Che Pro Wrk5

The Evolution of the
Human Brain
Center for Human Evolution
proceedings of workshop 5
March 19-20, 2005
123 105th Ave SE Bellevue, Washington USA
The Evolution of the Human Brain

Proceedings of Workshop 5
2006 Foundation For the Future
Foundation For the Future, Publisher
123 105th Avenue SE
Bellevue, WA USA 98004
Tel: 425-451-1333
Fax: 425-451-1238
www.futurefoundation.org
ISBN 0-9742786-7-X
1. Evolution Human
2. Human Brain
3. Human species futurology
I. Title.
The comments and deliberations of all
participants are deemed very important
by the Foundation For the Future. While
every attempt has been made to preserve
the accuracy of dialogue in the workshop
sessions, it is impossible to guarantee that
no errors or omissions were made in the
course of transcribing and editing the
live-session tape recordings. All participants were afforded the opportunity prior
to publication to review and amend their
comments recorded in this document.
The Foundation advocates no causes or
positions. Its goal in publishing the proceedings of the workshop is to encourage
human minds to ponder issues that may
shape humanitys future.
A printed copy of this publication is
available at cost from the Foundation For
the Future. Contact the Foundation for
details.
Printed in the United States of America
Officers
Walter Kistler
President
Bob Citron
Executive Director
Sesh Velamoor
April 2006
Deputy Director, Programs
Donna Hines
Deputy Director, Administration
Board of Advisors
Dr. William Calvin
University of Washington
Dr. Eric Chaisson

Tufts University
Dr. Clement C.P. Chang

Tamkang University
Joseph Coates
Consulting Futurist, Inc.
Dr. Ricardo Diez-Hochleitner

Club of Rome
Dr. Brian Fagan
University of California
Santa Barbara
Barbara Marx Hubbard
Foundation for Conscious Evolution
Dr. Donald Johanson
Institute of Human Origins
Dr. Michio Kaku
City University of New York
Graham Molitor
Public Policy Forecasting, Inc.
Dr. Robert Muller

University for Peace
Advisors Emeriti
Dr. George Bugliarello

Polytechnic University
Dr. Christian de Duve
Dear Readers:
Making a science of human beings is a touchy matter in our society today and, as
a result, we do not adequately understand what drives the human mind. The brain
has basically two parts: the cortex, which is largely a reservoir of knowledge, and the
limbic system, which controls emotions, drives, and motivations. The more we can
study and come to understand both parts of the brain, the better equipped we will be
going forward into the future of the species.
The Foundation For the Future was established with the mission to increase and
diffuse knowledge concerning the long-term future of humanity, and the Center for
Human Evolution focuses that mission on evolution, an arena of vast application.
In March 2005, the Center for Human Evolution brought together eight noted scholars
to offer their research and perspectives on the evolution of the human brain. I am
pleased to present to you the proceedings from that workshop. This book is a record of
the papers presented, the questions and answers engaged as a result of the papers, and
the scholars views on emerging knowledge of the brain and its implications for the
long-term future.
I hope you will enjoy reading the comments of prominent scholars on these
challenging and important issues.
Institute of Cellular Pathology
Dr. Edward O. Wilson

Harvard University
Sincerely,
Co-operating Organizations
Futuribles
Paris
Institute for
Alternative Futures
Alexandria, VA
Pacific Science Center

Seattle, WA
World Future Society

Washington, DC
World Futures
Studies Federation
Philippines
Walter Kistler
President and Benefactor
Contents
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
The Proceedings Sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
List of Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Section 1
The Critical Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Section 2
Center for Human Evolution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Section 3
Description of Workshop 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Section 4
Workshop Transcripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1 Introductory Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2 Scholar Presentations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.1 William H. Calvin Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.2.2 Terrence Deacon Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2.3 Ralph L. Holloway Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2.4 Richard G. Klein Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.5 Steven Pinker Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2.6 John Tooby Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2.7 Endel Tulving Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2.8 Ajit Varki Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3 Emerging Knowledge of the Brain and Its Long-term Implications for Humanity . . . . . . . 105
4.4 Closing Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Appendix 1 Workshop Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Appendix 2 Participant Biographies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
The Evolution of the Human Brain | Center for Human Evolution Proceedings of Workshop 5
Contents
vi
Acknowledgments
he Foundation For the Future wishes to acknowledge the following persons for their efforts and
contributions in the Center for Human Evolution
Workshop The Evolution of the Human Brain:
The Foundation Board of Advisors for their guidance in planning the Center for Human Evolution
Program. These members currently include Dr. William H. Calvin, Dr. Eric J. Chaisson, Dr. Clement C.P.
Chang, Joseph Coates, Dr. Ricardo Diez-Hochleitner,
Dr. Brian Fagan, Barbara Marx Hubbard, Dr. Donald
C. Johanson, Dr. Michio Kaku, Graham T.T. Molitor, and Dr. Robert Muller. Advisors Emeriti are Dr.
George Bugliarello, Dr. Christian de Duve, and Dr.
Edward O. Wilson.
The eight participants of the workshop The Evolution of the Human Brain, whose broad expertise
and indefatigable seeking after knowledge formed the
basis of the workshop and whose contributions will
be valuable well into the future. These participants
include William H. Calvin, Ph.D.; Terrence Deacon,
Ph.D.; Ralph L. Holloway, Ph.D.; Richard G. Klein,
Ph.D.; Steven Pinker, Ph.D.; John Tooby, Ph.D.; Endel
Tulving, Ph.D.; and Ajit Varki, M.D.
The staff of the Foundation For the Future, for

their dedication and commitment to ensure that
event planning and facilitation resulted in a smooth
and memorable experience for all involved. This staff
includes Kathy Carr, Special Programs Manager;
Jean Gilbertson, Public Relations and Publications
Manager; Jeff Holdsworth, Creative Director and IT
Manager; Tom Price, Executive Assistant; and Mary
Stroh, Executive Assistant.
Lisa McClary, for transcription.
Bill Wright, for extensive photographic coverage.
The Trustees and Executive Director of the Foundation, for reposing their trust and confidence in all
of us.
Sesh Velamoor
Donna Hines
Deputy Director, Programs
Deputy Director, Administration
vii
Acknowledgements
viii
Introduction
he fundamental objective of the Foundation For

the Futures Center for Human Evolution workshops is to bring together prominent thinkers
from a variety of scholarly disciplines for the purpose
of sharing their knowledge and perspectives of the
evolutionary factors affecting the long-term future of
humanity.
Center for Human Evolution workshops are convened on a periodic basis as the need arises for an
in-depth look at a specific aspect of evolution. Five
workshops have been conducted to date. The proceedings of all five colloquies, with transcripts of
presentations and discussions, may be downloaded
from the Foundations website at www.futurefoundation.org/programs_pub.htm.
All Center for Human Evolution workshops are

held at the Foundation building in Bellevue, Washington USA.
The Foundation For the Future maintains a neutral
stance in regard to research and perspectives in the
scientific and social sciences fields. In keeping with its
mission to increase and diffuse knowledge concerning the long-term future of humanity, the Foundation
does not advocate positions, but rather believes that it
is the dissemination of research findings and scholarly
dialogue that benefits the full community of scholars
and ultimately all of humanity.
ix
Introduction
The Proceedings Sections
ummarized below are the contents of each Section

and Appendix of the Proceedings of the Center for
Human Evolution Workshop 5.
cites the critical questions that formed the

basis of the Center for Human Evolution workshop
on The Evolution of the Human Brain.
Section 1
summarizes the purpose, organization and

management, activities, and workshop programs of
the Center for Human Evolution.
Section 2
Section 3
shop 5.
Section 4 provides transcripts of the presentations

and dialogic sessions from the two-day workshop.
Appendix 1 is the workshop agenda, noting key
activities from the Presidents welcome to closing
remarks.
Appendix 2 provides biographical information on the
participants in Workshop 5.
provides specific details describing Work-
xi
The Proceedings Sections
xii
List of Participants
William H. Calvin, Ph.D.
Steven Pinker, Ph.D.
Terrence Deacon, Ph.D.
John Tooby, Ph.D.
Ralph L. Holloway, Ph.D.
Endel Tulving, Ph.D.
Richard G. Klein, Ph.D.
Ajit Varki, M.D.
University of Washington
School of Medicine
Seattle, WA
University of California, Berkeley

Department of Anthropology
Berkeley, CA
Columbia University
New York, NY
Stanford University
Program in Human Biology
Stanford, CA
Harvard University
Department of Psychology
Cambridge, MA
University of California
Center for Evolutionary Psychology
Santa Barbara, CA
University of Toronto
Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care
Rotman Research Institute
Ontario, Canada
University of California, San Diego

Glycobiology Research and
Training Center
Department of Medicine
La Jolla, CA
xiii
List of Participants
xiv
Section 1
The Critical Questions

The Evolution of the Human Brain
1. How might the evolution of the human brain
be assessed in terms of past, present, and future,
where past refers to the evolutionary context;
present means the current state of knowledge on
the human brain; and future takes into account
potential applications of genetic and germline engineering, technological augmentation, cultural
indoctrination, and space colonization?
2. What are the implications of brain plasticity in

the nature versus nurture debate?
3. Will human brains be significantly different in the
future, given the potential of technological intervention?
4. Will/should a global brain protocol emerge
aimed at regulating intervention and manipulation of the human brain?
Section 1 | The Critical Questions
Section 2

Overview
Purpose
The Center for Human Evolution was established by
the Foundation For the Future to sponsor research
and conduct workshops related to the understanding
of the evolutionary factors affecting the long-term
future of humanity.
Organization and Management

Established in 1998, the Center for Human Evolution
became fully operational in early 1999. It is directed
by the Foundation For the Future and managed by
the Deputy Director, Programs, overseen by Walter
Kistler, founder and President of the Foundation.
Activities
Activities of the Center for Human Evolution include
providing funds for: studies in the field of human evolution, publishing the results of research in human
evolution, and hosting seminars and workshops concerning human evolution. Additional activities may
be determined by the Foundations Board of Trustees.
Workshops
The subject of workshops 1 and 2, held in November
1998 and February 1999, respectively, was The Evolution of Human Intelligence. Workshop 3 was held
in November 1999 and convened scholars to discuss
How Evolution Works. Workshop 4, on Cultural
Evolution, was held in May 2000, and Workshop

5, which is the subject of this proceedings, was held
in March 2005 on the topic The Evolution of the
Human Brain.
Center for Human Evolution workshops focus on
a wide range of evolution questions including, but not
limited to:
How did human intelligence evolve and how is it
currently evolving?
What role does culture play in the evolution of human societies?
How do genetic factors influence human behavior,
intelligence, innovation, motivation, and achievement?
What role will medical and genetic technologies
play in the future evolution of human intelligence
and in the long-term evolution of human societies?
What role does dysgenics play in the development
of human societies?
Participants
Each workshop brings together six to ten scholars,
experts in fields related to the evolution topic designated for the workshop. Participation is by invitation
only. Researchers interested in participating in workshops on specific aspects of human evolution may
contact Sesh Velamoor, Deputy Director, Programs.
Section 2 | Center for Human Evolution Overview
Section 3
Description of Workshop 5
The Evolution of the Human Brain was the theme
of Center for Human Evolution Workshop 5. Eight
scholars were invited to participate, specifically
selected to allow for a solid, scientific look at the
human brain and its evolution, both past and future.
The invitees were selected by Walter Kistler, President
of the Foundation, and Sesh Velamoor, Deputy Director, Programs.
Each participant was asked to prepare a paper
for presentation and discussion at the workshop.
Abstracts of these papers were received sufficiently in
advance to allow time for distribution to all attendees
prior to the event. During the workshop, each participant was given approximately one hour to deliver his
presentation and respond to questions and comments
from the other attendees.
In addition to the eight scholars, three officers
of the Foundation For the Future and four outside
observers took part in the discussions.
Venue and Themes

The Center for Human Evolution Workshop 5 was
held in the main conference room at the Foundation
For the Future building in Bellevue, Washington. In
addition to the views of human brain evolution that
were presented in the eight papers, the workshop
discussions led spontaneously into a wide-ranging
dialogue on emerging knowledge of the brain and the
long-term implications for humanity.
Publication of Results
Transcripts of all presentations and discussions in
the workshop The Evolution of the Human Brain
are published in this document, which is available in
hard copy upon request to the Foundation as well as
downloadable from the Foundations website at http://
www.futurefoundation.org/programs_pub.htm.
Section 3 |Description of Workshop 5
Section 4
Workshop Transcripts
enter for Human Evolution Workshop 5 addressed

a variety of issues related to The Evolution of the
Human Brain. Eight participants, whose expertise ranged from neurobiology and anthropology to
psychology and cellular and molecular medicine,
were charged with assessing the past, present, and
future of the human brain.
These scholars hold professorial and research
positions at university and research institutions. They
presented lectures sharing the perspectives of their
disciplines and study.
Center for Human Evolution workshops are

structured as colloquies. Each participant is given
approximately one hour to present a paper and
answer questions generated by the presentation.
Following each paper, a round-table discussion
provides a means of synthesizing the wide-ranging
material. Finally, each group of scholars discusses
critical themes related to the subject. Following
are transcripts of these presentations and discussion sessions in Workshop 5, The Evolution of the
Human Brain.
Section 4 | Workshop Transcripts
Section 4.1 | Transcripts
Introductory Session
Eight participants all experts in one aspect or another

of the human brain gathered at the Foundation building for the workshop The Evolution of the Human
Brain. In the opening session, they were welcomed by
Foundation officers, then introduced themselves with
comments about their professional affiliations and
research interests.
Bob Citron: Good morning. We are glad to see you
all here for this workshop. I would like to introduce
Walter Kistler, the President and benefactor of the
Foundation.
Walter Kistler: Good morning, everybody, and welcome to this meeting. This promises to be a most
interesting meeting. I hope you will enjoy these conversations on the human brain over this time we have
together.
Where have we come from?

Where are we today? And where
are we going as a species thousands
of years into the future?
Citron: Thanks, Walter. Just a few words now about
the Foundation For the Future: All of you have seen
our new brochure, which gives you a good sense of
what the Foundation is and what its purpose is. An
important point to emphasize is that the Foundation
is here in perpetuity it has an endowment; it never
seeks outside funding. A thousand years from now, 40
generations into the future, there will be another group
such as yourselves sitting around a table discussing
similar issues to the ones youre going to discuss today,
and the Foundation will host those people.
Four or five years ago we produced a 15-minute film
that places the Foundation in context: Where have we
come from? Where are we today? And where are we
going as a species thousands of years into the future?
Not the near-term future but the long-term future.
As you deliberate in the next day and a half, keep in

mind that when we talk about where the human brain
is going, were talking about multimillennia, not just
the near future.
With that, were ready to roll the video, Cosmic
Origins, which was created for us by a filmmaker from
WGBH in Boston who also makes films for the Nova
series and Frontline. After the film, Sesh will open the
workshop.
[Showing of film Cosmic Origins]
In the next day and a half, I am
hopeful that we can cover much
ground with respect to three specific
aspects of the brain: the past,
the present, and the future.
Sesh Velamoor: Thank you, Bob. We are ready to
start the deliberations for the morning, and first I
want to put into context why were here and what the
focus of the workshop is. Essentially, the workshop
is all about the human brain. In the next day and a
half, I am hopeful that we can cover much ground
with respect to three specific aspects of the brain: the
past, the present, and the future. We expect that the
papers that will be presented today will set the stage
for assessing the human brain in the evolutionary
context, bringing us all the way from the past to the
present, in terms of what we know about the brain.
The conversations tomorrow will focus on what
the future is of the human brain over the next thousand years the very long-term aspect is a matter of
specific interest to the Foundation. Our conversations
tomorrow morning will formulate the questions for
those discussions, specifically taking into account all
of the interventions and augmentations, and perhaps
even possibilities for evolution if we were to colonize
some other planetary body in space. So, those are the
objectives that were trying to accomplish.

Lets start with introductions of the participants,

beginning with Dr. Pinker.
my empirical research has been
concentrated on one very small
phenomenon of language, the
difference between storage in memory
and real-time computation
Pinker: Im Steve Pinker, Professor of psychology at
Harvard. I am interested in all aspects of the mind. My
empirical research has been on visual cognition, earlier
in my career, but mostly on language: language development in children, language in the brain, the structure
of language, the use of language in real-time.
In the last ten or fifteen years, my empirical research
has been concentrated on one very small phenomenon of language, the difference between storage in
memory and real-time computation, which I study
by contrasting regular and irregular inflectional morphology: the difference between walk-walked, on
the one hand, and bring-brought, on the other. The
idea is that though both of them are matched in terms
of what they do in language they are just two different ways of talking about something that happened
in the past one of them is a productive, combinatorial process, so that when a new verb enters the
language, like spam, everyone instantly knows that
the past tense has to be spammed. Even though they
never memorized that word, they dont have to go to
the dictionary to look it up.
On the other hand, for the irregular forms like singsang, bring-brought, and so on, you have no choice
but to memorize them. So, its a way of contrasting
the role of memory in computation in language. Ive
looked at how regular and irregular forms develop in
childhood, how they change over historical time periods, how they differ in closely related languages, and
where they are processed in the brain.
About ten years ago, I started to write books for
a wider audience. My first two books were highly
technical books on language acquisition. I wrote a
book called Language Instinct: Everything You Always
Wanted to Know about Language, followed by a book
with the modest title How the Mind Works, which
tried to do the same thing for the other cognitive and
emotional faculties such as visual perception, reasoning, the emotions, humor, music. In 1999, I wrote a
10
book called Words and Rules, which tried to present

my research on language in a framework that would
make the microscopic study of one phenomenon of
language widely accessible. My most recent book was
the one I spoke about last night, The Blank Slate: The
Modern Denial of Human Nature.
Specific things that weve worked on
have demonstrated, for example, that
reasoning fractionates into a series of
content-specialized systems.
Tooby: Im John Tooby, and Im presently a Professor of anthropology at the University of California,
Santa Barbara. My wife and lifelong collaborator,
Leda Cosmides, and I are co-directors of the Center
for Evolutionary Psychology.
My background is in psychology, evolutionary
biology, and anthropology. Since I was an undergraduate, I have been interested in exploiting the really
great and under-used inferential power present in
bringing together what we know about natural selection, the cognitive revolution, and other phenomena
to see, if you put it all together, what inferences you
can make about the computational organization of
the human brain and mind. Weve been trying to do a
number of existence proofs or demonstrations of the
empirical power of these kinds of applications, working backwards from adaptive information-processing
problems we believe our ancestors were subject to,
to see if that would lead us to discover phenomenon
structures or adaptive, functional, regulatory architecture in the human brain that people hadnt thought
was there before, in contrast to the idea that the thing
that is doing most of the inferential work in the
human brain is some sort of general set of contentindependent learning and inferential systems.
Specific things that weve worked on to our
own satisfaction, not to anybody elses have demonstrated, for example, that reasoning fractionates
into a series of content-specialized systems. Theres
an inferential system that is specialized for reasoning
about hazards, danger, and precautions, and theres a
system for reasoning about exchange. So, the foundation economic activity is, in fact, a specialized ability
for doing conditional reasoning in the context of contingencies of interpersonal interaction.
Transcripts | Section 4.1

We have moved out into other areas of emotion.

Reasoning was one of the hardest cases because thats
what people had assumed was completely a contentindependent kind of system. But we have been moving
systematically into other aspects of cooperation and
conflict. We think there is a distinct coalitional set of
inferential and motivational and emotional specializations existing in groups for dealing with other groups,
for navigating within your social group, for collective
action, for competition in groups, even including
aggressive competition in groups. So, maybe our
history of endemic, small-scale, inter-group conflict
might have led to some specializations, and we have
evidence about how these collective-action systems
operate.
There are lots of differences in human
brains and nonhuman brains, and I
have been very interested in trying
to understand what the
crucial difference is.
Im Terry Deacon. I am currently at the University of California, Berkeley, in anthropology and

neuroscience. My background is mostly centered
around the question of whats unusual about human
brains, or, rather, to use Gregory Batesons phrase:
Whats the difference that makes a difference? There
are lots of differences in human brains and nonhuman brains, and I have been very interested all of my
career in trying to understand what the crucial difference is.
I began my benchwork actually studying different
species connections with respect to memory in the
hippocampus. I did my Ph.D. work on the connections of what one might call homologues to language
areas in primate brains, tracing connections from the
homologue to Brocas area, Wernickes area, anterior
singulate supplementary motor and a number of
brain stem nuclei that control, for example, tongue
and larynx. I found that they were strikingly similar
to what people had predicted about human brains,
and now that more and more imaging has come out, I
think that most of those correlations have shown it to
be the case that the connectivity, at least, of monkey
brains is very much like our own.
I have gone on from there to study developments
and, over the last decade, I spent a great deal of time
doing fetal neural transplantation actually across

species. My purpose was to find out how axons find
their targets and to find out if it is different in different species. What we found out, surprisingly, was
that its not very different. In fact, this work went
on to be used in transplantation work in people for
Parkinsons disease, Huntingtons disease, and others
even across species, to some extent against my will.
But what I can say is that, as far as we could find, there
was very little difference.
Subsequently, I have shifted my attention a bit from
the development to ask another question thats related
to that: How is it that our behavior has changed our
evolution? This is a question I asked many years ago
in my book The Symbolic Species. Ive essentially repudiated some of my thoughts, then, and Ill talk a little
bit about that today.
Im a biological anthropologist Im
really interested in human variability,
particularly brain variability.
Deacon:
Holloway: My name is Ralph Holloway. Im in the

Department of Anthropology at Columbia University. Im a biological anthropologist, a dying breed. I
got my degree in geology from the University of New
Mexico and found myself working as a metallurgical
engineer the next year in Burbank, California. That
experience was so shattering that I went to Berkeley
and got a Ph.D. degree in anthropology.
My main interest is to find out how this species
became so insane. That is really my target. My main
interest when I got out of graduate school was to do
quantitative neural histology on primates, having
done it on rats in the visual cortex. I came to Columbia
University with that hope, but since I wasnt studying
Aplysia, the sea slug, there was no possibility of learning anything about primate brains. I ended up looking
at something that I had said in my dissertation was
absolutely useless, which was brain endocasts, that is,
the cast of an inside of a skull. Thats what Ive been
doing for the last 35 years: looking at the inside of skulls
and working with latex rubber, and so forth, which is
a very delightful process. I brought for your consideration a hobbit brain, in case at some point during the
proceedings you would like to talk about it.
11

My interests, though, are very broad. Im really

interested in human variability, particularly brain
variability. Ive worked on sexual dimorphism of
the brain, particularly corpus callosum in males and
females. Im interested in sex differences, naturally.
Im interested in racial differences. And Im about to
retire in another two years.
Ive always been interested in trying
to integrate the evidence for human
biological evolution with the evidence
for the evolution of behavior
Klein: Im Richard Klein. I lecture on human evolution
at Stanford University. I guess Im an archaeologist

Im not sure. I like to think theres a field called
paleoanthropology that combines the study of human
fossils and the study of the artifacts that occur with
or without the fossils but in the same time period.
Ive always been interested in trying to integrate the
evidence for human biological evolution with the
evidence for the evolution of behavior, the archaeological evidence.
I have been particularly interested in the question
of when and where people like us evolved, and I suppose you could also add to that why Ill talk about
that later. It seems to have happened about 50,000
years ago in Africa that modern humans in the fullest
sense emerged, modern humans both in their anatomy and their behavior, and they spread from there
to the rest of the world. I would like to talk a little bit
about that in my presentation.
In terms of what I actually do, every summer I go
off to South Africa and I dig up some old bones and
stones, and analyze them. I hope that I do it in an openminded way and dont just attempt to fortify a position,
which youll see I have, about the relatively sudden origin of modern humans about 50,000 years ago.
by far, the most interesting, most

mysterious object left for scientists to
study is human consciousness.
I am Endel Tulving. I am essentially interested in consciousness. Ive always been interested

Tulving:
12
in it, since my high school days. It took me a long,

long journey to actually get close to it as an object
of scientific interest, but what Im trying to do now
is to convince as many people as I can that, by far,
the most interesting, most mysterious object left for
scientists to study is human consciousness. I will be
talking about the future later on today, which turns
out to be a part of human consciousness. Its something that only the human brain can produce in its
particular manifestation.
My training has been in cognitive psychology.
Psychologists are people who, when theyre hard up
for new ideas or new discoveries, change at least the
names of the ideas they already have. So, I started as
an experimental psychologist, then became a cognitive psychologist, then became Professor and now
Chair of something called cognitive neuroscience.
I do not know anything at all about the brain. I
finally figured out what the front end of the brain
is and what the back end is. I know a few technical
terms, but what goes on in there is totally and utterly
beyond me, but it turns out, too, to my own satisfaction, that one really doesnt have to know very much
about things that one is interested in, in order to make
some sense of them.
what I now focus on is how you
avoid speaking incoherent nonsense
how your brain creates ever more
coherent arrangements of ideas
Calvin: Im William Calvin. Im a neurobiologist. I
started in physics, wound up doing a Ph.D. in physiology and biophysics, working on nerve cells basically
their electrical computing properties. I moved on to
emergent properties of circuits of cells, and what I
now focus on is how you avoid speaking incoherent
nonsense, that is to say, how your brain creates ever
more coherent arrangements of ideas in the several
seconds before the words come out of your mouth.
But Im also fascinated with why such quality bootstrapping has evolved, presumably sometime in the
last few million years of human evolution. So, I write
books like A Brief History of the Mind: From Apes to
Intellect and Beyond. I scratched the surface, at least,
of linguistics. I, too, write about consciousness.
When evolution is rapid, climate changes are usu-

ally part of the push, and so for the last 20 years Ive
also been paying a lot of attention to the paleoclimate
studies. It turns out that the glacially slow ice ages were
punctuated by hundreds of very fast flips big changes
like drought, but everywhere and they flip back even
faster into a warm and wet climate like todays.
In 1998, I was asked to write a cover story for The
Atlantic Monthly, which came out as The Great Climate Flip-flop. 1998 was a time when no one had yet
heard much about whats currently in the news and
in the disaster movies. The effect of flips on human
evolution is what my previous book was about, called
A Brain for All Seasons: Human Evolution and Abrupt
Climate Change.
If you want to understand the human

brain, you need to understand the
human condition
Varki: Im Ajit Varki, a Professor of medicine and
cellular and molecular medicine at the University
of California, San Diego. I earned a medical degree
and proceeded to complete training in hematology,
oncology, and internal medicine, and even practiced
for a while, but then I became what is called a physician-scientist. I got interested in science, using my
background in medicine, so thats really my job at UC
San Diego.
In 1984, my daughter was born, and no amount of

education in medicine and pediatrics prepared me
for watching the human mind emerge. The second
thing that happened in 1984 was I saw a patient in
whom there was an immune reaction against animal
products and it turned out that we then found the
first known molecular and genetic difference between
humans and our closest cousins, the chimpanzees. So,
in the middle of the 1980s, I got very interested in this
question of what makes us human. Since then, I have
been pursuing it mostly at a molecular and cellular
level but also collaborating with other people at different levels. Im involved in the Chimpanzee Genome
Project and other issues related to great apes.
I guess Ive come a long way from starting out in
medicine. But I think I have the advantage that medical education forces you to learn lots and lots of things
about everything, and youre not scared of finding out
about anything new. I like to go into new fields and
learn. I realize Im nave about some of these things.
As far as this particular meeting goes, Im not sure
I have so much to say about the brain, but my point
is going to be: If you want to understand the human
brain, you need to understand the human condition,
just as much as if you want to understand a disease
in a human, you dont study just the specific organ or
system where you think there is a disease; you have
to study the whole human. Thats the way I think we
should approach the problem of the human condition.
Velamoor: Thank you, all. We have a most interesting and qualified group to discuss the human brain.
13

14
Scholar Presentations
Throughout the first day of the workshop, the eight

participants presented papers on aspects of the human
brain. Here, Program Director Sesh Velamoor provides
guidelines for the presentations.
Our objective is to assess the past,
present, and future of the human
brain, and each of you has
prepared a presentation on an
aspect of the brain
and future of the human brain, and each of you has

prepared a presentation on an aspect of the brain in
which you are particularly interested. We have allotted approximately an hour to each paper, with breaks
between the papers. Following each presentation
will be an opportunity for the speaker to entertain
questions from the other participants or from the
observers in the room. Lets begin.
Velamoor: We are ready to begin the presentations of

the papers. Our objective is to assess the past, present,
15

Scholar Presentations
16
Section 4.2.1 | Transcripts
The Once and Future Brain

Presentation by William H. Calvin, Ph.D.
Intellect is not about set pieces but

mostly about things we havent done
before, a way of repackaging things.
Calvin: Intellect is not about set pieces but mostly
about things we havent done before, a way of repackaging things. It tends to be about novel assemblages
of things, particularly long and complex like the
sentences were capable of speaking. Theres a great
deal of need to do quality control just to improve the
assemblage and to ignore nonsense.
Because brain size is often all we have to go on,
together with some of the endocast findings, we tend
to assume that bigger brains are better. There are certainly comparative studies over many species that do
suggest some role of that, and it may, indeed, be true
for some of the period of brain evolution, but Im
going to raise the issue of whether its really important
in human evolution, per se.
Theres certainly a reorganization in the brain, size
aside, that is surely very important. Language sharing,
novel plans that are right the first time, and creativity
all those things require some brain reorganization
and that may, in fact, be what the brain size increases
are about.
Just to remind those of you who arent anthropologists, the ancestral environment for the great apes
is typically forest with clearings [slide: river forest,
woodland, savanna]. Some of the chimpanzees can
live out in woodland, but thats the specialty of the
bipedal woodland apes, which are the australopithecines and such. By the time you get to Homo erectus
and probably earlier, they are clearly able to make a
living out in the grassy areas where there is not a convenient tree to climb. Woodlands are very nice for a
transition population: You can nest in trees. You can
climb them. The woodlands also have a lot more rea-
sons to climb trees than the forests do, namely lions.

There is, on the other hand, this enormous resource
of meat on the hoof [slide: herds of zebra and wildebeest], and there are probably some behavioral
changes that one can speculate about early on, by 1.8
million years ago. For example, theres probably some
way of dealing with the lions and the hyenas, and so
forth, which are going to show up pretty quickly when
a kill is made. Certainly what many species do to deal
with larger animals is the so-called mobbing behavior that you see often in birds. I assume that our
ancestors learned that there was safety in numbers
that if they all rushed toward the lions, throwing
clods of dirt or whatever, they could buy some time
for one of them to amputate a leg and run off with it.
It would be fairly sure that the lions wouldnt follow
because they would have the rest of the carcass there,
which would be terribly tempting.
There was likely an improvement in sharing behaviors back then. Its one of the advantages of big prey as
opposed to small. You might be able to eat the whole
thing yourself if its small prey but not the big prey.
The best strategy then is to give in to all the others
that come around and want a piece, and to expect
reciprocity.
The other thing I suspect theyre going to need,
certainly by the time they get out into the savanna,
where there just are no good places to nest at night,
is a social organization that would lead to an ability
for most of the people to sleep while only some stay
awake. Those are what you might expect to be early
behavioral changes.
There is a big brain puzzle [slide: Brain size is
perhaps not driven by a steady improvement in toolmaking during the first 2 million years.] This is just
an old picture of brain size Ive rearranged a bit that
shows you this modern range in the human brain
size. This shows the ice ages and major stages in hominid toolmaking. A steeper slope of brain size comes
in somewhere in the last half to three-quarter million
17

years. There is a substantial conservatism in toolmaking styles from the initial invention at 2.5 million years
ago to the first really major improvement at 1.7 million years ago. That isnt to say that the old style didnt
continue. The improvement clearly did not replace it.
If bigger brains are cleverer, it doesnt

really show up very well in the first
2 million years of toolmaking
Its interesting to note that bigger brains did not necessarily make them cleverer at toolmaking. In other
words: If bigger brains are cleverer, it doesnt really
show up very well in the first 2 million years of toolmaking, so maybe it is growing for some reason other
than toolmaking.
However, reorganization in a brain may have
something to do with it. Let me tell you what I mean
by reorganization. The temporal lobe houses categories in regions that are about objects for tool use,
animate/inanimate, and so on. But the visual area, the
V5 area, that is right in the middle of the temporal
lobe beneath the auditory specializations in monkeys,
has moved all the way back to the occipital parietal
junction in humans. If you have to reorganize something, as anybody who has had to reorganize an office
knows, its sure nice to have some surge space. That is
to say, its nice if you can increase something without
having to downsize something else simultaneously.
So, in any generation, the individuals who by chance
happened to have larger brain size were also the ones
where the reorganization would go more easily. So,
brain size in some sense could be an epiphenomenon
of reorganization. I like to put it this way: We might
be able to take our present brain size and downsize it
back to one-third, and as long we kept the same organization, it might function pretty similarly. I dont
know what size, per se, adds to anything yet.
Protolanguage is certainly one of the things that
brain reorganization might be better for. Protolanguage is the words and short sentences like a
two-year-old has. For short sentences, you dont need
syntax. You can get along pretty well without all the
clues of who the actor is, who the recipient is, and
so forth. Its not that hard a problem. But surely the
growth in sentence complexity would require some
18
brain reorganization.
Sharing is one of these things that, the more items
you share, the more people you share them with, over
longer periods of time all have a growth curve that
keeps on giving. Throwing accuracy is like this too.
No matter how good you are, getting twice as good
has additional payoffs in terms of days per month that
your family can eat a nutritious and relatively sterile source of food. So, all of these have great growth
curves, which is unlike a lot of things in evolution.
Once youve invented a carrying basket, its played a
very important role probably in human evolution, but
it doesnt have this kind of growth automatically.
Staged toolmaking is the idea that you make one
thing and then from it you make something else. For
example, if you create a ledge, you can come along and
strike it, shaving off single-edged razor blades. Thats
an example of what is meant by staged toolmaking.
Blades come in by about 280,000 years ago in Africa
and are well established by 120,000 years ago.
The time frame for the designation anatomically
modern was moved back a few weeks ago to 196,000
years ago instead of 165,000 or so. But there wasnt a
big step up in behavioral complexity then. Everybody,
I think, would agree that images the sort of thing
you see in cave paintings are behaviorally modern.
Certainly if the holes in the snail shells [referring to
slide] were well polished, you would be fairly convinced that these were used for necklaces. Theres also
a lot of red ocher found in various places that people
have argued represents a body decoration such as war
paint. Chimpanzees love to decorate themselves. I
dont think thats the issue. The issue is that its hard to
imagine apes sticking to a task like this long enough,
and that same argument is probably true for our
ancestors up to some point. If these were beads for
necklaces, it does bespeak a notion that humans by
that time had a capacity to maintain agendas, revisit
them, and update them, and so forth, in a way that
was perhaps lacking earlier.
Transcripts | Section 4.2.1

The big brains, while they might be necessary, are

not sufficient to get modern behaviors. Theres likely
something else we have to deal with here.
[Slide: though anatomically modern came in

200,000 years ago, the Minds Big Bang took another
150,000 years, taking off only about 50,000 years ago
in Africa.] This is the last 400,000 years. There were
some big brains already back in Homo heidelbergensis
times. The halfway-modern stuff is all in the period
of 90,000 down to 40,000 years ago; we call it 50,000
for convenience. There is a gap of 150,000 years
when this gap was first postulated 50 years ago, it was
more like 15,000 and you could easily imagine things
just changing place. Now it has expanded about tenfold. It tells you something: The big brains, while they
might be necessary, are not sufficient to get modern
behaviors. Theres likely something else we have to
deal with here.
I want to now go through some candidates that
have been proposed for what makes this behaviorally
modern what traits had to be there for it to happen.
One is mimicry.
Now, mimicry can be done with a bird-sized brain
[slide: much mimicry is seen in birds]. This is not
an argument about size. The problem is that even if
mimicry is easy, you dont see much of it in chimpanzees (though orangutans often mimic). For example,
Tomasello did this nice experiment at Yerkes, taking
a couple of young chimps out of a playgroup of young
chimps and teaching them, just with standard conditioning practices, to make a gesture in order to get a
food reward. I dont know what he did, whether it was
patting his head or pulling his ear, or something like
that, but he trained up a couple of the animals this way
and put them back in the playgroup. Then the experimenters came around with a pouch of goodies and
every chimp there knew what the goodies were for.
But only the two animals that had been trained ever
got any of the goodies and all the rest were standing
around trying to figure this out. Not a single one of
them ever picked up on either of the two gestures they
had been trained for. It shows that arguments about
how useful it would be for them to do this really break
down here. Theres something about the chimpanzee
mindset that doesnt make monkey see, monkey do

the standard practice that you might have thought.
Yet theres a lot of mimicry in us humans. Theres so
much of it that we do a lot of it unconsciously: mirroring or echoing or matching the sort of thing where
two people are talking and one crosses his legs, and in
the next minute the other person is likely to cross his
legs. Thats what is referred to here. People will synchronize breathing; theyll do all sorts of things, even
with strangers. It appears to be part of establishing
rapport. There was an experiment with graduate students working as waitresses, who on alternate nights
of the week would match, fully sympathetic, whatever
the tone of voice the person ordering was using and
mimic some of their body gestures. They got a lot
more tips those nights than on the alternate nights
when they avoided doing those things. So, mimicry is
one of the candidates.
Creativity is often mentioned as another candidate
for the transition to Homo sapiens sapiens. Language,
of course, is another, as are logic, more working
memory, planning. And consciousness could be, to
some extent, thought of as an umbrella term covering
the rest. I like all of these. I would just add the word
structured to them, so you end up with mimicking
sequences, with the kind of creativity that includes
getting set offline, and not just protolanguage but
long sentences that you need syntax for, and not just
a logical inference but chains of logic where theres a
lot more possibility to go wrong. Maybe its not more
working memory but a better-structured working
memory. Maybe its not simply planning, but planning that has contingencies built in, so if one thing
doesnt work for example, if you cant go to the
country this weekend, you could go to the movies on
Sunday instead.
Coherence-finding, when we discover hidden patterns
amongst seeming chaos, is the sort of thing we have
to do to reconstruct the past or to make
a projection into the future.
The best-known example of structuring amongst the

higher intellectual functions is, of course, syntax. With
syntax, you can even nest sentences like: I think I saw
him leave to go home. The other higher intellectual
functions include things like games with arbitrary
19

rules, which, of course, is a lot like logic where you

have to check against an arbitrary set of rules. Music
that goes beyond rhythm and melody to use multiple
voices in parts-singing or in symphonies. Coherencefinding, when we discover hidden patterns amongst
seeming chaos, is the sort of thing, as I was mentioning earlier, that we have to do to reconstruct the past
or to make a projection into the future. Were engaged
in trying to find things that hang together well.
Complex thought, as in figurative speech, narrative frameworks, parables that map one story onto
another but leave out certain attributes, are examples
of structured thought and they all pretty much separate humans from the great apes. Now imagine us
without them in other words, looking fully human
but not having the structured aspect of these things.
Its very hard to find examples of that. Oliver Sacks has
a nice description in his book Seeing Voices [University of California Press, 1989] about the deaf. This is a
boy who is being tested at age eleven but for the first
ten years of his life he was mistakenly diagnosed as
being mentally retarded and no one taught him sign
language. The average age for diagnosis of deafness
is age three, which means that a lot of deaf children
are undiagnosed for three years, And if the average
is three, there are an awful lot that arent diagnosed
until ages five and six. Its something that could be so
easily fixed before the infant ever leaves the hospital.
Its quite sad that these kinds of tragedies occur. Here
is a paragraph from Seeing Voices:
Joseph saw, distinguished, categorized, used; he had
no problems with perceptual categorization or generalization, but he could not, it seemed, go much beyond
this, hold abstract ideas in mind, reflect, play, plan. He
seemed completely literal unable to juggle images or
hypotheses or possibilities, unable to enter an imaginative or figurative realm. He seemed, like an animal or
an infant, to be stuck in the present, to be confined to
literal and immediate perception.
any intrinsic aptitude for language

has to be developed by exposure
during early childhood
There are similar cases like this that indicate that

any intrinsic aptitude for language has to be devel-
20
oped by exposure during early childhood, and Joseph

really didnt have the opportunity to observe syntax
in operation. Whatever instincts there might be for it
are clearly something that kids pick up. They pick up
the syntax of their own culture and surroundings by
having a lot of examples.
This premodern mind probably had some things
like Freuds sense of trial action. But without structuring plus the offline quality improvement that you
need to make it work, you cant create novel sentences
of any length or complexity and you likely cannot
think such thoughts either. You might dread, for
example, another repetition of something unpleasant,
but you couldnt worry about novel threats without
structure and imagination and some quality control.
Joseph is a candidate for what our ancestors even
the ones that look like us might have been like until
70,000 to 50,000 years ago when real creativity finally
appeared on the scene.
Certainly there are parts of the brain that have
a lot of movement planning and there are
areas of the brain that we think of as language areas
theres a fair amount of overlap.
So, how could this happen? What stepped up? Well,

a lot of things that happened in evolution are on
the basis of what you might call borrow first and
buy later. That is to say: Behavior invents some new
moves. If the move is particularly useful, the biological
variations that make it more efficient will reproduce
better. Natural selection thus reinforces what was
basically a behavioral invention. Certainly there are
parts of the brain that have a lot of movement planning and there are areas of the brain that we think of
as language areas theres a fair amount of overlap.
One can imagine protolanguage going to language via
some sort of borrowing like this. Nested movements
like throwing are things that have to be planned in
great detail.
Doing something novel for the first time is handled
by a lot of animals very simply by just going slowly and
fumbling their way into it. There are very few situations
that really demand advance planning, and theyre the
ballistic movements because the feedback really cant
guide you. A dart takes an eighth of a second. It also
takes an eighth of a second to send a message into the

spinal cord and go back out again. The whole motion

from the time you start is truly ballistic: Theres no calling it back and changing it. So, the ballistic movements
are good candidates for what you might need a lot of
this for. And throwing is hard; you have at least four
joints to coordinate, hundreds of muscles, a need to
guess the movement combinations that hang together
to get it on target and the trouble is that while there
may be hundreds of combinations that would work,
theyre hidden in a sea of wrong answers, millions of
them, any one of which would cause dinner to run
away. Theres a real premium here upon being right
the first time as you get set to throw.
The other good setup for syntax is in the area of
sharing. Its pretty standard in us, compared to apes.
It has a long growth curve: As I say, sharing more
things over longer periods of time, etc. Sharing also
has this cheater problem at every step, having to
combat the freeloaders. Its been suggested, by Derek
Bickerton [co-author with William Calvin of Lingua
ex Machina, MIT Press, 2000] in particular, that you
have a need to keep rough track of who owes what
to whom, amongst all the hundred people that you
deal with, by, in effect, tagging some of your memories with whether this person is an actor or a recipient
and the value of things exchanged. Thats one of the
ways to make the cooperation curve go a lot further
than it would otherwise.
Once that mental capacity is there for doing the
sharing problem, then its likely that you can make
use of the same neural machinery in order to gossip
about who did what to whom. That is to say: Its not
entirely a free lunch. It was paid for by the natural
selection for the sharing problem, but once youve got
the circuitry for monitoring sharing, then you can use
it for other things.
In this creative-explosion period, sometimes called
the Minds Big Bang, for some skills, clearly earlier
is better. For languages, as in Josephs situation, later
is much more difficult. So, you can imagine a scenario for a sensitive period early in life where being
exposed works much better than it does otherwise.
For example, some individuals manage to solve the
syntax problem with something like case marking,
where there are different forms of the word for if the
person is an actor versus a recipient (he and him; she
and her), and now there are kids overhearing this
structured language at an age where theyre more
impressionable literally, kids can softwire for these

things, apparently, becoming much more capable.
[Slide: sensitive period of early childhood] The
standard neurobiological thinking on this is that these
are plots of the number of connections or inputs per
cortical neuron, and theres quite a growth in them
in the first eight months of life in humans the first
two months in monkeys and then they tend to drift
down. They drift down different amounts in different
areas of cortex, but some, like the visual cortex, go
down by about half. While this all could be perfectly
random, of course, the general thinking is that there is
a use it or lose it going on here and that what youre
doing is creating a pattern this way. Its just like doing
woodcarving: removing material in order to leave a
pattern there. This is the kind of speculation that one
makes about whats going on.
[Slide: natural selection for long sentences] This
is a hypothetical construct showing proficiency as an
adult as a function of being exposed to things at various ages so it shows how acquisitive and when.
Suppose a person is basically acquisitive for structured
stuff at the age when he has enough fine motor control to do throwing, as an example. I suspect that a lot
of food preparation would qualify in here, too. If this
curve is out beyond this inflection, it really doesnt
make much difference at what age you do it because
this curve is flat. Now, suppose that that curve shifts
into the area where now there is a lot of increased
proficiency as an adult if your basic acquisitiveness
for the knowledge shifts back. So, if the acquisition
age is heritable, the better adults create even earlier
variants, and this repeats. That is to say: You would
expect the curve to march back because of the steepness of that.
[Slide: dominant task shaping the softwiring of
childhood] This is a model for how you might take
a dominant task, something like throwing or food
preparation that would be in later childhood, and
move it back into a region where its now operating
upon observational stuff instead, such as language.
Now language tunes up the circuitry in an area when
softwiring is really much easier and produces these
permanent effects into adulthood. Now we have this
situation where kids handle structured sentences at
an age when they still cant tie their shoelaces they
have the speed of operation for the vocal system but
still not for the limbs.
21

The other thing about intellect that I want to say is

that there are levels of intellect just because of our ability
to handle abstraction. I want to remind you that levels
of organization are a very common notion and a level
is semi-independent of its foundations, a study unto
itself. For example, if you start with fleece and you spin
it into yarn, you produce something that doesnt backslide into fleece very easily. Theres a stabilization. Yarn
can be woven into cloth; cloth sticks together into clothing. Each of these things is a study unto itself. You can
understand how to do clothing without understanding
anything about weaving or spinning. Thats one of the
other characteristics of levels.
one of the things that the
arbitrariness of symbol buys you is this
ability to play the same games with
abstractions that youre playing with
concrete objects.
We see levels in the natural sciences all the time.

Mendeleyev figured out the table of organization of
the elements without really understanding any of
the quantum mechanics of electron orbits. You can
study the electron orbits without really understanding whats going on in the nucleus, and so forth. This
is a familiar kind of thing to us, and one of the things
that the arbitrariness of symbol buys you is this ability
to play the same games with abstractions that youre
playing with concrete objects.
You also see a pyramiding of levels. As babies
encounter the patterns in the world around them, you
get at least four levels. Babies first pick up the short
sound units called phonemes, and once theyve found
the common ones in their experience, they form categories around them. Then they start acquiring the
patterns of phonemes called words at a very substantial rate just by hearing them. Then they tune up to
the patterns within strings of words these things
that span many seconds and the regularities in it
with things that we call syntax. Then they go on to
this fourth stage where they are pattern-finding over
many minutes these things that we call a good story
or a proper narrative. So, there are four levels in four
years, the pyramiding of taking, in effect, the categories made at an earlier level and looking for patterns
and how they assemble.
Doing all these things, you have this enormous
22
problem of quality control, because most of the combinations you make of things are nonsense. All the
elements have to hang together despite the combination being novel so that theres no exact memory of
it to go by. Most are nonsense. But we create quality
every time we speak a sentence weve never spoken
before. This is a routine, everyday occurrence that
even kids of low IQ can do.
Looking at intellect rather than language per
se shows us, first of all, that general cleverness and
creativity may be rather late 50,000 years ago, the
last one percent of post-ape, pre-sapiens evolution. I
like to think of it as something like a new operating
system for old hardware. That is to say: an ability to
handle various things at the same time in a way that
you werent doing very efficiently before.
Structuring and quality bootstrapping, when you add

them atop the ape-like cognitive abilities, create this
qualitatively different kind of mental life for us.
Structuring and quality bootstrapping, when you

add them atop the ape-like cognitive abilities, create this qualitatively different kind of mental life for
us. I would also point out that theres not much time
here to get the bugs out. If this is the sort of thing that
that creative explosion at 50,000 years ago is about,
50,000 years is just not very much time to debug anything of this complexity. So, all the parts of higher
intellectual function particularly all the planning
and inference and game-playing with rules and all the
logical aspects are, as any psychology textbook will
show you, just riddled with paradoxes and certainly
inefficiencies.
Finally, Ill say a few words about whats next in
human evolution. Once we understand the mechanistic aspects of mind, which were on the way to doing,
will we see a second Minds Big Bang? There are various things you can postulate. Im going to stick to
something very simple: the number of concepts you
can juggle at the same time: the 7 2 business and,
of course, the speed with which you can make good
decisions and move on. These are heavily involved in
the subtests for IQ. About 60 percent of the variance
in the general intelligence score comes from tests
that emphasize these two things, so you can immedi-

ately see that if you had a mechanistic understanding

of mind that allowed you to train for either of these
things, you could very likely improve kids coming
out of that training to be higher in, at least, IQ. I tend
to think IQ and intelligence are somewhat different
things, but you could certainly change IQ scores if
you were able to train early for such skills.
for a second Minds Big Bang, you probably dont
need gene changes what will affect the most people
in the most places will be a better-informed
educational practice
I would point out that for a second Minds Big Bang,

you probably dont need gene changes. Im sure they
will be tried, but I think what will affect the most
people in the most places will be a better-informed
educational practice: knowing what to do when in the
softwiring period of early childhood, in particular.
The analogy I like to use is that in the 20th century
medicine went from being probably 10 percent scientific and 90 percent empirical to, in the course of
the century, becoming closer to 5050. We began to
understand what worked and why it worked, and we
began to understand all the things that didnt work,
even though they seemed perfectly logical and worked
in some settings.
It is very much like leaving bleeding and purging
behind. Bleeding is a very good treatment for iron-retention disorders, as it turns out, but over-generalizing it
and using it for everything was ineffective. Finding such
errors and improving the bottom-up approaches made
great strides in 20th century medicine.
I tend to think that 21st century education, once it
has developmental psychology and a lot of cognitive
neuroscience to go on, will be able to make a transition something like 20th century medicine did. That
is to say: If you figure that, of the current educational
practices, only about 10 percent are informed by science, imagine it getting closer to 5050. That would
be the major development. While the babies that pop
out of the womb might not be different from today, by
the time they pop out of the school system, they could
be substantially different than they are today.
Thank you. Are there questions?
What I dont see, when you go through

the fossil record, is trying to take into
account the relationship of body size
to brain size
Holloway: The size of the brain is an old chestnut in
anthropological figuring, and the old chestnut has
been that theres just no relationship between brain
size and behavior or cognitive tasking, and so forth.
The recent studies that have now been replicated over
20 times involve using MRI and algorithms to calculate brain size. These are correlated with cognitive
tests at the level of between 0.4 and 0.6.
In a recent metastudy, a meta-analysis was done
on all of those studies and it came out to be about 0.3
in terms of a correlation coefficient the correlation
coefficient being extremely significant. So, there is
some aspect of the size thing. What I dont see, when
you go through the fossil record, is trying to take into
account the relationship of body size to brain size,
because youve got both allometric and nonallometric
kinds of changes in brain size with time.
Calvin: Yes. One of the things Im fond of pointing
out about brain size is that as you get a bigger body,
you get longer conduction distances for the nerves.
Unless you do something to increase the conduction of velocity, your reflexes are going to slow down
substantially. The basic cure for this is to insulate
the nerves better with more myelin so that you can
get the messages there in the same amount of time.
That takes a lot of space. When the corpus callosum
myelinates, the number of axons it can get through
the corpus callosum drops by about 70 percent or 80
percent. Myelin size within the brain has to be a substantial part of the so-called brain size increase and
its not about intellect at all. Its about compensating
for body size.
What you point out in terms of cortical thickness
having some correlations, Im not surprised at all. What
we dont understand is that you can do things like putting rats from the standard impoverished environment
of a cage by themselves into enriched environments
and cause, temporarily at least, even an 88 percent
increase in the number of synapses per neuron. This
isnt to say that thats permanent. You certainly cant
keep doing that or the head would explode.
23

The problem is: How do you create new patterns

in the brain to do these things? Clearly, part of that is
epigenetic and theres an awful lot about what culture
you grow up in that determines what brain wiring is
available in adulthood. I think that thats a big part of
the puzzle. Culture is going to be very important here
but the genetics will still be there because theyll help
make it more efficient and theyll fill in behind. They
wont necessarily get rid of the bugs because bugs, at
least in the side effects of medicines, are things where
its very hard to get rid of one and save the other. And
evolution is just full of genes that do more than one
thing and it can be difficult to change one without
making another part of the system so inefficient that
you get developmental failures.
How strong are the inferences that you

can make from material culture
to brain structure?
Tooby: Things that strike people as interesting expres-
sions of uniquely human abilities are, of course,

rooted in the brain very importantly, but also because
as you describe, and other people do this cultural
effect of improving the quality by it being processed
and reprocessed is something that involves the size
of the social network. I, myself, am open-minded
skeptical would be too strong a way of putting it
that people put timing in the biology by looking at
the paleoarchaeological record, but one thing thats
happening is that population sizes are very low then,
so to identify the creative explosion as a time when
biological changes happened seems to me to be not
a strong inference. If you look at the Tasmanians, if
you took three of us and dropped us on some island
off the shore here, in two generations we would look
like Tasmanians: We wouldnt have computers; we
wouldnt have anything.
My question is (and maybe Richard would be able
to speak to this as well): How strong are the inferences that you can make from material culture to
brain structure?
Calvin: Clearly there are a lot of things that are just
carried along by cultural practice and its very easy
to lose them if you get a disease that comes through
24
that happens to wipe out the experts before theyve

trained another generation. This is, presumably, what
happened to the Tasmanians.
Tooby: Im saying the other way around. What if you
had really smart people 200,000 years ago but theyre
in very small groups, and then you only start to get
the significant large population sizes often enough
that they start to show up in the record 50,000?
Calvin: I agree that there could be a substantial gap
in there. One of the things that genetic changes do,
even as simple as the one Im hypothesizing here
taking the acquisitiveness curve and moving it back
is make a cultural practice more efficient and more
likely to be reinvented. That is to say: Its sufficiently
strong now that a deaf kid will invent his own sign
language to use with another deaf kid. There are some
instincts now that are serving as backups but theyre
very general in how detailed they are.
Maybe there were many attempts to

take off, so to speak, and so when we
finally see a take-off, we assume that
that was the first take-off.
Varki: Following up on the matter of population,
I think that really is an issue. When we talk about
human universals lets say that music is a human
universal. Well, its not, in the sense that many people
in the population couldnt carry a tune if they had
to, to save their lives; then there are others who are
Mozarts. Its possible that what happened is that you
had these abilities maybe 150,000 years ago, but as the
population grew and they started bootstrapping this
culture, then maybe that one population got wiped
out. Maybe there were many attempts to take off, so
to speak, and so when we finally see a take-off, we
assume that that was the first take-off.
We were talking at the break about the 400,000year-old spears from Germany that are still
unexplained. Somewhere, someone was able to make
these incredible balanced javelins out of whole trees.
Whoever those people were, they didnt make it,
obviously, because we would have seen signs of that
technology around after that. Im not discounting the
possibility of some specific genetic event or events.
Im saying that its also equally plausible that you

could have had a problem of bootstrapping that kept

recurrently failing until it finally.
But then, if that was the case, we would have
expected a larger effective population size in the end,
because if there were many peoples that were capable
of this and, finally, one group had to take off, that culture would have dispersed. Instead, what we see in the
genetic record is a relatively constrained, small-group
origin.
Calvin: Indeed. As I suspect Richard will tell us, the
population density in some of the areas where we
think this was going on, like Southern Africa, this was
a low point. Its not as if you can argue big populations.
Furthermore, the climate was constantly flipping
back and forth, so there were always big drought
downsizings in this period. About 16,00015,000
14,000 years ago, the climate was flipping every couple
of centuries. This was a very unstable situation. They
could build up a good population size in the warm
and wet, but then it is crashing back down.
Velamoor:
Thank you, Dr. Calvin.
25

26
Erasing the Slate: Devolving toward Increased

Complexity of Brain Function
Presentation by Terrence Deacon, Ph.D.
I actually think of our own species as

a kind of degenerate chimpanzee
in a very serious genetic sense and
neurological sense.
Deacon: What I want to say today is something that
I think youll find very counter-intuitive. Evolution
is one of the hardest things to study because it fools
us every time. We always think that anybody who
has gone through high school knows how evolution
works; they know how its supposed to be. But, in fact,
I think theyre confused most of the time. I think we
are confused most of the time. As much as weve gone
through 150 years of studying this process, we still
have a lot to learn.
What Im going to suggest today is not a story
about all of evolution. Theres no chance that I could
fit that in. Im going to talk about one very counterintuitive feature that Ive been looking at recently. Im
not going to talk a lot about brains but this all has to
do with brains. The question that I want to talk about
has to do with the nonprogress side of the story. I am
going to say that the nonprogress side of the story
may be one of the most interesting parts of it you
sometimes have to fall back to leap ahead. There is
a significant feature of human evolution, and I think
this may be generalized to many aspects of evolution, and that is where what we might want to call
devolution turns out to be tremendously powerful. I
actually think of our own species as a kind of degenerate chimpanzee. I dont mean this just humorously;
I mean this in a very serious genetic sense and neurological sense. Im going to try to make that idea clear.
[Referring to slide] These are the chimpanzees; we
see the bonobos over here in blue. This is the mitochondrial DNA tree. Here we are, this little red bush over
here. The Neanderthals are pretty close; in fact, theyre
closer to us than most of the chimpanzee groups are
to each other. What you might think is: If I saw this in

any other natural history study, I would say that this is a
species on the way out. This is a species that has lost its
genetic variance. This must be a tiny corner someplace in
the world where they are about to go extinct. We havent.
One of the reasons, I think, is because there has been
a kind of degeneration process going on. Thats what I
want to suggest to you here. I dont want to suggest that
this is everything there is to know about evolution, but
I think that we tend to overlook it and maybe it is more
important than we think.
What is the flexibility of our evolved cognitive and
emotional adaptations to cope with the highly divergent
social, technological, and living environments that were
involved in now and are about to produce?
What matters most for the next thousand years, since

thats where were looking here? Brain evolution,
certainly by spontaneous natural means, is probably
not going to be in the cards unless we get really isolated on Mars or somewhere else for a very, very long
period of time. In that case, perhaps some interesting
things will happen. But I think a number of things do
matter. One is: What is the flexibility of our evolved
cognitive and emotional adaptations to cope with
the highly divergent social, technological, and living environments that were involved in now and are
about to produce? Were going to move into very alien
environments. I think thats a pretty remarkable and
troubling issue. Whats the sensitivity of our brain
development to these significant departures from the
species typical environments? Brains have evolved
for environments. They have evolved to take advantage of things in the world around them. One of the
things Im going to talk about today is exactly how
that process happens.
Finally, whats our capacity to co-opt old, adaptive
complexes to serve phyletically unprecedented, novel,
27

Erasing the Slate: Devolving toward Increased Complexity of Brain Function
adaptive functions? Clearly, something like reading

and writing is a case in point where phylogenetically
old and unrelated faculties have been drawn into this
very novel process.
I titled my book The Symbolic Species [subtitle: The
Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain, W.W. Norton,
1997] because I have all along been of the impression
that weve been significantly altered biologically by
evolving within a symbolic niche. I think that the use
of symbols is quite old perhaps there will be debate
about that. In any case, if we have been living in a
symbolic niche for any significant period of time, that
could have had a remarkably powerful effect on our
biology and I want to talk about how that might have
happened. I want to talk about how things get distributed, not just inside of our heads but across all those
influences that might affect cognition.
Theres little doubt that we have unique biological capacities and unprecedented features that make
us capable of acquiring language. I actually think, as
Steve [Pinker] does, that these were honed by extensive natural selection, that we went through a very
long and intensive period in which the features that
now drive language have changed our brains to make
it easier for us in a variety of ways. Its an important
background piece of the story.
I want to ask a few questions: Whats the nature of
the contribution if its made by the evolved changes
that have affected our brain structure? What is the
contribution of what we are doing now or what we
possibly can do that can be attributed to brain structure itself? Are there other significant influences
affecting language, competence, and structure that
are not in the brain, so to speak? (Ill use language as
my example throughout this talk.) What might there
be that has an effect on language and the structure
and even our competence to do language that is not
in the brain? Finally, how could such capacities have
evolved either one of these kinds of capacities? One
of the things Im going to suggest is that, in part, they
evolved because of things falling apart.
28
to the extent that epigenesis can

take advantage of these kinds of
things the genome will
cede control of these and shift to
a more regulative role
Im going to title this the lazy gene hypothesis.

Obviously, it has inverse connotations with other
gene terms. The point I want to make is that we now
are very familiar with lots of what often are called
self-organizing processes in biology. Lots of systems assemble themselves, organize themselves into
cyclic processes. They are not regulated and they are
not instructed in a strong way. So, to the extent that
epigenesis can take advantage of these kinds of things
self-organizing, self-assembly, or environmental invariance in the world the genome will cede
control of these and shift to a more regulative role,
handling contextual variables instead of trying to
instruct the specifics. Weve seen this again and again
as weve begun to trace genes and their effects in cells
and developing embryos.
My favorite example is the Fibonacci spiral, which
occurs all over in the plant world. We now know
that with a simple physical model of simply dripping
liquid metal onto a watchglass, we can produce Fibonacci spirals by just adjusting the rate at which the
drips occur. The Fibonacci spirals are there in nature
because of spatial phenomena, not because theyre
encoded in the genome. But what they do provide is
a wonderful distribution so that the sun hits all the
leaves reasonably well in a plant thats growing up
a stalk. It has adaptive advantages but that adaptive
advantage can be utilized without having to encode
it directly. You still have to encode things that affect
growth, and so on.
Im going to make a genetic parsimony argument
that will be behind all of this. It basically can be laid
out in three parts: Extragenomic support for structure formation or functional operation that can be
obtained extragenomically will tend to degrade corresponding information embodied in the genome,
and will do so by masking the forces of stabilizing
selection that maintain its structural integrity. It will
lead to a random-walk mutational diversity in degradation of those systems. The key word here that
Ill come back to again and again is masking. That is,

selection can be masked by a variety of phenomena,

some of them produced simply by behavior.
I want to contrast two extreme views. One claims
that everything thats relevant to language is somehow
in a box in the brain, and that there was a wonderful, hopeful-monster mutation someplace in the past.
Various of us might want to place this wonderful
human-making mutation at some place, nearby or
far back. According to this view, thats what makes
language possible that theres a unitary, modular,
domain-specific, mental algorithm that does it all. In
fact, its the strong computer model.
Im going to make a very different model a model
that talks about the distribution of control, because in
all other biological systems we often find that control
gets distributed, gets shoved off of the genome. My
argument is that its a system of neural, behavioral,
and social regularities all working together. Theres no
single feature that controls this. They are self-organizing processes within the brain, within embryogenesis,
within the genome, and within social interactions.
Theyre all playing a role in this.
Mostly today Ill be talking about the effects of
higher-order organizing phenomena on the lowerorder systems. I will give you some neurological and
genetic examples and then show you some simulations weve run.
While we used to think that maybe one or two structures

might be doing language, its now becoming clear that a
vast number of structures are playing crucial roles.
One of the stories that weve come to realize over the

last decade and a half is that the more we look for structures in the brain that are doing something relevant to
language, they multiply daily. While we used to think
that maybe one or two structures might be doing language, its now becoming clear that a vast number of
structures are playing crucial roles. Whether it has to
do with automatization in the basal ganglia or whether
it has to do with intentional phenomena that are controlled both in mid-line cortex and all the way down
in cerebellum, were finding all kinds of multiple contributions. Its the kind of thing that when you have
a very complex process that could involve many supports, you can recruit a lot of helpers to do it, and the
more you recruit and the more you can integrate that
help, the better your processing can be.
Alfred Russel Wallace asked: How can you explain
the complexity of human cognition? It goes so far
beyond what you might imagine to be survival value.
The answer to this at the end of the 19th century was
posed by a number of researchers who made a kind
of end-run around Lamarckian-inherited stories to
talk about what is now called the Baldwin effect,
although it was actually discovered by three people
independently James Mark Baldwin, Lloyd Morgan,
and Henry Osborne in fact, all in the same year. The
argument was that you could acquire innate capacities
by virtue of your plasticity: If early-on you had relatively little innate support but a lot of trial-and-error
support for a behavioral adaptation or a phenotypic
adaptation that was simply a physiological adaptation
that had some plasticity to it, it would, in effect, shield
selection. So, individuals who could make it by their
plasticity and flexibility for transmitting information
generation to generation could, in effect, do so long
enough so that spontaneously variants could show up
in the population we would say mutants today. This
could eventually replace this clumsy way of doing it
with a more innate, more streamlined way of doing
it. Baldwin called it organic selection. It has come
to take on his name after a number of critics called it
the Baldwin effect in the 1950s.
A parallel idea Im going to show you that it is, in
fact, a very different idea was proposed in the 1950s
and 1960s by the geneticist Conrad Waddington. He
called it genetic assimilation. But Conrad Waddington didnt do it theoretically he showed it. We
now know what the genetics of his experiment was.
It turns out that although I have based a good part
of my argument on these views at least in my book
The Symbolic Species as I went back to review it, I
realized that they both dont work the way these men
thought they did. What Im going to tell you is some
of the evidence weve gathered to show how they dont
work and to show you that something else much more
interesting shows up.
29

You can unmask selection by putting

animals in difficult spots and then
lots of things that normally
wouldnt have been selected
suddenly become available
Baldwin and Waddington are, in fact, quite different.

Baldwin suggested sea level as a kind of metaphor for
this: Above sea level is what selection can get to, and
what selection cant get to think of it as erosion
in the body, and this is the expression of the genotype. You can unmask selection by putting animals
in difficult spots and then lots of things that normally wouldnt have been selected suddenly become
available for natural selection to pick at and work at.
Baldwin suggested that, in a sense, sea level rises and
a whole lot of stuff can now freely vary, so you can
sample a wider space because of your learning ability,
or because of your plasticity.
Waddington, on the other hand, put animals in a
very much more stressful environment, an environment full of ether, for example, or an environment that
was very hot, and showed that you can also unmask a
lot of variants and subject those to selection.
Theyre very different effects. They both have
effects on the genome and what I want to talk about is
what those effects are.
The problem with the Baldwin effect was pointed
out right about the time Baldwin was writing, but
its mostly been forgotten. It was picked up again by
George Gaylord Simpson in 1953 and subsequently
forgotten and variously brought up and down again.
The basic argument is this: The phenotypic plasticity that allows the Baldwin effect will mask the very
forces of selection that would be necessary to shape
up those innate surrogates that would be appropriate
to eventually supplant that adaptation. In other words,
the very mechanism that should allow it blocks the
natural selection that would allow it to be replaced.
Thats a challenge: This will inhibit their evolution
and, more than that, it will actually degrade any existing partial innate analogues because youve reduced
stabilizing selection.
Now, there are special cases in which it can happen and those simulations in which it has succeeded,
and weve run some of these as well. You have to have
a very high cost/benefit ratio between the acquired
30
and innate trait; you have to have a very tight genotype/phenotype correlation, one-to-one; and you have
to have something like a hopeful-monster saltational
mutation. In other words, in one step you already get
an adaptive function. You dont work your way up to it,
because, in fact, selection has inhibited that process.
Pinker: There was a computer simulation of evolution
of neuronetworks by Geoffrey Hinton and Steven
Nowlan.
Deacon: Ill talk about the Hinton-Nowlan project
a little bit later because actually we re-ran it under
slightly different, more realistic conditions and it
failed. Ill tell you why.
Pinker: It seemed there was an extra condition there
that wasnt in your list, namely that acquisition of the
trait is not all or none that what could drive selection is how early in ontogeny you master it. So, even
if something is acquired, it could be acquired after
100 trials or after 50 trials or after 10 trials, and the
replacement of learned with innate structure moves
the age of acquisition earlier, with the assumption
that the sooner you get it, the sooner you enjoy the
adaptive benefits.
Deacon: Its part of the cost/benefit problem. In effect,
as you can move things earlier, you lose some of the
costs.
Pinker:
Right.
You can weight it in a variety of ways. The

cost/benefit is absolutely crucial to drive this. What
we also show, and what Geoff [Hinton] doesnt show,
is that the cost/benefits will come to a middle. It wont
drive learning all the way out and it wont drive innateness all the way out. It will come to a balance point.
Deacon:
Pinker: My understanding was that that was their

conclusion they never got 100 percent.
Deacon: They never got 100 percent. They got better
than weve ever gotten.
Pinker:
innate?
In terms of how many of the connections are
Deacon:
Thats right.
Pinker: But, as I remember, it was some proportion

that was innate but, because the learning never went

away, the selection pressure was never high enough to

drive every last connection to the innate state.
Lesions in the auditory areas damage your ability to

take advantage of early learning. They also, if theyre
significantly damaged, make the sound different.
Deacon: Thats right. The bottom line is that the
advantages decline as you approach it.
All right, let me give you an interesting example
that Ive been studying recently. This comes from the
work of a man named Kazuo Okanoya in Chiba University. He was looking at birdsong and the control
of birdsong in the brains of these birds. [Referring to
slide] Here we see a domesticated species called the
Bengalese Finch and a feral species. He recently found
the ancestor to this domesticated species. The species
has been domesticated for over 250 years, domesticated for its coloration. It does not have a very pretty
song: chirps and clicks and that sort of thing. But he
wanted to study its song because it was a very easily
bred bird and it did have a song of some interest.
A very interesting phenomenon came up that
caused us to argue for a while and have to go out and
chase down the feral cousin, and then to figure out
whats happening, because heres what we found: The
domesticated species was fun to study because it had
a complicated song. The song had lots of different elements; it had a lot of variability over time; there was
a lot of learning in it. However, the feral cousin had
a very stereotypic song. The species that it came from
had a song that was very limited and, in fact, the feral
species does not learn its song. Theres a slight amount
of learning, but its pretty minor; whereas the domesticated species had a tremendous amount of learning
going on. Kazuo Okanoya was initially convinced
that, to some extent, there must be some unconscious
breeding for song going on in this process, or that
there might be some wonderful linkage between coloration and song. Its not impossible and thats still a
hypothesis we havent falsified.
Let me show you a little bit more about it. [Referring to slide] Heres the transition. If we break up this
song into song units, one of the things we find is that
the wild species has a lot of repeats and you can show
this by having the various song units and the tran-
sition probabilities between them diagrammed. The

domesticated species has a much more complicated
song. It can move around. Its song has a family history, that is, it acquires its song from its parent and
has the variants of its parent and plays with those
variants but not other variants. They dont have syntax but they have, in a sense, the movability of parts,
and he calls it syntax parenthetically, to talk about
this as a process of shuffling parts.
In the wild species, there is a fairly simply syntax,
or structure, and theres very little individual difference and very little regional difference, whereas in the
domesticated species you can find a generation-togeneration difference if you simply cross-rear them.
You can find remarkable differences in song structure.
Okanoya was originally studying the structure of
the brain and what controls song, something thats
been studied for a number of years now. There is a lot of
wonderful work. I find it very influential in helping us
understand how language in the brain is processed. His
discoveries about the song were that if you damaged
one structure, for example, you would get increased
linearity of the song. If you damaged another one, you
would reduce the structure of notes there would be
fewer transition differences. And if you damage yet
another structure, the final common output from the
brain, you basically get a significant reduction in the
number of elements in the song altogether.
The interesting thing is that this paralleled this
species difference though I remind you that its not
a species difference; its a breed difference. Lesions
in the auditory areas damage your ability to take
advantage of early learning. They also, if theyre significantly damaged, make the sound different. The
animal doesnt actually pick out its sound well.
What about the wild cousin? If the wild cousin is
damaged in all of these areas, it does almost nothing
to the song. Whats happened is that the wild cousin
uses very little of its brain. The White-Back Munia
really has the thing specialized. Its using just the RA
structure, its primary motor structure, and it produces this song. It could care less about whos singing
what. By the time it reaches adulthood, it knows what
it is going to sing because its well built-in.
The hypothesis I want to suggest here is that
domestication masked selection that was maintaining
song structure. What was it maintaining? Well, it was
31

maintaining the complex asymmetries of transition

probabilities between these various song components. That was well represented and could be easily
automatized in just a few areas of the brain. But with
domestication, I think the innate transition biases
between these song elements is regressed toward the
mean, and, indeed, thats what you see if you try to look
at these values. Theyve approached very, very similar
values all the way across all the possible combinations.
The result is that you get a quite complex song.
You could talk about this as complexity or more
noise I leave that up to you but let me tell you
about a simulation weve run on it just recently. This
is done with agents that are acting like birds. These
birds have begun their lives in an environment
where theres a lot of selection. Theyre not real birds;
theyre computer birds. They have to acquire their
song. Theres selection on whether you pick the song
right because if you mate with someone thats singing
the wrong song, you dont produce babies.
In the first phase, theres quite a bit of selection on
this and we see a bunch of interesting things. In fact,
the average fitness goes up as you get better and better
at doing this. Your song gets more stabilized, and all
the variants of song begin to disappear. By the second
phase, we get a very stabilized system in which there
are a few song variants. The birds I keep saying
birds; you might call them agents or you might even
call them algorithms dont have to do a lot of work
to learn it. Its fairly straightforward and theyre pretty
successful with it. These birds now have an auditory
template for picking out who is singing the right song
and they have a motor template for producing the
right song. What we did is simply make it so theres
no cost to making a mistake.
What would happen if the birds were, for example,
being bred by hand by somebody else, and it didnt
matter who they mated with? Well, in the first phase,
after Stage 2, the songs look a lot like those of the
feral cousin. What happens when we mask selection
is that everything starts to fall apart. Song linearity
decreases; the complexity of the song increases; the
number of transitions increases; the filter that the
bird needs to pick out somebody else degrades. This
is a filter degrading. It doesnt actually recognize anybody. This is what you would predict is going on.
One of the surprising features is that the load on
the learning mechanism actually increases in this pro-
32
cess, even though theres not a cost, because theres so

much variability. What we see in these songs is something very similar to what we see in this domestic
species. We see that the song transition probabilities
have become much more complex.
How could the masking of selection
have also resulted in the evolution
of complex distributed functional
integration if there was
no selection?
So, what does this tell us about neurocomplexity? This

is a story not just about song but also about complexity of the brain, and let me tell you why. How could
the masking of selection have also resulted in the evolution of complex distributed functional integration
and recruitment of the multiple brain structures in
the domestic species if there was no selection?
Heres what we hypothesize and this is what seems
to be characterized by the learning mechanisms that
weve shown in the simulations: In the stabilizing selection, the song template is well built into this structure.
Theres genetic control of it. We have a sort of gene
analogue thats controlling the template and that can
be degraded if selection falls off, which is exactly what
happens. When we block selection, it gets degraded.
The capacity for this to do it on its own begins to flag
or, rather, the biases become closer to each other.
The result is other systems that contribute some bias
now have the possibility of contributing their biases.
When the biases in the driver were so powerful that
they could determine the outcome without any significant variation, there was no possibility for this.
But as this degrades, other systems can now contribute a bias. You get increased song variability under
this, and if this continues, one thing that happens is
that the learning mechanisms get more distributed.
The system had to be partially degraded for the function

to be distributed across the brain.
In the case of the transition for White-Back Munia and

Bengalese Finch, what we actually see is something
very interesting: As the transition probabilities drop

down close to equal, a whole variety of other biases

that are acquired in the lifetime of the bird suddenly
become able to make a difference, but those biases
get into the system by virtue of other mechanisms: by
virtue of auditory processes, by virtue of motor capacities, by virtue of mimicry capacities, and so on. All of
these systems can now play a role where they couldnt
before. The system had to be partially degraded for the
function to be distributed across the brain.
Are there finch analogues in language? I think
there are plenty of them. I dont think its everything
about language I want to be clear about this. But I
think we should pay attention to this.
Theres a significant loss in simplification in the
cooptation of innate call systems. We dont have the
kind of innate call variety that other species of apes
have, certainly of chimpanzees. There has been what
I would call a degeneration of vocal transition biases.
We can produce almost any vocal sound after any other
one, with a few mechanical constraints on it, and a few
breathing constraints, but we dont have very strong
transition biases between our speech elements. We
have increased influence of auditory experience, like
the birds. We have an increased capacity for auditory
vocal learning, again like the birds. I think this is only
going to play a role if youve decreased the template
structure here. And also theres been a decoupling of
social/vocal behavior from the arousal systems in us.
You dont have to be really aroused to produce speech.
We can produce it in very low arousal states. I think
thats given us an increased potential to link sounds
with diverse sensory motor experiences. In other
words, I think we had to take a step backwards in this
process, as well as steps forward.
the release-like phenomenon of babbling in early
children suggests that both the arousal decoupling
and the allowance of multiple kinds of transitions are
characteristic features of this kind of
release phenomenon.
Another part of the finch analogues is that the

release-like phenomenon of babbling in early children suggests that both the arousal decoupling and
the allowance of multiple kinds of transitions are
characteristic features of this kind of release phenomenon. There are a variety of others as well.
I told you I would say something about Wadding-
ton. Waddingtons experiments were in breeding fruit

flies. He showed that if you breed them in ether, a
small number of them develop bithorax something
we now know can be generated by homeotic mutations. He showed that this was a facultative feature but
if you breed them in regular environments, they dont
produce this feature. If you breed, however, bithoraxproducing animals who produce it only under ether,
and do it for about 30 generations, they will produce
bithorax without ether. In other words, this is the
apparent acquisition into the genome of an acquired
characteristic, and he called it genetic assimilation. I
think its a misnomer. We now know a couple of his
examples. One was with a cross-wing vein pattern
thats been recently studied. It turns out to have to do
with heat shock protein variants. These animals were
raised in heat and a small number of them raised in
heat produced an unusual cross-wing vein pattern. In
the normal environment, none of them produces this,
but if raised in heat, a small fraction of them do. What
Waddington did was he simply regularly bred those
flies to show this pattern. Its a facultative adaptation
you might think of it as something having to do
with distribution of heat in the wings or fluid in the
wings, but by about 30 generations he was able to get
animals that produced this without heat. So, something that was acquired or, in a sense, conditional on
the environment became nonconditional innate, in
some sense.
What we now know about this is that there are
multiple variants of heat-shock proteins on different
loci. What was happening is that Waddington was coassorting these loci. Each of them had some potential
under heat to produce this effect, but when you put
many of them together independently, they will produce this effect independent of that. These genes were
there in the population already, but they were distributed and could not have this effect.
One of the reasons that heat-shock proteins also
have the kind of variability they do is that theyre not
under selection in every generation. Many generations never express many heat-shock protein effects,
so they have high variability, but you can get them
to express their effects and if you then breed on the
basis of those expressed effects, youre effectively
inbreeding these biases toward cross-wing vein pattern. Waddington exposed this phenotype and then
bred for it.
33

What I want to argue is something Ill call parallel

distributed selection in which both of these are playing
a role, in which the masking effect, which generates
degradation and, indeed, differentiation of systems,
also will produce distribution of selection onto other
systems that are not degraded. It will increase the
conditionality and plasticity that Ive just shown, but
that means that anything that has a role to play in the
bringing of that plasticity into the system will now also
suddenly be exposable to selection. This will unmask
selection on variants that were not selected before but
were relatively neutral and varying. The result is that
youll get this kind of co-assortment. Its a way that
evolution can, in effect, sample for incipient synergies
that are not there, but theyre distributed across the
population. Why? Because there are multiple loadings on a single phenotype and if that phenotype is
being selected, youll also be selecting on all the possible contributors to that phenotype. Thats why I call
it parallel distributed selection.
language, culture, tools have
radically altered the niche that we
human beings have been in for a
very long time and that has
changed our biology.
I want to end by bringing us back to the question at

hand and an idea that I posed in my book The Symbolic Species, which has since gotten a better name,
Niche Construction, although I think its not quite the
same. Beaver dams are the classic example. Beavers
are aquatic rodents because beavers build dams. Beavers have changed their environment, changed their
niche, and their bodies, their biology, have responded
to this changed niche. That niche has special requirements. What I want to argue is that language, culture,
tools, the whole range of things that are relevant to
us, have radically altered the niche that we human
beings have been in for a very long time and that has
changed our biology. Depending on how long you
carry this back, it could have a very significant effect
on our biology. What will it do?
This is masking of a different sort. I think this is
what is most interesting for our future, but its also
interesting for our present. If the masking of this effect
is not by something that I do but by something thats
going on outside of me that I can interact with for
34
example, a social process where I contribute to it but

I am not making it happen by myself, then the masking effect can have a very troublesome consequence.
A bunch of genes producing a protein produce some
function many steps away, and selection increases
the probability of that gene being present in the next
generation. But what if this function is masked by
something outside, something in the environment?
What will happen is selection will be masked on this
system and this gene will take a random walk only,
of course, if this persists for a long period of time and
is fairly stable.
Weve become addicted to vitamin C.
We have to get it from the outside.
We cant make it ourselves.
This is a masking from the outside.
I think this has happened in a number of cases. I want

to highlight one of them: vitamin C dependency.
Somewhere around 35 million years ago, primates
became diurnal and began to parasitize trees for
their fruit. Now, birds have been doing this for a long
time. Trees have apparently been advertising ripeness when its the right time for the birds to steal
by changing color. Fruits keep oxidated metabolism from causing damage to this wonderful source,
to which they are going to attract these distributors,
by virtue of the vitamin C thats packed into many of
these plants. The result is that if you eat this regularly,
you wont need to produce your own vitamin C. Most
mammals do. Primates, anthropoid primates particularly, dont. Weve become addicted to vitamin C. We
have to get it from the outside. We cant make it ourselves. This is a masking from the outside.
Primates themselves, by their behavioral plasticity, created this masking but it has an unusual effect.
It changed the physiology in fact, its recently been
studied. The gene has been cloned for endogenous
production of vitamin C LGO, its called. We know
that in humans its on Chromosome 8. Why do I say
that? Because its a pseudogene in us. In fact, its a
pseudogene in all the anthropoid primates that have
been looked at. We can actually even now do the family tree of this pseudogene and see how it has changed
across these various primates.
What has happened is that this gene has taken a ran-

dom walk. It has accumulated a couple of stop codons

and some major deletions. In fact, for all intents and
purposes, those mutations are noise. Theyre randomly distributed. This gene has taken a random
walk under masking, under the fact that behavioral
flexibility could allow this system to degrade. But now
were addicted to vitamin C.
But when you get addicted to something from the
outside, its quite a bit different, because now anything
that helps you get it, just like anything that could bias
your song, is now subject to selection. It becomes
unmasked so that something that was controlled by
one locus, LGO, can now be controlled by any number of loci that have any effect on increasing and
maintaining the probability of getting vitamin C.
Selection becomes distributed across the genome
onto genes that may play very irregular and unlikely
roles in this process. My suggestion is that one of
those is color vision. We find that when we look at the
anthropoid primates, there are some interesting effects
in terms of when three-color vision shows up. Its not
all been fully worked out but now were looking at
some of the variants that exist, and it looks at though
they all date back to pretty much the same time. This is
the result of a gene duplication event: again, a duplication, redundant function, masking, and variation a
similar sort of process at the genome.
I want to suggest to you as a hypothesis that color vision
in primates is an adaptation for vitamin C. I think weve
shifted selection for making vitamin C onto the
opsins on the X chromosome.
I want to suggest to you as a hypothesis that color

vision in primates is an adaptation for vitamin C. I
think weve shifted selection for making vitamin
C onto the opsins on the X chromosome. Theyve
become duplicated to produce color vision. I think
this is a very powerful phenomenon. Its a phenomenon that will shift selection across the genome and
pick out synergistic functions. We dont have color
vision just for our fruit eating. We have lots of other
capacities. [Referring to slide] This is a variant of the
Hinton and Nowlan experiment but we did it with a
vitamin C model. What you see here is the onset of
vitamin C being available in the world. Its lower in
the world here. We have endogenous vitamin C-mak-
ing happening here in this picture. But a little bit later

in time we drop off the vitamin C so theres not quite
as much available in the environment. We have three
other systems that at various times came online that
could get it. So long as you had some vitamin C in
the environment, it could aid because you couldnt
make it all yourself. When those came online, they
were maintained. These were learning adaptations,
in effect, that needed something in the environment.
But when vitamin C got produced in huge amounts,
the endogenous production system dropped to zero.
There was no longer selection on it; it accumulated
noise and failed to work.
In this case, you can completely eliminate one component, whereas in the other direction we can push it
to equilibrium, so to speak. With this kind of masking effect, you can completely eliminate function,
but under these circumstances, these three adaptations became necessary. When vitamin C availability
dropped down in this model, you had to keep these
up and they increased in their probability in the population over time. All three of them supported each
other.
I want to make the claim that language and culture and tools you put them all together and you
get the ultimate of an artificial niche. I want to claim
that the creation of a symbolic niche recruited this
highly robust, metastable, many-segmented, component system. Not one mutation, not one place, but
many systems simultaneously drew them together
by virtue of, first of all, the masking effects of culture
that allowed the system to, in effect, accomplish these
things in a variety of social ways. This masked a lot of
other functions, including, I think, a lot of vocalization functions that we were now being able to carry
on by other means, allowing the release of some of
these functions to be taken up elsewhere. The reason
that we have such a widely distributed and multicomponent system that has been adapted for language
function is, in part, because it was degenerated then
re-recruited by this process.
35

What you get is a very complicated

system, in which we have to look at
all of these levels and understand
their interaction, and thats
not a trivial problem.
Every time you mask selection, so long as you allow the

random walk noise effect, its very hard
to go backwards.
The multi-stable system that will result from this kind

of recruitment can make learning appear innate and
totally pre-specified, not because theres one place that
does it, but because there are so many cooperating
biases in the system that the system will, in a sense, fall
into what we call attractors so easily under these circumstances. The real challenge is that this makes the
problem really complicated. Where are you going to
find all these? You cant now look for the single magic
bullet in the story. What you get is a very complicated
system, in which we have to look at all of these levels
and understand their interaction, and thats not a trivial problem. But who thought evolution was trivial?
And who thought language and brains were trivial?
Thank you. Im open for questions. Steve?
Deacon: Weve actually been trying to simulate this

exact question. If you have one template that you can
mask and knock out, why cant you throw a bunch of
partial templates into the system and see what happens? As far as we can tell so far, you get the same
effect. Every time you mask selection, so long as you
allow the random walk noise effect, its very hard to
go backwards. Its hard to go backwards because when
you make something noisy, its hard to make it, in a
sense, organized again.
What has to happen under those circumstances is
exactly what you described. There has to be a reason
to keep them around but to inhibit them. Now thats
certainly possible and theres no way to know at this
stage if thats what were dealing with.
I dont know finch phylogeny very well, but

I imagine that these Munias must have relatives and
ancestors that had fairly elaborate song and that it
may have been lost in the lineage leading to Munias?
Pinker: If you can reconstruct the phylogeny of the

finches, it could be that they have a close relative,
the Munias, that perhaps indicate that a fairly recent
common ancestor did have elaborate song, which was
being unmasked.
Pinker:
Deacon: Many finches have had a different song variety.
Is it possible that the unmasking consists of

basically unmasking genes that, perhaps for adaptive reasons, were suppressed in the Munia lineage,
presumably because in many environments birdsong
would have costs but no benefits say, low parasite
load, high predator attraction and that really a lot of
the complexity didnt come because there was some
underlying plasticity that was allowed to emerge but
there was a fair amount of specificity from a finch
ancestor that just in that lineage was suppressed, that
the selective breeding may have selected out inhibitory genes that suppressed this preexisting system?
Pinker:
Deacon: The question is: What would keep those

genes in the population when theyre being masked
from selection?
Pinker:
36
Yes.
Deacon: I know a little bit about those in Northern

India where this was picked up, and most of the ones
around this do not, but that doesnt mean that finches
in general dont. So, I dont know for sure whether
thats true. One of the things were trying to do now is
a finch genome study in which we can begin to look
at this question.
One thing that we think has happened in this
process is that, in effect, the genome of the finch in
captivity has become progressively degraded like it
does in many domesticated species in which you get a
lot of variants showing up you get a lot of randomwalk effects. A question we want to ask is: Exactly
what genes were hit by this; can we trace it out? A lot
is known about genes that are active in song production, so I think this will be a very fruitful way to go.
Pinker: You said that the human vocal call repertoire
is smaller than that of other great apes such as chimpanzees.

Deacon: Not smaller than all great apes, of course,

because orangutans have an almost zero.
Is that well established, especially if you were

to include among human vocalizations things that
may have been given linguistic output but which,
nonetheless, might be triggered like swearing, like
exclamations of various kinds, epithets, expletives?
Even though they have as output sequences of vowels
and consonants in your native language, we also have
reason to believe you covered some of this literature
in The Symbolic Species that they have subcortical loci
that can be unmasked in case of aphasia, and so on.
Pinker:
Deacon: Its interesting that with all the subcortical

loci, now that we know something about these, they
are not the subcortical loci involved in call production. Thats the natural assumption; it turns out theyre
mostly basal ganglia. The point could be made even
stronger, and that is I think prosody has so many features that are characteristic of primate calls. We have
totally recruited it for language. To do so, I think,
we had to degrade its control system. It still plays a
role in signaling some of the same emotional states,
and so on, but it doesnt have the stereotypic function that it did have. What Im talking about is not
elimination, in this case, but reducing some of these
constraints and flattening out some of the probability distribution so that it can become utilized under
these circumstances.
Pinker: So, the calls that we may have inherited from
the common ancestor with the chimpanzee might
still be present in humans?
Deacon: I think that most people who have pursued
this would argue that most of them are gone, and
those that we have that are highly stereotypic are very
different from chimpanzee calls. For example, most all
other primate calls do a significant amount of vocalization on inhalation breath. It hurts us to do that. Its
not something we do well, so even when we laugh and
sob we try not to do it. Its only when we sob that we
have any kind of inhalation vocalization, but its very,
very common in most other primates. So, a number
of things seem to have shifted even in the innate calls
that we do have, suggesting that theres really been a
reorganization in that system. I dont mean to suggest
that its gone.
Pinker:
Is it a reduction or just a reorganization?
Deacon: Its a little of both. Obviously we dont have

the range of stereotypic calls, but we have a handful
of stereotypic calls. Most people put it somewhere
around ten, maybe a little below, depending on
whether you are a lumper or a splitter. We could
probably go around the room and figure them out
here its pretty easy. But even those are not nearly as
stereotypic as many of the chimpanzee calls.
it may be that one component of

this complex system might have to
be some core engine that does some
kind of mapping from propositional
structure onto signals.
Pinker: The third question: I know that you meant
to draw the dichotomy stronger than you would ultimately push it, but in the last slide that you showed,
with the various self-organizing, co-dependent systems, it could still be compatible with some kind of
partial specialization for grammatical language, if it
wasnt enough just to tune up attention, just to tune
up memory, and so on. It wont necessarily give you
grammatical language with a complex mapping of
propositions onto syntactically strong signals.
Im very sympathetic to the overall story, but it
may be that one component of this complex system
distributed among capacities in the auditory system,
the motor system, attention, and memory, still one of
those boxes might have to be some core engine that
does some kind of mapping from propositional structure onto signals.
Deacon: Could be. Obviously this is something that
we dont know the answer to. In one of the studies that
were doing now again, a simulation study; Simon
Kirby has been working with me on this stuff there
are a number of self-organizing kinds of models that
hes been showing, generating various components of
syntactic structure not anything complicated, but
confidentiality and that sort of thing. Right now were
running a model in which the population is, in effect,
given an innate grammar to do those things that we
know can self-organize in the environment. It looks as
though we get the same effect. In other words, if it can
be generated by self-organizing processes outside of
the template, even having the template to begin with
37

is not enough to keep it there. Its a very interesting

finding, but clearly there may be many components
that you just cant do that way. And if you cant, those
are the things that will have to be put in.
Pinker: The components could be fairly abstract and
generic and need the support of all of these other
cooperating systems.
Deacon:
Thats right.
Observer: Do you expect that these distributive,

synergistic systems that happen by masking and
unmasking are fragile or robust?
Its one of the most remarkable things

in the world that the vast majority of
living human beings acquire
language almost effortlessly.
Deacon: I think theyre quite robust. Whats happened is
that weve shifted from a single locus or a few loci onto a
highly distributive set of loci. What that means is that any
one or two or three or four of those might be knockable
and not actually affect the whole final system.
This is also an argument about how you evolve
toward metastability. Its unfortunately also an argument about how you evolve toward epistasis. These
genes will now become more and more dependent on
each other in complicated ways.
A theory that weve not really had good data for yet
is how you get the kind of epistasis were now seeing
in the genome. This is an argument that would say
that its a spontaneous consequence. Things may fall
into epistasis under these circumstances. But epistasis
in the way Ive described it here, and its certainly
not true for all epistasis would tend to produce
what I would call metastability; that is, if youve got
multiple, partially redundant supports, youre not so
fragile, and that is, of course, what we find with language. We could do a lot to a human brain and still
have language function. Its one of the most remarkable things in the world that the vast majority of living
human beings acquire language almost effortlessly. I
think part of the story has to be that there is a kind of
metastability to it. Its hard to fail.
Im wondering about the distinction youre

trying to draw, in the sense that wouldnt everything
Tooby:
38
always already be this way? You have this notion that

there is this initial state in which there is a single, isolated, sort of modular thing in which genetic effects
map onto unique structures that are causally isolated
from the rest of the system, and then the thing gets
more complicated and degenerates. You drew this
opposition between prespecified and things that end
up looking like innate and prespecified. What you call
things that would have ended up looking like innate
and prespecified was always my model of what innate
and prespecified was anyway.
Deacon: If thats true, then theres no difficulty here.
The other side of this argument is: How do you start
this process? This is a hierarchic process, if you think
about it. This is a process in which higher-order relationships are being superimposed, not one in which
youre sticking new genes in. However, I think gene
duplication contributes to this significantly. Gene
duplication is an internal way to produce masking
effects. This is how youll generate new starting points,
and then wander away from those starting points and
build new higher-order relationships. I actually think
that this is an effect that we have to follow through
all of evolution, because when we talk about what
we might call synergistic effects, this has to come into
play. That would be at the cellular level, at the multicellular level, at the brain level.
This system will almost never have

a uniquely causally isolated, single
solution that develops independently.
Thats not the way any biological
system would look.
Tooby: It follows from the distinction between human
engineering and natural selection, which is: Everything that has an effect on an output thats under
selection will come under selection. Throughout the
system, in any complex engineering system, that will
be a lot of things. This system will almost never have a
uniquely causally isolated, single solution that develops independently. Thats not the way any biological
system would look.
Deacon: Absolutely. And thats certainly what this
shows.
Another piece is that this is a challenge to aspects
of the modularity argument, in which you can get

modular function with a distributed system. There are

some very interesting questions to be asked because
what this basically says is that you might get multicomponent contributions, but theyre all drawn by a
central function. Theyre all drawn by a central phenotypic effect thats become unmasked, so you could
get what I would call facultative modularity quite

easily out of this story. I think there are some very
interesting questions to be sorted out in terms of how
the two sides of this coin fit together.
Velamoor:
Thank you, Dr. Deacon.
39

40
The Contribution of Paleoneurology to Our

Understanding of Human Brain Evolution
Presentation by Ralph L. Holloway, Ph.D.
Its the endocasts that give you the

direct evidence of what may have
happened to the brain.
Holloway: Im going to deal with endocasts. It makes
sense to me that if youre really interested in the
evolution of the brain, it would be wise to study the
direct evidence for it. Its the endocasts that give you
the direct evidence of what may have happened to the
brain. Im going to take you through what Ive been
trying to do over the last 35 or 40 years to understand
what things you can see on fossil brain endocasts.
First of all, we have to ask this question: Is paleoneurology paleophrenology? The answer is: You
better believe it. If you dont have localization of function, somewhere to look to, the game is lost at the
very beginning. [Referring to slide] Here is our father
figure, Frantz Gall. Hes not a hero figure in anthropology, as you can well understand, but at least in his
very early days he came up with the ideas of localization and demonstrated that the brain was not some
homogenous blob or mass without distinctions.
[Referring to slide] These are endocasts, or are they
really? You really cant be sure that I havent put a couple of different kinds of baking potatoes in there. But
these are really true brain endocasts; they are the dorsal view. What youre seeing at the top is the anterior
frontal portion and what youre seeing in the bottom,
of course, is the inferior portion. Pan paniscus, the
bonobo or pygmy chimpanzee; Pan troglodytes; and
Gorilla gorilla this gives you some idea of the size of
these. The collections that I have put together over the
last 30 years include about 44 Pan paniscus, roughly
34 Pan troglodytes, and roughly 44 Gorilla.
Theres very little you can say about them. You can
say something about size because you can dunk them
in water and find out how much water is displaced.
You can say something about the relative shape of the

frontal lobe how long it is, how broad it is, and so
forth. But youll be hard-pressed to find the central
sulcus, to find the lunate sulcus, and so forth. On the
very top is a picture of a brain. The blue is the central sulcus. The red is the sylvian fissure, the anterior
portion being to the left, and on the bottom is an
endocast. It looks like a Mayan pot, almost.
What do you see on the endocast? Precious little,
and that is the problem with endocasts. When I wrote
my dissertation in 1964, I said, Endocasts are useless; you cant do anything with them; why bother?
Theres a long story there, about the Department of
Biology and how if you couldnt study Aplysia, the sea
slug, and find out what was happening in the brain,
how could you find out what was happening in a primate brain? So, there went my career in quantitative
primate neurohistology. I had an opportunity to go to
South Africa and study under Philip Tobias for a halfyear and I became entranced with endocasts once
again, even though I had thought I had demolished
them in my dissertation.
This is a dorsal view of the same. If you look at the
right-hand side of the brain, you will see that the left
occipital cortex extends posteriorly and is wider. And
if you look at the top part of the frontal lobe, you can
detect that the right frontal lobe is a little bit wider.
Those are asymmetries that have been well described,
particularly by Marjorie LeMay in the past, and they
have a very, very strong correlation with handedness.
So, when you find a left occipital/right frontal, in
90 percent of the cases, youre dealing with a righthanded person. You can see this on the endocast as
well. If you look at the endocast on the left-hand side,
look at the left occipital portion at the bottom; I think
you can see that it extends posteriorly and is also a
little bit wider than it is on the right. If you can detect
the midline on the endocast, you can see that the right
frontal is probably wider as well.
These are some of the things that we tend to use
41

The Contribution of Paleoneurology to Our Understanding of Human Brain Evolution
when we examine endocasts to get some idea of what

the cerebral structures might have been, at least in
terms of possible laterality.
there might have been some
cerebral specialization taking place,
at least with regard to handedness, 1.8
million years ago.
[Referring to slide] This is KNM-ER-1470, which is

now called Homo rudolphensis. There was a time in
which it might have been an enlarged Homo habilis.
In any event, its really about the first Homo that we
have in Africa going back to about 1.8 million years.
Theres a little bit of distortion in this skull but theres
no question that you get a left occipital petalia pattern
and you get a right occipital/frontal with pattern as
well. So, this sort of suggests that there might have
been some cerebral specialization taking place, at
least with regard to handedness, 1.8 million years ago.
In fact, from about 1.8 million years ago, when we go
through Homo ergaster, when we go through Homo
erectus, and so forth, even Neanderthals, we do find
these asymmetries.
I want to back up just a little bit, because there
have been claims that you find these asymmetries on
gorillas, chimpanzees, orangutans, and so forth, and
all I can tell you is that what you do not find is this
torque pattern of left occipital/right frontal. What
you do find, on gorillas in particular, who are highly
asymmetrical, is perhaps a left occipital or perhaps a
right occipital. But they never tend to be associated
also with the opposite side in terms of the frontal, so
you dont get the torque pattern of asymmetry. Its a
very different thing and I dont think there is very
good evidence that the great apes show a great deal of
handedness, at least not at this point.
These are two specimens, a left lateral view of
them: A. garhi on the top, a possible stem ancestor
for A. africanus, and some part of it might have gone
into Homo habilis, though possibly not. A. boisei, of
course, is the robust Australopithecine, or Zinjanthropus boisei, if you like. These are both from Ethiopia.
The green that you see on A. garhi is a reconstructed
portion but almost all of it was available on the
underlying plaster that Tim White sent me, so I feel
fairly good about the reconstructed portions. On the
42
A. boisei, the orange that you see at the bottom is the

reconstruction, but I had OH5 to go on; I had SK1585
from Swartkrans to go on; I had a whole series of
other afarensis and Australopithecines that I could use
to help model these missing parts.
The lateral portions of A. garhi and A. boisei look
very much the same, outside of the fact that one was
reconstructed in blue clay and one was reconstructed
in yellow clay. But when you look at this view, you see
that the shape change is extremely different in terms
of the occipital view. What you get is this very, very
broad width in A. boisei and a much narrower one in
A. garhi, indicating, very likely, that there are some
probable differences in the brain organization as well,
although from the endocast youre certainly not going
to be able to say what that brain organization was that
shows the difference.
So, this is a third aspect of brain endocasts that is
useful. The first is that you get size; the second is that
you get asymmetries; the third is that you get some
indication of possible shape differences and then possibly, using multivaried analysis on large samples, you
might be able to glean something functional from
that. So, endocasts are not totally useless.
the concept of reorganization what I meant by
it was that there were quantitative shifts in neural
components and once you had a quantitative shift
in a neural component, that really meant
reorganization in the brain.
What I became interested in, back in 1964 when I did

my dissertation, was the concept of reorganization. I
certainly did not invent this concept. The concept of
reorganization has been around a long time, certainly
Grafton Elliot Smith used it; Raymond Dart certainly
used it. But what I meant by it was that there were
quantitative shifts in neural components and once
you had a quantitative shift in a neural component,
that really meant reorganization in the brain.
You can get a change through time, from Time 1 to
Time 2, in which size only is changing. You could take
the anterior dotted line on the top sort of as a central
sulcus. You could look at the bottom one as perhaps a
lunate sulcus, which separates primary visual striate
cortex. You simply enlarge it and nothing really is happening. They are scaling exactly isometrically. In the
case of reorganization, however, you can change the

growth patterns as to what is developing through the

ontogenetic time. Here we see that the size is the same
thing, but look what has happened to what I would
call the lunate sulcus here: It is moving posteriorly
and youre getting a reduction in primary visual striate
cortex (area 17) and what might be an increase in the
parietal lobe or extra-striatal parts (areas 18 and 19).
Thats just one example of reorganization. You
could get reorganization if you change the hierarchy
or maturation rates so that you would get different
fiber distributions in here, which might not change
the size at all. But you are never going to be able to
discover those from endocasts. Those are lost in the
prehistory.
You get degrees of different asymmetries. I think
there are, possibly, also changes that you find in neuroreceptor distribution, as you see between Time 1
and Time 2. I havent studied voles. When I look at a
vole brain, the prairie and mountain voles look exactly
the same to me. If I weighed their brains I dont think
I would find any differences in their weight particularly. If I examine the morphology, as lissencephalic
as it is, what do I find? Nothing that I can tie on, and
yet look at those behavioral differences between them
in terms of, particularly, motherly care. Whats the
difference? The differences are in oxytocin distributions throughout the cerebral cortex and the rest of
the brain. One group lights up like a Christmas tree;
the other is very blank. You can imagine that there can
be these possible kinds of reorganizational change in
the hominid record and youre not going to find these
in endocasts either.
One of the things you can do if you go to the comparative record is take a look at the marvelous dataset
that came out of Stephan et al. in 1981 and is still being
used. They had these brains; they got their overall
sizes; they had their body weights for something like
46 different species, including ourselves, of primates;
then they did the histological sectioning, and then
calculated the volumes of different parts of the brain,
and so forth. What Ive put up here is Logbase 10 of
striate cortex versus Logbase 10 of brain weight. We
have to use logs because scientists minds go only in
straight lines. This is the human point here. If you
dont use the human point and you get the regression line for this this being chimpanzee and gorilla
up here you end up with a correlation coefficient
of about .97 or .98. Its extremely high, as one would
expect from these kinds of allometry studies. If you
then ask: What would I expect, then, for a primate of
this brain size, if it were human; what would its striate
cortex be, based on this nonhuman regression line?
What you would come up with is that the regression
line is up here and this distance actually is 121 percent
less than would be expected, so the predicted volume
is 121 percent more, if I could put it that way.
I would suggest that when your predictions are off
by more than 100 percent, its time to think about it
and look at it carefully. I think thats a very important argument for the reduction, speaking relatively
and allometrically, of primary visual striate cortex in
humans. I would translate that, then, into a relative
increase of posterior parietal association cortex that
is, through time.
The things Im concerned with are the reduction in

area 17 primary visual striate cortex and possible
asymmetries in Brocas cap region.
We didnt evolve from chimpanzees, so please keep

that in mind we always play the game of using the
chimpanzee as our stem ancestor. Be careful in
that kind of reasoning.
Just to remind you, this is the famous Brodmanns area

17. The things Im concerned with are the reduction in
area 17 primary visual striate cortex and possible
asymmetries in Brocas cap region. Now, Brocas cap
region includes 44, 45, and 47 down here. These do
show up in fossil brain endocasts. Of course, you have
very, very important things that are happening in area
39 and 40 in the angular gyrus, and it gets very complicated in area 37.
We didnt evolve from chimpanzees, so please keep

that in mind, because we go back and forth from the
comparative record to the phylogenetic evidence from
fossils, and so forth, and we always play the game of
using the chimpanzee as our stem ancestor. Be careful
in that kind of reasoning.
[Referring to slide] These are predictions for
Homo for various structures you can get out of these
figures. Terry [Deacon] did the same thing years ago
43

and published it in the international journal Primatology. As I said, what you get is 121 percent, if you
use all of the 45 primate species. If you just use Old
World and apes, it comes down to 66.6 percent but
thats still a respectable amount. If youre doing the
lateral geniculate body, which, of course, relates to
primary visual striate cortex (area 17), its 146 percent
less than would be expected. If youre doing cerebellar
weights, 6.2 percent. Now, remember that this is log
data; confidence intervals are going in this direction,
narrowing toward the central part of the regression
line, and getting increasingly divergent at the ends of
the distribution. Consequently, 6 percent is possibly
meaningless in any significant statistical sense.
However, consider the diencephalon, which is 54
percent greater than expected, or the septum, which
is 20 percent greater than expected, or the amygdala,
which in humans is, for whatever reason, 53 percent
less than expected. I dont know what to say about that.
Im not sure that 53 percent is truly statistically significant. My intuitive feeling is that differences above
1520 percent should be examined more carefully as
possible candidates of examples of reorganization. I
would want to really look at the difference between
the amygdalas in great apes and humans, and explore
whether, for example, fear responses, or amgydaloid/
cerebrum interconnections play some functional role
in differentiating their respective fear responses.
[Referring to slide] This is not a fried potato or
dumpling. This is Australopithecus afarensis, AL16228, an endocast thats possibly around 3.2 million years
of age. Youre looking directly on the occipital surface
of this endocast these being the occipital poles right
here, the cerebellum line here. The anterior portion
is broken off. The main thing to look at is this groove
that you see here. In all great apes, the lunate sulcus
the anterior boundary of area 17 is always bounded by
the lunate sulcus. Coming down from the pre-central
sulcus to the lunate sulcus is the interparietal sulcus.
That always abuts posteriorly on the lunate sulcus in
great apes. Hopefully, this slide helps. John Gurche
made this rendition for me because the actual photographs are very difficult to interpret.
What you have here, then, is this groove we were
talking about being identified as an interparietal. If
it is interparietal and it is ending here and this is a
great ape pattern, then the lunate sulcus has to be
here. Dean Falks argument was, in fact, that this is
44
the lunate sulcus; therefore, it is a great ape. But the

problem is that the lambdoid suture is also there, and
the anterior part of the lambdoid suture always has a
little groove in it that appears on the endocast. This
was shown way back in 1936 by LeGros Clark. So,
you have the cerebellar lobe here. Notice the occipital
pole. The distance between here and here is 15mm.
Any chimpanzee is at least 25 to 30mm. The chimpanzee of the same size as this this is about 385cc
in terms of volume has a lunate sulcus thats at least
twice the distance to the occipital pole.
What this tells me, as a hypothesis, is that Ive got
major reduction in primary visual striate cortex starting roughly 3.5 million years ago.
[Referring to slide] This is a beautiful chimpanzee
braincast. There was a time in which I was so disposed
that I was taking measurements every 5 degrees on
the surface of the endocast, going to a central homologous point, and then doing a multivariate analysis of
this. The upshot of it was that I got most of my variation on a large comparative sample in this region back
here where you find the lunate sulcus. Thank god I
threw that dataset away. I would never want to go
back to it.
[Referring to slide] But now you can see a nice
chimpanzee brain. I got this from Wally Walker many
years ago. Theres the lunate sulcus. Theres just a sample of five more chimpanzee braincasts that I have,
and Ive put arrows at the lunate sulcus in each case.
The point here is that they show variability, of course,
but that variability is still in a very anterior position
and now we have measured something on the order
of 80 chimpanzee hemispheres and the average distance from occipital pole to lunate sulcus is roughly
on the order of 30 to 35mm.
[Referring to slide] Remember old Taung, the child
here? This is part of the summary of the arguments.
When Dart studied it in 1924 and 1925 and published
on it, he thought that the lunate sulcus was in this
region. Remember that Dart studied under Grafton
Elliot Smith in London, and Grafton Elliot Smith was
the one who put the lunate sulcus on the cognitive
map (if I could put it that way) of neural anatomy. Falk
disputes that. This is Falks dimple, which she insists
was the lunate sulcus. The lunate sulcus, according to
Falk, would have come pretty much down like this.
When we took the chimpanzees from the previous
slide and got the coordinates for it, then put it back

onto Taung, the chimpanzee average lunate sulcus

would fall along here. I think if you look fairly carefully at this, youll see that if you have a lunate sulcus
going here, its going to violate the morphology thats
already there. Its going to cut across gyri and you see
no cuts across those gyri at all. So, I think its a reasonable way of testing the hypothesis that Falks dimple
is too far anterior. If you put the chimpanzee there,
it is also too far anterior, given what you have in the
endocast. So, I think Dart was probably right.
Here you can see it again from the occipital view:
lunate sulcus on a chimpanzee here; Falks dimple;
average chimp lunate sulcus here; and possibly Darts
lunate sulcus in this region. The problem, of course, is
that this is where the lambdoid suture is. The lambdoid
suture, unfortunately, is probably masking whatever
true lunate sulcus morphology is in there. Theres
nothing we can do about it. Thats the way it is.
Now, there is another endocast its Stw 505 from
Sterkfontein, South Africa that has been recently
described and Im so pleased to tell you that it really
does have a lunate sulcus, and here it is, right here.
Youre looking at the posterior part of the frontal lobe
over here. The midline is somewhere in here and you
have about 20mm of difference between the midline
and where you would expect the lunate sulcus to be,
and that is in a relatively posterior position, because
this thing is about 560cc. You would expect it to be
roughly about 40mm out to the side.
Now were looking at Pan troglodytes. Youre looking at the base of it. I just want you to look at these
regions here and I think youll see that theyre unremarkably symmetrical, or at least nothing is popping
out at you to say: Wow, Im asymmetrical. At least
not from the endocast.
Pinker:
Is this the ventral surface?

We know that cerebral asymmetries
have something to do with cognitive
differences and specialization in the
two hemispheres.
Holloway: Yes, that was the ventral surface. What

I was pointing out to you was what we would call
Brocas cap in those regions right in here. Now youre
looking at modern Homo sapiens. I think you can pos-
sibly detect that there might be some asymmetries in

that region. If we look at the frontal view of this Homo
sapiens, the same one, I think you can detect asymmetries, very visible in what we call Brocas regions.
Do these asymmetries have any functional aspects?
Different researchers get different views. Im not really
sure that these are very useful, but on the other hand,
there are asymmetries in Brocas region, and sometimes they seem to favor the left; sometimes they
seem to favor the right. It might be prudent at least
to look at these and see how they come out. These
are casts of the frontal lobes. Youre now looking at
the ventral surface of it, this being the orbital surface
of the frontal lobe here. Ive got roughly about 40 or
50 of these so far. Yes, you can see asymmetries, but
its not enough to say, Theres an asymmetry here.
You really want to give some quantitative estimate or
demonstration of what that is. Thats the next research
project were involved in.
This is Jebel Irhoud; its a Neanderthal. Youre looking at the basal view of it, so this is left Brocas cap here
and heres right Brocas cap. I think you might agree
that you see some asymmetry there rather striking
asymmetry the same kind, roughly, of asymmetry
you find in modern Homo sapiens. This is Sambungmacan (SM3), the Homo erectus recently discovered.
(There is now an SM4.) This is the cranium of SM3.
This is the brain endocast that we prepared, and I had
one of my friends draw red around those areas that
we could identify as basically Brocas cap region, and
so what you see is this larger left Brocas cap appearing
then on the right side.
Well, its fascinating. It certainly doesnt prove language in Homo erectus times, but its very suggestive.
So, if it looks like a duck, acts like a duck, walks like a
duck, sounds like a duck, is there some outside possibility that it might be a duck?
Were looking at brains that show cerebral asymmetries. We know that they relate to handedness. We
know that cerebral asymmetries have something to
do with cognitive differences and specialization in
the two hemispheres. We also see asymmetries in
Brocas caps. Are we entitled to be uniformitarianists and argue that if you see these things in modern
Homo sapiens then you can make these connections?
Are you entitled to make them into the past? I would
say yes.
These would be the major areas of cortical regions
45

that were important early in hominid evolution, running from area 17, primary visual, which we think is
reduced to increases in asymmetries down in areas 44
and 45 in Brocas region.
Im going to suggest that these basic reorganizational changes took place in the evolution of the
human brain, starting with the reduction of primary
visual striate cortex with Australopithecus afarensis this taking place 3.5 to 3 million years ago, the
evidence being at least AL16228. Now I think you
could add Stw 505 to this and possibly Taung as well.
Somehow at the time of Homo habilis, perhaps 2 to
1.8 million years ago, or at least with early Homo,
youre getting reorganization of the frontal lobe. The
third inferior frontal convolution in Brocas area is
very distinct on KNM-1470, if I were to show you a
lateral view of it. It is identifiable as human and not
as pongid. We do know that there are cerebral asymmetries, left occipital/right frontal petalias probably
in Homo habilis. Certainly you see them in the 1470
endocast, but you find them in all subsequent Homo
erectus endocasts after that. There are three aspects
of cerebral reorganization. Here we have refinement
in cortical organization. I have no evidence for that. I
just assumed that there has been some of that.
its not just simply increase in brain
size that characterizes human brain
evolution. It isnt just reorganization
but theres an interdigitation
through time
So, the conclusions: Paleoneurology directly tells us

about brain size. It demonstrates asymmetries in Brocas region and left-right hemispheres. Brain endocasts
show changes in cerebral organization; both changes
in size and organization are present at between 1.5 and
2 million years. The evolution of the brain, then, has
been an integration of both size and reorganizational
effects occurring at different times and at different rates where both allometric and nonallometric
changes have occurred. My point is that its not just
simply increase in brain size that characterizes human
brain evolution. It isnt just reorganization that characterizes, but theres an interdigitation through time
and the challenge is to unravel that interdigitation.
Thank you.
46
why would we expect, say, a

shrinkage of primary visual cortex
(D1) in a species that we antecedently
expect to be smarter
Pinker: We all take for granted that there is this allometric function relating brain weight to body weight.
In one nave view, you would think that it doesnt
really take that much more brain to control the body
of a gorilla than the body of a gibbon, nor would you
need that much more brain tissue to process visual
input from the retina of a gorilla compared to the
retina of a gibbon. That would be at least one model,
in which case you would expect that the bigger the
animal, the smarter if there was some law of growth
that would make the brain grow with some positive
monotonic function compared to body size. You
would get smarter and smarter as you got bigger and
bigger. It would be a very dramatic effect because how
much more motor cortex do you need for a gorilla
than a gibbon, or, for that matter, a mouse?
On the other hand, I dont think we see that as a
strong pattern, and, if not, then why would we expect,
say, a shrinkage of primary visual cortex (D1) in a species that we antecedently expect to be smarter in the
other direction?
Holloway:
Its not really shrinkage. Its proportional.
Pinker: So, if posterior parietal gets bigger, then all

you are saying is that D1, as a proportion of the total
brain, gets smaller?
Holloway:
Pinker:
Probably so.
Not in absolute terms.
What Im trying to show you is that

you dont need the brain to enlarge at all
to get the reorganizational effects.
Now were getting into directional pressures, and so forth. I would think that the pressures for
increasing posterior association cortex were stronger
than. Theres no evidence that reduction, relatively
speaking, in primary visual striate cortex would have
Holloway:

any effect on the issue of vision and its acuity.

The interesting argument is really between myself
and Jerrison and Falk, who really thought that the
only way you could get a reduction in primary visual
striate cortex, or this kind of reorganization, would be
to have the brain enlarged. What Im trying to show
you and them is that you dont need the brain to
enlarge at all to get the reorganizational effects.
Pinker: Has there been any coherent theory as to why
there should be an allometric function relating brain
weight to body weight at all? If its just growth, namely,
just the developmental program requires you to have
more of the other, then why wouldnt all that extra
brain tissue be put to use when you have super-intelligent whales and super-intelligent elephants, and so
on? Is there any story on that?
Deacon:
Pinker:
Lots of stories!
Any good ones?
The real challenge is that we still cant

agree on how to do the statistics.
The real challenge is that we still cant agree

on how to do the statistics. This is challenging because
what line you draw through those points, although
the one that Ralph shows is probably the most robust
of all of these, but also simply for brain and body size.
While you might think that we would have a good
sense of whats going on, in fact, I dont think we
do. I cant remember who mentioned that .75 is the
accepted number. I certainly dont accept that number because, in fact, its drawn through all mammals.
Now, its wonderful to put all the mammals
together, but, of course, if you look at their embryological development, the primates start, from the
earliest point in embryology, being shifted off of that
significantly. If you drop them out, the line drops
back down to three-quarters. It differs within species.
It differs within various groups. We really dont have
a clear sense of it.
Let me give you the three standard hypotheses.
The first one is that it scales with metabolism. That
idea was brought up by Otto Snell in 61 and has been
Deacon:
brought back and forth.

Holloway:
Thats 1861.
Deacon: Sorry, yes. Actually, 1891. The second story

is that it scales with some kind of surface-to-volume
relationship. That idea has been brought back and
forth as people have done different statistics to come
down with the two-thirds slope.
I, myself, favor one that you mentioned at the end,
which is that the nervous tissue is all developed from
ectoderm. Ectoderm, when its set up, divides at a different rate than endoderm and mesoderm. It divides
because its going to be surface on the body. It must
have a particular genetic program to do that at a fairly
early stage or the body would become very abnormal
in shape. I think its a very, very old program.
The point I want to make is that only one of those
stories says anything about intelligence. Thats the one
that says that somehow surface-to-volume is some
sort of assessment of, say, sensory input surfaces. Both
of the others the metabolism story and the surfaceto-volume story dont actually make claims about
intelligence and we have to have an independent story
about intelligence to sort that out.
Another theory is that body size

correlates with longevity The effect
is not through body size per se, but
through selection and longevity.
Tooby: Another theory you could have is that body
size correlates with longevity, so an increasing life
span may require and allow and permit the beneficial
use of information over longer terms.
If you have a larger truck and a smaller truck, both
take a truck driver, right? It doesnt take a bigger truck
driver. The whole question is, I think, a very interesting and important one, but the only thing that and
I dont find this satisfying is coherent and semifunctional and makes some sense is the longevity
correlation with body size. The effect is not through
body size per se, but through selection and longevity.
Pinker: It makes a testable prediction. If you did a
multiple regression with longevity and body size,
assuming that they werent perfectly correlated, then
the brain size would regress much more cleanly on to
47

longevity than body size. Has anyone found that?

Holloway:
Deacon:
Pinker:
Sacker did that.
Yes, thats right, back about 30 years ago.
And the answer is?
longevity. The real challenge is, of course, figuring out

what maximum life span really is, which is a challenge
in and of itself. Finally, humans dont fit well with that.
That makes it even more difficult. We actually live too
long even for our brains.
Velamoor:
loway.
Thank you for this presentation, Dr. Hol-
We actually live too long

even for our brains.
Deacon: Its slightly better. In fact, a number of people

have pursued it. Many organs scale to body size with
48
The Origins of Human Creativity

Presentation by Richard G. Klein, Ph.D.
Orrorin tugenensis, at least as far as I

can determine, is the oldest species
for which we have evidence of
bipedalism. Bipedalism is the
definition of humanity
Klein: This is going to be very different from what weve
done so far. Ive been very interested to listen to these

talks, and I appreciate the opportunity to come here.
But Im kind of like an auto mechanic: I dont have a lot
of theory in my head. What I do is go out and dig up
stuff and then I try to understand what it means.
Looking into the very deep past, I think its a kind
of storytelling. You have this fragmentary evidence.
You have some fossils human fossils and animal
bones that, perhaps, represent the food debris of the
peoples who are represented by fossils. You have the
artifacts, then you have to weave it together into some
kind of coherent story starting out whenever. [Referring to slide] This chart basically outlines the human
family tree, at least as I see it, back to about six million
years ago. Even this is a kind of story. This is a phylogeny or a family tree. Other people may disagree with
the specifics. But one thing that is true, even if you
regard this as storytelling, is that it is constrained by
evidence, and as we get new evidence, it will get closer
and closer to the truth.
I thought I would say a few words in general about
human evolution, and then what I want to focus on is
the origins of modern humans people who look and
act just like we do. As youll see and as most people
probably know, this is a very recent event. Bill Calvin
already spoke about modern humans originating or at
least spreading from Africa to the rest of the world only
about 50,000 years ago. Down here you have the oldest
species thats known to be bipedal. Bipedal is the definition of the human group. We used to say the human
family; strictly speaking, we should say the human
tribe, if you want to get into the zoological nomencla-
tural niceties. But this thing called Orrorin tugenensis,

at least as far as I can determine, is the oldest species
for which we have evidence of bipedalism. Bipedalism
is the definition of humanity, in the broad sense.
The general assumption is that chimps went one way;
our ancestors went another. But there could have been
more than one species six million years ago
that became bipedal.
There is a problem that we dont talk about very much.

We dont know that back at six million years ago,
roughly the time when people and chimps split, that,
in fact, there wasnt more than one ape species that
went off and became bipedal. The chimps obviously
didnt. They went in another direction. The general
assumption is that chimps went one way; our ancestors
went another. But there could have been more than
one species six million years ago that became bipedal.
For the moment, we have the one that, I think, right
now is probably the oldest for which theres a reasonable consensus on bipedalism, and then you see this
sort of bushy tree afterwards. When you move up to
here you can see these question marks these lines
are supposed to indicate ancestor-descendant relationships. Theyre not very well established; thats why
you have all those question marks. When you get up
to here this is roughly two million years ago the
picture becomes clearer and you dont see question
marks. If you were wondering about these dotted lines
as opposed to the black ones, the black bars indicate
demonstrated time spans for a species and the dotted
bars indicate what I think are probable time spans or
additional time spans beyond the black.
You see here a species called Homo ergaster. Some
people call it African Homo erectus. Thats the first
human species to leave Africa. It certainly was by 1.4 to
1.5 million years ago; some people would argue for 1.7.
After that, you get what I perceive as a kind of branch-
49

ing of the human family tree. You get a species, which

I call Homo erectus in the narrow sense thats strictly
a Far Eastern thing, as I perceive it that reached the
Far East maybe as much as 1.5 million years ago. I put
it here closer to 1.1 or 1.2. Im not going to talk about
Homo erectus any further in here. We dont know very
much about particularly the final stages of what we
might call the Homo erectus evolution. We dont know
very much the prehistory of the Far East in the last
100,000 to 200,000 years. It looks as if Homo erectus was replaced by people like us roughly 50,000 to
40,000 years ago, but the actual archaeological and
fossil evidence for that is pretty sparse.
If you stay on the West, the Homo ergaster thing,
as I see it, evolved into something called Homo heidelbergensis. I was looking at Ralph Holloways chart
of brain volumes a moment ago, and I see that he
perceives it just about the way I do. This is a species
that represents another out-of-Africa event. Homo
ergastus is obviously an out-of-Africa event the first
human species to spread to Eurasia. Homo heidelbergensis also spread from Africa, just to Europe, as far
as we can tell, and maybe as far east as India. Thats
partly based on fossils but the fossil record for Homo
heidelbergensis isnt all that impressive. Its much more
firmly based in artifacts.
About 600,000 to 700,000 years ago, there was a
dramatic change in the nature of artifacts. [Referring
to slide] You see here what are called Acheulian handaxes. By the way Ive drawn this chart, it looks as if
they span the interval between 1.65 million years ago
and 250,000 years ago, and thats the conventional
way of looking at it. But about 600,000 or 700,000
years ago, they changed character dramatically. They
got much prettier; they appeal much more aesthetically; they got thinner; they got more symmetrical;
many more flakes struck from them. I think its as big
a change in the archaeological record as were likely
to detect at 600,000 or 700,000 years. Whats interesting is that when that change takes place in Africa,
almost immediately those more sophisticated handaxes show up in Europe, presumably brought there by
Homo heidelbergensis from Africa.
50
Homo heidelbergensis is the last

shared ancestor for us, Homo sapiens,
and for the Neanderthals.
Homo heidelbergensis is the last shared ancestor for us,

Homo sapiens, and for the Neanderthals. The Neanderthals evolved in Europe. We can show that now
pretty clearly from the fossil record. We have Homo
heidelbergensis in Europe, say, 600,000 years ago,
and then we can see the progressive evolution of the
Neanderthals out of Homo heidelbergensis. We have
fossils that anticipate the Neanderthals by 400,000
years. We have the full-blown Neanderthals by, lets
say, 150,000.
Then in Africa, we have a different evolution
toward ourselves. Sometimes when you talk about
the origins of modern humans certainly I have
colleagues who believe that this is a chimera, that
we shouldnt discuss this subject, because all fossil
humans sort of look alike. In particular, a colleague
at the University of Michigan has argued that if you
took a Neanderthal heres a Neanderthal skull from
a place called La Ferrassie in France; this is dated to
about 70,000 years ago if you dress this person up
in a coat and tie and a fedora, or whatever, and put
him on the Manhattan subway, no one would notice.
I think that would only be true and Ralph can speak
to this, as Im sure hes taken the subway in New York
often enough if, like most subway riders in New
York, people are just minding their own business and
arent looking at each other. Otherwise, I think that
you would notice immediately that this was somebody very peculiar, not just in terms of the way he
looks. You can see the big brow ridges here, not much
in the way of forehead, but also in terms of the way
these people behaved. I think they would have been
very peculiar by our standards.
Now over here is an early modern human from
France, a young woman who died in France about
22,000 years ago. I hate to resort to anecdote here and
one-on-one comparisons, but I hope you can see the
great difference in form. She doesnt have anything
like the brow ridge. Now, this is probably a male and
this is a female, and there would be some difference
between the sexes. But weve had male skulls and they

dont have the structure of the brow ridges that Neanderthals do. You can see that she has a lot in the way
of forehead. Her skull is relatively short from fore to
rear, and high from, say, the ear aperture to the top.
His is very long from fore to rear, and relatively short
from here to here.
You can see that the face of this Neanderthal is
mounted way out in front of the rest of the skull, and
particularly the midline of the face, from between the
brow ridges or running from between just above the
nose down between the upper incisor teeth. If you
wanted to be a Neanderthal and your face was absolutely plastic, made of clay, what you would do is put
your fingers in your nose and pull out two inches and
everything would sweep back. The cheekbones would
sweep back. Hers come out this way and then go back,
which is, of course, the case in this room today.
its not difficult to distinguish Neanderthals from

modern humans We have no fossils, as far as Im
concerned, that indicate any kind of interbreeding.
My point here is that its not difficult to distinguish

Neanderthals from modern humans. We have a lot of
Neanderthal fossils. We have these modern human
fossils in Europe. Modern humans appear there relatively abruptly beginning about 40,000 years ago and
it looks as if they completely replaced the Neanderthals. We have no fossils, as far as Im concerned,
that indicate any kind of interbreeding. We now
have Neanderthal DNA nine different Neanderthals now mitochondrial DNA. Its interesting for
a lot of reasons. Theres relatively little variability, like
in ourselves. All living humans have, if you look at
mitochondrial DNA or other DNA, remarkably little
variability in the genes. It seems that that was true in
Neanderthals, too, but its quite different from ours.
If you look at the earliest modern humans in Europe,
theres a difficulty in extracting the mitochondrial
DNA from their bones because if you sneeze in the
vicinity of these bones, theyre going to have all kinds
of modern human sequences from you or me or whoever did the sneezing.
Its one thing to extract mitochondrial DNA from
the Neanderthals; its different enough so that you
know when you have it. But when mitochondrial DNA
has been extracted from specimens like that some of

them going back 30,000 years there are no Neanderthal sequences. You cant be sure the modern human
sequences youre looking at werent introduced by the
lab workers or excavators or whatever, but if there are
no Neanderthal sequences, then it, again, suggests that
there was probably no interbreeding.
Why did these two population groups fail to interact

either culturally or biologically?
Its a very interesting sort of replacement of the Neanderthals by modern humans in Europe. If you think
about European expansions in the age of exploration
Europeans going to Africa and Australia and the
Americas, and what have you wherever they went,
European culture became dominant. But there was a
lot of interbreeding. We sometimes say the Tasmanians are extinct, for example, but you can still detect
Tasmanian genes without any problem. You cant
detect Neanderthal genes, even in the earliest modern humans. So, that makes it a very different kind
of interaction between human populations of any we
have observed historically, and I think that requires a
very special kind of explanation. Why did these two
population groups fail to interact either culturally
and I can talk about that in more detail later or
biologically? Why was it such a complete replacement
without any interbreeding? When I say complete, if it
was at a very low level, say less than five percent, we
probably wouldnt be able to detect it, but right now
thats the level it would have to be at if there was interbreeding.
Now, where did modern humans come from? They
came from Africa. We have an abundant fossil record
to demonstrate this not, unfortunately, as abundant
as the record that demonstrates the evolution of the
Neanderthals, but we feel its still pretty good. Heres
a skull that is maybe as much as 160,000 years old.
Its certainly more than 50,000 years old. It comes
from Herto in Ethiopia. This is somebody who lived
in Ethiopia at the same time when the Neanderthals
were the sole occupants of Europe. This is essentially
a big, robust, modern skull. Theres nobody around
like this today, but you can see that the face is tucked
51

in underneath the fore part of the brain, as it is in us.

The brow ridges are very substantial and in that sense
you would have a hard time duplicating this skull
today. There are other features in terms of its general
robustness, which you could argue would be difficult
to duplicate today, but in terms of its overall form,
this is a modern human skull.
The best fossil evidence for the

African origin of modern humans
comes from Israel.
We have other modern human fossils from Africa

that date to more than 50,000 years ago. We also have
them on the southwest Asian periphery of Africa.
About 100,000 to 120,000 years ago, the Ethiopian
fauna, the African fauna, expanded just into Israel
southern Israel and with that expansion went
modern humans, or early, near-modern humans. In
fact, thats where theyre best known. The best fossil
evidence for the African origin of modern humans
comes from Israel.
So, we have a kind of paradox here. We have modern humans, at least in anatomical terms, and actually
I think that can be over-stressed. That skull we were
just looking at, I dont think that is a modern human,
in the sense of the kind of thing we see after 50,000
years ago. The same would be true of these Israeli
things that I mentioned a moment ago. For example,
if you take, as an important modern human anatomical feature, the chin, or the size of the brow ridges,
these things are enormously variable in these early
so-called modern Israelis of 90,000 to 100,000 to
120,000 years ago, so I would argue that those people
are not modern. What theyre telling us is that its to
Africa that we should look for our origins. Theyre not
our ancestors. Almost certainly, 100,000 years ago we
still had those people. They wouldnt look quite modern to us but theyre close.
52
If all we had were the artifacts from Africa, lets say at

100,000 years, and we didnt have the physical remains,
we might think that the people who lived in Africa
100,000 years ago were Neanderthals.
Now, we still have this problem: If you have the

appearance of people who are anatomically modern
or near-modern by 100,000 years ago, why did they
only disperse to Eurasia, as Ive already said, 50,000 to
40,000 years ago? What causes that gap? It could be
that they were already anatomically modern or nearmodern, depending on what term you want to use,
160,000 years ago. That would mean that you would
have 100,000 or 110,000 years between the appearance of modern anatomy and its spread from Africa
to Eurasia. I think the answer is fairly straightforward as to why it only spread 50,000 years ago. There
are a whole series of behavioral traits, which distinguish people before 50,000 years ago from people
afterwards, and it doesnt matter whether youre in
Africa or in Europe. If all we had were the artifacts
from Africa, lets say at 100,000 years, and we didnt
have the physical remains, we might think that the
people who lived in Africa 100,000 years ago were
Neanderthals. There is no difference between the
archaeological record of Africa up to 50,000 years
ago and the archaeological record of Europe. Theyre
essentially identical. Then, at roughly 50,000 years,
things change pretty dramatically.
Before 50,000 years ago, people made relatively
informal stone artifacts. What I mean by that is: If
you think of what archaeology is, what many people
think of it as being (and I kind of myself think this
way) you go out and you dig up a bunch of stuff, all
the artifacts, and you spread them all out on a table,
and then you want to put them in pigeonholes, categorize them, typologize with them. When I was a
student at the University of Bordeaux, learning to do
this with the Neanderthal artifacts, I found that I had
a really difficult time distinguishing between different
kinds of Neanderthal artifacts. The technical term is
Mousterian artifacts; you should separate the people
from their artifacts because, as I have already said, the
people who lived in Africa made the same artifacts as
the people in Europe 50,000 years ago, but they were
different physical types.

There was a professor at the University of Bordeaux

with whom I went to study who had identified 62 different kinds of Neanderthal stone artifacts. I couldnt
do it. I sat in his lab for a year. I think he thought
I was a lost cause. I could maybe recognize eight to
ten. There were all kinds of other pieces that he could
put into one of his 62 types that seemed to me to fall
between the cracks. We now know that what he was
doing, in fact, was taking stone artifacts that were in
different stages in the resharpening or refreshening of
a single piece and calling them different types. And
it looks as though the Neanderthals made only, say,
eight or ten different kinds of artifacts. Thats also true
of the people in Africa before 50,000 years ago.
After 50,000 years ago, it changes dramatically.
I went off to Russia to do my Ph.D. research. I was
trying to apply the same system to the categorization
of Neanderthal artifacts there, and I couldnt do it. I
thought, Im not going to get a Ph.D. out of this. I got so
frustrated; I thought I would look at the artifacts that
the people made afterwards, the Cro-Magnons, after
40,000 years who were in Russia. I could recognize
large numbers of different types without any problem
whatsoever. I had been trained to do this in France,
too, but it wasnt difficult. Ninety or a hundred different stone artifacts routinely I could recognize. I
became convinced then that the Neanderthals had a
different mindset than I did, or at least that the people
who succeeded them, who I assumed had the same
mindset as I did.
Now, what does all this mean? I dont know, but if
you think about carpentry, for example lets suppose
you had to build a doghouse on a weekend. You could
do this with just a hammer, perhaps. You could use
one of the prongs on the back as a screwdriver. You
could use the two of them together as a saw. Obviously,
you could use the hammer for what its supposed to
be used for. But you would rather have the saw and
the screwdriver in addition to the hammer, wouldnt
you? I think thats the kind of thing the Neanderthals
didnt have. They didnt make special-purpose tools
for special purposes, at least not to the extent that
their successors did. This was very inefficient.
It is only for the last 40,000 or 50,000 years that the

archaeological record looks like the archaeological
or material record of people who are
hunting and gathering historically.
People before 50,000 years ago rarely worked plastic

materials like bone, ivory, or shell into artifact types.
Now, why, I dont know. If you look at the archaeological record to see when it is that it comes to look like
the material record of historic hunter-gatherers, when
we see the easy distinction between stone tool types,
when we see the first bone and ivory shell artifacts,
and so forth, these are things that are recorded widely
among historic hunter-gatherers. Its about 40,000
to 50,000 years ago. It is only for the last 40,000 or
50,000 years that the archaeological record looks like
the archaeological or material record of people who
are hunting and gathering historically.
Before 50,000 years ago, people rarely, if ever, produced art. Their sites are remarkably unstructured.
You go out camping and you put your tent here and
youre filleting your fish over here and maybe you do
your laundry over here. Neanderthals didnt do that,
nor did anybody else before 50,000 years. It doesnt
matter where you put a hole in their sites, you get the
same thing. You get to the Cro-Magnons and it matters a lot. Their sites are much more structured. We
dont have any evidence for housing before 50,000
years ago. I think people had houses but they were
too flimsy to leave an archaeological trace. People
before 50,000 years ago did bury their dead both
the Neanderthals and these Israeli near-moderns of,
say, 100,000 years ago but theres no clear indication of ritual or ceremony. You could even argue that
it was just for hygiene. Youve got a dead friend on the
surface of the site and you want to stay on the site for
a little while, so you dig the smallest possible hole and
jam him in. No grave goods, nothing that indicates
ritual or ceremony.
Finally and this is what I studied particularly;
I think it is very important people before 50,000
years ago didnt fish routinely and they hunted relatively inefficiently or ineffectively. The sites I work at
in South Africa are all coastal sites. If you look down
into the water, you see the fish. If youre going to
get them and after 50,000 years ago, people did in
53

large numbers that automatically means a lot more

energy, a lot more calories, other things that you
can build; its going to mean more people. The same
is true with other aspects of hunting improvements
after 50,000 years ago.
What I think is the oldest, widely
accepted evidence for art is a
volcanic pebble from Berekhat Ram
on the Syrian-Israeli border.
Now, let me say a word or two about the art. This is

kind of a controversial thing. Not everybody agrees
with me that there is no art or, at least, art before
50,000 years ago isnt anticipating art afterwards.
What I think is the oldest, widely accepted evidence
for art is a volcanic pebble from Berekhat Ram on the
Syrian-Israeli border. The lines on it were incised by
stone tools. Its been examined microscopically and
there seems to be no question that somebody applied
the edge of a stone tool to it to make it into something
you could call a figurine. Maybe its a potato made
into a figurine. Its a very awkward looking thing.
[Referring to slide] Theres a figurine made by CroMagnons in Europe. That one happens to be 26,000
to 27,000 years ago, and theres no question about this
kind of thing. Is that art? The incised volcanic pebble
from Berekhat Ram is probably a quarter of a million
years old. Bererkhat Ram is a hand-ax site, so maybe
an Acheulean or hand-ax Picasso started on this and
showed it to other people, who said, What the devil
are you doing? What a stupid thing, and that caused
him to give up. Thats always a possibility, isnt it? I
tend to dismiss things like that because its unknowable whether thats what happened, but its possible.
Then there are the supposed beads, which Bill
Calvin spoke of earlier, from Blombos Cave. These
are actually tiny. They are shorter than most of our
thumbnails. They have holes in them and those holes
are supposed to have been made by sticking a bone
point in from the inside and pushing out through
the outside. You can do it that way, Ive tried it, but
most of the time you break the shell and you break the
bone point. So, I dont know. My work in South Africa
involves looking at bones and shells from a wide variety
of sites. I see these things everywhere. I had some sent
from South Africa so that I could experiment on them
54
and when they arrived in the mail, they had holes like
that. So, I dont know: Maybe these are beads; thats
the interpretation. You can see how irregular the holes
are. They dont show any polish from being strung on
strings. Its possible that they are beads.
One of the things that must be true about being modern
is that new, novel behaviors if they increase the
likelihood of reproduction and survival
should spread.
Theres one thing that I think is critical if youre evaluating this. There are other things from Blombos Cave
that are less compelling than this; this is the most
compelling evidence for art or jewelry. This site is one
of 25 in South Africa that could be expected to show
something like this of how people before 50,000 years
ago were behaving, making art or jewelry in a way
that anticipates later people. But this is the only one
that does. One of the things that must be true about
being modern is that new, novel behaviors if they
enhance fitness, that is, if they increase the likelihood of reproduction and survival those behaviors
should spread. I think they should. In historic times,
and certainly in late prehistoric times, when you have
a major innovation, it spreads pretty quickly, if it, in
fact, allows people to have more kids and their kids to
have more kids. Why has this remained restricted to
this particular site for 25,000 or 30,000 years?
Tooby: Richard, are you saying that you dont think these
are beads that they just happened spontaneously?
Klein: Well, I dont know. You could never prove that
theyre not beads. I could say all kinds of things about
the site; Ive been involved in it.
Tooby: But is there any strong, confirmatory evidence
that they are intentionally manufactured?
Klein:
Thats a matter of taste, and my taste is no.
Calvin: They are imported, and there are only adult

ones that are imported.
Klein: Thats true. First of all, these things grow on
estuarine grass. When we look in the record after
50,000 years ago, they appear and disappear in
archaeological sites. Its telling us about the history
of sea level and what happens to the estuaries. So,

its telling us that there was an estuary nearby where

more people could get this. Now, at least in late prehistoric times and historic times, people went out and
collected this estuarine grass and used it as bedding.
They brought it back. The very first site I dug in South
Africa was just full of this stuff. There was very nice
organic preservation, too. Now you ask: What about
the babies? No, the babies arent there. Its only the
adults because when you carry this stuff back in bales,
its only the biggest ones that would stick. So, I dont
know. Maybe these things are beads. Its quite possible, I suppose. But I would be much more compelled
to think that this is something that we should take
seriously if there were some other sites.
Prehistory is a matter of patterning If we had only
one site in all of Europe that had, say, cave paintings
in it, what would we think? That the people who made
those paintings were everywhere? Probably not.
Prehistory is a matter of patterning, if youre trying

to work out the story that I talked about before. The
first occurrence of something can be an accident; the
second occurrence can be a coincidence; if you get
three or more, you begin thinking that youve got a
pattern. The record is inherently noisy. I can tell you a
lot about this site. Im prepared to take it at face value,
and if you take it at face value, you still have to explain
why the other 24 sites in South Africa dont have stuff
like this. When you look at, say, the Cro-Magnons
in Europe after 40,000 years ago suppose youre
looking for beads; you have to have bone or shell
preservation if theres adequate preservation in the
site, they are everywhere. Sometimes the acidic conditions remove things. If we had only one site in all of
Europe that had, say, cave paintings in it, what would
we think? That the people who made those paintings
were everywhere? Probably not. But because we have
the cave paintings, and we have the art in the ground,
we say: Yes, thats something that people did everywhere after 40,000 years ago. But this is one site. If in
Europe in the Cro-Magnon era there was just one site,
I dont know what we would make of it, but I dont
think we would take it all that seriously. In South
Africa, this is being taken very seriously. These beads
are on display in the so-called Democracy X Exhibition at what used to be military headquarters for the
Western Cape region.

After 40,000 years ago, we dont have any problem
with identifying art. Theres a statuette from Vogelherd Cave in southwestern Germany; theres a very
famous painting from Chauvet Cave. These are about
32,000 years old, maybe a little bit older. You find it
everywhere, if the preservation conditions are adequate. You might wonder how these things got dated.
Now with specialized radio-carbon technology, you
can scrape off little bits, hardly do any damage, and
you can date them directly.
Varki:
What about Australia?
Klein: Australia is very relevant to this issue. There

was an argument about when people first reached
Australia. Maybe its a matter of convenience for me
but I think 40,000 to 45,000 years ago. Most Australian archeologists think 40,000 to 45,000 years ago.
Theres a modern human burial at a place called Lake
Mongo. Its an extended burial with all kinds of coloring matter spread all over it. The coloring matter had
to have been brought from 200 kilometers away. Its
the kind of thing that people were doing in Europe
after 40,000 years ago.
As I say, I think its only 40,000 or 45,000 at the
most. There is a date on it, a highly controversial date,
of about 60,000. The date is based on something
called electron spin resonance. Now I probably sound
cynical, but I think you could go buy a lottery ticket
at the drugstore that would give you just as good a
date. The method is just whatever you want it to be.
Some electron spin resonance dates must be right
because there are lots of them, and just by chance a
few have to be right. There are plenty of radio-carbon
dates for sites that are older than 40,000 years, but its
only at about 40,000 with radio-carbon that you get
evidence for human occupation, unless you take the
Mongo thing at face value.
Varki: You said that no one was fishing. What were
sea levels?
Klein: The site Im digging was right on the coast. In
fact, sea level would have been pretty much as it is
today. The coast would have been no more than two or
three kilometers away. People bring back vast numbers
of intertidal shells and seal bones. Ive worked on both
coasts. We have the oldest evidence for human exploitation of coastal resources: lots of shellfish; there is a
55

fur seal that lives on this coast today that they hunted
and collected in large numbers; there are penguins that
were brought back in large numbers; and then there are
coastline birds cormorants, gulls, and so on.
Varki: Was the sea level going up and down? What
was the range?
Calvin: A hundred meters is by 22,000 years ago.
Thats the maximum of water being taken out. In that
period, youve got all these fluctuations, but the ice
doesnt follow them very fast.
Klein: There are a couple things. Its not just sea level
fluctuation. Its the nature of the African topography.
If its very steep, sea level can drop 50 to 60 meters and
the coastline wont be more than.
Varki: My question is: Could there be sites along the
east African coast that are now below sea level?
People had full control over fire

before 50,000 years ago, or at least
its hard to imagine that they could
have built fires so routinely if they
didnt control them
Klein: Its possible. Im sure there are sites out here
[referring to slide] that are below sea level. This is
Table Bay and there are these early European shipwrecks out there, which are very valuable for their
cannons and things of this sort, so people dive on
these things. They come up with hand-axes on the
sea floor because there were times when sea level was
much lower. False Bay is only about 50 meters deep
and it just disappeared during most of the last glacial.
But I dont think sea level is playing a role in this. If
it is, it should affect everything that you collect at the
coast, not just the fish. In the sites that we have that
date from before 50,000 years ago, theyre commonly
just chock-full of shells and seal bones.
Klasies River Mouth has provided, again, early evidence for marine exploitation or coastal exploitation,
together with some fossils that are considered to be
modern or near-modern. Blombos Cave is closer to
Capetown. Im working right now at Ysterfontein.
I probably should have brought a map that could
have shown you all the South African sites older than
50,000 years. Theyre called Middle Stone Age sites.
The ones younger than that are called Later Stone Age
56
sites. Ive shown only the coastal ones here but there
are a lot of them up in here and they dont show what
Blombos does. They dont have all the things that are
said to be special that Blombos has.
[Referring to slide] This is the site, Ysterfontein,
that Im working now. It may not look like much.
This is a granite cliff here. This forms the base of what
was a rock shelter. When the road was widened here
going down to a small boat harbor, they cut into this
cliff face and truncated what was a rock shelter. Artifacts and shells started falling out and thats how we
discovered the site. This is about seven meters above
present sea level, so that means that it has to be older,
at least the occupation here has to be younger than
115,000 years 115,000 years ago, the sea would have
been lapping right at the base of this shelter. We have
a radio-carbon date from near the top of greater than
46,000 years.
[Referring to slides] Here are some of the shells, the
limpet shells in place. Down here is a fireplace. Theres
a whole stack of them in this site. Thats a common
thing, not only in Middle Stone Age sites in Africa
but in comparable or like-age sites in Europe. People
had full control over fire before 50,000 years ago, or
at least its hard to imagine that they could have built
fires so routinely if they didnt control them, if they
had to look for lightning strikes.
These are not chimpanzees, before 50,000 years ago.

Whatever they are, they are far more like us than they
are like chimpanzees.
You can go too far in talking about behavioral differences between people before and after 50,000 years
ago. I dont want to brutalize the Neanderthals and
their African contemporaries. They would be very
interesting to have around today. They would be so
like us and, yet, maybe we wouldnt want them in
Harvard or maybe they couldnt survive there. Its
a fortunate thing, in a way, that theyre not around
because it would present a real ethical dilemma.
These are not chimpanzees, before 50,000 years ago.
Whatever they are, they are far more like us than
they are like chimpanzees. The difficulty is trying to
understand in any kind of detail what the nature of
this behavioral evolution really was. We see differ-

ences but we also see lots of similarities. I mentioned

before the burial of the dead. We also have evidence,
at least for the Neanderthals, that they seem to have
been concerned about the old and the sick taking
care of people when they were debilitated. Yes, theyre
human; theyre just not modern humans. What that
means exactly, other than a list of archaeological
things that are present or absent, it is hard to say.
Some of what distinguishes sites before 50,000 years
ago from sites after, in terms of their animal content
I already mentioned sites before 50,000 years ago have
no fish bones to speak of. There are a few, usually very
large fish, tuna for example, which the people certainly
werent fishing for because theyre deep-water fish. But
they would get washed up every once in a while. What
might seem to us to be an unpleasant source of food,
to Stone Age hunter-gatherers, it was something they
could eat.
When you look at the Middle Stone Age sites,
before 50,000 years ago, penguins are very common.
Flying birds are much less common. After 50,000
years ago, the flying birds become much more common, and penguins become less common. Ill come
back to why that might be in a moment. The Middle
Stone Age sites are much richer in animal bones from
relatively docile species like eland, and much poorer
in bones from really dangerous species like buffaloes
and wild pigs. I think that whats going on here is that
there was a technological change about 50,000 years
ago. People came up with projectile weapons and also
with the technology needed to fish, and so we see this:
There is an artifactual correlate now reflected in the
animal remains in their sites.
We have no evidence before 50,000 years ago for
projectile points. Were sure that people made spear
points but these were mounted on the ends of wooden
shafts and they had to walk up right next
to a buffalo to kill it.
We have no evidence before 50,000 years ago for

projectile points. Were sure that people made spear
points but these were mounted on the ends of wooden
shafts and they had to walk up right next to a buffalo
to kill it. Not a good idea unless youre really, really
hungry. On the other hand, if you have something
you can throw or shoot from a distance, you might
not be all that successful but at least youre not going
to put yourself at such great physical risk. So, something happened: Technology changed and it allowed
this change in the animal remains we find in sites.
Now, when you look at Middle Stone Age sites right
before 50,000 years ago, you can tell what season of
the year the site was occupied. In this environment on
the South African coast, it would have been better to
be at the coast in the winter and inland in the summer.
Plant resources are abundant in the summer. Baby
seals, in particular, are abundant on the coast in the
winter. So, you should have a kind of seasonal round.
This is characteristic of all historic hunger-gatherers:
They recognize the different seasons when they could
exploit different resources in different places, and they
moved around. In the Middle Stone Age, it doesnt
look as though they did that. They kept coming back
to these coastal sites. I am not saying that they were
there straight through the year but they didnt focus
on them seasonally. In the Later Stone Age, they were
there at exactly the right time to harvest baby seals.
Theres a particular time of year between August and
October when you can do that.
Why might Middle Stone Age people have been
more restricted in their movements? Well, maybe they
lacked water containers. We have lots of evidence that
Later Stone Age people had them. They made these
canteens out of ostrich eggshells. We find them abundantly in Later Stone Age sites. We dont find them in
Middle Stone Age sites.
The final point is that you can look at certain animal remains tortoises and shellfish, in particular
and you can get an idea of the average size that was
being exploited. When you look at the Middle Stone
Age tortoises and shellfish, theyre absolutely huge.
[Referring to slides] This is a limpet, Patella granatina. Here are a bunch of Later Stone Age samples
and Middle Stone Age samples. You can see that the
Middle Stone Age ones are larger. When gray bars
dont overlap between samples, it means that theyre
statistically significantly different. Sometimes these
Middle Stone Age samples are relatively small so the
gray bar, which is an estimation error in the median,
is very wide. But the Middle Stone Age shells are very
much larger.
I took a bunch of students a long time ago to rocks
that are not being exploited today, and said, Go out
there, pick up as many of these shells as you can in
ten minutes. You can do this without doing any real
57

harm to the animals if youre careful about it and put

them right back down, but you can measure them at
the same time. You can see how big they are. Nobody
eats these things today so its not too hard to find
rocks where theyre not exploited. The Middle Stone
Age ones are much closer in size to those unexploited
ones than the Later Stone Age ones. To me, this is telling us that there was much less predation pressure
in Middle Stone Age because there were a lot fewer
people. That would make sense if they werent fishing
or hunting all that effectively.
You see the same thing with tortoises. The average size of the tortoises is much bigger in the Middle
Stone Age than it is in the Later Stone Age. That must
be a reflection of collection or predation pressure;
fewer people going out there and doing it.
If you accept that there was a change
in behavior 50,000 years ago theres
still the question of what was behind
this change in behavior.
So, something happened about 50,000 years ago that

dramatically increased human population size. If you
accept that there was a change in behavior 50,000
years ago, thats fine. I think most archaeologists would
accept that, but theres still the question of what was
behind this change in behavior. Thats a difficult one.
The most popular hypothesis is that there was population growth, maybe beginning 100,000 years ago in
Africa, and about 50,000 years ago some threshold
was crossed and people had to reorganize themselves.
There were so many of them that they just had to do
things differently and, in the process, they became
much more creative, much more innovative. I dont
know. Frankly, it doesnt make a lot of sense to me. In
any case, when you look at the actual archaeological
evidence for human population growth or shrinkage, if
you look at southern or northern Africa, its very hard
to find people 50,000 years ago. Something happened
about 60,000 years ago that depressed human populations and we only pick them up again about 30,000
years ago. Its only East Africa that seems to have been
continuously occupied between 60,000 and 30,000
years ago. It doesnt seem to have been that dense.
Then there is this other possibility that Terry mentioned, the hopeful monster idea: Maybe there
58
was a genetic change. This could explain why there

wasnt that interbreeding. Now, I dont think that
interbreeding between Neanderthals and these invading Africans would have been impossible. They had
only been separate maybe 500,000 or 600,000 years.
Thats probably not long enough for the gene pools
to have diverged sufficiently that interbreeding would
have been precluded, but I kind of think that one
side probably wasnt interested because the other side
was very strange in the way it behaved and couldnt
behave in a fully modern way. So, you get these CroMagnons showing up in Europe; they look at these
Neanderthals and they say, Oh no, were not interested. Too bad. Go away. There may have been even
some violence involved.
we can look into the genome and get some notion
from genes and trying to date them as to whether my
hypothesis that there was a genetic change 50,000 years
ago holds any water or not.
How do you go about testing for a genetic change

point mutation change in a regulatory gene or whatever
50,000 years ago? Well, I may be overly optimistic,
but I think that the only way you can do this is to look
into the human genome today and look for genes that
underlie language or underlie cognitive abilities, and
see whether there are some that changed roughly
50,000 years ago. The only one right now that sort of
points the way is something called FOXP2, which is a
gene that is implicated in language and speech. There
is an excess of rare alleles in this gene today, and it
has been shown that the version that most of us have
must have been fixed by a selective sweep. This happened sometime between last Tuesday and 200,000
years ago. Thats not very satisfying. I would like to say
that it happened 50,000 years ago. But at least it shows
that we can look into the genome and get some notion
from genes and trying to date them as to whether my
hypothesis that there was a genetic change 50,000
years ago holds any water or not.
Thats all I have to say. Thank you very much.

Im not sure why it would have to be

a single mutation as opposed to just
some episode of selection involving
some number of genes not
instantaneously
Pinker: I found this entire story very plausible, especially since, unlike other cases where there were
sudden or rapid technological changes that were not
due to genetic changes such as all the changes subsequent to development of agriculture, we can see
what the cumulative dependence was of certain innovations on earlier innovations. You couldnt have,
for example, cities until you had a food surplus, so
it makes sense that there could have been one magic
innovation that led to everything else, whereas the
kind of changes that youre talking about seem to be
very conceptually independent of one another, such
as art, on the one hand, and projectiles, on the other.
This much more strongly seems to suggest that the
people who created them had a kind of combinatorial
creative cognition that manifested itself in a number
of independent ways, which all seem to appear more
or less together, as opposed to one innovation that led
to all the others.
So, I find the whole thing plausible except for the
last point. Im not sure why it would have to be a single
mutation as opposed to just some episode of selection
involving some number of genes that may have taken
place not instantaneously but even over a period of
thousands or tens of thousands of years, perhaps not
even in the place where youre unearthing these artifacts and bones. This extra assumption that it had to
be a saltation or a hopeful monster seems to be less
plausible. It doesnt seem to be necessary for the rest
of your hypothesis.
Klein: Im looking for what I think is the simplest
explanation. Maybe its simplistic.
Pinker: Lets say FOXP2 was 50,000 years ago. That
itself would falsify that particular version of it because
we have every reason to believe that, say, the KE family who have the mutant form of the FOXP2 were not
like Middle Stone Age people or like the 90,000-yearold Israeli people. I suspect that there isnt going to
be one mutation that you would find in any modern
human group that would revert them to Middle Stone
Age or near anatomically modern humans.

Moreover, I think more recent findings suggest
that there are an awful lot of genes in humans that
seem to have been the subject of recent selection. I
dont know if its 50,000 or if its 200,000 years ago
but the genome center at the Brod Center at Harvard
and MIT is doing the same analysis done on FOXP2
group but on the entire genome to see which genes
seem to have been subject to recent selective sweeps.
The problem is that, unlike FOXP2, for the majority
of them we wont know what they do, at least not right
off the bat. But it seems to me that that would be more
genetically and evolutionarily plausible but it would
still fit in with the overall hypothesis of a recent evolutionary change.
Klein: Yes. First of all, I dont think that Neanderthals
had the defective version of FOXP2 that we see in the
KE family. Even if you take that 200,000-year date
as the basement for the appearance of the selective
sweep, thats already after the split of Neanderthals
and people. They didnt have it, so if this thing is
important in language and speech, that is already
interesting, I think.
Pinker: The Middle Stone Age people presumably
were not Neanderthal.
No. They might have it. Its possible. When I

talk about things like this, people say: Do you think
there was an agriculture gene? Thats what they hear
me saying, that there was a kind of creative gene.
Maybe its much more complex than that. I appreciate that. But the answer is no, I dont think there was
an agriculture gene. What you do today is you look
at historic hunter-gatherers and you look back to see
when they appear, not at agriculturists.
But you can look at it in another way. When did
agriculture originate? In Eastern Mediterranean, lets
say 11,000 years ago, and I suppose the most widely
accepted hypothesis now is that it was a response to
environmental change. These people had been hunting goats and sheep, and collecting wild barley and
wild wheat, and now the things they have been subsisting on for years are trying to get away. They know
about planting seeds and they know that if you take
a young animal and keep it by the fire, sometimes, at
least, theyll stay with you. So, now they get into that
in a big way and youve got agriculture.
Klein:
59

Well, we have the same kind of environmental change that happened, lets say 11,000 years ago,
many, many times before. Roughly the same thing
happened, lets say, 128,000 years ago but no agriculture. I just dont think the capacity to do it was
there. I think whatever was involved in inventing
something like agriculture was a change 40,000 years
ago. Whatever you want to say that change was, that
was the basis for it and everything that follows. I dont
believe that there is an industrial revolution gene or a
computer gene obviously thats not right.
You can look at it a lot of different ways, because
you can take somebody who was born in the Australian outback, an Aboriginal, and, if you get them early
enough, you bring them to Bellevue, WA, or Cambridge, MA, or whatever, they are going to become
just like anybody else there, in terms of speaking English without an accent, if theyre brought early enough;
theyre going to have the same capacity to become
computer programmers, or whatever. To me, that
rules out the possibility that there are special genes
for agriculture or whatever since hunter-gatherers
can become agriculturists or computer programmers
without any problem.
Australia to Europe that fast. When you look at most

of the molecular clock estimates, theyre like FOXP2.
Thats 200,000 plus or minus 200,000. Thats what you
were saying, effectively. Many of the other clock estimates are like 100,000, 150,000 everything seems
to go back a little bit further. The other possibility
is that there was a small group isolated somewhere
we havent found that particular region of Africa yet
and that they were developing separately. They went
through these types of selective sweeps with multiple
selection, and then they emerged with their new technologies and their abilities and their culture.
My question is: Are you saying that they did not
breed with the Israelis of 100,000 years ago? They
probably didnt. So, that could be a genetic or cultural thing. I favor the notion of not a specific event
at exactly this point or a group that emerged earlier but took a long time to manifest themselves in
the archaeological record. That fits the molecular data
better, because there are no genes that seem to clock
back to.
Everything you say could be true but whatever the genetic change is for clearly not agriculture
or computer programming it still could be 200 or
500 genes as opposed to one gene.
Varki:
Pinker:
Klein: Sure. The problem with that is that if thats true,

we may not know for a very long time. I would like to
think that Im right, but more importantly, I would
like to think that somebody is and well know.
Pinker: Yes. We could know if this scan of the genome
for genes showing a recent history of selection could
easily turn up in fact, I think they already have
turned up a couple hundred genes that seem to show
signs of recent selection. They dont know what theyre
for but they can find out.
To pick up from what Steves saying, I tend to

favor the idea that a bunch of different genes were
selected for, but in terms of the timing, 50,000 is a
time that youre picking because thats when you see
this apparent explosion of artifacts. But if this story of
an effective population size of 10,000 or less is true,
that population of 10,000 couldnt have suddenly
exploded to the extent of populating everything from
Varki:
60
Klein: The latest estimates on the Y chromosome are

60,000.
Right. Thats the narrowest one.
Klein: Yes. Mitochondrial DNA is mostly 100,000 to

150,000 but you would expect that, given its different
mode of inheritance. If youre just looking at genetic
diversity without worrying about which genes youre
particularly concerned with and what their function
is, I think 50,000 to 60,000 is perfectly reasonable.
Varki: Just on genetic diversity, most genes tend to go
back on the clock a little further.
Sure, and some are going to go back much,

much further. Every gene is going to have its own history.
Klein:
Pinker: Given the size of the error bars, do we actually
know that they were not 50,000 years ago?
Varki: No. The error bars are big, but you dont see a
lot of means that are 30,000 40,000 50,000. You
tend to see things at 100,000 150,000 200,000.
Klein:
Certainly for mitochondrial DNA.

Its an extraordinarily strong,

surprising, almost astonishing claim
and, therefore, Im systematically open
to other explanations
Tooby: The total replacement of the European population is extremely puzzling from a genetic perspective.
If you look at other comparable mammals, they can
fertilely interbreed, or many of them, even though
theyve been evolutionarily separated for a million
years. The idea that human populations that would
have been separated for 100,000 years, or something
like that, when they met couldnt have interbred is an
extremely strong claim against the norm. Ive always
been skeptical.
You also mentioned that there are many people
who say that maybe there was a little interbreeding,
but literally thats like being a little bit pregnant. If
there is any interbreeding at all, then its a very different selective model where the new genes are now in
new individuals and theyre subject to selection. Its a
massive infusion of mutations into this other population, and presumably if theyre being selected for, its
a better design thats leading to their replacement and
they can also be mobilized in this other population.
Anyway, I am working that out. Its an extraordinarily
strong, surprising, almost astonishing claim and, therefore, Im systematically open to other explanations for
the genetic data that appeared to show it. Secondly, its
extremely unlikely that a single gene change would
render two populations mutually interfertile.
I cant imagine that interbreeding

was precluded by genetic differences,
given the short time they were
separate. Its the dog-wolf thing.
Klein: Oh, I think they were interfertile. I cant imagine
that interbreeding was precluded by genetic differences, given the short time they were separate. Its
the dog-wolf thing. When I was a graduate student,
I used to take care of dogs and wolves in a laboratory on the University of Chicago campus. When
female wolves came into estrus, the male wolves were
really interested. When a female dog came into estrus,
sometimes they were interested, and sometimes they

werent. But we know that when there was copulation,
it often resulted in infertile offspring.
So, theres kind of an intermediate stage in this
case, I would say theres just a behavioral gulf. The
Cro-Magnons just werent interested. When you look
at these archaeological sites, there are Neanderthal
layers, and smack on top of them are the Cro-Magnon
layers. We can argue about the date because its right
at the edge of the radio-carbon dating range, but its
about 35,000 years ago. If you look at the cultural
sequences, its the same from the Czech Republic
across to France. Something very dramatic happened,
and its not like anything historic. I agree that its an
unusual claim.
Tooby: If there was a replacement then for that reason
alone, much less the other reasons you might think
of, its much more likely the kind of model that Steve
was suggesting, where theres quite intense selection
that leads to 100 or 200 different substitutions. You
have a speciation event where theres enough selection such that the groups remained distinct and one
replaces the other. Thats a lot of selection at a lot of
loci for a lot of things. Thats not a single FOXP2 or
something like that.
Calvin: There are perfectly good examples of how you
can lose a population for example, what happened
to the Native Americans when European viruses
arrived. If the people who came into Europe from
around eastern Mediterranean and central Asia were
bringing with them a lot of viruses picked up by association with animals that the Neanderthals had no
immunity to, you would expect the 90 percent fatality
rates that we had with the Native Americans without
any physical contact between the groups at all.
Tooby: These processes are intense, and there is a
big drop-back in the population. With the North
American Indians, it wasnt a replacement; it was
hybridization.
61

the mitochondrial genome is

inherited as a whole, and youre not
going to get any kind of admixture.
Deacon: Im always troubled by discussion of the
Neanderthal mitochondrial DNA when people talk
about it as though one could get admixture. Of course,
the mitochondrial genome is inherited as a whole,
and youre not going to get any kind of admixture.
If we found a Neanderthal-looking skeleton that had
any kind of linkage with an anatomically modern, it
would be within our group; it would not be a little
bit of something or other. One of the problems with
that is that, of course, mitochondrial DNA is inherited in one direction. I can easily imagine especially a
dominant group in which males are mating into one
group but not in the other direction. It makes it really
difficult to sort this out because were not probably
going to get any of the other DNA evidence. All we
can hope is that if it happened, one set of mitochondrial DNA crossed over.
If thats the case, if thats all our evidence, we dont
really have good evidence that it didnt go the other way,
that we didnt get genes floating. Its almost impossible
to do that, especially if theres strong linkage between
some of the traits that show up in the fossils. It would
be very hard to pick them out. What Im saying is that
on that question, I think, even though weve got the
data, what it tells us is when the group split but it probably doesnt tell us much about the interbreeding story,
and I think thats a real problem.
Klein: It would have to be modern human females
and Neanderthal males. What are the chances of that
happening? There might be a chance for that. We now
have nine Neanderthal mtDNA sequences. If we get
100, eventually, and every Neanderthal looks different
from every modern human and all these early modern humans failed to provide mitochondrial DNA
sequences yes, there are other explanations but it
seems to me theyre terribly uneconomic because of
the way mitochondrial DNA is inherited. Admittedly,
I think its a stretch. You could do it, if you really want
to put mitochondrial DNA evidence away.
Deacon: One other thing: Weve been talking about lots
62
of genes changing, and, of course, the word selection

comes up. The co-assortment story can happen very
fast. In Waddingtons story, he created co-assortment in
30 generations of quite a number of genes. Even hundreds of genes could be co-assorted rapidly if theyre
already in the population. The combinatorial effect is
not necessarily dependent on a mutation effect.
Klein: Dont you think the problem is to figure out
what actually happened? We can imagine lots of
things. I enjoyed your presentation, but we have the
example of the finches; we have the fruit flies; and we
see things happening there that you could imagine
happened in human evolution, but did they? And
how would we go about trying to find that out?
The internal curvature of the prefrontal

lobe in the Neanderthals is exactly the
same as it is in modern Homo sapiens.
Holloway: I think that if I dressed up Australian
Aborigines and put them on the subway, I might
notice them quite well. Neanderthals, incidentally,
though they look as though they have a sloping forehead, really dont have a sloping forehead. The internal
curvature of the prefrontal lobe in the Neanderthals is
exactly the same as it is in modern Homo sapiens, as
Bookstein has shown.
One of the questions I have, though, is on the logic
of using sophistication of stone tools, and so forth,
to make these kinds of jumps about behavior and
selection. What would you do with the Clovis people?
What is the tool kit of the Clovis people that populated the New World 12,000 to 15,000 years ago, in
terms of stone tool technology?
Klein: Its complicated. You have to take a kind of
multifaceted approach to the understanding of the
archaeological record. Clovis people made these wonderful fluted points, mounted on the ends of spears,
and they took small blades out of the base on either
side of the point, which presumably made it easier
to insert it in the end of a wooden spear. The spear
probably was hurled with a spear thrower. We have
the spear throwers. We have other wonderful bone
artifacts that they made that look just like ones that
people were making in Europe.

Holloway: You dont have any art; you dont have any
burials; you dont have any red ochre.
We do have some burials. You can do much

better than that: What about the Tasmanians at the
time of historic contact? These are people who arguably had the most impoverished material culture on
the planet. Interestingly, if you go back 19,000 years
in Tasmania they were doing much better.
Klein:
Holloway: I was going to add the Australian Aborigines because their social systems have wracked modern
anthropological brains despite some of the most miserable stone tools that you have ever found.
the weather changes that took place there really had

tremendous effects on the overall bodily proportions
of Neanderthals versus Cro-Magnons. Neanderthals,
basically, were in forest kinds of conditions, whereas
the Cro-Magnons were out in more open kinds of
territories. If the boreal elements retreat, and you
have very small population sizes to boot, you can lose
Neanderthal that way as well.
It seems to me that it would be a remarkable coincidence
to have the Neanderthals disappear just as modern
humans were invading Europe, if climate
was the reason.
Bill [Calvin] showed his slide with the Greenland ice sheet fluctuations in temperature, which
were pretty dramatic. Its been argued that those
things caused the Neanderthals to become extinct.
Some of those fluctuations, one way or the other,
occurred within a human lifetime. Its hard to imagine people adjusting, but they continued after the
Cro-Magnons appeared and if they had an effect on
the Cro-Magnons, its not clear that it was different
from the effect it had on the Neanderthals. It all looks
the same.
Most of what we call Neanderthal sites are as much
carnivore sites, places where cave bears were living, as
they were human-occupation sites. Thats true of European sites before 40,000 years ago. Then suddenly at
40,000 years you get these modern humans appearing. The cave bear becomes extinct and the sites are
just chock-full of stuff. You no longer get any indication that the people are competing with carnivores for
their living sites. Something very dramatic happened
and it might be that the climate is somehow implicated, but then why 40,000 years ago just at the time
when modern humans appeared? Those rapid fluctuations in temperature were occurring before that.
They had a particular impact on the North Atlantic
region. It seems to me that it would be a remarkable
coincidence to have the Neanderthals disappear just
as modern humans were invading Europe, if climate
was the reason.
Klein:
Why is it such an impoverished

stone artifact record?
Klein: Its difficult. Definitely where people are

recorded historically, some prehistorically, who dont
fit into what I call the post-50,000-year picture, they
look more like people living in Australia. The kinds of
stone artifacts that people were making 40,000 years
ago look like the ones people were making in Africa
2,000,000 years ago. Why is it such an impoverished
stone artifact record? In all other respects, we had
the boomerang back there at 15,000 years. We have
other things going back before that. For whatever reasons, when you look at the stone technology, it looks
remarkably primitive.
Before 40,000 years ago, everything was sort of
the same wherever you look. After 40,000 years ago
there was a lot of variation. Some of that variation
does look like what was happening before 40,000 but
a lot of it is quite different. I think what thats telling us is that before 40,000 years ago were dealing
mainly with a difference in the genes thats just my
perspective and after 40,000 years ago were looking
at history, environment, things of that sort, leading to
differences in material culture.
The recent BBC Horizon program on

Neanderthals did a tremendous job at looking at the
whole skeleton. One of the hypotheses that came out
of that is that the recession of the glaciers or the
advance of the glaciers, however you want to look at
Holloway:
Holloway: I would have no doubt that they were outcompeted by modern Homo sapiens. I think thats
clear, but the reasons why they were out-competed
63

are not clear. There is no evidence that it was the brain

that failed them.
This is a conference largely about the brain,
so Im looking at what the brain has produced and
then inferring back to the brain or back to biology.
Theres a lot of circularity in that and you can argue
that we have to actually know something about the
brain. Thats why I got into the genome data, but the
archaeology itself, the behavior, is not a proper proxy
for the biological change.
Klein:
Varki: I have to agree with Terry that if you get a

Neanderthal skeleton and you get a modern human
mitochondrial DNA, you have to discard that because
you dont know about contamination. There could be
an ascertainment bias. So, the number we need to
know is: If you have nine Neanderthal mitochondrial
preparations that are completely different, how many
times would we also find human? At the moment,
anyway, its nine to none, but, of course, negative
results dont get reported.
The second point is in regard to the interbreeding,
if it occurred, and it might well have occurred. Were
not considering the possibility of social isolation.
Look at what happened in North America. Theres
extensive breeding between Africans and Europeans, and there was almost a complete exclusion of
64
those peoples that had any contamination cultural

appearance or whatever of one group by the other
group. So if, in fact, by some historical process, the
Civil War had not occurred and that whole group
had been wiped out, you would have said: There is no
evidence for interbreeding. But its purely a cultural
isolation mechanism. So, I dont see why it could not
have been a cultural isolation mechanism.
Tooby: There is some recent evidence that in modern
human mitochondria, there are some specializations
for cold weather areas and that theres a different tradeoff from the mitochondria of keeping warm and muscle
strength. So, its not at all implausible that Neanderthals would look very much like a periglacial adapted
subspecies. That kind of mitochondria might disappear
with the ending of the ice age, so to base the notion of
genetic contact or admixture across very broad classes
of human subpopulations based on just Neanderthal
mitochondria seems very weak evidence to me.
Klein: Its very controversial as to whether mitochondria are under selection. Doug Wallace at Irvine has
probably been the major proponent. I just dont know.
I dont think that its widely accepted.
Velamoor:
Thank you, Dr. Klein.
Can We Change Human Nature?

Presentation by Steven Pinker, Ph.D.
I often get the following question

Is human nature going to change?
Are we going to change it ourselves?
Pinker: Im going to give part of a talk that Ive given a
couple of times called The Past, Present, and Future
of Human Nature, but in deference to the name
of this foundation, Im going to concentrate on the
future.
When I lecture about human nature, I often get
the following question, and I bet many people in this
room get it as well: Is human nature going to change?
Or even more specifically: Are we going to change it
ourselves? There are a number of ways of answering
this question. How could we change human nature?
Well, there have been a number of attempts in the
20th century. There was coercive social engineering,
such as the idea of the New Socialist Man tried out in
Stalinist Russia and in Maoist China, based on something like a blank slate that since human nature is
a function of the environment, you change the environment and you could change human nature. I think
the results of that experiment are well known and not
something we want to replicate.
Theres eugenics, where the actual genome would
be changed, either through negative eugenics, namely,
sterilization or even genocide, or positive eugenics,
government subsidies for high-IQ people to have
more children or people with a college education, as
we see in Singapore. I think most people in most parts
of the world would not be terribly receptive to that
means of changing human nature either at this point
in history.
What Im going to talk about is a third way in
which human nature could change, namely, voluntary generic engineering, so-called designer babies
or genetic enhancement, something weve heard a lot
about in the last five or ten years. Its ethically controversial. There have been a number of jeremiads
against it from Francis Fukuyama, Michael Sandel,
Leon Kass, and other bioethicists. But there also have
been authors welcoming it: Gregory Stock, a past winner of the Kistler Book Award, in fact, and others.
But the common assumption among people who
dread designer babies and people who welcome them
is that it is inevitable, that if current progress in genetics continues, designer babies are around the corner,
leading also, at least among the people who think this
is a bad idea, to the idea that we should intervene and
regulate now, pass laws against genetic enhancement,
perhaps curtail research in human reproductive physiology, in human genetics, and genetic engineering in
general, because left to its own devices it would lead to
germline enhancement, and since thats such a terrible
thing, we had better stop it in its tracks right now.
genetic enhancement of human nature is not

inevitable. In fact, I think its highly unlikely
in our lifetimes.
Im going to challenge the common assumption underlying both the fans and critics of designer babies and
suggest that the genetic enhancement of human nature
is not inevitable. In fact, I think its highly unlikely
in our lifetimes. Its foolish to say that anything will
never happen but one could look at the current state
of the technology and make some guesses. One can
certainly challenge the idea that something is inevitable. Why? Just to give you a preview: the fallibility
of predictions about complex technology in general,
impediments from the science of behavioral genetics,
and impediments from human nature itself.
Let me start off with some of the limitations of predictions about our inevitable future. Heres a quote,
Fifty years hence we shall escape the absurdity of
65

growing a whole chicken in order to eat the breast or

wing by growing these parts separately under a suitable medium. That was a prediction from Winston
Churchill in 1932. Fifty years would have been in 1982
but were still growing the whole chicken. Nuclearpowered vacuum cleaners will probably be a reality
within ten years, said Alex Lewyt in 1955. He had a
company that manufactured vacuum cleaners. These
and many, many others can be found in a delightful book called The Experts Speak by Victor Navasky
and Christopher Cerf [subtitle: The Definitive Compendium of Authoritative Misinformation, Random
House, 1990], which ought to be a humbling experience for anyone who talks about whats inevitable.
Here are a few others. These I remember from
my childhood; it was confidently predicted that they
would be in place in 1980, 1990 2000 certainly:
domed cities that would control the weather; commuting by jet pack remember that? Mile-high buildings
you crowd an entire city into one apartment building. Artificial organs this is probably closer to fact
than anything else but would anyone have predicted
around the time of the first heart transplant, which I
think was 1966, that the year 2005 would come and
there would be no artificial heart, let alone an internal
artificial kidney or an artificial eyeball?
Routine consumer space flight remember the
Pan American flight to the Moon in the movie 2001:
A Space Odyssey? Maybe its because PanAm went out
of business. Interactive television where you would
choose the ending to your sitcom or drama; people
would decide on their remote control how they wanted
the plot to end. The paperless office remember that
from the early 1980s? Did any of you know what the
word ream meant before you got a computer? The
Internet refrigerator this is only five years old: We
were all going to have these, where the refrigerator
would have an Internet connection. When you were
running low on milk, a sensor would detect that, call
up the supermarket so you would get milk delivered.
Then, of course, the dot.com revolution and the end
of bricks-and-mortar retail. There werent going to be
any stores anymore.
Why do predictions so often go wrong, wildly
wrong? One of them is just the fallible human habit
of linear extrapolation of progress, the so-called fallacy of climbing trees to get to the Moon, the failure
of many futurologists to consider the costs as well as
66
the benefits of new technology, whereas the actual

users consider both the benefits and the costs. Just to
take one example, the Internet refrigerator. It would
be nice not to run out of milk but, on the other hand,
do you really want to have to reboot your refrigerator
or get on the helpline to Microsoft when its freezing
all of your food, to be put on hold for 47 minutes, or
when you go on vacation, to have to go to the manual
to try to figure out how to disable the function that
automatically orders the milk? The costs given the
trends in user interfaces with complex technology
would far outweigh any benefit.
Also, futurology itself has an incentive structure.
You get attention both for announcing a brave new
world of enhanced technology, but also for being the
prophet, the Jeremiah, the person who warns about
an impending catastrophe. There have been a number
of bestsellers for example, Bill Joy had a manifesto
of how we had better stop technology now, otherwise
were going to be engulfed in gray goo as the nanobots
take over. Whereas if you were to say, Well, the future
probably in most respects is going to be an awful lot
like the present except for a few respects that no one
can predict right now, then youre unlikely to get much
notice in Technology Review or Wired magazine.
If I were to identify one Achilles heel of
genetic enhancement, it would be the
rarity of single genes with consistent
beneficial psychological effects.
A second reason for skepticism is that what we know

about behavioral genetics and neural development
throws some cold water on the idea of genetically
enhanced humans. If I were to identify one Achilles
heel of genetic enhancement, it would be the rarity of
single genes with consistent beneficial psychological
effects. That is, when you read about the inevitability
of designer babies, you always hear: What yuppie parent could resist the temptation of inserting the gene for
musical talent into his child? The question is: Is there
going to be a gene for musical talent? Here, we run up
against an enormous paradox in current behavioral
genetics, which is that we know that tens of thousands
of genes working together have a large effect on the
mind. We know that from twin and adoption studies, the most dramatic examples being the uncanny

similarities among identical twins separated at birth.

Theres no question that the genes have a substantial
effect on individual differences both between normal and pathological humans and within the normal
range, but we found few or no single genes that have
a consistent effect on the mind. Even though there is
no doubt, except maybe among some members of the
Harvard faculty, that schizophrenia, autism, OCD,
and so on, have an important genetic component,
no one has found the schizophrenia gene, the autism
gene, the OCD gene, and so on, let alone genes for
musical talent or likeability. I say let alone because
a priori, you would be much more likely to expect a
single gene, hypothetically, that could cause schizophrenia than something like musical talent because
any complex system can be damaged by a single hit,
whereas its harder to imagine a single hit that would
suddenly give a complex system a new talent.
So, if we cant even find a single gene behind defects
like autism and schizophrenia, its even less likely that
well find them for talents like music, intelligence, and
so on. There have been reports of single-gene discoveries for things like bipolar illness, sexual orientation,
and higher IQ, but they have a notorious history of
not replicating when larger samples are examined.
Now, this isnt an irresolvable paradox because we
know, just based on our knowledge of developmental
biology, that the human brain is not a bag of traits
with one gene for each trait. We know that neural
development is staggeringly complex with many genes
interacting in complex feedback loops. We know that
the effects of genes are often nonadditive. We know
that the pattern of expression of genes is as important
as which genes are present. The pattern of expression
can be affected by the products of other genes, by
other aspects of the extracellular environment, by the
environment outside the organism having an indirect
effect through messenger molecules and other cues.
So, dont hold your breath for the musical talent gene
to be discovered any time soon, if ever.
An analogy would be: We certainly know that the
content of computer software determines how easy
the program is to use, but its not as if theres going to
be one line of code that implements user friendliness.
Its going to be distributed over the structure of the
entire program.
Even if we could insert all 22,000 genes, our

predictability would be on the order of 50 percent.
There are some other genetic impediments to genetic

enhancement and one of them is an upper bound
on how much we can hope to enhance our children,
imposed by the probabilistic effect of all the genes.
This is a remarkable statistic that people almost never
call attention to: You all know that monozygotic twins
reared apart are highly correlated, but monozygotic
twins reared together are not perfectly correlated,
nowhere near perfectly correlated. You often get correlations on the range of .5. Thats really, really high.
Thats much higher than zero, but on the other hand,
its much, much less than 1.0, which is significant
given that these are two kids who have pretty much
identical genomes. There may be mutations that arose
after the split of the zygote, but theyre a small fraction
of the genome. They have the same parents, the same
home, the same neighborhood, same school, same
peer group, same number of TVs in the house, and
so on. Yet, one of them can be gay and the other one
can be straight; one of them can be schizophrenic, the
other one not; one of them can be more intelligent
than the other. Again, theyre much more likely to be
correlated than ordinary siblings, let alone strangers,
but theyre far from perfectly correlated, even given
identical genes and virtually identical environments.
So, that puts an upper bound on the best that we
could do. Even if we could insert all 22,000 genes, our
predictability would be on the order of 50 percent.
There is also the phenomenon of pleiotropy, where one

gene has multiple effects or dominance, where the effect
of a gene can depend on the complementary allele.
There is also the phenomenon of pleiotropy, where

one gene has multiple effects or dominance, where
the effect of a gene can depend on the complementary allele. Most genes probably have some degree of
pleiotropy, and what evolution selects for is the best
compromise, not necessarily a gene that only has a
67

desirable trait. We know of some examples pertaining

to the traits that would be targets of genetic enhancement. The famous Doogie Howser mice, reported
about six years ago, that had extra NMDA receptors
knocked into them, which enhanced their learning
and retention of how to find a submerged platform
in a water maze, also turned out to be hypersensitive
to inflammatory pain. Thats probably not a combination that anyone would want to insert into his/her
unborn children.
I have heard, at least informally,
that most genes that are associated
with higher IQ are also associated
with some enhanced susceptibility to
various neurological disorders.
Ive read that there is a condition called torsion dystonia caused by a single gene that on average gives
a 10-point boost in IQ but also a 10 percent chance
of being confined to a wheelchair with uncontrollable
muscle spasms. There isnt a lot published on this but
I have heard, at least informally, that most genes that
are associated with higher IQ are also associated with
some enhanced susceptibility to various neurological
disorders.
This combines with another problem, namely, the
impediments to actually doing the research in this area
that would get us from here to there. How could one
try out possible genetic enhancements on an experimental basis, given the risk of a deformed child? Can
anyone even imagine a path toward common use of
genetic enhancement, given that the research is pretty
much undoable?
Another genetic impediment is that most traits
are desirable at intermediate values. Wallis Simpson
famously said you cant be too rich or too thin, but
most traits arent like that. Maybe you cant be too
smart but lets take something like self-confidence
or assertiveness. You dont want a shrinking violet
for your child, but you dont want Vlad the Impaler
either. You want some intermediate level of assertiveness or aggressiveness. Likewise, conscientiousness:
You dont want a psychopath for a child, but you also
dont want children who are so self-abnegating that
they cant do anything in their own interests. You
dont want a child who is completely averse to taking
a risk, who just cowers under a desk the whole time,
68
but you dont want a candidate for the so-called Darwin Awards either.
So, lets say that you had a gene, even hypothetically,
that would enhance risk-taking as a personality trait.
What would be desirable in your child would depend
on what the other 19,999 genes are doing. That is, are
they placing your child below the mean or above the
mean or at the mean? Until we know what all of the
genes are doing, its not clear that any gene that simply
increments a trait is going to be desirable.
The third part is that I think there may be strong
impediments in human nature to enhancing human
nature. In parental psychology, its always pointed out
in these discussions that parents, especially in this
culture of young, urban professionals, would stop at
nothing to help their children. If they drive them to
umpteen lessons after every day of school, arrange
play dates, play Mozart to their pregnant bellies, play
Baby Einstein videos, what would stop them from
inserting genes that would enhance IQ, musical talent, tennis skill, and so on? Well, its true that there
is a strong desire to help children, but there is also, I
would think, a much stronger aversion to harm children and that is a force pulling in the other direction,
given that the effects of genetic enhancement would
not be certain.
If its a hard sell to get people to accept
genetically modified soybeans, it might be
an even harder sell to get them to accept
genetically modified children.
We also have intuitions about contamination and

naturalness that might play a role here. We see this
in resistance to technologies that, on strict cost/benefit grounds, would seem to be completely desirable
but against which there are very strong qualms, such
as genetically enhanced foods. Even though in this
country they are unexceptionable, in Europe theyve
made no inroads at all. One could argue that nuclear
power has a similar status. Nuclear power is probably
the only practicable energy technology that wont
contribute to global warming, but there hasnt been
a new nuclear power plant built in this country in
30-odd years. These come from intuitions you can
argue about how reasonable they are that there is a
pure state of affairs and that there is a process of con-

tamination or pollution, such as genes inserted into

your tomatoes. If its a hard sell to get people to accept
genetically modified soybeans, it might be an even
harder sell to get them to accept genetically modified
children.
Then theres another practical problem that probably all technologies of genetic enhancement would
require some form of in vitro fertilization, which is
certainly a less desirable method of creating a baby
than the old-fashioned one. So, the parents choice is
not, as is often said in these discussions: Would you
opt for a procedure that would give you a happier and
more talented child? Rather, it is: Would you opt for
a traumatic and expensive procedure that might give
you a slightly happier, more talented child; might give
you a less happy, less talented child; might give you
a deformed child; and probably would do nothing?
For human nature to change, for us to actually take
control of our biological evolution, not just a few but
billions of people would have to answer yes to that
question, and I dont think thats obvious at all.
To sum up, I think that changing human nature
by voluntary genetic enhancement is not inevitable
because of the complexity of neural development
and the rarity or absence of single genes with large,
consistent, beneficial effects, because of the tradeoffs of the risks and benefits of enhancement, both
by researchers in doing this research ethically and by
parents intuitions of what is an unacceptable thing to
do to your child.
bioethics policies should acknowledge the frailty of
long-term technological predictions; should be based on
fact, not fantasy; and, if predicated on the inevitability
of genetic enhancement, should be rethought.
I want to be clear: Im not arguing that genetic

enhancement will never happen, just because no one
should argue that anything will never happen. Rather,
I think that bioethics policies should acknowledge the
frailty of long-term technological predictions; should
be based on fact, not fantasy; and, if predicated on
the inevitability of genetic enhancement, should be
rethought.
Another way of putting this is that this is not a pessimistic assessment, one that would be skeptical or
even negative about effects to alter our future quite
the contrary. I think that the biggest threat to beneficial technological change is the mindset that would
say that as soon as we start on that path, there will be
a juggernaut, a runaway freight train that will lead us
to horrific ends, so we had better stop it now. We had
better stop the runaway freight train before it gains
momentum. We had better nip this in the bud, which
is definitely the argument of people like Leon Kass
and Francis Fukuyama in trying to curtail progress in
biomedical research. Their position is that the costs
of designer babies ethically would be so huge that we
have to shut down the enterprise now, have a moratorium for five years until we understand it or ten
years before we let it get going again with, I think,
quite disastrous consequences for human health and
human well-being, given the possible benefits of this
research.
The state of ignorance is so huge that any decision you
make right now is bound to be the wrong one but
we shouldnt cut off a whole branch of inquiry based on
assumptions that the worst case is the inevitable case.
Rather, if you say that we really dont know benefits or

costs on that great a timescale, its not like stopping a
runaway freight train but, rather, its like making decisions about where your great grandchildren ought to
live. The state of ignorance is so huge that any decision you make right now is bound to be the wrong
one and, therefore, when a hazard comes up we can
deal with when it comes up, but we shouldnt cut off
a whole branch of inquiry based on assumptions that
the worst case is the inevitable case. Thank you.
Steven, great talk. The only thing that troubles me is totalitarian government. It does seem to
me, especially if you take the Foundation For the
Future long view of a thousand years, if we do have
the technology it is readily available; it can be massproduced; cloning technologies can be mass-produced
almost certainly; stem cells certainly can totalitarianism is a risk. There are lots of reasons where if you
had no real compulsion, you could do the selection,
you could do the eugenics, but you could do it one
better with genetic engineering.
This doesnt mean that we should stop doing the
research, of course, but my bottom line is that if it
Deacon:
69

happens, I dont see that changing human nature will

be for beneficial purposes. I think youre right that
people wont choose it, but it might be chosen for us.
I do worry about that.
Pinker: That sometimes raises an objection against
other kinds of enhancements, such as drugs that
change the functioning of the brain, that enhance
memory. Are they going to put it in the drinking
water? Are they going to force everyone to have it?
Are they going to have mandatory Prozac to pacify
us so we wont challenge the government, and so on?
It seems to me that in all of these things there is a
question: Will we have the kind of totalitarian government that could force that on us? Then theres the
question: Would such a totalitarian government have
access to even greater methods of control, such as
drugs, genetic enhancement, and so on?
It seems to me that the horror of having that
kind of totalitarian government, with or without
mind-improving drugs, with or without genetic
enhancement, so overwhelms the extra increment
of badness that having enhancing drugs or genetic
enhancement would give them that the biomedical
technology is a red herring. Its a strong argument for
never having a totalitarian government of that sort.
But I have often heard the argument that we shouldnt
allow this kind of biomedical improvement because
what happens if it gets into the hands of a totalitarian
government? I think the answer is: Lets make sure we
dont have that kind of government.
when we study the genetics of

identical twins, they not only have
the same genes; they have the same
combinations of genes. They have
exactly the same synergies of genes.
Deacon: Let me add one other thing. We have talked
about twin studies a few times. One thing that is seldom brought up is that when we study the genetics
of identical twins, they not only have the same genes;
they have the same combinations of genes. They have
exactly the same synergies of genes. Since the numbers
of combinations are vastly more than the numbers of
genes, the amount of similarity is remarkable. What
astounds me is how little concordance there is, given
that fact.
70
Pinker: Right. Thats a very significant point. There

are some traits that are what behavioral geneticists
sometimes call emergenic, where you have known
linearities. For example, heritability is a very crude statistic because its a linear statistic, but the estimate that
you get from twin studies is much higher than what
you get from adoption studies simply because having
100 percent genes in common gives you all of the highorder interactions, so you get much more similarity
than you would predict, say, based on the difference
between biological and adopted siblings. Its more than
twice the similarity. There are some things like political
orientation: Conservative/liberal orientation is pretty
heritable but highly emergenic in that identical twins
would be very similar but fraternal twins, not particularly, compared to adopted siblings.
As you say, it also underlines the ignorance that we
have of development that allows there to be half the
variance thats unaccounted for by most of the environment. All of the additive effects of the genes, all of
the nonadditive effects of the genes, and we still cant
predict everything. Its humbling.
Holloway: There are different forms of monozygotic
twinning. The implantation in the placenta has effects,
and I would imagine that epigenetic effects during
development would really kick in and give possible
differences, even though, possibly, the genes are the
same.
Pinker: Yes, there are monochorionic and dichorionic
monozygotic twins.
Holloway: And almost none of these studies on twins
really differentiate between these different kinds of
monozygotic twins.
Pinker: Some of them do. There are a lot of cases
where monochorionic twins can actually be more different because they compete over placental real estate
and, hence, can get more or less blood supply, and so
on. So, there are some ways in which some of the estimates from the monozygotic/dizygotic comparisons
might actually underestimate the genetic effect, to the
extent that that is true.
Another one is that there are mutations that can
make monozygotic twins not genetically identical
as well. In fact, Chris Walsh at Harvard had an idea
that there could be a new behavior/genetic technique
that could be very powerful: If you could get identical

twins and since they arent identical in their behavior,

psychology, and so on, if you could measure those
differences and see if there were genetic differences
between them they would be few and far between,
but that could, in principle, be a very powerful way of
doing gene/behavior correlations because they would
be against a common backdrop.
theres something else called
somatic nuclear transfer and it
has nothing to do with cloning
humans, although theoretically its
on the path to doing that.
I want to resonate with everything youve said

and add a couple of things. One is that when you introduce foreign DNA into the genome, the genomes of
mammals are highly specialized to shut off anything
that comes in, so somatic gene therapy has yet to succeed. We are at that stage.
Second, having spent many years making knockout mice and modifying mice, and so on you hear
about the Doogie Howser mouse but what they
dont tell you is that this was successful after many,
many tries and hundreds of embryos. In other words,
the effort barrier is not just individual fertilization; its
going to be a huge effort for the parents.
The last comment: As you correctly said, we dont
want this to stop the good biomedical research, but
I think we need to be careful to further define this
constant mixing unwittingly, actually; we all do it
of the idea of creating designer babies or cloning
humans with somatic nuclear transfer, which is really
what people want to do to provide tissues for other
people. This constantly gets mixed up. We almost need
to always have a disclaimer that theres something
else called somatic nuclear transfer thats not the same
thing, where youre taking a nucleus and putting in
an egg because youre trying to make something that
you can then put back into the human from which
the nucleus came, and it has nothing to do with cloning humans, although theoretically its on the path to
doing that. Somehow we need to keep them separate.
Velamoor: Why would a free market not resolve all

these issues?
It might, and if these arguments have merit, I

would say that the free market would not create much
of a demand for human genetic enhancement.
Pinker:
Wherever the chips fall would that not

be the best way to go?
Velamoor:
Pinker: You would not get high consumer demand

from most parents once they were informed what the
costs and benefits would be.
Varki:
Pinker: I agree. I actually think that most bioethicists

are a menace. Theyre actually making society much
less ethical.
this is not just somebodys kids.

This is the genome of the species.
One of the real challenges is that were talking about the human genome. Lets say that the free
market keeps all but .001 percent of the population
from fiddling with their childrens genomes. Those
genes are in the population. Those genes will proliferate in future generations. The question is really an
open end. We have to be more careful than to just let
it sort itself out. As much as it is right that it will work
that way, this is not just somebodys kids. This is the
genome of the species.
Deacon:
Velamoor: So, it comes down to a question of information and more information and more information,
unbiased as opposed to simply casting prohibitions
by those who presume to know.
Calvin: Just look at how effective information has
been in influencing the people that utilize untried
medical treatments by buying all their drugs in the
health food stores. People will have enthusiasms for
doing things that are irrational by other standards and
theyll try them out. Now, this might not be putting a
particular gene in or taking it out, but it is going to
help bias the population, after a while, because there
are going to be a lot of things you take that will turn
out to produce, for example, more spontaneous abortions in certain gene types than others. You can get
shifts of population out of much more subtle effects.
71

the long-term benefits.

Is this frontier any different from any
prior revolutionary technology in
terms of how it got to be adopted?
Velamoor: Is this frontier any different from any
prior revolutionary technology in terms of how it
got to be adopted? Is it radically different? Are there
patterns, for instance, for innovating jet aircraft or
riding a bicycle, for that matter? Is it the same or is it
not the same?
Pinker: Jet aircraft is a nice analogy. Steven Weinberg
pointed out, as an example of how improvements in
technology are not inevitable, that commercial jet
travel is a case where theres been virtually no change
of the experience at the consumer level for probably
close to 50 years. If anything, it has gone downhill.
The idea that things just get better and better they
do get better in some ways; jets are more fuel-efficient
now, but in terms of how long it takes to get from Boston to Seattle, and how enjoyable the trip is, from 1957
to 2005 theres not a whole lot of improvement.
In general, I think there is a difference in that
people have much stronger moral intuitions about
the case of improving the technology of the human
constitution, as opposed to improving the technology
of jet travel. Some are valid, some are not so valid, but
my point is that both sides are based on overestimates
of how easy this would be to do.
Varki: I would second what Terry said, that this one is
different. Changing the genome of the species is a very
serious matter because of the downstream potential
consequences for generations, which are highly likely
to be negative rather than positive, based on the many
things you said, even if we were successful. In the few
cases of gene therapy that have actually worked, all
those trials have been stopped because those kids are
getting leukemia now. Those are the unanticipated
consequences you get when you go messing around.
And those are treatments of somatic cells; theyre not
germline.
Pinker: I would not be surprised if somatic gene
therapy will eventually be successful ethically, simply
because these are often kids who are very, very sick in
the first place and so the risks could be outweighed by
72
Varki:
dies.
The experiment ends when the individual
Pinker: Thats another matter, yes. But I think the

ethically more relevant criterion is what happens to
the individual child. The risk that therapy might end
with death in the case of someone who has a severe
illness to begin with could make it justifiable, whereas
if you are having these deformed children, Doogie
Howser-mouse-type children, there the price would
so far outweigh the benefit that its less likely that that
research would ever get done.
What would you need to do to be able

to ethically do this kind of thing?
Tooby: What would you need to do to be able to ethically do this kind of thing? It would mean that you
would have to have an inventory with all the functional
interactions and systems in human development and
the brain at such a level that you could do predictive
computations. You could predict in advance the effect
of the intervention and all the costs and benefits on all
the different systems. Thats a kind of science that is a
millennium away, or 500 years away. It certainly falls
beyond anything we have on the horizon.
Regarding what you were saying about why predictions dont pan out, the reason is the rise of
competitive things that are cheaper. With changing
human nature, you have to control the developmental
process throughout the life cycle, which means computations with all the interactions. Computationally,
that is just immensely intricate.
On the other hand, making an intervention in an
adult is something where you dont have to deal with
all the developmental complexity of that. Something
like installing a chip in the brain to have higher intelligence, which is something that is not so far away
whether you could have a chip that would increase
all types of intellectual activity, thats a much more
complicated thing, but having some sort of direct
sensory feed into the Internet or something like that
Im just saying that there are all sorts of installation
technologies that dont require such dauntingly com-

plex developmental information, which are much

more plausible. They are going to out-compete it on a
technological level on the 100-year scale rather than
the 500-year scale.
we dont know the code of the brain

anywhere near well enough to know
how to have it interface with our chips.
Pinker: Im skeptical about the brain implants as well,
but it is still an order of magnitude less complex than
genetic enhancement. Im skeptical about it except for
cases like, perhaps, paralyzed or blind people where
even a crude brain/machine interface would be better
than none at all. Just the fact that we have ten fingers
means that with something like a keyboard we can
have such a high throughput of information. So, a
Palm Pilot, I think, would always be better than a chip
in the brain with 60 little prongs, given all the technological problems of the brain pulsing with every beat
of your heart and sites of infection and scar tissue,
and the fact that we dont know the code of the brain
anywhere near well enough to know how to have it
interface with our chips. Nonetheless, as hard as that
is Im guessing impossible as you point out, human
genetic enhancement is even more complicated.
To the extent that human nature is controlled by our interactions with the environment,
it is possible to modify human nature with genetic
manipulation of other creatures, starting, of course,
with agriculture and animals, but even designer pets
and strange things like that.
Observer:
Pinker: Whether you would want to call it human

nature if you just have cuter pets or more easily
trainable pets I think it wouldnt have such strong
effects on our lifestyle that we would call it a change
of human nature. But just to throw something out,
one could argue that there are social changes, cultural
changes that lead to such widespread and pervasive
changes in our lifestyle that one could almost call
them human nature.
One could say, for example, that the change in
the status of women in the last 30 years if someone
were to do a global history of Homo sapiens, both the
sexual revolution and the gender revolution might be
severe enough that you would call that a change in

human nature. The decline in force and violence in
Western democracies compared to the time span of
human history is strong enough. The Flynn Effect on
IQ, where we seem to be gaining three IQ points a
decade, is another, and possibly the increase in anxiety, which seems also to be a secular trend thats linear
over a number of decades.
So, there could be cultural changes that are pervasive enough that they would almost count as human
nature, although I suspect that genetically engineering
plants and animals would be a small part. I guess the
agricultural revolution could almost be considered
that, given that it did involve genetic modification
through selective breeding, so that might be an example of what you had in mind.
Observer: Although we might get used to requesting
certain traits and having them made in our pets, for
example. It changes the initial barrier to curiosity in
modifying children.
in the last century we have

changed something thats been
constant for about 65 million years
in primates
Deacon: We also overly play out the story that human
nature is in our heads, because our biology has
expected certain things from the environment, and
when the environment changes, we physiologically
are different creatures. I think thats also true with our
brains. My own suspicion is that in the last century
or so, since weve begun to leave young babies away
from parents in cradles and on floors and in playpens,
we have changed something thats been constant for
about 65 million years in primates, which is being
moved around constantly after birth. We know that
in other species of primates that has a very troublesome consequence on social behavior. Were trying
this experiment right now without knowing that
were doing it or what the consequences are, nor has
anyone even looked at the consequences. So, I think
its also a mistake to think that human nature is just
in our heads.
You could consider human nature, rather

than a fixed set of traits, a fixed set of if-then rules
Pinker:
73

in response to the environment that thats fixed, but

then when the environment changes, the outcome is
going to change. A lot of it depends on how you take
the folk term human nature and map it onto some
sort of scientific construct.
The only problem with the if is that its
really big.
Deacon:
Pinker:
Yes.
I dont know that its changed anything very much,

but you can clearly have a society that believes that it
shouldnt happen, and it could be implemented without talking about genes at all.
Pinker: Right. I dont know what the population
genetic prediction of that would be, but I think that
if there was an increase in assortative mating, you
would get greater variance on the traits that are being
selected. Is that right?
Calvin:
If selective breeding is repugnant

to people, they should consider the
experiment that started about 100
years ago in exactly this direction.
Calvin: If selective breeding is repugnant to people,
they should consider the experiment that started
about 100 years ago in exactly this direction. We dont
call it that, but when you have co-educational colleges, and the colleges have a substantial entry-level
requirement, then youre putting high IQ males and
females together at a time when mate selection is at its
maximum. That experiment, to some extent, has run.
74
Yes.
Pinker: So, it wouldnt account directly for the Flynn

Effect except, perhaps, if it leads to a higher positive
tail and then the negative tail doesnt get entered into
the statistics, for whatever reason.
Tooby: It would go against the Flynn Effect. HighIQ people have fewer children. If you are bringing
together both sexes of high IQ and they are mating
more commonly together, theyre going to have fewer
children and then the population average will drop.
Pinker:
Yes, thats true.
Velamoor:
Thank you, Dr. Pinker.
Evolved Neurocognitive Programs as the

Foundations of Cultural and Social Phenomena
Presentation by John Tooby, Ph.D.
What Im interested in doing is seeing

if we can map some of the brains
computational devices.
Tooby: Many of you know that you can look at the
brain in two ways. One is as a set of physical structures of which were really only in infancy, because
the thing that does what the brain is important for,
which is computation, happens on such a fine-structured level that the gross level at which we can explore
the structure is not all that informative. Its beginning
to be informative but its not truly yet informative
for describing what happens in the brain in terms of
detail in computational operations that change information from one form into another.
What Im interested in doing is seeing if we can map
some of the brains computational devices. Though Ill
be using the word brain, Im really talking about the
information mapping, and then ultimately one wants
to cash that out in terms of the physical structure.
Im interested in widget mapping. Were robots;
were physical structures that came about by evolution. Theres a random component to evolution. The
nonrandom component to evolution is natural selection. Any time you find functional structure, thats
caused by natural selection; therefore, its really informative to look at the detailed adaptive problems that
our ancestors encountered on a day-by-day basis, not
just things that are important and very interesting and
very worth doing, like looking at what happens when
an ice age comes, but what about looking at what happens every day to a hunter-gatherer and asking: What
computational circuits does that hunter-gatherer
need in his head?
The other quick thing is Just So stories. A Just
So story is a post hoc explanation of how you got a
phenomenon already known. It is exactly not what
evolutionary psychology is, because you take models

of selection pressures and our understanding of the
ancestral environment, and you make predictions
about neurocomputational architecture that should
be there that nobody has ever thought to look for
before. Then you go and you find it. You cant have
a post-hoc explanation for a phenomenon that you
found that nobody knew was there before. Its just a
wrong temporal order. Therefore, a Just So story is
probably the most inappropriate criticism of this kind
of research.
The last of these preliminary remarks is: Another
kind of difference, perhaps, is that a major problem
that people are centrally interested in with humans
is: How do we have this spectacularly interesting
human-unique phenomenon that you might call
improvisational intelligence, the ability to do things
right the first time? Thats not what Im going to talk
about. There is so much discourse about this, and
its not that I criticize that discourse, but it seems to
me that somebody ought to be looking at all the rest
of the stuff in the brain, which is doing incredibly
important, detailed things.
The traditional blank slate notion was that you have
a blank slate and then you have improvisational intelligence. Everything important about behavior comes
out of the improvisational intelligence. It might be that
even our whole understanding of what improvisational
intelligence is will shift when we find out that we are
an artificial intelligence system with 200 or 500 some
large number of little computational devices in there
and theyre doing a lot of the important work that we
now attribute to improvisational intelligence. If all of
our research effort continues to be exclusively devoted
to looking at intelligence and rationality and these bigpicture items, we may never, in fact, come to a correct
description of them, but instead, come back around to
looking at widget mapping. If you map enough of the
widgets, you might end up with a description of the
architecture that really is informative.
75

Evolved Neurocognitive Programs as the Foundations of Cultural and Social Phenomena
our design necessarily reflects the

structure of the ancestral environment
and the selection pressures that acted
within that environment.
The basic idea is that were a highly improbable

physical outcome and what has caused this highly
improbable tower is natural selection, given a certain set of ancestral environments. Just like the key
necessarily reflects the structure of locks, our design
necessarily reflects the structure of the ancestral environment and the selection pressures that acted within
that environment. So, by looking at the structure of
the lock, you can figure out what the key is like.
We have this brain with this population of hundreds of billions of neurons really too complicated
to look at as a whole system very well, at this point
in our history. Instead, we can start to identify substructures in their subcomputational subsystems
by thinking really carefully about this functionality. If you do an analysis of the long-term statistical
and causal structure of the ancestral world and look
at what states of affairs natural selection favors, this
tells us about the likely characteristics of machinery
that evolved to solve adaptive problems and how the
subcomplements are coordinated with each other to
achieve solutions. This is really like the keys to the
kingdom. You can use these kinds of ideas and drill
down in any area of psychology and really quickly
come across stuff that nobody had found before.
By computational structure, Im talking about natural selection. Our bodies, our brains are there to solve
problems. Most of these problems are regulatory in
nature. The brain is there with regulatory structure to
change inputs into outputs, and so were interested in
getting at what set of variables environmental and
endogenous variables the system is designed to take
as input, the operations that are performed on these
inputs, the regulatory variables and representations
they produce, and the evolutionarily designed effects
these regulatory variables and representations have on
all sorts of things outputs that regulate behavior.
The other thing I think will happen is that when
we start to get really good maps of the computational
structure, this will allow us to come back and make
discoveries about the physical structure that you
76
couldnt have done otherwise, and about the genetic

processes that lead to the realization of computational
structure.
What you have with humans and designs in organic

systems is engineering human universal
pieces of machinery.
I want to see how many examples I can get through to

give you a sense that its an engineering kind of thing.
What you have with humans and designs in organic
systems is engineering human universal pieces of
machinery. These are important. I like thinking on a
large scale and this is the largest possible scale.
Whats the importance of this kind of thing? We
heard, to some extent, the importance last night from
Steve [Pinker] that the traditional way of thinking in
the social sciences is you have a blank-slate model.
What he didnt talk about so much but which is
really key to all this is the next step in that, which is:
Durkheim said that the social sciences are causally disconnected from psychology because if all you have is
a blank slate, then nothing about the individual mind
determines anything or has an impact on any social
phenomena. This is a core, fundamental thing thats
taught in sociology. Its taught in anthropology that
the human sciences are autonomous, disconnected
from biology, from psychology, all these other levels
evolution has nothing to do with human behavior
because the blank slate is there. It intervenes and it
tears the fabric.
Now, some people in the room might smile and
shake their heads that this is a silly belief. It is so
regularly taught, so universally believed, that all of
the research efforts in the social sciences are carried
out within that paradigm. On the other hand, if you
have a different model that the brain has, in fact,
important pieces of circuit logic that have to do with
things like human conflict and cooperation and family structure, and so on then these pieces of circuit
logic form crucial components to social theories. I
think we have lost sight of the fact that we could have
a natural science of the social sciences that looked
really like natural sciences. We are accustomed to
human sciences being impressionistic, particularistic,
not telling us anything very useful in any particu-

lar case, so that were just used to it as being failures

as sciences, however much it might be enriching in
other respects, more like humanities.
if we really can map the human universal
neurocomputational architecture, that will be a
foundation for a set of social sciences that really look
like sciences, so that we could do something important
about the human problems that face us
But now were at the point where, if we really can map

the human universal neurocomputational architecture,
that will be a foundation for a set of social sciences that
really look like sciences, so that we could do something important about the human problems that face
us, if we understand the circuit logic that is governing
human behavior in complex circumstances.
A series of examples: The first one that weve been
working on is the architecture of the Human Kin
Detection System and its relationship to motivational
output systems. There was intense selection to avoid
mating with close relatives. A blank-slate mind can
say nothing against mating with your sister, mother,
brother, children theyre just people like anybody
else. But from a biological perspective, there is intense
selection against it. Your deleterious recessives are
expressed. There are some other costs to it.
A second important thing that is known from
evolutionary biology is that another strong selection
pressure is to take into account the welfare of your
relatives when you act. That is, the closer the genetic
relative, the gene has an effect on its own frequency
when its found in close relatives. All other things
being equal, you should be selected to have mechanisms to make you nicer to your close relatives than
to more distant relatives and to nonrelatives. That presupposes that the brain can identify who is a genetic
relative and who is not a genetic relative.
So, you have two behavioral adaptive problems
here of quite different payoff structure. One is: Dont
have sex with your relatives; the other is: Otherwise,
be nice to them. They both presuppose a certain cognitive ability to track a certain kind of information.
That predicts the existence of a regulatory solution,
a neurocomputational system thats well-engineered,
given the structure of the ancestral environments, to
detect the genetic relatedness of others and to compute a behavior that regulates sexual attraction or
repulsion to the individual and what we call a welfare

tradeoff ratio: the degree to which the other individuals welfare is weighted against your own. That shows
up in a lot of different adaptor problems, but in this
one, it regulates love, caring, an intrinsic interest in
the other persons welfare and, on the negative side,
neglect and abuse.
What was the ancestral world like? You cant see
DNA directly. The question is: What kind of reliable cues generation by generation, over thousands
of generations, over a diverse set of environments
would there have been to genetic relatedness? Our
research started out on siblings because we have
undergraduates and our undergraduates dont have
children yet, and we dont have the money for research
so were doing Kin Detection System for siblings sibling detection. One thing thats a reliable cue is were
assuming, but theres very good evidence for this that
you know who your mother is. And especially your
mother also knows who you are. If an organism comes
out of your body and youre a female, well, thats your
offspring. So, theres an initial kin detection that happens there. A mothers behavior is organized to invest
in that offspring. She keeps in close association with
that offspring for a period of time. That leaks information to observers: Those people are connected; theres
relatedness. If you know who your mother is and you
see your mother in close maternal perinatal association with another individual, thats a strong cue that
thats your sibling. So, that was a prediction about one
source of information. In our dataset, it actually turns
out to be a predictor at .88 [r =.88]. But were talking
about the long-term evolutionary rate, and we believe
that, given the structure of foraging environments,
that was a pretty reliable cue.
I want to point out, before we go on to the secondary cue, that this can work only for older siblings
looking at younger siblings. If youre a younger sibling, you werent around when your older sibling was
being nursed by your mother; you didnt exist yet. Its
a complex problem in information engineering. The
integration of multiple cues comes up with an estimate of kinship.
Another kind of cue this one was proposed a long
time ago was from Westermark. He thought that
the duration of childhood co-residence was the primary factor that caused sexual disinterest. If you think
about that in a more modern context than the hunter-
77

gatherer fusion/fission structure in which parents stay

with children and siblings co-associate to some extent,
the more often youre in the presence of somebody
because of the way families aggregate and disaggregate
for foraging and for food and seasonal types of things,
visiting among relatives across bands overall, you
would get a relationship between how often you saw
somebody and how related they were to you.
for every individual you know,
theres a Kinship Index It regulates
these two things: your sexual
attraction to the person and how much
you care about them
A prediction notion is that we have something internal

in our brains that is computed, which is that for every
individual you know, theres a Kinship Index. Its in your
brains and its not a declarative, consciously accessible
thing like your episodic memory, but its a variable that
is part of person representation and it indexes the degree
of genetic relatedness. It regulates these two things: your
sexual attraction to the person and how much you care
about them, love them.
[Referring to slide] Heres an overall mapping of
the structure that you have. Over on the left, you have
cues that the system is designed to take in from the
external environment. We dont think we have necessarily exhausted the cues, but we have very strong
evidence about the co-residence monitoring system
and maternal perinatal association monitoring system. How we get this evidence is we take our subjects,
who are undergraduates here and subjects on an
island called Dominica; were going to do it in Japan
and South America, also. You take how long theyve
lived with people when they were children, other
kinds of variables and information, and then you see
how that maps onto these two output variables: intensity of disgust at the notion of having sexual contact
with the person, and what kinds of things they would
do and to what extent they would do them in terms of
acts of assistance to other people.
The idea is that you can take those and you can
see what things in the environment may increase or
decrease those predictive functional output variables.
Then you can recover the architecture of the system.
78
The Kinship Index operates independent of your formal,

declarative beliefs because the emotions track these
things like how long you lived with somebody
when you were a child
There are the two inputs of the co-residence monitoring system and the maternal perinatal association
monitoring system, and we believe there are possibly other things. Some people have speculated about
MHC monitoring from olfaction, but things like that
cant be all that strong, from our dataset, because we
have people in our datasets who are adopted people.
The Kinship Index operates independent of your formal, declarative beliefs because the emotions track
these things like how long you lived with somebody
when you were a child and did you observe them
breastfeeding or taking care of your younger sibling?
Those are the things that govern the intensity of the
emotion and not formal beliefs about whether they
think the person is a sibling or not. That does not control or predict the intensity of these emotions.
So, we have these inputs, which go into something
that integrates them, the Kinship Estimator. The Kinship Estimator produces a Kinship Index for person I
I to my brother, or my sister. Then there are two output systems. We all have a sexual psychology, and its a
complicated one, so there are things like attractiveness
and all sorts of other things sexual value or how
attractive somebody is to you. But one of the things
that affect it is the Kinship Index: Did you receive cues
when you were growing up that they are related to you?
Not any cue at all that theyre related to you? There are
certain ones that are evolutionarily stable, long-term
cues. That has a negative effect on the Sexual Value
Estimator, and the Sexual Value Estimator is passed
out to the programs that guide sexual attraction and
sexual avoidance. People who were raised with a person or who had a period when they saw their mother
taking care of a person, even if they were subsequently
separated from that child, the idea is that when they
are adults, the notion of having sex with that person is
disgusting to them. Its at least uninteresting and, more
often, its positively repugnant.
Theres a separate system that has to do with how
much you are predisposed to spontaneously trade off
your welfare for somebody elses. Thats a variable that

is a constituent of love and caring, and various kinds

of close social attitudes.
Were talking about only one aspect of psychology
here, which is: How is the Kinship Index related to the
welfare tradeoff ratio? This system computes the Kinship Index between yourself and somebody else, and
then that has a positive effect on the Welfare Trade-off
Estimator and that feeds out into programs regarding
altruistic behavior. Theres a real piece of engineering
here. Its complex; its important; you can map important pieces of it by doing careful task analyses of what
information was available, the nature of the ancestral
environment from a cue basis, and so on.
There are reasons to think that the sexual psychology will be different for males and females. Females
lose more by incest than males do, so we analyzed the
data separately for males and females. The point is
that it was a prediction and its confirmed here that if
youre looking just at co-residence, which is one of the
variables people have believed from Westermark
that it might be a variable in, at least, incest avoidance. Here, you can put it as part of a larger system
including altruism and you can show that co-residence makes a big difference with respect to altruism
and personal disgust at the idea of having sex with a
sibling as well as your moral attitude toward thirdparty situations, if youre a younger sibling. If youre
an older sibling, co-residence doesnt make nearly as
much difference. Basically theres a big drop-off systematic in all the categories, but it is a less important
cue because there is this other more informative cue
that trumps it, which is that you were able to observe
your mother taking care of your sibling. If you have
that information, you dont need co-residence information. The co-residence information is not used
nearly as much.
We have a similar mapping system with anger.
Anger has internal-specific logic that has a computational architecture what variables trigger it, and
so on.
Im going to skip over to race. Theres a separate
system that regulates coalitional cooperation and conflict. One of the classes I teach is genetics. I did a lot
of evolutionary genetics for a while. We teach undergraduates that race, as a genetic concept, makes no
sense, and that we cant do any kind of mapping from
the underlying genetic distributions to what people
think are the racial groups that they seem to see every
day and everywhere. So, after you teach them that

theres no such thing as race in quite the way theyre
thinking about it, they look at you in the same sort
of patronizing way that undergraduates do when you
tell them something clearly false. Who are they going
to believe the professor or their lying eyes? They see
race in the world.
The question is: How come people see race in the world
when the underlying biology doesnt support it?
The question is: How come people see race in the

world when the underlying biology doesnt support
it? Social psychologists for 30 years have found that
when people meet new people, theyre automatically
processing in codes certain kinds of information
thats part of their personal representation that theyve
formed. One of these is sex or gender; the second
one is life stage or age; and the third one is race. This
kind of information is automatically and mandatorily
encoded. The psychologists found this very distressing because they wanted to create a race-free world.
Why is race information so salient to people? They
attempted to find manipulations that would reduce
or eliminate peoples racial awareness and they found
nothing that they could do. All sorts of manipulations
were tried over 30 years.
We looked at this, starting from the genetic basis
that one theory you could have about race is that race
is really out there. Its like: Why do you see apples as
different from nectarines? Because apples are different
from nectarines theyre really there. Your perceptual
system just sees something different. But there is a
kind categorization that goes on. Theres not a smooth
distribution between apples and nectarines, whereas
in the human species there is an interpenetration of
all sorts of different dimensions of variation in a way
that doesnt come out into just three kinds. And yet
the imposition on the actual perceptual network of a
kind perception is very interesting.
Social psychologists dont necessarily think in
terms of evolved systems but they thought they found
an evolved system that was specialized for encoding
race. Well, gender makes sense because that would
always have supported a lot of very important things
79

behaviorally for hunter-gatherer. But the notion that

we have an evolved system for detecting race makes
no sense because hunter-gatherers never would have
been in a world where they would have walked far
enough on a regular basis to regularly encounter
people who would be genetically different enough to
qualify as being from a different race.
Race is a cue to coalitional affiliation,
and it is encoded because our minds
are designed to sift for coalitional
affiliation in the world on an
unconscious basis
This was coming together with a different kind of

work we were doing, which is that there are evolved
cognitive specializations for dealing with groups and
dealing with coalitions. So, if our race-encoding system is not there with the evolved function of racial
categorization, why does it exist? The alternative view
would be: Race is a proxy for something else that
did exist among our hunter-gatherer ancestors. Our
hypothesis was that that would be coalitional affiliation. Race is a cue to coalitional affiliation, and it is
encoded because our minds are designed to sift for
coalitional affiliation in the world on an unconscious
basis in the same way that theres a whole layer of
cognitive object construction thats going on in our
minds, such as the kinship identifiers. There are
lots of specializations that are giving our consciousness access to concepts that have been preprocessed
because of the evolved functions that these devices,
these widgets, were designed to serve. We have been
mapping a lot of features about this.
There is a cartoon from Gary Larson with the
notion that theres this miracle product called StopIt.
You can use it to stop your faucet from leaking; if you
want a taxi to stop for you, you spray it; if you want
your spouse to stop smoking, you spray it on him; if
you want your baby to stop crying, you spray it on
the baby; if an elephant is charging, it will work for
that. The notion is that this is our model of the human
mind that general intelligence is just one thing and
thats not what it really looks like.
80
our perceptual systems are being trained by an

underlying nonvisible characteristic,
which is coalitional affiliation.
Categorization happened over all the dimensions that

you could discriminate. But you dont have to categorize that way. You could do equally well to categorize
in a different way. There are lots of different physical
features that people have. It is, in fact, extremely hard
though our brains can possibly do it to come up
with just that exact set of things to discriminate in
order to sort what we think of as our racial categories.
The point is that there are a lot of options that the
perceptual system could be using and the claim is that
our perceptual systems are being trained by an underlying nonvisible characteristic, which is coalitional
affiliation. Its not race per se that is being picked out,
but it is any appearance cue that would predict coalitional affiliation in the world.
The experimental design we did is a very interesting one. Nancy Etcoff was one of the people in this
very clever research paradigm called the who said
what? paradigm, where you infer what categorization
people are using from how they confuse one person
with another. For example, if you were to confuse
Eddie Murphy with Steve Martin, the principle might
be that you were encoding comedian, as a dimension
of social categorization. If, on the other hand, you
were confusing Eddie Murphy with O.J. Simpson, it
wouldnt be comedian that was the categorization; it
would be race, plausibly. The targets have a conversation and you see a picture of somebody with a little
sentence underneath it, indicating what the person
said. Another picture comes up, another sentence;
another picture, another sentence. Then, at the end,
you see a whole series of these sentences of what people said, then the subjects are given a surprise recall
task in which one by one the sentences come up and
they have to say who said what. If they correctly do
it, it doesnt tell us anything and we hate it, but when
they make mistakes, it tells us what their principles
of categorizations are. Its an unobtrusive measure of
all sorts of categorization, including racial categorization. You couldnt control it if you wanted to. People
are not aware that theyre leaking this information, so

we know when race is a dimension of their categorization and when its not.
If they make an error and they attribute it to somebody else of the same race, that tells us that they do it
more often than chance, and that tells us that race was
a dimension of variation. On the other hand, if the
pictures show people in different jerseys of basketball
teams, then in this scenario the person might be categorizing by team and not race. So, we can get a measure
of the relative intensity of their disposition to make
categorization errors to categorize people by race, by
gender, by team, by a number of different things.
The underlying idea is: What coalitions is this
person a member of, so that the mind automatically
picks up this information? Theres a variable assigned
to a personal representation that indexes the persons
coalition membership. Theres a specialized coalition-mapping device that infers coalitional alliances.
It sits there in the world, in your mind youre not
aware of it and in the social world it detects acts of
cooperation and acts of conflict. It also sifts and sees if
there are some predictor values. For example, if youre
going to be a well-defined hunter-gatherer, you have
to know: If Im going to propose this in this group, can I
get away with it? Will enough people come in on my side
of the issue? You have to have a map of the social world
in which you can anticipate the likely consequences of
various types of activities, and who is going to come in
on what side of what issue is very important.
groups arent really there at all. Groups are a

mental construct, so one has to keep track of the
alliance structure in the world.
There are in-group conflicts and conflicts between

groups and, of course, groups arent really there at
all. Groups are a mental construct, so one has to keep
track of the alliance structure in the world. If you have
appearance cues that are correlated with alliance, then
you can detect somebodys alliance without having to
always be present exactly when they reveal certain
types of intentional acts that would reveal their alliance. You can know in advance how things would
turn out. Even though social psychologists hadnt
been able to find a way to drop racial awareness, our
notion was that if what racial awareness really was,
was a proxy for coalitional affiliation, then if you created a social world in which coalitional affiliation
no longer maps onto racial affiliation, then subjects
should stop encoding race. The notion is that you
could reduce it, and potentially, if you understood it
enough, maybe eliminate it.
We created an experiment in which the people are
racially mixed, but the conflict that emerges in this
group that theyre seeing the story of doesnt map
onto a racial division. Its two different sports teams.
We didnt know whether we would detect any effect
at all, but in the course of four minutes of this, a very
short period of time, we were quite astonished that the
effects were so big, particularly because theres prior
history among social psychologists: Theyve never
been able to find anything that decreased racial coding at all. But if you put people into this environment
where people are having a dispute but the dispute
doesnt map onto racial alliance, what you find out is
that within that context, subjects seriously reduce the
degree to which they encode race of subjects, so that
they will no longer be mistaking what one person said
for what another person said by race. Racial awareness or race consciousness, as an organizing feature
of personal representation, diminishes.
So, we have a very rich, complexly structured piece
of machinery. When you add the shared appearance
cue, which predicts coalitional alliance, you create an
artificial model race. People spontaneously start to
encode that and the degree to which they encode race
goes down. We created this artificial world, only four
minutes long; it was a striking effect and we now replicate it in a lot of different contexts. The underlying
point Im trying to make is that there are a lot of these
widgets in there. You can find out their properties by
modeling adaptive problems carefully.
Varki: In terms of the group that youre defining as
the ancestral state, if youre studying things that are
universal to human population, I suppose youre
defining this as being some time period before 50,000
or 60,000 years ago, before people started out across
the world. In other words, when you said hunter-gatherers, were you using that as a proxy for what we think
that people were doing between 100,000 and 50,000
years ago? If youre dealing with things that you think
were selected for that would be the same in an Australian Aborigine and a Native American, then you
81

would have to be talking about selection that occurred

prior to the diaspora of these peoples.
environmental evolutionary
adaptiveness is intrinsic in the
Darwinian notion when you talk
about things that are more than
single-locus things.
Tooby: Theres a lot to say about your question. Its a
very big question. The thing is that its such an underutilized approach that we can pick things that are
adaptively significant that were endured for a long
period of time.
The other thing is that were interested in complex cognitive systems thats the notion that it takes
a long time for natural selection to operate, so its
unlikely that simple things can happen fairly fast. For
example, the ability to digest milk in a few thousand
years you can get that. But if youre talking about a
complex thing with a lot of inputs and outputs, that
takes a big chunk of evolutionary time. Thats 100,000
years or something like that.
Youre also looking at it from the point of view of
the adaptive information-processing problem. Environment is not just a physical place; its a structure
of causal relations and informational relations. Australian Aborigines had alliances. They had disputes.
The notion is that at a certain abstract level, theres
a uniformity. This notion of an environmental evolutionary adaptiveness is intrinsic in the Darwinian
notion when you talk about things that are more
than single-locus things. Something drove an allele
towards fixation. It either went there by random walk
or it went there under selection, systematically. If it
went there systematically, that causal aspect of the
world that drove it there is what were talking about
as the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness with
respect to that adaptation.
82
My point is that if youre talking about

something that is local to a particular
region and impact, then it was
recently selected.
Varki: My point is that if youre talking about something that is local to a particular region and impact,
then it was recently selected. But if youre talking
about something thats universal to humans, then
youre talking about, actually, this time period that
Bill [Calvin] was alluding to where there doesnt seem
to be any evidence for anything. There arent any fossils; there arent any peoples. My point is that we dont
know what that environment was.
Tooby: Again, if youre talking about gizmos, a lot of
these things will be true for extremely broad lengths
of time things like: space is three-dimensional. Even
though we dont know what happened to Atlanteans,
or if UFOs landed in that particular period, still, space
was three-dimensional. In gender, there were two genders. So, with the notion that we have an automatic
system that assigns gender categorization and does
powerful inferences on it, we can reconstruct certain
aspects of the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness with certainty at this compositional level. Some
aspects of it we have no idea about, in which case we
are back with normal psychological research, which
is to say that you dont know where your hypotheses
come from.
But, yes, you do a lot of work thinking about the
structure of foraging environments and foraging
peoples use, primatology use, research on huntergatherers in paleoanthropology.
Deacon: I have a question about just how you do this.
In coalitional assessment and race assessment, of
course, one could come up with 500 possible competing ways that you could get a conflict of assessment
of categorization here, which was indicated with your
initial categorization story. How do you then go about
picking out the ones that youre going to utilize? Do
you just have to walk through the ones that you bestguess, or is there a more statistical way that says: I
only have to do three of them and Ive done it?

Race only appears to be significant because it arbitrarily

cues a coalitional thing, and clothes will do that
just as well. And hair styles.
Tooby: The question is: Have we exhausted the
kinds of computation systems that are in there? as
opposed to: Have we identified some? For example,
sex is really not affected by coalition, so we did that
as a control. People almost never make these crossgender errors. If a man says something, you dont
confuse it with something a woman said. If a woman
says something, you dont confuse it with a man. It
didnt have to be that way. It means that its incredibly
robust. Its effect sizes are almost unheard of in certain
aspects of psychology social psychology, certainly.
Its very important that people dont make the gender
error, for example. Here we have positive information
about what does happen.
Thats not to say that there couldnt be other kinds
of categories, so were also doing other work now on
whether people pick up kinship information in this
way. Its an experiment, so we control what things we
vary. We can affirm that certain variables are being
processed. As I said, we dont know that others are
not, although we do know that a lot of things arent;
for example, arbitrary clothing doesnt get processed.
Thats the thing about race: Race only appears to be
significant because it arbitrarily cues a coalitional
thing, and clothes will do that just as well. And hair
styles.
So, in terms of this kind of processing, theres no
preference given to something that is biologically part
of the development, over things that are put on for the
day. Its not a different kind of thing, in terms of the
minds categorization system.
My question was about the broader methodology. In some sense, this is a positive fishing in
which you pick out a couple of things that are your
best guess, then you plot them against your best-guess
competitors.
Deacon:
Tooby: I prefer to say that we make theoretically principled predictions.

Deacon: Thats fine. So, the question is: What do you do
with all the negatives. You say, I think its coalition, so

you come up with markers that you think are coalition
and set up this assessment. You come up with sex being
an interesting counter that might be something different from coalition, but coalition is an assumption to
begin with. Youve created that. How do you subdivide
that? How do you go in and analyze that?
Tooby: How do we operationalize our theoretical
concepts? That is one part of your question. Here,
we invent a new coalition. We dont tell the subjects
that theres a new coalition there. It just emerges in
the course of the conversation. They didnt have to
encode. All theyre being asked about at the end is:
Who said what sentence? Theres nothing in there to
divide this into two teams or anything like that. Thats
something that the subjects themselves have brought
to the task. Theres nothing about the instructions that
forces them to do that, but they backward-infer from
the structure of the conversation that theres an argument going on, and pick up on who is on what side
of the argument. We also have a verbal-only part in
which theres no shared appearance at all.
Men are more coalition-activated than women are.
Its an extremely hard task. Youve never seen these
people before; you dont care about the conversation,
and so on, but, still, something shifts there and you
are interpreting that this is an interpersonal thing in
which there are two groups. Thats something that is
being brought by the mind to the task; its not intrinsically in the task.
I guess my point had to do with the operationalization of coalition.

Deacon:
Tooby: Its operationalized by the structure of the

argument. You notice that some people are agreeing
with other people and disagreeing with other people.
Thats how coalition appears in the stimuli.
Velamoor:
Thank you, Dr. Tooby.
83

84
What Is Future?
Presentation by Endel Tulving, Ph.D.
future exists solely by virtue of a

certain kind of consciousness of the
evolved human brain,
not duplicated anywhere else
in the known universe
Tulving: I wish to talk about an idea that has to do
with future. The idea is that future exists solely by virtue of a certain kind of consciousness of the evolved
human brain, not duplicated anywhere else in the
known universe, and that this kind of consciousness
was one of the necessary conditions for the initiation and development of human culture. I came here,
actually, to try out this idea, which I have tried out
in other quarters, and Ive asked people to tell me
exactly where Ive gone wrong. I have not succeeded
in getting people to say, Youre totally off base here.
I thought that this particular audience will tell me
where Im wrong.
I made the discovery about the future in my own
life relatively recently. I came to it in two ways: from
my own research in human memory, on the one hand,
and then, on the other, the question: What is consciousness all about? A known problem with people
who are interested in consciousness is that they usually just talk about it. When I read a paper or book on
consciousness, I say, Beautiful, but what is the evidence? How can I tell that your story is a better story
than that of the other person, who came to exactly the
opposite conclusion? So, thats one problem.
The other problem lies in the difficulty of objectively studying something as intangible and fuzzy as
consciousness, something that many hard-nosed scientists and other experts think is an epiphenomenon
to begin with. Indeed, if one goes by the rules of the
19th century science, the problem appears to be real.
But if we accept a few new rules, still compatible with
the basic foundation of science of empirically verifiable and replicable observations then consciousness
becomes a tractable object of study, and the issue of

its epiphenomenality can be addressed objectively.
The primary question then becomes: What exactly
is it that humans, with their consciousness, can do
that a nonconscious machine, or a nonconscious
animal could not? Its an interesting question. When
Deep Blue beat Garry Kasparov in the famous chess
match, there went one big idea that humans can plan
for the future in a way that machines cannot. Chess
was supposed to be the prototypical planning, thinking-about-the-future game that requires the kind of
intelligence that lower animals or mere machines
do not possess. And Deep Blue seemed to prove that
supposition wrong. Or did it? Perhaps all it proved
was that chess is not the kind of game that we thought
it was. We were wrong about the game, not necessarily about the human mind.
If so, there was a possible answer to the query
about the epiphenomenality of human consciousness:
Humans can consciously think not only about their
own past but also about their own future, whereas
nonconscious machines, or animals with different
kinds of consciousness cannot. This kind of ability
should manifest itself in human achievements that are
beyond the powers of other creatures and machines.
I actually believe that everything that we know today
all of those things are going to be wrong. Its only a
question of how long it will be before humankind
has figured it out
I actually believe that everything that we know today

I teach my students this all of those things are
going to be wrong. Its only a question of how long it
will be before humankind has figured it out: Oh, the
silly ideas they used to have back in 2005. So, all of
these ideas are wrong. The question is not whether
theyre right or wrong; the question is how are they
wrong? In what sense? How can we change it so that
85

What Is Future?
the next step that we take will be a little closer to what

eventually will remain from all the activities that all
kinds of scientists engage in?
So, I make this outrageous statement: Future is
one of the most powerful ideas ever to emerge from
the human brain/mind. You can prove me wrong by
giving me a better idea. Ill accept many other equivalents, but I would like to get a better idea, a more
important idea, a more powerful idea. Im not saying
its the only idea. Im going to argue that the future
is a very important driver of human culture, for
instance. By no means does it mean that there are no
other determinants. Its one necessary condition. One
enabling variable one of zillions, perhaps.
The future, of course, is disputable and subjective; it
has something to do with time, but its not time. Time
is all over us. Time is something that surrounds everything that happens in the universe. Cosmic evolution
all happened in time. All physical laws run their course
in time; all behavior takes place in time; the lowliest
organism operates in time. Time is a discriminative
variable. Its something that controls peoples behavior,
an organisms behavior. I mean by subjectively apprehended time something totally different.
You apprehend time in a way that, I will argue,
other organisms, other animals, do not. For example,
you can close your eyes, plug your ears, turn off the
nose (if you can), and think about yesterdays evening
celebration. What happened? You can play that tape
in your own mind, in any way you want, either taking
snippets or playing from the beginning or going to the
highlights, or so on. You can revisit the past in your
own mind. Now, it is possible that there is somebody
in this room who cannot do that. I will argue that this
ability of mental time travel is a relatively recent evolutionary happening on the scene, and, therefore, it is
not unlikely that there are perfectly normal, intelligent human beings, successful in our society, who do
not have this ability of mental time travel. Later on,
Ill introduce the concept of autonoetic consciousness. There are probably people around who do not
have that. These are people who become mystified
when we tell them about it. Its like color-blind people
who listen to others who have color vision talk about
different hues and have to make some sense of it, but
they cope and adjust and figure it out.
86
conscious awareness of subjective

time is made possible by something I
call chronesthesia time sense. This
is an evolved neurocognitive capacity
probably unique to humans.
If youre normal, you can travel back into the past in

your own mind. This is what subjectively apprehended
time means. You have to have some ability of subjectively getting your mind on what happened at another
time in another place. By the way, very little of what is
known as memory is concerned with that. Most kinds
of memory that people have studied have nothing to
do with the past nothing more than anything else in
the universe has to do with the past. Now, I am going
to argue that this conscious awareness of subjective
time is made possible by something I call chronesthesia time sense. This is an evolved neurocognitive
capacity probably unique to humans. I am not saying
that other animals, including our closest relatives on
the evolutionary tree, do not have that time sense of
chronesthesia. Im simply saying that there is no evidence that would satisfy me, as a relatively objective
observer, that they do.
Chronesthesia is a recently evolved capacity that
enables us to mentally travel in time into the past as
well as into the future. This is where the future comes
in. The past and future are connected, in the sense
that they are enabled by the same mental capacity. I
will also argue that mental time travel was a critical
driver of culture. It defined culture. I like to think Im
not capable of thinking complicated thoughts. I like
very simple thoughts. Chronesthesia provides one of
the most telling illustrations of the function of consciousness. Chronesthesia is an example of what an
organism that has this higher level of consciousness
can do that organisms without it cannot. Otherwise
consciousness, like everything else, is distributed
continuously in nature.
I always get a chuckle out of these arguments: Is
this organism conscious? Or is this species conscious?
Are cats conscious? Are worms conscious? Of course
they all are, although in different ways. Even the tree
outside my house in Toronto is conscious, in a way.
How do I know? It reacts to the environment in a way
that a rock does not. Ive seen it. Its a fir tree that has
been growing there in front of our eyes for the last 20

What Is Future?
years. Its seed certainly did not have that information

genetically implanted that as I grow older, I had better keep toward the east because toward the west there
is a mountain ash that steals my light and I am better
off with more light. Thats consciousness: awareness of
whats happening in ones world. It is consciousness
(anoetic or non-knowing consciousness) but it is
not the same kind of consciousness that is involved
in your or my mentally traveling back into our own
personal past or forward into our personal future.
Consciousness covers so many things. To talk about
consciousness as an all-or-none phenomenon or
even self-consciousness, self-awareness is like talking about, Are you a sick person or are you a healthy
person? Are you an old person or are you a young person? Make up your mind. You have no more choices.
I dont understand why people do that, but Ive been
puzzled about what people do for a long time.
Without this chronesthetic conciousness,

the future could not exist, nor would culture.
The bottom line, then: This hypothesized, hypothetical entity called future that does not exist in the
physical world but it does exist in the more important world of human consciousness. As such, it is very
much a part of reality. It is made possible by chronesthesia, a kind of consciousness that only humans
possess. Without this chronesthetic conciousness, the
future could not exist, nor would culture. Im happy
to tell Walter Kistler that your Foundation owes its
existence, among other things, to something you did
not even know about: chronesthesia.
When I figured out that future plays an important role in shaping human affairs, I sat down one
day and wrote down things that human beings do in
their organized activities. I ended up with a very long
list, organized under category names such as education, science, art, literature, religion, communication,
construction, trade, commerce, banking, and many
others like these. I asked, What do all these activities require? What are things without which none of
those activities could occur? The answer is that they
all require large brains and intelligence and creativity
and inventiveness and abstract problem-solving activ-
ity; they require language. Then I said, Yes, of course,

no problem with that all of these above plus many
others. But every single one also requires chronesthesia. You take away the human ability to imagine the
future, being aware that theres a tomorrow after today
take that away, and they will not engage in any of
these activities. Its one of these thought experiments;
its very simple to sit down and imagine: Would you
take your money to the bank if you didnt know that
there is a tomorrow? Would you send your children
to school? Would you buy a newspaper today? Would
you go and buy yourself a new car if you did not know
that you would be using it for a while?
How does someone like me who has spent most
of his life doing tightly controlled laboratory experiments on undergraduates ability to learn and retain
this and that, under these and those conditions, get to
lofty thoughts about consciousness and future? In 1972
I wrote an essay about what I called episodic memory,
the kind of memory involved in remembering personally experienced events. (The concept as such was
old many others had played with the thought that
there is something special about this kind of memory but the term was new.) And ever since I myself
started to take seriously the possibility that there was
a real difference between episodic memory and all
the other kinds, I was haunted by the question: Why
did it evolve? What is it good for? If it is true that the
rest of the world can do without episodic memory, if
it is true that all the animals that have ever lived, all
the species that have ever lived, and all the millions of
species that are alive too, are doing exceedingly well
at the main business that they have to do namely,
to survive and procreate, and so on without having
something called episodic memory, why did it switch
in, in humans? What is it good for? What does it help?
Whats the adaptive value of it?
Then at one point I started wondering if there is
something wrong with that question: What is episodic
memory good for? Where have I gone wrong? But
perhaps this is the wrong way to look at it. Perhaps
remembering is something derivative of something
else.
In 1983, I met a young man whose name is Kent
Cochrane. I dont hesitate saying his name because
he has been all over TV in Ontario and elsewhere.
[Referring to slide] Here he is in a wedding photograph of his brother, who is standing next to him, and
87

What Is Future?
the young bride is in the middle. His mother sits in

the front with father and another brother. This is 1979.
He had made a surprise for the other people by getting
himself an Afro haircut. He was an object of admiration and attention throughout it. He now looks at this
picture hes over 50 years old now and you ask him
who these people are, and he says, Oh, thats my family. He can tell you all about it. You ask him when this
picture was taken, and he says, I dont know. You
ask, Do you know these people? Yes. But when?
And nothing. The reason is that in 1981 he suffered a
closed-head injury, traumatic brain injury, as a result
of which he became deeply amnesic. That means that
he does not remember ongoing experiences from his
regular life. Hes like H.M., the famous H.M., in terms
of severity of anterograde amnesia.
One interesting feature is that also he does not
remember any personal happenings that ever occurred
to him in his life. For personal experiences that you and
I have no difficulty with, at least mostly, of any kind,
he has none. His blankness of the mind when it comes
to personal happenings goes back to Day One. Otherwise hes perfectly fine. He speaks; he writes; he reads;
he thinks; he plays musical instruments; he plays chess
hes not a great chess player, but he knows the rules;
hes learned it. Now he spends his time mostly playing
computer games. But if you ask him, Kent, before you
came here, he doesnt know.
If I had brought him with me, I could ask him,
Where are we? and he would answer, I dont
know. Well, describe the room. He would say, Its
a room full of people and you are making one of your
speeches, I suppose, and you are showing my picture
here and they seem to be paying attention to what
youre saying. He has a dry sense of humor. But you
know where you are; I know where I am. Have you
been here before? No. Then how do you know where
you are? You know where you are because you remember how you got here, and thats the only reason. Take
away the memory of personal happenings and you do
not know where you are. This ability to orient in time
is made possible by episodic memory and autonoetic
(self-knowing) consciousness, remembering what
happened to you.
Earlier I suggested an outrageous, and possibly wrong, hypothesis about future being the most
powerful idea of the human brain/mind. Part of
the hypothesis is the idea that chronesthesia, which
88
makes future possible, evolved because it allowed

human beings to deal more effectively with vagaries
of unpredictable environment. Instead of adapting to
the world, chronesthetic humans began to change the
world to fit their needs.
Culture is the difference between the world as it
actually exists and as it would have existed, as a natural product of evolution, if there had been no changes
wrought by the creative human intervention. The initiation of culture was, and its continued development
is, critically dependent on autonoetic consciousness
and proscopic (forward-looking) chronesthesia. The
kind of culture that Homo sapiens sapiens has created
over the last 40,000 years or so can be produced only
by individuals whose intelligence includes conscious
awareness of the existence of the future in which they
and their progeny will continue to live and survive. We
take this ability of our awareness of time, both backward and forward, so much for granted that we dont
give it a second thought. But I say its one of the greatest miracles that evolution and nature have produced.
Pinker: Would you remind us of what autonoetic consciousness means?
Humans acquired autonoetic

consciousness some time after their
line split from the one that ended up
with chimpanzees.
Tulving: Autonoetic is the one consciousness that you
and I have that has to do with self and time. This is a
necessary component of episodic memory. Episodic
memory is a conjunction of self, subjective time, and
autonoetic consciousness. The way it works is this:
Humans acquired autonoetic consciousness some
time after their line split from the one that ended up
with chimpanzees. We do not know when, but probably quite recently. This difference from chimpanzees
and all other primates, and all other animals, ought to
be potentially discoverable at the level of physics and
chemistry of the brain. Chronesthesia allows us to
create autonoetic conscious awareness of the past and
conscious awareness of the future, so that we have an
idea of the future. And because we have a future, we
can think about future the way Kent or an amnesic
patient cannot. He does not know any more what hes

What Is Future?
going to do after he leaves here than he knows what

he did just before he got here. He does not know and
cannot tell you what hes going to do next summer or
next week.
We have a paper just coming out, a long, long
paper on Kent in Neuropsychologia, the whole story
with particular reference to the nature of his brain
damage. The damage is diffuse, consisting of multiple
lesions, so Kents case is not very informative regarding anatomical localization of brain regions involved
in his memory impairment. But even so, his case
can be seen as teaching us that if one can imagine
the future, as all healthy humans can, then one can
choose to act now in preparation for the future. Animals without autonoetic consciousness and ability to
think future act only in response to present stimuli
and need states.
I have recently proposed something called a spoon
test, which essentially is a test of future thinking in
chimps. If your chimps pass this test, bring me the
evidence and Ill say that I was wrong and your chimp
has chronesthesia. The chimp doesnt have to talk; it
just has to act in a particular way.
The point is that you change your environment if
you have some idea of what this environment is going
to be and continue to be. If you dont have any idea,
you simply adapt to the environment as it exists. Darwin knew all about it. It is what evolution has been
all about always making sure that you fit into the
environment as it exists. There are always exceptions,
but Im talking about the large scale. Then you change
your environment. It may start with burying your
dead. But Im not too sure whether that really requires
any future thinking. What does require future thinking is if you bury your dead and grave goods to go
with it, to be useful in the hereafter. Is there a hereafter? Of course there is, but only in your mind, and
only if you have autonoetic consciousness that enables
you to think future.
Tool use: I am not impressed about this fact. If
Homo erectus, for instance, used tools but did not
really improve them for a million years used more
or less the same tools then just making and using
tools is not an impressive achievement. What is more
impressive is if the tool users carried their tools with
them as they moved from one location to another, and
stored their tools out of sight for long periods of time
that they were not needed. Getting the materials for
making tools at a faraway location and transporting

them home where the tools are made is also more
interesting, because it requires forethought, imagining the future.
What is future? One of the most powerful ideas ever to

emerge from the human brain/mind. The important
thing is that future does not exist in the physical world.
So, thats the end of my story. What is future? One

of the most powerful ideas ever to emerge from the
human brain/mind. The important thing is that future
does not exist in the physical world. If there were no
human beings around, if you could look at the universe
as it existed for the first 11 billion years, there was nothing like humans around. There was no future in that
universe. Anyone who argues differently has a job.
Future comes in only as a manifestation of the
human brain and not hardware manifestation but
something that goes beyond it, that emerges from the
brain: consciousness. And that is why consciousness
is necessary. Thats why it has given us the current
world in which we live and thats why we have a conference here of this sort, and thats why theres no
telling what will happen in another thousand years, if
humans, somehow, manage to keep themselves alive
until then.
What do you think the role

of forgetting is?
Holloway: That was a really fascinating talk that has

so many tendrils in it that I would like to talk about.
You might be interested to know that toolmaking
goes back at least 2.5 million years ago, and theres
very good evidence that there was planning and
future anticipation because some of the materials that
were used to make the stone tools were clearly being
transported from one place to another. As you get
into about 1.8 million years, 1.5 million years, those
distances become quite large.
I wanted to ask you: What do you think the role of
forgetting is?
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What Is Future?
Tulving: Highly overrated. Forgetting is something

that happens naturally in the human brain, as all
biological organisms are machines; they wear down.
Thats very simple-minded. You probably have in
mind: Why is it important for the brains to be instruments that are programmed, not only to soak up
information but also to forget information? Thats
why I say that it is overrated. Too many people think
that somehow the brain gets full and then in order to
make room for new information in there, you throw
some stuff out and just forget. Its so nave I dont even
want to.
Holloway:
Thats too rational for me.
Forgetting is one of these natural phenomena. It also makes possible the study of memory by
psychologists. If there is no forgetting, then psychologists have no business saying anything about
memory.
Tulving:
Holloway: My question was more: Do you think

there is remembering to forget?
Tulving:
No.
these phenomena, I think, exist
in warm-blooded animals, but what
needs to be explained is how it got
enormously amplified
Im not an expert on this topic but from my

reading, my understanding is that there are some
birds that can store things and come back much later,
even knowing whether they are perishable or nonperishable. Chimps actually do carry their stones for
cracking nuts some distance, and they can remember
when the fruit tree fruited last year, and so on.
What Im getting at is that I dont think theres a
great rubicon, but I think theres some kind of quantum jump. In other words, these phenomena, I think,
exist in warm-blooded animals, but what needs to
be explained is how it got enormously amplified and
made so much more complex, as opposed to a bright
line saying that only humans are capable of thinking
about the future.
Varki:
Tulving: There is something called episodic-like memory. I have been involved watching it and supporting
90
these young people, particularly Nicky [Nicola S.]

Clayton, who is one of the major players in Cambridge, England, and whom I met some ten years ago
at UC Davis. When I was there, we talked about it. She
wanted to call it episodic memory in her scrub jays,
but had the good sense to call it episodic-like memory.
Yes, sure, there are always these exceptions. What is
tool use? What is language? Where does language
end and nonlanguage begin? Where does language
end and nonlinguistic communication begin? Nature
doesnt work like this. It doesnt come in packages.
Im simply saying that I have no evidence that any
other particularly, were talking about these great
apes that a chimp would be able to think about
the future and take action now in preparation for
the future in the absence of currently active drive or
stimuli or hormonal states or even changes in the light
and dark cycle. In the absence of those, I dont see that
any one can do what a three-year-old or four-year-old
child can do. Not a two-year-old two-year-olds also
have no future. Three-year-olds probably dont have
future. Future comes in somewhere around age three,
four, or five; this is what developmental psychologists
tell you. Young children, like all other animals, have a
sense of time in several senses, but they do not have
it in the same sense that they will have when their
brains mature and they begin acting like chronesthetic creatures. Young children do not sit around and
think about what they are going to do ten minutes
from now, or tomorrow.
If you ask a four-year-old child: What is this
color called? The child says, Green. No, no, no. Its
chartreuse. Then you test the child ten minutes later,
What is this color called? These three-year-olds are
fast learning machines, very clever, very intelligent.
They soak up information about their environment.
You ask them, What is it called? What does a child
say? Chartreuse. Good! Does that mean she
remembers where she picked up that information?
No. You ask her, How long have you know it? Forever, always. Everybody knows it. Exactly like my
patient, Kent. I can teach him things that have nothing to do with himself. He can learn. Kent, the dog
confronted what? He says, Bullfrog. I said, Dog
confronted bullfrog? He said, Yes. Why do you say
that? I dont know. Now hes getting smart enough
that he can think and say, Hey, perhaps it is unusual.
Perhaps you taught me. But whatever you know,

What Is Future?
you take for granted. Remembering where or when

something happened or where or when you picked
up some information is not a very important part of
human life. This is episodic memory, and the question is: What good does it do?
My mistake was trying to answer this question
thinking only about the past. This was a mistake in
the sense that it does not allow one to claim human
uniqueness of episodic memory. This is why the
insight (hypothesis) of a common subjective-timerelated sensibility (chronesthesia) that covers both
the past and the future was more promising. Chronesthesia can be (hypothetically) denied to all kinds of
animals, and machines, that otherwise have excellent
ability to learn and retain skills and knowledge. And
there are tests, such as the spoon test that I mentioned,
that can be used to prove the hypothesis wrong.
Varki: I basically agree with you. My point is that if you
set a line in an area or level of this issue where, in fact,
it turns out that there are many exceptions in nature,
youre going to be accused of moving the goalposts.
I think its much better to set the goalpost somewhere
in the middle of where humans are, rather than at the
minimal, otherwise you always run into this problem
where people say, Yes, but look at scrub blue jays or
chimpanzees. I agree with your general principle. I
would say that humans have this ability in far greater
excess than other animals do, but we may not have
studied enough animals to know how much of it does
exist in other parts of the animal kingdom.
Tulving: As a matter of fact, I talk provocatively
mostly to specialists because I want them to, as I said,
tell me where Im wrong. Now if you tell me that, yes,
theres evidence about tool storage and tool carrying
earlier than 40,000 or 50,000 years, fine, I accept that.
Im not going to argue with specialists who know. But
its still inferential evidence. I would be much happier to take our close relatives and see them, whom
we can actually follow. Jane Goodall is supposed to
have described an incident where some of her chimps
carried a stick around. I said, Fine, great. Now, next
time lets not just have Jane Goodalls word on it, but
lets have a videotape. Lets have a videotape of another
chimp or two on another occasion, and then we will
find out whether this is a cultural acquisition in that
particular group, or whether its really a general thing.
Then Im persuaded. But until then, I need hard evi-
dence they can do certain things.

Biology cannot have any laws because every single
organism that you study in biology is different from
every other single organism. Thats a kind of problem that physical scientists do not have. An atom of
helium or hydrogen in outer space is exactly the same
as here in your bottled water, right? You can study it,
and thats why you can make up laws. But everyone
here we may have 99 or 99.5 of the genome parallel sequences in common, but every one of us here is
as different as you can make us, if you want to look
at differences. Thats not meaning that there are no
similarities.
I am not one of those people who say, Its only differences. I am talking about differences because the
received wisdom right now in neuroscience and brain
sciences in general is that we are just big monkeys or
big apes, nothing much different. And, as a matter of
fact, Ive had heated arguments with people who are
supposed to be in the know. Ive said, Look, it is our
duty as scientists to study both similarities and differences, not just similarities. Some of them tell me,
No.
for the future you have to piece
things together that probably have
never been together before and you
have to make judgments
Calvin: I like that summary. One of the problems with
both looking into the future and looking into unique

aspects of the past, as opposed to annual migrations to fruit trees, is that you have to piece this stuff
together. That is to say, the what is likely to be in the
temporal lobe and the where in the parietal lobe or
hippocampus. In piecing together unique stories like
that, you make a lot of errors. You wind up probably
with things that look a lot like our nighttime dreams
of people, places, occasions that do not hang together
very well.
But since we speak unique sentences every day,
all the time, we get a great deal of practice in finding
coherent collections of things. Its this quality-control
problem that makes it hard to do whats in the past
very well, unless its been repeated and tied together
very well. But for the future, you have this creativity problem you have to piece things together that
91

What Is Future?
probably have never been together before and you

have to make judgments such as: Does this hang
together well enough to act on, or to speak about? Its
that quality-control problem that makes planning of
all sorts difficult, and it certainly is what makes difficult-to-piece-together stories pass decently. It seems
to me that thats the kind of thing you start seeing
with higher intellectual function and that may not be
very old in human evolution.
plays a role in causing what goes on in the present,

which sounds like nonsense in any realistic philosophical framework, but of course its what we do all
the time. In biology we often talk about something
less than that, but that looks a lot like it. Its been now
given the name teleonomy by Pittendridge back in the
1950s. That is, we have, in effect, over time become
more and more capable of something that has a very
old ancestry though it was much simpler.
Tulving: You are right, but note that you are talking
about mental activity and its contents. You are talking
about the message, and here I have been talking about
the medium. Youre talking about ships and voyages
that the ships are on. Im talking about the water on
which these ships float. Voyages are important, and
water makes them possible; thinking about your own
future (and your own past) is important, and chronesthesia makes it possible.
Tulving:
Calvin: Thats what I would really like to get at: What

are the processes in the brain that allow us to do this
coherence-finding? I think thats what enables us to
do what you are emphasizing.
we have tried to get rid of final

causality that is, causality in which
the future somehow plays a role in
causing what goes on in the present
A phrase that Ive fallen in love with about

this comes from Charles Sanders Peirce, the philosopher at the end of the 19th century. He called us the
creature that lives in futero. That is, we dont live in the
present in fact, we live in the future.
I think it really makes sense. He connects it with
something larger and I wanted to carry you back on
this because I think it fits with Ajits question, which
is somewhat like mine. I always find it very interesting, once you look at a phenomenon and you struggle
with it, to find out whats the special case of the general rule. The special case, of course, is this living in
futero that we can do, and we almost cant do without
it, as you pointed out and I think rightly so.
I look back at it related to a very much older philosophical idea Aristotles idea of final causality. In
biology, of course, we have tried to get rid of final causality that is, causality in which the future somehow
Deacon:
92
Good point.
Are there interesting interrelations

in the patterns of dissociations with
planning and imagining the future?
Tooby: Now that youve been reborn as this utterly
different thing, a cognitive neuroscientist, let me ask a
cognitive neuroscience question about this, which is:
Its an interesting claim that there is a computational
faculty for the apprehension of time and that episodic
memory might not be entirely spun off as a unique
thing but as an expression of this larger faculty. With
Kent and whatever other cases you have, can you get
a disassociation, people who lose the ability to plan
but are perfectly okay with episodic memory? Are
there interesting interrelations in the patterns of dissociations with planning and imagining the future? I
remember one time you talked about remembering
the future.
In general, the literature on these sorts

of issues is largely nonexistent; the
game is barely starting.
Tulving: There are lots of cases described in the literature showing that people with normal memory
(episodic and otherwise) are not capable of making
plans for the future. This kind of a dissociation frequently occurs as a result of damage to prefrontal
cortex. It underscores the fact that chronesthesia is
not a sufficient condition for future planning or future
thinking; it is only necessary.
Talking about dissociations, however, more inter-

What Is Future?
esting is a case described by Stanley Klein and his

colleagues at UC Santa Barbara (John Toobys home
institution). They tested a patient with four kinds of
questions, conforming to a two-by-two design. One
factor was the direction of time: past versus future.
The other one was personal versus general. The patient
did much better answering past- and future-related
questions having to do with the world in general than
he did with similar questions about his own personal
past and personal future.
In general, the literature on these sorts of issues is

largely nonexistent; the game is barely starting. When
I talk to neuropsychologists and other clinicians concerned with neurological and psychiatric conditions,
I suggest that they talk to their clients not only about
the clients personal past but also personal future. Not
everyone likes such new radical ideas, but the message is spreading.
Velamoor:
Thank you, Dr. Tulving.
93

What Is Future?
94
Explaining the Human Condition:

Problems and Prospects
Presentation by Ajit Varki, M.D.
Theres extensive molecular evidence

now showing that our closest cousins
are the rodents,
not dogs or pigs or whales
Varki: The first point that I was going to make was
actually already made by this Foundation, and that is
that if you want to know where you are going, you
have to know where you came from. We need to
know what makes us what we are, how we got here,
and where we came from. Its the totality of this information thats going to, eventually, allow us to try to
answer this question.
I also realized that the Foundation had a broad
view when I picked up this quote from your brochure
where Walter Kistler says that the purpose of the
Foundation is to bring some light into the dark cave,
so that humanity really sees and understands its surroundings and its own place in the universe.
Lets just zoom right into that region of evolution
that gave rise to us, the origin of primates. Theres
extensive molecular evidence now showing that our
closest cousins are the rodents, not dogs or pigs or
whales or anybody else, but the rodents. So, we actually picked the right species in terms of research
mice and rats next to primates. Then, of course, we
have common ancestors with prosimians, New World
monkeys, Old World monkeys, lesser apes, and great
apes. My work is focused on the hominids. Its pretty
clear now that we shared a common ancestor with the
orangutan about 13 million years ago, with the gorilla
about 8 million years ago, and with the chimpanzee
and bonobo, or so-called pygmy chimpanzee, about
67 million years ago. Now, the remarkable fact is that
while we classify all these species as great apes, the
mean amino acid difference between our proteins
between humans and the bonobo/chimpanzee clade
is less than 1 percent, and were closer to the bonobo
and chimpanzee than any of us are to the gorilla.

In fact, the correct classification now is as follows.
I wont go into details, but basically we are classified
as Homo along with Pan these two species under
hominids. So, is it wrong that we call all these species the great apes? Ive always wondered about this,
and I feel that weve gone too far overboard in the
other direction, going from saying that humans are
totally unique and different to saying that the politically correct view is that were just a third chimpanzee
(although I really like that book by Jared Diamond of
that title).
Over the years, then, I have collected these features
of humans that seemed to me to be somewhat different from great apes. This is just a part of a very long
list, an amateur list Im not an expert on this kind
of topic. You all know about brain size, the adductive thumb, and body hair, but some of you may not
be aware about the chin, skeletal muscle strength,
the descended larynx, the penis bone, concealed
ovulation, breast tissue in virgin females, a different
chromosome number, ear lobes, frequency of third
molar impaction (wisdom tooth impaction), and so
on. This list does not have cognition, consciousness,
language, or any of those things on it. Chris Wills saw
this list of mine sometime in the late 1980s when he
was writing a book. He took this information and put
it into one of these phylograms. And he put it in his
book [Children of Prometheus: The Accelerating Pace of
Human Evolution, Perseus Publishing, 1998], saying,
we stick out like a sore thumb, or like a fishing pole.
There is something unusual about us How do
you have a group of species that are a relatively
conservative clade, then you have this
unusual species emerge?
There is something unusual about us, and I dont think

its purely anthropocentric. I think its an interesting
95

Explaining the Human Condition: Problems and Prospects
question of evolution. How do you have a group of

species that are a relatively conservative clade, then
you have this unusual species emerge?
[Referring to slide] This is my daughter when she
was born in 1984. About ten years later I was flying
across the Pacific on a long flight with her and trying
to keep her busy, so I took out a dictionary that she
happened to have and I said, Check entries in the dictionary under each letter from the top. Stop when you
reach the first one that you think is unique to humans,
and Ill help you out. In very short order, we came
up with abbreviating, bag-making, calculus, darts, etc.,
and hit zeroing pretty soon. We finished up in an hour.
Then I said, All right, take the letter S and scan all the
entries under the letter S and record all the ones that
you think are unique to humans. And we started with
sacrificing, sack-making, saddling, and went on and
on. By the time we reached the middle, spending, we
were already tired so we jumped to the end to surfing.
The point of all this is that there is something unusual
about us humans, and I think its worthy of study and
its not an anthropocentric point of view. There is
something to be studied and its quite big.
The most obvious difference is cognition. There
are many areas of cognition: the arts, the humanities, and the sciences. My expertise is in the sciences.
[Referring to slide] Here we see C.P. Snows great
divide of the natural and social sciences, but actually I see the sciences somewhat differently: that is,
engineering and computing sciences, physical sciences, and biological sciences being quite distinctive,
and Ill explain why. Over the last century, all of these
sciences have made major inroads into each other,
although I would daresay that while the social sciences and biological sciences are beginning to merge,
theres still somewhat of a gap.
Now, I had the good fortune, as I mentioned, of
having come from a background in biomedical sciences. This is a shotgun marriage, the one field
where we cannot afford to say theres social science or
natural science or physical science or biological science. Theres only one science its medicine and we
have to use information from all the fields. This gives
me the advantage of having a central view in terms of
many of these problems.
If you look back at these different sciences, engineering and computing are highly precise. Well, we
created these sciences; we know the rules. Unless
96
somebody loses the code, we know exactly what were

doing there. In the physical sciences, we didnt plan it
that way, but it turned out that there are almost universal laws in most of the physical sciences. So, theres
a tendency to believe that biological sciences fit in
here as a form of a highly precise type of science, as
opposed to, as some people would try to argue, the
social sciences. I would say thats wrong. The central
dogma of molecular biology that Francis Crick enunciated in 1958 is: DNA makes RNA makes protein.
Its a wonderful and almost digital dogma, but theres
a tendency to then think, as this student put out on
the Web recently, that DNA makes RNA she recognized various kinds of RNA makes proteins; add
some chicken fingers, and you get me! In other words,
protein makes cell makes organism. In other words,
DNA makes the organism.
I organize some meetings on human origins in San
Diego, and the last time I heard Francis Crick speak,
this is what he said, There are no laws in biology only
widgets. Widgets, as you know, are little mechanical
devices that are useful for little things. What Francis
was saying is, Now I see that biology is just a huge
collection of widgets. We have all these little things
that do little things. We conglomerate them in various
combinations to achieve things that seem to work. So,
really, I think the physical sciences have to get used to
the idea that there are no laws in biology. But perhaps
there is one and that is this famous statement of Dobzhnasky: Nothing in biology makes sense except in
the light of evolution. But I think we need to be very
careful. I like the statement of John Coffin: Although
no biological explanation makes sense except in the
light of evolution, it does not follow that all evolutionary explanations make sense. So, you have to be very
careful, but that should not inhibit us from speculating and thinking along those lines.
most medical students think that
evolution results in optimal design
when in fact, what we are right now is
a snapshot in the history
The other point Ill make, since Im in Seattle, is that

we have our creationists and we have our evolutionists, and we think that they are in two different
camps altogether. Of course, the creationists now

have come up with the idea of Intelligent Design. I

realized in medical school that we train people how
to take care of one species humans but we teach
nothing about the evolution of that species. Actually,
most medical students think that evolution results in
optimal design, that everything is perfectly designed
and optimal, when in fact, what we are right now is a
snapshot in the history of this complex process called
evolution. Survival of the fittest was not coined by
Darwin, and survival of the luckiest could happen
just as well.
Lets go back to the central dogma [DNA > RNA
> protein > cell > organism], and Ill give you a
couple of other reasons why the dogma is inadequate.
Obviously, DNA is meaningless unless you express
DNA, and the physical environment has an impact.
The biological environment theres a huge impact of
microbes, particularly, on the expression of our DNA.
And in some species, we have cultural environments
where we can alter each others DNA expression. In
the case of humans, weve expanded this cultural
environment to take over all these other environments, so I daresay that humans are a major cause of
gene expression on the planet today, in many, many,
many species, including ourselves.
But theres another reason why this paradigm is
incomplete, and thats a molecular one, which is really
my area of research. Besides DNA, RNA, and proteins,
there are two other major classes of micromolecules
that got left out of the molecular biology revolution.
One are lipids fats that form membranes, without
which you dont have a cell. The other very major one
is called glycans, or sugars. This is not carbohydrate
diets and energy, and so on. If you were to approach a
cell, it would look like the Amazon Jungle, and everything that was green would be sugars. That entire area
of biology just got left out of the molecular biology
revolution because it was too hard to study. I stumbled
on it coming from a background in hematology and
stuck with it, and it now has a name. It is called glyobiology, which is really a variant of molecular biology.
[Referring to slide] Here Im showing you two
cells, and its not an exaggeration that Ive drawn there
in terms of the thickness and complexity of these glycans. So really, we have proteins and enzymes, glycans
and lipids, glycoproteins and glycolipids, giving rise
to cells and matrices, tissues and organs, organisms.
Of course, things do signal back to DNA, although
it turns out that a lot of what we thought was junk

DNA is, in fact, very, very functional. But, of course,
dont forget diet, microbes, parasites, physical environment, and, of course, in an organism like ourselves,
cultural environment.
This is an overview of my thinking about the
human condition. Our own specific research had to
do with a finding that there was a molecular difference
between humans and other animals. Basically, there is
a molecule thats on that cell surface that sticks right
out, called Neu5Ac its a molecule called sialic acid.
We found that the other major variant of this, called
Neu5Gc, was missing, specifically in humans, though
present in all the apes and other animals. The reason
for this is a specific genetic mutation that occurred
about three million years ago in one chromosome in
one individual somewhere, and is now fixed in the
worldwide human population. We actually have evidence now that it was probably fixed a few hundred
thousand years after the initial mutation.
Essentially, what we found is that as Ac is the precursor of Gc, so were actually mutants, being unable
to make this, but like any metabolic precursor, we
accumulate this other molecule. So, we have two differences one is a missing Gc on our cell surface, and
the other is that we have an excessive Ac. This has
raised a huge number of questions that we have been
pursuing over the last decade: how, why, what, when,
where, etc. Im not going to go through any of this
except to say that it ranges all the way from studying
fossils with Meave Leakey and Svante Paabo to studying the brain with Rusty Gage to studying stem cells,
or studying infections or malaria with people at CDC.
Were finding that a lot of this has had some impact
on the human condition.
This slide is from a review [An Anthropocentric
View of Primate Gene Evolution] I wrote recently
about known genetic differences that have emerged
over the last decade between humans and great apes.
This is an anthropocentric view, starting with rodents
and coming down to humans. These are genes that
have undergone these types of different classes of
changes. We initially found one genetic difference in
sialic acid biology. The entire field of sialic acid biology involves about 55 genes, and out of all of these, we
have now found 14 genes in which there have been
significant changes in sialic acid biology. We think
that this means this is a signature of some event that
97

occurred in human evolution that left its scars, so

the sialic acid system has been shaken up in humans.
Thats what were trying to study now.
So, how do you approach this kind of problem?
Unlike most other fields of science, when it comes
to humans, or, for that matter, great apes, 99 percent
of the experiments you would like to do, you cannot
do. Youre left with taking a very different approach,
for which I realized that my training as a physician
was extremely useful that is, the approach of making a diagnosis. If you went into the emergency room
with a coma, the worst possible thing that can happen
to you is to have the neurologist arrive immediately.
The neurologist will immediately go to your brain
and miss the fact that youve got a murmur in your
heart or a spot on your toe and what youve really got
is bacterial endocarditis, because youve had some
infection that came from somewhere else and thats
why you happen to be in a coma.
The right way to proceed is to collect
every possible piece of information
and put it together before you try
to make a conclusion.
The point is: How do you proceed? The right way to

proceed is to collect every possible piece of information and put it together before you try to make a
conclusion. So, my view of approaching the human
condition is that. Its fine to follow Suttons Law and
go for the brain, and to those that do it, I think thats
wonderful; I commend you for doing that; but I think
we may just as well find clues in the skin that lead us to
the brain or elsewhere. Its not a surprise that Arthur
Conan Doyle was a physician; in fact, many murder
mysteries are written by physicians. Physicians are
accustomed to being detectives, basically. I think that
Richard [Klein] would say that sometimes it is sort of
like a detective story that were trying to figure out. So,
this is our detective story for sialic acid biology.
Coming back to this issue of the different sciences, when I got interested in what makes us human,
obviously I had to try to learn some anthropology
and I tried to educate myself from Anthropology
101 onwards. As I said, my medical school education
didnt teach me any of this. I found to my surprise
that, as you all know, most of anthropology is classi-
98
fied under the social sciences. It seemed strange to me

until I read the history of anthropology and realized
that thats the way the field evolved. So, I would like
to suggest that rather than anthropology, which is a
broad study of humans in every context, maybe we
need to go back to what Haeckel called anthropogeny. Anthropogeny is the investigation of the origin
of humans (explaining humans). Its only a subset of
anthropology, but I believe anthropogeny should be
sited right in the middle of all the sciences. We need
to use all the sciences if were going to get anywhere
because of this problem of not being able to do every
experiment we want.
We need to make comparisons between great apes and

humans and other animals obviously everything we
can find out coming from a common ancestor
Here would be a very ambitious and broad agenda

for what we need to do. We need to understand great
apes and humans. We need to make comparisons
between great apes and humans and other animals
obviously everything we can find out coming from a
common ancestor, all of the environmental influences
of all levels on both groups of animals and intraspecies interactions: male versus female, adults versus
infants, etc. All of these things need to be studied.
When I started thinking this way about ten years
ago, I would walk around San Diego talking to friends
who happened to be a linguist or an anthropologist
or something or the other. One day, one of the neurobiologists, Rusty Gage, said to me, How many people
are you talking to? I said, Oh, about 20 people. And
its too bad: Theyll never understand each other. They
all speak different languages, and I cant understand
half of them. He said, Why dont you ask them to
get together? I said, They are not going to do that.
Lo and behold, they did! We formed something called
The Project for Explaining the Origin of Humans. We
have a broad-based view of this and try to take many,
many areas into account. We hold meetings and discussion groups. My biggest fear in getting this group
together was that these are all very famous people
who are well known to have big egos in their own
fields. This seemed to me to be a problem, and, in
fact, I think this is one of the big problems in human

evolution research. When we study humans, we are

studying ourselves. Were talking about ourselves.
Much more than in any other science, we have a tendency to hang on to our beliefs because were talking
about me. So, one very important aspect of human
origins research is that we need to cut out the egos.
a hypothesis I have come up with is that the major
diseases of a given species are likely to be related to
maladaptations during the recent evolutionary past
of that species.
The other thing I got involved in is that I realized

that here we have the closest evolutionary relative,
the chimpanzee, and theres very little information
about the chimpanzee. So, in one of the few areas
of scientific lobbying I did, I decided to ask for the
chimpanzee genome not just to explain humanness, but to explain biomedical differences between
humans and chimpanzees, and to improve the care
and conservation of great apes, keeping in mind that
we need other primate genomes to interpret differences, check differences in multiple individuals, and
pay attention to ethical, legal, and social issues.
When it comes to the biomedical issues, I decided I
needed to learn about chimpanzees so I spent a month
and a half at the Yerkes National Primate Research
Center, just learning the chimps. After interacting with
the chimpanzees, I sat down with the veterinarian who
takes care of chimpanzees, and found that hes using
Harrisons Principles of Internal Medicine, the same
textbook we use for humans, to take care of chimps.
We went through chapter by chapter, and it turns out
that there are a lot of biomedical differences between
humans and great apes many, many more than you
might think. It turns out that the chimpanzee research
community downplays those differences because they
think that it somehow means that they dont have a
good model. In fact, I think those differences are the
amazing things. If somebody is interested, I can tell
you a list of all these differences. But a hypothesis I
have come up with, which may not be novel, is that
the major diseases of a given species are likely to be
related to maladaptations during the recent evolutionary past of that species. A corollary is: The comparison
of disease incidence between humans and our closest
evolutionary relatives should be useful.
We managed to convince the powers-that-be to

put money into the Chimpanzee Genome Project.
We held a symposium last year when the information in the draft sequence came out. Its still coming
out. The bottom line is that things are far, far more
complicated than we thought. There are many, many
differences, many of which may be neutral. We are
going to be searching for many needles in a very large
haystack.
The other issue related to this is that apes are not
mice. Having spent time with apes, Ive come to realize they are very special creatures. So, weve argued
ethical, legal, and social issues regarding this. We my
colleagues Pascal Gagneux and Jim Moore, who are
primatologists, and I have written an article entitled
Great Apes in Captivity: Ethical and Scientific Challenges in the Post-genomic Era, which will come out
in the same issue of Nature. [Editors note: The Ethics
of Research on Great Apes, by Pascal Gagneux, James
J. Moore, and Ajit Varki, was published in Nature, 437
(September 1, 2005), 2729.] We are sitting on the
proverbial slippery slope where neither end likes us,
but I think that is the place to be on issues like this.
You have to be on a slippery slope sometimes.
phenome our original definition is: complete

information about an organisms phenotype and
relevant environmental influences.
The genome, of course, is a diploid set of chromosomes. We know exactly what the genome is. We
know how to go about defining it. A few years ago we
published an article in Science suggesting that while
we knew so much about humans, we needed to know
more about chimpanzees and great apes, and we suggested the term phenome. Its still not in any dictionary
but I just checked this morning and there are 113,000
entries in Google for phenome. Its now being used in
many different ways, but our original definition is:
complete information about an organisms phenotype and relevant environmental influences. Here is
the problem we face: We have the human genome at
a 10X coverage. All that remains to be done is to find
the differences between individuals, mostly. And we
have a huge amount of knowledge about the human
phenome. Over the millennia, weve accumulated so
99

much information in so many fields of endeavor, so

this makes sense. We can look at the genome and the
phenome and its influence on the environment, and
compare to the genotype and the phenotype.
The chimpanzee genome, by the way, is not complete. Its not polished. It will be polished in the next
few years, and it will come up to the same preciseness
as humans, although theres more genetic diversity
among chimps. When it comes to the chimpanzee
phenome, it turns out we know very, very little. So,
we have suggested that this is where the big hole is,
in terms of interpreting this matrix. One of the things
were trying to do is to create what we would like to
call a Museum of Comparative Anthropogeny, where
we will take all areas from ecology, complete including culture, to try to identify those things where
either people know that there are differences between
humans and great apes or that there are potential differences between humans and great apes including
the ones where it has been incorrectly claimed that
there are differences between humans and great apes.
This, we hope, will be a resource, although were just
beginning on this and it will be quite a while. The San
Diego Supercomputer Center is helping us with this.
The second project is to try to develop materials
and databases just simple things like if you want a
piece of chimpanzee skin to find out if there are genes
that are expressed that are different from humans. Its
not available. If you want a library of genes expressing
a given tissue, its not available, and so on.
[Referring to slide] This is Bernard Woods version
of the emergence of humans from a common ancestor after the common ancestor of the chimpanzee. But
as you all know, modern humans are a very recent
success story. While its not clear exactly when things
happened back here, the point is that a lot of things
happened very recently. Why is this? Again, it seems
to me that innovation and imitation are critical features. We have a very small number of innovators,
but despite our common phrase imitating like a
monkey, we are the greatest imitators of all. Cycles
of innovation/imitation can go a long way. Of course,
this is not a novel concept.
[Referring to slide] Here is the diffusion of hybrid
seed corn across two Iowa communities. There are 2.5
percent innovators and the laggards who didnt do it
even after a long time, but it diffuses pretty fast. There
are additional factors: population, communication,
100
and instruction. As you increase your population,

you can obviously greatly increase the availability of the actual number of innovators. Suppose we
had two billion chimpanzees. I dont think its fair to
compare the studies weve done on five chimpanzees
with four billion humans to see what their potential is. We do know that a chimpanzee doesnt have
the capabilities of imitation that humans have, but
this innovation factor can be great. Then, of course,
youve got communication and instruction or teaching, which amplify this whole thing further.
Finally, I want to conclude with my favorite we
all read Darwin and Wallace, and so on, and Im still
struck by this and somehow other people dont necessarily feel that theres a problem here, but I think there
is one. As you all probably know, Alfred Russel Wallace was the co-discoverer of evolution, but toward
the end of his life, he lost favor with science and sort
of faded from history. A lot of that was because he
wrote this article, The Limits of Natural Selection as
Applied to Man. What Wallace said is: It will, therefore, probably excite some surprise among my readers
to find that I do not consider that all nature can be
explained on the principles of which I am so ardent
an advocate; and that I am now myself going to state
objections, and to place limits, to the power of natural selection. So, he became a bit of a spiritualist.
Essentially he said, I can explain everything except
humans by natural selection. The origin of consciousness that developed into humans theres something
different about this. Again, what hes talking about
is this phenomenon: How do you have an exaptation that somewhere back here gives you a brain that
is capable eventually of I saw my daughter a few
years ago sitting in front of a computer typing, talking
on the phone, listening to music, and talking to three
people on AOL Instant Messenging all of this at the
same time. Granted that times were tough 50,000
years ago, but where did this come from? Im not
suggesting that theres anything more than normal
biology, but there may have been some other kind of
selective forces.
So, Wallace says, These can only be met by the
discovery of new facts or new laws of a nature very
different from any yet known to us. He lost favor
because of saying this, but I think he was just being
honest, saying: This is unusual. We need to go beyond
simple natural selection to explain these phenomena.

The great majority of differences

between humans and apes are in favor
of apes, apart from our brains, our
upper arm coordination, and maybe
our striding, bipedal gait.
One thing would be that we seem to have relaxed

selection for physical attributes as Terry [Deacon]
says: Were a degenerate ape. The great majority of differences between humans and apes are in favor of apes,
apart from our brains, our upper arm coordination,
and maybe our striding, bipedal gait. In everything
else we are degenerate; we are much worse off than
apes. Maynard Olson and I have written articles on
the idea that throwing away genes may be a much better way to get sudden change than tweaking existing
genes. Maynard likes this analogy: If you had a Lexus
and the weather changed and you had to survive, you
are not going to survive by tweaking the air conditioning and tinting the windows. Youre going to rip
the top off, throw away the air conditioner, and get a
Jeep. Thats how youre going to do it. Maybe something like that happened.
[Referring to slide] Heres a little thing I made up,
just off the top of my head. This is definitely part of the
story, but when it came in, I dont know: Prolonged
Helplessness with Extended Nurturing Occurring
with Maternal input during Extended Neotony Of the
Nervous System [PHENOMENON]. I think this is
one of the features that contribute to our abilities.
Ive barely talked about the brain at all, but I would
say that we need to take a holistic view of the human
condition because that will eventually lead us to the
brain and, in the bargain, will help us in many areas of
human endeavor. And when it comes to genetic modifications, I would say: Do what you like to yourself,
but dont do it to the germline, because you are going
to affect other people. Thanks.
Velamoor: Thank you, Dr. Varki. Are there any questions from either participants or observers?
Observer: When you had your tree with the humans
sticking up like a sore thumb, based on attributes,
what would happen to that tree if you filled in from
the fossil record all these other hominid species? Does
it become a little more uniform?
Varki:
No, not really. Many of those attributes we
have no evidence for, one way or the other, so it would

be difficult. But I think youre making an important
point that what we need to do is try to fill in as much
information as we can on the other fossil hominids.
The orangutan is so far away from us in molecular,
genetic terms and in terms of speciation, and yet I
would argue that classifying the great apes as a group
is still a very useful thing to do because they have a lot
of similarities.
The other reason human evolution is interesting is
not just a case of studying human evolution, but how
does one get evolutionary novelty out of a relatively
conservative clade of creatures? Thats my feeling. You
can look at it from the physical viewpoint. Obviously,
the moment you get into cognitive issues, there is no
end to the number of things you can list.
Velamoor: Even though its estimated, as you pointed
out, that the difference between the bonobo and the
human is about 1 percent or 1.4 percent, do all the differences you have listed add up to being within that 1
percent, even though it appears, when you consider
the spectrum, that it is far greater than 1 percent?
Varki: This whole 1 percent story was a useful thing
to focus attention, but now I think we need to get
away from it. As I said, mice and rats are our closest
cousins, not whales or dolphins or dogs. The percent
difference is no longer that interesting to me. It turns
out, actually, that the percent difference that has been
touted for so long is based on alignable sequences. If
you have two pieces of DNA, you couldnt align them,
you just had different parts of the genome. Now that
we have the whole genome, it turns out that in the
alignable regions, its actually less than 1 percent in
protein sequences. Twenty-five percent of our proteins are identical. But if you go to other regions of
the genome, there are huge chunks present in a chimp
and not in a human, and visa versa. There are all sorts
of insertions and deletions, so the actual number is
more like 4.5 percent, if you take the total. So, the
number of differences is huge. A lot of that is in areas
called junk DNA, but as weve been hearing recently,
a lot of that junk DNA is very active. In fact, in our
system, two of our genes were taken out by so-called
junk DNA landing there and killing them.
Velamoor: Given the fact that these are the differences and the magnitude is not great, taking all of the
101

junk DNA into account, what are the risks of the same
argument being co-opted by Intelligent Design?
I realize that its an inadequate position, but I
dont stay awake at night worrying about the Intelligent Design people. Sometime maybe in my
lifetime, I hope they will go away.
Varki:
Velamoor:
Not likely any time soon.
Varki: I have this view that bad ideas reach a crescendo before they collapse and right now we are
facing a huge crescendo of fundamentalism in all
areas. I think thats the prediction of a collapse. The
question is when it happens, and hopefully it happens
soon. The fact is that we shouldnt go exactly by numbers and percentages; we should go by actual genes.
One of the things the Genome Project has found
is that there are so many differences, they dont know
where to start. Meanwhile, we had a system of 55
genes and we had found eight that were different.
Then we found a few additional differences. It turns
out we found most of them just by nosing around in
a gene-centric way. So, what should happen is people
should pursue their little areas and make inroads into
the genome as a resource, and thats how it will happen, I think.
I always find it curious that

were terribly worried about the
simplification of the chimpanzee
genome when ours is such a
vastly smaller variation.
Deacon: You mentioned the very big difference
between gene variation within the chimpanzee clade,
for example, and the human clade. Unfortunately you
didnt show one of the nice tree pictures that give that
sense of how incredibly small our variation is genetically compared to a species that has maybe 100,000
or so individuals in Africa. I always find it curious
that were terribly worried about the simplification of
the chimpanzee genome when ours is such a vastly
smaller variation. I think there are significant consequences for our future because of that. I would be
interested in what you think.
tion than all the humans on the planet. Thats true

chimpanzees have a much wider variation. So, we
are an unusual species and this fits the idea of some
very small, common origin of peoples that spread out
and, by sexual selection and environment, and so on,
selected ourselves into so-called races. I personally
would advocate the complete abandonment of the
term race, going instead to looking at peoples of different origin, which is a very interesting concept. If
you want to talk about our future, I think that race is
one of the most damaging words that is used.
The fact is its not a matter of being politically
correct. Everybody in this room is genetically more
similar than a few chimpanzees in West Africa. Thats
just how it turned out. Now, having said that, on the
other hand, when you take a particular gene and
you look, you find many more polymorphisms in
humans. You say APO-E, the worst allele to have for
Alzheimers Disease and heart attacks, both of which
chimps never seem to have had. Heres the allele in
chimps. We have APO-E2 and APO-E3 and various
other things. Partly its population size, but partly we
came from a very narrow bottleneck and then subjected ourselves to enormous selection over a very
short period of time.
So, I think were going to see both: on the one hand,
overall incredible similarities and yet were going to
see all sorts of little selections that occurred. It makes a
huge difference whether you live on the Equator or in
the Arctic its going to make a difference in how you
get selected. Theres been rapid evolution over the last
50,000 years but, because of the rate at which humans
migrate and copulate with each other, a lot of that has
been partially rehomogenized, which creates a big
mess if youre trying to figure out whats going on.
Calvin: Regarding the Intelligent Design problems,
and, for that matter, creationism, these are beginners
mistakes. I think beginners mistakes are always going
to be with us because most of the population even
if they had the time that we have to study the issue,
some of them will do that, but the people who are
only ten years old or they stopped reading in this area
at age 20, or whatnot, are going to wind up with much
simpler analogies to work from.
Varki: Pascal Gagneux did his post-doctoral on this

and his thesis work was to show that one group of
chimpanzees in West Africa had more genetic varia-
102

the way I would speak to Intelligent

Design people is to say, Boy, you call
this intelligent design? What a mess!
Varki: The point I was trying to make is that most
biologists are unwittingly falling into that trap. We like
to think that the systems that we study the system
I study is wonderful! Its amazing in its precision and
balance because it was honed by many years of evolution. But that somehow translates into biologists
thinking everything is perfectly honed, and that gets
co-opted by the Intelligent Design people. Instead, the
way I would speak to Intelligent Design people is to say,
Boy, you call this intelligent design? What a mess!
Calvin: The other thing I wanted to say was that in
terms of a lot of selection going on in the period of,
say, the Minds Big Bang 50,000 years ago or in that
vicinity, in this period theres an enormous amount
of the climate flipping around. When you go from a
warm and wet climate to a cool and dry, dusty, windy
climate, and then pop in five years back up to the
other, what this means is an enormous amount of
drought, an enormous amount of shrinkage of populations down into confined areas where there are not
enough resources to make the trip to another population. So, you wind up with a lot of inbreeding, a lot of
loss of alleles and all different in each of the different
groups. Even when they come back together, youve
still got a lot of loss.
Varki:
Theres no question that theres huge variation.
Calvin: Particularly with the spread out of Africa at

this time, you have a perfect setup for squeezing the
populations down, reexpanding them, and when you
squeeze them down, you lose a lot.
my point is that the way that humans were classified

was a social construct the convenience of using these
old classifications is detrimental to society
and our future.
Varki: My point is not that theres incredible diversity in the human species; my point is that the way
that humans were classified was a social construct. I
think if you want to reclassify humans according to

our current knowledge, I have no problem with comparing groups. The biggest problem I have is with
the concept of white. I have no idea what white is.
You could have a man from North India who comes
to the United States and changes his name and has
fair-enough skin and he suddenly becomes a white,
whereas some blonde-haired, blue-eyed Scandinavian gets called a white. I think that if we got rid of
that, to begin with, that would help a great deal.
Now, if you want to say, My ancestry is primarily
of Scandinavian origin or West African origin, thats
very useful information, extremely useful biologically.
I just think that the convenience of using these old classifications is detrimental to society and our future.
Tooby: I was just wondering if you would talk a little
bit about having identified the eight genes that might
have glycobiological differences. I know that all the
consequences would come to a huge list, but do you
have, from what you have studied, a functional interpretation of any of them? What would have been the
selective force that would have driven it?
Varki: Yes. One thing for sure: We have changed our
susceptibility to certain infectious diseases because
these are the targets for things like malaria and various livestock diseases, and so on. That is pretty clear.
The second thing thats pretty clear is that we are
missing a molecule from our bodies that we are eating in our food. It turns out that its getting into our
bodies, incorporating into ourselves, and were making antibodies against it. And its also in stem cells,
which is why our recent work on stem cells got all this
attention because these animal molecules are getting
into stem cells and antibodies are reacting.
From the point of view of the brain, its all indirect
right now. We have one molecule that has turned on
in the human brain and it is not in ape brain, but we
dont know what it does, so were in the early days in
that. The other is the particular molecule that is present throughout the body of the chimp and missing in
humans. Theres only one place where its hard to find
its the brain. If you go back all the way to whales,
you find the same thing. Theres some reason why you
dont want this molecule in the brain; we find tiny
amounts in every brain we look at except humans. So,
our fantasy is that we finally got rid of it. Weve been
trying for three years to make a mouse that overex-
103

presses this molecule in the brain to see whats so bad

about having this molecule in the brain. Weve been
unable to get a mouse so far, which is interesting, but
unfortunately I dont have any definite statements to
make.
This has impact on biotechnology, on many other
things: food, various diseases of humans, and so on.
But its still in the early days.
Tooby: So, one of them might be because bigger
brain evolution, greater brain functioning in humans
requires a lower level for that one?
Varki: The timing is right. The mutation occurred
and got fixed about two and a half million years ago,
presumably by some infectious agent. It would have
actually resulted in an immune system that is hyperreactive, which we think is still not settled down. A
by-product of that could have been some selection
for some brain process. But we have a mouse now
that has the same defect as humans, the exact same
defect, and its certainly not walking around talking.
It has a few funny changes actually surprising things
like balance not things that we would have thought.
The problem is that youre talking about something
that happened a long time ago, and were seeing the
outcome right now. I think its too early for us to say
much more than that.
Holloway: Im interested in the possibility that the
loss of the gene or the molecule that you were talking
about might have to do with rationality. I find whales
quite rational. I find even chimpanzees to be rational,
and moose and caribou and all the rest. But I do wonder about humans.
104
Varki: Youre wondering if we became irrational by

losing this thing. Thats an interesting idea.
Holloway: In your talk, you mentioned Francis Crick
and widgets. Do you really subscribe to the idea that

there are no biological laws?
When I say laws, I mean universal laws. In
physics, there are universal laws; in chemistry, there
are universal laws that, at least in this universe, are
not going to change.
Varki:
With regard to the relationship between

brain and body, there seems to be a very, very lawful
constraint in which the exponent comes out to be .75,
suggesting a relationship to metabolism.
Holloway:
Varki: But Im sure it wont be very difficult to find

exceptions to the rule, like humans. Take a law in
chemistry: An oxygen atom, unless its in very, very
unusual circumstances, is going to behave like an
oxygen atom, and you can hang your hat on that certainty. Thats my point. Maybe I should change that
to say that what Francis is really saying is that there
are no universal laws in biology. There are little laws
you can make when a certain bunch of widgets get
together and do a certain thing, then you get a law of
those widgets, which works for that zone, but wont
work in another biological circumstance.
Velamoor: Thank you, Dr. Varki, and thank you all
very much. I think it was an extraordinary set of eight
papers.
Critical Question Theme

Emerging Knowledge of the Brain and Its Long-term Implications for Humanity
Following the individual presentations on Day 1, participants returned the following day to focus their
attention on group discussions of critical themes related
to the evolution of the human brain. Rather than adhere
to a set list of questions, the scholars chose to engage in
an open-ended discussion on emerging knowledge.
brain? Its that postnatal input when you make a

major change in something thats been working in a
particular way, how do we handle that in the face of
wanting very much to continue the so-called womens
liberation movement and have equality of women in
all spheres? There are a lot of unknowns there that are
very important.
What might be the most important

issues to discuss further, going
forward, specifically related to the
human brain and the future?
Velamoor: This morning is intended for the group
to have a conversation on the question: What might
be the most important issues to discuss further, going
forward, specifically related to the human brain and
the future? I want to make sure that we stay with those
aspects: the future and the human brain.
Take a moment, each of you, and think about what
two issues should be put on the table in a conversation,
and well see if there is a consensus that emerges.
attempts at genetic modification

and the dangers of doing so.
the use of addictive electronic

devices in the particularly sensitive
period of childhood.
I phrase that as soft-wiring in childhood,

encompassing both the instinctive stuff and the way it
has changed, as in Terrys example yesterday. Also, the
game machine that would be the modern manifestations of it the use of addictive electronic devices
in the particularly sensitive period of childhood. It is
the sort of thing that we could use to train for handling more things at a time or doing them quicker,
the preschool versions of those that people will surely
try out and that will surely have some lifelong effects,
in some cases.
Calvin:
Velamoor: Should we call that risks of electronic

babysitting?
Calvin:
For my top two, the first would be, basically

following up on Steves talk from yesterday, this whole
idea of attempts at genetic modification and the dangers of doing so.
The second for me would be something we didnt
discuss a lot but which I think is really critical, which
is the major changes that are being made in how
babies and infants are being managed. Its a major
change from our evolutionary background. How do
we handle that and understand the consequences of
that, negative or positive, for the future of the human
Electronic baby training.
Varki:
flexibility with respect to adaptation

to alternative social and
technological environments.
Deacon: Those are probably the top two, but I will
add another one. It could be phrased: How flexible
are we? How flexible is our species? Its really an evolutionary psychology question. Are there some things
105

we cant do? Some places we cant push? Some ways

of organizing human societies we cannot do because
of predispositions that we have inherited and are
not modifiable? So, this is flexibility with respect to
adaptation to alternative social and technological
environments.
In other words, the top one is the dangers and risks
of actually moving ourselves, which weve already
done to an extensive degree, into a very atypical rearing environment. We are also, of course, because of
this, in a very atypical adult environment, and the
consequences of that are significant. So, the first one
is about pushing us. The second one, which Im suggesting, is that there may be a push too far that we
simply cant do. There are certain societies that will
not form simply because of the way we are. I think
thats a possibility.
Calvin:
There will be side effects.
Deacon: Right. What I want to say is that it would

be nice to be able to identify that ahead of time, not
that we will. The first one is possibly a what could
happen issue. The second one is a constraints issue:
What are our constraints and biases?
Calvin: You can use modern society as a brief example. People these days are living in a society where
90 percent of the people they meet every day theyll
never see again. Its completely different.
What would be the impact on our

species of having a social science that
was based on the circuit logic in the
brain, as opposed to the present
social sciences
Tooby: Before we get to quite such ambitious topics, let me try some other still-too-ambitious topics.
The first thing is: Whats the functional circuit logic
mechanism in the human brain? The second thing
is: Whats the developmental genetic instantiation of
that, which would give us insights into questions like
flexibility, and so on. Then the third thing would be:
What would be the impact on our species of having
a social science that was based on the circuit logic in
the brain, as opposed to the present social sciences,
which are in contradiction to what the brain is going
to be like and, therefore, hopelessly weak?
106
the brain, human nature, and its

relationship to political realities
what is missing here is any overview of
what is happening in the world
Holloway: What I would suggest is probably involved
in all of these. What I would suggest is something
like the brain, human nature, and its relationship
to political realities, because what is missing here is
any overview of what is happening in the world, not
just whats happening in foundations and academic
circles. The fact that were growing to about 9 billion
people in a very few decades is a reality that I think
has to be put in context when were talking about the
brain and human nature whether we can change it
or cant change it and that fits in exactly with Terrys
issue about how flexible we are as a species. I would
like to say something about political realities.
Calvin: I would modify that slightly to say that its not
only how flexible we are as individuals, but as a society, what we permit individuals to have. Were getting
a lot of reaction at the moment to evolution in various
parts of the country, to concepts of the newly fertilized ovum having a soul, for example.
There is a batch of societal concerns about things
that in the future will buy us academic concerns. Its
not just a matter of what the brain is capable of. Its a
question of how political reality will guide it.
Deacon: I would like to expand our first issue also.
Genetic intervention is, of course, not the only kind
of intervention, and, certainly we are going to see
in the very near future lots of attempts to come up
with prostheses of various kinds. Were seeing it now
only with respect to sensory and motor processes,
but that clearly is not the end of the issue, and the
question then becomes: What are the consequences
of expanding our ability to directly access computational resources and that sort of thing?
Now, in a sense, the boundaries of what we call
human nature are going to be different. The more we
directly connect in with this and I think this is also
true of the social connections were talking about it
really changes the boundary of what we are. Thats a
significant issue because I dont think we know how
to think those processes through. I dont think we

know what the consequences are going to be.

Calvin: For example, suppose you do have training
machines for the sensitive period in childhood. And
suppose that those are largely developed by groups
religious groups come to mind that will have a very
distinctive agenda of give them to me when theyre
young and Ive got them for life. All the things that
we can imagine to do to enhance intellect can also,
presumably, work to do other things like that.
What makes us what we are?

find out when in life and from what
sources in life we turn into what we are
that is a significant question.
Pinker: Im interested in all of these topics. I have a
couple comments on some of them.
I tend not to think that the first issue is going to
be a big problem, just because of the practical limitations. I dont think were going to face the ethical
dilemma of human germline engineering. I am also
very skeptical of implanted chips or interfaces in the
brain, simply because of the physiological problems
such as a brain that pulses with every heartbeat and
floats around in the skull, our lack of knowing the
neural code, the crudeness of any interface. Since
we have, already, such a rich interface through our
eyes and voice and hands, I think that the cost/benefit
ratio is always going to go towards a better Palm Pilot
rather than an implantable chip.
There may be an issue with drugs that enhance
memory, intelligence, attention, and so on. I tend
to think that those are minor ethical problems, and
theyll be worked out as people find a balance of costs
and benefits.
Regarding the second issue, Im also skeptical that
this is going to be a big problem because I think the
developmental program is buffered against a lot of
variation other than extreme neglect and abuse. It
certainly is a significant question what socializes
people? what gives them the certain set of values and
skills of their culture? but I think that, as a result of
over-interpreting some of the findings of plasticity in
neuroscience, weve thought way too much about the
first few years of childhood, whereas what we really
ought to look at is adolescence, which is when a per-
son adopts his adult identity. Its when they get a lot
of their values, and when peer-to-peer influences are
likely to be much more significant than parent-tochild. But, again, its an empirical question.
As a sign of how important it is, the fact that weve
looked only at one possible solution probably the
wrong solution suggests that this is something that
we need more research in. In particular, the fact that
an enormous amount of variation in intelligence
and personality is not predictable by either genes or
families (up to half the variation) means that theres
an enormous set of causal processes that we have no
understanding of. I suspect it is some kind of small or
random events in either brain development or early
lifelong experience, for that matter. A broader version
of Question 2 is: What makes us what we are? And
not prejudging it by saying that its neo- or postnatal,
but to find out when in life and from what sources
in life we turn into what we are that is a significant
question.
I think Question 3 is interesting but I think we
should remember that the kind of people around this
table are probably not the best ones to address it, but
rather social historians. There is a lot of interesting
data from experimental societies that were set up
in the late 19th and middle of the 20th century. The
Kibbutz; the socialist societies of the Soviet Union,
China, Cambodia; the various utopian rural communities in the United States; the Oneida community;
and so on. There are very interesting social histories
on how these attempts at reforming human nature
ran up against human nature, which provides a lot of
insight to Question 3.
Question 4: Johns point about whether the kind of
science that many of us think ought to be done will
be unacceptable for political and emotional reasons,
I think, is a very significant issue. Bill mentioned creationism. Many of us around the table in the corridors
and over dinner have talked about postmodernism
within academia as a significant barrier to biological anthropology. The fact that both the right and the
left, large segments of them, would rather see this not
happen is something we have to deal with, which is
why I wrote The Blank Slate.
I would like to add another issue that is perhaps a
sub-issue of Question 3: How flexible are we? Another
way of looking at it is: We know that there has to be
some degree of flexibility because there are cross-cul-
107

tural differences and historical change. Ironically, the

people who have pushed the malleability of culture
have very few explanations as to where these differences come from and what causes them.
To give one example that I think many people
ought to study and very few people are studying,
theres an enormous secular trend over the past couple of millennia away from violence in the following
senses. I should say force in general. Slavery used
to be the norm and now its rarer and rarer not,
of course, that its eradicated but its gone from the
Western democracies. That wasnt true 150 years ago.
Torture as a sanctioned form of criminal punishment;
bodily mutilation as a sanctioned form of criminal
punishment cutting off an ear or a finger; corporal punishment as a sanctioned form of criminal
punishment we dont put people in stocks or hang
them from chains legitimately. The fact that there was
such outrage over Abu Ghraib proves this point. The
lynchings and ethnic riots: A hundred years ago, if
a black man was accused of a crime in a town, that
would have been an excuse to go out and burn the
homes of all the black people. That doesnt happen
any more. Wars, even in the last 50 years: There used
to be the generalization that no two countries with
a McDonalds ever go to war. It turns out that there
is an exception now, since the Americans bombed
Sarajevo, because there is a McDonalds in Sarajevo.
But, still, if France and Germany have a dispute, they
wouldnt invade each other, and that is something we
take for granted now but which couldnt have been
taken for granted 100 years ago. Human sacrifice, corporal punishment of children theres a long list of
cases that, as awful as these times are, by a lot of measures theyre much better than they were 100 years
ago, 500 years ago, 2,000 years ago.
Human nature, in the sense of the
biological given of emotions and
self-deception, hasnt changed, but
something has changed.
Can we bottle it and get more of it?
So, what happened? Human nature, in the sense of

the biological given of emotions and self-deception,
hasnt changed, but something has changed. Can we
bottle it and get more of it? What are the candidates?
I talked briefly about Peter Singers notion of an
108
expanding circle. Somehow you take a capacity that

we all have, in some degree of empathy, and you try
to expand its range of application. How does that happen? One hypothesis from Robert Wright is that its
through trade. When you have expanding networks
of trade owing to advances in technology, you just
make it easier to ship goods or services over greater
distances. More and more of the world becomes more
valuable alive than dead and youre in a positive sum
rather than a zero-sum situation.
Another hypothesis is that its other technologies of empathy: history, realistic fiction, journalism,
enough knowledge of what its like to be someone else
that its harder to dehumanize them because you are
tempted to think, there but for fortune go I. Maybe
Hobbes was right, and its having a Leviathan, that
as we have better police forces, better criminal justice systems, people not only have less temptation to
commit aggression but they have less temptation to
commit preemptive aggression, worrying about the
other guy getting to them before they get to him.
So, these are a few hypotheses. I know of very little
work, other than Bob Wrights nonzero, that systematically identifies this trend and tries to isolates its
causes. Likewise for other secular trends I mentioned
yesterday, such as the Flynn Effect.
Could we state the issue as: Can we think
in terms of the limits to the expandability of our identities?
Velamoor:
Do we know the antecedents, the causes, that would

make one culture a culture of vendetta
and another one less so?
Pinker: We dont know what the limits are. I would
rather put it as: Do we know what the causes are of
long-term historical changes? That is, how can there
be long-term secular changes given a constant brain,
presumably, or constant genome, assuming that we
havent seen any genetic changes in the last 100500
2,000 years? Its a version of Terrys Question 3, but
more on the positive than the negative. Its not: When
will we bump into a wall? But rather: Whats been the
motor thats pushed us around so far? It can be asked
cross-culturally as well as within a culture.

Another example, partly relevant to this, is instead

of looking diachronically, to look cross-sectionally. A
work of Dick Nesbitt and Dov Cohen on cultures of
honor. We know that different cultures have more
or less of a sense of honorable displays of force and
retaliation, and displays of bravado and toughness.
Not all cultures are the same, even though I assume
that its a feature of human nature that you find in
all cultures, but some ramp it up more than others.
Do we know the antecedents, the causes, that would
make one culture a culture of vendetta and another
one less so? They claim to have identified several factors. But hypotheses as to where that flexibility comes
from and what drives it are surprisingly missing from
our social sciences, probably because, as John points
out, unless you have a theory of human nature that
includes what the parameters of variation are that
it allows, what inputs its sensitive to, ironically you
cant do the social science. You have to have a good
understanding of the innate structure, which is going
to have lots of inputs, lots of ways of responding
facultatively to changes in the environments. If you
simply assume that cultures vary arbitrarily without
limit, just by the throw of the dice, then one change is
as likely as another change and youll have no insight
as to what causes particular changes and, therefore,
no lever in which to nudge it in that direction more
in the future.
all of the violence and force
committed by almost all societies can
be accounted for by
the Y chromosome.
What were really talking about is the use of

violence and force. What weve not mentioned at all
in fact, all of the discussants here are male is that
all of the violence and force committed by almost all
societies can be accounted for by the Y chromosome.
You can almost say that civilization is the process of
taming the human male. How can we bottle that and
proceed in that direction? I think we need to acknowledge that.
I remember about ten years ago there was a lot of
discussion in Science with Letters to the Editor about
the genetic basis for aggression. Finally, there was a
short letter from a woman scientist that said, I dont
Varki:
know what all this discussion is about. More than 95

percent of all the violence on the planet is due to one
piece of DNA the Y chromosome. Why dont we
first do something about that?
Pinker: This, by the way, maps onto Question 4. If the
President of Harvard mentioned that, his head would
get cut off. You would get violence from the other side.
Varki: Yes. Weve reached a difficult situation where
the people who try to bring up the issue on either side
get pilloried by the Left or the Right. I think these
issues need to be brought out into the open. Essentially the process youre describing is a gradual process
going from 50 percent of all deaths being male-onmale violence to being less than .1 percent. In a sense,
thats the picture that has occurred. And thats what
we call civilization. Everything else that comes along
in civilization is possible because of that. If you just
remove that one plug, then you lose most of what we
call civilization.
Pinker: Although a lot of the changes occurred within
what we call civilization. Its within civilization that
you have disemboweling as a form of punishment and
slavery.
Varki: Yes. I am using civilization as a positive term,
not as a general phenomenon.
theres a great mystery in brain

science as to how knowledge is
converted into behavior people
know exactly what to do and
they do not do it.
Tulving: I am agreeable to everything you people say.
At the same time, I also told you that I frequently tend
to be out of sync with the rest of humanity and the
rest of society on occasions like this. I know its not
going to make you very happy. Its going to be upsetting, but I feel that I have to say whats on my mind.
My question is: What are you people doing here?
Exactly what is it thats going on? What kind of exercise
is this? Ive been sitting through all kinds of scientific
meetings and faculty meetings; it reminds me of a faculty meeting people get up and start making wise
statements about everything. First of all, the topic was
supposed to be Future of the Human Brain. I look at
that list of issues we have developed, and I ask: Exactly
109

where is the brain there? Are you going to engineer a

change of the future human brain?
Why does brain matter? Why does brain play a
role in it? Answer: Brain is behind behavior. You can
change your brains as much as you wish, but unless
it somehow expresses itself in what the people who
own the brains do with the new brains genetically
modified or artificially filled with knowledge then
when it comes to behavior theres also knowledge.
Theres a relation between knowledge and behavior.
Are we talking about changing behavior? Are we talking about changing knowledge?
Right now, as it happens, theres a great mystery in
brain science as to how knowledge is converted into
behavior. There are instances after instances where
people know exactly what to do and they do not do it.
That, to me, is a kind of mystery that requires attention.
The point here, in general, is that we have so many
really hard, unsolved, fundamental problems having
to do with the brain, behavior, mind, and then the
third level my specialty, my love object consciousness, which is separate from behavior and cognition.
Very few people want to acknowledge it. I dont mind.
I hope that a hundred years from now they will have
come to that conclusion.
The problem is what we could call individual differences,
variety, Darwinian diversity, the one fact about nature
that drives all of evolution What are you going to do
about individual differences in your plans for
the future of the brain?
My point here is that I will be quiet during your discussions. Ill let you change your world. But theres only
one thing that I want you to keep in mind and this
is my contribution to that list there. You have overlooked one of the most basic facts about humanity
and biology in general, and I wish that in your discussions you would at least think about it. The problem
is what we could call individual differences, variety,
Darwinian diversity, the one fact about nature that
drives all of evolution, everything. One of the most
important problems you dont have to have a Ph.D.
in anything to realize it is that theres a tremendous
variety of individuals in every imaginable way, right
here in this room, and this is a highly selected, small
segment of society. Just go outside: in northern Wash-
110
ington State, then in Washington, then in the United

States, then go to the rest of the world. What are you
going to do about individual differences in your plans
for the future of the brain?
Im sorry to sound so negative, but thats the way I
am. I like people who really try to identify problems
that exist and then say: Okay, is there anything we can
do about that problem? If so, how do we go about it?
This kind of dreaming about. I hope Im not offending anyone. I dont want to offend anyone. Im simply
speaking my mind. This is the way with academics,
too; this is very normal behavior, as I said. You get
together; you take an academic interest in something;
then you generate ideas; then you argue about them.
These grand visions about changing the world: What
is human nature as if there is one thing called human
nature? What is our future? What is our brain? Who
is this generality? This is, by the way, the mistake that
you find most frequently made in our daily media:
generalization. Americans think that way. The Muslims think that way. The Palestinians are all like that.
Men are like this; women are like that. Used car sales
men you know what they are like. Mothers-in-laws
theyre all the same. Thats good for general conversation but when you actually tackle the problem, its
silly. You dont think that way.
a lot of whats going on in brain
sciences today involves telling people
something they dont want to hear
that the brain is physical,
that we evolved.
Deacon: This has to do with, not exactly the moral,
but the spiritual side of whats going on here. Over the
years, Ive been invited to many conferences in which
religious people, sometimes fundamentalists for
example, in South Africa at the Parliament of World
Religions spoke about the brain and evolution and
what the consequences are. Many people dont want
to know. I think that a lot of whats going on in brain
sciences today involves telling people something they
dont want to hear that the brain is physical, that we
evolved. All of those things are dangerous knowledge.
Theyre knowledge that is not wanted, in some sense.
One conference I went to was A Knowledge Worth
Having in the Decade of the Brain. There were many
in the audience who said that this is not knowledge

worth having, and their arguments sounded very

much like the responses to the Copernican revolution or the Darwinian revolution. That is, were in the
process of pulling ourselves out of the center of the
universe and the more we understand issues of consciousness, for example, the more we can say: Look,
I am struggling to understand, and I think I have a
story to tell. If, for example, 50 years or 100 years or
however many years from now we have a relatively
complete picture of what the brain is doing that contributes to what we call consciousness, that will have
an effect far more drastic than the Copernican revolution. It will demystify something that many people
dont want to demystify.
The question is: How do we communicate this in a way
that does not limit the spirit, that does not limit the
humor of the joke, that gives a spiritual piece
to this story?
The analogy I would suggest is that of telling a person

why a joke is funny. Most people dont want to know
that. To tell the story ruins the experience. I think that
were not sensitive to that, and part of the reason I
say this is I think thats part of the political issue, part
of fundamentalist issue. One of the reasons that were
having this rise in fundamentalism is because of what
science has done what we have done in terms of
trying to know these things. The question is: How do
we communicate this in a way that does not limit the
spirit, that does not limit the humor of the joke, that
gives a spiritual piece to this story? Weve not done
so. Theres nothing about what weve talked about and
what most of my neuroscience colleagues talk about
that has spirit in it.
Tulving: I just want to totally, utterly agree with Terrys
statement that the major problem that faces people
like us here today is the large number of people who
think differently from us and do not want to know.
Therefore, suppose that you can convert another one
percent of Americans, lets say, to the view that perhaps evolution is not just a theory, its a scientific fact
and that our behavior is governed by the evolved brain
in every single way and thought and idea and feeling
and twitch. If we could get this going, wouldnt this be
a better world at the end of the thousand years? There
is none of this argument going on about people not

wanting to know, wanting to deny facts. Thats a current problem but it also continues forever.
The whole idea of differences between
people became eradicated, instead
of looking at it as one of the greatest
things the human species has:
brain variability.
Holloway: Maybe its time for an anecdote. I had
the good fortune to go to Australia and spend some
weeks there with Clive Harper who is a neuropathologist. We were working on, among other things,
differences between males and females in terms of the
corpus callosum and the effects of alcohol, which is a
very serious problem in Australia. But years before,
around 1985 or 1982, I hooked up with Clive Harper
and met a fellow by the name of Jorge Klebamp. Klebamp and his friend at the time, Agnes Reidel, and
Harper decided to take a very close look at Australian
Aborigine brains. They collected a large number of
them. They sectioned them; they did the histological
work on them; they had a very large sample of German brains; and they made a comparison. What they
found was that yes, indeed, the Australian Aboriginal
brain is somewhat smaller overall than the German
brain, but so is stature and those differences could
really be explained very well by environmental things
such as diet, and so forth.
But when they came back to area 17 of Brodmann,
which I talked about a little bit yesterday, they found
that the primary visual striate cortex in the Australian
Aboriginal brains was roughly on the order of twice
the volume of what they found in Germans. They
tried very hard to find a dietary explanation for it:
They were from the Outback or they didnt eat right
or the mother milk wasnt good, and so forth. They
had to really get rid of almost all of those hypotheses.
Then they started looking at the scores on perceptual
abilities and found that the Australian Aborigines
were outscoring Caucasians vastly more because
they were just much better at finding complex relationships in the environment. That material was
published a long time ago.
Well, it took close to eight years of submitting these
findings for publication. Nobody, of course, wanted
to publish this kind of finding because, after all, thats
111

the sort of stuff that was demolished by Gould in The

Mismeasure of Man [W.W. Norton, 1981] wasnt it?
The whole idea of differences between people became
eradicated, instead of looking at it as one of the greatest things the human species has: brain variability.
Well, the anecdote is this: The Australian Aborigines caught wind of this research and said, in essence,
Thank God were not Caucasian!
Whether were going to have designer

kids or not depends on whether theres
going to be anything around to design.
Klein: It seems to me that if I were worried about the
future, I would worry about whether theres going to
be a human brain, primarily because theres a problem with climate change, which is humanly induced,
and the possibility of viral diseases, which we have no
antibiotics to deal with, or bacterial diseases. It seems
to me that what you want to do is educate the collective human brain society to begin thinking about
these questions, not a thousand years from now.
There probably isnt ten years to do it. That might be
the biggest issue of all. Whether were going to have
designer kids or not depends on whether theres going
to be anything around to design. I think thats a really
massive issue.
This bird flu thats out there mostly in Southeast
Asia and which looks like it will eventually jump, if it
hasnt already jumped, to people could have the same
kind of effects. When was that flu epidemic about
1919 that killed 40 million people? Could be more
than that. Nobody seems to be worried about the
overuse of antibiotics. On a governmental or administrative level, nobody seems to be very much worried
about whats going to happen when the back bay of
Boston is under water or much of Lower Manhattan.
Its going to happen and its going to happen pretty
quickly. That, to me, is what is imminent. The other
stuff we can worry about after we solve that. Its really
hard to get people collectively to deal with an issue
like that.
112
I dont think we can get a rational

collectivity until we have some
understanding of exactly how social
interactions are driven by the
circuit logic in the brain.
Tooby: To respond to what you said first, the assumption is: Can we get the collective to think rationally?
We assume, as academics, that we think rationally
and, therefore, our perceptions of the worlds problems and the worlds solutions its a problem of
persuading those less rational than we are. I think
theres some truth to that or I wouldnt be an academic. But there are social processes that occur when
you put all these different psychological architectures
together and certain things become markers of superiority of an in-group: I perceive this moral problem;
other people dont perceive that moral problem; therefore, theyre inferior to me. Therefore, certain types of
attention go to certain kinds of problems much more
than other kinds of problems. What Im trying to say
is that I dont think we can get a rational collectivity until we have some understanding of exactly how
social interactions are driven by the circuit logic in
the brain.
For example, witch hunts are fortunately remote in
time so we can say, Ah, thats irrational. But we dont
really see the same things that pass through academic
environments in the same kinds of ways, even though
very similar underlying logics are driving those kinds
of things. So, I see the connection to understanding
the brain as very much relevant and connected to getting our collective brain to think rationally.
Theres been this dialogue between universality
and individual differences that has been going on
for a long time. Theyre not in opposition, although
the normal thing is to say that to look at individual
differences is immoral because that raises the possibility of sex differences and race differences, and only
demented people do that. So, theres a huge collective
distortion in rational information processing on these
questions.
On the other hand, I think that there is something extremely important that emerges out of the
primary science about species typicality that there
is robust species typicality in the functional architecture because you cant get functional pieces to fit

together unless you have standardized parts. We have

sexual recombination and if everybody had different
functional pieces then the next generation wouldnt
fit together. So, human species typicality is something
objective and real, like the Toyota Camry standardized design, and looking at individual differences and
how individual differences fit in the context of universality is a very interesting scientific question. Often,
the very same phenomenon looks as if its an individual difference when you look at it with one metric,
and then you find an underlying principle, and you
find principles variation, which means that theres a
universal-principles relationship, which explains the
variation, too.
Scientifically I very much sympathize with the feeling of oppression that people who objectively try to
look at individual differences feel. On the other hand,
I wouldnt want to go too far and say that universality is a platonic illusion and that its not something
real and hard and principled and important. If the
functionality is going to turn out to be much more
species-typical, then medically important individual
differences will emerge as deviations from that.
Third, in thinking about the future and the brain,
its God is in the details so that its a little bit hard to
think systematically about the future.
A different way of expressing an important intellectual project is to say: What are the major unsolved
questions about the brain? Everything about how the
future emerges out of our understanding of the brain
will come out of what the answers to those questions are. Theres a sort of tacit premise though I
dont want to oversell this that in some sense were
already on the right boat; were already headed in the
right direction; the major questions about the brain
are sort of in principle understood. I dont think thats
true at all. You pick on consciousness. I, myself, am
much less worried about consciousness than other
smarter people are, so Im stuck in my materialist
delusion.
nobody knows (though there are many theories)

what the connection is between material organization
and knowledge.
Another very specific kind of major, fundamental,

unsolved question is that you can walk through cognitive neuroscience and people dont really admit
that nobody knows (though there are many theories)
what the connection is between material organization
and knowledge. Can we say: Here is a set of cells;
here are inputs to the cells. Whats in the structure of
this input? Thats how information is carried. Heres
the computation going on because of these cellular
interactions. Heres the output. The most basic fundamental question about brains people dont have
any idea about. Thats a fundamental question that we
dont understand and finding the answer to that would
be unimaginably major. I think we wouldnt know
what the implications of that would be. Finding the
basic scientific answers to fundamental questions like
DNA would have all these unforeseen consequences.
Theres nobody attacking, using technology, to really
try to answer these fundamental questions and I find
it surprising and a little bit disturbing.
Velamoor: What were coming up against in listing
all these things is maybe a division in a binary sense
as to what the nature of the issues is. One is to treat
the brain like the black box and lets consider the
inputs and outputs and see what the relationships
are, as opposed to what I gather John to be saying,
and perhaps somewhat resident in the comments by
Ralph and Endel, too: No, lets understand the black
box first and then everything else will fit.
Deacon: None of us, as far as I can perceive, would want
to ignore whats in the black box. Crucially, opening
the black box and doing the best we can is, of course,
the important first move. Thats going to happen. Johns
point is quite right. We dont have a general theory of
brain function. We have a bunch of very cheap theories,
mostly from the 19th century, and were applying them
with all of these new tools and I dont think we really
still understand how to put it together. I dont think we
can actually, unfortunately, make predictions on what
were going to find. When we find it, to know what to
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do next that will come up then. I dont think we can

foresee that. Thats a real problem were in. Obviously,
we have to continue the science.
Velamoor: Considering that were focusing on a
thousand-year horizon, they dont have to happen in
an either/or, first/second sequence. They could happen simultaneously, which is, presumably, what is
happening anyway.
You could argue that getting rid of

violence is taking away something that
is part of our evolutionary heritage
Varki: Im in favor of looking in the black box but
also dealing with the situation as a black box, at the
moment, because its probably going to take a thousand years before we really know. We dont know how
the lobster ganglion that controls whether the tentacle
goes this way or that way, how it makes its output, and
were talking about things orders and orders of magnitude more complicated. So, I think its going to be
a long time before we get enough information about
the black box in order to make rational decisions.
Meanwhile we are experimenting with the very
evolutionary processes that brought us this black
box, on a social level and in many different ways. You
could argue that getting rid of violence is taking away
something that is part of our evolutionary heritage, so
were experimenting there; were experimenting with
children; were doing all these things. I think you have
to proceed on both fronts, because one is a somewhat
empiric approach to how things are and what you
think might be the right answer, and hopefully it will
be right when you find out the black box.
I want to briefly comment on the issue of differences. I think this is extremely important. In fact,
the definition of life is that you have to have variety;
otherwise there is nothing to select. I think this is a
very important research agenda I agree with Endel
and Ralph but I would say that when people say
that they have trouble with this kind of research, that
they keep getting flak, the reasons are obvious to me,
right in what Ralph said. He started out by saying that
comparing German brains brains taken from a particular part of Europe with brains from Australian
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Aborigines a reasonably defined group and found

differences. Thats very interesting. I would want to
know what that is. Then as he progressed to speak,
he switched from German to Caucasian. I think thats
what the problem is; thats what is causing this unnecessary backlash against this very important research.
If you can get away from these old terms that have
baggage hanging on them, which create unnecessary
reactions from people, and stick with the scientific
fact. You could say: I have these brains from Germany.
They come from this particular group of people and
Ive identified that all these brains are from people
who have three generations of ancestry locally here.
I define my Aborigines not according to whether they
happen to be in Australia and theyre dark-skinned but
according to what I know about their ancestry. Then I
think people would be much more receptive.
All these terms are preventing a very important
research agenda. Although I agree that you can keep
changing names, I think the way to do it is not to
throw away terms because people are used to them,
but put them in scare quotes. So, when you talk about
race in your lecture, you know youre using race in its
old colloquial meaning and you know that theres no
such thing, as a genetic term, but the people sitting in
the audience think youre espousing it. Its very simple
just put it in scare quotes. Whenever you use these
terms that are not scientific, but you still need to use
them because of the historical significance, put them
in quotes.
Pinker: This is, basically, calling for euphemisms,
which I think ultimately will be ineffective. In fact,
they wont even be effective on the short term. We
already have changed from black to African-American and I dont think its made any difference. I think,
actually, that there is an impending crisis that all of the
clashes between human genetics, behavioral genetics, evolutionary psychology, and so on, are going to
reappear in a way that might make the whole Larry
Summers thing look like a tea party by comparison.
When the medical geneticists who are interested in
differences in the genome that correlate with geographic ancestry we can call it that instead of race
but people will still know that that correlates pretty
well with race come up with characterizations based
on clusters of genes instead of a single gene. Its true
that skin color is a pretty minor part of the complex

but if you do a correlation matrix among all of the

different human gene variations, there are going to be
clusters, and the clusters are going to correlate with
ancestry, and the clusters are also going to correlate
more or less with traditional racial terms, at least on
continent-wide scales.
Lets say that there are genes that are associated
with variations in psychological functioning: intellect, personality, motivation, and so on. There are
going to be statistical clusters that reflect our relative reproductive isolation on continent-wide scales
until Columbus and they may find that some genes
that are associated with personality and intellect are
also associated with these clusters that were shaped
by ancestry. Theres no guarantee that that wont happen. Its quite possible that it will. Then theres going
to be the bell curve wars, the Arthur Jensen wars all
over again, and I think one of the challenges that
people with a biological approach to mind behavior
are going to come up against is how to deal with the
ensuing outrage.
Just to give you an example, just three days ago
there was a huge op-ed in The New York Times by
a developmental biologist by the name of Armand
Leroi, saying that contrary to the generalization that
race doesnt exist its just a social construct; theres
no such thing as race theres going to be a statistical genetics that is going to reconstruct something
probably pretty close to continent-wide races as a real
biological entity. Again, I think theyre very trivial
compared to the universals, and I think scientifically
theres not going to be a whole lot of interest compared to the universals because its going to be such a
minor part of the variation and it is so statistical. But
people will find out about it when it happens and we
have to be equipped to deal with the ensuing ruckus.
Calvin: There are overgeneralizations that the public will engage in and there are beginners errors that
they will fall into and never get out of. One of the
reasons were never going to get a rational society is
because most people will never get up to speed. They
will stop at some point with a metaphor that was
convenient. Robert Frost had this wonderful saying
about metaphors. He said, You dont know how far
you can ride it and when it will break down. Thats
the position that even we, as scientists, tend to be in,
but its certainly the position of what the publics going
to be in, and its simply a consequence that we dont

live forever; we always have new children growing up
instead. There will always be a substantial population
that is not going to be able to get their heads around
the issues we have to spend 20 or 30 years getting our
heads around to understand it.
I have got to have some clear
understanding of how brains vary
to have some better understanding
of what the evolutionary forces have
been in the past
Holloway: I agree with John that the vast amount of
variability is probably shared, as far as we can go with
the phenotypic aspects of the brain. What troubles me
about it is that it has a possibility of leading to a perception that the loss of this gene pool over here and the
loss of this gene pool over there really isnt that terribly
important to the human species, in a way, because, after
all, we have all this tremendous shared genome that we
can all count on. But as somebody who has studied
evolution for 40-some years, I would not think of writing a paper or studying a phenomenon without having
some understanding of the underlying variability to it.
This is just part and parcel of what we do in anthropology. If a skull is found, Ive got to go and study a whole
mess of skulls and find out where this thing fits. Can
I explain it with regard to the variability that I see in
here, or is it outside that range?
I think the same applies to my understanding of
how the brain evolved. I have got to have some clear
understanding of how brains vary. It doesnt matter whether its chimpanzee, whether its gorilla or
orangutan, whether its Australopithecus africanus, or
whether its modern Homo sapiens, Ive got to have
that knowledge to have some better understanding of
what the evolutionary forces have been in the past
and then to understand what the future of it might be.
So, Im intensely interested in Richards point [Will
there be a future to worry about the brain?], because
what I see are political things happening and environmental things happening in which, for example, you
might lose a good, significant proportion of the population of southern Sudan the Darfur thing, as an
example. These are very unrosy pictures that are taking place and Im very concerned, really, to maintain
as much variability as we possibly can. Im thinking
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that we have this tendency to get too academic about

all these issues and dont really place it in the context
of the political reality that is out there. I would like to
hear a little more addressed to Richards point.
I think this knowledge is the most
dangerous knowledge weve had in our
hands Whats the significance for
the ethical, moral, and political issues
that are around this?
Deacon: The issues I see dividing here are not whether we
should know whats in the box or whats out of it. It seems
to me, clearly, that everyone wants to know both. The division seems, to me, to be about whats most important to
know, as No. 1: how brains work, how they function; and
what the consequences are of fiddling with them. No. 2 is:
How do we deal with the ramifications political, ethical,
moral, communicative?
This knowledge is going to mean something. This
knowledge is going to change things. Whether its
about individual differences, whether its about population differences, this knowledge is not neutral. The
bottom line is that this is knowledge about what it
means to be me; therefore, this knowledge will not be
neutral. If we dont pay attention to the fact that the
knowledge is not neutral, that it is really hot, that when
somebody brings up issues about Aborigines versus
Germans, for example, this is not neutral information. We in the sciences can want to treat it as neutral
information, but this is not neutral information. We
need to be savvy about that and, in fact, as we do this
research it will bring up all kinds of political hassles.
I think religious problems will grow because of this. I
dont think that we are going to see an end to this for
a long time. I think this knowledge is the most dangerous knowledge weve had in our hands for all of
these reasons. And so I think we need to think about
that piece of it: Whats the significance for the ethical,
moral, and political issues that are around this?
Varki: I think Terry has the two major issues absolutely correct: What do we need to know, how do we
find out, and how do we deal with the consequences?
But theres a piece in between. Its going to take a long,
long, long time before we have this dangerous information, even though we may think otherwise. What
are we going to do in the meanwhile? In the mean-
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while we have to proceed on a somewhat empiric basis,

based on our best guess, literally, of how we came to
be what we are, how our brains work. We have to use
all the information we have because it may be too late
by the time we find out how things really work.
Calvin: It seems to me that things like the genetic
possibilities, the wired-brain kind of enthusiasms
that science fiction writers come up with, and the
early childhood softwiring possibilities are all things
that we can talk about effectively for informing others
about where our concerns lie.
I think that the political problems here are going to
be very serious. No one would really have thought that
public opinion would or could matter very much to
the physicists investigating gravity. You just wouldnt
think that the publics conception of it was going to
bias the way the research went. Clearly, thats the sort
of thing that can happen with the brain, because the
things were talking about implicates how children are
brought up, and that arouses great emotions on the
part of parents who think theres a right way. In many
cases, they will not want to know. Things will happen in terms of the public getting its impression of
the scientific enterprise coming from the people who
make Gameboys or something like this. When we
discover in another ten years what the effects are on
the kids brought up on all that intensive training the
upsides and the downsides the scientific enterprise
will, in some sense, get painted by the publics reaction to those things. A lot of it is going to be out of
our control.
We will probably discover a number of attempts
like what were seeing with the problems with teaching evolution and such now. There will be substantial
enterprises, like trying to keep evolution out of the
movies. Certainly, if you read The New York Times yesterday, its already happening with the IMAX films.
Could I ask the panel to think about one

thing? Unlike going to space, which you can do with
a thousand Ph.D.s and a few astronauts, this seems to
be a different kind of enterprise. What fraction of the
human population would you want involved in this
enterprise? First, the genetic heritage of humanity is
everybody, and the other thing is social. Were discussing what happens to the United States as opposed
to other parts of the world, but actually that social
backlash is going to come from everywhere at once.
Observer:

Tooby: Looking at all the cell surface proteins and all

the possible interactions in a cell population of hundreds of billions, thats not all going to be mapped out
for 150 years or 300 years. The increase in computation and simulation might actually get us somewhere
some day. On the other hand, making very discrete,
forward progress on concrete functional mapping is
actually not all that hard, provided somebody actually does it. Theres a lot of important neuroscience
that Im not including in this, but Im talking about
mapping widgets, and mapping widgets has concrete
benefits very rapidly. It took us one graduate student
and three years to find a way to turn off peoples racial
awareness. People think race is important and being
able to turn that off is significant. Once we have circuit logic, we can look for the physical correlates of
that, and I think some of these other things will start
to get untied. I think real material progress could
happen fairly rapidly.
Calvin: What were dealing with here is the long-term
view of future brain evolution.
That is correct. Not for the next decade,

not for the next 20 years, but over the long horizon.
Velamoor:
Observer: My work is in organizational behavior and

education. Im especially interested in pursuing the
black box, but also what can be done immediately.
I was intrigued with the line of question that Steven
was taking us down about lets look at the reasons for
secular progress that have happened over time and
explore what is behind those and see if we might be
able to accelerate those.
Second, Terry [Deacon] said that No. 8 [Will there
be a future to worry about the brain?] is not a brain
issue. I think it might be a brain issue if we think of
it as a collective brain issue. One of the things that
you have said is that human nature is not just in the
brain but its also out there. It seems that, as we connect more and more using the Internet, its even more
out there. I would be interested in comments from
you folks on the idea of collective human nature or
collective brain in this process and maybe touching on what Ajit [Varki] was talking about with the
innovators and the imitators. It seems that part of our
connectivity is quicker imitation.
Even knowing how the brain works, even knowing what

we might call circuits of human nature we may still
not be able to figure out how that works collectively.
Deacon: One issue that is a part of this but is very
hard to put our fingers on at this time because of its
complexity is what I think generally goes under the
term emergent properties. Even knowing how the
brain works, even knowing what we might call circuits of human nature or whatever, we may still not
be able to figure out how that works collectively. We
may still not have good models for how, when you
put a bunch of these critters together that have these
biases, what actually comes out is a collective process.
That is a particularly difficult problem.
I think it is a problem of human nature because
we are an ultrasocial species. Part of the problem of
human nature is what you might call collective human
nature. I think its a very different phenomenon and
we dont understand it well. It is clearly something
that social science will help us with but I think not
enough. We need to have some general principles
also about how these collectives self-organize, and we
have a long ways to go in that.
Part of my reason for talking about the offloading
in evolution of processes into the world is something
I think is critical about what we are. Our nature is a
nature that has a lot of offloaded components to it,
and, for that reason, we need to know that kind of
emergent logic, as well as knowing whats inside the
thing. This idea of inside and outside the black box,
which I, myself, threw out, is a misnomer, in part,
because I dont think the box has very nice insides.
Velamoor: Is there a likelihood that individual differences, in terms of decision-making or choices
affecting the future, will be moderated by the collective nature? I would assume that if you look at
history there is such a possibility, where, in fact, the
collective can moderate and can, in fact, even out
individual differences. Would someone care to comment on that?
Deacon: What I think is interesting about this is that
often times collective processes amplify some differences and bury others. Often times its very hard to
117

understand how that occurs. Now, curiously and not

surprisingly, these same kinds of problems come up
when we talk about how brains function collectively or
how embryos develop collectively. We have some similar principles to look at that, which we can even draw
out of this, but one of the things that I think is likely
is that for the most part were talking about general
features that will eclipse, amplify, hide individual differences in ways in which our view that my difference
makes a difference may be quite trivial. And the kinds
of individual differences that were talking about might
be trivial, but perhaps some general algorithmic-like
feature, when you put a group of people together, takes
over and swamps out those differences.
Velamoor: It goes back to what Steven was raising as
an issue: force and violence. I would imagine that the
moderation of violence, whether its on an individual
level or at the collective level, has moderated individual differences and individual propensity here.
how does cognition adapted to

deal with rocks and plants
get metaphorically extended to
deal with molecules and quarks?
Pinker: I think there are a lot of issues about how indi-
vidual psychology, when aggregated into a collection

of people exchanging information and promises and
threats and bargains, results in collective behavior,
most of which were completely ignorant of. Despite
the fact that we have this social science tradition that
appeals to culture and social change, and so on, a lot
of it we really dont understand, such as the secular
change in violence that I alluded to.
Another example of how individual talents and
even individual differences can get subsumed into
some collective, more or less mind-like entity is the
scientific enterprise itself, where I think you can ask
the question: How does a brain shaped for certain
ways of building tools, negotiating social contracts,
outsmarting plants and animals, come to understand
the material basis of life, the origin of the universe?
Part of it, I think, is purely psychological. That is, how
does cognition adapted to deal with rocks and plants
get metaphorically extended to deal with molecules
and quarks?
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Part of it is: How do human motives that otherwise

get in the way of the rational pursuit of the truth get
subsumed by a collective value of truth for its own
sake? The scientific enterprise is as much about social
mechanisms that prevent self-deception, and how ego
and belief in the service of social identification may
be submerged for this greater goal of figuring out the
way the world works things like peer review, things
like the ethos where even a graduate student can ask
a challenging question of a Nobel Prize winner. If
someone disagrees with you, you dont sue them, you
dont challenge them to a duel, but you hash it out. You
would lose points if you were to file a lawsuit against
someone who challenges your idea or if you threaten,
Why dont we settle this outside? So, that whole set
of social norms that submerges a part of individual
human nature, that tends to protect reputation, that
tends to engage in self-deception, that tends to adopt
beliefs as a form of social solidarity, I think, is well
worth understanding as much as development of statistics and this so-called experimental method.
Another example is that most social changes really
have no good explanation from within social sciences. Lets take as a simple example fads and trends
in naming children, especially for female names. You
can pretty much date the decade that someone was
born in, depending on whether her name is Mildred
or Betty or Linda or Susan or Jennifer or Ashley or
Tiffany or Morgan or Meredith. All hypotheses that
try to explain what causes these decade-to-decade
changes fail. Its not that people are named after soap
opera characters. Its not that biblical names become
more popular at ages of revival of religion. Its some
process that begins in individual psychology. A lot
of people individually think that they are unique in
naming their child Abigail, that it just sounds right.
They dont know anyone else named Abigail. Then
they go to the daycare center and all the other little
girls are named Abigail.
What is it in the collective environment, obviously very
subtle, implicit, unstated, but that can cause many
uncoordinated minds to move in the same
direction at the same time?
What is it in the collective environment, obviously

very subtle, implicit, unstated, but that can cause many

uncoordinated minds to move in the same direction

at the same time? Its a real mystery and I think an
enormous amount of social change works like that.
Its not a response to advertising. Theres no company
that profits if you name your child Morgan. Its not a
question of any kind of role models. Its clear that some
mechanism must be at work; its a kind of explanation
that clearly involves some self-organization, some sort
of high-level patterning as the result of many low-level
decisions that influence each other in weak ways.
Why did the NBA go from short, tight basketball
shorts to long, baggy basketball shorts? Why did the
first teenager decide to turn his baseball cap around
backwards? These are trivial examples of something
that, obviously, must happen at a more consequential
scale. Things like, Do I challenge someone to a duel
if he chats up my girlfriend at a party? in different cultures, the response is going to be very different
and these changes and differences might come about
through this process of contagion or some sort of
synchronicity-like process. If we understood it better, we might have a better handle on why societies
change and whether there is any chink in this process in which we can insert a little bit of influence or
whether that would be desirable at all.
Varki: Changing the subject to interventions that
improve the brain, I would like to point out something that is usually avoided in all these discussions
and that is the very simple fact its been shown over
and over again that prolonged breastfeeding results
in an improved IQ and a healthier child and a better outcome. There are hardly any exceptions to that.
Meanwhile, society has appropriately decided that
women are no longer to be for want of a better word
baby-making machines and that women need to
find an equal place in society. In the process of doing
that, what has been done is to have good nutrition in
childhood, resulting in early menarche in childhood:
delay your first child as long as possible, minimize
breastfeeding because its a nuisance and gets in the
way of your career. I have just described the prescription for ovarian and breast cancer, of which we have
an epidemic going on right now.
Meanwhile, any male who brings this up will be
immediately challenged as being a male chauvinist
pig, so I want to bring it up not from that point of
view but to point out that we need to realize that were
re-engineering what our evolutionary background is

and make appropriate adjustments.
Theres a letter in this weeks issue of Science that I
co-authored. I had a graduate student in my lab have
a baby. I had a post-doc have babies twins, actually.
And, of course, I watched what my wife went through
when she tried to be an academic with a child, so we
talked about this and somebody had just written an
article in Science saying, We need to adjust the tenure clock so that women can have It turns out, in
fact, that that works negatively because if you give a
woman an extra year, the men in the group think that
theres some kind of special favor. We didnt use the
term, but we should have we should have said, Its
childcare, stupid.
In other words, what a young mother needs is to
have immediate access to her baby while doing work
and be able to breastfeed. This is a good prescription,
but we dont do it for liability reasons and for cost reasons. We proposed a solution in this letter. I just want
to point out that this is an example of social engineering that needs to be done in a positive manner, which
would have a huge impact on the future of the brain
because breastfeeding is a very specific biological fact.
And along with that comes a lot of other things that I
cant imagine arent beneficial to the growing mind.
I would like to ask Endel about the
conversation about individual differences and the
collective brain, and we can expand that to individual consciousness and the collective consciousness
or unconsciousness. Would you care to comment on
that, Endel?
Velamoor:
the way society is organized is not

synchronized with biological reality. It
tries to deny what is absolutely true in
nature in too many ways
Tulving: By individual, I did not really mean individual differences in the old psychometric sense of taking
a bunch of people or population and giving them all
kinds of tests, like Francis Galton, who started the
tradition, as some of you know. I simply meant that
there are probably kinds of variance in humanity that
no amount of tinkering with will ever change, for
reasons that Steve [Pinker] was alluding to. Its just
119

too complex for anyone to try to make sense of, and

these conflict with our present social systems. This is
a major problem I have with society as it is organized
now, and unfortunately I cannot take any credit for
this great insight because zillions of other people have
said it before.
It is a fact that the way society is organized is not
synchronized with biological reality. It tries to deny
what is absolutely true in nature in too many ways
for people who try to look at it objectively, perhaps.
Take the two terms pro-life and pro-choice. Can you
imagine that a thousand years from now you will have
converted all of the individuals to one of these two
positions? Of course not. Take religion: Some people
are religious; some are not. Are you going to talk them
out of it and others into it? No, because apparently, for
reasons that I, as a psychologist, will only observe I
am in no position to really even speculate this is
a built-in system. Some people, lets say, need religion; others do not. These are individual differences.
When we talk about us human beings, we have to
remember that there are basic differences, fundamental differences.
The Foundation really doesnt want anyone to make
predictions about the future. How can you talk about
future without making predictions, because you know
nothing else about it? And you have to remember one
interesting psychological fact. Psychologists have
studied it but its well known to common sense, the
wisdom of the hindsight, the 20/20 vision it comes
to the same thing about explaining and understanding behavior after something has happened. Through
the history of the world or a nation or a group or
an individual, it makes perfect sense. All the pundits know exactly why it happened. Im so amused.
Every day I look at the paper and see what has happened to the Dow Jones index and sometime it goes
up 100 points and sometimes it goes down 8 points
and sometimes it goes up 12 and comes down. They
always have an explanation for it. The same way for
the American dollar against yen and Euros theres
always an explanation. They know exactly what happened. And that creates an illusion that behavior is
relatively easy to understand and to explain because
we do it all the time.
I must say, not as a scientist but simply as a human
being whos been around for a long time, Im very
skeptical about this ability.
120
Velamoor: Im still waiting to hear you talk about the

relationship, if any, between the idea of a collective
brain and an individual brain.
Theres no such entity as a

collective brain.
Tulving: I dont think there is any collective brain. I

think this is a jack of spades kind of entity. You can
always define it; you can always point to it; but it does
not exist. Individual brains behave totally differently
in a different context. Pecking order changes; people
become heroes; and others become followers. We
know about dynamics of the masses. Its very easy to
describe, but to say that this is a collective brain is like
talking about collective memory, which is another
one of these very popular literary terms. Media people love it. Scientifically it is nothing because you cant
really do anything with it.
I dont know how to study collective brain independently of individual brains in different contexts:
alone, in duos, in large collections. The dynamics
change, of course. Theres no such entity as a collective brain.
Velamoor: Is there an absence of evidence? Or evidence of absence?
How can I prove that there is no collective

brain? I cannot. The onus is on you to prove that there
is one. When you do that, then we can always come up
with alternative explanations and then we can argue
about why your explanation is better than my explanation. You say, My explanation is better because I
believe in it, and I dont believe in yours, and thats
how it ends up in science a lot of the time.
Tulving:
the fact that you dont have an

operational scientific method to
investigate something doesnt mean
that it doesnt exist in a
metaphorical sense
Calvin: Obviously, collective brain is a metaphor
and the fact that you dont have an operational scientific method to investigate something doesnt mean

that it doesnt exist in a metaphorical sense that may

turn out to be scientifically approachable. Its just
like saying that theres a knowledge of history thats
available, if you look far enough for it, that will help
inform your decisions. Clearly people respond differently when theyre in committee settings, than they
do when theyre sitting down to write, than they do in
a public forum. Its a different mindset.
Still, humans evolved in groups, unlike
many other species, and so our brains
are designed to interface with others in
certain systematic fashions.
Tooby: Taking the point about the metaphor, theres
nothing unreal about people existing in groups and
interacting in groups. Theyre real phenomena that can
be studied like any other phenomena. If you look at
individual brains, the fact is that the parts are in physical contact with each other, but the physical contact
is an arbitrary feature. It dovetails with our intuitive
physics of solid objects and, therefore, we think that
solid, cohesive, bounded things are somehow real and
other kinds of systematic stable relationships in the
world are not.
The bigger difference between collectivities and
individuals is in the stability of the relationship of
the parts and the dynamics. Still, humans evolved
in groups, unlike many other species, and so our
brains are designed to interface with others in certain
systematic fashions. Therefore, I think there is potentially a genuine social science that emerges out of our
understanding of these evolved interfaces.
You were saying that in mass psychology the
dynamics are well understood, but then you were saying that collective brains dont exist. I think theres the
possibility of understanding mass psychology. Certain superficial features are obvious, and I think that
eventually we will understand it.
Exactly the sort of collectivity and what kinds of
systematic biases Im not sure Im entirely fond of
the word bias because it underplays the reality of the
selectivity of what happens in human, social, network
brains. But in any case, theres a real science there. As
soon as you get rid of the blank-slate hypothesis, you
can then make progress towards a real social science.
Your intuitions about mass psychology can be turned
into genuine science, at some point.

Tulving: Now the discussion has turned in a direction
I would classify as having to do with concepts. Thats
a different level of analysis and science altogether. We
are now talking about what exists and what does not
exist. In many other sciences, these things that exist
and we study are taken for granted. When it comes to
life science, and particularly psychological behavioral
mind sciences (brain/mind sciences), this is a real
problem because we use terms that were adopted from
rather primitive societies, trying to press them into
service to describe things that never, ever occurred to
the hunter-gatherer.
This is a very important part of any science the
conceptual pieces and its totally, utterly neglected
in all kinds of psychology: cognitive psychology or
developmental psychology or neural psychology or
your evolutionary psychology. What is what? Before
you can start studying anything, you have to know
what it is you want to study. Scientists have two kinds
of ideas. Some say: How can I tell you what I want to
study before I study it? Let me study it first, then Ill
tell you what it is.
The other view is that you have to have some idea
what youre studying. Im studying memory. What is
memory? I started studying it as a graduate student. I
dont ask that question. Thats for old fogies to worry
about. I know exactly what Im doing, and dont come
and confuse me about these questions of what it is. I just
do my job. I do the experimenting; I analyze the data;
I write it up and then chew my fingers waiting for the
acceptance or rejection letter. Thats what Im doing.
Then I reach the present age and I say, We do not
know. As a matter of fact we dont know what it is. It
is a very important problem and if we knew it better,
if we could get people all those individually variable
people in my little neck of the woods to agree on
what it is were studying, we would be making faster
progress. But we do not because everybody has his or
her own idea what it is. Now, people who work with
genes dont have that problem.
Deacon: There is one important thing that we have
not touched on. When a bunch of folks get around
to talk about brains and minds and evolution, all you
hear about brains is thoughts and knowledge or tendencies or behaviors. A word that has never come up
that I want to bring up is art or literature.
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We have, over the course of the evolution of cultures, developed remarkable tools for educating the
emotions, educating empathy. I think of literature as
a part of that process, of helping us figure out what
its like to be in another mind, in another world, in
another time, in another circumstance. I think those
are incredibly important pieces of the story. I dont
think that all ethical education comes from religion
or from some sort of humanistic explanation of why
we should do things. Most of it, in fact, comes from
the stories we tell or hear or exchange, or the movies
we watch, for that matter.
A very important part of the future of the mind or
brain however you want to look at it, and whether
it is collective or individual doesnt matter in this
story is that we have to spend considerable effort
at understanding how we do this. We have developed
incredible tools for this, but we really just use them
at random. Now, maybe thats the right way; its the
evolutionary way, to some extent. Those that stick
around, stick around, but maybe not always for the
right reasons.
It does seem to me that one of the things that we
need to think about even those of us who are not
artists and literary folk is the role of that. Its a very
big part of our society, a very big part of our world, as
big as religion in some ways. Yet even in the educational system, there is a pretense that it doesnt exist
or that it plays a trivial, fun role just to entertain. I
actually dont think that arts and literature and music
and plays are about entertainment. I think in the
real world theyre about educating the emotions and
empathy. I think its an important part of the future.
Klein: What I hear makes great sense to me. I think
that if there were people sitting in the room whose
backgrounds were in academic economics or political science, they would say that the issues that face
humanity have nothing to do with the brain, really.
Its interesting to learn a lot more about the brain, but
youre being overly reductionist. We have to understand precisely how people operate in groups thats
the only thing that really matters. You want to solve a
problem like global warming or the possibility of antibiotic resistance in lots of bacteria that kind of stuff.
Velamoor: Would everyone agree that an understanding of how groups function or behave is a priority?
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The neuroscience world has sold

the country a bill of goods in saying,
for example, that were going to
reform education by a better
understanding of neurons.
Pinker: Yes. With a lot of social scientists, I would
be skeptical as to how much information about, say,
the neurophysiology of the brain is going to lead to
insight into social problems. I think the right level of
analysis is one of a higher level of function of entire
circuits characterized in functional terms basically
the cognitive or psychological level rather than the
neurophysiological level. The neuroscience world as
much as Im part of it, and as much as Im a booster
of it has sold the country a bill of goods in saying,
for example, that were going to reform education by a
better understanding of neurons. Theres been a lot of
mischief that came out of that in the 1990s.
Where I would disagree with these social scientists and historians who would certainly say that is,
by their own standards, on their own turf, there are
enormous explanatory gaps such as some of the ones
I alluded to before: Why have we gotten less violent?
Why do we name our daughters Madison and Morgan? There are no answers coming from the social
sciences. I dont think there will be answers coming,
necessarily, from mechanisms of synaptic transmission either, but I think there will be an intermediate
level of psychological functioning of cognition that,
in combination with a better understanding of social
network dynamics, might someday lead to answers
to the questions that the social scientists themselves
have posed for themselves but which they cant
answer because they/we are still ignorant of so much
of human psychology.
Does fiction have a causal role in change of attitudes?

Does it educate the emotions?
We dont know the answer to that.
To go back to an example that I mentioned and that

Terry [Deacon] also brought up: Does fiction have a
causal role in change of attitudes? Does it educate the
emotions? We dont know the answer to that. I would

like to know. On the one hand, you have anecdotes

such as: Apparently when Abraham Lincoln met Harriet Beecher Stowe, he said, Oh, so youre the little
lady that started this big war, because of the alleged
influence of Uncle Toms Cabin on changing sensibility toward slavery.
On the other hand, we know that some of the Nazi
leaders were great fans of literature and came from a
culture that revered great literature. To what extent
does fiction in TV and movies and video games and
novels lead to a change in sensibility, and why? On
the one hand, there obviously is a process of extreme
empathy that goes on. Thats what makes fiction gripping. On the other hand, in order not to become
deluded and not to blend what you learn about fiction with what you learn about reality, when its
inappropriate, theres got to be some mechanism in
the brain that sequesters this hypothetical world from
your knowledge of the real world. Now, both of those
cant be completely true because they are alternatives.
If we understood something more about the interaction, maybe we would understand when something
is just a story and is not taken seriously, as opposed
to something that is capable of changing individual
and then, perhaps, collective sensibilities. Thats one
of many examples of how social change could get a lot
of insight from studies of individual psychology.
Velamoor: A few years ago, television series on two
great epics were produced and telecast at a certain
time of the day in India. When these serials were on,
the entire country came to a standstill and people
were watching these programs. I dont know what it
did, insofar as any behavior modification, because
I dont see corruption levels or crime or anything
else declining in India, but it certainly captured the
attention and the imagination of these hundreds of
millions of people for that one hour every day.
Theres another story from India. When

the first woman policeperson in India took over one
of the largest and worst prisons in India, which was,
apparently, a horrible place to be, and introduced
Vipassana meditation to the inmates not all of
them; it was voluntary it completely transformed
that place. So, again, there is something very powerful
there that is very difficult to understand, but theres
anecdotal evidence that says that interesting things
are happening.
Observer:
Observer: Im an educator in the Bellevue School

District and I teach highly capable students who are
in the fifth grade. Many function at post-high school
level, and some go to the university after eighth grade.
Theyre sort of off the charts statistically.
The question I have, in relation to the development of the brain and the role of education, is: Is
there a point at which individuals may crash and burn
because of their development, whether its enhanced
through education or however? For instance, I had a
student who went to the university and graduated at
the age of 18 magna cum laude in biochemistry. He
committed suicide. I have been talking to his mother;
every month we meet and talk about many of the
other students who are in this program who are at the
edge. They are the brightest minds and very highly
developed.
And this is common: There are many suicide
attempts among this group of kids. Something that
she and I have talked about is this power of the human
story. For instance, this boy had all of this scientific
awareness, but he joined a religious cult right before
he committed suicide. There was obviously something that he was looking for beyond the science and
the systematic logic and the number crunching. Im
really concerned: Is there something else that were
missing here related to education?
Weve become so used to the notion

that our human uniqueness means
that we cannot be captured
in a science
Tooby: I want to follow up on what Richard and Steve
said and then maybe address a little of that.
Its certainly the case that if you have anthropologists and economists and many other social scientists
in the room, they would absolutely say what you said:
The brain is irrelevant. Thats been the default model
for a hundred years. They believe its a famous fallacy
the compositional fallacy in Durkheims sociological method that you cannot go from the individual
to the group level. The group level is autonomous in
some fundamental way that makes its interactions
and its dynamics independent of the properties of
individuals. Thats led to a very weak social science,
so that there are all these anxieties and resentments
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against the real scientists who have big machines

with bright lights and lots of money and they can
make predictions that come true.
At the physiological level, theres not going to be
all that much insight, although there might be some
interesting technologies, like jetpacks, that will make
our brains really super-efficient one cant rule out
that kind of very important medical or augmentation
possibility.
Science was started in the Renaissance and there
was this Enlightenment notion that maybe we could
have a science of humans. Before the rise of the
standard social science model was the American
Revolution, when Madison and the others said, We
want a government that maybe would work based
on human nature. There are several extremely significant claims about human nature in The Federalist
Papers that were based on extensive reading of history, of what went wrong and how freedom was lost
in these other opportunities, and they came up with
the system of checks and balances. I have an engineer
mentality, so I dont think its necessarily a perfect system, but its been stable for a much longer period than
any other democracy.
You can look at Hitler and Lenin: You couldnt have
known with a science well-grounded, theoretically
principled, comes from first principles, empirically
validated set of models about computational structures in the human mind that giving unbridled
power to some small groups of people will lead to
completely disastrous consequences. Yet thats not
something thats even contemplated in the present
nature of the social sciences - that you can say there
are all these mechanisms in your mind that form
coalitions, which have these computational variables
that identify self-interests, which sort out people who
are going to move in the same direction as you, that
then develops myths or stories about the out-group
and the righteousness of the in-group, and the importance of empowering the in-group.
Weve become so used to the notion that our
human uniqueness means that we cannot be captured
in a science that weve given up the idea that there is a
natural science of human nature that could exist and
that would have real, important, functional dividends
in forming a constitution in Iraq or a constitution in
South Africa, and so on that different structures will
lead, over time, to different kinds of outputs like the
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EU constitution, to take one realm of applicability.

I think that in 50 years or 30 years we could have
a real, genuine human science. Economics is moving slowly in that direction, precisely to the extent
that they have given up the blank slate notion that
anything could be learned and that anything could
happen. They have some very minimal, reductive
claims about agency and self-interest, and so on.
And they get a lot of traction that gives them a lot of
empirical bite for that. To the extent that people are
stepping away from blank slate notions to specific
claims and the more you make the claims computational rather than impulses or dispositions, what
inputs go in, what representations get created, what
motivational intensity magnitudes get generated all
those things can give you a really precise kind of
model of human dynamics not that its going to be
like physics anytime soon, but it will be a fundamental transformation of the human condition to have a
genuine natural science of humans.
Right now the people who are professionally
entrusted with the social sciences dont believe in
its possibility. Not only do they not believe that its a
possibility, they resent the very implication that something like that could exist, so theres a huge resistance.
Thats a problem but I think its a solvable problem. I
think the world, over the next 40 or 50 years, will look
very different, in the same way that every other fundamental scientific advance has had all these spinoffs.
the recent tsunami phenomenon
provides, in a sense, an absolute
laboratory for ethnic responses to
tragedy and disaster
Holloway: The young lady here was talking about the
educational aspects and the sad case of suicide and
what seems to be a dangerous, growing trend of suicide. I think it would be well to remember that the
maturation of the nervous system seems to be viewed
by everybody as complete by age 18 or 20. This thing
is continuing on with myelination, cell death, and
everything else right up into age 27 to 28.
Im witnessing this with my own child who is now
23, whos beginning to understand that I, too, have a
brain. But its going to take another four years before
he understands that I know he has a brain, too. Thats

just one aspect of it. There is the possibility that different populations differ somewhat to minor degrees in
the speed at which those processes are completed. It
might be interesting to think along those terms without getting too reductionist about it.
One of the other fragments of thought I had was the
recent tsunami phenomenon, because this provides,
in a sense, an absolute laboratory for ethnic responses
to tragedy and disaster that seem to me, from what
I read in the popular press, are really extremely different responses. There are two aspects to it: Now we
are trying to get a worldwide tsunami system that can
predict or give us warning. When you think about the
fact that there have been tsunamis and earthquakes
and all the rest of it and there has not been this ability already in place I find it mind-boggling that it is
now at 2005 and politicians are still arguing as to how
to set this thing up.
Then there are what we read about the differences
between the Tamils in Sri Lanka and their responses
to the distribution of aid, and how the political processes could impede the easing of terrible conditions
among millions and millions of people. You have the
same thing in Sumatra. Then we read about the Thais
and their ability to sacrifice to provide help for those
in their country. I imagine that there are all sorts of
different explanations for it, but it seems to me that
we could look at this as a natural laboratory showing
how the mind elucidates some aspects about human
differences and human similarities.
What are the consequences insofar
as our inherent natures and our
capacities? Are we coming up
against the limits of our flexibility
relative to the pace?
Velamoor: It seems to me that what Paula described
is a case of a child in fast-forward. The child may have
been 18, but perhaps in a mental sense he has lived a
lifetime. Maybe a proposition that we could entertain
is that we, even though we have gone past age 18 in a
civilizational sense, are also in a fast-forward mode.
What are the consequences insofar as our inherent
natures and our capacities? Can we say that we are in
a fast-forward mode, hastening the process to what
the future holds? Are we coming up against the limits
of our flexibility relative to the pace?
Pinker: Its exactly the kind of question that we should

be asking and we could probably even be a little more
specific: It may not be just how fast is the speedometer,
but rather qualitatively what are the different challenges we as a species are designed to face at different
points in our lives? Its sort of life-history biology. The
most obvious thing from the point of view of evolutionary biologists is that when you reach biological
adulthood in a social species, youve got to find a mate;
youve got to establish status in the particular pecking
order of your peer group; youve got to establish some
claim to adult status. If you put children in an environment in which theyre going to be miserable failures at
all of those three life challenges at a stage when they are
younger, more nave, and in many ways ill-equipped
for the social competition that is the most important
thing that a human being does at that stage of life, then
it can be a recipe for disaster.
It comes from thinking of kids just as little academic achievement machines and forgetting about
the rest of human nature. Its not a subtle point. This is
just one of the first things one would say about human
life history, that thats the major challenge that emotionally were equipped to face, the failure of which
will have the most devastating consequences on our
emotional well-being. That would obviously have to
be elaborated to get more predictive power as to who
succeeds and who fails when accelerated in this way.
But I think thats an ingredient above and beyond the
mere acceleration that a good science of human nature
could help contribute to key questions like this.
Varki: As I said in my talk, I think that until we
know where we came from, were not going to be
able to know where were going. Personally, I think
that Alfred Wallaces paradox is still unsolved. The
one possible explanation is, essentially, what you are
saying. We used to think that the human brain was
developing for three or four years. Now were saying
25 years, 27 years, and we dont know when that long
period of potential feedback and mental response
occurred. Ive read all the stories of feral children, and
although theyre all contaminated, you get the feeling
that theres a lot of input needed.
As a Gedankenexperiment this is one that Ive
posed to Terry [Deacon] and others in the past lets
go back in time and take a newborn baby, born from
a perfectly healthy mother, and bring that baby here
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today in an environment where its facial appearance

and anything else will not be an issue. Actually, you
may have to do it with 100,000 babies to look at the
variations. I think everybody would agree that from
50,000 years ago we wouldnt notice any difference.
That is, 100,000 babies from 50,000 years ago put into
the right environment today would function no differently from any one of us.
[Some participants comment out of microphone
range]
The second Gedankenexperiment is to
take 100,000 newborn babies today
and put them on a desert island and
have them taken care of by robots
Okay, theres a little bit of uncertainty there.

Now lets go back a little further in time. I know that
Terry would say that Homo erectus would be okay.
It wouldnt be identical but it would be okay. Does
anyone want to go further back in time than Homo
erectus? The real question is: When did this feedback
loop of prolonged helplessness, brain development,
imitation, and innovation start and really take off? To
me, this is a fundamental question. It is not easy to
answer but I think it goes to the nub of what the problem were facing is, so I ask you to think about it.
The second Gedankenexperiment is to take 100,000
newborn babies today and put them on a desert
island and have them taken care of by robots that take
care of their health perfectly but, unlike the case in
the Nicaraguan sign language situation, there would
be no prior exposure to human societies or interactions or even gestures. If you came back 50 years later,
would they have a language?
Varki:
Calvin:
Would they be alive?
Varki: In terms of the experiment Im giving you, the

conditions of that island are such that theyre going to
be healthy and alive and functional.
Tooby: Its a question about whether one can believe
that premise that the co-adapted developmental process between mother and infant might be so highly
interdigitated that it would be hard to imagine that a
child brought up by a robot would not have lost a serious part of the normal nurturing environment.
126
Varki: Youre saying that theres a significant dependence on that external input even at that point.
we have two genetic inheritances.

One is the stable features of
the environment that the genetic
inheritance evolved to depend upon
for reliable development.
Tooby: If you want to call it external. The way I think
about it is that we have two genetic inheritances. One is
the genetic inheritance and the other is the stable features of the environment that the genetic inheritance
evolved to depend upon for reliable development. So,
if you monkey around with that, then you start not
getting normal development.
Varki: Im leaving everything stable except cultural
and linguistic input.
Tooby: If you could, in a way that I cant imagine
would be possible, remove cultural inputs but you
still had maternal love and sociality and other kinds
of things, if thats the thought experiment.
Velamoor:
Tooby:
Would they have a language?
Yes, I think they would have a language.
The story in The Lord of the Flies is somewhat similar.

Velamoor:
theres also, I think, an expectation

of a peer group of mixed age with
knowledge and expertise filtering
down from older kids to younger kids.
Pinker: Theres a lot they wouldnt have. In addition
to whatever expectation the brain might have of a
mother, family, and so on, theres also, I think, an
expectation of a peer group of mixed age with knowledge and expertise filtering down from older kids
to younger kids. If that is disrupted, it would be like
taking the fish out of water, putting the child in an
environment to which it was probably not adapted.
The social ecology of the human being is one in
which kids are in mixed-age peer groups that shade
into adulthood and in which lateral cultures develop,
but in which theres also a lot of vertical transmission

from older to younger. You have, presumably, some

sort of learning mechanism including a desire for status proven by skill and expertise, which depends on
acquisition from other people, who, in an ecologically
natural environment, really will have more expertise.
Now, if you distort that environment so that a
mechanism that might be equipped to getting knowledge from what ordinarily would be people with more
expertise comes from people who have the same
amount of expertise that you do, you might have all
kinds of bizarre cults and irrational beliefs that get
fixed kind of like what you already see happening
in various teenage cults, the Goths and the Columbine kids. Where you have severe isolation, you might
have a disruption of that mechanism.
Like John, I dont think of it in terms of something
that ordinarily needs to be shaped and you remove
the shaping influence and you see what form the protoplasm might take by itself. I think of it more as a
system equipped with certain devices for acquiring
information from the environment with an expectation that the environment is structured in particular
ways.
An experiment like that would be scientifically
fascinating as a thought experiment, but the results
would best be interpreted in terms of the key difference between that environment and the one that the
organism expects.
Varki: So, you would say that the social consequence
would be such that it would be unpredictable. But Im
talking about the higher cognitive functions. If you
did the same experiment with 100,000 piglets and
there are enough resources on the island, we would
probably find pigs doing what pigs do. If we did the
same experiment with New World monkeys, Im not
so sure. If we did the same experiment with Old World
monkeys, we would probably have greater problems.
If we did the same experiment with chimpanzees, I
think there would be even greater problems.
I have tried this thought experiment on many
people, and its interesting that the academics who
think about this range from people who say that the
children would have a language to people who say,
Well, I dont know. They may not have much of anything. They may not be what we call human at all. So,
I think the jury is out on that.
Pinker: I think everyone would agree that they would
be significantly abnormal. The question is: Why? Is it

because ordinarily they come in as blank slates and
nothing is written on the slate, or is it because they
come in with the expectation of a particular environment and when you change the environment there
will be systematic pathologies, like taking an organism out of its typical environment?
That would imply, then, that we are caught in a

feedback loop where our systems are designed to
expect certain environments to come back to us.
Varki: I would agree with that. That would imply, then,
that we are caught in a feedback loop where were very
dependent, that is, our systems are designed to expect
certain environments to come back to us.
Pinker:
Yes.
Varki: But those environments are not consisting of

molecules or pH or anything like that. Theyre consisting of the input from the prior generations.
Pinker: I would argue that thats why we have language
because thats the ecosystem. We evolved in a social
ecosystem and we depend on language, among other
things, as a medium through which we acquire much
of our survival-necessary skills and knowledge.
Varki: So, if the other extreme end of the view is right
this would go to Terrys idea in the evolution of
humans we have thrown away dependence on genes
and hardwired inputs more and more, but absolutely
meanwhile the genes have been evolving to accommodate to this system so were in this feedback loop.
The other extent of the question is: How far can the
feedback loop go before you start having problems?
all organisms have genes that exploit certain

regularities of their typical environment.
Pinker: Im wondering if it would be best to frame it

in terms of we depend less on our genes, but rather
that all organisms have genes that exploit certain regularities of their typical environment. In our case, this
127

includes a social environment, as it probably does in

other species as well. Humans may not be unique in
this regard.
Is Terrys view an alternative to the view that we
have an evolved nature with a lot of structure, or is it
that view and is it what you would expect based on
how all organisms work? Just in our case, our particular dependence on the environment, perhaps, is of a
greater degree.
Varki: Its on the social and cultural environment, as
opposed to the physical environment. Of course, Im
sure that in many social animals this is going on, but
I think we humans are an unusual case where weve
made that commitment much, much further, to a
point where it gives us an advantage and yet leaves us
at a great disadvantage.
Pinker: I think the way to understand it might be to
have more comparisons to other kinds of sociality.
You take other social species were not the only ones
and you bring them up in this thought experiment.
How much pathology would you see? I imagine it
would be considerable.
Varki: I havent brought up the question. The next
generation would be a total mess in this experiment.
Pinker: Yes. We know that close relatives, the orangutans,
have far reduced degree of sociality and the answer might
even be different for them than it is for us.
under what circumstances would

society tend to self-organize the same
way that you would see in an
unstirred pot of oatmeal?
Calvin: One of alternatives I think of it as pathology under what circumstances would society tend
to self-organize the same way that you would see in
an unstirred pot of oatmeal? That is to say, you would
get hexagonal columns, and the equivalent, I suppose, would be gated communities and everybody in
enclaves. Its a question like what Terry was bringing up
before, of self-organization properties where there are
patterns that emerge and, of course, theyre influenced
by properties that are more traditional, but theyre basically not evolution. Theyre self-organization, which
you just discover along the way. All of a sudden teams
128
have formed up and you never have expected that.

Deacon: To take the thought experiment in a slightly
different direction, imagine that a number of educational administrators have their way and decide that
we cant afford the arts and they are going to cut it
off: Literature is irrelevant, music in the schools is
irrelevant, and so on. These are social engineering
experiments that we dont necessarily know were
running. How much do we know that these are not
absolutely critical parts of whats going on in that
social ecology that weve come into the world with?
I think of ourselves as very close to social insects
in a lot of regards, and social insects dont do so well
when you change those kinds of things. In social
insects, genes have as Steve was pointing out very
much restructured around this process. But there is
also a lot of loss of function as well. There are things
they just cannot do.
There are things that we cannot do and the reason I pushed that side of it was to recognize that were
what I would call an ultrasocial species, one in which
so much has been offloaded. A lot of social processes
do things for us. For example, how many of you know
how to repair a carburetor? Well, a few.
What Im saying is that just spontaneously weve
offloaded. I talk to students who think that we people know how to do all these things. The fact is that
almost none of us knows how to do most of this stuff.
Were totally dependent technologically, but I think
were totally dependent in other ways emotionally,
for example, and in terms of educating things like our
capacities for empathy. Clearly there are genetic components for this. Clearly theres a biological base for
all of this. It evolved in the context of those things.
I think its important to recognize that its not an
either/or. It really is a both/and problem. We need to
understand that interaction relationship. It goes well
beyond knowledge and technology. It goes into all
aspects of human societies.
Holloway: Another example that comes to mind are
the attempts by school administrators to take away
recess in grammar school. There is a clear indication
that boys and girls are simply not the same, and if you
dont give boys at the ages of 12, 11, 10 the chance to get
some of that energy outside, you really have extraordinary problems. I think thats just a little capsule of
where were at with that.

Observer: If youre saying that brain development is

now extending to age 20 and 25, and its happening
very much in the social context, then is the information content that specifies the brain so much more
than the genes in really an entire society? How much
information should I be thinking of as specifying connections?
Specifically, do these isolated children in this
experiment have physical connections that are absent
in their brains?
Varki: I guess youre asking: What would be the phys-
ical structure of their brains? I dont know.
The notion that the developmental period lasts to age

30 has been around a long time. It comes from the
observation of neurologists and neurosurgeons.
Calvin: It depends on the techniques of how late
things occur. Theres a sense in which this softwiring
process is just our long-term memory process that we
use all the way through life.
The notion that the developmental period lasts to
age 30 has been around a long time. It comes from
the observation of neurologists and neurosurgeons.
For example, the Army did a study of soldiers who
got tossed out of Jeeps, back before Humvees were
invented. The 18-year-old soldiers with the same kind
of head injury as the 30-year-old soldiers recovered a
lot better. Thirty-year-olds dont have much plasticity

to deal with that kind of thing. As our techniques get
better, the whole notion will disappear; it will just be
a process thats faster and slower.
Varki: If you did the same analysis with pigs that have
had no input, would you find as much difference as
you would find in a human?
Calvin: It would be on a different timescale, but yes,
I would expect that humans are not unusual in this
regard. What Im talking about is something that
I think you would see in any of the species that we
regularly study.
Pinker: In your thought experiment, there would
still be social stimulation; there would still be visual
stimulation. Its not like Hubel and Wiesel bringing
up a cat in a striped cylinder. There would be a lot of
pattern visual input. There would be sounds. There
would be correlated changes in the visual field, and so
on. So, I bet that the brains wouldnt look different to
anything that a neuroanatomist or a neurophysiologist could tell, but obviously they would be different
in terms of the particular patterns, presumably synaptic strengths that store all of our knowledge, just in
the same sense that brains of two people in two different cultures would have to be different.
Velamoor: With that, I think we can proceed to the
next step. Thank you all for this discussion.
129

130
Closing Session
At the conclusion of the two-day workshop, the eight

participants made final remarks regarding the future
of the human brain and their evaluation of the workshop overall.
Velamoor: We have reached the end of our workshop on The Evolution of the Human Brain. Would
any of the participants like to make any concluding
remarks? Ajit?
Until we know where we came from

and how we got here, its going to be
very difficult to know what to do
in the future.
Varki: I would like to thank the Foundation for this
wonderful opportunity. Its always great to meet people in different backgrounds and exchange views in a
manner thats free of ego and purely intellectual.
I would like to conclude with the theme I brought
up: Until we know where we came from and how we
got here, its going to be very difficult to know what to
do in the future. I would say in the interim that that
does not mean that we should not worry about the
future. We very much should, but I think that, because
of the rate of progress, we are going to be forced to
use some very broad-based and somewhat empirical
pieces of information to decide what to do until we
know what the black box has in it. I dont think that,
even when we know everything thats in the black
box, we can stop worrying about the broader findings
that we will make.
but I think that most of the

mechanisms that we understand about
how brains changed in the past are not
going to extrapolate into the future.
Calvin: I think thats true, Ajit, but I think that most
of the mechanisms that we understand about how
brains changed in the past are not going to extrapolate into the future. If you make the story, as I do, that
the abrupt climate changes of the past played a role
in pumping up brain complexity, I dont think that
another episode of it is going to do the same thing,
because there are so many other conditions that have
changed. I think that there are no further implications
of the general growth in brain size and so forth.
I may be wrong in this, but I think that the problems well be dealing with in the future are going to
be taking our knowledge of brain mechanisms and
social mechanisms, and trying to figure out the longterm implications of this new, emerging knowledge.
What are the potentials for good and for mischief in
this, and how will they play out in time?
it really comes down to not the

brain but the wonderful, miraculous
tricks that nature performs through
the mediation of something
called the brain.
Tulving: I now have a fairer idea as to what this exercise was all about. Im very happy to have been here. It
has been an interesting experience for me, too.
One thing, however, does bother me and thats
something that I mentioned before, namely, that
theres too much talk about the brain without the mind.
Theres no such thing in the universe. Theres a brain
behind the mind that exists in the physical universe,
in reality, but it is totally, utterly irrelevant to anything
131

Closing Session
that is happening in the world unless something that

happens in the brain is translated into what the body
does thats a behavior and the knowledge that the
body has, and then consciousness that comes after it.
So, do not please overlook that as a real challenge.
One way in which we could really make a difference, perhaps, in what is going to happen in the future
is if all scientifically enlightened, well-meaning, intelligent people would understand that it really comes
down to, in the final analysis, not the brain but the
wonderful, miraculous tricks that nature performs
through the mediation of something called the brain.
The way the research priorities have
been laid out comes from this older
social science theory that the past
doesnt really matter because
were blank slates
Tooby: I also thank the Foundation. If our species is
driving along at high speed and nobodys at the wheel,
then having the Foundation that encourages thinking
about the broader issues is very much needed.
Ajit overestimated me, at least, by saying that we
had interaction that was free of ego. If our species
were serious about understanding itself, then theres
been a serious under-funding not just funding but
its a social process of exclusion. There have been wars
familiar to all anthropologists in which biological
people are basically on the losing end. The study of
this huge number of different important issues in biological anthropology is being killed off as a field, or
at least heavily stunted compared to the magnitude
and importance of the scientific questions, which will
then have real, material implications for our species.
Another specific application of this is hunter-gatherer studies. Studies of small-scale populations are
almost gone. The next ten years is the last opportunity to have any real science of that. It is at least as
important as going to the Moon. Im a big admirer of
going to the Moon, but getting all the information we
can about primates and having a major paleoanthropology research effort would also be very important.
The way the research priorities have been laid out
comes from this older social science theory that the
past doesnt really matter because were blank slates
and nothing about the past tells us anything about
what we are now. From that point of view, biologi-
132
cal anthropology is a marginal discipline, and all

sorts of different component sciences are vastly under
invested-in.
Chekhov: Man will become better

when you show him
what he is like.
Pinker: I echo that and Ive mentioned this to people
at NSF and other funding agencies. All of the areas
that are most critical to our species autobiography
are endangered, either by lack of funding or by imminent disappearance of the subject matter or both, but
evolutionary psychology, hunter-gatherer studies,
studies of great ape behavior in the wild, endangered
languages how much information are we going to
lose about the scope and flexibility of the human language faculty when 90 percent of worlds languages
disappear within 100 years?
I dont know about paleoanthropology it doesnt
seem to be a very well-supported field and I dont
know whether the actual material basis of the field
is in danger of disappearing as crucial spots become
inaccessible because of war and other difficulties, but
it seems that thats another area where were doing
much less than we should if we really want to understand where we came from.
The reason all of this is important is because of a
quote that I have at the beginning of The Blank Slate
from Chekhov: Man will become better when you
show him what he is like. I suspect that that is a sentiment that all of us would agree with and that the
Foundation is committed to.
Theres something about whatever

happened 50,000 years ago,
whether its a new brain or at least a
brain that has a different
genetic underpinning
Klein: I certainly like the idea of more money for
paleoanthropology, if that could be arranged. Its not
a very well-supported field. Its interesting that theres
such a disproportion between the attention it gets
in the press and the amount of funding it receives.
Hardly a month goes by when there isnt an article

Closing Session
in The New York Times or on CNN about what they

perceive to be an important find, but in fact, the total
number of people doing it would certainly fit in this
building without any problem. The total amount of
money available for paleoanthropological research is
maybe a million or two million dollars a year. Its not
extraordinary.
When Steve was saying before that we dont understand why first names assigned to little girls shift
through time a shift in fad or fashion; there is the
same lack of understanding as to why hemlines go up
and down or cars sometimes have fins and sometimes
dont but I can tell you that that sort of thing didnt
occur until 50,000 years ago. If you look at the artifacts from before 50,000 years ago, they are the same
for tens of thousands of years and over vast distances.
We only get the sense that somebody is interested in
novelty, whether its functional or stylistic, after 50,000
years ago, and then you get these very rapid changes,
at least in some places, in what they produce.
Theres something about whatever happened
50,000 years ago, whether it was a new brain or at
least a brain that had a different genetic underpinning
than it had before, or whether it was just some kind of
change in social organization. Whatever it was, it produced something that were familiar with. Its almost
inconceivable to us, I think, in terms of what we know
about recorded history, that you could have material
culture persisting for 10,000, 20,000, 30,000 years,
and it wouldnt make a difference whether you were
looking at the artifacts from, say, Crimea, France, or
Cape Town. For 100,000 years theyre the same. The
only way you can tell the difference is that the raw
materials would be a little different because the rock
types that were available to people were different.
So, whatever it is that underlies this fad and fashion change in naming, thats a modern human thing
in the last 50,000 years. That would imply to me that
the brain before 50,000 years ago was not modern, for
whatever reason.
there have been these inordinate

changes in material culture and,
indeed, psychological culture
that do not parallel in any sense
neurological changes.
Holloway: Im delighted to have been here and Ive
had a very fine time listening to my colleagues and
getting insights where they stand on various issues.
I have to say that I certainly agree with Richard here
regarding funding.
Its a very interesting problem as to why paleoanthropology is so popular. I see it in terms of ecological
dynamics. That is to say, anthropology departments
are putting out PhDs like crazy, but unfortunately
there are only a few fossil finds to go around, so the
most is made out of it and that hits the press.
With regard to the stasis that one finds with the tool
types over so many thousands and hundreds of thousands of years, I dont agree with Richard here. The
reason I dont is because tool types really dont necessarily correlate one to one with their use. It seems to
me that the possibility is open that while we see the
same tool types again and again through many, many
long periods of time, the way theyre being used and
the way theyre being interacted with might very well
be somewhat different.
What brought me into physical anthropology in
the first place and the evolution of the brain, in
particular was trying to understand the dynamics
behind the rise and fall of the Third Reich. That was
a very important part of my individual bringing up,
not because I came from a Jewish background I
certainly didnt but because I was in a Jewish neighborhood and when 1945 came and 1946, the behavior
of peer groups toward each other changed as the evidence for what really happened became available.
It really struck me how it was possible for arbitrary
symbol systems to put together regimes and that arbitrary symbol systems could do what they did. That
fascinated me.
So, when I got into paleoanthropology and started
looking at the evolution of the brain, I wanted to
know as much as I could about the development of
the brain through time, of course. But what I come
out with now, having studied it and trying to understand, in particular, the reorganizational aspects that
133

Closing Session
have taken place starting at least 3.5 million years ago,

I would take human nature much further back than
most people would. Of course, it has evolved over the
last 3.5 million years, but I would say by about 1 to
1.5 million years, Im very sure that youve got human
nature and it hasnt really changed enormously.
The other thing I get a little antsy about is when
we think of all the progress that has taken place over
the last 50,000 years and need to get some monster
gene that has come in there to make it possible to do
that. I just wonder what my great-great-great-grandfather would think if he were suddenly plopped into
this room or plopped onto that highway out there or
plopped into the middle of an airplane. It seems to me
that without any change whatsoever in the hardwiring
of the brain, there have been these inordinate changes
in material culture and, indeed, psychological culture,
if I could put it that way, that do not parallel in any
sense neurological changes. I would dearly like to have
Thomas Edison sitting here and telling us what in the
world he thinks about our electronic gadgets at this
point. So, Im a little skeptical of that interpretation.
Im very, very grateful to be here. One of the hallmarks of humanity that has been around a very, very
long period of time maybe 3.5 million years and
one of the hallmarks of us is curiosity and wanting to
know. I think thats kept us going for a long time.
Homo erectus, with its simple Swiss
Army knife, made it for a million
and a half years they were an
evolutionarily stable strategy.
We are not.
It looks like I may have the last word!

Im going to be a little pessimistic, because I think
scientists oftentimes tend to be a little optimistic. Let
me start it with an optimistic piece and then do my
pessimistic rant.
The optimistic piece is something Ive remembered
every time I come into a conversation like this. On
one of these many trips Ive taken across the country,
running through airports, seeing people piled up and
arguing with each other, I saw a young woman just
sitting one of the many people just sitting there
engrossed in a book and sobbing. It had an incredible
impact on me that this person, living somebody elses
life who never lived probably, was totally transfixed.
Deacon:
134
Her entire consciousness was in the mind, in the soul,

in the experience of this potentially fictional character. Its just an incredible thing that we dont really
realize about being a human species. Theres no other
species that would do that. This is so totally unusual
and so incredible. Thats the positive.
The negative: We start with Ralphs comment about
the Nazis. We often blame this on some psychopath
or a few psychopaths. But normal people can do horrible things. Its part of every one of us, and we have to
be totally conscious of that part.
The second piece of it is that I think if a civilization
at 2 million years were to come down to Earth and
assess the hominids, Homo erectus would be the winner. Homo erectus, with its simple Swiss Army knife,
made it for a million and a half years; didnt destroy
its ecology; didnt have to change, in my perspective;
didnt have to be creative because they were an evolutionarily stable strategy. We are not.
This is not an evolutionarily stable strategy. I suspect that it doesnt have a long time to go. I think that
the very stuff were doing is so threatening to the spiritual health of so many people partly because they
dont understand it; partly because they think were
telling them that theyre robots and theres nobody
home that I dont think that the fundamentalism
is going to go away. I think what were going to see
is those few places where it hasnt spread Canada,
Europe are going to become more fundamentalist,
as we do as well. Those of us thinking these thoughts
because we havent figured out how to get the aesthetic out of it; how to bring the spiritualism into this
conversation; how to communicate that this stuff is
uplifting, not subtractive we havent done that and
we have not figured out how to do it. No matter how
well the popular press seems to be playing up this
stuff, I think they also play up the Wow, gee whiz!
weirdness of it.
We have to recognize that our denial of consciousness

pretending that its not there or pretending that well
explain it away is a spiritually threatening message.
I think these conversations could, indeed, be a dying

breed and I thank the Foundation for trying to keep
it going, but we have to think that thought. We have

Closing Session
to think the thoughts from the negative. We have to

recognize that our denial of consciousness, to some
extent, in a lot of this work pretending that its not
there or pretending that well explain it away is a
spiritually threatening message. And I think that
the vast, vast majority of people in the world are not
ready for that message and, in fact, will stop us from
telling the story.
So, what do I see in this organization thats a positive to me? A time capsule. I hope that some of this
stuff survives the Dark Age.
Velamoor:
shop?
Walter, would you like to close the work-
theres too much emotion,

too much feeling, too much pride in
all these things, which prevents these
matters from being well studied.
Kistler: Weve talked about the human brain and
many other things more or less connected with it.
Maybe I may give my view of whats important in this
world.
There is, of course, a big environmental movement
to save the environment, and that is certainly very
appropriate and very good. I fully agree with their
goal. But still, the most important thing in this world
is the human being. There is lots of difficulty with
studying human beings so that we could understand
whats going on and maybe predict, a bit, the future.

Studying man himself his mind, thinking, sensitivities, drives is all very much taboo. It touches
the people in their feeling, in their ambition, in their
pride mostly in their pride. Analyzing people today,
telling them what they are or what groups they are in
or really making a science of humans, is a very touchy
matter. I hope some day that will change. Thats my
personal view and hope, that this will slowly change,
that people will start feeling above these matters of
belonging to a group: That group is bad, or that group
is good, or that should be preferable. They feel insulted
at being classified or being in a group. I would say
that theres too much emotion, too much feeling, too
much pride in all these things, which prevents these
matters from being well studied.
We are very poor in understanding the human
mind: what drives it and what is the basis of it. So, I
hope that will be studied a bit more from two viewpoints. The brain, very roughly analyzed, has basically
two parts the cortex, which is mostly a reservoir of
knowledge, and the inner brain, the limbic system,
where the emotions, the drives, the motivation are.
Analyzing this and expanding this a bit better would
be a worthwhile long-range study. I hope that will
slowly evolve along these lines.
I am glad you all came and shared your research
and your thinking with us. Travel safely to your
homes. I hope we will meet again.
135

Closing Session
136
Appendix 1
Workshop Agenda
March 19, 2005
March 20, 2005
Foundation For the Future building in Bellevue, WA
Foundation For the Future building
Welcome
Walter Kistler, President
Summary of Day 1 activities

Sesh Velamoor
Introduction to the Foundation For the Future;

Introduction to the Center for Human Evolution
Bob Citron, Executive Director
Discussion of Critical Questions
Introduction to the workshop The Evolution of

the Human Brain
Sesh Velamoor, Deputy Director, Programs
Closing remarks and adjournment

Walter Kistler
Sesh Velamoor
Self-introductions by workshop participants

Viewing of Video Cosmic Origins: From the Big
Bang to Humanity
Presentation of papers followed by Q&A
Paper 1
William H. Calvin
Paper 2 Terrence Deacon

Paper 3 Ralph L. Holloway
Paper 4 Richard G. Klein
Paper 5
Steven Pinker
Paper 6 John Tooby

Paper 7 Endel Tulving
Paper 8 Ajit Varki
137
Appendix 1 | Workshop Agenda
138
Appendix 2
Participant Biographies
William H. Calvin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Terrence Deacon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Ralph L. Holloway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Richard G. Klein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Steven Pinker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
John Tooby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Endel Tulving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Ajit Varki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
139
Appendix 2 | Participant Biographies
140
Participant Biographies | Appendix 2
William H. Calvin
Terrence Deacon
William H. Calvin, Ph.D., a theoretical neurobiologist, is Affiliate

Professor Emeritus of psychiatry and
behavioral sciences at the University
of Washington School of Medicine
in Seattle. He is also affiliated with
Emory Universitys great apes project, the Great Ape
Trust of Iowa, and on the Board of Advisors of the
Foundation For the Future.
His 1998 cover story for The Atlantic Monthly, The
Great Climate Flip-flop, grew out of a long-standing
interest in abrupt climate change and how it influenced the evolution of a chimpanzee-like brain into a
more human one. He addressed the same topic in his
2002 book, A Brain for All Seasons: Human Evolution
and Abrupt Climate Change, which won the Phi Beta
Kappa Book Award for Science.
Calvin has written a dozen books for general readers. A Brief History of the Mind: From Apes to Intellect
and Beyond (2004) addresses what led up to the
Minds Big Bang about 50,000 years ago, a creative
explosion compared to the very conservative trends in
toolmaking over the previous 2.5 million years. That
span featured two million-year-long periods without
much progress despite the growth in brain size.
Calvins neurobiology research interests primarily concern the neocortical circuits used for detailed
planning and for improving the quality of the plan
as you get set, presumably utilizing a millisecondsto-minutes version of the same Darwinian process
(copying competitions biased by natural selection)
seen in the immune response and species evolution
on longer timescales. His research monograph, The
Cerebral Code: Thinking a Thought in the Mosaics of
the Mind (1996), concerns Darwinian processes in
neural circuitry that can operate on the timescale of
thought and action to resolve ambiguity and shape up
novel courses of action. He also collaborated with the
linguist Derek Bickerton to write Lingua ex Machina:
Reconciling Darwin and Chomsky with the Human
Brain (2000) about the evolution of syntax.
Following studies in physics at Northwestern University, Calvin branched out into neurophysiology
via studies at MIT, Harvard Medical School, and the
University of Washington (Ph.D., physiology and biophysics, 1966).
Terrence Deacon, Ph.D., is a Professor of biological anthropology

and neuroscience at UC Berkeley.
His research combines human evolutionary biology and neuroscience,
with the aim of investigating the evolution of human cognition. His work extends from
laboratory-based cellular-molecular neurobiology to
the study of semiotic processes underlying animal
and human communication, especially language. He
is the author of The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain (1997).
Dr. Deacons neurobiological research is focused
on determining the nature of the human divergence
from typical primate brain anatomy, the cellularmolecular mechanisms producing this difference, and
the correlations between these anatomical differences
and special human cognitive abilities, particularly
language. In pursuit of these questions he has used a
variety of laboratory approaches including the tracing of axonal connections, quantitative analysis of
regions of different species brains, and cross-species
fetal neural transplantation. Future research plans
will focus on isolating elements of the developmental
genetic mechanisms that distinguish human brains
from other ape brains, and attempting to study the
cognitive consequences of human brain differences
using in vivo brain imaging.
His theoretical interests include the study of evolution-like processes at many levels, including their role
in embryonic development, neural signal processing,
language change, and social processes, and focusing
especially on how these different processes interact
and depend on each other. In addition, he has a longstanding interest in developing a scientific semiotics
that could contribute to both linguistic theory and
cognitive neuroscience. This is fueled by a career-long
interest in the ideas of the late 19th century American
philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce.
Deacon is completing a new book, Homunculus,
which explores the relationship between evolutionary and semiotic processes. His Ph.D., in biological
anthropology, is from Harvard University. He taught
at Harvard for eight years before relocating to Boston
Universitys Department of Anthropology in 1992,
and from there to UC Berkeley.
141
Ralph L. Holloway
Richard G. Klein
Ralph L. Holloway began teaching

in the Department of Anthropology
at Columbia University in 1964, after
receiving his Ph.D. in anthropology
from the University of California,
Berkeley, under the late Professor
T.D. McCown. His dissertation was titled Some
Quantitative Relations of the Primate Brain.
Dr. Holloways main interest is the evolution of
brain and behavior, particularly in hominids. To
understand that evolution from roughly four to five
million years ago requires a careful consideration of
the fossil evidence for human evolution, and the most
direct part of that evidence, at least for the brain, are
brain endocasts, i.e., paleoneurology. While endocasts do provide basic information regarding brain
size, it is Holloways belief that in addition to brain
size increase, either allometric or not, there have
been important episodes of reorganization, meaning shifts in the quantitative relationships between
parts of the brain. An example is the relative reduction of primary visual cortex (area 17 of Brodmann)
and a relative increase in posterior association cortex,
something that appeared during Australopithecine
times three to four million years ago. Holloway is also
keenly interested in neural variation between and
within populations, and has studied sexual dimorphism in primate brains, particularly involving the
corpus callosum. His earliest neurological work was
with dendritic branching in environmentally stimulated rats.
In addition to writing roughly a hundred peerreviewed articles, Holloway edited the 1974 volume
Primate Aggression, Territoriality, and Xenophobia: A
Comparative Perspective, published by Academic Press.
His book with co-authors Broadfield and Yuan, Brain
Endocasts: Paleoneurological Evidence, is the 3rd volume
in the Schwartz/Tattersall Human Fossil Record series,
published in June 2004 by John Wiley & Sons. It won
the 2005 Association of American Publishers Award in
Sociology and Anthropology. Holloway has done extensive paleoneurological work with hominids from South
Africa, Kenya, and Ethiopia, as well as Indonesia and
Europe, and has built a comparative hominoid endocast
collection of roughly 200 apes, including Pan paniscus,
the pygmy chimpanzee.
Richard G. Klein, Ph.D., joined the

faculty at Stanford University in 1993
and is a Professor in the Program in
Human Biology. Dr. Klein researches
the archeological and fossil evidence
for the evolution of human behavior. He has done fieldwork in Spain and especially
in South Africa, where he has, since 1969, excavated
ancient sites and analyzed the excavated materials. He
recently finished directing the first of three excavation
seasons at the 200,000-year-old archeological site of
Duinefoutein 2, near Cape Town. He has focused on
the behavioral changes that, about 50,000 years ago,
allowed anatomically modern Africans to spread to
Eurasia, where they swamped or replaced the Neanderthals and other non-modern Eurasians.
Klein has published articles on various aspects of
human evolution and two book-length syntheses: The
Human Career: Human Biological and Cultural Origins (University of Chicago Press, Second Edition,
1999), aimed at professional paleoanthropologists
and their students, and (with Blake Edgar) The Dawn
of Human Culture (John Wiley, 2002), written for
non-specialists.
After earning his undergraduate degree from the
University of Michigan, Klein earned his M.A. and
Ph.D. degrees from the University of Chicago. He has
taught at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,
Northwestern University, the University of Washington, the University of Chicago (for 20 years), and now
at Stanford University.
142
Participant Biographies | Appendix 2
Steven Pinker
John Tooby
Steven Pinker, a native of Montreal, received his B.A. from McGill

University in 1976 and his Ph.D. in
psychology from Harvard in 1979.
After serving on the faculties of Harvard and Stanford universities for a
year each, he moved to MIT in 1982, where he spent
21 years before returning to Harvard in 2003 as the
Johnstone Family Professor of Psychology.
Professor Pinkers research has focused on visual
cognition and the psychology of language. The research
has been reported in two technical books and many
journal articles, and won the Troland Award from
the National Academy of Sciences, the Henry Dale
Prize from the Royal Institution of Great Britain, and
the Early Career Award and McCandless Prize from
the American Psychological Association. Pinker has
also received awards for graduate and undergraduate
teaching, two prizes for general achievement, three
honorary doctorates, and eights awards for his critically acclaimed popular science books, The Language
Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language (William
Morrow, 1994), How the Mind Works (W.W. Norton, 1997), and The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial
of Human Nature (Viking, 2002). The latter two were
finalists for the Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction. Dr.
Pinker also won the Walter P. Kistler Book Award in
2005 for The Blank Slate.
Pinker is an elected Fellow of several scholarly societies, including the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, the American Association for
the Advancement of Science, and the Neuroscience
Research Program. He is an Associate Editor of Cognition and serves on many professional panels, such as
the Usage Panel of the American Heritage Dictionary,
the Scientific Advisory Panel of the Evolution series
on NOVA, and the Endangered Language Fund. Dr.
Pinker also writes in the popular press, including The
New York Times, Time, The New Yorker, and Technology Review.
John Tooby, Ph.D., is best known

for his work in co-founding the new
field of evolutionary psychology.
This multidisciplinary new approach
weaves together evolutionary biology, cognitive science, human
evolution, hunter-gatherer studies, neuroscience, and
psychology into a unified new framework for discovering the functional organization of the human mind
and brain. By using models of the adaptive problems
our hunter-gatherer ancestors faced during their evolution, researchers can empirically map the detailed
functional designs of the reasoning algorithms, emotion programs, and motivational systems that evolved
as part of our universal human nature.
Dr. Tooby developed his interest in rebuilding
psychology along evolutionary lines while an undergraduate at Harvard in the early 1970s. He continued
at Harvard, where he received his Ph.D. in biological
anthropology, and married his long-time collaborator, Leda Cosmides. He did postdoctoral work with
Roger Shepard, a cognitive psychologist at Stanford,
and then became a Fellow at the Center for Advanced
Study in the Behavioral Sciences, where he helped to
form the Special Project on Evolutionary Psychology.
In 1990 he joined the Department of Anthropology at
the University of California, Santa Barbara, where he
is now Professor in anthropology. Tooby co-directs
the UCSB Center for Evolutionary Psychology with
Cosmides. In 1992, they published The Adapted
Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of
Culture, an edited volume designed to be a state-ofthe-art survey of the new field.
Dr. Tooby has published in the fields of cognitive psychology, evolutionary biology, evolutionary
psychology, cultural and biological anthropology,
neuroscience, evolutionary genetics, philosophy, and
economics. He has won various awards and honors
for his work on the foundations of evolutionary psychology and evolutionary biology. In 1991, Tooby
won a Presidential Young Investigator Award from
the National Science Foundation. In 1999, he received
a John Simon Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship,
and was President of the Human Behavior & Evolution Society from 19992001.
143
Endel Tulving
Ajit Varki
Endel Tulving, Ph.D., holds the

Tanenbaum Chair in Cognitive Neuroscience at the Rotman Research
Institute of Baycrest Centre, University of Toronto, as well as the Clark
Way Harrison Distinguished Visiting
Professorship of Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience, Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri.
He was born in Estonia in 1927 and came to Canada in 1949. He completed undergraduate work at
the University of Toronto, and received his Ph.D. in
experimental psychology from Harvard. He taught at
the University of Toronto continuously from 1956 to
1992, with the exception of a few years at Yale University in the early 1970s. In 1992 he retired as a University
Professor Emeritus and accepted his present position
at the Rotman Research Institute.
Dr. Tulving has studied human memory all his academic life. Among the concepts he has introduced to
the field and discoveries he has made are: subjective
organization (1962), the distinction between availability and accessibility of stored information (1966),
encoding specificity principle (1973), cuedependent
forgetting (1974), stochastic independence between
priming and episodic memory measures (1982),
retrieval mode (1983), the distinction between noetic
and autonoetic consciousness (1985), the recognition/
know (R/K) paradigm (1985), the distinction between
perceptual and conceptual priming (1990), the hemispheric encoding/retrieval asymmetry (HERA)
model of the involvement of frontal lobes in memory
processes (1994), the novelty/encoding hypothesis
(1996), episodic retrieval mode (1983, 2000), and
chronesthesia (2002).
Tulving has been elected to seven national or international academies of science, including the Royal Society
of London and the National Academy of Sciences (USA),
and has received honorary degrees from five countries.
Among his other honors are the Howard Crosby Warren Medal of the Society of Experimental Psychologists,
Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award of the
American Psychological Association, Killam Prize in
Health Sciences of the Canada Council, and Gold Medal
Award for Life Achievement in Psychological Science of
the American Psychological Foundation.
Ajit Varki, M.D., is Professor of

Medicine and Cellular & Molecular Medicine; Co-director of the
Glycobiology Research and Training Center; and Associate Dean for
Physician Scientist Training at the
University of California, San Diego. He studied physiology, medicine, biology, and biochemistry at the
Christian Medical College (Vellore, India), University
of Nebraska, and Washington University (St. Louis).
He also has formal training and board certification in
internal medicine, hematology, and oncology.
Dr. Varkis research interests are currently focused
on a family of sugars called the sialic acids, and their
roles in biology, evolution, and disease. He is particularly intrigued by finding multiple differences in sialic
acid biology between humans and our closest evolutionary cousins, the great apes. These differences are
a signature of events that occurred during the last few
million years of human evolution, and may be relevant to understanding several aspects of the current
human condition, both in health and disease.
Dr. Varki was Executive Editor of the textbook
Essentials of Glycobiology (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, 1998) and serves on the editorial boards
of several journals, including The Journal of Clinical
Investigation, PloS Medicine, and Glycobiology. He also
serves as Coordinator for the multidisciplinary UCSD
Project for Explaining the Origin of Humans and is an
Affiliate Faculty Member of the Living Links Center of
Emory University. He is a recipient of a MERIT award
from the NIH and an American Cancer Society Faculty Research Award, and he serves on the Scientific
Advisory Boards of PubMed Central (NLM/NIH),
the Human Gene Nomenclature Committee, and
the Huntsman Cancer Institute (University of Utah).
Significant past appointments include: Co-head,
UCSD Division of Hematology-Oncology (198789);
President of the Society for Glycobiology (1996); Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Clinical Investigation
(199297); Interim Director of the UCSD Cancer Center (19961997); President of the American Society for
Clinical Investigation (19981999); Scientific Advisor,
Complex Carbohydrate Research Center (University
of Georgia), and Scientific Advisor, the Yerkes Primate
Center (Emory University).
144

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The Evolution of the

123 105th Ave SE Bellevue, Washington USA

The Evolution of the Human Brain

Deputy Director, Programs

Deputy Director, Administration

Dr. William Calvin

Dr. Eric Chaisson

Dr. Clement C.P. Chang

Consulting Futurist, Inc.

Dr. Ricardo Diez-Hochleitner

Dr. Brian Fagan

Barbara Marx Hubbard

Foundation for Conscious Evolution

Dr. Donald Johanson

Institute of Human Origins

Dr. Michio Kaku

City University of New York

Public Policy Forecasting, Inc.

Dr. Robert Muller

Dr. George Bugliarello

Dr. Christian de Duve

Institute of Cellular Pathology

Dr. Edward O. Wilson

Pacific Science Center

World Future Society

The Critical Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Center for Human Evolution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Appendix 1 Workshop Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

The staff of the Foundation For the Future, for

Deputy Director, Programs

Deputy Director, Administration

he fundamental objective of the Foundation For

All Center for Human Evolution workshops are

The Proceedings Sections

ummarized below are the contents of each Section

cites the critical questions that formed the

summarizes the purpose, organization and

Section 4 provides transcripts of the presentations

provides specific details describing Work-

The Proceedings Sections

Steven Pinker, Ph.D.

Terrence Deacon, Ph.D.

John Tooby, Ph.D.

Ralph L. Holloway, Ph.D.

Endel Tulving, Ph.D.

Richard G. Klein, Ph.D.

Ajit Varki, M.D.

University of California, Berkeley

University of California, San Diego

The Critical Questions

2. What are the implications of brain plasticity in

Section 1 | The Critical Questions

Center for Human Evolution

Organization and Management

Evolution, was held in May 2000, and Workshop

Section 2 | Center for Human Evolution Overview

Venue and Themes

Section 3 |Description of Workshop 5

enter for Human Evolution Workshop 5 addressed

Center for Human Evolution workshops are