Lavagem de Dinheiro Na Europa

2013 edition
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Statistical working papers
ISSN 1681-4789
2
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ISSN 2315-0807
2013 edition
Kml cwj_s bcpgl egl Cspmnc
Statistical working papers
2013 edition
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ISBN 978-92-79-22843-8
ISSN 2315-0807
doi:10.2785/415
Cat. No: KS-TC-13-007-EN-N

Theme: Population and social conditions
Collection: Statistical working papers

European Union, 2013
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
Table of contents
6
3 Money laundering in Europe
Table of Contents
1. NewdevelopmentsatEuropeanUnionandinternationallevel..............................................9
1.1.ShortintroductiontothefightagainstmoneylaunderinginaEuropeancontext.............10
1.2.BackgroundtothefirstpublicationofEuropeanstatisticsonlaundering.........................11
1.3.Thepurposeandoutcomesofthispublication:asecondvitalstep,butwithmoderate
results.........................................................................................................................................12
1.4.Thedifficultyofinterpretingdataortheissueofcomparabilityofstatisticsbetween
MemberStates...........................................................................................................................15
2.Detailedinformationonselectedindicators..............................................................................21
2.1.Glossaryofterms................................................................................................................22
2.2.Statisticaldata.....................................................................................................................25
2.2.1.Reporting/Intelligencestage........................................................................................25
2.2.2.Investigationstage.......................................................................................................57
2.2.3.Judicialstage................................................................................................................67
Annex:Guidelinesandrationaleforthecollectionofdata...........................................................74

Table of contents
List of Tables
Table1:Numberofreportsfiledbytype....................................................................................25
Table1.a:PercentageofSTRs,SARsorUTRsfromcreditinstitutions........................................26
Table1.b:NumberofSuspiciousTransactionReports(STRs)filedbyeachcategoryofobliged
entities,2008...............................................................................................................................27
Table1.c:NumberofSuspiciousTransactionReports(STRs)filedbyeachcategoryofobliged
entities,2009...............................................................................................................................28
Table1.d:NumberofSuspiciousTransactionReports(STRs)filedbyeachcategoryofobliged
entities,2010...............................................................................................................................29
Table2:Numberofpostponementordersadoptedonreportedtransactions.........................33
Table3:Numberofmoneylaunderinginvestigationscarriedoutindependentlybylaw
enforcementagencies(withoutapriorSTR)..............................................................................36
Table4:NumberofdeclarationsmadeinapplicationtotheEUCashControlRegulation........41
Table5:Numberofincorrectcashdeclarationsorfindingsasaresultofcustomscontrolsin
theEUatexternalborders..........................................................................................................42
Table6:NumberofsuspiciouscashactivitiesattheEUbordersreportedtotheFIU(including
thosebasedondeclarationsandsmuggling)..............................................................................45
Table7:NumberofSuspiciousTransactionReports(STRs)senttolawenforcement(
1
)..........48
Table7.a:PercentageofreportssenttolawenforcementbyMemberStates.........................49
Table8:Numberofstaffdedicatedfulltime(orfulltimeequivalent)tomoneylaunderingin
theFIU(
1
)....................................................................................................................................53
Table9.1:PercentageofSuspiciousTransactionsReports(STRs)sentbytheFinancial
IntelligenceUnit(FIU)tolawenforcementwhicharetheninvestigated...................................58
Table9.2:NumberofcasesinitiatedbylawenforcementagenciesonthebasisofSuspicious
TransactionsReports(STRs)sentbytheFinancialIntelligenceUnit(FIU)(
1
).............................59
Table10:Numberofcasesbroughttoprosecution:originatingfromSuspiciousTransaction
Reports(STRs),CashTransactionReports(CTRs)andindependentlawenforcement
investigation(ilei)(
1
)...................................................................................................................64
Table11:Numberofpersons/legalentitiesconvictedformoneylaunderingoffences(
1
)........68
Table12:Numberofsentences(bytype)formoneylaunderingoffences(
1
)...........................72
List of Figures
Figure1:DeclarationsmadeinapplicationtotheEUCashControlRegulation.........................39
Figure2:IncorrectcashdeclarationsorfindingsasaresultofcustomscontrolsintheEUat
externalborders..........................................................................................................................40
Figure3:TotalnumbercasesbroughttoprosecutionoriginatingfromSTRs,CTRsorILEI........63
Figure4:Numberofpersons/legalentitiesconvictedforMLoffences.....................................67
Foreword
6
This publication is dedicated to Cynthia Tavares, who passed away suddenly in January 2013. Her work
on crime statistics spanned twenty years, beginning first in the UK Home Office and then continuing as a
Eurostat expert working on international crime and criminal justice statistics. She co-authored a series of
annual Eurostat Statistics in Focus publications and drafted the first Eurostat Working Papers on Money
Laundering and on Trafficking in Human Beings. She worked with colleagues in organisations around the
world, including national statistical offices, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the European
Sourcebook Group; her commitment and enthusiastic contribution to the development of international
statistics on crime will be sadly missed.

Foreword

Foreword
In 2011 Eurostat published a report on Money laundering in Europe, in the series Eurostat Methodologies
and Working Papers. This represented a first attempt to collect information in a difficult and sensitive
area of crime statistics. The present publication seeks to build upon the progress already made and to
improve the quality of the existing information.

The need to produce comparable statistics for the European Union was stressed by the European Council
in the Hague Programme of 2004, which tasked Eurostat with the collection of a set of agreed indicators.
Following the conclusion of the Hague Programme, further development of crime statistics has taken
place within the context of the Stockholm Programme, agreed by the Council in 2009. The Stockholm
Programme stressed the need to extend the statistical coverage of crime to areas beyond those
traditionally covered in national statistics, to include for example organised crime, money-laundering,
cybercrime and trafficking in human beings.

In the 2010 Working Paper, Eurostat noted that the quality of the statistics did not in all respects comply
with the stringent requirements of the European Statistics Code of Practice. Some improvement in this
quality has been made possible through the gradual implementation of the Third Anti-Money Laundering
Directive, but nevertheless suitable caution should be exercised in interpreting the figures, and the
methodological notes and caveats provided should be rigorously taken into account in all subsequent
analysis. Full details of the background to the data collections can be found in the 2010 Working Paper.

In 2012, the Financial Action Task Force published a revised set of standards, and the Commission
followed this up with a proposal for a Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, adopted in 2013. The
revisions entail a reinforcement of the risk-based approach, implementation of which will be
particularly challenging in terms of understanding risks, thus strengthening the need for good quality data
both at national and EU level. At the same time, the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive has revised
the evaluation methodology for assessing technical compliance with the Directives Recommendations
and the effectiveness of anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing systems, which will
require solid statistical data (
1
).

In the production of the current Working Paper, Eurostat wishes to thank its contact points for crime
statistics in the European Statistical System, and gratefully acknowledges the specialist information
provided by the colleagues in the Commissions Directorates-General responsible for Home Affairs,
Internal Market and Services, and Taxation and Customs Union.
(
1
) http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013.pdf
Foreword
6
New developments at European
Union and international level
1 New developments at European Union and international level

1. New developments at European Union and
international level

The first steps towards a European ambition

Promoting greater understanding and comparability of measures taken to address money laundering and
terrorist financing is a vital part of reinforcing the effectiveness of the EU preventive framework and the
existing measures to combat money laundering at national level.

In the field of money laundering, there are significant gaps between what has been promised and what has
been actually achieved in terms of statistical data; between data at a national level and comparable data
across the continent.

The European Commission, in partnership with the Member States and associated countries, has set out to
fill these gaps. However, more is required than a bookkeeping style perspective on money laundering
that runs from the filing of the suspicious transaction report to criminal conviction.

An integrated perspective is required to establish a cost/benefit analysis of national and European anti-
money laundering tools.

The fight against money laundering is one of the European Commissions strategic priorities. As such,
this vast and complex criminal market is being addressed from different angles across various sectors.
Several of the Commissions Directorates-General (
2
) are coordinating their policies to provide joint
action that combines prevention, enforcement and financial support for Member State projects. In view of
these actions, it has become apparent that there is a need to develop a better statistical knowledge of
money laundering at national and European levels in order to provide a more precise and more reliable
diagnosis of this criminal threat.

This deeper and more evidence-based knowledge has the potential to enrich analysis of the phenomenon
and thus to enable a cost/benefit analysis of national and European anti-laundering systems. While this is
the Commissions long-term ambition, it will however take some years to implement, as the cost/benefit
issue is complex and has barely begun to be explored at international level.

Exploring this terra incognita involves advancing methodically on the basis of current statistical
information available within the Member States. For that reason this report, the second publication of
statistical data on money laundering at European level, is limited to the linear monitoring of the anti-
money laundering chain, from the filing of the suspicious transaction report through to criminal
conviction.

(
2
) DG Internal Market (the main player regarding the preventive site of fight against money laundering), DG Home Affairs in charge of the EUs
repressive respond to ML and DG Taxation and Customs Union.
1
New developments at European Union and international level
However, this first step, which should form a basis for drawing up a cost/benefit analysis, has run into
difficulties. Twenty one years after the First Anti-Money Laundering Directive, national systems are now
sophisticated enough to follow different routes. These strategic choices, the result of the principle of
subsidiarity being applied, make it difficult to compare and therefore interpret current data.

Despite its limits, this publication represents a tangible result which deserves to be warmly welcomed
since the difficulties faced were great. It bears testimony to the Commissions commitment while offering
a concrete basis for future work.

1.1. Short introduction to the fight against money laundering in
a European context

Historically, European anti-money laundering policy took a preventive focus, which involves protecting
the proper functioning of the financial system from pollution by laundering schemes. The keystone of the
European system remains the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive, adopted in 2005 (
3
). The
preventive approach and the objective to protect the Internal Market justified the adoption of a directive, a
first pillar instrument. As regards the repressive side of the EUs response to money laundering, in
particular the criminalisation of that offence, the European Commission is examining the possibility
under Article 83(1) of the TFEU of proposing corresponding harmonisation legislation.

This distinction is significant. It stems from the international structure of the fight against money
laundering adopted within the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (
4
), based essentially, given the
prevailing preventive approach, on the filing of suspicious transaction reports.

Today, twenty one years after the First Anti-Money Laundering Directive was adopted, the European
corpus iuris is extensive, clearly showing the investment made by the Commission and the Member
States. The Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive sits alongside other related directives and regulations
such as the Regulation on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community (
5
) managed by DG
Taxation and Customs Union. DG Home Affairs (and its predecessor, DG Justice, Freedom and Security)
has put a lot of effort into cooperation between financial intelligence units (
6
) and harmonising to a certain
degree criminal penalties for money laundering (
7
). In addition, DG Home Affairs and DG Internal
Market co-chair the EU Financial Intelligence Units Platform and DG Home Affairs provides financial
support to projects led by Member States and private partners to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing. In particular, the Commission is also funding the FIU.Net project (
8
), a system enhancing
secure information exchange between the financial intelligence units of the Member States.

The legislative framework is progressively evolving and strengthening. In February 2012, the FATF
amended its 40 Recommendations, the global standards for the fight against money laundering and
terrorist financing. Various changes were introduced (
9
) which are designed to deliver more effective and
targeted measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. In parallel to the international
(
3
) Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for
the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing.
(
4
) The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental body which seeks to develop and promote national and international policies to
combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
(
5
) Regulation 1889/2005 of 26 October 2005.
(
6
) Council Decision 2000/642/JHA of 17 October 2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation between financial intelligence units of the
Member States in respect of exchanging information.
(
7
) Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation
of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime.
(
8
) See http://www.fiu.net/
(
9
) http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%20(approved%20February%202012)%20reprint%20May%
202012%20web%20version.pdf

process, the European Commission carried out its own review process regarding the Third Anti-Money
Laundering Directive. Based on both the results of the review process as well as the revised international
standards, the Commission (DG Internal Market and Services) adopted a proposal for a revision of the
Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive (
10
) in February 2013. This proposal recognises the importance
of data gathering as a valuable tool to enable Member States and obliged entities to review the
effectiveness of their systems to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as the
important role solid data will play with respect to the preparation of risk assessments. The Commissions
proposal includes a revised and more detailed Article on statistics (
11
).

In addition to these legislative and operational activities, DG Home Affairs launched an initiative in
collaboration with Eurostat, the Member States and associated countries. The aim is to collect statistical
data on money laundering with a view to building the foundations of a (primarily statistical) structure,
which in the long term should help to determine a cost/benefit analysis of national and European anti-
money laundering provisions. This analysis should be valuable input for the Commissions future policy
development.

At this stage, the focus was to compile the statistical data available and to identify the obstacles to
comparing data at European level.

1.2. Background to the first publication of European statistics
on laundering

Quantitative information on the trends, rates and types of crime and on the measures used to prevent and
combat different criminal markets, both in the Member States and at European Union level, is essential in
order to develop an evidence-based policy against cross-border crime. This knowledge gap must be
targeted in a coherent and uniform way giving priority attention to all Eurocrimes (
12
) as referred to in
Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Since 2005, the Commission has identified the lack of reliable and comparable statistical data from
Member States as an obstacle to the qualitative assessment of its policies.

For that reason, a 2006-2010 action plan - Developing a comprehensive and coherent EU strategy to
measure crime and criminal justice (
13
) - was adopted on the basis of the mandate given by the Member
States under the Hague Programme, which laid down the political priorities in the field of freedom,
security and justice for the period 2005-2009.

The publication of the Working Paper in 2010 was the end result of pioneering work. No international
organisation had ever before carried out work of this scale on money laundering. It was also the first time
that a Eurocrime was the subject of a publication of statistical data consolidated at European level.
However, this was only the first step towards the real objective which the Commission has set itself: to
enable a cost/benefit analysis of anti-money laundering provisions which would feed into and clarify not
only political decision-making but also operational cooperation. The current report should be seen as a
further step in this direction.

(
10
)

COM(2013)45final also called 4
th
Anti-Money Laundering Directive.
(
11
)

COM(2013)45final, Chapter V, Record keeping and statistical data, art. 41.
(
12
) Article 83 paragraph 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union spells out the list of serious crimes with a cross-border
dimension for which minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions could be established at EU level. They include:
terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money
laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime.
(
13
) See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0437:FIN:EN:PDF
1
1.3. The purpose and outcomes of this publication: a second
vital step, but with moderate results

This publication has four aims. They are:

- to clearly identify obstacles to comparing data between Member States;
- to bring clarity and transparency to a complex issue;
- to encourage Member States to improve their statistical expertise by collecting data more
rigorously, in particular in the judicial phase of money laundering cases;
- to encourage Member States to develop a cost/benefit analysis of their anti-money
laundering scheme.

At this stage of the development of European statistical work on money laundering, the Commission is
endeavouring to obtain a linear view of the anti-money laundering chain. Ideally, this would track a
suspicious transaction report from its filing to criminal conviction, allowing rates of progression between
each successive stage to be calculated.

While determining such rates would offer some indication of the efficiency of the anti-money laundering
regime, one has also to recognise their limitations. Trying to put a simple figure on how many filed
suspicious transaction reports led to criminal conviction has proved challenging due to the complex and
fragmented (i.e. non-linear) nature of the anti-money laundering chain. This is one of the conclusions
of the second data collection exercise, as presented in this report. However, comparison based on the
current indicators over time (trends) may provide a clearer indication of the performance within a
Member State and in the EU as a whole.

It should also be noted that one indicator of the collection takes account of the number of investigations
opened without suspicious transaction reports - without the contribution of the Financial Intelligence Unit
(FIU) - with the aim of trying to determine the role of the prudential regime in the fight against money
laundering.

With regard to the figures for unrecorded money laundering, the difference between the real and known
figures can only be approximated and indirectly estimated. The weaker the correlation, the cruder the
estimate, to the extent that the very point of having an estimate is questionable, as with the United
Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimate of $1.6 trillion, amounting to around 2.7% of
global GDP.

At this stage, whilst Article 33(1) of the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive states that Member
States must review the effectiveness of their systems to combat money laundering, Article 33(2) gives
guidance on the type of statistics necessary to carry out this review (
14
). This non-exhaustive list must be
regarded as a minimum requirement. However, some Member States have continued to encounter
difficulties in providing data in a reliable way, or simply in communicating that data. This is particularly
true with regard to the number of persons prosecuted and the number of confiscations, which indicates a
need to improve the collection and consolidation of statistical data at national level.

Article 33(2) makes reference to the activity of law enforcement services and their relations with
reporting entities (banks, casinos, notaries, lawyers etc.) whereas these statistical data should also be
(
14
) Article 33(2): Such statistics shall as a minimum cover the number of suspicious transaction reports made to the FIU, the follow-up given to
these reports and indicate on an annual basis the number of cases investigated, the number of persons prosecuted, the number of persons
convicted for money laundering or terrorist financing offences and how much property has been frozen, seized or confiscated.

compared with the threat of money laundering itself. A comparison of this kind would be wholly in line
with the spirit of Article 33(1) of the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive.

The table below summarises the results of the three data collections, with the indicators used for this
publication highlighted in blue. The 23 indicators are divided into three stages in accordance with the
linear approach described in Section 1.3. As can be seen, the Member States collaborated better in the
later collections of data, in particular thanks to an awareness raising campaign and the quality of the list
of contact points, drawn up by the Commission with the support of the Member States.

Number of EU Member States and other countries which supplied data for the first,
second and third data collections

Summary of responses:

(blue shading = indicators considered in this publication)
Number of countries able to provide
data for collections in
2008 / 2009 / 2010
(grey shading = third data collection)
EU Member
States(
15
) (27)
Other
countries (7)

REPORTING / INTELLIGENCE PHASE
1.1
Number of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) filed by
each category of obliged entities
23/25/26 5/6/5
1.2
Number of Cash Transaction Reports (CTRs) filed by each
category of obliged entities
9/10/12 0/2/2
1.3
Number of postponement orders adopted on reported
transactions
13/16/19 0/3/3
1.4
Number of money laundering investigations carried out
independently by law enforcement agencies (without a prior
STR)
14/11/15 2/1/2
1.5
Number of declarations made in application to the EU Cash
Control Regulation
14/27/27 0/2/-
1.6
Number of incorrect cash declarations or findings as a result of
customs controls in the EU at external borders
12/27/27 0/1/-
1.7
Number of suspicious cash activities at the EU borders reported
to the FIU (including those based on declarations and
smuggling)
12/15/17 3/4/4
1.8
Number of STRs sent to law enforcement and on which further
analysis was made
15/18/18 3/5/5
1.9
Number of staff dedicated full time (or full time equivalent) to
money laundering in the FIU
20/20/20 5/6/6
(
15
) Croatia was not an EU Member State at the time of the third data collection.
1
Summary of responses:

(blue shading = indicators considered in this publication)
Number of countries able to provide
data for collections in
2008 / 2009 / 2010
(grey shading = third data collection)
EU Member
States(
16
) (27)
Other countries
(7)

INVESTIGATION PHASE
2.1 Number of cases initiated by law
enforcement agencies on the basis of STRs
sent by the FIU
17/17/16 0/4/3
2.2 Number of staff dedicated full time (or full
time equivalent) to money laundering in law
enforcement agencies
10/16/17 0/2/2
2.3 Number of cases brought to prosecution:
originating from STRs, CTRs and
independent law enforcement investigation
15/19/20 0/2/3

JUDICIAL PHASE
3.1 Number of staff dedicated full time (or full
time equivalent) to money laundering in the
judiciary
3/5/4 0/1/0
3.2 Number of persons / legal entities convicted
for money laundering offences
13/19/23 3/4/6
3.3 Number of convictions for laundering
proceeds of crimes committed abroad
6/7/8 0/0/2
3.4 Number of convictions for crimes other than
money laundering originating from STRs
4/3/3 0/1/0
3.5 Number of sentences by type for money
laundering offences
15/18/20 1/4/5
3.6 Number of unsuspended custodial
sentences by length (as principle offence, as
predicate offence)
13/15/15 3/4/5
3.7 Number of freezing procedures (based on a
court order)
8/10/10 0/1/3
3.8 Number of confiscation procedures 12/13/13 1/2/2
3.9 Number of requests received for freezing
orders from another EU Member State and
the value of frozen assets
5/9/8 0/1/1
3.10 Number of requests received for confiscation
orders from another EU Member State and
the value of confiscated assets
7/10/7 0/1/1
3.11 Amounts recovered from assets 9/10/6 0/0/1
(
16
) Croatia was not an EU Member State at the time of the third data collection.

1.4. The difficulty of interpreting data or the issue of
comparability of statistics between Member States

This key question is complex for legal, operational and statistical reasons.

Legal reasons

Article 5 of the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive authorises Member States, in accordance with
the principle of subsidiarity (
17
), to lay down measures which go beyond the obligations required by the
Directive (
18
). This allows for a degree of flexibility, as can be seen in the adoption of different concepts
when implementing the Third Directive. Whilst the Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) is the counting
unit most used by Member States, some (United Kingdom, Cyprus and Finland) have preferred to use the
Suspicious Activity Report (SAR). Furthermore, The Netherlands has preferred to use a different concept
in the form of the Unusual Transaction Report (UTR).

The use of different counting units, each with a different scope, inevitably compromises
the comparability of data between Member States (
19
).

Moreover, it would be pointless to compare the absolute number of such reports without looking to
correlate figures in relative terms, that is to say by comparing them with the size of the financial sector of
each Member State.

Operational reasons

The flexibility arising from the application of the principle of subsidiarity and the use of a directive (
20
) is
also evident in the operational choices made by the Member States. The Member States are free to
determine their approach in the fight against money laundering in a way consistent with the obligations in
force. Consequently, each Member State has made different operational choices.

From these choices, very different needs and working methods often emerge. Inevitably,
these anti-money laundering models act as prisms through which national statistics must
be interpreted, further restricting the comparability of data.

Accordingly, each Member State may decide, within the scope of the Third Directive, to make the
reporting obligations for reporting entities (banks, casinos, notaries, etc.) subject to a different set of
objective criteria (e.g. there may be an automatic reporting obligation on moving from one variable
threshold of one Member State to another) and subjective criteria (where the reporting entity, after having
made its own risk assessment, may decide whether or not to submit a report to the FIU).
(
17
) Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union provides: Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved at Union level.
(
18
) It provides: The Member States may adopt or retain in force stricter provisions in the field covered by this Directive to prevent money
laundering and terrorist financing.
(
19
) A grandfather who buys a car for his granddaughter paying with EUR 20 000 hidden under the mattress makes a transaction which is unusual
but does not in itself arouse a suspicion of money laundering. This same transaction will therefore be reported in one national system and not in
another, illustrating the different scopes of those systems.
(
20
) The legal basis is binding on Member States only in relation to the objectives to be achieved, with the means deemed necessary remaining at
the discretion of the Member State.
1
Of course, with regard to the objective criteria, the lower the threshold, the greater the number of reports
which will be filed.

As a result, the fact that a Member State records a high number of reports must not
necessarily be regarded as an indicator of susceptibility to money laundering and/or of
the effectiveness of the prevention system.

These subjective criteria remain, despite established guidelines, within the discretion of the reporting
entities. Although they risk allegedly deterrent fines for not reporting a transaction or a suspicious or
unusual activity, the number of reports filed on the basis of those subjective criteria inevitably varies as a
result of the degree of sensitivity and professionalism of the economic operator in question (which varies
from one economic sector and from one Member State to another). This has a direct impact on the
statistics.

Data are therefore to be considered as a possible indication of money laundering but will
be influenced by various factors (
21
).

These operational differences between Member States also have ramifications in terms of investigations.
Some FIUs have extensive powers which allow them to carry out real groundwork, enabling them to hand
over detailed files which in fact are equivalent to investigations; obviously, putting together such files is
very time consuming. Other FIUs may function differently, for example by requiring and obtaining large
amounts of data concerning suspicious or unusual transactions, and performing analysis to identify trends
and movements which may not be visible by looking at transactions individually. They will therefore tend
to submit more files where the suspicion of laundering in those files will be weaker, leaving the task of
pursuing and deepening the investigation to the investigation services.

FIUs which make full use of extended powers of investigation will tend to hand over
fewer files to the investigation services than other FIUs. Those files will, however,
contain stronger elements, thus facilitating the investigation phase. FIUs requiring
reports to be filed on the basis of lesser suspicions may use the reports to perform trend
analysis. It is essential to consider this point when comparing the number of files sent to
investigation services.

Statistical reasons

In the context of data collection, Eurostat has found that Member States tend to aggregate, and therefore
to count, their reports differently. Member States tend to classify them in files according to their
relevance (by the name of the natural or legal person forming the subject matter of the report). In some
Member States, all relevant reports held in one single file may be counted whereas other Member States
count only the first report which led to the file being opened. However, a file may comprise several STRs,
SARs and UTRs, each in turn made up of several transactions or activities (sometimes thousands)
declared over many years.

This has a direct impact on the comparability of data between Member States.

(
21
) Such as guidelines provided by the FIUs, the FATF and supervisory authorities.

This issue of comparability arises again at the investigation phase: several files sent by the FIU may form
just one enquiry at the investigation stage and will tend to be accounted for as such.

That is why, in statistical terms, it becomes difficult to follow a report from its filing to a
possible criminal conviction because the unit of account changes between the reporting
phase and the investigation phase (
22
).

In order to address this issue, the Commission had submitted guidelines with the aim of establishing
common definitions and counting units/rules in order to ensure as much comparability as possible within
each of the three phases of the anti-money laundering regime. However, these guidelines have been only
partly followed, limiting their potential value.

CONCLUSION:

The cost/benefit analysis of anti-money laundering regimes needs continuous efforts with
the objective of being able to use it as an element for future policy development at EU
level.

As previously mentioned, the Commissions long term aim is to draw up a cost/benefit analysis of anti-
money laundering provisions. Article 33(1) of the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive (
23
) requires
Member States to review the effectiveness of their anti-money laundering provisions (i.e. how and to
what degree they produce the desired effect). The Commission intends to support this effort by
facilitating the sharing of approaches and best practice on the subject.

The Commission already provided financial support to a project led by the University of Utrecht, the
ECOLEF project, aiming to establish the cost/benefit analyses of national anti-money laundering/
financing of terrorism regimes in the 27 Member States(
24
). The final results of this study will be
published in the near future.

The Commission also continues to follow the debates within the FATF.

According to a 2009 study, the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive is seen, within the financial
sector of the internal market (
25
), as a costly directive. It requires the creation of a system to monitor
transactions and clientele, which is relatively onerous for the banks. Consequently, some in the private
sector question the effectiveness of such a system. It is here that the need for reliable statistics is acute,
not only to provide a basis for the justification of a policys relevance to private partners in the system,
but in particular to improve it by adapting it to needs.

It is therefore a matter of comparing the available data with the analyses of the criminal threat in order to
draw up a European and national money laundering profile. Once this profile has been created, the aim
(
22
) Furthermore, it remains difficult to determine the nature of the evidence which leads to conviction by the court. The evidence may well relate to
confessions or phone tapping, in which case the file sent by the FIU and supplemented during the investigation phase will be used above all to
assess the nature of the proceeds of the crime at the confiscation stage.
(
23
) Article 33(1): "Member States shall ensure that they are able to review the effectiveness of their systems to combat money laundering or
terrorist financing by maintaining comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to the effectiveness of such systems."
(
24
) University of Utrecht, "The Economic and Legal Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing Policy" also called
ECOLEF project (ref.JLS/2009/ISEC/AG/87).
(
25
) See Final Report by Europe Economics, Study on the Cost of Compliance with Selected FSAP Measures,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/090707_cost_of_compliance_en.pdf, 5 January 2009. In order to strike a
balance between depth and breadth of coverage, we have focused our work upon the following Directives: the Capital Requirements Directives
(the CRDs); the Transparency Directive; the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID); the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive
(3AMLD); the Prospectus Directive and the Financial Conglomerates Directive (together, the Selected Directives). With the exception of the
3AMLD, these measures formed important parts of the Financial Service Action Plan (FSAP).
1
will be to identify those economic sectors which are most vulnerable to criminal penetration by means of
money laundering and the consequences of such penetration (impact of money laundering) in order to
better calibrate the strategic approach to both legislation and operations at European level.

A combined approach bringing together risk analyses (threats, vulnerabilities and impact) as well as legal
analyses (e.g. are relevant laws correctly implemented and adapted to identified needs?) and economic
analyses (e.g. what does the system cost reporting entities and public authorities?) would help in
identifying anomalies more effectively.

By targeting weaknesses more effectively, the anti-money laundering provisions should be able to be
adapted more rapidly, more effectively and with greater ease to changes in the criminal threat (at a fair
cost for operators and public authorities) and without necessarily having to reform legal instruments,
which by definition is a slow and arduous process.

Although there is still much to do in order to establish a true cost/benefit analysis of anti-money
laundering provisions, the Commission is confident that these efforts will have an important impact on
the EUs fight against money laundering future and its policy development in this field.
Detailed information on
selected indicators
2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2. Detailed information on selected indicators

Information on selected indicators for the three stages of the anti-money laundering regime
(reporting/intelligence, investigation and judicial) is presented in this section.

Guidance Notes and a Glossary of Terms were provided to the Eurostat contact persons for each indicator
in order to facilitate the collection of the relevant statistical data. These Guidance Notes and Glossary of
Terms are reproduced here together with the data and metadata. The Eurostat contact persons provided
the data for Tables 1-3 and 6-12 whilst DG Customs and Taxation Union provided the data for Tables 4
and 5.

The Eurostat contact persons were also provided with a document, Guidelines and rationale for the
second collection of data based on detailed comments on the first money laundering data collection
exercise (see Annex) in order to facilitate the collection of the relevant statistical data. For each table,
the Guidelines included the standard definition which countries were asked to observe in assembling the
figures. If the national figures diverged from the proposed standard definition, the contact person was
asked to provide an explanation. These explanations (or metadata) are included in the Country notes
applicable to each table. Please note, however, that only a selection of the most significant metadata is
reproduced for each table in this publication.

Some tables show trends. These trends need to be carefully interpreted as they can both
bear testimony of better reporting and of an overall improvement in statistical awareness,
and perhaps also provide an indication of Member States legal actions against money
laundering. These trends need also to be considered with other types of information such
as threat analysis and should not be used and interpreted in isolation.

As a result, users are reminded that they need to exercise caution when using the data, to study the
metadata associated with each table, to take note of the difficulty of interpreting and comparing data from
Member States (see Section 1.4) and to take into account the comments on the following pages.

Statistical data are available for the following stages:

Reporting/Intelligence stage

1. Number of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) filed each category of obliged entities
2. Number of postponement orders adopted on reported transactions
3. Number of money laundering investigations carried out independently by law enforcement agencies
4. Number of declarations made in application to the EU Cash Control Regulation
5. Number of incorrect cash declarations or findings as a result of customs controls in the EU at external
borders
6. Number of suspicious cash activities at the EU borders reported to the Financial Intelligence Unit
(FIU) (including those based on declarations and smuggling)
7. Number of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) sent to law enforcement
8. Number of staff dedicated full time (or full time equivalent) to money laundering in the Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU)
2
Detailed information on selected indicators
Investigation stage

9. Number of cases initiated by law enforcement agencies on the basis of Suspicious Transaction
Reports (STRs) sent by the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)
10. Number of cases brought to prosecution originating from Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs),
Cash Transaction Reports (CTRs) and independent law enforcement investigation (ileis)

Judicial stage

11. Number of persons/legal entities convicted for money-laundering offences
12. Number of sentences, by type, for money-laundering offences

2.1. Glossary of terms

Cash for the purposes of Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 on controls of cash entering or leaving the
Community is defined in Article 2 of the Regulation as:
Bearer-negotiable instruments, including monetary instruments in bearer form such as travellers
cheques
Negotiable instruments (including cheques, promissory notes and money orders) that are either
in bearer form, endorsed without restriction, made out to a fictitious payee, or otherwise in such
form that title thereto passes upon delivery
Incomplete instruments (including cheques, promissory notes and money orders) signed, but
with the payee's name omitted
Currency, i.e. banknotes and coins that are in circulation as a medium of exchange.

Cash transaction report means a disclosure made to an FIU, by a party having an obligation to disclose
based on a threshold established by national legislation.

Confiscation means a penalty or a measure, ordered by a court following proceedings in relation to a
criminal offence or criminal offences resulting in the final deprivation of property (2005 Warsaw
Convention of the Council of Europe on Laundering of the Proceeds from Crime and Financing of
Terrorism, CETS 198).

Directive 2005/60/EC (
26
) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing.

Egmont Group (
27
) is an informal network of FIUs whose goal is to facilitate international co-operation
especially in relation to the sharing of information and expertise.

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (
28
) is an inter-governmental policy making body whose purpose
is to establish international standards, and develop and promote policies, both at national and
international level, to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. In response to mounting concern
over money laundering, the FATF was established by the G-7 Summit that was held in Paris in 1989. The
European Commission is member of the FATF together with 15 Member States. Countries that joined the
(
26
) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:309:0015:0036:EN:PDF
(
27
) http://www.egmontgroup.org/
(
28
) http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.html

European Union from 2004 onwards are represented in the MONEYVAL group, which has the status of
observer at the FATF and since 2006 the status of associated member (allowing more countries within the
MONEYVAL group to attend and participate in the FATF meeting). The FATF develops and promotes
national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. It works to
generate the necessary political will to bring about legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas. This
is done by means of the adoption and revision of a series of recommendations.

Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) means the central national unit responsible for receiving (and to the
extent permitted requesting), analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of
information which concern potential money laundering, potential terrorist financing or are required by
national legislation or regulation. This definition is enshrined in Article 21, paragraph 2 of the EU Third
Anti-Money Laundering Directive.

Freezing or seizure means temporarily prohibiting the transfer, destruction, conversion, disposition or
movement of property or temporarily assuming custody or control of property on the basis of an order
issued by court or other competent authority (2005 Warsaw Convention of the Council of Europe on
Laundering of the Proceeds from Crime and Financing of Terrorism, CETS 198).

Money-laundering investigation means an investigation initiated by a disclosure by an obliged party or
by intelligence gathered by investigators.

MONEYVAL group (
29
) - countries that joined the European Union from 2004 onwards are represented
in the MONEYVAL group, which has the status of observer at the FATF and since 2006 the status of
associated member (allowing more countries within the MONEYVAL group to attend and participate in
the FATF meeting).

Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 (
30
) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005
on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community.

Seizure see Freezing.

Self-laundering refers to "own proceeds" laundering by a person who may be the author of the offence.

Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) is a disclosure made to an FIU by a professional having an obligation
to disclose based on any suspicious activity of money laundering or terrorist financing. The main
difference with STR is the fact that the SAR scope is broader as it may not include a transaction.

Suspicious transaction report (STR) is a disclosure made to an FIU by a party having an obligation to
disclose based on any type of suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing which are required by
regulations which may include unusual behaviour. Suspicious transactions are handed to the appropriate
law enforcement units for investigation. The counting unit was specified as the initial STR received for
each case opened by the FIU from each category of obliged entity.

Third-party money laundering means laundering by a person other than the author of the offence.
(
29
) http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/
(
30
) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:309:0009:0012:EN:PDF
2

Unusual transaction is a transaction designated as such on the basis of indicators established at national
level. The unusual transaction must be reported by the relevant institutions to an FIU. Unusual
transactions are analysed by the FIU and, where suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing can
be established, a Suspicious Transaction Report is forwarded to the appropriate law enforcement Units for
investigation.

Unusual transaction report (UTR) is a disclosure made to an FIU by a professional with an obligation
to disclose, based on unusual behaviour in a client's profile. The main distinction between an STR and
UTR is the higher standards and quality expected of STRs.

2.2. Statistical data

2.2.1. Reporting/Intelligence stage

During this third data collection, a number of countries have revised their data for 2008. This explains the
discrepancies with the figures published in 2010. Moreover, the reporting unit for Spain is not the
Suspicious Transaction Report as erroneously stated in 2010 publication, but the Suspicious Activity
Report. Figures for 2008, 2009 and 2010 for STRs (or SARs and UTRs, if applicable) are presented in the
table. Nearly all Member States (apart from Ireland) were able to provide some data and a full or partial
breakdown by obliged entity.

The figures reported vary greatly, reflecting the different sizes of the respective financial markets and the
differences in the concepts, the counting rules and the reporting practices. FIUs tend to process
transactions received in STRs as cases. Relevant cases are sent to the law enforcement authorities. Some
FIUs record all related STRs as one case, while others only count the first case-opening STR. As a result
some countries report extremely high figures.

For some Member States (Cyprus, Spain, Finland, and United Kingdom) the concept is interpreted as a
Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) which may include activities not related to any particular monetary
transaction but to the opening of a bank account. One Member State (NL) records Unusual Transaction
Reports (UTR) which, if found to be suspicious, may be sent to the law enforcement authorities. In 2008
and 2009 Latvia reported the highest number of STRs, followed by Belgium, France, Italy and Sweden.
In 2010, it was Italy that reported the highest number of STRs and more than twice the number reported
in 2008.

All in all, there is an increase in the total number of STRs and SARs throughout the reference period
2008-2010. Calculations were based only on the 22 Member States that provided data for all three
reference years.

Table 1: Number of reports filed by type

Number of
reports filed
2008 2009 2010
STR 88 499 101 341 126 116
SAR 247 366 261 312 266 388
UTR 295 464 90 976 118 559

In particular, Tables 1.b 1.d show that 13 Member States show an increase from year to year, 7 Member
States show an increase in 2010 in comparison to 2008 whereas 6 Member States have reported a smaller
number of STRs or SARs in 2010. It is however possible that the 2010 figures could be revised in the
future as in the case of the 2008 data.

Similarly, Switzerland, Serbia and Turkey show an increase in the number of STRs contrary to what
happened in Croatia. This increase could be a sign of a substantive progress if disclosures were indeed
related to money laundering. However, this increase could alternatively be a product of over-reporting
whereby only a small proportion of these reports are deemed by law enforcement as worthy of
investigation. This could only truly be assessed in a longer time frame depending on judicial follow-up
(and a reliable corresponding collection of data).
2
Credit institutions (
31
) (banks) are the principal source of STRs. The following table gives the distribution
of the percentage of STRs, SARs or UTRs that came from credit institutions. For example, in half of the
Member States that provided data, STRs from credit institutions represent more than 75 % of the total
number of STRs filed by the obliged entities. The Member States with the lowest percentages are
Finland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom for all three years of reference. It is important to note
that none of them files STRs, but SARs or UTRs.

Table 1.a: Percentage of STRs, SARs or UTRs from credit institutions

Percentage of STRs,
SARs or UTRs from
credit institutions
Number of Member States
2008 2009 2010
less than 25 % 3 4 4
25 % 50 % 2 4 2
51 % 75 % 7 4 6
more than 75 % 14 12 10
Total 26 24 22

The percentage of STRs or SARs that come from credit institutions is reduced in 2010 for a number of
Member States. The highest reduction was noted in Portugal where in 2008 94 % of the STRs were filed
by credit institutions, whereas in 2010 only 48 % of STRs were filed by credit institutions.

(
31
) As defined in Article 1 of Directive 2000/12/EC as "an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the
public and to grant credits for its own account".
2
27
Money laundering in Europe
Table 1.b: Number of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) filed by each category of obliged entities, 2008

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Belgium STR 4 032 85 2 0 : 8 576 3 320 47 : 1 1 047 : : : 1 441 : 15 554
Bulgaria STR 492 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 66 : 566
Czech Republic STR 2 090 : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 230 : 2 320
Denmark STR 545 0 : : 711 273 5 : : 0 1 17 : : : 1 : 1 553
Germany STR 6 352 37 0 0 920 0 9 5 3 5 0 4 9 0 0 5 : 7 349
Estonia STR 3 028 2 1 0 2 136 41 6 53 3 0 0 37 23 0 0 264 252 5 846
Greece STR 1389 : 204 : 322 37 : : : : : : : : : 272 : 2 224
France STR 11 511 703 58 10 : 1 467 3 347 24 : 3 37 11 : : 191 200 14 565
Croatia STR 1 948 175 3 : : : : 2 : : : : : : : 25 : 2 153
Italy STR 12 614 147 4 8 1 071 0 6 103 5 37 13 3 : 20 : 9 183 14 223
Latvia STR 21 266 26 0 0 414 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 250 : 23 963
Lithuania STR 126 : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 66 : 192
Luxembourg STR 636 27 45 : : : 2 1 33 0 1 7 0 : : : : 752
Hungary STR 8 165 83 370 7 : 981 3 4 10 1 : : 3 : : 2 51 9 680
Malta STR 44 0 2 0 13 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 5 0 1 : 69
Austria STR 992 8 : : : : 6 3 1 : 3 : 8 : : 38 : 1 059
Poland STR 1 260 4 21 : : : 2 : : : : : : : : 3 : 1 290
Portugal STR 535 3 0 0 1 17 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 10 : 568
Romania STR 1 545 5 3 : 17 1 2 225 : : 2 12 51 : 2 468 5 2 338
Slovenia STR 188 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 192
Slovakia STR 1 942 261 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 49 0 0 17 : 2 275
Sweden STR 7 232 0 5 : 1 452 4 177 : : 2 0 0 145 : 4 1 30 : 13 048
Member States reporting Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)
Spain SAR 2 156 11 12 : 195 : 32 248 6 : 30 2 : : : 212 : 2 904
Cyprus SAR 216 0 1 0 0 0 2 : 2 0 0 : 0 0 0 23 : 244
Finland SAR 876 67 6 : 17 225 : 5 : 12 : 14 4 252 7 : : 288 : 22 752
United Kingdom SAR 202 : 909 : 8 438 3 524 6 319 : 7 104 97 170 : 41 : 48 25 994 168 620 221 466
Member States reporting Unusual Transaction Reports (UTRs)
Netherlands UTR 5 013 13 : 0 288 799 0 16 568 112 7 0 538 53 4 : 341 : 295 464
Member States not providing data
Ireland : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :

Iceland STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Liechtenstein STR 119 6 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 : 0 61 : 1 : 189
Switzerland SAR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 851
Serbia STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Turkey SAR 4889 10 0 0 : 0 0 1 0 0 0 : : : : 0 24 4 924

: Data not available or concept does not apply.
0 = zero (no cases) in that year.
Source: Eurostat.
2
28
Table 1.c: Number of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) filed by each category of obliged entities, 2009

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Belgium STR 3 628 82 1 1 : 9 973 3 251 120 : 9 1 055 : : : 2 047 : 17 170
Bulgaria STR 640 : 0 0 : 0 0 3 0 0 0 5 1 : 0 42 100 791
Denmark STR 755 0 0 0 797 499 11 0 0 4 0 25 0 0 0 4 0 2 095
Germany STR 8 111 47 1 0 830 0 16 5 1 1 1 8 12 : : 7 6 9 046
Estonia STR 2 583 0 3 0 2 078 48 4 50 3 0 1 2 5 0 0 327 1 159 6 263
Greece STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
France STR 12 254 1 007 67 58 : 2 249 2 370 77 : 33 30 12 : 0 476 675 17 310
Croatia STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 1 493 494
Italy STR 17 147 232 3 24 2 721 0 3 69 9 38 3 6 : 33 : 14 357 20 659
Latvia STR 21 326 4 0 0 10 7 13 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 077 : 28 439
Lithuania STR 141 : : : : : : 31 : : : : : : : 41 : 213
Luxembourg STR 1 166 46 54 : : : 6 2 41 1 0 15 1 : : : : 1 332
Hungary STR 4 637 134 166 3 5 416 9 2 11 0 0 0 0 : : 1 23 5 407
Malta STR 26 0 3 0 6 0 2 1 4 0 2 4 0 2 3 10 : 63
Austria STR 1 239 12 : : : : 8 15 5 : : : 5 : 1 100 : 1 385
Poland STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Portugal STR 594 1 0 0 12 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 20 : 634
Romania STR 1 876 8 4 : 43 : : 200 : 1 1 11 9 : 41 558 19 2 771
Slovenia STR 157 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 163
Slovakia STR 2 377 115 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 1 2 2 0 0 2 66 114 2 686
Sweden STR 3 275 : 1 : 1 749 3 680 : : 8 0 8 322 : 0 7 87 : 9 137
Spain SAR 2 111 14 10 2 153 : 32 194 5 : 12 9 : : : 222 : 2 764
Cyprus SAR 380 0 0 0 1 : 6 : 2 : 0 : 0 0 0 : 389
Finland SAR 869 68 1 : 21 543 : 8 : 16 : 9 5 023 15 : : 229 : 27 781
United Kingdom SAR 300 1 611 644 13 7 244 4 051 4 992 : 6 720 : 119 491 3 059 71 : 10 306 190 757 230 378
Netherlands UTR 3 396 9 : 0 84 952 0 15 338 578 88 3 510 23 5 : 1 059 : 90 976
Ireland : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :

Iceland STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 1 493 494
Liechtenstein STR 136 9 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 83 0 2 0 235
Switzerland SAR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 896
Serbia STR 136 9 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 83 0 2 0 235
Turkey SAR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 896

Source: Eurostat.
2
29
Table 1.d: Number of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) filed by each category of obliged entities, 2010

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Belgium STR 3 870 76 0 1 : 11 491 0 163 74 : 26 912 : : : 2 060 : 18 673
Bulgaria STR 726 : 0 0 : 2 1 4 0 0 1 7 0 : 0 117 372 1 230
Denmark STR 968 3 0 0 972 342 4 0 0 3 1 16 0 0 0 7 0 2 316
Germany STR 10 227 97 0 0 574 0 10 4 0 3 0 11 33 0 0 77 6 11 042
Estonia STR 2 635 1 0 0 1 744 221 5 59 0 0 0 5 2 0 0 332 29 5 033
Greece STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
France STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Croatia STR 307 0 0 2 0 0 5 23 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 63 6 406
Italy STR 30 345 154 21 30 5 333 24 12 66 18 66 3 34 : 197 : 38 702 37 043
Latvia STR 22 528 0 0 0 18 2 26 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 428 : 26 003
Lithuania STR 165 : : : : : : 31 : : : : : : : 26 : 222
Luxembourg STR 4 629 78 63 : : : 13 4 56 2 0 21 0 : : : : 4 866
Hungary STR 6 551 155 72 0 16 352 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 26 7 177
Malta STR 38 4 2 0 4 0 3 0 3 0 0 6 0 4 5 4 : 73
Austria STR 1 941 7 : : : : 12 6 5 : 2 1 3 : : 241 : 2 218
Poland STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Portugal STR 1 061 4 0 0 995 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 138 : 2 205
Romania STR 1 915 11 : : 711 1 1 108 : : : 1 29 : : 682 18 3 477
Slovenia STR 170 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 0 181
Slovakia STR 2 031 85 0 0 27 0 1 1 3 2 2 7 0 0 5 192 114 2 470
Sweden STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Spain SAR 2 082 11 14 4 285 : 39 345 6 : 23 7 : : : 356 : 3 172
Cyprus SAR 463 1 8 0 4 : 6 : 2 : 0 : : 0 2 24 : 510
Finland SAR 1 000 153 5 : 16 012 : 7 : 17 : 14 3 951 45 : : 250 : 21 454
United Kingdom SAR 384 1 430 664 7 8 562 4 216 4 878 : 6 085 : 116 563 3 742 57 : 5 976 204 572 241 252
Netherlands UTR 7 415 2 : 0 108 826 0 11 277 445 127 2 564 44 12 : 834 : 118 559
Ireland : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Iceland STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 1 413 414
Liechtenstein STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Switzerland SAR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 1 159
Serbia STR : 9 : : : : : : : : : : : : : 63 4 590 4 662
Turkey SAR 9968 47 2 0 : 11 : 1 : : 0 : : : : 25 197 10 251

Source: Eurostat.
2
Country notes applicable to Tables 1.b, 1.c and 1.d

Belgium: Tax advisers are included with eternal accountants/auditors.

Bulgaria: The statistics provided for 2007, 2008 and 2009 represent cases opened on the basis of STRs
received from the obliged entities. Each case is opened based on at least one STR and can contain
subsequent STRs received by the FIU. The cases opened most closely reflect the recommendation to
only count the initial STR/report received in each case opened by the FIU from each category of obliged
entities per year. As a result of the new internal rules introduced, the STRs are further designated either
for operative purposes or for information purposes. For 2010 the additional, complementary STRs are
subtracted from the statistics and the STRs that were designated for information purposes are counted
according to the respective category of reporting entities. In 2008 the Money Transfer Provider reporting
is counted as reporting done by credit institutions and no separate statistics are maintained. For 2009 and
2010 a number for the money transfer institutions again cannot be provided as Money Transfer Provider
reporting is distributed between both credit institutions and financial institutions (money transfer activity
based on a contract with banks or other financial institutions. The numbers for both the financial
institutions and the credit institutions include also STRs related to money remittance. Therefore the cell
for money transfer institutions is marked with : as no separate statistics are maintained. The statistics
under the category financial institutions also cover activities of currency exchange.

Germany: The FIU is police-based and therefore has a different reporting structure from the
administrative FIUs operating in some other Member States. Germany proposes a new definition for the
STR (suspicious transaction report): STR is a disclosure made to a Financial Intelligence Unit or law
enforcement agency by a party having an obligation to disclose based on any type of suspicion, which
may include unusual behaviour. Suspicious transaction reports are analysed by the FIU.

Estonia: FIU Estonia aggregates statistical data about STR by the following subject categories: credit
institutions, financial institutions that include life insurance companies and investment forms, providers
of currency exchange services, providers of cash transfer services, organizers of gambling and lotteries,
persons who carry out or act as intermediaries in transactions with real estate, intermediaries of high-
value goods, auditor, accountants, tax advises, lawyers, notaries and others.

Iceland: The FIU gets almost all its STRs from Financial Undertakings, which means commercial banks
and from Money Value Transfer Companies.

Ireland: The FIU is also a Police Unit and therefore the Competent Authority to investigate Suspicious
Transaction Reports.

Italy: The reporting obligation of STRs on money laundering only entered into force in 2006, with the
enactment of the secondary legislation. A suspicious transaction report could contain several transactions.
In the statistics produced, based on the Italian FIU annual report, the FIU count all the STRs received
from each category of obliged entities per year, based on suspicion of money laundering. The category
credit institutions includes also Poste Italiane; the category money transfer institutions includes the
money transfer companies; the category others includes government authorities, the category financial
institutions includes the financial intermediaries officially listed in Banca dItalia.

Latvia: This definition excludes STRs from parties not having an obligation to report. The STRs
therefore show only the number of reported transactions.

Lithuania: The majority of STRs are received from the credit sector. Other STRs are received from other
obliged entities and these data are not sorted by entities.


Luxembourg: Reports to the FIU are counted per case file (dossier), each case file may contain a large
number of suspicious transactions and a large numbers of suspected individuals or entities. Additional
reports from the same reporting entity are not counted separately (no separate file is opened) and are
included in the file opened when receiving the initial report from the professional. Also responses to
requests from the FIU are not counted but included in the file on the basis of which the request for
information was initiated.
The statistics are based on the FIU annual reports (www.justice.public.lu) and the categories of
professionals set in the template do not entirely match the breakdown provided by the FIU. The concept
of financial institution in Luxembourg encompasses the banks, the professionals of the financial sector
and the insurance companies. Company service providers are only partly captured as a separate category
since the law of 17 July 2008. Before, this category was included in the one for professionals of the
financial sector (PSF), accountants/auditors or lawyers. As the categories are overlapping since the 2008
law, it is probable that the statistics of company services providers will encompass only the residual
category, when the professional does not fit any of the previous mentioned categories (accountant,
lawyers etc.).
The STRs files in the context of mutual funds are mainly files by the central administration and the entity
holding the register of the mutual funds. Those entities are banks or professionals of the financial sector.
Thus, the STRs files in relation to mutual funds are counted in the category Banks/PSF. There is no
bureau de change as such in Luxembourg.

Hungary: According to the Hungarian FIU database, the FIU received 9680 STRs in 2008. Credit
institutions cover the banks, cooperative saving banks and other specialised credit institutions.
Investments firms covers commodity stock exchange service; Others covers inter alia postal
services (other than money remittance) and traders in precious metals; Financial institutions covers
inter alia financial services connected to credit/debit cards and leasing services.

Netherlands: The FIU receives Unusual Transactions (UTs) from the reporting institutions. The unusual
nature of the transactions is based on either objective or subjective indicators. Reporting is compulsory
with respect to objective indicators, which are based on a certain threshold. With respect to subjective
indicators, reporting is compulsory if the reporting institution feels the situation described by the indicator
applies. After investigation by the FIU, an unusual transaction can be declared suspicious. Only then it
will be forwarded to investigation services. The category Others includes the following institutions:
insurance agents, government, business economic advisors, independent legal advisors, finance
companies, credit card companies. In each reported unusual transaction, the applying indicator is linked
to a financial action. One unusual transaction may consist of more than one financial action, which means
that one transaction may be reported with more than one indicator. Since, in this table, a distinction is
made between objectively and subjectively reported transactions, the figures provided are based on the
number of financial actions.

Austria: Data come from reports by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Poland: The STR comprises a report that may cover many individual transactions that, when considered
together, create a suspicion of money laundering. Credit institutions include banks, co-operative credit
unions and leasing corporations. Lawyers include notaries. The data do not cover STRs made by co-
operating organizations, i.e. other governmental units, for example the fiscal service, customs or the
Agricultural Property Agency.

Romania: STRs are recorded by an administrative office: the National Office for the Prevention and
Control of Money Laundering is the Financial Intelligence Unit of Romania.

Slovakia: The FIU receives Unusual Transactions Reports (UTRs) which are analysed by the FIU and,
where suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing (or any other crime) can be established, a
Suspicious Transaction Report is forwarded to the appropriate law enforcement bodies for further
2
analysis or for investigation. Unusual transactions meet both definitions (UT and STR). All the STRs are
considered and processed as cases and if they are found to be relevant, they are sent to law enforcement
authorities. Each STR may contain several (sometimes hundreds or thousands of) transactions and due to
that the FIU is not able to provide data based on the number of concrete transactions included in STRs
received by it (it does not maintain this type of data), particularly when taking into account the number of
STRs received daily. Moreover, not all the STRs will cover a specific transaction (to which STRs may
refer). For example a STR might be generated by an attempt to open an account or by refusal to carry out
the required unusual transaction.

Switzerland: The FIU reports on SARs.

Spain: It should be highlighted that, according to the Spanish internal regulations, the suspicious reports
disclosed by the obliged institutions to the FIU (Sepblac) fall undoubtedly into the category of Suspicious
Activity Reports (SARs).

Cyprus: The FIU receives Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs). That means that each SAR may contain
many (sometimes hundreds or thousands) transactions.

Finland: The reports are rather reports of suspicious activity, in which case one SAR often includes a
great number of transactions. It is not possible for Finland to distinguish the number of transactions
included in the SARs.

United Kingdom: Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) are recorded. Not all SARs will cover a specific
transaction (to which STRs may refer). So for example a SAR might be generated by an attempt to open
an account or retain the services of a legal adviser. SARs are reported to the United Kingdom FIU from
across the regulated sector. The figures provided relate to individual SARs received, regardless of
whether they were linked to other SARs or featured the same subject or activity, and regardless of how
they were then developed and used by end users. The FIU does not develop SARs in "cases".

Turkey: Suspicious transaction is the case where there is some information, suspicion or reasonable
grounds to suspect that the assets, which is subject to the transactions carried out or attempted to be
carried out within or through the obliged parties, has been acquired through illegal means or used for
illegal purposes, used for terrorist activities or by terrorist organisations, terrorists or those who finance
terrorism or connected or linked with them. Illegal transactions have to be reported to the Presidency
(MASAK) by the obliged parties. Thus, the MASAK has no duty to send STRs analysed by MASAK to
law enforcement agencies and the law enforcement agencies have no such authorization to demand STRs.
In cases where MASAK detects a money laundering offence, MASAK reports the crime to Public
Prosecutors directly.

Postponement orders adopted on reported transactions

This is the first publication of data on this indicator. Sixteen Member States provided data for the years
20052010 and four Member States for at least one year.

Figures for United Kingdom for 2009 and 2010 are very high in comparison to the other MSs that provide
data for these years. This may be explained by the fact that in the UK legislation there is no actual
postponement wording, and data refer to the nearest equivalent i.e. reporters submitting SARs to seek the
consent of the FIU to carry out a transaction they believe falls within the definition of money laundering.

Table 2: Number of postponement orders adopted on reported transactions
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Belgium 29 41 39 21 38 60
Bulgaria 0 5 3 2 1 5
Czech Republic 122 105 59 34 57 140
Denmark : : : : : :
Germany : : : : : :
Estonia 19 58 58 103 132 201
Ireland : : : : : :
Greece : : : : : :
Spain : : : : : :
France : : : : 4 2
Croatia 1 5 4 4 3 2
Italy 9 12 13 27 14 34
Cyprus 12 13 10 19 18 19
Latvia 56 125 94 99 70 48
Lithuania 10 13 8 12 10 11
Luxembourg 44 26 18 13 31 28
Hungary : : : : 20 48
Malta 0 1 1 0 3 0
Netherlands : : : : : :
Austria 15 21 28 16 12 17
Poland 5 4 1 1 : :
Portugal 5 15 14 13 16 14
Romania 106 3 3 3 5 6
Slovenia 2 0 2 2 1 0
Slovakia : : 7 18 69 68
Finland 11 13 10 43 12 28
Sweden : : : : : :
United Kingdom : : : : 1 814 1 851
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0
Liechtenstein : : : : : :
Switzerland : : : : : :
Serbia : : : : : 59
Turkey : : : : : :

Source: Eurostat.

2
2
Country notes applicable to Table 2

Bulgaria: In cases previewed by the law, the Minister of Finance, upon proposal of the chairman of the
State Agency for National security, can postpone by written order certain transactions or deals for a term
of three work days starting from the day following the date of issue of the order. The statistics for 2009
and 2010 reflect the number of postponement orders. Each order may contain multiple transactions to be
postponed.

Croatia: The Croatian FIU (AMLO) may issue an order to instruct the reporting entity to postpone the
execution of the suspicious transaction for a maximum period of 72 hours, in instances where it is
necessary to take urgent action to verify data on a suspicious transaction or when the FIU judges that
there are grounded reasons that a transaction or a person is linked to money laundering or terrorist
financing.

Czech Republic: The FIU can apply for both an extension of the postponement of the transaction (in
cases where the postponement was already applied for by the Reporting Entity) and an independent
order for a postponement (without such a prior action by the Reporting Entity itself).

Germany: German legislation does not recognize postponement orders.

Estonia: We have defined the number of postponement orders adopted on reported transactions as the
directions to suspend a transaction issued by the FIU. Due to the changes in the law in 2008, the data
from 2008 will not be comparable to the previous year.

Iceland: FIU Iceland has only used this order twice in recent years. Both were done informally and in
cooperation with the banks involved.

Ireland: Irish legislation provides for the issue of direction to cease all transactions on an account if it is
suspected that the funds in the account are the proceeds of criminal conduct pursuant to Section 31(8)
Criminal Justice Act 1994 as amended.

Spain: Postponement orders are within the competence of the Spanish FIU.

Italy: Pursuant to Article 6 of Lgs. Decree no. 231/2007 the Italian FIU has the authority to suspend the
execution of a transaction for 5 days, also at request of the Nucleo Speciale di Polizia Valutaria (NSPV),
the Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA) and the judicial authority.

Latvia: Since 2008 there has been a new Anti-Money Laundering / Counter Terrorist Financing law in
force: Law on the Prevention of Laundering the Proceeds from Criminal Activity and of Terrorist
Financing.

Liechtenstein: All further transactions are prohibited by law after the filing of an STR; no postponement
order is needed.

Lithuania: According to the Anti-Money Laundering / Counter Terrorist Financing law, financial
institutions and other entities, except for notaries and persons authorised to perform notarial acts, lawyers
and lawyers assistants and bailiffs, upon the detection that their client is carrying out a suspicious
financial operation or transaction, must terminate the operation or transaction and, not later than within 3
working hours report about this operation or transaction to the Financial Crime Investigation Service,
regardless of the amount of the financial operation or the transaction. The Financial Crime Investigation
Service, within 5 working days after the receipt of the information or after giving an instruction to

postpone the operation without a delay, carries out the actions necessary to prove or deny the criminal
activity being conducted by the customer.

Luxembourg: Article 5(3) of the Anti-Money Laundering / Counter Terrorist Financing law from 2004
provides that the Prosecutor (FIU) has the power to freeze any transaction or any account on the grounds
of money laundering/terrorist financing suspicion. The validity of such a freezing order is for 3 months
and may be extended from month to month up to 6 months.

Hungary: The figures cover the postponements/suspensions based on the decision of the service provider
as well as postponement orders issued by the Hungarian FIU.

Poland: The data include postponements orders. However, bank account freezing orders are used much
more frequently as they are more effective.

Portugal: The Portuguese FIU has no powers to carry out this type of operation. When necessary, a
proposal to freeze a financial transaction is presented to the competent judicial authority (DCIAP Public
Prosecution), which will evaluate it and then make a decision. Therefore, the values refer to proposals
made by the Portuguese FIU to the Public Prosecution.

Romania: According to the Anti-Money Laundering / Counter Terrorist Financing law, if the Office
considers it necessary, it may impose, based on a reason, the suspension of performing the transaction for
a period of 48 hours. This period may be extended for another period of up to 72 hours by the General
Prosecutors Office by the High Court of Cassation and Justice (GPOHCCJ), if motivated by the FIU.
The GPOHCCJ may authorize only once the required prolongation, or, as the case may be, may order the
cessation of the suspension of the operation.

Slovenia: Slovenias FIU may issue a written order temporarily suspending a transaction for a maximum
of 72 hours.

Slovakia: The FIU has the power/legal possibility to postpone a transaction up to 72 hours in total. Data
are not available prior to 2007.

Finland: FIU Finland has the power to freeze assets (give a postponement order), either based on an STR
received or on the request of a foreign FIU.

Turkey: The Turkish FIU (MASAK) has no authorization to postpone financial transactions.

United Kingdom: There is no actual postponement wording in the legislation. Reporters submitting
SARs may seek the consent of the Serious Organised Crime Authority (SOCA) to carry out a transaction
they believe to fall within the definition of money laundering. Consent can be granted or refused by
SOCA within 7 working days, during which the reporter can take no action. If SOCA refuses consent,
funds can be restrained for 31 days. On the 32
nd
day the activity can commence if there is no law
enforcement action.

2
Money laundering investigations carried out independently by law enforcement agencies

The information available from Member States regarding independent money laundering investigations
was very limited, but nevertheless an improvement on the amount of data provided in previous years. Not
all countries recorded the number of investigations commenced, while some others were unable to
distinguish between investigations based solely on intelligence gathered by investigators and those
triggered by an STR.
Table 3: Number of money laundering investigations carried out independently by law
enforcement agencies (without a prior STR)
Reporting
Unit
Commencements
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Belgium STR : 385 437 456 511 438
Bulgaria STR 214 186 33 92 55 108
Czech Republic STR 42 25 25 34 : 74
Denmark STR : : : : : :
Germany STR : : : : : :
Estonia STR : : : : : :
Ireland STR : : : : : :
Greece STR : : : : : :
Spain SAR 74 122 108 : 202 230
France STR : : : : : :
Croatia STR : : : : 6 9
Italy STR : : : : : :
Cyprus SAR 237 231 332 390 443 494
Latvia STR 5 19 10 24 32 35
Lithuania STR 7 8 4 6 10 34
Luxembourg STR : : : : 22 47
Hungary STR 102 1 137 13 62 4 12
Malta STR 5 9 9 4 8 6
Netherlands UTR : : : : : :
Austria STR 70 183 229 274 254 582
Poland STR : 87 120 87 : :
Portugal STR : : : : : :
Romania STR : 52 162 172 201 259
Slovenia STR 2 1 1 5 7 30
Slovakia STR : : 58 60 85 111
Finland SAR 47 73 77 79 63 105
Sweden STR : : : : : :
United Kingdom SAR : : : : : :
Iceland STR : : : : : :
Liechtenstein STR : 1 2 0 1 2
Switzerland SAR : : : : : :
Serbia STR : : : : : :
Turkey SAR : : : : : :

Source: Eurostat.


Belgium: Complete data are only available for 2006, 2007 and 2008 and not all information for 2009 and
2010 has been encoded. The lower figure for 2010 does not therefore imply an actual reduction in the
number of investigations. The Cellule des Traitements des Informations financiers (CTIF, Belgian FIU)
forwards the documents to the prosecutor when there are serious indications of money laundering.

Bulgaria: The figures are for the number of cases that ended with a recommendation to initiate pre-trial
proceedings.

Czech Republic: Concerning law enforcement agencies, i.e. the police, 74 cases were investigated in
2010 without a prior STR. The data for 2009 are not available.

Germany: The FIU Germany has no statistics on integrated financial investigations. In criminal
proceedings based on an STR or in other criminal proceedings based on suspicion of money laundering or
financing of terrorism, the competent public prosecutors office shall inform the Federal Criminal Police
Office - FIU - of the commencement and the outcome of proceedings.

Estonia: Investigations initiated on the basis of FIU materials (other investigations not included).

Iceland: According to the Police Computer System four cases were investigated by police agencies in
2007. One of the investigations was without a prior STR.

Ireland: A number of money laundering investigations are conducted in relation to investigation into
targets of criminal gangs involved in organised crime. There are approximately 40 investigations into
money laundering over the years concerned, however the numbers for each year cannot be supplied.

Cyprus: The numbers represent only the investigations other from STRs carried out by the FIU which
also include reports submitted to the FIU by the police.

Latvia: The source used includes around 95% of the data; the rest of the data are registered by other
institutions.

Liechtenstein: Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 of 26 October 2005 on controls of cash entering or
leaving the Community is not legally binding for EEA Countries including Liechtenstein.

Luxembourg: Not available before 2009.

Hungary: This figure cover the money laundering investigations carried out either on the basis of an
STR, or independently (without STR).

Austria: Data come from reports by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Bundeskriminalamt).

Poland: Such investigations result from the activity of the prosecution office, reports from the police,
citizens, banks, tax offices, customs and others. No data are available prior to 2006.

Portugal: These data are not separated from the rest of the STRs analysed by the Portuguese FIU.

Slovakia: This figure covers the money laundering investigations carried out either on the basis of an
STR, or independently (without STR). No data are available prior to 2007.

2
Finland: The numbers given as answers reflect the numbers of those criminal investigation cases
conducted by the Finnish law enforcement agencies where the suspected crime has been money
laundering. Data are available since 2004. There is no justification to compare the number of money
laundering investigations independently versus unindependently which would mean with a prior STR.
The law enforcement agencies investigate crime, and one (rare) type of crime is a money laundering
offence.

Sweden: Money laundering is not a crime regulated with its own paragraph in Sweden.

United Kingdom: The United Kingdom does not record the number of investigations commenced, so
money laundering investigation numbers are also not recorded.


Declarations made in application to the EU Cash Control Regulation

DG Taxation and Customs Union (DG TAXUD) collects the number of declarations made by Member
States in application to the EU Cash Control Regulation 1889/2005. All Member States were able to
provide data for 2008, 2009 and 2010, presented in Table 4.

Incorrect cash declarations or findings as a result of customs controls in the EU at the external
borders

DG TAXUD also collects information on the number of incorrect cash declarations or findings as a result
of customs controls in the EU at external borders, shown in Table 5.

The figures in Tables 4 and 5 are summarised below.

Figure 1: Declarations made in application to the EU Cash Control Regulation
(in thousands)

Value of declarations
(million euro)
Value of incorrect declarations
(million euro)
2008 48 393 1 433
2009 45 315 324
2010 55 139 514
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
2008 2009 2010
on leaving the EU
on entering the EU
2

Figure 2: Incorrect cash declarations or findings as a result of customs controls in the EU
at external borders
(in thousands)

0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
2008 2009 2010
Unknown
on leaving the EU
on entering the EU
2 2
41
Table 4: Number of declarations made in application to the EU Cash Control Regulation
2008 2009 2010

on entering
the EU
on leaving
the EU
Total number
Amount
(in million
euro)
on entering
the EU
on leaving
the EU
Total number
Amount
(in million
euro)
on entering
the EU
on leaving
the EU
Total number
Amount
(in million
euro)
Belgium 331 201 532 27.10 464 170 634 38.48 784 206 990 48.31
Bulgaria 1 445 954 2 399 176.08 1 123 316 1 439 127.67 1 031 265 1 296 171.79
Czech Republic 298 264 562 156.73 373 164 537 376.45 399 288 687 223.20
Denmark 27 177 204 7.69 36 262 298 10.08 33 215 248 8.34
Germany 14 441 10 626 25 067 34 820.69 9 126 6 047 15 173 24 056.39 11 852 7 229 19 081 41 163.79
Estonia 46 930 976 580.91 30 767 797 385.08 120 989 1 109 496.25
Ireland 4 11 15 0.39 5 10 15 0.42 9 16 25 1.06
Greece 2 221 86 2 307 74.39 2 611 127 2 738 91.21 2 411 115 2 526 70.02
Spain 4 694 3 812 8 506 753.84 4 004 3 178 7 182 507.05 3 273 2 783 6 056 402.07
France 6 571 7 419 13 990 1 274.91 6 982 9 889 16 871 1 238.34 7 665 11 158 18 823 1 435.04
Italy 14 250 10 460 24 710 4 690.97 20 045 12 203 32 248 7 464.07 23 606 10 915 34 521 5 850.56
Cyprus 375 209 584 23.37 580 148 728 27.39 763 165 928 30.28
Latvia 57 113 170 43.88 67 103 170 49.97 72 60 132 41.66
Lithuania 3 029 794 3 823 101.64 832 557 1 389 50.84 1 229 828 2 057 82.73
Luxembourg 3 4 7 0.25 11 9 20 1.15 7 21 28 1.02
Hungary 709 121 830 46.35 427 54 481 29.80 372 54 426 23.02
Malta 116 36 152 5.65 210 58 268 14.86 308 73 381 16.52
Netherlands 1 126 647 1 773 72.63 1 334 1 264 2 598 116.06 1 346 723 2 069 280.01
Austria 602 1 895 2 497 3 271.22 931 1 633 2 564 8 327.73 1 280 2 133 3 413 3 553.56
Poland 4 227 1 421 5 648 219.02 714 271 985 23.92 388 2 155 2 543 61.56
Portugal 1 071 277 1 348 96.10 1 611 168 1 779 122.99 2 071 81 2 152 126.33
Romania 769 177 946 98.31 528 130 658 81.83 855 202 1 057 150.82
Slovenia 610 187 797 1 687.21 270 73 343 352.85 195 67 262 13.40
Slovakia 35 0 35 1.21 18 0 18 0.53 43 0 43 1.21
Finland 129 117 246 31.91 57 115 172 18.46 91 95 186 7.59
Sweden 71 562 633 21.32 104 259 363 11.07 92 310 402 789.56
United Kingdom 1 652 1 501 3 153 109.25 1 728 1 420 3 148 1 790.74 1 721 1 046 2 767 89.69

Source: DG TAXUD (Taxation and Customs Union) except Spain and Eurostat for Spain.
2
42
Table 5: Number of incorrect cash declarations or findings as a result of customs controls in the EU at external borders
2008 2009 2010

on entering
the EU
on leaving
the EU
Total number
Amount
(in million
euro)
on entering
the EU
on leaving
the EU
Total number
Amount
(in million
euro)
on entering
the EU
on leaving
the EU
Total number
Amount
(in million
euro)
Belgium 5 1 6 0.14 0 1 1 0.02 6 2 8 0.18
Bulgaria 3 26 29 2.75 11 12 23 0.72 11 7 18 0.83
Czech Republic 1 0 1 0.01 3 1 4 0.21 3 19 22 0.38
Denmark 1 134 135 3.85 63 131 194 3.84 11 127 138 3.02
Germany 1 680 1 050 2 730 930.20 2 140 1 239 3 379 97.42 1 879 1 057 2 936 260.25
Estonia 1 0 1 0.01 2 2 4 0.16 4 0 4 0.23
Ireland 1 8 9 0.17 1 4 5 0.12 1 2 3 0.08
Greece 2 6 8 0.93 0 4 4 0.80 5 3 8 0.33
Spain 21 236 257 18.35 22 180 302 20.85 84 242 326 18.22
France 1 018 559 1 577 185.27 857 574 1 431 59.98 644 502 1 146 40.29
Italy : : 1 115 245.91 691 576 1 267 50.53 959 1 077 2 036 123.95
Cyprus 6 12 18 0.58 0 11 11 0.27 1 14 15 0.39
Latvia 2 0 2 0.64 0 4 4 0.09 0 0 0 0.00
Lithuania 0 1 1 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 3 0 3 0.02
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0.00 7 6 13 0.36 3 7 10 0.25
Hungary 9 10 19 0.46 6 1 7 0.09 8 4 12 0.39
Malta 1 0 1 0.03 1 1 2 0.06 3 0 3 0.10
Netherlands 96 113 209 7.28 254 576 830 23.73 145 128 273 35.16
Austria 3 6 9 0.49 25 58 83 3.42 88 143 231 10.21
Poland 37 31 68 5.08 3 4 7 0.13 0 0 0 0.00
Portugal 22 99 121 4.37 779 91 870 41.57 257 224 481 9.97
Romania 0 1 1 0.00 2 1 3 0.55 6 8 14 0.38
Slovenia 33 3 36 2.47 11 11 22 0.89 10 4 14 0.43
Slovakia 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 0.00
Finland 27 10 37 0.76 6 3 9 0.20 14 1 15 0.54
Sweden 2 0 2 0.09 12 11 23 0.67 6 5 11 0.30
United Kingdom 241 626 867 22.88 153 413 566 17.36 105 266 371 8.14

Source: DG TAXUD (Taxation and Customs Union) except Spain and Eurostat for Spain.

Country notes applicable to Tables 4 and 5

Italy: It should be noted that the number of declarations make reference to the overall declarations on
transfers of cash, instruments and securities in an amount greater than 10 000 Euros (or the equivalent
value) carried or else transferred (also by means of postal parcel) from or to a foreign country by residents
or non-residents. As of 1 January 2009, with the implementation of Lgs. decree no. 195/2008, such
declarations must be made for the Customs Agency.

Slovenia: From 2004 onwards only transfers of cash to/from third countries have been supervised. The
threshold which has to be reported to the Office For Money Laundering Prevention has also been
changed as until June 2007 the amount was approximately 12 500 EUR, but since then the threshold has
been 10 000 EUR.

Turkey: The Regulation is not implemented in Turkey. Also, combating cash smuggling at the borders is
not under the scope of duties of the Turkish FIU (MASAK).

2
Suspicious cash activities at the EU borders reported to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)

Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community (adopted by the
European Parliament and the Council on 26 October 2005) entered into force on 15 December 2005 and
has been applicable since 15 June 2007. Article 5 of the Regulation stipulates that information obtained
under Art 3 and 4 (cash declarations, controls and cash detained) is made available to the Financial
Intelligence Units (FIUs).

This process differs from sending or reporting suspicious activity to the FIUs. In some Member States,
the customs authorities do not necessarily report to the FIUs but, instead, make their database available.
The figure should be the sum of Table 3 (incorrect cash declarations or findings) plus a part of Table 2
(number of cash declarations they are not necessarily suspicious but some of the declarations may in
fact be so).

Member States were asked to state whether the information is made available to FIUs on request or if the
FIUs have access to databases managed by the customs authorities. Member States were also asked to
indicate whether all information relating to cash declarations is reported or made available to the FIU or
just those considered to be "suspicious", in an attempt to gauge the reality of the cooperation between EU
customs and the FIUs.

Although the Regulation only became applicable in June 2007, 8 Member States have been collecting this
information for several years. 17 Member States were able to provide this data for 2008 and some others
(Czech Republic, Germany and United Kingdom) indicated that the data might, nevertheless, be available
in the future.

Nineteen Member States were able to provide data for at least one reference year.


Table 6: Number of suspicious cash activities at the EU borders reported to the FIU
(including those based on declarations and smuggling)

2005 2006 2007 (
1
) 2008 2009 2010
Belgium : : 196 619 957 1 096
Bulgaria 5 6 9 9 : :
Czech Republic : : : : 8 49
Denmark (
1
) : : : : : 250
Germany : : : : : :
Estonia 129 73 54 28 3 4
Ireland : : : : : :
Greece : : : : : :
Spain 322 563 432 444 593 557
France : : : : : :
Croatia 29 34 34 45 45 32
Italy : : : : : :
Cyprus 3 0 3 3 4 3
Latvia : 33 132 159 191 126
Lithuania : : : 3 780 877 1 979
Luxembourg : : 0 0 0 0
Hungary 1 032 1 069 461 483 37 22
Malta : : 1 4 3 1
Netherlands 366 571 1 265 1 819 2 716 2 736
Austria : : : : : :
Poland : : : : : :
Portugal 358 426 493 698 1 390 2 150
Romania : 53 25 11 0 1
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia : : 11 35 5 36
Finland : : 162 260 180 189
Sweden : : 222 635 : :
United Kingdom : : : : : :
Iceland : 0 1 : : :
Liechtenstein : : : : : :
Switzerland : : : : : :
Serbia : : : : : :
Turkey : 0 0 3 0 6

(
1
) June to December only.
Source: Eurostat.

2


Belgium: Customs authorities send reports to the FIU (CTIP in Belgium).

Czech Republic: The data is within the Czech Customs authority's competence.

Denmark: Figures not available, but in most cases where no declaration is made, the local police are
informed. Cash declarations, controls and cash detained is made available to the FIUs, and within a few
months the Danish FIU will put the information into their own database.

Spain: Ministerial Order EHA/1439/2006, of 3
rd
May imposes the obligation to declare the movement
into or out of national territory of coins, bank notes or bearer cheques made out in the national currency
or any other currency or any material support, including electronic supports, designed for use as a means
of payment in an amount greater than 10,000 euro per person and journey. The figure shows the number
of interventions carried out by the law enforcement authorities at the Spanish borders into persons who
failed to declare. Furthermore, in accordance with the law 10/2010 of 28
th
April on the prevention of
money laundering and terrorist financing, there is an obligation to declare the movement of means of
payment into or out of national territory.

Germany: No comparable data available but the Customs Administration reports that the amount of cash
controls with indicators for money laundering was as follows: 2003: 189, 2004: 170; 2005: 160, 2006:
205, 2007: 320, 2008: 409.

Ireland: Section 38(1) Criminal Justice Act 1994 as amended provides for the seizing of cash over a
prescribed sum in legislation where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it represents the
proceeds of crime or intended to be used for the purposes of criminal conduct.

Iceland: STRs from the Customs authorities to the FIU-Iceland in recent years were 1 in 2007 and 0 in
2006. Usually it is no more than a couple per year.

Italy: It should be noted that the number of declarations make reference to the overall declarations on
transfers of cash, instruments and securities in an amount greater than 10 000 Euros (or the equivalent
value) carried or else transferred (also by means of postal parcel) from or to a foreign country by
residents or non -residents. As of 1 January 2009, with the implementation of Lgs. decree no. 195/2008,
such declarations must be made for the Customs Agency.

Latvia: In Latvia this declaration has been activated since 1 July 2006.

Liechtenstein: The reporting system will be implemented by the Swiss Border Patrol (under the Customs
Union with Switzerland).

Lithuania: The FIU receives information from customs authorities when a person brings into or takes out
from the European Community via the Republic of Lithuania and third countries a single sum of cash in
excess of the amount indicated in Part 1, Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1998/2005 Para 1.5. So the
statistics provided refer to reports of this type.

Luxembourg: No STRs were filed upon the application of the cash control regulation 2009 and 2010.


Netherlands: The figures provided are for the number of UTs (unusual transactions or cash activities) at
the borders reported by Customs including the number of declarations made based on the EU cash control
regulation 1889/2005 (Table 4).

Portugal: Some cases of suspicious cash activities carried out by Portuguese citizens, which were
detected by police forces of other countries, near the EU land borders and, in particular, the border next to
Switzerland (on average, less than five cases per year) have been conveyed to the FIU and, through it, to
DCIAP (Public Prosecution). On the other hand, at the national airports, there have been some cash
entries from African countries, which were mostly based on passengers spontaneous declarations. Such
communications have led to preventive investigations, even though there is no specific provision in the
Portuguese legal system that restricts or subjects the transport of any amount of cash within national
territory to any conditioning.

Romania: The data were provided by the National Customs Authority in accordance with the provisions
of Art. 3, para. 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering / Counter Terrorist Financing Law no. 656/2002,
consequently amended and completed. The National Customs Authority communicates to the Office, on a
monthly basis, all the information it holds, according to the law, in relation to the declarations of natural
persons, regarding cash in foreign currency and/or national currency, which is equal or above the limit set
by the Regulation (EC) no. 1889/2005 while entering or leaving the Community. The National Customs
Authority is required to transmit all the information related to suspicion of money laundering or terrorism
financing within 24 hours.

Slovakia: The figures provided refer to the number of declarations received by the customs authorities
and then reported to the FIU. Data are not available prior to 2007.

Finland: The figures show the total number of declarations to the FIU; that is, the number includes all
known cases.

United Kingdom: Only drugs-related cash of 50,000 or more is reported to the FIU but the figures are
not available.

Croatia: The Customs Administration is obliged to notify the FIU on cash entering or leaving across the
state border amounting to 10,000 or greater, whether declared or undeclared, and on cash entering or
leaving or attempted cash entering or leaving across the state border where the suspicion of money
laundering or terrorist financing exists, irrespective of the amount. The Custom Administration notifies
the FIU on cash carried across the state border via an electronic form, using electronic data transmission
means.

Turkey: The figure indicates the number of suspicious cash activities detected at the EU borders of
Turkey.

2
Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) sent to law enforcement

Member States were asked to provide information on the Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) which,
after analysis by the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), are then sent to the law enforcement authorities for
further action. The number of STRs submitted to law enforcement authorities, compared to the total
number of STRs filed by the obliged entities, is usually small.

Table 7: Number of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) sent to law enforcement (
1
)

(
1
) The full Guidance Notes (as provided to the Eurostat contact persons) appear in the Annex.
With regard to the comparability issues, these figures should be used with caution and with reference to the associated metadata and the
comments on the interpretation of data (mentioned in Section 1).
Source: Eurostat.

Reporting
Unit
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Belgium STR : 912 1 166 937 1 020 1 259
Bulgaria STR 320 274 337 401 521 480
Czech Republic STR 196 134 102 71 191 296
Germany STR 8 241 10 051 9 080 7 349 9 046 11 042
Estonia STR 159 358 397 282 742 1 118
Ireland STR : : : : : :
Spain SAR 462 466 569 686 2 144 2 606
Croatia STR : : 91 103 114 116
Italy STR : : : : : :
Cyprus SAR : : : : : :
Latvia STR 3 942 4 029 2 996 3 612 3 378 6 174
Lithuania STR 65 65 69 91 104 131
Luxembourg STR 25 40 33 104 110 138
Hungary STR : : : : 1 268 1 674
Malta STR 28 24 24 41 20 34
Netherlands UTR 38 481 34 531 45 656 54 605 32 100 29 795
Austria STR : : : : : :
Poland STR 798 941 1 168 996 : :
Portugal STR 200 272 378 300 188 240
Romania STR 483 367 660 796 706 524
Slovenia STR 32 37 69 63 65 55
Slovakia STR : : 811 915 861 816
Finland SAR 385 779 2 548 1 700 2 702 3 636
Sweden STR : 300 462 : : :
Iceland STR : : : : 1 1
Liechtenstein STR 139 113 141 161 174 :
Switzerland SAR 504 507 629 687 797 1 002
Serbia STR : : : : 61 72


Table 7 should be interpreted with caution, as there is no direct and linear correlation between STRs,
SARs, UTRs filed in any given year and the number of cases sent to law enforcement services.

A case can be built over the course of several years and comprise hundreds if not thousands of STRs,
which in turn can contain anything between one and several thousand transactions. Moreover, the
counting units retained by Member States vary. Some Member States may retain as a counting unit the
first STR opening the case, while others may count them all, which affects the results and reduces
comparability.

The distribution of the number of STRs submitted to the law enforcement authorities for 2008, 2009 and
2010 is given below. The data reveal that almost half of the Member States submit to the law enforcement
authorities less than 25% of the STRs, SARs or UTRs filed by the obliged entities. The calculations are
based on 16 Member States that provided data for all three reference years.

Table 7.a: Percentage of reports sent to law enforcement by Member States

Percentage band
Number of Member States
2008 2009 2010
less than 25% 8 6 8
25% 50% 4 7 5
51% 75% 3 1 1
more than 75% 1 2 2
Total 16 16 16

Some FIUs make full use of extensive powers at their disposal while other FIUs have more restricted
possibilities. Hence, the former type of FIUs tend to deliver more complete cases, which take more time
to process, further disconnecting the linear and annual approach of this statistical analysis. This table is
therefore to be interpreted in this context.

A significant decrease in the number of STRs / UTRs submitted to law enforcement authorities has been
noted in Bulgaria, Portugal, Romania and Luxembourg. On the contrary, an increase in the number of
STRs / UTRs submitted to law enforcement authorities has been noted in Spain, Estonia, the Czech
Republic and Finland.

2

Bulgaria: STRs that are not sent to law enforcement agencies for further investigation (because the
financial intelligence analyses could not confirm/find enough data supporting the initial suspicions of the
reporting entity) are archived; but information from these STRs remains in the databases of the FIU.

Czech Republic: All STRs are analysed by the FIU. Only after this analysis and when the suspicion
persists is a complaint forwarded by the FIU to the law enforcement agency.

Germany: All STRs result in the initiation of criminal proceedings in Germany, there are no exceptions.
The criminal proceedings are led by the competent state police forces.

Estonia: For the number of STRs sent to law enforcement, it should be noted that the numbers refer to
the STRs used in the files sent to the law enforcement agencies, not the number of files forwarded (one
file may consists of the information contained in more than one STR). It should also be noted that the
Estonian FIU never sends to law enforcement agencies the STR itself as it is prohibited by law, but the
files formed on the basis of the STRs instead. However, statistics are kept on which STRs the files
forwarded to law enforcement agencies were based on.
The comment made by Czech Republic applies to Estonia as well.

Ireland: All STRs received by FIU Ireland are investigated fully.

Spain: All STRs are subject to analysis in the Spanish FIU. The number of STRs sent to law enforcement
agencies excludes the number of reports that are provisionally shelved in a given year.

Cyprus: Although there are no statistics kept for this, in a small number of STRs no investigation was
carried out because of the nature of the STR.

Latvia: Further analysis is made for all transactions, including the identification of participants and
finding their previous reported transactions. The total number of transactions included in the files sent by
the FIU to law enforcement agencies is indicated here.

Lithuania: The Lithuanian Financial Crime Investigation Service under the Ministry of Interior, FCIS
(Lithuania FIU) is responsible for both analysis of STRs and for pre-trial investigations on the
background of STRs. FCIS is a law enforcement institution. After receiving an STR, the FCIS Money
Laundering Prevention Division (MLPD) opens an analysis file. MLPD is an intelligence unit of FCIS
and has no pre-trial investigative powers. So after preliminary analysis, if some indications of crime are
detected, MLPD sends information to local units (county divisions) of FCIS where pre-trial investigation
starts.

Luxembourg: All STRs received are analysed by the FIU which is part of the Luxembourg State
Prosecutors Office. If the analysis conducted by the FIU confirms the suspicion, the analysis report will
be forwarded to the State Prosecutor to open or corroborate a criminal investigation file.

Netherlands: This information is not available. Instead is the total number of suspicious transactions
forwarded to investigation services per year is provided. After investigation by the FIU-The Netherlands,
a UT (unusual transaction) can be declared suspicious and only then will it be forwarded to investigation
services.

Poland: These include the number of analyses made, which have not led to the law enforcement
investigation.

Portugal: The data refer to the STRs that, after analysis and decision form the part of the Portuguese
FIU, are sent to the police and judiciary authorities for investigation.

Romania: The Office receives, analyses and processes all STRs and notifies the General Prosecutors
Office by the High Court of Cassation and Justice in cases where solid evidence for money laundering
exists. Whenever there operations are identified that involve suspected terrorism financing, the General
Prosecutors Office by the High Court of Cassation and Justice and the Romanian Intelligence Service are
notified.

Slovakia: Within the FIU all the STRs are included in further analysis and preliminary police
investigation because of the police nature of the FIU (the FIU is a law enforcement body, however it has
no investigative powers). If suspicion of money laundering or any other crime is established, an
intelligence file is forwarded to other appropriate law enforcement bodies for further analysis or for
investigation. If suspicion is proved following the analysis done by the FIU then the case is closed within
the FIU and details are stored in the FIU database for further exploitation in the future. Thus the figures
in Table 7 show the number of STRs (intelligence files) forwarded to the law enforcement bodies for
further analysis or for investigation, as well as the number of STRs closed within the FIU as being
negative.

Finland: All the STRs are subject to FIU analysis. Based on the analysis, information related to 1700
STRs was forwarded to law enforcement in 2009. Information can be forwarded to law enforcement for
the purpose of preventing or investigating money laundering / terrorist financing or the predicate offence
beyond these. In FIU Finland all the STRs are included in our further analysis. The numbers are given by
calculating the difference between the total of the STRs and the STRs forwarded to the law enforcement.

Sweden: The FIU has a new data system for registering money laundering and this information is no
longer available.

United Kingdom: The FIU does not maintain specific statistics on all the SARs it analyses and
disseminates. The FIU retains partial statistics i.e., those analysed and disseminated relating to
terrorism/terrorist financing and SARs seeking consent. Otherwise, SARs are data-mined, evaluated for
relevance to the research, and may undergo further analysis dependent upon the objective. In addition,
most of the SAR database, by being available directly to law enforcement, is automatically
disseminated to those agencies for further analysis and action. Law enforcement agencies have
provided some feedback on the use of SARs during investigations. However, precise figures on the
number of SARs not used for investigation but further analysed are not available in any standardised
format.

Croatia: Data refer to the number of cases (not STRs) disseminated to law enforcement. In Croatia, all
STRs received from reporting entities are subject to analytical-intelligence processing by the FIU.

Turkey: The Turkish FIU (MASAK) is the main authority responsible for the prevention of money
laundering and financing of terrorism in Turkey. It receives STRs from obliged parties and denunciations
originated from the public prosecutors, public institutions, persons/legal entities and from abroad. The
data received by MASAK are analysed and evaluated by its own experts or sent to examiners for further
examination. If there are serious findings about the perpetration of a laundering offence, the cases are
referred to the Public Prosecutors Office.

Serbia: The data provided refer to the number of FIU cases concerning suspected money laundering, and
one case contains more than one suspicious transaction.

2
Iceland: All STRs received by the FIU are analysed before they are sent to the police. The Economic
Crime Unit investigated 23 STRs in 2007. The Unit started a formal investigation in two cases resulting
from information from STRs.


Staff dedicated full time (or full time equivalent) to money laundering in the FIU

Although FIUs may perform the same core functions in each Member State they may have a different
legal status and therefore conduct the work in different ways. This may have implications on human
resources. In order to obtain comparative data, Member States were asked to describe the legal status of
the FIU (i.e. administrative, police, judicial etc.).

Thirteen Member States had administrative FIUs, 9 had police FIUs, 2 had judicial FIUs and 3 had
hybrid types of FIUs. Since the previous publication a correction was made regarding the status of the
British FIU which is now registered as "hybrid" instead of "police".

There are no significant differences in the number of dedicated staff from year to year. Slovakia is the
only exception with an increase of 10 staff members from 2008 to 2009.

Table 8: Number of staff dedicated full time (or full time equivalent) to money laundering
in the FIU (
1
)

FIU legal status 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Member States with "administrative" FIUs
Belgium administrative : : : : : 51
Bulgaria administrative 36 44 42 41 : :
Czech Republic administrative 25 27 27 15 15 19
Greece administrative 3 4 15 18 : :
Spain administrative 80 77 79 78 77 80
France administrative 37 48 47 46 51 :
Croatia administrative 18 18 18 22 22 22
Italy administrative : : 92 99 97 104
Latvia administrative 19 18 19 19 19 19
Malta administrative 3 3 6 6 8 10
Poland administrative : : : : : :
Portugal administrative 25 26 27 27 27 28
Romania administrative 39 27 35 34 36 36
Slovenia administrative 15 14 15 16 18 18

Member States with "police" FIUs
Germany police 16 16 16 17 17 19
Estonia police 11 12 17 22 18 16
Ireland police : : : : : :
Lithuania police 12 12 12 13 13 13
Hungary police : : : : 31 30
Austria police : : : : : :
Slovakia police 29 29 29 28 38 38
Finland police 27 27 27 27 25 24
Sweden police 15 15 15 17 14 14

Member States with "judicial" FIUs
Cyprus judicial 14 19 19 19 21 21
Luxembourg judicial 5 5 6 6 6 6
2
FIU legal status 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Member States with "hybrid" FIUs
Denmark hybrid 11 12 14 18 18 14
Netherlands hybrid : 56 56 56 56 56
United Kingdom hybrid : : : : : :
Iceland hybrid 1 1 1 : : :
Liechtenstein : 7 7 7 7 7 :
Switzerland administrative 8 8 8 8 8 8
Serbia administrative : : : : 26 25
Turkey administrative 126 138 146 155 161 172

(
1
comments on the interpretation of data (mentioned in Chapter 1).
0 = zero (no personnel) in that year.
Source: Eurostat.



Greece: Hellenic Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Commission (H.A.M.L.C.)

Spain: All of them are full-time employees of the Spanish FIU (Sepblac), dependent on Sepblacs
direction.

Italy: The FIU includes not only the financial analysts, but also the regulatory and legal specialists,
administration and management personnel.

Latvia: Minor changes during the years are due to employees on parental leave. The Latvian FIU
operates under the supervision of the Office of the Prosecutor.

Portugal: The numbers that are indicated correspond to all the staff working at the Portuguese FIU.

Romania: The data provided represent the number of staff within the Reporting/Financial Analysis
Department of National Office for Prevention and Control of Money Laundering (NOPCML) within FIU
Romania.

Estonia: Figures are as of 31 December in the respective year.

Ireland: Garda Siochana Fraud Investigations Unit (FIU).

Lithuania: Money Laundering Prevention Division of the Financial Crime Investigation Service
(Lithuanian FIU) under the Ministry of the Interior (Internal FIU databases).

Slovakia: As of November 2012, the FIU is composed of 35 full-time dedicated police officers
(including management, financial analysts, regulatory and legal specialists, excluding administrative
staff).

Cyprus: MOKAS (the FIU of Cyprus) is a law enforcement agency. Its main functions are to gather,
classify, evaluate and analyse information relevant to money laundering and financing of terrorism.

Luxembourg: The FIU is functioning under the authority of the Vice-Prosecutor and the State
Prosecutor.

Denmark: The Danish FIU is a hybrid between a Judicial FIU and a police FIU.

Netherlands: Before 2006 there were two separate organisations, MOT and BLOM. MOT was an
administrative organisation and BLOM was a police organisation. Both organisations were partners in the
prevention and combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The reporting institutions
were obliged to report unusual transactions to MOT. BLOM on the other hand was a police support
centre of the national public prosecutor for money laundering. As from 1 January 2006 both MOT and
BLOM integrated into one organisation called FIU-the Netherlands.

United Kingdom: The United Kingdom FIU is within the Serious and Organised Crime Agency
(SOCA). The FIU is a hybrid, so staff carry out all the activities of an FIU, but are not specifically
dedicated to deal with money laundering on its own.

Croatia: The Croatian FIU is situated in the Ministry of Finance.
2

Iceland: In FIU-Iceland (Peningavttisskrifstofa), one police officer dedicated full time. The post
holders job is to receive, analyse and forward STRs to other police departments. The post holder also
acts as a contact person with the entities under an obligation to report, mainly the banks. A lawyer
specialised in Anti-Money Laundering / Counter Terrorist Financing in the Economic Crime Unit also
works extensively with the FIU.


2.2.2. Investigation stage

Suspicious Transactions Reports (STRs) sent by the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to law
enforcement which and then investigated

As some investigations take a long time, Member States were asked to provide information on the
number of investigations commenced during the reference year. FIUs tend to process transactions
received in STRs as "cases". One FIU case can be made up of several STRs and/or CTRs, which in turn
can also contain several transactions (possibly thousands) received over a long period of time. It is,
therefore, difficult to ensure consistency in monitoring the work carried out by FIUs in comparison with
the work of law enforcement agencies since a single investigation may contain several FIU cases.

In some countries law enforcement agencies may decide not to start an investigation after reviewing the
information sent by FIUs; this means that there is no direct correlation between the number of STRs
analysed in order to construct a case and the initiation of an investigation.

Given this limitation, it does not appear to be possible to assess the performance of the entire anti-money
laundering system as the linear process from one or more reported transactions (contained in an STR or a
CTR) to the final conviction during the judicial phase. In some cases, the reporting, investigation and
judicial phases can only be monitored separately. However, comparison over the years may provide an
indication of the performance within a Member State and in the EU as a whole.

Sixteen Member States provided figures for at least one of the reference years and this varied
considerably, from several thousand cases in Germany to fewer than 20 cases in others (Czech Republic
and Lithuania). For Germany, this is because all STRs are sent to the police for investigation.

Table 9.1 indicates whether the law enforcement agencies have used the cases they received from the
FIUs at the investigation stage of the anti-money laundering operational chain (see also Table 7). Given
the above limitations, it can only provide a rough indication on the nature of domestic cooperation.

Depending on Member States legal systems, the cases sent may be investigated on a systematic basis
(e.g. the 100 % figure for Germany) or subject to a material review, to which other type of information
and intelligence is to be added by law enforcement agencies.

The number of cases initiated in a given year by law enforcement agencies on the basis of STRs sent by
FIUs would not normally be expected to exceed the number of STRs sent to law enforcement. However,
some discrepancies may occur as a result of differences in timings and the inclusion of additional
investigations that are not based on the STRs transmitted by the FIU. For Bulgaria and Portugal, the
number of cases initiated by law enforcement agencies is higher than the number of STRs sent by the
FIU.

2
Table 9.1: Percentage of Suspicious Transactions Reports (STRs) sent by the Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU) to law enforcement which are then investigated

2008 2009 2010
N
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Member States reporting Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs)
Belgium STR 132 14 : 161 13
Bulgaria STR 719 179 : :
Germany STR 7 349 100 9 046 100 11 042 100
Estonia STR 6 2 29 4 47 4
Italy STR 686 1 070 876
Latvia STR 91 3 69 2 132 2
Lithuania STR 15 16 13 13 16 12
Luxembourg STR 104 100 110 100 138 100
Malta STR 41 100 : :
Poland STR 197 20 : :
Portugal STR 906 302 970 516 1 459 608
Romania STR 719 90 179 25 96 18
Slovenia STR 8 13 23 35 27 49
Slovakia STR 3 0 159 18 64 8
Spain SAR 66 10 61 3 61 2
Member States unable to provide data
Denmark STR : : :
Ireland : : : :
Greece STR : : :
France STR : : :
Croatia STR 103 100 114 100 116 100
Cyprus SAR : : :
Hungary STR : : :
Netherlands UTR : : :
Austria STR : : :
Finland SAR : : :
Sweden STR : : :
United Kingdom SAR : : :
Iceland STR : : :
Liechtenstein STR 52 32 61 35 58
Switzerland SAR : : :
Serbia STR : : :
Turkey SAR : : :

Cases initiated by law enforcement agencies on the basis of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs)
sent by the FIU

In the table below, Portugal shows a notable increase in the number of cases initiated by law enforcement
agencies on the basis of STRs sent by the FIU from 906 in 2008 to 1459 in 2010. On the contrary
Romania shows a significant decrease from 719 cases in 2008 to 96 in 2010.

Table 9.2: Number of cases initiated by law enforcement agencies on the basis of
Suspicious Transactions Reports (STRs) sent by the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) (
1
)

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Belgium STR : 250 252 132 : 161
Bulgaria STR 534 458 369 719 : :
Germany STR 8 241 10 051 9 080 7 349 9 046 11 042
Estonia STR 19 35 13 6 29 47
Italy STR 642 648 765 686 1 070 876
Latvia STR 155 155 146 91 69 132
Lithuania STR 8 17 10 15 13 16
Luxembourg STR 25 40 33 104 110 138
Malta STR 21 26 21 41 : :
Poland STR : 201 176 197 : :
Portugal STR : 801 1 067 906 970 1 459
Romania STR : : : 719 179 96
Slovenia STR 2 3 2 8 23 27
Slovakia STR : : 9 3 159 64
Spain SAR 73 63 53 66 61 61
Ireland : : : : : : :
Croatia STR 70 87 120 103 114 116
Cyprus SAR : : : : : :
Hungary STR : : : : : :
Netherlands UTR : : : : : :
Austria STR : : : : : :
Finland SAR : : : : : :
Sweden STR : : : : : :
Iceland STR 0 0 2 : : :
Liechtenstein STR 24 21 39 52 61 58
Switzerland SAR : : : : : :
Serbia STR : : : : : :

(
1
comments on the interpretation of data (mentioned in Section 1).
Source: Eurostat.
2
Country notes applicable to Tables 9.1 and 9.2

Belgium: The FIU (Cellule de traitement des informations financires, CTIF) sends cases (where there
are suggestions of serious levels of money-laundering) to the prosecutor. However, it is not possible to
ascertain from the Banque de donnes Nationale Gnrale (BNG) whether an investigation results from a
report to the CTIF. It is possible to tell whether the facts were first recorded by the police or by the
prosecutor and according to the BNG, there were 177 reports in 2009 on the basis of cases initially
reported by prosecutors. These records are mainly based on information from the CTIF although
prosecutors may also start proceedings on the basis of complaints or information they themselves receive.
In 2010, 161 reports were recorded based on information received by the prosecutor. These statistics are
incomplete, however, insofar as incidents not noted directly by the police and forwarded by the
prosecutor are later the subject of an offence. Only reports initiated by the police are systematically
recorded in the BNG. These statistics should, therefore, be supplemented by data from the Collge des
Procureurs Gnraux.

Bulgaria: Until the end of 2007, the FIU was an administrative body with its own budget and reporting to
the Ministry of Finance. With the adoption of the Law on the State Agency for National Security (SANS),
the FIU was transferred to the Financial Intelligence Directorate of SANS, where it retains operational
independence and continues to operate as an administrative FIU. The FIU notifies the Prosecution Office
or the Combating Organized Crime General Directorate (Ministry of the Interior) when there is a
suspicion of money laundering. Files are then initiated at the Supreme Cassation Public Prosecutors
Office. The notifications received are both from the FIU and from the Ministry of the Interior
Combating Organized Crime General Directorate, less from other directorates within the Ministry of the
Interior, from investigations of the Prosecutors Office itself, from other institutions e.g. tax authorities,
the media and very rarely from citizens. The data represent the number of reports sent by the FIU to the
law enforcement authorities, on the basis of which correspondence was initiated.

Czech Republic: Not all cases initiated by the police on the basis of STRs sent by the FIU were
evaluated as a money laundering cases. Some of the STRs were solved as frauds, forgery and others (76
cases) and the rest (102 cases) were money laundering cases.

Germany: All STRs result in the initiation of criminal proceedings in Germany; there are no exceptions.

Italy: The STRs sent by the FIU are investigated by the Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA) and by
the Nucleo Speciale di Polizia Valutaria (NSPV) of Guardia di Finanza. The figure for 2010 is
provisional.

Latvia: The FIU sends groups of STRs, which may contain one or more (also hundreds of) transactions,
to law enforcement. The table shows the numbers of these groups and includes only around 95% of such
cases. The data come from one source, other sources are not included.

Lithuania: The statistics show how many reports originating from STRs, ended with pre-trial
investigations on money laundering and other crimes.

Luxembourg: The numbers encompass both the enqute prliminaire (preliminary investigation)
under the authority of a Prosecutor and information judiciaire (judicial investigation) under the
authority of an investigating judge. The statistics on money laundering investigations triggered by FIU
analysis (STR) are as follows: 17 (2008); 56 (2009); and 60 (2010).

Poland: The number relates to investigations started in a given year (i.e. not necessarily completed in that
year). The number of on-going investigations was 645 in 2007 and 535 in 2006.


Portugal: The numbers refer to the investigations taken forward by the General Prosecution (DCIAP),
following the communication of operations likely to lead to the commission of a crime related to money
laundering or to terrorism financing (STR). For every communication received, DCIAP carries out a
preventive investigation. If the preventive investigation identify elements that confirm the suspicion of a
crime, then an inquiry is opened; otherwise the preventive investigation ends and is filed. Quite often the
communication of suspicious operations relate to situations already known to the Public Prosecutor or is
linked to on-going investigations. In this case, the relevant elements of the communication are appended
to the on-going inquiry and a separate inquiry is not carried out. In 2009, 970 preventive inquiries were
carried out following a communication of suspicious operations; 117 communications proceeded to an
inquiry or were linked to existing inquiries, and 60 of these led to a specific inquiry. For 2010, there were
1459 preventive inquiries; 117 proceeded to an inquiry or were linked to existing inquiries, and 45 of
these led to a specific inquiry. The inquiries concern money laundering and the predicated crime unless
the predicated crime was committed outside national territory.

Romania: The number 719 for 2008 refers to cases that include those where there are solid grounds for
suspicion of money laundering and terrorism financing, disseminated by the FIU to the General
Prosecutors Office by the High Court of Cassation. The data presented for 2009 and 2010, registering a
much smaller amount comparable to 2008, highlight a significant decrease in the number of STRs
received from law enforcement agencies and submitted for settlement by the Public Ministry by the
National Office for Preventing and Control of Money Laundering.

Slovakia: The police statistical system contains only aggregate figures for all the investigations initiated
by law enforcement agencies relating to the appropriate criminal offence, irrespective of the source of the
information or suspicion. The FIU does not keep these kinds of statistics. It maintains the statistics on
how many STRs (cases) were sent to the law enforcement agencies directly for criminal prosecution
commencement as well as the statistics on how many STRs (cases) were sent to other police bodies for
further analysis or investigation, if appropriate. However, the FIU has no feedback on whether the
investigation has been actually initiated by a specific law enforcement agency or not and hence these
specific statistics are not available.

Spain: The police consider research to be a coherent set of activities (surveillance, monitoring,
wiretapping etc.) as well as the exchange of intelligence and collaboration with other units. Hence all
transactions by a person or group of persons related to each other are grouped in the same investigation.
So the figures given in this section are the numbers of investigations which can involve the grouping of
more than one transaction. Normally a case coincides with an investigation.

Cyprus: MOKAS, the FIU, is a law enforcement agency. All STRs are investigated by MOKAS.

Hungary: The system for collecting this sort of statistical data is under development.

Netherlands: Each transaction that (after investigation by the FIU-The Netherlands) has been declared
suspicious, is forwarded to one or more investigation services. It is also placed on the Intranet Suspicious
Transactions (IVT), which can be consulted by the investigation services. The table provides the total
number of suspicious transactions consulted in 2006 and 2007 (years before are not available). Note that
one transaction may be consulted by different investigation services. Therefore, it is not possible to
calculate the share of consulted transactions from the total forwarded transactions mentioned in Table 7.

Finland: The law enforcement authorities do not investigate the STRs as such. Instead they investigate
crime, i.e. the suspected criminal activity of individuals, with the aim of collecting enough evidence to
take the case to the prosecutor in the first place and later on, for the prosecutor to take the case to court.
FIU Finland analyses the STRs received, and when there are strong enough suspicions of indications of a
connection to a criminal activity, the FIU may forward the information of the STR to law enforcement. In
most of the cases, the investigating authority is already investigating a case and the FIU information may
2
or may not bring added value to the investigation. Far less often the FIU information contains totally new
information strong enough to start a new criminal investigation. The numbers given to this question refer
to the number of STRs forwarded (disseminated) to law enforcement authorities (in Finland or abroad).

Sweden: Because money laundering is not a crime regulated with its own paragraph in Sweden it is not
possible to identify the crime in the system.

United Kingdom: United Kingdom does not record the number of investigations commenced.

Croatia: FIU cases are disseminated to relevant bodies.

Turkey: If there are serious findings about the occurrence of a money laundering offence, the cases are
referred to the Public Prosecutors Office by the FIU (MASAK).

Iceland: The number of STRs investigated by the Economic Crime Unit of the National Commissioner of
the Icelandic Police was 23 in 2007. Eight STRs were in one of the cases investigated by the Economic
Crime Unit ( FIU-Iceland is part of the Economic Crime Unit). Only information from the STR, not the
STR itself, is sent to other police departments in the country.

Switzerland: Of the 1,159 SARs in 2010, 1002 were forwarded to the Prosecutor in 2010. From January
2001 to 31 December 2010, the Swiss Money Laundering Reporting Office had forwarded a total of
6,326 SARs to prosecuting authorities. By the end of 2010, decisions had been reached in 4,271 cases. Of
these, 283 cases led to a court judgement; 1,896 cases led to criminal proceedings which were later
suspended; 1,690 cases were dismissed and 402 cases were adjourned due to on-going related criminal
proceedings abroad.

Cases brought to prosecution: originating from Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs), Cash
Transaction Reports (CTRs) and Independent Law Enforcement Investigation (ILEI)

After a case has been further built at the investigation phase it may be prosecuted. This is the third phase
of the anti-money laundering chain. The intended goal of this analysis was to better identify the role
played by the prudential regime (i.e. disclosure of suspicions) in comparison with other types of
intelligence brought at the investigation phase.

Member States were asked to provide figures on the number of cases brought to prosecution broken down
by
- the number of cases initiated by (a/several transaction(s) identified in) one/several STR(s);
- the number of cases initiated by (a/several transaction(s) identified in) one/several CTR(s);
- the number of cases initiated based on law enforcement intelligence i.e. independently from
FIUs input.

Member States were largely unable to provide such information as the prosecution process is often
presented as the result of an overall assessment, thereby preventing such a disaggregation of data.

The results by country are shown in Table 10. Fourteen Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain
and Finland) provided figures for 2006 to 2010 on which the following graph on the total number of cases
is based. It should be noted that the observed fluctuations are mainly due to the German cases as they
represent between 73 % and 83 % of the total number of cases every year.

Figure 3: Total number cases brought to prosecution originating from STRs, CTRs or
ILEI (
1
)

The judicial phase of the money laundering proved to be the least reliable and least exhaustive part of the
money laundering data collection. Some Member States were unable to provide the requested data despite
their obligations under Art. 33(2) of the Anti-money Laundering Directive.

0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(
1
) Based on 14 MSs
2
64
Table 10: Number of cases brought to prosecution: originating from Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs), Cash Transaction Reports
(CTRs) and independent law enforcement investigation (ilei) (
1
)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
originating from: originating from: originating from: originating from: originating from: originating from:

Reporti
ng Unit
STR CTR ilei TOTAL STR CTR ilei TOTAL STR CTR ilei TOTAL STR CTR ilei TOTAL STR CTR ilei TOTAL STR CTR ilei TOTAL
Belgium STR 660 : : 1 100 812 : : 1 237 1 083 : 316 1 658 856 : 298 1 374 807 : 309 1 306 992 : 289 1 618
Bulgaria STR : : : 26 : : : 40 : : : 50 : : : 56 : : : 94 : : : 85
Czech Republic STR 0 : 23 23 0 : 6 6 0 : 9 9 0 : 16 16 1 : 25 26 7 : 71 78
Germany STR : : : 6 692 : : : 9 929 : : : 13 593 : : : 10 478 : : : 11 218 : : : 20 387
Estonia STR 0 0 : 0 0 0 : 0 1 0 : 1 1 0 : 1 : : : : : : : :
Italy STR : : : 79 : 11 1 448 143 : 17 1 627 76 : 11 1 501 110 : 10 1 541 17 : 1 1 404
Latvia STR 4 : 7 11 3 : 3 6 3 : 6 9 91 : 24 115 : : : 25 : : : 32
Lithuania STR 1 : 4 5 7 : 1 8 2 : 2 4 5 : 9 14 3 : 0 3 3 : 16 19
Luxembourg STR 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 2 0 3 5 2 : 2 4 2 : 11 13 2 : 12 14
Hungary STR : : : : : : : 6 : : : 1 : : : 1 : : : 5 : : : 11
Malta STR 8 : 5 13 12 : 9 21 4 : 9 13 : : : 4 : : : : : : : :
Poland STR : : : : 54 : : 54 82 : : 82 23 : : 23 : : : : : : : :
Portugal STR : : : : : : : 84 : : : 95 : : : 141 60 74 134 45 91 136
Romania STR : : : 22 : : : 29 : : : 21 : : : 36 : : : 800 : : : 421
Slovenia STR 0 0 0 0 13 5 2 20 10 8 1 19 6 0 5 11 8 : 4 12 11 : 11 22
Slovakia STR : : : : : : : : : : : 18 : : : 7 : : : : : : : :
Sweden STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 94 : : : 50 : : : 40
Spain SAR 30 51 81 40 62 102 37 56 93 31 107 138 27 140 167 27 148 175
Cyprus SAR 3 : : : 2 : : : 4 : : 4 5 : 72 77 6 : 6 12 1 : 39 40
Finland SAR : : : 23 : : : 66 : : : 61 : : : 66 : : : 61 : : : 102
Netherlands UTR : : : 154 : : : 275 : : : 427 : : : : : : : : : : : :
Denmark STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Ireland : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Greece STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
France STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Croatia STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 4 0 5 9 3 0 2 5
Austria STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
United Kingdom SAR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Iceland STR : : : : : : : : : : : 1 : : : 1 : : : 2 : : : :
Liechtenstein STR 23 : 7 30 20 : 10 30 33 : 7 40 47 : 14 61 54 : 10 64 49 : 7 56
Switzerland SAR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Serbia STR : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Turkey SAR 1 : : 1 3 : : 3 5 : : 5 7 : : 7 5 : : 5 3 : : 3

(
1
) The full Guidance Notes (as provided to the Eurostat contact persons) appear in the Annex. With regard to the comparability issues, these figures should be used with caution and with reference to the associated metadata and
the comments on the interpretation of data (mentioned in Chapter 1).
Source: Eurostat.


Bulgaria: All files received are initiated at the Supreme Cassation Public Prosecutors Office. The
communications received are both from the Bulgarian FIU and from the Ministry of the Interior
Combating Organized Crime General Directorate, less from other directorates of the Ministry of Interior,
from investigations of the Prosecutors Office itself, from other institutions e.g. tax authorities, the media
and very rarely from citizens. Having consideration of the Bulgarian legislation in force this term implies
two different meanings and respectively different data. According to Bulgarian legislation, once the
investigation has been completed it is the prosecution authorities who decide whether pre-trial
proceedings should be opened in a given case. As a result, the number of cases where a police
investigation has been opened is higher than that of cases where pre-trial criminal proceedings have been
instituted by the prosecution.

Belgium: The difference between the total and the number of suspicious transaction reports does not only
contain independent law enforcement investigations. Complaints and cash reports are also taken into
account. These figures are transmitted by prosecution offices. For complete information, the following
figures are related to police investigations regarding offences brought to prosecution: 316 (2007); 298
(2008); 309 (2009) and 289 (2010). These figures are provided by the prosecution offices.

Germany: The information concerns proceedings terminated by the public prosecution office in the field
of money laundering as defined in section 261 of the German Penal Code. No distinction between CTR/
STR/ independent law enforcement investigation is available.

Spain: Police files do not differentiate between STRs and CTRs, therefore in this section overall figures
are given.

Italy: The data concern proceedings brought to the Prosecution Offices that include at least one person
charged for money laundering and data from Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (DNA). Only data from
DNA have the information regarding the origin of the investigation.

Latvia: The data from FIU are not identified as originating from STRs or CTRs, because the material
transmitted is a file which may contain both STRs and CTRs.

Lithuania: The data are provided by the Lithuanian FIU and the IT and Communications Department
under the Ministry of the Interior.

Luxembourg: The figures are only related to prosecution for money laundering. The prosecutions for
other offences resulting from STRs are not reflected in these statistics. Only prosecutions started in 2010
have been taken into consideration and the statistics take into account: affaires comportant un judgement
frappe dappel, affaires comportant un jugement rendu (pas dappel), affaires cites, affaires
renvoyes/en instance de renvoi/renvoi requis.

Hungary: The system for collecting this sort of statistical data is under development.

Netherlands: The figures provided for 2005 2007 refer to the total number of verdicts of guilt
concerning money laundering. The distinction between STRs, CTRs and independent law enforcement
investigation cannot be made. Figures for other years are not available.

Poland: The number covers all prosecutions, regardless of their source. No data are available prior to
2006. The number of accused persons was: 288 (2007) and 275 (2006).

2
66
Portugal: The figures only relate to money laundering and it is not possible to distinguish the origin of
the file for either STRs or CTRs. The data in the total column includes files originating from STRs, CTRs
and independent law enforcement investigation.

Romania: In accordance with the feed-back received from the General Prosecutors Office by the High
Court of Cassation and Justice, the numbers in the table for this item represent the indictments reached by
the competent directorates within this institution, in cases originating from STRs. The difference between
2008 and 2009-2010 is due to the fact that for 2008 only indictments were reported, not all cases brought
to prosecution.

Slovenia: No such data are available. The Office has only the total number of cases, investigated by the
law enforcement authorities (police and State Prosecutor).

Slovakia: The figures from the police statistical system indicated the number of cases where money
laundering was proved by law enforcement bodies and brought to the individual prosecutor's offices of
the General Prosecutor's Office. No data are available prior to 2007.

Finland: The figures include all crimes originating from STRs, CTRs and independent law enforcement
investigation. It is not possible to make any further separation.

Sweden: Money laundering is not a crime regulated with its own paragraph in Sweden. The reported
number is the amount of conviction decisions for handling stolen money or for pretty crime involving the
handling of stolen money.

United Kingdom: The United Kingdom does not record the number of cases initiated from SARs, or
assisted by SARs.

Turkey: The total number indicates the number of cases originating from STRs or other denunciations
including requests from public prosecutors received by the Turkish FIU (MASAK).

Iceland: The statistics are for money laundering prosecutions.


2.2.3. Judicial stage

Persons/legal entities convicted for money laundering offences

Given the time lag between the different steps of the anti-money laundering chain (reporting -
investigation - prosecution), it is not possible to directly correlate convictions with the number of cases
presented in the preceding tables. It can only be said that Belgium has the largest number of convictions
every year from 2005 to 2010 followed by the Czech Republic until 2007, Italy and Germany. The United
Kingdom reports a large number of convictions but only for 2005 and 2006. For the following years no
data were provided.

Table 11 shows the total number of persons or legal entities convicted for money laundering offences by
country and Figure 4 summarises the results for the 18 Member States that were able to provide data for
2006-2010.

Figure 4: Number of persons/legal entities convicted for money laundering offences (
1
)

The gradual decrease in the number of persons convicted for money laundering offences can be explained
by the fact that final prosecution for a money laundering case may take 3 to 5 years, from the time when
an STR may have first triggered investigation and prosecution (and many cases may be pending).
Therefore it is advisable to avoid making comparisons between years.

0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(
1
) Based on 18 Member States
2
68
Table 11: Number of persons/legal entities convicted for money laundering offences (
1
)

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

3
r
d

p
a
r
t
y

s
e
l
f
-

l
a
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e
r
i
n
g

u
n
a
b
l
e

t
o

d
i
s
t
i
n
g
u
i
s
h

TOTAL
3
r
d

p
a
r
t
y

s
e
l
f
-

l
a
u
n
d
e
r
i
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g

u
n
a
b
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e

t
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d
i
s
t
i
n
g
u
i
s
h

TOTAL
3
r
d

p
a
r
t
y

s
e
l
f
-

l
a
u
n
d
e
r
i
n
g

u
n
a
b
l
e

t
o

d
i
s
t
i
n
g
u
i
s
h

TOTAL
3
r
d

p
a
r
t
y

s
e
l
f
-

l
a
u
n
d
e
r
i
n
g

u
n
a
b
l
e

t
o

d
i
s
t
i
n
g
u
i
s
h

TOTAL
3
r
d

p
a
r
t
y

s
e
l
f
-

l
a
u
n
d
e
r
i
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g

u
n
a
b
l
e

t
o

d
i
s
t
i
n
g
u
i
s
h

TOTAL
3
r
d

p
a
r
t
y

s
e
l
f
-

l
a
u
n
d
e
r
i
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g

u
n
a
b
l
e

t
o

d
i
s
t
i
n
g
u
i
s
h

TOTAL
Belgium : : : 1 799 : : : 1 601 : : : 1 492 : : : 1 436 : : : 1 231 : : : 1 156
Bulgaria : : : : 2 2 0 4 : : : 10 1 24 0 25 : : : 37 : : : 37
Czech Republic 804 33 0 837 731 33 0 764 636 24 0 660 : : : : : : : : : : : :
Denmark : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Germany 97 : 0 97 216 : 0 216 603 : 0 603 608 : 0 608 416 : 0 416 704 : 0 704
Estonia 0 : : : 0 1 0 1 0 11 0 11 0 11 0 11 : 5 7 12 : 20 39 59
Ireland : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Greece : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Spain : : : : : : : : : : : : 36 10 0 46 41 8 0 49 73 24 0 97
France : : 290 290 : : 270 270 : : 320 320 : : 381 381 : : 353 353 : : : :
Croatia : : 0 : : 4 : : 4 : : 5 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6
Italy : : 721 721 : : 570 570 : : 768 768 : : 736 736 : : 908 908 : : 739 739
Cyprus 0 6 0 6 0 10 0 10 0 13 0 13 1 21 0 22 0 4 0 4 0 15 0 15
Latvia 1 2 0 3 0 4 0 4 1 61 0 62 2 27 0 29 1 9 0 10 2 11 0 13
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Luxembourg : : 0 0 : : 1 1 : : 3 3 : : 2 2 : : 5 5 : : 51 51
Hungary : : : 1 : : : 2 : : : 8 : : : 6 : : : 6 : : : 15
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 : : : : : : : :
Netherlands : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Austria 5 : : 5 10 : : 10 18 : : 18 20 : : 20 12 : : 12 : : 14 14
Poland : : : : : : : : : : : 53 : : : : : : : :
Portugal : : 2 2 : : 0 0 : : 6 6 : : 10 10 : : 12 12 : : 12 12
Romania : : 13 13 : : 2 2 : : 7 7 : : 4 4 : : 2 2 : : 0 0
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Slovakia : : 8 8 : : 19 19 : : 9 9 : : 10 10 : : 10 10 : : 14 14
Finland 4 0 0 4 7 0 0 7 15 0 0 15 28 0 0 28 19 0 0 19 20 0 0 20
Sweden 15 : 15 12 : 12 19 : 19 97 : 97 50 : : 50 40 : : 40
UK: England &
Wales
: : 595 595 : : 1 273 1 273 : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
Liechtenstein : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 1 1 : : 0 0 : : 1 1
Switzerland : : 139 139 : : 148 148 : : 159 159 : : 194 194 : : 185 185 : : 238 238
Serbia (
2
) : : : : : : : : : : : 2 2 : : 5 5 : : 6 6
Turkey (
3
) : : 8 8 : : 2 2 : : 43 43 : : 2 2 : : 64 64 : : 60 60

(
1
the comments on the interpretation of data (mentioned in Section 1).
(
2
) Break in series in 2008 and 2009.
(
3
) Break in series in 2008.
Source: Eurostat.


Belgium: Figures do not distinguish money laundering from concealment (same article in the Belgian
Penal Code).

Bulgaria: Punishments are imposed according to the persons and the types of punishment. There are
cases when more than one person has been sentenced with one sentence and more than one type of
punishment has been imposed on one person.

Germany: Data on 2006 and years before relate only to the former territory of Germany. The data
concern only convictions of persons arising from third party money laundering. According to the German
Penal Code, offenders of self-laundering can only be sentenced to the predicate offence.

France: An individual may be prosecuted and convicted for both a drug trafficking offence and the
laundering of funds derived from this illegal activity. The figures on convictions for money laundering
cannot distinguish between convictions for third party and self-laundering.

Latvia: It is not possible to distinguish between third party and self-laundering.

Luxembourg: In 2010, the data available do not make a distinction between third party and self-
laundering. The figures reflect all the convictions which were pronounced by court, encompassing
definitive and non-definitive convictions.

Austria: The data provided includes only third party money laundering as self-laundering does not
constitute a criminal offence according to Austrian law. On 1 July 2010 self-laundering became a
criminal offence in Austrian legislation. Hence, its not possible to distinguish between third party money
laundering and self-laundering in the reporting year 2010.

Poland: The figures show the number of persons convicted in the first instance (not final).

Portugal: It was not possible to distinguish between third party money laundering and self-laundering.
So the data in this question refers to all convictions for money laundering. The accounting of the
convicted people relates to the most serious offence for which they were accused. From January 2007 the
method changed and the data began to be collected directly from the courts computer system.

Romania: The figures show definitive convictions in the first instance. The Superior Council of
Magistracy records do not include the classification required in the Eurostat questionnaire.

Slovakia: The Ministry of Justice only holds statistics of finally-sentenced persons. Only natural persons
can be sentenced for a crime. All of these finally-sentenced persons used illegally-acquired revenues for
their benefit.

Finland: The statistics describe persons who have received sentences from courts of first instance and are
compiled by the main offence. Money laundering became a distinct offence category in the legislation on
1 April 2003, before which the sentences were given for concealment. Self-laundering is not punishable
in Finnish legislation and so figure is zero.

Sweden: Money laundering is not a crime regulated with its own paragraph in Sweden.

United Kingdom: The figures include England and Wales only and do not distinguish between third
party laundering and self-laundering.
2

Croatia: Data refers to both first instance and final convictions.

Turkey: This statistic is based on the decisions of Courts of First Instance. The number indicated in the
statistic is the number of real persons. The increase in 2007 is due to the entry into force of the basic legal
instrument for anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism on 18 October 2006.


Sentences by type for money laundering offences

Member States were asked to provide data for all money-laundering offences by type of sentence, broken
down by non-custodial (fines, other than fines) and custodial (suspended sentences, unsuspended
sentences, other measures).
In Table 12, 20 Member States were able to provide some information for at least one year between 2005
and 2010. For some Member States, where multiple sentences are imposed, it is only possible to identify
the sentence for the most serious offence.

2
72
Table 12: Number of sentences (by type) for money-laundering offences (
1
)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
non-
custodial

non-
custodial

non-
custodial

non-
custodial

non-
custodial

non-
custodial

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Belgium : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Bulgaria : : : : : : 1 0 2 2 0 5 6 0 5 5 0 16 9 0 9 16 0 34 16 0 17 20 1 54 15 0 18 19 0 52
Czech Republic 6 2 21 2 0 31 9 3 16 1 0 29 6 0 13 2 0 21 : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Denmark : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Germany 42 : 43 8 4 97 157 : 46 6 7 216 480 : 95 11 17 603 476 : 99 14 19 608 305 : 80 14 17 416 566 : 103 16 19 704
Estonia : : : : : : 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 9 0 1 11 0 0 4 6 1 11 1 0 4 7 0 12 1 0 38 20 0 59
Ireland : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Greece : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Spain : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 46 0 0 46 0 92 49 0 0 45 0 94 97 0 0 97 0 194
France 43 46 76 4 169 37 57 60 8 162 39 55 74 2 170 28 : 79 68 3 178 42 64 63 3 172 : : : : : :
Croatia : : : : : : 2 : : 2 : 4 : : : 6 : 6 : : 1 4 : 5 : : : 6 : 6 : : : 6 : 6
Italy 1 : 307 418 650 1 376 7 237 333 446 1 023 12 : 123 633 785 1 553 1 : 0 735 998 1 734 0 : 0 908 1 235 2 143 : : 1 738 971 1 710
Cyprus 0 0 0 7 0 7 0 0 0 10 0 10 0 0 0 13 0 13 : : : : : : 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 13 0 13
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 9 9 10 17 0 45 2 5 10 6 3 26 1 0 6 3 0 10 2 0 10 1 0 13
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
Luxembourg : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Hungary 1 0 1 1 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 5 7 1 0 1 0 2 4 2 0 2 1 1 6 2 0 5 5 3 15
Malta 3 1 1 0 0 3 1 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 3 2 0 6 : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Netherlands : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Austria 0 0 1 2 0 3 0 0 1 2 0 3 0 0 11 3 0 14 3 0 3 1 0 7 1 0 3 1 0 5 1 0 3 1 0 5
Poland 1 0 36 8 0 45 0 0 112 14 0 126 0 0 60 15 0 75 : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Portugal 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 0 6 1 0 7 2 0 10 0 1 2 9 0 12 0 0 6 6 0 12
Romania : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia 3 1 6 1 0 11 1 2 13 6 0 22 0 1 5 4 0 10 1 0 8 1 0 10 0 0 10 0 1 11 2 0 11 2 0 15
Finland 0 0 4 0 0 4 2 0 4 1 0 7 3 0 11 1 0 15 6 0 20 1 1 28 5 0 10 4 0 19 8 0 11 4 0 23
Sweden 0 0 6 9 0 15 2 1 9 0 0 12 0 1 6 11 1 19 15 1 60 12 9 97 13 1 19 14 3 50 5 0 16 15 4 40
UK:England & Wales 53 294 29 194 5 575 109 613 139 365 18 1 244 : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Iceland : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 0 : : : : : 2
Liechtenstein : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Switzerland 0 0 53 86 0 139 1 0 72 75 0 148 29 2 45 83 0 159 57 2 37 98 0 194 30 5 48 102 0 185 67 4 46 121 0 238
Serbia : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 1 : 1 : : : 4 : 4 : : : : : : : : : : : :
Turkey (
2
) 0 0 0 8 0 8 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 43 9 52 0 0 0 2 0 2 23 0 2 25 14 64 24 0 0 23 13 60

(
1
the comments on the interpretation of data (mentioned in Chapter 1).
(
2
) Break in series in 2008.
Source: Eurostat.


Bulgaria: There are cases when more than one person has been sentenced with one sentence and more
than one type of punishment has been imposed on one person.

Germany: Data for 2006 and earlier years relate only to the former territory of Germany. Only
convictions for third party money laundering are shown because, according to the German Penal Code,
offenders of self-laundering can only be sentenced to the predicate offence. Although educative and
disciplinary measures under Juvenile Crime Law can be custodial or non-custodial, they are generally
counted as 'other measures' in this table.

France: Figures refer only to convictions for money laundering, transfer of irregular funds or
unexplained revenue (non justification de ressources).

Latvia: The data are on persons sentenced, not on the sentences themselves.

Luxembourg: There are no statistics on the sentences for money-laundering.

Malta: Individuals may have been sentenced to both a fine and other penalties.

Austria: Partially suspended sentences are counted as unsuspended sentences.

Poland: The figures refer to adults convicted by a final verdict. The categories fines and other
measures include only penalties imposed as the sole punishment. Those fines and punitive measures that
were imposed together with imprisonment (including conditional imprisonment) and restriction of liberty
are not included in the figures.

Portugal: The values only include the condemning sentences and are based on the most serious offence.

Romania: In 2009 there were two convictions and in 2010 there were no final convictions.

Finland: The statistics describe persons who have received sentences from courts of first instance and are
compiled by the main offence.

Sweden: Money laundering is not a crime regulated with its own paragraph in Sweden. The figures are
for persons found guilty of receiving stolen money and for pretty crime involving the handling of stolen
money.

United Kingdom: The figures include England and Wales only.

Turkey: The source of data for 2008 and earlier is the Turkish FIU (MASAK). For 2009 and 2010, the
source is the Ministry of Justice.

Switzerland: Each sentence can involve more than one sanction and the figures concern only the main
sanction. Also, each sentence involves only one global sanction for all offences judged in the same
sentence. Often there are more offences than just money-laundering. In the questionnaire only sentences
with money laundering exclusively have been included. Since 2007, the Swiss penalty system provides
for partially suspended sentences and these have been counted as unsuspended sentences.
2
Annex: Guidelines and rationale for the
collection of data

In order to facilitate the collection of the relevant statistical data, the Eurostat contact persons were
provided with a document Guidelines and rationale for the second collection of data based on detailed
comments on the first money laundering data collection exercise. The Guidelines are included here. For
each table, the Guidelines provide the standard definition which countries were asked to observe in
assembling the figures, together with any relevant comments of the Eurostat Task Force.

REPORTING/INTELLIGENCE

1.1 Number of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) filed by each category of obliged entities

Comments of the Eurostat Task Force: The definition of a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) may
vary, since some countries group a number of transactions together. National figures also vary
considerably over time; DG Home Affairs indicated that some entities reported only after the national
implementation of the 2
nd
and 3
rd
Anti-money laundering Directive). There was some discussion about
the need for detailed figures by types of reporting entity (as had been attempted) or if a total would
suffice. In fact most countries seemed able to provide the breakdown by entities. Suspicious
Transaction Report figures appeared to represent different concepts, such as files, persons or even
activities not related to any transaction, as the opening of a bank account (in fact, the United Kingdom
counts suspicious activity reports/SAR). However, it was decided that, despite the interpretational
difficulties, the table should be retained in its current format.

Guidelines:
A Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) is defined as a disclosure made to a Financial Intelligence
Unit (FIU) by a party having an obligation to disclose based on any type of suspicion of money
laundering or terrorist financing which are required by regulations which may include unusual
behaviour. Suspicious transactions are handed to the appropriate law enforcement units for
investigation.

A crucial issue when aiming at ensuring better comparability between Member States on STRs lies in
defining the most relevant counting unit. Based on the analysis of the previous data collections, it
appears that FIUs tend to process transactions received in STRs as cases. Those cases are, if found
relevant, sent to law enforcement authorities. It also appears that some FIUs count all the STRs of the
same relevance grouped in one case, while other FIUs only count the first STR that has been used to
open the case. As a result, the data collected can be misinterpreted.


Taking this into account, for statistical purposes, and given the fact that a report could also contain
several transactions, Member States should therefore specify what the numbers provided refer to
(STRs, SARs, etc.). When it comes to the counting unit, Member States should only count the initial
STR/report received in each case opened by the FIU from each category of obliged entities per year.
As discrepancies have been noted in the previous data collections, please note that the 3
rd
Anti-money
laundering Directive provides a definition for "credit institution" and "financial institution" (Art. 3).

These definitions are reproduced here:

Art. 3 (1):

A "credit institution" means a credit institution as defined in the first subparagraph of Article 1 (1) of
Directive 2000/12/EC [] including branches within the meaning of Article 1 (3) of that directive
located in the Community having their head office inside or outside the Community". The article 1 of
the directive 2000/12/EC defines "credit institution" as following: "credit institution shall mean an
undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to
grant credits for its own account."

"'Branch' shall mean a place of business which forms a legally dependent port of a credit institution
and which carries out directly all or some of the transactions inherent in the business of credit
institution; any number of places of business set up in the same Member State by a credit institution
with headquarters in another member State shall be regarded as a single branch."

A financial institution means:

a) "an undertaking other than a credit institution which carries out one or more of the operation
included in points 2 to 12 and 14 of Annex 1 to Directive 2000/12/EC, including the activity of
currency exchange offices (bureaux de change) and of money transmission or remittance offices.

ANNEX 1 of Directive 2000/12/EC is reproduced here
1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds
2. Lending (
32
)
3. Financial leasing
4. Money transmission services
5. Issuing and administering means of payment (e.g. credit cards, travellers' cheques and
bankers' drafts)
6. Guarantees and commitments

(
32
) Including, inter alia: consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring with or without recourse, financing of commercial transactions (including
forfeiting).
2
7. Trading for own account or for account of customers in:
(a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, certificates of deposit, etc.)
(b) foreign exchange;
(c) financial futures and options;
(d) exchange and interest-rate instruments;
(e) transferable securities
8. Participation in securities issues and the provision of services related to such issues
9. Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related questions and
advice as well as services relating to mergers and the purchase of undertakings
10. Money broking
11. Portfolio management and advice
12. Safekeeping and administration of securities
13. Credit reference services
14. Safe custody services

b) an insurance company

c) an investment firm as in point 1 of Article 4 (1) of Directive 2004/39/EC[]

The article 4 (1) of Directive 2004/39/EC is reproduced hereafter for your convenience:

Investment firm means any legal person whose regular occupation or business is the
provision of one or more investment services to third parties and/or the performance of one
or more investment activities on a professional basis;
Member States may include in the definition of investment firms undertakings which are not
legal persons, provided that:
(a) their legal status ensures a level of protection for third parties' interests equivalent to that
afforded by legal persons, and
(b) they are subject to equivalent prudential supervision appropriate to their legal form.
However, where a natural person provides services involving the holding of third parties'
funds or transferable securities, he may be considered as an investment firm for the
purposes of this Directive only if, without prejudice to the other requirements imposed in
this Directive and in Directive 93/6/EEC, he complies with the following conditions:
(a) the ownership rights of third parties in instruments and funds must be safeguarded,
especially in the event of the insolvency of the firm or of its proprietors, seizure, set-
off or any other action by creditors of the firm or of its proprietors;
(b) the firm must be subject to rules designed to monitor the firm's solvency and that of its
proprietors;
(c) the firm's annual accounts must be audited by one or more persons empowered, under
national law, to audit accounts;
(d) where the firm has only one proprietor, he must make provision for the protection of

investors in the event of the firm's cessation of business following his death, his
incapacity or any other such event;

d) a collective investment undertaking marketing its units or shares;

e) an insurance intermediary as defined in Article 2 (5) of Directive 2002/92/EC[] at the exception
of intermediaries as mentioned in Article 2 (7) of that Directive, when they act in respect of life
insurance and other related investment related services;

The article 2 (5) of Directive 2002/92/EC is reproduced hereafter for your convenience.

Article 2(5): "insurance intermediary means any natural or legal person who, for remuneration,
takes up or pursues insurance mediation."

Article 2 (7):" tied insurance intermediary means any person who carries on the activity of
insurance mediation for and on behalf of one or more insurance undertakings in the case of
insurance products which are not in competition but does not collect premiums or amounts
intended for the customer and who acts under the full responsibility of those insurance
undertakings for the products which concern them respectively.
Any person who carries on the activity of insurance mediation in addition to his principal
professional activity is also considered as a tied insurance intermediary acting under the
responsibility of one or several insurance undertakings for the products which concern them
respectively if the insurance is complementary to the goods or services supplied in the
framework of this principal professional activity and the person does not collect premiums or
amounts intended for the customer;"

f) branches, when located in the community, of financial institutions as referred to in points (a) to (e),
whose head offices are inside or outside the Community."

1.2 Number of Cash Transaction Reports (CTRs) filed by each category of obliged entities

Comments of the Eurostat Task Force: Not all countries have an obligation to report on Cash
Transaction Reports (CTRs). (For example DE and UK do not have this concept) When countries have
such an obligation the figures may therefore be included in the STR figures (although they do not
relate to suspicious transactions). It was decided however to retain the table in its current format, so
as to at least have the information for those Member States using the concept.

Guidelines:
MS should indicate whether they have an obligation to report all CTRs (suspicious or not). If so, they
could also indicate whether CTRs are reported as a separate category or included in the STR figures.
Member States also using a CTR system should count the STRs and CTRs in two different categories.
2
It also appears that some FIUs count all the CTRs of the same relevance grouped in one case, while
other FIUs only count the first CTR that has been used to open the case. As a result, the data collected
can be misinterpreted.

Taking this into account, when it comes to the counting unit, and given the fact that a suspicious CTR
could also contain several transactions, Member States should only count the initial CTR received in
each case opened by the FIU from each category of obliged entities per year.
The same definitions of obliged entities for the STRs apply to CTRs.

1.3 Number of postponement orders adopted on reported transactions

Comments of the Eurostat Task Force: This instrument does not exist in all countries but some find it
useful, especially when foreign authorities are involved. PL does not use postponement orders but only
"freezing orders". SE does not use "freezing orders" but one STR may be postponed indefinitely. In DE
no data were available at federal level as such actions were taken by the Lnder.
DG Home Affairs explained that they were interested in the postponement orders made by the FIU
rather than the judiciary; however this power was not available to all FIUs.

Guidelines:
Member States should indicate whether their FIU has the power to freeze transactions. Only FIUs
having the legal possibility to issue postponement orders should provide data for this table.
Postponement orders by FIUs and freezing orders based on a court order are seen as temporary
measures prohibiting "the transfer, destruction, conversion, disposition or movement of property or
temporarily assuming custody or control of property on the basis of an order issued by court or other
competent authority" (2005 Warsaw Convention of the Council of Europe on Laundering of the
proceeds from Crime and Financing of Terrorism). However, for the purposes of this exercise, a clear
distinction should be made between the two. Freezing orders should be counted under indicator 3.8
below.

1.4 Number of money laundering investigations carried out independently by law enforcement
agencies (without a prior STR)

Comments of the Eurostat Task Force: Cases may take many years to complete, so it may be more
useful to count "commencements of money laundering investigations". Some countries may conduct
money laundering investigations for tactical reasons (i.e. to use wire-tapping etc.) but the prosecution
may be for another offence such as fraud.

Guidelines:
Member States should only include money laundering investigations based solely on intelligence
gathered by investigators (i.e. without a previous STR analysed and sent by an FIU). As investigations

may last several years, only the investigations commenced in a given year should be counted here.

1.5 Number of declarations made in application to the EU Cash Control Regulation

Guidelines:
DG Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD) collects the number of declarations made in application
to the EU Cash control regulation (R 1889/2005) by all Member States.

"For the purposes of this Regulation 'cash' means:
a) bearer-negotiable instruments including monetary instruments in bearer form such as travellers
cheques, negotiable instruments (including cheques, promissory notes and money orders) that are
either in bearer form, endorsed without restriction, made out to a fictitious payee, or otherwise in
such form that title thereto passes upon delivery and incomplete instruments (including cheques,
promissory notes and money orders) signed, but with the payee's name omitted;
b) Currency (banknotes and coins that are in circulation as a medium of exchange)."

Note that EUROSTAT will obtain data on this indicator directly from DG TAXUD.

1.6 Number of cash smuggling operations detected in the EU at External border

Guidelines:
DG TAXUD collects the number of cash recordings (cash found in customs controls or false
declarations). Data collected by TAXUD are limited to "cash found in customs controls" and "false
declarations". On this point, it is important to note that Customs regulation on cash control does not
consider cash found in customs controls as a smuggling operation. Only a false declaration is
considered as such. Note that EUROSTAT will obtain data on this indicator directly from DG
TAXUD.

1.7 Number of suspicious cash activities at the EU borders reported to the FIU (including those
based on declarations and smuggling)

Comments of the Eurostat Task Force: This figure should be the sum of 1.6 (suspicious activity) plus
a part of 1.5 (not necessarily suspicious but some of the declarations may in fact be so). The source is
customs authorities, which report information to FIUs; either authorities may declare these data.

Guidelines:
Regulation 1889/2005 on cash control stipulates (Article 5) that information obtained under Art 3 and
4 (cash declarations, controls and cash detained) is made available to the FIUs. This is different than
sending or reporting suspicious activity to FIUs. In other words, in some Member States, customs
authorities do not necessarily report to FIUs but simply run a database to which FIUs may have access.
2
Member States should clarify whether, in their country, information is available for FIUs upon
request, if they provide access to customs databases, (indicating whether on all information related to
cash declarations, or only to "suspicious ones"), or if they report this information to the FIU.

1.8 Number of STRs sent to law enforcement

Comments of the Eurostat Task Force: In some countries (but not all) all STRs are investigated, so in
such cases this figure will be identical with 1.1 (total).

Guidelines:
Member States where all STRs are investigated should provide an explanation in the metadata. Only
those Member States not investigating all STRs on a systematic basis should provide data for this
indicator.

1.9 Number of staff dedicated full time (or full time equivalent) to money laundering in the FIU

Guidelines:
Given the relative simplicity of this indicator, data should be readily available in all Member States.
It is important to consider that FIUs perform the same core functions but may have a different legal
status. Thus some FIUs undertake work in a different way to other FIUs. This may have implications
on human resources. In order to obtain a better comparison, this data must be broken down by the
FIUs' legal status (i.e. administrative FIUs, Police FIUs, Judicial FIUs and FIUs of hybrid status).
FIUs should therefore mention their legal status along with the information for this indicator.


INVESTIGATION

2.1 Number of cases initiated by law enforcement agencies on the basis of Suspicious Transaction
Reports (STRs) sent by the FIU

Guidelines:
FIUs tend to process transactions received in STRs as cases. One FIU case can be made up of several
STRs and/or CTRs which, in turn, can also contain several transactions, possibly received over a
rather long period of time (i.e. more than a year).
Therefore, ensuring consistency in monitoring the work carried out by FIUs in comparison with the
work of law enforcement agencies can be difficult since one investigation could concern several FIU
cases. As law enforcement agencies in some countries could decide not to start an investigation after
reviewing the information sent by FIUs, no direct correlation exists between the number of
transactions analysed to build a possible case and the initiation of an investigation.
Given this limitation, assessing the overall Anti-money laundering system as the linear process from
one or more reported transactions contained in a STR or a CTR to a final conviction during the judicial
phase may not be feasible.
In some cases, the reporting, investigation and judicial phases can only be monitored separately.
In any case, from a statistical point of view, Member States should indicate the number of cases
initiated each year by law enforcement authorities on the basis of the input provided by FIUs.
Therefore, the counting unit of this indicator should be the number of cases (i.e. not files and not
persons) investigated by law enforcement authorities.

2.2 Number of staff dedicated full time (or full time equivalent) to money laundering in law
enforcement agencies

Guidelines:
It seems very difficult to gather this type of data as law enforcement agencies investigate various types
of crime and may not have dedicated money-laundering law enforcement staff.
Member States should indicate whether or not specialised investigation units have been set up in the
field of money laundering/financial crime. If so, the number of staff dedicated full time (or full time
equivalent) to money-laundering investigations could be provided by these units.
From a statistical point of view, Member States' law enforcement agencies should therefore provide
data on the number of staff dedicated full time (or full time equivalent) to money laundering, mostly in
specialised investigators units, but not necessarily.

2
2.3 Number of cases brought to prosecution: originating from STRs, CTRs and independent law
enforcement investigation

Guidelines:
As the role of the prosecution office in leading the investigations in some Member States may cause
misunderstandings, this indicator should be interpreted as counting, in each year, the number of cases
found conclusive enough to be prosecuted (i.e. judged by judicial authorities). It should be recognised
that a single case brought to prosecution could refer to several persons or legal entities.

For consistency reasons, this indicator is broken down:
- by the number of cases initiated by (a/several transaction(s) identified in) one/several STR(s);
- by the number of cases initiated by (a/several transaction(s) identified in) one/several CTR(s); and
- by the number of cases initiated based on law enforcement intelligence i.e. independently from FIUs
input.

For statistical purposes, law enforcement agencies should provide data on the number of cases brought
to prosecution originating from i) information(s) contain in STR(s), ii) information(s) contain in
CTR(s) and iii) independently from these two sources.


JUDICIAL

3.1 Number of staff dedicated full time (or full time equivalent) to money laundering in the
judiciary

Comments of the Eurostat Task Force: DG Home Affairs are interested in the resource implications
for all stages of the anti-money laundering process but it is impossible for some countries to supply
this figure. A calculation of full-time equivalents might be attempted. In federal states (DE) even this
would be impossible.

Guidelines:
The collection of both reliable and comparable data is difficult in absence of designated units in the
judiciary specifically set up to judge money laundering offences (some Member States have set up
judicial units specialised in a wider range of offences such as economic and financial crime). Member
States should indicate whether such units exist in their country and provide the relevant data.
As this type of data is also requested by the FATF, the Task Force decided to retain this table.

3.2 Number of persons /legal entities convicted for money laundering offences

Guidelines:
Within this indicator, distinction should be made between:
- the number of persons and/or legal entities convicted for 'third party' money laundering offences;
- the number of persons and/or legal entity convicted for 'self laundering' offences;
Judicial authorities unable to distinguish those two categories should provide data as a total on "the
number of persons and/or legal entities convicted for money laundering offences".
Note that "third party money laundering" is defined as "laundering by a person other than the author of
the offence" and "self laundering" as referring "to 'own proceeds' laundering by a person who may be
the author of the offence".

3.3 Number of convictions for laundering proceeds of crimes committed abroad

Comments of the Eurostat Task Force: Most countries do not distinguish between crimes committed
internally or abroad. Member States co-operate on these investigations. Prosecutions are usually in
the country where the original offence occurred. The citizenship of the offender is a further
complication. This indicator cannot produce meaningful results.

Guidelines:
Further to the difficulty mentioned above, one should consider that there are also a number of "mixed
cases" i.e. cases where dirty money does not come solely from abroad but both from domestic and
international sources.
2
As this type of data is also requested by the FATF, the Task Force decided to retain this table.

3.4 Number of convictions for crimes other than money laundering originating from STRs

Comments of the Eurostat Task Force: STRs may play a role in many types of investigation, but often
the money-laundering element is weak or difficult to assess. No adequate means exist to provide
meaningful figures.

Guidelines:
It may be proven very difficult to gather data on this indicator as the track of an information provided
by an FIU may be lost through the judicial phase. Moreover, the expression "originating from" in the
name of the indicator could be considered as objectively impossible to assess.
As some Member States may be able to provide data on this indicator in the future, the Task Force
decided to retain it.

3.5 Number of sentences (by type) for money laundering offences

Guidelines:
This indicator is to be interpreted as the "number of sentences pronounced each year by judicial
authorities by type of money laundering offences" (i.e. fines, non-custodial, suspended sentences,
unsuspended sentences, other measures).
Also see information below in indicator 3.6

3.6 Number of unsuspended custodial sentences (by length) for money laundering offences

Guidelines:
Both indicators 3.5 and 3.6 aim at providing input on the range of sanctions imposed by the judicial
authorities. These indicators require cautious interpretation since, in some countries, there is no system
which allows the allocation of a specific sanction for a crime when the perpetrator has committed
several crimes (e.g. a person convicted for fraud, human trafficking and money laundering). Therefore,
these indicators should be seen as only providing general indications. For statistical purposes, the data
requested should refer to all money-laundering offences. Since the data collected previously revealed
that a breakdown between the predicate offences and the principal offences was not sufficiently
meaningful, Member States need only provide totals of sentences without distinguishing between
these offences. An indication of the both minimum and maximum penalties provided by law should
also be communicated by the judicial authorities.


3.7 Number of freezing procedures (based on a court order)

Guidelines:
It should be noted that article 33 of the 3
rd
Anti-money laundering Directive requires Member States to
provide data on "how much property has been frozen, seized or confiscated".
The CARIN network, Asset Recovery Offices as well as judicial authorities should be able to provide
the relevant data. Since there are many agencies within the Member States able to freeze assets, the
data provided by these three contacts points could provide a reliable set of information.

3.8 Number of confiscation procedures concerning money laundering convictions

Guidelines:
For clarity and consistency purposes, this indicator is to be understood as confiscation for money
laundering convictions (i.e. final decision taken by a court). As temporary orders cannot be considered
as a final decision they should be excluded from this indicator and only reported under 3.8 if based on
a court order. Note that, legally speaking, freezing and seizing are to be considered as temporary
measures while confiscation is a final decision. The CARIN network, Asset Recovery Offices as well
as judicial authorities should be able to provide the relevant data.

3.9 Number of requests received for freezing orders concerning money laundering cases from
another EU Member State and the value of frozen assets

Guidelines:
the relevant data.

3.10 Number of requests received for confiscation orders concerning money laundering convictions
from another EU Member State and the value of confiscated assets

Guidelines:
the relevant data.

2
3.11 Amounts recovered following money laundering convictions

Guidelines:
Note that article 33 of the 3
rd
Anti-money laundering Directive requires Member States to provide data
on "how much property has been frozen, seized or confiscated". Therefore, for statistical purpose, this
indicator should be interpreted as the quantity and/or value of frozen, seized and confiscated assets. In
order to assess the effectiveness of confiscation procedures, it is essential to cover also the amounts
actually recovered after confiscation.

The indicator is broken down by:
- the quantity and/or value of assets frozen;
- the quantity and/or value of assets seized;
- when such break down is proven impossible, it may be possible to combine the quantity and/or
value of assets frozen and/or seized;
- the quantity and/or value of assets confiscated;
- the proceeds generated from the sale of confiscated assets (and/or the value of the assets
allocated for social reuse, as applicable).

the relevant data.

European Commission


Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union

2013 86 pp. 21 x 29.7 cm

Theme: Population and social conditions
Collection: Statistical working papers

ISBN 978-92-79-22843-8
ISSN 2315-0807
doi:10.2785/415
Cat. No: KS-TC-13-007-EN-N

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1 New developments at European Union and international level

1 New developments at European Union and international level

1 New developments at European Union and international level

1 New developments at European Union and international level

1 New developments at European Union and international level

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

2 Detailed information on selected indicators

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