U.S.

Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts:

Introduction, Background and Analyses

Peter M. Swartz
with Karin Duggan

MISC D0026421.A1/Final December 2011

CNA is a not-for-profit organization whose professional staff of over 700 provides in-depth analysis and results-oriented solutions to help government leaders choose the best courses of action. Founded in 1942, CNA operates the Institute for Public Research and the Center for Naval Analyses, the federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. CNA Strategic Studies (CSS), created in 2000, conducts high-quality research on and analysis of issues of strategic, regional, and policy importance. CSS analyses are based on objective, rigorous examination and do not simply echo conventional wisdom. CSS provides analytic support to U.S. Government organizations and the governments of partner countries. CSS also maintains notable foundationsponsored and self-initiated research programs. CSS includes a Strategic Initiatives Group, an International Affairs Group, and a Center for Stability and Development. The Strategic Initiatives Group (SIG) looks at issues of U.S. national security, and military strategy, policy and operations, with a particular focus on maritime and naval aspects. SIG employs experts in historical analyses, futures planning, and long-term trend analysis based on scenario planning, to help key decision makers plan for the future. SIG specialties also include issues related to regional and global proliferation, deterrence theory, threat mitigation, and strategic planning for combating threats from weapons of mass destruction. The Strategic Studies Division is led by Vice President and Director Dr. Eric V. Thompson, who is available at 703-824-2243 and on e-mail at thompsoe@cna.org. The executive assistant to the Vice President and Director is Ms. Rebecca Martin, at 703-824-2604. The principal author of this study thanks especially Karin Duggan for graphic assistance; Loretta Ebner for administrative assistance; Gregory Kaminski, Laurie Ann Lakatosh, and Rhea Stone for library assistance; and Dana Smith and Anwar Fry for production assistance. A full listing of substantive contributors can be found in Peter M. Swartz and Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Introduction and Background: Volume I, (D0026421.A1, December 2011). A full listing of all volumes in the CNA Navy Strategy series can be found on the inside back cover of this document. Approved for distribution: December 2011

Dr. W. Eugene Cobble, Jr. Director, Strategic Initiatives Group

This document represents the best opinion of the author at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited. Copies of this document can be obtained through the Defense Technical Information Center at www.dtic.mil or contact CNA Document Control and Distribution Section at 703-824-2123. Copyright 2012 CNA This work was created in the performance of Federal Government Contract Number N00014-11-D-0323. Any copyright in this work is subject to the Government's Unlimited Rights license as defined in DFARS 252.227-7013 and/or DFARS 252.227-7014. The reproduction of this work for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited. Nongovernmental users may copy and distribute this document in any medium, either commercially or noncommercially, provided that this copyright notice is reproduced in all copies. Nongovernmental users may not use technical measures to obstruct or control the reading or further copying of the copies they make or distribute. Nongovernmental users may not accept compensation of any manner in exchange for copies. All other rights reserved.

Contents
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Overview & description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Study origins & sponsorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Approach & methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Caveats & limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 What are capstone documents? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Terminology & definitions: major issues . . . . . . . . . 20 Can/should the US Navy have a strategy? . . . . . . . 41 Kinds of policies & strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 Pre-1970s US Navy capstone documents . . . . . . . .47
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Actual document texts: Sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58 Analyzing capstone documents: Issues identified . .60 Appendices: Documents, leaders, study contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96

Dedication
Five OPNAV Strategy & Concepts Branch (N513) staff officers died or were severely wounded in the line of duty in the Al Qaeda attack on the Pentagon, September 11, 2001
CAPT Bob Dolan USN
Branch head

LCDR Bill Donovan USN LCDR Pat Dunn USN LCDR Dave Williams USN LT Kevin Shaeffer USN

This study is respectfully dedicated in their honor

3

30-40 Capstone Documents: 1970-2010

Project SIXTY & Missions of the U.S. Navy Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, NWP 1 (5) Sea Plan 2000 CNO Strategic Concepts & Future of U.S. Sea Power The Maritime Strategy (8) The Way Ahead The Navy Policy Book . . . From the Sea NDP 1: Naval Warfare ForwardFrom the Sea Navy Operational Concept (NOC) Anytime, Anywhere Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) (2) Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS Naval Power 21 . . . A Naval Vision Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO) Fleet Response Plan (FRP) Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 08 Naval Operations Concept (NOC) Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 (Change 1) Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 12 Naval Operations Concept (NOC) NDP 1: Naval Warfare Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13 Sep 1970, Mar-Apr 1974 Dec 1975-May 78 Mar 1978 Jan, May 1979 Nov 1982-May 1990 Apr 1991 May 1992 Nov 1992 Mar 1994 Oct 1994 May 1997 Nov 1997 Aug 1999 & Apr 2000 Jun 2002 Oct 2002 Apr 2003 May 2003 Apr 2006 Sep 2006 Sep 2007 Oct 2007 Nov 2007 May 2009 Oct 2009 May 2010 Aug 2010 Oct 2010

Overview of whats here

What this is
A study of the development of US Navy strategy and policy, 1970-2010
By analyzing content & context of official Navy strategy & policy documents In briefing slide format. Unclassified. In seventeen volumes (this is the introductory volume) Parsed by decade (1970s, 1980s,1990s, 2000s) With some discussion of pre-1970 documents & 2011 events Comparisons & analyses Recommendations: How to write the next one
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Analysis of each document

What was it? Why was it written? What was going on at the time? What documents did it cite? What other documents had influence at the time? How was it written? What were its key ideas? What did it say that was new? What did it leave out? What has been written about it? For what was it criticized? What was its influence & why?
7

Substance (vs. form): Slides w/ blue borders

What were its key ideas? What did it say that was new? What did it leave out?

What else is here? Context for each decade

Comprehensive surveys of
The global system; world events The nation: US political, economic, opinion trends US national security policies; planned & actual adversaries Defense, services, Navy budgets & manpower trends Allied, joint & US Navy operational command structures US national security & defense documents USN deployment strategy, ops, exercises, forces USN status, force level numbers & capability trends
Incl. organizational development, sealift, basing, Merchant Marine, shipbuilding, key individuals, Navy-relevant policy literature, ONI public documents

USN relations w/ USMC, USCG, USAF, USA, foreign navies

Incl. relevant developments within each service
9

Purpose of this study

To identify, organize & present data (and context) on development & influence of USN capstone documents, 1970-2010 To analyze the data and make comparisons, judgments & recommendations to inform current and future USN capstone document efforts

10

Why this study? And why now?

USN developed a New Maritime Strategy (2005-07) As part of development process, USN wanted:
Record of previous such endeavors Useful insights drawn from that record

Subsequently, USN wanted:

Record of development of new maritime strategy itself Record of development of four 2009/2010 documents derived from new maritime strategy Documents useful for educating USN pol-mil officer sub-specialty community in their field
11

The utility of looking at the record

The past is our best guide to the future. Actually, the past is our only guide to the future; it is the sole source of evidence. Since the future, by definition and the laws of physics, has yet to happen, any and every claim about the future is guesswork; it is theory, speculation. If history, by your choice, is a closed book to you, and the future -- the focus of your interest -- has yet to happen, what remains? The answer is the present and the lessons you derive from your personal life experience. These aids to wisdom are unlikely to be impressive.
Colin Gray, Coping with Uncertainty: Dilemmas of Defense Planning Comparative Strategy (2008)
12

Premise
I believe in the power of our past to inspire and instruct.

ADM Michael Mullen, USN Chief of Naval Operations 22 July 2005 U.S. Naval Academy Annapolis, Maryland

13

What this study can do

Help USN better understand why it is what it is today Help foster thinking about appropriate USN roles in the future Help inform USN decisions on formulation and dissemination of new capstone documents
Identify stages in document development, dissemination Give range of USN options & choices; best practices

Provide context, perspective to USN staff officers Provide a basis for more sophisticated analyses
14

What study drafts have already done (I)

Helped inform USN decisions on formulation and dissemination of new capstone documents
E.g.: Naval Operations Concept 2010

Provide context, perspective to USN staff officers

E.g.: OPNAV N51, N00X, N00Z

Used by USN CNO Transition Team (2010)

15

What study drafts have already done (II)

Provided a basis for more detailed analyses
Dr. John Hattendorfs edited NAVWARCOL volumes on US naval strategy in 1970s, 1980s, 1990s Ph.D. dissertations by
CAPT Peter Haynes USN Larissa Forster (Switzerland) Sebastian Bruns (Germany) Amund Lundesgaard (Norway)

Simultaneous and subsequent CNA studies

16

Study origins: 14 April 2005

3/1 Strategy Workshop at Lockheed Martin offices
POC: CAPT Robby Harris USN (Ret)
Director, Advanced Concepts

To inform 3/1 Strategy construct

Original request
Look at
The Maritime Strategy (1982-9) . . . From the Sea (1992) Forward . . . From the Sea (1994)

Answer questions
What were they? What prompted these initiatives? What was the Effect? Keys to Success?

But . . . we found that there were many more

17

Study sponsorship
OPNAV N51 (2005-7) Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work (2010-11)

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Analytic approach
Understand the question Develop appropriate methodology to answer the question Gather data: Documents, interviews, workshops
Use only unclassified & declassified sources

Find patterns in the data Analyze the patterns & make comparisons Make judgments & recommendations Keep unclassified, for wide distribution & broad potential advisory/educative effects
19

What questions does this study answer?

Original question:
What should the U.S. Navy do to ensure its next capstone documents are successful?

Refined questions:
What should decision-makers and authors consider when drafting Navy capstone documents?
What are the right questions to answer? What past best practices have been identified?

What has been the Navys recent prior experience in drafting capstone documents?

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Methodology
Empower an experienced analyst/ SME Conduct extensive naval, academic literature review Conduct interviews & personal correspondence Conduct conference, workshops. Surface data, issues Draft, present strawman briefs, as murder boards Provide updated briefs & circulate successive drafts within wide network, for review & criticism
Include sponsors, USN, retired USN, outside USN

Develop typologies from data & analyses Improve data and analysis; develop recommendations Socialize approach, findings prior to final publication
21

Study analyzes documents

There is a range of options to choose from in organizing an analysis of the evolution of strategiclevel thinking
Ideas Events Personalities Documents

This study focuses on & is organized by documents Why? Designed principally to help future US Navy strategic-level document-writers & contributors

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11

Study format: Slides

Why slide format?
Slides are the lingua franca of the practicing US Navy strategy & policy community, and those who support & comment on US Navy policy & strategy Document began as a briefing Original intent: Publish an annotated briefing
I.e.: Each page to have a slide on top, with explanatory text on bottom

Slide numbers grew as more data & analyses were included Number of slides and time & funding limitations eventually precluded annotation

Limitations
Provides only a (detailed) skeleton; lacks flesh & muscle
23

Methodological difficulties
Proof of document success is impossible Too many interacting military, political, bureaucratic, economic & human factors to track Impossibility of untangling all relationships Difficulty in finding data
Very sparse and unbalanced literature

Difficulty in finding accurate data

Memories can be thin reeds

Precise parallels between past & present & future are speculative
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Caveat: The Navy is about ops, not documents (I) Essence of post-WW II US Navy is operations
Specifically: Global forward operations in peacetime, crises & war

Most post-WW II US Navy officers most of the time have been at-sea operators, or direct enablers of operations, not desk-bound scribes Focus of study, however, is on documents, not operations Necessarily focuses on USN officers as scribes No intent to slight importance of activities of operators, or of scribes when on operational tours, in contributing to US Navy & to the Nation
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Caveat: The Navy is about ops, not documents (II)

We believe in command, not staff. We believe we have real things to do.

Admiral Arleigh Burke USN Chief of Naval Operations (1955-1961)

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Caveat: The Navy is about ops, not documents (III)

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Study focus: Strategic level of war

Levels of war
Strategy Operations Tactics

Inter-related
Strategy requires tactics (top-down construct) Tactics can enable strategy (bottom-up construct)

USN operators mostly focus on tactical level at sea Study focus, however, is on strategic level of war
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Limits of this study (I)

Study cannot definitively ensure or predict future success: What will work & what wont It also cannot definitively explain what worked in the past
Valid measures of effectiveness (MOEs) difficult to identify, calculate & compare Each situation had important unique characteristics Few past efforts to measure success beyond anecdotes Past data on success missing, uneven &/or uncertain
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Limits of this study (II)

Study does not focus on:
Allied, coalition, national security, defense, joint or other service or agency strategies and documents Except as they relate to US Navy capstone strategy & concept documents

Study does not provide full texts of each document

Available in related Naval War College Newport Paper series

Limitations due to classification of some documents

Many documents have been declassified Some documents remain classified, which limits UNCLAS description & analysis
30

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Limits of this study (III): Classification

Project SIXTY Missions of the U.S. Navy NWP 1 (Rev. A): Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy Sea Plan 2000 Future of U.S. Sea Power; CNO Strategic Concepts The Maritime Strategy The Way Ahead The Navy Policy Book . . . From the Sea Naval Doctrine Pub (NDP) 1: Naval Warfare Forward . . . From the Sea Navy Operational Concept (NOC) Anytime, Anywhere Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) I & II Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPs Naval Power 21: A Naval Vision Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO) Fleet Response Plan (FRP) Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 08 Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2006 Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 (Change 1) Navy Strategic Guidance (NSG) ISO PR 11 Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 12 Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010 Naval Doctrine Pub (NDP) 1: Naval Warfare Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 13 Declassified UNCLAS UNCLAS UNCLAS Exec. Summary; study still SECRET UNCLAS; Strategic Concepts still TOP SECRET Some UNCLAS; SECRET versions declassified UNCLAS UNCLAS UNCLAS UNCLAS UNCLAS UNCLAS UNCLAS NSPG I still SECRET; NSPG II UNCLAS UNCLAS UNCLAS UNCLAS Largely UNCLAS Two versions: UNCLAS; still SECRET UNCLAS Still SECRET UNCLAS Still SECRET Still SECRET Still SECRET UNCLAS UNCLAS 31 Still SECRET

What are capstone documents?

Criteria
General, over-arching Washington-level documents Convey fundamental beliefs about the application of US naval power Intended to inform USN subordinate commands & documents
Ref A

CNO involvement, visibility, signature

A couple of exceptions

Self-descriptions are of little help

Strategies, concepts, visions, strategic plans, etc. Few formal definitions Even formal definitions change over time
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30-40 Capstone Documents: 1970-2010

Project SIXTY & Missions of the U.S. Navy Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, NWP 1 (5) Sea Plan 2000 CNO Strategic Concepts & Future of U.S. Sea Power The Maritime Strategy (8) The Way Ahead The Navy Policy Book . . . From the Sea NDP 1: Naval Warfare ForwardFrom the Sea Navy Operational Concept (NOC) Anytime, Anywhere Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) (2) Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS Naval Power 21 . . . A Naval Vision Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO) Fleet Response Plan (FRP) Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 08 Naval Operations Concept (NOC) Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 (Change 1) Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 12 Naval Operations Concept (NOC) NDP 1: Naval Warfare Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13 Sep 1970, Mar-Apr 1974 Dec 1975-May 78 Mar 1978 Jan, May 1979 Nov 1982-May 1990 Apr 1991 May 1992 Nov 1992 Mar 1994 Oct 1994 May 1997 Nov 1997 Aug 1999 & Apr 2000 Jun 2002 Oct 2002 Apr 2003 May 2003 Apr 2006 Sep 2006 Sep 2007 Oct 2007 Nov 2007 May 2009 Oct 2009 May 2010 Aug 2010 Oct 2010

33

No in-depth analysis here of: (I)

Unsigned & aborted draft efforts, e.g.:
Won if by Sea (1990) The Strategic Concept of the Naval Service (1992) NDP 3: Naval Operations (1995-6) Power and Influence . . . From the Sea 2020 Vision (1996) Naval Operational Concept (1997) 4X4 Strategy (1998) Beyond the Sea . . . (1998-9) Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century (1999-2001) Navy Strategic Planning Guidance 2001 (2000) 21st Century Navy (2000) 3/1 Strategy (2005) Navy Operating Concept (2006)
34

17

No in-depth analysis here of: (II)

2 USN Transformation Roadmaps (2002, 2003) 3 USN-USCG National Fleet policy statements (1998, 2002, 2006) CNO Guidance (CNOGs) & Navy Objectives ONI products (e.g., Understanding Soviet Naval Developments) Influential in-house USN studies & analyses Unofficial efforts

35

No in-depth analysis here of: (III)

USN annual Capstone communications to the Congress Annual Navy Posture Statements (through FY 2000, & resumed) Navy testimony before Congress Annual Navy Program Guides (since 1993) Annual Navy Budget Highlights documents

36

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Posture statements; Program guides; Budget highlights

37

Posture Statements & Program Guides (I)

Annual general pubs justifying Navy overall budget requests to Congress First chapter normally presented Navy policy & strategy
Often reprinted verbatim or paraphrased current USN capstone document But not always comprehensive (e.g.: FY 07 Program Guide)

Reflect current CNO & OPNAV thinking Short-term influence: one year; but opportunity for continuity
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Posture Statements & Program Guides (II)

Last glossy Navy Posture Statement: for FY 2000
SECDEF Rumsfeld cancelled all glossy service posture statements for FY 2001 & later But still published as initial CNO FY budget testimony

1st annual Navy Program Guide (Force 2001) published for FY 93

Became VisionPresencePower in FY 1998 Became Sea Power for a New Era in 2006 No program guide published in 2008 for FY 09
Printed copy OBE due to 2008 DDG-1000 decisions

2009 & 2010 editions titled simply Navy Program Guide

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Terminology & definitions: Difficult issues

This study
Identifies & acknowledges the issues Does not address these issues definitively

Worthy of further study & analysis

40

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Identifying the right terminology

41

Terminology: USN capstone documents

At least 35 capstone strategy & concepts documents since 1970
Some explicitly said they were strategy or strategic
E.g.: The Maritime Strategy, Navy Strategic Plan

Some explicitly said they were visions or concepts Others said they were something else, but contained important elements of strategy or vision
E.g.: Navy Policy Book, Fleet Response Plan

Mosteven those labeled strategyhave occasioned debates as to whether or not they really were strategies
42

21

Were capstone documents strategies?

Or were they
Doctrines? Concepts? Strategic concepts? Concepts of operations (CONOPS)? Principles? Mission statements? Missions? Visions? White Papers? Philosophies or styles of warfare? Policies? Guidance? Strategic plans? Analysis? Navy stories? Narratives? Ethos? Creeds? Core values? Charters?

Definitions differ & change over time for each

43

Terminology: Authorities & reality

Agreed DOD joint definitions
Joint Pub 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2007) Evolves over time. Continuously updated Missing some definitions; in other Joint Pubs however NTRP 1-02 Naval Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2006) Superseded NWP 1-02 (1995) & NWP-3 (pre-1995) Often at variance with formal joint & Navy definitions

Navy definitions

Navy usage

44

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The Navy and terminology (I)

US Navy never rigorous in its approach to policy/ strategy/ concepts terminology
Definitions considered dull, unimportant

Individual idiosyncratic approaches abound (and change over time) Generally little knowledge or appreciation of existence of joint and even Navy official definitions Strong contrast to Joint Staff & US Army approach
Definitions considered important, useful, necessary Included in Gen Martin Dempsey USA list of issues important to the US Army: Getting the words right (2010)
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The U.S. Navy & terminology (II)

When I use a word . . . it means just what I choose it to mean . . .
Humpty Dumpty
In Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass

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The U.S. Navy & terminology (III)

The record:
Terminological disinterest, disregard, unawareness,

E.g.: USN leaders variously termed . . . From the Sea

(1992):
A white paper A vision A strategic concept

47

Terminology: Scattered among sources (I)

Example #1: Missions & capabilities (in 2009)
Sea control operations Power projection
Maritime power projection

Joint Navy
Joint

Forward presence Strategic deterrence Humanitarian assistance/DR

Humanitarian & civil assistance Foreign HA, Foreign DA

Navy Joint ----- ---Joint Joint

Maritime security operations (MSO)

Maritime interception operations (MIO)

-----

---Navy

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Terminology: Scattered among sources (II)

Example #2: Warfare tasks (in 2009)
Strike warfare Amphibious operations Anti-air warfare Anti-submarine warfare Anti-surface warfare
Surface warfare

Navy Joint Navy Joint ----- ---Joint

Mine warfare Naval special warfare Electronic warfare Information operations

Joint Navy Joint Joint

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What is strategy? (I)

The concept of strategy has proven notoriously difficult to define. Many theorists have attempted it, only to see their efforts wither beneath the blasts of critics . . . Straightforward definitions go fundamentally astray, for strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.
Williamson Murray & Mark Grimsby Introduction: On Strategy The Making of Strategy (1994)
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What is strategy? (II)

Enormous literature. Numerous definitions
Definitions evolve & diverge
The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.
Joint Pub 1-02 (1994)

A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.
Joint Pub 1-02 (2008)

This definition is bureaucratically appealing, politically correct, and relatively useless.

Gabriel Marcella & Steven Fought Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century JFQ (1st qtr 2009)
51

What is strategy? (III)

Strategy = plan of action

Choosing & using certain Means in chosen Ways to achieve certain specific Ends In a given Context

52

26

What is a Navy strategy?

The US Navys theory about how its forces contribute to US national security
A set of concepts & arguments

It should coherently enumerate, think through, lay out, & ideally prioritize:
Maritime components of threats to the nation Strategies those threats are likely to employ Reasons why these threats & strategies are salient Optimal potential Navy operations to counter those threats & strategies Reasons how & why these operations will work
53

Navy, naval & maritime strategy

All include how the U.S. Navy is/should be used Naval strategy sometimes also means include USMC Maritime strategy sometimes means include USCG
Maritime industries believe it should include them too

Maritime strategy has also meant a type of total national strategy As opposed to a continental strategy

54

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Naval Strategy: The formal Navy definition The use of naval forces (including naval aviation and Marine forces) to achieve naval objectives determined by national strategy, with the overall objective of controlling the seas and denying to an enemy the use of those sea areas important to enemy operations
Virtually unchanged in 20+ years
NTRP 1-02 Navy Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Aug 2006) NWP 1-02 Navy Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Jun 1995) NWP 3 (Rev. D) Naval Terminology (Feb 1985)

Exclusive focus on sea control

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Strategy & doctrine (I)

Most of these documents are closer to doctrine than strategy
Doctrine is
Abstract, conceptual & general Official and authoritative (Directive in joint system, US Army)

Strategy has a particular context

USN formally says doctrine is an essential bridge between strategy & Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTP) (NDP 1 Naval Warfare (1994))

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Strategy & doctrine (II)

Strategy is a far more positive term in USN than doctrine
USN officers wary of doctrine. What little doctrine the Navy has, it ignores in favor of operational flexibility
CAPT Wayne Hughes USN (Ret), Fleet Tactics

To the naval strategist, the combination of definitions and doctrine becomes rather toxic
CAPT Roger Barnett USN (Ret), Navy Strategic Culture (2009)

Few USN mechanisms to ensure knowledge of doctrine Strong contrast w/ joint system & other services, esp/ US Army But 1st study of doctrine was USN (Dudley Knox, 1915)
57

Strategy & doctrine (III)

Navy wariness re: doctrine not solely a US phenomenon
Over the course of their histories, most Commonwealth navies have acquired reputations for their aversion to written doctrine
Aaron P. Jackson, opening sentence in Keystone Doctrine Development in Five Commonwealth Navies: A Comparative Perspective (2010)

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Strategy & concepts (I)

Dictionary definition of concepts: General ideas Joint forces definition of concepts: Future-oriented; beyond the FYDP
Innovative, debatable, unvalidated As opposed to doctrine (Current, authoritative)

Actual Navy usage: Closer to dictionary than joint usage

Sister service usage tracks with Joint definition

Operational, operating & operations concepts

Have specific, future-oriented meanings in joint usage Navy view has been that they are closer to capstone doctrines

59

Strategy & concepts (II)

Navy striving to develop an approach to concepts reflecting the joint force approach (2009-11)
OPNAVINST 5401.9 Navy Concept Generation and Concept Development Program (Feb 2010)
A concept is a notion or statement of an idea with an expression of how something might be done; a visualization of future operations . . .

Navy Warfare Development Command, Guide for Navy Concept Generation and Concept Development Program (Feb 2010)
Similar to OPNAVINST Superseded by Jun 2011 edition But content of various Naval Operations Concepts often has not conformed to these definitions
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Strategy & concepts (III)

Those who think about naval matters are, for the most part, entirely at ease with concepts and quite uninterested in definitions
CAPT Roger Barnett USN (Ret) Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently (2009)

But his idea of a concept is itself not in conformance with contemporary joint usage
Concepts are abstract, indistinct, and malleable Closer to common dictionary usage
61

Strategy & strategic concepts

Strategic concept
Popularized by Samuel Huntington in 1954 Periodically used by Navy and naval commentators No official joint definition Some Navy strategy documents may really be strategic concepts A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

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Strategy & concepts of operations

Concept of operations (CONOPS)
A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation
JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary (2008)

Fleet Warfighting CONOPS

A written document specifying how the Fleet will employ current capabilities . . . to effectively and efficiently perform the missions assigned by the Combatant Commander (CCDR) to naval forces
COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 5401.1A Fleet Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development ( Mar 2009)

63

Strategy & principles

Universally accepted, self-evident truths. Axioms. To inform, for better understanding. Not directive. Navy leaders have often put forth their own sets of principles (often calling doctrine principles) USN has had little recent interest in classic principles of war A few exceptions:
NWP 10 Naval Warfare (1950s) included Principles of War NDP1 Naval Warfare (1994) included Principles of War RADM John Morgan interest (2003)
Yielded essay contest, book, articles
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Strategy & vision

Term borrowed from American corporate business usage
Popular in 1990s Future-oriented, like concepts Short, succinct, inspiring statements of what an organization intends to become & achieve at some point in the future. Broad, all-inclusive, forward-thinking intentions. The image of an organizations goals before it sets out to reach them. Describes aspirations for the future, without necessarily specifying the means that will be used to achieve desired ends. May be as vague as a dream or as precise as a goal or a mission statement
65

Strategy & white papers

Term borrowed from UK usage
Authoritative report outlining government policy & proposed actions Play specific roles in UK politics & government policy Not part of normal US government usage But term sometimes applied to US Navy capstone documents to lend them authority

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Strategy & philosophies of warfare (I)

Philosophies, styles, types of warfare Usually discussed in pairs, as polar opposites One pole often used as a straw man
Annihilation vs. attrition Attrition vs. maneuver Attrition vs. effects-based operations (EBO) Conventional vs. nuclear (or strategic) Conventional vs. unconventional (or guerrilla) Irregular vs. regular (or conventional) Asymmetric vs. symmetric 3-block war, hybrid war vs. single-type
67

Strategy & philosophies of warfare (II)

Attrition warfare vs. maneuver warfare Characterized USMC writings
Late 1980s onward

Adopted in several subsequent Navy & naval capstone documents Large literature analyzing maneuver vs. attrition Terms defined as philosophies in Navy Supplement to Joint Pub 1-02 (NTRP 1-02)
Not part of US joint lexicon (Joint Pub 1-02)

Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare (2010)

Doctrine, but describes our operating philosophy
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Strategy & policy (I)

Current usage:
Politicians make policy Generals & admirals make strategy

Strategy is the art of applying power to achieve objectives, within the limits imposed by policy
Gabriel Marcella & Stephen Fought Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century JFQ (2009)

69

Strategy & policy (II)

I know of no way to make a sharp, easy distinction between policy & strategy. They blend & overlap. Both provide guidance for plans & operations. Policy . . . provides guidance under which officials work to attain an effect desired. Policy must dominate strategy; strategy influences policy
RADM (Ret) Henry Eccles Strategy The Theory & Application Naval War College Review (1979)
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35

Strategy & policy (III)

Another usage
Strategy as operational, for warfighting Policy as administrative, for management Reflecting the dual DOD chains of command

. . . I try to separate military strategy from policy. Military strategy needs a specific enemy and, though developed in peacetime, is applied during war. . . . I do not expect a global conflict so the issue before us today seems more one of naval policy.
CNO ADM Frank Kelso USN 71 SASC Confirmation Hearings (1990)

Strategy & guidance

USN has used term in at least two ways:
Annual CNO direction in building or refining the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)
Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999, 2000) Navy Strategic Guidance in support of PR 11 (2009)
Similar direction also found in Navy Strategic Plans

Periodic statements of CNO intentions & planned way ahead

CNO Guidance (CNOG) (Similar to CJCS, CMC, other service leader usage) Audience was entire US Navy, especially staffs

Contained elements of strategy Audience is chiefly DON Washington-area military & civilian staff charged with POM & budget development

No official joint or Navy definition for guidance

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Strategy & analysis (I)

Analysis (in a military context):
A tool to assist in decision-making Usually conducted to yield specific answers to specific questions, e.g.:
How many ships to buy? How many weapons of what kind to use?

To achieve that level of specificity, analysts make assumptions

Strategists & analysts often disagree on assumptions SECDEF McNamara-era emphasis on analysis had continued in OSD ever since
Somewhat discredited following use measuring/claiming Vietnam War success
73

Usually much more narrow & specific than those of strategists

Strategy & analysis (II)

SECNAV Claytor, USN Woolsey, later SECNAV Lehman saw them as antithetical (late 1970s/1980s)
Strategy often equated w/ professional military judgment Believed OSD emphasis on quantitative policy analysis devalued, eviscerated strategy & intellectual audacity Saw aspects of campaign analysis as pernicious
How much is enough? = the wrong question for navies Downplayed analytic focus on scenarios & marginal changes Preferred to use lessons from historical experience Saw need for flexibility in face of uncertainty Emphasized role of naval forces in seamless transitions from peace to crises to war

Also saw analysis as cover for OSD subjective judgment

Then Peaceful coexistence (1990s & 2000s)

74 Campaign analyses central to USN programming in 2000s

37

Strategy & analysis (III)

One of the great heresies of our time, the cult of systems analysis . . . Instead of a tool, it became the decision process The grafting of the systems analysis cult onto the navy had a particularly unfortunate effect. Given the overwhelming engineering bent of the naval officer corps and the effects that Rickovers obsession with engineering was having throughout the navy, the seeds of systems analysis found naval waters most hospitable, and they grew like hydrilla, choking off strategic thinking. The result of these trends was the disappearance within the navy itself of any coherent rationale for the navy and its historic mission. One looks in vain through the congressional testimony of the late 1960s and 1970s for a consistent intellectual case for the navy. . . . Things that could be quantified, put into statistics, and massaged by computers became the total product of the Department of the Navy headquarters.
John F. Lehman, Jr. (SECNAV 1981-7) Command of the Seas (1988) 75

Strategy & The Navy Story or Narrative

Drafters often conflated strategy with developing a Navy Story or narrative for external public relations Some documents were designed to increase public and congressional understanding of and support for the Navy Terming them strategies and strategic concepts was seen as giving them a respectability that furthered this aim Story or narrative is also a document-crafting technique
Flow from a beginning through a middle to a successful ending Most notably used in The Maritime Strategy (1980s)
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Strategy & Ethos

Institutional ethos
Term borrowed from organization theory The largely informal rules of an organization:
Its history, cultural values, norms, taboos

Navy Ethos (Nov 2008)

USNs distinguishing character, culture, guiding beliefs Short statement of values CNO ADM Roughead directed, in CNOG 2007-8 Product of Navy-wide solicitation for inputs Criticisms: Too long, not focused enough on combat Not claimed as part of 2007-9 capstone document trifecta
77

Strategy & Creed

Creed
A statement of belief usually religious belief

Sailors Creed (1993; 1994 rev, 1997 rev)

An institutionally-developed personal statement
I am a United States Sailor. I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America and I will obey the orders of those appointed over me. I represent the fighting spirit of the Navy and all who have gone before me to defend freedom and democracy around the world. I proudly serve my countrys Navy combat team with Honor, Courage and Commitment I am committed to excellence and the fair treatment of all.
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Strategy & Core Values Charter

Charter
A written instrument, usually a grant, contract, or guarantee of rights Navy Core Values CNO ADM Kelso promulgated (Oct 1992)
In the wake of Tailhook 91 incident

Department of the Navy Core Values Charter

1996; re-issued 1999, 2005, 2008 Signed by successive SECNAVs, CNOs, CMCs A broad framework which outlines those key principles embodied in our Core Values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment . . . they shape our standards and define our priorities/ ethos
79

This studys approach

Does not further analyze debates on nature of strategy, concepts, vision, doctrine, story, etc. Lines between policy & strategy, strategy & operations, strategy & doctrine, etc. can be fuzzy This study acknowledges the issues involved, but does not focus on definitional rigor, to more clearly show context and sweep of US Navy thinking

80

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A way to categorize US Navy capstone documents

81

Can/should the USN have a strategy?

Yes. Its the services responsibility to:
Describe & amplify on global maritime aspects of national military strategy Recommend changes and professional judgments Organize, train & equip coherently, now and in future

Others often dont agree

Joint Staff, combatant commander staffs Civilian & military defense specialists Believe services can have visions, policies, doctrines, etc., but not strategies Strategy = domain of joint staffs
82

41

Why strategies, concepts & visions? (I)

83

Why strategies, concepts & visions? (II)

Samuel P. Huntington*

National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy

US Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1954)
*Age 27

84

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Why strategies, concepts & visions? (III)

The fundamental element of a military service is its purpose or role in implementing national policy. The statement of this role may be called the strategic concept of the service. If a military service does not possess such a concept, it becomes purposeless, it wallows about amid a variety of conflicting and confusing goals, and ultimately it suffers both physical and moral degradation.
Samuel Huntington (1954)
85

Why strategies, concepts & visions? (IV)

If a service does not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence, and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resource of society. A military service capable of meeting one threat to the national security loses its reason for existence when that threat weakens or disappears. If the service is to continue to exist, it must develop a new strategic concept related to some other security threat.
Samuel Huntington (1954)

86

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Why strategies, concepts & visions? (V)

Two audiences:
The public and the political leaders The military service itself Samuel Huntington (1954)

87

The four functions of (grand) strategies

A guide for the allocation of scarce resources Helps complex organizations coordinate their activities Communicate interests to others (potential adversaries, allies & friends) Permit criticism & correction; organize public discourse; allow for policy evaluation
Barry R. Posen A Grand Strategy of Restraint in Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy (June 2008)

88

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Kinds of policies (and strategies)

Declaratory policy/ strategy (our topic) Deployment strategy Planned employment strategy Actual employment strategy Acquisition strategy Personnel and training strategy Issues:
Which, if any, leads others? Alignment
89

Declaratory strategy/ policy

Proclamations and official descriptions of US Navy policy and strategy announced by the US Navy leadership What the US Navy leadership wants others inside and outside the Navy to know and believe about the Navys policy intentions, as a component of the U.S. government Central vehicle: Capstone documents

90

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Parallel tracks vice sequencing

Its less like this
Declaratory Strategy Acquisition Strategy Planned Employment Strategy Actual Deployment & Employment Strategies

And more like this

Declaratory Strategy Acquisition Strategy Planned Employment Strategy Actual Deployment & Employment Strategies

with limited feedback

91

Strategy as a determinant of naval power

Strategy/policy/concepts/doctrine etc. is a determinant of national naval power, not the determinant CAPT John Byrons construct: Four determinants*
Resource input Strategy Technology Force structure Each drives & is driven by the other 3

*US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jan 1987)

92

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Why start with 1970?

Familiar. Spans living USN memory. An obvious, traceable trail of successive CNO involvement, commitment, & visibility begins US naval power vocabulary transformed in 1970 Not to say that there were no USN strategies/ concepts/ visions/ strategic plans etc. before 1970

93

200 years of USN capstone documents (I)

1775 1775-6 Continental Congress resolutions (Oct-Nov 1775): Interdiction Continental Congress Naval Committee & Naval Commissioners orders: Interdiction SECNAV Reports to the Congress Adams, Hamilton, Jefferson & USN supporters writings Navy captains letters to SECNAV Hamilton
Especially Commodores Rodgers & Decatur

1777-83 Captain John Paul Jones correspondence 1798+ 1800s: 1812: 1821

Captain Elliot et al. in Fortifications (Bernard) Board report on coast defense

94

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200 years of USN capstone documents (II)

1830s 1851: Naval officer Naval Magazine articles USN officer reports to SECNAV on coast defense strategy
Esp. Dupont Report on National Defences

1861:

CAPT Dupont & Blockade Board

1861-5: SECNAV Mallory (CSA): commerceraiding & homeland defense 1870s: 1874+ Admiral Porter: Commerce-raiding & homeland defense US Naval Institute Proceedings articles
95

200 years of USN capstone documents (III)

1881-2 1885+: 1889: 1890 Admiral Rodgers et al., Naval Advisory Board reports Naval War College lectures, papers, games SECNAV Tracy Report to the Congress Navy Dept. Report of the Policy Board
Sea power through decisive battle fleet action

1890s+ Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan writings 1890s-1930s: Color Plans

96

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200 years of USN capstone documents (IV)

1900-50: General Board of the Navy
Strategy & policy studies & memoranda U.S. Naval Policy (1922)

1900s: 1916:

War Plan Black (vs. Germany) RADM Bradley A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine
Forward fleet ops

1920s & 30s:

War Plan Orange (vs. Japan) F.T.P. 143, War Instructions, 1934 Army-Navy Rainbow Plans (1939-40)
97

200 years of USN capstone documents (V)

1940s: World War II
CNO ADM Harold Stark, Plan Dog Germany first U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pacific Fleet Tactical Orders & Doctrine (PAC 1) (Jun 1943) U.S. Fleet, Current Tactical Orders & Doctrine (USF 10A) (Feb 1944) COMINCH ADM Ernest J. King, F.T.P. 143(A) War Instructions, United States Navy, 1944 (Nov 1944) Context:
Global offensive Membership in new Joint Chiefs of Staff

98

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200 years of USN capstone documents (VI)

Mid-late 1940s: Cold War & containment (I)
At first:
People in the navy did not know very much about strategy . . . Thats why we did not have any organization to lay out the navys case or defend ourselves . . . We suffered from a lack of knowledge within the navy of what the navy was all about . . .
Reminiscences of Admiral Arleigh Burke

Then emergence of a coherent global, offensive transoceanic strategy vs. Soviet Union
Quick response, protracted war, nuclear strikes, persistent combat-credible forward presence Initial focus on Mediterranean theater, NATO ally support (1949) Fleet balance: Shift from PAC to LANT
99

200 years of USN capstone documents (VII)

Mid-late 1940s: Cold War & containment (II)
JCS PINCHER war plan vs. USSR (1946) SECNAV James Forrestal, Policy of the United States Navy (Jan 1947) DCNO (OPS) VADM Forrest Sherman, Presentation to the President (1947) CNO FADM Chester Nimitz, The Future Employment of Naval Forces (1947) CNO FADM Chester Nimitz, USF-1, Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets (May 1947) General Board of the Navy (CAPT Arleigh Burke), National Security and Navy Contributions Thereto Over the Next Ten Years (1948)
100

Capstone of new post-war USN United States Fleets doctrine & tactics pub series

50

200 years of USN capstone documents (VIII)

1950s: Continued Cold War
Naval strategy diffused
Soviet Union still the principal threat Limited wars Finite (or minimum) nuclear deterrence Naval alliances & foreign military assistance Regional presence
East Asia & Mediterranean focus

Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) focus Continental (homeland) defense

Numerous naval technological transformations

Nuclear power & weapons, jet aircraft, helicopters, missiles, angled carrier decks, mirror landing systems, steam catapults, undersea surveillance systems, etc.
101

200 years of USN capstone documents (IX)

CNO ADM Robert Carney (1953-1955)
Significant USN strategic thinker & writer Outlook profoundly shaped by World War II
Continuous Atlantic & Pacific theater operational experience

Wrote & published often: To US Navy officer corps

The Principles of Sea Power, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (Aug 1953) Role of the Navy in a Future War, Naval War College Review (Jun 1954) Always the Sea, Proceedings (May 1955) Sea Powers Enduring Influence, Proceedings (Jul 1955) Principles of Sea Power, Proceedings (Sep 1955)

Chartered OPNAV Long-Range Objectives Group (OP-93)

102

51

200 years of USN capstone documents (X)

CNO ADM Burke (1955-1961)
But no capstone documents
Exception: Origins of United States Navy Doctrine (Apr 1960) (pamphlet)

Significant USN strategic thinker

OPNAV Long-Range Objectives Group (OP-93) did studies & annual Long Range Objectives Statement Burke made no public or radical restatements of national or naval strategy or policy, nor did he require the staff of the CNO to produce one . . . he understood that creating real capability would do more for the service than articulating strategies that national policy was not ready to accommodate, and that the Navy was not yet ready to implement.
CAPT/ Dr. David Alan Rosenberg (2010)
103

Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (I)

NWP doctrinal & tactical pub series superseded USF series Evolving NWP 10 series superseded USF 1
May 1954 1956-60 Nov 1961 Apr 1970 NWP 10 NWP 10 (Changes 1-4) NWP 10(A) NWP 10(B)
Same date as Samuel P. Huntington, National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy article in US Naval Institute Proceedings

104

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Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (II)

Signed by RADM
ADCNO, Fleet Ops & Readiness Roughly equivalent (in 2010) to N31 (Contrast w/ later CNO signatures on NWP 1 & NDP 1)

105

Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (III)

Contents
Concepts of national power, national security, sea power Control of the seas Organization for US national security DON organization Types of naval operations
An ever-evolving list 1970 edition included riverine warfare, domestic HA/DR

Regional security arrangements Principles of War (through 1960)

106

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Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (IV)

The basic publication of the NWP series Presents the basic principles of sea power and naval warfare and the broad aspects of the naval operations which are generally necessary to conduct naval warfare An authoritative reference for experienced officers and a suitable text for . . . junior officers and midshipmen
NWP 10 May 1954

A source for general information on the Navy as part of the national security establishment & on naval warfare
NWP 10(B) Apr 1970
107

Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (V)

Types/aspects of naval operations
NWP 10 w/ changes (1960)

NWP 10(B) (1970)

Strike force operations Amphibious operations Anti-air warfare Anti-submarine warfare Mining and mine countermeasures

Striking force operations Naval air operations Amphibious operations Submarine operations Mining operations Air defense operations Anti-submarine operations Mine countermeasures operations Control & protection of shipping Scouting operations Base defense operations Logistics operations Support operations Blockading operations Search and rescue operations

Riverine operations Support operations Surveillance and blockading Search and rescue Domestic emergency operations
108

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Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (VI)

NWP 10(B):
Emphasis on control of the seas Projection of power, deterrence & presence mentioned only occasionally, in passing Provided domestic emergency operations policy
No mention of foreign disasters or humanitarian assistance ops

Blockade discussed as a discreet & important naval operation

109

1960s interlude (I)

Focus more on PPBS than on drafting strategy
SECDEF McNamara management initiatives OPNAV focus on campaign analysis
E.g.: CYCLOPS ASW I, II, III; War at Sea I & II, ASWFLS

Focus more on current combat ops, regional contingencies, nuclear strategy, than on planning future global war vs. Soviets
Vietnam War ongoing: Strike & in-country COIN ops Crises: East Europe, Middle East, Caribbean, Far East Soviets achieving strategic nuclear weapons parity with US US global naval preponderance; limited Soviet Navy threat

Continued fleet focus on absorbing revolutionary systems & tactics developed & introduced in 1950s

110

55

 Compartmentalization & bifurcation of USN strategic thinking vs. Soviets

Anti-Soviet SSBN warfare decoupled from other aspects of anti-Soviet naval warfare Anti-Soviet SSBN warfare discussed only at highest levels of classification, & within only a few USN communities (submarines, NAVFACs, intel, etc.) Reinforced USN fragmentation by union community

1960s interlude (II)

CNOs: ADMs Anderson, McDonald, Moorer

ADM Moorer went on to become CJCS

Few flag officer strategy books, articles OPNAV Long-Range Objectives Group (OP-93) Long Range Objectives Statements superseded as internal Navy strategy & policy statements by OP-06 Navy Strategic Study (mid-1960s)

111

1960s interlude (III)

But . . .
RADM Henry Eccless Military Concepts and Philosophy (1965) RADM J.C. Wylies Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (1967) OP-06 Navy Strategic Studies (TS) (from mid-1960s) A few CNO-signed US Naval Institute Proceedings articles NWP 10 Naval Warfare updates

Strike, AAW, ASW, inshore warfare improvements

112

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1960s: Some literature on the period

Alain Enthoven & K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (1971) CDR Linton Brooks, An Examination of Professional Concerns of Naval Officers Naval War College Review (Jan-Feb 1980) Richard Hegmann, In Search of Strategy: The Navy and the Depths of the Maritime Strategy (Ph.D. diss. 1991)

113

113

1960s: Naval policy & strategy literature (I)

Hanson Baldwin, The New Navy (1964) Robert Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (1968) (resisted) CAPT (Ret) Daniel Carrison, The United States Navy (1968) Analyses of World War II experience
E.B. Potter & FADM (Ret) Chester Nimitz, Sea Power (1960) Samuel E. Morison, History of U.S. Navy in World War II (1947 62) Bernard Brodie, Guide to Naval Strategy (5th ed.) (1965)
114 114

57

1960s: Naval policy & strategy literature (II)

Focus on bureaucratic politics, civil-military relations
Samuel Huntington, The Common Defense (1961) Paul Hammond, Organizing for Defense (1961) Robert Albion & Jennie Pope, Forrestal & the Navy (1962) Demetrios Caraley, Politics of Military Unification (1966) Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy & the U.S. Navy (1966) & The Admirals Lobby (1967)
115 115

Actual document texts: Sources (I)

Can be found in a series of Naval War College Press Newport Papers (NP) Seeds planted by CNA work Naval War College Press editor Carnes Lord had vision & created the opportunity Naval War College professor & noted maritime historian Dr. John Hattendorf edited

116

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Actual document texts: Sources (II)

3 volumes published to date
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s (NP #30) (2007) U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s (NP #33) (2008)
Co-edited with CAPT Peter M. Swartz USN (Ret)

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s (NP #27) (2006)

4th volume forthcoming

U.S. Naval Strategy in the First Decade of the Twenty-first Century (2012?)

117

Actual document texts: Sources (III)

Hattendorf U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1st Decade of the 21st Century (forthcoming)

118

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Analyses of 1990s, 2000s documents texts

The United States Navy Since President Ronald Reagan,
Kenneth Hagan & Michael T. McMaster In Sea Power: Challenges Old and New (Australia) (2007)

US Navy Strategy and Force Structure After the Cold War

Amund Lundesgaard Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (2011)

American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy & the Emergence of Maritime Strategy, 1989-2007
CAPT Peter Haynes USN Ph.D. dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (2011)

119

Analyzing capstone documents: Issues

Overall judgments Why werent they similar? What can they influence? Have they been successful? How to measure success? Measuring outputs & inputs Factors contributing to success Secondary consequences Reciprocal causality CNOs matter CNO goals Why no impact? Impediments to overcome Links to fleet operations Links to USN budget requests Who should do what? Why so many documents? Better analysis needed

120

60

Overall judgments
USN has not lacked for capstone documents
At least 25 over the full careers of current USN leadership

They often matter They usually spawn further debate Success is hard to measure There is no consistent, agreed system, formula, format, or process for producing these documents, or the ideas in them.

121

Why werent they all similar?

Question:
Why such a mix of strategies, vision, policies, doctrines, etc.?

Answer:
Different eras & different problems require different kinds of documents Different CNOs have different needs US Navy generally indifferent to nomenclature issues

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What can they potentially influence?

Inside Inside U.S. Adversaries U.S. Navy government Policy & Grand Strategy Employment Strategy
(OPS & Training)

Allies

Acquisition Strategy Morale, confidence, unity of effort

123

What can they potentially influence? DOTMLPF

Organization

Doctine

Training Material Leadership & Education

124

Facilities

Personnel

62

What can they potentially influence? DOTMLPF Doctrine Organization Training Material Leadership & education Personnel Facilities
Developed for analyzing operational deficiencies Acronym gained currency within DOD in 2000s Capstone documents can help ensure consistency
125

What did they help influence? DOTMLPF

Helped influence
Project SIXTY Missions of the Navy Sea Plan 2000 The Maritime Strategy . . .From the Sea NDP 1: Naval Warfare Forward . . . From the Sea Seapower 21 Fleet Response Plan Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

DOTMLPF re:
Sea control Forward presence Power projection Forward operations Joint littoral projection Navy-Marine Corps team Forward presence Sea Shield, FORCEnet Readiness to surge Maritime Security Ops, Humanitarian Assistance, International engagement
126

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What can capstone documents do?

If successful, they can:
Create or contribute to a general climate of opinion re: present & future purposes, uses, & forces of the Navy
Borrows from Dr. Warner R. Schillings analysis of the role of Congressional oversight

Build or reinforce consensus & unity within the Navy Avoid (to paraphrase Dr. Samuel Huntington):

Confusion by the American public and its political leaders as to the Navys role Uncertainty as to the necessity of the Navys existence Apathy or hostility to the Navys claims upon the resources of society

127

Have the documents been successful?

Copyright 2007, Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland (410) 268-6110 www.usni.org
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Have the documents been Successful?

How to measure? What factors made for success? Issues:
Measuring outputs: Very difficult Measuring inputs: Easier Secondary effects of documents The problem of reciprocal causality

129

Measuring outputs
What is success? How do you measure it? Two models
Barry Posen: Four functions of grand strategies Raphael Cohen: Three metrics to observe doctrines effects

130

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Four functions of (grand) strategies

1. A guide for the allocation of scarce resources 2. Helps complex organizations coordinate their activities 3. Communicate interests to others (potential adversaries, allies & friends) 4. Permit criticism & correction; organize public discourse; allow for policy evaluation
Barry R. Posen A Grand Strategy of Restraint in Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy (Jun 2008)
131

1. Who reads it?

Three metrics to observe doctrines effect

Target audience? Others?

2. Who quotes it?

How often? What forum?

3. Does it substantially change anything?

Hard to determine causality Difficulty of quantifying relationships What and how to measure? Competing causal explanations of outcomes Anecdotal reflections
--Raphael Cohen A Tale of Two Manuals 132 Prism (Dec 2010)

66

Outputs: How measure Success? (I)

Effect on joint, DOD, national security, & allied policy & strategy Retain/regain/enhance USN freedom to shape its own destiny Have desired effect on the adversary/adversaries Become central message & lingua franca of USN policy- and decision-makers & their staffs
Resource for OPNAV documents, flag officer speeches & testimony Real influence or lip service?
133

Outputs: How measure Success? (II)

Influence USN programmatic decisions
Usually stated as a goal; rarely achieved Legacy programs, OSD guidance, technology push are primary program drivers Hard for Navy strategy/concepts/policy/doctrine to compete as influence Hard to discern cause and effect due to complexity of intervening layers of processes But, NSPGs & Navy Strategic Plan attempt(ed) to measure

134

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Outputs: How measure Success? (III)

Increase integration of USN platforms, systems & communities Influence fleet operations, exercises, war games, training & analyses Stimulate internal USN conceptual & strategic thinking & debate Better USN reputation for intellectual thought
Within DOD & externally

135

Outputs: How measure Success? (IV)

Effect on subsequent documents
Mostly positive in the past But some negative reactions
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy vs. Project SIXTY

136

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Caveat
In the other services, when you make a policy decision, the debate stops. In the Navy, when you make a policy decision, the debate starts
ADM Stanley R. Arthur VCNO (1992-95)

137

Measuring inputs

Four naval experts re: Alignment is success Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Identified 6 major characteristics of a strategy Identified 27 element of those characteristics

Library of Congress Congressional Research Service (CRS)

Identified 9 considerations in evaluating strategies

Harvard University Olin Institute

Identified 7 lessons from case studies

CNA research, workshops, interviews, & other solicited expert inputs

Factors contributing to success Checklist
138

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4 experts re: Alignment as success

Contrasting views
George Baer & Joe Bouchard: Alignment with national policy

also: Alignment with Navy strategic culture Roger Barnett & Sam Bateman Sam Bateman also: Convincing to politician appropriators also: Persuasive to friends & allies & credibly threatening to potential adversaries

Is such success a sufficient criterion? Should USN have not written documents in 1970s? How can documents shape the future if they are tied to current culture? How can this success be measured?

139

GAO: Desirable characteristics of a strategy U.S. Congresss General Accounting Office (GAO) has developed & used a set of desirable characteristics for national strategies (2004)
Consulted public & private sector sources 1st published & used in:
Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism (GAO-04-408T) (Feb 2004)

Subsequently used in:

Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DODs Global Posture Restructuring (GAO-06-852) (Sep 2006) Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented (GAO-08672) (Jun 2008) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain 140 Awareness (GAO-11-621) (Jun 2011)

70

GAO: 6 desirable characteristics of a strategy I. Purpose, scope & methodology II. Problems, risks & threats III. Goals, objectives, activities & performance measures IV. Resources, investments & risk management V. Organizational roles, responsibilities, & coordination mechanism VI. Integration among & with other entities

141

GAO: 6 desirable characteristics of a strategy In other words I. Why was it produced? Whats the scope of its coverage? Whats the process by which it was developed? II. What problems & threats is it directed toward? III. Whats it trying to achieve? What steps will achieve those results? What priorities, milestones, and performance measures gauge results?

142

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GAO: 6 desirable characteristics of a strategy IV. Whatll it cost? What are the sources & types of resources & investments needed? Where should resources & investments be targeted by balancing risk reductions & costs? V. Who will be implementing the strategy? Whatll their roles be compared to others? What mechanisms coordinate their efforts? VI. How does the strategy relate to other strategies goals, objectives & activities? To subordinate levels and their plans to implement the strategy?
143

GAO: The 27 elements of a strategy (I)

I. Purpose, scope & methodology
1. Identify the impetus that led to the strategy being written 2. Discuss the strategys purpose 3. Define or discuss key terms, major functions, mission areas or activities 4. Discuss the process that produced the strategy 5. Discuss the assumptions or principles & theories that guided the strategys development

144

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GAO: The 27 elements of a strategy (II)

II. Problems, risks & threats
6. Discuss or define the problems the strategy intends to address 7. Discuss the causes of the problems 8. Discuss the operating environment 9. Discuss the threats at which the strategy is directed 10. Discuss quality of data available, e.g.: constraints, deficiencies, unknowns

145

GAO: The 27 elements of a strategy (III)

III. Goals, objectives, activities, & performance measures
11. Address overall results desired, end state 12. Identify strategic goals & subordinate objectives 13. Identify specific activities to achieve results 14. Address priorities, milestones, & outcome-related performance measures 15. Identify process to monitor & report on progress 16. Identify limitations on progress indicators

146

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GAO: The 27 elements of a strategy (IV)

IV. Resources, investments & risk management
17. Identify what the strategy will cost 18. Identify the sources & types of resources or investments needed 19. Address where resources or investments should be targeted to balance risks & costs 20. Address resource allocation mechanisms 21. Identify risk management principles and how they help implementers prioritize & allocate resources

147

GAO: The 27 elements of a strategy (V)

V. Organization roles, responsibilities, & coordination mechanism
22. Address who will implement the strategy 23. Address lead, support and partner roles & responsibilities of specific organizations 24. Address mechanisms and/or processes for parties to coordinate efforts 25. Identify processes for resolving conflicts

148

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GAO: The 27 elements of a strategy (VI)

VI. Integration among & with other entities
26. Address how the strategy relates to strategies of other organizations, horizontally 27. Address integration with relevant documents from higher authority & subordinate organizations, vertically

149

CRS: Considerations for evaluating strategies U.S. Congresss Library of Congress Congressional Research Service (CRS) has developed & used a set of considerations for evaluating strategies (2008) Published & used in
CRS Report for Congress: National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates, Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress (May 7, 2008; updated Jul 28, Sep 23, Dec 15)

150

150

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CRS: 9 considerations for evaluating strategies 1. Frequency 2. Synchronization of timelines 3. Clear relationships among strategic documents 4. Prioritization 5. Roles & responsibilities 6. Fiscal constraints 7. Competition of ideas 8. Intended audience 9. Timeframe
151 151

CRS: 9 considerations for evaluating strategies 1. Frequency

How often should strategies be changed and updated?

2. Synchronization of timelines
Are superior & subordinate strategies issued in a logical sequence?

3. Clear relationships among strategic documents

Are types of strategy documents sufficiently different from each other to warrant separate publication?
152 152

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CRS: Considerations for evaluating strategies: 4-6 4. Prioritization

Are objectives and missions prioritized?

5. Roles & responsibilities

Do strategy documents assign responsibilities for carrying out missions?

6. Fiscal constraints
Has the strategy been fiscally constrained?

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CRS: Considerations for evaluating strategies: 7-9 7. Competition of ideas

Was the strategy created through a competition of ideas? Is an alternative document also being published to provide a competitive mechanism, once the strategy is published?

8. Intended audience
Who is the intended audience? Has the strategy been classified appropriately for its audience?

9. Timeframe
Does the strategy address the current situation or the future?
154 154

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Harvard Univ. Olin Institute: 7 Lessons Learned (I) 2 conferences held on uncertainties in military & strategic planning 11 historical case studies examined
Included Andrew Krepinevich, Transforming to Victory: The U.S. Navy, Carrier Aviation, and Preparing for War in the Pacific

Derived 7 Lessons Learned

In Talbot Imlay & Monica Duffy Toft, Conclusion: Seven Lessons about the Fog of Peace, in Imlay & Toft (eds.), The Fog of Peace & War Planning: Military & Strategic Planning under Uncertainty (2006)

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Harvard Univ. Olin Institute: 7 Lessons Learned: II Seek multiple viewpoints as inputs: Civilian & military, domestic & foreign Balance both short-term & long-term perspectives & desired effects in planning Hedge your bets: Balance your forces & your R & D Be flexible in identifying friends & foes Prepare effectively for allied planning & operations One dominant power can make for more effective alliance planning, but resentments must be managed Be adaptable: Avoid rigid plans, unrealistic goals, & undesirable side effects. Reconsider assumptions.
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CNA: Factors contributing to Success (I)

From CNA research, workshops, interviews:
No competing USN capstone documents
One capstone document at a time

CLAS & UNCLAS versions Satisfy a real need by OPNAV, fleet & nation Show how all NCCs & fleet commanders fit Time release of the document for maximum impact Tie to national policy & joint & coalition strategy, explicitly & implicitly
157

CNA: Factors contributing to Success (II)

From CNA research, workshops, interviews:
Acknowledge joint, sister service & allied relationships Push or real buy-in by the CNO. CNO signs Continuity across CNO terms Real buy-in by cross-section of senior OPNAV & Fleet flags
One or two champions not enough

USMC buy-in Simplicity & power of title, core elements, structure

Reduce central message to a few simple concepts

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CNA: Factors contributing to Success (III)

From CNA research, workshops, interviews:
Plan dissemination; seize all distribution opportunities Start with a briefing, then wide multi-media distribution Relate to Navy as a whole, not just a collection of individual communities, but ensure all important communities are addressed to ensure buy-in Ensure threat characterizations are supported by Intel community & administration Build on what came before OR lead/reflect changes

159

CNA: Factors contributing to Success (IV)

From CNA research, workshops, interviews: Use plain English
What the Fleet, the Congress, the public, allies, & adversaries understand

Involve all USN intellectual institutions in some fashion:

OPNAV, CEP, ONI, SSG, NWC academics & War Gaming Center, NPS, NWDC, US Naval Institute, CNA, etc., Especially Naval War College:
For substance & for cachet

Choose specialists as drafters Allocate sufficient manpower & dollar resources

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CNA: Factors contributing to Success (V)

From CNA research, workshops, interviews: Tough internal criticism, discussion, debate, at AO & flag levels
Know how to handle attacks Incorporate valid ideas Stick to your guns

Consider effects on adversaries

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Secondary Consequences (I)

Influence on other services
USN routinely briefs to other service colleges

Often strong influence on allied & coalition naval thinking

Affects their support for USN Affects how they present themselves to their own parliaments, ministries of defense USN routinely briefs strategies & concepts at ISS, Navy talks, etc.

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Secondary Consequences (II)

Influence on civilian national security specialists & academia
Reflected in education of next generation of policy wonks (including USN officers in graduate education)

Influence on adversaries Influence on contractors Open debate on US naval policy and strategy

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Problem: Disentangling reciprocal causality

DoD strategies Operations Organization Technology Force posture Perceptions of others

USN Declaratory Strategies BUT

DoD strategies Operations Organization Technology Force posture Perceptions of others

can influence

can influence

USN Declaratory Strategies

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Reciprocal causality: Strategies & force goals (I) Do capstone documents drive or justify force goals?
Classic chicken and-egg issue

On surface, they seem to justify them, ex post facto

Force goal announcements often precede publication of capstone documents
600-ship Navy goal preceded Maritime Strategy publication 451-ship DOD Base Force goal preceded The Way Ahead & . . . From the Sea 346-ship Bottom-Up Review goal preceded Forward . . . From the Sea 313-ship CNO goal preceded A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century
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Reciprocal causality: Strategies & force goals (II) Truth is more complicated
Same ideas & concepts often drive both force level goal decisions & capstone document contents Force levels & capstone documents are developed at different paces
Force level goal decisions are often driven by tight deadlines mandated by external authorities Capstone documents normally originate from internal USN tasking.
Deadlines can & do slip Need for internal USN inclusiveness lengthens capstone document development processes

Some capstone documents try to drive the next round of force level goal development
. . . From the Sea preceded Bottom Up Review (BUR) (1993) A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century preceded QDR 166 2009

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CNOs usually matter . . . A lot

CNO has 2 main roles
Provide professional naval advice to President, SECDEF, CJCS, SECNAV, other chiefs Craft Navy program & budget recommendations

Timing & nature of CNO capstone document involvement is a vital contributor to success Each CNO has taken a different approach

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SECNAVs sometimes matter

Examples
Claytor & Sea Plan 2000 Lehman & The Maritime Strategy OKeefe & From the Sea Dalton & ForwardFrom the Sea Danzig abortive initiatives England & Naval Power 21 Winter speech at ISS 2007

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Goals of a CNO capstone document (I)

Internal to the Navy
Show linkages among current initiatives Lend coherence to USN force structure Build internal USN consensus, cohesion & esprit Integrate internal USN communities Focus exercise, war gaming, experimental, education, training efforts

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Goals of a CNO capstone document (II)

External to the Navy
Demonstrate that USN leadership is:
Thoughtful Consistent with national & joint policy In step with or ahead of the times Highly trustworthy tool of national policy Has a compelling rationale for its desired new procurements Unified

Give sister & allied services a sense of how best to partner with USN Contribute to deterrence and perception management of potential adversaries Shape and leverage national security policy documents
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Why dont documents have more impact? (I)

Three alternative hypotheses presented
1. Does not matter for the current fight 2. It is all about timing and politics 3. Bureaucratic culture
His own preference as an explanation

More guidance is not always more value added

--Raphael Cohen A Tale of Two Manuals Prism (Dec 2010)
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Why dont documents have more impact? (II)

Hypothesis #1: Does not matter for the current fight
Tends to be one war behind And even when it serves to document & institutionalize changes that have already been made ( combating institutional memory loss), it may well not be heeded either

Hypothesis # 2: It is all about timing and politics

Needs supportive leaders Requires a pressing need, e.g.: linkage to world events & operations

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Why dont documents have more impact? (III)

Hypothesis #3: How accepting is the bureaucratic culture?
Organizations cultural attitudes toward doctrine (and other forms of capstone thinking)
Are they routinely considered roadmaps or simply background information and just another resource?

But they can help outsiders understand the organization better Inter-agency products reflect brokered consensus compromises, & dont ensure equal acceptance across all signatories.

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Impediments to overcome (I)

Opposition on substantive grounds: Wrong strategy or Wrong vision Other influences drive force structure decisions beside USN strategies or visions Warfare/platform communities retain power Administration changes Next USN strategy/concept follows too soon Low relevance to actual fleet ops Navy leadership changes
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Impediments to overcome (II)

Joint system opposed to service strategies Lack of USN appreciation of influence of these documents USN officer focus often tactical vice strategic USN wariness of doctrine Internal USN turf issues Fear of debate and discussion Navy-Marine Corps issues
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Impediment to overcome (III)

Practically the entire OPNAV organization is tuned, like a tuning fork, to the vibrations of the budgetary process {T}here is a vast preoccupation with budgetary matters at the expense of considering planning, or readiness or requirements, or operational characteristics or any of the other elements contributing to the ability of the Fleets to fight.
OP-03G (Fleet Ops) memo To OP-090 (Program Planning) (Sep 1970)
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Impediment to overcome (IV)

I felt that no office in the Navy Staff could effectively draft any sort of NOC whether Navy or naval because CNOs Title 10 responsibilities always got in the way. In other words, every document produced by the Navy Staff had to support the Navys programming and budget message, which in effect meant justifying on-going programs. That had the effect of stifling conceptual innovation . . . front end innovation like developing the NOC should be at the Naval War College, not the Navy Staff.
CAPT (Ret) Joe Bouchard OPNAV N513 (1995-7) (Mar 2006 e-mail)

But . . . USN views CNO & OPNAV as more authoritative than NAVWARCOL; & certainly more that NAVDOCCOM or NWDC
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Sporadic fleet demand for/ influence on documents Some important exceptions:

7th Fleet post-Vietnam/PRC experience led to Hayward Future of U.S. Seapower Submarine force, numbered fleet ops & exercises influenced The Maritime Strategy
In turn, The Maritime Strategy influenced fleet deployments

DESERT STORM experience influenced From the Sea, NDP 1 OEF and OIF surge experience influenced Fleet Response Plan
In turn, Fleet Response Plan altered fleet deployment strategy

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower reflected post-9/11 real-world HA/DR, maritime security ops

Butall Washington documents have been initiated & drafted by recent (& future) fleet sailors & operators

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Why so few links to the fleet?

Fleet operations are directed by SECDEF, CJCS, CINCs/CCDRs & their staffs Not directed by SECNAV or CNO or OPNAV SECNAV, CNO & OPNAV are focused on Navy programs, budgets, acquisition, relations with USMC, & fostering Navy institutional unity
Documents usually reflect this focus

Navy POM processes unlike those of other services are mostly conducted within OPNAV
To the extent that capstone documents are seen as part of the POM process, their drafting reflects this
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Links to USN budget requests

Issues:
To link explicitly or not One document or a family documents Presentations to Capital Hill
The SECNAV Lehman tripartite message Stand-alone strategy presentations

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Who should do what re: USN strategy?

CNO? OPNAV N3/N5? CNO special assistants? USFF? Navy component commanders (NCCs)? Naval War College? Navy Warfare Development Command? Contractors? U.S. Naval Institute?

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Why so many documents?

DILBERT: (c) Scott Adams/Dist. by United Feature Syndicate, Inc.

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Why so many documents? (I)

Conditions change National policies & strategies change Personalities change It was ever thus: War Plan Orange
27 versions in 36 years

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Why so many documents? (II)

Conditions change
Ending of the Vietnam War Iran Revolution & Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Gorbachev regime in USSR End of the Cold War Tiananmen Square incident Desert Storm victory Taiwan Straits crisis USS Cole (DDG-67) terrorist attack Al Qaeda attacks on America Extension of the wars in Afghanistan & Iraq Economic conditions change
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Why so many documents? (III)

National policies & strategies change
8 Presidential administrations Numerous Presidential directives & doctrines Numerous treaties & changes in US public law 14 National Security Strategies (since 1987) 4 roles and missions reviews (since 1989) 5 National Military Strategies (since 1992) 2 announced Nuclear Posture Reviews (since 1994) 2 National Defense Strategies (since 2005) 3 Quadrennial Defense Reviews (since 1997) Numerous PPBS guidance & other DOD directives Numerous JSPS documents & joint doctrine pubs Other defense reviews

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Why so many documents? (IV)

Personalities change
8 U.S. Presidents 13 Secretaries of Defense 11 Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 15 Secretaries of the Navy 11 Chiefs of Naval Operations 20+ DCNOs for Plans, Policy & Operations (OP-06/N3/N5) 30+ Directors, Strategy, Plans & Policy (OP-60/N51/N5SP) 35+ Strategy branch heads (OP-605C/603/N513/5SC) 100+ Other thoughtful, activist OPNAV VCNOs, Special Assistants, DCOSs, ACOSs, Division Directors, Branch Heads, Deputies, Action Officers, Contractors 17 Naval War College Presidents; 100s of professors NAVDOCCOM & NWDC commanders & staff officers
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Better analysis needed: I. Assessment

This was a merely an introduction to assessment issues More rigorous analyses could prove helpful E.g., assess influence & impact of each on:
USN ops, plans, training recommendations & decisions
By the President, SECDEF, CJCS, CCDRs By USN commanders

USN force structure recommendations & decisions

By the Congress, President, SECDEF, OSD By OPNAV

One updated document (80s) vs. several (90s)

Which is more effective approach? Dont the times drive this?
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Better analysis needed: II. MOEs

How to measure success?
Budget share? Operational effectiveness? Acquisition-operations alignment? Favorable press reports? Preservation of autonomy? Richness of the debate? Other?
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Better analysis needed: III. Processes

Need to flesh out each case study Discuss strategic planning processes Disentangle causes and effects

189

Better analysis needed: IV. Expansion

Go farther back in time Trace USMC experience Trace USA, USAF, USCG, joint experiences Trace foreign experiences

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Appendices
Presidents National security directives National security strategies Secretaries of Defense National defense strategies Defense reviews Nuclear posture reviews Functions papers Chairmen of the JCS National military strategies Joint visions Capstone joint doctrine pubs Roles and missions reports Secretaries of the Navy Chiefs of Naval Operations Plans, Policy & Operations DCNOs OPNAV Strategy & Policy Directors OPNAV Strategy Branch heads Contributors to this effort
191

Presidents & national security directives (I)

Nixon/Ford administrations (1969-74, 1974-77)
National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs)

Carter administration (1977-81)

Presidential Review Memoranda (PRMs) Presidential Directives (PDs)

Reagan administration (1981-9)

National Security Study Directives (NSSDs) National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs)

G. H. W. Bush administration (1989-93)

National Security Reviews (NSRs) National Security Directives (NSD)
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Presidents & national security directives (II)

Clinton administration (1993-2001)
Presidential Review Directives (PRDs) Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs)

G.W. Bush administration (2001-09)

National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs)

Obama administration (2009- )

Presidential Study Directives (PSDs) Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs)

193

National Security Strategies (NSSs) (I)

President Ronald Reagan (1981-9)
National Security Strategy of the United States (Jan 1987) National Security Strategy of the United States (Jan 1988)

President George H.W. Bush (1989-93)

National Security Strategy of the United States (Mar 1990) National Security Strategy of the United States (Aug 1991) National Security Strategy of the United States (Jan 1993)

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National Security Strategies (NSSs) (II)

President William Clinton (1993-2001)
A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Jul 1994) A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Feb 1995) A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Feb 1996) A National Security Strategy for a New Century (May 1997) A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Oct 1998) A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Dec 1999) A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Dec 2000)
195

National Security Strategies (NSSs) (III)

President George W. Bush (2001-9)
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sep 2002) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Mar 2006)

President Barack Obama (2009- )

National Security Strategy (May 2010)

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Secretaries of Defense
1969 Melvin Laird (R) 1973 Elliot Richardson (R) 1973 James Schlesinger (R) 1975 Donald Rumsfeld (R) 1977 Harold Brown (D) 1981 Caspar Weinberger (R) 1987 Frank Carlucci (R) 1989 Richard Cheney (R) 1993 Leslie Aspin (D) 1994 William Perry (D) 1997 William Cohen (D) 2001 Donald Rumsfeld (R) 2006 Robert Gates (R/D) (to 2011)

197

National Defense Strategies

SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld (2001-6)
The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Mar 2005)

SECDEF Robert Gates (2006-2011)

National Defense Strategy (Jun 2008)

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Defense reviews
Bush/Cheney/Powell
Base Force review (1990)

Clinton/Aspin
Report on the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) (Oct 1993)

Clinton/Cohen
Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (May 1997)

Bush/Rumsfeld
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) (Sep 2001) Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) (Feb 2006)

Obama/Gates
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) (Feb 2010)
199

Nuclear posture reviews & policies (I)

Nixon/Ford/Schlesinger
National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242: Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (Jan 1974)

Carter/Brown Presidential Directive (PD) 59: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (Jul 1980) Reagan/Weinberger National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 13: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (Oct 1981) G.H.W. Bush/Cheney Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) (Sep 1991)
200

100

Nuclear posture reviews & policies (II)

Clinton/Perry
Nuclear Posture Review (Sep 1994) Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 60: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy Guidance (Nov 1997)

GW Bush/Rumsfeld
Nuclear Posture Review (Dec 2001)

Obama/Gates
Nuclear Posture Review (Apr 2010)

201

DOD DIRs 5100.1 (Functions papers)

SECDEF McElroy, Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Dec 1958) SECDEF Brown, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components (Jan 1980) SECDEF Weinberger, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components (Apr 1987) SECDEF Weinberger, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components (Sep 1987) SECDEF Rumsfeld, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components (Aug 2002)
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Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1970 ADM Thomas Moorer USN 1974 Gen George Brown USAF 1978 Gen David Jones USAF 1982 GEN John Vessey USA 1985 ADM William Crowe USN 1989 GEN Colin Powell USA 1993 GEN John Shalikashvili USA 1997 GEN Hugh Shelton USA 2001 Gen Richard Myers USAF 2005 Gen Peter Pace USMC 2007 ADM Michael Mullen USN (to 2011)

203

National Military Strategies

ADM William Crowe USN (1985-9) National Military Strategy (classified) (Aug 1989) GEN Colin Powell USA (1989-93) National Military Strategy of the United States (Jan 1992) GEN John Shalikashvili USA (1993-97) National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (1995) National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era (1997) GEN Hugh Shelton USA (1997-2001) Gen Richard Myers USAF (2001-5) National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow (2004) Gen Peter Pace USMC (2005-7) ADM Michael Mullen USN (2007-11)
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Joint visions
GEN John Shalikashvili USA (1993-7)
Joint Vision 2010 (Jul 1996)

GEN Hugh Shelton USA (1997-2001)

Joint Vision 2020 (Jun 2000)

Gen Myers USAF (2001-5)

Joint Operating Concepts (Nov 2003)

Gen Peter Pace USMC (2005-7)

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 2.0 (CCJO) (Aug 2005)

ADM Michael Mullen USN (2007-11)

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0 (CCJO) (Jan 2009)
205

Capstone Joint Doctrine Pubs

GEN Colin Powell USA (1989-93)
Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces: Joint Warfare is Team Warfare (Nov 1991)

GEN John Shalikashvili (1993-7)

Joint Pub 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (Jan 1995)

GEN Hugh Shelton (1997-2001)

Joint Publication 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (Nov 2000)

Gen Richard Myers USAF (2001-5) Gen Peter Pace USMC (2005-7)
Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (May 2007)

ADM Michael Mullen USN (2007-11)

Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (May 2007) (Ch 1 Mar 2009)
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Roles & missions reports

CJCS ADM William Crowe USN
Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces: A Report to the Secretary of Defense (Sep 1989)

CJCS GEN Colin Powell USN

Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces (Feb 1993)

Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM)

Directions for Defense (May 1995)

SECDEF Robert Gates

Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report (Jan 2009)
207

Secretaries of the Navy (1969-2009)

Jan 1969 John Chaffee May 1972 John Warner Apr 1974 J. W. Middendorf Feb 1977 Graham Claytor Oct 1979 Edward Hidalgo Feb 1981 John Lehman May 1987 James Webb Mar 1988 William Ball May 1989 H. L. Garrett Jun 1992 Daniel Howard (a) Oct 1992 Sean OKeefe Jan 1993 ADM Frank Kelso (a) Jul 1993 John Dalton Nov 1998 Richard Danzig Jan 2001 Robin Pirie (a) May 2001 Gordon England Jan 2003 Susan Livingstone (a) Feb 2003 H.T. Johnson (a) Oct 2003 Gordon England Dec 2005 Dionel Aviles (a) Jan 2006 Donald Winter Mar 2006 B.J. Penn (a) Jun 2009 Ray Mabus

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Chiefs of Naval Operations (1970-2010)

Jul 1970 Jun 1974 Jul 1978 Jun 1982 Jul 1986 Jun 1990 Apr 1994 May 1996 Jul 2000 Jul 2005 Sep 2007 ADM Elmo Zumwalt ADM James Holloway ADM Thomas Hayward ADM James Watkins ADM Carlisle Trost ADM Frank Kelso ADM Jeremy M. Boorda ADM Jay Johnson ADM Vern Clark ADM Michael Mullen ADM Gary Roughead (to 2011)

209

OPNAV DCNOs for Operations, Plans & Strategy

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OPNAV Directors for Strategy & Policy

211

OPNAV Strategy branch heads

212

106

Contributors to this effort (I)

CAPT Dennis Anderson USN (Ret) Mr. Philip Ballard CAPT Roger Barnett USN (Ret) LtCol R. Benbow USMC (Ret) (CNA) CDR Steve Benson USN (Ret) LtCol John Berry USMC (Ret) CAPT Joe Bouchard USN (Ret) Dr. Tom Bowditch (CNA) CAPT Linton Brooks USN (Ret) CDR Mitch Brown USN (Ret) Mr. Sebastian Bruns Mr. Curtis Buckles CAPT Steve Burich USN CAPT John Byron USN (Ret) RDML Bill Center USN (Ret)

Dr. Eugene Cobble (CNA) CAPT Bud Cole USN (Ret) Mr. Tim Colton Dr. Greg Cox (CNA) Hon. Seth Cropsey RDML Philip Cullom USN CDR Steve Deal USN CAPT Dick Diamond USN (Ret) CDR John Dickmann (Ret) CDR Tom Disy USN CDR Lee Donaldson USN CAPT Will Dossel USN (Ret) CAPT Mike Dunaway USN (Ret) Mrs. Loretta Ebner (CNA) Col Tom Ehrhard USAF (Ret)

213

Contributors to this effort (II)

LCDR Teresa Elders USN LCDR Tom Emerick USCG LT John Ennis USN CAPT Craig Faller USN CDR Eric Fino USN CAPT Jamie Foggo USN Dr. Norman Friedman Dr. Hank Gaffney (CNA) Mr. Mike Gerson (CNA) CDR Paul Giarra USN (Ret) CDR Neil Golightly USNR (Ret) Col Brad Gutierrez USAF (Ret) (CNA) CAPT John Hanley, USNR (Ret) Ms. Gia Harrington CAPT Robby Harris USN (Ret) Dr. John Hattendorf CAPT Bradd Hayes USN (Ret) CAPT Peter Haynes USN LtCol Frank Hoffman USMCR (Ret) RADM Jerry Holland USN (Ret) ADM James Holloway III USN (Ret) Dr. Tom Hone CAPT Wayne Hughes USN (Ret) CAPT Spence Johnson USN (Ret) Mr. Greg Kaminski (CNA) Mr. John Kaskin Dr. Catherine Kelleher CDR Steve Kelley USN Mr. John Kennedy Dr. Ken Kennedy (CNA)

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Contributors to this effort (III)

Mr. Eric Labs Ms. Laurie Ann Lakatosh (CNA) Ms. Catherine Lea (CNA) CAPT Ed Long USN (Ret) RDML Don Loren USN (Ret) Mr. Amund Lundesgaard CAPT Bill Manthorpe USN (Ret) Mr. Mike Markowitz (CNA) Mr. Bob Martinage CAPT Rod McDaniel USN (Ret) RADM Mike McDevitt USN (Ret) (CNA) CDR Bryan McGrath USN CAPT Ken McGruther USN (Ret) CAPT John McLain USN LT Ed McLellan USN RADM Eric McVadon USN (Ret) Dr. Sal Mercogliano Mr. Ed Miller CAPT Vance Morrison USN (Ret) CAPT Al Myers USN (Ret) CAPT Judy (Holden) Myers (Ret) CDR Paul Nagy USN Mr. Ron ORourke Dr. Mike Palmer Ms. Margie Watson Palmieri RDML Frank Pandolfe USN CDR John Patch (Ret) CAPT Jim Patton USN (Ret) RADM Bill Pendley USN (Ret) Dr. Dave Perin (CNA) Dr. Peter Perla (CNA)
215

Contributors to this effort (IV)

Hon. Robin Pirie CDR Mike Pocalyko USN (Ret) Dr. Bruce Powers Dr. Mike Price (CNA) Mr. Fred Rainbow Col Robyn Read USAF (Ret) CDR Steve Recca USN (Ret) Dr. Matt Robinson (CNA) CAPT John Rodegaard USNR CAPT Dave Rosenberg USNR CAPT Pat Roth USN (Ret) Mr. Jeffrey Sands Ms. Kristine Schenck CAPT Brian Scott USN CAPT Larry Seaquist USN (Ret) Mr. Jim Seerden VADM Joe Sestak USN Mr. Adam Siegel CAPT Mike Simpson USN CAPT Ed Smith USN (Ret) Mr. Tim Smith RADM Jim Stark USN (Ret) VADM Jim Stavridis (USN) RADM Joe Strasser USN (Ret) Ms. Rhea Stone (CNA) CAPT Bruce Stubbs USCG (Ret) CDR Cappy Surette USN CDR Ken Szmed USN CAPT Sam Tangredi USN CAPT George Thibault USN (Ret) Dr. Eric Thompson (CNA)

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Contributors to this effort (V)

VADM Emmett Tidd USN (Ret) Dr. Geoffrey Till VADM Pat Tracey USN (Ret) CDR Jim Tritten USN (Ret) Dr. Scott Truver ADM Stansfield Turner USN (Ret) CDR Harlan Ullman USN (Ret) CAPT Gordan Van Hook USN Mr. Lee Wahler CDR Stan Weeks USN (Ret) CDR Mark Werner (Ret) Hon Francis J. West Mr. Bob Wilhelm MajGen Tom Wilkerson USM (Ret) CAPT John Williams USNR (Ret) UNDERSECNAV Bob Work CAPT Rob Zalaskus USN

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CNA studies on U.S. Navy strategies and their context

Swartz, Peter M., U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy, Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What to consider before you write one, (CQR D0020071.A1/Final, March 2009). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010): A Brief Summary, (MISC D0026437.A1/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Introduction, Background and Analyses, (MISC D0026421.A1/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-2010): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Volume I, (MISC D0026417.A1/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-2010): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Volume II, (MISC D0026417.A2/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-1980): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026414.A1/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-1980): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026418.A1/ Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1981-1990): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026415.A1, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1981-1990): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026419.A1/Final (December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1991-2000): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026416.A2/Final, March 2012). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1991-2000): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026420.A2/Final, March 2012). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (2001-2010): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026241.A2/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (2001-2010): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026242.A2/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., and Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010): Comparisons, Contrasts, and Changes: Volume I, (MISC D0026422.A1/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010): Comparisons, Contrasts, and Changes: Volume II, (MISC D0026423.A1/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Michael C. Markowitz, Organizing OPNAV (1970-2009), (CAB D0020997.A5/2Rev, January 2010). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy U.S. Air Force Relationships 1970-2010, (MISC D0024022.A4/1Rev, June 2011).

These documents supersede Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies & Concepts (1970-2009), (MISC D0019819.A1/Final, February 2009.)

MISC D0026421.A1/Final

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