadron commander gives the troop commanders and
staff direction, sets priorities, and establishes the command climate
(values, attitudes, and beliefs). Successful preservation of combat
power requires him to imbed risk management into individual
behavior. To fulfill this commitment, the commander must exercise
creative leadership, innovative planning, and careful management.
Most important, he must demonstrate support for the risk
management process. The commander and others in the chain of
command can establish a command climate favorable to risk
management integration by taking the following actions:
• Demonstrate consistent and sustained risk management
behavior through leading by example and by stressing
active participation throughout the risk management
process.
• Provide adequate resources for risk management. Every
leader is responsible for obtaining the assets necessary to
mitigate risk and for providing them to subordinate
leaders.
• Understand their own and their soldier’s limitations as
well as their unit’s capabilities.
• Allow subordinates to make mistakes and learn from
them.
• Prevent a “zero defects” mindset from creeping into the
unit’s culture.
• Demonstrate full confidence in subordinates’ mastery of
their trade and their ability to execute a chosen COA.
• Keep subordinates informed.
• Listen to subordinates.
B-15. For the commander, his subordinate leaders, and individual

soldiers alike, responsibilities in managing risk include the following:
• Make informed risk decisions; establish and then clearly
communicate risk decision criteria and guidance.
• Establish clear, feasible risk management policies and
goals.
• Train the risk management process. Ensure that
subordinates understand the who, what, when, where,
B-7
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
and why of managing risk and how these factors apply to

their situation and assigned responsibilities.
• Accurately evaluate the unit’s effectiveness as well as
subordinates’ execution of risk controls during the
mission.
• Inform higher headquarters when risk levels exceed
established limits.
SECTION II – FRATRICIDE
B-16. Fratricide is broadly defined as the employment of friendly

weapons and munitions with the intent to kill the threat or destroy
his equipment or facilities, but the action results in the unforeseen
and unintentional death or injury to friendly personnel. Fratricide is
avoidable. Leader actions coupled with our current resources (e.g.,
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below [FBCB2]) can greatly
reduce the risk of fratricide.
B-17. The modern battlefield is more lethal than any in history. The
tempo of operations is rapid, and the nonlinear nature of the
battlefield creates command and control challenges for all unit
leaders. The accuracy and lethality of modern weapons make it
possible to engage and destroy targets at these extended acquisition
ranges. At the same time, however, the ability of US forces to acquire
targets using thermal imagery and other sophisticated sighting
systems exceeds our ability to accurately identify these targets as
friend or foe. As a result, friendly elements can be engaged
unintentionally and destroyed in a matter of seconds.
B-18. Battlefield obscuration adds to the problem, which becomes a
critical consideration whenever thermal sights are the primary source
of target identification. Rain, dust, fog, smoke, and snow degrade
identification capability by reducing the intensity and clarity of
thermal images.
B-19. On the battlefield, positive visual identification cannot be the
sole engagement criteria at ranges beyond 1,000 meters. Situational
awareness is the key; it must be maintained throughout an
operation.
RISK IDENTIFICATION AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES

B-20. Reduction of fratricide risk begins during the planning phase
of an operation and continues throughout preparation and execution.
Risk identification must be conducted at all levels during each phase,
and the results clearly communicated throughout the chain of
command so risk assessment can begin. This section covers
considerations that influence risk identification; it also focuses on
measures leaders can implement to make the identification process
more effective and to help prevent friendly fire incidents from
occurring.
PLANNING PHASE
B-8
8
B-21. A plan that is thoroughly developed and understood helps to

minimize fratricide risk. The following considerations help indicate
the potential for fratricide in a given operation:
• The clarity of the threat situation.
• The clarity of the friendly situation.
• The clarity of the commander’s intent.
• The complexity of the operation.
• The planning time available at each level.
B-22. Graphics are a basic tool that commanders at all levels use to
clarify their intent, add precision to their concept, and communicate
their plan to subordinates. As such, graphics can be a very useful
tool in reducing the risk of fratricide. Commanders at all levels must
understand the definitions and purpose of operational graphics and
the techniques of their employment.
NOTE: See FM 1-02 [FM 101-5-1] for the definitions of each type of graphic control measure.
PREPARATION PHASE
B-23. The following are some indicators that may identify potential
fratricide risks:
• Rehearsals not conducted to standard, or not done at all.
• Low training or proficiency levels of units and individuals.
• No habitual relationships between units conducting the
operation.
• Weakened physical readiness (endurance) of the troops
conducting the operation.
B-24. Backbriefs and rehearsals are primary tools in identifying and

reducing fratricide risk during the preparation phase. The following
are some considerations for their use:
• Backbriefs ensure subordinates understand the
commander’s intent. They often highlight areas of
confusion, complexity, or planning errors.
• The type of rehearsal conducted determines what types of
risks are identified.
• Rehearsals should extend to all levels of command and
involve all key players.
EXECUTION PHASE
B-25. During execution, in-stride risk assessment and reaction are
necessary to overcome unforeseen fratricide risk situations. The
following are factors to consider when assessing fratricide risks:
• Intervisibility between adjacent units.
• The level of cross-talk between units.
• Amount of battlefield obscuration.
B-9
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Ability or inability to positively identify targets.

• Similarities and differences in equipment, vehicles, and
uniforms among friendly and threat forces.
• Vehicle density on the battlefield.
• The tempo of the battle.
B-26. Maintaining situational awareness at all levels and at all

times is another key to fratricide reduction as an operation
progresses. Units must develop and employ effective techniques and
SOPs to aid leaders and crewmen in this process. These techniques
include—
• Monitoring on the next higher net.
• Radio cross-talk between units.
• Accurate position reporting and navigation.
• Training and use/exchange of liaison officers (LNO).
B-27. The following measures are provided as a guide to actions

that can reduce fratricide risk. They are not directive in nature, nor
are they intended to restrict initiative. Apply them as appropriate
based on the specific situation and METT-TC factors.
• Identify and assess potential fratricide risks in the
estimate of the situation. Express these risks in the
OPORD or fragmentary order.
• Maintain situational awareness, focusing on such areas as
current intelligence; unit locations and dispositions;
denial areas (minefields/family of scatterable mines
[FASCAM]); contaminated areas, such as improved
conventional munitions (ICM) and nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC); SITREPs; and METT-TC factors.
• Ensure positive target identification. Review
vehicle/weapon identification cards. Know at what ranges
and under what conditions positive identification of
friendly vehicles/weapons is possible.
• Establish a command climate that stresses fratricide
prevention. Enforce fratricide prevention measures,
emphasize the use of doctrinally sound tactics,
techniques, and procedures. Ensure constant supervision
in the execution of orders and the performance of all tasks
and missions to standard.
• Recognize the signs of battlefield stress. Maintain unit
cohesion by taking quick, effective action to alleviate it.
• Conduct individual, leader, and collective (unit) training
covering fratricide awareness, target identification and
recognition, and fire discipline.
• Develop a simple, decisive plan.
• Give complete and concise mission orders.
B-1
10
• Use SOPs that are consistent with doctrine to simplify

mission orders. Periodically review and change SOPs as
needed.
• Strive for maximum planning time for you and your
subordinates.
• Use common language/vocabulary and doctrinally correct
standard terminology and control measures, such as fire
support coordination line, zone of engagement, and
restrictive fire lines.
• Ensure thorough coordination is conducted.
• Plan for and establish effective communications, to
include visual.
• Plan for collocation of command posts whenever it is
appropriate to the mission, such as during a passage of
lines.
• Designate and employ LNOs as appropriate.
• Ensure rules of engagement are clear.
• Include fratricide risk as a key factor in terrain analysis
(observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment,
obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach [OCOKA]).
• Conduct rehearsals whenever the situation allows time to
do so.
• Be in the right place at the right time. Use position
location/navigation devices (global positioning system and
position navigation); know your location and the locations
of adjacent (left, right, leading, and follow-on) units
(FBCB2 as an enabler); and synchronize tactical
movement.
• Plan and brief operations security, especially when
utilizing dismounted operations (challenge/password,
sign/countersign).
• Include discussion of fratricide incidents in after-action
reports.
FATRICIDE RISK CONSIDERATIONS (OPERATION ORDER FORMAT)

B-28. The example shown in Figure B-4 parallels the five-paragraph
OPORD and contains key factors and considerations in fratricide
reduction. This is not a change to the OPORD format; rather, it
should be used during OPORD development to ensure fratricide
reduction measures are included in the order. It is not a strict guide.
The factors and considerations are listed where they would likely
appear in the OPORD, but they may warrant evaluation during
preparation of other paragraphs.
B-11
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
1. Situation.
a. Threat forces.
(1) Are there similarities among threat and friendly equipment and uniforms that could lead
to fratricide?
(2) What languages do threat forces speak? Could these contribute to fratricide risk?
(3) What are the threat’s deception capabilities and his past record of deception activities?
(4) Do you know the locations of threat forces?
b. Friendly forces.
(1) Among the allied forces, are there differences (or similarities with threat forces) in
language, uniform, and equipment that could increase fratricide risk during combined operations?
(2) Could differences in equipment and uniforms among US armed forces increase
fratricide risk during joint operations?
(3) What differences in equipment and uniforms can be stressed to help prevent fratricide?
(4) What is the friendly deception plan?
(5) What are the locations of your unit and adjacent units (left, right, leading, follow-on)?
(6) What are the locations of neutrals and noncombatants?
c. Own forces.
(1) What is the status of training activities? What are the levels of individual, crew, and unit
proficiency?
(2) Will fatigue be a factor for friendly forces during the operation? Has an effective sleep
plan been developed?
(3) Are friendly forces acclimatized to the area of operations (AO)?
(4) What is the age (new, old, or mix) and condition of equipment in friendly units? What is
the status of new equipment training?
(5) What are the expected mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) requirements for the
operation?
d. Attachments and detachments.
(1) Do attached elements understand pertinent information regarding threat and friendly
forces?
(2) Are detached elements supplied this pertinent information by their gaining units?
e. Weather.
(1) What are the expected visibility conditions (light data and precipitation) for the
operation?
(2) What effect will heat and cold have on soldiers, weapons, and equipment?
f. Terrain.
(1) Do you know the topography and vegetation (such as urban, mountainous, hilly, rolling,
flat, desert, swamp/marsh, prairie/steppe, jungle, dense forest, open woods) of the expected AO?
(2) Have you evaluated the terrain using the factors of OAKOC?
2. Mission. Is the mission and all associated tasks and purposes clearly understood?
3. Execution.
a. Task organization.
(1) Has the unit worked under this task organization before?
(2) Are SOPs compatible with the task organization (especially with attached units)?
Figure B-4. Example OPORD Format with Fratricide Reduction Measures
B-1
12
(3) Are special markings or signals (for example, cats’ eyes, chemlites, or panels) needed
for positive identification of uniforms and equipment?
(4) What special weapons and/or equipment will be used? Do they look or sound like threat
weapons and/or equipment?
b. Concept of the operation.
(1) Maneuver. Are main and supporting efforts identified to ensure awareness of fratricide
risks and prevention measures?
(2) Fires (direct and indirect).
(a) Are priorities of fires identified?
(b) Have target lists been developed?
(c) Has the fire execution matrix/overlay been developed?
(d) Have locations of denial areas (minefields, FASCAM) and contaminated areas
(ICM, NBC) been identified?
(e) Are the locations of all supporting fire targets identified in the OPORD/OPLAN
overlays?
(f) Are aviation and close air support targets clearly identified? Have signals been
established to positively identify these targets for the aircraft? Have airspace coordination areas been
developed? Have threat air defense systems been suppressed?
(g) Has the direct-fire plan been developed and synchronized with the fire support
plan?
(h) Have final protective fires been designated?
(i) Have sector limits been identified and verified?
(j) Have executors for each target been assigned and do they understand when and
where to shoot? Do the shooters have “eyes on” the target?
(k) Are the observers surveyed in or are they using a map spot? Target location
errors can cause big problems.
(l) Do all leaders and executors understand where the fire support coordination
measures are and when they go into effect? Rehearsal is the key.
(m) Can the FSO hear what targets are being called on the maneuver nets?
(n) Have targets been rehearsed with the executors and the field artillery battalion?
(o) Does the reinforcing or general support reinforcing field artillery have all the
proper graphics and understand where they fit in? Did they attend the rehearsal?
(p) Have restrictions on specific munitions been established and does everyone
know where they are planned and emplaced?
(3) Engineer tasks.
(a) Are friendly minefields, including FASCAM and ICM dud-contaminated areas,
known?
(b) Are obstacles identified, along with the approximate time needed for
reduction/breaching of each?
(4) Tasks to each subordinate unit. Are friendly forces identified, as appropriate, for each
subordinate maneuver element?
(5) Tasks to combat support (CS)/combat service support (CSS) units. Have locations of
friendly forces been reported to CS/CSS units?
(6) Coordinating instructions.
(a) Will rehearsals be conducted? Are they necessary? Are direct and indirect fires
included?
(a) Is a backbrief necessary?
Figure B-4. Example OPORD Format with Fratricide Reduction Measures (Continued)
B-13
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
(c) Are appropriate control measures clearly explained and illustrated in the OPORD
and overlays? Have they been disseminated to everyone who has a need to know? What is the plan for
using these control measures to synchronize the battle and prevent fratricide?
(d) Have target/vehicle identification drills been practiced?
(e) Do subordinate units know the immediate action, drill, or signal for “CEASE FIRE”
or “I AM FRIENDLY” if they come under unknown or friendly fire? Is there a backup action?
(f) Is guidance in handling dud munitions, such as ICM and cluster bomb units,
included?
4. Service Support.
a. Are train locations and identification markings known by everyone?
b. Do medical and maintenance personnel know the routes between train units?
5. Command and Signal.
a. Command.
(1) What are the locations of the commander and key staff members?
(2) What is the chain of command and the succession of command?
b. Signal.
(1) Do instructions include backup code words and visual signals for all special and
emergency events?
(2) Do instructions cover how to identify friendly forces to aircraft?
(3) Are signal operating instructions (SOI) distributed to all units with a need to know, such
as higher, lower, adjacent, leading, and follow-on elements?
Figure B-4. Example OPORD Format with Fratricide Reduction Measures (Continued)
B-1
14
Appendix C
Collection Management and Battle Tracking

This appendix provides a
description of the CONTENTS
collection management The Collection Management Process ........ C-1
Battle Tracking ............................................ C-5
process and battle
tracking tool.
SECTION I – THE COLLECTION MANAGEMENT PROCESS
C-1. Collection management is a doctrinal procedure that uses the

same procedural thought process shown in Figure C-1 regardless of
echelon, type of operation, or time available. However, circumstances
will dictate the nature and amount of detail you can develop in the
specific products.
C-1
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure C-1. Collection Management Functions and Process

C-2. The collection management process is cyclic in nature. As you
use the process to satisfy some intelligence requirements, you
simultaneously use it to generate new requirements or reprioritize
existing ones.
STEP 1 - DEVELOP REQUIREMENTS

C-3. This step involves the identification, prioritization, and
refinement of uncertainties concerning the threat and battlefield
environment that must be resolved to accomplish the intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission. The overall purpose of
this step is to receive, analyze, and prioritize the intelligence
requirements from higher, subordinate, and adjacent units. The
intelligence preparation of the battlefield process facilitates the
identification of unknowns related to weather, terrain, and the threat
(disposition, organization, equipment, etc.). What is known about the
threat has targeting implications (targeted areas of interest) and what is
not known has reconnaissance implications (named areas of interest).
The gaps in this knowledge will generate information requirements (IR)
that form the basis of the commander’s critical intelligence requirements
(CCIR). Normally, these gaps are identified during mission analysis in
the decision-making process. The commander’s guidance given at the
end of the mission analysis brief provides directions to the squadron. He
also provides the staff his intent for the operation and his CCIR that
supports his intent.
Commander’s critical information requirements—Upon receipt of a mission, the

commander identifies information requirements most important to him based on
his judgment and experience, and formulates his CCIR. CCIR are refined during
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and the military decision-making
process (MDMP) and supporting priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and
friendly force information requirements (FFIR) are developed.
Priority intelligence requirements are those intelligence requirements for which

a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and
decision making (JP 2-0). They are the subset of CCIR that deal with
adversaries and the environment. PIR establish priorities for ISR. As part of the
CCIR, they establish priorities for information management as well. PIR tell
soldiers, especially those performing ISR tasks, what to look for; they tell
soldiers in the command and control system which intelligence to disseminate
first.
C-4. The commander states his CCIR and PIR, or they are
recommended by the staff and approved by the commander. CCIR
and PIR provide focus to the collection plan. Each CCIR/PIR supports
a decision expected to occur during execution of the selected threat
C-2
____________________________________ Appendix C – Collection Management and Battle Tracking
course of action. When answered, they allow the commander to make

timely decisions.
C-5. When the staff receives intelligence requirements from higher,
subordinate, and adjacent units, they should prioritize and
consolidate them with the commander’s PIR. Once all requirements
have been identified, they are converted into specific taskings for the
recce (reconnaissance) and surveillance troops. When an intelligence-
gathering asset cannot feasibly collect a requirement, the S2 must
provide an explanation to the requester.
STEP 2 - DEVELOP COLLECTION PLAN

C-6. This step involves the selection, integration, and
synchronization of the best collectors to cover each intelligence
collection requirement based on resource availability and capability.
With the linkage of sensors through Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and other digital systems, the squadron
can acquire virtually a near perfect picture of the threat. Integration
and synchronization are accomplished through development and
refinement of the collection matrix. This matrix is the graphic
representation of the squadron’s intelligence collection plan and the
sensors used to execute that plan. During this step, the S3, battle
captain, and S2 collection manager initiate a close working interface
related to mission management. The S2 collection manager is the
resident expert on sensor capabilities, limitations, and land
management issues while the S3 and battle captain are the experts
on the capabilities and limitations of the recce troops. Each knows
the status and availability of respective sensors and units.
STEP 3 - TASK OR REQUEST COLLECTION

C-7. This step involves the implementation of the intelligence
collection plan through execution of system specific taskings or
request for collection. The tasking process provides the selected
collection unit with specific, prioritized requirements.
C-8. The S3 battle captain becomes intimately involved in the
intelligence collection process. The ISR plan is the tool that identifies
the brigade commander’s collection strategy to higher, subordinate,
and adjacent units. When the S2/S3 and battle captain tasks or
requests collection assistance, they must provide specifics that
clearly define the collection requirement and make sense to the
collector. These are—
• Clearly defined collection requirements in either
preformatted taskings or free text messages.
• Latest time the information is of value.
• Reporting instructions (format).
• When and how long to collect.
STEP 4 - DISSEMINATE
C-3
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
C-9. This step is where intelligence/combat information is

delivered to the user who needs it. Digitization allows a very high
volume of intelligence data to be received, parsed, correlated,
analyzed, and viewed graphically. With digitization, information
should flow directly from the collector and processor to the requester
in near real time. Unless this information is collected, blended,
quickly analyzed, and disseminated, it tends to “stovepipe” into
individual databases. In addition, information not relevant to the
brigade only clogs the system and serves to slow the processing and
dissemination process. Direct dissemination is especially important
for intelligence that supports targeting efforts. Whenever possible, the
fire support coordinator and S2 collection manager should be
collocated to enhance the speed with which targeting intelligence is
directly disseminated to the firing batteries. The S2 must determine
how much information to send the user based on individual need,
security requirements, and data perishability. Information must be
distributed as soon as possible via voice, FBCB2, Maneuver Control
System, All-Source Analysis System, or any other digital system. See
FM 2-33.3 [FM 34-2] for dissemination techniques/methods.
NOTE: The optimal mix is to send graphics and/or text immediately via digital means
with a notice that voice clarification can be accomplished if the digital traffic is
not understood. Under all circumstances it is important to ensure that the
recipient received the information sent.
STEP 5 - EVALUATE REPORTING

C-10. Step five determines how well the systems are satisfying the
brigade’s intelligence requirements as well as those of subordinate,
adjacent, and higher units. The S2, in coordination with the analysis
control team, must continually evaluate information produced as a
result of the collection process to ensure it is answering the
CCIR/PIR. It is important to determine if the collection asset is
accurately reporting what it sees based on its capabilities and if the
report answers the original question. If the PIR/IR is not being
answered, the S3 battle captain may task the relocation of sensors,
based on the S2’s recommendation, and/or the S2 collection
manager will request support from higher headquarters to answer
specific information requirements. The objective is to fully satisfy
intelligence requirements in a timely manner while keeping the
intelligence system fully synchronized. It is vitally important that the
S3 battle captain and the S2 collection manager remain aware of the
status of collection systems and the requirements levied on them.
STEP 6 - UPDATE COLLECTION PLANNING

C-11. Adjustments to the overall collection plan are made to keep
intelligence efforts synchronized to optimize collection and
exploitation capability as the current tactical situation changes.
Intelligence requirements are consistently updated to ensure that
intelligence gathering efforts are synchronized with current
operations and that they support future operations planning. As PIR
and IR are answered, the collection plan and matrix are updated. The
C-4
____________________________________ Appendix C – Collection Management and Battle Tracking
collectors are repositioned and or refocused to begin answering other

intelligence questions.
C-12. Remember to always conduct every step in the process. The
time required to execute these steps depends upon the tools you
choose to use and develop. If you are familiar with the capabilities of
your assets, for example, you may speed up the process by not
actually constructing asset evaluation worksheets. You will, however,
consider the capabilities of your assets against the collection target
before selecting them as part of your collection strategy. The goals of
each step are clearly defined in
FM 2-0 [FM 34-1].
SECTION II – BATTLE TRACKING
C-13. To report effectively, the command post (CP) must maintain

awareness of what each of its subordinate units is doing and where
they are located. In order to perform this mission the CP must have a
system in place to effectively track and monitor the progress of each
of these subunits. The creation of a mission tracker matrix provides a
useful tool to help monitor various activities within the area of
operation. The mission tracker (see Figure C-2) should include
specific vehicles to be used, number of personnel involved, the
mission, and risk assessment for each mission. The mission tracker
can be used as a system to plan missions, get them approved,
continuously track the missions for the day, and pinpoint locations of
all squadron assets that might be needed for a response to crisis
situations.
C-5
C-6
MISSION DATE:
MISSION/PU
RPOSE/ADDI
VEH LINKUP
UNIT TIONAL CREDIT # OIC MARCH TIME SP TIME # OF PAX
BUMPER #s POINT
INFORMATIO
N
1 N/A
2 N/A
3 N/A
4 N/A
5 N/A
Figure C-2. Mission Tracker

6 N/A
7 N/A
8 N/A
9 N/A
10 N/A
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Appendix D
Stability Operations and Support Operations

Force protection is one of CONTENTS
the four primary Stability Operations .....................................D-1
elements that combine to Characteristics of Stability
create combat power. The Operations.............................................D-2
The Army’s Role in Stability
primary objective of force Operations.............................................D-2
protection is to help units Types of Stability Operations..................D-3
protect their combat Considerations for Stability
power through accident Operations.............................................D-8
Support Operations .....................................D-9
prevention, enabling Characteristics of Support
them to win the battle Operations.............................................D-10
quickly and decisively, Types of Support Operations ..................D-10
with minimum losses. The Army’s Role in Support
This appendix will focus Operations.............................................D-11
Forms of Support Operations .................D-11
on two aspects of force Considerations for Support
protection: safety or risk Operations.............................................D-14
management, and the Squadron’s Role in Stability/Support
avoidance of fratricide. Operations.............................................D-15
Planning and Preparation
Risk is the chance of Considerations......................................D-16
injury or death for Force Protection.......................................D-20
individuals and damage Task Organization ....................................D-20
to or loss of vehicles and CSS Considerations.................................D-20
equipment. Risks, and/or Media Considerations ..............................D-21
Operations with Outside Agencies .........D-21
the potential for risks, Leader Requirements...............................D-21
are always present in Soldiers’ Responsibilities........................D-21
every combat and Employment Considerations...................D-22
training situation the Specific Squadron Tasks.........................D-23
squadron faces. Risk
management must take place at all levels of the chain of command
during each phase of every operation; it is an integral part of all
tactical planning. The squadron commander, troop commanders,
staff, and all soldiers must know how to use risk management,
coupled with fratricide reduction measures, to ensure that the
mission is executed in the safest possible environment within
mission constraints. For additional information on risk
management, refer to FM 5-19 [FM 100-14].
SECTION I – STABILITY OPERATIONS
D-1. Stability operations are conducted outside the US and its

territories to promote and protect US national interests by
influencing political, civil, and military environments and by
disrupting specific illegal activities. Combatant commanders employ
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Army forces to accomplish those goals by supporting diplomatic

initiatives, improving military-to-military relations, and deterring or
resolving conflict. Their overall purpose is to promote and sustain
regional stability.
CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

D-2. Stability operations are normally executed in the context of
the geographic combatant commander’s theater strategy.
Commanders employ military forces to complement and reinforce the
other elements of national power as part of their theater engagement
plan.
D-3. Stability operations may include both developmental and
coercive actions. Developmental actions enhance a host nation (HN)
government’s willingness and ability to care for its people. Coercive
actions apply carefully prescribed limited force or threat of force to
change the environment of the area of operation (AO). Military forces
conduct stability operations to accomplish one or more of the
following:
• Protect national interests (as defined by the National
Command Authority).
• Promote peace/deter aggression.
• Satisfy treaty obligations or enforce agreements and
policies.
• Reassure allies, friendly governments, and agencies.
• Encourage a weak or faltering government.
• Maintain or restore order.
• Protect life and property.
• Demonstrate resolve.
• Prevent, deter, or respond to terrorism.
• Reduce the threat of conventional arms and weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) to regional security.
• Eliminate or contain subversion, lawlessness, and
insurgency.
THE ARMY’S ROLE IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

D-4. Army forces are particularly well suited for stability
operations because they are trained, equipped, and organized to
control land, populations, and situations for extended periods of
time. The commander of an Army force has vital options to meet
operational requirements. This routinely includes conducting peace
operations, military-to-military contacts, humanitarian demining
operations, and multinational training exercises or exchanges.
D-5. Stability operations are inherently complex and place greater
demands at the small-unit level. Junior leaders are required to
develop engagement skills while maintaining warfighting skills.
Capable, trained, disciplined, and high-quality leaders, soldiers, and
teams are especially critical to success. Soldiers and units at every
D-2
___________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
level must be flexible and adaptive. Often stability operations require

the mental and physical agility to shift from noncombat to combat
operations and back again.
D-6. Stability operations conducted by Army forces complement
and are complemented by offensive, defensive, and support
operations. Stability operations help restore law and order during
support operations in unstable areas. Offensive and defensive
operations may be necessary to defeat adversaries intent on
preventing the success of a stability operation. Shows of force
(presence) often precede offensive and defensive operations in
attempts to deter aggression and provide opportunities for diplomatic
and economic solutions. The ability of Army forces to stabilize a crisis
is directly related to its ability to attack and defend.
D-7. Army forces may conduct stability operations before
hostilities, in crisis situations, during hostilities, and after hostilities.
Before hostilities begin, stability operations focus on deterring or
preempting conflict. In a crisis situation, a stability operation may
resolve a potential conflict or prevent escalation. During hostilities, it
can help keep armed conflict from spreading. Following hostilities, it
can provide a secure environment for civil authorities to work in to
regain control.
PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
D-8. Peacetime military engagement activities are stability
operations designed to have a positive impact on the regional security
environment and preclude conflict. The objectives of peacetime
military engagement are to open communication, increase
interoperability, increase regional military professionalism, educate
HN forces on the role of the military in a democracy, and increase
regional stability. Examples of peacetime engagement activities
include multinational training exercises, individual training and
observers, medical and engineer projects and exercises, and staff
information exchanges.
RAPID RESPONSE AND PRECLUSION
D-9. Rapidly responding in the early stages of an imminent or
ongoing crisis is a critical component of stability operations. For
example, a rapid response to a smaller-scale contingency (SSC) can
defuse a crisis situation and restore regional stability. Prompt
deployment of sufficient forces in the initial phase of a crisis can
preclude the need to deploy a larger force later. The deployed force
must be capable of conducting decisive offensive and defensive
operations to achieve successful preclusion.
PRESENCE AND DETERRENCE
D-10. Presence promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic
and economic programs designed to eliminate root causes of
instability may flourish. It can take the form of forward basing,
forward deploying, or prepositioning assets in an AO.
D-11. Deterrence for both SSCs and major theaters of war (MTW) is
the sustainable presence of strong, capable ground forces. If
deterrence fails, or if required, Army forces must be ready to
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
transition to decisive combat operations. Effective deterrent forces

should ideally be capable of conducting decisive operations
immediately.
TYPES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

D-12. There are typically 10 types of stability operations.
• Peace operations.
• Foreign internal defense.
• Security assistance.
• Humanitarian and civic assistance.
• Support to insurgencies.
• Support to counterdrug operations.
• Combating terrorism.
• Noncombatant evacuation operations.
• Arms control.
• Show of force.
D-13. These operations may be conducted to complement any

offensive, defensive, and/or support operation; may be the decisive
operation; or they may occur before, during, and/or after an
offensive, defensive, and support operation. The types of stability
operations are described below.
PEACE OPERATIONS
D-14. Peace operations support strategic and policy objectives.
Peace operations include peacekeeping operations and peace
enforcement operations. The US usually participates in peace
operations as part of a United Nations (UN) force or another
multinational organization; it reserves the right to conduct peace
operations unilaterally. Peace operations require the continual
assessment of commanders and staffs to ensure that units are ready
to transition into other operations as a result of an escalation of the
current situation. The transition may be from a US unilateral
operation or multinational coalition to a UN-led coalition, from
noncombat to combat operations, and from military to civilian
control.
Peacekeeping Operations
D-15. A peacekeeping operation is conducted with the consent of all
major parties to a dispute. It is designed to monitor and facilitate
implementation of agreements (cease fire, truce, or other such
agreements) and to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term
political settlement. The use of force, actual or threatened, occurs
only in self-defense or as a last resort to accomplish the mission.
Peace Enforcement Operations
D-4
D-16. Peace enforcement operations are the application of military

force, or threat of force, to compel compliance with resolutions or
sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Peace
enforcement operations normally include one or more of six
subordinate operations:
• Forcible separation of belligerents.
• Establishment and supervision of protected areas.
• Sanction and exclusion zone enforcement.
• Movement denial and guarantee.
• Restoration and maintenance of order.
• Protection of humanitarian assistance.
D-17. The nature of this type of mission requires that the military
force must be capable of conducting combat operations. Maintaining
and demonstrating combat capability is essential for successful
peace enforcement operations.
Operations in Support of Diplomatic Efforts

D-18. Forces may conduct operations in support of diplomatic
efforts to establish peace and order before, during, and after a
conflict. These operations include preventive diplomacy,
peacemaking, and peace building. Military support of diplomatic
activities improves the chances for success by lending credibility to
diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable
political settlements.
D-19. Preventive Diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy is diplomatic
action taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit
violence. Army forces are not normally directly involved in preventive
diplomacy, but they may support a state department effort by
providing transportation and communications assets. In some cases,
military forces may conduct a preventive deployment or show of force
as part of the overall effort to deter conflict.
D-20. Peacemaking. Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy,
mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that
arranges an end to a dispute and resolves the issue that led to the
conflict. It includes military actions that support the diplomatic
process. Army forces participate in these operations primarily by
performing military-to-military contacts, exercises, peacetime
deployments, and security assistance.
D-21. Peace Building. Peace building consists of post-conflict
actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and
rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions to avoid a
relapse into conflict. Military actions that support peace building are
designed to identify, restore, and support structures that strengthen
and solidify peace. Typical peace building activities include restoring
civil authority, rebuilding physical infrastructure, providing
structures and training for schools and hospitals, and helping
reestablish commerce.
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
D-22. Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and

military agencies of a government in any action programs taken by
another government to free and protect its society from subversion,
lawlessness, and insurgency. The main objective is to promote
stability by helping a HN establish and maintain institutions and
facilities responsive to its people’s needs.
D-23. Army forces in foreign internal defense normally advise and
assist HN forces conducting operations to increase their capabilities.
When conducting foreign internal defense, all Army forces provide
indirect or direct support (not involving combat operations), or
conduct combat operations to support HN efforts.
D-6
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
D-24. Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which
the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-
related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales
to further national policies and objectives.
D-25. Army forces support security assistance efforts through
military training teams, maintenance support personnel and training,
and related activities.
HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE
D-26. Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are provided in
conjunction with military operations and exercises. In contrast to
humanitarian and disaster relief operations, they are planned
activities. Humanitarian and civic actions are limited to the following
categories:
• Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural
areas of a country.
• Construction of rudimentary surface transportation
systems.
• Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
• Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
SUPPORT TO INSURGENCIES
D-27. The US may support insurgencies that oppose regimes that
threaten US interests or are a threat to regional stability. This type of
mission is normally carried out by Army special operations forces.
Support includes logistics and training, but normally not combat
operations.
SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS
D-28. In 1986, the president declared drug trafficking a threat to
national security. This resulted in US forces being employed in a
variety of operations to support other agencies that are responsible for
detecting, disrupting, interdicting, and destroying illicit drugs and the
infrastructure (personnel, material, and distribution systems) of illicit
drug-trafficking entities. Counterdrug activities are always conducted
in conjunction with another government agency. When executed inside
of the US and its territories, counterdrug operations are considered
domestic support operations. Army forces do not engage in direct
action during counterdrug operations. Typical support to counterdrug
operations include:
• Detection and monitoring.
• Host nation.
• Command, control, communications, and computers.
• Intelligence.
• Planning.
• Logistics.
• Training.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Manpower.
• Research, development, and acquisition.
• Reconnaissance.
COMBATING TERRORISM
D-29. In all types of stability operations, counterterrorism and
antiterrorism activities are a continuous requirement in protecting
installations, units, and individuals from the threat of terrorism.
These operations contain elements of both offensive and defensive
operations. Counterterrorism encompasses a full range of offensive
measures, including strikes and raids, to prevent, deter, and respond
to terrorism. This is a specified mission for selected special
operations forces. Antiterrorism focuses on defensive measures used
to reduce vulnerabilities of individuals and property to terrorist
attacks, to include limited response and containment by local
military forces. Commanders must take the security measures
necessary to accomplish the mission and protect the force against
terrorism. Typical antiterrorism actions include—
• Coordination with local law enforcement.
• Positioning and hardening of facilities.
• Physical security actions designed to prevent
unauthorized access or approach to facilities.
• Crime prevention and physical security actions that
prevent theft of weapons, munitions, identification cards,
and other materials.
• Policies regarding travel, size of convoys, breaking of
routines, HN interaction, and off-duty restrictions.
• Protection from WMD.
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

D-30. Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) are conducted to
evacuate US citizens from dangerous locations in a foreign nation to
a secure area. They may also include HN civilians and third-country
nationals. NEO may take place in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile
environment. These operations can be conducted as a prelude to
combat actions, as part of deterrent actions, or as part of peace
operations. NEO involve swift insertion and temporary occupation of
an objective, followed by a planned withdrawal. Leaders use only the
amount of force required for self-defense and protection of evacuees.
ARMS CONTROL
D-31. Arms control operations are conducted to support arms
control treaties and enforcement agencies. Army forces may conduct
arms control during combat operations or stability operations to
prevent escalation of the conflict and reduce instability. This could
include a mandated disarming of the belligerents and/or the
collection, storing, and destruction of conventional munitions and
weapon systems.
SHOW OF FORCE
D-8
D-32. A show of force is an operation designed to demonstrate US

resolve that involves the increased visibility of US-deployed forces.
The US conducts show of force for three reasons: to bolster and
reassure allies, to deter potential aggressors, and to gain or increase
influence. The show of force operation usually involves the
deployment or build-up of forces in the AO, an increase in the
readiness status and level of activity of designated forces, or a
demonstration of operational capabilities by forces in the AO. Units
assigned this mission must assume that combat is not only possible
but also probable.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

D-33. Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing stability
operations are fundamentally identical to the process used for
offensive, defensive, and support operations. However, the following
six considerations help Army forces develop tailored concepts and
schemes for stability operations.
LEVERAGE INTERAGENCY, JOINT, AND MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION
D-34. Unity of effort is fundamental to success in stability
operations. Achieving unity of effort requires constant coordination
with all involved agencies. Commanders must adapt to situations
where there may not be a clear delineation of authority and
responsibility. This is especially important in stability operations
since the military is often the supporting rather than the supported
agency.
D-35. Coordinating and integrating civilian and military activities
should take place at every level. A coordination center such as the
civil-military operations center (CMOC) is designed to accomplish this
task. These operations centers should include as many agencies as
possible. Effective civil-military operations can reduce the use of US
resources through coordination with host and third-nation
governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGO),
and international organizations operating in the AO.
ENHANCE THE CAPABILITIES AND LEGITIMACY OF THE HOST NATION
D-36. Army forces must demonstrate the proper respect for the HN
government, police, and military forces to be successful in a stability
operation. The HN military and police forces must be integrated as
much as possible with all aspects of planning, preparing, executing,
and assessing every operation.
D-37. When HN capabilities are inadequate for the task, Army forces
focus on enhancing those capabilities through training, advice, and
assistance. Commanders make maximum use of HN forces and
personnel as the lead for all possible activities. These include
offensive and defensive operations, protection of the civilian
populace, security of critical facilities and installations, intelligence
and counterintelligence tasks, new construction and reconstruction,
psychological operations, police duties, and civil affairs (CA).
UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL FOR UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INDIVIDUAL
AND SMALL-UNIT ACTIONS
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
D-38. Individual and small-unit actions can have consequences

disproportionate to the level of command or amount of force involved.
In some cases, tactical operations and individual actions can have
strategic impact. Recognizing and avoiding these potential problems
requires trained, disciplined, and knowledgeable leaders and soldiers
at every level. Every soldier must be aware of the operational and
strategic context of the mission. Additionally, each soldier must
understand the potential military, political, and legal consequences
of the actions they take or fail to take. Dissemination of this
information throughout the force minimizes any possible confusion
regarding desired objectives.
DISPLAY THE CAPABILITY TO USE FORCE WITHOUT THREATENING
D-39. Army forces conducting stability operations must be capable
of limited combat operations for self-defense. The intent is to
demonstrate strength and resolve without provoking an unintended
response. To be effective, shows of force in stability operations cannot
be perceived as attempts to goad or bully an opponent into an attack.
D-40. Units can display preparedness by routinely conducting
demanding combat training in the AO. Training should include
challenging soldiers to react to situations involving weapons use,
levels of force, and rules of engagement (ROE).
ACT DECISIVELY TO PREVENT ESCALATION
D-41. Army forces must always be prepared to act with speed and
determination when carrying out assigned tasks. Opponents of
stability may perceive hesitation to act decisively as weakness. Units
and individuals must pursue military objectives energetically and
apply military power forcefully. By doing so, Army forces assure
friend and foe alike that they not only can protect themselves and the
people and facilities under their charge but also achieve stability
objectives.
APPLY FORCE SELECTIVELY AND DISCRIMINATELY
D-42. Commanders must make sure their units apply force
consistent with and adequate to assigned objectives and employ
combat power selectively in accordance with assigned missions and
prescribed legal and policy limitations. Commanders use the ROE to
guide the tactical application of combat power. When available,
nonlethal capabilities can provide additional tools to augment, but
not replace, the traditional means of deadly force. Nonlethal means
are particularly valuable in both stability operations and support
operations as they expand the number of options that are available to
confront situations in which the use of deadly force is not warranted
or ill advised. The commander on the ground is best qualified to
estimate the correct degree of force that must be used, consistent
with the ROE.
SECTIN II – SUPPORT OPERATIONS
D-10
D-43. Support operations employ Army forces to assist foreign and

domestic civil authorities as they prepare for or respond to crises and
relieve suffering. Support continues until civil control can be
reestablished or support is no longer required. The overall purpose of
support operations is to meet the immediate needs of designated
groups, for a limited time, until civil authorities can accomplish these
tasks without Army assistance.
D-11
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

D-44. Support operations involve Army forces providing essential
supplies, capabilities, and services to help civil authorities deal with
situations beyond their control. In most cases, Army forces are
focused on overcoming conditions created by natural or man-made
disasters. Army forces may provide relief or assistance directly.
However, Army force activities in support operations most often
involve setting the conditions that facilitate direct support to the
affected population through civil authorities or NGOs.
TYPES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

D-45. The two types of support operations are domestic support
operations and foreign humanitarian assistance operations.
Domestic support operations are conducted in the US and its
territories. Active as well as reserve component Army forces respond
to domestic support operations. Foreign humanitarian assistance
operations are conducted abroad and under the direction of a
combatant commander.
DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS
D-46. Domestic support operations are those activities and measures
taken by Department of Defense (DOD) to foster mutual assistance and
support between DOD and any civil government agency in planning or
preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the
consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national
security emergencies or major disasters. A Presidential Declaration of
an emergency or disaster area usually precedes a domestic support
operation.
D-47. The US military provides domestic support in accordance with
a DOD directive—military assistance to civil authorities. The directive
for military assistance to civil authorities addresses responses to
both natural and man-made disasters and includes military
assistance to civil disturbances, counterdrug activities, combating
terrorism, and law enforcement.
D-48. In accordance with the Constitution, civilian government is
responsible for preserving public order. The Constitution does allow
the use of military forces to protect federal and civilian property and
functions. The Posse Comitatus Act restricts the use of the military in
federal status and prevents it from executing laws and performing
civilian law enforcement functions within the US.
D-49. The operations focus on the condition of all types of natural
and man-made properties, with the goal of helping to protect and/or
restore these properties as requested. Typically, environmental
operations are conducted in response to such events as forest and
grassland fires, hazardous material releases, floods, and
earthquakes.
FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
D-50. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are conducted to
relieve the negative effects of natural or man-made disasters or other
endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, or hunger. The US
D-12
military typically supplements the HN authorities in concert with

other civilian agencies—US, international, governmental, and private.
D-51. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are limited in
scope and duration, focus on providing relief for the immediate
crises, and are only conducted in a permissive environment. Crises
or disasters caused by hostile individuals or factions attacking its
government would normally be classified as a stability operation. In
environments where the situation is vague or hostile, support
activities would be considered a subset of a larger stability, offensive,
or defensive operation.
D-52. The majority of foreign humanitarian assistance operations
closely resemble domestic support operations. The distinction
between the two is the legal restrictions applied to US forces inside
the US and its territories. Posse Comitatus does not apply to US
forces overseas.
THE ARMY’S ROLE IN SUPPORT OPERATIONS

D-53. The Army is not specifically organized, trained, or equipped
for support operations. Instead, Army elements and forces, tailored
for warfighting, are rapidly adapted to dominate a crisis or disaster
situation. In support operations, Army forces apply decisive military
capabilities to set the conditions for the supported civil authorities to
achieve success. Army forces have a functional chain of command,
reliable communications, and well trained and equipped forces that
can operate and sustain themselves in an austere environment with
organic assets. In most situations, Army forces involved in support
operations, both domestic support organizations and foreign
humanitarian assistance, will execute a combination of multiple
overlapping activities.
FORMS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

D-54. Most offensive, defensive, and stability operations will require
some form of support operations before, during, and after execution.
Support operations generally fall into four categories:
• Relief operations.
• Support to incidents involving WMD.
• Support to civil law enforcement.
• Community assistance.
D-55. Support operations may be independent actions, or they may

complement offensive, defensive, and stability operations.
RELIEF OPERATIONS
D-56. In general, the actions performed during relief operations are
identical in both domestic support operations and foreign
humanitarian assistance operations. The actions can be
characterized as either humanitarian relief, which focuses on the well
being of supported populations, or disaster relief, which focuses on
D-13
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
recovery of critical infrastructure after a natural or man-made

disaster. Relief operations accomplish one or more of the following:
• Save lives.
• Reduce suffering.
D-14
• Recover essential infrastructure.

• Improve quality of life.
Humanitarian Relief
D-57. This focuses on life-saving measures to alleviate the
immediate needs of a population in crisis. It often includes the
provision of medical support, food, water, medicines, clothing,
blankets, shelter, and heating/cooking fuel. In some cases, it
involves transportation support to move affected people from a
disaster area.
Disaster Relief
D-58. This encompasses the actions taken to restore or recreate the
minimum infrastructure to allow effective humanitarian relief to be
accomplished and set the conditions for longer-term recovery. This
includes establishing and maintaining the minimum safe working
conditions, minus security measures necessary to protect relief
workers and the affected population from additional harm. Disaster
relief may involve repairing or demolishing damaged structures,
restoring or building bridges, roads and airfields, and removing
debris from critical routes and relief sites.
Phases of Relief Operations
D-59. Although each operation is unique, support operations are
generally conducted in three broad phases:
• Response.
• Recovery.
• Restoration.
D-60. Army elements can expect to be most heavily committed

during the response phase. They will be progressively less involved
during the recovery phase, with only very limited activity, if any,
during the restoration phase.
D-61. Response Phase. In the response phase, commanders focus
on life-sustaining functions that are required by those in the disaster
area. Response phase operations include the following:
• Search and rescue.
• Emergency flood control.
• Hazard identification.
• Food distribution.
• Water production, purification, and distribution.
• Temporary shelter construction and administration.
• Transportation support.
• Fire fighting.
• Medical support.
• Communications support.
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D-62. Recovery Phase. Recovery phase operations begin the

process of returning the community infrastructure and related
services to a status that meets the immediate needs of the
population. Typical recovery operations include—
• Continuation of response operations as needed.
• Power distribution.
• Water and sanitation services.
• Debris removal.
D-63. Restoration Phase. Restoration is a long-term process that

returns the community to predisaster normalcy. Restoration
activities do not generally involve large numbers of military forces.
When they are involved, Army elements work with affected
communities in the transfer of responsibility to other agencies as
military support forces redeploy.
SUPPORT TO INCIDENTS INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
D-64. Military operations assist civil authorities in protecting US
territory, population, and infrastructure prior to an attack by
supporting domestic preparedness and critical asset protection
programs. If an attack occurs, military support will respond to the
consequences of the attack.
Domestic Preparedness
D-65. The Army’s role in facilitating domestic preparedness is to
strengthen the existing expertise of civil authorities. This is done in
two primary areas—response and training. Response is the
immediate reaction to an attack and training includes what happens
after the attack.
Protection of Critical Assets
D-66. The purpose of this program is to identify critical assets and
to assure their integrity, availability, survivability, and capability to
support vital DOD missions across the full spectrum of military
operations. Critical assets include telecommunications, electric
power, gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, water, and
emergency services. An attack on any of these assets may disrupt
civilian commerce, government operations, and the military.
Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents
D-67. The initial response will be primarily from local assets, but
sustained Army forces participation may be quickly required. The
Army’s capabilities in this environment are—
• Detection.
• Decontamination and medical care, including assessment.
• Triage treatment.
• Medical evacuation.
D-16
• Hospitalization.
• Follow-up on victims of chemical and biological agents.
SUPPORT TO CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT

D-68. Support to domestic civil law enforcement generally involves
activities related to counterterrorism, counterdrug, civil disturbance
operations, or general support. Army support may involve providing
resources, training, or direct support. Federal forces remain under
the control of their military chain of command at all times while
providing the support.
Support to Counterterrorism
D-69. Military units in support of the lead agency may operate to
eliminate identified threats. Assistance may be provided in the areas
of transportation, equipment, training, and personnel. When
terrorists pose an imminent threat to US territory, its people, and
critical assets, the US military, using ground, air, space, special
operations, or maritime forces, may be used to support operations to
counter these threats. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is
responsible for crises management in the US.
Support to Counterdrug Operations
D-70. Army forces support to domestic counterdrug operations is
very limited and will usually be in a support role only.
Civil Disturbance Operations
D-71. The Army assists civil authorities in restoring law and order
when local and state law enforcement agencies are unable to resolve
the civil disturbance. Federal Army forces assist in restoring law and
order when the magnitude of a disturbance exceeds the capabilities
of local and state law enforcement agencies, including the National
Guard. Army participation is to apply the minimum force necessary
to restore order to the point where civilian authorities no longer
require military assistance.
General Support
D-72. The Army may also be directed to provide training, share
information, and provide equipment and facilities to federal, state,
and local civilian law enforcement agencies.
COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE
D-73. Community assistance is a broad range of activities designed
to strengthen the relationship between the Army and the American
people. These projects should exercise individual soldier skills,
encourage teamwork, challenge leader planning and coordination
skills, and result in accomplishments that are measurable. Example
activities include Youth Physical Fitness Programs, Medical
Readiness Programs, and Antidrug Programs.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUPPORT OPERATIONS

D-74. Planning and executing support operations are fundamentally
similar to planning, preparing, executing, and assessing offensive,
D-17
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
defensive, and stability operations. However, while each support

operation is unique, the following four broad considerations can help
forces develop mission-specific concepts and schemes for executing
support operations.
• Provide essential support to the largest number of
people. Commanders will be required to allocate finite
resources to achieve the greatest good. Additionally,
commanders require an accurate assessment of what
needs to be done to effectively employ military power. In
some cases, war fighting reconnaissance capabilities and
techniques can be executed to accomplish this task. They
must determine how and where to apply limited assets to
benefit the most people in the most efficient way. Initial
efforts are usually focused on restoring vital services,
which include food and water distribution, medical aid,
power generation, search and rescue, and fire fighting.
• Coordinate actions with other agencies. Domestic
support operations are typically joint and interagency, and
foreign humanitarian assistance operations are usually
multinational. Unity of effort between the military and
local authorities requires constant communication to
ensure that tasks are being conducted in the most
efficient and effective way and resources are used wisely.
• Establish measures of effectiveness. A critical aspect of
mission handover is to have objective standards for
measuring progress. These measures of effectiveness
determine the degree to which an operation is
accomplishing its established objectives. For example, a
measure of effectiveness might be the number of deaths
caused by starvation. This is an indicator that food
convoys are reaching the designated areas. These
measures are situationally dependent and must be
adjusted as the situation changes and guidance from
higher is developed.
• Handover to civilian agencies as soon as feasible.
Support operations planning must always include the
follow-on actions of the civilian agencies and the HN to
restore conditions to normal. The following considerations
determine handover feasibility:
Condition of supported population and governments.
Competing mission requirements.
Specified and implied commitment levels: time,
resources, and forces.
Maturity of the support effort.
SECTION III – SQUADRON’S ROLE IN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND

SUPPORT OPERATIONS
D-18
D-75. The squadron can execute missions/tasks associated with

these operations, or it can conduct its primary role of reconnaissance
in support of the brigade conducting stability operations and support
operations. Because of the SSC environment (noncontiguous
operations and an asymmetric threat), the squadron may have to
conduct decentralized operations in one area, while on the higher
end of SSC, subordinate units are conducting missions that support
the brigade’s offensive or defensive operations; and in another area,
the remainder of the squadron is conducting missions/tasks that
support stability operations and support operations.
D-76. Disciplined, well-trained, combat-ready leaders, to include the
staff, and soldiers can adapt to the specialized demands of stability
operations and support operations. To achieve the required degree of
readiness, the squadron commander and his staff must plan and
resource training prior to deployment on such factors as the
operational environment, the ROE and rules of interaction (ROI),
force protection, and individual soldier responsibilities. The training
must be updated and conducted continuously after deployment.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION CONSIDERATIONS

D-77. Although stability operations and support operations can take
place in any part of the world, they are most likely to occur in third-
world countries, where social, political, economic, and psychological
factors contribute to political instability. Each country or region is
unique, with its own history, culture, goals, and problems. US forces
deployed to these areas can be subject to rapid and dramatic
changes in situations and missions. The squadron leadership must
understand this environment, plan for rapid changes in the situation
or mission, and constantly be prepared to adapt to them. Stability
operations and support operations involving the squadron will occur
most often in the state of peacetime. It consists of decentralized
operations focused primarily on the employment of platoons
conducting a variety of activities, such as populace and movement
control (checkpoints and roadblocks), the handling of enemy
prisoners of war (EPW) or refugees, or EPW exchanges.
D-78. Several important considerations will influence planning and
preparation for stability operations and support operations. These
are—
• Environment.
• Tempo.
• Intelligence.
• Decentralized operations.
• ROE.
• Graduated response.
• ROI.
D-79. The following paragraphs briefly discuss these seven

considerations. Refer to FM 3-07.3 [FM 100-23] for a detailed
discussion of these subjects.
D-19
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
ENVIRONMENT
D-80. Stability operations and support operations can take place in
any part of the world. To deal effectively with the diverse situations
they may face, US forces must undergo orientation training on the
complex conditions and factors at work in a specific region. Each
soldier must understand the political and economic situation, as well
as the cultures, climates, and terrain of the region. He should
understand the military situation, especially the doctrine, tactics,
and equipment that are employed by belligerent, guerrilla, and
terrorist forces. Orientation training should also clarify
environmental factors as well as the planning and operational
considerations discussed in the remainder of this section.
TEMPO
D-81. Although extreme tension may underlie stability operations
and support operations, the tempo of these operations is generally
slow. Nonetheless, the speed of military action can vary widely, from
fast, violent tactical movement by a reaction force for the purpose of
relieving encircled friendly forces to the occupation of checkpoints to
control vehicular and civilian traffic.
D-82. The threat can be expected to execute both overt and covert
operations to test friendly reaction times and security procedures
throughout stability operations and support operations. Units that
are predictable or that lack sound operations security (OPSEC) leave
themselves susceptible to attack. For the squadron, the key to a
secure environment is not only to maintain the highest possible level
of OPSEC, but also to vary the techniques by which security
procedures are executed (for example, varying security patrol routes
and moving checkpoints).
INTELLIGENCE
D-83. Intelligence is crucial during the execution of stability
operations and support operations. The threats faced by military
forces in these operations are more ambiguous than those in other
situations because combatants, guerrillas, and terrorists can easily
blend with the civilian population. Before forces are committed and
while they are conducting operations, intelligence must be collected,
processed, and focused to support all planning, training, and
operational requirements. (NOTE: See FM 3-07 [FM 100-20] for
additional information.)
DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS
D-84. Although stability operations and support operations are
normally centrally planned, execution often takes the form of small-
scale, decentralized actions conducted over extended distances. In
some situations, junior leaders will have the responsibility for making
immediate and monumental decisions on the ground. Effective
command guidance and a thorough understanding of ROE are
critical at each level.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
D-20
D-85. ROE are politically imposed restrictions on military

operations. Higher military authorities direct the ROE based on the
political and tactical situations and the level of threat. For example,
these restrictions may require that the forces involved limit their use
of firepower to a certain geographical area or that they limit the
duration of their operations. Refer to Figure D-1 for an example of
ROE for one possible situation.
D-86. ROE must be considered during the planning and execution
of all operations. The unit’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)
will require adjustment based on each particular situation’s ROE.
Understanding, adjusting for, and properly executing ROE are
especially important to success in stability operations and support
operations. The restrictions change whenever the political and
military situations change; this means ROE must be updated and
explained continuously.
D-87. ROE provide the authority for the soldier’s right to self-
defense. Each soldier must understand the ROE and be prepared to
execute them properly in every possible confrontation. In addition,
ROE violations can have operational, strategic, and political
consequences that may affect national security; the threat can be
expected to exploit such violations.
All threat military personnel and vehicles transporting threat personnel or their equipment may be
engaged subject to the following restrictions:
A. When possible, the threat will be warned first and asked to surrender.
B. Armed force is the last resort.
C. Armed civilians will be engaged only in self-defense.
D. Civilian aircraft will not be engaged, except in self-defense, without approval from division level.
E. All civilians should be treated with respect and dignity. Civilians and their property should not be
harmed unless necessary to save US lives. If possible, civilians should be evacuated before any US
attack. Privately owned property may be used only if publicly owned property is unavailable or its use
is inappropriate.
F. If civilians are in the area, artillery, mortars, AC-130s, attack helicopters, and tube-launched or
rocket-launched weapons should not be used against known or suspected targets without the
permission of a ground maneuver commander (lieutenant colonel or higher).
G. If civilians are in the area, all air attacks must be controlled by forward air controller or forward
observer, and close air support, white phosphorous weapons, and incendiary weapons are
prohibited without approval from division.
H. If civilians are in the area, shoot only at known threat locations.
I. Public works such as power stations, water treatment plants, dams, and other public utilities may not
be engaged without approval from division level.
J. Hospitals, churches, shrines, schools, museums, and other historical or cultural sites will be
engaged only in self-defense against fire from these locations.
K. All indirect fire and air attacks must be observed.
L. Pilots must be briefed for each mission as to the location of civilians and friendly forces.
M. Booby traps are not authorized. Authority to emplace mines is reserved for the division commander.
Riot control agents can be used only with approval from division level.
N. Prisoners should be treated humanely, with respect and dignity.
O. Annex R to the operations plan (OPLAN) provides more detail. In the event this card conflicts with
the OPLAN, the OPLAN should be followed.
D-21
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
DISTRIBUTION: ONE FOR EACH SOLDER DEPLOYED (ALL RANKS)
Figure D-1. Example Rules of Engagement
GRADUATED RESPONSE
D-88. ROE will be published in any stability operation and support
operation. As the operation continues and the military is forced to
deal with different ROE situations, the threat will quickly determine
what US forces can and can’t do. With the information, the threat will
test US forces and their resolve. For this reason, a graduated
response matrix should be used. This provides leaders and soldiers a
framework of how to deal with ROE situations. They should be
rehearsed using vignettes that actually put the soldiers and leaders
in a situation that forces them to work through the graduated
response. Refer to Figure D-2 for an example of a graduated
response.
SITUATION: Your unit is conducting an operation (i.e., secure a weapons storage facility). Signs have
been posted that no crowds are allowed near the facility. After a period of time, a crowd of civilians begins
to gather. You are given the order to disperse the crowd as quickly and safely as possible. The following
steps should be followed to disperse the crowd. Steps can be used independently or in conjunction with
each other to get the crowd to disperse.
1. Bring in linguists assigned to your unit to talk to the crowd and tell them to disperse.
2. Employ Airborne Speaker Teams to transmit instructions to the crowd to disperse.
3. Employ bullhorns to relay instructions to the crowd to disperse.
4. Use Loud Noise Speaker Teams to disperse the crowd.
5. Honk the horns of unit vehicles to get the crowd to disperse.
6. Employ concertina wire to keep the crowed from gaining access to the area.
7. Start the vehicle you have to show the crowd that you will move on them if necessary.
8. Employ mechanized vehicles (interim armored vehicles) as a show of force to the crowd.
9. Take pictures of the instigators of the crowd.
10. Employ military working dogs to disperse the crowd.
11. Fix bayonets.
12. Conduct procedures used in Civil Disturbance Drills.
13. Use pepper spray to disperse the crowd.
14. Show that you have CS canisters.
15. Use the CS canisters.
16. Employ helicopter blades wash to disperse the crowd.
17. Fire rounds in the air.
18. Employ the use of deadly force.
Figure D-2. Example Graduated Response Card
RULES OF INTERACTION
D-89. ROI describe what forms of local civilian contact are allowed
and prohibited. ROI may account for local political, religious, other
D-22
cultural sensitivities; or ROI may be designed to protect US personnel

by prohibiting contact with potentially dangerous elements in the
local population. ROI support mission accomplishment by
maintaining a positive image of US personnel with the local
population, and by preventing US forces from being involved in
compromising and dangerous situations. ROI may also be used to
define appropriate courtesy during interactions with local military
and civilian authorities during activities such as compliance
inspections conducted during peace operations.
D-90. The ROI applied by the squadron are developed by higher
headquarters with input from CA, Staff Judge Advocate, chaplain,
counterintelligence, medical, and others. Although the squadron
commander cannot make the published ROI less restrictive, he may
need to impose additional rules to account for local considerations.
ROI are tools the individual soldier will need to deal with the
nontraditional threats that are prevalent in stability operations and
support operations, including political friction, unfamiliar cultures,
and conflicting ideologies. In turn, ROI enhance the soldier’s
survivability in such situations.
FORCE PROTECTION
D-91. Because of the influence of local politics and news media in
stability operations and support operations, precautions and
operations required to minimize casualties and collateral damage
become particularly important operational considerations during
these operations. At the same time, however, force protection must
be a constant priority.
D-92. In attempting to limit the level and scope of violence used in
stability operations and support operations, leaders must avoid making
tactically unsound decisions or exposing the force to unnecessary risks.
On the contrary, an overpowering use of force, correctly employed, can
reduce subsequent violence or prevent a response from the threat force.
This must be covered in the ROE and the operations order (OPORD)
from the troop.
D-93. OPSEC, tempered by restrictions in the ROE and ROI, is an
important tool for the commander in accomplishing his force
protection goals. Security procedures should encompass the full
range of antiterrorist activities for every soldier and leader. Examples
include proper communications security; strict noise, light, and litter
discipline; proper wear of the uniform; display of the proper
demeanor for the situation; as well as effective use of cover and
concealment, obstacles, observation posts (OP) and early warning
devices, the protection afforded by armored vehicles, and safe
locations for eating and resting.
D-94. A final consideration in force protection is hygiene. Many
stability operations and support operations take place in
underdeveloped nations; therefore, proper field sanitation and
personal hygiene are mandatory if soldiers are to stay healthy.
TASK ORGANIZATION
D-23
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
D-95. Because of the unique requirements of stability operations

and support operations, the squadron may be augmented to operate
with a variety of units. Examples may include infantry, armor,
psychological operations (PSYOP), CA, counterintelligence, and or
military police (MP).
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

D-96. The operational environment (infrastructure) of stability
operations and support operations may be limited, creating special
combat service support (CSS) considerations. These factors include,
but are not limited to, the following:
• Reliance on local procurement of certain items.
• Shortages of various critical items, including repair parts,
Class IV supply materials, and lubricants.
• Special Class V requirements, such as pepper spray.
• Reliance on bottled water.
MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS
D-97. The presence of the media is a reality that confronts every
soldier involved in stability operations and support operations. All
leaders and soldiers are subject to instantaneous worldwide scrutiny
as a result of the growth of news coverage via international television
and radio broadcasts and the Internet. Opponents to the operation or
anti-US personnel may interpret or embellish interviews to imply that
the operation counters official US policy and may damage the
nation’s interests and international standing.
D-98. The squadron soldiers must learn how to deal effectively with
broadcast and print reporters and photographers. Training should
cover any information restrictions imposed on the media. Soldiers
must also gain an understanding of which subjects they are
authorized to discuss and which ones they must refer to higher
authorities, such as their chain of command or the public affairs
office (PAO). PAO personnel usually issue daily guidance dealing with
these subjects.
OPERATIONS WITH OUTSIDE AGENCIES

D-99. US Army units may conduct certain stability operations and
support operations in coordination with a variety of outside
organizations. These include other US armed services or government
agencies (see Chapter 6) as well as international organizations,
including private voluntary organizations (PVO), such as Doctors
Without Borders; NGOs, such as the Red Cross; and UN military
forces or agencies.
LEADER REQUIREMENTS
D-100. Flexibility and situational awareness are paramount
requirements. Leaders must ensure that every soldier understands
the mission, the history, and reason they are executing the mission.
This creates confident leaders and soldiers who don’t hesitate when a
D-24
decision has to be made. The squadron’s role and/or objectives in

stability operations and support operations will not always be clear.
The squadron commander must ensure his intent and OPORD is
clear and concise to empower leaders and soldiers at all levels to
make on-the-spot decisions that could have an immediate, dramatic
effect on the strategic or operational situation.
SOLDIERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES
D-101. US soldiers may have extensive contact with HN civilians
during stability operations and support operations. As a result, their
personal conduct has a significant impact on the opinions, and thus
the support, of the local population. As noted, soldiers must
understand that misconduct by US forces (even those deployed for
only a short time) can damage rapport that took years to develop. US
soldiers must treat local civilians and military personnel as personal
and professional equals, affording them the appropriate customs and
courtesies.
D-102. Every soldier must be updated continuously on changes to
operational considerations (such as environment, ROE/ROI, media,
and force protection). Such changes can have immediate impact on
his freedom to react to a given situation. Keeping the soldier informed
of changes enhances his situational awareness and his ability to
adapt to changing conditions. Leaders must disseminate this
information quickly and accurately.
D-103. The collection of information is a continuous process, and all
information must be reported. Intelligence is provided by many
sources, including friendly forces, threat elements, and the local
populace. From the friendly standpoint, each soldier must be familiar
with the commander’s critical information requirements and other
applicable intelligence requirements. At the same time, threat
soldiers will be continuously seeking intelligence on US actions, often
blending easily into the civilian population. US soldiers must be
aware of this and use OPSEC procedures at all times.
D-104. To emphasize responsibilities, soldiers and leaders conduct
precombat checks (PCC) and precombat inspections (PCI) that focus
on a soldier’s knowledge of the environment and application of ROE,
graduated response, and ROI. These checks and inspections should
also identify possible OPSEC violations and deficiencies that could
place the soldier and his equipment at risk. Leaders should stress
that terrorists and thieves may attempt to infiltrate positions or
mount vehicles either to steal equipment and supplies or to cause
harm to US forces or facilities.
D-105. To enhance civilian cooperation and support, the S2 is
responsible for issuing key word and phrase cards (primarily to
commanders) to assist in translation of key English phrases into the
language of the HN. These phrases should apply specifically to the
AO.
D-25
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
D-106. In support of the brigade, the infantry conducts the routine

daily tasks associated with stability operations and support
operations while the squadron performs reconnaissance and security
missions. The brigade should focus the squadron on priority
intelligence requirements (PIR) that identify events that may escalate
the current situation to a SSC or MTW conflict. Example missions
may include reconnaissance of routes to determine the level of
activity along routes (such as increased activity may indicate a build-
up of supplies or repositioning/evacuation of hostile/nonhostile
personnel). Another situation may warrant surveillance of certain
areas or activities, such as motor pools or known insurgent/guerilla
camps, where increased levels of maintenance or training may
indicate preparation for combat actions. Security missions (screening
or area security) may be used to provide early warning to the brigade
or battalions as they conduct their routine missions. Refer to Chapter
3 (Reconnaissance Operations) and Chapter 4 (Security Operations)
for respective planning considerations.
D-107. The squadron has unique capabilities that make it an
important asset to US and combined forces executing missions in
stability operations and support operations. The squadron can task
organize to obtain a unique combination of human intelligence
(HUMINT), aerial, and electronic capabilities and can receive
augmentation of detaching units to provide a tailored organization to
accomplish assigned missions.
D-108. The squadron utilizes the recce (reconnaissance) troop to
conduct the various reconnaissance and security missions and
augments it with assets from the surveillance troop. Because of the
resources necessary to deploy, operate, and sustain forces in stability
operations and support operations, the recce troop is used to execute
activities that maximize its inherent capabilities of stealth,
reconnaissance, surveillance, and HUMINT collection. On the other
hand, the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC)
may require the squadron to execute tasks other than traditional
reconnaissance and surveillance. For example, the troop could be
tasked with conducting crowd and riot control if an MP shortage
exists.
SPECIFIC SQUADRON TASKS

D-109. As part of a force involved in stability operations and support
operations, the squadron can expect to perform these tasks:
• Security operations, including the following:
Convoy security.
Support to recce platoon checkpoints.
Roadblocks.
• Reconnaissance operations, including the following:
Area reconnaissance.
Route reconnaissance.
Building searches.
D-26
• Liaison/negotiate.
• Conduct presence operations.
• Compliance inspection operations.
• Conduct a Joint Military Commission (JMC) meeting.
• React to civil disturbance.
• Plan for and react to a media interview.
• Deliver supplies or humanitarian assistance.
• Supervise minefield clearance.
D-110. The highest level of execution is normally at troop level. The

squadron will rarely conduct a full-up squadron mission. The
responsibility of the squadron commander and staff is to analyze,
plan, resource, coordinate, arbitrate disputes (see paragraph
“Liaison/Negotiate” below), and track operations.
NOTE: This is not an all-inclusive list of tasks. The following lists contain information
only on the squadron task, purpose, and planning considerations for the tasks
specified here.
LIAISON/NEGOTIATE
D-111. When conducting stability operations and support operations,
the squadron commander must conduct liaison or negotiations with
many military forces, factional force leaders, government
organizations, NGOs, PVOs, and international agencies. Leaders
must be in control, dominating, and confident. The squadron
commander must be aware of all liaison tasks being conducted in his
organization. He should delegate liaison tasks to subordinate leaders
and establish a liaison officer (LNO) within the staff when capable
and assume responsibility of specific liaison requirements that
warrant his level of attention.
D-112. The following is a guide and should be modified to fit
individual METT-TC conditions. The majority of the steps are geared
toward a stability operation but are easily applied to all types of
operations.
• Unit headquarters (squadron commander and staff)
determines liaison requirements for making contact.
Determines the need for interpreter. Plans the type of
interpreter to be used. Ensures that the interpreter is
the right one for the situation. Many times the
interpreter is of the opposite factional affiliation and
could hinder proper dialog or mood of the liaison. May
request interpreter assistance from higher or perhaps
request that the agency/individual conducting liaison
bring his interpreter for heightened clarification.
Identifies military forces, civil authorities, religious
leaders, ethnic groups, local factions, and NGOs
operating in the area of responsibility (AOR).
D-27
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Conducts intelligence preparation of the battlefield of

the individuals involved with the liaison. HUMINT
collector compiles information on individuals from
other liaison HUMINT activities with the identified
individuals. Liaison team should know all information
about the individual such as likes, dislikes, family
information, tobacco user, sports interests, factional
affiliation, and combat experience. Anything that will
enhance small talk or knowledge of previous
difficulties.
Determines whom to liaison with and contact
frequency for elements in the AOR.
Establishes times and locations for initial liaison
contacts with elements.
Determines who the best LNO is for a particular
contact.
Determines the need for a quick reaction force (QRF).
Develops an agenda for liaison meeting(s).
Develops a plan on how to maintain continuous
contact until dispute is resolved or tensions are
reduced.
• Unit/LNO considerations.
Sets the conditions for a professional and cooperative
relationship.
− Ensures uniforms, equipment, appearance, and
security procedures are appropriate.
− Acquires communication and transportation for
liaison.
− Ensures they know current political and military
situation.
− Ensures the LNO team understands the mandate,
ROI, ROE, graduated response, terms of reference
(TOR), and status of forces agreement (SOFA).
Upon request, provides liaison assistance in
accordance with unit constraints.
− Establishes an on-call liaison to respond to crises
that may develop in the unit AOR.
− Updates squadron situation map for current
locations of liaison contacts.
As required, coordinates with units and/or agencies
operating in the unit AOR.
− Determines what units and/or agencies are
operating in the unit AOR.
− Establishes contact at checkpoints, or as specified
in the regional force SOP.
− Exchanges information (military, paramilitary, and
mass civilian movements; minefields and
D-28
obstacles; intentions and missions for belligerents;

and locations of key faction force leaders).
Determines how to stabilize an area with existing or
escalating tension.
− Identifies potential “hot spots” of increased
tension.
− Determines which factions may be involved and
the regions affected.
− Designates forces to stabilize the area, within
capability, or requests additional support.
− Coordinates with belligerents to resolve real or
perceived problems.
− Reports developments of any destabilizing
situation to higher headquarters, as required.
− Contacts forces or civilians involved.
− Establishes an upgraded alert status and security
awareness of units in affected area and adjacent
areas, as needed.
− Dispatches liaisons to all elements involved.
• Execution.
Performs necessary greeting functions, salutations,
and exchange of courtesies.
Encourages informal small talk among participants
while offering refreshments and tobacco products.
Discusses the purpose of the meeting, agenda, and
potential end state.
Communicates that only major problems are brought
to the attention of liaison’s headquarters (squadron
commander). (This should be only after subordinates
have been unable to resolve the issues; always attempt
to power down and to use rank as a means of
escalating the liaison situation.)
Demonstrates resolve, confidence, commitment, and
concern for local customs and people living in the AOR
by attending major local events.
Implements immediate response to any serious breach
of trust, confidence, or deception that has occurred.
CONDUCT PRESENCE OPERATIONS

D-113. During tactical operations, the squadron commander may
task a recce troop(s) to conduct presence operations. The troop
conducts presence operations by manning OPs and checkpoints, and
conducting presence patrols and reconnaissance patrols, with the
intent to be seen. The troop operates on visible routes and locations.
It demonstrates tasks with collective determination with actions that
are meant to deter belligerent actions and defuse tense situations
between belligerents. ROE are strictly adhered to and security of the
force is always planned and demonstrated. Professionalism,
D-29
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
discipline, and the appearance of combat readiness are projected.

Backbriefs, confirmation briefs, or attending the troop commander’s
OPORD briefing or rehearsal are some of the methods available to
verify mission understanding.
D-114. The squadron commander ensures these planning
considerations for conducting presence operations are followed:
• The squadron task organizes a QRF in accordance with
METT-TC.
• In coordination with higher headquarters, the squadron
commander conducts mission planning to determine
probable deployment locations.
• The squadron conducts intelligence preparation of the AO.
Evaluates area.
− Determines maps in use by force headquarters and
adjacent units (different grid designations, place
names).
− Evaluates scope of AO. Determines probable time
and distance factors and reaction times.
Establishes triggers, control measures. Establishes
fire support plan.
Evaluates terrain.
− Completes military aspects of the terrain
assessment.
− Determines if demonstration location of the troop’s
elements is defensible. Determines where it is
defensible.
− Determines if the force can be seen (an essential
condition for presence).
− Identifies key or favorable terrain to belligerents.
Conducts weather analysis.
− Determines effects of weather on the unit’s
operations and the belligerent’s operations.
− Considers effects on mobility, trafficability, and
reaction time.
Evaluates the threat-belligerent faction information.
− Evaluates and distributes all known information
(location, composition, disposition) on belligerent
parties and various factions.
− Evaluates and distributes information on
uniforms, markings, insignia, vehicles, and
equipment.
− Plots and keeps current all known locations of
weapons holding areas, staging areas, or
encampments.
D-30
− Evaluates and distributes known information

about belligerent faction leaders and their
headquarters.
− Identifies headquarters, police stations, barracks
locations, political party headquarters.
Determines threat-belligerent integration.
− Describes typical or anticipated belligerent actions
based on recent significant activities and available
equipment.
− Designates named areas of interest (NAI) and
target areas of interest (TAI), as appropriate.
− Identifies TAIs for nonlethal effects.
− Determines locations for liaison for aggressive
HUMINT collection to defuse any belligerent
activity.
• The unit conducts reconnaissance of potential or
anticipated demonstration sites.
Within the troop’s sector, this includes—
− Checkpoints.
− OPs.
− Routes and main supply routes.
− Unit compounds, operation bases, or key facilities.
− Towns or villages in or near zones of separation or
within sector.
Designated sites by higher headquarters or where
information suggests rising tensions.
Reconnaissance tasks should include—
− Available routes and time factors.
− Potential vehicle and weapon position.
− Adjacent unit coordination (this may be US or
international forces).
− Casualty evacuation routes and treatment
locations.
− Limited visibility factors considered.
− Indirect-fire target identification and verification.
• The troop assesses the need for liaison activities and
translators.
• The troop maintains radio contact with adjacent units at
specified intervals.
• The QRF rehearses all aspects of the mission.
Rehearses linkup with all elements that make up
demonstration element.
Checks internal communications and compatibility.
Rehearses movement.
D-31
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Reviews ROE limitations on use of force.

Rehearses casualty evacuation, rearmament, and
resupply.
• Unit conducts presence operations by conducting OPs,
checkpoints, patrols, and inspections.
Troop leadership confirms mission plan and ensures
personnel are briefed on and know the following before
commitment:
− ROE and use of force.
− Purpose of operation and desired outcome.
− Inherent risks of the operation.
− Graduated response to provocation.
− Command relationship and controlling
headquarters.
− Authentication procedures for order of fire. (Any
unnecessary response may have strategic
implications.)
− Weapon control status and orientation.
The element moves rapidly with lights on and UN or
appropriate markings and colors prominently
displayed.
• The platoons may conduct linkup with area or base camp
commanders and other platoon check points/OPs while
conducting presence operations.
Conduct initial recognition by radio (direct to
commander/officer in charge).
Conduct face-to-face coordination on arrival.
Occupy positions as planned or as directed by the
local commander.
• The squadron receives updates from the troop.
Weapon systems are not aimed directly at belligerents,
but oriented on their direction.
Subordinate leaders are prepared to react
proportionally to escalation.
Leaders conduct negotiations or liaison, as required,
during the presence operation.
Troop is prepared to execute the troop’s QRF, attack,
or defend as necessary within the scope of all
applicable directives.
CONDUCT COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS OPERATIONS

D-115. When intelligence identifies and locates an area to be
inspected, such as arms cache inspection, members of an insurgent
infrastructure, mine field clearance operation, factional barracks
inspection, or any other thing or activity worthy of inspection (usually
in accordance with treaty or peace accord), a compliance inspection
D-32
is mounted to ensure conformity. As with presence operations, the

squadron commander normally assigns a recce troop(s) this mission.
D-116. The following planning considerations are the same for
squadron and troop level.
Task Organization
D-117. Task organization for a compliance inspection requires the
unit to designate a security force to isolate the area to be inspected, a
search or reconnaissance force, and a QRF. Special consideration
must be made to determine the size of security needed and the QRF
to over match any possible threat. Augmentation from the brigade
can usually provide an effective QRF.
Conduct of the Operation

D-118. An effective security force is critical to the success of the
reconnaissance/search effort. The security force isolates the search
area, prevents the escape of individuals, and protects the forces
conducting the operation. Checkpoints and roadblocks are
established along roads entering and exiting the area when
necessary. This helps isolate the objective. This may not always be
necessary and is dependent on the compliance inspection mission
and the threat or potential noncompliance activity. The security force
will establish OPs, and when necessary, security patrols are executed
in the surrounding area. Members of the security force orient mainly
on people or vehicles attempting to escape or evade the compliance
inspection in the populated area; however, the security force can also
cut off elements or individuals trying to reinforce threat forces in the
search area. Deployment to the search area is rapid and is
synchronized so it does not provide early warning to the local
population.
D-119. A QRF is located near the compliance inspection. Its specific
mission is to reinforce OPs, patrols, or the search force and to assist
the other elements as required by the mission.
CONDUCT A JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION MEETING

D-120. When the squadron is conducting stability operations and
support operations, it must conduct a JMC meeting in which issues
are raised, discussed, and resolved. Negotiation is the term used in
conducting these operations. A unit negotiates with various elements
in the area for an indeterminate number of reasons. The squadron
commander must determine at what level negotiations can occur and
the parameters of the negotiation (what the negotiator has to
negotiate with). To conduct effective negotiations, the LNOs
(commanders and designated representatives), in conjunction with
local UN/government organizations and civilian/military observers,
must establish rapport with local leaders of warring factions and the
civilian population. The squadron commander may be directed to
renew efforts to conduct negotiations within the area and in turn
direct his subordinate commanders or staff representative to conduct
the negotiations. If the squadron commander delegates the
D-33
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
responsibility, he should be prepared to arbitrate or assume

negotiations if the LNO cannot make any progress. The factions
within the squadron’s AO may still be engaged in armed conflict.
D-121. Based on the peacekeeping mandate, the squadron
commander should provide subordinates with guidance on the TOR,
SOFA, and the ROE that define the desired end state, as well as the
limits of concession.
D-122. The following are planning considerations for the conduct of
negotiations:
• The unit prepares to conduct negotiations.
Squadron commander ensures unity of effort by
forming a negotiation team. The team consists of—
− Designated team leader (squadron executive
officer, S3, or troop commander). May or may not
be the chief negotiator. Supervises the team’s
efforts.
− Negotiation/resource coordinator (troop
commander or staff member). Serves as the link to
the brigade staff. Procures and requests
information. Ensures availability of equipment and
materiel necessary to conduct negotiations.
− Recorder. Maintains chronological record of all
conversations between parties and negotiating
team. Compiles information in separate lists or
databases that indicate demands, deadlines,
agreements, or disputes. Maintains a separate
listing of all promises made by the negotiating
team.
− Interpreter. An additional interpreter may be
required if the accuracy of the primary interpreter
is questioned.
Negotiating team collects all available information. The
team is included in routine message and report flow
from the tactical operations center.
− Identifies the problem or source of contention.
− Analyzes any previous attempts at resolution and
their outcome.
D-34
− Analyzes existing agreements or understandings

that may be part of the problem.
− Knows the constraints and limitations of the
squadron’s negotiation capabilities.
Negotiating team requests or seeks additional
information.
− Makes or issues queries to LNOs.
− Questions local UN/government organizations and
civilian/military observers.
− Queries are included as specific information
requirements (SIR) in reconnaissance and security
tasks.
Negotiating team recommends, negotiates, selects
meeting place.
− Ensures meeting place is a neutral location or is
acceptable to all parties.
− Ensures communications assets are adequate for
all parties, but especially for the negotiating team.
− Ensures site is surveyed for security requirements.
Security elements tasked and positioned to prevent
attack or sabotage.
− Ensures availability and use of same map editions
and scales by all parties or any other supporting
documents that the dispute is concerned with
(such as contracts and mine data sheets).
− Coordinates for videotape or other electronic media
recording.
Negotiating team arranges meeting place.
− Organizes tables, chairs, maps, cameras, and
coffee (with condiments).
− Designates a waiting area for guards and support
personnel, an area for parking, etc.
− Posts signs or designates locations for various
activities.
− Establishes communications.
− Establishes and designates break areas.
− Ensures latrine facilities are adequate.
− Makes arrangements for negotiation attendees to
rapidly pass through security checks.
• Negotiating team conducts negotiations.
Performs greeting functions, salutations, and
exchange of courtesies.
Makes formal introductions, by name and position, of
all attendees.
Encourages informal small talk among participants
while offering refreshments.
D-35
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Discusses layout and configuration of site before

starting formal portion of meeting.
Reviews an agreed upon agenda or establishes one.
Allows participants to establish or present their case
without interruption.
− Serves as mediator between multiple parties.
− Corrects inaccurate information or
misrepresentation by the presentation of facts
supported by evidence.
− Does not argue to win a point.
− Records all positions, opinions, and issues.
− Avoids making judgments or becoming bogged
down with complaints presented by parties.
Recorder makes notes for investigation and further
actions.
Presents the preferred solution (if there is one);
otherwise, works to achieve a solution.
− Isolates what each party desires or what will
satisfy them.
− Identifies a common middle ground.
− Encourages small concessions to get parties in the
habit of agreement.
− Uses previous agreements or understandings as a
framework for accord (unless those are the basis of
contention).
− Facilitates the process by making commitments
without exceeding the limits imposed by the
mandate or higher headquarters.
Concludes session at agreed time, or when no further
action is possible.
− Recorder summarizes results of session,
acknowledging agreements and concessions made.
Reviews issues requiring investigation and
tentative agenda for follow-up meetings. If
possible, provides written copy of record to
participants.
− Requests copies of other parties’ records if they
were taking notes.
− Prepares agreements for signature before parties
depart.
− Ensures clear and positive understanding of any
actions agreed on. Fully defines coordination
measures.
− Makes arrangements for future meetings;
coordinates dates, times, locations, and means of
communication.
D-36
− Speaks pleasantly to each party during their

departure, regardless of results of the session.
D-37
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Negotiating team reports results of negotiation to higher

headquarters.
Squadron commander/team leader or chief negotiator
makes concluding remarks that point out the positive
aspects or results of the session.
Leader ensures team consolidates all notes and other
raw data.
Leader uses debrief format to prepare report. In
conjunction with recorder, debriefs all team members
or other participants (unit personnel or
representatives of NGOs and PVOs).
Identifies key points or issues that require
investigation or immediate attention.
Posts and updates chronological logs and information
databases.
Prepares formal written report listing circumstances,
issues, and recommendations.
Prepares documents to implement any agreed upon
peacekeeping force actions.
Prepares information summary to brief troop
commanders, brigade commander and staffs, and
UN/government organizations, and civilian/military
observers. Considers inclusion of local or regional
NGO and PVO.
Briefs unit public affairs representative (if augmented)
on results, publicity issues, or necessity to maintain
close hold on results.
• Negotiating team begins preparations for subsequent
negotiations.
Updates and disseminates new information
requirements.
Updates or creates personality profiles of counterpart
negotiating team.
Conducts rehearsals to improve negotiating a position
or resolving a dispute.
REACT TO CIVIL DISTURBANCE

D-123. While the squadron conducts stability operations and support
operations, it may be required to assist in the containment of a civil
disturbance by itself or as part of a larger unit. By itself, the
disturbance may threaten nothing, but the potential for destruction
of critical property and the loss of supplies or other assets demands
upgraded security measures. The civilians may be unarmed, but if
agitated they may use sticks, rocks, and bottles as weapons.
However, never underestimate the access to small-arms weapons by
noncombatants. Local civil authority usually is insufficient to contain
or restrain the civil demonstration or disturbance. This is why the
squadron employs the recce troop to react to a civil disturbance.
D-38
Security of the troop is paramount. Soldiers should be armed and

equipped with riot control equipment and loaded ammunition is
carried (in accordance with ROE).
D-124. The following are planning considerations for the reaction to a
civilian disturbance:
• Area isolated.
Establish a perimeter.
Erect appropriate barriers.
Alert the QRF.
• Liaison established with local law enforcement authorities.
Request local law enforcement authorities to resolve
disturbance.
Determine the scope and severity of the disturbance.
Advise higher headquarters of possible necessity to
implement arming orders, and request assistance from
other organizations (MPs or UN civil police).
• Key facilities affected by the disturbance identified and
prioritized for protection (such as food distribution point,
checkpoint, government headquarters).
• Forces apportioned as needed to control disturbance and
protect facilities.
• Fixed security posts augmented, while a QRF remains
centrally located to respond to threats at other likely
targets.
Fixed security posts implement rigid entry and exit
controls; only one used.
Facility occupants moved to interior safe room or
escorted out of danger area.
• Unit leader assesses the situation if tasked to exert
control over the civilians. The unit leader should consider
the following:
Intensity level of the disturbance (crowd mood,
composition, activity, and perceived intent).
Recent trend in local public opinion.
Unit capabilities and readiness.
Immediate and long-term effects if lethal force is
required.
Weather, terrain, and time of day.
ROE.
• Commander selects or recommends a course of action
(COA) in accordance with the graduated response.
Monitor.
Contain.
Block.
D-39
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Disperse.
• Unit leaders select and employ control formations to best
accomplish the task assigned.
• Soldiers respond with strict discipline to orders to help
demonstrate firm resolve.
• Soldiers resist provocation and deliberate attempts to
humiliate them.
• Leaders consider rotation scheme for soldiers in
perimeter, especially those closest to civilians.
• Commander uses all available resources to help reduce
tensions.
PSYOP assets are used for recording unlawful
activities, communicating to crowd, identifying covert
direction or leadership.
CA assets are used to aid in communication and
liaison.
PVO and other nongovernmental agencies identify the
real cause of the disturbance and potential means to
end confrontation.
• Soldiers are required to review rules for use of lethal force
before employment in the perimeter.
Brigade or squadron commander may add or delete
restrictions to the ROE.
Soldiers must be able to react immediately to every
threat. (Commander must wargame every considerable
action of the crowd or hostile individuals.)
Soldiers rehearse all physical restraint options to be
used in escalating situation before the use of deadly
force prior to assuming duties on the perimeter.
Adhere to the graduated response.
Leaders ensure that soldiers on the perimeter can hear
orders, and soldiers are kept informed of the situation.
• Apprehension and detention of civilians are consistent
with specific guidance issued for the current operation.
Apprehension and detention limited to serious
offenses involving death or injury, or property theft or
destruction.
Personnel searches are conducted to check for
weapons or evidence.
• Leader considers use of patrols and visible mobile
checkpoints after cessation of the disturbance to assist
the resumption of control by the local civil authorities.
• Leader uses video equipment to tape the disturbance and
unit’s actions to document accuracy of activities and
preclude incorrect reporting of force response.
PLAN FOR AND REACT TO A MEDIA INTERVIEW
D-40
D-125. The squadron will react to media personnel or events within

stability operations and support operations. The squadron must be
prepared to face such events and the squadron commander must
ensure each soldier is prepared to react in accordance with unit
standing operating procedures (SOP) and ROI. The squadron and its
soldiers may be approached for an interview that may or may not be
justified by media representatives who appear to be legitimate. Care
must be given in response to the media. The response a soldier gives
the media has the potential to spark international controversy or
conflict. All interviews will not materially affect the unit or a soldier’s
ability to conduct his assigned tasks. These are guidelines to react to
media:
• Interviews are not conducted with non-accredited media
representatives.
• Unit public affairs representative provides guidance to
both interviewer and soldier to be interviewed.
• Soldier interviewed does not speculate, nor does he
express opinions beyond the scope of his experience or
duties.
• Operational information is not discussed.
• Squadron adheres to the ROE and ROI.
D-126. The following are planning considerations for the reaction to a

media interview.
• Squadron staff (S1 or S3) must be aware of all planned
media events and media personnel in the AOR and
maintain the latest media information from the brigade
civil affairs officer (S5).
• Leaders ensure that all personnel are briefed on how to
act/react to the media.
Soldier asks to see accreditation certification. (The
PAO at brigade, division, or Army Forces (ARFOR)
provides authorization paperwork or escort.)
Soldier asks where the escort is if reporter appears to
be unescorted.
If all details are in accordance with instructions
received from briefings, soldier participates in the
interview.
• Staff coordinates for public affairs representative to be
present during the interview.
• Soldier responds to interviewer’s questions.
Listens to the question; asks for clarification if needed.
Thinks about answer before responding.
Is honest in replies and says “I don’t know” if answer
is beyond scope.
Explains if he cannot answer a question due to
OPSEC.
D-41
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Does not respond to hypothetical situations used by

correspondent to elicit a response.
Terminates interview if he becomes uncomfortable
with the questions being asked, or if questioning
becomes provocative.
Does not allow himself to be “baited” into a response
by a controversial or so-called “investigative reporter.”
Avoids saying “no comment.”
D-42
• If press representative is unescorted, soldier—

Determines if escort is in the area. Asks for a specific
name and unit rather than accepting a general wave
“over there.”
Requests person or team to accompany the reporter to
headquarters element location, or calls for superiors to
come to the location.
Uses tact in dealing with media team.
• Leader attempts to verify identity of media team.
Notifies the squadron’s public affairs representative or
PAO.
Advises media team to depart AO to make contact with
higher headquarters unit public affairs representative
or PAO. Provides location and recommends route.
• If media team is in an area under direct US force control
(for example, compound, protected area, buffer zone),
soldier detains them to maintain positive control.
Informs media team that they are in a controlled area.
Informs media team that detention is for security
reasons and will continue until released by higher
headquarters.
Uses restraint consistent with authorized methods.
Leader considers that a ploy may be engineered to
portray US force unfavorably.
Keeps higher headquarters informed of all actions
taken.
DELIVER SUPPLIES OR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

D-127. The squadron may be called upon to escort transportation of
humanitarian supplies to a location that supports a variety of
situations. Some of these situations may be food for civilians,
medicine for refugee center/hospital, election materials, and utility
equipment just to name a few. The squadron must measure the
importance of the mission, the threat situation (what may try to
interfere with the mission), task organization, and the consequence of
failure (media reaction, loss of life) in accomplishing the mission.
Many times the mission can be delayed until the situation is less
threatening. The amount of supplies and level of threat will
determine if the mission is a troop or squadron level mission. The
following are guidelines to consider in achieving success for such a
mission:
• Reconnaissance force (quartering party/security force at
the delivery site), security force for the convoy, and QRF.
• Delivery is completed without incident.
• Accountability is maintained and receipt is acknowledged.
• The unit adheres to the ROE.
D-43
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
D-128. The commander confirms the mission and intent from higher
for the humanitarian assistance, and does the necessary
coordination with government organizations/NGOs that are
concerned with the mission. He establishes a reconnaissance force to
reconnoiter the route and the delivery site (liaisons with delivery site
officials, evaluates the security of the site, establishes security of the
site). Once complete, the reconnaissance force may become the
overall security force. He also establishes the convoy security force to
organize the convoy security mission and a QRF to respond to chance
contact by the convoy.
D-129. The following are other planning considerations for the
execution of the delivery of humanitarian assistance/supplies:
• The convoy halts in a covered, concealed site short of the
delivery destination.
• The convoy commander confirms the location for delivery.
• The commander conducts liaison with authorities for
drop-off point.
• The commander organizes the unit to maintain security
during delivery.
Security elements posted at intersections or choke
points en route from the halt site to the delivery site.
Security element posted at delivery site; wire emplaced
as necessary.
Security is maintained at halt site.
• Supply vehicles move in manageable numbers (dependent
on off-load timing) to delivery site.
En route security or QRF prevents diversion of
vehicles.
Site security prevents infiltration and attempts to loot.
QRF prepared to respond to events at delivery site.
• The commander ensures relief organization or local
authority acknowledges receipt of supplies.
• Security collapses onto and around the delivery site when
all vehicles complete unloading. The unit may set up area
security with subordinate elements/platoons conducting
screen, reconnaissance, defensive, and QRF missions.
• Security remains on site until local authorities assume
control or distribution is completed.
• The convoy commander reports mission complete to
higher headquarters.
SUPERVISE MINEFIELD CLEARANCE

D-130. While the squadron conducts stability operations and support
operations, it may be required to supervise other agencies (NGOs,
local military, contractors) in the clearance of a minefield by itself or
as part of a larger unit. The minefield may threaten ongoing
operations by relief workers and pose a threat to the local populace.
D-44
In many cases, those tasked to clear minefields may be open to

harassment or assault by local factions or may be prone to doing an
inadequate job of clearing the minefield. In all cases, clearing
minefields demands upgraded security measures. Local civil
authority usually is insufficient or ill trained to supervise the
minefield clearance. This is why the squadron may be employed to
provide supervision to other agencies clearing minefields. Security of
the units conducting supervision is paramount. Soldiers should be
armed and equipped with riot control equipment and loaded
ammunition is carried (in accordance with ROE). The squadron unit
conducting this operation will be augmented with engineers who are
responsible for the direct supervision of the minefield clearance.
Squadron units will assist the engineers by supervising the overall
operation and providing security around the minefield. Additionally,
a medical unit will provide support to the operation.
D-131. The following are planning considerations for supervision of
minefield clearance:
• Isolate the area.
Establish a perimeter.
Erect appropriate barriers.
Alert the QRF.
• Establish liaison with attached engineers and medical
personnel.
Review the plan for movement to, isolation, and
security of the area.
Review the plan for the minefield clearance.
Develop a sketch or overlay of the area and designate
required control measures.
Develop a detailed sketch of the clearance
organization: who leads, where the engineers will
locate, where the squadron elements will locate, etc.
Determine how disarmed mines will be transported
out of the area.
Determine actions to take in the case of an accidental
explosion.
• Establish liaison with local law enforcement authorities.
Request local law enforcement authorities to assist
with isolating the area.
Brief them on the plan for the minefield clearance.
• Establish liaison with the agency/unit conducting the
clearance.
Review their plan for the clearing operation with the
attached engineers.
Ensure they are fully aware of the security plan for the
area and know whom to contact prior to moving
around the area.
D-45
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Nearby facilities affected by the minefield location are

identified and occupants are notified of the potential for
damage in the case of an explosion.
• Forces are apportioned as needed to isolate the area and
supervise the operation.
• The unit leader assesses the situation and determines if
the operation can proceed.
Is the area isolated adequately?
Does the recent trend in local public opinion and
activities threaten the operation?
Is the clearing agency or unit capable and ready to
conduct the operation?
What are potential immediate and long-term effects if
an accident happens?
Do the weather, terrain, and time of day support the
successful execution of the operation?
Review the ROE as necessary.
• Commander uses all available resources to help reduce
the potential for disruption to the operation.
PSYOP assets are used for recording unlawful
activities, communicating to crowds, identification of
covert direction or leadership.
CA assets are used to aid in communication and
liaison.
• Leader uses video equipment to tape the operation and
the unit’s actions to document accuracy of activities and
preclude incorrect reporting of force activities.
D-46
Appendix E
Deployment
Speed, precision, and
CONTENTS
knowledge are Predeployment Activities............................ E-2
necessary if we are to Movement..................................................... E-2
meet the Army’s Fort to Port Movement ............................ E-2
Port to Port Movement ............................ E-3
requirement for a
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement,
strategically responsive and Integration......................................... E-3
full spectrum brigade. Airlift Operations ......................................... E-4
The brigade will deploy Planning ................................................... E-4
Operation Considerations....................... E-7
within 96 hours of
Load Shoring ........................................... E-7
notification and begin Unit Load Planning Personnel................ E-11
operations immediately Basics of Aircraft Load Planning ........... E-12
upon departure from Types of Loads ........................................ E-12
463L Cargo System ................................. E-13
the aerial port of
debarkation (APOD).
The squadron will be the first unit to deploy within that timeline.
To achieve that goal, we need to examine what is necessary in
predeployment activities; fort to port movement, port to port
movement; and reception, staging, onward movement, and
integration (RSOI).
There are several overarching requirements for the deployment of

the squadron. An obvious one is that necessary airlift must be
allocated by the Commander in Chief (CINC) to the Army
component to allow the squadron and the brigade’s early
deployment. Traditionally, the majority of the available airlift early
in the flow is allocated to the Air Force component. Total asset
visibility in Global Combat Service Support-Army (GCSS-A) and
Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for
Movement System II (TC-AIMS II) with automatic identification
technology (AIT) are required to quickly determine combat
readiness of the squadron. Along with visibility, in-flight
communication capability and en route intelligence feeds will add
to the squadron’s ability to deploy quickly and operate
immediately upon disembarking at the APOD.
Whether deploying as part of a brigade or in an independent

operation, the squadron will generally conduct the following
sequence of activities for deployment: predeployment activities,
movement [fort to port and port to port], and RSOI.
Another aspect of deployment is airlift planning, including

opposed-entry planning considerations. Because resupply may be
by air to support any given operation, airlift planners must be
E-1
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
familiar with opposed-entry procedures and the low-altitude

parachute extraction system (LAPES).
SECTION I – PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES
E-1. Predeployment activities are actions taken to prepare forces

for deployment. They are essentially constant and ongoing activities
performed at home station prior to and continuing after warning or
alert notification. Predeployment activities include:
• Planning and training validation. The squadron assists the
brigade by maintaining and improving its combat
readiness, preparing mobilization plans and files as
directed by higher headquarters (including logistics and
family support plans), providing required data to various
mobilization stations (through the division transportation
officer) as appropriate, ensuring unit movement data
accuracy, conducting required mobilization and
deployment training.
• Alert. This phase begins when the unit receives notice of a
pending order. Commanders complete administrative and
personnel processing actions begun during the
mobilization planning phase. The alert phase concludes
with preparation for deployment.
• Deployment planning. During this phase, the squadron
takes the necessary steps to clear installation accounts
and hand receipts, if required. Any required task
organization is made and equipment maintenance
continues. The squadron also dispatches an advance
party to the APOD, if required.
E-2. The squadron must minimize predeployment activities. First of

all, it must be 100 percent trained in joint deployment operations, and
it should exercise joint deployment frequently (deployment is set as a
mission essential task). Not only should squadron personnel be
trained, but they also must be 100 percent soldier readiness process
compliant. This level of readiness and training requires school-trained,
long-term unit movement officers in every troop. The S4 section must
have a subject matter expert in transportation movements,
deployment, and TC-AIMS II.
E-3. The transportation requirements for the squadron must be
established prior to any alert or warning order. Consequently,
deployment equipment lists must be prepared and maintained in TC-
AIMS II for immediate submission (unique packages can be created
for different missions). Troop and squadron movement officers are
required to prepare and maintain accurate and up-to-date
deployment and movement data. The movement officers ensure that
the brigade has accurate deployment data on file.
E-2
_______________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Deployment
SECTION II – MOVEMENT
FORT TO PORT MOVEMENT

E-4. The squadron deploying with the brigade completes its
preparation for movement based on the mobilization plan and the
CINC’s time-phased deployment list. Units update their automated
unit equipment lists to deployment equipment lists and submit them
to the installation transportation office for transmission to
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). Based on information given
to the joint operations planning and execution system, TRANSCOM
provides movement guidance for the brigade’s movement to the port
of embarkation (POE) through its component command.
E-5. The receipt of the air mobility command air tasking order
initiates aerial port of embarkation (APOE) operations and specifies
the dates the unit is required to arrive at the POE. In customary
deployments, units are validated and configured for movement and
then move to the POE by highway, rail, and commercial transport.
E-6. Deploying units should immediately configure for deployment
with required deployment documentation (e.g., military shipping
labels, hazardous cargo), vehicle and aircraft preparation,
preparation of sensitive cargo, secondary loads properly tied down
(125 percent of the tie-down requirements must be available), and
463L pallets constructed. Vehicle center of gravity markings are also
required. Hazardous material and airload planners are essential
during this period.
E-7. The APOE must initiate immediate operations. Material
handling equipment must be on hand and procedures established for
the immediate initiation of the joint inspection process.
Disagreements between the loadmasters and the joint inspection
teams will be limited by clear and mutually agreed upon loading
standards. The APOE must offer sufficient staging and available
inclement weather facilities.
PORT TO PORT MOVEMENT

E-8. This phase begins with strategic lift departure from the POE
and ends with arrival in the theater. One of the key requirements is
that both the APOE and the APOD have enough parking MOG
(maximum on ground) (i.e., the number of aircraft that can fit on the
ground) and operational MOG (i.e., how many of the parked aircraft
can be worked simultaneously) to sustain the flow. Sufficient in-flight
refueling must be available to support the flights as well as fuel
availability at the APOE and APOD. Procedures for country clearance
and overflight rights, if not the agreements themselves, must be in
place and ready to be submitted. Fundamental to the success of the
port to port movement is the ability of the theater to receive the
required capability.
E-3
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
SECTION III – RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND

INTEGRATION
E-9. The four processes for RSOI are—
• Reception: The process of unloading personnel and

materiel from strategic transport; marshaling the
deploying units; transporting them to staging areas, if
required; and providing life support to deploying
personnel.
• Staging: The process of assembling, holding, and
organizing arriving personnel and equipment into units
and forces; incrementally building combat power and
preparing units for onward movement; and providing life
support for the personnel until the unit becomes self-
sustaining.
• Onward Movement: The process of moving units and
accompanying material from reception facilities and
staging areas to tactical assembly areas or other
destinations, moving arriving non-unit personnel to
gaining commands, moving arriving sustainment material
from reception facilities to distribution sites.
• Integration: The synchronized transfer of authority over
units and forces to a designated component or functional
commander for employment in the theater of operations.
E-10. RSOI are processes that generate combat power. Limited time
requires the rapid processing of RSOI. The TC-AIMS II will integrate
information from the Worldwide Port System and the Global Air
Transportation and Execution System to support this process.
E-11. As the initial step in the introduction of combat power,
reception can determine the success or failure of an entire operation;
it must therefore be thoroughly planned and carefully executed.
Reception from strategic lift is implemented at or near designated
APODs and SPODs, under the control of the CINC or the joint task
force commander. While the reception plan for each theater may vary,
reception capacity must, at a minimum, equal strategic lift delivery
capabilities.
E-12. The APOD serves as the primary port of entry for all deploying
personnel as well as for early entry forces, which are normally
airlifted into theater together with their equipment. At a minimum,
responsibility for APOD operations is divided between the Army and
US Air Force (USAF). In general, the Air Force is responsible for air
terminal control, loading, unloading, and servicing of aircraft. The
Army is responsible for clearing personnel and cargo and for life
support, as required.
SECTION IV – AIRLIFT OPERATIONS
E-4
E-13. Airlift operations provide the means by which contingency

forces rapidly enter a hostile or nonhostile area of operations (AO)
under any conditions of the operational continuum. The Stryker
brigade combat team (SBCT) cannot conduct forced entry, but it
provides the joint force commander with an improved capability to
arrive immediately behind forced-entry forces and begin operations to
shape the battlespace. The entire SBCT can deploy within 96 hours
at “first aircraft wheels up.”
PLANNING
E-14. Four plans are developed for the execution of airlift
operations:
• Ground tactical plan.
• Landing plan.
• Air movement plan.
• Marshaling plan.
E-15. Primarily, Army planners in coordination with the USAF

develop these plans. A reverse planning sequence is used beginning
with the ground tactical plan.
E-16. Airlift operations are based on a detailed ground tactical plan.
The landing plan, air movement plan, and marshaling plan are based
on requirements to support the success of the ground tactical plan.
Any contingency force requires air movement and marshaling plans.
GROUND TACTICAL PLAN
E-17. The ground tactical plan is developed from analysis of the
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,
time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). The ground
tactical plan, as a minimum, contains—
• An airhead line.
• Assault objectives.
• Combat outposts.
• Reconnaissance and security forces.
• Boundaries.
• Assault task organizations.
• Reserves.
E-18. Once terrain has been analyzed for offensive operations, it

must be considered for defensive operations. Terrain that must be
retained or controlled is identified. Threat avenues of approach into
the AO are analyzed. Battle positions that offer good cover and
concealment and long-range fields of fires are planned along avenues
of approach. Natural obstacles that can be extended or improved are
also important.
E-19. Weather in the objective area must be checked. Wet soil
conditions, however, can prevent air-landing operations on
unimproved runways. Limited visibility caused by rain or fog can
E-5
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
hamper delivery of supplies and equipment by the LAPES and can

limit close air support. The degree of visibility in the objective area
influences the conduct of the operation. Deployment at night
enhances mission accomplishment.
E-20. Sufficient airlift capability must be available to deliver the
brigade to the objective area. When there are too few aircraft to
deliver the assault echelon in a single lift or in multiple lifts over a
short time, risk to the force could be unacceptable. Airlift must be
available not only to deliver the force but also to sustain it until
completion of operations. The ground tactical plan serves as the basis
for the other three plans in this area.
LANDING PLAN
E-21. The landing plan contains the sequence and method of
delivery into selected drop zone (DZ) and landing zone (LZ) in the AO.
The landing plan is the link between the air movement plan and the
ground tactical plan. It contains the following information:
• Locations of DZs, LZs, and LAPES extraction zones.
• Sequence in which the zones will be used.
• Method of delivery.
• Parachute hour (P-Hour).
AIR MOVEMENT PLAN

E-22. The air movement plan is prepared jointly as an annex to the
operations order. It covers all actions from the time units load aircraft
until they arrive at the AO (P-Hour). It supports the landing plan and
contains the flight route diagram to the DZs and the air movement
table. The flight route diagram contains—
• The flight route.
• The location and directional orientation of the DZs and
landing strips.
E-23. The air movement table contains—

• Departure airfield(s) for each serial.
• The number and type of aircraft in each serial.
• The aircraft parking diagram.
• Names of USAF unit commanders.
• Aircraft designated for personnel, heavy drop, or LAPES.
• Station and take-off times.
• P-Hour for lead aircraft in each serial (if air-drop).
MARSHALING PLAN
E-24. The marshaling plan provides for the assembly of personnel,
equipment, and supplies to be employed in the execution of the
operation. It includes everything from the issuance of the warning
order to the loading of aircraft. The timeline to be executed during the
E-6
marshaling phase and the necessary actions deploying units must

exercise (ammunition issue, contingency stocks of combat items) are
usually outlined in the unit readiness standing operating procedure.
E-25. Specifically, the marshaling plan covers—
• Marshaling, preparing, and inspecting vehicles and
equipment for air movement/airland.
• Movement plan to personnel holding areas.
• Administration and legal requirements.
• Execution of troop-leading procedures.
• Staff-to-commander backbriefs.
• Concurrent planning.
E-7
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
OPERATION CONSIDERATIONS
E-26. During airland operations, aircraft land on available runways
in a secure area to deliver cargo. They land, quickly dispense their
cargo, and take off immediately. The airland method ensures
negligible damage to materiel; delivers vehicles ready for immediate
drive away; delivers crews with their weapons and vehicles; and
provides for the backhaul of casualties, enemy prisoners of war, and
damaged equipment. Airland operations have the disadvantages of
requiring LZs and more time for delivering loads than the LAPES and
the low velocity airdrop (LVAD) methods. Additionally, aircraft and
units are extremely vulnerable to threat direct and indirect fires
during landing and unloading.
E-27. During a LAPES operation (C-130 only), aircraft approach an
identified cargo delivery strip flying several feet above the ground. The
flight crew deploys an extraction parachute and the cargo is pulled
out of the aircraft. The aircraft then regains altitude and leaves the
area. A secure LZ and USAF control teams are usually required at the
site. LAPES requires less preparation time, personnel, and equipment
support than LVAD. LAPES is a pinpoint delivery system for large
items of equipment; however, materiel is more susceptible to damage
when the LAPES method is used as compared to the airland method.
Additionally, the LAPES zone may require a significant amount of
preparation. Wet soil conditions hinder LAPES operations.
E-28. LVAD operations (C-130, C-141, C-17) are used during the
initial assault and during follow-on delivery of cargo. During LVAD
operations, the delivering aircraft eject cargo with the aid of an
extraction parachute from the minimum height necessary to fully
deploy cargo parachutes needed to suspend the specific cargo they
are carrying (usually 500 to 1,500 feet above ground level). LVAD
delivers the most cargo in the least amount of time and is usually the
prime method of delivery during initial assaults.
E-29. The adverse weather aerial delivery system (AWADS) on the C-
130 and station keeping equipment on the C-141 provide all-weather
delivery capability for both troops and equipment.
E-30. The AWADS delivers smaller bundles of supplies via airdrop.
This system provides the assault force a high assurance of accurate
parachute delivery of follow-on material.
E-31. Helicopters are deployed by flying them to the airhead and/or
by USAF airland aircraft. While flying them to the airhead is
preferred, this may not be possible because of refueling requirements
en route.
LOAD SHORING
E-32. Shoring is lumber, planking, plywood, or any other similar
material that protects the aircraft cargo floor or 463L pallet surfaces,
decreases the approach angle of aircraft ramps, protects airport
tarmacs, spreads weight over a larger area, and keeps 463L pallets
off the ground. Shoring is used during airland operations; it is not
required for LVAD or LAPES operations. Modern cargo aircraft can
carry considerable weight; however, shoring is necessary, particularly
E-8
for tracked vehicles, to protect the aluminum cargo floors of the

aircraft. The organization offering cargo for air shipment must
provide shoring.
E-33. Not all military airlift command aircraft have the same floor
pressure tolerances. Consult the applicable aircraft loading technical
order for specific limitations. Items that require shoring on one
aircraft may not require shoring on another. USAF aircraft
loadmasters will ensure the proper amount of shoring is used.
E-34. Light armor units must determine shoring requirements and
maintain sufficient stockage on hand. Units must include the
following in their logistical planning process:
• Specific amounts of shoring needed for the operation
based on number of deploying vehicles and type of
aircraft.
• Disposition/storage of the shoring once the aircraft lands
at the AO.
• Shoring needed for redeployment and plans to acquire it.
SIZE AND CONDITION OF SHORING

E-35. Every planned aircraft load will probably need shoring. The
load configuration and weight determine the thickness and width of
the shoring needed. Lengths of shoring can be cut to meet specific
needs. For ease of handling, however, the length of shoring should
not exceed 12 feet. Plywood also makes good shoring. Four-by-eight
foot sheets are ideal for loading tracked vehicles.
E-36. All dimensions (thickness, length, and width) must be actual
size. Commercial-size lumber may not satisfy this requirement.
Inspect shoring before use to ensure that it is clean, sound, free of
nails, and fit for its intended use. The aircraft loadmaster may reject
dirty or badly warped lumber, delaying the loading of the aircraft.
TRANSPORTING THE SHORING
E-37. When shoring is required to load cargo, it will also be needed
to unload. If shoring is not available at the destination, it must be
transported with the load. Include the weight of the shoring with the
weight of the cargo to accurately determine the center of gravity of
the load. For tracked vehicles, simply place the shoring on top of the
vehicle when it is weighed.
TYPES OF SHORING
E-38. There are five types of shoring: rolling, parking, bridge,
sleeper, and approach.
Rolling Shoring
E-39. Use rolling shoring to protect airport parking ramps, the cargo
floor and loading ramps of cargo aircraft from damage (see Figure E-
1). This type of shoring is used to protect surfaces from damage when
moving a vehicle across them. Most wheeled vehicles do not require
rolling shoring, but tracked vehicles do. The minimum thickness is
E-9
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
3/4 inch; however, some aircraft may require thicker shoring than
others. Refer to applicable USAF technical orders.
Figure E-1. Example of Rolling Shoring
Parking Shoring
E-40. Use parking shoring to protect the aircraft floor or aircraft
loading ramps from concentrated contact, such as steel wheels and
trailer tongue supports and wheels (see Figure E-2). Each aircraft has
specific floor weight limitations that apply to wheeled and
nonwheeled cargo. Most pneumatic tires do not require parking
shoring. The minimum thickness of parking shoring is 3/4 inch.
Always use parking shoring when rolling shoring is required.
E-10
Figure E-2. Example of Parking Shoring
E-11
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
BRIDGE SHORING
E-41. Use bridge shoring to take advantage of the greater strength of
the vehicle treadways of the aircraft cargo floor. It allows the heavy
cargo to be positioned between the treadways without overloading the
center of the floor area. Shoring is first placed lengthwise, nose-to-
tail, or laterally on the treadways. Planks or beams are positioned on
top of the shoring planks and form the bridge (see Figure E-3).
Figure E-3. Example of Bridge Shoring
SLEEPER SHORING
E-42. Use sleeper shoring under the frame or axle of any special-
purpose vehicle (such as a forklift, scoop loader, or grader) that
weighs over 20,000 pounds and has tires that are not designed for
highway travel. Sleeper shoring is placed between the aircraft floor
and a structured part of the vehicle, such as the frame or axle (see
Figure E-4). This type of shoring prevents the vehicle from bouncing
up and down and possibly pulling the tie-down rings out of the
aircraft floor.
E-12
Figure E-4. Example of Sleeper Shoring

APPROACH SHORING
E-43. Approach shoring has specific applications. Use approach
shoring to decrease the approach angle of the aircraft loading ramps
(see Figure E-5). Some items of cargo will strike the aircraft or ground
during loading/off-loading operations. For example, a tow pintle on a
tank may strike the tarmac as the vehicle is off-loaded. Plan to
transport any required approach shoring aboard the same aircraft as
the item that requires the shoring.
Figure E-5. Example of Approach Shoring
UNIT LOAD PLANNING PERSONNEL

S3-AIR
E-44. The Assistant S3 officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO)
are the primary load planners at the squadron level. They should be
school trained in air movement operations from a Department of the
Army approved air movement operations course. The course
encompasses manual load planning and loading of cargo onto aircraft
and the certification of hazardous cargo.
UNIT AIR MOVEMENT OFFICER

E-45. The unit air movement officers (AMO) work under the
guidance of the squadron AMO during deployments and are
responsible for the proper outloading of the equipment being
deployed from their unit. Unit AMOs should also be school trained in
air movement operations and must be school trained to certify
hazardous cargo.
E-13
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
BASICS OF AIRCRAFT LOAD PLANNING

E-46. The following basic principles of load planning apply to any
type aircraft. Load planning—
• Identifies the type aircraft needed to carry a load.
• Identifies the exact number of aircraft needed to
accomplish a particular mission.
• Identifies in advance any additional required loading aids
to ensure availability at the equipment load time.
• Helps the unit prioritize the movement of their cargo and
personnel.
E-47. Many factors must be considered in the load planning

process. Primarily, the load planner must ensure the safe and
efficient use of the aircraft. The load planner must comply with
aircraft safety, weight, balance, and floor load restrictions. The load
must be within an acceptable center of balance condition for takeoff,
flight, and landing (if not LVAD or LAPES). Computer automation has
replaced much of the manual system of load planning; however,
AMOs must understand the methodology of load planning. The load
planner must keep other factors in mind, such as ease of on-loading
and off-loading, coordinating for the rigging of cargo that will be air-
dropped, and the support in both manpower and logistics for all
loading operations. Improper planning can result in excessive loading
or off-loading time or structural failure of the aircraft in flight or upon
landing.
E-48. There are two distinct phases in air movement. The first is the
load-planning phase. During this phase, the unit identifies aircraft
requirements in terms of equipment and personnel. The unit also
identifies how many aircraft and which types are required to move
the unit. This phase may be repeated many times to refine the
movement or to reduce the total aircraft requirement.
E-49. The second phase of movement planning is manifesting.
During this phase, load planners complete the final load plans and
cargo manifests. The final load plans may differ from the preplanned
ones due to changes in unit movement priorities, aircraft scheduling,
and actual vehicle weights at deployment time. Preliminary plans
identify the overall requirement in terms of unit equipment and
number and type of aircraft. During execution, the unit prioritizes
movement requirements based on operational conditions at the time
of the movement and on the deploying task force commander’s
guidance.
TYPES OF LOADS
E-50. Aircraft loading is generally categorized into two types—
concentrated loading and palletized loading. Table E-1 summarizes
USAF aircraft load data.
• Concentrated Loading. Concentrated loads are very large
or heavy items, such as tanks, vehicles, or construction
equipment.
E-14
• Palletized Loading. The entire aircraft load generally

consists of preloaded 463L pallets, properly secured and
ready for flight. The 463L restraint rail system positions
and secures the pallets in the aircraft.
463L CARGO SYSTEM

E-51. The 463L system encompasses all phases of cargo loading,
including material-handling equipment, cargo-loading platforms,
restraint equipment, and in-aircraft systems. The 463L system is the
USAF standard for moving concentrated cargo to be airlanded. It
comprises the components discussed in the following paragraphs.
DUAL-RAIL SYSTEM
E-52. The dual-rail system is installed in all airlift or 463L-capable
military aircraft. This system consists of rows of rollers that allow the
palletized cargo to easily move into the aircraft. Many of these rollers
are stowable to convert the cargo deck to a flat, clear loading surface
for wheeled or tracked cargo. The side rails guide the pallets into the
aircraft and provide lateral and vertical restraint. These rails are
equipped with detent locks that hold the pallet securely in place once
inside the aircraft. The locks also prevent the forward and aft
movement of pallets during flight.
Table E-1. United States Air Force Aircraft Data
C-130 C-141 C-17 C-5

Takeoff Gross Weight (lbs)
• Wartime 173,700 343,000 580,000 769,000
• Peacetime 153,700 323,000 580,000 769,000
Runway Requirements (ft)
• Takeoff 2,600 6,600 7,600 10,650
• Landing 2,700 3,840 3,000 4,610
Maximum Aircraft Cargo Load (lbs)
• Wartime 45,000 72,900 172,200 204,904
• Peacetime 35,000 45,000 N/A 100,000
Maximum 463L pallets
Maximum # soldiers
• Wartime 92 200 N/A 340
• Peacetime 74 143 N/A 340
Paratroopers
80 180 102 73
• Wartime
44 126 N/A 73
• In-flight rig
64 152 N/A 73
• Training
LVAD Capable Yes Yes Yes Yes
LAPES Capable Yes No No No
E-15
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
463L PALLET
E-53. The 463L pallet is made of corrosion-resistant aluminum with
a soft wood core and is framed on all sides by aluminum rails. The
rails have 22 attached tie-down rings with six rings on each long side
and five rings on each short side. Each ring has a 7,500-pound
restraint capacity. The rails also have indents (notches), which are
designed to accept the detent locks located on numerous types of
material-handling equipment on all airlift-capable aircraft. The
overall dimensions of the 463L pallet are 88 inches long by 108
inches wide by 2-1/4 inches thick. The usable dimensions of the
surface area are 84 inches wide by 104 inches long. This allows two
inches around the periphery of the pallet to attach straps, nets, or
other restraint devices. An empty pallet weighs 290 pounds (355
pounds with nets) and has a maximum load capacity of 10,000
pounds.
463L PALLET NETS

E-54. There are three nets to a set: one top net (yellow) and two side
nets (green). The side nets attach to the rings of the 463L pallet. The
top net attaches by hooks to the rings on the side nets. The nets have
multiple adjustment points and can be tightened to conform to loads
of almost any shape. A complete set of 463L nets provides adequate
restraint for a maximum of 10,000 pounds when properly attached to
a 463L pallet. A complete set of nets weighs 65 pounds.
E-16
Appendix F
Intelligence Systems
This appendix
augments the CONTENTS
Interconnectivity and Reachback Systems .... F-1
discussion in Chapter Global Broadcast Service ............................. F-3
6 (Section X – National TENCAP Communication System
and Joint Intelligence Processor ................................................... F-4
Assets), by providing Secret Internet Protocol Router Network .... F-5
Common Systems at the National Level ......... F-5
technical data for some
E-3 Sentry AWACS ........................................ F-5
of the more prominent RC-135V/W RIVET JOINT .............................. F-6
and probable systems U-2 Reconnaissance Aircraft........................ F-7
from which the Common Systems at the Joint Level .............. F-7
squadron will receive or Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System............................................. F-8
request information/ Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) ......... F-9
intelligence. RQ-1A Global Hawk (Tier II+) HAE UAV....... F-10
Trackwolf ....................................................... F-12
Ground Station Module................................. F-13
Figure F-1 displays an Common Ground Station.............................. F-15
TROJAN SPIRIT II .......................................... F-17
intelligence systems
Electronic Processing and
architecture from the Dissemination System .............................. F-20
national level down to Common Systems at the Corps Level............. F-20
the cavalry squadron, Guardrail Common Sensor........................... F-21
reconnaissance, Enhanced Tactical Unit Terminal ................. F-22
Imagery Processing and Dissemination
surveillance, and System........................................................ F-23
target acquisition Common Systems at the Division Level ......... F-23
(RSTA), which will be AN/TSQ-114 Trailblazer................................. F-23
referenced throughout AN/TRQ-32A(V)2 Teammate.......................... F-25
AN/ALQ-151(V)2 Quickfix.............................. F-26
the sections when
AN/TSQ-2000 Mobile Integrated
identifying the Tactical Terminal ....................................... F-26
systems at each level. AN/TSC-125 Commander’s Tactical
Terminal...................................................... F-27
SECTION I – INTERCONNECTIVITY AND REACHBACK SYSTEMS
F-1. There are primarily three overarching systems that provide

the vertical and horizontal flow of information and intelligence. They
are the—
• Global broadcast service (GBS).
• Tactical exploitation of national capabilities (TENCAP)
communication system processor (CSP).
• Secret internet protocol router network (SIPRNET).
F-1
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
F-2. Figure F-2 displays a typical intelligence flow from systems at

all operational levels to the appropriate operation centers.
Figure F-1. Systems Architecture
F-2
________________________________________________________Appendix F – Intelligence Systems
ARFOR
ARFOR
Brigade and/or
Brigade
Squadron
Squadron
Figure F-2. System Interconnectivity
GLOBAL BROADCAST SERVICE

F-3. The GBS capitalizes on the
popular, commercial, direct In 1996, the National
Reconnaissance Office and the
broadcast satellite technology to
Department of Defense rapidly
provide the nation’s warfighters integrated key commercial
with critical information. The GBS technologies to deploy the first
system is a space-based, high data operational use of the Global
rate communications link for the Broadcast Service in the
flow of information from the US or peacekeeping operation in Bosnia
rear echelon locations to deployed and called it the Joint Broadcast
forces. System, which is the GBS
European counterpart.
F-4. GBS is an extension of the
Defense Information Systems
Network (DISN) and a part of the overall Department of Defense
(DoD) military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) architecture.
It will interface with, and augment, other major DoD information
systems, such as the Global Command and Control System (GCCS)
as well as other theater information management systems.
F-5. The GBS system consists of broadcast management, space,
and terminal segments. The broadcast management segment
integrates, encrypts, and packages multimedia information and
provides a bit stream to the primary injection points (PIP) for radio
F-3
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
frequency (RF) transmission to the satellite. The user receiver

terminal; consisting of a small satellite antenna, low noise block, and
receiver; will receive and convert the RF downlink signal into a bit
stream for receive broadcast management decryption and
distribution to end users.
F-6. The broadcast is conducted under the GBS Program Office
and is implemented by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
Operational Support Office (OSO) and the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA).
F-7. The GBS system will “push” a high volume of intelligence,
weather, and other information to widely dispersed, low-cost receiver
terminals, similar to the set-top-box used with commercial GBS. The
system includes a capability for the users to request or “pull” specific
pieces of information. These requests will be processed by an
information management center where each will be prioritized, the
desired information requested, and then scheduled for transmission.
F-8. GBS is a system of information sources, uplink sites,
broadcast satellites, and receiver terminals, as well as management
processes for requesting and coordinating the distribution of
information products.
• Primary uplink sites are where information products are
assembled and transmitted up to a high-powered satellite
for relay to forces over a large geographic area. GBS can
inject products directly into the theater it serves.
• The receiver terminals for information are rather large, but
what makes GBS effective is the ability to provide high-
volume data directly into 18-inch antennas. Mobile force
elements are no longer restricted by the requirement for
large, fixed antennas to receive information formerly
relegated only to command centers.
F-9. The GBS enables the storage, retrieval, and dissemination of

large information files that would quickly exceed the capability of
most mobile users. The GBS broadcast, capable of multiple levels of
security, will be one-way; it will only distribute information. Requests
for information will be made via other communications means in
accordance with established unit procedures.
TACTICAL EXPLOITATION OF NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

COMMUNICATION SYSTEM PROCESSOR
F-10. The TENCAP CSP system allows for the dissemination of
multi-source collection to all echelons in near-real time. The TENCAP
CSP provides the capability to receive and transmit data from both
landlines and radio-frequency circuits. It also provides connectivity
to up to 15 mode-1s, generic gateway (digital data communications
protocol [DDCMP]/full duplex message protocol [FDMP]), half duplex,
and asynchronous tactical circuits. This equipment is common to all
Army TENCAP systems.
F-4
SECRET INTERNET PROTOCOL ROUTER NETWORK

F-11. SIPRNET is the secret capability of the DISN. Its complete
architecture will be achieved by constructing a new worldwide
backbone router system. The primary method for secret-level network
connectivity is via Base secret-level networks, which in turn provide
base router connectivity to SIPRNET. This secret router layer of the
DISN is intended to support national defense command, control,
communications, and intelligence (C3I) requirements, to include the
issuing of communications security (COMSEC) keys used with the
secure telephone unit (STU)-III to make secure dial-up SIPRNET
communication server connections.
F-12. The SIPRNET is the new, worldwide router-based network
replacing the older X.25-based packet switched network (the defense
secure network 1 [DSNET1] of the defense data network [DDN]). The
SIPRNET wide area network (WAN) consists of a collection of
backbone routers interconnected by high-speed serial links to serve
the long-haul data transport needs of secret-level DoD subscribers.
SIPRNET supports the DoD standard transmission control
protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) protocol service. Subscribers
within the DoD and other government agencies are able to use the
SIPRNET for passing datagrams at the Secret-Not Releasable to
Foreign Nationals (SECRET-NOFORN) classification level. The
squadron can utilize All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) and TROJAN
special purpose intelligence remote integrated terminal (SPIRIT) to
access SIPRNET.
SECTION II – COMMON SYSTEMS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
F-13. The following systems are specially designed reconnaissance

aircraft used to collect and disseminate high quality, relevant (timely)
information with ultimate standoff capability. The systems discussed
here are—
• E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS).
• RC-135V/W RIVET JOINT.
• U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.
E-3 SENTRY AWACS
F-14. The E-3 Sentry provides all-weather surveillance, command,
control and communications. The system is a modified Boeing
707/320 commercial airframe with a rotating radar dome and is
maintained by the US Air Force (USAF). There are currently thirty-
three aircraft in inventory. Capabilities of the aircraft are—
• Can fly for 8 hrs without refueling (capable of air to air
refuel).
• Used to support:
Air to air.
Air to ground.
F-5
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Air defense systems.
F-6
F-15. System specific capabilities are—

• 360-degree rotating dome (30 feet in diameter, six feet
thick).
• A radar subsystem that permits surveillance from the
earth’s surface up into the stratosphere, over land, or
water. Radar capabilities include:
Detection range of 200 miles (320 kilometers) for low-
flying targets and farther for aerospace vehicles flying
at medium to high altitudes.
The radar combined with an identification friend or foe
subsystem can look down to detect, identify, and track
threat and friendly low-flying aircraft by eliminating
ground clutter returns.
F-16. Other major subsystems in the E-3 Sentry are navigation,

communications, and computers (data processing). Consoles display
computer-processed data in graphic and tabular format on video
screens. Console operators perform the following:
• Surveillance.
• Identification.
• Weapons control.
• Battle management.
• Communications functions.
F-17. In support of air-to-ground operations, the E-3 Sentry can

provide direct information needed for—
• Interdiction.
• Reconnaissance.
• Airlift and close air support for friendly ground forces.
• Air operations to gain and maintain control of the air
battle.
RC-135V/W RIVET JOINT

F-18. The USAF RC-135V/W
RIVET JOINT surveillance aircraft RIVET JOINT Aircraft were widely
used in the 1990’s in—
are equipped with an extensive
Desert Storm.
array of sophisticated intelligence- Haiti.
gathering equipment enabling Bosnia.
military specialists to monitor
threat electronic activity. Using
automated and manual equipment, electronic and intelligence
specialists can precisely locate, record, and analyze much of what is
being done in the electromagnetic spectrum. There are 15 RIVET
JOINT aircraft in the USAF inventory.
F-19. Basic roles include the following:
F-7
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Providing indications about the location and intentions of

threat forces and warnings of threatening activity.
• Broadcasting direct voice communications. Of highest
priority are combat advisory broadcasts and imminent
threat warnings.
• Operating both data and voice links to provide target
information to ground-based elements.
F-20. Capabilities include:

• Flying 11 hours (up to 20 hours with air refueling).
• Conducting electronic intelligence (ELINT) and
communications intelligence (COMINT) intercept
operations against targets at ranges of up to 144 miles
(240 kilometers).
• Providing direct, near-real time reconnaissance
information and electronic warfare support to theater
commanders and combat forces.
• Collecting, analyzing, reporting, and exploiting threat
command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence (C4I).
• Providing an air refuelable theater asset with a nationally
tasked priority.
• Securing UHF, VHF, high frequency (HF), and satellite
communications (SATCOM).
U-2 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT
F-21. The U-2 provides continuous day or night, high-altitude, all-
weather, standoff surveillance of an area in direct support of US and
allied ground and air forces. It provides critical intelligence to
decision makers through all phases of conflict, including peacetime
indications and warnings, crises, low-intensity conflict and large-
scale hostilities.
F-22. The U-2 is a single-seat, single-engine, high-altitude,
reconnaissance aircraft. It can carry a variety of sensors and
cameras, and is an extremely reliable reconnaissance aircraft with a
high mission completion rate.
• Products:
Photographs.
Electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR), and radar imagery.
• 70,000+ feet service ceiling.
• Approximately 9-hour flight time (6090+ nautical mile
range).
SECTION III – COMMON SYSTEMS AT THE JOINT LEVEL
F-8
F-24. The following systems include reconnaissance aircraft, ground

collection and processing systems, and systems that possess
processing and dissemination capabilities.
F-9
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
F-25. The aircraft discussed are—

• Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).
• Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) aircraft.
• RQ-1A Global Hawk (Tier II and high-altitude, long-
endurance [HAE] unmanned aerial vehicle [UAV]).
F-26. The Enhanced TRACKWOLF is a ground collection and

processing system. The processing and disseminating systems are—
• Ground station modules (GSM).
• Common ground station (CGS).
• TROJAN SPIRIT II.
• Electronic processing and dissemination system (EPDS).
JOINT SURVEILLANCE TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM

F-27. The JSTARS is a long-range, air-to-ground surveillance
system designed to locate, classify and track ground targets in all
weather conditions. The system consists of Air Force E-8C aircraft
with a multi-mode radar system and Army ground station modules.
F-28. Capabilities/features include:
• Operations in virtually any weather, on-line, in real time.
• Eleven-hour flight time (20 hours with air refueling).
• 42,000-foot service ceiling.
• A detection range of more than 150 miles (250 km) with
the mounted 26-foot radar antenna.
• Can call on aircraft, missiles, or artillery for fire support.
• Signal/electronic/imagery relay system.
• Information disseminated through TROJAN SPIRIT II,
Advanced Electronic Processing and Dissemination
System (AEPDS), and ground station modules.
• Command and control (C2) at corps and division level.
There are eight aircraft and six ground station modules
each at the corps and division level.
• Communications include:
Surveillance and control data link (SCDL) for
transmission to mobile ground stations.
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS)
for tactical air navigation operation and Tactical Data
Information Link-J (TADIL-J) generation and
processing.
Two encrypted HF radios and three VHF encrypted
radios with provision for SINCGARS.
F-29. The radar’s primary operating modes are wide area
surveillance (WAS) and moving target indicator (MTI). WAS/MTI is
designed to—
F-10
• Detect, locate, and identify slow-moving targets.

• Can differentiate between wheeled and tracked vehicles.
• Provide high-resolution images to define moving targets
and provide combat units with accurate information for
attack planning.
F-30. Additional operating modes are synthetic aperture radar

(SAR)/fixed target indicator (FTI) produces a photographic-like image
or map of selected geographic regions. SAR data maps contain
precise locations of critical non-moving targets such as bridges,
harbors, airports, buildings, or stopped vehicles.
F-31. The FTI display is available while operating in the SAR mode
to identify and locate fixed targets within the SAR area. The SAR and
FTI capability used in conjunction with MTI and MTI history display
allows post-attack assessments to be made by on-board or ground
operators following a weapons attack on hostile targets.
F-32. Major advanced technological elements of the program

include—
• Software-intensive radar with several operating modes.
• A unique antenna with three receiver ports.
• Four high-speed processors capable of performing more
than 600 million operations per second.
In Desert Storm, JSTARS was praised for tracking mobile Iraqi forces, including
tanks and Scud missiles. The crew flew 49 combat sorties accumulating more
than 500 combat hours. In one mission, JSTARS provided surveillance support
of the battlefield during the battle for the town of Khafji. JSTARS detected a
follow-on force of 80 Iraqi vehicles heading toward Khafji. This follow-on force
was engaged and stopped by tactical airpower and the Marine ground
commanders knew that additional Iraqi forces would not enter the battle.
In another mission, JSTARS surveillance of the Iraqi retreat from Kuwait City
provided real time information of the retreat to the air operations center. This
information allowed commanders to use tactical airpower to interdict and destroy the
slow-moving Iraqi mechanized columns as they used the roads out of Kuwait City.
AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE LOW (ARL)

F-33. The ARL is a multifunction, day/night, all-weather
reconnaissance intelligence asset developed and fielded by the Army
in support of an urgent requirement for a low-profile intelligence
aircraft. ARL is a modified DHC-7 fixed-wing aircraft with a core
SIGINT and IMINT mission payload controlled and operated via on-
board open architecture, multifunction workstations.
F-34. The ARL was built to support nation building, counter
narcotics, and promote democracy missions, making it optimum for
stability operations and support operations. The system is primarily
F-11
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
operated in the Southern Command’s (SOUTHCOM) area of

responsibility.
F-12
F-35. The aircraft platform is the DeHavilland Dash-7 (a four-

engine, turboprop, commuter airplane) with SIGINT and IMINT
collection modifications. Capabilities of the system include—
• Operate out of austere runways and short take-
off/landing capable.
• Eight-hour flight time (range – 1,500 nautical miles).
• Flexibility in packaging its mission payload.
• High endurance and extended range.
• Survivability (AN/APR-39A[V1] radar warning receiver, the
AN/AAR-47 IR missile warning receiver, and the M-130
flare and chaff dispenser).
• Interoperable with ASAS and commander’s tactical
terminal (CTT).
• SIGINT subsystem (HF/VHF/UHF intercept and direction
finding [DF] capable electronic support measures [ESM]
system).
• IMINT subsystem (IR line scanner [IRLS], forward looking
IR [FLIR], and daylight imaging system [DIS]).
• Core complement of sensors may be augmented with low-
light level television (LLTV), MTI cueing radar, SAR, multi-
spectral camera, acoustic range extension system,
precision targeting subsystem, and remote configuration
using a direct air-to-satellite data link.
• Air-to-air and air-to-ground standoff imaging with six-
meter resolution and a moving target indicator facility.
• Sensors derived from the U-2 spy plane (SAR and the DB-
110 long-range optical sensors).
RQ-1A GLOBAL HAWK (TIER II+) HAE UAV

F-36. The Global Hawk (Tier II+) HAE UAV program is designed to
satisfy the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office’s (DARO) goal of
providing extended reconnaissance capability to the joint force
commander. The Global Hawk is focused on the radar integrated into
the system for all-weather, wide-area and spot capability that can
provide high quality imagery with targeting accuracy. Figure F-3
illustrates the HAE UAV capabilities, to include the Dark Star UAV.
F-37. Capabilities/features include—
• Operates at ranges up to 3,000 nautical miles from its
launch area.
• 24-hour loiter time.
• 60,000+ foot service ceiling.
• Utilizes both wideband satellite and line of sight (LOS)
data link communications.
• Can simultaneously carry EO, IR, and SAR payloads.
F-13
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Can integrate with the existing tactical airborne

reconnaissance architectures for mission planning, data
processing, exploitation, and dissemination.
• When linked with systems such as the Joint Deployable
Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and the GCCS,
imagery may be transferred near-real time to the
operational commander for immediate use.
• HAE UAV data will be accessible for indications and
warning (I&W), cueing, rapid strike/restrike tasking,
combat assessment, and further analysis to the chain of
command within minutes of receipt.
• Can electronically broadcast selected frames of imagery
and reports via voice or data. (Operational commander will
determine the preferred means of dissemination and
distribution.)
• Capable of both direct LOS communications with the
ground station by a common data link or beyond LOS
through SATCOM.
• The CGS displays and disseminates the imagery.
Figure F-3. High-Altitude, Long-Endurance

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Capabilities
F-14
TRACKWOLF
AN/TSQ-152 TRACKWOLF
F-38. The AN/TSQ-152 Special Purpose Receiving System
(Trackwolf), shown in Figure F-4, provides the commander, US Army
Europe, with an organic capability to intercept, locate, exploit, or
initially target sources of threat HF voice communications. Trackwolf
is a high-frequency sky wave, intelligence, and emitter location
system. This ground-based system can be tailored extensively—from
a large, fully capable mobile COMINT field station to a small, elusive,
four-vehicle field configuration—to meet a wide range of mission
objectives, giving early, reliable, and critical intelligence to the
theater commander before initiation of hostilities.
Figure F-4. Trackwolf
F-39. Two separate interactive subsystems—collection and

processing subsystem (CPS) and DF subsystem (DFS)—comprise the
Trackwolf system.
F-40. The primary mission of the CPS is signal interception. The
CPS consists of—
• C2 element.
• Receiving system.
• Collection analysis shelters.
F-41. The CPS is modular, with all components linked together via a
fiber optic digital data local area network (LAN). This allows systems
to be tactically sized, ranging from field station operations to rapid
deployment corps operations.
F-42. The primary mission of the DFS is direction finding. The DFS
consists of—
• Net control station (NCS).
• Three remotely located direction-finding outstations.
F-43. The DFS is capable of both netted direction finding and

single-station location (SSL) operations.
F-15
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
F-44. Capabilities/features of the Trackwolf include—

• Support of ARFOR/joint commanders by supplying
intelligence information to the theater-level All Source
Analysis System (ASAS). (The CPS is normally located in
the theater rear area, approximately 200 kilometers
behind the FLOT in a linear framework.)
• Communication with the ASAS at divisions and corps
through the single source processor–SIGINT (SSP-S) link.
ENHANCED TRACKWOLF (ET) AN/TSQ-199

F-45. Enhanced Trackwolf (ET) is an echelon above corps (EAC)
ground-based, man-transportable transit case, high-frequency,
direction finding, and intercept system. In addition to transportability
advantages from the current Trackwolf system, ET incorporates
several capabilities that allows intercept of the most modern
modulations.
• Three automated AN/TSQ-205 stations capable of netted
or stand-alone operations.
Each AN/TSQ-205 is a rapid deployment station
capable of conventional and LPI COMINT collection
and DF.
The AN/TSQ-205 can be configured to meet changing
operational needs.
A wideband digital system is the core of each AN/TSQ-
205.
Each station can have up to nine operator positions to
perform any mix of management, analysis, collection,
and DF functions.
• Digital signal processing.
• Instant signal acquisition, recognition, targeting, and
reporting.
• Captures entire high-frequency spectrum.
• Improved direction finding.
• Targets high-frequency jammers and emitters.
• Interoperability: SINCGARS/Automatic Digital Network
(AUTODIN)/Defense Special Security Communications
System (DSSCS)/TROJAN SPIRIT II/SSP-S, CROSSHAIR,
and UHF MIL SATCOM transceiver.
• Products:
COMINT.
Technical reports.
GROUND STATION MODULE

F-47. The ground station module (GSM) is a mobile multisensor
IMINT tactical data processing and evaluation center (Figure F-5).
F-16
The GSM is a subcomponent of the JSTARS system (refer to JSTARS

previously discussed in this section). The E-8C/GSM data link is a
wideband, anti-jam, two-way data link and is also linked through
secure UHF and VHF radios. The GSM receives and analyzes the
radar imagery data from the E-8C JSTARS aircraft, CTT, Joint
Tactical Terminal (JTT), and UAV; and disseminates intelligence,
battle management, and targeting data to Army Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence (C3I) nodes via LAN, wire, or radio.
This enables development/execution of integrated battle
management, surveillance, targeting, and interdiction plans by
providing near-real time interactive displays, which can be
reproduced on a remote terminal.
Figure F-5. Ground Station Module
F-48. Two separate GSM configurations exist:

• The Medium GSM (MGSM), which consists of two 5-ton
trucks, a standard S280 shelter mounted on one 5-ton
truck, and a 30-kilowatt generator.
•The Light GSM (LGSM), which consists of two high
mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) with a
lightweight multipurpose shelter (LMS) mounted on one
HMMWV.
• Accurate fixed and moving target locations, speed, target
classification, and direction of movement.
• Display/manipulate multi-sensor data.
• Remote display.
• Interactive data link.
• Mission history replay.
• Global positioning system (GPS).
• Interoperability:
ASAS/TROJAN SPIRIT II/ground-based common
sensor (GBCS)/JDISS/CTT/JTT.
F-17
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
AFATDS.
Standard tactical and commercial communications.
Secure facsimile (FAX).
• Products:
Color or black and white hardcopy imagery.
Electronic maps.
Graphics, targeting, track display, and target files.
• Six GSMs per division, seven per corps (six per corps and
one per armored cavalry regiment), and two per each EAC
military intelligence (MI) brigade.
F-50. The follow-on GSM, also known as the CGS, is the next
generation intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) system. Refer to
following paragraph on CGS.
COMMON GROUND STATION

F-51. The CGS is a fully-mobile targeting, battlefield management,
and surveillance system (Figure F-6). It receives, manipulates,
displays, stores, and disseminates JSTARS, UAV, Army aviation,
SIGINT, broadcast intelligence, and secondary imagery from tactical,
theater, and national systems. The CGS is designed to operate on the
move and at a secret collateral level. It interfaces with armored
combat earthmover (ACE), the tactical operations center (TOC),
aviation, and artillery nodes. CGS facilitates intelligence,
surveillance, targeting, and other battle management operations. It
provides the force with a fully scalable, tailorable, mobile, and
responsive sensor data processing capability to satisfy operational
and tactical requirements.
Figure F-6. Common Ground Station and Common Ground Station with Trailer
F-52. The CGS, identified as Target Acquisition Subsystem

AN/TSQ-179(V)1, provides support to Army field commanders by
simultaneously receiving, processing, displaying, manipulating,
storing, retrieving, and disseminating information to intelligence, fire
support, and C2 elements from brigade to EAC.
F-18
F-53. The CGS facilitates:

• Situation development.
• Battle management.
• Targeting.
• Force protection.
• Operations planning.
F-54. The system consists of a mission vehicle, LMS containing

mission equipment, support vehicle, and two trailer-mounted
generators. The mission and support vehicles, which tow the trailers,
are heavy variant HMMWVs. CGSs can function independently or
may be interconnected to other CGSs over a fiber optic LAN. When
interconnected, their multiple databases can be integrated.
F-55. Each CGS contains a remote workstation (RWS) in the truck
cab and connections for interfacing up to four other RWSs at remote
locations. The RWS has the same functional capabilities as the
internal CGS operator workstation, in addition to providing CGS
functions for in-unit training. The RWS also provides an interface for
additional displays.
F-56. The RWS modes of operation are:
• Remote mode – In remote mode, all the capabilities of
internal workstations are available, except transmitting
intelligence, targeting, and tasking messages.
• CGS workstation mode – The workstation mode provides
all the capabilities of an internal CGS workstation, except
audio.
• Training mode – Training mode is operation of the RWS as
a lesson control workstation for in-unit training.
F-57. The following summarizes some of the major CGS functional

capabilities/features:
• Six-man crew (capable of operating 24 hours a day, with
up to 1.5 hours per day for system preventive
maintenance and displacement).
• Found in MI brigades at EAC, MI battalions at corps, and
division headquarters companies.
• Simultaneous and independent asynchronous receipt,
storage, and display of sensor data in the form of IMINT,
ELINT, and COMINT from multiple sensors and
intelligence broadcast networks (IBN) on each operator
display, including:
National: U2/RIVET JOINT/Defense Mapping Agency
products (electronic map backgrounds from
compressed arc digitized raster graphics (CADRG) map
data and digital terrain elevation data (DTED).
Joint: JSTARS/ARL/UAV.
F-19
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Corps and below: Guardrail/Apache Longbow

MTI/UAV.
Correlated Tactical Reconnaissance Intelligence
Exchange System (TRIXS), Tactical Information
Broadcast System (TIBS), Tactical and Related
Applications (TRAP), and Tactical Data Information
Exchange System-B (TADIX-B) IBN data.
• Maintain spatial relationships of simultaneously displayed
data from multi-mode sensors.
• Secondary imagery dissemination (SID).
• Display sensor positions.
• Relay JSTARS data to other CGSs via TROJAN SPIRIT II
and UHF SATCOM.
• Manipulate on-screen data (e.g., generate overlays,
automatic target tracking, target prediction, single frame,
time compression, and time integration of imagery data).
• Secure and non-secure radio and phone communications
among CGS operators, JSTARS aircraft, GSM operators,
and Army C2 systems.
• Transfer CGS database contents to other designated
CGSS.
• On-line storage and archive storage capabilities for sensor
data.
• On-the-move operations.
• Utilize GPS for current time and location.
• Print and fax on-screen imagery data and messages.
ASAS/TROJAN SPIRIT II/GBCS/JDISS/Army airspace
command and control (A2C2)/CTT/JTT.
AFATDS.
Standard tactical communications.
Commercial communications.
Secure FAX.
• Products:
Color hardcopy imagery.
Black and white hardcopy reports.
Mission history replay.
Graphics, electronic maps, GPS, track display, target
files.
TROJAN SPECIAL PURPOSE INTELLIGENCE REMOTE INTEGRATED

TERMINAL (SPIRIT) II
F-58. The AN/TSQ-190(V) TROJAN SPIRIT II (TSII), depicted in

Figure F-7, is an intelligence dissemination satellite terminal that
F-20
provides communications access for intelligence processing and

dissemination systems. It supports fast-paced, flexible Army
operations by providing tactical commanders with mission critical,
high capacity intelligence information via voice, facsimile, digital
traffic, video, and secondary imagery.
Figure F-7. TROJAN SPIRIT II
F-59. The communications central extends the current worldwide

TROJAN SPIRIT II fixed-station architecture to the tactical
intelligence force structure in a mobile configuration. It has
alternative communications capabilities down to brigade level.
F-60. Supporting components are—
• A primary heavy HMMWV shelter (PHS) subsystem
consisting of:
An S-788/G shelter mounted on an M-1097 heavy
HMMWV. Imbedded in the shelter are secure:
− Voice communications.
− Data communications.
− Satellite communications.
− Processing and dissemination equipment.
− Back-up communications – LST-5C SATCOM radio
and an international maritime satellite
(INMARSAT) telephone.
X-Band 5.5-meter antenna mounted on separate
trailer.
Primary power supplied by 10-kilowatt tunnel-
mounted generator, 400 amp under-the-hood power,
or host site facility shore power.
F-21
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Mobile antenna platform (MAP) 2.4-meter C-/Ku-band

SATCOM antenna mounted on a high mobility flat deck
trailer. The C/Ku-band SATCOM mobile antenna platform
is for echelons corps and below (a tri-band SATCOM
trailer for EAC).
• A spare equipment maintenance (SEM) subsystem
consisting of a second S-788/G shelter carried on a heavy
HMMWV.
Workstation is capable of being configured for
operation.
Provides storage for system line replaceable units
(LRU).
Primary power supplied by 10-kilowatt tunnel-
mounted generator, 400 amp under-the-hood power,
or host site facility shore power.
F-61. Additional capabilities of the TS II include:

• Receive, display, and transmit digital imagery, weather
and terrain products, templates, graphics and text
(electronic mail) between continental US (CONUS)/and
outside the continental US (OCONUS) bases and deployed
forces.
• Can serve as a temporary communications set for the ACE
during redeployment or split-based operations.
• Can support up to 14 channels of digital voice or digital
data subscribers consisting of eight sensitive
compartmented information (SCI) channels and six secret
collateral subscribers.
DSNET1/DSNET3/mobile subscriber equipment
(MSE) and tactical packet network (TPN) interfaces.
ACE/ETUT/Tactical High Mobility Terminal
(THMT)/ASAS/TENCAP. Digital subscriber voice
terminal MSE.
Ethernet LAN/WAN/ DSNET1, DSNET 3, and other
DoD networks.
CTT.
Satellite up/downlink interfaces with intelligence
satellite (INTELSAT), global strategic attack radar
(GSTAR), and Pan American satellite (PANAMSAT).
F-62. The TROJAN Data Network (TDN), depicted in Figure F-8, is a

router, TCP, or IP-based network. It is overlaid on the
communications network that links the AN/FSQ-144(V) TROJAN
CLASSIC central operating facilities and switch extensions at various
US bases with remote collection facilities worldwide. The TDN is
subdivided into three electronically and physically separated
networks that correspond to the three security levels required of the
system. The TDN has a TROJAN Network Control Center in the
F-22
TROJAN Switch Center at Fort Belvoir, VA, to provide configuration

control and network management. The three networks of the TDN
are—
• TROJAN Data Network-1 (TDN-1). The TDN-1 operates at
the SECRET security level and is the gateway to DSNET1.
It provides data exchange between TROJAN CLASSIC
facilities, switch extensions, and SPIRIT.
the TOP SECRET/SCI level. It provides data exchange
between selected TROJAN sites requiring access to the
National Security Agency (NSA) network.
the TOP SECRET/SCI security level and is the gateway to
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
(JWICS). It provides data exchange between TROJAN
CLASSIC facilities, switch extensions, and SPIRIT.
Figure F-8. TROJAN Data Network Connectivity
ELECTRONIC PROCESSING AND DISSEMINATION SYSTEM

F-63. The AEPDS combines the EPDS and the enhanced tactical
unit terminal (ETUT) into one system that provides corps and EAC
commanders timely intelligence collected by national, theater, and
corps sensors. The AEPDS configuration is achieved by upgrading
the existing ETUT systems with a miniaturized Data Acquisition
System (MiDAS), S-band capability, and EPDS software functions.
F-23
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Once a unit’s ETUT is upgraded into an AEPDS, the EPDS is

obsolete. Refer to ETUT in the following section.
SECTION IV – COMMON SYSTEMS AT THE CORPS LEVEL
F-64. The systems available at corps level for

information/intelligence collection are the Guardrail Common Sensor
(GR/CS), and the UAV (see Appendix G for a discussion of UAVs).
The additional processing and disseminating systems not previously
discussed include the ETUT, ASAS (refer to Chapter 2), and the
Imagery Processing and Dissemination System (IPDS). Refer to Figure
F-1 at the beginning of the appendix for the other systems at corps
level.
GUARDRAIL COMMON SENSOR

F-65. GR/CS is a SIGINT collection/location system that integrates
the improved Guardrail V (IGR V), Communication High Accuracy
Airborne Location System (CHAALS), and the Advanced QUICKLOOK
(AQL) into the same SIGINT platform, which is the RC-12K/N/P/Q
aircraft.
F-66. The GR/CS system consists of—
• Twelve RC-12 aircraft.
• Four integrated processing facility (IPF) vans.
• Three inoperable data link (IDL) trackers.
• Nine to 32 CTTs.
F-67. Sensors include:

• Advanced QUICKLOOK ELINT collection and DF.
• COMINT collection and DF.
COMMUNICATIONS HIGH ACCURACY AIRBORNE LOCATION SYSTEM

F-68. Capabilities/features of CHAALS include:
• Integrated COMINT and ELINT reporting.
• Enhanced signal classification and recognition.
• Rapid DF.
• Provides near-real time SIGINT and targeting information
to tactical commanders throughout the corps area with
emphasis on deep battle and follow-on forces attack
support.
• It collects; identifies/classifies selected low, mid, and high
band radio signals; and determines precise locations of
their sources.
• Provides near-real time reporting to tactical commanders.
F-24
• Utilizes an IPF, which is the control, data processing, and

message center for the overall system.
• One GR/CS system is authorized per aerial exploitation
battalion (AEB) in the MI brigade at each corps.
• Detection ranges: COMINT – 70-220 kms; ELINT – 70-150
kms.
• LOS coverage 450 km from aircraft.
• 5.5 hours flight time.
• Data link range: 150-mile LOS.
• Targets: Communications emitters, jammers, and non-
communications emitters.
F-69. The typical system configuration uses on IPF, two or three
airborne relay facilities (ARF), approximately nine (up to 32) CTTs,
and an auxiliary ground equipment van.
F-70. A typical mission requires the aircraft to orbit to the rear and
parallel to the FLOT. The IPF sends commands to and receives
information from the ARF through a secure data link. The operators
in the IPF process the collected information and report the
intelligence to the tactical commanders and other possible joint
consumers via the JTT relay on-board the aircraft.
ENHANCED TACTICAL UNIT TERMINAL

F-71. The ETUT is a trailer-mounted system that processes SIGINT
data and intelligence received from other TENCAP systems (Figure F-
9). It provides security sanitization of the data it receives and also
provides tailored reporting to its command. The ETUT is a mobile air
and ground transportable, intelligence, and communication system.
The system is designed as the interface between the EPDS for SIGINT
data, the MIES for imagery data, and provides an automated
collection management capability to the tactical commander.
Figure F-9. External/Internal Views of the Enhanced Tactical Unit Terminal
F-25
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Receives, annotates, and disseminates secondary imagery

from national/theater/tactical sensors.
• Near-real time reporting.
• Integrates and cross cues SIGINT/IMINT.
Multiple airborne and space borne platforms.
TROJAN SPIRIT II/SATCOM/TENCAP.
UHF/STU-III/MSE.
• Products:
Intelligence reports.
Imagery.
Targeting data.
IMAGERY PROCESSING AND DISSEMINATION SYSTEM
F-73. The Army TENCAP IPDS provides a means to receive, process,
exploit and disseminate digital IMINT data from national and theater
collection systems at EAC, corps, division, maneuver brigade and
special operations forces (SOF) levels. The IPDS consists of multiple
operational groups housed in modular 20-foot shelters. Some of the
operational groups are:
• Soft-copy Processor Group (SPG). This provides computer
software processing, exploitation, and dissemination of
imagery data with on-line mass storage and off-line
reference image storage.
• Hard-copy Processor Group (HPG). Provides a film print
output of processed and exploited imagery.
• Communications Processor Group (CPG). Provides the
patching, switching, and interface functions necessary for
internal and external transfer of data, imagery, and voice.
Free text messages can be exchanged with the EPDS for
cueing and other purposes. The IPDS accesses DSN
circuits through the corps LAN to establish interfaces with
the EPDS, ETUT, TRAC, THMT, and mobile integrated
tactical terminal (MITT).
• National Input Segment (NIS). Receives and routes low
rate data and imagery from national systems.
F-74. A 20-foot quick reaction antenna (QRA) is provided for

satellite communications. Five-ton trucks move the 20-foot shelters.
Power is provided by two 200-kilowatt generators with a 25-ton
truck. Commercial power is also an alternative.
SECTION V – COMMON SYSTEMS AT THE DIVISION LEVEL
F-26
F-75. Systems at the division level are shown in Figure F-1 at the
beginning of this appendix. This section discusses the divisional
assets not previously discussed, which further provide detection,
processing, and disseminating capabilities at the division level. The
systems discussed are the Trailblazer, Teammate, Quickfix, the MITT,
and the CTT.
AN/TSQ-114 TRAILBLAZER
F-76. The AN/TSQ-114 Trailblazer (Figure F-10) is a mobile,
ground-based LOS electronic warfare (EW)/SIGINT intercept system
with VHF direction-finding capability. The Trailblazer system consists
of five AN/TSQ-138A master control sets. Each master control set is
mounted on an M923A2 five-ton carrier with a trailer support unit,
which houses a 30-kilowatt generator. A quick erecting, self-
supporting telescopic mast for the DF antenna group, and separate
antennas for HF intercept and voice link, are attached to the top of
the shelter. The shelter has a ballistically protected exterior to resist
small arms fire. The MCS operator is capable of intercepting and
monitoring signals in the HF, VHF, and UHF frequency bands. The
operator determines the locations of signal emitters by intercepting
and analyzing signals of interest in the VHF band. DF tasking and
other communications between MCSs are controlled by a secure data
link.
• Five Trailblazer systems per heavy division.
• Searches for, intercepts, records, identifies, locates, and
reports on radio signals in the HF/VHF/UHF frequency
ranges.
• Can perform netted DF operations with other Trailblazers
and various other platforms.
• DF capabilities in VHF range
• Receives in AM, FM, continuous wave (CW), lower side
band (LSB), and upper side band (USB) modes.
• Capable of interoperating with QUICKFIX (ALQ-151) and
TRQ-32A(V)2.
• UHF data link for reporting and tasking.
• 6 x 98G (linguists).
• Operates 5-15 kilometers from the FLOT in a linear
framework.
F-27
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure F-10. Trailblazer
F-78. Considerations when employing the Trailblazer:

• Obstacles may interfere with antenna emplacement or
reception (power lines, pine trees, 30 feet (10 meters) clear
to the left, overhead tree clearance).
• Must have LOS between system and target of interest.
• The NCS should also have LOS to each station for effective
data link communications.
• Normally the ground over which the signals travel does
not affect VHF signal reception. However, objects in their
wave path can affect signals or obstructions in the near
vicinity of a Trailblazer can distort reception (i.e., barbed
wire, armored vehicles, surrounding hills, trees, and
streams.) Any metallic bodies located close to a Trailblazer
set can produce DF inaccuracies from that location. This
includes radar scattering camouflage.
AN/TRQ-32A(V)2 TEAMMATE
F-79. The TRQ-32 Teammate (Figure F-11) is a mobile, multi-
station, LOS ground-based EW/SIGINT asset, used as a tactical DF
and intercept system. Teammate is capable of performing netted DF
operations with other Teammates and various other platforms.
F-28
Figure F-11. Teammate

• Four 98Gs (linguists).
• Intercept in HF, VHF, and UHF frequency ranges.
• DF capabilities in VHF frequency range.
• Forms DF network with other TRQ-32, PRD-12,
Trailblazer (TSQ-138), and QUICKFIX (ALQ-151) systems
to increase accuracy.
• PRD-12 backup system allows HF DF.
• Operates 5 to 10 kilometers from FLOT in a linear
framework.
F-81. One consideration is that it requires level terrain with radio

LOS to threat transmitters for accurate direction finding.
AN/ALQ-151(V)2 QUICKFIX
F-82. The EH-60A (Figure F-12) is a Blackhawk helicopter fitted
with the AN/ALQ-151(V)2 Quickfix equipment, and features the host
interface unit to connect with the ASAS Tactical Commander’s
Analysis Center (TCAC), and an improved Teammate direction-finding
link. The EH-60A is normally deployed 20 kilometers behind the
FLOT in a linear framework.
F-29
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure F-12. EH-60A Quickfix
AN/TSQ-2000 MOBILE INTEGRATED TACTICAL TERMINAL

F-83. The MITT (Figure F-13) provides ETUT functionality in a more
mobile vehicle than a trailer, the HMMWV. The MITT system provides
seamless multi-source intelligence receipt, transmission, and
analysis of a wide range of intelligence products from national,
theater, and tactical collection assets. Refer to ETUT in the previous
section for capabilities.
Figure F-13. Rear and Side Views of Mobile Integrated

Tactical Terminal
AN/TSC-125 COMMANDER’S TACTICAL TERMINAL

F-84. The CTT supplies the critical data link to battle managers,
intelligence centers, air defense, fire support, and aviation nodes
across all services. The CTT allows Army, Air Force, Navy, and
F-30
Marine Corps users to exploit multiple intelligence broadcast

networks.
• Single-channel, anti-jam, COMINT/ELINT tasking and
reporting transmitter/receiver.
• Near-real time dissemination of tactical intelligence.
• Interoperability: Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS)
networks: TRIXS/TIBS/TRAP/TADIX-B.
• Can be sheltered aboard helicopters, jet- and propeller-
driven aircraft, and wheeled and tracked vehicles.
F-86. CTT hardware is incorporated into both ground and airborne

systems and consists of four major sub-components:
• Communications terminal (CT).
• Radio relay system (RRS) on board the RC-12 and U2-R
aircraft.
• Radio relay test set (RRTS) used to support pre-flight
checks.
• Security data system (SDS) located in the ground
processing facility (GPF).
F-87. The CT is a stand-alone system consisting of four

components: operator’s terminal, red/black processor (RBP), radio
receiver transmitter (RRT), and an adaptive array LOS antenna. It
provides simultaneous, secure full duplex data and half duplex voice
communications between GPFs and mobile, tactical field units.
Messages/reports are transmitted over the TRIXS net.
F-88. The RRS, AN/ARW-85, is composed of an UHF radio receiver
and transmitter, signal data translator, and rack/harness assembly.
The function of the RRS is to receive the uplink data for
retransmission on UHF and receive UHF data for downlink to the
GPFs.
F-89. The RRTS, AN/URM-214, supports preflight checkout,
operational verification, and fault isolation of the RRS. The RRTS is
located on flight lines at relay platform ground sites and is composed
of a receiver/transmitter test group and a test controller and
cable/case assembly.
F-90. The SDS, AN/GYQ-65, provides message accountability, user
authentication, discretionary access, and an audit log and analysis
capability necessary to meet national agency accreditation
requirements for operation in a system-high environment. The SDS is
composed of a computer terminal, monitor, keyboard, printer, and
removable disks.
F-91. There are three CTT configurations:
• CTT-1. A stand-alone, single-channel transmitter and
receiver (full duplex data and half-duplex voice) system
F-31
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
that operates either SCI or SECRET collateral in the

TRIXS network only.
• CTT-2. A two-channel receive-only system that can
receive any two of the four broadcast networks
simultaneously. This is the system currently integrated
into the JSTARS LGSMs and MGSMs.
• CTT-3. A three-channel full duplex transmitter and
receiver. It can receive three broadcast intelligence
networks simultaneously and adds the capability to
transmit and receive secondary imagery.
F-32
Appendix G
Surveillance Troop
The surveillance troop
of the squadron CONTENTS
provides the squadron Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Platoon ............. G-1
commander with a wide Organization............................................. G-1
Mission ..................................................... G-3
array of reconnaissance Capabilities............................................... G-3
assets that enhance its Limitations................................................ G-6
intelligence-gathering System Description ................................. G-6
capability. Among these Employment Considerations .................. G-7
Ground Sensor Platoon .............................. G-10
assets are imagery Organization............................................. G-10
intelligence (IMINT), Mission ..................................................... G-12
signal intelligence PROPHET ................................................. G-13
(SIGINT), and GSR/IREMBASS ....................................... G-16
NBC Reconnaissance Platoon ................... G-34
measurement and Organization............................................. G-34
signature intelligence Mission ..................................................... G-35
(MASINT). Capabilities/Limitations........................... G-35
Employment Considerations .................. G-35
Through the use of the organic systems in the surveillance troop

(unmanned aerial vehicle [UAV]; Improved Remotely Monitored
Battlefield Sensor System [IREMBASS]; ground surveillance radar
[GSR]; PROPHET; and nuclear, biological, and chemical [NBC]),
the squadron commander employs these assets singularly or in a
combined effort to gather required intelligence. This intelligence is
used to complete both the squadron and Stryker brigade combat
team’s (SBCT) missions, within the guidance given in the
commander’s intent of both units.
The surveillance troop consists of a headquarters section, a UAV

platoon, a ground sensor platoon, and an NBC platoon. This
appendix discusses the organization, mission, capabilities,
limitations, and employment considerations of the systems in each
of the platoons in the surveillance troop.
SECTION I – UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE PLATOON
ORGANIZATION
G-1. The UAV platoon consists of a platoon headquarters, a ground
control section, and a launch and recovery (L/R) section (see Figure
G-1). Each section is divided into two teams.
G-1
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure G-1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Platoon
PLATOON HEADQUARTERS
G-2. The UAV platoon headquarters collocates with the
surveillance troop command post (CP). The platoon leader is
responsible for coordinating the movement and linkup of platoon
elements deploying into a maneuver brigade’s forward area. The
platoon leader uses his aviation subject matter expertise to conduct
mission planning and to identify airspace coordination requirements.
The platoon leader forwards the mission plan to the surveillance
troop commander. The surveillance troop commander forwards his
complete plans for all organic sensors to the squadron S2 and S3 for
approval. The platoon leader and surveillance troop commander
subsequently request airspace coordination/ deconfliction through
the squadron S3.
GROUND CONTROL STATION

G-3. One ground control station (GCS) is normally collocated with
the squadron CP to allow dynamic retasking of the UAV assets by the
squadron commander. The second GCS is normally located near the
L/R section. The GCS has two primary functions. First, it is the
primary means to control, track, and operate the UAV. Second, it is
used to manipulate the payload and receive and process telemetry
and video downlinks. The GCS will adjust the preplanned mission
parameters to allow for dynamic retasking, to include the ability to
call for and adjust indirect fire.
G-2
_________________________________________________________ Appendix G – Surveillance Troop
LAUNCH AND RECOVERY SECTION

G-4. The L/R section is normally located at a site (road, soccer
field, etc.) suitable for the launch and recovery of the UAVs. They
perform all tasks and procedures necessary for the successful launch
and recovery of the air vehicle (AV). They assemble and disassemble
the AV coming out of or going into the storage containers. They
perform the daily AV inspections, perform preflight inspections, and
accomplish required procedures prior to launch. The section
performs normal rail launches as well as normal recovery operations
and maintenance of the runway areas and arresting cables. They
perform rolling take-off procedures in the event the rail launcher is
inoperable. The L/R personnel will also operate the tactical
automated landing system when it becomes integrated into the UAV
system. Upon successful return of the AV after a mission, the section
performs all post-flight inspections and readies the AV for another
flight or for the storage container. The L/R section has limited
maintenance capability.
MISSION
G-5. The mission of the UAV units is to provide a real-time,
responsive, day and night imagery surveillance and reconnaissance
capability to support situational awareness (SA), target acquisition,
battle damage assessment (BDA), and enhanced battle management
capabilities (friendly situation and battlefield visualization).
G-6. Based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC),
the squadron may task organize the UAVs to individual recce
(reconnaissance) troops or may keep them under squadron control.
The surveillance troop operates its UAVs out to 50 kilometers for
periods up to four hours. In addition, the Army Force may be able to
provide additional aerial reconnaissance to the brigade out to 50
kilometers beyond the forward line of own troops (FLOT). The Imagery
Workstation–Brigade (IWS-B) database provides the capability to
correlate and synchronize imagery from bottom-up tactical imagery
feeds, top-down imagery feeds supporting visualization of the
brigade’s battlespace, and that of subordinate battalions.
CAPABILITIES
G-7. The UAV baseline is capable of 12 hours of continuous
operations on-station within a 24-hour period. The system has the
capability of surge operations for 18 hours within a 24-hour period
for no more than three consecutive days. The following day is limited
to eight hours of operation. Although the system has the capability to
surge for 18 hours over the course of 72 hours, the UAV baseline and
its parent unit may be reconstituted after 36 hours.
G-8. The AV can operate during less than ideal weather conditions
(environments similar to a small light aircraft) with a range of 50
kilometers from the L/R site, flying at altitudes of 14,000 feet mean
sea level (MSL) or greater. Nominal operating altitudes/survivable
G-3
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
altitudes are from 8,000 to 10,000 feet above ground level (AGL) for
day operations and between 6,000 to 8,000 feet AGL for night
operations. The UAV system will have an endurance of four hours on-
station at 50 kilometers. It can launch and recover in crosswinds
from 0 to 20 knots and operate in moderate precipitation conditions
(up to 2 inches per hour).
G-9. The UAV system’s mobility and rapid set-up and tear-down
times allow the UAV platoon to keep pace with the brigade’s
movement. To facilitate rapid movement, the control of the UAV may
be passed to other control stations or L/R stations to allow
continuous flight operations to meet the commander’s requirements.
The minimal UAV system (to include all personal gear and sufficient
Class I, Class III, and Class IX supplies for the initial 72 hours of
operations at a minimum of 12 flight hours on-station in a 24-hour
period) fits into two high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles
(HMMWV) with shelters, two cargo/troop-carrying HMMWVs, and two
trailers deployable in a single C-130 sortie. The complete baseline
UAV system with all personnel and equipment is transportable in no
more than two C-130 sorties. Sustainment beyond the initial 72
hours is supported with a divisional mobile maintenance facility
consisting of a HMMWV and trailer. The addition of a mobile
maintenance facility will require an additional C-130.
G-10. The UAV can be retasked in flight to ensure it is responsive to
the commander’s immediate information requirements. The UAV is
fully integrated with and cued by other collection systems, such as
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Guardrail
Common Sensor, Artillery Counter Mortar/Battery Radars, and
Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAADC2), in a
synchronized effort to support the warfighter.
G-11. There are a variety of imagery sensors available for use on
UAVs. Each sensor has a unique capability, with distinct advantages
and disadvantages for each sensor. Sensors are currently limited to
electro-optical (EO) and infrared (IR). Additional payloads are under
development and may be fielded as payload technology matures.
Table
G-1 is a matrix of sensor characteristics for the type sensors
currently available on the UAV.
G-4
Table G-1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Sensor Character Matrix
SENSORS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

VISIBLE (ELECTRO-OPTICAL)
Best tool for daytime, clear Affords a familiar view of a scene Can be deceived by employment
weather, detailed analysis of camouflage and concealment
techniques
Offers system resolution that Restricted by weather conditions;
cannot be achieved in other visible light cannot penetrate
optical systems or in thermal clouds or fog
images and radars
Preferred for detailed analysis Restricted by terrain and
vegetation
INFRARED
Best tool for nighttime, clear Offers stereoscopic viewing Limited to nighttime use
weather, detailed analysis
A passive sensor and is Not effective during thermal
impossible to jam crossover (1 to 1.5 hours after
sunrise or sunset)
Offers camouflage penetration Tactical platforms threatened by
enemy air defenses
Provides good resolution Bad weather degrades quality
Nighttime imaging capability
G-12. There are four types of legacy sensor packages in use or

proposed to be in use on the UAV. The currently fielded day/night EO
and IR sensors support the commander’s intelligence needs by
providing imagery in response to his priority intelligence
requirements (PIR). Field Manual (FM) 2-22.5 [FM 34-56] provides in-
depth information on the technical parameters and reporting
requirements of imagery intelligence as part of the all-source
intelligence capability at strategic, operational, and tactical echelons.
The UAV can support both offensive and defensive operations in a
variety of missions. See Figures G-2 and G-3, pages G-8 and G-9,
which show UAV missions in a route reconnaissance and an area
reconnaissance. It should be noted that in both cases the UAV does
not fly over the specified target area, but flies in an “offset” mode
several hundred meters from the target area to avoid being engaged
by small arms fire or threat anti-UAV systems.
G-13. The system’s ground components have standard electrical
power available within the Department of Defense (DoD) family of
mobile electric power sources (i.e., mobile tactical generators). The
system is capable of providing continuous power to avoid loss of all
system data or loss of AV control during prime power outages. The
system does not rely on the prime movers as a primary power source;
however, they can be used as an emergency or backup power source.
Operators will be able to adapt the system to standard worldwide
commercial alternating current power (120 volts/60 hertz and 220
volts/50 hertz).
G-5
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
LIMITATIONS
G-14. There are several significant limitations to the UAV. They
include—
• Unique operational signature. Due to the signature
associated with the launch and recovery of the UAV, the
L/R area will normally not be collocated with the
brigade/Joint Task Force (JTF) CP. The high operational
signature also means that the UAV launch site must
periodically be in environments in which the threat can
acquire and attack the site. The L/R team has little or no
capability to provide its own security.
• Limited operational capability. The UAV is not yet capable
of 24-hour operations. For sustained operations it can
operate 12 hours per day with a three-day surge capability
of up to 18 hours per day.
• Limited loiter time. At a 50-kilometer range, the UAV has a
four-hour loiter time. This reduces its effectiveness as a
long-term surveillance system.
• Limited AVs. The UAV has only three AVs per system,
which restricts its employment and limits the number of
named areas of interest (NAI) that it can cover. Although
missions can sometimes be combined, the dedication of
UAV to BDA, for example, would necessarily reduce its use
in missions such as flank security.
• Limited payload. The UAV has a limit of 60 pounds of
usable payload capacity.
• Altitude limited to 15,000 feet MSL. This limitation makes
the UAV more vulnerable to threat weapons systems in
higher terrain elevations.
• Survivability. The UAV flies slow and relatively low, which
makes it an inviting target for threat air defense systems.
The UAV system will operate in close proximity to heavily
defended areas. It will be subject to hostile air defenses
that may include the full range of antiaircraft systems.
These systems include conventional small arms;
automatic antiaircraft weapons; man portable air defense
(MANPAD) systems; and crew-served systems using radar,
optics, and EO for detection, tracking, and engagement.
The threat will also include shoulder-fired surface-to-air
missiles (SAM), launcher-mounted SAMs; and air-to-air
weapons launched by fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters,
counter-UAVs, anti-radiation missiles, and directed energy
weapons. Airborne and ground components will be
susceptible to the same threat as the unit they support.
Airborne and ground computers and
communications/data links (networks) may be subjected
to threat electronic warfare (EW) and SIGINT exploitation
and attack as well as computer network attack.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
G-6
G-15. A UAV system consists of two basic components—the GCSs

and related equipment and the AVs and related equipment.
GROUND CONTROL STATION AND RELATED EQUIPMENT
G-16. The UAV system has two GCSs, two ground data terminals
(GDT), one portable GCS, and one portable GDT with line of sight
(LOS) command and control (C2) links to and receipt for telemetry
and imagery from the AV. Additionally, it has four remote video
terminals (RVT) to provide payload information in the area of
operations (AO). The system’s four RVTs that receive near-real time
video/telemetry from the AV can be used by the brigade in the CP (if
a GCS is not collocated), by the brigade’s subordinate maneuver
battalions, or by direct support artillery or supporting aviation assets.
The commander will allocate RVTs based on METT-TC and his
scheme of maneuver.
AIR VEHICLES AND RELATED EQUIPMENT

G-17. The system has three AVs as well as a means of launch and
recovery, and the necessary transportation and ground support
equipment for the operations and maintenance of the system. The
system is designed to be easy to launch, operate, recover, and
maintain with a minimum of training, logistics, and personnel. The
AVs are capable of autonomous navigation and flight between
multiple, selected way points; they have the capability of updating or
reprogramming way points from controlling GCS or L/R equipment.
During flight, the AV may perform automatic loiter (adjustable by the
AV operator for radius, pattern, standoff distance and azimuth) on
command and execute lost-link procedures to attempt to reacquire
the link in the event of data link loss. AVs are capable of returning to
preplanned recovery areas in the event of failure of reacquisition of
data link and can execute autonomous emergency recovery
procedures (such as parachute deployment).
G-18. Figures G-2 and G-3 are two examples of flight patterns for
employment of the UAV for intelligence-gathering operations. The
figures depict possible flight paths of the UAV as it would fly a route
reconnaissance along a highway across brigade boundaries deep into
the area of interest (AOI). Again, care is taken to fly at a safe distance
from the actual target area to preclude being engaged by threat
weapons systems.
G-19. The surveillance troop and the UAV platoon leader direct the
deployment, operations, and redeployment of the UAV platoon when
it is retained under squadron control. The UAV platoon’s CP consists
of the platoon headquarters and the collocated GCS. The CP is
normally collocated with the surveillance troop CP. The location of
the CP must support continuous mission management of aerial
reconnaissance assets. The location must also support the
dissemination of taskings, reports, and technical data between the
analysis and control element and the aerial reconnaissance platoon.
G-7
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
G-20. Control of the UAV during flight is affected through the GCS.
At the launch site, the AV is programmed to climb out to a specified
altitude and distance from the launcher. The AV operator launches
the UAV from inside the GCS. The mission is flown with the AV
operator controlling the UAV via the C-band microwave data link
from inside the GCS shelter. The data link must maintain LOS
between the AV and the GCS. The shelter can be located within the
CP, giving the supported commander the ability to immediately effect
a mission change. The GCS can also be located up to several
kilometers away from the CP.
120
km
Hwy 7
2
0
0
k Hwy 7
m
Launch/Recovery Area
Figure G-2. Possible Flight Path for a

Route Reconnaissance
G-8
G-9
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
120
km
Hwy 7 Hwy 5
Assembly area
2
0
0
k
m
Hwy7
Launch and recovery area
Figure G-3. Possible Flight Path for an Area

Reconnaissance at the Intersection of Two Highways
GROUND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

G-21. The UAV GCS system has a minimum of two VHF radios and
is mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) compatible. UAV
communications interface with selected standard DoD command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems,
architectures, and protocols. All communications are interoperable
with National Security Agency approved encryption systems. All real-
time video exported to other imagery systems is in compliance with
the DoD/Intelligence Community (IC)/United States Imagery and
Geospatial System (USIGS) approved video imagery standards profile.
The system has UHF communications (capable of secure operations
G-10
during wartime) with air traffic control agencies (peacetime) and

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Airborne
Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) aircraft
(wartime/exercises).
G-22. Communications between the GCS and the CP is by landline
or radio as provided by the supported unit. When the GCS is not
located with the CP, an RVT is placed in the CP. The RVT is a “receive
only” terminal that allows the supported commander to view the
downlinked video from the UAV. When the GCS is not collocated with
a supported unit CP, mission changes will normally be requested
through the mission commander via the supported unit.
G-23. The system is capable of near-real time transmission of EO/IR
imagery. Initially, the system will have a basic EO/IR mission
payload. The UAV will provide products via the tactical common data
link, a secure data link. The GCS, including the tactical control
station, gives ready interface to the existing secure C4I architecture,
to include CGS, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
(AFATDS), All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), FAADs, and Army
airspace command and control (A2C2). Intelligence reports from the
GCSs include secure voice, electronic dissemination, and/or video via
the various communication systems in the GCS. Secure
communications for the system are integrated into the AVs and
ground control components and allow for transmission and receipt of
C2 data, telemetry, and imagery. Additional secure communications
and intelligence dissemination are provided via the standard DoD
tactical radios (VHF and UHF), MSE, and the tactical local area
network (TACLAN).
G-24. Reporting is normally performed through voice or FBCB2
messages detailing observed activity. The report flow will be through
normal reporting channels and in the size, activity, location, unit,
time and equipment (SALUTE) report format.
SECTION II – GROUND SENSOR PLATOON
ORGANIZATION
G-25. The ground sensor platoon consists of headquarters element
and four multi-sensor sections (see Figure G-4). Each section
consists of one SIGINT team and one MASINT team. The platoon
depends upon the ISR integration section located at the squadron CP
for SIGINT mission management, technical support, and direction-
finding analysis.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure G-4. Ground Sensor Platoon
PLATOON HEADQUARTERS
G-26. The platoon headquarters consists of the platoon leader and
the platoon sergeant. They work together to ensure the subordinate
sections are deployed, employed, and supported in accordance with
the squadron’s OPORD and the surveillance troop commander’s
guidance. Using troop-leading procedures, the platoon leader is
responsible for coordinating the movement and link-up of platoon
elements that the squadron might attach to the recce troops or
deploy into a maneuver battalion’s AOs.
G-27. The ground sensor platoon’s CP is normally collocated with
one of its subordinate sections. The platoon CP can serve as an
alternate CP for the troop during deployment and redeployment. The
location of the CP must support the C2 of the sections.
MULTISENSOR SECTION
G-28. The multi-sensor section consists of one SIGINT team and one
MASINT team. Both teams always move as a two-vehicle multisensor
section within the AO. Movement by section allows the platoon to use
bounding overwatch techniques to maintain MASINT coverage and to
move the direction-finding baseline while maintaining continuous
G-12
SIGINT support. This type of movement also improves command,

control, and security of the multisensor sections. The section moves
as individual teams only during dismounted operations or when
under imminent threat of hostile action.
G-29. The section CP operates at the collateral security level to
ensure the timely dissemination of combat information and targeting
data. The collateral-level operating environment also limits the
damage to the brigade’s intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) operations should threat forces capture the CP
or its personnel. Operations above this level require the platoon to
have the approval of the brigade S2 and comply with security
regulations governing the establishment of a field special
compartmented information facility.
G-30. Based on METT-TC, the squadron may attach a multi-sensor
section to a recce troop to operate in direct support of the troop. The
direct support relationship increases SA and capability of the recce
troop to perform its missions, particularly during initial entry, cross-
FLOT, and close battle offensive operations. In direct support, the
section deploys and employs the tactics and techniques described for
general support operations, but on a troop vice squadron or brigade
scale.
The tactics, techniques, and procedures for the multisensor section support the future
fielding and evaluation of a multisensor platform. The multisensor platform will
consolidate the SIGINT and MASINT capability in a single vehicle.
MISSION
G-31. The surveillance troop directs the platoon based on the orders
of the supported higher headquarters. The surveillance troop
commander determines which subordinate platoons are best adept at
covering the taskings and tasks the ground sensor platoon leader
with covering specific NAI(s). Based on the surveillance troop’s
tasking, the ground sensor platoon leader directs the organization,
means, and method of covering the assigned NAI(s). The C2
relationship affects the communications relationship as well. Several
variations are possible, but these are METT-TC driven and will be
completely spelled out in the OPORD for the mission.
G-32. The squadron provides the surveillance troop commander
with the NAIs, specific information requirements, high pay-off target
lists (HPTL), the attack guidance matrix, and current order of battle
information, ISR graphics, threat databases, and target
identifications necessary to conduct collection missions. The
surveillance troop commander provides the information above, but
tailors it to the needs of the ground sensor platoon along with the
operations graphics and order. If the platoon is attached to brigade or
another battalion, the S2 directly provides the ground sensor platoon
leader with the NAIs, specific information requirements, HPTLs, the
attack guidance matrix, current order of battle information, ISR
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graphics, threat databases, and target identifications necessary to

conduct collection missions.
G-33. The squadron is responsible for coordinating the surveillance
troop’s operations sites. The surveillance troop commander
coordinates with the reconnaissance troop commanders, maneuver
battalion S3s (if the mission requires), and the maneuver battalion’s
subordinate units/elements (if the mission requires) for movement
and sites within the brigade’s forward area. Coordination for sites
within the forward area should include arrangements for the physical
security of the site and medical evacuation procedures. The ground
sensor platoon leader should coordinate with the platoon leader(s)
where his squads are operating to ensure site deconfliction and
fratricide prevention. If the ground sensor platoon is attached to a
maneuver battalion, the battalion S3 is responsible for coordinating
the ground sensor platoon’s operations sites with the company and
separate units under the battalion’s control. The ground sensor
platoon leader coordinates with the maneuver company commanders
and appropriate subordinate units for movement and sites within the
supported battalion’s forward area. The platoon leader still
coordinates with the platoon leader(s) where his squads are operating
to ensure site deconfliction and fratricide prevention.
PROPHET
PERSONNEL AND SITE SELECTION

G-34. A PROPHET section contains three SIGINT soldiers. The
section has one prime mover carrying all equipment. The section is
augmented with a linguist of the appropriate language code for the
specific operation.
G-35. The platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leaders will
conduct a map reconnaissance of possible sites, which provide LOS
to the target areas, ensuring there no barriers to intercepting or
locating targets. Barriers will include power lines, urban areas, large
bodies of water, iron deposits, and heavy dense foliage. The platoon
leader cannot avoid all barriers, but he must attempt to minimize
their effects on the mission.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR PROPHET
PROPHET Offensive Operations (Mounted)

G-36. In offensive operations PROPHET assets are positioned along
the brigade’s front to monitor threat activity, answer specific
information requirements, and target specific high-payoff targets
(HPT). PROPHET provides support to targeting with location and
cueing and is integrated into the sensor attack matrix to ensure a
seamless synchronization from sensor to shooter.
G-37. If three vehicles are available, they deploy in one of the four
basic baselines. Unless missions dictate otherwise, the systems will
set up along a broad front to provide battlefield intelligence to the
G-14
commander, while covering a large portion of the brigade’s front. One

system, while unable to exactly plot threat position, can still provide
significant information of threat activity. Examples of the four
possible baselines are—
• Convex.
• Concave.
• Lazy-W.
• Stand-alone.
G-38. Convex provides good lines of bearing against targets that are
located to the sides of the baseline systems. The convex baseline is a
multi-station formation used when the threat forces are operating
along a broad, deep front. This formation supports intercept coverage
over a large front but is not for precise location (see Figure G-5).
Figure G-5. Effects of Distance and Line of Bearing

Accuracy on Location Accuracy – Convex Formation
G-39. Concave, which is the most accurate, is used when targets are
directly in front of the baseline. The concave baseline is a multi-
station formation used when the threat is operating in a compact,
narrow, but deep area like a salient. The direction finding accuracy is
excellent at short ranges under 15 kilometers and satisfactory at
longer ranges (see Figure G-6).
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G-40. Lazy-W is used when the target’s location in relation to the

baseline is unknown. The Lazy-W baseline is a multi-station
formation that uses four or more systems and combines the
characteristics of the convex and concave baseline. This baseline is
resource-intensive, using all of the brigade’s SIGINT assets.
G-41. Stand-alone provides a line of bearing from the PROPHET to
the target. This is the most difficult use of the asset due to the
necessary fusing of different intercepts. One possible approach is the
use of GSR/IREMBASS and PROPHET to mutually support one
another’s matching lines of bearing, sensors, and radar to identify
targets and locations.
Figure G-6. Effects of Distance and Line Bearing Accuracy on

Location Accuracy – Concave Formation
PROPHET RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS (DISMOUNTED)

G-42. PROPHET dismounted operations are primarily limited due to
the speed at which personnel can move the system. The manpack
configuration provides the commander with unique capabilities when
conducting initial entry stability operations and support operations.
G-43. The manpack allows the commander to place teams in areas
where vehicle-mounted equipment would present too large of a
footprint and terrain is too restrictive for air assets. Because of this
G-16
capability, manpack systems are often close to or past the FLOT.

Manpack systems also have a lower battlefield signature due to
placement and equipment. Thus they can be used in more low profile
operations and are especially helpful in urban situations.
G-17
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
PROPHET SECURITY OPERATIONS

G-44. PROPHET assets are used to monitor or search for specific
targets ensuring LOS along specified routes. This tailoring of
intelligence, while covering less of an area, will provide advance
warning of threat movements and actions. In defensive operations,
PROPHET will monitor multiple targets and specifically target threat
units at NAIs and decision points. PROPHET will also monitor the
threat and cue fire support systems as the threat enters designated
kill zones.
PROPHET STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

G-45. In the electronic complexity of the stability operations and
support operations environment, legitimate communications may be
intermixed in location and in frequency with threat communications.
This intermixing, coupled with the use of nonmilitary
communications systems, poses a particular challenge for SIGINT
operators. In stability operations and support operations, the SIGINT
assets are used to monitor specific target AOIs. Due to the
requirement of 360-degree force protection, assets will usually be
unable to form a baseline and will move to monitor and locate HPTs.
Platoon operations will use both SIGINT and MASINT assets together
to pinpoint targets and develop intelligence. Regardless of how these
assets are used in stability operations and support operations, the
rules of engagement must be carefully reviewed with SIGINT in mind.
G-46. PROPHET assets will monitor a variety of targets in stability
operations and support operations, to include civilian radio traffic,
civilian radio stations, police traffic, military traffic, and paramilitary
traffic. In order to better ascertain the attitudes of the populace and
predict major upcoming events, SIGINT assets will perform numerous
missions not only for force protection but also to satisfy the
commander’s intelligence requirements.
PROPHET URBAN OPERATIONS

G-47. Buildings diffract radio signals, making direction finding
highly inaccurate, unless systems have LOS. Diffraction also
hampers electronic warfare support when signals are at the threshold
levels for intercept.
G-48. In order to be effective, PROPHET assets are emplaced on high
ground throughout the urban environment. Tall buildings, water
towers, and radio towers provide good LOS; however, due to the high
content of metal in these structures, direction-finding accuracy is
degraded, but sufficient. Use PROPHET in its dismounted
configuration in these areas. In order to support the commander,
these assets are initially air-assault emplaced.
GSR/IREMBASS
G-49. MASINT assets provide situation development, targeting, and
force protection information by detecting, classifying, and locating
moving targets. The GSR provides combat information and targeting
G-18
data through the detection and location of moving targets. Its primary
functions are forward, flank, or rear security and early warning,
target acquisition, and limited assistance to friendly force movement
control. The IREMBASS provides the commander with information
from forward, flank, or rear. This information includes the
approximate number of targets, last known location, time of last
activation, type of target, and direction of travel.
G-50. The principal MASINT units in the brigade are the
GSR/IREMBASS sections of the ground sensor platoon in the
surveillance troop. These units operate under the centralized control
of the platoon leader. The platoon is integrated within the RSTA plan
that supports the identification and location of the threat along the
front, flank, or rear of the brigade to provide early warning,
surveillance, and target acquisition. Either the GSRs or the
IREMBASS (the choice is METT-TC driven) can accomplish this by
providing coverage on routes or areas not easily accessible or
desirable for maneuver forces. Since the same prime mover carries
both systems, only the GSR systems or the IREMBASS sensor strings
can be used.
G-51. The platoon supports the surveillance troop and cavalry
squadron, RSTA, by—
• Providing indications and warning of threat movement,
reinforcement, or withdrawal.
• Providing near-real time combat information and targeting
data.
• Confirming or denying movement along major supply
routes and avenues of approach or through specific NAIs.
• Supporting flank and rear security.
• Vectoring friendly forces to objectives during periods of
poor visibility by monitoring their movement.
• Providing tip-off and cross-cueing of other sensors to
support the squadron and brigade’s targeting effort.
G-52. The GSR/IREMBASS section contains four members—two

GSR soldiers and two IREMBASS soldiers. The team has one prime
mover that carries all the equipment. In accordance with the platoon
order, the team will deploy either IREMBASS sensor strings or
establish GSR positions.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR GSR AND IREMBASS
GSR Operations
G-53. The team uses its GSR to detect, locate, classify, and track
moving ground targets in an area under surveillance. The GSR
detects moving ground targets only and cannot distinguish between
threat and friendly targets. The team uses the radar to search an
area by using one of four different modes of operation.
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• Search-Auto. This mode is used for sector surveillance,

with continuous scanning occurring automatically at a
sector width of 800 to 1,000 mils or 1,600 to 2,000 mils.
When operating in this mode, the radar set detects all
targets within the surveillance area.
• Search-Manual. This mode is used to locate and track
targets in any desired azimuth. By using a control switch,
the operator can rotate the radar set to the left or right
and stop it at any azimuth. When operating in this mode,
the radar set detects all targets within the surveillance
area.
• Search-Range. This mode is used to locate and determine
the range of selected targets. Operation of the RANGE
control enables determination of target range.
• Range Gate. This mode is used to determine the precise
range of targets detected in the other modes of operation.
Only targets within 20 meters of the range displayed will
be detected.
G-54. The team can operate the system up to nine meters from the
vehicle or its battery power source. The operator evaluates the radar
data to determine the type of target, number of targets, direction of
travel, rate of speed, length of column, and last known location. With
this information he then prepares and submits a spot report to the
platoon leader and surveillance troop CP. This information is sent to
the ISR integration section at the squadron operations center that is
collocated with the S2.
G-55. The main advantage of radar is its ability to detect objects and
provide accurate target locations when other surveillance means
cannot. Radar is used mostly for limited visibility operations—
operations during darkness, haze, fog, or smoke. Radar can penetrate
light camouflage, smoke, haze, light rain, light snow, darkness, and
light foliage. Heavy rain or snow restricts radar-detection capabilities;
however, having a well-trained operator can compensate in part for
these negative effects. Radar is limited to LOS. The GSR provides a
highly mobile, nearly all-weather 24-hour capability, including night
and poor daylight visibility, for battlefield surveillance.
G-56. The GSR team can operate its equipment either vehicle- or
ground-mounted. This capability ensures the team has the mobility
of its supported unit. Its employment is coordinated closely with that
of scouts, patrols, observation posts (OP), and other sensor devices.
The GSR is ineffective against air targets unless the target is flying
near the ground. This is because GSR is designed to detect moving
targets in front of a background. It is also vulnerable to direction-
finding and jamming by threat electronic combat and other deception
means.
GSR Surveillance Missions

G-57. The GSR team may support a recce troop, or it may operate
under surveillance troop control. The supported unit must integrate
G-20
the GSR team into its planning and operations in order to optimize its
employment. The GSR teams perform the following missions:
• Search missions. Search for threat activity on likely
avenues of approach or withdrawal, attack positions, and
assembly areas.
• Point surveillance. Monitor point targets such as bridges,
defiles, or road junctions to detect movement in and
around the point. Similarly, this type of surveillance can
be conducted to cover gaps between friendly units and key
terrain where OPs might be established.
• Control and coordination. Assist in the control of units,
especially during night operations, by monitoring and
vectoring the movement of friendly forces and warning
them of threat and other friendly activities along their
routes.
• Target acquisition and tracking. Acquire targets for fire
missions and track the advancing or retreating threat to
permit the timely shifting of fire. When coordinated with
final protective fires and illumination plans, GSR teams
are used to locate the threat and alert the supported unit
so that fires, illuminations, and prepositioned munitions
can be employed at the appropriate time. Survey target
areas immediately following the lifting of fires to detect any
remaining activity.
• Observation. Vector friendly maneuver while concurrently
searching for threat activity during periods when visibility
is limited or obscured.
• Perimeter security. Enhance security and provide early
warning of intrusions, movements in likely routes of
approach toward the perimeter, and unusual or
suspicious activities near long stretches of pipeline or
lines of communications.
G-58. Figures G-7 and G-8 highlight the capabilities of the GSR.
G-21
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure G-7. Ground Surveillance Radar Employment
Figure G-8. Ground Surveillance Radar

Employment Based on Terrain
GSR Position Selection
G-22
G-59. The GSR team leader must conduct a detailed leader’s

reconnaissance of the area to select the specific radar site. To take
advantage of the maximum range of the GSR, the team should
position the radar as far forward as necessary to support the mission.
The position is normally on the forward slopes of dominating terrain.
For security, the supported unit may direct the GSR team to locate
with or near OPs. In these cases, the unit must not use the GSR
team to man the post. The GSR team and OP observers must
mutually support each other. Once the team has selected a site and
emplaced the GSR, the MASINT platoon leader and the supported
company commander or platoon leader should check the site. The
most important feature of an operational site is the capability to
support the accomplishment of the surveillance mission. In addition
to the primary site, the team leader must select alternate and
supplementary positions. He must use the same care in selecting
these positions as he did in selecting the primary position. Figure G-9
shows primary and alternate positions, which cover a road junction,
and a supplementary position, which covers a bridge.
Figure G-9. Types of GSR Positions
G-60. Since many threat forces can detect radar signals, the team
should not locate the system near troop concentrations or other
friendly HVTs. The team should use the terrain to decrease the
electronic signature of the radar and increase the team’s electronic
protection. The GSR team can use hills, embankments, trees, and
other terrain features to absorb the radar’s side lobes. A soft target
background, such as heavily wooded terrain, also helps absorb the
radar signal. A hard background, such as rock terrain or buildings,
scatters and reduces the signal, thus limiting the threat’s capability
to detect the signal and locate the radar. Although LOS to the target
is required, the team should not use terrain such as hilltops that
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FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
may increase its probability of detection. If the terrain cannot be used

effectively to block the radar signal, a low power signal can be used to
limit its range.
GSR Position Occupation

G-61. The GSR position must provide cover and concealment for the
GSR team and LOS to the target. Therefore, the team must effectively
use the available terrain and improve the site. Cover and
concealment are best obtained through the construction of field
fortifications. The type and extent of fortifications depend on the
mission and the time available. A hasty position is prepared when
time is limited. It uses the natural terrain more for protection of the
team. A deliberate position is well fortified and camouflaged. It may
be completed in three to four hours. Most deliberate positions begin
as hasty positions that have been improved in time. Figure G-10
provides an example of a typical GSR position.
Figure G-10. Typical GSR Position

G-62. The team prepares its position in the following stages:
• Site radar and clear surveillance area.
• Initiate camouflage and concealment.
• Prepare operator protective and fighting positions.
G-24
• Improve position.
G-63. Initially, the team emplaces the radar and clears the
surveillance area. It emplaces the radar where it can best cover the
target area, yet provides an acceptable degree of concealment and
cover from hostile direct and indirect fire. The team clears a
surveillance area in front of the GSR. Clearing a surveillance area is
very similar to clearing a field of fire in front of weapons systems. In a
hasty position, the initial emphasis is on concealment from threat
observation. The radar must be sited in a camouflaged position that
allows the team to cover its assigned area. The GSR team uses the
following principles when clearing a site:
• Clearing should not be excessive or it will disclose the

radar position.
• Clearing should start at the GSR position and work
forward as far as required.
• A thin natural screen of vegetation should be left to hide
the GSR position.
G-64. Soon after occupying a new position, the GSR team completes
a surveillance card. The team leader or senior operator prepares a
card for the primary, alternate, and supplementary radar positions.
The team maintains the card at the GSR position. The team leader
forwards copies of the card to the platoon leader or to the
surveillance troop for inclusion in the maneuver unit’s ISR plan. The
team leader transfers the card to a new GSR team when the team is
relieved in place.
GSR Support in Reconnaissance Operations

G-65. The GSR teams are primarily limited to flank security during
offensive type operations due to the speed at which the situation
develops. The flank security provides early warning to help prevent
envelopment of the supported unit. However, during consolidation
after offensive operations, the brigade layers the GSR teams with
reconnaissance elements to help determine the threat’s forward trace
in order to prevent surprise from a counterattack.
GSR Support in Security Operations

G-66. The GSR team is capable of a number of surveillance missions
during security operations. These missions include—
• Monitor choke points and other critical points such as

bridges and defiles. The GSR team can cue artillery and
combat engineer units as the threat enters these points.
• Search likely avenues of approach into defensive areas.
GSRs on the flanks detect threat movement at the
maximum range. Early detection of a possible
envelopment force is crucial to the supported
commander’s decision cycle. This role is especially crucial.
• Cue the fire support system as the threat enters
designated kill zones. With proper planning and
employment, the team’s radars can increase the timeliness
G-25
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
and effectiveness of long-range fires. The team can also

assist in target acquisition during darkness or limited
visibility.
• Provide coverage of areas not otherwise observed. Because
of their wide capability, GSR teams are effective economy-
of-force assets. Teams provide coverage of areas where
patrols, outposts, or other elements are unable to operate
or cover.
GSR Support in Rear Area Operations.

G-67. The GSR team can monitor approaches to primary threat rear
targets. It can also provide coverage for air insertions of special
operations forces or air assault troops in areas conducive to threat
landing zones.
GSR in Stability Operations and Support Operations

G-68. In these environments, the GSR teams may provide base
camp perimeter security and monitor areas that are of command
concern but are not accessible to regular US presence due to force
protection, economy of force, or political considerations. Examples
include but are not limited to resettlement areas, cleared and unclear
routes, and suspected infiltration routes for arms, drugs, and weapon
storage sites. The commander is then able to cue patrols to potential
trouble areas or problems. In many cases, GSR operations are
integrated into other ongoing operations to give them access to
desired emplacement areas.
IREMBASS Operations
G-69. The team’s IREMBASS is capable of detecting and classifying
moving targets by responding to seismic acoustic disturbances,
changes to the IR energy, and magnetic field changes produced by
the targets. The IREMBASS operator collects information using three
sensors:
• Magnetic (M) Sensor. The magnetic sensor is a count
indicator sensor capable of detecting, counting, and
determining the direction of travel when objects containing
ferrous metal (iron) come within its detection radius.
• Seismic Acoustic (SA) Sensor. The seismic acoustic
sensor is a classification sensor capable of detecting and
classifying targets by ground vibrations and acoustic
signals. The sensor classifies the target as personnel,
vehicle, wheeled vehicles, tracked vehicles, and
unidentified.
• Infrared (IR) Passive Sensor. The infrared passive sensor
is a count indicator sensor capable of detecting, counting,
and determining the direction of travel of a target by
measuring the temperature change of a target against a
steady thermal background.
G-26
G-70. The surveillance troop can effectively employ IREMBASS for

many operational tasks, alone or with other surveillance assets. For
optimum potential to be achieved, sensors must be fully integrated
into the unit’s overall surveillance plan in the early planning stages.
The platoon leader or the surveillance troop commander designates
the area to be covered by remote sensors. The squadron S2 integrates
remote sensor coverage with other surveillance means to cover gaps,
flanks, dead space, or avenues of approach into the battalion area.
The unit S2 and surveillance troop plan sensor employment by the
type, number, location, and layout of sensors on the ground. The
major advantages of remote sensors are—
• Timeliness. The information is near-real time and
therefore may provide enough information to effect an
immediate response or target acquisition capability by the
supported command.
• All-weather use. This is possible, if the sensor data is
interpreted to account for changes in the environment.
• Full-time operation without regard to visibility or fatigue.
• Battlefield expendability will result in sensors being able
to be employed in high-risk environments. Implant areas
may be attacked by supporting arms with a high
probability of the sensors being undamaged.
• Sensors may be hand-emplaced by maneuver unit.
• Effective during hours of darkness and reduced visibility.
• Area surveillance. Scan choke points or portions of a
selected area to detect and obtain information on traffic
density, rate, direction, and type of movement. (See
Figures G-11 and
G-12.)
• Point surveillance. Scan critical points to detect and
obtain information on traffic density, rate, direction, and
type of movement. (See Figures G-13 through G-16).
• Route surveillance. Scan roadways or portions thereof to
detect and obtain information on traffic density, rate,
direction, and type of movement. (See Figures G-17
through G-20.)
G-27
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Figure G-11. Technique of IREMBASS Employment

at a Choke Point
Figure G-12. Grid Technique of IREMBASS Employment
G-28
Figure G-13. Point Surveillance (Footbridge)
Figure G-14. Point Surveillance (Bridge)
G-29
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Figure G-15. Point Surveillance (Tunnel)
Figure G-16. Point Surveillance (Building)
G-30
Figure G-17. Route Surveillance (Airstrip)
Figure G-18. Route Surveillance (Airfield)
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Figure G-19. Technique of IREMBASS Employment at

Avenue of Approach
Figure G-20. Route Surveillance (Railroad)
IREMBASS Position Selection

G-71. Deployment of remote sensors is similar to that of the GSR,
with one major exception—the emplacement and recovery of
IREMBASS is not as flexible as GSRs. Once employed, the team may
not be able to access the sensors for recovery. Because of recovery
problems, the surveillance troop must issue the team additional
sensors before assigning new missions. The team may be able to
G-32
recover sensors during offensive operations as friendly forces

advance; however, additional sensors usually are required for
employment ahead of attacking forces.
G-72. The MASINT platoon leader and the IREMBASS team leader
conduct an in-depth map reconnaissance of the desired coverage
area prior to IREMBASS deployment. Once they have plotted the
primary locations for the sensor strings and concealed routes to the
planned locations, the IREMBASS team leader conducts a ground
reconnaissance to verify the map reconnaissance and the deployment
plan. During the ground reconnaissance, the team leader may find
better locations to employ the sensors and sensor relays than
revealed by the map reconnaissance. The team leader also identifies
alternate and supplementary positions through ground
reconnaissance. Upon completion of the ground reconnaissance, the
team leader briefs the supported S2 either in person or by radio. The
IREMBASS deploys and emplaces the sensor strings once the support
unit S2 and S3 have approved the plan. The team emplaces and
maintains strings during the hours of darkness in order to minimize
the likelihood of compromise by the local populace or hostile forces.
The S2 provides light data and a local population assessment to help
the team to determine the best emplacement time.
G-73. The IREMBASS team requires additional support in certain
environments. Where mines are prevalent in a stability operation, a
IREMBASS team requires engineer support and military police (MP)
canine support to temporarily clear the string emplacement areas.
Combat engineers may have to clear large-scale obstacles that the
team leader identified in the ground reconnaissance prior to the
insertion by the IREMBASS team. Prior planning reduces
emplacement time and minimizes both the risk of compromise and
the physical risk to the soldiers emplacing the sensors.
IREMBASS Position Occupation

G-74. The IREMBASS team emplaces the sensors to best cover the
assigned area whether the team is in the battalion AO, attached to a
maneuver battalion, or operating in direct support of the brigade. The
exact locations of sensors must be reported to the platoon leader,
surveillance troop, and squadron operations centers. Ideally, the
team locates with the platoon or surveillance troop headquarters.
These locations improve the timeliness of evaluation and reporting of
sensor activations.
G-75. The IREMBASS team hand-emplaces a string of one or more
IREMBASS sensors along likely avenues of approach, choke points,
obstacles, or other AOIs. The number of sensor strings depends on
the area being covered. The first sensor is normally a seismic
acoustic sensor for early warning and classification. The second
sensor is normally a count indicator of the expected type of target. It
can also act as a magnetic sensor for vehicles, and an infrared
passive sensor for personnel. The count indicator sensor provides the
number of targets and direction of travel. The third sensor is also a
count indicator and provides rate of speed and length of column. This
arrangement helps to prevent accidental activation or false signals,
G-33
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
because other types of sensors must confirm any sensor activation.

For example, severe weather can activate the seismic sensor, but not
the magnetic sensor. Winter conditions, such as falling snow, snow
cover, and frozen ground, can limit the effectiveness of
acoustic/seismic and infrared passive sensors. An animal can
activate the seismic and infrared passive sensors, but cannot activate
the magnetic sensors.
G-76. Once a sensor is activated, it sends a burst of digital
messages to the monitoring station. The system requires radio LOS to
transmit activations from a sensor to the monitor station. A radio
repeater can extend the range by 15 kilometers on the ground and by
100 kilometers from the air. Once the activation message reaches the
monitoring station, the operator evaluates the sensor data to
determine the type of target, number of targets, direction of travel,
rate of speed, length of column, and last known location. With this
information he then prepares and submits a sensor activation spot
report to the ISR integration section collocated with the squadron S2.
G-77. IREMBASS operators can monitor road junctions, river
crossing and fording sites, or previously occupied positions.
Operators can determine the target’s rate of speed and length; they
can also determine the type and number of vehicles or personnel in a
column. The road or trail junction string includes two seismic
sensors placed at each end of the three approaches of a Y-type road
or trail junction. A rule of thumb is to place two seismic sensors on
every approach and confirming sensors at all road junctions or
intersections. Figure G-21 provides an example of road or trail sensor
string.
Figure G-21. Road or Trail Junction IREMBASS

Sensor String
G-78. The IREMBASS team can use a sensor field consisting of two
or more sensor strings to monitor two or more specific locations
within an AOI (see Figure G-22).
G-34
Figure G-22. IREMBASS Sensor Field Monitoring

Multiple Road or Trail Junctions
G-79. The timeliness and accuracy of sensor-derived data make

IREMBASS an excellent target acquisition resource. As depicted in
Figure G-23, the team emplaces sensors near predesignated target
areas and reports activations to the fire support element.
Figure G-23. Typical Sensor Employment for

Target Acquisition
G-35
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
IREMBASS Support in Offensive Operations

G-80. Offensive operations, including exploitation and pursuit,
present only limited opportunities for IREMBASS employment. The
team places its IREMBASS on lightly defended flanks of the
advancing forces to provide early warning of threats. IREMBASS can
also be effective when emplaced deep in the threat’s rear area to
provide indications of movement, reinforcement, withdrawal, or
threat intentions. Emplacement of IREMBASS in the deep battle area
requires special operations forces, long-range surveillance personnel,
or the air dropping of IREMBASS sensors.
IREMBASS Support in Defensive Operations
G-81. In the defense, primarily area defense, the IREMBASS team
serves as an early warning system to provide information of threat
movement and locations. The amount of activity detected that each
sensor string or field detects may provide indications of main or
supporting attacks. The team’s sensor strings can also help identify
threat movement along avenues of approach. The IREMBASS is also
effective as an economy of force measure on lightly defended flanks to
provide early warning of threat attempts to conduct envelopments or
to identify unexpected avenues of threat advance. The team uses the
sensor grid for area surveillance to detect penetration or occupation
of an area by the threat, when the threat avenue of approach is
unknown. The sensor grid consists of two or more strings emplaced
in rows to monitor the entire area of concern.
IREMBASS Support in Rear Area Operations
G-82. IREMBASS provides support to economy of force in protecting
the support areas. Sensor strings can be used to cover avenues of
approach from the flanks into the support area. Sensor grids can be
used to monitor areas that provide the threat with landing zones for
air insertions of special operations forces or air assault troops.
IREMBASS in Stability Operations and Support Operations
G-83. In these environments, the brigade may use the IREMBASS
team for base camp perimeter security and to monitor areas that are
of command concern, but are not accessible to regular US forces
presence due to force protection, economy of force requirements, or
political considerations. Examples include but are not limited to
resettlement areas, cleared and uncleared routes, and suspected
infiltration routes for arms, drugs, and weapon storage sites. The
commander is then able to cue patrols to potential trouble areas or
problems. In many cases, IREMBASS operations are integrated into
other ongoing operations to give them access to desired emplacement
areas.
G-84. IREMBASS operations in a stability operations and support
operations environment are very similar to other types of platoon
operations. An in-depth map reconnaissance of the desired coverage
area must occur first. Once templated locations for the strings have
been plotted and concealed routes to these locations have been picked, a
ground reconnaissance must be conducted. The ground reconnaissance
verifies the map reconnaissance and the plan. During the ground
reconnaissance, the platoon or team leader may find better locations to
G-36
employ the sensors and relays than those revealed by the map
reconnaissance.
G-85. Upon completion of the ground reconnaissance, the leader
backbriefs the surveillance troop commander or the supported S2
(this can be in person or via FM; if FM, then grid locations of the new
scheme must be sent). Emplacement of the sensor strings occurs
once the new plan has been approved. Emplacement should occur at
night, at a time when the local populace are in their homes. This time
determination is part of the surveillance troop commander and/or
S2’s assessment of the population. This helps prevent the observation
of the emplacement and conceals the soldiers. Additionally,
maintenance operations on emplaced strings should also occur at
night. In certain environments, the IREMBASS teams will require
additional support. In a stability operations and support operations
environment where mines are prevalent, an IREMBASS team will
require engineer support and MP canine support. This type of
support allows the team to temporarily clear the area in which the
strings are to be emplaced. The dog allows for quick identification of
mines/explosives in darkness, while the engineers clear the small
obstacles. Any large-scale obstacles should have been identified in
the ground reconnaissance and cleared by engineers prior to the
night insertion by the IREMBASS team. Although this process
sounds very time-intensive, prior planning helps cut down the
emplacement time. By having contingency areas for IREMBASS
already identified, the map and ground reconnaissance can be
accomplished well before emplacement, requiring only a quick
validation before execution. This builds in the time needed for
additional support requirements.
SECTION III – NBC RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON
ORGANIZATION
G-86. The NBC reconnaissance platoon consists of four vehicles (see
Figure G-24).
G-37
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure G-24. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

Reconnaissance Platoon
MISSION
G-87. The NBC reconnaissance platoon provides a special
reconnaissance capability. It can locate and identify life-threatening
chemical and radiological contaminants. It also performs extensive
planning and analysis to determine threat weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) capabilities in the brigade’s AO. This enables the
brigade commander to anticipate and counter WMD threats before
they materialize.
CAPABILITIES/LIMITATIONS
G-88. The NBC reconnaissance platoon possesses limited capability
to provide warning and enhance protection against a “low-tech” NBC
threat, to include accidental or deliberate release of industrial
hazards and terrorism. Some significant limitations exist with respect
to area coverage, staff planning, and organic decontamination
capabilities. The size of the brigade’s AO presents a challenge to the
ability of the platoon to provide full coverage. Any determined effort
by an adversary to employ NBC capabilities against the brigade will
require chemical staff and unit augmentation.
G-89. In urban and complex terrain, the brigade leverages point,
standoff, and look-down detection capability to gain NBC situational
understanding. Urban and complex terrain creates
microenvironments that affect the behavior of NBC hazards and
smoke. The brigade will require augmentation of smoke assets to
provide long duration smoke that can screen movement of brigade
assets or support deception operations.
G-38
Appendix H
Command Post Operations

As discussed in Chapter
2, the squadron CONTENTS
Command Post Enabling Operations.........H-1
organizes command
CP Positioning ..........................................H-1
posts (CP) to assist the CP Security ...............................................H-2
commander in CP Displacement ......................................H-3
commanding and Shift Change Briefings.............................H-4
Battle Update Brief ...................................H-5
control-ling the CP Battle Drills..........................................H-5
squadron. By organizing SBCT CP Organization, Equipment
into CPs, the squadron Personnel, and Functions .......................H-6
distributes its staff, Squadron CP Organization,
Equipment, and Personnel ......................H-10
computers, and Squadron Main CP Deployment
communications cap- Considerations .........................................H-11
abilities across the area Independent Operations ..........................H-11
of operations (AO), Collocated with Other CPs ......................H-11
Command, Control, Communications,
making them more and Computers Architecture ...................H-12
survivable and SOP Considerations ....................................H-13
expanding the Filter Settings ...........................................H-13
commander’s span of Reporting ..................................................H-14
Updates .....................................................H-14
control. This chapter Charts and Status Boards .......................H-14
discusses CP operations Filing System and Naming
enabling tasks as well Convention ............................................H-15
as configuration consid- Color Standards........................................H-15
Databases .................................................H-15
erations for each CP. It Shift Organization.....................................H-15
also includes a Graphics and Orders................................H-15
comprehensive review of Integrating Digital and Analog Units.......H-16
the command, control, Fratricide Prevention................................H-17
communications, and
computers (C4) arch-
itecture.
SECTION I – COMMAND POST ENABLING OPERATIONS
COMMAND POST POSITIONING

H-1. When planning an operation, the staff should develop a
command and control (C2) plan that addresses the initial and
subsequent positioning of each CP. Also included in the C2 plan
should be the designation of the command group for each phase of
the operation, including the most likely branches and sequels. The
movement and positioning of the CPs and command group and the
supporting communications architecture should be integrated into
wargaming and rehearsals.
H-1
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
H-2. CPs are positioned where they can best balance the need for
security and self-protection with the requirements to maintain both
digital and FM communications architectures. This may require a
centralized position during operations in a noncontiguous AO or
during stability or support operations. Conversely, during operations
in smaller-scale contingency or major theater of war environments,
CPs may be forced to locate well forward and prepared to move
frequently in support of mobile operations. Regardless, the CP should
not set up along likely threat avenues of approach, and it should be
prepared to displace as necessary to ensure survivability and
continuous battle control.
H-3. The general positioning of any CP should consider several
factors, including—
• Security.
• Trafficability of terrain.
• Line of sight communications (for both communications
and tactical unmanned aerial vehicle [UAV] operations).
• Terrain for passive security (cover and concealment) and
signal masking.
• Location away from main avenues of approach.
H-4. The main CP must be positioned where it can maintain

communications with the command group and the controlling
brigade CP. Ideally, it should be able to communicate with all
subordinate elements. The combat trains CP (CTCP) should be
positioned where it can maintain communications with the main CP,
monitor the battle, communicate with the brigade rear CP (or main
CP as a relay), and control logistical operations. Ideally, it is located
near a primary main supply route (MSR) central to maintenance
collection and casualty treatment/evacuation operations.
H-5. Movement planning for CPs is critical. It must address
triggers for displacement, sequence of locations for likely situations,
and timing to ensure that the CPs are functional at critical times.
H-6. When degraded by vehicle or equipment losses, the CPs will
usually be forced to implement some degree of analog operations, or
rely primarily on FM voice and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade
and Below (FBCB2) in high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles
(HMMWV).
COMMAND POST SECURITY

H-7. CPs must be prepared to secure themselves against a wide
range of threats, to include conventional attacks by mounted or
dismounted forces, artillery and air attack, electronic attack, terrorist
threats, or weapons of mass destruction. CPs rely primarily on
passive measures to avoid detection but must have well-developed
standing operating procedures (SOP) to react to contact if located.
Consider the following operations security (OPSEC)/information
security measures when positioning CPs:
H-2
__________________________________________________ Appendix H – Command Post Operations
• Do not erect signs advertising CP locations.

• Maintain noise and light discipline.
• Limit traffic to the CP.
• Post a security force to protect the CP. The security force
normally consists of personnel organic to the CP, but may
be augmented by combat forces tasked to secure the CP.
• Establish security force positions as in any defensive
position and maintain a 360-degree perimeter.
• Position the security force far enough out from the CP to
prevent threat direct fires on the CP and equip it with
antitank weapons.
• Establish communications between the security force and
the CP.
• Establish individual and crew-served fighting positions
protecting the perimeter of the CP.
• Rehearse the execution of the perimeter defense.
• Disseminate near and far recognition signals to all
subordinate units and elements of the CP and control
access to the CP.
• Designate a rally point and an alternate CP location in the
event of artillery or air attack.
• Avoid positioning CPs on sites previously occupied by
jammers, signal equipment, radars, UAV, other
headquarters, or other high visibility elements that attract
threat attention and fires.
• Position vehicles in an orderly and dispersed fashion.
• Ensure vehicles are appropriately camouflaged.
• Ensure guards use an access roster provided by the S2 to
control personnel entering main CP.
• Allow media access only to main CP area (with commander
or executive officer [XO]/S3 approval). If media are allowed
access to main CP, they must be accompanied at all times.
• Obtain a threat vulnerability assessment if the CP is
occupying a permanent location or base camp.
COMMAND POST DISPLACEMENT

H-8. While all CPs have some ability to conduct C2 on the move,
they lose many of the capabilities they have when stationary.
Therefore, CPs normally control operations from a static location.
When forced to move during an operation or due to threat activity,
control is given from one CP to another. The tactical situation and
unit SOP may specify whether a CP moves by echelon or in a single
march unit. Normally, the main CP will hand the battle over to the
TAC CP and displace by echelon using the following technique:
• The main CP conducts a battle update brief (BUB) for the
TAC CP and transfers the battle.
H-3
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
• The first echelon eavesdrops while moving to the new

location.
• The second echelon continues to execute CP
responsibilities.
• The first echelon establishes itself at the new location, and
updates its situational awareness (SA) from the second
echelon.
• The first echelon assumes responsibility for CP operations
and the second echelon displaces.
• During movement, messages to the CP should be
minimized. This may require reconfiguration of auto-send
and auto-forward functions to route traffic to the TAC CP
during main CP displacement.
• When the second echelon is established, the TAC CP
conducts a BUB for the main CP.
SHIFT CHANGE BRIEFINGS

H-9. During continuous operations, a CP will normally operate in
shifts. To ensure continuous, uninterrupted operations, the staff
conducts a shift change briefing. The purpose of the brief is to
educate the incoming shift on the current status of the brigade, to
inform them of significant activities during the previous shift, and to
prepare them to deal with upcoming decisions and events. While the
format for the brief is a matter of SOP, it should address the
following:
• Intelligence—
Significant threat actions during last shift.
Current threat situation and threat course of action
that remain valid.
Limited visibility and weather update.
UAV and Joint Surveillance Targets Acquisition Radar
System operations.
• S3—
Task organization changes.
Changes to mission, fragmentary orders, or execution
of branches and sequels.
Friendly situation two levels higher.
Current subordinate unit status.
Significant friendly actions during last shift.
Current commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIR), and answers to CCIR received
during previous shift.
Activities scheduled during next shift (timeline).
Anticipated planning requirements.
• S4—
Current logistical status.
H-4
MSR status.
Logistical “warstoppers.”
• S1—
Significant personnel actions.
Changes in medical coverage.
Safety.
• Fire support coordinator—
Current fire support coordination measures.
Army airspace command and control (A2C2) update.
Air defense artillery coverage.
• Engineer — Obstacle/survivability update.
• Military police — Rear area security.
• Chemical — Mission oriented protective posture (MOPP).
• S6—
Current communications and network status.
Location of key leaders.
• Headquarters commandant—
CP logistical issues.
CP security.
Displacement plan and proposed jump locations.
• S3 sergeant major (SGM) — Priority of work for CP.
H-10. The shift change brief is not intended to be an information

brief for the commander, although it may be useful for him to attend.
If he does attend, the primary focus must remain the smooth
transition between shifts. The XO orchestrates the brief, with each
staff section briefing its area of responsibility (AOR). It is normally
conducted as a face-to-face meeting with all CP personnel in
attendance.
BATTLE UPDATE BRIEF

H-11. The BUB is often conducted shortly before an operation
begins to summarize changes made during the preparation phase
and as a result of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) collection effort. The BUB is similar in format and content to the
shift change brief, but has a battle focus and a much different
audience. It also omits the administrative data normally presented by
the S3 SGM and the headquarters and headquarters company
commander. The BUB is designed as an information brief to the
brigade and subordinate commanders. Its purpose is to ensure that
all the key personnel are operating from a common understanding of
the situation.
H-12. During the brief, the staff presents its AOR, and subordinate
commanders brief their current situation and operations conducted
in their AO. The brief may be conducted at one centralized location,
H-5
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
but is usually done over FM-voice radio or via video teleconferencing

(VTC). The BUB should follow a specific script to keep transmissions
short, ensure completeness, and ease note taking.
COMMAND POST BATTLE DRILLS

H-13. CPs will encounter various situations during operations. The
specific actions taken by a CP should be well defined in unit SOPs
and rehearsed during training. Typical action drills include—
• Threat Air Attack. The main CP will not engage threat
aircraft until confirmation that the main CP is
compromised. M240 and M2 fire as directed by the shift
noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). Main CP
personnel not on duty will assume security positions and
engage using small arms.
• Threat Ground Attack. Engage dismounted threat
immediately and then send a spot report (SPOTREP) to the
main CP. The shift NCOIC designates a rally point for the
reaction force to meet, then leads the patrol against the
threat. AT-4 fires will be directed in volleys against threat
vehicles. M240 and M2 will shift as directed to destroy the
threat. Ensure visiting personnel and vehicles are
included and briefed on the defensive plan.
• Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Attack. Personnel
don their protective masks and assume MOPP 4 upon
hearing the M8A1 chemical alarm or other signal
determined by the unit SOP. The shift NCOIC ensures that
everyone inside and out has initiated MOPP 4 status. The
shift NCOIC then supervises the execution of M256 kit
testing and unmasking procedures.
• Indirect Fire Attack. Shift NCOIC directs the main CP to
displace to an alternate location. Control of the battle is
transferred to the TAC CP. Vehicles evacuate the CP as
soon as antennas are detached. Trail party will return to
police up any abandoned equipment, conduct crater
analysis, and send shell report to higher.
• Electronic Protection (EP). If nets are suspected of being
compromised or the target of electronic warfare, the
radiotelephone operator or main CP NCO initiates
troubleshooting procedures and informs the battle
captain. If troubleshooting procedures fail to correct the
communications problem, the battle captain concurs that
the net is being jammed and that the jamming will affect
the unit mission. He then initiates EP procedures by
announcing the EP attack code word over the jammed net
and all operators switch to the ALT 1 setting per signal
operating instructions (SOI) and reestablish
communications. The signal officer (S6) assesses the
extent of degradation to the communication and digital
networks and takes corrective actions. The S2 coordinates
with the direct support military intelligence (MI) company
commander to update threat databases and to nominate
H-6
targets for potential nonlethal attacks. Upon

reestablishment of secure communications, the brigade
forwards an interference report to the division spectrum
management office. Interference is resolved at the lowest
possible level of the Department of Defense component
chain of command, using component organic resources to
resolve interference incidents where possible.
SECTION II – SBCT COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT,

PERSONNEL, AND FUNCTIONS
H-14. CPs in the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) are the main
CP, the TAC CP, the command group, and the rear CP. Figures H-1
and H-2 show the SBCT main CP’s organization, equipment, and
personnel. As discussed in Chapter 2, the squadron main CP will
collocate with the SBCT main CP. To facilitate an effective inter-staff
working relationship, the squadron staff must understand the
functions of SBCT staff sections and special cells. Figure H-3 outlines
the major functions within the SBCT staff.
H-7
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure H-1. SBCT Main Command Post Organization and Equipment
H-8
Figure H-2. SBCT Main Command Post Personnel Organization
H-9
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure H-3. SBCT Main Command Post Functions
H-10
SECTION III – SQUADRON COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT,

AND PERSONNEL
H-15. Squadron CPs include the main CP, the TAC CP, the
command group, the CTCP, the field trains CP (FTCP), and the
surveillance troop CP. Figures H-4, H-5, and H-6 show the main CP
and TAC CP organization, equipment, and personnel.
Figure H-4. Main Command Post Organization and Equipment
Figure H-5. Main Command Post Personnel
Figure H-6. Tactical Command Post Equipment, Organization, and Personnel
H-11
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
SECTION IV – SQUADRON MAIN COMMAND POST DEPLOYMENT

CONSIDERATIONS
INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS
H-16. The SBCT’s main CP is the principle C2 facility for the SBCT.
The cavalry squadron, reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition (RSTA) main CP is optimized to operate with subelements
in the SBCT main CP. These subelements include the MI company’s
ISR analysis and integration platoons, the SBCT S2X, brigade S2,
and the fires and effects coordination cell (see Figure H-2). Under
certain circumstances the squadron main CP may need to operate
independently from the SBCT main CP. These circumstances include
the following:
• When conducting independent operations in the AO while

the SBCT main CP resides in sanctuary.
• When C2 of reconnaissance operations dictate
independent operations.
• To facilitate C2 in an expanded SBCT AO.
• When conducting independent operations (assigned an
AO) during stability and support operations.
• To facilitate C2 and coordination with another element
during passage of lines.
H-17. When operating independently, the squadron main CP may

require additional assets from the SBCT, such as a TROJAN SPIRIT
to ensure connectivity and/or a ground control station (see Figure H-
7).
Figure H-7. Independent Squadron Main Command Post

with TROJAN SPIRIT
COLLOCATED WITH OTHER COMMAND POSTS

H-18. The main CP may also collocate with CPs other than the SBCT
to facilitate C2 or deployment. This category of collocation may
include:
H-12
• Collocate with the SBCT TAC CP when deployed as an

early entry force.
• Facilitate ISR operations when the SBCT TAC CP is
deployed forward.
• Collocate with an infantry battalion headquarters to
facilitate C2 and/or ISR.
• Facilitate C2 and coordination with another element
during passage of lines.
• As required by METT-TC.
SECTION V – COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND

COMPUTERS ARCHITECTURE
H-19. C4 is a system of ISR doctrine, procedures, organizational

structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, communications, and
computers. It is designed to collect, process, store, display, and
disseminate the information needed to develop a common operational
picture (COP) in support of the commander’s mission, and it supports
the commander’s exercise of C2 across the range of military
operations through regulation of forces and functions in accordance
with the commander’s intent.
H-20. The SBCT’s C4 infrastructure (Figure H-8) provides the
commander and staff with the ability to plan, prepare and execute
using resilient voice and data communications networks to enable
effective C2 on the battlefield. Within the SBCT’s C4 infrastructure,
the squadron maintains a complex C4 network to facilitate the
information flow up, down, and laterally.
H-13
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Figure H-8. SBCT Command, Control, Communications, and

Computers Infrastructure
SECTION VI – STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES CONSIDERATIONS
H-21. This section contains information regarding digital operations

that is relevant for the brigade and squadron tactical SOPs (TACSOP).
Most of the digital operating procedures used by the squadron must
be established at brigade level to achieve standardization and
effective C2.
FILTER SETTINGS
H-22. To achieve a COP, all FBCB2, from individual vehicle to
squadron, must have the same SA filter settings. This is particularly
important for the Red picture so that as information about icons
ages, the system purges them at the same time on all of the
squadron’s systems. Standard filter settings based on the nature of
the threat’s operation should be established in unit SOPs and be the
same throughout the brigade. For threat offensive operations, the
filter settings should be short; for threat defensive operations, the
setting times should be longer, reflecting the more static nature of the
threat picture. Table H-1 provides an example of possible filter
settings.
Table H-1. Sample Standard Situational Awareness Filter Settings
H-14
Mission Stale Old Purge

Counterreconnaissance 20 minutes 40 minutes 1 hour
Reconnaissance 1 hour 2 hours 4 hours
Threat attack 5 minutes 10 minutes 1 hour
Threat defense 1 hour 2 hours 4 hours
H-23. Standard filter setting may also need adjusting based on

terrain and the mission. In compartmented, difficult terrain, longer
settings are more appropriate, maybe 10 minutes for the attack. In
the wide-open, fast-paced operations in the desert, shorter settings in
the five-minute range may be more appropriate. Also, as the threat
transitions from offensive to defensive operations, the decision should
be made at brigade level to change to the appropriate standard filter
setting.
H-24. The standardization of Blue SA filter settings is of equal
importance in maintaining a common SA picture throughout the
force. FBCB2 provides three methods for updating individual vehicle
locations: time, distance, and manually. When the system is fully
operational, it will automatically update Blue icons using either time
and/or distance traveled based on the units’ Blue SA filter settings.
These settings should be standardized across the force based on both
the mission and the function of the unit/vehicle, shorter refresh rates
for combat vehicles and vehicles that frequently move versus longer
refresh rates for fairly static vehicles such as main CPs. Tailoring the
frequency of these automatic updates will also reduce the load on the
tactical internet (TI), freeing more capacity for other types of traffic.
H-25. The Blue icon refresh rate may also change as the battle is
executed. This is especially true in the transition from the offense to
the defense or vice versa. The standardization of Blue situational
filter setting is probably most effectively done at the brigade level
using the brigade TACSOP. There are no set rules for what these
setting should be. They must be established based on the unit’s
experience in using FBCB2 and the capacity of the TI. The capability
to manually update a vehicle’s position should only be used when a
vehicle’s system is not fully functional and has lost the ability to
automatically maintain its position within the system, or to input
information about non-digitally equipped units operating in the
squadron’s AO.
REPORTING
H-26. It may not be advantageous to have all vehicles sending
SPOTREPs digitally. This can lead to multiple reports of the same
threat element and contribute to an already confused and
indecipherable intelligence picture. Defining who within the SBCT
can initiate digital SPOTREPs can help eliminate this problem. One
technique is to limit the creation of Red icons via digital SPOTREPs to
reconnaissance elements and the troop leadership (commander, XO,
or first sergeant [1SG]). Others would report on FM to their higher
headquarters, which will create and manage the icon. This will also
help those who execute the direct firefight by moving the digital
reporting responsibility to someone somewhat removed from the
H-15
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
fight. At troop level, the XO, 1SG, or troop CP personnel become the
primary digital reporters. These constraints cannot be completely
restrictive. Unit SOPs and command guidance must allow for and
encourage soldiers who observe the threat and know they are the sole
observer (for example, there is no corresponding Red icon displayed
in the SA picture) to create a digital SPOTREP. The brigade and
squadron SOPs should define the schedule for report submissions,
the message group for the report, and the medium (digital system or
verbal) to be used.
UPDATES
H-27. The squadron establishes a routine schedule of when system
updates should be executed. For example, the S2 section should be
continuously updating the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS)
database, and every 30 minutes transmit the latest ASAS SA picture
to the FBCB2 network. Staff sections should print critical displays on
an established schedule. These printed snapshots of SA can be used
for continuity of battle tracking in the event of system failures and
can contribute to after-action reviews and unit historical records.
CHARTS AND STATUS BOARDS

H-28. Staff sections maintain charts and status boards with current
information in the main CP at all times. These status boards may be
analog or digital. Regardless, the on-duty section NCOIC is
responsible to update his section’s boards. The S3 NCOIC has overall
responsibility for completeness and accuracy of all main CP visual
display boards. The FTCP has access to identical versions of the main
CP tracking charts to facilitate its role as an alternate CP.
H-16
FILING SYSTEM AND NAMING CONVENTION

H-29. For interoperability and minimal confusion, the SOP should
define the naming convention and filing system for all reports, orders,
and message traffic. This will significantly reduce time and
frustration associated with lost files or changes in system operators.
COLOR STANDARDS
H-30. The SOP should define the colors used in graphics down to
troop level.
DATABASES
H-31. C2 systems will inevitably migrate to a web-based capability,
allowing information to be entered into a database and then accessed
by users as needed or when they are able to retrieve it. For example,
the S2 may transmit an intelligence summary to all subordinates and
some will inevitably not receive it or lose the file. He could
simultaneously post that same summary to his “homepage” so users
can access it as required. If this technique is used, note the
recommendations below:
• Posting a document to a homepage does not constitute
communications. The right people have to be alerted that
the document is there and available.
• Keep documents concise and simple. Elaborate
PowerPoint slide briefings will take days to transmit,
collapsing the TI. Similarly, gaudy graphics and templates
should not be used.
• The amount of information in the database and who has
access must be carefully controlled, both for security and
for keeping from overloading the TI.
SHIFT ORGANIZATION
H-32. CPs must be capable of conducting continuous operations for
considerable lengths of time. Fatigue caused by stress, lack of sleep,
extremes in temperature, combat, and monitoring digital systems will
significantly degrade operations if leaders do not actively manage the
shift changes. Squadron CPs are manned at a level that allows for
two shifts. While these may be broken into a traditional day and
night shift, the schedule may require modification based on the
tempo of operations and requirements for conducting the military
decision-making process. Each shift in the main CP is led by a battle
captain from the S3 shop and contains representation from every
staff section, to include radio operators and security personnel.
GRAPHICS AND ORDERS

H-33. The staff should have an SOP defining the technical process
for creating, collating, and transmitting orders and overlays, both
analog and digital. At a minimum, the main CP should keep the
operations, situation template, and fire support overlays current in
H-17
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
both analog and digital formats. The CTCP maintains both the
operational and combat service support (CSS) overlays current in
both formats.
H-34. All of the Army Tactical Command and Control Systems
(ATCCS) effectively support the creation and transmission of doctrinal
field orders. The brigade staff sections will normally develop their
portions of orders, send them to the S3 plans maneuver control
station where they are merged into a single document and
transmitted to subordinate, higher, and adjacent units. In creating
orders, remember that the TI does not possess high transmission
rates like civilian electronic mail. Orders and graphics must be
concise to reduce transmission times. Table H-2 provides
transmission times and capabilities based on system capability and
sample file sizes. Consider as well that orders transmitted directly to
FBCB2-equipped systems (such as all subordinate leaders in the
squadron) must meet the size constraints of the order formats in
FBCB2.
H-35. Graphics and overlays should be constructed with the same
considerations for clarity and size. SA reduces to some degree the
need for control measures, but the staff must always consider the
integration of analog units and that SA may not always be available
to all elements.
Table H-2. Network Speed Relative to File Size (Unloaded Network)
Equipment (data rate Kbytes/sec 100K File 1 MB File 5 MB File 10 MB File 1 GB File
capacity)
56K Modem 5.4 17 sec 4 min 15 min 30 min 2.1 days
ISDN (128k) 7 14 sec 2 min 12 min 24 min 1.6 days
T1 (1544k) 150 1 sec 7 sec 34 sec 68 sec 1.8 hours
WIN-T (2,000k) 2MB 208 .5 sec 5 sec 24 sec 48 sec 1.3 hours
WIN-T (8,000k) 8MB 833 .12 sec 1.2 sec 6 sec 12 sec 20 min
ABCS MAIN CP LAN 10MB 1,042 .1 sec .96 sec 5 sec 10 sec 16 min
ABCS MAIN CP LAN 100MB 10,417 .01 sec .1 sec .5 sec .96 sec 96 sec
SINCGARS SIP (16K) 1.7 59 sec 10 min 49 min 98 min 7 days
EPLRS (64K) 6.7 15 sec 2.5 min 12.5 min 25 min 42 hours
EPLRS VHSIC (128K) 13.3 7.5 sec 1.3 min 6.3 min 12.5 min 21 hours
NTDR (288K) 30 3.3 sec 33 sec 2.8 min 5.6 min 9.2 hours
JTIDS (238K) 24.8 4 sec 40 sec 3.4 min 6.7 min 11.2 hours
INTEGRATING DIGITAL AND ANALOG UNITS

H-36. It will be several years before the majority of the Army will be
digitally equipped, and even then there will be elements with which
H-18
the brigade will operate in a joint or coalition environment that will

not have digital equipment. National Guard and Army Reserve units,
light forces, supporting corps artillery, and corps-level logistical units
will be the types of analog units that the brigade and squadron will
most likely operate with. Procedures for integrating both digital and
analog units will be essential for the brigade.
H-37. Some basic considerations include—
• FM and mobile subscriber equipment will be the primary
communications mediums with the analog unit.
• Hard copy orders and graphics will be required.
• Graphical control measures will require the level of detail
necessary to support operations of a unit without SA. In
general, this requires more control measures tied to
identifiable terrain.
• Liaison teams will be critical.
H-38. The staff must recognize that integrating an analog unit into
the unit requires retention of most of the analog control techniques.
In essence, two control systems have to be in operation, with
particular attention paid to keeping the analog unit apprised of all of
the pertinent information that is flowing digitally.
FRATRICIDE PREVENTION
H-39. Digital systems, particularly FBCB2, make a significant
contribution to reducing fratricide by allowing all units to have
visibility of FBCB2-equipped forces in their network. Vehicle
commanders can quickly check their displays to see if friendly forces
are operating in an area as they prepare to execute direct or indirect
fires. However, there are some limitations to the system that
operators must be aware of and trained on.
H-40. To begin with, not all systems will be equipped with FBCB2 or
(embedded battle command software, nor will all systems always be
operational. Also, elements that are not operating within the
squadron’s communication architecture will not be visible on FBCB2
or on ATCCS unless they have been manually entered and
continuously updated (manually). When leaders know that there are
elements without FBCB2 or with inoperable FBCB2 in the area, they
should alert all their soldiers to that situation. For example, a
reconnaissance platoon may be conducting a rearward passage of
lines when some of the unit’s FBCB2 or associated radios are
inoperative. In this case, the platoon leader should alert the unit they
are passing through that some vehicles are not able to transmit SA
data, and identify where they are and on what route they are
returning. If possible, vehicles with operable FBCB2 should link up
and act as escorts for vehicles whose systems are inoperable.
H-41. There is not a dismounted system for FBCB2, and it will be
some time before one is widely fielded. This is critical for dismounted
soldiers, particularly during infiltration operations when indirect fires
are being employed. Fire support elements may check digital displays
H-19
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
and see no Blue icons in the target area and be unaware that
dismounted soldiers are operating there. FBCB2 and ATCCS displays
may be used for denying fires, but not for clearing fires. The absence
of a Blue icon should not be the basis for assuming there is no
friendly force there. Additionally, if an ATCCS display is being viewed,
remember that the information may not be current. Never use ATCC
displays as a sole source for targeting information. Some other
method of both target observation and clearance must be used.
H-42. Depending on the Blue SA filter setting, an operator may not
have all Blue units displayed. If the filter setting is for display of only
armor and infantry elements, the operator will not have visibility on
all other Blue assets such as artillery, air defense, and CSS vehicles.
The same is true for the echelon filter setting; if only troop and higher
echelons are selected, the operator will not have visibility on the
majority of the systems on the battlefield.
H-43. The nature of tactics and capabilities are evolving at an
alarming rate, with an increase in maneuvering forces and the use of
rapidly emplaced obstacles. This can lead to an increase in obstacle
fratricide. Digital systems can help reduce this if CPs keep obstacle
overlays current and quickly disseminate changes, and if operators
keep current, critical overlays posted on their systems. Transmission
of updated overlays should be accompanied by net-wide FM alerts to
ensure system operators know new obstacle information has been
disseminated and they are to display the new overlay.
H-44. Finally, the increase in maneuvering of forces over expanded
battlespaces, the increased forward presence and maneuvering of
artillery units, and the increased use of rapidly emplaced obstacles
can lead to fratricide incidents. Operators must utilize their digital
displays to track friendly elements and conduct the essential FM
crosstalk to clear fires and maintain their total SA.
H-20
Appendix I
Environmental Protection
Protection of natural
CONTENTS
resources is an ever-
Environmental Risk Management
increasing concern. It is Process ................................................... I-1
the responsibility of all Identify Environmental Hazards ............... I-1
unit leaders to decrease Assess Environmental Hazards................ I-1
and, if possible, eliminate Develop Controls and Make Decisions .... I-3
Implement Controls ................................... I-3
damage to the Supervise and Evaluate............................. I-3
environment when Environmental Risk Assessment
conducting all types of Worksheet................................................... I-3
operations. This appendix
focuses on measures the squadron must implement to accomplish
that objective. Training Circular (TC) 3-34.489 provides a
comprehensive listing of procedures and considerations applicable
when operating in environmentally sensitive areas.
SECTION I – ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
I-1. Environmental risk management is similar to safety risk

management and is based on the same philosophy and principles.
(NOTE: Refer to the discussion of safety risk management in
Appendix B of this manual.) The environmental risk assessment and
management process consists of the five steps outlined below.
STEP 1 – IDENTIFY ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

I-2. The squadron must identify potential sources of
environmental degradation during his analysis of METT-TC. These
environmental hazards are conditions with the potential for polluting
air, soil, or water and/or destroying cultural or historical structures,
sites, or artifacts. Figure I-1 lists procedures and considerations for
identifying possible sources of environmental risks that the squadron
may face during a typical tactical operation. The list is organized
according to METT-TC factors.
STEP 2 – ASSESS ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

I-3. The squadron uses the environmental risk assessment
worksheet (Figure I-2) and worksheet instructions (Figure I-3) to
analyze the potential severity of environmental degradation for each
training activity. The worksheet allows them to quantify the risk to
the environment as extremely high, high, moderate, or low. The risk
impact value is an indicator of these levels of severity.
I-1
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
IDENTIFYING SOURCES OF BATTLEFIELD RISK (BY METT-TC)

MISSION
• Identify and assess known environmental risks during planning.
• Determine environmental impact on mission execution.
• Specify areas of risk and/or concern to minimize the impact on the unit’s scheme of maneuver.
• Select alternate training methods or goals as necessary.
• Develop maps and/or sketches with detailed areas of environmental concern.
• Emphasize the importance of every soldier playing an active role in the identification and timely
reporting of new environmental risk elements.
•
Rapidly and effectively respond to all petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and/or hazardous waste
accidents.
ENEMY (THREAT FORCES)
• Identify probable areas of environmental contamination that could affect friendly force movement.
• Evaluate intelligence reports of how the threat will employ his equipment and/or capabilities to
overcome or take advantage of environmental factors.
• Develop threat target options to minimize environmental effects.
•
Maneuver friendly forces in such a way as to direct threat action away from environmentally
sensitive areas, when feasible.
TERRAIN AND WEATHER
• Provide recommended paths of movement to avoid environmentally sensitive areas.
• Identify well-defined terrain features to assist in navigation accuracy.
•
Obtain and analyze weather data to diminish possible environmental risks, focusing on predominant
and developing weather patterns.
TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE
• Brief all soldiers thoroughly on environmental risks, concerns, and/or points of interest.
• Develop a detailed and accurate SOP that identifies guidelines for avoiding risk areas without
inhibiting mission accomplishment.
• Brief troops on how to prevent environmental damage based on anticipated areas of probable risk.
• Employ practice scenarios that test soldier response to changing environmental risks and promote
use of the decision-making process in dealing with risks.
•
Require accurate and timely reporting pertaining to all environmental issues (friendly or threat).
TIME AVAILABLE
• Maximize planning time. (NOTE: One key step is to minimize the complexity and length of the
mission briefing as much as possible.)
•
Practice and develop various mission profiles that emphasize adjusting for changing environmental
factors, while maintaining the desired momentum.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
• Identify and emphasize rules of engagement and/or rules of interaction that minimize environmental
damage.
• Expect media coverage and analysis of troop actions that affect the environment.
• Anticipate and limit collateral damage to civil infrastructure (such as agriculture and other food
production, delivery and supply systems, and hazardous chemical storage facilities).
• Identify environmental targets of value that the threat might attack.
Figure I-1. Example Procedures for Identifying Environmental Risks
I-2
____________________________________________________ Appendix I – Environmental Protection
STEP 3 – DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE DECISIONS

I-4. Based on the results of the risk assessment, the squadron
commander makes decisions and develops measures to reduce
significant environmental risks. Risk decisions are made at a level of
command that corresponds to the degree of risk. The squadron staff
should brief all responsible individuals and agencies (to include the
installation environmental office, if applicable) on the proposed
operational and training plans and on pertinent high-risk
environmental factors.
STEP 4 – IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

I-5. The squadron commander and staff implement environmental
protection measures at all stages of operational planning,
preparation, and execution. They integrate these measures into
plans, orders, SOPs, training performance standards, and rehearsals.
STEP 5 – SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE

I-6. The squadron must enforce environmental protection
standards during supervision of all training activities.
SECTION II – ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
I-7. To use the environmental risk assessment worksheet (see

Figure I-4 for a sample, completed worksheet) for a specific operation
or training event, the reconnaissance platoon leader and subordinate
leaders first conduct an operational analysis to break down the
exercise into events, allowing them to manage the risks for the
various tasks. They also identify particular tasks for the operation
using the troop’s mission training plan (MTP). Leaders develop the
hazard list using their experience, lessons learned, unit SOPs,
applicable references, and guidance from the chain of command.
They identify applicable environmental standards, laws, and rules of
engagement (ROE) that affect the mission. Leaders annotate each
task and associated environmental hazards on the risk assessment
worksheet in sections E and F.
I-8. The commander and staff assess each hazard to determine
the risk for potential harm to the environment. Their assessment is
based on how often the environmental hazard occurs during the
operation (probability) and what effect the hazard has on the
environment (severity). They use the probability and severity
definitions from
FM 3-100.4.
I-9. They develop controls to eliminate or reduce the probability or
severity of each hazard. They identify a mix of educational-, physical-
, and avoidance-type controls and annotate them in section H. Once
all risk control measures are in place, any residual risk is annotated
in section I.
I-10. The staff identifies how each control would be implemented
and assigns responsibility to unit personnel. The “how to” for each
I-3
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
control is annotated in section J. In the sample worksheet, the

squadron adjusts its FTX scenario to account for environmentally
fragile wetlands in one of its assigned training areas.
I-4
A. Mission or Task: B. Date/Time Group C. Date Prepared:
Begin:
End:
D. Prepared By: (Rank, Last Name, Duty Position)

Page _____ of _____
E. Task: F. Identify Hazards: G. Assess Hazards: H. Develop Controls: I. Determine J. Implement

Residual Risk: Controls
(“How To”):
Figure I-2. Environmental Risk Assessment Worksheet

K. Determine overall mission/task risk level after controls are implemented (circle one):
LOW (L) MODERATE (M) HIGH (H) EXTREMELY HIGH (E)
I-5
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
Worksheet Instructions
Block
A–E Self-explanatory.
F Identify Hazards. Identify hazards by reviewing METT-TC factors for the mission or
task. Additional factors include historical lessons learned, experience, judgment,
equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental considerations.
G Assess Hazards. Assessment includes historical lessons learned, intuitive analyses,
experience, judgment, equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental
considerations. Determine initial risk for each hazard by applying the risk assessment
matrix (refer to Chapter 2, FM 3-100.4). Enter the risk level for each hazard.
H Develop Controls. Develop one or more controls for each hazard to either eliminate the
hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or severity) of a hazardous incident. Specify
who, what, where, when, and how for each control. Enter controls.
I Determine Residual Risk. Determine the residual risk for each hazard by applying the
risk assessment matrix (refer to Chapter 2, FM 3-100.4). Enter the residual risk level for
each hazard.
J Implement Controls. Decide how each control will be put into effect or communicated to
the personnel who will make it happen (written or verbal instruction: tactical, safety,
garrison SOPs, rehearsals). Enter controls.
K Determine Overall Mission/Task Risk. Select the highest residual risk level and circle it.
This level becomes the overall mission or task risk level. The commander decides
whether the controls are sufficient to accept the residual risk. If the risk is too great to
continue the mission or task, the commander directs development of additional controls
or modifies, changes, or rejects the COA.
Supervise and Evaluate. This last step is not on the worksheet. Plan how each control
will be monitored for implementation (continuous supervision, spot checks), and
reassess hazards as the situation changes. Determine if the controls worked and if they
can be improved. Communicate lessons learned.
Figure I-3. Instructions for Risk Management Worksheet
I-6
A. Mission or Task: B. Date/Time Group C. Date Prepared:
Squadron FTX Begin: 010600 JUN XX 22 MAY XX
End: 040900 JUN XX
D. Prepared By: (Rank, Last Name, Duty Position)

MAJ Smith, S3 Page 1 of 1.
E. Task: F. Identify Hazards: G. Assess Hazards: H. Develop I. Determine J. Implement

Controls: Residual Risk: Controls
(“How To”):
Conduct area Environmentally Moderate (M) Designate this area Low (L) Squadron OPORD,
reconnaissance sensitive area in the as contaminated Para 3, and
northeast corner of with a persistent Operations Overlay
Training Area 13 chemical agent and
declare it off limits.
Figure I-4. Sample Environment Risk Assessment Worksheet

K. Determine overall mission/task risk level after controls are implemented (circle one):
LOW (L) MODERATE (M) HIGH (H) EXTREMELY HIGH (E)
I-7
Glossary
A/L administrative and logistics
A2C2 Army airspace command and control
AA assembly area; avenue of approach
AADC area air defense commander
AAGS Army air-ground system
AAR after-action review
ABCS Army Battle Command System
ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
ABF attack by fire
ACA airspace coordination area
ACC airspace control center
ACE analysis and control element; aviation combat element;
armored combat earthmover
ACL allowable cargo load
ACM airspace control measures
ACMR air combat maneuvering range
ACO airspace control order
ACP airspace control plan
ACT analysis and control team; air cavalry troop
ACTM air cavalry team
ACU area common user
ACUS area common user system
AD air defense
ADA air defense artillery
ADAM area denial artillery munitions; Air Defense Airspace
Management
ADO air defense officer
ADSI Air Defense System Integrator
AEB aerial exploitation battalion
AEPDS Advanced Electronic Processing and Dissemination
System
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
AFCC Air Force component commander
AGL above ground level
Glossary-1
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
AGS armored gun system

AGT air-ground team
AH attack helicopter
AIT automatic identification technology
ALO air liaison officer
AM amplitude modulation
AMC US Army Materiel Command; air mission commander
AMDPCS Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System
AMDS advanced monitoring display system
AMDWS Air and Missile Defense Workstation
ammo ammunition
AMO air movement officer
ANAV autonomous navigation system
ANGLICO air and naval gunfire liaison company
AO area of operations
AOC air operations center
AOI area of interest
AOR area of responsibility
APC armored personnel carrier
APOD aerial port of debarkation
APOE aerial port of embarkation
APU auxiliary power unit
AQL advanced QUICKLOOK
ARF airborne relay facility
ARFOR Army Force(s)
ARL airborne reconnaissance low
arty artillery
ASAS All-Source Analysis System
ASAS–RWS all source analysis system–remote workstation
ASIS all-source intelligence system
ASL authorized stockage list
ASOC air support operations center
ASP ammunition supply point
ASR alternate supply route
AT antitank
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
Glossary-2
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
ATCCS Army Tactical Command and Control System

ATGM antitank guided missile
ATIZ artillery target intelligence zone
ATKHB attack helicopter battalion
ATO air tasking order
ATP ammunition transfer point
ATS (Army) air traffic service
AUTODIN automatic digital network
AV air vehicle
AVIM aviation intermediate maintenance
AVLB armored vehicle launched bridge
AVN aviation
AVO air vehicle operator
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
AWADS adverse weather aerial delivery system
AXP ambulance exchange point
BAO brigade ammunition officer

BCE battlefield coordination element
BCIS battlefield combat identification system
BCT brigade combat team
BDA battle damage assessment
BDAR battle damage assessment and repair
BDE; bde brigade
BDU battle dress uniform
BFA battlefield functional area
BFV Bradley fighting vehicle
BHL battle handover line
BICC battalion intelligence collection coordinator
BLOS beyond line of sight
BLT battalion landing team
BMNT before morning nautical twilight
BOLT brigade operational law team
BOS battlefield operating system
BP battle position
bps bytes per second
Glossary-3
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
BPV battlefield planning and visualization (tool in ABCS

software)
BRT brigade reconnaissance troop
BSA brigade support area
BSB brigade support battalion
BSC brigade signal company
BSFV Bradley Stinger fighting vehicle
BSMC brigade support medical company
BUA built-up area
BUB battle update briefing
BVTC battlefield video teleconference
C&E communications and electronics

C2 command and control
C3 command, control, and communications
C3D camouflage, cover, concealment, and deception
C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence
C4ISR command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CA civil affairs
CADRG compressed arc digitized raster graphics
cal caliber
CAM chemical agent monitor
CAMB combined arms maneuver battalion
C&E communications and electronics
CANA convulsant antidote for nerve agent
CAS close air support
CASCOM Combined Arms Support Command
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CATK counterattack
cav cavalry
cbt combat
CBU cluster bomb unit
CCDTV charged coupled device television
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
Glossary-4
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
CCL combat configured load

CCP casualty collection point
CCDTV closed circuit day television
CDR; cdr commander
CDS container delivery system
CFF call for fire
CFFZ call-for-fire zone
CFL coordinated fire line
CFN call for fire net
CFV cavalry fighting vehicle
CFZ critical friendly zone
CGS common ground station
cGy/hr centigray(s) per hour
CHAALS communication high accuracy airborne location system
CHAP chaplain
CHAT counterintelligence (CI)/human intelligence (HUMINT)
automated tool (kit)
CHL combat health logistics
CHS combat health support
CI counterintelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CINC Commander in Chief
CIP combat identification panel
cm centimeter(s)
cmd command
CMOC civil military operations center
CNA computer network attack
CNR combat net radio
CNRV combat net radio voice
co company
COA course of action
COC chain of command
COLT combat observation lasing team
COMINT communications intelligence
commo communications
COMSEC communications security
Glossary-5
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
CONUS continental United States

COP common operational picture
COSCOM Corps Support Command
CP command post; check point (when followed by numerical
designator)
CPG communications processor group
CPO copilot
CPS collection and processing subsystem
CRC control and reporting center
CRCP corps rear command post
CROP containerized roll-in/roll-out platform
CPT captain
CRT combat repair team
CS combat support
CSAR combat search and rescue
CSC combat stress control
CSM command sergeant major
CSP communication system processor
CSR controlled supply rate
CSS combat service support
CSSC combat service support company
CSSCS Combat Service Support Control System
CT communications terminal
CTAPS Contingency Theater Automated Planning System
CTCP combat trains command post
CTIL commander’s tracked item list
CTIS combat terrain information system
CTT commander’s tactical terminal
CW continuous wave
CZ censor zone
DA Department of the Army

DAG divisional artillery group
DAGR defense advanced global positioning system receiver
DAMA demand assigned multiple access
DARO Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office
Glossary-6
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
DASC direct air support center

DCE distributed computing environment
DCS Divisional Cavalry Squadron
DD Form Department of Defense form
DDCMP digital data communications protocol
DDN defense data network
DEA Drug Enforcement Agency
DF direction finding
DFS direction-finding subsystem
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DIMHRS Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System
DIS daylight imaging system
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DISCOM Division Support Command
DISN Defense Information Systems Network
div division
DIVARTY division artillery
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DLIC detachment left in contact
DMC distribution management center
DOCEX document exploitation
DO/DO drive-on/drive-off
DoD Department of Defense
DP decision point
DPICM dual-purpose improved conventional munitions
DRS digital reconnaissance system
DS direct support
DSM decision support matrix
DSN defense switched network
DSNET1 defense secure network one
DSO domestic support operation
DS/R direct support/reinforcing
DSSCS defense special security communications system
DST decision support template
DTEP digital terrain elevation data
DTG date-time group
Glossary-7
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
DTSS digital topographic support system

DTV day television
DVE driver’s vision enhancer
DVO direct view optics
dvr driver
DZ drop zone
EA engagement area
EAB echelons above brigade
EAC echelons above corps
EAD echelons above division
EAVO external air vehicle operator
EBC embedded battle command
EC effects coordination
ECCM electronic countercountermeasures
ECOA enemy course of action
ECT effects coordination team
EEFI essential elements of friendly information
EFET essential fires and effects task
EFF COORD effects coordinator
EFST essential fire support task
ELINT electronic intelligence
ELM electronic maintenance
EM enlisted men
EMPCOA enemy most probable course of action
eng; engr engineer
EO electro-optical
EP electronic protection
EPDS electronic processing and dissemination system
EPLRS enhanced position location reporting system
EPLRS–VHSIC enhanced position location reporting system–very high
speed integrated circuit
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ERFS extended range fuel supply
ESM electronic support measure
ET enhanced Trackwolf
Glossary-8
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
ETUT enhanced tactical unit terminal

EVENTEMP event template
EW electronic warfare
1SG first sergeant

FA field artillery
FAAD-EO Forward Area Air Defense Engagement Operations system
FAADC2 forward area air defense command, and control
FAADC2I forward area air defense command, control, and
intelligence
FAADC3I forward area air defense command, control,
communications, and intelligence
FAADS forward area air defense system
FAC forward air controller
FAC-A forward air controller-airborne
FARE forward area refueling equipment
FARP forward arming and refueling point
FASCAM family of scatterable mines
FAX facsimile
FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCR fire control radar
FDC fire direction center
FDL FAAD data link
FDMP full duplex message protocol
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
FECC fire and effects coordination cell
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FFA free fire area
FFAR folding-fin aerial rocket
FFIR friendly force information requirements
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FIST fire support team
FISTV fire support team vehicle
FLE forward logistics element
FLIR forward looking infrared
FLO fighter liaison officer
Glossary-9
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
FLOT forward line of own troops

FM frequency modulation (radio); field manual
FMC forward maintenance company
FMS Force XXI manning system
FPF final protective fires
FPL final protective line
FPOL forward passage of lines
FRAGO fragmentary order
FRS forward repair system
FS fire support
FSB forward support battalion
FSC forward support company
FSCL fire support coordination line
FSCM fire support coordination measure
FSCOORD fire support coordinator
FSE fire support element
FSO fire support officer
FST forward support team
ft foot; feet
FTCP field trains command post
FTI fixed target indicator
FWF former warring factions
G2 Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (Intelligence)

G6 Assistant Chief of Staff, G6 (Signal)
gal gallon(s)
GBCS ground-based common sensor
GBS ground-based sensor
GCE ground combat element
GCS ground control station; ground control shelter
GCCS global command and control system
GCCS-A global command and control system-A
GCSS-A global combat service support-Army
GCT ground cavalry troop
GDT ground data terminal
GHz gigahertz
Glossary-10
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
GIRS grid index reference system

GLD ground laser designator
GO governmental organization
gnr gunner
GPF ground processing facility
gpm gallon(s) per minute
GPS global positioning system
GR/CS Guardrail common sensor
GRREG graves registration
GS general support
GSM ground station module
GSR ground surveillance radar
GSTAR global strategic attack radar
G/VLLD ground/vehicle laser location designator
HAE high-altitude, long-endurance

HAZMAT hazardous material
HDC Headquarters and Distribution Company
HE high explosive
HEDP high explosive duel purpose
HEMTT heavy expanded mobile tactical truck
HF high frequency
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
HHT headquarters and headquarters troop
HICHS helicopter internal cargo handling system
HIDACZ high-density airspace control zone
HIMAD high-to-medium-altitude air defense
HIMARS high mobility artillery rocket system
HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HOC human operations control
HPG hard-copy processor group
HN host nation
HPT high-payoff target
HPTL high pay-off target list
HQ headquarters
hr hour
Glossary-11
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
HTI horizontal technology integration

HUMINT human intelligence
HVA high-value asset
HVT high-value target
I&W indications and warnings

IA international agency
IADS integrated air defense system
IAV interim armored vehicle
IAW in accordance with
IB international border
IBN intelligence broadcast network
IBS integrated broadcast service
ICCR integrated circuit chip reader
ICM improved conventional munitions
ID identification
IDL inoperable data link
IEDK individual equipment decontamination kit
IEW intelligence and electronic warfare
IFF identification friend or foe
IGR V improved Guardrail V
IMC instrument meteorological condition
IMETS integrated meteorological system
IMINT imagery intelligence
INC internet controller
INFOSEC information security
INFOSYS information system
INMARSAT international maritime satellite
INR (Bureau of) intelligence and research
INS inertial navigation system; Immigration and Naturalization
Service
INSCOM Intelligence and Security Command
intel intelligence
INTELSAT intelligence satellite
INTSUM intelligence summary
IOM install, operate, maintain
Glossary-12
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
IP internet protocol
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPDS imagery processing and dissemination
IPF integrated processing facility
IR information requirement; infrared
IREMBASS improved remotely monitored battlefield sensor system
IRLS infrared line scanner
ISF internal security force
ISMS improved SIGINT (signal intelligence) manpack system
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IV intravenous
IWS-B imagery workstation-brigade
JAAT joint air attack team

JACC joint airspace control center
JDISS joint deployable intelligence support system
JFACC joint forces air component commander
JFC joint forces commander
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JMC Joint Military Commission
JP joint publication
JSEAD joint suppression of enemy air defense
JSTARS joint surveillance target attack radar system
JTAGS Joint Tactical Air and Ground Station
JTF joint task force
JTIDS joint tactical information distribution system
JTRS joint tactical radio system
JTT joint tactical terminal
JVMF joint variable message format
JWARN joint warning and reporting network
JWICS joint worldwide intelligence communications system
k kilowatt
kbps kilobytes per second
KIA killed in action
km kilometers
Glossary-13
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
km/h; kmph kilometers per hour

LAN local area network
LANTIRN low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night
(operations)
LAPES low-altitude parachute extraction system
lb pound(s)
LC line of contact
LD line of departure
ldr leader
LEN large extension node
LGSM light ground station module
LHS load handling system
LLTV low-light level television
LMS lightweight multipurpose shelter
LNO liaison officer
LOA limit of advance
LOB line of bearing
LOC line of communication
log logistics
LOG SITREP logistical situation report
LOGCAP Logistics Augmentation Program
LOGPAC logistics package
LOGSTAT logistical status
LOR limit of reconnaissance
LOS line of sight
LPI low probability of intercept
LPXMED logistics processor external – medical module
L/R launch and recovery
LRAS3 long range advanced scout surveillance system
LRF laser range finder
LRF/D laser range finder/designator
LRP logistics release point
LRS launch and recovery shelter
LRSC long range surveillance company
LRU line replaceable unit
LSB lower side band
Glossary-14
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
LST laser spot tracker

LT lieutenant
LTC lieutenant colonel
LUH light utility helicopter
LVAD low velocity air drop
LZ landing zone
m meter(s)
MAC Military Airlift Command
MAJ major
MANPAD man portable air defense
MANPADS man portable air defense system
MAP mobile antenna platform
MARC multi-technology automated reader card
MASINT measurement and signature intelligence
MAV medium assault vehicle
max maximum
MBA main battle area
MBT main battle tank
MC4 Medical Communications for Combat Casualty Care
MCB mine-clearing blade
MCI Marine Corps intelligence
MCL mission configured load
MCO maintenance control officer
MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay
MCS Maneuver Control System; maintenance control section
MCWP Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
MDITS migration defense intelligence threat data system
MDMP military decision-making process
MEA munitions effects assessment
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
MEDLOG medical logistics
MEL maximum engagement line
MELIOS mini-eyesafe laser infrared observation set
MES medical equipment set
Glossary-15
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support

available, time available, and civil considerations
MEU Marine expeditionary unit
MFD multi-function display
MFP mortar firing point
MGS mobile gun system
MGSM medium ground station module
MHE material handling equipment
MHz megahertz
MI military intelligence
MICLIC mine clearing line charge
MiDAS miniaturized data acquisition system
MILSATCOM military satellite communications
min minute(s); minimum
MITT mobile integrated tactical terminal
MLMC Medical Logistics Management Center
MLRS multiple launch rocket system
mm millimeter(s)
MM1 mobile mass spectrometer (M93 NBCRS equipment)
MMS mast-mounted sight
MMW millimeter wave
MOG maximum on ground
MOGAS motor gasoline
MOPMS modular pack mine system
MOPP mission oriented protection posture
mort mortar
MOS military occupational specialty
MOUT mounted operations in urbanized terrain
MP military police; monitor-programmer
MRB motorized rifle battalion
MRC motorized rifle company
MRE meals ready to eat
MRP motorized rifle platoon
MSE mobile subscriber equipment
MSG master sergeant
MSL mean sea level
Glossary-16
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
MSR main supply route

MSRT mobile subscriber radio terminal
MST maintenance support team
MTI moving target indicator
MTMC Military Traffic Management Command
MTOE modified table(s) of organization and equipment
mtr motor
MTS movement tracking system
MTT military training team
MTV medium tactical vehicle
MTW major theater of war
MU movement unit
MWR morale, welfare, and recreation
NAAK nerve agent autoinjector kit

NAI named area of interest
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVWAR navigation warfare
NBC nuclear, biological, chemical
NBC-R nuclear, biological, chemical-reconnaissance
NBCRS nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance system
NBCWRS nuclear, biological, chemical warning and reporting
system
NCO noncommissioned officer
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
NCS net control station
NCU notebook computer unit
neg negative
NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NFA no fire area
NG National Guard
NGF naval gunfire
NGO nongovernmental organization
NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NIS national input segment
NLECC nonlethal effects coordination cell
Glossary-17
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
NM network management
NMC non-mission capable
NOE nap of the earth
NOFORN not releasable to foreign nationals/governments/non-US
citizens
NOSC Network Operations and Security Center
NPL no penetration line
NRO National Reconnaissance Office
NSA National Security Agency
NSFS naval surface fire support
NTDR Near Term Digital Radio
NVD night vision device
NVG night vision goggles
OI operations and intelligence (radio net)

O&O organization and operation
obj objective
OBSTINTEL obstacle intelligence
OCOKA observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment,
obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach
OCONUS outside the continental United States
OE operational environment
OEG operational exposure guidance
OIC officer in charge
OIODACR observation, indirect (fire), obstacles, direct (fire), air(craft),
chemical, reserves
OMT operations management team
O/O on order
OP observation post
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
OPNS operations
OPORD operation order
ops operations
OPSEC operations security
OPTEMPO operating tempo
OSO Operational Support Office
Glossary-18
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
OT observer-target
Glossary-19
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
P/N part/number
PA physician’s assistant
PAC personnel and administration center
PANAMSAT Pan American satellite
PAO public affairs office; public affairs officer
PARC principal assistant responsible for contracting
PAS personnel accountability system
PAX personnel (number of)
PC personnel carrier
PCC precombat check
PCI precombat inspection
PDDE power-driven decontamination equipment
PDS personnel data system
PEOC3S program executive officer command, control, and
communications system
PERSITREP personnel situation report
PERSTAT personnel status
PGM precision-guided munitions
P-Hour parachute hour
PHS primary heavy HMMWV shelter
PIP primary injection point
PIR priority intelligence requirements
PL phase line
PLGR position locator grid reference
PLL prescribed load list
PLS palletized loading system
plt platoon
PM program manager
PMCS preventive maintenance checks and services
PME peacetime military engagement
PMO provost marshal office
PMS portable monitoring set
POE port of embarkation; priority of effort
POF priority of fires
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POS; pos priority of support; position
Glossary-20
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
POSNAV position navigation

POW prisoner of war
PP passage point
PSG platoon sergeant
PSNCO personnel services noncommissioned officer
PSSCS personnel service support control system
PSYOP psychological operations
PVNTMED preventive medicine
PVO private voluntary organization
PW prisoner of war
PZ pickup zone
QA quality assurance
QC quality control
QRA quick reaction antenna
QRF quick reaction force
R&S reconnaissance and surveillance

RAAMS remote antiarmor mines system
RAG regimental artillery group
RALS right add, left subtract
RACO rear area combat operations
RAPIDS real-time automated personnel identification system
RAS regimental aviation squadron
RATO rocket assist takeoff
RBP red/black processor
recce reconnaissance
recon reconnaissance; reconnoiter
REDCON readiness condition
regt regiment
RES radiation exposure guidance
res reserve
retrans retransmission
RF radio frequency; rim fire
RFA restrictive fire area
RFI request for information
Glossary-21
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
RFL restrictive fire line

R/GS reinforcing/general support
RHO reconnaissance handover
RHOCP reconnaissance handover coordination point
RHOL reconnaissance handover line
RI relevant information
RMS root mean square
ROA restricted operations area
ROE rules of engagement
ROI rules of interaction
ROM refuel on the move
ROZ restricted operations zone
RP release point
RPG rocket-propelled grenade
RRS radio relay system
RRT radio-receiver transmitter
RRTS radio relay test set
RSCAAL remote sensing chemical agent alarm
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
RT route; receiver/transmitter
RTD return to duty
RTE route
RTO radiotelephone operator
RTP radiotelephone procedures
RV reconnaissance vehicle
RVT remote video terminal
S1 adjutant (US Army)

S2 intelligence officer (US Army)
S2X intelligence officer (Military Company) (US Army)
S3 operations and training officer (US Army)
S3-Air air operations officer (US Army)
S4 supply officer (US Army)
S5 civil affairs officer (US Army)
S6 signal officer
Glossary-22
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
SA situational awareness
SAAFR standard use Army aircraft flight routes
SAFFMM sustaining, arming, fixing, fueling, manning, moving
SALUTE size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
SAM surface-to-air missile
SAMS-1 Standard Army Maintenance System-1
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SAS squadron aid station
SATCOM satellite communication
SAW squad automatic weapon
SBCT Stryker brigade combat team
SBF support by fire
SCDL surveillance and control data link
SCI sensitive compartmented information
SCL strategic configured load
SCO squadron commander
sct scout
SDS security data system
SEAD suppression of enemy air defense
sec second(s)
SEM spare equipment maintenance
SF Special Forces; security force
SFC sergeant first class
SGLI Serviceman's Group Life Insurance
SGM sergeant major
SGT sergeant
SHORAD short-range air defense
SICPS standard integrated command post system
SIDPERS Standard Installation/Division Personnel System
SID secondary imagery dissemination
SIGINT signal intelligence
SIGSEC signal security
SINCGARS Single Channel Ground-Airborne Radio System
SINCGARS–SIP single channel ground-airborne radio system–system
improvement program
SIPRNET secret internet protocol router network
Glossary-23
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
SIR specific information requirement

SITEMP situation template
SITREP situation report
SKE system keeping equipment
SME subject matter expert
SMS sensor monitoring set
SO signal officer (S6)
SOF special operations forces
SOFA status of forces agreement
SOI signal operating instructions
SOSO stability operations and support operations
SOSR suppress, obscure, secure, reduce
SOSRA suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault
SOP standing operating procedure
SOR specific order and request
SOUTHCOM Southern Command
SP start point
SPC; Spec specialist
SPF special purpose forces
SPG soft-copy processor group
SPIRIT special purpose intelligence remote integrated terminal
SPO support operations officer
SPOD seaport of debarkation
SPOE seaport of embarkation
SPOTREP spot report
spt support
sqd squad
sqdn squadron
SRP soldier readiness processing
SSA supply support activity
SSC smaller-scale contingency
SSG staff sergeant
SSL single-station location
SSN social security number
SSP-S single-source processor–SIGINT
STAMIS standard Army management information system
Glossary-24
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
STE special test equipment

STON short ton
STRIKER strike reconnaissance
STRIKWARN strike warning (NBC message)
STU special telephone unit
SU situational understanding
SWO squadron weather officer
SWR scout weapons team
T&R technical and reporting (net)

TAA tactical assembly area
TAC tactical
TAC CP tactical command post
TACAIR tactical aircraft
TACLAN tactical local area network
TACP tactical air control party
TACS theater air control system
TACSAT tactical satellite
TADIL-B Tactical Data Information Link-B
TADIL-J Tactical Data Information Link-J
TADIX-B tactical data information exchange system-B
TAEC tactical air effects controller
TAI targeted area of interest
TAIS Tactical Airspace Integration System
TAML Theater Army Medical Laboratory
TAMMS The Army Maintenance Management System
TBM theater battlefield management
TBMCS Theater Battle Management Core System
TCAC tactical commander’s analysis center
TC-AIMS II Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for
Movement-System II
TCP transmission control protocol
TDD time definite delivery
TDDS Tactical Data Dissemination System
TDN TROJAN data network
TENCAP tactical exploitation of national capabilities
Glossary-25
FM 3-20.96 ____________________________________________________________________________
TEP theater engagement plan

TF task force
THMT tactical high mobility terminal
THREATCON threat condition
TI tactical internet
TIBS Tactical Information Broadcast System
TIRS terrain index reference system
TIS thermal imaging system
TLP troop-leading procedures
tm team
TMD theater missile defense
TOC tactical operations center
TOE table(s) of organization and equipment
TOR terms of reference
TOT time on target
TOW tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (missile)
TPL timed-phase line
TPN tactical packet network
TRANSCOM Transportation Command
TRAP tactical and related applications
TRIXS tactical reconnaissance intelligence exchange system
TRP target reference point
trp troop
TSOP tactical standing operating procedure
TST time-sensitive target
TSU thermal sight unit
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
TV television
TVA target value analysis
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UBL unit basic load
UCL unit configured load
UHF ultra high frequency
ULLS-G unit-level logistics system-ground
ULLS-S4 unit-level logistics system-S4 module
Glossary-26
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
UMCP unit maintenance collection point

UMT unit ministry team
UN United Nations
UNMO United Nations military observer
US United States
USAF United States Air Force
USB upper side band
USIGS United States Imagery and Geospatial System
USMC United States Marine Corps
USMTF United States message text format
USN United States Navy
UTARL unsupported tactical air request list
VCU versatile computer unit

VHF very high frequency
VHSIC very high speed integrated circuit
VIXL video image cross link
VMF variable message format
VOS25 vehicle orientation system (M93 NBCRS equipment)
VPK vehicles per kilometer
VSTOL vertical and short take-off/landing
VTC video teleconference
WAN wide area network

WARNO warning order
WAS wide area surveillance
WCS weapons control status
WIA wounded in action
WIN MS Warfighter information network management system
WIN-T Warfighter information network-terrestrial
WIN-T POC Warfighter information network-tactical proof of concept
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WP white phosphorous
WRSK war reserve stockage kit
WSRO weapon system replacement operations
XO executive officer
Glossary-27
Bibliography
AR 380-19. Information Systems Security. 27 February 1998.
DA Form 581. Request For Issue and Turn-in of Ammunition. July 1999.
DA Form 1156. Casualty Feeder Report. 1 June 1966.
DD Form 565. Statement of Recognition of Deceased. August 1984.
FM 1-02 [FM 101-5-1]. Operational Terms and Graphics. 30 September 1997.
FM 2-0. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. 27 September 1994.
FM 2-01.3 [FM 34-130]. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994.
FM 2-33.3 [FM 32-2]. Collection Management and Synchronization Planning.
8 March 1994.
FM 2-22.5 [FM 34-56]. Imagery Intelligence. To Be Published.
FM 3-0 [FM 100-5]. Operations. 14 June 2001.
FM 3-04.111 [FM 1-111]. Aviation Brigades (and Digital Annex). 12 October 1997.
FM 3-04.112 [FM 1-112]. Attack Helicopter Battalion (and Digital Annex).
2 April 1997.
FM 3-04.113 [FM 1-113]. Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations (and Digital Annex).
12 September 1997.
FM 3-04.114 [FM 1-114]. Air Cavalry Squadron/Troop Operations (and Digital Annex).
1 February 2000.
FM 3-06 [FM 90-10]. Urban Operations. 30 May 2001.
FM 3-07 [FM 100-20]. Stability Operations and Support Operations. 5 December 1990.
FM 3-07.3 [FM 100-23]. Peace Operations. 30 December 1994.

FM 3-09.4 [FM 6-20-40]. Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy). 5 January 1990.
FM 3-09.12 [FM 6-121]. Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures for Field Artillery Target
Acquisition. 25 September 1990.
FM 3-09.33 [FM 90-21]. JAAT Multiservice Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team
Operations. 3 June 1998.
FM 3-11.3 [FM(M) 3-3]. NBC Contamination Avoidance. 16 November 1992.

FM 3-11.4 [FM(M) 3-4]. NBC Protection (FMFM 11-9). 29 May 1992.
FM 3-11.19 [FM 3-19]. NBC Reconnaissance and Surveillance. 19 November 1993.
FM 3-11.101 [FM 3-101-1]. Smoke Squad/Platoon Operations Techniques, Tactics, and
Procedures. 20 September 1994.
Bibliography-1
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FM 3-18.12 [FM 90-4]. Air Assault Operations. 16 March 1987.

FM 3-20.95 [FM 17-95]. Cavalry Operations. 24 December 1996.
FM 3-20.971. Reconnaissance Troop. To Be Published.
FM 3-20.98 [FM 17-98]. Reconnaissance Platoon. To Be Published.
FM 3-21.75 [FM 21-75]. Combat Skills of the Soldier. 3 August 1984.
FM 3-34.1 [FM 90-7]. Combined Arms Obstacle Integration. 29 September 1994.
FM 3-34.2 [FM 90-13-1]. Combined Arms Breaching Operations. 31 August 2000.
FM 3-34.13 [FM 90-13]. River Crossing Operations. 26 January 1988.

FM 3-34.32 [FM 20-32]. Mine/Countermine Operations. 29 May 1998.
FM 3-52 [FM 100-103]. Army Airspace Command and Control (DCX). 7 October 1987.
FM 3-52-1 [FM 100-103-1]. ICAC2–Multiservice Procedures for Integrated Combat
Airspace Command and Control. June 2000.
FM 3-52-2 [FM 100-103-2]. TAGS Multiservice Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground
System. 29 July 1998.
FM 3-60 [FM 6-20-10]. Tactics ,Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process.
8 May 1996.
FM 3-90 [FM 100-40]. Tactics. 4 July 2001. 4 July 2001.

FM 3-90.2 [FM 71-2]. The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force.
27 September 1988.
FM 3-90.3 [FM 71-3]. The Mounted Brigade Combat Team. November 2001.
FM 3-91.123 [FM 71-123]. Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures for Combined Arms
Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team.
30 September 1992.
FM 3-100.4 [FM 20-400]. Environmental Considerations in Military Operations.
15 June 2000.
FM 3-100.21 [FM 100-21]. Contractors on the Battlefield. 26 March 2000.
FM 4-0 [FM 100-10]. Combat Service Support. 03 October 1995.
FM 4-01 [FM 55-1]. Army Transportation. 3 October 1995.
FM 4-01.1 [FM 55-9]. Unit Air Movement Planning. 5 May 1993.

FM 4-01.4 [FM 100-10-1]. Theater Distribution. 1 October 1999.
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17 March 1999.
FM 4-01.011 [FM 55-65]. Strategic Deployment by Surface Transportation [Unit Deploy
Operations]. 3 October 1995.
FM 4-01.41 [FM 55-20]. Army Rail Transport Units and Operations. 31 October 1986.
Bibliography-2
___________________________________________________________________________Bibliography
FM 4-01.51 [FM 55-21]. Railway Operating and Safety Rules. 17 July 1989.
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Armored Cavalry Regiment. 30 September 1993.
FM 4-100.2 [FM 100-10-2]. Contracting Support on the Battlefield. 4 August 1999.
FM 5-0 [FM 101-5]. Army Planning and Orders Preparation. 31 May 1997.
FM 5-19 [FM 100-14]. Risk Management. 23 April 1998.
FM 6-0 [FM 100-34]. Command and Control. To Be Published.
FM 6-02.7 [FM 24-7]. Tactical Local Area Network (LAN) Management.
8 October 1999.
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JP 3-09. Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. 12 May 1998.

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JP 4-01.4. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution.
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TC 3-34.489. The Soldier and the Environment. 8 May 2001.
TM 55-1520-240-10. Operator's Manual for UH-1H/ V Helicopters. 15 February 1988.
Bibliography-3
Index
Army tactical command and logistics package
A control system (ATCCS), (LOGPAC), 8-60 – 8-61
1-2, 2-41, 4-2 maintenance, 8-10, 8-55 –
actions on contact, 1-17 –
1-19, 3-17, 3-24, 3-40, 5-16 assembly area, 5-8 – 5-12 8-66
eight forms of contact, personnel support, 8-14,
1-16 – 1-17 B 8-76 – 8-85
advanced field artillery tactical battle command methodology, planning, 8-1, 8-13, 8-47,
data system, (AFATDS), 2-2 – 2-6 8-51 – 8-55
2-41, 2-43 battle handover, 5-32 reconstitution, 8-32, 8-46,
air and missile defense 8-91 – 8-93
squadron and above, 5-33
workstation (AMDWS), resupply operations,
squadron and below, 5-34
2-44 – 2-45 6-68 – 6-69, 8-46, 8-61,
battle tracking, C-5 – C-6 8-66
air defense, 1-22
battlefield operating systems, in stability and support
air defense artillery, 6-1, 6-106
1-20 – 1-23, 6-100. See also operations, D-28, D-38
active air defense, 6-107 intelligence, maneuver, fire
situational understanding,
command and control, support, air defense, mobility
8-1, 8-2, 8-7, 8-8, 8-9,
6-107 and survivability, combat
8-11 – 8-13
passive air defense, 6-106 service support, command
and control. support for attachments,
all source analysis system 8-61 – 8-62
(ASAS), 2-42, 6-93, 6-95,
support for detachments,
6-117 C
8-62
analysis and control team cavalry squadron (RSTA),
support for
(ACT), 2-17 1-1 – 1-2
reconnaissance
Army airspace command and missions, 1-6 – 1-8 operations, 8-53 – 8-54
control (A2C2), 6-21 – 6-30 organization, 1-3 – 1-6 support for security
Army aviation, 6-30, 6-36 close air support (CAS), 6-5 – operations, 8-54 – 8-55
air cavalry, 6-36 – 6-50 6-6, 6-17 – 6-20 trains, 8-13, 8-27, 8-44,
air-ground integration, collection management, C-1 – 8-45, 8-46 – 8-51
6-37 – 6-49, 6-53 – 6-60 C-4 transportation, 8-6, 8-8,
attack helicopter, 6-31 – COLT, 1-22 8-9, 8-14, 8-15, 8-17,
6-32, 6-50 – 6-60 combat service support, 1-23, 8-18, 8-19
assault and cargo 4-13 velocity of, 8-2, 8-6 – 8-11
helicopter, 6-32, 6-63 – brigade support battalion, combat service support control
6-74 8-3, 8-16 – 8-45 system (CSSCS), 2-45,
forward arming and classes of supply, 8-17, 8-12, 8-18, 8-44, 8-52, 8-53,
refueling point (FARP) 8-66 8-58, 8-67, 8-68, 8-72, 8-77,
operations, 6-71 – 6-74 8-79, 8-81
combat health support,
missions, 6-34 – 6-35 8-15, 8-85 – 8-91 combat support. See
joint air attack team intelligence (and electronic
convoy survivability, 8-54, warfare), fire support, target
operations, 6-20 – 6-21 8-62 acquisition, Army aviation,
Army battle command system essential functions, 8-14 – signal support, Army
(ABCS), 1-21, 2-41, 6-89, 8-15 airspace command and
6-97 control (A2C2), engineer
field services, 8-75 – 8-76
force agility, 8-2, 8-3 – 8-6
Index-1
FM 3-20.96_______________________________________________________________________________
support, air defense, air compliance inspection. See Force XXI Battle Command
defense artillery. stability operations and Brigade and Below
command and control (C2), support operations. (FBCB2), 1-2, 2-41 – 2-42,
1-3, 1-23, 2-1, 2-7, 2-30, computers, 2-40 – 2-48 4-2, 6-25
2-38, 4-13 contact paradigm, 1-15 – 1-19 forward area air defense
Air Force, 6-27 – 6-28 command, control,
contiguous operations, 1-14,
communications, and
Army airspace, 2-24 1-15
intelligence system
command group, 1-4, counterreconnaissance, 4-2, (FAADC3I), 2-44
2-12 – 2-13 4-7, 5-17
fratricide, 5-19, 5-23, 5-57, B-1,
digital systems, 2-14, 2-47 B-7 – B-13, H-17
global C2 system-Army D
(GCCS-A), 2-41 decontamination. See nuclear, G
information management, biological, chemical (NBC).
global combat service support-
2-8 – 2-10 defensive operations, 1-8, Army (GCSS-A), 8-12, 8-52
role of the commander, 1-13, 1-20, 4-1, 4-2, 4-26,
global command and control
2-6, 2-13 4-27, 5-23, 5-32, 6-16 –
system–Army (GCCS-A),
command post, 2-6, 2-11, 6-17, G-33
2-41
2-17 – 2-26, 6-26 – 6-27 deployment, E-1
graphic control measures, 2-3,
battle drills, H-5 – H-6 airlift operations, E-4 – 2-44, 5-48 – 5-49
battle update brief, H-2, E-14
ground sensor platoon, 1-1,
H-5 movement, E-2 – E-3 1-6, G-1, G-10 – G-34
combat trains, 2-27 – 2-28 predeployment activities, ground surveillance radar, 1-7,
command, control, E-2 3-28, 3-37, 3-42, 4-5, 4-8,
communications, and reception, staging, onward 4-11, 4-14, 4-19, 4-20, 4-31,
computers (C4) movement, and G-1, G-15, G-16 – G-24
architecture, H-1, H-12 integration, (RSOI),
communications, E-3 – E-4 H
2-31 – 2-39
human intelligence (HUMINT),
deployment operations, E 1-2, 3-2, 3-11, 3-37
H-11 – H-12 engineer support, 3-37, 3-38,
displacing, H-2, H-3 – H-4 3-40, 4-9, 4-13, 4-27, 4-30, I
field trains, 2-29, H-10 4-32, 6-1, 6-99 – 6-106
infrastructure, 3-8 – 3-9
positioning, H-1 – H-2 environmental protection, I-1
improved remotely monitored
recce troop, 2-30 risk assessment
battlefield sensor system
worksheet, I-3 – I-6
responsibilities, 2-32 (IREMBASS), 1-17, 3-28,
risk management process, 4-5, 4-8, 4-11, 4-19, 4-20,
SBCT CP organization,
I-1 – I-3 G-1, G-15, G-16 – G-17,
H-6 – H-8
exfiltration, 5-16 – 5-17 G-24 – G-34
security, H-1, H-2 – H-3
infiltration, 5-12 – 5-16
shift change briefing, H-4 –
H-5 F intelligence, 1-21, 6-1, D-17.
fire support, 1-21, 5-50, 6-1 See also human intelligence.
SOP, H-2, H-13 – H-18
assets and capabilities, and electronic warfare
squadron CP organization, (EW), 6-84
H-6, H-10 6-3 – 6-7
components, 6-4 military intelligence
surveillance troop, company, 6-90 – 6-98
2-30 – 2-31, H-10 planning, coordination,
execution, 6-13 – 6-17 intelligence preparation of the
tactical, 2-14 – 2-16 battlefield (IPB), 1-16, 1-17,
common ground station (CGS), fire support coordinator 1-19, 1-20, 2-1, 2-19, 2-20,
6-95, 6-96 (FSCOORD), 6-23 2-21, 3-5, 3-6, 3-9, 3-10,
communications, 2-31 – 2-40 fire support team (FIST), 5-12 3-11, 3-23, 3-25, 3-37, 3-46,
Index-2
_____________________________________________________________________________________Index
4-16, 5-29, 5-40, 5-41, 5-52, RQ-1A Global Hawk 1-2, 2-9, 3-10, 3-12, 3-13,
A-1, A-4 – A-6 unmanned aerial 3-18, 3-39, 3-41, 4-4, 4-7,
intelligence, surveillance, and vehicle, (UAV), F-10 – 4-8, 4-28,
reconnaissance (ISR), 1-2, F-11 mobility and survivability, 1-22,
1-3, 1-7, 1-9, 1-11, 1-12, secret internet protocol 4-13
1-15, 1-17 – 1-20, 2-1, 2-5, router network, F-5 mortar section, 1-5
2-6, 2-9, 2-13, 2-15, 2-19, systems architecture, movement, 5-2 — 5-4
2-20, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-5, 3-8, F-1 – F-2
3-11, 3-12, 3-19, 3-25, 3-26, planning, 5-4 – 5-8
tactical exploitation of
3-31, 3-32, 3-33, 3-36, 3-43, tactical, 5-2 – 5-7. See
national capabilities,
3-44, 3-46, 3-47, 4-4, 4-16, also tactical roadmarch.
(TENCAP), F-4
4-27, 4-28
Teammate, AN/TRQ-32A
intelligence systems N
(V) 2, F-25 – F-26
airborne reconnaissance national and joint intelligence
Trackwolf, AN/TSQ-152,
low (ARL), aircraft, assets, 6-117 – 6-128
F-12 – F-13
F-9 – F-10
Trailblazer, AN/TSQ-114, CIA, 6-120
commander’s tactical
F-23 – F-25 DoD, 6-120 – 6-125
terminal, AN/TSC-125,
F-27 – F-28 TROJAN SPIRIT II, F-17 – non-defense intelligence
F-20 elements, 6-125 –
common ground station
(CGS), F-15 – F-17 U-2 reconnaissance 6-128
aircraft, F-7 noncontiguous operations,
E-3 Sentry airborne
warning and control 1-14, 1-15, 2-39, 5-58 – 5-59
system (AWACS), F-5 – J nonlinear operations, 1-14
F-6 joint surveillance and target nuclear, biological, chemical
electronic processing and attack radar system (NBC) operations, 5-40 –
dissemination system (JSTARS), 3-41, 3-45, 4-4, 5-47, 6-1, 6-98 – 6-99
(EPDS), F-20 4-12, 6-117, F-8 – F-9 actions after NBC attack,
enhanced tactical unit 5-46 – 5-47
terminal (ETUT), F-22 L actions before NBC attack,
enhanced Trackwolf, 5-44 – 5-45
linear operations, 1-14
AN/TSQ-199, F-13 actions during NBC attack,
linkup, 5-17 – 5-23
global broadcast service 5-45 – 5-46
(GBS), F-3 – F-4 local area network (LAN), 2-46
decontamination, 5-43,
ground station module 5-46 – 5-47, 6-98
(GSM), F-13 – F-15 M defense, 5-42 – 5-43
Guardrail common sensor major theater of war (MTW), platoon, 1-6
(GR/CS), F-21 – F-22 1-2, 1-12, 3-6, 3-7, 3-13,
reconnaissance, 5-40 –
imagery processing and 3-14, 3-18, 3-40, 4-5, 4-7,
5-42
dissemination system 4-30, 4-31
reconnaissance and
(IPDS), F-23 maneuver, 1-21
security, 5-32
joint surveillance target maneuver control system
reconnaissance platoon,
attack radar system (MCS), 2-42, 3-25, 3-28,
5-43, G-34 – G-35
(JSTARS), F-8 – F-9 3-29, 4-17
reconnaissance system
mobile integrated tactical military decision-making
(NBCRS), 5-40 – 5-42
terminal, AN/TSQ-2000, process (MDMP), 1-16, 2-4,
F-26 – F-27 2-5, 2-15, 3-14, 3-26, 4-16,
Quickfix, AN/ALQ-151(V)2, 6-9, 6-10 —6-11, A-1 – A-3, O
F-26 A-6 – A-16 observation and fields of fire,
RC-135V/W RIVET JOINT mission, enemy, terrain, troops cover, obstacles, key terrain,
aircraft, F-6 – F-7 and support available, time and avenues of approach
available, and civil (OCOKA), 3-9
considerations (METT-TC),
Index-3
FM 3-20.96_______________________________________________________________________________
obstacle breaching operations, operations, 6 43, G-15, 3-40, 4-5, 4-7, 4-30, 5-52,
4-16, 5-51 – 5-58 G-23 5-58
offensive operations, 1-8, 4-1, pull, 1-20 society, 3-6 – 3-8
4-2, 4-23, 4-26, 4-27, 4-32, push, 1-19 stability operations, 3-15, D-1 –
5-22, 5-23, 5-32, 6-15 – D-3. See also stability
route, 3-37 – 3-38
6-16, G-13, G-33 operations and support
sensor, 3-19 – 3-20
operational environment, operations.
1-10 – 1-20, 3-3 – 3-5 tempo, 3-14, 3-16, 3-33
considerations for, D-8 –
orders, 2-5 zone, 3-20 – 3-29 D-9
FRAGO, A-39 rehearsals, 3-44, 4-17 types of, D-3 – D-8
OPORD, A-17 – A-18, relief operations, 5-23 – 5-27 stability operations and support
A-19 – A-35, B-10 – relief in place, 5-24 – 5-26 operations, 3-3, 3-5 – 3-7,
B-13 retrograde operations, 4-1, 3-9, 3-10, 3-13, 3-14, 3-17,
WARNO, A-19 5-27 – 5-32 3-40, 5-52, 5-58, 6-17, G-16,
G-23, G-33 – G-34
risk management, B-1 – B-6
P compliance inspections,
river crossing, 5-48 – 5-51 D-29
passage of lines, 5-32 – 5-39 rules of engagement (ROE), CSS considerations, D-20
PROPHET, 1-7, 1-17, 3-37, 1-11, 3-15, 3-34, 6-11, D-9,
4-8, 4-11, 4-19, G-1, G-13 – D-17 – D-18 force protection, D-1, D-20
G-16 rules of interaction (ROI), D-16, intelligence, D-17
D-19 – D-20 joint military commission
R meeting, D-29 – D-33
readiness condition S media considerations,
(REDCON), 5-8 D-21, D-35 – D-37
security drill, 4-8, 4-17
recce troop, 1-5 minefield clearance,
security operations, 4-1 – 4-5,
reconnaissance, 6-104 – 6-105 D-38 – D-40
4-7, 6-43, 6-105, G-16, G-23
and security, 2-31, 3-1, planning and preparation,
security missions, 1-6, 4-2
4-26, 4-27, 5-25 – 5-26 D-16 – D-20
area security, 4-3, 4-26 –
and surveillance (R&S), react to civil disturbance,
4-29
2-26, 3-43, 3-46, 4-2, D-33 – D-35
5-41 convoy security, 4-3,
squadron tasks, D-23 –
4-32 – 4-35
aerial, 3-19. See also D-40
unmanned aerial cover, 4-2
squadron’s role in, D-15 –
vehicle (UAV). fundamentals, 4-3 – 4-5 D-40
area, 3-29 – 3-37 guard, 4-2 soldiers’ responsibilities,
command push, 1-19 – high-value asset, 4-3, D-21 – D-22
1-20 4-26 – 4-29 Stryker brigade combat team
commander’s essential route, 4-3, 4-29 – 4-32 (SBCT), 1-1 – 1-2, 1-8 –
guidance, 3-14 – 3-18 screen, 4-2, 4-9 – 4-25 1-10, 3-11, 3-24, 3-29,
dismounted, 3-18 3-31 – 3-37, 3-43, 6-1,
signal support, 6-110 –
6-84 – 6-98
engagement criteria, 6-117
3-16 – 3-18, 3-33 support operations, D-9 –
situational awareness, 1-2, 2-3,
D-15. See also stability
focus, 3-6 – 3-9, 3-14, 3-2, 4-1
operations and support
3-15, 3-33 situational understanding, 1-2, operations.
fundamentals of, 3-10 – 1-3, 1-8, 1-10, 2-3, 3-2, 8-1,
characteristics of, D-10
3-13 8-2, 8-7, 8-8, 8-9,
8-11 – 8-13 considerations for, D-14 –
handover, 3-42 – 3-50 D-15
missions, 1-6 smaller-scale contingency
(SSC), 1-2, 1-13, 3-6, 3-7, forms of, D-11 – D-14
mounted, 3-18 – 3-19 3-9, 3-13, 3-14, 3-15, 3-17, types of, D-10 – D-11
multidimensional, 3-5
Index-4
_____________________________________________________________________________________Index
surveillance, 4-2 offensive operations,

aerial, 3-42 U 7-16 – 7-17
dismounted, 3-41, G-12, unmanned aerial vehicle, planning, 7-2, 7-18 – 7-36
G-15 (UAV), 1-6, 3-18, 6-7, 6-24, Stryker brigade combat
mounted, 3-41, G-13 – F10 – F-11 team’s role in, 7-14 –
G-15 platoon, G-1 – G-3 7-18
operations, 3-38 – 3-39 urban operations, 3-9, G-16 society (or social), 3-6 –
3-8, 7-2, 7-7, 7-19
planning, 3-40 – 3-42 defensive operations,
7-17 – 7-18 terrain, 3-9, 7-1, 7-2 – 7-5
sensor, 3-42
execution, 7-37 – 7-42 threat, 3-6, 7-2, 7-5, 7-7 –
troop, 1-6, G-1
7-14
fundamentals, 7-14 – 7-16
T helicopter support, 7-29 –
7-32 W
tactical internet, 2-41, 2-47 –
infrastructure, 3-8 – 3-9, wide area network, 2-47
2-48
7-2, 7-5 – 7-6
tactical road march, 5-3 – 5-4
target acquisition, 6-7 – 6-12
terrain, 3-9
threat, 3-6
Index-5
FM 3-20.96
23 DECEMBER 2002
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0307710
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the
initial distribution number 115891, requirements for FM 3-20.96.
PIN: 080700-000

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FM 3-20.

CAVALRY SQUADRON (RSTA)

Chapter 4 SECURITY OPERATIONS.......................................................................................4-1

Chapter 8 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT/SUSTAINMENT ...................................................8-1

The squadron is essential to successful SBCT operations within this

• Provides a significant dismounted/mounted reconnaissance

• Assures protection of the highly mobile, light-armored force

The squadron operations are key to the success of the SBCT in

The fundamental role of the squadron is to conduct ISR operations

Outfitted with Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS)

SECTION I – CAVALRY SQUADRON (RSTA) ORGANIZATION

1-1. The squadron serves as the brigade commander’s primary

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP

Figure 1-1. Squadron Organization

Figure 1-2. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop

Figure 1-3. Recce Troop Organization – Troop Headquarters

Figure 1-4. Recce Troop Organization – Recce Platoons

Figure 1-5. Recce Troop Organization – Mortar Section

SECTION II – CAVALRY SQUADRON (RSTA) MISSIONS

1-7. The squadron’s primary missions that support the SBCT’s

• Establish analog and digital information linkages

SECTION III – STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM OVERVIEW

1-11. The SBCT is a full-spectrum combat force. It has utility in all

SBCT CAPABILITIES AND ORGANIZATION

excellent operational and tactical mobility, enhanced situational

Figure 1-6. Stryker Brigade Combat Team Organization

SECTION IV – OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

counter the technological and numerical advantages of US joint

1-22. Potential adversaries recognize that the US will likely retain

CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR THEATERS OF WAR

forces will also be part of a strategy of simultaneous, distributed

CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES

CHARACTERISTICS OF PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS

CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

operations and support operations. The squadron may perform a

Figure 1-7. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Area of Operation

RE-EXAMINING THE CONTACT PARADIGM

• Situations involving NBC conditions.

STEPS FOR CONDUCTING ACTIONS ON CONTACT

1-41. When there is no intelligence about the threat’s location,

• How to gain positional advantage over the threat (from the

Choose and Recommend a COA

1-52. This purpose is similar to reconnaissance push in that

SECTION V – BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS

detection and assessing portions. FM 3-60 [FM 6-20-10] has more

Figure 1-8. Fires and Effects Coordination Methodology

MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

COMMAND AND CONTROL

SECTION I – THE ART OF COMMAND

2-1. Command and control are interrelated. Command resides with

• The elements of command (authority, decision making, and

BATTLE COMMAND METHODOLOGY

Figure 2-1. Commander’s Visualization

environment, developing a desired end state that represents mission

2-6. As the commander receives staff analysis of the mission, he

2-7. The commander focuses on three main factors during

Figure 2-2. Seeing the Battlefield