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Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Communication

from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council entitled
'Strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the EU: the European
Information Exchange Model (EIXM)

THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR,


Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in
particular Article 16 thereof,
Having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and in
particular Articles 7 and 8 thereof,
Having regard to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, 1
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free
movement of such data, and in particular Article 28 (2) thereof, 2
Having regard to Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 3
on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters,

HAS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING OPINION:

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Consultation of the EDPS
1. On 7 December 2012, the Commission adopted a Communication entitled
'Strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the EU: the European Information
Exchange Model (EIXM) (hereinafter: 'the Communication'). 4 On the same day
the Commission adopted a report on the implementation of Council Decision
1

OJ L281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.


OJ L8, 12.1.2001, p. 1.
3
OJ L350, 30.12.2008, p. 60.
4
COM(2012)735 final.
2

2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation,


particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (the Prm
Decision). 5 This report will not be separately commented in this opinion, but is
mentioned here in order to better understand the context.
2. Before the adoption of the Communication, the EDPS was given the opportunity
to provide informal comments. The EDPS welcomes that some of his comments
have been taken into account in the Communication.
1.2. Background and objectives of the Communication
3. The Stockholm Programme 6 aims at meeting future challenges and further
strengthening the area of freedom, security and justice with actions focusing on
the interests and needs of citizens. It establishes the EU's priorities in the field of
Justice and Home Affairs for the period of 2010-2014 and defines strategic
guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom,
security and justice in accordance with Article 68 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union ('TFEU') 7.
4. In particular, the Stockholm Programme acknowledges the need for coherence and
consolidation in developing information management and exchange in the field of
EU internal security and invites the Council and the Commission to implement the
Information Management Strategy for EU internal security, including a strong
data protection regime. In this context, the Stockholm Programme also invites the
Commission to assess the need for a European Information Exchange Model
(EIXM) based on evaluation of existing instruments in the field of EU information
exchange. This assessment should help to determine whether these instruments
function as originally intended and meet the goals of the Information Management
Strategy 8.
5. Following-up the Stockholm Programme, the Commission published a
Communication in July 2010 9 (hereafter the 'Communication of 2010') which
provides a full overview of the EU-level measures in place, under implementation
or consideration, that regulate the collection, storage or cross-border exchange of
personal information for the purpose of law enforcement and migration
management.
6. Answering the invitation of the Stockholm Programme and building on the
Communication of 2010, the present Communication aims to take stock of how
the cross-border information exchange in the EU works in practice and to
recommend possible improvements.
5

COM(2012)732 final
The Stockholm Programme - An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, Council
Document 5731/10, 3.3.2010.
7
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 83/47, 30.03.2010.
8
The Stockholm Programme - An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, Council
Document 5731/10, 3.3.2010, section 4.2.2
9
Communication of 20 July 2010 from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
entitled Overview of information management in the area of freedom, security and justice,
COM(2010) 385 final.
6

2. COMMENTS
2.1. General comments
Need for better information exchange whilst respecting fundamental rights
7. As already pointed out in previous opinions 10, the EDPS acknowledges that a
better exchange of information is an essential policy goal for the European Union
in the area of freedom, security and justice. This emphasis on information
exchange is even more logical in the absence of a European police force, a
European criminal justice system and a totally harmonised European border
control. Measures relating to information are therefore an essential contribution of
the European Union allowing the national authorities of the Member States to
address cross border crime in an effective way and to effectively protect the
external borders.
8. However, these measures should not only contribute to guaranteeing the security
of the citizen, but within our European society they also have to fully respect the
citizen's fundamental rights including the right to the protection of personal data.
This is all the more important as exchange of information in the area of police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters involves to a large extent personal data.
The processing of personal data in this area poses specific risks for the individuals
and therefore requires a high level of data protection.
9. The EDPS appreciates the general attention paid to data protection in the
Communication. He welcomes that the Communication refers to the substantive
principles of (i) safeguarding fundamental rights - in particular the right to privacy
and protection of personal data - and (ii) the necessity requirement which implies
that a restriction of the right to privacy may be justified only if it is lawful, pursues
a legitimate aim and is necessary in a democratic society. The Communication
also recalls that necessity tests and purpose limitation are essential. 11
10. The EDPS also positively notes that the Communication emphasises the need to
ensure high data quality, data security and data protection and stresses that
"whatever combination or sequence is used for exchanging information, the rules
on data protection, data security and data quality as well as the purpose for which
the instruments may be used must be respected". 12
The context of instruments already available
11. The Communication states at the outset that information exchange generally
works well, adding that neither new EU-level law enforcement databases nor new
EU information exchange instruments are needed, but existing instruments should
be better implemented. The EDPS welcomes this conclusion. Considering that a
10

See for instance EDPS Opinion of 10 July 2009 on the Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council on an Area of freedom, security and justice serving the citizen,
OJ C 276, 17.11.2009, p. 8 and EDPS Opinion of 7 October 2009 on the proposals regarding law
enforcement access to EURODAC, OJ C 92, 10.04.2010, p. 1.
11
See point 2.5 of the Communication.
12
See point 2.3 of the Communication

multiplicity of systems for the cross-border exchange of information carries risks


in terms of personal data protection and invasion of privacy, the EDPS has in
various opinions advocated that before creating a new instrument, a thorough and
more up-to-date evaluation should be carried out in order to see whether a full
implementation of the existing instruments would not be sufficient. 13
12. The Communication mainly focuses on Member State's use of four EU
instruments: the Swedish initiative 14, the Prm Decisions 15, Europol 16 and the
Schengen Information System 17. It does not address all existing and envisaged EU
instruments for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and does not
mention for instance the existing European Criminal Record Information System
for EU nationals. 18 Furthermore although the Communication mentions other EU
instruments in the area of freedom, security and justice (e.g. Customs information
System, Visa Information System, EURODAC, EUROSUR) or initiatives (e.g. the
proposals for an Entry-Exit System), it does not analyse them.
13. Finally, the EDPS draws the attention to the fact that also legal instruments in
other areas than the area of freedom, security and justice should be taken into
consideration, since they become more and more relevant (see the instruments
meant in point 16).
Tendencies in investigative methods
14. New technologies have lead to an increasing amount of available information and
a wide range of possible uses of this information. In an information society there
is the logical tendency that law enforcement authorities increasingly make use of
information available in open sources, and combine this information using
13

See for instance EDPS Opinion of 5 September 2012 on law enforcement access to EURODAC,
EDPS Opinion of 30 September 2010 on the Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council Overview of information management in the area of freedom, security
and justice, EDPS Opinion of 24 November 2010 on the Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council concerning the EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main
achievements and future challenges, EDPS Opinion of 20 December 2007 on the draft Proposal for a
Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement
purposes, and EDPS Opinion of 19 October 2005 on three Proposals regarding the Second Generation
Schengen Information System (SIS II).
14
Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of
information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the
European Union, OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 89
15
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation,
particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L210, 06.08.2008, p. 1 and Council
Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the
stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ
L 210, 06.08.2008, p. 12.
16
Council Decision 2009/371/JHA establishing the European Police Office, OJ L 121, 15.05.2009, p.
37.
17
Council Decision 2007/533/JHAof 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the
second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), OJ 205, 07.08.2007 p. 63.
18
Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on the organisation and content of
the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between Member States , OJ L 93,
07.04.2009,p. 23, and Council Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment of the
European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in application of Article 11 of Framework
Decision 2009/315/JHA , OJ L 93 , 07.04.2009 p. 33.

sophisticated IT tools. Technological phenomena like cloud computing, social


networks, road toll collecting and geo-location devices as well as the linking and
sharing of data from different databases or the use of analytical tools to predict
human behaviours have profoundly changed the way in which data may be collected
and further processed. Working methods of law enforcement authorities such as
data mining and profiling are becoming more and more proactive and investigations
take place on the basis of general developments, sometimes without concrete
suspicions, but with the use of powerful IT-tools.
15. There is a general and growing tendency to grant law enforcement authorities
access to available data which were, are or will be initially collected and
processed for purposes that are not related to the combat of crimes and which
concern individuals who in principle are not suspected of committing any crime.
Wider access is more often given or envisaged for law enforcement authorities to
several large-scale information and identification systems set up for example in
the areas of immigration and borders control 19.
16. Traditionally, a clear separation has existed between law enforcement and private
sector activities, where law enforcement tasks are performed by specifically
dedicated authorities and private actors are only solicited on a case by case basis
to communicate personal data to these authorities in the event of concrete
suspicion. There is now a tendency to require that private actors cooperate with
law enforcement authorities on a systematic basis. This tendency relates for
instance to the traffic data of electronic communications 20 and the passenger data
of individuals flying to (certain) third countries21, and is also developing in the
financial sector 22.

19

See for instance Council Decision 2008/633/JHA of 23 June 2008 concerning access for consultation
of the Visa Information System (VIS) by designated authorities of Member States and by Europol for
the purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious
criminal offences, OJ L 218,13.08.2008, p. 129; the Amended proposal of the Commission for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of 'EURODAC' for the
comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No [/] (establishing the
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a
stateless person) and to request comparisons with EURODAC data by Member States' law enforcement
authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011
establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area
of freedom, security and justice (Recast version), COM (2012) 254 final, 30.05.2012 and the proposal
of the Commission for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an
Entry/Exit system (EES) to register any entry and exit of third country nationals crossing the external
borders of the Member States of the European Union, COM(2013) 95 final, 28.02.2013.
20
Directive 2006/24/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive
2002/58/EC, OJ L 105, 13.04.2006, p.54.
21
See Council Decision 2012/472/EU of 26 April 2012 on the conclusion of the Agreement between
the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of Passenger Name
Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, OJ L 215, 11.08.2012, p.4.
22
Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist
financing OJ L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15 (currently under review). See also the Communication of 13.July
2011 from the Commission to the European parliament and the Council entitled 'A European terrorist
finance tracking system: available options', COM(2011)429 final.

17. The availability of an increasing amount of information outside the law


enforcement area as well as the use of new powerful IT tools by law enforcement
authorities contribute - to a certain extent - to the current ongoing shift from a
surveillance of individuals that are suspected of having committed or having taken
part in a criminal offence or regarding whom there are reasonable grounds based
on factual indications that they will commit criminal offences to a more general
surveillance where all individuals may be considered a priori as potential law
breakers, and for that reason subjected to surveillance.
Consequences
18. Because of these far reaching developments there is a need to rethink and possibly
redefine the right balance between law enforcement purposes and safeguarding
fundamental rights of the individuals. It is for instance worth noting that when
information is gathered through surveillance methods outside of a concrete
criminal case, also the context of fundamental rights protection changes. One
could argue that when there is no case before a court, the principle of fair trial
(Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights) cannot be applied and
that therefore data protection and privacy considerations should gain importance.
19. This implies in the first place a reflection on the effectiveness of data protection
principles in light of technological changes as well as the growing gathering and
use of data for law enforcement purposes. This may lead to adjustments and/or
additional safeguards.
20. In the second place, there is indeed nowadays, more than ever before, a clear need
for an in-depth reflection on EU information exchange, in view of developments
relating to IT large-scale systems and the growing use of data initially collected
for purposes not related to the combat of crime. This reflection should also
address the effectiveness for public security of the current trend to a widespread,
systematic and proactive monitoring of non suspected individuals and its actual
usefulness in the fight against crime.

21. The EDPS welcomes the Communication as a first step towards a full evaluation
process and encourages the Commission to carry out the above further reflections,
the outcome of which should lead to a comprehensive, integrated and wellstructured EU policy on information and exchange management in this area.
The relation with the existing and the proposed data protection framework
22. The EDPS notes that it is crucial to ensure a consistent and comprehensive legal
framework for data protection. A first important step has been taken through the
adoption of Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA 23. However, this legal
instrument cannot be qualified as a comprehensive framework, in essence because
its provisions do not have general application. They do not apply to domestic
situations, when personal data originate from the Member State which uses

23

Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal


data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, OJ L 350,
30.12.2008, p. 60.

them 24. Secondly, the other data protection instruments applicable in the area of
freedom, security and justice should be further harmonised and consolidated.
23. The EDPS would like to stress that the ongoing discussions on the Commission's
proposal of 25 January 2012 for a Directive applying to the processing of personal
data for law enforcement purposes 25should not prevent the Commission from already now - making an inventory of data protection problems and risks, and of
possible improvements within the current legal context. To the contrary, the
discussions on the proposed directive could serve as an inspiration for further
developing the European Information Exchange Model. Good examples in this
context are the discussions on clear distinctions as to processing of data on
suspects and non suspects. The EDPS recommends further analysing these notions
in the context of the European Information Exchange Model.
24. The EDPS notes that the Communication refers to the Commission proposal for a
Directive. In particular, the Communication mentions the need of reviewing
existing instruments to align them with the proposed Directive. The EDPS fully
subscribes to this intention and encourages the Commission to take further action
in this direction.
2.2. Specific comments
Assessment of instruments
25. The Communication gives examples of success stories on exchange of
information under the Swedish Initiative and the Prm Decisions while stressing
at the same time that implementation of the Prm Decision is seriously lagging
behind and that the Swedish initiative has not reached its full potential. As regards
the SIS and SIRENE channels, the Communication mentions that it does not
present recommendations because extensive changes are already underway, in
particular the migration to SIS II. 26
26. As mentioned in the Communication, the first outcomes of the exchange of
information based on the Swedish initiative and Prm Decisions are positive in the
context of law enforcement. However, the EDPS wishes to point out that a
comprehensive assessment of these instruments (including where appropriate
failures and weaknesses of the systems such as the number of people wrongly
arrested or inconvenienced following a false hit in the system) can only happen
once they are fully implemented. He encourages the Commission to pursue the
assessment of these instruments during and after their full implementation.

24

See also EDPS opinion of 19 December 2005 on the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on
the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial co-operation in
criminal matters (COM (2005)475 final), OJ C 47, 25.02.2006, p. 27
25
Proposal of 25 January 2012 for a Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation,
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free
movement of such data, COM(2012) 10 final.
26
See on this the announcement by the Commission on 9 April 2013: SIS II goes live :
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2013/20130409_01_en.htm

Choice of channels
27. In its Communication, the Commission states that apart from legal requirements to
use specific channels, Member States use different channels to different extents.
Although nothing in the Communication seems to indicate that the use of different
channels raises particular concerns, the Commission concludes that the time has
come for a more coherent approach, which gives Europol a central role. In this
respect, the Communication invites the Member States to use, for exchanges
where the channel is not legally defined, the Europol channel using the SIENA
tool as the default channel, unless there are specific reasons to use another.
28. The EDPS supports the need for a consistent and harmonised approach on the
choice of channels. However, as regards the use of one of the channels as default
channel, he recalls the principle of purpose limitation which is a key principle of
data protection. As pointed out in the Communication, there is a diversity of
instruments, channels and tools, each designed for particular purposes. The use of
a channel designed for a specific purpose should not lead to the possible use or
collection of the data transiting on this channel for other purposes. This poses the
risk of what is often described as 'function creep', namely, a gradual widening of
the use of a system or database beyond the purpose for which it was originally
intended. Furthermore, the use of a channel has also a direct impact on the
responsibilities in terms of data protection and security of the authority/agency
managing the channel. The EDPS regrets that the Communication does not
underline these consequences, and recommends that the guidance which the
Council is invited to give takes these perspectives into account.
29. Finally, the EDPS draws attention to the fact that mechanisms that are designed
for information exchange for a specific purpose are not necessarily appropriate to
other purposes. The communication tool SIENA developed by Europol has been
tailored for specific exchange of information between the competent authorities of
Member States and third parties for police cooperation. Thus specific
functionalities of SIENA have been developed and implemented based on the
needs identified at the moment of the creation of such tool. These functionalities
require amongst others the users to enter certain types and amount of information.
The EDPS points out that SIENA's functionalities are not necessarily appropriate
for the exchange of information in a different context and for different purposes.
Therefore, in this specific case, he encourages the Commission to justify more
clearly the choice of this channel, and to assess whether this choice is in
compliance with the principle of privacy by design.
Managing the channels - SPOC
30. The Communication invites the Member States to create or use, if already
existing - a Single Point of Contact (SPOC) as a one-stop shop for international
cooperation covering all main channels, available 24/7, bringing together all law
enforcement authorities with access to all relevant national databases. Given the
existence of different units dealing with different parts of police cooperation on
national level, the EDPS understands that the accessibility via one single point of
contact will help the requesting country as it would not have to address the
different authorities and contacts in the requested country.

31. The creation of SPOCs may present advantages since it facilitates the overview of
the cross-border information flow and it allows a further recording of actors
directly involved. However, the creation of SPOCs should take into account data
protection implications. All databases have been created for defined purposes and
are subject to specific rules. A database may only be accessed by duly authorised
staff in the performance of their tasks and for the purposes for which the database
has been created. Therefore, the composition and the modalities of SPOCs should
be carefully analysed and defined in order to ensure that the rules applicable to
each database are complied with.
32. In the absence of harmonised conditions for SPOCs there might be cases where
entities represented in SPOCs will not be authorised to directly access the
database but will facilitate the access and ensure that the requested information is
communicated to the requested authority from another Member State. The EDPS
notes that the Communication specifies that SPOCS should have direct access to
national databases where legally permissible. The EDPS notes with satisfaction
that the Communication recalls that information may only be actually exchanged
and used where legally permitted, which includes compliance with data protection
rules. However, he invites the Commission to start working on harmonised
conditions for SPOCs, to ensure that the requirements are similar in all Member
States and effectively protect individuals.
Ensuring data quality, data security and data protection
33. As to the interoperability between different national systems and administrative
structures referred to in the Communication, the EDPS stresses the need to
consider the protection of personal data as an inherent part of the establishment or improvement - of the interoperability of relevant systems.
34. As already underlined in earlier comments and opinions 27, making access to or
exchange of data technically feasible becomes, in many cases, a powerful drive
for de facto acceding or exchanging these data. Although the introduction of
interoperability will not lead to new databases, it will necessarily introduce a new
use of existing databases by providing new possibilities of access to those
databases.
35. In that respect, the EDPS would like to point at the basic data protection principle
of purpose limitation, which requires that personal data may not be used for
purposes which are incompatible with the purpose for which the data were
originally collected, unless this would be specifically allowed under certain strict
conditions.

27

See EDPS Opinion of 26 February 2006 on Exchange of information under the principle of
availability; EDPS Comments of 10 March 2006 on the Commission's Communication of 24
November 2005 on improved effectiveness of enhanced interoperability and synergies among
European databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, and EDPS Opinion of 7 December 2009
on the Agency for large-scale IT systems.

Improving training and awareness


36. The Communication refers to the preparation by the Commission of a European
Law Enforcement Training Scheme that will include training on cross-border
exchange information. The EDPS notes the recent adoption of the Commission
Communication establishing a European Law Enforcement Training Scheme 28 on
which he will come back in his opinion on the proposal for a Regulation on
Europol 29. Taking into account that cross-border information exchange will in a
number of cases involve personal data, the EDPS would like to draw attention to
the need of including trainings on information security and data protection in the
Scheme envisaged by the Commission as well as in the trainings Member States
are invited to ensure.

3. CONCLUSIONS
37. The EDPS appreciates the general attention devoted to data protection in the
Communication which emphasises the need to ensure high data quality, data
security and data protection and recalls that whatever the combination or sequence
used for exchanging information, the rules on data protection, data security and
data quality as well as the purpose for which the instruments may be used must be
respected.
38. The EDPS also:
welcomes that the Communication concludes that neither new EU-level law
enforcement databases nor new EU information exchange instruments are
needed;
emphasizes the need for a full evaluation process of the instruments and
initiatives in the Justice and Home Affairs area, the outcome of which should
lead to a comprehensive, integrated and well-structured EU policy on
information and exchange management and encourages the Commission to
pursue the assessment of other existing instruments;
encourages the Commission to carry out reflections on (i) the effectiveness of
data protection principles in light of technological changes, the developments
relating to IT large-scale systems and the growing use of data initially collected
for purposes not related to the combat of crime, as well as on (ii) the
effectiveness for public security of the current tendency to a widespread,
systematic and proactive monitoring of non suspected individuals and its real
usefulness in the fights against crimes; the outcome of these reflections should
lead to a comprehensive, integrated and well-structured EU policy on
information and exchange management in this area;
28

Communication of 27 March 2013 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European and economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled
'Establishing a European Law Enforcement Training Scheme', COM(2013) 172 final.
29
Proposal of 27 March 2013 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation and Training (Europol) and repealing
Decisions 2009/371/JHA and 2005/681/JHA, COM(2013) 173 final.

10

underlines that the ongoing discussions on the proposal for a Directive should
not prevent the Commission from making an inventory of data protection
problems and risks, and of possible improvements within the current legal
context, and recommends using theses discussions in particular on the
distinction on processing of data of suspects and non suspects for further
development of the European Information Exchange Model;
fully subscribes to the need for reviewing existing instruments to align them
with the proposed Directive and encourages the Commission to take further
action;
encourages the Commission to pursue the assessment of existing instruments
along and after their full implementation;
recommends that the guidance which the Council is invited to give as regards
the choice of channel takes into account the consequences in terms of purpose
limitation and responsibilities;
encourages the Commission to justify more clearly the choice of the Europol
channel using the SIENA tools as default channel and to assess whether this
choice is in compliance with the principle of privacy by design;
notes with satisfaction that the Communication recalls that information may
only be actually exchanged and used where legally permitted, which includes
compliance with data protection rules, and invites the Commission to start
working on harmonised conditions for SPOCs, to ensure that the requirements
are similar in all Member States and effectively protect individuals;
recommends including trainings on information security and data protection in
the Scheme envisaged by the Commission as well as in the trainings Member
States are invited to ensure.
Done in Brussels, 29 April 2013
(signed)
Peter HUSTINX
European Data Protection Supervisor

11

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