SIEMENS

Case 1:08-cr-00367-RJL
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 1 of 50
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
(Foreign Corrupt Practices ActInternal Controls and Books and
Records Provisions, 15 U.S.c.
78m(b)(2), 78(b)(5), and 78ff(a)
v.
SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT,
Defendant
FILED
DEC 1 5 2008
Clerk, U.S. District and
Bankruptcy Courts
STATEMENT OF OFFENSE
The United States and Defendant SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT ("SIEMENS")
agree that the following facts are true and correct:
SIEMENS AND OTHER RELEVANT ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS
1.
Defendant SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT ("SIEMENS") was a
corporation organized under the laws of Gennany with its principal offices in Berlin and
Munich, Gennany, and, through its operating groups, subsidiaries, officers, directors, employees,
and agents, was engaged in a variety of business activities for, among others, national, state, and
municipal governments. This included, among other things, developing, constructing, selling,
and servicing telecommunications equipment and systems; power generation, transmission, and
distribution equipment and systems; transportation equipment and systems; medical equipment
and systems; and industrial and traffic equipment and systems.
2.
As of March 12,2001, SIEMENS was listed on the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") and was an "issuer" as that tenn is used in the FCPA. 15 U.S.C. 78dd-l(a). By
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 2 of 50
virtue of its status as an issuer, SIEMENS was required to comply with the provisions of the
FCPA.
3.
SIEMENS was organized in a matrix-like structure with both operating groups
and regional companies, organized by location. The functions of operating groups and regional
companies often overlapped, though each operated independently with minimal, if any,
centralized reporting mechanisms beyond financial reporting. Over 1,800 legal entities operated
as part of the SIEMENS group of companies.
4.
SIEMENS' Supervisory Board (the "Supervisory Board"), based in Munich,
Germany, was the highest-level board within SIEMENS and was composed oftwenty members,
ten of whom were elected by the shareholders and ten of whom were elected by the employees.
The Supervisory Board had the authority to appoint and remove members of the Managing
Board, known in German as the "Vorstand," but was not permitted to make management
decisions or give directions to management.
5.
SIEMENS' Vorstand, based in Munich, Germany, was the Managing Board for
SIEMENS and was composed of eleven members. Pursuant to the Bylaws of the Managing
Board, as they existed at the time, a Corporate Executive Committee (the "SIEMENS ZV") was
created, with a maximum number of nine members. The SIEMENS ZV was authorized to make
all management decisions unless specifically reserved by the Managing Board. Most SIEMENS
ZV members "coached," or had oversight responsibility for, both a geographic region and an
operating group.
6.
SIEMENS' Audit Committee (the "Audit Committee"), based in Munich,
Germany, was composed of a subset of the Supervisory Board and was responsible for the
supervision of accounting and risk management, compliance, ensuring the independence of
2
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 3 of 50
SIEMENS' external auditor, engaging the external auditor for the audit of SIEMENS' financial
statements, determining the focus of the audit, and agreeing on the audit fees.
7.
As part of the legal function, SIEMENS' lawyers, based in Erlangen and Munich,
Germany, advised on corporate and compliance matters and supported the SIEMENS operating
groups and regional companies in legal matters, including drafting and reviewing contracts,
participating in customer negotiations, and reviewing and analyzing third party legal claims
against SIEMENS. Those lawyers relevant to this matter reported to the General Counsel.
8.
SIEMENS' compliance function was established in 2001 and in 2004 a Corporate
Compliance Office (the "Corporate Compliance Office") based in Erlangen and Munich,
Germany was established. It was composed of several lawyers responsible for compliance
initiatives within SIEMENS, but who were also responsible, at least until 2006, for defending
SIEMENS against outside allegations and for handling compliance investigations.
9.
SIEMENS' Regional Compliance Officers (the "Regional Compliance Officers")
and Group Compliance Officers (the "Group Compliance Officers") were employees who were
responsible for compliance at the regional companies and the operating groups, respectively.
Many of the Regional Compliance Officers and Group Compliance Officers had other full-time
responsibilities besides compliance, and they received minimal training or direction regarding
their compliance responsibilities.
Select Operating Groups
10.
SIEMENS' former Communications operating group ("COM"), headquartered in
Munich, Germany, was responsible for the design, manufacture, sale, and service of mobile and
fixed telecommunications systems. COM operated worldwide, and a substantial portion of its
business was with foreign government entities. Prior to October 1,2004, the communications
3
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 4 of 50
business was operated by two separate groups, Siemens Information and Communication Mobile
Group ("ICM") and Information and Communication Network Group ("ICN").
11.
ICM was responsible for the design, manufacture, sale, and service of mobile
telecommunications systems.
12.
ICN was responsible for the design, manufacture, sale, and service of fixed
network telecommunications systems.

13.
SIEMENS' Industrial Solutions and Services operating group ("I&S"),
headquartered in Erlangen, Germany, was responsible for the development, design, construction,
sale, operation, and maintenance of infrastructure and automation equipment and systems. I&S
operated worldwide, and a substantial portion of its business was with foreign government
entities.
14.
SIEMENS' Power Generation operating group ("PG"), headquartered in
Erlangen, Germany and with subsidiary offices in Orlando, Florida, was responsible for the
development, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of large-scale power plants. PG
operated worldwide, and a substantial portion of its business was with foreign government
entities.
15.
SIEMENS' Power Transmission and Distribution operating group ("PTD"),
headquartered in Erlangen, Germany and with subsidiary offices in Wendell, North Carolina,
was responsible for the design, manufacture, sale, and service of power transmission and
distribution equipment, software and network control equipment. PTD operated worldwide, and
a substantial portion of its business was with foreign government entities.
16.
SIEMENS' Transportation Systems operating group ("TS"), headquartered in
Erlangen, Germany and with subsidiary offices in Sacramento, California, was responsible for
4
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 5 of 50
the development, design, construction, sale, operation, and maintenance of trains, train tracks,
and railway systems. TS operated worldwide, and a substantial portion of its business was with
foreign government entities.
17.
SIEMENS' Medical Solutions operating group ("MED"), headquartered in
Erlangen, Germany, was responsible for the development, sale, and service of medical products,
medical equipment, and health care information systems, as well as the provision of management
consulting and support services. MED operated worldwide, and a substantial portion of its
business was with foreign government entities.
Select Senior Officers and Directors
18.
"Officer A," a German citizen, was President and Chief Executive Officer of
SIEMENS from 1992 to 2005, a senior member ofthe SIEMENS ZV from 1992 to 2005, and
Chairman of the Supervisory Board from 2005 to 2007.
19.
"Officer B," a German citizen, was General Counsel from 1992 to 2004 and the
Chief Compliance Officer from 2004 until the end of 2006.

20.
"Officer C," a German citizen, was Chief Financial Officer of SIEMENS from
1998 to 2006.
21.
"Officer D," a German citizen, was a member of the SIEMENS ZV and a senior
executive with management and oversight responsibility for PTD and the Americas from 2000
until 2007.
22.
"Officer E," a German citizen, was a member of the SIEMENS ZV from 1994
until 2007.
23.
"Officer F," a German citizen, was a member of the SIEMENS ZV from 2003 to
2007.
5
24.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 6 of 50
"Officer G," a German citizen, was President and Chief Executive Officer of
SIEMENS from 2005 to 2007.
United Nations Oil for Food Program: Select Entities and Individuals
25.
Siemens S.A.S. of France ("Siemens France"), SIEMENS' regional company in
France, entered into contracts for power station renovation, servicing, and spare parts, with the
Iraqi government in connection with the United Nations Oil for Food Program. All of Siemens
France's contracts under the United Nations Oil for Food Program (the "OFFP") were entered
into in partnership with PG or PTD.
26.
Siemens Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. of Turkey ("Siemens Turkey"), SIEMENS'
regional company in Turkey, sold power and electrical equipment to the Iraqi government in
connection with the OFFP.
27.
Osram Middle East FZE ("Osram Middle East") was the United Arab Emirates-
based subsidiary of Osram GmbH, which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of SIEMENS. Osram
Middle East sold light bulbs and lighting equipment to the Iraqi government in connection with
the OFFP.
28.
Gas Turbine Technologies S.p.A. ("GTT"), an Italian subsidiary of SIEMENS,
contracted to sell gas turbines to the Iraqi government in connection with the OFFP.
29.
"OFFP Agent A," a Paraguayan company registered in Jordan, acted as an agent
for Siemens France and Siemens Turkey in connection with sales to the Iraqi government made
through the OFFP.
30.
"OFFP Agent B," an Iraqi citizen, acted as an agent for Osram Middle East in
connection with sales to the Iraqi government made through the OFFP.
31.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 7 of 50
"OFFP Agent C" and "OFFP Agent D," Iraqi citizens, acted as agents for GTT in
connection with sales to the Iraqi government made through the OFFP.
SIEMENS' HISTORICAL FAILURE TO
MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT INTERNAL ANTI-CORRUPTION CONTROLS
Pre-l 999
32.
By the late nineteenth century, SIEMENS and its subsidiaries had become known
as an international company, with over half of their employees outside of Germany. After World
War II, with most of its facilities destroyed, its material assets and trademark patents confiscated,
and its business prospects in the developed world weakened, SIEMENS began to focus on
developing markets. By the mid-1950s, SIEMENS was handling major infrastructure projects in
South America, the Middle East, and Africa. By the mid-1990s, SIEMENS became the first
foreign corporation to have a holding company in China.
33.
Until in or about February 1999, SIEMENS operated in a largely unregulated
environment with respect to international business practices, in which (a) German law did not
prohibit overseas bribery and permitted tax deductions for bribe payments to foreign officials;
(b) SIEMENS was not yet listed on the NYSE; and (c) SIEMENS operated in many countries
where corruption was endemic.
34.
Until in or about February 1999, SIEMENS' project cost calculation sheets
sometimes reflected "niitzliche aufwendungen" ("NAs"), a common tax term literally translated
as "useful expenditures" but partly understood by many SIEMENS employees to mean "bribes."
35.
Until in or about February 1999, certain systems existed within SIEMENS that
allowed for corrupt payments as necessary to win business. For example, there were multiple
"cash desks" housed within SIEMENS offices where employees could withdraw large sums of
7
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 8 of 50
cash, up to and including one million Euros at a time. In addition, in the 1990s, very large sums
of money - more than one billion Euros - were withdrawn for questionable business purposes
from off-books accounts in Austria, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and elsewhere. SIEMENS also
relied heavily on purported "business consultants," in many cases for the sole purpose of passing
along corrupt payments from SIEMENS to foreign government officials responsible for
awarding business.
1999 - 2004
36.
Over the period from in or about February 1999 to in or about July 2004, certain
SIEMENS ZV members became aware of changes in the regulatory environment. While foreign
anti-corruption circulars and policies were promulgated, that "paper program" was largely
ineffective at changing SIEMENS' historical, pervasive corrupt business practices.
37.
On or about February 15, 1999, the German law implementing the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business

Transactions (the "OECD Convention"), which generally required signatory countries to
implement antibribery laws similar to the FCP A, came into force. On the same day, Officer A
made a presentation at a high-level SIEMENS executive meeting expressing "concern at the
number of criminal and other investigations into members of the company," further noting the
new German law prohibiting foreign bribery and that "[a]s the Board could possibly he held
responsible for various offenses, it was important to take protective measures."
38.
In or about March 1999, the SIEMENS ZV issued a Z Circular, a company-wide
policy, reminding employees ofthe general need to observe laws and regulations.
39.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 9 of 50
On or about April 25, 2000, Officer B issued a report to the SIEMENS ZV
recommending the creation of a company-wide list of agents and consultants and a committee to
review these relationships.
40.
On or about April 25, 2000, during the SIEMENS ZV meeting, a debate ensued
regarding whether to promulgate company-wide uniform guidelines for consultants, but meeting
minutes indicate that the SIEMENS ZV rejected the concept of instituting such guidelines due to
"different business practices" in each division.
41.
In or about June 2000, SIEMENS' lawyers sent memoranda to Officer C and a
Supervisory Board member warning of the potential criminal and civil implications of
maintaining off-books accounts for cash payments in light of SIEMENS' upcoming listing on the
NYSE. Specifically, the memoranda identified "three bank accounts in Switzerland which are
run as trust accounts for SIEMENS AG and for which confiscation was ordered by the Swiss
courts."
42.
On or about July 5,2000, SIEMENS issued a Z Circular requiring operating
groups and regional companies to ensure that the following anti-corruption clause would be
included in all contracts with agents, consultants, brokers, or other third parties: "The agent shall
strictly comply with all laws and regulations regarding the performance of the activities
applicable to the agent. Without limitation, the Agent agrees to comply with the requirements of
the anticorruption laws applicable to the Parties."
43.
In or about September 2000, Officer B forwarded to Officer C a letter regarding a
foreign public prosecutor's investigation into bribes to a former Nigerian dictator allegedly paid
from SIEMENS' off-books accounts. Officer B's handwritten note on the letter said "for infoparticulars verbally."
9
44.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 10 of 50
On or about September 12, 2000, in connection with an investigation, Austrian
authorities froze assets in at least one Austrian bank account used by SIEMENS. On or about
February 7,2001, in connection with the Nigeria investigation, an Austrian judge granted a
Swiss prosecutor's request for judicial assistance concerning that account and another off-books
Austrian bank account used by SIEMENS for improper payments.
45.
On or about March 12,2001, SIEMENS became listed on the NYSE. At the time
of listing, SIEMENS and its subsidiaries had over 400,000 employees and operated in 190
countries.
46.
On or about July 18, 2001, SIEMENS issued Business Conduct Guidelines that
included the following anti-corruption provision: "No employee may directly or indirectly offer
or grant unjustified advantages to others in connection with business dealings, neither in
monetary form nor as some other advantage." The guidelines also provided that gifts to business
partners should "avoid the appearance of bad faith or impropriety," that no gifts should be made
to "public officials or other civil servants," and that employees entering into contracts with
consultants or agents must see to it that those parties also offered no "unjustified advantages."
47.
In or about July 2001, SIEMENS established a new position for a Corporate
Officer for Compliance and expanded the existing antitrust compliance system to cover anticorruption issues. The Corporate Officer for Compliance worked on compliance issues part-time
due to other job duties and, until 2004, had a staff of only two lawyers.
48.
On or about October 18, 2001 - nearly seven months after SIEMENS became an
issuer - the Swiss off-books accounts were still active, despite knowledge by certain individuals
at the highest levels of SIEMENS of the legal concerns surrounding these accounts raised in or
about June 2000.
10
49.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 11 of 50
On or about October 18, 2001, Officer A testified about the Swiss off-books
accounts before a Gennan parliamentary committee investigating donations to a political party.

Officer A con finned the existence of the accounts and testified that they were not used for cash
payments to Gennan political parties, but rather for business consultant commissions in foreign
countries.
50.
On or about June 13, 2002, SIEMENS issued principles and recommendations,
but not mandatory policies, regarding business-related internal controls and agreements with
business consultants, including that such agreements should be in writing, transparent, and as
detailed as possible. These non-binding recommendations were largely ineffective. They
contained no discussion of how to conduct due diligence on consultants or agents, and although
SIEMENS employees often reduced consulting agreements to writing, they frequently did so
only after SIEMENS won a contract and needed documentary support for a payment. Many
written consulting agreements were fonn agreements containing no substance particular to the
engagement, and most called for success fee payments.
51.
In or about July 2003, The Financial Times reported that the Milan, Italy public
prosecutor's office was investigating payments by SIEMENS to managers of the Italian energy
company, Enel. The Milan investigation focused on 6 million in bribes that PG managers had
arranged to be paid to managers of Enel so that PO could win two power plant projects. The
payments to the Enel managers were routed through slush funds in Liechtenstein and through an
account at Emirates Bank.
52.
In or about July 2003, the Dannstadt, Oennany public prosecutor's office also
publicly announced an investigation into the Enel matter.
11
53.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 12 of 50
In or about August 2003, SIEMENS engaged a U.S. law finn for advice on how
to respond to the Enel cases.

54.
On or about September 9,2003, the U.S. law finn submitted to SIEMENS a
memorandum, received by several SIEMENS ZV members including Officer A, Officer C,

Officer D, and Officer E, concluding that there was an "ample basis for either the [Securities and
Exchange Commission] or [Department of Justice] to start at least an infonnal investigation of a
company's role in such a matter." In addition, the U.S. law finn infonned SIEMENS that U.S.
enforcement officials would expect an internal investigation to be carried out on behalf of senior
management and SIEMENS ZV. Finally, the U.S. law finn suggested that SIEMENS
immediately review and assure proper functioning of its FCP A compliance program, report on
those findings to the SIEMENS ZV, and discipline the employees involved in wrongdoing.
55.
On or about September 30,2003, SIEMENS engaged a local law finn in
Erlangen, Gennany to investigate some of the facts underlying the Enel allegations.
56.
In or about October 2003, SIEMENS' outside auditors discovered that 4,120,000
in cash had been brought to Nigeria by COM personnel and flagged the issue for additional
review. A SIEMENS compliance lawyer conducted a one-day investigation and wrote a report
warning of numerous possible violations of Gennan law, including antibribery laws, in
connection with cash payments to purported business consultants. Officer C received the report,
which identified as playing prominently in the scheme several COM employees later arrested by
the Munich public prosecutor's office in 2006. Further, the compliance lawyer's report indicated
that based on interviews with employees, the issue investigated was not an isolated incident.
Officer C asked the CFO of COM to take care of the problem, but no follow-up was conducted
12
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 13 of 50
on whether any action was taken. The report itself was not circulated to the Vorstand as a whole
or to the Audit Committee, and the employees involved were not disciplined.
57.
In or about November 2003, to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002,
SIEMENS issued a Code of Ethics for Financial Matters, which, among other things, required
Chief Financial Officers and business heads to act responsibly and with integrity.
58.
In or about November 2003, at a meeting of SIEMENS financial officers, Officer
C reported on "unpleasant topics regarding Business Conduct which emerged in the past weeks
of the Financial Statement," and reminded the financial officers of their duties to adhere to the
Business Conduct Guidelines.
59.
In or about November 2003, a compliance lawyer, at Officer B's request, wrote a
memorandum describing the standards for an effective compliance organization under both
German and United States law, and highlighting deficiencies in SIEMENS' compliance
organization.
60.
In or about November 2003, Officer B forwarded to Officer C the memorandum
outlining deficiencies in SIEMENS' compliance organization, with a request to circulate the

memorandum to other members of the SIEMENS ZV. The subject of compliance was taken off
the agenda for the SIEMENS ZV meeting that immediately followed the drafting of the
memorandum, and was also not discussed at the subsequent SIEMENS ZV meeting in or about
December 2003.
61.
From in or about February 1999 to in or about July 2004, notwithstanding the
promulgation of some written policies, SIEMENS senior management provided little

corresponding guidance on how to conduct business lawfully in countries where SIEMENS had
been paying bribes historically. The SIEMENS ZV provided few strong messages regarding
13
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 14 of 50
anti-corruption. Senior management made no clear statement that SIEMENS would rather lose
business than obtain it illegally, and employees were still under tremendous pressure to meet
their sales goals.
2004 - 2006
62.
From in or about mid-2004 to in or about 2006, the SIEMENS ZV grew
increasingly alarmed at developments in the Enel corruption cases and adopted more robust - but
still imperfect - compliance measures in response. Certain SIEMENS ZV members began to
recognize the serious legal risks in both the United States and Europe that SIEMENS faced for
bribery.
63.
On or about April 24, 2004, the Milan, Italy investigating judge issued a written
opinion stating that the evidence in the Enel case indicated that SIEMENS, as a company, saw
bribery "at least as a possible business strategy." The judge further opined that the existence of
the Liechtenstein and Emirates Bank accounts had been "disguised deliberately" and that such
conduct "creates the danger that cases of corruption will recur." Finally, the judge noted that
SIEMENS was not cooperating with the investigation, as evidenced by its concealment of the
accounts.
64.
On or about May 4,2004, several members of the SIEMENS ZV, including
Officer A, Officer C, Officer D, Officer E, and Officer F received a memorandum outlining the
Milan, Italy investigating judge's ruling.
65.
On or about June 1, 2004, the Erlangen law firm SIEMENS engaged to
investigate the Enel matter issued the first report of its findings to Officer B, who shared the
report with Officer A, Officer C, and Officer D. The report discussed the Milan prosecutor's
allegations that various SIEMENS employees had paid bribes to Enel officials through purported
14
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 15 of 50
business consultants. In the report, the Erlangen law finn indicated that several key SIEMENS
employees had refused to submit to interviews. None of these key SIEMENS employees was
ever disciplined as a result of the failure to submit to interviews by SIEMENS' Erlangen lawyer
regarding the Enel corruption allegations.
66.
In or about July 2004, Officer C delivered a speech to the SIEMENS ZV and
high-level business managers entitled "Tone from the Top," which was the first time a member
of SIEMENS ZV strongly and directly sent a message to a large group of employees that
corruption would not be tolerated and was contrary to SIEMENS' principles of integrity. In this
speech, Officer C proposed that in order to impose more control over consulting agreements and
"off set the[ir] danger," such agreements should be reviewed and signed by the chainnen of the
divisional boards. Officer C also suggested implementing more stringent disciplinary penalties
for employees who violate internal controls and fail to cooperate with investigations. He
explained that in U.S. companies, "whenever employees refuse to cooperate with the authorities,
they are immediately dismissed irrespective oftheir position on the corporate ladder."
67.
On or about August 4,2004, SIEMENS promulgated its first Company-wide,
comprehensive policy on the use of bank accounts and external payment orders. The policy,
among other things, restricted the use of bank accounts controlled by SIEMENS employees or
third parties, a mechanism that had previously been heavily used by certain operating groups,
particularly COM, to make improper payments on behalf of SIEMENS.
68.
On or about September 7, 2004, Officer C sent an email to SIEMENS ZV
members Officer A and Officer E stating that divisional chainnen did not consider his July 2004
compliance speech as mandatory and requesting a Z Circular regarding agreements with business
consultants.
15
69.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 16 of 50
On or about November 4, 2004, the Erlangen law firm SIEMENS engaged to
investigate the Enel case issued its second report, and the full SIEMENS ZV received a briefing
about the contents of the report. The report highlighted questionable payments from SIEMENS
to a Dubai-based business consultant and to certain off-books accounts in Liechtenstein.
70.
On or about November 5, 2004, the SIEMENS ZV received a written report
identifying by name the Dubai-based purported business consultant as the conduit for the
payments through Emirates Bank in the Enel matter. Nevertheless, no action was taken to
investigate the broader implications of this report.
71.
On or about January 26,2005, at an Audit Committee meeting in which the Enel
case was discussed, a member of the Audit Committee asked Officer C "whether pointers could
be drawn from this regarding gaps in the internal control system." In response, Officer C said
"the existing rules were comprehensive and clearly written down," despite the fact that he and
other senior executives were aware by that time of significant control weaknesses.
72.
On or about April 25, 2005, at an Audit Committee meeting in which the off-
books accounts in Liechtenstein were mentioned, a member of the Audit committee asked
Officer C whether "an inference might be drawn from existing knowledge that cash deposits
might exist outside Siemens AG." Despite his knowledge that such cash deposits did exist,
Officer C replied that "no indication existed of any [such] accounts which may be attributable to
the company and in the case that any such indication existed, the company would look into this."
73.
On or about May 4,2005, the Erlangen law firm engaged by SIEMENS to
investigate the Enel case issued the final report of its findings to several SIEMENS ZV members.
74.
On or about May 31, 2005, the full SIEMENS ZV learned at a meeting that the
final report of the Enel investigation submitted by the Erlangen lawyer had discovered 126
16
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 17 of 50
payments totaling 190 million to Liechtenstein accounts from 1997 to 1999 for which recipients
could not be identified. At the same meeting, SIEMENS ZV received a report that Liechtenstein
authorities were investigating a former ICN employee accused of siphoning money from
SIEMENS through sham consulting agreements. The report identified five off-books accounts in
Liechtenstein that were seized. Despite striking similarities between the facts of the two reports,
SIEMENS ZV members took no action to investigate the payments or accounts further.
Similarly, SIEMENS ZV made no attempt to determine whether the former ICN employee had
in fact embezzled company money. At the same SIEMENS ZV meeting, Officer B including the
following statements in his presentation:
The most important thing in each Compliance programme is the
absolute commitment of management: Adherence to the laws is
for us the most important commandment. Offences are not
tolerated and are punished consistently and without exception. In
the Enel case, the investigating Franlifurt chiefprosecutor said to
a counsel for the defence of the former Siemens employees that he
considered the Siemens Compliance programme to exist only on
paper.
(Emphasis added.)
75.
On or about July 27,2005, Officer B made a presentation to the Audit Committee,
during which he told the Audit Committee that "an investigation by an external [accountant] of
unclarified payments to a bank in Liechtenstein had become necessary. This has revealed that
the recipient of 126 payments totaling EUR 190 million in 1997 to 1999 could not be identified."
Officer B said the information had been given to the auditors and that [two] Z Circulars ... had
added new rules on external payments and bank accounts, which would make it possible in the
future to identify payment recipients. During the same meeting, Officer B included in his
presentation statements regarding the compliance and adherence to the laws that were identical
17
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 18 of 50
to those he had made at the May 31, 2005 SIEMENS ZV meeting, but he removed the final
sentence regarding the Frankfurt prosecutor's statement that SIEMENS' compliance program
existed only on paper.
76.
On or about July 26,2005, the Corporate Compliance Office, at Officer G's
request, completed a written benchmarking analysis comparing SIEMENS' compliance program

and infrastructure with that of General Electric Company ("GE"). The analysis, which was
distributed to Officer E and Officer G, showed serious deficiencies in SIEMENS' resourcing and
infrastructure when compared to GE's. In particular, the analysis noted, "[t]he Compliance
Office team is extremely small (six lawyers) in relation to the number of employees, and
understaffed in comparison with GE," which had 300 "ombudsmen." The memorandum further
pointed out that GE's program "seem[ed] more efficient than SIEMENS' at diffusing
Compliance principles throughout the entire company." SIEMENS took no action to augment
compliance resources in response to the benchmarking memorandum apart from Officer G
ordering an audit of the compliance organization, which remained in draft form until as late as
November 2006.
77.
In or about July 2005, SIEMENS redistributed the Business Conduct Guidelines,
with a new foreword by Officer G.

78.
On or about June 29,2005 - nine months after Officer C's email request for
consulting agreement guidelines - SIEMENS enacted a Z Circular containing mandatory

guidelines regarding agreements with business consultants. The guidelines prohibited success
fees and required relevant compliance officers to sign off on consulting agreements and attached
a due diligence questionnaire.
18
79.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 19 of 50
On or about November 23,2005, in his report to the SIEMENS ZV, Officer B
commented on the lack of effectiveness of the Regional Compliance Officers. Officer B noted
that when SIEMENS attempted to collect business consulting agreements from the regions after
the June 29,2005 Z Circular, most Regional Compliance Officers had reported that "either such
agreements [did] not exist, or that the possible infringements of the laws of the Business Conduct
Guidelines [were] not visible." Officer B went on to comment that "[t]aking into account the
known business environments in, for example, the Asiatic territories, the correctness of this
statement [had] to be questioned. It also [shed] some doubt as to the quality of the [Regional
Compliance Officers]." Notwithstanding Officer B's explicit doubts that existing consulting
agreements had been produced by regions as requested, there was no follow-up to seek the
missing documents.
80.
On or about December 7,2005, during his presentation to the Audit Committee,
Officer B made no mention of the questions he had raised at the November 23,2005 SIEMENS
ZV meeting regarding the Regional Compliance Officers' quality and their truthfulness in
reporting on the status of business consulting agreements.
81.
In or about March 2006, in the course of a compliance investigation, a SIEMENS
Greece COM manager admitted to the Corporate Compliance Office and Internal Audit that he
had received substantial funds to make "bonus payments" to managers at the Greek national
telephone company, OTE. Neither the SIEMENS ZV nor the Corporate Compliance Office
undertook a comprehensive investigation aimed at discovering the full extent of corruption in
Greece or in the COM business more broadly.
82.
In or about April 2006, in response to a special audit request by Intercom's board
of directors, SIEMENS' outside auditors reported at least 250 suspicious payments made through
19
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 20 of 50
Intercom to companies in foreign jurisdictions on behalf of COM ICM and SIEMENS' Italian
subsidiary. The audit report was provided to the board of directors of Intercom, as well as to
certain members of the SIEMENS ZV and the Corporate Compliance Office. Neither the
SIEMENS ZV nor the Corporate Compliance Office made any attempt to investigate these facts,
or explore whether they were related to other similar instances of wrongdoing.
83.
From in or about 2004 to in or about 2006, in addition to learning of the
corruption issues involving SIEMENS in Nigeria, Italy, Greece, Liechtenstein, and elsewhere,
SIEMENS' senior management became aware of government investigations into corruption by
SIEMENS in Israel, Hungary, Azerbaijan, Taiwan, and China. Nevertheless, SIEMENS ZV
members and other senior management failed to adequately investigate or follow up on any of
these issues. SIEMENS ZV also failed to take effective disciplinary measures with respect to
any of the employees implicated in the various investigations. For example, the three PG
managers implicated in the Enel cases each received a severance package standard for early
retirees, despite the fact that certain SIEMENS ZV members knew that at least two of the PG
managers had already admitted to paying bribes at the time of their retirement.
84.
From in or about 2004 to in or about 2006, the Corporate Compliance Office
continued to lack resources, and there was an inherent conflict in its mandate, which included
both defending the company against prosecutorial investigations and preventing and punishing
compliance breaches. In addition, there were extremely limited internal audit resources to
support compliance efforts. All of these factors undermined the improved policies because
violations were difficult to detect and remedy, and resources were insufficient to train business
people in anti-corruption compliance.
20
85.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 21 of 50
From in or about 2004 to in or about 2006, there was a consistent failure on the
part of certain members of management to alert the Audit Committee to the significance of the
compliance failures discovered within SIEMENS. Reports to the Audit Committee by the Chief
Compliance Officer were principally status reports on prosecutorial investigations and often
conveyed incomplete information. In some instances, management provided inaccurate
information in response to Audit Committee inquiries. At no time did management convey to
the Audit Committee a sense of alarm or growing crisis.
SIEMENS' SYSTEMATIC EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT
INTERNAL CONTROLS AND FALSIFY BOOKS AND RECORDS
86.
From in or about the mid-1990s to in or about 2006, SIEMENS engaged in
systematic efforts to falsify its corporate books and records and circumvent existing internal
controls. These systematic efforts included, but were not limited to: (a) using off-books
accounts for corrupt payments even after compliance risks associated with such accounts were
raised at the highest levels of management; (b) entering into purported business consulting
agreements with no basis, sometimes after SIEMENS had won the relevant project; (c) engaging
former SIEMENS employees as purported business consultants to act as conduits for corrupt
payments to government officials; (d) justifying payments to purported business consultants
based on false invoices; ( e) mischaracterizing corrupt payments in the corporate books and
records as consulting fees and other seemingly legitimate expenses; (t) limiting the quantity and
scope of audits of payments to purported business consultants; (g) accumulating profit reserves
as liabilities in internal balance sheet accounts and then using them to make corrupt payments
through business consultants as needed; (h) using removable Post-It notes to affix signatures on
approval forms authorizing payments to conceal the identity of the signors and obscure the audit
21
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 22 of 50
trail; (i) allowing third party payments to be made based on a single signature in contravention of
SIEMENS' "four eyes principle," which required authorization of payments by two SIEMENS
managers; (j) drafting and backdating sham business consulting agreements to justify third party
payments; and (k) changing the name of purported business consulting agreements to "agency
agreements" or similar titles to avoid detection and conceal noncompliance with the 2005
business consulting agreement guidelines.
87.
In addition, from on or about March 12,2001 to in or about 2007, SIEMENS
made payments totaling approximately $1,360,000,000 through various mechanisms. Of this

amount, approximately $554,500,000 was paid for unknown purposes, including approximately
$341,000,000 constituting direct payments to business consultants. The remaining $805,500,000
of this amount was intended in whole or in part as corrupt payments to foreign officials through
the following payment mechanisms, among others:
a.
Direct payments to business consultants: COM, MED, PO, PTD, TS,
I&S, and various SIEMENS regional companies made payments directly to purported business
consultants, knowing that at least some or all of those funds would be passed along to foreign
government officials. From on or about March 12,2001 to on or about November 15, 2006,
COM, MED, PO, PTD, TS, I&S, and various SIEMENS regional companies made
approximately $183,400,000 in direct payments to business consultants. Thereafter, those
groups and companies made another $6,300,000 in direct payments to purported business
consultants.
b.
Cash desks: SIEMENS maintained three cash desks within SIEMENS'
offices where COM employees withdrew large sums of cash for corrupt payments. COM
employees typically brought empty suitcases to fill with the cash received from the cash desks.
22
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 23 of 50
The same managers who submitted the requests for the cash were able to authorize the cash pickups. From on or about March 12,2001 to on or about September 2004, COM employees
withdrew approximately $66,600,000 predominantly from cash desks operated by Siemens Real
Estate. Thereafter, an additional $500,000 was paid out in cash until November 2005, when the
last cash desk was closed.
c.
Barschecks: Until approximately March 2002, COM's Accounting
department wrote special checks called "Barschecks" to two former COM managers, who
deposited these cash equivalents in Austrian off-books accounts. The two former COM
managers then transferred corrupt payments intended in whole or in part for foreign government
officials from the off-books accounts to purported business consultants. COM stopped using the
Barschecks system from in or about September 2000 to in or about March 2002, the period in
which the Austrian off-books accounts were seized by the Austrian public prosecutor's office.
On or about March 21, 2002, COM issued approximately $1,500,000 in Barschecks to the two
former COM managers.
d.
Bearer checks: Beginning in or about September 2000 and continuing
until approximately September 2003, COM authorized its bank in Germany to issue bearer
checks to two former COM managers, who then deposited these cash equivalents into off-books
accounts. The two former COM managers then transferred corrupt payments from the off-books
accounts to purported business consultants. The bearer checks system was established in large
part to replace the barschecks system. From on or about March 12,2001 to on or about
September 2002, COM authorized approximately $80,500,000 in bearer checks to the two
former COM managers. Thereafter, COM authorized an additional $1,900,000 in bearer checks
to the two former COM managers.
23
e.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 24 of 50
Payment intennediaries: COM, MED, PO, PTD, and TS entered into
agreements with intennediary entities for the sole purpose of transferring money from SIEMENS
to purported business consultants, who then used some or all of the money to pay bribes to
government officials. The payment intennediaries sent sham invoices to SIEMENS to trigger
payments for certain projects, then kept a percentage of the payments for themselves and passed
along the rest to purported business consultants. COM, MED, PO, PTD, and TS utilized this
mechanism to further conceal the end recipients of the funds in SIEMENS' books and records.
From on or about March 12,2001 to on or about November 15,2006, COM, MED, PO, PTD,
and TS paid approximately $185,400,000 to payment intennediaries. Thereafter, COM, MED,
PO, PTD, and TS paid an additional $2,700,000 to payment intennediaries. Although SIEMENS
used thousands of business consultants, it used less than a dozen intennediaries. Intennediaries,
unlike business consultants, did not interface directly with the end recipients of the payments.
f.
Slush funds: Until approximately September 2004, COM, PO, PTD, and a
SIEMENS regional company in South America created "slush funds" controlled by nonSIEMENS "trustees" and SIEMENS managers at off-shore banks. COM, PO, PTD, and the
regional company in South America used the slush funds to generate cash for corrupt payments.
Slush funds differed from payment intennediaries in that funds were often pooled gradually
rather than through project-specific invoices. From on or about March 12,2001 to on or about
September 2004, COM, PO, PTD, and the regional company in South America paid
approximately $192,600,000 to third parties through the slush funds. Thereafter, COM, PO,
PTD, and the regional company in South America paid approximately $1,900,000 to third parties
through the slush funds.
24
g.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 25 of 50
Confidential payment system: PG utilized a confidential payment system
that was outside the nonnal accounts payable process and that facilitated corrupt payments
without invoices. There was no evidence of the payments in the accounts payable detail, thereby
obscuring the audit trail, providing flexibility regarding which project to charge for the
payments, and eliminating any record in the project accounting of the exact purposes of the
payments. From on or about March 12,2001 to on or about November 15, 2006, PG paid
approximately $36,500,000 to purported business consultants and agents using the confidential
payment system.
h.
Internal Commission Accounts: Until approximately July 2005, MED and
various regional companies created pools of funds for corrupt payments in balance sheet
accounts called internal commission accounts. MED and the regional companies reserved
percentages of the customer prices from certain projects and allocated them to the internal
commission accounts as liabilities. The funds were then used for various purposes, including by
purported business consultants for corrupt payments. From on or about March 12, 2001 to in or
about 2007, MED and the various regional companies paid approximately $12,600,000 to
purported business consultants through the internal commission accounts.
1.
Other Mechanisms: From on or about March 12,2001 to in or about
2007, SIEMENS entities paid approximately $33,100,000 through other mechanisms including
sham supplier agreements, sham resale transactions, receivables manipulation, and others. Part
or all of that amount was intended as corrupt payments to foreign officials.
88.
The payments described in paragraphs 87(a) though 87(i) are summarized in the
chart below:
25
Document 15
Payment Mechanism
Direct Payments to
Business Consultants
Cash Desks
Barschecks
Bearer Checks
Payment Intermediaries
Slush Funds
Confidential Payment
System
Internal Commission
Accounts
Corrupt Payments
through other methods
Total corrupt payments
paid through all of the
above mechanisms
Filed 12/15/2008
SIEMENS
Entities that
Employed
Mechanism
COM, MED, PG,
PTD, TS, I&S,
various regional
compames
COM
COM
COM
COM, MED, PG,
PTD,TS
COM, PG, PTD,
various regional
companies
PG
MED, various
regional companies
Various SIEMENS
entities
COM, MED, PG,
PTD, I&S, TS, and
various regional
compames
Page 26 of 50
Amount of Corrupt
Payments Paid
Through Mechanism
After March 12, 2001
$189,700,000
$67,100,000
$1,500,000
$82,400,000
$188,100,000
$194,500,000
$36,500,000
$12,600,000
$33,100,000
$805,500,000
THE UNITED NATIONS OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAM

89.
On or about August 6, 1990, days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the United
Nations ("U.N.") adopted Security Council Resolution 661, which prohibited U.N. memberstates from transacting business with Iraq, except for the purchase and sale of humanitarian
supplies. Resolution 661 prohibited virtually all direct financial transactions with the
government of Iraq.
90.
On or about April 15, 1995, the U.N. adopted Security Council Resolution 986,
which served as a limited exception to the Iraq sanctions regime in that it allowed Iraq to sell its
oil. However, Resolution 986 required that the proceeds from oil sales be used by the Iraqi
26
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 27 of 50
government to purchase humanitarian supplies, including but not limited to food, for the Iraqi
people. Hence, this program became known as the Oil for Food Program ("OFFP"). Payments
made to the Iraqi government that were not approved by the U.N. and that were outside the strict
contours of the OFFP were prohibited.
91.
The rules of the OFFP required that the proceeds from all sales of Iraqi oil be
deposited into a U.N.-controlled escrow account at the New York, New York, branch of Banque
Nationale de Paris ("BNP-Paribas"). That escrow account funded the purchase of humanitarian
goods by the Iraqi government.
92.
Under the rules of the OFFP, a supplier of humanitarian goods contracted with a
ministry or other department of the Iraqi government to sell goods to the government. Once that
contract was finalized, the contract was submitted to a U.N. Committee ("the 661 Committee")
which reviewed the contracts to ensure that their terms complied with all OFFP and Iraqi
sanction regulations. The 661 Committee accepted the contracts, rejected them, or asked the
supplier to provide additional information upon which the committee could make a decision.
93.
If a contract was approved by the 661 Committee, a letter of credit was issued by
BNP-Paribas to the supplier's bank stating that the supplier would be paid by the OFFP for the
relevant goods once certain conditions were met, including delivery of the goods to Iraq and
inspection of the goods by a U.N. contractor based in Geneva, Switzerland, that provided
inspection services in Iraq on behalf of the U.N. Once those conditions were deemed by the
U.N. to have been met, the U.N. would direct BNP-Paribas to release payment to the supplier.
94.
On or about December 10, 1996, the first Iraqi oil exports under the OFFP began.
The OFFP continued from in or about December 1996 until the United States' invasion ofIraq
on or about March 19,2003. From in or about December 1996 through March 2003, the United
27
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 28 of 50
States government prohibited United States companies, including their foreign branches, and
individuals from engaging in transactions with the government of Iraq, unless such transactions
were authorized by the U.N. pursuant to the OFFP.
95.
Beginning in approximately August 2000, the Iraqi government demanded that
suppliers of humanitarian goods pay a kickback, usually valued at 10% of the contract price, to
the Iraqi government in order to be awarded a contract by the government. These kickbacks
violated OFFP regulations and U.N. sanctions, which prohibited payments to the Iraqi
government that were not expressly approved by the U.N. and that were not contemplated by the
guidelines of the OFFP.
96.
Often, these kickbacks were termed "after sales service fees" ("ASSFs"), but did
not represent any actual service being performed by the supplier. These ASSFs were usually
included in the contract price submitted by the supplier to the U.N. without disclosing to the
U.N. that the contract contained an extra 10% which would be returned to the Iraqi government.
Including the 10% in the contract price allowed the supplier to avoid paying the 10% out of its
profits; instead, the suppliers caused the U.N. to fund the kickbacks to the Iraqi government.
97.
Some suppliers labeled the ASSFs as such, thereby leading the U.N. to believe
that actual after-sales services were being provided by the supplier. Other suppliers disguised
the ASSFs by inserting fictitious line items into the contracts for goods or services that were not
being provided. Still other suppliers simply offered or accepted contract prices inflated by 10%
to account for the payments they would make, or cause to be made, to the Iraqi government.
SIEMENS' OFFP Kickback Payments
98.
From in or about 2000 to in or about 2002, Siemens France, Siemens Turkey,
Osram Middle East, and OTT, each wholly owned by SIEMENS or one of its subsidiaries, were
28
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 29 of 50
awarded 42 contracts with a combined value of more than $80,000,000 with the Ministries of
Electricity and Oil of the Government of the Republic ofIraq under the OFFP. To obtain these
contracts, at the demand of these ministries, the relevant Siemens entities caused to be paid as
much as $1,736,076 in kickbacks to the Iraqi government, and they collectively earned a gross
profit of over $38,000,000.
99.
In order to generate the funds to pay the kickbacks to the Iraqi government and to
conceal those payments, the Siemens entities inflated the price of some contracts by up to 10%
before submitting them to the 661 Committee and the U.N. for approval.
100.
In most cases, after the U.N. approved the Siemens France, Siemens Turkey, and
Osram Middle East contracts, BNP-Paribas issued letters of credit, via international wire
communications, to banks used by Siemens France, Siemens Turkey, and Osram Middle East.
These letters of credit authorized Siemens France, Siemens Turkey, and Osram Middle East to be
paid the contracted amounts, which included the kickbacks to be paid to the Iraqi government.
In connection with one of the Siemens Turkey contracts and all of the GTT contracts, which
were not performed until after the war began in 2003, the U.N. requested that Siemens Turkey
and GTT reduce the contract amounts by 10% to eliminate the ASSFs promised to the Iraqi
government. Siemens Turkey and GTT ultimately complied with the U.N.'s requests with
respect to those contracts, though they had already caused kickbacks to be paid to the Iraqi
government.
Siemens France Contracts
101.
From in or about January 2000 to in or about April 2001, Siemens France, in
partnership with PG and PTD, entered into at least twelve contracts with the Iraqi Ministry of
Electricity ("Ministry of Electricity") to provide power station renovation, servicing, and spare
29
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 30 of 50
parts. At the demand of the Ministry, Siemens France caused a kickback to be paid to the Iraqi
government on each contract. In connection with the Siemens France OFFP contracts, PG
engaged OFFP Agent A as the agent on each of these contracts.
102.
Between in or about November 2000 and in or about January 2001, several PG
operational managers had a meeting to discuss how to fund and pay the 10% kickback required
by the Iraqi government on the OFFP contracts.
103.
In or about March 2001, a PG employee wrote a memorandum regarding how to
secure the 10% "after sales service ch." The memorandum reported a statement by an employee
of OFFP Agent A that Siemens Turkey paid this amount partially in cash "so that no names
appear on paper."
104.
In or about March and April 2001, a now-deceased PG employee met with two
representatives of the Ministry of Electricity and wrote memoranda summarizing the meetings.
The memoranda indicated that the Ministry of Electricity representatives informed him that the
Iraqi government would from then on require a guarantee of 10% of the contract value to be paid
to the relevant Iraqi government customer before the Central Bank of Iraq would authorize a
letter of credit to be issued for the contract. One of the Ministry of Electricity representatives
referred to the 10% guarantee as an "after sales service" payment. The PG employee's
memoranda expressed his concern as to the permissibility of the payments under the OFFP rules
and indicated he would relay the information to his supervisors for their review.
105.
In or about 2001, in connection with at least one OFFP contract, PG signed a
supplemental agreement with OFFP Agent A providing for a payment of 10% of the contract
value for "after sales services" to cover the kickback payment.
30
106.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 31 of 50
On each contract, on behalf of Siemens France, OFFP Agent A deposited the 10%
kickback into a Jordanian bank account held by two Iraqi officials, whereupon such officials
transferred the funds into a Jordanian bank account held by the Ministry of Electricity. OFFP
Agent A, using the name of an acquaintance who did not work for OFFP Agent A to conceal its
identity, made the deposits in cash into the account of the Ministry of Electricity. When the
funds were transferred to the Ministry of Electricity's account, OFFP Agent A received
documentary confirmation from the Jordanian bank that the "after sales services fees" had been
paid.
107.
Siemens France caused a total of at least $321,745 in kickbacks to be paid to the
Iraqi government in connection with Siemens France OFFP contracts.

108.
After OFFP Agent A made the kickback payments, PO reimbursed OFFP Agent
A for the kickbacks based on sham invoices for commissions prepared by OFFP Agent A.
109.
In or about 2000 and 2001, in order to conceal on its corporate books and records
the kickback payments made to the Iraqi government, Siemens France and PO improperly
characterized payments to OFFP Agent A, part of which were paid as kickbacks to the Iraqi
government, as commissions to OFFP Agent A.
110.
At the end of SIEMENS' fiscal years 2001 and 2002, the books and records of
Siemens entities involved in the Siemens France contracts, including those containing false
characterizations of the kickbacks paid to the Iraqi government, were incorporated into the books
and records of SIEMENS for purposes of preparing SIEMENS' year-end financial statements.
Siemens Turkey Contracts
111.
From in or about September 2000 to in or about June 2002, Siemens Turkey
entered into at least twenty contracts to provide power and electrical equipment to the Ministry
31
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 32 of 50
of Electricity. On each contract, Siemens Turkey caused a kickback to be paid to the Iraqi
government. Prior to the OFFP, Siemens Turkey had not conducted business in Iraq. Because
PG had a relationship with OFFP Agent A for work in Iraq, Siemens Turkey engaged OFFP
Agent A as an agent for its OFFP contracts as well.
112.
For each of its contracts, Siemens Turkey caused OFFP Agent A to deposit the
10% kickback into a Jordanian bank account held by two Iraqi officials, whereupon such
officials transferred the funds into a Jordanian bank account held by the Ministry of Electricity.
OFFP Agent A, using the name of an acquaintance who did not work for OFFP Agent A to
conceal its identity, made the deposits in cash into the account of the Ministry of Electricity.
When the funds were transferred to the Ministry of Electricity's account, OFFP Agent A
received documentary confinuation from the Jordanian bank that the "after sales services fees"
had been paid.
113.
Siemens Turkey caused a total of at least $1,243,119 in kickbacks to be paid to
the Iraqi government in connection with its OFFP contracts.

114.
After OFFP Agent A made the kickback payments, Siemens Turkey reimbursed
OFFP Agent A for the kickbacks based on sham invoices for commissions prepared by OFFP
Agent A.
115.
From in or about 2000 to in or about 2002, in order to conceal on its corporate
books and records the kickback payments made to the Iraqi government, Siemens Turkey
improperly characterized payments to OFFP Agent A, part of which were paid as kickbacks to
the Iraqi government, as commissions to OFFP Agent A.
116.
At the end of SIEMENS' fiscal years 2000 through 2002, the books and records
of Siemens Turkey, including those containing false characterizations of the kickbacks paid to
32
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 33 of 50
the Iraqi government, were incorporated into the books and records of SIEMENS for purposes of
preparing SIEMENS' year-end financial statements.
Osram Middle East Contracts
117.
From in or about February 2000 to in or about June 2002, Osram Middle East
entered into at least six contracts to sell lightbulbs and lighting equipment to the Ministry of Oil.
On each of the contracts, at the demand of the Ministry, Osram Middle East caused a kickback to
be paid to the Iraqi government. Osram Middle East used OFFP Agent B as its agent and made
commission payments to OFFP Agent B of approximately 10% on each of the contracts. The
commission paid to OFFP Agent B included an amount based on a percentage of the contract
that Osram Middle East employees understood to be a kickback payment required by the Iraqi
government.
118.
In connection with at least three of the contracts, Osram Middle East delivered
side letters to the Ministry of Oil in which it promised to provide the Ministry of Oil with a
"letter of credit" or "irrevocable bank guarantee" for a specified sum equivalent to approximately
10% of the contract value. On the same contracts, an amount covering the specified sum was
incorporated into the contract price.
119.
For each contract, Osram Middle East caused OFFP Agent B to wire transfer the
10% kickback payment from his own account into a Jordanian bank account held by the Ministry
of Oil.
120.
Osram Middle East caused a total of at least $89,250 in kickbacks to be paid to
the Iraqi government in connection with its OFFP contracts.

121.
By paying OFFP Agent B his "commission" on the OFFP contracts, Osram
Middle East reimbursed OFFP Agent B for the kickbacks it had paid to the Iraqi government.
33
122.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 34 of 50
From in or about 2000 to in or about 2002, in order to conceal on its corporate
books and records the kickback payments to the Iraqi government, Osram Middle East
improperly characterized payments to OFFP Agent B, part of which were paid as kickbacks to
the Iraqi government, as commissions to OFFP Agent B.
123.
At the end of SIEMENS' fiscal years 2000 through 2002, the books and records
of Osram Middle East, including those containing false characterizations of the kickbacks paid to
the Iraqi government, were part of SIEMENS' books and records.
GTT Contracts
124.
In or about June 2001, OTT entered into at least four contracts to sell gas turbines
and equipment to the Ministry of Electricity. OTT engaged OFFP Agent C and OFFP Agent D
to act as its agents on the OFFP contracts. On each of the four contracts, at the demand of the
Ministry, OTT caused a kickback to be paid to the Iraqi government.
125.
OFFP Agent C informed GTT that they were making payments to the Iraqi
government to secure letters of credit for the contracts. In connection with at least three of the
contracts, GTT documents budget for a 20% commission to either OFFP Agent C or OFFP
Agent D. GTT employees understood that halfofthat commission, or 10%, was intended to be
paid as a kickback to the Iraqi government.
126.
On all four contracts, the U.N. requested that GTT amend the contracts to
decrease their value by 10%, representing the removal of the "after sales service" component.
Nevertheless, GTT caused some kickback payments to be made on these contracts.
127.
GTT caused a total of at least $81,962 in kickbacks to be paid to the Iraqi
government in connection with its OFFP contracts.
34
128.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 35 of 50
By paying OFFP Agent C and OFFP Agent D their "commission" on the OFFP
contracts, GTT reimbursed OFFP Agent C and OFFP Agent D for the kickbacks they had paid to
the Iraqi government.
129.
In or about 2001, in order to conceal on its corporate books and records the
kickback payments to the Iraqi government, GTT improperly characterized payments to OFFP
Agent C and OFFP Agent D, part of which were paid as kickbacks to the Iraqi government, as
commissions to OFFP Agent C and OFFP Agent D.
130.
In or about fiscal year 2001, the books and records of GTT, including those
containing false characterizations of the kickbacks paid to the Iraqi government, were
incorporated into the books and records of SIEMENS for purposes of preparing SIEMENS'
year-end financial statements.
FCPA INTERNAL CONTROLS VIOLATIONS
131.
From on or about March 12,2001 to in or about at least November 2006,
SIEMENS knowingly circumvented and knowingly failed to implement a system of internal

accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that: (i) transactions were
executed in accordance with management's general and specific authorization; (ii) transactions
were recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles and any other criteria applicable to such statements, and
(II) to maintain accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets was permitted only in accordance
with management's general and specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for
assets was compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action was
taken with respect to any differences, to wit: SIEMENS: (a) knowingly failed to implement
sufficient antibribery compliance policies and procedures; (b) knowingly failed to implement
35
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 36 of 50
sufficient controls over third party bank accounts and the use of cash; (c) knowingly failed to
appropriately investigate and respond to allegations of corrupt payments; (d) knowingly failed to
discipline employees involved in making corrupt payments; (e) knowingly failed to establish a
sufficiently empowered and competent Corporate Compliance Office; (f) knowingly failed to
report to the Audit Committee substantiated allegations of corrupt payments around the world;
(g) limited the quantity and scope of audits of payments to purported business consultants; (h)
created and utilized certain mechanisms for making and concealing approximately
$1,361,500,000 in payments to third parties; (i) engaged former SIEMENS employees as
purported business consultants to act as conduits for corrupt payments; (j) continued to use offbooks accounts for corrupt payments even after compliance risks associated with such accounts
were raised at the highest levels of management; (k) used removable Post-It notes to affix
signatures to approval forms authorizing payments to conceal the identity of the signors and
obscure the audit trail; (1) allowed third party payments to be made based on a single signature in
contravention of SIEMENS' "four eyes principle," which required authorization of payments by
two SIEMENS managers; (m) changed the name of purported business consulting agreements to
"agency agreements" or similar titles to avoid detection and conceal noncompliance with the
2005 business consulting agreement guidelines; (n) knowingly failed to exercise due diligence to
prevent and detect criminal conduct; (0) knowingly included within substantial authority
personnel individuals whom SIEMENS knew had engaged in illegal activities and other conduct
inconsistent with an effective compliance and ethics program; (p) knowingly failed to take
reasonable steps to ensure SIEMENS' compliance and ethics program was followed, including
monitoring and internal audits to detect criminal conduct; (q) knowingly failed to evaluate
regularly the effectiveness of SIEMENS' compliance and ethics program; (r) knowingly failed to
36
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 37 of 50
have and publicize a system whereby employees and agents could report or seek guidance
regarding potential or actual criminal conduct without fear of retaliation; (s) knowingly failed to
provide appropriate incentives to perform in accordance with the compliance and ethics program;
and (t) knowingly entered into purported business consulting agreements with no basis, and
without performing any due diligence, sometimes after SIEMENS had won the relevant project.
FCPA BOOKS AND RECORDS VIOLATIONS
132.
From on or about March 12,2001 to in or about at least November 2006,
SIEMENS knowingly falsified and caused to be falsified books, records, and accounts required
to, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of
SIEMENS, to wit: SIEMENS (a) used off-books accounts as a way to conceal corrupt payments;
(b) entered into purported business consulting agreements with no basis, sometimes after
SIEMENS had won the relevant project; (c) justified payments to purported business consultants
based on false invoices; (d) mischaracterized bribes in the corporate books and records as
consulting fees and other seemingly legitimate expenses; (e) accumulated profit reserves as
liabilities in internal balance sheet accounts and then used them to make corrupt payments
through business consultants as needed; (f) used removable Post-It notes to affix signatures to
approval forms authorizing payments to conceal the identity of the signors and obscure the audit
trail; and (g) drafted and backdated sham business consulting agreements to justify third party
payments; and (h) falsely described kickbacks paid to the Iraqi government in connection with
the Oil for Food Program in its corporate books and records as commission payments to agents
when SIEMENS and Siemens France, Siemens Turkey, Osram Middle East and OTT were
aware that a substantial portion of these payments was being passed on to the Iraqi government
in exchange for being awarded contracts with the Iraqi government.
37
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 38 of 50
STEVEN A. TYRRELL
Chief
Fraud Section, Criminal Division
By:
1twt..VJ.1tUL---
Mark F. Mendelsohn
Deputy Chief
(202) 514-1721
By:
~jw~~{U1l-
Lori A. Weinstein
Trial Attorney - Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(202) 514-0839
United States Department of Justice

1400 New York Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
JEFFREY A. TAYLOR
United States Attorney
8Y:#o.1~~
Assistant United States Attorney

District of Columbia
Fraud and Public Corruption Section
(202) 353-2453
United States Attorney's Office
555 Fourth Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20530
38
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 39 of 50
DEFENDANT'S ACCEPTANCE
I have read this Statement of Offense. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and on behalf of
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, I accept and acknowledge responsibility for the acts of Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft's officers and employees and I admit that the evidence supporting the
Statement of Offense establishes that Siemens Aktiengesellschaft is guilty of the crimes to which
it is pleading guilty.
FOR SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
39
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 40 of 50
ATTACHMENT 1
Corporate Compliance Program
Defendant Siemens Aktiengesellschaft ("Siemens AG"), on behalf of itself and its

subsidiaries and affiliates (collectively, "Siemens") represents and agrees, as a condition of the
plea agreement, that its internal controls system and compliance code will include, but not be
limited to, the following minimum elements:
1.
A compliance code with a clearly articulated corporate policy against violations of
the FCPA, including its anti-bribery, books and records and internal controls provisions, and
other applicable counterparts (collectively, the "anti-corruption laws").
2.
A system of financial and accounting procedures, including a system of internal
accounting controls, designed to ensure the maintenance of fair and accurate books, records and
accounts.
3.
Promulgation of compliance standards and procedures designed to reduce the
prospect of violations of the anti-corruption laws and Siemens' compliance code. These
standards and procedures shall apply to all directors, officers and employees and, where
necessary and appropriate, outside parties acting on behalf of Siemens in foreign jurisdictions,
including agents, consultants, representatives, distributors, teaming partners and joint venture
partners (collectively referred to as "agents and business partners").
4.
The assignment of responsibility to one or more senior corporate officials of
Siemens AG for the implementation and oversight of compliance with policies, standards and
procedures regarding the anti-corruption laws. Such corporate official(s) shall have the authority
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 41 of 50
to report matters directly to the Audit or Compliance Committee of Siemens AG's Supervisory
Board.
5.
Mechanisms designed to ensure that the policies, standards and procedures of
Siemens regarding the anti-corruption laws are effectively communicated to all directors,
officers, employees and, where necessary and appropriate, agents and business partners. These
mechanisms shall include: (a) periodic training for all such directors, officers, employees, and,
where necessary and appropriate, agents and business partners; and (b) annual certifications by
all such directors, officers, employees, and, where necessary and appropriate, agents and business
partners, certifying compliance with the training requirements.
6.
An effective system for reporting suspected criminal conduct and/or violations of
the compliance policies, standards and procedures regarding the anti-corruption laws for
directors, officers, employees, and, as necessary and appropriate, agents and business partners.
7.
Appropriate disciplinary procedures to address, among other things, violations of
the anti-corruption laws or Siemens' compliance code by directors, officers and employees.
8.
Appropriate due diligence requirements pertaining to the retention and oversight
of agents and business partners.

9.
Standard provisions in agreements, contracts, and renewals thereof with all agents
and business partners which are designed to prevent violations of the FCPA and other applicable
anti-corruption laws, which provisions may, depending upon the circumstances, include: (a)
anti-corruption representations and undertakings relating to compliance with the anti-corruption
laws; (b) rights to conduct audits of the books and records of the agent or business partner to
ensure compliance with the foregoing; and (c) rights to terminate an agent or business partner as
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 42 of 50
a result of any breach ,of anti-corruption laws, and regulations or representations and
undertakings related to such matters.
10.
Periodic testing of the compliance code, standards and procedures designed to
evaluate their effectiveness in detecting and reducing violations of the anti-corruption laws and
Siemens' internal controls system and compliance code.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 43 of 50
ATTACHMENT 2
Corporate Compliance Monitor
The duties and authority of the Corporate Compliance Monitor (the "Monitor"), and the
obligations of Siemens Aktiengesellschaft ("Siemens AG"), on behalf of itself and its
subsidiaries and affiliates (collectively, "Siemens") with respect to the Monitor and the
Department, are as described below:
1.
The Monitor will for a period of up to four (4) years from the date of his
engagement (the "Term of the Monitorship") evaluate, in the manner set forth in paragraphs 2
through 8 below, the effectiveness of the internal controls, record-keeping and financial reporting
policies and procedures of Siemens as they relate to Siemens' current and ongoing compliance
with the books and records, internal accounting controls and anti-bribery provisions of the FCP A
and other applicable anti-corruption laws (collectively, the "anti-corruption laws") and take such
reasonable steps as, in his or her view, may be necessary to fulfill the foregoing mandate (the
"Mandate").
2.
Siemens shall cooperate fully with the Monitor and the Monitor shall have the
authority to take such reasonable steps as, in his view, may be necessary to be fully informed
about Siemens' compliance program within the scope of the Mandate in accordance with the
principles set forth herein and applicable law, including applicable data protection and labor laws
and regulations. To that end, Siemens' existing Project Office shall: (a) facilitate the Monitor's
access to Siemens' documents and resources, (b) not limit such access, except as provided in this
paragraph, (c) serve as the Monitor's principal interface with Siemens and (d) provide guidance
on applicable local law (such as relevant data protection and labor law). Siemens shall provide
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 44 of 50
the Monitor with access to all information, documents, records, facilities and/or employees, as
reasonably requested by the Monitor, that fall within the scope of the Mandate of the Monitor
under this Agreement. Any disclosure by Siemens to the Monitor concerning corrupt payments,
related books and records and related internal controls shall not relieve Siemens of any otherwise
applicable obligation to truthfully disclose such matters to the Department.
a.
The parties agree that no attorney-client relationship shall be
formed between Siemens and the Monitor.

b.
In the event that Siemens seeks to withhold from the Monitor access to
information, documents, records, facilities and/or employees of Siemens which may be subject to
a claim of attorney-client privilege or to the attorney work-product doctrine, or where Siemens
reasonably believes production would otherwise be inconsistent with applicable law, Siemens
shall work cooperatively with the Monitor to resolve the matter to the satisfaction of the Monitor.
If the matter cannot be resolved, at the request of the Monitor, Siemens shall promptly provide
written notice to the Monitor and the Department. Such notice shall include a general description
of the nature of the information, documents, records, facilities and/or employees that are being
withheld, as well as the basis for the claim. The Department may then consider whether to make
a further request for access to such information, documents, records, facilities and/or employees.
To the extent Siemens has provided information to the Department in the course of the
investigation leading to this action pursuant to a non-waiver of privilege agreement, Siemens and
the Monitor may agree to production of such information to the Monitor pursuant to a similar
non-waiver agreement.
3.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 45 of 50
To carry out the Mandate, during the Term of the Monitorship, the Monitor shall
conduct an initial review and prepare an initial report, followed by up to three (3) follow-up
reviews and reports as described below. With respect to each review, after consultation with
Siemens AG and the Department, the Monitor shall prepare a written work plan, which shall be
submitted no fewer than sixty (60) calendar days prior to commencing each review to Siemens
AG and the Department for comment, which comment shall be provided no more than thirty (30)
calendar days after receipt of the written work plan. The Monitor's work plan for the initial
review shall include such steps as are reasonably necessary to conduct an effective initial review
in accordance with the Mandate, including by developing an understanding, to the extent the
Monitor deems appropriate, of the facts and circumstances surrounding any violations that may
have occurred before the date of acceptance of this Agreement by the Court, but in developing
such understanding the Monitor is to rely to the extent possible on available information and
documents provided by Siemens, and it is not intended that the Monitor will conduct his own
inquiry into those historical events. In developing each work plan and in carrying out the reviews
pursuant to such plans, the Monitor is encouraged to coordinate with Siemens personnel
including auditors and compliance personnel and, to the extent the Monitor deems appropriate,
he may rely on Siemens processes, on the results of studies, reviews, audits and analyses
conducted by or on behalf of Siemens and on sampling and testing methodologies. The Monitor
is not expected to conduct a comprehensive review of all business lines, all business activities or
all markets. Any disputes between Siemens AG and the Monitor with respect to the work plan
shall be decided by the Department in its sole discretion.
4.
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 46 of 50
The initial review shall commence no later than one hundred twenty (120)
calendar days from the date ofthe engagement of the Monitor (unless otherwise agreed by
Siemens AG, the Monitor and the Department), and the Monitor shall issue a written report
within one hundred twenty (120) calendar days of initiating the initial review, setting forth the
Monitor's assessment and making recommendations reasonably designed to improve the
effectiveness of Siemens' program for ensuring compliance with the anti-corruption laws. The
Monitor is encouraged to consult with Siemens AG concerning his findings and
recommendations on an ongoing basis, and to consider and reflect Siemens AG's comments and
input to the extent the Monitor deems appropriate. The Monitor need not in its initial or
subsequent reports recite or describe comprehensively Siemens' history or compliance policies,
procedures and practices, but rather may focus on those areas with respect to which the Monitor
wishes to make recommendations for improvement or which the Monitor otherwise concludes
merit particular attention. The Monitor shall provide the report to the Managing Board of
Siemens AG and contemporaneously transmit copies to Mark F. Mendelsohn, (or his successor),
Deputy Chief, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 10th and
Constitution Ave., N.W., Bond Building, Fourth Floor, Washington, DC 20530. After
consultation with Siemens AG, the Monitor may extend the time period for issuance of the report
for up to sixty (60) calendar days with prior written approval ofthe Department.
5.
Within one hundred and twenty (120) calendar days after receiving the Monitor's
report, Siemens shall adopt all recommendations in the report; provided, however, that within
sixty (60) calendar days after receiving the report, Siemens AG shall notify the Monitor and the
Department in writing of any recommendations that Siemens AG considers unduly burdensome,
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 47 of 50
inconsistent with local or other applicable law or regulation, impractical, costly or otherwise
inadvisable. With respect to any recommendation that Siemens AG considers unduly
burdensome, inconsistent with local or other applicable law or regulation, impractical, costly or
otherwise inadvisable, Siemens AG need not adopt that recommendation within that time but
shall propose in writing an alternative policy, procedure or system designed to achieve the same
objective or purpose. As to any recommendation on which Siemens AG and the Monitor do not
agree, such parties shall attempt in good faith to reach an agreement within forty-five (45)
calendar days after Siemens serves the written notice. In the event Siemens AG and the Monitor
are unable to agree on an acceptable alternative proposal, Siemens AG shall promptly consult
with the Department, which will make a determination as to whether Siemens AG should adopt
the Monitor's recommendation or an alternative proposal, and Siemens AG shall abide by that
determination. Pending such determination, Siemens AG shall not be required to implement any
contested recommendation(s). With respect to any recommendation that the Monitor determines
cannot reasonably be implemented within one hundred and twenty (120) calendar days after
receiving the report, the Monitor may extend the time period for implementation with prior
written approval of the Department.
6.
The Monitor shall undertake up to three (3) follow-up reviews to carry out the
Mandate. If, reasonably promptly after completing two (2) follow-up reviews, the Monitor and
Siemens AG mutually agree that Siemens' compliance program is reasonably designed and
implemented to detect and prevent violations of the anti-corruption laws, and that further
monitoring and review is not warranted, the Monitor may apply to the Department for permission
to forego the third follow-up review. If the Department approves, the Term of the Monitorship
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 48 of 50
shall be reduced accordingly. Conversely, if, reasonably promptly after completing three (3)
follow-up reviews, the Monitor and the Department agree that Siemens AG has not successfully
satisfied its obligations under the plea agreement with respect to the Monitor's Mandate, the
Tenn of the Monitorship shall be extended for a period the Department deems appropriate.
Within one hundred and twenty (120) calendar days of initiating each follow-up review, the
Monitor shall: (a) complete the review; (b) certify whether the compliance program of Siemens,
including its policies and procedures, is reasonably designed and implemented to detect and
prevent violations within Siemens of the anti-corruption laws; and (c) report on the Monitor's
findings in the same fashion as set forth in paragraph 4 with respect to the initial review. The
first follow-up review shall commence one year after the initial review commenced. The second
follow-up review shall commence one year after the first follow-up review commenced. The
third follow-up review, unless one is deemed unnecessary by the Department, shall commence
one year after the second follow-up review commenced. After consultation with Siemens AG,
the Monitor may extend the time period for these follow-up reviews for up to sixty (60) calendar
days with prior written approval of the Department.
7.
In undertaking the assessments and reviews described in paragraphs 3 through 6
of this Agreement, the Monitor shall fonnulate conclusions based on, among other things: (a)
inspection of relevant documents, including Siemens' current anti-corruption policies and
procedures; (b) on-site observation of selected systems and procedures of Siemens at sample
sites, including internal controls and record-keeping and internal audit procedures; (c) meetings
with, and interviews of, relevant employees, officers, directors and other persons at mutually
convenient times and places; and (d) analyses, studies and testing of Siemens' compliance
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 49 of 50
program with respect to the anti-corruption laws.

8.
Should the Monitor, during the course of his engagement, discover that
questionable or corrupt payments or questionable or corrupt transfers of property or interests may

have been offered, promised, paid or authorized by any entity or person within Siemens, or any
entity or person working directly or indirectly for Siemens, or that related false books and records
may have been maintained relating to Siemens either (a) after the date on which this Agreement
is accepted by the Court or (b) that have not been adequately dealt with by Siemens (collectively
"improper activities"), the Monitor shall promptly report such improper activities to Siemens
AG's General Counselor Audit Committee for further action. If the Monitor believes that any
improper activity or activities may constitute a significant violation oflaw, the Monitor should
also report such improper activity to the Department. The Monitor should disclose improper
activities in his discretion directly to the Department, and not to the General Counselor Audit
Committee, only if the Monitor believes that disclosure to the General Counselor the Audit
Committee would be inappropriate under the circumstances, and in such case should disclose the
improper activities to the General Counselor the Audit Committee of Siemens AG as promptly
and completely as the Monitor deems appropriate under the circumstances. The Monitor shall
address in his reports the appropriateness of Siemens' response to all improper activities, whether
previously disclosed to the Department or not. Further, in the event that Siemens, or any entity
or person working directly or indirectly within Siemens, refuses to provide information necessary
for the performance of the Monitor's responsibilities, if the Monitor believes that such refusal is
without just cause the Monitor shall disclose that fact to the Department. Siemens shall not take
any action to retaliate against the Monitor for any such disclosures or for any other reason. The
Document 15
Filed 12/15/2008
Page 50 of 50
Monitor may report any criminal or regulatory violations by Siemens or any other entity
discovered in the course of performing his duties, in the same manner as described above.
9.
At least annually, and more frequently if appropriate, representatives from
Siemens AG and the Department will meet together to discuss the monitorship and any
suggestions, comments or improvements Siemens AG may wish to discuss with or propose to the
Department.

SIEMENS

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SIEMENS

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

SIEMENS

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case 1:08-cr-00367-RJL

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Defendant SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT ("SIEMENS") was a

SIEMENS was organized in a matrix-like structure with both operating groups

SIEMENS' Supervisory Board (the "Supervisory Board"), based in Munich,

SIEMENS' Audit Committee (the "Audit Committee"), based in Munich,

SIEMENS' compliance function was established in 2001 and in 2004 a Corporate

SIEMENS' Regional Compliance Officers (the "Regional Compliance Officers")

SIEMENS' former Communications operating group ("COM"), headquartered in

network telecommunications systems.

SIEMENS' Industrial Solutions and Services operating group ("I&S"),

SIEMENS' Power Generation operating group ("PG"), headquartered in

SIEMENS' Power Transmission and Distribution operating group ("PTD"),

SIEMENS' Transportation Systems operating group ("TS"), headquartered in

SIEMENS' Medical Solutions operating group ("MED"), headquartered in

Chief Compliance Officer from 2004 until the end of 2006.

SIEMENS from 2005 to 2007.

Siemens S.A.S. of France ("Siemens France"), SIEMENS' regional company in

Siemens Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. of Turkey ("Siemens Turkey"), SIEMENS'

Gas Turbine Technologies S.p.A. ("GTT"), an Italian subsidiary of SIEMENS,

"OFFP Agent A," a Paraguayan company registered in Jordan, acted as an agent

Until in or about February 1999, SIEMENS operated in a largely unregulated

Until in or about February 1999, SIEMENS' project cost calculation sheets

Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business

In or about March 1999, the SIEMENS ZV issued a Z Circular, a company-wide

On or about April 25, 2000, Officer B issued a report to the SIEMENS ZV

In or about June 2000, SIEMENS' lawyers sent memoranda to Officer C and a

On or about July 5,2000, SIEMENS issued a Z Circular requiring operating

In or about September 2000, Officer B forwarded to Officer C a letter regarding a

On or about September 12, 2000, in connection with an investigation, Austrian

In or about July 2001, SIEMENS established a new position for a Corporate

accounts before a Gennan parliamentary committee investigating donations to a political party.

On or about June 13, 2002, SIEMENS issued principles and recommendations,

publicly announced an investigation into the Enel matter.

to respond to the Enel cases.

On or about September 9,2003, the U.S. law finn submitted to SIEMENS a

memorandum, received by several SIEMENS ZV members including Officer A, Officer C,

On or about September 30,2003, SIEMENS engaged a local law finn in

In or about October 2003, SIEMENS' outside auditors discovered that 4,120,000

In or about November 2003, to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002,

In or about November 2003, at a meeting of SIEMENS financial officers, Officer

In or about November 2003, a compliance lawyer, at Officer B's request, wrote a

In or about November 2003, Officer B forwarded to Officer C the memorandum

outlining deficiencies in SIEMENS' compliance organization, with a request to circulate the

From in or about February 1999 to in or about July 2004, notwithstanding the

promulgation of some written policies, SIEMENS senior management provided little

From in or about mid-2004 to in or about 2006, the SIEMENS ZV grew

On or about May 4,2004, several members of the SIEMENS ZV, including

On or about June 1, 2004, the Erlangen law firm SIEMENS engaged to

In or about July 2004, Officer C delivered a speech to the SIEMENS ZV and

On or about August 4,2004, SIEMENS promulgated its first Company-wide,

On or about September 7, 2004, Officer C sent an email to SIEMENS ZV

On or about November 4, 2004, the Erlangen law firm SIEMENS engaged to

On or about November 5, 2004, the SIEMENS ZV received a written report

On or about January 26,2005, at an Audit Committee meeting in which the Enel

On or about May 4,2005, the Erlangen law firm engaged by SIEMENS to

On or about July 27,2005, Officer B made a presentation to the Audit Committee,

On or about July 26,2005, the Corporate Compliance Office, at Officer G's

request, completed a written benchmarking analysis comparing SIEMENS' compliance program