FY2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Fiscal Year 2016
Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Plan
Report to Congress
March 2015
National Nuclear Security Administration

United States Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
Department of Energy | March 2015
Administrators Letter of Transmittal

This strategic document is the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. It addresses the statutory requirements
of Title 50 of the United States Code, Section 2523, and related congressional requests. This fiscal year
(FY) 2016 document presents the current detailed plan for maintaining the Nations nuclear weapons
stockpile.
The FY 2016 SSMP builds upon last years SSMP in balancing NNSAs investments in maintaining and
modernizing the stockpile, revitalizing its physical infrastructure and workforce, and sustaining its
research, development, testing, and evaluation programs. The joint DOE and Department of Defense
3+2 Strategy for stockpile modernization through life extension programs implemented by this SSMP
provides the opportunity to continue the Administrations commitment to maintaining a safe, secure,
and effective deterrent while reducing the size of the stockpile.
For example, once the B61-12 life extension program is completed in FY 2025 and confidence is gained
in the B61-12 weapons in service, the B83-1, the last megaton-class weapon in Americas nuclear
arsenal, will be retired. The combination of these actions will result in a 50 percent reduction in the
number of nuclear gravity bombs in the stockpile, the removal of a megaton-class weapon, an
80 percent reduction in amount of special nuclear material in the bomb portion of the air leg, and a
reduction in the safety and security risks associated with the stockpile.
Furthermore, consistent with life extension program plans, NNSAs investments in plutonium will allow
war-reserve-quality production of 30 plutonium pits per year by FY 2026 and 50 to 80 pits per year
by 2030. Similarly, our Uranium Strategy will allow us to recapitalize critical enriched uranium
operations that currently reside in outdated facilities. The plans described in this document for these
essential capabilities are consistent with the requirements outlined in the FY 2015 National Defense
Authorization Act.
To support this plan, NNSA has, for the sixth consecutive year, increased the budget request for
Weapons Activities. If adopted by Congress, this budget request will increase funding by $891 million
from the comparable FY 2015 enacted level. Much of this 11.2 percent increase will be devoted to
stockpile life extension programs and recapitalization of critical plutonium and uranium capabilities. In
addition, the schedule for the W80-4 life extension program has been moved up 2 years, and a
conventional high-explosive refresh has been added to the W88 Alteration.
With this plan and the support of Congress, the nuclear deterrent will support the Nation's current and
future defense posture while meeting its New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty agreements and enable
progress toward a world without nuclear weapons.
Pursuant to the statutory requirements, this report is being provided to the following members of
Congress:
The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations
The Honorable Barbara Mikulski

Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Appropriations
The Honorable John McCain

Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page i
The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services
The Honorable Lamar Alexander

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
Senate Committee on Appropriations
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
Senate Committee on Appropriations
The Honorable Jeff Sessions

Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Senate Committee on Armed Services
The Honorable Joe Donnelly

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Senate Committee on Armed Services
The Honorable Harold Rogers

Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey

Ranking Member, House Committee on Appropriations
The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
The Honorable Mike Simpson

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies
House Committee on Appropriations
The Honorable Marcy Kaptur

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies
House Committee on Appropriations
The Honorable Mike Rogers

Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
House Committee on Armed Services
The Honorable Jim Cooper

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
House Committee on Armed Services
If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact me or Mr. Clarence Bishop,
Associate Administrator for External Affairs, at (202) 586-8343.
Sincerely,
Frank G. Klotz
Page ii | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
Message from the Secretary

Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear explosive
testing remains one of the Department of Energys (DOE) fundamental responsibilities to our Nation.
The Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) lays out a comprehensive plan
for achieving this mission. The DOEs National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will continue to
maintain effective stewardship of the nuclear deterrent, via stockpile maintenance and life extension
programs, while leveraging cross-cutting initiatives in science, engineering and technology capabilities,
and rightsizing the infrastructure needed to meet national security requirements. All of this will be
achieved through effective and efficient program and project management and a continued emphasis
on safe and secure operations, which remains a priority for the Department.
The challenge of extending the life of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile without testing is one that
NNSA has successfully met through concerted investments in the people, the infrastructure, and the
technology to support this work. The program outlined in the FY 2016 SSMP is an excellent example of
how NNSA will continue these stewardship and management efforts consistent with DOEs broader
management strategy, including in the area of building strategic partnerships with the national
laboratories to support our nuclear and broader national security missions. DOE efforts across all of our
missions are heavily grounded in science, and the national laboratories are a major asset in executing
our missions in collaboration with all of NNSAs productions plants and sites.
There are a number of ways in which strengthening our partnerships with the national laboratories has
already yielded benefits. Joint investments by DOEs Office of Science and NNSA in achieving exascale
computing will directly support modeling and experiments as part of NNSAs stockpile stewardship
program, while helping to ensure continued U.S. leadership of this critical capability. These partnerships
have also helped DOE and NNSA improve our efforts in project management and performance, including
for the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex, where NNSA is developing a
disciplined modular approach that will remove risks early in the process and build to a more rigorously
managed budget and schedule. This improved process will be an important and recurring project
management theme at the NNSA and across the Department.
Specifically, the FY 2016 SSMP outlines two critical areas of our infrastructure modernization plans,
which ultimately support a reduced stockpile while ensuring a responsive infrastructure: our Plutonium
and Uranium Strategies. The Plutonium Strategy will allow war-reserve-quality production of
30 plutonium pits per year by FY 2026 and 50 to 80 pits per year by 2030. Similarly, our Uranium
Strategy will allow us to recapitalize critical enriched uranium operations that currently reside in
outdated facilities. The plans described in this document for these essential capabilities are consistent
with the requirements outlined in the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.
The FY 2016 SSMP provides a coherent strategy for achieving one of DOEs critical national security
mission areas in line with Departmental priorities. This plan will ensure the nuclear deterrent supports
our national security now and into the future, while simultaneously helping to achieve progress toward
a world without nuclear weapons.
Sincerely,
Ernest J. Moniz
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page iii
March 2015 | Department of Energy
This page left blank intentionally.
Page iv | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
Executive Summary
The Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) is the DOE NNSAs 25-year
strategic program of record for maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear
stockpile. The SSMP is published annually, in response to statutory requirements, in report or summary
form, to support the Presidents Budget submission to Congress for Weapons Activities. It is also used
to provide, where possible, NNSAs formal response to other congressional reporting requirements in
order to present a single, integrated picture of current and future activities funded by the Weapons
Activities account in support of the nuclear deterrent. Beyond meeting these specific requirements, the
document contains information, descriptions, and explanations to provide greater transparency and
understanding of what the nuclear security enterprise does and how it works in support of the Nations
stockpile.
The program of record described in this years SSMP represents a continuation of the program approved
by the Nuclear Weapons Council and described in the FY 2015 SSMP, with the following significant
changes:
The W88 Alteration (Alt) 370 effort now includes a conventional high explosive (CHE) refresh
and retains the original schedule for the first production unit in FY 2020.
The cruise missile warhead life extension program (LEP) is now designated as the W80-4 LEP,
following the Nuclear Weapons Council downselect among warhead families. The first
production unit has also been moved ahead by two years to FY 2025 to align with revised
U.S. Air Force plans for the carrier missile.
Additional resources have been devoted to executing the plutonium strategy, which will enable
cessation of programmatic operations in the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) Building
at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) by FY 2019 and support the ramp-up to a war reserve
production capacity of 50 to 80 plutonium pits per year by FY 2030.
Balancing the program among the near-term needs of managing the stockpile; sustainment and
recapitalization of an aging infrastructure; investment in the research, development, testing, and
evaluation (RDT&E) that underpins stockpile stewardship; and maintaining and refreshing the skilled
workforce of NNSAs management and operating (M&O) partners continues to be difficult and requires
some hard choices. One such choice NNSA made is a two year delay in the plutonium experiment
capability upgrades to confirm pit reuse approaches to implement the 3+2 Strategy that will drive the
future composition of the stockpile. Another tradeoff is a reduction in surveillance activities for legacy
B61 and B83 warheads to support the CHE refresh in the W88.
In response to these pressures, NNSA continues to work on improving its business operating processes
and tools. Many of the SSMP chapters provide descriptions of these efforts such as the Systems
Integration Framework, which is intended to achieve higher technology readiness levels for warhead
technologies in advance of entry into the life extension Phase 6.x Process (see Chapter 2). Additive
Manufacturing, which holds the promise of increasing production agility and reducing production costs,
is discussed in both Chapters 2 and 3. New infrastructure planning tools that make best use of the
resources available for maintenance and recapitalization are described in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 also
reports NNSAs assignment of managers to key mission-critical nuclear commodities to develop and
oversee strategies for ensuring continued production and processing for uranium, tritium, and
plutonium capabilities.
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page v
Similarly, in the spirit of improvement, greater understanding, and transparency, the FY 2016 SSMP
includes new or expanded content. Chapter 2 includes a number of workload charts that display the
planned workload against the nuclear security enterprise capacity as examples of the tools being used to
plan NNSAs program. The description in Chapter 4 of NNSAs activities to maintain its general purpose
and programmatic infrastructure has been expanded from previous SSMPs. Chapters 5 and 6 describe
activities to ensure the security of the programs physical, personnel, and information technology assets.
Chapter 7, Sustaining the Workforce, has been expanded to describe the current workforce and how it
is managed in response to workload and funding changes. The associated Appendix D includes a brief
primer regarding each of NNSAs M&O partners, including descriptions of their individual missions,
mission capabilities, FY 2016 funding requests, physical infrastructure, and workforce composition.
NNSA has great confidence in its ability to execute the program described in this document if funded at
the requested levels. The LEPs underway are on schedule and, with minor exceptions, on budget.
NNSAs RDT&E programs continue to report accomplishments that demonstrate the world-class quality
of the workforce. NNSA continues to work closely with the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) through
the Nuclear Weapons Council and, for the last several years, the interagency budget process to respond
to changes in the stockpile and to reflect changes in DOD plans. With Congress support, the safety,
security, and effectiveness of the stockpile can be maintained, and the Nations stewardship sustained.
Page vi | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship

and Management Plan
Table of Contents
List of Figures ....................................................................................................................................................... xii
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................................................... xvii
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... xix
Legislative Language ..........................................................................................................................................xxiii
Chapter 1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................ 1-1
1.1
Policy Framework ................................................................................................................................... 1-1
1.2
Introduction to the Stockpile ................................................................................................................. 1-3
1.3
Stockpile Stewardship and Management .............................................................................................. 1-4
1.3.1
Stockpile Stewardship ............................................................................................................ 1-4
1.3.2
Stockpile Management .......................................................................................................... 1-5
1.4
Partnership with the Department of Defense ....................................................................................... 1-6
1.5
The Nuclear Security Enterprise............................................................................................................. 1-8
1.5.1
National Security Laboratories ............................................................................................... 1-9
1.5.2
Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities ............................................................................... 1-10
1.5.3
Nevada National Security Site .............................................................................................. 1-10
1.6
Secure Transportation ......................................................................................................................... 1-10
1.7
Security of the Nuclear Security Enterprise ......................................................................................... 1-11
1.8
Federal and Contractor Workforce ...................................................................................................... 1-11
1.9
Budgetary Requirements and Business Processes and Procedures..................................................... 1-11
1.10 Additional Information......................................................................................................................... 1-11
Chapter 2 Stockpile Management ....................................................................................................................... 2-1
2.1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 2-1
2.1.1
Surveillance ............................................................................................................................ 2-2
2.1.2
Significant Finding Investigations ........................................................................................... 2-6
2.1.3
Maintenance .......................................................................................................................... 2-7
2.1.4
Life Extension Programs ......................................................................................................... 2-8
2.1.5
Weapon Dismantlement and Disposition ............................................................................ 2-14
2.1.6
Technology Maturation ........................................................................................................ 2-15
2.2
Management and Planning .................................................................................................................. 2-16
2.2.1
Technical Basis for Stockpile Transformation Planning ........................................................ 2-16
2.2.2
Component Maturation and Technology Development ...................................................... 2-16
2.3
Overview of the Program of Record .................................................................................................... 2-18
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page vii
2.4
2.5
Program Details.................................................................................................................................... 2-19

2.4.1
Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations ................................................................... 2-19
2.4.2
Stockpile Systems ................................................................................................................. 2-26
2.4.3
Stockpile Services ................................................................................................................. 2-27
2.4.4
Warhead Dismantlement and Disposition ........................................................................... 2-32
2.4.5
Advanced Manufacturing Development .............................................................................. 2-32
2.4.6
Nuclear Materials Commodities ........................................................................................... 2-33
2.4.7
Cross-Cutting Programs........................................................................................................ 2-38
Summary of Significant Stockpile Management Accomplishments and Plans .................................... 2-40
2.5.1
Recent Major Stockpile Management Accomplishments .................................................... 2-40
2.5.2
Stockpile Management Activities, Milestones, and Key Annual Deliverables ..................... 2-41
Chapter 3 Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Activities ................................................................ 3-1

3.1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 3-1
3.1.1
Recent Stockpile Stewardship Program Accomplishments .................................................... 3-3
3.1.2
Responding to Current Stockpile Issues Component Lifetimes and Aging .......................... 3-3
3.1.3
Stockpile Stewardship Programs Role in Life Extension Programs ....................................... 3-4
3.1.4
Supporting Broader National Security Missions..................................................................... 3-5
3.1.5
Retaining Expert Stockpile Stewards into the Indefinite Future ............................................ 3-5
3.2
Nuclear Test Readiness .......................................................................................................................... 3-5
3.3
Grand Challenges ................................................................................................................................... 3-6
3.3.1
Certification of the Evolving Stockpile ................................................................................... 3-6
3.3.2
Boost ...................................................................................................................................... 3-6
3.3.3
Vulnerability and Hardening .................................................................................................. 3-6
3.4
Management and Planning .................................................................................................................... 3-7
3.4.1
Defense Programs Advisory Committee ................................................................................ 3-7
3.4.2
The Predictive Capability Framework .................................................................................... 3-7
3.5
Experimental and Computational Capabilities....................................................................................... 3-9
3.5.1
Modeling and Simulation ....................................................................................................... 3-9
3.5.2
High Energy Density Facilities .............................................................................................. 3-11
3.5.3
Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments......................................................................... 3-12
3.5.4
Laboratory-Scale Science ..................................................................................................... 3-13
3.5.5
Emerging Facilities................................................................................................................ 3-14
3.6
Programs .............................................................................................................................................. 3-15
3.6.1
Science Program ................................................................................................................... 3-15
3.6.2
Advanced Simulation and Computing Program ................................................................... 3-17
3.6.3
Engineering Program ............................................................................................................ 3-19
3.6.4
Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program ............................................. 3-20
3.6.5
Other Programs .................................................................................................................... 3-22
3.7
Milestones, Objectives, and Future Planning ...................................................................................... 3-23
Chapter 4 Revitalize Physical Infrastructure ........................................................................................................ 4-1
4.1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 4-2
4.2
General Purpose Infrastructure ............................................................................................................. 4-3
4.2.1
Current State .......................................................................................................................... 4-3
4.2.2
Accomplishments ................................................................................................................... 4-5
4.2.3
Challenges .............................................................................................................................. 4-5
4.2.4
Strategies The Way Forward ............................................................................................... 4-6
4.3
Programmatic Infrastructure ................................................................................................................. 4-9
4.3.1
Current State .......................................................................................................................... 4-9
4.3.2
Challenges ............................................................................................................................ 4-10
4.3.3
Recapitalization of Programmatic Infrastructure ................................................................. 4-10
4.3.4
Non-Weapons Activities Program Dependencies ................................................................ 4-16
Page viii | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
4.4
4.5
Integrated Project List for Capital Construction and Planned Recapitalization ................................... 4-17
Disposition of Excess Facilities ............................................................................................................. 4-19
Chapter 5 Secure Transportation Asset .............................................................................................................. 5-1

5.1
Secure Transportation Asset Program ................................................................................................... 5-1
5.1.1
Core Components of the Secure Transportation Asset Program ........................................... 5-2
5.1.2
Major Organizational Efforts of Secure Transportation Asset ............................................... 5-3
5.1.3
Secure Transportation Asset Goals ........................................................................................ 5-4
5.1.4
Secure Transportation Asset Strategy .................................................................................... 5-5
5.1.5
Secure Transportation Asset Challenges ................................................................................ 5-6
5.1.6
FY 2014 Accomplishments ..................................................................................................... 5-7
5.1.7
Milestones, Objectives, and Future Plans .............................................................................. 5-7
Chapter 6 Security .............................................................................................................................................. 6-1
6.1
Defense Nuclear Security Program ........................................................................................................ 6-1
6.1.1
Offices of the Defense Nuclear Security Program .................................................................. 6-2
6.1.2
Defense Nuclear Security Goals ............................................................................................. 6-2
6.1.3
Defense Nuclear Security Strategy ......................................................................................... 6-3
6.1.4
Defense Nuclear Security Challenges ..................................................................................... 6-3
6.1.5
Defense Nuclear Security Milestones, Objectives, and Future Plans ..................................... 6-4
6.2
Information Technology and Cybersecurity Program ............................................................................ 6-5
6.2.1
Information Technology ......................................................................................................... 6-5
6.2.2
NNSA Network Vision ............................................................................................................. 6-6
6.2.3
Transformation of Information Technology Architecture ...................................................... 6-6
6.2.4
Subprograms of Information Technology and Cybersecurity ................................................ 6-7
6.2.5
Information Technology and Cybersecurity Goals ................................................................. 6-7
6.2.6
Information Technology and Cybersecurity Strategy ............................................................. 6-8
6.2.7
Information Technology and Cybersecurity Challenges ......................................................... 6-9
6.2.8
Summary of Significant Accomplishments and Plans ............................................................. 6-9
Chapter 7 Sustaining the Workforce ................................................................................................................... 7-1
7.1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 7-1
7.2
The Nuclear Security Enterprise Workforce .......................................................................................... 7-2
7.2.1
Strategic Drivers ..................................................................................................................... 7-2
7.2.2
Summary of Workforce Structure .......................................................................................... 7-2
7.3
Planning the Workforce ......................................................................................................................... 7-6
7.3.1
Federal Workforce Planning ................................................................................................... 7-6
7.3.2
Management and Operating Partner Workforce Planning .................................................... 7-6
7.4
Unique Workforce Characteristics ......................................................................................................... 7-8
7.4.1
Difference of Nuclear Security Enterprise from Private Industry .......................................... 7-8
7.4.2
Unique Set of Essential Skills Required for Nuclear Weapons Work ..................................... 7-8
7.4.3
Adherence to Unique Laws and Regulations for NNSA Scope ............................................... 7-9
7.4.4
Future Issues Facing the Workforce ....................................................................................... 7-9
7.4.5
Summary of Current State of the Workforce at the Sites .................................................... 7-10
7.5
Workforce Accomplishments ............................................................................................................... 7-11
7.6
Managing the Workforce ..................................................................................................................... 7-13
7.6.1
Workforce Challenges .......................................................................................................... 7-13
7.6.2
Plans for Addressing Workforce Challenges ........................................................................ 7-15
7.7
Summary and Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 7-17
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page ix
Chapter 8 Future Years Nuclear Security Program Budget, Requirements Estimates, and Operations
and Business Improvements ............................................................................................................................... 8-1
8.1
Future Years Nuclear Security Program Budget ..................................................................................... 8-1
8.2
Directed Stockpile Work Budget ............................................................................................................ 8-3
8.3
Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Budget ..................................................................... 8-4
8.3.1
Science Program ..................................................................................................................... 8-4
8.3.2
Engineering Program .............................................................................................................. 8-5
8.3.3
Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program ............................................... 8-5
8.3.4
Advanced Simulation and Computing Program ..................................................................... 8-6
8.3.5
Advanced Manufacturing Development ................................................................................ 8-6
8.4
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities ............................................................................................. 8-7
8.5
Infrastructure and Safety ....................................................................................................................... 8-7
8.6
Secure Transportation Asset .................................................................................................................. 8-8
8.7
Other Weapons Activities ...................................................................................................................... 8-8
8.8
Other Fiscal Issues .................................................................................................................................. 8-9
8.9
Estimates of Requirements beyond the Future Years Nuclear Security Program ................................. 8-9
8.9.1
Stockpile Sustainment .......................................................................................................... 8-11
8.9.2
Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations ................................................................... 8-11
8.9.3
Construction Costs ............................................................................................................... 8-19
8.10 Operations and Process Improvements ............................................................................................... 8-20
8.10.1 Update of the Phase 6.x Process .......................................................................................... 8-20
8.10.2 Additive Manufacturing ....................................................................................................... 8-21
8.10.3 Defense Programs Cost Improvement Initiative .................................................................. 8-21
8.10.4 General Purpose Infrastructure Planning and Management ............................................... 8-21
Chapter 9 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 9-1
Appendix A Requirements Mapping ...................................................................................................................A-1
A.1 National Nuclear Security Administration Response to Statutory Reporting Requirements
and Related Requests ............................................................................................................................ A-1
A.2 Ongoing Requirements .......................................................................................................................... A-1
A.3 Other Requirements .............................................................................................................................. A-9
Appendix B Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Subprograms ....................................................... B-1
B.1
Science Program .................................................................................................................................... B-1
B.1.1
Advanced Certification Subprogram ...................................................................................... B-1
B.1.2
Primary Assessment Technologies Subprogram .................................................................... B-1
B.1.3
Dynamic Materials Properties Subprogram ........................................................................... B-2
B.1.4
Advanced Radiography Subprogram ...................................................................................... B-2
B.1.5
Secondary Assessment Technologies Subprogram ................................................................ B-2
B.2
Advanced Simulation and Computing Program ..................................................................................... B-3
B.2.1
Integrated Codes Subprogram ............................................................................................... B-3
B.2.2
Physics and Engineering Models Subprogram ....................................................................... B-3
B.2.3
Verification and Validation Subprogram ................................................................................ B-3
B.2.4
Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation Subprogram ........................................ B-3
B.2.5
Computational Systems and Software Environment Subprogram ........................................ B-4
B.2.6
Facility Operations and User Support Subprogram................................................................ B-4
B.3
Engineering Program ............................................................................................................................. B-4
B.3.1
Enhanced Surety Subprogram ................................................................................................ B-4
B.3.2
Weapon Systems Engineering Assessment Technology Subprogram .................................... B-4
B.3.3
Nuclear Survivability Subprogram .......................................................................................... B-5
B.3.4
Enhanced Surveillance Subprogram ....................................................................................... B-5
Page x | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
B.4
Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program ............................................................... B-5
B.4.1
Ignition Subprogram .............................................................................................................. B-5
B.4.2
Support of Other Stockpile Programs Subprogram................................................................ B-6
B.4.3
Diagnostics, Cryogenics, and Experimental Support Subprogram ......................................... B-6
B.4.4
Pulsed Power Inertial Confinement Fusion Subprogram ....................................................... B-6
B.4.5
Joint Program in High Energy Density Laboratory Plasmas Subprogram ............................... B-6
B.4.6
Facility Operations and Target Production Subprogram ........................................................ B-7
Appendix C Exascale Computing ......................................................................................................................... C-1

C.1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... C-1
C.2
Background ............................................................................................................................................ C-2
C.3
Technical Challenges .............................................................................................................................. C-3
C.4
Usable Exascale System Requirements .................................................................................................. C-4
C.5
Approach and Strategy .......................................................................................................................... C-4
C.5.1
System Integration Research, Development, and Engineering .............................................. C-5
C.5.2
Hardware and Software Technology Research and Development ........................................ C-5
C.5.3
Exascale Co-Design ................................................................................................................. C-5
C.6
Current Activities ................................................................................................................................... C-5
C.7
Collaborative Management ................................................................................................................... C-7
C.8
Budget and Major Milestones................................................................................................................ C-7
C.9
Risk Management .................................................................................................................................. C-9
C.10 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. C-9
C.11 References ........................................................................................................................................... C-11
Appendix D Workforce and Site-Specific Information ........................................................................................ D-1
D.1 National Nuclear Security Administration ............................................................................................. D-3
D.1.1 Federal Workforce ................................................................................................................. D-3
D.2 National Security Laboratories............................................................................................................... D-8
D.2.1 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory .............................................................................. D-8
D.2.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory .......................................................................................... D-18
D.2.3 Sandia National Laboratories ............................................................................................... D-29
D.3 Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities ............................................................................................... D-40
D.3.1 National Security Campus at Kansas City ............................................................................. D-40
D.3.2 Pantex Plant ......................................................................................................................... D-50
D.3.3 Savannah River Site .............................................................................................................. D-60
D.3.4 Y-12 National Security Complex ........................................................................................... D-70
D.4 The Test Site ......................................................................................................................................... D-80
D.4.1 Nevada National Security Site .............................................................................................. D-80
Appendix E Glossary .......................................................................................................................................... E-1
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page xi
List of Figures
Figure 11. The 3+2 Strategy ...................................................................................................................................1-6
Figure 12. The nuclear security enterprise ............................................................................................................1-9
Figure 21. Continuous cycle of Surveillance Program activities .............................................................................2-5
Figure 22. Nuclear weapons stockpile surveillance governance model ................................................................2-5
Figure 23. Historical number of Significant Finding Investigations opened and closed during calendar
years 2001 to 2014 and the number that resulted in an impact to the stockpile ................................2-7
Figure 24. Schematic of 6.x Process integrated with key gate reviews required by the
Product Realization Process ................................................................................................................2-11
Figure 25. Weapon assembly and disassembly notional projected workloads for the Pantex Plant................2-12
Figure 26. Canned subassembly notional projected workloads for the Y-12 National Security Complex ........2-13
Figure 27. Arming, fuzing, and firing and/or equivalent electronics notional projected workloads
for the National Security Campus in Kansas City ................................................................................2-13
Figure 28. Neutron Generator notional projected workloads for Sandia National Laboratories .....................2-14
Figure 29. Process flow of activities involved in the safe dismantlement and disposition
of nuclear warheads ............................................................................................................................2-15
Figure 210. National Nuclear Security Administration warhead activities ............................................................2-19
Figure 211. Schedule for irradiation of tritiumproducing burnable absorber rods to meet
post-Nuclear Posture Review (DOD 2010) requirements ...................................................................2-35
Figure 212. NNSAs uranium mission requirements ..............................................................................................2-38
Figure 213. Potential schedule for Integrated Surety Architecture solutions implementation
for National Nuclear Security Administration transportation .............................................................2-40
Figure 214. Goals, milestones, and key annual activities for weapon assessment, surveillance,
and maintenance ................................................................................................................................2-41
Figure 215. Milestones for life extension programs, major weapons component production,
and weapons alteration and dismantlement ......................................................................................2-42
Figure 31. Processing power of the largest NNSA computing platform and number of nuclear tests ..................3-3
Figure 32. Version 2.0 of the Predictive Capability Framework, identifying major efforts required to
advance stockpile assessment, sustainment, and certification capabilities .........................................3-8
Figure 33. Modeling and simulation budget distribution (FY 2016 budget request) ...........................................3-11
Figure 34. Subprograms of the Science Program .................................................................................................3-17
Figure 35. Subprograms of the Advanced Simulation and Computing Program .................................................3-18
Figure 36. Subprograms of the Engineering Program ..........................................................................................3-20
Figure 37. Subprograms of the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program ...........................3-21
Figure 38. Experimental and analysis milestones and objectives led by the Science Program ...........................3-23
Figure 39. Computational milestones and objectives led by the Advanced Simulation
and Computing Program .....................................................................................................................3-24
Figure 310. Engineering and technological milestones and objectives led by the Engineering Program.............3-24
Figure 311. Milestones and objectives based on experiments on NNSAs high energy density facilities
and led by the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program ....................................3-25
Figure 41. Data on the age of Y-12 buildings from the G2 Program Management System ...................................4-1
Figure 42. NNSA Asset Condition Ratings using DOE Order 430.1B assessment by replacement
value of facilities ...................................................................................................................................4-7
Figure 43. NNSA Asset Condition Ratings using LOB assessment by replacement value of facilities ....................4-7
Page xii | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
Figure 44. NNSA Integrated Project List for capital construction ........................................................................4-18
Figure 45. Planned recapitalization projects ........................................................................................................4-20
Figure 51. Secure Transportation Asset Program milestones and objectives timeline .........................................5-8
Figure 61. Defense Nuclear Security program milestones and objectives timeline ..............................................6-4
Figure 62. Information Technology and Cybersecurity milestones and objectives timeline ...............................6-10
Figure 71. Nuclear security enterprise workforce components ............................................................................7-3
Figure 72. Headcount of NNSA Federal workforce by Common Occupational Classification System ...................7-4
Figure 73. Headcount of national security laboratories and Nevada National Security Site
by Common Occupational Classification System ..................................................................................7-5
Figure 74. Headcount of nuclear weapons production facilities by Common Occupational
Classification System .............................................................................................................................7-5
Figure 75. M&O workforce projections for the current Future Years Nuclear Security Program period ..............7-7
Figure 76. M&O headcount distribution by age...................................................................................................7-10
Figure 77. M&O headcount distribution by years of service ...............................................................................7-10
Figure 78. Five basic components of the talent management life-cycle process ................................................7-13
Figure 81.
Figure 82.
Figure 83.
Figure 84.
Figure 85.
Figure 86.
Figure 87.
Figure 88.
Figure 89.
Figure 810.
Figure 811.
Figure 812.
Figure 813.
Figure 814.
Figure 815.
Figure 816.
Figure 817.
Figure 818.
Figure 819.
Figure 820.
Figure 821.
Figure 822.
Figure 823.
Weapons Activities historical purchasing power fiscal years 2001 through 2020 ..........................8-3
Directed Stockpile Work funding schedule for fiscal years 2015 through 2020 .................................8-3
Science Program funding schedule for fiscal years 2015 through 2020 .............................................8-4
Engineering Program funding schedule for fiscal years 2015 through 2020.......................................8-5
Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program funding schedule
for fiscal years 2015 through 2020 ......................................................................................................8-5
Advanced Simulation and Computing Program funding schedule
for fiscal years 2015 through 2020 ......................................................................................................8-6
Advanced Manufacturing Development funding schedule for fiscal years 2015 through 2020 .........8-6
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities funding schedule for fiscal years 2015 through 2020 ......8-7
Infrastructure and Safety funding schedule for fiscal years 2015 through 2020 ................................8-7
Secure Transportation Asset funding schedule for fiscal years 2015 through 2020 ...........................8-8
Other Weapons Activities funding schedules for fiscal years 2015 through 2020 ..............................8-8
Estimate of out-year budget requirements for NNSA Weapons Activities in then-year dollars .........8-9
Detail of out-year budget requirements for Weapons Activities of the NNSA
in then-year dollars ...........................................................................................................................8-10
Estimate of warhead specific sustainment costs ..............................................................................8-11
W76-1 life extension program cost FY 2015 to completion ..............................................................8-13
B61-12 life extension program cost FY 2015 to completion .............................................................8-14
W88 Alt 370 (with CHE refresh) cost FY 2015 to completion ............................................................8-14
W80-4 life extension program cost FY 2015 to completion ..............................................................8-15
IW-1 life extension program cost FY 2020 through FY 2040 .............................................................8-16
B61-13 life extension program cost FY 2038 through FY 2040 .........................................................8-18
Total U.S. projected nuclear weapons life extension costs for fiscal years 2015
through 2040 (then-year dollars) ......................................................................................................8-19
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page xiii
Figure D1.
Figure D2.
Figure D3.
Figure D4.
Figure D5.
Figure D6.
Figure D7.
Figure D8.
Figure D9.
Figure D10.
Figure D11.
Figure D12.
Figure D13.
Figure D14.
Figure D15.
Figure D16.
Figure D17.
Figure D18.
Figure D19.
Figure D20.
Figure D21.
Figure D22.
Figure D23.
Figure D24.
Figure D25.
Figure D26.
Figure D27.
Figure D28.
Figure D29.
Figure D30.
Figure D31.
Figure D32.
Figure D33.
Figure D34.
Figure D35.
Figure D36.
Figure D37.
Figure D38.
Figure D39.
Figure D40.
Figure D41.
Figure D42.
Figure D43.
Figure D44.
Figure D45.
Federal total headcount ..................................................................................................................... D-3

Federal employees by age .................................................................................................................. D-3
Federal employees by years of service ............................................................................................... D-4
Change in last two fiscal Years for Federal employees (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) .............. D-4
Age of Federal employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ............................... D-5
Years of service of Federal employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ............ D-5
Federal employees trends by career stage ........................................................................................ D-6
Federal employment separation trends ............................................................................................. D-6
Total projected Federal workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP ......................................................... D-7
LLNL age of facility assets in Site 200, Livermore, California ............................................................ D-11
Laboratory Operating Board rating for LLNL facility assets in Site 200, Livermore, California ........ D-12
LLNL total headcount ....................................................................................................................... D-13
LLNL employees by age .................................................................................................................... D-13
LLNL employees by years of service ................................................................................................. D-14
Change in last two fiscal years at LLNL (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) .................................... D-14
Age of LLNL employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) .................................. D-15
Years of service of LLNL employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ............... D-15
LLNL trends by career stage ............................................................................................................. D-16
LLNL employment separation trends ............................................................................................... D-17
Total projected LLNL workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP ........................................................... D-17
LANL age of facility assets in TA-3, Los Alamos, New Mexico .......................................................... D-21
Laboratory Operating Board rating for LANL facility assets in TA-3, Los Alamos, New Mexico ....... D-22
LANL total headcount ....................................................................................................................... D-23
LANL employees by age .................................................................................................................... D-23
LANL employees by years of service ................................................................................................ D-24
Change in last two fiscal years at LANL (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) .................................... D-24
Age of LANL employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ................................. D-25
Years of service of LANL employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) .............. D-25
LANL trends by career stage ............................................................................................................. D-26
LANL employment separation trends ............................................................................................... D-27
Total projected LANL workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP .......................................................... D-28
SNL age of facility assets in TA-1, Albuquerque, New Mexico ......................................................... D-33
Laboratory Operating Board rating for SNL facility assets in TA-1, Albuquerque, New Mexico ...... D-34
SNL total headcount ......................................................................................................................... D-35
SNL employees by age ...................................................................................................................... D-35
SNL employees by years of service ................................................................................................... D-36
Change in last two fiscal years at SNL (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ...................................... D-36
Age of SNL employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ................................... D-37
Years of service of SNL employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ................ D-37
SNL trends by career stage ............................................................................................................... D-38
SNL employment separation trends ................................................................................................. D-38
Total projected SNL workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP ............................................................. D-39
NSC age of facility assets in Bannister Road Facility, Kansas City, Missouri (historical) ................... D-43
NSC age of facility assets in Botts Road Facility, Kansas City, Missouri (current)............................. D-43
Laboratory Operating Board rating for NSC facility assets in Bannister Road, Kansas City,
Missouri (historical) .......................................................................................................................... D-44
Figure D46. Laboratory Operating Board rating for NSC facility assets in Botts Road,
Kansas City, Missouri (current)......................................................................................................... D-44
Figure D47. NCS total headcount......................................................................................................................... D-45
Page xiv | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
Figure D48.
Figure D49.
Figure D50.
Figure D51.
Figure D52.
Figure D53.
Figure D54.
Figure D55.
Figure D56.
Figure D57.
Figure D58.
Figure D59.
Figure D60.
Figure D61.
Figure D62.
Figure D63.
Figure D64.
Figure D65.
Figure D66.
Figure D67.
Figure D68.
Figure D69.
Figure D70.
Figure D71.
Figure D72.
Figure D73.
Figure D74.
Figure D75.
Figure D76.
Figure D77.
Figure D78.
Figure D79.
Figure D80.
Figure D81.
Figure D82.
Figure D83.
Figure D84.
Figure D85.
Figure D86.
Figure D87.
Figure D88.
Figure D89.
Figure D90.
Figure D91.
Figure D92.
Figure D93.
Figure D94.
Figure D95.
NSC employees by age ..................................................................................................................... D-45

NSC employees by years of service .................................................................................................. D-46
Change in last two fiscal years at NSC (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014)...................................... D-46
Age of NSC employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ................................... D-47
Years of service of NSC employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ................ D-47
NSC trends by career stage .............................................................................................................. D-48
NSC employment separation trends ............................................................................................. D-49
Total projected NSC workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP ............................................................ D-49
Pantex age of facility assets in Amarillo, Texas ................................................................................ D-53
Laboratory Operating Board rating for Pantex facility assets in Amarillo, Texas ............................. D-54
Pantex total headcount .................................................................................................................... D-55
Pantex employees by age ................................................................................................................. D-55
Pantex employees by years of service .............................................................................................. D-56
Change in last two fiscal years at Pantex (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ................................. D-56
Age of Pantex employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) .............................. D-57
Years of service of Pantex employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ........... D-57
Pantex trends by career stage .......................................................................................................... D-58
Pantex employment separation trends ............................................................................................ D-58
Total projected Pantex workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP ........................................................ D-59
SRS age of facility assets in H Area (Tritium), Aiken, South Carolina ................................................ D-63
Laboratory Operating Board rating for SRS facility assets in H Area (Tritium),
Aiken, South Carolina ....................................................................................................................... D-64
SRS total headcount ......................................................................................................................... D-65
SRS employees by age ...................................................................................................................... D-66
SRS employees by years of service ................................................................................................... D-66
Change in last two fiscal years at SRS (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ...................................... D-67
Age of SRS employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ................................... D-67
Years of service of SRS employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ................ D-68
SRS trends by career stage ............................................................................................................... D-68
SRS employment separation trends ................................................................................................. D-69
Total projected SRS workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP ............................................................. D-69
Y-12 age of facility assets in Oak Ridge, Tennessee ......................................................................... D-72
Laboratory Operating Board rating for Y-12 facility assets in Oak Ridge, Tennessee ...................... D-73
Y-12 total headcount ........................................................................................................................ D-75
Y-12 employees by age ..................................................................................................................... D-75
Y-12 employees by years of service ................................................................................................. D-76
Change in last two fiscal years (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ................................................. D-76
Age of Y-12 employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) .................................. D-77
Years of service of Y-12 employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ............... D-77
Y-12 trends by career stage .............................................................................................................. D-78
Y-12 employment separation trends ................................................................................................ D-78
Total projected Y-12 workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP............................................................ D-79
NNSS age of facility assets in Mercury, Nevada ............................................................................... D-83
Laboratory Operating Board rating for NNSS facility assets in Mercury, Nevada ............................ D-84
NNSS total headcount ...................................................................................................................... D-85
NNSS employees by age ................................................................................................................... D-85
NNSS employees by years of service ................................................................................................ D-86
Change in last two fiscal years (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ................................................. D-86
Age of NNSS employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014) ................................ D-87
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page xv
Figure D96.
Figure D97.
Figure D98.
Figure D99.
Years of service of NNSS employees who left service (end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014).............. D-87
NNSS trends by career stage ............................................................................................................ D-88
NNSS employment separation trends .............................................................................................. D-88
Total projected NNSS workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP .......................................................... D-89
Page xvi | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
List of Tables
Table 11.
Current U.S. nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems ..........................................................1-4
Table 21.
Table 23.
Table 24.
Fiscal year 2014 actual and fiscal year 2015 projected major Directed Stockpile Work Program
stockpile evaluation activities (as of January 31, 2015) ........................................................................2-3
Major surveillance evaluations completed in FY 2014 and planned for FY 2015,
as well as planning requirements for the Future Years Nuclear Security Program
(FYs 2016 through 2020) (as of January 31, 2015) ................................................................................2-4
Technology drivers ..............................................................................................................................2-16
Pit development timeline ....................................................................................................................2-34
Table 31.
Specifications of Most Recent Advanced Computing Technology System Procurements ..................3-10
Table 41.
Infrastructure management strategy to sustain National Nuclear Security Administration

functions and mission capabilities ......................................................................................................4-21
Table 51.
DOE and NNSA programs, offices, and other agencies supported by the
Secure Transportation Asset Program ..................................................................................................5-2
Table 71.
Table 72.
Essential skills for the nuclear security enterprise ................................................................................7-8

NNSA workforce awards and achievements for technical and professional excellence .....................7-12
Table 22.
Table 81.
Overview of Future Years Nuclear Security Program budget for Weapons Activities
in fiscal years 2015 through 2020 .........................................................................................................8-2
Table 82. Surveillance Program funding for fiscal years 2010 through 2020 .......................................................8-4
Table 83. Estimated Tritium Sustainment resource requirements .......................................................................8-4
Table 84. Total estimated cost for W76 life extension program ........................................................................8-13
Table 85. Total estimated cost for B61-12 life extension program ....................................................................8-14
Table 86. Total estimated cost for W88 Alt 370 .................................................................................................8-15
Table 87. Total estimated cost for W80-4 life extension program .....................................................................8-15
Table 88. Total estimated cost for IW-1 life extension program ........................................................................8-16
Table 811. Total estimated cost for B61-13 life extension program ....................................................................8-18
Table 812. Total cost and average annual cost of construction for fiscal years 2020 through 2040 ...................8-20
Table C1.
Table C2.
Proposed usable exascale system requirements compared to the latest ASC system ........................ C-4
Risks in achieving exascale computing ................................................................................................. C-9
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page xvii
Page xviii | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

3D
AC
AF&F
ALCM
Alt
ARES
ASC
ATDM
CD
CFF
CHE
CME
CMF
CMR
CMRR-NF
CNI
COCS
CSAs
DANCE
DARHT
DNS
DOD
DOE
DPAC
EMAC
FFRDC
FIMS
FTE
FXR
FY
FYNSP
GTS
HANM
HE
HEAF
HED
HERMES
HEU
Three-Dimensional
Analytical Chemistry
Arming, Fuzing, and Firing
Air-launched Cruise Missile
Alteration
Advanced Radio Enterprise System
Advanced Simulation and Computing
Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation
Critical Decision
Contained Firing Facility
Conventional High Explosive
Component and Material Evaluations
Component Maturation Framework
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility
Capabilities for Nuclear Intelligence
Common Occupational Classification System
Canned Subassemblies
Device for Advanced Neutron Capture Experiments
Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
Defense Nuclear Security
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Defense Programs Advisory Committee
Enterprise Modeling and Analysis Consortium
Federally Funded Research and Development Center
Facilities and Infrastructure Management System
Full-time Equivalent
Flash X-Ray
Fiscal Year
Future Years Nuclear Security Program
Gas Transfer System
H Area New Manufacturing Facility
High Explosives
High Explosives Applications Facility
High Energy Density
High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source
Highly Enriched Uranium
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page xix
HEUMF
HPC
ICBM
ICF
IDC
IHE
IT
ISA
ISST
IW
JASPER
JC3
JTA
LANL
LANSCE
LEED
LEP
LEU
LLCs
LLNL
LOB
LRSO
M&O
MaRIE
MC
MESA
MDI
MGT
Mod
MRL
MTAD
MTP
NDE
NDSE
NEA
New START
NG
NIF
NMMSS
NNSA
NPAC
NPR
Highly Enriched Uranium Material Facility

High Performance Computing
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield
Integrated Design Codes
Insensitive High Explosive
Information Technology
Integrated Surety Architectures
Integrated Surety Solutions for Transportation
Interoperable Warhead
Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research
Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center
Joint Test Assembly
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Los Alamos Neutron Science Center
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
Life Extension Program
Low-Enriched Uranium
Limited Life Components
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Laboratory Operations Board
Long Range Standoff
Management and Operating
Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extreme
Materials Characterization
Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications
Mission Dependency Index
Mobile Guardian Transporter
Modification
Manufacturing Readiness Level
Multi-application Transportation Attachment Device
Management, Technology, and Production
Non-Destructive Evaluation
Neutron-Diagnosed Subcritical Experiments
Nuclear Enterprise Assurance
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
Neutron Generator
National Ignition Facility
Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System
Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control
Nuclear Posture Review
Page xx | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
NSC
Pantex
PCF
PF-4
PHELIX
PIDAS
PPD
PRIDE
R&D
RDT&E
RLUOB
RTBF
SAR
SFIs
SGT
SIEM
SIF
SLBM
SNL
SNM
SRS
SSiFR
SSMP
STA
ST&E
STEM
TA
TPBARs
TRIM
TRL
U1a
Y-12
Z
National Security Campus

Pantex Plant
Predictive Capability Framework
Plutonium Facility
Precision High-Energy-density Liner Implosion eXperiment
Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System
Presidential Policy Directive
Product Realization Integrated Digital Enterprise
Research and Development
Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities
Selected Acquisition Report
Significant Finding Investigations
Safeguards Transporter
Security Information and Event Management System
Systems Integration Framework
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
Sandia National Laboratories
Special Nuclear Material
Savannah River Site
Sandia Silicon Fabrication Revitalization
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
Secure Transportation Asset
Science, Technology, and Engineering
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
Technical Area
Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rods
Tritium Responsive Infrastructure Modifications
Technology Readiness Level
U1a Complex
Y-12 National Security Complex
Z Pulsed Power Facility
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page xxi
Page xxii | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
Legislative Language
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is required to report on how it plans to maintain
the nuclear weapons stockpile. Specifically, Title 50 of United States Code section 2523 (50 U.S.C. 2523),
requires that the NNSA Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other
appropriate officials of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, shall develop and
annually update a plan for sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile. The plan shall cover, at a
minimum, stockpile stewardship, stockpile management, stockpile surveillance, program direction,
infrastructure modernization, human capital, and nuclear test readiness. Pursuant to previous
statutory requirements, NNSA was required to submit reports on the plan. Except in 2012,1 a version of
the document has been submitted to Congress annually since 1998. However, starting in 2013, reports
on the plan are only required every odd-numbered year, with summaries of the plan provided in evennumbered years.
The majority of the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) is captured in
a single, top-level, unclassified document. In addition, one classified Annex to the SSMP is also
provided. The Annex contains supporting details concerning U.S. nuclear stockpile and stockpile
management issues and describes the research, development, testing, and evaluation base for the
stewardship and management of the stockpile.
In 2012, an FY 2013 SSMP was not submitted to Congress because analytic work conducted by the Department of
Defense/NNSA to evaluate the out-year needs for nuclear modernization activities across the nuclear security enterprise was
ongoing and not yet finalized.
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page xxiii
Chapter 1
Overview
Although its heritage can be traced back to the Manhattan Project in World War II, Congress established
the NNSA relatively recently (in 2000) as a separately organized agency within the DOE. NNSAs mission
is to enhance national security through the military application of nuclear weapons science, with
responsibilities encompassing several areas:
maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nations nuclear deterrent without
nuclear testing;
strengthening key science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) capabilities and modernizing the
national security infrastructure;
reducing global nuclear security threats; and
providing safe and effective integrated nuclear

propulsion systems for the U.S. Navy.
Expert nuclear scientists and engineers
This Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and

help improve our understanding of
Management Plan (SSMP) is NNSAs 25-year strategic
foreign nuclear weapons activities, which
program of record for the first and second mission areas
is critical for managing risks on the path
to zero. And, in a world with complete
mentioned above. The SSMP has two primary purposes.
nuclear disarmament, a robust
First, it documents NNSAs plans to maintain and extend the
intellectual and physical capability would
life of the nuclear stockpile and modernize the supporting
provide the ultimate insurance against
infrastructure, as well as to sustain the skilled workforce.
nuclear break-out by an aggressor.
Second, it provides NNSAs formal response to statutory
reporting requirements. Inclusion of detailed budget
- Nuclear Posture Review, 2010
information for the FY 2016 Future Years Nuclear Security
Program (FYNSP) period, along with life extension program
(LEP) schedules, construction priority lists, and estimated resource requirements to FY 2040, provide the
transparency to Congress and NNSAs Department of Defense (DOD) partners as it works to ensure the
Nations nuclear deterrent.
1.1
Policy Framework
A number of documents provide the policy framework for the current NNSA stockpile mission. These
are the Presidents National Security Strategy (February 2015); the Nuclear Posture Review (DOD 2010);
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START); the 2013 Presidential Policy Directive, Nuclear
Weapons Employment Guidance (PPD-24); and the 2003 National Security Presidential Directive 28,
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and Security (NSPD-28).
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 1-1
Drawing on the Presidents national security priorities, the Nuclear Posture Review outlined the
following guidelines relative to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. Though four
years have passed since the Nuclear Posture Review was released, these directives still provide the
foundation for the NNSA stockpile mission.
The United States will not conduct nuclear testing and will pursue ratification and entry into
force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. LEPs will use only nuclear
components based on previously tested designs and will not support new military missions
or provide for new military capabilities.
The United States will study options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of
nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis. The full range of LEP approaches will be
considered: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different
warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.
In any decision to proceed to engineering development for warhead LEPs, the United States
will give strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear
components will be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program goals could
not otherwise be met and if specifically authorized by the President and approved by
Congress.
The United States will retain the smallest possible nuclear stockpile consistent with our need
to deter adversaries, reassure our allies, and hedge against technical or geopolitical
surprise.
In addition, based on the recognition that,

In order to remain safe, secure, and effective, the U.S. nuclear stockpile must be supported by a
modern physical infrastructure comprised of the national security laboratories and a complex
of supporting facilities and a highly capable workforce with the specialized skills needed to
sustain the nuclear deterrent. As the United States reduces the numbers of nuclear weapons,
the reliability of the remaining weapons in the stockpile and the quality of the facilities
needed to sustain it become more important.
The Nuclear Posture Review stated the need for:
Strengthening the science, technology, and engineering base needed for conducting
weapon system LEPs, maturing advanced technologies to increase weapons surety,
qualification of weapon components and certifying weapons without nuclear testing, and
providing annual stockpile assessments through weapons surveillance. This includes
developing and sustaining high-quality scientific staff and supporting computational and
experimental capabilities.
Increased investments in the nuclear infrastructure and a highly skilled workforce to

ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal and to support the full
range of nuclear security work, to include nonproliferation, nuclear forensics, nuclear
counterterrorism, emergency management, intelligence analysis, and treaty verification.
Page 1-2 | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
On June 19, 2013, President Obama announced a new Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-24) that aligns
U.S. nuclear policies to the 21st century security environment. The Presidents new guidance to the
nuclear stockpile mission:
affirmed that the United States would maintain a credible deterrent to convince its adversaries
that the consequences of attacking the Nation or its allies and partners would far outweigh any
potential benefit to be gained through an attack,
modified the principles for hedging against technological or geopolitical risk to create more
effective management of the stockpile, and
reaffirmed that the United States would maintain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent for
itself and its allies and partners for as long as nuclear weapons exist.
The NSPD-28, issued in June 2003, provided explicit guidance and standards on nuclear command,
control, and communications and on nuclear weapons safety and security. Of particular relevance to
the SSMP, NSPD-28 mandated that NNSA conduct a broad range of research and development (R&D)
activities concerning the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile. That 2003 mandate has
influenced the design and production decisions for LEPs and the funding for R&D efforts.
Within NNSA, the Weapons Activities account funds specific activities, such as Stockpile Stewardship,
Stockpile Management, Infrastructure, Security, and the Secure Transportation Asset (STA), that are
required to support these and other policy directives. The sections in the remainder of this chapter
briefly describe these activities, along with the skilled workforce necessary to accomplish the NNSA
mission. These activities are then discussed in detail in the upcoming chapters.
1.2
Introduction to the Stockpile
The size and composition of the nuclear stockpile has evolved as a consequence of the global security
environment and the national security needs of the United States. As of 1967, the stockpile peaked at
31,255 weapons; in September 2013, the stockpile consisted of 4,804 weaponsthe smallest since the
Eisenhower Administration. New START between the United States and Russia, which entered into force
February 5, 2011, will reduce the operationally deployed stockpile even further by 2018.
In addition, no new nuclear weapons have been developed since the closing days of the Cold War. The
average age of weapons in the stockpile is now the highest it has ever been. Weapons that were
originally produced on average from 25 to 30 years ago are now well past their original design life.
While the stockpile is reduced in absolute numbers and the United States maintains the policy of no new
nuclear testing or weapon designs, confidence in the existing stockpile and the effectiveness of the
deterrent must remain high. For this reason, there is a strong need to continue to modernize the
existing stockpile through LEPs.
The current stockpile consists of active weapons, which are maintained in an operational, ready-for-use
configuration, and inactive weapons, which are maintained in a nonoperational status. A portion of the
stockpile is maintained as a hedge to mitigate against the risk of technological surprise or unexpected
geopolitical challenges. Retired weapons are not considered in the count of stockpile weapons; these
are non-operational as they await dismantlement.
Table 11 summarizes the major characteristics of the current stockpile, which is composed of two
types of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warheads, two types of intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) warheads, multiple types of bombs, and a cruise missile warhead delivered by aircraft.
Table 11. Current U.S. nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems
WarheadsStrategic Ballistic Missile Platforms
a
Description
Delivery System
Laboratories
Mission
Military
W78
Reentry vehicle warhead
Minuteman III intercontinental

ballistic missile
LANL/SNL
Surface to
surface
Air Force
W87
Reentry vehicle warhead
Minuteman III intercontinental

ballistic missile
LLNL/SNL
Surface to
surface
Air Force
W760/1
Reentry body warhead
Trident II D5 submarine
launched ballistic missile
LANL/SNL
Underwater
to surface
Navy
W88
Reentry body warhead
Trident II D5 submarine
launched ballistic missile
LANL/SNL
Underwater
to surface
Navy
Type
BombsAircraft Platforms
B613/4/10
Nonstrategic bomb
F15, F16, certified

NATO aircraft
LANL/SNL
Air to surface
Air Force/Select
NATO forces
B617
Strategic bomb
B52 and B2 bombers
LANL/SNL
Air to surface
Air Force
B6111
Strategic bomb
B2 bomber
LANL/SNL
Air to surface
Air Force
B831
Strategic bomb
B52 and B2 bombers
LLNL/SNL
Air to surface
Air Force
Air to surface
Air Force
WarheadsCruise Missile Platforms

W801
Airlaunched cruise missile

strategic weapons
B52 bomber
LLNL/SNL
LANL = Los Alamos National Laboratory

NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization
LLNL = Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
SNL = Sandia National Laboratories
a
The suffix associated with each warhead or bomb type (e.g., -0/1 for the W76) represents the modification associated
with the respective weapon.
1.3
Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Before 1992, developing and maintaining the nuclear deterrent was largely accomplished by a continual
cycle of weapon design, weapon testing, and the incorporation of lessons learned in the next design. A
critical step in this process was conducting nuclear explosive tests. From 1945 through 1992, the
United States conducted 1,054 nuclear explosive tests, the majority of which tested design concepts,
physics, and engineering details such as safety and radiation effects. But perhaps of equal importance,
these explosive tests also tested the competence of the designers, engineers, manufacturing plants
(now called nuclear weapons production facilities), and indeed the entire nuclear infrastructure in
carrying out the mission. Since 1992, the United States has observed a self-imposed moratorium on
nuclear explosive testing.
1.3.1 Stockpile Stewardship

The challenge for NNSA is maintaining confidence in the nuclear weapons in the stockpile without
producing new weapons or conducting nuclear explosive tests. The solution has been to field a suite of
innovative experimental platforms, diagnostic equipment, and supercomputers that build on past test
data to simulate the internal dynamics of nuclear weapons. Armed with this understanding, the effects
of changes to the current stockpilethrough either aging or component replacementmay be
modeled. This is referred to as the Stockpile Stewardship Program. A complete description of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program can be found in Chapter 3, Research, Development, Testing, and
Evaluation Activities.
1.3.2 Stockpile Management

Stockpile Management is the program of surveillance, maintenance, and modernization efforts such as
LEPs, alterations (Alts), and modifications (Mods) that sustain current weapons in the stockpile. That
program includes the following:
Assessments. Assessments determine warhead performance, safety, and reliability based on

physics and engineering analyses, experiments, and computer simulations. Specific assessments
may also evaluate performance deterioration caused by aging and quantify performance
thresholds, uncertainties, and margins.
Surveillance. Surveillance is the process whereby individual weapons undergo inspections and
various tests of the overall weapon, weapon components, and materials to determine whether
they are meeting performance expectations. Information collected during the surveillance
process is used to support the assessment process and to inform life extension decisions.
Maintenance. This process includes limited life component (LLC) exchanges, which are periodic
exchanges of components as they reach the end of their lives. Tritium gas transfer systems
(GTSs), neutron generators (NGs), and power sources are examples of LLCs that age and are
replaced on a regular schedule.
Significant finding investigations (SFIs). These are evaluations and investigations of anomalies
that are identified through experiments, assessments, surveillance, or other activities. Each SFI
is evaluated to determine the impact of the anomaly on weapon performance, reliability,
security, and safety.
Modernization: Alts, Mods, and LEPs.
Alterations (Alts) are limited-scope changes that typically affect the assembly, testing,
maintenance, and/or storage of weapons. An ALT may address identified defects and
component obsolescence, but does not change a weapons operational capabilities.
Modifications (Mods) are more comprehensive modernization programs that change

the operational capabilities of the weapon. A Mod may enhance weapons margins
against failure, increase safety, improve security, extend limited life component life
cycles, and/or address identified defects and component obsolescence.
Life extension programs (LEPs) are modifications that refurbish warheads by replacing
aged components with the intent of extending the service life of the weapon. LEPs can
extend the life of a warhead 20 to 30 years, while increasing safety, improving security,
and addressing defects.
Dismantlement and disposition. This is the process whereby the major components of
weapons are disassembled and earmarked for reuse, storage, recycling, surveillance, or disposal.
These activities and those that directly support their performance are described in Chapter 2, Stockpile
Management.
1.4
Partnership with the Department of Defense
NNSA and DOD play critical roles in implementing the Administrations agenda for maintaining strategic
stability with other major nuclear powers, deterring potential adversaries, and reassuring the Nations
allies and partners as to its national security commitments. NNSAs role is to ensure that nuclear
weapons remain safe, secure, and reliable, and DODs role is to ensure they can be delivered effectively.
Their respective efforts are coordinated through the congressionally mandated Nuclear Weapons
Council, which is comprised of senior officials from both organizations who work together to determine
the options and priorities that shape national policies and budgets for developing, producing, and
retiring both nuclear weapons and weapon delivery platforms.
In addition, the influence of the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 have
generated more cooperation between DOD and NNSA in the interagency budget process. For the last
several years, this annual process serves as a two-agency affirmation of the NNSA program and costs.
Since the Nuclear Posture Review was released in the spring
of 2010, NNSA and DOD have worked together to develop
approaches to hedge against technological and geopolitical
surprise with a smaller stockpile. The resulting plan, called
the 3+2 Strategy, was introduced in the FY 2014 SSMP and
remains the guidance of the Nuclear Weapons Council. The
3+2 Strategy underlies the NNSA FY 2016 program of record
in this report.
The Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed

the Nations commitment to its
Nonproliferation Treaty Article VI
obligation to make progress towards
nuclear disarmament.
The 3+2 Strategy is important to that
commitment: it allows the United States
to minimize the number of warheads,
which are a significant portion of the
stockpile, and hedge against
technological or geopolitical surprise by
providing operational flexibility.
Over time, as each of the 12 warhead or bomb variants

within the seven deployed warhead families enters an LEP,
the strategy would transition the stockpile to three
interoperable ballistic missile warheads (each type would
have a common nuclear explosive package and common or
adaptable non-nuclear components) deployed on both the
SLBM and ICBM legs of the triad and on two air-delivered warheads or bombs (see Figure 11).
Figure 11. The 3+2 Strategy
The 3+2 Strategy meets military and Administration policy objectives by allowing for a smaller stockpile,
increasing interoperability, and reducing the number of warhead types, while providing the flexibility
required to hedge against geopolitical surprise. Because it will require decades, implementing the
3+2 Strategy requires a constant, cyclical process of testing, modernizing (via life extension), and
replacing warheads within the active stockpile to maintain confidence not only in the reliability of each
warhead, but also in its safety and security. This process is accomplished through several programs and
activities conducted throughout the nuclear security enterprise, as described in the following chapters.
Modernize to Downsize Implementing the 3+2 Strategy
The planned Stockpile Stewardship and Management activities described in this report support the
Presidents goal of pursuing the security of a world without nuclear weapons.1 The W76-1 sea-based
warhead is currently in production. Over half of the W76 LEP production has been completed, and the
remainder will be completed by the end of FY 2019. When complete, this program will have enabled
the reduction of the number of W76 warheads by a factor
"As long as nuclear weapons exist, the
of two.
United States must invest the resources
While the 3+2 Strategy will take 30 or more years to
necessary to maintain-without testingimplement fully, implementation has begun with the
a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
B61-12 LEP. The B61-12, now nearing the end of the
deterrent that preserves strategic
second year of full-scale engineering development, will
stability. However, reducing the threat
enable the consolidation of four families of the B-61 bomb
requires us to constantly reinforce the
(the -3, -4, -7, and -10 variants) and will improve both the
basic bargain of the Nuclear Nonsafety and security of the oldest weapon system in the
Proliferation Treaty, which commits
U.S. arsenal. The B61-12 is currently scheduled for a first
nuclear weapons states to reduce their
stockpiles while non-nuclear states
production unit in FY 2020. Once the B61-12 LEP is
remain committed to using nuclear
completed, following roughly a four-year build and once
energy only for peaceful purposes. For
confidence is gained with B61-12 weapons in service, the
our part, we are reducing the role and
B83the last megaton-class weapon in Americas arsenal
number of nuclear weapons through
will be retired. The combination of these events will result
New START and our own strategy.
in (1) a reduction in the number of bombs by a full factor of
two, (2) the removal of a megaton-class weapon, (3) a
National Security Strategy
reduction in special nuclear material of more than
(February 2015)
80 percent in the bomb portion of the air leg, and (4) a
reduction in the overall destructive power by a
commensurate factor.
The W88 Alt 370, a new arming, fuzing, and firing unit (AF&F) for the W88 warhead, is now in full-scale
engineering development (Phase 6.3). The W88 Alt 370, an adaptable configuration, is planned to form
the basis of the AF&F for the current W88 system, as well as for the current W87 arming and fuzing
assembly. In November 2014, the Nuclear Weapons Council directed that the CHE main charge in the
W88 weapon be replaced concurrently with the Alt 370 work.
Next, the 3+2 Strategy calls for a replacement of the current air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). In
July 2014, the Nuclear Weapon Council selected the W80 nuclear package for this effort. The program,
designated the W80-4 LEP, has entered Phase 6.1 (Conceptual Studies). Given the sizeable investment
to develop modern non-nuclear components for the B61-12 LEP, it makes economic sense to reuse and
reapply as much of that component set as possible to the ALCM replacement, or long-range stand-off
1
Remarks by President Obama at the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin, Germany, June 19, 2013.
(LRSO) weapon. Current schedules within the nuclear security enterprise call for a first production unit
in FY 2025 to align with a revised Air Force schedule for the missile carrier.
The first ballistic missile warhead LEP in the 3+2 Strategy is the W78/88-1 warhead. The Nuclear
Weapons Councils objective for this LEP is to deploy an interoperable nuclear explosive package for use
in both the Mk21A and the Mk5 SLBM aeroshells, with adaptable non-nuclear components. Hence, this
LEP constitutes the first interoperable warhead (IW) option, the IW-1. Initial production for this
program will be for use on Air Force ballistic missiles.
Consolidation of the present four ballistic systems into three interoperable systems will enable an
eventual reduction in the number of weapons retained as a hedge against technical failure. In todays
stockpile, if a technical problem is experienced in a bomb, cruise missile warhead, or ballistic warhead
type, there can be a period when one of two arms in one leg of the deterrent is out of commission
while the problem is solved. In the future, with two or three warhead types available for insertion into
either ICBM or SLBM aeroshells, interleg technical hedging will be possible. When analyzed in detail,
this capability can be shown to remove the need for a significant part of the technical hedge, but only
when fully implemented.
In summary, when fully implemented, the 3+2 Strategy will reduce the number of weapon types, reduce
the number of weapons in the deployed stockpile, simplify maintenance requirements, and reduce the
number of weapons retained as a hedge against technical failure.
It is the intent of NNSA and DOD to improve the safety and security features of each weapon type and to
extend the life of these weapons while not creating new nuclear weapon capabilities. In doing so, NNSA
expects to sustain a highly specialized technical workforce and to develop and sustain the capabilities,
the facilities, and the infrastructure essential for meeting stockpile requirements.
1.5
The Nuclear Security Enterprise
The nuclear security enterprise, also called the nuclear weapons complex, is composed of NNSA
Headquarters, the NNSA field offices, nuclear weapons production facilities, national security
laboratories, and the Nevada National Security Site (see Figure 12). At these locations a highly trained
workforceconsisting of Federal employees, M&O contractors, and assigned members of the military
works to ensure the success of the NNSA mission. NNSA Headquarters develops the strategy and
manages and coordinates activities to ensure they are being accomplished in an efficient and fiscally
responsible manner.
This overview provides a brief description of the national security laboratories, nuclear weapons
production facilities, and the sites, as well as some of the supporting functions funded by the Weapons
Activities account, such as secure transportation and security. More information on these areas can be
found in Chapter 4, Revitalize Physical Infrastructure, Chapter 5, Secure Transportation Asset, and
Chapter 6, Security. Additional information on the eight individual M&O sites can be found in
Appendix D, Workforce and Site-Specific Information.
Figure 12. The nuclear security enterprise
1.5.1 National Security Laboratories

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). LLNL is one of the two national security laboratories
within the nuclear security enterprise that designs the nuclear components of the Nations weapons.
The LLNL mission is to develop and sustain design, simulation, modeling, and experimental capabilities
and competencies to ensure stockpile confidence without nuclear testing. LLNL is responsible for
nuclear design activities in support of the B83, W80, W84, and W87 legacy systems and for nuclear
design of the W78/88-1 and the cruise missile warhead LEP (recently designated the W80-4). LLNLs
additional core capabilities include plutonium R&D; tritium operations and R&D; high explosives (HE)
R&D; and nuclear counterterrorism and nonproliferation.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). LANL is the second of the two national security laboratories
within the nuclear security enterprise that designs the nuclear components of the Nations weapons.
The LANL mission is to develop and sustain design, simulation, modeling, and experimental capabilities
and competencies to ensure stockpile confidence without nuclear testing. LANL is responsible for the
nuclear design and engineering of the B61, W76, W78, and W88 legacy systems, as well as the W76-1
and B61-12 LEPs. In addition, LANL provides the only fully functioning plutonium facility used for R&D
and the only pit manufacturing capability within the nuclear security enterprise. LANLs additional core
missions include tritium and HE R&D; detonator, power supply, and other non-nuclear component
production and testing; special nuclear material (SNM) accountability, storage, protection, handling, and
disposition; and nuclear counterterrorism and counterproliferation.
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). SNL is the national security laboratory uniquely responsible for the
systems engineering and integration of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile and for the design,
development, qualification, sustainment, and retirement of non-nuclear components for nuclear
weapons. SNLs additional core missions include neutron generator and other non-nuclear component
production; HE and energetic materials R&D; counterterrorism and counterproliferation; and
engineering, design, and technical systems integration for the NNSA Office of Secure Transportation.
1.5.2 Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities

National Security Campus (NSC) at Kansas City. NSC, formerly called the Kansas City Plant, is the main
production site for non-nuclear weapon components. NSC manufactures and procures many of NNSAs
most intricate and technically demanding components, including radar systems, mechanisms,
programmers, reservoirs, joint test assemblies, engineered materials, and mechanical cases. These
components make up approximately 85 percent of the elements that constitute a nuclear weapon.
Pantex Plant (Pantex). Pantex manufactures and tests HE components (the main charge and other
components) and assembles, disassembles, refurbishes, repairs, maintains, and surveills stockpile
weapons and weapon components; fabricates joint test assemblies and performs postmortems;
assembles and disassembles test beds; conducts interim staging and storage of nuclear components
from dismantled weapons; and performs pit requalification, surveillance, and packaging.
Savannah River Site (SRS). SRS supplies the radioactive hydrogen gas, tritium, for nuclear weapons.
That activity, which is an integral part of the Nations nuclear defense, has been central to the SRS
mission for more than 50 years. SRSs primary mission activities include extracting tritium from
irradiated target rods, managing the tritium inventory for the nuclear stockpile, loading tritium and
deuterium into the GTSs of nuclear weapons, performing surveillance of GTSs to support certification of
the stockpile, recovering helium-3, which is a byproduct of tritiums radioactive decay, for use in
Government and commercial industry, and conducting R&D of tritium gas processing and GTSs.
Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12). Y-12 serves as NNSAs Uranium Center of Excellence. Y-12
manufactures uranium components for nuclear weapons, cases, and other nuclear weapons
components and evaluates and tests these components for surveillance purposes. In addition, Y-12
serves as the main storage facility for Category I/II quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU);
conducts dismantlement, storage, and disposition of HEU; and supplies HEU for use in naval reactors.
1.5.3 Nevada National Security Site

The primary mission of the Nevada National Security Site is to provide facilities, infrastructure, and
personnel that the national security laboratories and other organizations can use to conduct nuclear and
non-nuclear experiments essential to maintaining the stockpile. It is the primary location within the
nuclear security enterprise where experiments using radiological and other high-hazard materials are
conducted. It is the only location where HE-driven plutonium experiments can be conducted.
Additional mission areas include development and deployment of state-of-the-art diagnostics and
instrumentation, data analysis, storage of programmatic materials, conduct of criticality experiments,
counterterrorism, and counterproliferation.
1.6
Secure Transportation
STA provides safe, secure transport of nuclear weapons, weapons components, and SNM for the nuclear
security enterprise. STA supports LEPs, LLC exchanges, surveillance, dismantlement, nonproliferation
initiatives, and experimental programs for the NNSA mission. STA also provides secure transport for
DOD and other Government agencies on a reimbursable basis.
1.7
Security of the Nuclear Security Enterprise
Two NNSA programs ensure the security of the Nations nuclear materials, infrastructure, workforce,
and sensitive information. These are the Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) Program and the Information
Technology and Cybersecurity Program. DNS ensures protection, control, and accountability of nuclear
materials, as well as the physical security of NNSAs sites and the personnel security of its workforce.
Information Technology and Cybersecurity ensures protection of classified and sensitive information
about the Nations nuclear weapons stockpile and sensitive information about the men and women who
are the stewards of that stockpile.
1.8
Federal and Contractor Workforce
Underpinning the nuclear security enterprise is a highly skilled and diverse workforce comprised of
Federal employees, management and operating contractors, and assigned members of the military. The
future of the nuclear security enterprise depends on a skilled and diverse workforce with experience
across a broad array of science, technology, engineering, and manufacturing expertise. NNSA employs
many of the top scientists and engineers in the United States because of the cutting edge nature of the
work to support the nuclear weapons stockpile. Maintaining, refreshing, and developing people in
essential areas of expertise are critical to ensuring the integrity of the nuclear deterrent well into the
future. These activities are documented in Chapter 7, Sustaining the Workforce.
1.9
Budgetary Requirements and Business Processes and

Procedures
The FY 2016 SSMP documents NNSAs strategic 25-year program of record for maintaining the safety,
security, and effectiveness of the Nations nuclear weapons stockpile. It describes the primary activities
funded by the Weapons Activities account. Detailed budget information for the FY 2016 FYNSP, as well
as the forecasted requirements out to FY 2040, is in Chapter 8, Future Years Nuclear Security Program
Budget, Requirements Estimates, and Operations and Business Improvements.
1.10 Additional Information

The conclusions to the FY 2016 SSMP are in Chapter 9; additional information can be found in the four
appendices and in an accompanying classified Annex.
The FY 2016 SSMP consolidates a number of statutory reporting requirements and related congressional
requests. Title 50 U.S.C. 2523 requires that NNSA develop and annually update a plan for sustaining the
nuclear weapons stockpile; that plan is required to cover, at a minimum, stockpile stewardship, stockpile
management, stockpile surveillance, program direction, infrastructure modernization, human capital,
and nuclear test readiness. Appendix A, Requirements Mapping, provides a comprehensive list of the
reporting requirements that this report satisfies and indicates the chapters and sections in the FY 2016
SSMP that relate to those requirements. Appendix B, Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
Subprograms, contains detailed information about the subprograms that support activities related to
stockpile stewardship. Appendix C, Exascale Computing, provides information about the strategy to
acquire advanced high performance computing technologies to support stockpile stewardship.
Appendix D, Workforce and Site-Specific Information, contains detailed information about NNSAs
individual M&O partners, as well as each ones workforce. Appendix E, Glossary, contains definitions
for terms that may provide clarification.
The three chapters and two appendices in the classified Annex provide extensive details about key
elements of nuclear weapons. Those chapters form a companion set to Chapters 2 and 3 in the FY 2016
SSMP, as well as to this chapter.
Chapter 2
Stockpile Management
Stockpile management encompasses the activities of the
Directed Stockpile Work Program. These include assessment,
surveillance, and maintenance of active weapons in the
stockpile, LEPs, and dismantlement and disposition of retired
weapons, as well as plans for preserving the capabilities to
accomplish these efforts. Chapter 2 presents an overview of
these activities. In conjunction with Chapter 2 in the
classified Annex, this chapter also provides an overview of the
Nations stockpile in terms of weapon types, quantities, and
age. It also presents the plans for weapon maintenance and
life extension of specific weapons systems during the next
25 years, while reducing the stockpile size and enhancing
safety and security features.
2.1 Introduction
FY 2014 Stockpile Management

Accomplishments
Selected warhead family (W80) for next
cruise missile warhead.
Tested B61-12 system design in flight
and ground environments.
Selected nuclear explosive package for
first interoperable warhead.
Completed full recovery of FY 2013
production shortfall for W76-1 LEP;
exceeded FY 2014 production baseline,
achieving halfway point in production in
September 2014.
Exceeded targets for warhead
disposition at Pantex and canned
subassembly dismantlement at Y-12 by
more than 5 percent.
Chapter 1 describes the policy framework for the Nations

nuclear weapon stockpile. NNSAs Stockpile Management
satisfies many of these policy requirements through various
specialized activities. The overall state of the stockpile is
determined through annual cycles of surveillance activities; discovered anomalies in the stockpile are
managed through the Surveillance Program. In addition to determining the status of the stockpile,
NNSA works with DOD to perform regular required
maintenance of stockpile weapons. Finally, informed by The B61 family of bombs is the oldest in
the stockpile. An LEP is well underway to
surveillance activities and enabled through technology
add 20 more years of life, consolidate four
maturation, a weapon type or family may be modernized
through an Alt or Mod, either of which can be executed via an of the existing five bomb variants (leaving
LEP.
In general, these life extension activities offer only two), reduce the amount of SNM in
deployed weapons, and still meet all
opportunities to improve the safety and security of stockpile
military requirements. The resulting
weapons. As per the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, LEPs do bomb will be the B61-12.
not support new military missions or provide for new military
capabilities. LEPs are based on refurbishment or reuse; any
replacement of nuclear components required the authorization of the President and approval by
Congress.
2.1.1 Surveillance
NNSAs Surveillance Program provides data to evaluate the condition of the stockpile in support of
annual assessments of reliability, safety, security, and performance. In addition, the cumulative body of
surveillance data supports decisions regarding weapon alterations, weapon modifications, repairs and
rebuilds, and life extensions. The Surveillance Program has the following goals:
Identify defects (e.g., manufacturing and design defects) affecting safety, security, performance,
or reliability.
Calculate margins between design requirements and performance at the component and
material levels.
Identify aging-related changes and trends at the component and material levels.
Further develop the capabilities for predictive assessments of stockpile components and
materials.
Provide critical data for the semi-annual Weapons Reliability Report and the annual Report on
Stockpile Assessment.
The Surveillance Program is comprised of two elements: the Stockpile Evaluation Program and the
Enhanced Surveillance subprogram within the Engineering Program. The Stockpile Evaluation Program
is mostly funded within Directed Stockpile Work by both Stockpile Systems and Stockpile Services. It
conducts surveillance evaluations of both the existing stockpile (stockpile returns) and new production
(i.e., Retrofit Evaluation System Test units). The Enhanced Surveillance subprogram provides
diagnostics, processes, and other tools to the Stockpile Evaluation Program to enable prediction and
detection of initial or agerelated defects, reliability assessments, and component and system lifetime
estimates. These two program elements work closely together to execute the current Surveillance
Program and develop new surveillance capabilities at the system, component, and material levels.
System-level tests occur jointly with the Air Force or Navy and use either existing weapons or
new production units, which are modified into Joint Test Assemblies (JTAs). Some JTAs contain
extensive telemetry instrumentation, while others contain high-fidelity mock nuclear assemblies to
recreate as closely as possible the mass properties of war reserve weapons. These JTAs are flown on the
respective DOD delivery platform to gather the requisite information to assess the effectiveness and
reliability of both the weapon and the launch or delivery platform and the associated crews and
procedures. Stockpile laboratory tests conducted at the component level assess major assemblies and
components and, ultimately, the materials that compose the components (e.g., metals, plastics,
ceramics, foams, and explosives). This surveillance process enables detection and evaluation of aging
trends and anomalous changes at the component or material level.
The following provides a more detailed description of the stockpile evaluation elements:
Disassembly and inspection. Weapons sampled from the production lines or returned from
DOD are inspected during disassembly. Weapon disassembly is conducted in a controlled
manner to identify any abnormal conditions and preserve the components for subsequent
evaluations. Visual inspections during dismantlement can also provide state-of-health
information.
Flight testing. After disassembly and inspection, selected weapons are reconfigured into JTAs
and rebuilt to represent the original build to the extent possible. However, all SNM components
are replaced with either surrogate materials or instrumentation. The JTA units are flown by the
DOD operational command responsible for the system. JTA configurations vary from high
fidelity units that essentially have no onboard diagnostics to fully instrumented units that
provide detailed information on component and subsystem performance.
Stockpile laboratory testing. Test bed configurations are built to enable prescribed function
testing of single parts or subsystems using parent unit hardware from stockpile weapon returns.
The majority of this testing occurs at the Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory, which is
operated by SNL at Pantex and involves electrical and mechanical testing of the systems. The
Air Forces Joint Interface Laboratory Test facility at Hill Air Force Base in Utah also conducts
evaluations of joint test beds to obtain information regarding delivery platformweapon
interfaces.
Component testing and material evaluation. Components and materials from the disassembly
and inspection process undergo further evaluations to assess component functionality,
performance margins and trends, material behavior, and aging characteristics. The testing can
involve both nondestructive evaluation techniques (e.g., radiography, ultrasonic testing, and
dimensional measurements) and destructive evaluation techniques (e.g., tests of material
strength and explosive performance, as well as chemical assessments).
The number of disassembly and inspections and major component tests completed in FY 2014 and
planned for FY 2015 are shown in Table 21.
Table 21. Fiscal year 2014 actual and fiscal year 2015 projected major Directed Stockpile Work
Program stockpile evaluation activities (as of January 31, 2015)
D&Is
JTA
Flights
Test Bed
Evaluations
Pit NDE
Pit
D-Tests
CSA NDE
CSA
D-Tests
GTS
Tests
DCA
Tests
Program
Totals
Fiscal Year
Warheads
14
15
14
15
14
15
14
15
14
15
14
15
14
15
14
15
14
15
14
15
B61
12
17
27
32
15
20
91
102
W76-0
10
13
14
14
13
10
62
61
W76-1
22
25
22
17
38
45
10
19
120 140
W78
11
49
12
96
61
W80-0/1
13
19
28
53
59
B83
56
36
24
17
103
71
W87
10
10
15
11
16
11
48
63
W88
10
13
12
18
12
63
54
Totals
91
82
30
23
39
56
226 195
1*
18
40
16
18
83
84
59
70
636 611
CSA = canned subassembly

D&I = disassembly and inspection
DCA = detonator cable assembly
D-tests = destructive tests

GTS = gas transfer system
JTA = Joint Test Assembly

NDE = nondestructive evaluation
*A pause in plutonium operations in PF-4 has caused postponement of most FY 2013 through FY 2015 pit D-test requirements.
Table 22 shows planned Directed Stockpile Work Program stockpile evaluation activities for FY 2015
through FY 2020. This table is based on the assessment requirements of the stockpile today and will
evolve as updated information is processed and new diagnostics are deployed.
Table 22. Major surveillance evaluations completed in FY 2014 and planned for FY 2015, as well as
planning requirements for the Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYs 2016 through 2020)
(as of January 31, 2015)
Major
Activity
FY 2014
Actual
FY 2015
FY 2016
Plan
Requirements
FY 2017
FY 2018
FY 2019
FY 2020
Requirements Requirements Requirements Requirements
FYNSP
a
Total
D&I
91
82
69
77
71
73
81
453
JTA Flight
30
25
30
27
27
28
27
164
Test Bed
Evaluation
39
56
52
58
44
51
54
315
Pit NDE
226
195
235
284
272
257
150
1,393
Pit D-Test
40
CSA NDE
18
40
42
49
42
49
42
264
CSA D-Tests
16
18
15
15
16
15
14
93
DCA Test
59
70
91
68
110
64
81
484
83
84
88
72
71
73
72
460
33
34
38
38
38
34
34
216
638
582
702
742
743
673
607
3,467
GTS Tests
HE D-Tests
TOTALS
CSA = canned subassembly

FY = fiscal year
D&I = disassembly and inspection FYNSP = Future Years Nuclear Security Program
DCA = detonator cable assembly
GTS = gas transfer system
D-Tests = destructive tests
HE = high explosives
JTA = Joint Test Assembly
NDE = nondestructive evaluation
Notes:
a
FYNSP-forecasted quantities do not reflect reductions that may result from the lowering of stockpile readiness proposed for certain
weapons.
b
Beginning in FY 2015, HE D-Tests are being counted as a Major Activity.
Surveillance requirements, as determined by the national security laboratories for the weapon systems,
in conjunction with the Air Force and Navy for joint testing, result in defined experiments to acquire the
data that support the Surveillance Program. The national security laboratories, in conjunction with
NNSA and the nuclear weapons production facilities, continually refine these requirements, based on
new surveillance information, annual assessment findings, and analysis (or reanalysis) of historical
information using modern assessment methodologies and computational tools. An agile and continuous
cycle of surveillance, as depicted in Figure 21, provides the flexibility for adjusting program priorities to
address critical issues. Key outcomes of this process include:
collections of data to quantify performance margins,
identification of knowledge gaps in NNSAs understanding of stockpile health,
technology updates,
establishment of priorities among competing surveillance activities, and
continuous improvement of surveillance processes.
Figure 21. Continuous cycle of Surveillance Program activities

NNSA instituted the nuclear weapons surveillance governance model to ensure rigor in planning and
execution (see Figure 22). Under this governance model, a Senior Technical Advisor for Surveillance
manages and integrates all elements of the Surveillance Program and reports directly to the Assistant
Deputy Administrator for Stockpile Management. The Senior Technical Advisor for Surveillance ensures:
key activities are coordinated so that the most appropriate diagnostics are developed and used
for surveillance evaluations,
systemspecific surveillance requirements are up to date and achieve a balance in priorities, and
all systems requirements are integrated into an executable plan.
Figure 22. Nuclear weapons stockpile surveillance governance model

This approach forms an annual surveillance schedule and ensures that requirements are defined and
communicated to the nuclear security enterprise and appropriate resources are available. The plan
includes proposed schedules and funding throughout the FYNSP. Furthermore, the integration of all
surveillance elements ensures that emerging issues and aging characterization will be addressed using
the most costefficient and effective diagnostics.
Nearterm surveillance activities include the following:
Continue to use new and improved component and material evaluation (CME) tests as part of
the Stockpile Evaluation Program.
Meet priority stockpile surveillance commitments.
Continue installing and testing equipment to double NNSAs capacity for high-resolution,
computed tomography of pits.
Continue to use advanced nondestructive evaluation techniques (e.g., laser gas sampling).
Develop and deploy methods to make surveillance data available for national security
laboratories and nuclear weapons production facility stakeholders.
Initiate process improvements identified by the Surveillance Community to increase efficiency.
Begin to implement additional surveillance metrics that assess the state of the Surveillance
Program and identify and prioritize the additional information needed to address shortcomings.
The following longterm and ongoing activities are related to surveillance:
Continue assessment of recent and historical test data to compare the state of each stockpile
weapon with its original certified design and inform future surveillance and LEP planning.
Improve and extend aging models for all major materials and components at risk.
Improve, extend, and deploy improved surveillance diagnostics in order to replace and augment
destructive techniques with advanced nondestructive evaluation techniques.
Adjust the program to handle stockpile commonality and develop, improve, and extend
capabilities to augment flight testing.
2.1.2 Significant Finding Investigations

SFIs are conducted when anomalies that can significantly
affect safety, security, reliability, or performance are
The B61 family of bombs has more SFIs
discovered during surveillance or are identified during
than any other warhead family. SFIs were
numerous activities, including weapons production, DOD a significant factor in justifying the need
operations, reacceptance and rebuild, and dismantlement. for the B61-12 LEP.
The SFI process includes determining the cause;
ascertaining the impact on weapon system performance,
reliability, security, and safety; and developing any recommended corrective actions. A tracking and
reporting system monitors progress from the initial discovery of an anomaly through its closure report,
as well as the status of any corrective actions. The closure report identifies the assessed impacts, if any,
and provides recommendations for followon activities. In addition, a prioritization process ensures that
the most serious and oldest SFIs are receiving appropriate resources. Depending on its nature, an SFI
may be resolved solely as part of Stockpile Management, or a broader evaluation scope may be required
that includes experiments, advanced code analysis, etc., as well as the participation of Research,
Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) experts. Most SFIs are closed out without impact to the
stockpile. Some impacts involve only a subpopulation of a particular stockpile system, which may result
in a minor, acceptable reduction in reliability. If the finding has a significant impact, it can result in a
change to the reported reliability, e.g., the issuance of an exception to the Major Assembly Release until
appropriate remedial action, such as an Alt, Mod, or LEP.
Figure 23 shows the total number of SFIs opened and closed during calendar years 2001 to 2014 and
the number that resulted in an impact to the stockpile. The variation in the number of SFIs opened
during these years is a result of many factors including:
the number of surveillance evaluations conducted,
the pending LEP activities in which additional warheads were evaluated,
the use of improved diagnostics to identify additional areas of concern, and
DOD activities conducted during the period of interest.
To ensure that any issue that may affect system performance, safety, security, or reliability is identified,
the threshold for the initial assessment of an anomaly is set intentionally low. Once notified of an
anomaly by the nuclear weapons production facility, the national security laboratory has 15 days to
disposition (close or promote) the anomaly. If promoted, the anomaly status changes to a Significant
Finding Notification, and investigation continues for up to another 45 working days. At the end of that
period, the national security laboratory dispositions the Significant Finding Notification by either closing
it or by opening a formal SFI.
Figure 23. Historical number of Significant Finding Investigations opened and closed during
calendar years 2001 to 2014 and the number that resulted in an impact to the stockpile
2.1.3 Maintenance
A number of nuclear warhead components (e.g., tritium
GTSs, NGs, and power sources) require periodic The B61-12 is designed to have much less
replacement to sustain system functionality. NNSA and frequent LLC exchanges than the Mods it
DOD jointly manage delivery and installation of replaces (B61-3, -4, -7, and -10).
replacements before warhead performance or personnel
safety is adversely affected. Typically, GTSs are replaced in
the field at the respective DOD weapon maintenance facility; however, more-invasive LLC exchanges
may require returning the warhead to Pantex to complete maintenance activities. In addition to LLC
exchanges, maintenance includes certain minor alterations to stockpile weapons to address specific
concerns that do not rise to the level of a system modification or an LEP activity. These minor
alterations respond to an emerging issue and are addressed on a priority basis, depending on stockpile
impact. Unlike LLC activities, alterations are scheduled on an as-needed basis.
Current or ongoing maintenance activities include the following:
Support NG production at a rate of 700 to 1,000 generators per year from FY 2016 to FY 2020.
(The change from the FY 2015 SSMP was directed in the applicable Program Control Document
because of increased uncertainty in specific requirements for the out-years.)
Support ongoing NG replacements on the W761, W87, and W78 warheads as well as planned
replacements on the W801 and W88 warheads and B61 bombs. (The NG production schedule
is in the classified Annex in Chapter 2.)
Complete the first production unit for the W87 GTS (Alt 360) by FY 2019.
Complete the first production unit for the 3rd generation W88 GTS by FY 2019.
Mature the technologies to support ontime delivery of all LLC exchanges (e.g., GTSs and
electronic NGs).
2.1.4 Life Extension Programs

Weapon systems are being maintained well beyond their original design lifetime. As these systems
age, NNSA continues to detect anomalies that may ultimately degrade performance of some nuclear
weapons to unacceptable levels.
The drivers for life extension activities are addressing aging The B61-12 LEP includes refurbishment of
both the nuclear and non-nuclear
and performance issues, enhancing safety features, and
improving security, while meeting strategic deterrence components to address aging, assure
extended service life, and improve the
requirements with a reduced stockpile size and retaining
reliability and improving performance margins. Additional bombs safety, effectiveness, and security.
goals are to reduce, to the extent possible, materials that are With the addition of new Air Force
components, the LEP will consolidate and
hazardous, costly to manufacture, degrade prematurely, or
replace the B61-3 -4,-7, and -10 bombs.
react with other materials in a manner that affects
performance, safety, or security.
For example, when
feasible, insensitive high explosives (IHE) will replace CHE to improve safety, security, use control, and
production efficiency. A wellplanned and wellexecuted stockpile life extension strategy will improve
safety and security, while enabling DOD to implement a deployment and hedge strategy consistent
with the Administrations goal of a smaller, yet still effective, deterrent. In addition, because of
production constraints, NNSA is pursuing both refurbished and reused components from legacy
systems, as described in the Nuclear Posture Review (DOD 2010). Changing materials, using
components from legacy systems in new LEPs, and remanufacturing legacy component designs present
significant challenges to todays stockpile stewards, as outlined below.
System Certification. The ability to certify designs that include new or updated material
combinations or surety features is a challenge for stockpile life extension programs in the
absence of underground testing. The Stockpile Stewardship Program, established in 1994,
develops computational, modeling and experimental capabilities that enable certification of
modernized weapon components and architectures. In recognition of the importance of system
certification for life extension programs, the national security laboratories developed the
Predictive Capability Framework (PCF) to increase the focus for primary and secondary physics,
weapon engineering, and surety activities. This is discussed further in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.2.
Nuclear C omponents Pits and Canned Subassemblies ( CSAs). Stockpile life extension
approaches may include nuclear component refurbishments, remanufacturing, and reuse to
extend the life of the weapon system and allow for modern surety architectures. As part of life
extension, the ability to certify the resulting nuclear package and any associated weapon
changes is key to providing optimal design options for LEPs. Fundamental understanding of
physics package interactions has significantly improved over the last decade because of
greater computing power, advanced simulations, and enhanced laboratory experiments.
These capabilities have allowed NNSA to consider a much broader range of LEP options than
previously possible. These improvements support the ability to certify to pertinent
environments. See Chapter 3 for further details about the RDT&E activities that underpin these
advanced assessment processes.
NonNuclear Components. Many nonnuclear components today use legacy technologies

that are more than 35 years old and have not been supported for many years. Moreover,
future LEPs must address new safety and security objectives that are not achievable in many
older designs because of component size or weight restrictions with currently available
technologies. Using the Component Maturation Framework (CMF), as discussed in
Section 2.2.2 below, NNSA has identified the key required technologies and components to
transform the stockpile over the next two decades. NNSA is establishing plans to mature these
technologies sufficiently in advance of planned insertion points to cost-effectively minimize risk.
The CMF provides the path to address the issues identified in the Technical Basis for Stockpile
Transformation Planning, as discussed in Section 2.2.1 below.
2.1.4.1
Life Extension Program Planning and Execution Process
LEP planning is a joint NNSA and DOD process to balance a number of goals, objectives, and constraints.
Key to this process is preventing any operational gaps in the Nations nuclear deterrence, while
enhancing the safety, security, use control, and reliability of the stockpile by selectively integrating new,
appropriately mature, and cost-effective technologies. Furthermore, consistent with the Nuclear
Posture Review ( DOD 2010), LEP activities support reduction in warhead types and stockpile size by
formulating options for IWs1 that could be flexibly deployed across different delivery platforms, along
with balancing the number of warheads carried on each of the ballistic missile systems. The
objectives essential to the longterm sustainability of the nuclear security enterprise include the
following:
Sustain a highly specialized workforce for nuclear warhead design and manufacturing.
Mature and insert modern technologies to improve safety and security.
Maintain a robust supply chain to meet DOD requirements.
Improve responsiveness to mitigate geopolitical surprise and the risk of operational gaps.
Enable multiple, concurrent design and manufacturing LEP activities through sustainable
steady-state operations.
IWs are warheads with a common nuclear explosives package integrated with nonnuclear systems that maximize the
use of common and adaptable components. IWs can be deployed on multiple delivery platforms.
In addition to these goals and objectives, the following critical constraints must be addressed:
Deliver warheads to DOD on schedule.
Execute LEPs within budget.
Manage production capabilities, primarily related to pits, CSAs, and non-nuclear components,
while undergoing significant facility revitalization to maintain adequate production capacity and
throughput.
Maintain a r obust RDT&E program t o ensure capabilities are available to certify the aging
stockpile without nuclear testing and to mature technologies and components for insertion
into the stockpile.
NNSA manages the LEP planning and execution process by implementing the NNSA Supplemental
Directive 452.3-1 Defense Programs Business Requirements and Processes Manual. The Federal
requirements for the phase-gate product realization process are described in R001, Product
Realization, and the Phase 6.x Process is described in R006, 6.x Process. R006 complies with the
original sevenphase Joint Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Process that covers the phases of a weapons
life from initial feasibility studies through development, production, deployment, and retirement.
Phase 6 encompasses production, maintenance, and evaluation of the stockpile. The 6.x phases
(i.e., Phases 6.1 through 6.6) are mirror images of Phases 1 through 6 and are conducted for a
warhead or bomb in Phase 6 of its life cycle. The Phase 6.x Process is focused on life extension of the
system and improvements to safety, security, and use control. DODs Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear Matters is finalizing the results of an interagency effort to update the shared
description of the 6.x Process. When the update has been completed, NNSA will review and possibly
modify the Federal requirements in both R001 and R006 to ensure continued compliance.
As mentioned here, NNSA issued R001 and R006 to improve the effectiveness of the Phase 6.x Process by
establishing a systems engineering, risk-informed approach. The Product Realization Process uses a
standard set of deliverables and reviews (i.e., phase gates) to advance to the next stage of product
development. This process ensures that issues and risks are addressed at the earliest possible time
and all key product stakeholders agree to proceed to the next stage of LEP development. Creating
standard gate checklists also provides consistency and a roadmap for future stockpile stewards to follow
in the product development life cycle. Product Realization Process requirements overlay on the LEP
planning and execution activities. Figure 24 shows the integration of the 6.x Process with the major
gate reviews required by the Product Realization Process through Phase 6.5. Subsequently, the LEP
system enters fullscale production (Phase 6.6). A revised 6.x Process with updated gate reviews is
in development to refine the process further and improve the alignment of deliverables to the
various gates.
Figure 24. Schematic of 6.x Process integrated with key gate reviews required by the
Product Realization Process
2.1.4.2
Baseline Life Extension Program Plan
The Baseline Life Extension Plan has been approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council and was developed
in coordination with DOD; changes to the plan will be coordinated with DOD. An overview of that plan is
described in Section 2.3.
NNSAs current baseline plan contains gaps in production activity and potential workforce management
issues that would result from those gaps. The plan will likely change at least annually because of
funding impacts, but the need to anticipate and mitigate manufacturing gaps wherever they appear is
an important part of the planning and management responsibility. Among the methods that may be
used to manage production gaps are building components ahead of schedule, assembling complete
units ahead of schedule, extending production schedules, or rescheduling work that competes for
resources (e.g., dismantlement).
The Enterprise Modeling and Analysis Consortium (EMAC) provides plant throughput information to
help decision-makers assess the feasibility of proposed changes to the Baseline Life Extension Plan.
EMAC provides a broad range of decision-making support by analyzing nuclear weapon enterprise
capabilities and capacities and the infrastructure life-cycle planning associated with stockpile
management alternatives. EMAC activities assist senior leaders within NNSA to understand and evaluate
alternative pathways to meet deterrence objectives.
The four figures below (Figures 25 through 28) are examples of the tools NNSA uses for capacity and
resource planning. These figures depict the planning for the projected workloads of various product
lines before any mitigation strategies are applied. Workload uncertainty in the figures is caused by
variability in the scope and schedule for system elements. The data are used to develop mitigation
strategies for optimal site and nuclear security enterprise output.
Figure 25. Weapon assembly and disassembly notional projected workloads

for the Pantex Plant2
2
By planning workloads across all areas at Pantex, NNSA intends to avoid a significant gap in dismantlement activities.
Figure 26. Canned subassembly notional projected workloads

for the Y-12 National Security Complex
Figure 27. Arming, fuzing, and firing and/or equivalent electronics notional
projected workloads for the National Security Campus in Kansas City
Figure 28. Neutron Generator notional projected workloads

for Sandia National Laboratories
2.1.5 Weapon Dismantlement and Disposition

Weapons are retired as a result of changes to strategic
requirements or as a result of surveillance evaluations. The
dismantlement and disposition process involves four major
activities: safety analysis, disassembly, characterization,
and disposition. Figure 29 illustrates the processes
involved in dismantlement and disposition of nuclear
weapons.
Many components for the B61-12 LEP

will come from disassembly of current
stockpile bombs, a process known as
Disassembly for LEP or DisLEP.
Weapons and their components are categorized before dismantlement to identify the associated
hazards and disposition streams. Disassembly operations separate the warhead into its major
components and materials.
Weapon components are
characterized and earmarked for reuse, storage, recycle, or
NNSA is 17 percent ahead of its
disposal. Disposition may include steps that demilitarize current schedule for eliminating
components so they cannot be used as originally intended, as
those weapons retired prior to
well as alteration of parts to declassify them for shipment to FY 2009.
offsite salvage locations in accordance with Federal regulations
and DOE Orders. Proper characterization and disposition ensure
that the nuclear weapons production facilities dispose of material in accordance with environmental
regulations.
Figure 29. Process flow of activities involved in the safe dismantlement and disposition of
nuclear warheads
2.1.6 Technology Maturation

Technology maturation enables development and delivery of design-to-manufacturing capabilities to
meet current and future nuclear weapons needs for the Nations stockpile. Planning for technology
maturation allows NNSA to meet DOD requirements while maintaining the capability to provide quick
response to evolving national security requirements. Technology maturation focuses on maintaining the
base capability to support the current stockpile, establishing manufacturing capability for the first user,
and adapting the capability for follow-on uses.
As part of the technology maturation process, NNSA, in conjunction with the national security
laboratories and the nuclear weapons production facilities, actively consolidates multi-system
technology maturation scopes. This consolidation improves prioritization and management of activities
to ensure components are ready for insertion, while minimizing costs. Technology maturation
component development activities are funded through Directed Stockpile Work (i.e., Stockpile Services,
Research and Development Support, and Research and Development Certification and Safety), as well as
through the Enhanced Surety and Enhanced Surveillance subprograms of the Engineering Program.
Associated manufacturing development activities are funded within the Advanced Manufacturing
Development program.
The national security laboratories and the nuclear weapons production facilities measure technology
development using technology readiness level (TRL) and manufacturing readiness level (MRL) metrics.
Target TRLs and MRLs are provided with the Integrated Phase Gate and 6.x Process to maximize
successful deployment with respect to cost and schedule.
2.2 Management and Planning

NNSA continues to improve its planning processes by aligning activities with programmatic elements
and recent stockpile decisions. This FY 2016 SSMP provides a discussion of the changes to the Technical
Basis for Stockpile Transformation Planning and the Component Maturation Framework.
2.2.1 Technical Basis for Stockpile Transformation Planning

The Technical Basis for Stockpile Transformation Planning was initially developed in 2012 to review the
needs of the Nations stockpile systematically by weapon system and planned LEPs. It was updated and
expanded in July 2014 to include a summary of the state of health of the Nations stockpile. Combined
with institutional knowledge gained through prior programs (e.g., the W76-1 and B61-12 LEPs), the
Technical Basis for Stockpile Transformation Planning has evolved and now emphasizes the importance
of early technology development prior to the Phase 6.x Process. Accordingly, the three national security
laboratories have reviewed the stockpile needs and ongoing LEP planning to identify potential
technologies based on the drivers identified in Table 23. The national security laboratories have added
another technology driver, provisioning, to fully address the primary issues and concerns that affect
the stockpile.
Table 23. Technology drivers
Technology Driver
Description
Confirmed end-of-life due to aging
Need for end-of-life replacement.
Provisioning
Replacement of limited available components that use legacy designs, but require
minor technology or manufacturing maturation to maintain stockpile quantities.
Performance
Ability to achieve required yield, ensure sufficient margins, and meet existing or
changed stockpile-to-target requirements.
Enhanced surety
Assurance of safety, security, and use control.
The Technical Basis for Stockpile Transformation Planning, in conjunction with the CMF, provides the
foundation for the technology maturation process to ensure that weapon system needs are identified
and addressed in a comprehensive and prioritized manner. Surveillance programs, risk assessments,
and output from the Nuclear Weapons Council, among other sources, support the identification of
weapon system needs.
2.2.2 Component Maturation and Technology Development

Following development of the Technical Basis for Stockpile Transformation Planning, the national
security laboratories coordinated with the respective nuclear weapons production facilities to update
the CMF. The CMF is a portfolio management tool that is used to integrate preliminary scope, proposed
TRLs and MRLs, and planning estimates to help enable decisions on component development,
technology maturation, and timely insertions. These decisions must take into account early investment
in capabilities (e.g., advanced manufacturing) to address stockpile needs. Being able to develop
capabilities in terms of both tooling and personnel that are synonymous with industry standards is key
to realizing significant cost savings and eliminating single-point failures. These capabilities apply to any
weapon system, ensure flexibility in addressing emerging issues, and facilitate implementation of
lessons learned. Technologies are normally transitioned after they reach TRL/MRL 5, but transition
details are documented in formal interface agreements. This work starts prior to Phase 6.1 activities
and continues until Phase 6.3 on technologies that support LEPs, alterations, and modifications; it
includes the following activities:
Determine resource requirements and identifying funding.
Link component maturation and technology development activities with the respective LEP
integrated master delivery schedules.
Track maturation of selected technologies through the nine TRLs and MRLs to ensure insertion
and document benefits.
Integrate with programs to design, develop, and qualify components.
NNSA works with the national security laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities to
determine the annual technology maturation scope to be conducted using the available funding.
2.2.2.1 Systems Integration Framework
The Systems Integration Framework (SIF) is a new framework that is currently under development and is
intended to complete coverage of the technology maturation development and testing programs. SIF
will leverage existing PCF and CMF frameworks, ultimately leading to a more thorough process for
component development and insertion into the stockpile. NNSA uses the concept of frameworks to
move through the Phase 6.x Process, which covers all phases of an existing weapons life from initial
feasibility studies and design through development, production, maintenance, deployment, retirement,
and dismantlement. The purpose of SIF is to ensure technology and concept readiness at higher TRLs for
inclusion in the Phase 6.x Process for LEPs. SIF is a framework that will bridge the gap between CMF and
the Phase 6.x Process framework and integrate the frameworks to support overall system development
activities. SIF will enable testing to be conducted in an operational environment using the Joint
Technology Demonstrator Testbed and the Developmental Flight JTAs with the Navy and Air Force. This
approach is intended to yield the following benefits:
Provide opportunities for earlier engagement on future technology familiarization and

maturation with DOD.
Provide optimization of available flight test opportunities.
Provide opportunities and new approaches to accomplish TRL requirements (such as

demonstration in a relevant environment) that involve ground and flight testing and may
require DOD assets for greater coordination and integration with DODs technology maturation
program.
Lead to joint concept exploration with DOD to evaluate modifications to current system
interface requirements and approaches that might enable a more reliable, safe, and effective
weapon system.
Produce higher TRL levels in advance of entry into the Phase 6.x Process, with DOD involvement;
inform DOE and DOD decision-makers of available technologies and concepts; and provide
greater confidence in their readiness for inclusion in an LEP.
Provide a common reference framework for testing in an operational environment that is

applicable to component development and addressing significant findings during annual
assessments of the stockpile.
Demonstrate to stakeholders how the disparate program elements must come together and
provide opportunities for technology maturation and component development to support
ground and flight testing.
Demonstrate the feasibility of new, pre-6.x technologies and new concepts to meet LEP
objectives, such as developing new production and inspection techniques and reducing the cost
and cycle time of developing and deploying weapon systems.
2.3 Overview of the Program of Record

In November 2012, the Nuclear Weapons Council selected
a baseline plan for life extension of the Nations stockpile
that implements a 3+2 Strategy. The baseline plan was
detailed in a Nuclear Weapons Council memorandum
dated January 15, 2013. The most recent version of this
joint DOE and DOD plan is in the FY 2015 Requirements and
Planning Document and contains five main elements:
The B61-12 is one of the weapons in the

3+2 Strategy. Another is the lifeextended cruise missile warhead,
the W80-4.
align the LEP schedules with the delivery of DOD platform upgrades;
provide a longterm strategy to maintain the Nations nuclear deterrent with a smaller stockpile;
enable a reduction in the number of warheads required in the technical hedge by balancing
the deployments in the submarinelaunched ballistic missile leg and the ICBM leg;
stay within NNSAs planned production capabilities and capacities; and
balance the workload across the nuclear security enterprise.
The NNSA life extension activities to implement the Nuclear Weapons Council plan are illustrated in
Figure 210. The Nuclear Weapons Council plan establishes the framework to develop more-detailed
implementation plans for the deployment of IWs. The first IW, IW1, is planned to be the W78/881 life
extended warhead. The Nuclear Weapons Council has not yet specifically determined the second and
third IWs (IW-2 and IW-3). The FY 2015 Requirements and Planning Document (RPD) also includes
information on management of the hedge stockpile, incorporation of reused or remanufactured nuclear
components, use of common nonnuclear components, improvement in safety and security, and
evaluation of affordability.
Currently, most of the stockpile is in various stages of life extension activities beyond Phase 6.1. The
W761 is in Phase 6.6 (Fullscale Production); the B6112 is in Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering); the
W78/881 (IW-1) is paused in Phase 6.2 (Feasibility Study and Option Downselect); and the W88 Alt 370
is in Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering). The W80-4 has entered Phase 6.1 (Conceptual Studies).
Additional details of these activities are described below and in the classified Annex. Not depicted in
Figure 210 are the technology maturation activities taking place at the national security laboratories
and the nuclear weapons production facilities to provide future options for stockpile improvements.
Long-range plans also include a refurbishment of the B61-12, which will begin a Phase 6.1 study in
approximately 2038 (not shown in the figure).
Figure 210. National Nuclear Security Administration warhead activities
2.4 Program Details

2.4.1 Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations
2.4.1.1
W76-1 LEP
Short Program Description

The W76-0 warhead is a 1970s-era SLBM system that the Navy first introduced into the stockpile in
1978. The W76 warhead is deployed with the Trident II D5 missile on the Ohio-class nuclear ballistic
missile submarines. The primary goals of the W76-1 LEP are to extend the original warhead service life
from 20 to 60 years; address identified aging issues; incorporate nuclear surety enhancements; minimize
system certification risk in the absence of underground nuclear testing; and refurbish the system in a
managed, affordable manner. The refurbishment programs first production unit was achieved in
September 2008, and the first delivery of warheads to the Navy for deployment was completed in
FY 2009. The current program of record is to complete production of the W76-1 no later than the end of
FY 2019.
Accomplishments
In FY 2013, several issues related to safety basis parameters for tools and equipment, facilities, and
weapon response changes occurred at Pantex resulting in lower than planned production unit
completions. To recover this production shortfall, a schedule was implemented in FY 2014 that
recovered the entire FY 2013 production shortfall and exceeded the baseline FY 2014 production
quantity requirements. By September 30, 2014, the W76-1 program achieved a major milestone by
completing 50 percent of the planned warhead production quantity for the current program of record.
Deliverables, Plans, Schedules, and Milestones

The primary deliverables for the W76-1 LEP in FY 2016 through the end of the program are as follows:
Achieve or exceed annual refurbished warhead production rates.
Deliver refurbished warheads on schedule to the Navy for deployment.
Produce and deliver JTAs for surveillance flight tests.
Execute Retrofit Evaluation System Test and Stockpile Surveillance activities to facilitate
completion of Annual Assessment and Weapon Reliability activities by the national security
laboratories.
Trends and Changes from the FY 2015 FYNSP

There are no significant trends or changes to the W76-1 LEP budget profile from the FY 2015 FYNSP
profile because of the execution of steady-state rate production.
Risks
The following are among the risks to execution of the W76-1 LEP:
Congressional continuing budget resolutions, budget sequestrations, and Government

shutdowns affect execution of production schedules and create funding uncertainties.
Funding gaps in Production Support, Safeguards and Security, and Readiness in Technical Base
and Facilities (RTBF) affect production capabilities, such as facility infrastructure and production
equipment required for execution of LEP production schedules.
Single-point failures associated with aging equipment that are critical to executing LEP
production schedules.
Risk Mitigation
The primary risk mitigation measures being implemented by the W76-1 LEP are as follows:
Meeting or exceeding annual production requirements to ensure NNSA remains ahead of the
Navys delivery requirements for deployment of refurbished warheads in the submarine fleet.
Identifying and funding replacement of critical aging equipment to ensure mitigation of

perturbations to the LEP production schedule.
2.4.1.2
W88 Alt 370

The W88 nuclear weapon, which entered the stockpile in late 1988, is deployed on the Navys Trident II
D5 SLBM system. The weapon is in its third decade of life and requires action to address provisioning
and aging issues to maintain its current state of readiness until the weapon can undergo a
comprehensive life extension process. The W88 Alt 370 replaces the Arming Fuzing & Firing subsystem,
enhances nuclear safety, and supports future alternatives for nuclear explosive package LEPs. The
Nuclear Weapons Council approved entry of the W88 Alt 370 into Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering)
on October 9, 2012. The Alt 370 conversion is scheduled concurrently with the planned LLC exchange
for the GTS and NGs. The Alt 370 scope includes design, development, qualification, production, and
surveillance of the W88 reentry body with a new AF&F, lightning arrestor connector, trainers, flight test
assemblies, and associated handling gear and spares. The W88 Alt 370 first production unit is scheduled
for December 2019.
In November 2014, the Nuclear Weapons Council decided to replace the CHE main charge in the W88
weapon concurrently with the Alt 370 work. This new requirement for NNSA was not in the FY 2015
budget submission. The Nuclear Weapons Council decided to partially offset the additional costs of the
CHE replacement with reductions in requirements for surveillance and hedge sustainment for legacy B61
and B83 systems.
Accomplishments
In FY 2014, the W88 Alt 370 completed several development, pre-production, and programmatic
accomplishments including the following:
Completed two major flight tests, the Critical Radar Arming and Fuzing Test and the Follow-on
Commanders Evaluation Test 50.
Tested functional component prototypes in stockpile-to-target-sequence environments.
Completed radar fuzing ground tests.
Shipped 1,861 (cumulative) pieces of hardware, including prototype hardware by NNSAs NSC
(formerly known as the Kansas City Plant) to support Integrated Contractor Orders.
Established Interface Requirements Agreements with Other Program Money to document

deliverables on which the W88 Alt 370 depends.
Implemented the Earned Value Management System.

The major deliverables for the W88 Alt 370 Program in FY 2016 through the end of the program are as
follows:
Conduct the system-level Baseline Design Review in FY 2016.
Conduct the Preliminary Design Review and Acceptance Group review in FY 2016.
Obtain Phase 6.4 (Production Engineering) approval in FY 2016.
Conduct the system-level Final Design Review in FY 2018.
Conduct the final flight test qualification (DASO-series tests) in FY 2019.
Obtain Phase 6.5 (First Production Unit) approval in FY 2019.
Complete the first production unit by December 2019.
Conduct the final Design Review and Acceptance Group review in FY 2020.
Obtain Phase 6.6 (Full Rate Production) approval in FY 2020.

The FY 2016 FYNSP request for FY 2016 reflects a $63.0 million increase to the program compared to the
FY 2016 amount in the FY 2015 Presidents Budget Request. The increase was required because of the
impact of FY 2013 sequestration-driven delays in key program activities, reentry-body-level lifetime
assessments, and the addition of a more rigorous Earned Value Management System across all NNSA
sites. The NNSA FY 2016 budget submission also reflects funding adjustments to partially fund CHE
replacement. To cover remaining shortfalls for the CHE replacement, NNSA will annually evaluate its
budget submissions to look for ways to fund the remaining CHE replacement costs.
Risks
The high-level risks for the W88 Alt 370 LEP are congressional continuing budget resolutions, budget
sequestrations, and Government shutdowns affect execution of production schedules and create
funding uncertainties.
Risk Mitigation
The following primary risk mitigation measures are being implemented by the W88 Alt 370 program:
NNSA is carefully managing annual work packages and using risk-based contingency to minimize
the effects of short-term budget gaps. NNSA will continue to engage with Congress to
communicate the need for consistent funding and support for the W88 Alt 370.
NNSA has implemented formal tracking and interface agreements between LEPs and other
programs to assure that technology and production maturation requirements are integrated
into FYNSP planning and monitored during execution.
NNSA is adding CHE replacement to the Alt 370 to mitigate technical risk to the W88 warhead
program.
2.4.1.3
B61-12 LEP

The B61 is one of the oldest nuclear weapons in the stockpile. On February 27, 2012, the Nuclear
Weapons Council authorized Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering) for the B6112 LEP. This LEP will
address multiple components that are nearing end of life and military requirements for reliability,
service life, field maintenance, safety, and use control. NNSA, in coordination with the Air Force, studied
a number of design options to address the militarys requirements, ranging from component
replacement alterations to fullscope nuclear and nonnuclear refurbishment. The joint effort also
included a separate study to assess the schedule and cost for each option. The selected option includes
refurbishment of both nuclear and nonnuclear components to address aging, assure extended service
life, and improve the safety, security, and reliability of the bomb. With these upgrades and the addition
of new Air Force components, the B6112 LEP will consolidate and replace the B613, 4, 7, and 10
bombs. The consolidation will enable a reduction in the number of gravity bombs, consistent with the
Nuclear Posture Review (DOD 2010) objectives. The scope incorporates component reuse where
possible and omits highrisk technologies to reduce cost and schedule risks. The first production unit is
planned for FY 2020.
Accomplishments
In FY 2014, the B61-12 LEP completed several major accomplishments, including the following:
Completed more than 20 B61-12 LEP system-level joint, ground, and aircraft integration tests
using functional developmental hardware.
Executed the first vibration fly-around and instrumented measurement vehicle flight to validate
flight environments.
Delivered 10,323 items of hardware, including prototype hardware, to support Integrated

Contractor Orders.
Completed first integration test of B61-12 LEP bomb assembly and tail kit assembly with aircraft
platform interfaces.
Demonstrated that the GTS design meets key DOD requirements and initiated pre-production
activities ahead of schedule.

The following are primary deliverables for the B61-12 LEP in FY 2016 through the end of the program:
First Development System Drop will occur in FY 2015.
Obtain Phase 6.4 (Production Engineering) approval in FY 2016.
The Air Force will hold a Design Review and Acceptance Group review in FY 2016 to assess
design and qualification against military requirements.
Conduct first System Qualification drop in FY 2017.
Obtain Phase 6.5 (First Production Unit) approval in FY 2019.
Conduct the final Design Review and Acceptance Group reviews in FY 2020.
Complete the first production unit no later than March 2020.

There are no significant trends or changes to the B61-12 LEP budget profile from the FY 2015 FYNSP
profile.
Risks
The risks to execution of the B61-12 LEP production include congressional continuing budget
resolutions, budget sequestrations, and Government shutdowns affect execution of production
schedules and create funding uncertainties.
Risk Mitigation
The following primary risk mitigation measures are being implemented by the B61-12 LEP:
NNSA is carefully managing annual work packages and using risk-based contingency to minimize
the effects of short-term budget gaps. NNSA will continue to engage with Congress to
communicate the need for consistent funding and support for the B61-12.
NNSA has implemented formal tracking and interface agreements between LEPs and other
programs to assure technology and production maturation requirements are integrated into
FYNSP planning and monitored during execution.
2.4.1.4
W80-4 LEP

The W80-4 LEP title reflects the July 2014 Nuclear Weapons Council downselect to the W80 warhead in
Phase 6.1 of the cruise missile warhead LEP program. This LEP will consider W80-based reuse,
refurbishment, and replacement options for nuclear and nonnuclear components to provide a warhead
for the Air Forces cruise missile to replace the current, aging, ALCM. The program will integrate the
warhead with the replacement missile platform and address warhead component aging concerns and
military requirements for reliability, service life, field maintenance, and surety. LLNL and SNL,
respectively, are the nuclear and non-nuclear national security laboratories3 for this LEP. Key design
requirements established for this LEP include using IHE, maximizing use of nonnuclear components
developed for other LEPs, exploring options for enhanced surety, and concurrent engineering with the
Air Force on the warhead/missile interface. NNSA has requested funding in the FY 2016 Presidents
Budget Request to support the DOD-requested first production unit in FY 2025.
Accomplishments
Initiated Phase 6.1 concept study activities in accordance with the weapon development cycle in
July 2014.
Completed a Nuclear Weapons Councilapproved downselect to the W80 warhead for the
W80-4 LEP.
The Phase 6.1 Report, including draft Military Characteristics and stockpile-to-target sequence,
and the request to proceed to Phase 6.2, are scheduled for delivery in June 2015.
The program is scheduled to enter Phase 6.2 (Feasibility Studies) in FY 2015 and continue into
FY 2017. This phase will identify and develop design options and compare design and
manufacturability tradeoffs and life-cycle advantages and disadvantages with respect to reuse,
refurbishment, and replacement; surety; military requirements for reliability, service life, and
field maintenance; and warhead/missile integration.
There are no Phase 6.2 deliverables in FY 2016. Phase 6.2 will conclude with a written Phase 6.2
report, identifying preferred design options, and an outbrief to the Nuclear Weapons Council
Standing and Safety Committee.
Phase 6.2a is planned to start in FY 2017, including performing a detailed cost study of selected
design options, identifying production issues, and developing workload and process
development plans to accomplish the LEP production. Phase 6.2a also will include development
of technical and programmatic documents in anticipation of developing a program baseline
early in Phase 6.3. At the conclusion of Phase 6.2a, the Weapon Design and Cost Report, along
with estimated DOD costs, will be presented to the Nuclear Weapons Council, along with a final
warhead design downselect and a recommendation for proceeding to Phase 6.3.
Phase 6.3 is planned to start in FY 2018. Phase 6.3 will develop the Baseline Cost Report and
Selected Acquisition Report; complete a detailed design demonstrated to be feasible with
NNSAs national security laboratories are LLNL, LANL, and SNL). NNSAs nuclear weapons production facilities are the NSC
(formerly called the Kansas City Plant), Pantex, SRS, and Y-12. In addition, both LANL and SNL have specific production
responsibilities.
regard to critical safety, performance, and production considerations; produce the final draft
version of the Military Characteristics and stockpile-to-target sequence; and produce a draft
addendum to the Final Weapon Development Report for review by the Design Review and
Acceptance Group.
Trends and changes from FY 2015 FYNSP
A $186 million increase in the budget request in FY 2016 from FY 2015 reflects the change of the first
production unit to FY 2025 and execution of Phase 6.2 activities for the duration of FY 2016.
Risks
Congressional continuing budget resolutions, budget sequestrations, and Government

shutdowns affect execution of development schedules and create funding uncertainties.
Changing the first production unit to FY 2025 introduces low-level schedule risk in technology
development.
Risk Mitigation
NNSA is engaging in a technology readiness assessment for the W80-4 LEP to mitigate or
eliminate high-risk technologies and focus technology maturation on options that support the
schedule.
NNSA continues to refine program requirements in conjunction with DOD and is developing
information on which to make cost-informed decisions.
2.4.1.5
W78/88-1 LEP (IW-1)

The first ballistic missile warhead LEP in the 3+2 Strategy is the W78/88-1 (IW-1) warhead. The Nuclear
Weapons Councils objective for this LEP is to deploy an interoperable nuclear explosive package for use
in both the Mk21A ICBM and the Mk5 SLBM aeroshells, with adaptable non-nuclear components.
Hence, this LEP is referred to as the first IW option, the IW-1. IWs, together with the B61-12 and the
Air Force cruise missile warhead, will lead to a reduction in both the overall stockpile numbers and the
number of warhead types. These activities are consistent with the DOD requirements in the Nuclear
Posture Review (DOD 2010).
In June 2012, the Nuclear Weapons Council authorized a Phase 6.2 study for a W78/881 IW. In FY 2013,
work on the W78/88-1 (IW-1) was accelerated to enable an early focus on the preferred design concept.
The U.S. Strategic Command, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force, and NNSA supported
the early pit downselect decision, which was briefed to the Nuclear Weapons Council. In FY 2014, NNSA
completed the W78/88-1 (IW-1) nuclear explosive package downselect process. That downselect
decision package was developed by the LLNL/LANL joint-design, dual-certification team and presented
to NNSA. The decision was supported by the Nuclear Weapons Council. However, because of budget
constraints, the first production unit for the W78/88-1 (IW-1) was shifted to FY 2030, in deference to the
priority given to the Air Force cruise missile warhead (now called the W80-4), and the FY 2014 W78/88-1
(IW-1) activities were focused on congressionally directed alternative studies and the remainder of the
Phase 6.2/6.2A activities delayed to meet the schedule alignment.
Accomplishments
In FY 2014, NNSA completed the W87-like pit nuclear explosive package downselect. That
decision was supported by the Nuclear Weapons Council.
NNSA conducted an orderly shutdown of the program while ensuring that all programmatic and
technical documentation had been archived and captured for the benefit of future restart of the
program.

The W78/88-1 (IW-1) LEP will restart in FY 2020 with a planned first production unit in FY 2030. Initial
production following that date will support the Air Force portion of IW-1 due to the age of the W78
relative to that of the W88.
Trends and changes from FY 2015 FYNSP
There are no significant trends or changes to the W78/88-1 (IW-1) budget profile from the FY 2015
FYNSP profile.
2.4.2 Stockpile Systems

The Stockpile Systems program consists of the following four major activities:
Weapon Maintenance includes production of LLCs (e.g., GTSs and NGs), as required in
accordance with national requirements documents and directive schedules; day-to-day stockpile
maintenance and repair activities; production and delivery of components for each weapon
type; refurbishment and replacement of aging components to maintain stockpile life; and
rebuilds.
Weapon Surveillance includes new material laboratory tests; new material flight tests; retrofit
evaluation system laboratory and flight tests; stockpile laboratory tests; stockpile flight tests;
quality evaluations; special testing; and surveillance of weapon systems to support assessment
of the safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile. Weapons Surveillance also contributes
to the Annual Assessment Reports and memorandum to the President.
Weapon Assessment and Support includes activities associated with management of fielded
weapon systems. This major effort provides systems and component engineering support and
supports the planning, resolution, and documentation of SFIs, including assessment of root
causes, extent of conditions, and impact to system effectiveness or safety. It also includes
planning, developing, and updating the technical basis for the materials, components, and
weapons and performing weapon assessments. In addition, this effort includes activities
associated with preparing, writing, and coordinating the Annual Assessment Reports and
Weapon Reliability Report and activities to assess and resolve system-specific weapon response
issues and to support the Nuclear Explosive Safety and the Nuclear Weapon System Safety
Groups, as required.
Development Studies and Capability Improvements include activities associated with improved
surveillance, technical basis improvements, technology maturation for insertion or replacement,
and system and surety studies.
FY 2017 to FY 2020 Key Milestones

B61 Stockpile Systems
Weapon Maintenance. Achieve first production of the electronic NG qualified for the B61-11 in
FY 2019.
W76 Stockpile Systems
Development Studies and Capability Improvements. Complete scheduled activities for surety
enhancements.
Development Studies and Capability Improvements. Begin surety enhancement development

activities in FY 2020.
Weapon Maintenance.
replacement.
Continue production of LLCs and Alt 369, which includes NG
Weapon Maintenance. Continue full-scale production of Small Ferroelectric NGs. Complete

final reclamation activities for existing GTS in FY 2015. Continue firing set qualification and first
production unit activities.
Weapon Surveillance. Conduct Retrofit evaluation system tests for the W87 LLC exchange and
firing set rebuilds in FY 2016.
Weapon Maintenance. Achieve first production unit build of new NGs and remanufacture of
the GTS. Begin Full-scale production of NGs and GTSs in FY 2019.
Development Studies and Capability Improvements. Continue critical development and

integration and start-system-level qualification activities to replace the legacy W88 system NG
and GTS. Conduct activities for surety enhancements.
2.4.3 Stockpile Services

The Stockpile Services Program provides the enabling elements essential for research, development,
and production capability and capacity within the nuclear security enterprise. Stockpile Services are
required by multiple weapon systems and provide the capability basis to conduct systemspecific
weapons work. These services include:
providing containers for nuclear component shipments,
maintaining production and surveillance capabilities (e.g., calibration and repair),
conducting experimental studies (e.g., effect of adhesive-HE compatibility of thermal ignition,

experimental measurement of brush discharge characteristics, and optical lightning detection
system),
performing engineering R&D to support assessments and certifications, and
operating facilities to support Directed Stockpile Work mission activities.
Stockpile Services Program R&D provides weapon system component development, including
technology maturation for NGS, GTSs, and AF&F devices. R&D services also include subcritical
experiments to obtain data on plutonium and hydrodynamic experiments to understand implosion
behavior.
Management of the physical infrastructure (see Chapter 4) and the workforce (see Chapter 7) are also
necessary for Stockpile Services and all related programs.
Improvement and modernization projects include the Product Realization Integrated Digital
Enterprise (PRIDE) program to modernize data integration and access information across the nuclear
security enterprise.
2.4.3.1
Production Support
Production Support is the backbone for the manufacturing capability of the stockpile and includes those
activities that provide the capability and capacity to sustain the nuclear security enterprises production
mission. The production mission is defined as weapon assembly, weapon disassembly, component
production, and weapon safety and reliability testing. Production Support funding not only sustains
current Directed Stockpile Work capabilities, but enables the modernization of the production
capabilities to improve efficiency and to prepare manufacturing operations to meet future
requirements. To gain better cost efficiency within the NG enterprise, a newly implemented funding
model calls for Production Support funding (with a corresponding work scope transfer) to provide the
base capability for development and production of neutron tubes and generators for all weapon
systems while the weapon systems maintenance funding pays for production of the NGs to be installed
in the individual systems. This funding model will achieve improved mission performance for the
nuclear security enterprise. As indicated previously, Production Support requires close coordination
with the Component Manufacturing Development activity under the Advanced Manufacturing
Development Program, which is charged with development and initial deployment of new
manufacturing and production capabilities.
The Production Support mission includes the following:
Engineering Operations. Internal plant-wide activities that establish product process flows and
improvements; develop and maintain operating procedures; determine critical design parameter and
manufacturing process capabilities; establish process controls, metrics, and quality indices; and develop
process safety controls/assessments.
Manufacturing Operations.
Activities that manage and provide oversight to manufacturing
departments and include all internal non-weapon-type specific manufacturing operations and processes,
material controls, supervision, planning and scheduling, inventory control, and internal productionrelated transportation and safety activities; also includes classified manufacturing operations that
cannot be associated with a particular warhead.
Quality, Supervision, and Control. Includes activities dealing with quality control of operating expenses;
supervision of general in-line inspection and radiography; procedures development and execution;
process control certification for war reserve products; measurement standards and calibration
techniques; calibration of equipment, tooling, gauges, and testers; and Quality Assurance (QA)-related
equipment/process for certification.
Tool, Gage, and Equipment Services. Activities that include preparation of specifications and designs
for non-weapon-type specific tooling (tools, gages, jigs and fixtures) and test equipment and design and
development of tester software (including tester control and product assurance). This category also
includes work related to verification/qualification of hardware and software, as well as procurement

processes and maintenance (corrective and preventative) that directly support production-related
equipment/process components.
Purchasing, Shipping, and Materials Management. Planning, engineering, supplier management and
logistics activities associated with the materials supply chain.
Electronic Product Flow. Activities that include internal plant-wide purchase, design, development,
installation, configuration, testing, training and maintenance of computer systems (hardware and
software) directly linked to the performance of site-specific production functions, but that are separate
and distinct from general-use administrative/office automated systems. Supported systems are in both
unclassified and classified environments that enable manufacturing and quality assurance functions. In
these environments, information technology (IT) elements are directly linked to plant-wide production.
2.4.3.2
Research and Development Support
The Research and Development Support Program provides the administrative and organizational
infrastructure to support R&D capabilities and activities for multiple weapon systems in the stockpile.
Research and Development Support also enables the national security laboratories to support the
nuclear weapons production facilities in addressing stockpile stewardship and management issues.
The Research and Development Support Program is responsible for:
providing support for multiple system flight tests;
providing development, diagnostics, and qualifications of HE surveillance;
archiving historical weapons data;
upgrading computer hardware and software to remain current with evolving technology;
providing the technical skills and knowledge to conduct the core base of tests and experiments;
implementing quality control, procedures, methods, instructions, certifications, calibrations, and

processes for R&D activities;
supporting detailees and subject matter expert assignments at NNSA; and
supporting Joint Integrated Life Cycle Surety activities.
In FY 2014, the Research and Development Support Program facilitated the W80 and B83 flight tests and
the development of new explosives for flight test diagnostics and qualifications of HE surveillance.
2.4.3.3
Research and Development Certification and Safety
The Research and Development Certification and Safety Program encompasses weapon component
development activities; R&D activities (primary and secondary modeling and assessment, weapons
effects and system analysis studies, and nuclear safety R&D activities); engineering and information
infrastructure support; production liaison and oversight; and material science support. These activities
provide the core competencies and capabilities for R&D efforts attributable to multiple weapon
systems.
The Research and Development Certification and Safety Program is responsible for addressing LLC issues
and sunset technologies that may jeopardize operations and safety if neglected. These technologies
include the following:
AF&F. Support is provided for development of early-stage exploratory technologies, such as

microelectronics, power sources and batteries, that are applicable to multiple stockpile systems.
Nuclear explosive packages. The activities in this category support technologies to ensure full
nuclear design performance of previously fielded nuclear explosive packages. These include
replacement of select components; qualification of new materials, including new formulations
of IHE; and advanced diagnostics to identify age-related defects and identify acceptable
components for reuse. Multiple science and engineering disciplines are included in this category
to ensure overall system performance and component certification.
NGs. These components deliver the neutrons at the initiation of the nuclear chain reaction.
These units must be inspected and replaced or refurbished in a timely or periodic manner to
address aging and obsolescence issues, as well as compatibility with evolving technology. Tests
are also conducted to ensure NG performance meets the space and environmental
requirements for multiple stockpile systems.
GTSs. These components serve as boosters to achieve and facilitate the required weapon yield.
As LLCs, these technologies are also replaced periodically to address aging and compatibility
issues. Moreover, engineering endeavors focus on ensuring their performance meets the space
and environmental requirements for multiple stockpile systems.
Other Research and Development Certification and Safety program efforts include the following:
Nuclear Safety R&D ensures weapon safety and security for nuclear-related and HE activities.
Studies focus on extreme temperature and environment effects, modeling of CHE and IHE safety
qualification tests, damage effects and limitations caused by detonations, and nuclear material
safety analyses.
Surety Engineering consolidates multiple science and engineering disciplines and ensures
emerging technologies meet requirements. Activities focus on auxiliary detonators, future
strong-link development, and enhanced safety for initiation systems. Studies are also designed
to ensure material properties and radiative effects are not harmful to the surrounding
environment.
Additional Research and Development Certification and Safety program activities include:
conducting R&D and engineering studies and experiments in support of safe nuclear explosive
operations;
conducting non-warhead-specific R&D studies, assessments, and analyses that support weapon
certification and safety processes;
managing Integrated Surety Architectures (ISA) program endeavors to meet DOE and DOD
timelines and deliverables (see Section 2.4.7.2);
supporting execution of hydrodynamic experiments and dynamic plutonium experiments

(i.e., experiments driven by HE); and
supporting obligations and agreements as directed by NNSA officials.
In FY 2014, the Research and Development Certification and Safety program facilitated realignment of
system-specific scope and cost estimates for ISA under Stockpile Services and successfully met B61
commitments to support work on the weapon controller unit and strong links. Additionally, Research
and Development Certification and Safety performed weapons effects studies, system certification
activities, and computer modeling and simulation activities; conducted primary, secondary, chemistry,
and materials systems analyses; and completed annual assessment activities for the Secretary of Energy,
with the Secretary of Defense, to certify to the President that the stockpile is safe, secure, and effective.
2.4.3.4
Management, Technology, and Production
Management, Technology, and Production (MTP) activities provide the products, components and/or
services for multi-weapon system surveillance (laboratory and flight test data collection and analysis),
weapons reliability reporting to the DOD, weapon logistics and accountability, and stockpile planning.
MTP funding is used to provide plant and laboratory personnel to help sustain the stockpile that
includes activities relating to surveillance, weapons requirements process improvements, engineering
authorizations, safety assessments, use control technologies to keep the weapons safe, secure and
available to the war fighter upon Presidential release authority, containers, base spares used to
maintain weapons in a safe reliable status, studies and assessments with respect to nuclear operation
safety, weapon components for use in multiple weapons systems and transportation and handling gear
used to safely and securely store weapons and transport weapons between DOD sites and DOE sites for
use in multiple weapons systems. MTP funding is pooled across the sites for a coordinated product
realization enterprise approach for information systems used to record weapon and component
transactional activities, an essential program for weapon stockpile inventory and accountability
reporting used to report quantities, values and status to Congress. Additionally, MTP includes weapons
sustainment activities that benefit the nuclear security enterprise mission as a whole, as opposed to
Production Support activities that focus on supporting internal site-specific production missions.
The MTP mission includes the following:
PRIDE. Operation and maintenance of 44 classified electronic information management systems
required for weapons accountability, vendor material purchases, viewing/transfer of design and
engineering drawings, and transit for surveillance, LLC exchanges, dismantlement, and weapons
refurbishment and manufacturing.
Weapons Training and Military Liaison. Staffing the multi-weapon subject matter experts for
Unsatisfactory Reports associated with DODs field issues for testing and handling gear, technical
publications, and coding issues; allows maintenance operations to return weapons back to active status.
Studies and Initiatives. Currently, this effort initiative identifies, prioritizes, and funds critical uraniumrelated requirements (skilled labor, casting, rolling, forming and machining) to re-establish and sustain
Y-12s capability to manufacture cases and CSAs for the stockpile, as well as a material capability
required for future LEPs.
General Management Support. Non-programmatic costs for program management and oversight,
shared taxes, assignees and support services contracts.
Assessments and Studies (Use Control). Includes in-depth vulnerability assessments of nuclear
weapons in the stockpile; identification or development and deployment of common technologies to
address vulnerabilities, if found; and special studies to support the decision processes for optimizing LEP
designs and for option down-select decisions by senior officials.
Surveillance. Efforts that focus on multi-system, common use, or non-weapon specific activities (data
capture, reliability assessments, flight test planning) directly contributing to stockpile evaluation,
including activities and new capabilities for surveillance transformation. Lengthened surveillance cycles
(due to budget) to collect data for weapon systems could violate weapon reliability, annual assessment
stockpile rationale standards, and laboratory/flight test requirements. Lengthening surveillance cycles
increases the time that a potential defect could go undetected in the stockpile, and subsequently
increases the amount of time the DOD could have a deficient nuclear deterrent.
External Production Missions. Weapon response subject matter experts across all systems and all
laboratories. Weapon response manning is critical for Pantex to return to operations in bays and cells
(should an unexpected weapon condition or anomaly be observed during LLC exchange replacement).
Weapon delivery schedules rely on throughput at the Pantex bays.
Base Spares (Production). Activities associated with production of new non-weapon-specific base
spares, containers, LLC forging procurements, detonators, mock HE, and other weapon components.
Base Spares (Maintenance). Activities associated with maintaining existing non-weapon-specific base
spares, test handling gear and containers, GTSs, use control equipment, code management switch tubes,
and other weapon components.
2.4.4 Warhead Dismantlement and Disposition

Many factors affect dismantlement rates, including shipping logistics, weapon system complexity, and
availability of qualified personnel, equipment, and facilities. For FY 2014, Pantex achieved nearly
120 percent of its required weapons dismantlement and Y12 exceeded its required CSA dismantlement.
Nearterm initiatives concerning dismantlement and disposition of retired warheads and bombs include
the following:
Reduce the legacy material inventories at the national security laboratories and nuclear weapons
production facilities.
Reduce legacy part inventories to provide additional staging capacity at Pantex.
Continue to support the Navys request for additional W760 dismantlement.
Longerterm and ongoing activities include the following:
Dismantle all nuclear weapons retired prior to 2009 no later than the end of FY 2022.
Continue to support nonproliferation, LEP, and surveillance needs.
Dispose of old GTSs to meet safety basis requirements.
2.4.5 Advanced Manufacturing Development

The Advanced Manufacturing Development program develops, demonstrates, and deploys modern
technologies to enhance secure manufacturing capabilities and ensure timely support for the production
of nuclear weapons and other critical stockpile needs. In accomplishing its mission, this program
enables Defense Programs to meet DOD requirements, while also maintaining the capability to provide
rapid response to evolving nuclear security requirements.
2.4.5.1
Component Manufacturing Development
The Component Manufacturing Development subprogram invests in technologies used in multiple

weapon system applications. The focus is put on the first insertion user to conserve development
resources and reduce production uncertainty for LEPs and legacy systems. The subprogram coordinates
investments with the Engineering and Science Programs to manage weapon technology and component
manufacturing development activities and meet mission requirements on time. Priorities for maturing
technologies and manufacturing capabilities are integrated across programs for the planned insertion of
components into LEPs, LLCs, alterations, and modifications. The subprograms primary objective is to
leverage the development of multi-system manufacturing capabilities and transition them to the
Directed Stockpile Work with reduced risk.
Manufacturing readiness relies on an integrated relationship between production equipment, vendors,
personnel, facilities, and other factors that compose a manufacturing system. These activities and
projects represent the fundamental capability to support the stockpile and future LEPs, which will fund
their own unique set of tools, fixtures, and materials for manufacturing activities. Studies have shown
that insertion of immature technologies and immature manufacturing systems increases risk and cost,
while significantly decreasing the probability of system or program success. Accordingly, NNSA uses the
MRL assessment process to make informed decisions. Of the nine MRLs, ranging from concept (MRL 1)
to first production unit (MRL 9), the Component Manufacturing Development subprogram is primarily
responsible up to manufacturing process development (MRL 5). The Directed Stockpile Work assumes
responsibility at MRL 6 for further development and application to a specific system. This is important
because, without the vital work of the Component Manufacturing Development subprogram, the
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile would be in question.
2.4.5.2
Additive Manufacturing
Additive Manufacturing is a Defense Programs initiative created to vet manufacturing concepts aimed at
shortening production schedules and design cycles. This effort is focused on gaining a better
understanding of the feasibility of making longer-term investments that will result in reduced cost of
design-to-manufacture iterations, fully characterize additive manufacturing processes and capabilities,
and produce methodologies that enable qualification and certification for weapons applications. This
initiative is a special case of technology maturation that will transition to the relevant programs in
support of their specific mission requirements.
2.4.5.3
Process Technology Development
The Process Technology Development subprogram supports development, demonstration, and use of
new production technologies to enhance manufacturing capabilities for nuclear weapon materials.
Funding will be used to ensure new technologies with the potential to shorten production schedules,
reduce risks, enhance personnel safety, or reach optimal maturity levels in time to support mission
needs.
At present, this subprogram focuses on uranium processing technology and, specifically, on acquiring
major items of equipment for Y-12 by 2025. The purpose of this subprogram is to ensure priority
technology investments have a dedicated funding source and can reach optimal levels of maturity
without having to compete with other program priorities.
2.4.6 Nuclear Materials Commodities

2.4.6.1
Plutonium Sustainment and Pit Production
The plans for the FY 2016 Plutonium Sustainment Program align with the pit production goals of the
Nuclear Weapons Council baseline plan. The Plutonium Sustainment Program balances the
requirements for plutonium capabilities, including national policy goals, stockpile requirements, and LEP
planning. Execution of this program depends on the infrastructure activities described in Chapter 4.
The Plutonium Sustainment Program for the FY 2016 FYNSP includes the following major activities:
Continue acquiring and installing pit production equipment to replace old, endofservicelife
machines, as well as additional equipment to increase war reserve production capacity from
10 pits per year in 2024 to 30 pits per year in 2026. NNSA will establish confidence in this
production plan through a series of pit production capacity demonstration activities beginning
in 2021.
Continue process development to manufacture a W87-like pit, a candidate for future stockpile
needs. Multiple development W87 pits were built in FY 2013.
Build 4 to 5 developmental pits per year over the FYNSP, after Plutonium Facility (PF-4)
operations resume, to facilitate transition to war reserve production through qualification and
certification.
Perform engineering and physics evaluations of the developmental builds for war reserve pit
qualification and certification.
Fund reconstitution of a power supply production capability.
The first war reserve W87 pit is planned in FY 2024, with a ramp-up in production to 30 pits per year by
FY 2026. The pit development timeline is shown in Table 24 below.
Table 24. Pit development timeline
Type
Pit Production Series
Number of Builds
(per year)
2016
2023
2024
Development
Builds
2017
2018
Process ProveIn
Builds
2019
2020
2021
Qualification
Builds
2022
W87like WR
Builds
W87like WR
Builds
4-5
10
WR = war reserve.
Future plans call for demonstrating higher levels of pit production capacity in 2027-2029, as NNSA ramps
up to 50 to 80 pits per year by FY 2030.
The Plutonium Sustainment Program also plans to provide the resources to establish a pit reuse
capability up to a potential capacity of 90 pits per year, in conjunction with a newly manufactured pit
capability by FY 2024. Funding requirements for the Plutonium Sustainment Program will be updated to
reflect potential future investments to support reuse.
Pit manufacturing relies on analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization (MC) analyses to
produce war reserve pits. Without the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear
Facility (CMRRNF) or a n alternative, a production capability of 30 pits per year is achievable
through several approaches that are not mutually exclusive, including additional shift work, additional
use of space in PF4 at LANL, and use of offsite laboratories that leverage resources outside the
Plutonium Sustainment Program. More information regarding the supporting infrastructure is in
Chapter 4.
2.4.6.2
Tritium Sustainment and Domestic Uranium Enrichment
Tritium is an integral component of nuclear weapons. An assured supply must be available to meet
nuclear security requirements for the stockpile. Tritium, a radioactive material with a halflife of
12.3 years, must be periodically replenished. One of NNSAs missions is to provide freshly-filled tritium
reservoirs to replace reservoirs that have reached their end of life.
NNSAs Tritium Readiness subprogram operates a production system to maintain the required
inventory of new tritium. Because the current inventory is larger than required, only a small amount is
produced today. However, to meet future inventory requirements, the production rate must increase.
Since 2003, tritium has been produced by irradiating lithiumaluminate pellets with neutrons in a
commercial nuclear power reactor. The pellets are inserted into specially designed, tritium
producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) that are similar in dimension to reactor fuel rods.
Irradiation of the rods occurs at the Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor.
After irradiation, the TPBARs are removed, consolidated into one or more shipping containers, and
transported in secure casks to the Tritium Extraction Facility at SRS for extraction. Gases containing
tritium are then piped to the SRS Tritium Loading and Unloading Facility, where the tritium is
purified and loaded into limitedlife tritium reservoirs. The spent TPBARs are disposed of as lowlevel
radioactive waste.
Future tritium GTSs to be incorporated into LEP weapons may involve larger tritium loads than past
weapons in order to require less-frequent exchanges. These proposed future GTSs would also result
in better performance margins for the nuclear explosive package and, therefore, higher confidence in
the nuclear design without the need for underground nuclear tests. Section 312 of the FY 2015
Omnibus Appropriations Bill directed NNSA to provide Congress with a bottoms-up re-evaluation of
active and reserve tritium needs. Final decisions, based on a cost-benefit analysis, to adapt larger
tritium loads, are pending.
NNSAs tritium production plan is illustrated in Figure 211. The major factors in tritium supply
planning are defined by the demands created from the exchange of LLCs in existing weapons, the
tritium requirements determined by LEPs, and the production efficiency of the TPBARs. Each
horizontal bar in Figure 211 represents an 18month irradiation cycle at the Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor.
Figure 211. Schedule for irradiation of tritiumproducing burnable absorber rods to meet
post-Nuclear Posture Review (DOD 2010) requirements
Factored into the production assessment requirements is the recovery of tritium through
dismantlement of weapons. Tritium reservoirs are removed from all inactive weapons and from those
that have been retired and are awaiting dismantlement. The reservoirs are returned to SRS for recovery
of the tritium and because this inventory is already considered in the supply planning. A total of
704 TPBARs were loaded in April 2014. Cycle 13 will be completed by September 2015, when the next
refueling outage is scheduled.
To meet future requirements, the number of TPBARs must increase to over 2,000 in the FY 2022 time
frame. The ramp-up to higher TPBAR numbers has begun. To support this ramp-up, NNSA has updated
the environmental impact statement, and a license amendment request was submitted to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission covering the increased TPBAR levels. NNSA out-year budget projections include
the higher TPBAR numbers required.
An integral component of tritium production is ensuring the availability of unobligated lowenriched
uranium (LEU) for use as reactor fuel by the Tennessee Valley Authority reactors. NNSA uses
unobligated uranium for tritium production for national defense purposes. However, there is no
domestic supplier of such material following the shutdown of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in
2013 and the 2014 bankruptcy of the United States Enrichment Corporation, now known as Centrus
Energy Corporation. The Tritium Readiness subprogram has identified sources of unobligated fuel
through 2027. DOEs Domestic Uranium Enrichment effort supports a U.S. interagency evaluation of
options to achieve a reliable and economic way to provide unobligated LEU reactor fuel for tritium
production. DOEs Uranium Inventory Working Group is reviewing the complex's uranium inventory
composition to identify any available material, as well as the cost associated with obtaining that
material, for tritium production. The Uranium Inventory Working Group is exploring the feasibility and
cost of preserving the unobligated status of existing enriched uranium, down-blending HEU from the
inventory, and processing spent nuclear fuel. DOE is also evaluating other uranium enrichment
technology options, including the cost of building out a national security train of AC100 centrifuges
(developed by Centrus Energy).
2.4.6.3
Uranium Sustainment
The uranium missions include producing parts for CSAs, providing fuel for the Navy, disposing of excess
uranium materials, and conducting R&D programs that require uranium. The enriched uranium mission
is performed in several large industrial buildings at Y-12, including Building 9212, which dates back to
the Manhattan Project. These buildings were to be replaced with the Uranium Processing Facility;
however, cost and schedule growth within the project led NNSA to consider alternative ways of
accomplishing the uranium mission.
In January 2014, NNSA chartered Oak Ridge National Laboratory Director Dr. Thomas Mason to form a
team, with representation from the national security laboratories, to develop and recommend, by
April 15, 2014, an alternative approach to the Uranium Processing Facility Project that would result in
delivery of Building 9212 capabilities for not more than $6.5 billion by 2025.
That group, known as the Red Team, said that the Uranium Processing Facility must be considered in
the context of the broader enriched uranium mission. The teams approach emphasized maximizing the
use of existing facilities, aggressively reducing safety and mission risks, and building new floor space only
for capabilities that are inappropriate for transition to existing facilities.
To execute the uranium mission, the Red Team recommended creating an Enriched Uranium Manager,
now called the Uranium Program Manager, to oversee the transition and balance resources among
investments in safety and mission risk reduction, facility risk reduction, and new construction.
Although those three priorities depend on each other, this section describes safety and mission risk
reduction efforts in existing facilities, while facility risk reduction and the new construction are
described in Chapter 4.
Goals
The following Uranium Program goals are related to safety and mission risk reduction:
Transition Y-12 Building 9212 capabilities to other existing facilities so NNSA can cease enriched
uranium programmatic operations in Building 9212 by 2025.
Sustain and increase the reliability of NNSAs uranium capabilities, including casting
sustainment, machine tool upgrades, application of new technologies for chip processing, and
waste solidification.
Aggressively reduce the safety risk by expanding and accelerating the Area 5 de-inventory
program and focusing on items with offsite dose consequences.
Plan
The first goal, ceasing enriched uranium programmatic operations in Building 9212, depends on five
activities. These are designed to stop the flow of material into Building 9212 and increase the flow of
material out of Building 9212. The first activity is to stop recovering solutions that have little SNM and
prepare for eventual decontamination of the facility by installing a calciner in Building 9212, to be
operational by September 2019. The second activity is to replace the metal purification capability by
installing uranium electrorefiners in Building 9215, to be operational by November 2020. The third
activity is to relocate the machine chip processing capability to Building 9215, where the metal turnings
are produced, to be completed by June 2021. The fourth activity is to relocate the 2-megaelectron volt
radiography to an existing x-ray vault in 9204-2E, to be completed in June 2017. The final activity is to
construct new floor space for casting, special oxide production, and salvage and accountability functions
as part of the Uranium Processing Facility project by 2025.
The second goal sustains and increases the reliability of the uranium capabilities that must remain in
existing facilities through a series of smaller individual activities. These include replacing obsolete noncapital equipment, increasing equipment maintenance, purchasing critical or long-lead spare parts, and
conducting studies to increase the efficiency of process equipment.
The third goal aggressively reduces safety risk by expanding and accelerating the Area 5 de-inventory
program to reduce material working inventories to near the just-in-time level beginning with Building
9215 in September 2015 followed by Building 9204-2E in September 2016 and Building 9212 in
September 2021. The program relocates material to the Highly Enriched Uranium Material Facility
(HEUMF) and prioritizes movements by material forms with the highest consequence in the case of an
accident starting in March 2015 and continuing through September 2017. When possible, the program
converts the material into a less hazardous form for long-term storage.
As previously stated, this plan relies on infrastructure investments to maintain safe operations in
existing facilities, as described in Chapter 4.
Figure 212 depicts NNSAs Uranium Program mission interfaces, where all capability and capacity
issues, including refining, casting, and storing, are based on the uranium mission requirements and
strategy. All infrastructure investments and equipment recapitalization will be able to draw from those
mission requirements.
Figure 212. NNSAs uranium mission requirements
2.4.7 Cross-Cutting Programs

2.4.7.1
Nuclear Enterprise Assurance
The Nuclear Enterprise Assurance (NEA) Program has been established to identify and mitigate the
consequences of the current and dynamic spectrum of threats to the nuclear security enterprise. NEA
includes a Weapons Trust Assurance element to ensure a safe, secure, and effective stockpile, as well as
Supply Chain Risk Management to ensure malicious hardware or software cannot enter the nuclear
security enterprise supply chain. The underlying requirement is to design, develop, and produce all
future weapons with enhanced trust features that are resilient to subversion attempts. For all legacy
stockpile weapons, mitigation steps will continue to be taken to assure a safe, secure, and effective
stockpile.
NNSA is institutionalizing NEA for the B61-12 and W88 Alt 370 by developing Program Protection Plans
for hardware and software applied to these weapon systems. These plans identify mission-essential
functions and critical components in addition to required activities to prevent or mitigate compromise,
which could result in reduced weapon system functionality or impact operability. The Program
Protection Plans are incorporated into the Integrated Master Schedules, which are supported by the
Integrated Planning Teams, approved by the NNSA Federal Program Manager, and coordinated with the
respective Lead Project Officers and Project Officer Groups.
NEA is being incorporated into the Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Security and Use Control program.
The four major elements of the approach are:
apply a principle-based engineering and product realization approach to the weapons supply
chain and trustworthiness throughout the weapons life cycle;
improve understanding of the evolving advanced persistent threat;
implement positive measures to improve the supply chain and trustworthiness of the weapons,
as appropriate, based on risk and programmatic constraints; and
establish understanding and improve confidence in the supply chain and trustworthiness of the
nuclear weapon system.
Nuclear Enterprise Assurance program principles are important to provide a foundation for action that
decreases or eliminates the potential for an adversary to sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted
function, or otherwise subvert the function of a nuclear weapon system without detection.
2.4.7.2
Integrated Surety Architectures
The ISA program will enhance NNSA transportation surety by integrating nuclear weapon shipping
configurations with elements of physical security. This risk mitigation approach was endorsed by the
2010 JASON Surety Study and subsequently validated by the 2013 Joint Integrated Lifecycle Surety
baseline assessment. ISA, which will kick off in FY 2016, is an extension of the Integrated Surety
Solutions for Transportation (ISST) program initiated in FY 2014. ISA includes all NNSA transportationfocused activities planned for ISST and, in addition, will explore the potential extension of ISST concepts
and technologies to other nuclear weapon venues. Major ISA product development activities are shown
in Figure 213. The ISA implementation sequence has been revised to ensure that all W88 Alt 370 units
returning to the Navy will have ISA capability. This requires development of an ISA W88 Alt 370 shipping
configuration (Alt 940) and the Safeguards Transporter (SGT) interface modifications to become lead
product development activities. These activities precede the restart, in FY 2017, of full-scale
development of the Multi-application Transportation Attachment Device (MTAD), which, together with
the SGT modifications, will enable ISA capability for all air-delivered weapons (i.e., the B61-11/12,
W80-1, B83-1, and possibly the W80-4). Development of ISA shipping configurations for the remaining
ballistic missile warheads will follow, with the W76-1 starting in FY 2019, the W78 in FY 2020, and the
W87 in the out-years beyond the FY 2016 FYNSP. The ISA program goal is to have operational capability
for all weapons in transportation by the end of FY 2028. Planning (feasibility and cost studies) and
residual technology maturation will be supported in FY 2015 by the Directed Stockpile Work R&D
Certification and Safety program. In FY 2016 and beyond, the Certification and Safety program will
continue to support development of multi-application products (SGT modifications and MTAD), while
the Stockpile Systems program will develop ISA products for specific warhead applications like the W88
Alt 940.
Figure 213. Potential schedule for Integrated Surety Architecture solutions implementation for
National Nuclear Security Administration transportation
2.5 Summary of Significant Stockpile Management

Accomplishments and Plans
2.5.1 Recent Major Stockpile Management Accomplishments
Completed full recovery of the FY 2013 production shortfall for the W76-1 LEP and exceeded the
FY 2014 production baseline, while maintaining scheduled deliveries to the Navy. The program
also achieved the halfway point in production in September 2014.
Exceeded targets for warhead disposition at Pantex and CSA dismantlement at Y-12 by more
than 5 percent.
Completed over 20 B61-12 LEP system-level joint ground and aircraft integration tests using
functional development hardware.
Initiated the first W88 Alt 370 Life of Program purchases, resulting in long-term savings.
Completed two W88 Alt 370 development flight tests: the Critical Radar Assembly Flight Test
and the Follow-on Commanders Evaluation Test 50.
Completed the W88 CHE Refresh planning, design, material downselect, development hardware
fabrication, and testing, as authorized in FY 2014 by the Nuclear Weapons Council-directed
baseline change.
For the W78/88-1 LEP, completed downselect activities, DOD W78 customer requirements
review, and orderly close-out of LEP activities until restart in FY 2020.
Initiated Phase 6.1 concept study activities in accordance with the weapon development cycle
for the W80-4 (formerly the cruise missile warhead) LEP.
Delivered all scheduled limited LLC exchanges for the B61, W76, W78, W80, B83, W87, and
W88. The LLCs included GTSs, NGs, and alteration kits delivered to DOD and Pantex to maintain
the nuclear weapons stockpile.
Conducted surveillance programs for all weapon systems using data collection from flight tests,
laboratory tests, and component evaluations sufficient to assess stockpile reliability without
nuclear testing. Surveillance culminated in completing all Annual Assessment Reports and
Laboratory Director Letters to the President.
Achieved the first production unit for the small ferroelectric NG for the W87 program and began
deliveries to DOD.
Met the Navys expectations to return W76-0 warheads early, saving the Navy several million
dollars in weapon-staging costs.
Performed analyses in conjunction with DOD to support key surety decisions for both NNSA and
DOD. Added new capabilities to accommodate cyber and insider threats.
Completed an extraction of 300 TPBARs at the Tritium Extraction Facility in the third quarter of
FY 2014.
Issued the revised W87 Development Pit Build Plan, which detailed the experimental matrix
with pit production rates at four to five pits per year through FY 2018.
2.5.2 Stockpile Management Activities, Milestones, and Key Annual

Deliverables
To be successful in moving forward, Stockpile Management has a number of goals, milestones, and
annual activities that have been discussed throughout this chapter. While the complete integrated body
of work is required, the following figures graphically depict those elements that are the culmination of
each of the major program elements. Figure 214 shows the Stockpile Management Programs goals,
planned milestones, and key annual activities through FY 2040 for its weapons assessment, surveillance,
and maintenance activities. Figure 215 shows the milestones set for the LEPs, major weapons
component production, and weapons alteration and dismantlement activities.
Figure 214. Goals, milestones, and key annual activities for weapon assessment, surveillance,
and maintenance
Figure 215. Milestones for life extension programs, major weapons component production,
and weapons alteration and dismantlement
Chapter 3
Research, Development, Testing, and
Evaluation Activities
This chapter discusses the essential RDT&E activities that
underpin stockpile stewardship. The chapter has been
reorganized significantly from the previous complete version
of the SSMP (the full FY 2014 SSMP and the updated FY 2015
version). The introduction below has been revised to provide
a more complete description of the purpose and success to
date of Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship. This is followed
by a description of the high-level planning tools and
supporting capabilities. The chapter concludes with a
description of the programs that conduct RDT&E activities.
Starting with this FY 2016 SSMP, Nuclear Test Readiness
(previously Chapter 4 in the FY 2014 and FY 2015 SSMPs) is
discussed in this chapter. The status of test readiness has not
changed since 2014, so interested readers should review the
2014 SSMP for detailed information.
FY 2014 Research, Development,

Testing, and Evaluation Activities
Accomplishments
Developed and assessed life extension
3.1 Introduction
The National Defense Authorization Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-160)
established Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship (also known
as the Stockpile Stewardship Program) to sustain the nuclear
deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing. Today, some
20 years later, Stockpile Stewardship scientists and engineers
have established a solid record of success in computing,
hydrodynamic testing, subcritical experiments, high-energydensity (HED) physics, and materials and weapon-effects
science.
These scientific achievements have enabled
resolution of many stockpile issues since the end of nuclear
testing and provided more detailed knowledge than could
have been attained through nuclear testing as practiced in the
early 1990s. This success demonstrates that Stockpile
Stewardship can provide the scientific capabilities required by
the safeguards discussed during the original Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty debate.
program alternatives based on high

explosive, hydrodynamics, and material
property experiments and simulations.
Conducted science-based assessment of
the W78 lifetime, including threedimensional (3D) modeling.
Resolved question of primary
performance of multiple systems using
the Dual-Axis Radiographic
Hydrodynamic Test facility and 3D
modeling.
Extended neutron generator lifetimes,
based on modern assessments, thereby
allowing scheduling flexibility for
weapon alterations.
Enabled higher confidence in a weapon
system based on National Ignition
Facility and Los Alamos Neutron Science
Center data and 3D assessments.
Enhanced models of plutonium,
uranium, and beryllium based on
materials data from the Z pulsed power
facility, gas guns, diamond anvil cells,
and other facilities.
Tested plutonium multi-phase models
based on FY 2013 Gemini series data.
Fully supported Cycle 19 Annual
Assessment Review Process; provided
reports to Project Officer Groups,
U.S. Strategic Command Strategic
Advisory Group Stockpile Assessment
Team, and Secretary of Energy.
From 1945 through 1992, the United States conducted

1,030 nuclear tests, along with an additional 24 nuclear tests
jointly conducted with the United Kingdom. These nuclear tests supported development and
deployment of 63 different weapon systems, from the B1 through the W88.
The development of nuclear weapons over many decades led to common practices for determining
when nuclear testing was required.1 In the final years of nuclear testing, the United States was
executing nuclear tests in support of several objectives, including completion of W88 development;
development of the W89 and W91 (both of which were subsequently canceled); development of
IHE-based primary options; and exploration of weapons physics, nuclear safety, and survivability. The
key Stockpile Stewardship Program strategy is to establish a sufficient scientific understanding of the
nuclear explosive process to replace those capabilities that were enabled by nuclear testing and to
support discovery and correction of any deficiencies that might occur during the lifetime of a weapon.
This required a much deeper understanding of the nuclear explosive process than was necessary during
the era of nuclear testing. Stockpile Stewardship scientists broke down the operation of a weapon into
a sequence of individual steps, analyzed the steps through computational models and experiments, and
reintegrated the steps through large-scale weapon simulation codes and computational tools. This
process necessitated development of new experimental facilities that could replicate the densities,
pressures, velocities, temperatures, and timescales present in a nuclear detonation; development of
high-fidelity weapon simulation codes; development and acquisition of very large, high-performance
computing platforms; and acquisition of detailed experimental data to validate and calibrate the
models. New approaches also became necessary to qualify nuclear and non-nuclear components
against hostile nuclear attack, which also required new or improved experimental tools and simulation
codes.
A key Stockpile Stewardship Program strategy is to understand the various environments (normal,
hostile, abnormal) and their potential impacts on weapon performance. These environments impose
thermal, mechanical, and radiation loads that engineering models and experiments have to address.
Nuclear weapons are subject to aging during the decades between manufacture and retirement. These
aging effects must be taken into consideration when assessing the ability of weapons to meet the
requirements of the stockpile-to-target sequence.
The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative provided the requirements and resources for
U.S. computer vendors to develop new generations of massively parallel, high-performance computers
(109 operations per second, or a gigaflop, in 1992 and 1015 operations, or a petaflop, in 2010
[see Figure 31]). This has enabled significant increases in simulation capabilities; three-dimensional
(3D) weapon simulation codes now allow for unprecedented resolution in simulations of the stockpile.
The experimental facilities that were built since 1992 in support of the Stockpile Stewardship Program
include the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at LANL, the National Ignition
Facility (NIF) at LLNL, the U1a Complex (U1a) at the Nevada National Security Site, and the Microsystems
and Engineering Sciences Applications (MESA) facility at Sandia National Laboratories. These and other
capabilities have also improved surveillance and maintenance of the existing stockpile and provided
methods and data to close SFIs. The quality and resolution of the data from these new facilities and
capabilities were and continue to be unprecedented; these data are used to benchmark new physics
models in the weapon simulation codes and supplement the physical data used in conjunction with the
codes. Facilities existing prior to 1992, such as the Z pulsed power facility (Z), Los Alamos Neutron
Science Center (LANSCE), Saturn, High Explosives Applications Facility (HEAF), Contained Firing Facility
1
A notable exception to this reason was that of a stockpile confidence test. Usually, the test was conducted after the weapon
system had entered the stockpile.
(CFF) and the High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source (HERMES) III, have been maintained and
upgraded and continue to make essential contributions.
Figure 31. Processing power of the largest NNSA computing platform and number of nuclear tests
3.1.1 Recent Stockpile Stewardship Program Accomplishments

From its inception, the Stockpile Stewardship Program has played a major role in the full range of
stockpile activities. Recent activities include design, development, and delivery of the B61-11 and W87
LEPs and ongoing W76-1 production and deployment and B61-12 development. Stockpile Stewardship
modeling and experimentation capabilities also played a critical role in technology maturation for and
design and qualification of the B61-12 and W88 Alt 370 and enabled the nuclear survivability
qualification of several components.
In addition, the national security laboratories completed the Annual Assessments of the Stockpile each
year and resolved all issues to date. The ability to manufacture pits was re-established at LANL and
newly manufactured pits were built, certified, and deployed in replacement W88 warheads. The
laboratories determined that certain limited life components could be replaced less frequently. New
stewardship tools and capabilities have been applied to broader national security areas, including
foreign nuclear weapon assessments, nuclear counterterrorism, advanced conventional munitions,
climate modeling, energy security, and advanced nuclear materials detection.
Despite significant advancements in capabilities, a variety of open issues remain. These issues fall
broadly into four areas: responding to current stockpile issues, sustaining the stockpile through LEPs,
providing unique expertise and capabilities to support broader national security missions, and retaining
expert stockpile stewards into the indefinite future.
3.1.2 Responding to Current Stockpile Issues Component Lifetimes

and Aging
A central Stockpile Stewardship challenge is assessing age-related failures sufficiently in advance to
allow for correction. This challenge requires aging models for all weapon materials, components, and
subsystems. Improved test capabilities, coupled with modeling, have been and are continuing to be
developed to provide both functional testing of the full system and component-level performance data
to support reliability calculations and aging assessments. For example, establishing confidence in the
estimates of primary system lifetimes has been one of the most important stockpile management issues
to date. Therefore, the national security laboratories have assessed pit lifetime estimates through
experimental, theoretical, and computational studies to predict the performance of primary systems.
The laboratories have also used the information to predict the minimum lifetime at which predicted
primary performance could fall below the required margin to assure reliable system performance.
Lifetimes can be lengthened through measures that increase the margin or reduce the uncertainties in
system lifetime estimates.
The national security laboratories released the first system-specific pit lifetime estimates in 2006 using
this methodology, and this work continues. To date, the laboratories have found no evidence that
would decrease the 2006 lifetime estimates.
Currently, high-explosive-driven subcritical experiments are the only reliable way to obtain the
pressures and temperatures that plutonium reaches in a primary implosion. Diagnosing these
integrated experiments with sufficient accuracy to contribute to the assessment of performance of
future 3+2 Strategy configurations and to elucidate the effects of aging is still a work in progress. This
work includes the planned development of advanced radiography and neutron-diagnosed subcritical
experiments (NDSE) at U1a.
The Stockpile Stewardship Program allows stewards to develop and deploy improved surveillance
diagnostics to better assess the current state of the stockpile as it ages. Declining stockpile numbers are
driving the reliance upon nondestructive testing for surveillance. Pantex routinely uses laser gas
sampling and x-ray computed tomography. Similar laser gas sampling techniques have been deployed
for canned subassembly surveillance at Y-12. Residual gas analysis and x-ray computed tomographic
scanning are employed for non-nuclear components to detect evidence of aging or contamination that
could adversely impact component functionality.
For Stockpile Stewardships non-nuclear surveillance program, new evaluation techniques and specific
component-level studies are enabling timely decisions to replace or reuse hardware in the stockpile. A
recent contribution was identification of the underlying causes of delamination in a component that was
creating new failure mechanisms. This delamination was subsequently mitigated via changes in
production processes.
Other recent contributions include development of techniques to
nondestructively evaluate detonator characteristics to enable correlation to performance, new
techniques to evaluate thermal batteries nondestructively, and new methods to evaluate lightning
arrestor connector safety performance. All these efforts strongly leverage materials science and
physics-based models.
3.1.3 Stockpile Stewardship Programs Role in Life Extension Programs

Stockpile Stewardship Program capabilities are essential to the success of the LEPs. Examples for the
B61-12 and W88 Alt 370 include development of reliable, radiation-hardened compound semiconductor
transistors to provide an adequate margin for hostile environment requirements; incorporation of highfidelity modeling into the design process to reduce the number, duration, and cost of design cycles; and
provision of validated modeling and experimentation capabilities to optimize qualification testing, as
well as to enable qualification where test capabilities no longer exist (e.g., for hostile environments).
These changes can also affect certification of weapon systems by moving the systems away from the astested configurations.
Future LEP opportunities include pit reuse and converting systems that use CHE to IHE to improve safety
and security, as well as to improve efficiency at the nuclear weapons production facilities. Pit reuse
involves the challenge of designing and certifying an IHE implosion system to work properly with a pit
that was originally designed and tested within a CHE implosion system. Experimental and
computational capabilities developed under the purview of RDT&E will be critical to this effort.
Improved surety (safety, security, and use control), more cost-effective designs and production
processes, and decreased waste streams are major challenges in weapons production. Using the
Stockpile Stewardship Programs capabilities, NNSA has the opportunity to reduce the life-cycle cost of
the weapon, including associated production processes, through an improved understanding of material
properties, aging phenomena, and weapon performance.
3.1.4 Supporting Broader National Security Missions

The national security laboratories have long applied their nuclear weapons expertise to challenges other
than maintaining the stockpile. These challenges include nuclear nonproliferation efforts, understanding
the nuclear capabilities of adversaries, and assessing and countering nuclear threats. Such capabilities
are essential to national security missions across the United States Government. Historically, these
activities were built on the margin of the core Stockpile Stewardship Program, but the more complex
global security situation today demands dedicated new experiments, enhanced theoretical and
computational models, and additional reinterpretation of archival nuclear test data.
In addition, Stockpile Stewardship Program capabilities are increasingly being applied to develop
advanced conventional (i.e., non-nuclear) systems. In performing this work, national security laboratory
experts are able to exercise critical nuclear design and engineering skills and provide broader experience
and validation opportunities to Stockpile Stewardship capabilities, turning synergistic technology
advancements in those areas into direct benefits for stockpile maintenance and sustainment
(e.g., enabling efficient modern radar design for LEPs).
3.1.5 Retaining Expert Stockpile Stewards into the Indefinite Future

Attracting and retaining world-class staff requires performing cutting-edge research that is both
challenging and has a compelling mission. The national security laboratories have developed or
maintained facilities that provide research opportunities that serve to attract and retain scientists and
engineers. Aging and less-than-state-of-the-art capabilities have the opposite effect and adversely
impact the quality of research. The core mission, sustaining the Nations nuclear deterrent by
developing the scientific understanding inside the Stockpile Stewardship Program, provides a wide range
of research opportunities. These opportunities are supplemented by broader national security mission
applications that provide some unique research challenges. In addition, the laboratories offer new staff
the opportunity to team with more experienced staff to pursue world-class, cutting-edge research that
is frequently unique to a particular laboratory and is funded by Laboratory Directed Research and
Development.
3.2 Nuclear Test Readiness

The United States continues to observe the 1992 nuclear test moratorium. NNSA has maintained a
readiness to conduct an underground nuclear test if required to ensure the safety and reliability of the
stockpile or, if otherwise directed by the President, for policy reasons. DOE and NNSA has maintained a
24- to 36month nuclear test readiness posture (response time) pursuant to Presidential Decision
Directive 15 (1993) during a period when readiness to test was funded as an active program. NNSAs
evaluation of test readiness response time has changed over the years, and the fundamental approach
taken to achieve test readiness has also changed. The status of nuclear test readiness and associated
facilities has not changed significantly since the 2014 SSMP. That information is provided in Chapter 4 of
the 2014 SSMP.
In addition to the artifacts of nuclear testing (test site, holes, cranes, etc.), NNSA maintains test
readiness by exercising capabilities at the national security laboratories and the Nevada National
Security Site through the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Maintaining test readiness is a product of a
robust, technically challenging Stockpile Stewardship Program, which invests in development of the
necessary personnel and infrastructure. This strategy relies on reconstituting the remaining
underground testing elements when needed, rather than maintaining obsolete facilities.
Operations such as subcritical experiments exercise the people, physical assets, and infrastructure
support services required for an underground nuclear test. These include critical skills and formality of
operations, ranging from weapon design; design, preparation, and fielding of advanced diagnostics;
modern safety analysis; experiment execution; and recovery and analysis of data. These experiments
are challenging multi-disciplinary efforts that enhance the technical competency of the nuclear security
enterprise workforce.
3.3 Grand Challenges

As part of its Stockpile Stewardship Program work, including preparing the SSMP itself, the national
security laboratories have identified several specific and challenging areas that require additional focus;
these have been designated Grand Challenges. Because of the classified nature of the specific applied
problems, these Grand Challenges are described in greater detail in Chapter 3 of the classified Annex to
this FY 2016 SSMP.
3.3.1 Certification of the Evolving Stockpile

Aging and stockpile modernization through LEPs inevitably introduce changes to the stockpile. Evolving
threat environments may also introduce changes that must be certified within the limitations of the no
integrated nuclear testing policy. These certification challenges require an evolving set of stewardship
capabilities.
3.3.2 Boost
A key challenge for the Stockpile Stewardship Program is the area of boost physics, which is focused on
improving the capability to develop an empirical understanding of initial conditions, as well as modeling
and simulating boost and thermonuclear burn.
3.3.3 Vulnerability and Hardening

Warheads must be designed to operate even under extremely hostile environments or fratricide effects.
In many cases, test capabilities do not exist to certify that stockpile hardware meets requirements, and
RDT&E capabilities must be applied in order that design and qualification meet requirements.
Addressing design and qualification involves complex multi-scale, multi-physics solutions, starting with
detailed understanding of weapon outputs and ending with integrated system responses to the direct
and indirect radiation effects. High-performance computational capabilities are required to evaluate the
survivability of weapon systems under external radiation exposure from hostile environments or
fratricide; such capabilities not only support qualification when test capabilities are not available, but
also increase confidence when testing is representative, but not comprehensive. These capabilities are
validated using limited nuclear test data, as well as by modern experimental capabilities that provide
testing in harsh radiation environments at representative levels. As weapon configurations and
requirements change, survivability in these environments must be reassessed and certified.
3.4 Management and Planning

NNSAs tools and approaches to address RDT&E are unchanged from the FY 2015 SSMP. NNSA
continues to improve its planning processes by aligning activities with programmatic elements and
recent stockpile decisions. The capabilities provided by RDT&E facilitate assessment of the stockpile
condition, evaluation of the effects of anomalies on warhead performance, and implementation of
solutions. RDT&E also supports broader national security issues by providing the capabilities needed to
avoid technological surprise and assure confidence in weapons system performance.
3.4.1 Defense Programs Advisory Committee

To provide independent technical advice on key issues for NNSA, in 2013 the Office of Defense Programs
chartered a Federal Advisory Committee Actcompliant advisory committee comprised of selected
experts: the Defense Programs Advisory Committee (DPAC). This committee is made up of experienced
experts and academics outside of both DOE and NNSA.
DPAC provides advice and recommendations to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs
regarding stewardship and maintenance of the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
DPAC activities include, but are not limited to, periodic reviews of the diverse, major activities of the
Office of Defense Programs through assessments of the Nations stockpile, the RDT&E infrastructure
needed to maintain the stockpile and the overall nuclear deterrent, and the nuclear weapons
production facilities and related manufacturing technologies.
DPAC is also used for ongoing analysis of the Defense Programs mission and its foundation in national
strategic policy (e.g., the Nuclear Posture Review [DOE 2010], New START, and other relevant treaties);
application of Defense Programs capabilities to broader national security problems; analysis of
management issues, including facility operations and fiscal matters; and analysis of issues of broader
concern to NNSA.
3.4.2 The Predictive Capability Framework

In the last decade, NNSA and the national security laboratories formulated the PCF, a framework to
guide and communicate advances in predictive science. Such advances are necessary to continue to
allow certification without testing and to address the Stockpile Stewardship Programs Grand
Challenges. The PCF reflects the assessment of where weapon science will be heading in the early to
mid 2020s. The three NNSA national security laboratories developed a series of pegposts to progress
systematically toward the ultimate goal of replacing calibrated simulations with higher fidelity, sciencebased simulations based on advances in weapon science research. These pegposts are also informed by
known, out-year needs for stockpile maintenance and LEPs. Pegposts often become level 1 milestones
two to three years before completion. Prior to being formally defined as milestones, pegposts can and
are revised, moved, or deleted.
A host of enabling capabilities support advances in weapons science and engineering, including
experimental facilities and computational tools. Major advances over the next decade have been
identified and are captured in the revised PCF chart. The 13 pegposts are grouped under four lines or
strands of activity: Primary Physics, Secondary Physics, Weapon Engineering, and Safety and Security,
as illustrated in Figure 32.
Figure 32. Version 2.0 of the Predictive Capability Framework, identifying major efforts required to
advance stockpile assessment, sustainment, and certification capabilities
Each pegpost in Figure 32 represents a major effort to further integrate the scientific contributions to
stockpile assessment or certification. Achieving these pegposts relies on advances in the enabling
capabilities. The pegposts are based on computational simulations of increasing complexity that will
require improvements in both the capability and capacity of high performance computing. Validation of
the simulation models and advances in understanding nuclear weapon performance rely on the data
from experimental facilities, such as DARHT, NIF, Z, as well as platforms at the Nevada National Security
Site [e.g., U1a].
Figure 32 identifies some of the motivating drivers of the PCF along the top of the figure. In addition to
these specific drivers, the outcome of the PCF (i.e., improved predictive capability in the form of
simulation codes, models, and methods), requires other stockpile management and stewardship
components, including the Component Maturation Framework (CMF), alterations, LEPs, and annual
assessments.
The pegposts in FY 2015 and FY 2016 deliver the capabilities to assess primary reuse and secondary
designs. These assessments will ensure the predictive science is in place to determine the most likely
design options for the W80-4 (in the FY 2015 SSMP, this was the cruise missile warhead) and the IW-1,
including pit reuse recertification and secondary reuse. The out-year PCF pegposts build on these
capabilities by developing common models to quantify uncertainties in predictions, as well as models to

assess the impact of variability caused by engineering, aging, or manufacturing. The culmination of all
these advances will support the delivery of high-fidelity, full-system weapon outputs.
3.5 Experimental and Computational Capabilities

This section discusses the modeling and experimentation capabilities required for stewardship in three
areas: modeling and simulation, HED experiments, and hydrodynamic (and subcritical) experiments. The
section concludes with a description of smaller RDT&E activities that are beyond these three areas, but
are crucial to long-term sustainment of the nuclear deterrent and support these three broad areas.
The Stockpile Stewardship Programs challenges demand a simulation-based predictive capability built
on modeling and simulation efforts and the experimental facilities described in the following sections.
Simulation and experiments are closely coupled. In addition to predicting and assessing nuclear
weapons behavior and performance, simulations are used to design experiments. These calculations
allow for more-cost-effective experiments by ensuring correct deployment of experimental
components, particularly diagnostics.
Experiments, in turn, are instrumental in advancing
understanding of the processes taking place during weapon performance because they provide much of
the fundamental material properties data for physically realistic predictions. They also serve as a means
of validating the predictive capability of simulations.
3.5.1 Modeling and Simulation

The modeling and simulation capability developed for stockpile stewardship relies on Integrated Design
Codes (IDCs), Science Codes, and high performance computing systems, together with the necessary
infrastructure consisting of both software and hardware. Designers and analysts use IDCs to simulate
component and system performance in normal, abnormal, and hostile environments for nuclear and
non-nuclear components. Researchers use Science Codes to investigate specific phenomena in detail,
resulting in the material and physical models utilized by IDCs. Calculations using both IDCs and Science
Codes are performed on the Stockpile Stewardship Programs computing platforms.
The capability embodied in IDCs is a key integrating element used for weapon physics and engineering
assessments of the Nations stockpile. Much of the experimental data obtained by NNSA since the 1992
nuclear test moratorium, in addition to the legacy underground nuclear test data and the accumulated
experience of the Directed Stockpile Work Program, are embodied in IDCs and in the models,
algorithms, and related physical databases developed for them. IDCs are a principal tool used across the
stockpile for design studies, maintenance analyses, experimental design, qualification, Annual
Assessment Reports, LEPs, Alts, SFIs, warhead safety assessments, and weapons dismantlement.
The current predictive capability of IDCs is successfully supporting most of todays stockpile stewardship
missions. However, as the life of the stockpile is extended and changes caused by aging, material
replacement, advanced and additive manufacturing techniques, alterations, and modernization move
the stockpile further from configurations tested in underground nuclear tests, maintaining the stockpile
will require IDCs to be more predictive. Predictive capability is limited both by approximations in the
physics models and the inability to resolve critical geometric and physics features at very small length
scales. The proposed Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extreme (MaRIE) experimental facility (see
Section 3.5.5) will interrogate materials in extreme environments and provide data to fill this gap in
physical understanding.
Results from high-fidelity experiments, such as those conducted at NNSAs HED, hydrodynamic, and
subcritical facilities, are instrumental in improving and validating the quality of the physics models used
in the IDCs, as well quantifying the uncertainties in the models and codes. The purpose of the
experiments is to recreate the unique environments occurring in the operation of a nuclear weapon as
closely as possible.
Science Codes are used to generate physical models and data when it is impractical, impossible, unsafe,
or prohibited by treaty to do so experimentally. Examples of such data include material strength and
damage models, HE behavior, equations of state, x-ray opacities, and nuclear cross sections.
Exascale computing systems, which represent the next generation of computing systems, will reduce the
need for some approximations, allow simulations to run at substantially smaller length scales, and
enable more accurate quantification of margins and uncertainties. In addition, understanding the
behavior of weapons materials created using advanced techniques such as additive manufacturing will
require predictions spanning a large range of scales (from the mesoscale [the scale of the materials
internal structure] to the scale of the weapon). Successful predictions will be enabled by an exascale
computing capability coupled with an experimental diagnostic capability to measure the dynamic
response of materials at the mesoscale in extreme environments. Details of the plan for achieving
exascale computing are presented in Appendix C. The mesoscale experimental diagnostic capability
provided by the MaRIE experimental facility is discussed in Section 3.5.5.
Exascale computing systems will present significant challenges, many of which are already present in
today's quickly evolving computer systems. Two new computational systems that reflect the phases of
the evolution toward exascale are Trinity, which will be located at LANL and will be ready for production
use in FY 2017, and Sierra, which will be located at LLNL and will be ready for production use in FY 2019.
The specifications for these systems are listed in Table 31.
Table 31. Specifications of Most Recent Advanced Computing Technology System Procurements
Trinity
Sierra
Vendor
Cray
IBM
Peak FLOPS
>40 PetaFLOPS
120-150 PetaFLOPS
Number of Cores*
>760,000
TBD**
Number of Nodes
>19,000
TBD**
Power
<10 MegaWatts
10 MegaWatts
Memory
>2 PetaBytes (system total)
512 GigaBytes per node
Disk Space (usable)
>80 PetaBytes
120 PetaBytes
Processor Technologies
Intel Haswell and Knights Landing
IBM Power and NVIDIA Volta Graphics

Processing Units
Interconnect Network
Aries Dragonfly
Mellanox Infiniband fat tree
TBD = to be determined.
* The term core is roughly synonymous to the term processor used to describe older systems.
** Details will be publicly released prior to system delivery.
While procurement of some of the worlds most capable computing systems is often newsworthy, the
costs of these procurements represent only one-eighth of the resources dedicated to the development
and maintenance of the Stockpile Stewardship Programs modeling and simulation capability.
Figure 33 shows the balance of the budgets for hardware system procurements, operations and
software environments, and development of the models and codes.
Figure 33. Modeling and simulation budget distribution (FY 2016 budget request)
3.5.2 High Energy Density Facilities

The operational sequence of a modern nuclear weapon multiplies the initial chemical energy stored in
the HE by many orders of magnitude in achieving full system output. Energy densities become
sufficiently high that plasma effects are important. Understanding this HED regime is critical to
predicting the performance of nuclear weapons and understanding boost. Specific phenomena of
interest include dynamic material behavior in extreme conditions, radiation transport, hydrodynamics,
and thermonuclear burn, along with outputs and effects. Achieving the requisite conditions for HED
experiments is only possible at facilities specifically designed to reach these conditions: NIF at LLNL, Z at
SNL, and the Omega Laser Facility (Omega) at the University of Rochesters Laboratory for Laser
Energetics.
The 192-laser-beam NIF was designed to produce the conditions required for thermonuclear ignition.
With the completion of the National Ignition Campaign in 2012, (which did not reach ignition) NIFs role
is expanding to tackle a broader array of weapons physics issues, such as material properties, radiation
flow, thermonuclear burn, and outputs and effects, as well as continuing studies leading to
thermonuclear ignition. NIF can reach higher densities, pressures, and temperatures than any other
facility in the world. In 2015, NIF will begin experiments to determine the properties of high atomic
weight materials, including very small quantities of plutonium, in conditions relevant to nuclear
weapons performance. Working in tandem with Omega and the Z, NIF contributes to an array of
national capabilities that are needed to probe fundamental weapons physics issues.
Z is a pulsed-power facility capable of delivering 26 million amps of current to small radii (10 centimeters
and less), where the resulting electromagnetic forces drive dynamic experiments to investigate weapon
physics topics such as the properties of materials, opacity, radiation flow, and thermonuclear burn. Z
can access regimes of relevance to weapon operation and effects. Continued upgrades and
improvements will realize Zs full pulsed-power potential of 32 million amps. The higher current will
increase x-ray outputs for radiation effects experiments, as well as for studies of material equations of
state and thermonuclear burn at higher magnetic pressures.
Omega is a 60-beam laser facility that provides a platform to conduct HED experiments that investigate
physics issues for both weapons performance and inertial confinement fusion. The main Omega laser is
supported by Omega EP [Extended Performance], an additional laser that can operate independently or
in tandem with the main Omega laser. Both lasers include an extensive suite of optical, nuclear, and
x-ray diagnostics to probe high-energy phenomena. In addition to fielding fundamental experiments,
Omega contributes to diagnostic development and serves as a staging platform for energy experiments
at NIF.
NIF, Z, and Omega are supported by many smaller-scale facilities, such as the Trident laser at LANL and
the Jupiter laser at LLNL. These intermediate energy facilities enable experiments that do not require
the highest energy densities and serve an important role in diagnostic development and calibration.
3.5.3 Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments

The Stockpile Stewardship Program assesses the effects of aging and various manufacturing processes
on proposed approaches to LEPs, SFIs, and other issues that affect the viability of the stockpile. To fulfill
these responsibilities without nuclear testing requires hydrodynamic tests with surrogate materials and
subcritical experiments using plutonium. These experiments, combined with theory, modeling, and
simulation tools and other focused experiments, underwrite the confidence in the Nations nuclear
deterrent.
The Stockpile Stewardship Program has accomplished significant work on radiographic sources and
other advanced diagnostic techniques. The DARHT facility at LANL, the CFF at LLNL, and the Cygnus
Dual-Axis Radiographic Facility at the Nevada National Security Site produce high-speed radiographic
images that contribute to understanding and simulation of weapon physics.
DARHT is a critical resource for characterizing the hydrodynamic conditions required for primary boost.
The first DARHT axis generates a single x-ray pulse, and the second axis provides a multi-pulse capability
to characterize the final moments of a primary implosion by producing time-dependent data. Other
diagnostics include pin and photon Doppler velocimetry and high-speed cameras. DARHTs capabilities
both improve NNSAs understanding of the current stockpile and help investigate issues of primary
performance that will enable future primary reuse capabilities.
CFF provides single frame single-axis radiographic hydrodynamic test capabilities in a building that is
rated for tests of the largest primaries in the stockpile. Multiple diagnostics are available for a single
hydrodynamics test, including pin and photon Doppler velocimetry diagnostics, wide-angle radiography,
and optical framing cameras.
In addition to these large-scale facilities, smaller installations provide data to inform NNSAs modeling
and simulation capabilities and to study single physics issues of interest.
U1a at the Nevada National Security Site is presently the only facility where focused and integrated
subcritical experiments, which mate HE with special nuclear materials, are conducted. Cygnus, located
at U1a, provides a dual-axis radiographic source as part of the suite of diagnostics that produces data on
the performance of surrogates and plutonium for refining models and understanding the early stage
implosion of primaries. However, an integrated facility that can adequately diagnose the final stages of
a primary implosion using plutonium does not exist.
To better diagnose this regime, NNSA developed a Mission Need Statement and Program Requirements
for Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (LLNL-TR-650015) in February 2014. Following
approval of CD [Critical Decision]-0 in September 2014, several requirements documents were
developed that defined the robust radiographic requirements and other technologies, at various
technical readiness levels, that could be evaluated in CD-1 (scheduled for September 2015). In addition,
an NDSE capability, timed to fire late in conjunction with a subcritical experiment implosion, is being
pursued to improve the ability to answer questions related to integral plutonium behavior. The details
of the proposed experiments, facilities, and NDSE are included in Chapter 3 of the classified Annex to
this 2016 SSMP.
3.5.4 Laboratory-Scale Science

The large projects and facilities described above crucially depend on a great deal of small-scale
science. This work is conducted by individuals or small teams using laboratory and plant facilities. The
following describes some of the more prevalent small scale areas:
Nuclear physics. Nuclear physics includes nuclear cross sections (probabilities of nuclear
reactions), the physics of fission and fusion processes, and research into the synthesis of heavy
elements. Currently, activity is mostly limited to work that supports reassessment of yield and
safety studies.
Plasma and atomic physics. This research area includes development of new radiation sources
(such as neutron and x-ray sources for radiation effects studies and radiography), understanding
atomic data relevant to modeling nuclear weapons performance and effects, and diagnostics
and physical understanding of fusion physics on HED platforms.
Chemistry. Major areas of chemistry and chemical research include analytical chemistry,
inorganic chemistry, organic chemistry (including chemistry related to HE), physical chemistry,
nuclear chemistry, and radiochemistry.
High explosives. Nuclear weapons use HE to drive the primary to super-criticality.

Consequently, the development of explosives, manufacturing, processing, safety, aging, and
disposition are all essential core competencies of the nuclear weapons laboratories. It is
essential to fully understand HE properties and performance in order to predict primary
performance. A more detailed discussion of essential challenges related to explosives
development and the challenges of converting to an all-IHE stockpile is provided in the classified
Annex to this chapter.
Materials. In the nuclear explosive package of a nuclear weapon, materials are subjected to
extreme states of pressure, strain, strain-rate, and temperature. Such extreme states are
typically several orders of magnitude greater than those obtained under ambient conditions.
Predictive capability requires a detailed understanding of the fundamental physics governing
the dynamic behavior of materials from ambient to extreme conditions. During a nuclear
explosion, the range of relevant loading of materials may span six orders of magnitude or more.
The extreme conditions are difficult to produce in laboratory or non-nuclear explosive systems
and, in some physical regimes, must be probed using large facilities such as Z, DARHT, and NIF.
For the complete weapon, including its non-nuclear components, the entire range of materials
science, from theory and modeling to small-scale experiments to large integrated experiments,
is required by the laboratories to understand material response in normal, abnormal, and
hostile environments. The dynamic properties of a wide variety of materials (metals, ceramics,
polymers, electronic materials, etc.) must be understood. This includes modeling and
characterization of impacts from processing and fabrication on dynamic properties for materials
used for or related to nuclear weapons.
Additive manufacturing. Additive manufacturing, also known as 3D printing (including with

metals), is an example of an advanced manufacturing technology that could have broad impact
across weapons components and materials. Beginning in FY 2013, laboratory and plant sites
began partnering to develop this technology for applications including tooling, stockpile
components, and experimental testing hardware. NNSA is accelerating laboratory, plant,
industry, and university co-development and scale-up of advanced manufacturing technologies,
like additive manufacturing, for nuclear weapons missions. The proposed MaRIE facility
(discussed below) is intended to provide in situ measurement of microstructure evolution and

materials performance under extremes of temperature, pressure, and shock loading.
Engineering science. The ability to deliver a weapon safely and reliably; arm, fuze, and fire it
and to be assured that it will function properly if, and only if, intended requires a broad suite of
theoretical, computational, and experimental engineering research capabilities. These
capabilities include structural mechanics, shock physics, fluid dynamics, thermal physics, and
electromagnetics. The research is often multi-disciplinary and is coupled strongly with materials
science and radiation science.
Radiation science. Weapons can be subject to extreme hostile and fratricide environments, as
well as to space radiation and intrinsic radiation environments. Research into the interaction of
radiation with the weapon and its subsequent response is essential to meeting radiation
requirements. This multi-disciplinary research is coupled with engineering and materials
science. While many experiments require the environments provided by HED facilities (Z, NIF,
Omega), unique capabilities at the Saturn, HERMES III, and Ion Beam Laboratory accelerators, as
well as the Annular Core Research Reactor, are key to advancing this science.
Microsystems science. The extreme radiation requirements for weapons can far exceed the
capability of commercial microelectronics to survive and function. Microsystems research
provides designs and manufacturing processes that enable devices and circuits to meet
radiation requirements. System design and qualification requires strong engagement with
radiation and engineering science.
3.5.5 Emerging Facilities

The MaRIE facility is currently in the planning stages. As proposed, MaRIE would combine many
different types of diagnostic imaging probes (protons, photons, neutrons) for in situ characterization of
materials under extreme conditions of temperature, pressure, and radiation to provide real-time
measurements of states of matter and phase transitions. While each of the individual techniques
intended for MaRIE exists at some level in different facilities in the United States and around the world,
no facility to date has combined these capabilities in one location. When combined with diagnostic
capabilities from across the national security laboratories and the modeling and simulation capabilities
developed under the Advanced Simulation and Computing Program (ASC), MaRIE would, for the first
time, allow rapid, thorough characterization of microstructure, physical properties, and material in a
single facility. These capabilities are essential to achieving the goals of rapidly developing new materials
from conception to fabrication, characterization, and application, while avoiding the indirect
methodologies of the past and present.
To put this in context, consider some of the promise of advanced manufacturing. New manufacturing
methodologies promise faster and possibly less wasteful fabrication of components, ranging from
replacements of existing items to production of objects that may be impossible to fabricate with
conventional techniques. However, unless the structure and performance of these materials and
components can be characterized in an equally rapid manner, the series of characterization experiments
could be long, expensive, and potentially cost prohibitive. The capabilities of MaRIE would facilitate
such substitutions by allowing direct, in situ, real-time measurements of the structure, properties, and
performance of both existing and new materials, and the generation of input for simulations would then
enable more rapid introduction of new components. Hence, MaRIE could accelerate the adoption of
advanced manufacturing, not just in nuclear weapons applications, but in any critical, high-technology
applications. Furthermore, MaRIE would attract the scientists and engineers required to maintain a
viable scientific community and, thereby, would enable long-term maintenance of the skilled workforce
upon which the U.S. nuclear deterrent ultimately rests.
As envisioned, MaRIE will be located at Los Alamos, and include a first of its kind X-ray free electron
laser [XFEL] in tandem with the LANSCE facility. It is currently pre-CD-0 and is awaiting the generation of
a mission needs statement.
3.6 Programs
3.6.1 Science Program
Science Program capabilities enable development and qualification of advanced safety concepts, new
materials and manufacturing processes, reuse and other options for LEPs, and contributions to weapon
lifetime assessments.
Key Science Program products and activities support: (1) stockpile Annual Assessments, (2) certification
statements for LEPs and weapon modifications, (3) prompt resolution of stockpile issues (e.g., SFIs,
including aging issues), (4) development of certification methodologies for warhead reuse or
remanufacturing options for future LEPs, (5) maintenance and exercise of nuclear-weapons-relevant
capabilities through experiments and calculations for the Annual Assessments, and (6) development and
maturation of technologies for the nuclear explosive package. Science Program products are developed
in partnerships with ASC, the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield (ICF) Program, the
Engineering Program, and the Directed Stockpile Work Program.
One Grand Challenge is to understand and provide models for primary boost. The Science Program is
making significant advances in understanding this phenomenon from the initial conditions required for
boost to its subsequent dynamics and role in producing the primary yield of stockpile weapons. A
second Grand Challenge is associated with the complex processes occurring during operation of the
secondary. Activities supporting improved models of primary and secondary performance span a range
that includes experiments to measure the properties of materials, hydrodynamic experiments,
subcritical experiments that probe properties of plutonium in extreme conditions, and HED experiments
at ICF facilities that study material in regimes that could otherwise only be examined in nuclear
explosions. The benefits of these activities include not only accurate estimates of weapon yield, but
detailed weapon outputs used for hostile environment design and qualification.
Implosion hydrodynamics studies advance nuclear primary science through complex, integrated
experiments that test, validate, and improve primary models, as well as analyze material performance
under relevant physical conditions.
Materials science is relevant to all nuclear weapons components and physics requirements. Relevant
materials include plutonium, uranium, other metals, high explosives, polymers, foams, composites, and
gases. Research in this area provides equation of state, thermodynamic, and constitutive property data
to support development and certification of advanced theories and models for nuclear weapon
performance. Materials data are also applied to validate models and simulation codes and are used to
identify and develop new material options to support component reuse and LEPs. The experiments are
conducted at several laboratory facilities, including PF-4 at LANLs Technical Area (TA)-55, Z, U1a,
LANSCE, the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) facility at the Nevada National
Security Site, other gas and powder gun facilities, HE facilities and firing sites, and small-scale
laboratories used for testing and characterization. The Dynamic Compression Sector, which is being
developed at the Argonne National Laboratory Advanced Photon Source, boasts unique capabilities for
coherent x-ray diagnosis of materials experiments under dynamic conditions. These include laser shock,
gas and powder guns, coupled with dynamic imaging and x-ray diffraction, small angle x-ray scattering,
and velocimetry to explore equations of state of materials, mechanical response, and reaction chemistry
under shock conditions. Additively manufactured materials pose the unique challenge of performance
characteristics defined by the manufactured microstructure, which would be interrogated at the
proposed MaRIE facility.
Nuclear physics work is accomplished at LANSCE using the Time Projection Chamber, Chi-Nu capabilities,
and the Device for Advanced Neutron Capture Experiments (DANCE) to provide nuclear cross section
and neutron output spectra that underpin databases used to simulate transport, criticality, boost, and
weapon output. The cross section work done at LANSCE recently has contributed to the first recent
adjustment in the expected yield of an existing warhead in the current stockpile for several decades.
The Science Program also supports development of advanced experimental technologies. R&D
continues on x-ray radiographic sources and the associated accelerators for subcritical experiments at
U1a, as well as diagnostics at DARHT and CFF. Pulsed power development efforts include use of the
Linear Transformer Driver accelerator technology for materials and hydrodynamic applications; the
Precision High-Energy Density Liner Implosion Experiment (PHELIX) technology for proton-radiographydiagnosed hydrodynamics, transport, and boost-related experiments; and Z and its successors for
technology development related to neutron sources, radiation physics, materials, and hydrodynamic
applications. In addition, improving and developing the pRad proton radiography capability at LANSCE
supports primary, secondary, and materials physics experiments.
The Capabilities for Nuclear Intelligence (CNI) initiatives expand predictive capabilities for application
outside of the U.S. stockpile design domain, in support of non-stockpile national security priorities. CNI
enables Intelligence Community assessments of foreign state programs and designs and provides
opportunities to exercise the skills of weapons designers on challenges of national security importance.
These initiatives have been ongoing for the past 4 years.
Although there is considerable overlap between the capabilities needed to sustain the U.S. stockpile and
those needed to assess foreign weapon activities, CNI addresses the capability gaps resulting from basic
differences between U.S. and foreign approaches to nuclear weapon design, production, and
qualification. As foreign designs may be far outside the tested and validated U.S. design experience, CNI
also provides critical weapon skills, training, and experimental opportunities for designers and engineers
that are not provided during LEPs by simultaneously testing the limits of validity for stockpile tools and
models. CNI is principally funded in the primary assessment sub-program of the Science program.
The subprograms of the Science Program also contribute to development of the future national security
laboratory workforce through the Stewardship Science Academic Alliances. The Stewardship Science
Academic Alliances funds university research in unique scientific fields that are relevant to stockpile
stewardship but are not funded elsewhere by the Government or private industry. These include
materials under dynamic conditions and in extreme environments, hydrodynamics, low-energy nuclear
science and radiochemistry, and HED science. This is funded with contributions across all of the
subprograms.
The five subprograms of the Science Program are displayed in Figure 34 and are described in more
detail in Appendix B. Milestones are provided in Figure 38, located at the end of this chapter.
Figure 34. Subprograms of the Science Program

3.6.1.1 FY 2014 Accomplishments of the Science Program
Executed two integrated hydrodynamic experiments in support of pit reuse concepts enabling
future stockpile options at DARHT at LANL and CFF at LLNL.
Conducted a total of five plutonium and five surrogate experiments on JASPER, as well as three
plutonium experiments on Z to obtain data to improve the fidelity of plutonium multi-phase
equation-of-state models.
Continued assessment of the potential effects of plutonium aging and their impacts on pit
lifetimes and reuse.
Executed Leda at U1a, a scaled experiment that demonstrated new diagnostic capabilities for
future subcritical experiments and exercised the nuclear security enterprise to satisfy the
requirement to exercise capabilities to maintain the safety for Category 3 nuclear operations at
U1a.
Achieved approval of the Justification and Mission Need (CD-0) for enhanced diagnostics
capabilities at U1a. LANL and LLNL finalized a joint radiographic requirements document for
U1a entitled, Primary Physics Requirements for a Proposed Enhanced Radiographic Capability in
U1a (LA-CP-14-007707). Significant progress was also made toward neutron diagnostics to be
fielded at U1a by carrying out conceptual design and transport studies and testing neutron
source technologies.
Performed the first detailed estimates of plutonium cross-section uncertainties at LANSCE using
the Time Projection Chamber. The Chi-Nu team also measured the relevant fission neutron
spectrum; measurements and analysis of the actinide nuclear reaction data were performed
using the DANCE array at LANSCE and the Triangle Universities Nuclear Laboratory.
Made progress in evaluating additive manufacturing technologies using polymers and metals
and in developing certification methodologies to address life-extension options.
3.6.2 Advanced Simulation and Computing Program

ASC provides the high-performance computing codes and systems that underpin stockpile stewardship.
ASC IDCs serve as the computational surrogate for nuclear testing to predict weapon environments,
effects, performance, and safety. ASC depends heavily on the understanding, experience, and data
gained through Directed Stockpile Work and Science Programs. ASC and other programs are integrated
through the PCF. In addition, ASC benefits greatly from collaboration with DOEs Office of Science for
Advanced Scientific Computing Research.
In coordination with other Government agencies, ASC supports nonproliferation, emergency response,
nuclear forensics, and attribution activities. ASC resources have been used to characterize special
nuclear materials and devices via postdetonation analysis and to assess securityrelated mitigation
strategies.
ASC created a new subprogram in FY 2014 called Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation to
help develop advanced computing technologies to support stockpile stewardship and to mitigate the
effects of these new technologies on NNSAs IDCs. This strategy recognizes the need for exascale
computing capabilities to support out-year requirements for computational assessments, although the
stewardship mission will continue to be accomplished with the available computational resources until
such systems are available. As requested by Congress, ASCs plan for achieving exascale computing is
outlined in Appendix C.2
The six ASC subprograms are displayed in Figure 35 and described in more detail in Appendix B.
Milestones are provided in Figure 39, located at the end of this chapter.
Figure 35. Subprograms of the Advanced Simulation and Computing Program

3.6.2.1 FY 2014 Accomplishments of the Advanced Simulation and Computing Program
Provided B61-12 computational simulation support using ASC capabilities: modeled thermalmechanical safety scenarios to determine representative conservative accident scenarios;
completed simulations of the subsonic captive carry response for the Joint Strike Fighter;
provided simulation-based design assessment of the aerodome, impact sensor, and firing
control unit.
Provided W88 Alt 370 computational simulation support using ASC capabilities. In collaboration
with the Engineering Program, completed a cavity system-generated electromagnetic pulse
validation study of experiments on Z. Implemented an improved x-ray air-transport database
that led to more accurate definitions of internal x-ray component requirements. Developed
models for turbulent boundary layer, base pressure fluctuations, and atmospheric turbulence,
consistent with aerodynamic loadings expected during normal atmospheric reentry of the
Mk5/W88.
The NNSA plan for exascale computing is provided in response to the request in Public Law 113-66, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Sec. 3129 Plan for Developing Exascale Computing and Incorporating Such Computing
into the Stockpile Stewardship Program).
Supported the W78/88-1 LEP mechanical design,

specification of component environments, and
subassembly tests.
Demonstrated a new hydrodynamics method for

use with models that are crucial to the FY 2015
LANL/LLNL Energy Balance II milestone.
Improved hydrodynamics and strength modeling

capabilities for more realistic simulations of
material break-up.
Completed 3D Global Security simulations on the

Tennessee Valley Authoritys Sequoia nuclear
plant using over 2 billion computational cells.
A highly scalable transport modeling capability

was released that enables design physicists to
complete accurate weapon assessments much
faster than previously possible.
3.6.3 Engineering Program
Critical Skills and Peer Review

During the process to vet a modern ASC code for
annual assessment calculations, LANLs B61
team discovered a discrepancy between the ASC
code, the trusted legacy code, and a
hydrodynamics experiment. Unfortunately, the
team did not have staff available with the right
experience and skills to address the discrepancy
promptly.
Following an internal review, LANL called on
LLNL to perform an informal peer review. After a
lengthy process involving a careful comparison
to LLNL code results, exchanges with experts at
SNL, comparison to additional hydrodynamics
experiments, and a substantial effort to rebuild
critical skills and knowledge, the discrepancy
was resolved.
As this example illustrates, a lack of skills can
result in errors in the codes and the manner in
which they are run. In the absence of nuclear
testing the Nation depends critically on the
accuracy of its simulation codes and the
expertise of its workforce.
The goal of the Engineering Program is to develop

capabilities to assess and improve the safety, security,
effectiveness, and performance of the nuclear explosive
package and nonnuclear components throughout a
weapons lifetime. The purpose is to ensure confidence in the design of all components and subsystems
and increase the ability to predict their response to external stimuli (i.e., large thermal, mechanical, and
combined forces and extremely high radiation fields) and aging effects, as well as to develop essential
engineering capabilities and infrastructure. The program includes advanced technology development
and physics discovery experiments supporting design and qualification, including validation of advanced
modeling capabilities. The Engineering Program also provides a sustained basis for certification and
assessment throughout the life cycle of each weapon.
FY 2016 objectives include the following:
Support design and qualification for the B61-12 and W88 Alt 370, as well as future LEPs.
Provide a formal process to mature improved safety and security technologies using the
Technical Basis for Stockpile Transformation Planning.
Provide fundamental, sustained R&D on the engineering basis for stockpile assessment and
certification.
Assess and improve fielded nuclear and non-nuclear components.
Increase the ability to predict the response of weapon components and subsystems to aging and
to normal, abnormal, and hostile environments.
Advance components and materials testing to minimize or avoid destructive testing while
ensuring high-level reliability and certification.
The four subprograms of the Engineering Program are displayed in Figure 36 and are described in more
detail in Appendix B. Milestones are provided in Figure 310, located at the end of this chapter.
Figure 36. Subprograms of the Engineering Program

3.6.3.1 FY 2014 Accomplishments of the Engineering Program
Provided validation data set for a coupled thermal-mechanical thermal battery model that will
be used for the B61-12, the W88 Alt 370, and future battery design and testing efforts.
Acquired one data set on the thermal-structural response of laser welds that will be used to
validate simulations for B61-12 qualification.
Fielded the first ever radiation experiments for cavity system-generated electromagnetic pulse
effects at NIF in collaboration with the United Kingdoms Atomic Weapons Establishment during
two experimental series.
Validated a model prediction at SNL for a heterojunction bipolar transistor, which is relevant to
upcoming weapon system alterations and will be compared against data gathered at the
Annular Core Research Reactor.
Developed Spectrally Encoded Imaging, a new diagnostic technique used to interrogate HE

during testing.
Developed an improved firing set disassembly process for surveillance, thereby reducing the
cycle time and greatly reducing the impact on the quality of the recovered components.
Completed B61-3/4/10 System Tester Qualification Engineering Release.
Generated a validation data set for PBX 9502 explosive in a weapon configuration that was
subjected to several thermal cycles.
Performed a radiation transport calculation of a hostile neutron attack using an engineering

analysis baseline model of a warhead that had assembly and reentry preloads applied.
Additively manufactured experimental fixturing and select components were used in

hydrodynamic testing, demonstrating the current capabilities of additive manufacturing to
accelerate testing and support product innovation. In addition, some components were
developed that would have been extremely difficult to produce conventionally.
3.6.4 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program

The ICF Program provides scientific understanding and experimental capabilities in HED physics to
validate the simulation codes and models used to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
weapons stockpile without underground testing. More than 99 percent of the energy from a nuclear
weapon is generated in the HED state (pressures greater than 1 megabar). ICF operates and conducts
experiments in facilities that create these HED conditions. This experimental basis, combined with
archived legacy data from the underground test program, gives confidence in the codes and models
used to support annual assessments and certifications, plan LEPs, and resolve SFIs. ICF facilities (such as
NIF, Z, and Omega) provide the only platforms on which the simulation codes that couple transport
processes with hydrodynamics models can be experimentally validated.
ICF supports stockpile stewardship through two principal experimental directions. First, it conducts nonignition HED physics research, develops diagnostics, and provides experimental expertise. Ongoing
experiments explore issues in materials science, radiation transport, and hydrodynamics to provide a
fundamental scientific knowledge relevant to nuclear weapons and to test the codes and models that
underpin stockpile confidence. Second, the ignition HED physics effort is dedicated to developing
thermonuclear burn and, ultimately, to demonstrating ignition in the laboratory. The demonstration
and application of ignition, when and if ignition is demonstrated, and thermonuclear burn will validate
models in the most extreme conditions generated in a nuclear explosion that cannot be reproduced in
the laboratory in any other way; that demonstration remains a major goal for NNSA and DOE.
Early ignition experiments showed differences between code predictions and data, revealing physics
unknowns and technical complexities that will require time to study and resolve. Advances in
diagnostics and experimental techniques have provided improved insight into where models are
diverging from experiments, and more recent experiments have demonstrated advances toward the
physics regime that are of great interest to the weapons program. Implosions designed to be more
hydrodynamically stable, with a lower convergence ratio (the ratio of the initial radius of the capsule to
the final radius), have resulted in performance that is closer to code simulations and close to the onset
of alpha heating (significant heating of the capsule gas by alpha particles emitted by fusion reactions).
Future progress in this area will require better understanding and control of hydrodynamic instabilities
and implosion symmetry. It is important to continue pursuing this Grand Challenge to maintain
scientific leadership and credibility, while recruiting scientists and engineers who will participate in
stockpile stewardship. Much of this research is open and shared; hence, ICF research provides an
avenue to establish the quality of relevant science through the broader scientific community, thereby
directly supporting deterrence.
The six ICF subprograms are displayed in Figure 37 and are described in more detail in Appendix B.
Milestones are provided in Figure 311, located at the end of this chapter.
Figure 37. Subprograms of the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program
3.6.4.1 FY 2014 Accomplishments of the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High
Yield Program
Developed a ten-year strategic vision for the HED sciences, consistent with the DOE Strategic
Plan.
Conducted a comprehensive review that addressed the experimental program at NIF and the
alignment of that effort with the ten-year vision.
Made progress toward achieving ignition in the laboratory:
Demonstrated a new, more-stable, indirect-drive-ignition design in which performance at

NIF is improved (with neutron yields approaching 1016 and significant heating from alpha
particles).
Conducted the first indirect-drive experiments at NIF with alternate ablators (beryllium and
high density carbon).
Achieved highest neutron yields to date in ignition-relevant, direct-drive, cryogenic target
implosions at Omega.
Conducted the first integrated magnetized liner inertial fusion experiments using Z, with
both magnetization and laser-plasma preheating.
Showed symmetry control in polar, direct-drive experiments at NIF that provide
understanding of the relevant laser-plasma interaction conditions.
Completed a community-led, 120-day study on improving operational efficiencies at NIF.
Demonstrated improvement in shot rate and efficiency at NIF during FY 2014; implemented
many of the recommendations from the 120-day study.
Performed many non-ignition HED experiments at NIF, Omega, and Z, including equation of
state and strength (also including plutonium at Z).
Prepared a five-year National Diagnostics Strategy that unifies the approach to diagnostic
investment at Omega, Z, and NIF.
Established an ICF/HED Review Panel to conduct a major ICF program review in FY 2015.
3.6.5 Other Programs

The unique normal, abnormal, and hostile environment requirements for warheads significantly
constrain the technologies that can be applied to provide critical weapon system functions. Even where
commercial products may perform similar functions, materials and design specifics cannot be easily
modified to meet system requirements. Advanced technology development is aimed at ensuring
warhead reliability in all required environments, while also enhancing safety and security. Advanced
technology development efforts span fundamental research in the materials, radiation, microsystems,
and engineering sciences toward application of established engineering design capabilities. Such
advanced technology development may take years to achieve a technology readiness level that is
suitable for final system-specific technology maturation during the full-scale engineering development
for an LEP.
In addition to the Science, ASC, Engineering, and ICF Programs, portions of other programs also provide
RDT&E capabilities for the advanced technology development activities described in this chapter. These
include capabilities in RTBF Program Readiness, which developed the compound semiconductor
transistor technology that will be inserted into the B61-12 and W88 Alt 370. RTBF Program Readiness
also develops and nurtures critical skills, including R&D skills.
3.7 Milestones, Objectives, and Future Planning

Milestones for the Science, ASC, Engineering, and ICF Programs are provided in Figures 38 through
311. Many milestones presented in earlier versions of the SSMP have been revised or eliminated so
that the programs can be better aligned with the most recent version of the PCF. The current program
milestone figures include, in fact, milestones that are identical to the PCF pegposts and are indicated by
the prefix PCF.
Figure 38. Experimental and analysis milestones and objectives led by the Science Program
Figure 39. Computational milestones and objectives led by the Advanced Simulation and
Computing Program
Figure 310. Engineering and technological milestones and objectives led by the
Engineering Program
Figure 311. Milestones and objectives based on experiments on NNSAs high energy density facilities
and led by the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program
Chapter 4
Revitalize Physical Infrastructure
The stockpile management programs described in Chapter 2 require specialized, unique facilities and
equipment to extend the life of the Nations weapons, dismantle retired weapons, perform surveillance,
and replace LLCs. Among these are metallurgy and chemistry laboratories, nuclear reactors, and special
rooms called bays and cells, where nuclear explosives can be assembled and dismantled. Also required
are various types of equipment, such as pressing machines and lathes, melting furnaces, and silicon chip
manufacturing equipment. The process of sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile requires many
different hazardous materials that must be specially stored and kept secure, and produces hazardous
waste streams that must be processed in specialized facilities to protect the environment and the public.
NNSAs RDT&E programs, described in Chapter 3, require specialized, unique experimental and
diagnostic equipment, such as high-powered lasers, particle accelerators, advanced radiography
equipment, many of the worlds fastest computers, and the facilities to house them. The national
security laboratories, nuclear weapons production facilities, and the Nevada National Security Site also
require reliable general purpose infrastructure to house their one-of-a-kind programmatic facilities and
equipment, as well as utilities, roads, fire-suppression systems, and other safety systems. Without this
physical infrastructure, the NNSA mandate to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile
would not be possible.
Sustaining and recapitalizing NNSAs
infrastructure is a complex, difficult,
and expensive task, complicated by
the fact that a majority of these assets
are well beyond their designed service
lives. More than half of NNSAs
buildings are over 40 years old, and
29 percent date to the Manhattan
Project era. As a specific example,
Figure 41 shows the age of
construction of the buildings at Y-12.1
This chapter describes NNSAs recent
achievements, the challenges it faces
in managing infrastructure issues, and
the plans put in place to overcome
these challenges in a portfolio that is
so vital to NNSAs mission.
Figure 41. Data on the age of Y-12 buildings from the

G2 Program Management System
Appendix D, Workforce and Site-Specific Information, contains detailed information about the NNSA sites.
4.1
Introduction
NNSAs physical infrastructure is funded and managed in two categories.
General Purpose Infrastructure includes all of the

facilities, infrastructure (such as roads and fire
suppression systems), site utilities, and
equipment that are not specifically program
focused, but support mission execution. Also
included in this category are building envelopes
(e.g., roofs, walls) that house the programmatic
infrastructure, as well as surveillance and
maintenance of excess general purpose and
programmatic infrastructure.
Programmatic Infrastructure includes the
equipment, core capabilities, and processes
housed and enabled by the general purpose
infrastructure.
Programmatic infrastructure
allows NNSA to carry out research, testing,
production, sustainment, and disposition related
to the entire range of its national security
commitments.
These infrastructure categories have both similarities and

some important differences, leading to distinctive
approaches and processes in both short- and long-term
management of their assets.
Both categories of
infrastructure must be maintained safely throughout their
life cycles until their eventual disposition. The following
sections describe the specific strategies NNSA has
implemented to provide and sustain the facilities and
equipment necessary for performing the NNSA mission.
FY 2014 Physical Infrastructure

Accomplishments
Relocated non-nuclear component
manufacturing from the Bannister
Federal Complex to a new, leased
National Security Campus in Kansas City.
Completed the Nuclear Facility Risk
Reduction Project at Y-12 to address
short-term infrastructure risks.
Completed HE Pressing Facility
construction at Pantex $30 million under
budget.
Improved infrastructure condition
assessment, maintenance, and planning:
Initiated Laboratory Operating Board
Process for Facility Condition
Assessment.
Adopted Mission Dependency Index
to provide a more accurate indicator
of how each asset supports the
mission.
Deployed G2 Program Management
System.
Selected BUILDER as new NNSA
facility assessment system.
To date, NNSA infrastructure has successfully enabled execution of the mission. Several new missioncritical facilities have been completed; facility availability and utility reliability have remained high;
interim investments are in progress; and more investments are planned to manage risk in the short
term. NNSA has laid the groundwork for more integrated, nuclear security enterprise-wide planning.
For the general purpose infrastructure, NNSA has initiated vastly improved management tools that allow
improved assessment, better visibility of infrastructure condition, and facilitate improved management
and decision making. On the programmatic side, NNSA has assigned managers to key mission-critical
commodities. The commodity managers are developing strategies for ensuring continued production
and processing for uranium, tritium, and plutonium activities. This may include replacing or repurposing
existing facilities and replacing or relocating process equipment. In addition, plans are in place to
replace aging facilities and equipment for capabilities that do not have specified commodity managers,
but are just as necessary to the future stockpile, such as lithium and HE production and processing.
However, significant recapitalization is required to revitalize the infrastructure during the 25-year
planning period. A significant portion of NNSAs infrastructure has aged well beyond its useful design
life and requires revitalization or disposition. The aging infrastructure issue has been reported in
Government Accountability Office documents and in independent reviews chartered by the Secretary of
Energy in 2005 and 2008 and by Congress in 2014.2
The latest review, by the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security
Enterprise, recognized the magnitude of these challenges, as reflected by the following statement in
their report:
Throughout the enterprise, the panel heard evidence of failing infrastructure, lack of
sufficient funding, and practices that will inevitably increase future costs.
The complexity of these challenges was also noted by the panel:
The complexity of ongoing modernization requirements, coupled with addressing safety,
security, and environmental issues in an increasingly austere budget environment,
requires holistic and integrated decision-making mechanisms to meet operational
requirements and find cost-saving solutions across the enterprise.
Without sustained investment, risks to mission execution and worker, public, and environmental safety
will increase as infrastructure elements that underpin critical mission areas continue to age and
approach failure.
4.2
General Purpose Infrastructure
4.2.1 Current State

Management of the physical infrastructure assets for any technical enterprise is a complex task. Good
stewardship depends on balanced allocation of resources in four areas:
providing new assets,
operating and maintaining existing assets,
periodically renewing and reinvesting in existing assets, and
disposing of assets at the end of their useful life.
4.2.1.1
NNSA as a Unique, Diverse, and Complex Enterprise
The operations at each NNSA-owned site comprise a vast array of facilities, utilities, infrastructure, and
equipment, many of which are highly specialized, to support mission deliverables. The DOE Facilities
and Infrastructure Management System (FIMS) reports more than 6,300 assets, representing more than
38 million gross square feet, that are owned by NNSA. The buildings alone are equivalent to six
Pentagons. In addition, thousands of items of programmatic equipment support R&D, design,
production, experimentation, and testing in support of operations and deliverables. NNSA owns over
2,000 square miles of land, 2,500 miles of paved roads, and all the other utility systems that normally
serve such an enterprise. In effect, each site is like a city with a major industrial park designed to
perform one or more of the NNSA primary missions.
2
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Report (aka Galvin Report) 2005; Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (SPEIS), December 19, 2008; A New Foundation for the Nuclear Enterprise: Report of the Congressional Advisory
Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, November 2014.
In FY 2014, NNSA allocated more than $1.1 billion to manage the general purpose and programmatic
infrastructure, which represented 13 percent of the Weapons Activities account budget. Of that
amount, $590 million was used to maintain facilities, while an additional $225 million was used to
purchase utilities (electricity and natural gas) and operate central steam plants. The remaining dollars
were used to replace or recapitalize the most critical infrastructure through the recapitalization
prioritization process. Maintenance and operations are, for the most part, fixed annual costs of
supporting the mission and are difficult to reduce without substantial investment in new facilities or
reduction in the number of facilities.
Even with several challenges during FY 2014, such as leaks in fire suppression systems and spalling of
concrete ceilings, no NNSA mission delivery schedules were delayed by failures in the general purpose
infrastructure. This is remarkable because of the aged and deteriorated nature of some of the
equipment and facilities and is a tribute to the hard work and teaming of the field offices and the staff of
the M&O partners. However, the general purpose infrastructure is not sustainable forever and will
require significant reinvestment and replacement to ensure continued mission success.
4.2.1.2
Management of Aging Facilities and Controlling Growth of Deferred Maintenance
Periodic reinvestment and renewal is essential to maintain the vitality of the infrastructure and control
maintenance costs. The expected service life for facilities varies by type of building; however, with
adequate sustainment during their lifetimes, buildings that house scientific laboratories are generally
expected to have service lives of 50 years, and administrative buildings are expected to last 75 years. As
mentioned, more than half of NNSAs buildings are over 40 years old, and 29 percent date to the
Manhattan Project era. In addition, many of these facilities have not had adequate sustainment over
their lifetimes. This has potentially shortened the useful life span of some facilities and increased
maintenance costs and recapitalization needs. The age of NNSAs facilities presents a unique challenge
to continuing to maintain safe operations to meet mission demands.
Moreover, in recent years, the limited availability of capital and maintenance funding has contributed to
a steady growth in deferred maintenance,3 which totaled $3.7 billion at the end of FY 2014 for NNSA. In
response to Secretarial direction, NNSA's FY 2016 budget provides funding necessary to ensure no
increase in deferred maintenance (DM) relative to the FY 2015 year-end DM level. In addition, Congress
has directed NNSA to develop and submit a ten-year strategic plan that would reduce the deferred
maintenance backlog below FY 2014 baseline levels and dispose of unneeded facilities.
4.2.1.3
Increased Resources for Disposal of Aging Assets to Increase Operating Efficiency
Failure to dispose of assets that can no longer support the mission imposes a penalty in unnecessary
maintenance and operating costs. For example, NNSA assets currently awaiting disposal (which
constitute 12 percent of all NNSA assets) consumed $48.7 million in FY 2014 for environmental
monitoring and utilities mandated to meet life safety codes. These facilities do not contribute to NNSA
mission deliveries, but continue to require substantial funds.
Deferred maintenance is defined in the DOE Facilities and Infrastructure Management System (FIMSWeb) Users Guide as
maintenance that was not performed when it should have been or was scheduled to be and which, therefore, is put off or
delayed for a future period.
4.2.2 Accomplishments
In spite of funding challenges for general purpose infrastructure needs, NNSA supported execution of
the national security mission. One notable accomplishment is the recent relocation of non-nuclear
manufacturing operations from the Bannister Federal Complex site in Kansas City to the new NSC
eight miles to the south, as part of the Kansas City Responsive Infrastructure Manufacturing Sourcing
(KCRIMS) project. The project included developing and implementing more efficient business process
and sourcing strategies in addition to the relocation. The new leased facility is reconfigurable to
accommodate anticipated stockpile support scenarios and is Gold-certified under the U.S. Green
Councils Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Certification System. The footprint was
reduced from 3.1 million square feet to 1.5 million square feet, and operational costs were reduced by
$100 million annually. The 18-month relocation, one of the largest industrial moves in North America,
was completed in July 2014, under budget and ahead of schedule. Nearly 3,000 truckloads were
required to move the 5.2 million cubic feet of equipment, materials, and product inventory. By using a
carefully planned pre-build and rolling shutdown strategy, all mission delivery commitments were met
during the relocation, with no loss or compromise of classified information. Plans are in place to
transfer the old facility to a private developer in FY 2016, thus eliminating more than $266 million4 in
deferred maintenance.
Overall facility availability and utility reliability remained at very high levels, ably supporting stockpile
and other mission activities. In addition, several new general purpose infrastructure capital projects
were implemented, which will collectively help reduce deferred maintenance, improve efficiency of
operations, and reduce short-term risks to the NNSA mission. These included the following:
Sandia Silicon Fabrication Refurbishment, consisting of ten recapitalization projects ($25 million)
LANL continued restoration of the LANSCE radio frequency power system ($11 million)
Los Alamos Weapons Neutron Research Substation Modification ($3.1 million)
Nevada Device Assembly Facility Fire Suppression Lead-In Line increased scope to respond to
catastrophic failures ($7.6 million)
Roof replacements and repairs at LLNL and LANL ($4 million)
More significantly, several initiatives were launched to address some of the future challenges related to
the general purpose infrastructure. These actions, described in Section 4.2.4, are aimed at increasing
capital reinvestment, controlling deferred maintenance, and efficiently managing risks to the mission.
4.2.3 Challenges
NNSA faces complex and difficult challenges in managing its general purpose infrastructure. Four of
these are summarized below.
Increasing age of facilities. In recent years, NNSA has given priority within available funding to facilities
that directly support mission work. However, many NNSA assets require significant recapitalization
investments to extend their service lives, be repurposed, or be dispositioned and removed by
demolition. This last category includes the 12 percent that were excess to mission needs in FY 2014. As
the average age of facilities increases, the risk of failures impacting mission deliverables increases.
FIMS data as of January 27, 2015.
Available funding for capital renewal has been limited and is not likely to increase in future year
budgets.
High deferred maintenance levels. Increased deferred maintenance levels provide insights into the
current and future condition of NNSA assets. NNSAs deferred maintenance costs totaled $3.7 billion at
the end of FY 2014 and are growing at $150 million to $250 million per year. In the FY 2015 Presidents
Budget, NNSA funded maintenance so that the backlog will not grow. Although some of this deferred
maintenance is for facilities that are soon to be determined as excess, and includes the Bannister
Federal Complex at Kansas City, the amount of deferred maintenance on enduring facilities presents a
challenge. The current level of deferred maintenance indicates that improved investment strategies and
more funding are needed, either for maintenance or for recapitalization and replacement of assets.
Identification of increased funding for capital reinvestment has proved difficult in recent years, and
NNSA anticipates similar challenges in future budgets. This scenario presents a challenge to addressing
the growth of deferred maintenance in line with Secretary of Energy and congressional guidance.5
Optimization of investments and enterprise-wide planning. Condition assessment, maintenance
planning, and many other processes guide decisions for general purpose infrastructure. These decisions
are made on a site-by-site basis by field office personnel and the M&O partners. Limited planning is
performed at an integrated, enterprise-wide level. Furthermore, the enterprise currently lacks the
latest tools and processes to implement such planning and decision making.
4.2.4 Strategies The Way Forward

NNSAs strategies for meeting the challenges of sustaining its general purpose infrastructure in a
resource-constrained environment are described below.
4.2.4.1
Optimize infrastructure investment decision making to prioritize resources
NNSA is taking an Enterprise Risk Management approach to infrastructure decision making. This
approach looks at risks to the infrastructure across the eight NNSA sites and seeks to prioritize needs at
a nuclear security enterprise level to address risks optimally. The approach follows the example of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and many profit-oriented entities. An Enterprise Risk
Management approach has been developed in 2015 to inform the FY 2017 budget formulation process.
The Secretary of Energy formed the National Laboratory Operations Board (LOB) in 2013 to engage all of
the DOE national laboratories and DOE programs in a joint effort to identify opportunities to improve
effectiveness and efficiency. One of the highest priorities identified by the LOB was the need to
revitalize general purpose infrastructure.
In November 2013, the Department, through the LOB, established an integrated plan to conduct a sitewide assessment of general purpose infrastructure across all 17 DOE laboratories, as well as the NNSA
nuclear weapons production facilities, for the first time using common standards and an enterprise-wide
approach. The assessments provided a detailed, uniform analysis of facilities and other infrastructure,
as well as information for decisions on future investment. As part of the assessments, consistent
definitions of functionality and utilization of the facilities were captured, enabling managers to
understand where excess space exists and broadening the possibility of sharing space across DOE. The
immediate focus of the LOB assessments was on general purpose infrastructure, however, during
FY 2015 NNSA is expanding the assessments to include all infrastructure.
5
Appendix D, Workforce and Site-Specific Information, contains additional information on the age of facilities and amount of
deferred maintenance at each site.
The LOB assessments included qualitative ratings of asset condition as adequate, substandard, or
inadequate. The LOB assessments provide a more holistic view of DOE infrastructure than the
traditional metric of Deferred Maintenance (DM)/Replacement Value (RPV), by going beyond physical
condition and considering the suitability of each facility for its current mission. Figures 42 and 43
present NNSAs general purpose infrastructure by the two rating systems, with the traditional
Excellent Good (DM/RPV 0.05) corresponding to LOB Adequate; traditional Adequate to Fair
(0.05 DM/RPV 0.25) corresponding to LOB Substandard; and traditional Poor to Fail (DM/RPV 0.25)
corresponding to LOB Inadequate. The broader considerations underlying the LOB ratings give greater
definition to the sufficiency of facilities for mission, thereby supporting more informed investment
decisions. The percentages in Figures 42 and 43 are based on total RPV, not the number of general
purpose facilities. The findings of the LOB assessment are included for each site in Appendix D,
Workforce and Site-Specific Information.
Figure 42. NNSA Asset Condition Ratings

using DOE Order 430.1B assessment
by replacement value of facilities
Figure 43. NNSA Asset Condition Ratings

using LOB assessment by replacement
value of facilities
The introduction of the Mission Dependency Index (MDI)

metric provides a more holistic and accurate indicator of
how each facility supports the mission than the current
three-tier Mission Dependency concept. NNSAs MDI
extends the concepts of DODs operationally-based MDI to
science, engineering, and manufacturing efforts and will
inform the prioritization of proposed infrastructure
recapitalization projects. In 2014, NNSA developed and
piloted the MDI process and started implementing that
process at the national security laboratories, the nuclear
weapons production facilities, and the Nevada National
Security Site. MDI determinations are on track to produce a
complete set of data to inform FY 2017 budget decisions.
Following DOD, NNSA is implementing the BUILDER
Sustainment Management System, a system that is being
adopted by other Government agencies. BUILDER will
inform the FY 2017 budget formulation process.
Asset Condition Definitions

Adequate: Fully capable of performing
its current mission with only minor
deficiencies that can be corrected
within normal operating budgets.
Substandard:
Deficiencies
limit
performance of the mission and
refurbishment is required to return the
asset to adequate condition.
Inadequate: Major deficiencies that
significantly impair performance of the
mission; major refurbishment is
required.
4.2.4.2
Improve program management tools to provide accurate data for decision making
A new program management plan documents the Enterprise Risk Management approach described
above and outlines a path forward for implementation. The new plan standardizes terminology;
increases consistency in cost reporting among national security laboratories, the nuclear weapons
production facilities, and the Nevada National Security Site; and improves the visibility of execution of
work using direct and indirect funds. In FY 2014, NNSA developed the plan and initiated its
implementation. Data collected under this plan will be recorded in the G2 software program and will be
used as the primary source of information for FY 2017 programming decisions about the general
purpose infrastructure.
The award-winning6 G2 software program, developed by NNSAs Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferations Global Threat Reduction Initiative, is being modified for use in managing the general
purpose infrastructure. The G2 software program standardizes and automates processes for scope,
cost, and schedule management. It also empowers NNSAs M&O partners to better manage projects,
while giving NNSA decision-makers a common, transparent picture of project performance to further
enhance data-informed decision making. In FY 2014, NNSA completed much of the programming to
enable the software to support multiple activities. Software modifications to align with infrastructure
requirements for data collection are complete, prepared to track FY 2015 budget execution, and on
track to support FY 2017 budget decisions. G2s flexibility will allow NNSA to better understand its
spending and execution, while avoiding an additional data collection burden on NNSAs M&O partners.
The budget structure flexibilities established by Congress in the FY 2014 and FY 2015 authorization and
appropriations bills provided new enterprise-wide control points for maintenance and recapitalization
that will enable NNSA to target funding at the highest level of NNSA need, while maintaining some
flexibility to respond to unanticipated failures of aging infrastructure.
4.2.4.3
Accelerate recapitalization efforts to halt the growth of deferred maintenance,

revitalize core capabilities, and reduce operating costs
NNSA is managing recapitalization work as projects, increasing requirements for adequate planning prior
to project approval and execution, creating smaller, one- to two-year projects, and closely tracking
financial and schedule performance. In FY 2014, NNSA developed and implemented the standardized
criteria in G2. This capability is fully operational and will be used to monitor execution of FY 2015 work.
Consistent with the strategy implemented in FY 2014, NNSA is planning increased recapitalization
spending in FY 2016, with commensurate reductions in other budget categories. This dovetails with the
Departments work (though the LOB) to assess the condition of its general purpose infrastructure and to
prioritize infrastructure funding through a cross-cutting budget initiative. This effort is establishing a
sustainable trajectory for the Departments infrastructure by ensuring no increase in the backlog of
deferred maintenance. Sustainability will be integrated into recapitalization decisions through a Return
on Investment methodology to evaluate energy savings and other efficiencies. The goal is to lower the
cost of operating the nuclear security enterprise. The Return on Investment methodology is mature and
ready to inform FY 2017 budget decisions.
In January 2011, NNSAs development of the G2 Program Management System earned NNSA the Program Management
Institutes Distinguished Project Award, the first time this award was given to a Federal agency.
4.2.4.4
Invest in the repurposing, reuse, deactivation, and disposition of facilities no longer

needed for mission execution
NNSA is developing investment strategies for repurposing, reusing, and disposing of facilities no longer
required for mission execution. In addition, Secretary Moniz has re-emphasized the requirements to
meet Government-wide initiatives, such as Freeze the Footprint, and to develop a DOE-level
infrastructure plan under the auspices of the Secretarys Laboratory Operations Board. NNSA, within
the recapitalization program, is disposing of one facility each year and taking other measures to reduce
the risk inherent in unused contaminated facilities. Several NNSA M&O partners are using indirect funds
to sustain a minimal level of disposition.
4.2.4.5
Increase purchasing power by employing equipment procurement models that

optimize use of funds across NNSA
NNSA is increasing its purchasing power through expanding strategic procurements for building systems
and equipment that are common throughout the NNSA enterprise. NNSA is using lessons learned from
the successful Roof Asset Management Program to explore other opportunities for strategic, enterpriselevel procurement of widely used infrastructure components. In FY 2014, NNSA initiated collection of
data and development of criteria to support development of a strategic procurement for other common,
enterprise-wide systems.
4.2.4.6
Leverage alternative funding mechanisms to meet NNSA infrastructure needs
NNSA is working to explore potential alternative funding mechanisms that could help finance
infrastructure modernization needs while also meeting statutory and policy requirements.
4.3
Programmatic Infrastructure
4.3.1 Current State

Many of the programmatic facilities and much of the equipment have been in service beyond their
designed and technical life spans in support of production, experiments, and testing schedules. Many
specialized programmatic processes and equipment items are over 35 years old. Therefore, previous
decisions to repair, rather than recapitalize, have pushed much of the equipment to the point that
maintenance staffs are reliant on third party sources and used parts to keep the systems operational.
Dedicated efforts by the M&O partners and field office personnel have kept the availability rate high and
minimized the loss of production, but that pace is not sustainable in the long term. Recapitalization and
process technology improvements through capabilities-based investments, line item construction
funding, capital equipment funding, and some site-specific investments developed within the nuclear
security enterprise are allowing NNSA to move from a position of technical obsolescence to near parity
with industry for specific vital capabilities. The Pantex Bays and Cells Upgrade project, the Sandia Silicon
Fabrication Replacement project, the Nuclear Facility Risk Reduction project at Y-12, and the TA-55
Reinvestment Project at LANL are examples of recapitalization of programmatic infrastructure for
essential weapons mission capabilities.
However, funding is insufficient to address technical obsolescence in all capabilities. While investment
levels have historically been adequate to address past mission workloads, the increased workload of the
current LEP schedule, along with increased testing requirements, is taxing aging programmatic
equipment to the point of unplanned equipment failures and capability gaps. The Capabilities Based
Investment program, commodity management strategies, and sustainment budgets are being used in
concert to address the highest risks in all areas.
4.3.2 Challenges
Two of the challenges of the programmatic infrastructure are summarized below.
Budget fluctuations have affected NNSAs ability to plan capital reinvestment. NNSAs infrastructure,
including the programmatically vital equipment, must be sustained and periodically replaced through
recapitalization. This is done most efficiently when there is a predictable funding stream that allows
weapons program managers to schedule and recapitalize equipment in coordination with mission
deliverable schedules. Continuing resolutions have been particularly hard on infrastructure planning
because they typically constrain the startup of new investment projects. This results in increased costs
due to inflation, replanning, lost windows of opportunity, and potential impacts to mission delivery
schedules.
Failure to tailor safety and security approaches has increased costs and complicated management of
programmatic infrastructure. Current approaches to safety and security sometimes result in high levels
of rigor as a means of avoiding risk. This issue was cited in the congressionally appointed Governance
Panel report7 as an obstacle to effective management of infrastructure. NNSA and DOE safety directives
provide the flexibility to grade requirements to achieve the level of protection appropriate to the actual
hazard in a facility and a safety benefit that is consistent with the cost. One valuable resource for
effectively assessing risk is the Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment, which DOE and DOD
worked together to update in 2011. The document describes, primarily, terrorist threats to U.S. nuclear
sites based on historical precedents and plausible scenarios. In many cases, application of a graded
approach allows selection of appropriate commercial safety standards to meet DOE requirements.
However, this flexibility is not always applied appropriately, resulting in higher costs and reduced
productivity. To improve mission effectiveness and reduce cost, NNSA and oversight personnel must be
empowered to balance risk against costs when approving an approach that ensures compliance with
fundamental safety requirements.
4.3.3 Recapitalization of Programmatic Infrastructure

Programmatic infrastructure includes the equipment, core capabilities, and processes that allow NNSA
to carry out research, testing, production, sustainment, and disposition of the entire range of its national
security commitments. This section discusses the strategies and plans in place to overcome the
challenges faced by key commodities, activities, and capabilities.
4.3.3.1
Strategy for Key Commodities
NNSA has appointed Federal Program Managers for uranium, plutonium, and tritium commodities, with
the responsibility to develop and implement management strategies. Ensuring continued mission
success is the primary focus of the commodity strategies, and modernizing the supporting programmatic
infrastructure is one of the highest priorities.
Action item 5 from the final report of A New Foundation for the Nuclear Enterprise: Report of the Congressional Advisory Panel
on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, November 2014: It is imperative that existing rulemaking practices and
execution oversight be overhauled so that risk is better assessed and balanced with the needs of mission execution.
Uranium8
Uranium activities include production of parts for CSAs, providing fuel for the Navy, disposing of
excess uranium materials, and conducting research and development programs on uranium.
Accomplishment of these activities requires the ability to process, store, and recover uranium
and manufacture precision uranium components.
Enriched uranium activities are performed in several large industrial buildings at Y-12; one of
which, Building 9212, is over 60 years old. The Uranium Processing Facility is a line item
construction project that will ensure the long-term viability, safety, and security of NNSAs
enriched uranium capability by replacing most of the capabilities in Building 9212. In 2014, cost
and schedule growth within the project led the NNSA Administrator to charter an independent
review team (Red Team) led by Dr. Thomas Mason, Director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
to develop an alternate approach for completing the project.
The Red Team report9 provided several recommendations to deliver Building 9212 capabilities
no later than 2025 at a cost not to exceed $6.5 billion. A key recommendation was to utilize the
existing uranium infrastructure to a greater extent and construct the minimum floor space
necessary for those operations that are not appropriate to be relocated to other facilities.
Therefore, the NNSA strategy now includes vital process relocations into other existing Y-12
facilities and completion of the Uranium Processing Facility project as a series of smaller
buildings. Each of the Uranium Processing Facility buildings will be certified for specific nuclear
safety, seismic, and security requirements. Processing capabilities will be located in the
appropriate facilities, based on the commensurate risk. This revised strategy consists of the
following four key efforts:
Cease enriched uranium programmatic operations in Building 9212 by 2025. This requires a
set of operational Uranium Processing Facility buildings and relocation of key processes
from Building 9212 into existing facilities.
Sustain and modernize NNSA's uranium manufacturing capabilities. Key technologies will be
employed to further modernize and enhance uranium operations, including electro-refining,
calciner, chip processing, and 2 mega electron volt radiography.
Reduce material-at-risk inventories from Y-12s enriched uranium processing facilities.

Excess uranium inventory throughout the enriched uranium facilities is being repackaged for
either disposition or storage into the modern Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility
(HEUMF).
Invest in new and enduring facilities. In addition to constructing new Uranium Processing
Facility buildings, additional facility investments in other existing buildings will be made to
electrical systems; heating, ventilation, and air conditioning; and equipment controllers to
recapitalize and extend their useful lives.
Uranium Strategy, signed September 2014.

Final Report of the Committee to Recommend Alternatives to the Uranium Processing Facility Plan in Meeting the Nations
Enriched Uranium Strategy.
Plutonium
The plutonium strategy encompasses the investments needed to meet pit production demands
and maintain continuity in AC and MC capabilities. The strategy reflects goals developed over
the past several years in coordination with DOD and other stakeholders. Specifically, the
plutonium strategy is being executed with a focus on the following:
NNSA and DOD remain committed to producing 50 to 80 pits per year by 2030.
NNSA plans to produce ten War Reserve pits in 2024, 20 in 2025, and 30 in 2026.
NNSA plans to accelerate demonstration of capabilities as soon as the investment strategy

allows.
To meet the plutonium infrastructure needs of the nuclear security enterprise, NNSA adopted a
three-step plutonium strategy in January 2014. The first two steps maintain continuity in AC
and MC capabilities by optimizing the existing infrastructure. The third step addresses the need
to extend the lifetime of PF-4 and provides additional space to support pit production
requirements.
Consistent with direction from the House Energy and Water Development subcommittee, the
first two steps of the strategy will be executed as two new subprojects within the CMRR line
item. Both subprojects support the goal of ceasing programmatic operations in the CMR
Building in FY 2019.
The Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building (RLUOB) Equipment Installation Phase 2
(REI-2) subproject maximizes use of RLUOB by reconfiguring some of the existing laboratory
space and equipping empty laboratories with AC and MC capabilities. As a result of changes
to NNSA regulations, RLUOB will operate at an increased radiological limit, 38.6 grams of
plutonium-239 equivalent, which will enable installation of additional AC and MC
equipment.
The PF-4 Equipment Installation subproject involves relocation and consolidation of existing
PF-4 processes to create open space, decontamination and decommissioning of old glove
boxes and equipment in PF-4, and installation of new glove boxes and AC and MC
equipment in the created open space.
The third step extends the lifetime of PF-4 and provides additional production space to reach pit
production targets by acquiring modular additions to PF-4. This effort is in preconceptual design
and plans are to submit CD-0 documentation in the third quarter of FY 2015. NNSA also
reaffirmed a commitment to construct at least two modular structures that will achieve full
operating capability not later than 2027.
In addition to the projects outlined above, the plutonium strategy also involves the following.
Continued investment in production equipment through the Plutonium Sustainment

Program which will support the production target of 30 pits per year by 2026.
In support of improved plutonium processing, LANL is modernizing its plutonium waste

processing and treatment capabilities through key line item construction projects, including
the Transuranic Waste Facility and Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility. These
facilities will allow sustainable throughput for the pit production cycle.
Tritium
4.3.3.2
The newly named Tritium Program Manager is in the process of consolidating programmatic
plans from across the tritium enterprise to produce a master tritium strategy that will balance
and prioritize the following tritium actions to reduce overall risk in meeting the tritium mission.
To move production and R&D processes out of aged and inefficient infrastructure (i.e., the
H Area Old Manufacturing facility) and into more modern enduring facilities, NNSA is
implementing the Tritium Responsive Infrastructure Modernization (TRIM) construction
program at SRS, which consists of one line item project, the Tritium Production Capability,
and a suite of capital equipment and general plant recapitalization projects. The TRIM
program will eliminate approximately half the deferred maintenance at the site by
eliminating the need to maintain two legacy facilities.
Three other projects that are currently scheduled outside the FYNSP (i.e., the H Area New
Manufacturing (HANM) facility Oxygen Monitor Replacement, HANM Chiller EPA
[Environmental Protection Agency] Compliance, and HANM Risk Reduction projects) will
extend the life of and reduce operating risk in the enduring HANM loading and unloading
facility.
Although current stocks of domestically produced, LEU fuel exist for the Tennessee Valley
Authority's reactors, they will not last the entire 25-year planning period. The Domestic
Uranium Enrichment Manager position was created to evaluate alternatives for ensuring the
continued supply of this vital part of the tritium production process.
Strategies for Other Capabilities
Lithium
The facility where lithium is processed and stored at Y-12 is well beyond its design life. Maintenance
and operations in such facilities is expensive and presents risk to the mission. A 300-pound slab of
concrete broke off of the ceiling and onto the floor in a production area in FY 2014, demonstrating how
aging facility risks are eventually realized. A line item construction project is scheduled to begin in FY
2017 to replace the lithium processing facility. The project will provide a modern, right-sized building to
meet mission needs. Advances in lithium manufacturing techniques, combined with use of reserve
lithium feedstock materials, will ensure that lithium component production continues uninterrupted
during transition to the new Lithium Production Capability facility.
High Explosives
Construction of the HE Pressing Facility at Pantex was completed in FY 2014, $30 million under
budget. The project included design, equipment installation, and construction to support HE
pressing, as well as rough contour machining, storage, and radiography. The 45,000-square-foot
state-of-the-art facility consolidates HE operations currently performed in 18 outdated buildings
totaling 49,000 square feet, with an average age of 56 years. The HE Pressing Facility will
significantly improve the reliability of HE operations at Pantex and increase the throughput
capacity when fully certified for operation in FY 2016.
To maintain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile, NNSA must continue to invest in HE R&D and
manufacturing capabilities. These functions are located at many unique facilities at several sites.
A key element in the management of HE capabilities is the plan to transition the stockpile to IHE
in future LEPs. During FY 2015 and FY 2016, NNSA will work with its M&O partners to evaluate
whether the present mix of infrastructure and capabilities are right-sized for stockpile
requirements across the nuclear security enterprise and to develop a strategy to manage
investments in IHE and CHE capabilities.
Weapons Assembly and Disassembly

The weapons assembly and disassembly infrastructure is aging in parallel with the rest of the nuclear
security enterprise. Recapitalization of safety systems at Pantex is in progress to ensure uninterrupted
assembly and disassembly of weapons to meet maintenance, surveillance, and disposition
requirements. NNSA is also planning long-term replacement of Y-12 assembly and disassembly
infrastructure as part of its modernization of uranium capabilities.
Nonnuclear Components
Electronics
GTSs
Electronic component support of the stockpile faces a materials supply issue. The fastpaced advances in the commercial semiconductor industry, driven by the needs of
commercial electronics, have created an obsolescence problem with the technologies and
products available for radiation-hardened semiconductors. As a result, spares and
feedstock are often no longer available. The Sandia Silicon Fabrication Revitalization plan
addresses this supply issue by transitioning the production line from the obsolete six-inch
wafers to more-readily available eight-inch wafers. This upgrade will provide a stable
programmatic infrastructure base through the mid-term while NNSA explores alternatives
for continued production of radiation-hardened electronics.
NNSAs recapitalization plans at SRS (described for tritium above) support ongoing
manufacturing of the tritium-filled GTSs for the existing nuclear stockpile and LEPs, as well
as for research.
NGs
The facilities that house the manufacturing activities for NGs are currently adequate.
However, it is essential to sustain and modernize the existing production equipment, as well
as to modify the production lines in these facilities to perform two to three phased LEPs
concurrently.
Design, Certification, Dynamic testing, Experiments, and Surveillance
NNSA is pursuing programmatic infrastructure upgrades to support an effective stockpile

without underground testing. Improvements to diagnostic equipment are occurring across the
nuclear security enterprise. For example, the Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments
project will provide advanced radiography, diagnostics, and explosive testing capabilities to keep
pace with demands for current and future LEPs.
In addition, NNSA is determining the mission need to achieve certification of new materials and
new processes, such as additive manufacturing, to address materials challenges in the nuclear
stockpile. A capability gap exists for determining time-dependent properties of materials at the
mesoscale (the dimensional range that lies between atomic scales and the scales of typical
engineering design tolerances) that is critical to expanding the understanding of materials
behavior in nuclear weapons. The MaRIE project is proposed to address this mesoscale
knowledge gap. Establishment of the MaRIE project performance baseline and commencement
of construction is planned for the 2020s. This facility would further reduce the possibility of
needing to return to testing by increasing the scientific understanding of materials contained in
nuclear weapons.

The STA Program provides safe, secure transport of nuclear weapons, weapons components, and SNM
for the nuclear security enterprise. To accomplish its mission, STA maintains a wide variety of facilities
across the United States; its primary headquarters is located in Albuquerque, New Mexico. For physical
infrastructure, the focus is on allocation of funds for construction projects, life cycle replacements,
repairs, reducing deferred maintenance backlog, and growth in a cost-effective manner. See Chapter 5
for specifics on solutions to STA infrastructure challenges.
DNS is committed to sustaining and modernizing the security infrastructure at all NNSA national
security laboratories, nuclear weapons production facilities, and sites in support of the overall
NNSA mission. The highest priority for DNS is to address the security infrastructure of both the
Y-12 and Pantex sites. Regarding the potential impacts of other NNSA projects, DNS is
partnering with the national security laboratories, nuclear weapons production facilities, and
sites to develop an approach that will maintain the effectiveness of high-security systems while
undertaking more efficient resource utilization. For a more detailed discussion of the DNS
mission, see Chapter 6.
The following are DNSs more-significant, recently completed projects:
The LANL Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrade Project Phase II was
completed in mid FY 2014.
The Y-12 Security Improvements Project was completed in mid FY 2014.
The following construction efforts are being evaluated for the planning period:
The Nevada National Security Site Device Assembly Facility Argus Replacement project is
proposed for FY 2016 funding.
Site security and Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System upgrades at Y-12
and Pantex (Zone 4 and Zone 12) are being evaluated and prioritized for inclusion in the next
FYNSP period.
4.3.4 Non-Weapons Activities Program Dependencies

In addition to the above key activities, several other NNSA programs rely on infrastructure funded by
Weapons Activities (e.g., nonproliferation, counterterrorism, counterproliferation and emergency
management). These programs will be described in detail in a forthcoming NNSA strategy to prevent,
counter, and respond to global nuclear and radiological dangers.
Nonproliferation
The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferations Office of Material Management and

Minimization relies heavily on the infrastructure maintained by other DOE and NNSA
offices. That office remains concerned about the impacts of the aging infrastructure on the
implementation of key nonproliferation programs. For example:
The program that is converting U.S. high-performance HEU research reactors to LEU fuel
relies on Y-12 uranium facilities to produce the LEU fuels. A critical part of the programs
efforts is research into a new fuel type using LEU-molybdenum (LEU-Mo) alloy. That
program has identified the aging casting furnaces at Y-12 as a program risk and a potential
single point of failure in the development of future fuel types. However, the replacement
casting facilities planned for the Uranium Processing Facility are being designed to
accommodate current and future fuel types in a modern facility, thereby reducing the longterm risk to this program. The conversion subprogram also relies heavily on the Sigma
facility at LANL for development of alternative LEU-Mo fuel fabrication processes.
The Material Disposition subprogram relies heavily on the PF-4 facility at LANL to
disassemble nuclear weapon pits and convert the resulting plutonium metal into an oxide
form using the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES).
The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferations Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control
(NPAC) also relies heavily on the infrastructure maintained by other DOE and NNSA offices. For
example:
NPAC relies on the availability of Category I, II, and III SNM standards and sealed sources for
detector and system development, as well as for training of foreign partner personnel in the
fundamentals of safeguards and material measurement. While the health of facility and
SNM infrastructure remains sufficient at this time, downsizing over the last decade has
required programs to use less Category I and II materials and more Category III and IV
materials for detector development and training. As NNSA recapitalizes facilities that are
critical to the NPAC mission, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation offices will work with the
appropriate program managers and through the Construction Working Group to ensure
NPAC requirements are considered.
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation

Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation rely heavily on infrastructure shared with stockpile
production, certification, and diagnostic activities. Many of the critical shared capabilities are under
consideration for modernization and/or recapitalization by the Weapons Activities programs described
here (e.g., analytical chemistry and HE testing). Analytical chemistry is being recapitalized as part of the
plutonium strategy, and explosive testing capabilities are under review as part of the HE strategy.
Counterterrorism and counterproliferation leaders will coordinate closely with other stakeholders
through such forums as the Construction Working Group to ensure their requirements factor into
construction and recapitalization discussions.
Emergency Operations
The Office of Emergency Operations leverages infrastructure that is predominantly maintained by other
NNSA and DOE offices and interagency partners. A suite of mission-specific equipment requires
continual
modernization
and
recapitalization
as
technologies
and
methodologies
advance. Infrastructure necessary for Emergency Operations core capabilities (Emergency
Management, Emergency Response, and Nuclear Forensics) needs mid- to long-term modernization as
mission capabilities grow to match partner requirements across the U.S. Government. For example:
The emergency operations centers (EOC) at Y-12, LLNL, and SNL are funded for replacement
within the FYNSP as part of recapitalization of onsite emergency management capabilities.
Emergency Response must recapitalize much of its aging and obsolete response equipment.
This long-term problem is currently being addressed as resources permit. Key areas requiring
recapitalization are radiation search, diagnostic, consequence management, and
communications equipment, as well as software modernization. In addition, fixed- and rotarywing aircraft used for consequence management response are currently nearing the end of their
life cycle.10
Infrastructure and equipment supporting nuclear forensics is largely healthy and is anticipated
to remain so. Required analytical capabilities at LANL are being recapitalized as part of the
plutonium strategy. Field environmental testing at the Nevada National Security Site, however,
is of concern with the deterioration of the CP-1 facility. Replacement is being discussed as part
of a new mission support facility for this and other activities at the Nevada National
Security Site.
4.4 Integrated Project List for Capital Construction and

Planned Recapitalization
To meet NNSAs known mission needs for the 25-year period from FY 2016 to FY 2040, the national
security laboratories, nuclear weapons production facilities, and the Nevada National Security Site have
identified mission gaps associated with aged and inefficient assets. All mission gaps are evaluated by
infrastructure experts, ranked by program sponsors, and consolidated into an NNSA nuclear security
enterprise-wide chronological project list of approved and proposed projects. The result is the approved
Integrated Project List of capital construction proposals in the FYNSP and post-FYNSP periods, as
presented in Figure 44. Near-term projects that have been approved are of higher priority and are
usually in more advanced stages of development, in accordance with DOE Order 413.3B. Cost ranges for
these projects show the total project cost, which captures costs associated with the project from
mission need definition to start of operations or project completion.
10
Final Report of the Office of Aviation Management Aviation Program Audit of the Nevada Site Office Aerial Measurement
System, February 11, 2014.
Figure 44. NNSA Integrated Project List for capital construction
The proposed post-FYNSP projects are preconceptual and have not been fully scoped. They are shown
here in chronological order, grouped into five-year segments with a rough order of magnitude cost and
schedule indicated. This information is provided to indicate the state of NNSA planning with regard to
future infrastructure recapitalization, but should not be considered as validated costs or as an official
schedule for proposed projects. These projects will be re-evaluated each budget year, and priorities will
shift based on mission need and funding availability.
Smaller recapitalization projects and expense-funded projects (e.g., minor construction, and capital
equipment, including major items of equipment) go through the same prioritization process as the
larger capital construction projects. Figure 45 summarizes the minor construction, major items of
equipment, capital equipment, and expense-funded projects planned for FY 2016.
Table 41 summarizes the required capability, current state of supporting infrastructure, and strategy
for achieving the requirements for the mission functions described above. The table links the projects
from the Integrated Project List with their functions and the strategies for overcoming current
limitations.
4.5
Disposition of Excess Facilities
Management of both general purpose and programmatic infrastructure requires balancing the
application of resources throughout the life cycle of the asset. When facilities are no longer needed and
are at the end of their useful lives they are identified as excess, but they still require resources to
maintain them safely until they can be dispositioned. Some 12 percent of NNSA's facilities have been
identified as excess and over the next five years NNSAs total disposition requirement will exceed
7 million gross square feet. (The Bannister Road Federal Complex in Kansas City accounts for 2.9 million
gross square feet.) The highest-risk facilities are those that are nuclear-process-contaminated and must
be dispositioned by the Office of Environmental Management. NNSA reported this information and the
challenges it faces in balancing funding priorities between operating facilities and excess facilities to
Congress in its FY 2014 annual report on facility disposition.11 As stated in that report, NNSA will not be
able to make significant progress in dispositioning the highest-risk contaminated facilities, and the
backlog of noncontaminated excess facilities is also projected to increase. However, NNSA is making an
effort to manage the risks posed by these facilities; in FY 2014, NNSA dedicated $5 million toward
disposition and is dedicating another $5 million in FY 2015.
11
Fiscal Year 2014 National Nuclear Security Administration Facilities Disposition Report, September 2014.
Infrastructure
Category
Programmatic
Infrastructure
Summary of planned investment in FY 2016 (non-line items)

Site
NSC
LLNL
LANL
NNSS
PX
SNL
SRS
Y-12
General Purpose
Infrastructure
NSC
LLNL
LANL
NNSS
PX
SNL
SRS
Y12
(e.g., minor construction, capital equipment [including major items of equipment],

and expensed projects)
Developmental laboratory modernization
Special application machining modernization
IHE qualification capabilities recapitalization
LEP and warhead assessment investments
Environmental testing and DARHT capability upgrades
Replacement of TA-55 wet vacuum material handling system
DAF and U1a Subcritical Experiments support investments
Stockpile stewardship mission infrastructure
Life-cycle replacement of production and analytic tools and equipment
Special nuclear material work stations
Sandia Silicon Fabrication Revitalization

Gas transfer systems unloading station modification and test station laser
replacement
Parts cleaning for direct lithium material manufacturing
Analytic and manufacturing equipment upgrades
Prepare for Bannister Road facility disposition
Facility modifications and capital equipment to support weapons production
Replace mission-critical HVAC systems in several buildings
HE Synthesis Pilot Plant Renovation
Facility modernization, seismic upgrades, safety upgrades, and control system
modifications in several mission-critical facilities
Prepare for CMR closure
Electrical, fire protection, and structural upgrades, several mission-critical facilities
Several utility and safety system upgrades in mission-critical facilities
Gas laboratory replacement
Facility modifications for B61
Refurbishments and upgrades for several mission-critical facilities
Relocation of mission-critical functions
Replace obsolete oxygen monitors
Utility and facility repair, replacement, upgrade in several mission-critical facilities
and functions
CMR = Chemistry and Metallurgy Research

DAF = Device Assembly Facility
DARHT = Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
HE = high explosive
HVAC = heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
IHE = insensitive high explosive
LEP = life extension program

NNSS = Nevada National Security Site
NSC = National Security Campus
PX = Pantex Plant
SRS = Savannah River Site
TA = technical area
Y-12 = Y-12 National Security Complex
Figure 45. Planned recapitalization projects
Table 41. Infrastructure management strategy to sustain National Nuclear Security Administration functions and mission capabilities a
Existing infrastructure is estimated to be sufficient for post-Nuclear Posture Review (DOD 2010) mission capabilities.
Existing infrastructure may not be sufficient or is inefficient or unreliable for post-Nuclear Posture Review (DOD 2010) mission capabilities.
Existing infrastructure is not sufficient for post-Nuclear Posture Review (DOD 2010) mission capabilities.
Mission
Capability
Required End State
RDT&E
Robust design and science

capabilities to support and perform
LEP schedule and execute the
Stockpile Stewardship Mission
Meeting mission; however,

facilities and programmatic
equipment are beyond
designed service life
30 ppy demonstration by FY 2021

30 ppy capability by FY 2026
50 to 80 ppy demonstration
by 2027 to 2029
50 to 80 ppy capability by FY 2030
Capability does not support

>30 ppy
Safely and securely protect

inventories of nuclear weapons
and weapons components

Pit Production
Uranium
Storage of
Components
Infrastructure Limitations
during Near Term
Plans to Overcome Limitations

Recapitalize programmatic
equipment to prevent technical
obsolescence and monitor
current facility conditions Build
modules to increase capacity
Plutonium Strategy: Plutonium
Sustainment investments, install
AC & MC capabilities in RLUOB
and PF-4, construct two to three
modules to extend life of PF-4
and increase capacity
Evaluate options to modernize
facilities and PIDAS, consolidate
storage, and sustain existing
facilities
Radioactive
N/A, Office of Environmental Management has assumed management of this function from the NNSA
Waste Disposition
capabilities to support and perform facilities and programmatic
RDT&E
facility conditions
Performing hazardous chemical
- Uranium Strategy: Cease
operations in aged, inefficient
programmatic operations in
facilities that do not meet
9212 by FY 2025 through Line
Sustained manufacture of CSA and modern safety or seismic
Item construction and
Production
associated component assemblies
standards. Infrastructure has
extending the service life of
to meet NNSA delivery schedule
been subjected to high
other Uranium facilities
corrosive processes that
- Recapitalized Programmatic
present risk to programmatic
Infrastructure
mission.
Safely, securely protect inventories
Storage of
of special nuclear materials and
Executing mission in HEUMF
Sustain HEUMF
Components
CSA components
Radioactive
N/A, Office of Environmental Management has assumed management of this function from the NNSA
Waste Disposition
Planned Future Associated Projects

PEI, LANL
REI 2, LANL
Weapons Engineering and Technology, LLNL
Proposed PF-4 Modular Extensions, LANL
PEI, LANL
REI 2, LANL
Proposed PF-4 Modular Extensions, LANL
Material Staging Facility, PX

TA-50-1, Replacement RLWTF
TW PED and Construction Facility
Applied Technology Laboratory, Y12
Weapons Engineering and Technology, LLNL
Uranium Processing Facility, Y-12

9215 Capability Replacement, Y-12
Lithium Production Facility, Y12
Plutonium
Function
Tritium
Mission
Capability
Required End State
RDT&E

Robust capability to continually

supply tritium in quantities that
meet or exceed demand
Production
Robust capability to continually
manufacture tritium-filled GTS
components
Storage
High Explosives
RDT&E
Production
Safe storage of reservoirs and

other tritium vessels

Stockpile Stewardship mission
Produce, press, and machine the
energetic materials to support LEP
schedule and the Stockpile
Stewardship Mission
Storage
Safely store IHE, CHE, inert and

energetic materials
Disposition
Dispose of waste energetic

materials in an environmentally
safe manner
during Near Term
Currently limited to laboratoryscale experiments on individual
processes; need capability to
conduct full-scale experiments
on integrated processes to
have confidence that
developmental technologies
will work when deployed.
Tritium-supply capability
insufficient to meet expected
demand throughout 25-year
planning horizon
designed service life; currently
operating under compensatory
measures to meet Safety Basis
requirements.
New HE Pressing Facility
supports needs of current and
future LEPs
Construct Hydrogen Processing

Demonstration System by
FY 2019
Minor construction project
- Establish plans to balance

tritium supply and demand
- Modify Tritium Extraction
Facility to enable full
operations by FY 2018
Sustain facilities and recapitalize

programmatic equipment as
needed
TRIM Program
HANM Risk Reduction
HANM Chiller EPA Compliance
Relocate storage to more robust

SRS Tritium Extraction Facility by Minor construction project
FY 2018
Modernize facilities and

recapitalize programmatic
obsolescence
Sustain existing facility and
modernized as needed
obsolescence
Sustain existing firing sites and
disposal methods
Energetic Materials Characterization, LANL;

HE Science, Technology & Engineering, PX;
HE Research and Development Facility, LLNL;
Site 300 Nuclear Security Infrastructure Stabilization, LLNL
HE Science, Technology & Engineering, PX;
Energetic Materials Characterization, LANL;
11-051/11-051A/12-188 Replacement (laboratory facilities),
PX
High Explosive Packaging and Staging, PX;
12-079 Inert Storage Refurbishment, PX;
Function
Weapons Assembly
and Disassembly (A/D)
Function
Mission
Capability
Required End State
Assembly bays
and cells,
Perform NNSA A/D schedule
weapons
surveillance, NDE,
and disassembly
LANL TA-55 PIDAS

LLNL Super Block PIDAS
Security
Certification, Testing,
Surveillance, and
Experimentation
Protection of
SNM
Life Extension
Design Support
Meeting mission in aged

Recapitalize bays and cells (2016
faculties with maintained, but
to 2022) ultimately replace aged
obsolete production equipment facilities
New PIDAS completed

Beyond designed service life;
however no longer needed due
to security category change
equipment is beyond designed
service life
Y-12 PIDAS

service life
Pantex Zone 4 and Zone 12 PIDAS

service life


12-064 Replacement (Weapons A/D), PX;

12-026 East Refurbishment and 12-026 Replacement, PX;
Cell Upgrade, PX
Sustain new PIDAS

Downgrade security posture to
match security category
NNSS PIDAS and SNM Staging at
DAF will exceed their design life
during planning period
Refresh the existing PIDAS as
the Uranium manufacturing
facilities are remodeled. The
previously anticipated PIDAS
reduction may not be realized
due to changes in Uranium
Mission footprint.
Consolidate the PIDAS at PX
when the proposed staging
facility is constructed and
eliminate unneeded PIDAS at
Zone 4

obsolescence
NNSS DAF PIDAS Argus installation during the FYNSP period
Rescope and execute the Y-12 PIDAS refresh in coordination

with Uranium Mission
Recapitalize existing equipment, consolidate PIDAS after

completion of the Staging Line Item
Research Reactor Facility, SNL
Weapons Engineering Facility, SNL
Consolidated Environmental Test Facility, SNL
Energetic Materials Characterization, LANL
NEP Engineering and Materials Complex Modernization, LLNL
Warhead Engineering, Science and Technology Facility, LLNL
Radiochemistry Laboratory Revitalization, LLNL
HE Research and Development Facility, LLNL
Mission Support Science and Technology Laboratory, SNL
Gravity Weapons Certification, SNL
MaRIE, LANL
NNSS DAF PIDAS
during Near Term
Certification, Testing, Surveillance, and Experimentation (contd)
Mission
Capability
Required End State
during Near Term
Nuclear Explosive
Package
Certification,
Surveillance and
Assessment
Sustain existing capabilities and

Test, surveil, assess, and certify the
periodically update the
physics package elements of the
experimental and test
stockpile
equipment

obsolescence

PF-4 Equipment Installation, LANL
Warhead Engineering, Science and Technology Facility, LLNL
Non-Destructive Evaluation Facility, PX
MaRIE, LANL
Nonnuclear
Components
Certification,
Surveillance and
Assessment
Test, surveil, assess and certify

non-nuclear components in the
stockpile
Sustain existing capabilities and

periodically update the
experimental and test
equipment

obsolescence

TCR Phase II, SNL
Test energetic components and

certify weapons components for
delivery schedule to the enduring
stockpile


obsolescence
HE Science, Technology & Engineering, PX

HE Research and Development Facility, LLNL
HE Test and
Certification

complete nuclear weapons in the
stockpile
Inadequate radiographic
infrastructure, including
diagnostic equipment for
subcritical experiments and
hydrographic experiments
Recapitalize hydrotest facilities

and gravity bomb data
collection equipment

Weapons Engineering, Science and Technology, LLNL
ICF

non-nuclear components in the
stockpile. Conduct material tests in
support of the NNSA weapons
missions.
Meeting mission
facility conditions
HEDP Precision Targets and Diagnostic Facility, LLNL
Computational
science
Develop computer models and

codes simulating weapons
characteristics to support Stockpile
Stewardship Plan
Sustain the current petaflop

capability and begin planning
for exaflop capabilities
Continue to advance the

simulation and computational
expertise of the NNSA to
support the weapons and other
NNSA missions
Sustainable Supercomputing and Analysis Center, LLNL

Supercomputing and Analysis Complex Modernization, LLNL
Stockpile
Certification and
Surveillance
Testing and
Experimentation
Function
Mission
Capability
Required End State
Electronic
Component
Production
Produce radiation hardened silicon

disks for satellites and national
security applications
Engineering
Components
Production
Lithium
Component
Production
Gas Transfer
System RDT&E
Enabling
Infrastructure
Neutron
Generator
Production
Produce components for 2 to

3 LEPs and enduring stockpile
according to the production
schedule
Produce lithium and specialty
metal foundry operations in
support of NNSA Mission delivery
schedules
GTS function testing capable of
supporting surveillance of the
stockpile, developmental systems
for LEPs, experimental systems,
and production samples
Produce neutron generators to
meet NNSA production
deliverables to the stockpile
Over 6,300 real

property assets,
Safe, energy efficient,
including utilities,
environmentally compliant
distribution
operations of NNSA assets
systems and
roads
AC = Analytical Chemistry
DAF = Device Assembly Facility
EPA = Environmental Protection Agency
GTS = Gas Transfer System
HE = high explosives
HEUMF = Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility
LEP = life extension program
during Near Term
Limited supply of six-inch wafer
stock exists; MESA must
SSIFR recapitalization to eighttransition to eight-inch
inch technology in 2019
products or cease trusted
foundry operations
Sustain operations and
Operations ongoing in National equipment at National Security
Security Campus
Campus through the lease
period (2030)
Rad Hard Foundry, SNL
Performing mission in aged,

Operate until the existing facility
inefficient facilities with
Lithium Production Facility, Y12
and equipment are replaced
obsolete production equipment
Insufficient GTS function
testing forces design lab tradeoffs
Facilities are less than 30 years
old; equipment is periodically
recapitalized
- Enabling infrastructure has
exceeded its design life and is
unreliable as the result of
corrective maintenance and
repair rather than
recapitalization
- Deferred maintenance
backlog increasing
Construct new function tester

by FY 2018
Continue to sustain facilities and

recapitalize equipment as
necessary
Recapitalize specific facilities

and infrastructure and minimize
maintenance to lowered priority
assets
MC = Materials Characterization
MESA = Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications
NNSS = Nevada National Security Site
PEI = PF-4 Equipment Installation
PF-4 = Plutonium Facility
ppy = pits per year
PIDAS = Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System
PX = Pantex
RDT&E = Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
Example General Purpose and Programmatic Infrastructure

Recapitalization are captured in Figure 45
REI-2 = RLUOB Equipment Installation Phase 2

RLUOB = Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building
SNM = special nuclear materials
SRS = Savannah River Site
TRIM = Tritium Responsive Infrastructure Modification
Y-12 = Y-12 National Security Complex
Non-Nuclear Components
Function
Chapter 5
The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) Program provides
safe, secure transport of the Nations nuclear weapons,
weapons components, and SNM. The program modernizes
mission assets and infrastructure, strengthens mission
support systems, and improves its workforce capability and
performance.
FY 2014 Secure Transportation Asset

Accomplishments
Completed 100 percent of shipments
(i.e., 115) without compromise, loss of
components, or release of radioactive
material.
Enhanced reliability and availability of
mission support communications.
Improved integration with national
intelligence assets.
The pillars of the STA security concept are specialized

vehicles, secure trailers, highly trained agents, and robust
communication systems. STA will continue to modernize its
assets and enhance the capability of its workforce. STA will
extend the life of the SGT, conduct an analysis of
alternatives for the development, testing, and production of
the SGT follow-on trailer (which will be called the Mobile
Guardian Transporter [MGT]), complete phased deployment of the Advanced Radio Enterprise System
(ARES), and continue replacement of vehicles and tractors and restoration of Federal agent strength
levels. In addition, STA will ensure all support systems remain efficiently integrated.
5.1 Secure Transportation Asset Program

Nuclear weapon LEPs, limited life component exchanges, surveillance, dismantlement, nonproliferation
initiatives, and experimental programs rely on transport of the weapons, components, and SNM
on schedule and in a safe, secure manner.
STA supports the DOE goal to reduce
the danger and environmental risk of
domestic transport of nuclear cargo and
consolidate storage of nuclear material.
Table 51 indicates that STA provides
secure transport for DOE, DOD, and other
Government agencies. Because of the
control and coordination required and the
potential security consequences of material
loss or compromise, STA is Governmentowned and -operated, and is subject to the
reporting requirements of the Government
Performance and Results Act.
Table 51. DOE and NNSA programs, offices, and other agencies supported by the
Secure Transportation Asset Program
DOE and NNSA Program, Office, or Agency
Type of Shipment or Service
NNSA Directed Stockpile Work Program
Weapons, joint test assemblies, canned subassemblies, tritium gas

transfer systems, tritium gas generators, uranium solids
NNSA Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response

Program
Emergency airlift, Office of Secure Transportation personnel and

equipment
NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
HEU metals and oxides, plutonium metals and oxides, mixed oxides
NNSA Office of Naval Reactors
Reactor fuel replacements, HEU
NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and International Security
Training events with nuclear transport elements of foreign nations
DOE Emergency Management
Alternate NNSA Emergency Operations Center
DOE Environmental Management
Hazardous surplus strategic material, site de-inventory movements
DOE Office of Nuclear Energy
HEU metals
DOE Office of Science
HEU
DOE Secretary, Deputy Secretary
Executive protection, stateside and overseas, as required
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Radioisotope thermoelectric generators
HEU = highly enriched uranium
5.1.1 Core Components of the Secure Transportation Asset Program

5.1.1.1
Federal Agent Force
Federal agents undergo rigorous selection and intensive training to master a unique set of skills to
defend a shipment from the full spectrum of threat scenarios. They must respond to unpredictable
situations, including non-hostile emergencies, without endangering the public or the cargo.
5.1.1.2
Specialized Vehicle Fleet
STA maintains a variety of escort vehicles and armored tractors for convoy operations. A methodical
engineering process ensures safety, security, quality control, and configuration management of the
vehicles. A vehicle remains in operation according to a reliability life cycle based on its maintenance
history and the life expectancy of its mechanical systems, rather than on its age or mileage. The
maintenance is three to four times that of a commercial vehicle: STA inspects, tests, and services a
vehicle and its communication system before each convoy mission.
STA procures commercial vehicles and components, which are then modified and reconfigured for a
Federal agent team. Equipment compartments and communications systems are installed to support
the safety and security of the convoy.
5.1.1.3
Specialized Trailers
Specialized trailers are STAs most critical capital asset. Their design, engineering, testing, production,
and use span decades. The design and construction addresses public safety, unique cargo
configurations, and protection systems. The SGT, a second-generation trailer used for transporting
nuclear warheads and weapons-grade material, was originally designed for a ten-year life cycle. STA
reviewed and extended the life cycle to 20 years; the first production units will reach end of service life
in 2018. The next-generation trailer is the MGT. STA has initiated an analysis of alternatives study for
development, testing, and production of the MGT. STA will use a modern transportation-industry design
approach and provide a platform to assure the safety and security of cargo. STA will implement a risk
reduction initiative to extend the life of some of the SGT fleet to maintain the current capacity until the
MGT has been produced and is operational.
5.1.1.4
Transportation Command and Control System
This component provides multiple communication channels, capabilities for redundant and automated
tracking, and robust data storage and processing. The essential elements are the primary and alternate
Transportation Emergency Control Center, high-frequency relay stations, satellite services, and an
overlapping integrated series of secure communication networks. The primary Transportation
Emergency Control Center operates 24 hours a day to control and monitor the convoys. The critical
nature of these communication channels mandates that a redundant alternative be available. STA is
establishing a new Alternate Operations Facility to serve as a backup location to ensure continuous
communications during convoy missions and emergency situations.
5.1.1.5
Geographically Situated Facilities
The STA facilities are geographically dispersed among several sites in Tennessee, New Mexico, Texas,
Arkansas, Idaho, Maryland, and Missouri. These sites support communications, training, logistics,
mission operations, and management oversight. Three Federal agent commands with vehicle
maintenance facilities are in Albuquerque, New Mexico; Amarillo, Texas; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, has centralized training facilities, a Federal agent academy, and vehicle
maintenance facilities.
5.1.2 Major Organizational Efforts of Secure Transportation Asset

5.1.2.1
Liaison and Domain Awareness
STA maintains a liaison program with agencies and organizations that may be in contact with a convoy
or have to respond to an emergency. This interface extends across the 48 continental states, but
particularly focuses on primary and secondary routes of the convoys. The scope of the liaison function
includes Federal, state, tribal, and local agencies and involves interactions with law enforcement
officers, firefighters, emergency and hazardous materials responders, dispatchers, and military
personnel. STA also provides emergency response information to law enforcement associations,
governors associations (specifically on hazardous material transport), and governors representatives.
STA has developed an Active Security Doctrine that is operationally focused, intelligence driven, and
emphasizes realistic threat scenarios and specific environments on the convoy routes. That doctrine
provides options to adjust protection levels commensurate with real-time conditions and the technology
to enhance domain awareness along transportation corridors. STA relies on extensive coordination and
established data-sharing relationships with the DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, the
United States Northern Command, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Implementation of doctrine, intelligence, reconnaissance, and liaison efforts enable STA
to evaluate its mission options and mitigate risks.
5.1.2.2
Training
Federal agents receive training in full-scale emergency and tactical operations scenarios, tactical driving
techniques, and a variety of weapons and explosives. Each agent command has facilities and staff to
refresh primary skills and accomplish most qualification training. At Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, a training
command with permanent facilities and billets supports special weapons, tactical scenarios, general
agent training, and the Agent Candidate Training Academy. A special vehicle fleet is maintained to
support training realism.
5.1.2.3
Safety and Security
Force-on-force validation exercises are the primary means to test all convoy systems, ensure
implementation of the Active Security Doctrine, and determine system effectiveness for the STA Site
Security plan. The safety and security staff design these exercises; the training and logistical staff then
execute the exercises and integrate them with the emergency command and control elements to
provide the most realistic convoy scenarios possible. Two primary documents serve as STAs licenses to
operate: the Site Security Plan and the Documented Safety Analysis. These documents outline the
compliance with security and safety orders and regulations related to nuclear operations within DOE
and NNSA.
5.1.2.4
Aviation Service
The fleet of Government-owned aircraft provides for the efficient and flexible airlift of LLCs, nuclear
incident response elements, Federal agents, joint test assemblies, training assemblies, and personnel
and equipment associated with national emergencies and disasters. Because of the distances traveled,
the quantities and types of materials moved, and the timeliness of the stockpile mission requirements,
STAs aviation assets provide the most efficient, safe, and effective mode for transporting LLC shipments
and supporting assemblies. STA also maintains an aircraft on 24-hour/seven-day alert that is ready to
respond within four hours to nuclear incidents, as well as to support evacuation and relocation of key
personnel to maintain the continuity of Government operations. Because the special requirement
associated with transporting Federal agents with full equipment and firearms makes commercial travel
difficult or in some cases impossible, STA aircraft provide efficient and effective movement of Federal
agents in support of operations and training requirements.
The recent purchase of two Boeing 737 aircraft and the transition from contractor pilots to Federal
pilots have added a noteworthy dimension to the safety and security of aviation operations. These two
major changes have required significant effort to implement, but also have provided an opportunity to
take a fresh look at how the aviation fleet is used and how the effectiveness and efficiency of the
aviation operations can be enhanced. When both 737 aircraft are fully upgraded, the DC-9 aircraft will
be removed from the fleet.
5.1.3 Secure Transportation Asset Goals

The overall goal is to be sized efficiently to support the projected workload with sufficient flexibility to
adjust to unforeseen requirements and changes in the security posture, while maintaining a workforce
and vehicle fleet capable of responding to the full security continuum.
Annual goals:
Modernize mission assets and infrastructure.
Strengthen mission support systems.
Drive an integrated and effective organization.
Continuously improve workforce capability and performance.
Long-term goals:
Complete production and fielding of the Replacement Armored Tractor by FY 2019.
Upgrade and replace aging vehicles on a continuous basis.
Implement SGT risk-reduction activities until the new MGTs come on line.
Complete MGT final design and initiate activities for a first production unit.
Develop security strategies based on intelligence assessments and risk mitigation and
management.
Rehabilitate and maintain facilities and infrastructure.
STA is focused on replacing end-of-life communications systems for its vehicle fleet, replacing armored
tractors, and preparing for the retirement and replacement of the Safeguards Transporter trailers.
To meet changing customer needs within budget constraints and account for emerging threats, STA has
developed an integrated, long-term plan to maintain, refurbish, modernize, and replace its critical
transportation assets. The life cycles of these assets require substantial investment and deliberate effort
spanning decades.
5.1.4 Secure Transportation Asset Strategy

5.1.4.1
Program Planning and Management
STA will maintain the capacity to support the workload associated with dismantlement and maintenance
of the stockpile and the initiative to consolidate storage of nuclear material. STA will continue
implementing operationally focused and intelligence-driven processes that concentrate on detection,
deterrence, and disruption of potential threats while sustaining capabilities to defend, recapture, and
recover nuclear weapons, SNM, and weapons components.
5.1.4.2
Strategic Management
STA will provide safe and secure transport of weapons, components, and SNM in support of national
security. External factors with the strongest impact on achieving that primary strategic goal are:
the effects of de-inventory and SNM consolidation on the life span of the vehicle fleet and
capacity requirements,
stabilized fleet replacement schedules,
an uncertain threat environment, and
the ability to train agents in realistic over-the-road environments.
5.1.4.3
Major Out-Year Priorities and Assumptions
STA has identified the following four key strategies to guide the Office of Secure Transportation over the
next five to ten years. These strategies are aligned with and support the key goals identified in the DOE
Strategic Plan (DOE 2014).
Modernize Mission Assets and Infrastructure. STA must maintain the transportation assets to
support its mission in the face of changing customer needs, budgets, and threats. Modernizing
and sustaining these assets requires an integrated, long-term strategy and a substantial
investment. The STA strategy includes eliminating outdated assets, refurbishing existing
transportation assets to extend their useful life, and procuring new assets.
Improve Workforce Capability and Performance. Although STAs assets and infrastructure are
essential for successful mission implementation, the workforce is STAs most valuable resource.
That workforce must be continuously replenished, developed, and maintained. This includes
everyone in the organization, from Federal agents to senior management. Initial and continued
training and development will ensure the staff is competent and proficient. STA will recruit and
retain experienced and innovative personnel and support the development of personnel skills
for future leaders.
Strengthen Mission Support Systems. The STA workforce needs proven state-of-the-art
technology to support the mission, including reliable, redundant systems to plan, track, and
communicate with convoys. STA is upgrading and enhancing the Transportation Command
Control System and mobile integrated systems to provide a timely, common operating picture
and real-time situational awareness of weather, traffic, and potential threats to security and
safety, especially in emergency situations. STA is enhancing data and workflow application
systems to support predictive maintenance, minimize vehicles breakdowns, provide
management tools, and maximize resource efficiency. STA will deliver technology solutions
developed through its own ideas and the experiences of other agencies and industrial partners.
Drive an Integrated and Effective Organization. STA will monitor, evaluate, and improve its
operation to ensure its secure transport mission is achievable in a changing environment. This
includes activities directly related to that mission, such as safeguards and security requirements
and business processes. STA will strive to eliminate redundancies, improve performance and
efficiency, and streamline operations. Key milestones, objectives, and future plans are displayed
in Figure 51 of Section 5.1.7.
5.1.5 Secure Transportation Asset Challenges

STA has structured its resources to address near- and long-term stockpile needs. The challenges are
listed below.
Beginning Replacement of the Trailer Fleet. In 2015, STA will complete an analysis of
alternatives to finalize the design for the MGT. STA will continue parallel development of
subsystems that are common to all candidate designs. STA will maintain the current capacity by
keeping some SGTs on the road beyond the certified 20-year life cycle. It will also scope the SGT
risk reduction efforts in 2015 and begin actions to ensure the availability of critical components.
Stable and Balanced Vehicle Production. In the past, vehicle replacements were based on bulk
purchases and accelerated production. During the transition to stable steady-state procurement
and production, STA must replace vehicles at the end of their life cycle without a surge in
production; other vehicles must undergo extensive refurbishment to establish steady
production.
Sunset Technology. Resources reaching the end of their service life must be evaluated and
replacement activities carefully managed so that, within a limited budget, STA can achieve the
greatest benefit through life-cycle management, steady-state vehicle procurements, and
maintenance initiatives.
Forecasting and Meeting Future Workload. Future workload planning depends on NNSA and
DOE shipping forecasts, consolidation of requests, synchronization of site activities, duration of
various weapon activities, and handling and delivery requirements for specific cargo.
Retention of Federal Agents. STA must safeguard career progression, job enrichment, and
quality of life to retain agents for 20 to 25 years. The separation from family, long travel hours,
and acute stress of the mission pose unique difficulties for retention. STA must continue to
adhere to a predictable schedule that balances training and mission weeks so agents can plan
personal time to improve their quality of life.
Facilities. Funds must be allocated for construction projects, life-cycle replacements, repairs,
and reduction of the deferred maintenance backlog to ensure management in a cost-effective
manner. STA has begun planning for the Albuquerque Complex move and transition of existing
facilities, which will present funding and logistical challenges. Industry best practices will be
implemented to maintain facilities in a safe and operable condition and meet all security
requirements. STAs Facility Board prioritizes and matches mission needs to existing funding.
5.1.6 FY 2014 Accomplishments
Completed 115 shipments without compromise or loss of nuclear weapons or components or

release of radioactive material.
Validated that the Site Security Plan meets the requirements of the Graded Security Protection
Policy.
Completed two operational training events. One live fire event at Ft. Knox, Kentucky and a
convoy event at Ft. Riley, Kansas.
Accepted delivery of 55 of the 89 Escort Vehicle Light Chassis to complete production in early
FY 2016.
Accepted delivery of 5 of the 42 Replacement Armored Tractors, with the goal of finishing
production by FY 2019.
Retrofitted two of five Federal agent units mission support vehicles with ARES. The last unit is
scheduled for completion in FY 2016.
Completed MGT look-ahead studies and estimates and the concept development tasks.
Completed the FY 2014 Ten-Year Site Plan for STA facilities and the Five-Year Site Plan for
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.
Moved Training Command Logistic operations to the refurbished Logistics Support Site facility.
5.1.7 Milestones, Objectives, and Future Plans

The milestones outlined below will move STA towards defined goals. The key strategies remain
unchanged; however, STA faces a challenging budget environment, and the risk of funding cuts requires
evaluation and analysis of the operational environment to ensure the greatest value to the taxpayer in
providing safe and secure transport of the Nations weapons and SNM.
To stabilize operating budgets and move to steady-state production, STA has adjusted its out-year
production plans for all escort vehicles and armored tractors and re-evaluated its plans to maintain a
high-frequency communication system. Design and production of the MGT will be challenging during
the FYNSP.
5.1.7.1
Milestones update
Trailer Fleet
Complete analysis of alternatives for the MGT to examine the costs of various options; then
finalize the conceptual design and prepare to procure and produce the third-generation trailer.
Complete the SGT Risk Reduction Initiative Program study to extend some of the SGT fleet to
maintain capacity.
Vehicle Fleet
Complete the ARES installations and retrofits in the vehicle fleet.
Complete production of the new trailer communication system.
Complete Escort Vehicle Light Chassis production.
Facilities and Aviation
Complete 737 aircraft avionics upgrade, ballast installation, and fuel tank suppression.
Achieve operational capability at the Alternate Operations Facility.
Complete Albuquerque Complex transition.
Figure 51. Secure Transportation Asset Program milestones and objectives timeline
Chapter 6
Security
Two NNSA programs ensure the security of the Nations nuclear materials, infrastructure, workforce and
sensitive information. These are the Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) and the Information Technology
and Cybersecurity Programs. DNS ensures protection, control, and accountability of nuclear materials,
as well as the physical security of NNSAs sites and the personnel security of its workforce. Information
Technology and Cybersecurity ensures protection of classified and sensitive information about the
Nations nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as sensitive information about the men and women who are
the stewards of that stockpile. The Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program plays a
leadership role in defending the Nation from the threat of nuclear terrorism. This program ensures
capabilities are in place to respond to any emergency at an NNSA site and to a nuclear or radiological
incident or emergency anywhere in the United States and abroad. It also develops capabilities to
address terrorist incidents involving nuclear threat devices. These two programs are described in a
separate NNSA document focused on preventing, countering, and responding to global nuclear threats.
6.1 Defense Nuclear Security Program

DNS protects NNSA assets by implementing security measures to thwart theft, diversion, sabotage,
espionage, unauthorized access, compromise, and other hostile acts that may affect national security,
program continuity, and employee security.
In
February 2014, the Acting NNSA Administrator announced
FY 2014 Security Accomplishments
reorganization of DNS. The new structure is consistent with
the Secretary of Energys goal to improve the security focus
Completed the Nuclear Materials
across the nuclear security enterprise by creating clear lines
Safeguards and Security Upgrades
of responsibility and accountability for effective, agile
(Phase II) Project at LANL.
decision-making and emergency response. The Chief of
Completed the Security Improvements
Project at Y-12 within cost and
Defense Nuclear Security provides implementation
schedule.
guidance and budget and assesses the effectiveness of the
Implemented Protective Force

physical, information, and personnel security at NNSAs
Enterprise Mission Essential Task List
national security laboratories, nuclear weapons production
and Handgun Standardization
facilities, and the Nevada National Security Site.
initiatives.
The Chief of Defense Nuclear Security is also NNSAs Chief

Security Officer. As such, the Chief of Defense Nuclear
Security/Chief Security Officer reports to the NNSA Administrator and has direct access to the Secretary
of Energy. The Chief Security Officer recommends DOE security policy changes as a member of the new
DOE Security Committee. When necessary and appropriate, the Chief Security Officer also provides an
interface with the new DOE Office of Enterprise Assessment. With that, the primary mission of NNSAs
DNS and the Chief Security Officer is to develop and implement sound security programs to protect
nuclear weapons, SNM, personnel, classified information, cybersecurity, and NNSA facilities, as well as
to control and account for SNM across the NNSA nuclear security enterprise.
6.1.1 Offices of the Defense Nuclear Security Program

DNS is a line management organization. Described below are its five offices.
6.1.1.1
Office of Resource Management and Mission Support
The Office of Resource Management and Mission Support manages the budget and provides business
operations support (e.g., human resources, contracts, logistics, and facilities) for DNS. It serves as the
focal point for developing and issuing strategic requirements, planning, and communication related to
safeguards and security at NNSA.
6.1.1.2
Office of Security Operations and Programmatic Planning
The Office of Security Operations and Programmatic Planning establishes operational direction for the
NNSA security program, evaluates execution of operational security requirements, and ensures line
management evaluation programs are rigorous and provide confidence that contractor security
programs are operating effectively. The major security program topical areas include program planning
and management, physical security systems, protective forces, information security, personnel security,
material control and accountability, technical surveillance countermeasures, operations security, and
incidents of security concern.
6.1.1.3
Office of Classification, Special Programs, and Headquarters Security
The Office of Classification, Special Programs, and Headquarters Security is the primary DNS point of
contact with internal and external organizations and agencies with respect to classification and special
access matters. The office manages the nuclear security enterprise-wide Classification and Controlled
Information Program, provides security oversight of the DOE Special Access Program, and oversees
management of the NNSA Classified Matter Protection and Control Program for NNSA Headquarters.
6.1.1.4
Office of Nuclear Materials Integration
In January 2015, NNSA completed a merger and realignment of several offices. As a result, the Office of
Nuclear Materials Integration merged under the newly formed Office of Safety, Infrastructure and
Operations and is no longer a subordinate office of Defense Nuclear Security.
6.1.1.5
Office of Personnel and Facility Clearances
The Office of Personnel and Facility Clearance administers the personnel security access authorization
program for NNSA sites, as well as the Facility Clearance Program for NNSA sites and NNSA
Headquarters. Facility Clearance (including Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence) ensures vetting
and registration to manage classified matter for companies.
6.1.2 Defense Nuclear Security Goals

DNSs overall goal is to provide programs to protect the nuclear materials, physical infrastructure, and
workforce that are vital to executing long-range plans for the stockpile. Short-term DNS goals include
the following:
Stabilize the DNS workforce and redefine roles, responsibilities, and authorities in terms of the
new structure.
Manage the DNS budget to provide sufficient resources in a constrained fiscal environment.
Partner with DOE offices and field elements to define and build a robust security culture.
Implement a life-cycle management plan to ensure the NNSA security program is sustainable.
Execute classification and controlled information programs to protect the Nations weapons
information.
Implement and oversee enhanced security for NNSA Special Access Programs across the nuclear
Complete NNSA initiatives pertinent to Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence and the Facility
Clearance Program, and implement capabilities for customer-interface web service.
Implement changes to DOE Order 472.2, Personnel Security, to ensure accurate, timely, and
equitable determination of eligibility for access to classified information across the nuclear
6.1.3 Defense Nuclear Security Strategy

DNS will create a healthy, collaborative security culture based on mutual trust and respect; strive for
consistency in process implementation while allowing for purposeful differences; and enhance the longterm viability of NNSAs Security Team. Accomplishing this strategy while fostering an environment of
healthy skepticism will include providing input to the DOE Security Committee, implementing
programmatic standardization across the nuclear security enterprise, developing career-path training for
security professionals that support NNSA needs, and continuing to develop Federal capabilities.
6.1.4 Defense Nuclear Security Challenges

DNS objectives to meet the challenges of nuclear security in the 21st Century are as follows:
Achieve effective safeguards and security across the nuclear security enterprise through
judicious stewardship in a fiscally challenged environment.
Lead the integration and standardization of safeguards and security across the nuclear security
enterprise.
Re-establish organizational credibility with internal and external stakeholders at all levels.
Cultivate a healthy, collaborative security culture by rebuilding NNSA Headquarters and field
office relationships and foster external collaborations across the nuclear security enterprise.
Ensure plans for physical security systems, facilities, and equipment are coordinated with
recapitalization and supply chain management.
Overcome prevalent nuclear security essential-skill vacancies within the enterprise Federal
workforce.
6.1.5 Defense Nuclear Security Milestones, Objectives, and Future Plans

Key programmatic milestones, objectives, and plans involving physical infrastructure and protective
force revitalization continue the positive trend outlined in the FY 2015 SSMP. In addition to DNS efforts
described in Chapter 4, Revitalize Physical Infrastructure, the following is a summary of further
ongoing efforts:
Implement the NNSA Security Roadmap and address long-standing unresolved security-related
issues.
Assess security implementation efforts by reviewing and updating security plans and
performance testing, reviewing vulnerability assessments, and revising threat and vulnerability
analyses.
Transition to and implement the Joint Nuclear Security Collaboration Initiative to provide
greater consistency between NNSA and DOD regarding nuclear weapons and material
protection strategies and practices.
Focus on standardizing technologies and equipment to provide operational efficiencies for security
programs.
Address critical decision zero (approved mission need) items and upgrades that are required by
prioritized necessity.
Use Enterprise Mission Essential Task List principles to identify protective force training needs
across the NNSA nuclear security enterprise and to direct appropriate and available resources to
ensure training and performance improves in those areas.
Figure 61. Defense Nuclear Security program milestones and objectives timeline
6.2 Information Technology and Cybersecurity Program

The Information Technology and Cybersecurity Program
protects NNSAs information assets from unauthorized access
and compromise by ensuring sufficient IT and cybersecurity
safeguards are implemented throughout the nuclear security
enterprise. In FY 2014, NNSA continued to refine the tools to
manage and protect its information systems and assets
within budget constraints using a risk management
approach.
FY 2014 Accomplishments in
Information Technology
and Cyber Security
Deployed a new security information
and event management system.
Implemented a new high-bandwidth
system for detecting network traffic
across the nuclear security enterprise.
Implemented a system to centralize all
classified connections with DOD
through a single monitoring point.
The Information Technology and Cybersecurity Program is

crucial to the success of stockpile stewardship and
management. IT provides the capability to streamline the
work to ensure accountability of nuclear material across the
nuclear security enterprise; manage the overall life cycle
processes of nuclear weapons from cradle to grave; provide
project communications; execute weapons response simulations using high-performance computers;
and conduct other critical activities to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nations
nuclear weapons.
Cybersecurity plays a crucial role in ensuring the IT environment meets the three key tenets of
confidentiality, integrity, and availability that are at the heart of information security. Confidentiality
ensures that the necessary level of secrecy is enforced at each juncture within data processing to
prevent unauthorized disclosure. Integrity maintains and assures the accuracy and consistency of data
over the entire life cycle by not allowing data to be modified in an unauthorized or undetectable
manner. Availability ensures that the information system is usable when needed and that the systems to
store and process information, the security to protect it, and the communication channels to access it
are functioning correctly. Moreover, in todays increasingly complex environment, costs must be
balanced against business requirements and the needs for increased automation for improved
performance and enhanced asset protection.
6.2.1 Information Technology

IT is a two-edged sword. It provides enhanced mobility, increased productivity, and automation of
manual activities; however, IT also provides opportunities to introduce vulnerabilities that can
compromise access and allow the Nations adversaries to obtain classified data about the stockpile and
sensitive information about NNSAs and DOEs workforce. The Information Technology and
Cybersecurity Program implements the tools needed to improve NNSAs ability to keep malicious
activities at bay, detect unauthorized access, and defend against malevolent actors. The IT program also
evaluates and adopts tools to recover and restore systems to their previous, uncompromised position,
while determining what data may have been lost and providing management with an analysis of the
potential damage. NNSAs three approaches to transform and modernize its IT operations are briefly
summarized below.
6.2.2 NNSA Network Vision

NNSA classified and unclassified networks are being developed, implemented, maintained, and
monitored in a manner that will ensure asset protection based on the category of the information and
associated security concerns. Life-cycle management is being implemented to ensure network systems
are available to support the stockpile stewardship mission throughout the nuclear security enterprise.
6.2.3 Transformation of Information Technology Architecture

During FY 2014, NNSA was focused on delivering the following four distinct capabilities that will provide
the underlying architectural tools for secure, integrated communication:
YOURcloud is a secure, community cloud-services broker that will enable a state-of-the-art,

multi-tenant, multi-cloud platform for secure application hosting, data center consolidation, and
shared services hosting. In 2014, implementation and integration work continued and testing
began.
OneNNSA is a secure, wide-area network that connects all NNSA sites to the cloud. All traffic
will be encrypted with compliant algorithms that follow the Government computer security
standard (FIPS 140-2) to protect the confidentiality of NNSA information. During 2014, NNSA
completed the initial pilot of OneNNSA and the implementation of full enterprise-wide testing.
Network operations were transferred to the DOE Associate Chief Information Officer for Energy
IT Services.
OneVoice is an agency-wide unified communications tool that provides desktop video, web
conferencing, instant messaging, presence, and voice for all NNSA employees (both Federal
employees and M&O contractors). This capability is integrated with an agency-wide social
network to provide enhanced features for collaboration, document sharing, crowd sourcing, and
knowledge retention. In 2014, implementation and integration of OneVoice was completed and
enterprise-wide testing began.
OneID is a multi-layered architecture that offers a federated (i.e., decentralized), complex-wide

tool to validate user identities and authorize access to DOE and NNSA applications. OneID will
replace the agencys existing data-transmission network and provide the foundational
infrastructure for accessing networks and shared services. The pilot of the OneID capability was
completed in 2014, and implementation, integration, and enterprise-wide testing began. The
ability to integrate with physical security access control systems was also demonstrated.
6.2.3.1
Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center
Incident management reform is a key element of the Secretary of Energys Management Excellence
Initiatives. In 2010, DOE assessed its Incident Management Program and identified the need to
(1) provide agile, robust, transparent, and integrated capabilities for frontline cybersecurity operations;
(2) use the collective DOE expertise; and (3) meet Federal requirements for incident management and
response. The Joint Cyber Security Coordination Center (JC3) was formed in 2011 to achieve these
objectives. JC3, which includes NNSA engagement, will allow DOE to understand the health of its
computing environment from a cybersecurity and network operations perspective. JC3 is responsible
for consolidating the cybersecurity incident management capability and governance processes into a
single comprehensive unit and for streamlining information sharing, reporting, and access to technical
resources (24 hours a day, seven days a week), while preserving an individual organizations unique
requirements and information.
In 2014, NNSA focused on improving communication and disseminating classified event information to
the nuclear security enterprise and the DOE elements responsible for cybersecurity. Enhanced sensors
were deployed to the sites serviced by JC3, and remote access to cybersecurity incident data was
provided to NNSA sites and JC3. Governance, programmatic activities, and operations were
consolidated into the DOE Office of the Chief Information Officer, and partnerships with other DOE
offices (e.g., Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, Office of the Inspector General, and Office of Independent Enterprise Assessment)
were expanded.
6.2.4 Subprograms of Information Technology and Cybersecurity

The subprograms described below support all activities within the Information Technology and
Cybersecurity Program.
6.2.4.1
Infrastructure
The Infrastructure Subprogram supports cybersecurity operations and activities at all NNSA sites and is
based on NNSAs defense-in-depth approach to achieving cybersecurity in a highly networked
environment. That approach has three major components: personnel, technology, and operations. The
approach recommends a balance between the protection capability and considerations of cost,
performance, and operations. That balance provides the personnel and technology to maintain a
cybersecurity posture that complies with Federal, DOE, and NNSA policies and procedures, while
addressing the increasing number and complexity of threats, vulnerabilities, and risks.
6.2.4.2
Enterprise Secure Computing
Enterprise Secure Computing provides the state-of-the-art classified computing infrastructure that
enables effective collaboration and information sharing in a secure environment. The subprogram
focuses on daily operations, infrastructure enhancements, and application deployment.
6.2.4.3
Technology Application Development
Technology Application Development is responsible for advancing policies and initiatives to support
short- and long-term solutions to specific cybersecurity needs at the NNSA sites and NNSA
Headquarters. Technological innovation, research, and development are critical components to protect
NNSAs assets in national and global technology-driven environments. The subprogram focuses on
emerging technologies and leverages existing technology resources to create a more secure
environment. It also develops new strategies for cybersecurity activities across NNSA and fosters
collaboration among organizations.
6.2.5 Information Technology and Cybersecurity Goals

The overarching goal is to implement a flexible, comprehensive IT and cybersecurity system to ensure
the protection of NNSAs classified and sensitive information assets related to the nuclear weapons
stockpile. Specific Information Technology and Cybersecurity goals include the following:
Ensure data confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Implement technology designs that provide effective network monitoring, limit an intruders
ability to traverse the network, and can be updated in a timely manner to mitigate new
vulnerabilities.
Develop enhanced information security protection tools for information systems, applications,
and networks within both classified and unclassified environments.
Ensure compliance with NNSAs defense-in-depth cybersecurity strategy.
6.2.6 Information Technology and Cybersecurity Strategy

NNSA continues to maintain and improve its defenses against cyber threats that are increasing in
number, complexity, and sophistication, while developing and applying advanced IT to ensure the
security of the Nations nuclear weapons and support other national security missions, such as
homeland security. The NNSA sites are continuing to improve the scope and quality of their IT and
cybersecurity systems by sharing ideas about asset protection and implementing NNSA guidance and
policies. The long-term NNSA strategy has four components. These are summarized below.
6.2.6.1
Planning
Planning is a collaborative effort between NNSA Headquarters and the NNSA field offices to understand
the threat landscape and identify weaknesses through compliance reviews and performance
measurement. The information NNSA gleans is fed back into planning to generate both a long-term
strategy and an annual tactical plan. The planning processes also include a cybersecurity working group
and participation in the development of periodic NNSA threat statements and risk assessments.
6.2.6.2
Cybersecurity Policy and Guidance
The cybersecurity policy and guidance component establishes high-level goals and outcomes for NNSAs
Information Technology and Cybersecurity Program and drives the implementation strategy. This
component ensures that direction is aligned with DOE and Federal cybersecurity policy and guidance
and with the planning component of NNSAs IT and cybersecurity strategy. The focus is on balancing
both mission and security requirements and providing an appropriately less risk-averse process, while
ensuring the right resources are applied to the more critical areas.
6.2.6.3
Architecture and Technology
The architecture and technology component of NNSAs strategy focuses on developing, installing, and
managing an IT architecture that is standardized and integrated across the nuclear security enterprise.
This strategic component includes architectural guidance, enterprise licensing of security tools and
products, and a technology review and development process.
6.2.6.4
Services
The aim of the services component is to develop an intelligent, proactive, centralized approach to
cybersecurity to mitigate security threats both at NNSA and DOE. The Information Technology and
Cybersecurity Program will facilitate the adoption of new processes and policies throughout the nuclear
security enterprise by providing specific services and performing key initiatives related to protecting
information assets. These services include cybersecurity communications, education and awareness,
asset management, advice and assistance, and awards and recognition.
6.2.7 Information Technology and Cybersecurity Challenges

The expanded use of advanced IT solutions to enhance user interactions and improve mobile computing
is stretching NNSAs limited resources to implement the best security tools. Specific challenges include:
protecting information assets from unauthorized access and compromise in the face of risks,
threats, attack vector concerns that grow every day, and the reality of budget constraints;
addressing new unfunded requirements from the Office of Management and Budget and DOE
for unclassified cybersecurity efforts;
competing with the commercial sector for qualified IT and cybersecurity personnel;
minimizing delays in replacing and modernizing the IT and cybersecurity infrastructure to meet
the production and R&D missions;
oversight and management of increased classified computing across NNSA, as well as new
Federal requirements (e.g., the Homeland Security Presidential Directive); and
minimizing the creation of disparate IT applications in favor of adopting a nuclear security

enterprise-wide, platform-based approach that utilizes shared capabilities.
6.2.8 Summary of Significant Accomplishments and Plans
Purchased and deployed a new Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system
(pronounced sim) to provide a holistic view of an organizations IT security. SIEM combines
security information management and security event management functions into a single
security management system. The underlying principle of a SIEM system is that relevant data
about an enterprises security is produced in multiple locations and all the data can be looked at
from a single point of view to make it easier to spot trends and see patterns that are out of the
ordinary. SIEM describes a products capabilities related to gathering, analyzing, and presenting
information from network and security devices; identifying and accessing management
applications; vulnerability management and policy compliance tools; operating system,
database and application logs; and external threat data. A key focus is to monitor and manage
user and service privileges, directory services, and other system configuration changes and to
provide log auditing and review of incident responses.
Implemented a new high-bandwidth solution to provide intelligent Traffic Visibility Networking

that improves the ability to see into the network infrastructure from both an enterprise and
local site perspective. The ability to share the same data stream across multiple monitoring
tools allows NNSA to be more agile, secure, and cost-effective. The network infrastructure
upgrade implementation provides flexibility for the enterprise architecture to test new tools by
sharing data from a single point, to integrate new technology as it is developed, and to improve
network monitoring. Overall, this accomplishment increases insight into the network and makes
NNSA better able to defend against and respond to incidents.
Received approval from the Defense Information Assurance Security Accreditation Working
Group to stand up an independent Computer Network Defense Service Provider as only the
second non-DOD civilian agency authorized. This allowed NNSA to centralize all DOD SIPRNet
[Secure Internet Protocol Router Network] connections through a single monitoring point,
thereby improving the overall view into potential events occurring on the classified
infrastructure.
Began conducting Command Cyber Readiness Inspections to provide insight into network
defense protection and compliance with system requirements. Processes for this ongoing
program were validated; these inspections will be conducted annually at selected sites.
Completed purchase of Splunk to standardize enterprise log aggregation and enhance log data
analysis. Splunk allows the collection and indexing of any machine data from virtually any
source in real time. It allows NNSA to search, monitor, analyze, and visualize its data to gain
new insights and intelligence. It indexes everything for deep visibility, forensics, and
troubleshooting. It allows ad hoc report creation to identify trends or prove compliance
controls and the ability to analyze user transactions, customer behavior, machine behavior,
security threats, and fraudulent activity in real time.
Initiated cybersecurity performance measures across all sites to improve measurement of

performance against specific goals and objectives. This will drive consistent performance and
allow the Chief Information Officer to focus resources in areas where performance
improvement is needed.
Progressed with the Continuous Monitoring project by establishing Phase Two requirements
and beginning initial deployment. Phase Two will focus on deployment to the classified
network, as well as further enhancements and deployment to the unclassified networks.
Started work on closer coordination of physical security systems and implementation of

cybersecurity requirements into these areas.
Started work on consolidation of networks that (1) have the same function or mission objective
and essentially the same operating characteristics and security needs, and (2) reside in the same
general operating environment (or in the case of a distributed information system, reside in
various locations with similar operating environments) to reduce operational and life-cycle
costs.
Figure 62. Information Technology and Cybersecurity milestones and objectives timeline
Chapter 7
Sustaining the Workforce
The future of the nuclear security enterprise depends on a skilled, diverse workforce with experience
across a broad array of the sciences, including engineering, mathematics, and technology. NNSA is
keenly aware that it must invest in an available, qualified,
and committed workforce to fulfill its nuclear security
FY 2014 Workforce Accomplishments
mission. Maintaining, refreshing, and training people in The national security laboratories
essential areas of expertise are critical to ensuring the
cumulatively earned nine R&D
integrity of the nuclear deterrent. NNSA and its M&O
100 awards in 2014 and garnered
partners are devoting extensive effort to sustaining and
53 of these coveted awards in the last
five years.
revitalizing the workforce to support the 3+2 Strategy. This
NNSAs M&O partners filed more than

chapter describes the nuclear security enterprise workforce
270 patents in FY 2014, with more
structure, how the various entities work together to support
than 210 granted that year.
the nuclear deterrent and meet other NNSA program and
Staff at all NNSA sites received

national security needs, and the challenges of sustaining
national recognition and prestigious
that workforce. Appendix D of this years SSMP includes
awards from their professional
descriptions of the mission, mission capabilities,
societies and technical communities.
infrastructure, and workforce data of the eight NNSA sites as
well as workforce data on the NNSA Federal staff. These
data describe site-specific mission assignments and capabilities, budget allocations, infrastructure plans,
and workforce characteristics and challenges. Although not exclusively focused on Defense Programs
needs, the data reflect the way in which each of the sites leverages other national security missions, in
varying degrees, to sustain the nuclear weapons mission. Specific discussion about the essential skills
for sustaining that nuclear weapon mission in particular appears in Section 7.4.2 of this chapter.
7.1 Introduction
NNSA and its collaborating partners face many challenges and looming issues in planning and managing
the multi-faceted workforce now and well into the future. Shortages in key areas of expertise and
essential skills, coupled with competition from private sector employers, are making it more difficult to
recruit, hire, and retain that workforce. NNSAs ability to retain mid-career and entry-level workers is
threatened by the competitive high-tech job market, with private sector employers offering higher
salaries and more-attractive benefits in several disciplines. Preservation and transfer of institutional and
technical knowledge prior to the exodus of retirement-eligible members are critical to the continuity of
NNSAs nuclear weapons work and its capability to develop and mentor the newest members of the
workforce. These issues must be managed in the face of an increasing workload to accomplish weapons
modernization through LEPs while reducing the stockpile size. Adding to the complexity of planning and
managing the future workforce under these circumstances are external factors such as a changing
geopolitical environment, budget uncertainties, and delays in the availability of Weapons Activities
funding.
7.2 The Nuclear Security Enterprise Workforce

7.2.1 Strategic Drivers
Two strategic documents inform the planning and management of the NNSA workforce. The key
messages in the DOE Human Capital Strategic Plan FY 2011 FY 2015 (DOE 2011) and the NNSA
Strategic Plan (DOE 2011) combine to form a clear and consistent overarching principle to manage the
workforce. People are the most important asset in maintaining nuclear deterrence and achieving other
national security goals: approximately 60 percent of the Weapons Activities budget is spent on M&O
labor. The alignment with the DOE and NNSA strategic direction is a prime driver for workforce planning
and management among NNSA and its partners. The workforce is referenced throughout the SSMP as
an asset critical to accomplishing NNSAs missions, with specific references cited in Chapter 2, Stockpile
Management with respect to Life Extension Program Planning and Execution (Section 2.1.4.1) and
Stockpile Services (Section 2.4.3). Chapters 3, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation,
5, Secure Transportation Asset Program, and 6, Security also contain references to the importance
and difficulty of acquiring and retaining personnel with essential skills.
The collective nuclear security enterprise workforce is dynamic because of external factors. The makeup
of the workforce will evolve because of changes in the geopolitical climate, technology, demographics,
and fluctuations in scope and budget. Along with mission needs, these factors and others will drive the
planning and management of the future workforce, as discussed in Sections 7.3 and 7.6.
7.2.2 Summary of Workforce Structure

The Weapons Activities workforce is composed of a diverse group of skilled and mission-focused
technical, administrative, and specialty area staff and managers. The overall workforce has three basic
components: the Federal workforce, the M&O partners, and the non-M&O entities, as illustrated in
Figure 71. That integrated workforce is dedicated to maintaining the Nations deterrent in a safe,
secure, and effective manner.
One example of workforce integration is through personnel exchanges, which provide key interfaces
among and within the Federal and M&O workforces. For example, the National Security Campus at
Kansas City sends technical staff to the national security laboratories early in the design phase to learn
about the design as it is being developed and to incorporate the design into manufacturability concepts
along with lessons learned from past programs. M&O partners with technical expertise are routinely
assigned to NNSA Headquarters and DOD locations. This exchange program provides opportunities that
are mutually beneficial and improves overall communications between the Federal and M&O
workforces.
In this document, workforce data are reported using the Common Occupational Classification System
(COCS). Federal and M&O workforce data are reported in the standardized COCS categories, allowing
consistent comparison among the sites. However, these categories are not completely descriptive of
the functions within each category. For example, the broad COCS category, General Management,
also includes technical and scientific management functions, and the Professional Administrators
category includes technical analysis and drafting design functions.
Figure 71. Nuclear security enterprise workforce components

7.2.2.1
Overall Workforce
At the end of FY 2014, the overall nuclear security enterprise Federal and M&O workforce had
37,071 employees. This excludes the Naval Reactors workforce, but it includes employees engaged in
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation activities. This included 34,927 M&O partners at the eight sites and
2,144 Federal employees (approximately 6 percent of the total). For the FY 2016 SSMP, NNSA changed
the overall reporting of personnel to capturing actual headcount workforce data (as opposed to
calculated full-time equivalent [FTE] data) to better reflect the total site work effort for the assigned
mission scope.1 The new baseline provides improved accuracy, is aligned with site human resource
practices, and provides consistent data to NNSA Headquarters. Collectively, the sites reported a
decrease of approximately 600 employees over the last two fiscal years. Although this is a net loss, it
has not materially affected the overall ability to execute the workload. However, several individual sites
have experienced more impactful losses. See Appendix D for workforce and site-specific data.
7.2.2.2
Federal Workforce
The Federal workforce consists of a mix of civilians and military officers. That collective pairing is
responsible for planning, managing, and overseeing the nuclear security enterprise and is accountable to
the President, the Congress, and the public. The Federal workforce performs key planning functions,
such as establishing and authorizing the work scope, integrating DOD requirements, and providing
program and project management, risk management, acquisition, and contract management services.
NNSA and its partners developed new personnel reporting procedures that are closely aligned with sites human resource data
collection and more closely relate to personnel data commonly understood across the eight NNSA sites. The new methodology
provides a much simpler process that is more widely recognized and matches established procedures and functions more closely
to historic data routinely collected. This new methodology is supported across all eight NNSA sites and the Federal workforce to
provide accurate, consistent, and timelier response to congressional legislation.
The Federal workforce also performs fiduciary oversight, risk acceptance, product acceptance, and
environmental, safety, and health oversight duties (see Figure 72). The Federal workforce resides
primarily at NNSA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at field offices across the eight NNSA sites. At
the end of FY 2014, total Federal headcount of 2,144 included 1,587 under the NNSA Federal Salaries
and Expenses (formerly called the Office of the Administrator) and 557 in the Office of Secure
Transportation Asset.
Figure 72. Headcount of NNSA Federal workforce by Common Occupational Classification System
A small cadre of military officers (25 to 30) is routinely stationed on active duty at NNSA within Defense
Programs. The senior military leader in Defense Programs is a flag officer whose position is established
by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. These officers bring a service perspective to Weapons
Activities and return to DOD at the end of their assignments with a better understanding of NNSA and
the nuclear security enterprise. In some NNSA offices, they make up a not insignificant percentage of
Federal staff overseeing nuclear security programs and activities.
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2015 capped the total number of Federal employees
under NNSA Federal Salaries and Expenses at 1,690 FTEs by October 2015, excluding the Office of Secure
Transportation Asset and Office of Naval Reactors. The 1,690-FTE cap represents a 14.2 percent
reduction from the previous 2010 target of 1,970, which continues to show a steady downward trend
with the cap. This trend is constraining the Federal workforce and yet offers an opportunity to reshape
the workforce for their oversight and program management roles.2
7.2.2.3
M&O Workforce
The M&O workforce resides at eight Government-owned or leased nuclear security enterprise sites.
Roll-ups (see Appendix D) of the workforce under COCS categories for the national security laboratories
(plus the Nevada National Security Site) and the nuclear weapons production facilities are shown in
Figures 73 and 74, respectively. The composition of the workforce has been relatively consistent
since the last SSMP. The numbers of scientists, engineers, and technicians are highest among the
national security laboratories, as would be expected for the R&D roles they primarily fulfill in the nuclear
security enterprise. The nuclear weapons production facilities also have engineers and scientists on
staff, but have higher proportions of operators and crafts to fulfill their manufacturing missions.
The current Federal staff, as of October 2014, totaled 1,587 FTEs under Federal Salaries and Expenses, which is below the cap
set for October 2015.
Figure 73. Headcount of national security laboratories and Nevada National

Security Site by Common Occupational Classification System
Figure 74. Headcount of nuclear weapons production facilities

by Common Occupational Classification System
Although professional administrative personnel and general management percentages are lower than
for the Federal staff, they still represent a substantial portion of the M&O workforce. This is a
byproduct of the COCS code definitions and how they are grouped, as explained above
(see Section 7.2.2). The COCS categories mask the numbers of scientists and engineers who are
functioning in the roles of technical managers, as well as the numbers of project and program managers,
as is the case for the Federal workforce.
Weapons Activities are primarily implemented through a Governmentowned, contractoroperated,
research, development, and production complex, along with a large commercial, academic, and
industrial supply chain. Under the umbrella of the M&O partners are the three national security
laboratories, which operate as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), the four
nuclear weapons production facilities, and the Nevada National Security Site.
The M&O partners perform the day-to-day activities of managing and executing the efforts at the eight
sites, such as R&D, design, production, test, manufacturing, surveillance, etc., with oversight by the
Federal workforce. The M&O workforce also partners with the Federal workforce to develop and
implement strategic planning for the nuclear security enterprise.
7.2.2.4
Non-M&O Workforce
NNSAs outreach for the requisite skill set goes beyond its own ranks. In addition to having access to the
expertise of M&O partners, NNSA relies on nonM&O partners to provide specialized services, access
supplemental experimental assets, and leverage the R&D resources of academia. These non-M&O
partners may include academic researchers, technical and management consultants, subject matter
experts at private corporations, and others on an adjunct, as-needed basis. An example of a non-M&O
partner is the Omega laser at the Laboratory for Laser Energetics, a unique national resource partially
funded by the Government and owned and operated by the University of Rochester. The research at
Omega complements high-energy-density laser R&D work at NNSA facilities (in particular, the NIF).
These non-M&O partners also include some 380 support service contractors supporting the Federal
staff.
7.3 Planning the Workforce

7.3.1 Federal Workforce Planning
The role of NNSA Headquarters in workforce planning is twofold: plan for the Federal workforce and
monitor the workforce planning of the M&O partners. NNSA requires its M&O partners to determine
the appropriate skill mix necessary to execute stockpile stewardship and management activities, in
response to changes in the workload. NNSA Headquarters works jointly with its M&O partners to collect
workforce data and identify and resolve issues, particularly those that affect multiple sites.
7.3.2 Management and Operating Partner Workforce Planning

NNSAs M&O partners develop and implement workforce plans and approaches to ensure the most
effective workforce is available for their respective organizations. Each NNSA site has workforce
planning processes tailored to its unique needs, but the processes have similar elements. First, line
organizations at the sites must translate their assigned mission into workload projections. These
projections are then analyzed along with anticipated retirements and other separations to identify likely
gap areas in future staffing.
The numbers of hires in required disciplines and specialized skill areas are identified over a one- to
two-year time frame (see Figure 75). Human resource organizations at the sites use this planning and
other information to formulate their recruiting strategies and compare their progress against the
planning baseline. They adjust hiring baseline plans for factors such as budget variability, scope
uncertainty, or attrition. Any gaps between workforce availability and workload are managed by each
site using a variety of mechanisms, with the intent of maintaining a steady, experienced workforce over
the FYNSP and beyond. Examples of such mechanisms include:
leveraging resources from other programs or parent company reach-back;3
deferring purchases, capital investments, maintenance, travel, etc.;
prioritizing work to available funding; and
relying on exempt staff4 flexibility.
Figure 75. M&O workforce projections for the current

Future Years Nuclear Security Program period
Parent company reach-back is the ability of operating contractors to leverage certain knowledge, skills, abilities, and business
practices of the parent company to respond to M&O contractor needs, such as best practices, technical capabilities, or access to
specialized resources and talent.
4
Exempt employees are those who are excluded from Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage and overtime pay requirements.
7.4 Unique Workforce Characteristics

7.4.1 Difference of Nuclear Security Enterprise from Private Industry
The work executed by the nuclear security enterprise requires a large, diverse array of unique
knowledge, skills, and capabilities, as well as the ability to perform classified R&D in the context of
national security. Security background investigations constrain universities from preparing students for
nuclear weapons work in an academic setting. Therefore, the entities in the nuclear security enterprise
must train their new workforce intensively and to a greater extent than private industry.
7.4.2 Unique Set of Essential Skills Required for Nuclear Weapons Work
NNSA recognizes its responsibility as the Federal oversight agency to ensure strategies are in place to
acquire and retain staff with the essential skills that are key to accomplishing NNSAs mission. Skills
considered essential can vary over time, depending on changes in work scope and economic conditions.
This time dependency and other characteristics lead NNSA to rely on its M&O partners to identify and
periodically update the list of essential skills that support the NNSA mission. Table 71 provides the
current listing of essential skills as developed by the NNSA sites. Sites apply the NNSA definition of
essential skills5 to derive their list.
Table 71. Essential skills for the nuclear security enterprise
National Security Laboratories
and the Nevada National Security Site
Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities
Nuclear design and evaluation primary and secondary design
Engineering electrical, mechanical, materials
Nuclear design code development
Nuclear criticality safety engineering
Physics atomic, nuclear, and high-energy-density plasma
Fire protection engineering
Computations and simulation
Project management and controls
Engineering design and evaluation all phases, all components
Reservoir engineering
Materials science and engineering
Material science and engineering
Manufacturing and fabrication
Radioactive materials process engineering
Lasers, pulsed power, accelerators, and gas guns
Operational and craft skills
Radiation effects sciences
Manufacturing
Reactor and radiation source operations and evaluation
Chemical processing
Electromagnetic sciences
Process and material development
Metrology
High explosive manufacturing and surveillance
Diagnostics and instrumentation systems
Engineering welding, radar, optics
Quality assurance
Quality assurance
High explosive research, development, test, and evaluation

and surveillance
Radioactive hydrogen isotope process design and

evaluation
Essential skills are those required to accomplish the NNSA mission. These skills are related to the scientific, technical,
engineering, operations, business, and professional disciplines. They are characterized by uniqueness, high market demand, the
time to acquire and maintain proficiency, and the difficulty in recruiting and retaining individuals with those skills.
7.4.3 Adherence to Unique Laws and Regulations for NNSA Scope

The size and composition of the nuclear security enterprise workforce, as described in Section 7.2.2, is
driven primarily by mission need. However, NNSA and its partners must also comply with a set of
legislative and legal requirements for managing the workforce. These include, but are not limited to, all
applicable labor laws, regulations for employee safety and protection, laws governing the protection of
classified information and the granting of security clearances, etc. While private employers deal with
many of these requirements, security in particular puts an especially heavy onus on NNSA and its
partners that adds complexity to the acquisition and retention of the workforce.
7.4.4 Future Issues Facing the Workforce

7.4.4.1
Evolution of Nuclear Security Enterprise Workforce since the Cold War
Events since the end of the Cold War have resulted in fluctuations in programmatic plans, scopes, and
associated funding and contributed to the evolution of the workforce. The current workforce, which is
statistically older than that in many other industries, is a combination of employees nearing retirement
who possess Cold Warera expertise and more recent entrants with newer, fresher skills in emerging
technical fields. Today, there is also a greater focus on national security with additional strategic
partners. This focus has attracted new skills and maintained existing nuclear weapons skills by
leveraging expertise.
7.4.4.2
Talent Management Issues Faced by the Current Workforce
NNSA and its partners face a number of challenges to workforce management: the aging workforce,
budgetary fluctuations, evolving requirements of stockpile modernization through LEPs, and increased
challenges in acquiring and retaining staff caused by a number of the external factors, including the
6
geographic locations of some of the sites.
7.4.4.3
Challenges in Managing the Current Workforce
The future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and the evolving geopolitical landscape will affect the size and
composition of the nuclear security enterprise workforce. The unique nature of nuclear weapons work
and the inability to develop weapon designers through academia because of security background
investigations will continue to be factors. A significant aspect of future planning is the ability to replace
and hire new staff in time to transfer essential skills from members of the workforce who are
approaching retirement. Another continuing issue is attracting and retaining staff with the essential
skills to replace the contingent of retiring workers. Providing a healthy, vibrant, and modern
infrastructure to attract the future workforce presents increasing challenges as infrastructure
modernization competes with the growing scope of stockpile modernization through LEPs
(see Chapter 4, Revitalize Physical Infrastructure). These demands must be addressed at flat or
reduced budgets.
Two specific examples: The Pantex Plant is located where the majority of skills relate to farming in the sparsely populated
Texas Panhandle. The proximity of LLNL and the SNL, California, site to Silicon Valley presents a different challenge in terms of
competition for the pool of available candidates.
7.4.5 Summary of Current State of the Workforce at the Sites

7.4.5.1
Data and Analysis
Metrics from the sites provide insight into the current health of the workforce, emerging trends, current
challenges, and likely future challenges.
Figure 76 provides a snapshot of the M&O workforce distribution by age. The average age of the
workforce at the eight sites varies from 46 to 51 years, with the percentage of retirement-eligible
employees ranging from 21 to 48 percent. Some sites (see Appendix D) portray a bimodal age
distribution, with large numbers of employees in the youngest and oldest age ranges and fewer in the
mid-range. These figures have generated concerns about anticipated turnover rates caused by
impending retirements, as well as concerns about the transfer and preservation of knowledge.
Figure 76. M&O headcount distribution by age

Figure 77 provides a snapshot of NNSAs M&O partner workforce distributed by years of service,
(i.e., the period from the date an employee was hired to the present). Statistics on the average length of
service reveal large numbers of employees with less than ten years of service and comparable
percentages of personnel with greater than 20 years of service. The average lengths of service at the
sites range from 12 to 22 years. Some sites also show a bimodal distribution of lengths of service similar
to that with employee ages; others show a single-mode distribution, with the mode skewed toward
fewer years of service. These numbers demonstrate overall increased hiring in recent years to replace
retirees and to staff emerging programs such as the B61-12 and the W88 Alt 370.
Figure 77. M&O headcount distribution by years of service

In spite of ongoing hiring programs at many sites, the workforce has sustained a net decrease of
approximately 2 percent over the last two years caused by:
planned attrition resulting from transition to a leased facility (i.e., the National Security Campus
in Kansas City),
restructuring and voluntary separation programs (at several sites), and
budget decreases and scope restructuring (i.e., at LLNL and the Nevada National Security Site).
At several sites, the ages and years of service of those who separated voluntarily from the nuclear
security enterprise workforce are indicated by small increases in voluntary separations in the 25 to
35 age group and in the zero to ten years of service range. While the voluntary separation rates are still
low, the affected sites are monitoring these trends among essential skill employees carefully.
At most sites, the percentage of the workforce in later stages of their careers has been steadily
increasing or remained relatively stable. Only one site has had enough early-career hiring to experience
a downward trend in the percentage of employees in late career.
7.4.5.2
Workforce Issues and Implications for the Nuclear Security Enterprise
Concerns about the high average age of employees in the current workforce and the percent eligible for
retirement are pervasive among the sites and NNSA. Such concerns include:
the ability to hire in sufficient numbers at a rapid enough rate to replace the expected
retirements and to staff growing modernization programs and
the knowledge transfer and preservation prior to the departure of retirees.
Additional concerns arise when considering the bimodal age and experience distributions at many sites.
As the large number of late-career employees retire, the sites will have limited numbers of mid-career
employees remaining to train and mentor the large body of incoming new hires.
The larger numbers of early-career employees, coupled with trending data on voluntary separations in
these low age and experience ranges, create concerns among NNSA and its M&O partners regarding the
ability to retain employees in the future. Growing competition from industry and shortages of
candidates in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) essential skill areas augment
these concerns.
7.5 Workforce Accomplishments

The members of the nuclear security enterprise workforce collectively demonstrate a long history of
outstanding technical and professional excellence and dedication through the cumulative honors and
awards earned. These include numerous awards and recognition for technical achievements in their
specialty fields, as well as for contributions to their professions and their communities. Such
accomplishments also demonstrate a service to the Nation through the sharing of the considerable body
of intellectual property generated by the collective workforce. This section summarizes some of these
accomplishments.
The three national security laboratories (LANL, LLNL, and SNL) cumulatively earned nine R&D
100 awards7 in 2014 and garnered a total of 53 of these coveted awards over the last five years. Y-12
and the Nevada National Security Site earned two additional awards in this same five-year period.
Members of the workforce at these five sites have been collaborators with other recipients on nine
additional R&D 100 awards since 2010.
NNSAs M&O partners have been granted patents numbering in the hundreds in each of the last three
years. Filings of technical advances and invention disclosures numbered close to 400 across the sites in
2014. NNSA sites also boast robust technology transfer programs with dozens of Cooperative Research
and Development Agreements and partnership agreements. Technological advances, as evidenced by
these statistics, benefit local communities and society at large by extending the innovation of the NNSA
workforce to other applications within and beyond national security.
The caliber of the workforce is further demonstrated by the numbers of scientists and engineers who
have received recognition and awards from their respective technical and professional societies. As one
example, in 2014, four members of the nuclear security enterprise workforce were named Fellows by
the American Association for the Advancement of Science. This honor recognizes awardees for
scientifically or socially distinguished efforts to advance science or its applications. Nomination and
selection is a rigorous, peer reviewed process. Some additional examples of such accomplishments are
listed in Table 72.
Table 72. NNSA workforce awards and achievements for technical and professional excellence
Award/Recognition
Gordon Bell Prize for outstanding achievement in
high-performance computing
Ernest O. Lawrence Award
Description/Significance
Set a new supercomputing simulation record in fluid dynamics.
For the development and implementation of a model integrating
regional and teleseismic data to yield seismic event solutions with
greatly improved location accuracy, and for its applications in
nuclear explosion monitoring.
RAZAR [Rapid Adaptive Zoom for Assault Rifles]

scope
Enables shooter to zoom in and out faster on near and far targets in
one low-power system.
2014 IMAPS [International Microelectronics

Assembly and Packaging Society] award for technical
contribution to the microelectronics industry
Awarded for sponsoring senior design projects, hiring and providing

training for interns in microelectronics, and promoting the industry
through contributions to scientific publications and journals.
2014 DOE Sustainability Award, Best in Class for Fleet

Maintenance and Water Loss Mitigation
Cited for alternative fuel use, fleet right-sizing, oil change frequency
driven by analysis vs. time interval/mileage, water conservation,
etc.
2014 HENAAC [Hispanic Engineer National

Achievement Awards Corporation] Award - Most
Promising Engineer/Advanced Degree
New (less than nine years since PhD) and promising Hispanics in a
STEM [science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) field
whose technical work already demonstrates a promising career
$1.2M research grant from DOE SunShot initiative
Develop materials to make solar power cost-competitive with other

sources of energy.
The Lawrence Award honors U.S. scientists and engineers at mid-career for exceptional contributions in R&D support for
DOE and its mission to advance the national, economic, and energy security of the United States.
Widely recognized as the Oscars of Invention, the R&D 100 Awards identify and celebrate the top technology products of the
year. Past winners have included sophisticated testing equipment, innovative new materials, chemistry breakthroughs,
biomedical products, consumer items, and high energy density physics. The R&D 100 Awards span industry, academia, and
Government-sponsored research.
7.6 Managing the Workforce

NNSA and its M&O partners are responsible for managing the workforce to address future missions and
emerging needs. To execute these responsibilities, NNSA and its partners use a talent management life
cycle approach. This approach characterizes the progression from recruitment and hiring, through
career development and performance, to transition out of the active workforce. Each entity in the
nuclear security enterprise applies the elements of this talent management life-cycle approach, as its
specific mission assignments demand, to plan and manage its workforce appropriately.
Talent management as a life cycle process is depicted in Figure 78. This model helps frame the
discussion of the challenges faced by NNSA and its partners as they acquire and retain their workforce.
Figure 78. Five basic components of the talent management life-cycle process
7.6.1 Workforce Challenges

7.6.1.1
Recruiting
NNSA and its M&O partners face several challenges in recruiting the workforce of the future. Many of
the best and brightest in the emerging technical talent pool are not aware of the nuclear security
enterprise as a career option. For high-demand disciplines such as electrical engineering and computer
science, industrial employers may offer greater compensation packages that appeal to the current
generation of graduates, therefore providing significant competition for ideal candidates for NNSA and
its partners.
Moreover, finding enough prospects with advanced degrees in the appropriate technical disciplines is
becoming more difficult because of the demographics of engineering education in the United States.
Statistics demonstrate the limitations of the employment pool of technical graduates eligible for hire by
NNSA and its partners, particularly at the national security laboratories.8
7.6.1.2
Hiring
Uncertain budget environments caused by continuing resolutions, sequestration, or other perturbations

present significant challenges. In the past, career stability was a major selling point for NNSA and its
partners to attract candidates. Many recent events, however, including the Government shutdown,
have eroded the confidence of candidates in the stability and predictability of the nuclear security
enterprise as a career.
At the Federal level, and to some extent among M&O partners, the length of time required to hire
results in a loss of candidates to other employers. This is an artifact of Federal requirements, security
background investigations, and internal processes that prolong the time between an interview and an
employment offer.
Compensation packages offered by industry tend to be very attractive, especially to candidates with
student debt or other fiscal concerns. While the total compensation at M&O sites is generally
competitive with the industry average, it cannot compete with lucrative sign-on bonuses or other fiscal
incentives from commercial entities.
7.6.1.3
Onboarding
If hiring the future workforce is challenging, keeping them engaged through the onboarding phase is
equally daunting. New hires awaiting security clearances are often limited in exposure to their actual
work assignments and physically isolated from their assigned work group for several months after they
are hired. Keeping new hires awaiting clearances engaged without being able to give them meaningful
work is a trial for employees and their managers alike. In addition, the availability of staff to orient,
train, and mentor new hires may be limited because of the increased workload for weapon
modernization through LEPs.
7.6.1.4
Developing and Sustaining
Retaining early- and mid-career employees with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to commit to a longterm career in the nuclear security enterprise over other commercial and Governmental opportunities is
an escalating challenge. Some private-sector opportunities, especially in disciplines with the highest
demand, offer very attractive compensation packages and hiring incentives that may be difficult for
early-career employees to resist. The transition of some M&O partners from defined pensions to
portable 401K contribution programs gives newer hires more mobility and freedom to change
employers without losing benefits. Of equal concern is erosion in the perceived stability of employment
within the nuclear security enterprise because of budget fluctuations, threats of sequestration, and
other anomalies. A number of early-career employees have reported a discrepancy between the work
content they expected before being hired and the actual work they were given to do, leaving them
feeling disillusioned and less inclined to stay. All of these issues will affect retention rates for employees
with two to ten years of service over the next decade.
The percentage of MS and PhD candidates eligible to work in national security positions has been dropping. For example, at
the end of 2012, the proportion of permanent U.S. residents receiving MS degrees in engineering was about 56 percent; for
PhDs, it was 47 percent, and the trend is continuing downward. Furthermore, the percentage of women and minorities
receiving advanced degrees in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics remains disproportionately low.
(From Engineering by the Numbers, published by the American Society of Engineering Education, 2013.)
Another challenge is the demographic profile of many NNSA sites, which shows a bimodal age and
experience distribution among employees.9 This profile foreshadows two looming issues. The first is a
large flood of expected retirements from among the substantial portion of the workforce that is
currently or will soon be eligible for retirement. The second issue is the declining numbers of mid-career
technical professionals because of current demographics, compounded by the recruitment and
retention issues described earlier in the subsections of Section 7.6. These two dynamics will leave fewer
mentors available to carry on the traditional apprenticeship model10 for developing new members of the
workforce into fully competent technical employees. Taking both dynamics into account, the shortage
of mid-career employees will pose increasingly serious challenges to performing NNSAs central mission
as the nuclear security enterprise moves beyond the period from 2016 to 2020. Sites will need to
develop innovative ways to educate and train early-career employees quickly and efficiently to become
full contributors, as well as focus more on retention of mid-career employees.
The traditional apprenticeship model poses additional challenges in terms of future needs. In the past,
apprenticeships were designed to create a cadre of deeply experienced subject matter experts in
narrow areas of expertise. In the future, the nuclear security enterprise will require more individuals
with both depth and breadth, in addition to very deep subject matter experts. Flexibility and
adaptability, coupled with technical expertise, will be more in demand than technical depth by itself.
The apprenticeship model will need to grow and evolve to accommodate this change.
7.6.1.5
Offboarding
The biggest current challenge for offboarding is getting process and programmatic knowledge
transferred rapidly enough to stay ahead of the expected wave of retirements. The current and
anticipated heavy stockpile modernization through LEPs workloads,11 coupled with increased mentoring
and leadership requirements caused by increased hiring, may also preempt the time available for
employees approaching retirement to follow through with substantive knowledge transfer.
7.6.2 Plans for Addressing Workforce Challenges

7.6.2.1
Recruiting
To compete favorably with private industry benefits and compensation packages, NNSA needs to
demonstrate the differentiating advantages of a nuclear weapons career to prospective employees.
These advantages include:
technically challenging work that is critical to national security;
flexibility in work schedules;
career mobility within and across NNSA, DOE, and their M&O partners; and
relative employment stability, even during economic downturns.
This bimodal distribution has two humps, with large numbers of employees in early and late career and many fewer
employees in the mid-career stage.
10
Traditionally, weapon designers and other technical specialists achieved competency over time through apprenticeship with
an experienced technical staff member. As they advanced and learned, they became journeymen by mid-career and
eventually masters, as they matured in their technical specialty.
11
See Chapter 2, Figure 210, and Section 2.4.1, Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations, for the Stockpile Life Extension
Program projections through FY 2040.
One advantage that M&O partners can leverage is the ability to reach back to their parent companies
for temporary or even permanent staffing needs. The recruiting mechanisms used at the parent
companies may also be leveraged by the M&O partners.
To help promote these benefits, NNSA and its partners need to increase support for outreach programs
that encourage a diverse cross section of young people to enter STEM careers. Outreach events allow
employees to influence future technical workers and provide positive impressions about working in or
peripheral to the nuclear security enterprise.
The demographics that demonstrate the limited availability of a diverse pool of science and engineering
candidates with appropriate qualifications can be approached both strategically and tactically. In the
longer term, NNSA and its partners must increase involvement in outreach programs that aim to
educate children, parents, and the general public as to the advantages and positive aspects of STEM
careers to help secure the pipeline. For a more tactical approach, NNSA and its partners must enhance
efforts to recruit at a broad variety of colleges and universities and to build partnerships with key
sources of the highest-demand disciplines.
7.6.2.2
Hiring
To attract key prospects to careers in the nuclear security enterprise, all entities must communicate with
these candidates as early as possible. They must offer more internships, summer institute
opportunities, fellowships, and special advanced degree opportunities to capture and retain candidates
early in their academic careers.
NNSA and its partners plan to increase the emphasis on local or on-site apprenticeships in essential skills
in order to increase the available pool of talented technologists and craft workers, particularly at the
manufacturing sites. Vigorous recruiting and partnerships with nearby vocational schools are key
strategies to this approach.
NNSA and its partners anticipate a need for more technical hires in disciplines such as nanotechnology;
next-generation, high-performance computing and associated computational modeling; additive
manufacturing technology; and other emerging fields. Developing partnerships with specific schools
that offer synergistic programs for these emerging disciplines must become a priority.
To fill the mid-career gap in its demographics, NNSA and its partners must put more emphasis on
experienced hires than has been done in the past. This will have the added advantage of providing a
proven work history, as well as private industry experience and a fresh perspective to NNSAs technical
challenges.
Offering more-competitive total compensation packages would help close the gap for candidates who
might be interested in working within the nuclear security enterprise, but are feeling the pull of cashbased incentives from commercial entities.
Programs that target former DOD personnel, especially individuals with experience in the nuclear
weapons arena and with security clearances, are another key strategy for future staffing. Individuals
with military experience have a proven record of serving the Nation and extremely relevant experience;
they also adapt well to the culture of national security employment.
7.6.2.3
Onboarding
Some entities have been successful in designing programs to keep new employees engaged in
meaningful work while they await security clearances. These model programs need to be shared across
the nuclear security enterprise to help all entities develop productive assignments for their uncleared
staff that will allow them to engage and learn while awaiting clearances.
NNSA entities also must transition to appropriate office accommodations for the workforce of the
future. Modern facilities with more collaborative space, more digital communication connectivity, and
more flexibility will better meet the needs and work styles of current graduates as they hire into the
nuclear weapons community. This will allow them to interact and connect during the onboarding phase
both before and after receiving clearances, resulting in higher job satisfaction.
7.6.2.4
Career Development
As with recruiting and hiring, capturing the interest of employees early in their academic careers and
exposing them to the benefits of working in nuclear security is instrumental to retaining early-career
employees who are now more mobile than in the past.
To combat the challenges of retention, it is paramount to use a forward-looking approach that will
impact the entire life cycle of an employees career. For example, using special hiring programs that pay
for newer employees to emerge from graduate school debt-free is a very effective means of building the
commitment to a long-term career in nuclear weapons.
Programs and incentives aimed at retention of mid-career employees are also essential to ensuring the
development of the future workforce. These include advanced education, training, mentoring, and
leadership and rotational opportunities. Mechanisms like these that enhance career development and
facilitate mobility across the various entities of the nuclear security enterprise (and even to DOD) will
establish higher levels of engagement and commitment from early- and mid-career employees. All of
these approaches would work together to stabilize and enhance retention.
7.6.2.5
Offboarding
Enhancement of existing programs and development of additional programs for knowledge capture and
transfer are critical to ensuring the expertise of seasoned employees approaching retirement is
documented and preserved for future weapon designers. In particular, efforts to capture weapons
knowledge prior to the retirement of late-career employees must be increased and improved to allow
retrieval by future weapon designers. Some sites are increasing the use of web-based applications and
technology to aid in this task.
7.7 Summary and Conclusion

The cumulative knowledge, skills, abilities, accomplishments, and caliber of todays nuclear security
enterprise workforce are an irreplaceable asset that is essential to the execution of NNSAs national
security mission, including maintaining the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. NNSA is fully committed
to sustaining a qualified and skilled workforce to execute the work detailed in the 3+2 Strategy and will
remain capable of adjusting to changes year-to-year as requirements dictate.
However, a number of challenges could affect the long-term viability of the future workforce. The
ability to attract and hire employees with the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for the future
nuclear security enterprise will be impacted by the availability of qualified STEM candidates. As demand
rises amidst a limited supply, NNSA and its partners will be challenged to compete against employment
offers from companies that can provide more-attractive total compensation packages.
Retention of the workforce will be equally challenging in this climate of increased competition. Among
the advantages that NNSA and its M&O partners offer are technically challenging, relatively stable work,
with workplace flexibility and appropriate benefits. However, it is difficult to retain workers who value
pay, bonuses, and public recognition for their technical achievements above the pride and satisfaction of
contributing to national security. To address these issues, NNSA and its M&O partners must focus on
promoting and enhancing the differentiating advantages of national security work.
NNSA needs to continue offering outstanding educational and training programs and to extend those
programs that are particularly effective in attracting and retaining the high-caliber workforce that its
nuclear security mission demands. In particular, career mobility throughout the nuclear security
enterprise needs to be enhanced and facilitated to provide a broader variety of career paths and
mobility.
Chapter 8
Future Years Nuclear Security
Program Budget, Requirements Estimates,
and Operations and Business Improvements
Chapter 8 provides an overview of the key elements in the Weapons Activities budget for the
FY 2016 FYNSP and includes figures that display budgetary information for specific activities associated
with these key elements and projected weapon system life-cycle costs for 20 years beyond the FYNSP.
Chapter 8 also describes NNSA efforts to improve the effectiveness and reduce the cost of its operations
and business practices. All costs displayed are in then-year dollars unless otherwise noted.
8.1 Future Years Nuclear Security Program Budget

Table 81 shows the FYNSP budget for Weapons Activities. The budget structure reflects a number of
changes from the FY 2015 budget structure. Activities formerly funded in RTBF are now split between
RTBF and a new Infrastructure and Safety line to reflect a distinction between program-specific facilities
support and nuclear security enterprise site-wide support. The Readiness Program funding line has been
eliminated and the activities of its only subprogram moved to a new budget line, Advanced
Manufacturing Development, based on the way in which the funding was appropriated by Congress in
FY 2015. More broadly, the term Campaign has been eliminated from the titles of NNSAs RDT&E
programs to better emphasize the ongoing nature of these programs. A new funding line within
Directed Stockpile Work, Nuclear Material Commodities, consolidates activities that support certain key
nuclear material activities, including Domestic Uranium Enrichment, which was in a separate line in the
FY 2015 SSMP. Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response and Counterterrorism/Counterproliferation
Programs have been combined as Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response and moved to the
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget. Additional explanations of these budget structure changes
and explanations of changes to program funding levels from FY 2015 to FY 2016 can be found in the
FY 2016 Presidents Budget Request. Changes to the subprogram funding lines within the programs
displayed in Table 81 are described in the following SSMP sections on these programs.
Figure 81 shows how the level of funding in the FY 2016 Presidents Budget Request over the FYNSP
compares with the Weapons Activities purchasing power (in 2010 dollars) in prior years. It also displays
how the general composition of this funding has varied over time. The most remarkable change over the
period displayed is the increase in Directed Stockpile Work. Some amount of this change is more
apparent than real because of changes in the budget structure. For example, pit production activities,
originally funded as a campaign, were moved into Directed Stockpile Work as Plutonium Sustainment in
FY 2008. In addition, as described above, the Tritium Readiness Program funding and some uranium
sustainment funding were recently moved from RDT&E and RTBF, respectively, to Directed Stockpile
Work as part of the new Nuclear Material Commodities subprogram. However, a significant amount of
this increase was the result of increased funding for multiple LEPs and supporting Directed Stockpile
Work programs.
Figures 82 through 810 display the pie charts for the FY 2016 budget and the tables that detail the
FY 2016 FYNSP breakdown and the reference year FY 2015.
Table 81. Overview of Future Years Nuclear Security Program budget for Weapons Activities
in fiscal years 2015 through 2020 a
Fiscal Year (dollars in millions)
2015
Enacted
2016
Request
2017
Request
2018
Request
2019
Request
2020
Request
2,692.6
3,187.3
3,322.0
3,616.9
3,689.0
3,740.8
Science Program
412.1
389.6
436.6
485.9
496.2
506.7
Engineering Program
136.0
131.4
120.5
138.7
140.8
141.3
Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and

High Yield Program
512.9
502.5
525.4
546.1
557.5
569.3
Advanced Simulation and Computing Program
598.0
623.0
636.2
649.6
663.3
677.3
Advanced Manufacturing Development
107.2
130.1
106.3
79.2
91.0
92.7
2,033.4
1,054.5
1,121.4
1,207.3
1,285.0
1,235.4
1,466.1
1,702.5
1,477.9
1,559.2
1,607.0
219.0
251.6
266.4
273.4
278.8
284.3
76.5
36.6
36.8
37.0
37.7
38.4
177.9
46.1
636.1
632.9
646.9
658.8
669.8
683.0
179.6
157.6
155.0
156.8
162.0
166.0
Legacy Contractor Pensions
307.1
283.9
206.5
157.1
87.4
87.4
Domestic Uranium Enrichment Research,

d
Development and Demonstration
97.2
(51.4)
8,180.4
8,847.0
9,282.3
9,484.6
9,717.7
9,829.7
Activity
Directed Stockpile Work
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities

Infrastructure and Safety
Site Stewardship
Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response
Counterterrorism/Counterproliferation
b
Programs
Information Technology and Cyber Security
Adjustments
Weapons Activities Total
Totals may not add because of rounding.

Funding for this program has been moved to Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget.
c
Formerly called Chief Information Officer Activities.
d
Domestic Uranium Enrichment was moved to Nuclear Material Commodities within Directed Stockpile Work and is funded in
the Presidents Budget Request for FY 2016 FY 2020 at $100 million per year.
e
Adjustments include rescissions and use of prior-year balances.
b
Figure 81. Weapons Activities historical purchasing power fiscal years 2001 through 2020
8.2 Directed Stockpile Work Budget
Figure 82. Directed Stockpile Work funding schedule for fiscal years 2015 through 2020
As noted in Section 8.1, Directed Stockpile Work includes a new subprogram, Nuclear Material
Commodities, which consolidates a number of nuclear material activities previously found elsewhere:
Uranium Sustainment, Plutonium Sustainment (formerly in Stockpile Services), Tritium Sustainment
(formerly Tritium Readiness in Stockpile Services), and Domestic Uranium Enrichment. The Stockpile
Systems and Stockpile Services budget lines in Figure 82 include Surveillance Program funding in the
amounts shown for FY 2014 through 2019 in Table 82.
Table 82. Surveillance Program funding for fiscal years 2010 through 2020
Surveillance Program
Funding
2010
2011
2012

2013
2014
2015 2016 2017
2018
2019
2020
181
239
239
217
248
263
252
225
236
230
234
Table 83 shows the estimated costs in the Tritium Sustainment subprogram to support current tritium
requirements estimates. NNSA is in the process of conducting an interagency, bottoms-up review of
tritium requirements that will be certified by the Nuclear Weapons Council and submitted to Congress,
as directed in FY 2015 congressional budget language, by April 30, 2015. Any adjustments to the Tritium
Sustainment resource requirements arising from this review will be addressed as part of programming
for the FY 2017 budget submission.
Table 83. Estimated Tritium Sustainment resource requirements
Requirements
Presidents Budget/Future Years
Nuclear Security Program
Surpluses/shortfalls
2014
83.5
2015
140.1

2016
2017
2018
2019
107.3
126.8
140.2
120.4
83.5
140.1
107.3
126.8
140.2
120.4
123.0
617.7
2020
123.0
20162020
617.7
8.3 Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Budget

8.3.1 Science Program
Figure 83. Science Program funding schedule for fiscal years 2015 through 2020
8.3.2 Engineering Program
Figure 84. Engineering Program funding schedule for fiscal years 2015 through 2020
8.3.3 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program
Figure 85. Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program funding schedule
for fiscal years 2015 through 2020
8.3.4 Advanced Simulation and Computing Program
Figure 86. Advanced Simulation and Computing Program funding schedule

8.3.5 Advanced Manufacturing Development
Figure 87. Advanced Manufacturing Development funding schedule

8.4 Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities
Figure 88. Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities funding schedule

8.5 Infrastructure and Safety
Figure 89. Infrastructure and Safety funding schedule for fiscal years 2015 through 2020
8.6 Secure Transportation Asset
Figure 810. Secure Transportation Asset funding schedule for fiscal years 2015 through 2020
8.7 Other Weapons Activities
Figure 811. Other Weapons Activities funding schedules for fiscal years 2015 through 2020
8.8 Other Fiscal Issues

Pension Cost Growth
The Administrations FY 2016 Budget Request will continue to cover the total pension reimbursement
and legacy contractor pension costs. The Weapons Activities portion of this cost is estimated to be
about $620 million in FY 2016.
8.9 Estimates of Requirements beyond the Future Years

Nuclear Security Program
For the cost projections beyond the FYNSP, other than specific projects, an escalation of 2.24 percent
per year is assumed (based on numbers provided by the Office of Management and Budget for 2014)
after FY 2020.1 Figure 812 shows the Weapons Activities funding for FY 2016 through FY 2025 included
in the FY 2016 Presidents Budget and escalated amounts for FY 2025 through FY 2040.
Figure 812. Estimate of out-year budget requirements for NNSA Weapons Activities
in then-year dollars
1
Projection of budget requirements for these efforts in this way assumes the continued manageability of whatever risks are
present during the FYNSP at the same level of effort as, typically, represented by the funding level of the last year of the FYNSP.
The Construction total for FY 2016 through FY 2020 shown in Figure 812 includes all construction
funded by RTBF and Infrastructure and Safety (I&S). It includes funding for all the projects listed on the
Integrated Project List found in Chapter 4, Figure 44. The high versus low lines on the figure reflect
uncertainties in the estimated budget requirements for LEPs and the construction projects. While these
two categories of activities constitute about 24 percent of total Weapons Activities over FY 2021
through FY 2040, they have the greatest uncertainty. The figure also displays a blue line representing
the total shown in the FY 2015 SSMP so that a comparison can be made between Figure 812 in this
chapter and Figure 811 in the FY 2015 SSMP. The dashed black line in Figure 812 is the FY 2016
Presidents Budget for FY 2016 through 2025, with the FY 2025 total escalated at the same 2.24 percent
as used in the estimates for FY 2026 through 2040 to evaluate the out-year affordability of the total
Weapons Activities account. Figure 813 in this section shows, in greater detail, the uncertainties of the
out-year budget requirements for Weapons Activities.
The nominal cost of the overall program for FY 2021 through FY 2040 in Figure 813 falls within +8.4
and -2.5 percent of the escalated (dashed black) FY 2020 line. The uncertainty (resulting from
construction and LEPs) ranges from +6.1 percent to -7.2 percent. The period in which there does appear
to be a potential affordability issue is FY 2021 through FY 2025 during which NNSA is simultaneously
executing four to five LEPs and several major construction projects, including the Uranium Processing
Facility. Most of the increase from FY 2020 to FY 2021 (and sustained through FY 2025) is driven by an
increase in construction. The FY 2017 programming process will need to address this potential issue.
Figure 813. Detail of out-year budget requirements for Weapons Activities

of the NNSA in then-year dollars
The following subsections explain in detail the cost basis for significant elements in Figure 813:
Stockpile Sustainment (Section 8.9.1), Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations (Section 8.9.2), and
Construction Costs (Section 8.9.3). In the FYNSP period, the match to the budget has largely been
achieved by taking efficiencies, programmatic restructurings, and some reduction in the DOD
requirements.
8.9.1 Stockpile Sustainment

Sustainment costs include assessment activities, limited life component exchanges, required and routine
maintenance, safety studies, periodic repairs, resolution and timely closure of SFIs, military liaison work,
and surveillance to assure the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective. These costs are incurred
every year that a weapon is in the active stockpile.
Figure 814 shows in then-year dollars the annual sustainment cost for FY 2016 through FY 2040
attributable to a particular warhead, and the average cost over FY 2003 through FY 2015. The FY 2021
through FY 2040 costs incorporate an update to the preliminary assessment of the additional
sustainment costs to be incurred during the 3+2 stockpile transition, as well as the two-years-earlier
W80-4 LEP schedule.
Figure 814. Estimate of warhead specific sustainment costs
8.9.2 Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations

The Defense Programs Office of Cost Policy and Analysis is responsible for the model development and
preparation of estimates in this section.2
LEPs, which are not part of stockpile sustainment, are undertaken to extend the life of a warhead for
several additional decades. Major alterations make component changes to warheads (which may not
address all aging issues such that they would be considered a life extension) and also have significant
2
A technical paper containing additional detail on the LEP cost model methodology is available upon request.
costs. Both LEPs and major alterations may be subject to Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)
requirements to Congress. Figures 815 through 821 show the estimated cost to NNSA for LEPs or
major alterations for the FY 2015 through FY 2040 period. High and low independent cost estimates
were developed for all LEPs. These are planning estimates intended to inform the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process, budgeting studies, and general conceptual planning.
These independent cost estimates are based on:
W76-1 actual costs to date for RDT&E and Production
A standard Work Breakdown Structure with comparisons of RDT&E scope and complexity by LEP
program office experts and subject matter experts to the W76-1
Estimates of Other Program Money and DOD costs by program office experts3
RDT&E, Other Program Money, and DOD costs distributed and spread using standard, wellknown Rayleigh profiles for the development period
Production costs distributed using the nonlinear cost growth profile exhibited by the W76-1
actual cost-quantity relationship
The high and low lines on each LEP cost figure (included for all systems except the nearly complete
W76-1) reflect the cost estimate uncertainties. All programs have unforeseen technical issues, budget
fluctuations, and even the level of component maturity available at a future date. The published ranges
account for this.
One important note is that early-stage LEPs can experience occasional but significant scope additions or
redefinitions, possibly resulting in substantial cost range changes. This potential for differences in
planning assumptions exists because LEPs in Phase 6.1 or 6.2 operate with considerable design
uncertainty. For example, the current W80-4 estimate assumes there will be moderate nuclear
explosives package refurbishment. As design options are downselected, the estimate may result in
changes to the cost and program scope. Major differences in year-to-year planning assumptions will
hopefully be minimal and exclusively for early-stage programs, but if and when they occur NNSA will
publish them in the subsequent SSMP.
In the previous FY 2014 and FY 2015 SSMPs, the estimates were informed primarily by LEP Federal
Program Managers and select subject matter experts, who evaluated relative scope complexity by Work
Breakdown Structure element between the W76-1 and their respective LEPs. However, the estimates
presented here reflect complexity factors scored by both the Federal Program Managers and, for the
first time, a broad ranging and highly integrated team of subject matter experts from the national
security laboratories and the nuclear weapons production facilities. This integrated team of subject
matter experts and Federal Program Managers provided significant technical expertise on each LEP and
major alteration. Coupled with the scope and scheduling experience of the Federal Program Managers,
this years LEP estimates are believed to reflect more inclusive ranges of costs and relative uncertainties.
The SSMP figures here attempt to account for all costs needed to execute each LEP or major alteration, regardless of the color
of money. This is why the cost model is designed to estimate funding streams not only for the LEP line items, but for earlier stage
technology maturation activities covered by Other Program Money and even DOD, if applicable. As the overall program
integrator, the Federal Program Manager assists in identifying the Other Program Money and DOD funding needed for their
respective LEP to be successful.
As in previous SSMPs, the nominal estimates (reflected in each figures bars) are the costs from either
the Weapon Design and Cost Report, the most recent SAR, or, if the LEP is too early to have generated
such estimates, the midpoint between the high and low cost model estimate values. The modeled high
and low cost ranges have also been included on select graphs with their Weapon Design and Cost Report
and/or SAR point estimates to emphasize that, for those programs, some cost uncertainty still exists in
their execution.
For each figure, an associated table displays the high, low, and nominal estimated total cost to NNSA
and DOD4 in both constant FY 2015 and then-year dollars. These are in Tables 84 to 811. The total
estimated cost is provided since three programs (the IW-1, -2, and-3) fall outside the 25-year window for
the FY 2016 SSMP. While figures are in then-year dollars, total estimated costs in current constant-year
(FY 2015) dollars are also provided to assist in comparing LEPs scheduled over different timeframes.5
Figure 815. W76-1 life extension program cost FY 2015 to completion

Table 84. Total estimated cost for W76 life extension program
FY 1999FY 2020
(Dollars in Millions)
SAR Value
a
NNSA
DOD
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year Dollars
4,397
3,697
FY 2015 Dollars
Not in NNSA SAR
Then-Year Dollars
Not in NNSA SAR
W76-1 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) values are reported in FY 2002 dollars. Those values are converted for this table
to FY 2015 dollars.
The DOD costs are for weapon components for which DOD is responsible, such as arming and fuzing. While not budgeted or
executed by NNSA, these estimated costs are published to be as transparent as possible of the all in costs for each LEP.
5
For LEPs for which no SAR or Weapon Design and Cost Report has been prepared, only the cost range is provided. It should be
noted that when a SAR or Weapon Design and Cost Report value is provided, this represents only the costs associated with
Phase 6.3 and forward without Other Program Money, based on reporting requirements.
Figure 816. B61-12 life extension program cost FY 2015 to completion

Table 85. Total estimated cost for B61-12 life extension program
FY 2009FY 2025
NNSA
DOD
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year Dollars
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year Dollars
High
9,278
9,789
207
220
Low
6,765
7,176
55
58
6,839
7,372
Not in NNSA SAR
Not in NNSA SAR
SAR Value
a
The B61-12 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) values are reported in FY 2012 dollars. Those values are converted for this
table to FY 2015 dollars. Also, SAR values do not include Other Program Money costs. However, the September 2014
B61-12 SAR did report a total of $763 million in then-year dollars for OPM costs that should be added to the SAR then-year
dollars totals for NNSA to make them comparable, in addition to $125 million in leveraged work being performed by the
W88 Alt 370 effort. The numbers reported here do not match those in the latest published SAR because of adjustments
for a new cost accounting model at Pantex and Y-12 that have been applied to the FY 2016 through FY 2020 numbers but
have not yet been applied to the FY 2021 through FY 2025 numbers.
Figure 817. W88 Alt 370 (with CHE refresh) cost FY 2015 to completion
Table 86. Total estimated cost for W88 Alt 370

NNSA
FY 20152025
DOD
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year Dollars
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year Dollars
High
2,690
2,928
981
1,072
Low
1,922
2,081
826
899
a
Budget Requirement
N/A
2,579
N/A
986
The W88 Alt 370 Selected Acquisition Report has not yet been updated to reflect the addition of the conventional high
explosive refresh scope. What is reflected here is based on FY 2016 FYNSP numbers and the Office of Cost Analysis and Cost
Assessments cost models.
Figure 818. W80-4 life extension program cost FY 2015 to completion6

Table 87. Total estimated cost for W80-4 life extension program
NNSA
FY 20152032
DOD
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year Dollars
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year
Dollars
High
7,845
9,486
207
252
Low
5,798
7,073
55
67
N/A
8,258
N/A
160
Budget Requirement
W80-4 estimates were based on the uncertainties associated with the B61-12. These uncertainties were carried through in the
subject matter experts and Federal Program Managers comparative analysis of complexity.
Figure 819. IW-1 life extension program cost FY 2020 through FY 2040
Table 88. Total estimated cost for IW-1 life extension program
FY 20132014, FY 20202043
NNSA
DOD
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year Dollars
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year Dollars
High
11,682
16,434
3,152
4,469
Low
8,755
12,482
1,051
1,510
N/A
14,352
N/A
2,989
Budget Requirement
FY 2023 2049
NNSA
DOD
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year Dollars
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year Dollars
High
12,139
19,004
3,152
4,966
Low
9,227
14,661
1,051
1,681
N/A
16,833
N/A
3,323
Budget Requirement
FY 2030 2057
NNSA
DOD
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year Dollars
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year Dollars
High
11,047
20,425
3,152
5,882
Low
8,547
16,078
1,051
1,995
N/A
18,252
N/A
3,938
Budget Requirement
Figure 822. B61-13 life extension program cost FY 2038 through FY 2040
Table 811. Total estimated cost for B61-13 life extension program
FY 2030 2057
NNSA
DOD
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year Dollars
FY 2015 Dollars
Then-Year Dollars
High
11,323
23,293
207
430
Low
8,606
17,807
207
432
N/A
20,550
N/A
431
Budget Requirement
Figure 823 is a one-chart summary of the total projected nuclear weapons life extension costs from
FY 2015 through FY 2040 based on the LEP schedule reflected in Chapter 2, Figure 210, of this FY 2016
SSMP. Figure 823 includes the direct LEP costs and OPM, both of which are incremental to an
adequately funded, operationally essential set of base activities. The dotted line shows the LEP cost
reflected in the FY 2015 SSMP.
The principal differences between the FY 2015 and FY 2016 LEP estimates are as follows:
The complexity factors used in the LEP cost model reflect both Federal Program Manager and
subject matter expert input, as described earlier. In most cases this new process resulted in a
higher factor score and cost estimate.7
The LEP production model was updated with actual W76-1 production quantities and costs for
FY 2013 and FY 2014. As the two years were collectively in line with previous W76-1 production
costs, this update resulted in only a minor change to any LEP estimate.
The assumed escalation factor was increased from last years 2.11 percent to the updated OMB
published 2.24 percent value. This resulted in only a minor change to the majority of programs.
The two-years-earlier schedule for the W80-4 warhead resulted in a significant profile change
(although not a change to the overall W80-4 program cost in and of itself).
The new LEP cost model process also resulted in wider complexity and scope ranges, particularly for earlier stage programs like
the IW-1, 2, and 3. This widening of uncertainty, which should be expected for earlier stage programs than for ones further in
design, has given Defense Programs confidence in the new complexity factor scoring process.
The addition of a CHE refresh to the W88 Alt 370 program resulted in a significant cost addition
for that program.
The assumed separate Air Force and Navy fuzes for the IW programs substantially increased the
DOD portions of the IW-1, IW-2, and IW-3 estimates.
The initial publication of a B61-13 program estimate now falls inside the 25-year SSMP time
frame.
Figure 823. Total U.S. projected nuclear weapons life extension costs
for fiscal years 2015 through 2040 (then-year dollars)
8.9.3 Construction Costs

The budget requirement estimate for construction in FY 2021 and beyond, as part of the Construction
total included in Figure 812, is based on the set of projects in the NNSA Integrated Project List, as
shown in Chapter 4, Figure 44, in this FY 2016 SSMP. Because of the preliminary planning status for
many of these projects, they have been binned into one of three cost ranges. For those projects
estimated to cost greater than $500 million, upper bounds were estimated based on the best available
data. The projects in the Integrated Project List that will start beyond the FYNSP have also been binned
in the five-year period in which they are expected to start, based on hard requirements for their
completion or general priority. Construction funding for each of these periods is based on the total cost
of the projects started in that period spread over the five years of the period.8 Table 812 shows the
low, high, and midpoint total cost for executing projects on the Integrated Project List that are
scheduled for FY 2020 and beyond. As can be seen in this table, there is significant uncertainty in these
construction costs because of the immaturity of planning for these projects. Most of them have not
achieved CD-0 Mission need under DOE Order 413.3.
For projects whose construction period exceeds five years, the project cost was split over two five-year periods.
Table 812. Total cost and average annual cost of construction for fiscal years 2020 through 2040
FY 2015 Dollars in Millions
Low
High
Midpoint
Total Integrated Project List cost
9,232
17,795
14,178
The low and high average annual costs were used along with those for LEPs to generate the low and
high lines on Figure 812 in order to provide some sense of the uncertainty in the total budget
requirements, based on these two components for which there is the greatest uncertainty.
8.10 Operations and Process Improvements

NNSA is committed to improving its processes and operations continuously to achieve greater efficiency,
reliability, and quality. In doing so, NNSA generates additional resources to support vital national
security interests. In the recent past, these improvements have included efforts to streamline DOE
orders and directives to eliminate duplication. In other cases, NNSA has worked with its national
security laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities to incentivize efficiencies and cost
savings, where possible, through the M&O contracts.
In a letter to Congress this past November, the Administrator reaffirmed this commitment to make the
nuclear security enterprise more efficient and announced the implementation of an annual process
within NNSA as a management tool to drive progress in this area. Specifically, each year beginning in
2015, NNSA will issue an annual report identifying the efficiencies achieved during the prior year, areas
for continuous improvement in the current year, and any specific enterprise-wide or site-specific
initiatives that it may pursue. Preparation of this report will include asking the national security
laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities to recommend specific changes NNSA could
make from an oversight and governance perspective (such as has been done with orders and directives)
that would enhance productivity, including how to make transactional oversight less costly and
burdensome for all parties. The results of NNSA efforts to achieve efficiencies, particularly those whose
savings can be quantified, will be addressed in the report. What will continue to be included in the
SSMP and what can be found below are examples of the more-qualitative improvements being pursued.
8.10.1
Update of the Phase 6.x Process
The Phase 6.x Process is a DOD and DOE process to plan and manage the joint activities required to
execute an LEP (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.4.1, for a further description). In response to a Government
Accounting Office report (GAO-11-387), a Nuclear Weapons Council Action Officer group reviewed and
updated the joint Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.x Process, dated April 19, 2000. This group
included representatives from all the members of the Nuclear Weapons Council. The review process
focused on streamlining and clarifying the descriptions and requirements of each phase to be more in
line with current LEP, alteration, and modification activities and to anticipate future activities, as well as
to address the Government Accounting Office recommendations. This review is now awaiting the
Nuclear Weapons Councils approval of its proposed changes to the process.
8.10.2
Additive Manufacturing
NNSA has an interest in applying new manufacturing processes and tools to allow the accomplishment
of mission activities more quickly and less expensively. Additive Manufacturing, also known as 3D
printing, has the potential to revolutionize production on a global scale and, in particular, could
significantly benefit the nuclear security enterprise. Additive Manufacturing benefits to the stockpile
include reduction of risk to program schedule and improved cost performance. The extent to which the
products of Additive Manufacturing technologies can be used in the stockpile is still being determined;
however, in the near term, applications include rapid prototyping, joint test assembly components,
tooling production, and production of pads and cushions. As confidence is gained in the use of Additive
Manufacturing, other applications may be possible. Additional information on this effort can be found
in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.5.
8.10.3
Defense Programs Cost Improvement Initiative
Defense Programs has taken several steps in recent years to improve its cost-estimating capabilities
through its Cost Improvement Initiative launched in 2013, including the issuance of cost-estimating
guidelines consistent with industry and Government Accounting Office best practices. These guidelines,
which are currently being piloted, include details on creating clear program requirements, documenting
a basis of estimate, and creating multi-year and total life-cycle profiles for planning and budgeting
purposes. In parallel, Defense Programs has also established a centralized cost database to capture
detailed cost actuals using a standardized Work Breakdown Structure, which will assist in future
program estimates.
8.10.4
General Purpose Infrastructure Planning and Management
In response to the challenge of managing aging infrastructure in a resource-constrained environment,

NNSA is taking a number of actions to implement infrastructure program management tools to ensure
accurate data is used for decision making, to perform an infrastructure assessment, and to align
resource allocations with priorities. Deployment of the BUILDER Sustainment Management System and
G2 program management software, as well as introduction of an MDI and an Enterprise Risk
Management approach, are all described in more detail in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.4.1.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
This DOE NNSA Fiscal Year 2016 SSMP, together with its classified Annex, is a key planning document of
the nuclear security enterprise. It represents the 25-year strategic program of record that captures the
plans developed across numerous NNSA programs and organizations to maintain and modernize the
stockpile through LEPs and revitalize the aging physical infrastructure. This SSMP was generated by the
NNSA Federal workforce, in collaboration with its eight M&O partners; the highly skilled and specialized
workforce of these partners is responsible for executing the technical activities described in this
FY 2016 SSMP. The plans detailed in the document were also coordinated with DOD through the
Nuclear Weapons Council, where most requirements originate for ensuring the Nations nuclear
deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective. In addition, the program and budget is also vetted with
the DOD annually in the interagency budget process. The SSMP is published each year in response to
specific statutory requirements to support the Presidents Budget Request to Congress with respect to
Weapons Activities. As with previous SSMPs, this NNSA plan will be updated annually as new
requirements and challenges arise.
FY 2014 was a year of accomplishment for the NNSA program of record described in this years SSMP.
The stockpile continued to be maintained as safe, secure, and effective without underground testing.
The multiple LEPs underway made progress toward their first production unit dates, and the W76-1 LEP
passed the halfway point in total production. Warhead dismantlement remained on track to meet the
NNSA goal to dismantle, by FY 2022, all weapons retired prior to FY 2009. The research, development,
testing, and evaluation programs advanced NNSAs understanding of weapons physics, component
aging, and material properties. These achievements, as well as previous progress, have enabled
evaluation of life extension alternatives for enhanced warhead safety and security, resolution of a
number of questions that could impact confidence in warhead performance, and extension of neutron
generator lifetimes to allow greater maintenance scheduling flexibility.
As part of revitalizing the physical infrastructure, the multi-year movement of non-nuclear component
manufacturing operations out of the aged Kansas City Plant to the newly built and leased National
Security Campus in Kansas City was completed with no impact to ongoing LEPs or warhead
maintenance. Construction of the HE Pressing Facility at the Pantex Plant was completed under budget.
These accomplishments, taken together with the myriad others reported in this SSMP, demonstrate
NNSAs effective stewardship of the Nations nuclear deterrent.
Plans for the future include the following highlights:
Complete production of W76-1 LEP warheads in FY 2019.
Deliver the B61-12 LEP first production unit in FY 2020.
Deliver the W88 Alt 370 first production unit (with CHE refresh) in FY 2020.
Advance the W80-4 LEP first production unit by two years to FY 2025.
Implement a disciplined, modular approach for constructing the Uranium Processing Facility at
Y-12 and the CMRR-NF at LANL.
Initiate the W78/88-1 LEP in FY 2020.
By the end of the next five years, the nuclear security enterprise will be well on its way to implementing
the 3+2 Strategy for a smaller, interoperable (for missile warheads) stockpile with upgraded safety and
security. NNSA will have made further advances in understanding weapons physics, aging, and material
properties based upon experiments, modeling, and simulations in alignment with the PCF. Warhead
technologies will be matured in conformance with the CMF and the new Systems Integration Framework
to reduce risks in the execution of what are already high-cost LEPs. The potential and challenge of using
additive manufacturing for nuclear weapons components production will have been evaluated and, if
merited, that capability will be pursued. Modifications of existing facilities will have been made at LANL
to allow cessation of programmatic operations in the outdated Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
facility so that ramp-up of operations can begin to produce 30 war reserve pits in FY 2026. New
assessment, maintenance, and planning tools will be in place to allow maximum effective use of NNSAs
infrastructure resources. In addition, these activities and the others described in this SSMP, along with
the workforce management approaches described in Chapter 7 and Appendix D, will have sustained
NNSAs highly skilled and experienced workforce, without which stockpile stewardship would not be
possible.
Unforeseen technological challenges, new requirements, and geopolitical events may occur that could
affect the priorities on which this strategic plan is built. NNSAs major challenges will be continuing to
balance requirements to meet the near-term needs of the stockpile, sustaining or recapitalizing aging
infrastructure, and advancing the understanding of the stockpile as it continues to age and new
manufacturing processes are adopted. NNSA will continue to work closely with DOD through the
Nuclear Weapons Council and with Congress to adjust its long-term plans to ensure the Nations
deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective for as long as nuclear weapons exist.
Appendix A
Requirements Mapping
A.1 National Nuclear Security Administration Response to
Statutory Reporting Requirements and Related Requests
The FY 2016 SSMP consolidates a number of statutory reporting requirements and related congressional
requests. This appendix maps the statutory and congressional requests to their respective SSMP
chapter and section.
A.2 Ongoing Requirements

50 U.S. Code Sec. 2521
NNSA Response
Sec. 2521. Stockpile stewardship program

(a) Establishment
The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator for Nuclear Security, shall establish a
stewardship program to ensure
(1) the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States
in nuclear weapons, including weapons design, system integration, manufacturing, security,
use control, reliability assessment, and certification; and
(2) that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of
underground nuclear weapons testing.
(b) Program elements
The program shall include the following:
(1) An increased level of effort for advanced computational capabilities to enhance the
simulation and modeling capabilities of the United States with respect to the performance over
time of nuclear weapons.
(2) An increased level of effort for above-ground experimental programs, such as hydrotesting,
high-energy lasers, inertial confinement fusion, plasma physics, and materials research.
(3) Support for new facilities construction projects that contribute to the experimental
capabilities of the United States, such as an advanced hydrodynamics facility, the National
Ignition Facility, and other facilities for above-ground experiments to assess nuclear weapons
effects.
(4) Support for the use of, and experiments facilitated by, the advanced experimental facilities
of the United States, including (A) the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;
(B) the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing facility at Los Alamos National
Laboratory;
(C) the Z Machine at Sandia National Laboratories; and
(D) the experimental facilities at the Nevada National Security Site.
Unclassified
All Chapters
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.6.2;
Appendix C
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Sections 3.5. 3.6, 3.7
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Sections 3.5. 3.6, 3.7;
Chapter 4,
Section 4.3.3
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Sections 3.5.3.6, 3.7
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page A-1

(5) Support for the sustainment and modernization of facilities with production and
manufacturing capabilities that are necessary to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of
the nuclear weapons stockpile, including (A) the nuclear weapons production facilities; and
(B) production and manufacturing capabilities resident in the national security laboratories.
(1) With respect to exascale computing
(a) PLAN REQUIRED.The Administrator for Nuclear Security shall develop and carry out a plan
to develop exascale computing and incorporate such computing into the stockpile stewardship
program under section 4201 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2521) during the 10year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) MILESTONES.The plan required by subsection (a) shall include major programmatic
milestones in
(1) the development of a prototype exascale computer for the stockpile stewardship
program; and
(2) mitigating disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale computing.
(c) COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES.In developing the plan required by subsection (a),
the Administrator shall coordinate, as appropriate, with the Under Secretary of Energy for Science,
the Secretary of Defense, and elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4))).
(d) INCLUSION OF COSTS IN FUTURE-YEARS NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM.The Administrator
shall
(1) address, in the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations reflected in each
future-years nuclear security program submitted under section 3253 of the National Nuclear
Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2453) during the 10-year period beginning on the date
of the enactment of this Act, the costs of
(A) developing exascale computing and incorporating such computing into the
stockpile stewardship program; and
(B) mitigating potential disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale
computing; and
(2) include in each such future-years nuclear security program a description of the costs of efforts
to develop exascale computing borne by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Office
of Science of the Department of Energy, other Federal agencies, and private industry.
(e) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.The Administrator shall submit the plan required by subsection
(a) to the congressional defense committees with each summary of the plan required by
subsection (a) of section 4203 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2523) submitted under
subsection (b)(1) of that section during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment
of this Act.
(f) EXASCALE COMPUTING DEFINED.In this section, the term exascale computing means
computing through the use of a computing machine that performs near or above 10 to the 18th
power floating point operations per second.

Sec. 2522. Report on stockpile stewardship criteria
(a) Requirement for criteria
The Secretary of Energy shall develop clear and specific criteria for judging whether the
science-based tools being used by the Department of Energy for determining the safety and
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile are performing in a manner that will provide an
adequate degree of certainty that the stockpile is safe and reliable.
(b) Coordination with Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Energy, in developing the criteria required by subsection (a), shall coordinate
with the Secretary of Defense.
Page A-2 | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
NNSA Response
Unclassified
Chapters 2,
Section 2.4.6;
Chapter 4,
Section 4.4
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.6.2;
Appendix C
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.6.2;
Appendix C
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.6.2;
Appendix C
Unclassified
Appendix C
NNSA Response
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.4.2
Classified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2
NNSA Response
Sec. 2523. Nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, management, and infrastructure plan
(a) Plan requirement
The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate
officials of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, shall develop and
annually update a plan for sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile. The plan shall cover, at
a minimum, stockpile stewardship, stockpile management, stockpile surveillance, program
direction, infrastructure modernization, human capital, and nuclear test readiness. The plan
shall be consistent with the programmatic and technical requirements of the most recent
annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.
Unclassified
All Chapters
(b) Submissions to Congress

(1) In accordance with subsection (c), not later than March 15 of each even-numbered year, the
Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees a summary of the plan
developed under subsection (a).
N/A
(2) In accordance with subsection (d), not later than March 15 of each odd-numbered year, the
Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees a detailed report on the
plan developed under subsection (a).
Unclassified
All chapters
(3) The summaries and reports required by this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) ELEMENTS OF BIENNIAL PLAN SUMMARY.Each summary
of the plan submitted under subsection (b)(1) shall include, at a minimum, the following:
N/A
(1) A summary of the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the number and age
of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each warhead type.
N/A
(2) A summary of the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life extension
programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace warhead types.
N/A
(3) A summary of the methods and information used to determine that the nuclear weapons
stockpile is safe and reliable, as well as the relationship of science-based tools to the
collection and interpretation of such information.
N/A
(4) A summary of the status of the nuclear security enterprise, including programs and plans
for infrastructure modernization and retention of human capital, as well as associated
budgets and schedules.
N/A
(5) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the previous summary or
detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).
N/A
(6) Such other information as the Administrator considers appropriate.
N/A
(d) ELEMENTS OF BIENNIAL DETAILED REPORT.Each detailed report on the plan submitted
under subsection (b)(2) shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(1) With respect to stockpile stewardship and management
(A) the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the number and age of warheads
(including both active and inactive) for each warhead type;
Unclassified
Chapter 1,
Section 1.2;
Chapter 2,
Section 2.1
Classified
Chapter 2,
Sections 2.2, 2.4.1
(B) for each five-year period occurring during the period beginning on the date of the report
and ending on the date that is 20 years after the date of the report
(i) the planned number of nuclear warheads (including active and inactive) for each
warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile; and
(ii) the past and projected future total lifecycle cost of each type of nuclear weapon;
Unclassified
Chapter 8,
Sections 8.9.1, 8.9.2
Classified
Chapter 2,
Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2

(C) the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life extension programs and any
other programs to modify, update, or replace warhead types;
NNSA Response
Unclassified
Chapters 2,
Sections 2.3, 2.4;
Chapter 8,
Section 8.9.2
Classified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.3
(D) a description of the process by which the Administrator assesses the lifetimes, and
Unclassified
requirements for life extension or replacement, of the nuclear and non-nuclear
Chapter 2,
components of the warheads (including active and inactive warheads) in the nuclear weapons Section 2.2.1
stockpile;
(E) a description of the process used in recertifying the safety, security, and reliability of each
warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile;
Unclassified
Chapter 2,
Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2,
2.4.3, 2.5.1;
Chapter 3,
Sections 3.4.2, 3.5.1,
3.6.1, 3.6.4
(F) any concerns of the Administrator that would affect the ability of the Administrator to
recertify the safety, security, or reliability of warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile
(including active and inactive warheads);
Unclassified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.1.2;
Chapter 3,
Section 3.3
Classified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.3
(G) mechanisms to provide for the manufacture, maintenance, and modernization of each
warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile, as needed;
Classified
Chapter 2;
Chapter 3,
Section 3.1.3
(H) mechanisms to expedite the collection of information necessary for carrying out the
stockpile management program required by section 2524 of this title, including information
relating to the aging of materials and components, new manufacturing techniques, and the
replacement or substitution of materials;
Unclassified
Chapter 2,
Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2,
2.4.5
(I) mechanisms to ensure the appropriate assignment of roles and missions for each national
security laboratory and nuclear weapons production facility, including mechanisms for
allocation of workload, mechanisms to ensure the carrying out of appropriate modernization
activities, and mechanisms to ensure the retention of skilled personnel;
Unclassified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.1.4;
Chapter 7,
Section 7.3.2
(J) mechanisms to ensure that each national security laboratory has full and complete access
to all weapons data to enable a rigorous peer-review process to support the annual
assessment of the condition of the nuclear weapons stockpile required under section 2525;
Unclassified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.4.3
(K) mechanisms for allocating funds for activities under the stockpile management program
required by section 4204, including allocations of funds by weapon type and facility; and
Unclassified
Chapters 4,
Section 4.4;
Chapter 8,
Sections 8.1, 8.9
(L) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted,
an identification of the funds needed to carry out the program required under section 2524.
Unclassified
Chapter 8,
Section 8.1
NNSA Response
(2) With respect to science-based tools

(A) a description of the information needed to determine that the nuclear weapons stockpile
is safe and reliable;
Unclassified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.1.1
Chapter 3,
Section 3.4.2
Classified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2
(B) for each science-based tool used to collect information described in subparagraph (A), the
relationship between such tool and such information and the effectiveness of such tool in
providing such information based on the criteria developed pursuant to section 2522(a) of
this title; and
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.4.2
Classified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2
(C) the criteria developed under section 2522(a) of this title (including any updates to such
criteria).
(3) An assessment of the stockpile stewardship program under section 2521 (a) of this title
by the Administrator, in consultation with the directors of the national security laboratories,
which shall set forth
(A) an identification and description of
(i) any key technical challenges to the stockpile stewardship program; and
(ii) the strategies to address such challenges without the use of nuclear testing;
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.3
Classified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2
(B) a strategy for using the science-based tools (including advanced simulation and computing Unclassified
capabilities) of each national security laboratory to ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile Chapter 3
is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of nuclear testing;
Classified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2
(C) an assessment of the science-based tools (including advanced simulation and computing
capabilities) of each national security laboratory that exist at the time of the assessment
compared with the science-based tools expected to exist during the period covered by the
future-years nuclear security program; and
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.3
Classified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2
(D) an assessment of the core scientific and technical competencies required to achieve the
objectives of the stockpile stewardship program and other weapons activities and weaponsrelated activities of the Administration, including
Unclassified
Chapter 7,
Section 7.4.2
(i) the number of scientists, engineers, and technicians, by discipline, required to

maintain such competencies; and
Unclassified
Appendix D
(ii) a description of any shortage of such individuals that exists at the time of the
assessment compared with any shortage expected to exist during the period covered by the
future-years nuclear security program.
Unclassified
Appendix D
NNSA Response
(4) With respect to the nuclear security infrastructure

(A) a description of the modernization and refurbishment measures the Administrator
determines necessary to meet the requirements prescribed in
Unclassified
Chapter 4,
Section 4.3
(i) the national security strategy of the United States as set forth in the most recent
national security strategy report of the President under section 404a of this title if such
strategy has been submitted as of the date of the plan;
(ii) the most recent quadrennial defense review if such strategy has not been submitted
as of the date of the plan; and
(iii) the most recent Nuclear Posture Review as of the date of the plan;
(B) a schedule for implementing the measures described under subparagraph (A) during the
10-year period following the date of the plan; and
Unclassified
Chapter 4,
Section 4.2.4
(C) the estimated levels of annual funds the Administrator determines necessary to carry out
the measures described under subparagraph (A), including a discussion of the criteria,
evidence, and strategies on which such estimated levels of annual funds are based.
Unclassified
Chapter 8,
Sections 8.4, 8.5, 8.9
(5) With respect to the nuclear test readiness of the United States
(A) an estimate of the period of time that would be necessary for the Administrator to
conduct an underground test of a nuclear weapon once directed by the President to conduct
such a test;
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2
(B) a description of the level of test readiness that the Administrator, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, determines to be appropriate;
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2
(C) a list and description of the workforce skills and capabilities that are essential to carrying
out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada National Security Site;
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2
(D) a list and description of the infrastructure and physical plants that are essential to carrying Unclassified
out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada National Security Site; and
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2
(E) an assessment of the readiness status of the skills and capabilities described in
subparagraph (C) and the infrastructure and physical plants described in subparagraph (D).
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2
(6) A strategy for the integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile
stewardship needs over a 20-year period that includes the following:
(A) An assessment of the baseline science issues necessary to understand plutonium aging
under static and dynamic conditions under manufactured and nonmanufactured plutonium
geometries.
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.4.2
Classified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2.1
(B) An assessment of scientific and testing instrumentation for plutonium at elemental and
bulk conditions.
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Sections 3.1, 3.5.3,
3.6.1, 3.6.4
Classified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2.1
NNSA Response
(C) An assessment of manufacturing and handling technology for plutonium and plutonium
components.
Unclassified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.4.6;
Chapter 4,
Section 4.3.3
(D) An assessment of computational models of plutonium performance under static and

dynamic loading, including manufactured and nonmanufactured conditions.
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.6.2
Classified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2.1
(E) An identification of any capability gaps with respect to the assessments described in
subparagraphs (A) through (D).
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Sections 3.3, 3.4.2
Classified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.2
(F) An estimate of costs relating to the issues, instrumentation, technology, and models
described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) over the period covered by the future-years
nuclear security program under section 2453 of this title.
Unclassified
Chapter 8,
Section 8.3
(G) An estimate of the cost of eliminating the capability gaps identified under subparagraph
(E) over the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program.
Unclassified
Chapter 8,
Section 8.3
(H) Such other items as the Administrator considers important for the integrated
management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile stewardship needs.
Unclassified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.4.6;
Chapter 4,
Section 4.3.3
(7) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the previous summary or
detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).
Unclassified
Executive Summary
(f) DEFINITIONS.In this section:

(1) The term budget, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that
is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of Title 31.
(2) The term future-years nuclear security program means the program required by section
2453 of this Title.
(3) The term nuclear security budget materials, with respect to a fiscal year, means the
materials submitted to Congress by the Administrator in support of the budget for that fiscal
year.
(4) The term quadrennial defense review means the review of the defense programs and
policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under section 118 of Title 10.
(5) The term weapons activities means each activity within the budget category of weapons
activities in the budget of the Administration.
(6) The term weapons-related activities means each activity under the Department of
Energy that involves nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons technology, or fissile or radioactive
materials, including activities related to
(A) nuclear nonproliferation;
(B) nuclear forensics;
(C) nuclear intelligence;
(D) nuclear safety; and
(E) nuclear incident response.
NNSA Response
Sec. 2524. Stockpile management program

(a) Program required
The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator for Nuclear Security and in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a program, in support of the
stockpile stewardship program, to provide for the effective management of the weapons in
the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the extension of the effective life of such weapons.
The program shall have the following objectives:
(1) To increase the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile of
the United States.
Unclassified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.1.4
(2) To further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground nuclear weapons
testing.
Unclassified
Chapter 3,
Section 3.4
(3) To achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
Unclassified
Chapter 1,
Section 1.3
Classified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.5.2
(4) To reduce the risk of an accidental detonation of an element of the stockpile.
Unclassified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.2
Classified
Chapter 2,
Section 3.2.3
(5) To reduce the risk of an element of the stockpile being used by a person or entity
hostile to the United States, its vital interests, or its allies.
Unclassified
Chapters 2,
Section 2.2;
Chapter 6,
Section 6.1.5
(b) Program limitations

In carrying out the stockpile management program under subsection (a), the Secretary of
Energy shall ensure that (1) any changes made to the stockpile shall be made to achieve the objectives identified
in subsection (a); and
Unclassified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.2
(2) any such changes made to the stockpile shall (A) remain consistent with basic design parameters by including, to the maximum
extent feasible, components that are well understood or are certifiable without
the need to resume underground nuclear weapons testing; and
(B) use the design, certification, and production expertise resident in the nuclear
security enterprise to fulfill current mission requirements of the existing stockpile.
Unclassified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.2
(c) Program budget

In accordance with the requirements under section 2529 of this Title, for each budget
submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of Title 31, the amounts
requested for the program under this section shall be clearly identified in the budget
justification materials submitted to Congress in support of that budget.
Unclassified
Chapter 8,
Section 8.1
A.3 Other Requirements

FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, Pu L. 113-66
Section 3112 of this Act adds the following section to 50 U.S.C. 2521Section 4219Plutonium Pit Production Capacity
(a) REQUIREMENTConsistent with the requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
Energy shall ensure that the nuclear security enterprise-(1) during 2021, begins production of qualification plutonium pits;
(2) during 2024, produces not less than 10 war reserve plutonium pits;
(3) during 2025, produce no less than 30 war reserve plutonium pits;
(4) during 2026, produces not less than 30 war reserve plutonium pits; and
(5) during a pilot period of not less than 90 days during 2027 (subject to produce war reserve
plutonium pits at a rate sufficient to produce 80 pits per year. In a coordinated manner, DOE
and DOD may slip this requirement up to 2 years.
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF TWO-YEAR DELAY OF DEMONSTRATION REQUIREMENTThe Secretary of
Energy and the Secretary of Defense may jointly delay, for not more than two years, the requirement
under subsection 2 (a)(5) if
(1) the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy jointly submit to the congressional
defense committees a report describing
(A) the justification for the proposed delay;
(B) the effects of the proposed delay on stockpile stewardship and modernization, life
extension programs, future stockpile strategy, and dismantlement efforts; and
(C) whether the proposed delay is consistent with national policy regarding creation of a
responsive nuclear infrastructure; and
(2) the Commander of the United States Strategic Command submits to the congressional
defense committees a report containing the assessment of the Commander with respect to
the potential risks to national security of the proposed delay in meeting
(A) the nuclear deterrence requirements of the United States Strategic Command;
and
(B) national requirements related to creation of a responsive nuclear infrastructure.
(c) ANNUAL CERTIFICATION.Not later than March 1, 2015, and each year thereafter through 2027,
the Secretary of Energy shall certify to the congressional defense committees and the Secretary of
Defense that the programs and budget of the Secretary of Energy will enable the nuclear security
enterprise to meet the requirements under subsection (a)
Section 3118 of this Act amends Section 3123 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2013 (Public Law 112239), as amended by section 3126 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-966) to add the following requirement(3) Annual CertificationNot later than March 1 of each year through 2025, the Secretary shall
certify in writing to the congressional defense committees and the Secretary of Defense that
Phase 1 under subsection (a) of the project referred in that subsection will
NNSA Response
Unclassified
Message from the
Secretary;
Chapter 2,
Section 2.4.6;
Chapter 4,
Section 4.3.3
Classified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.1.2
Unclassified
Message from the
Secretary; Chapter 2,
Section 2.4.6;
Chapter 4,
Section 4.3.3
(A) Not exceed the total cost set forth in paragraph (1) (as adjusted pursuant to paragraph (2), if
so adjusted); and
(B) meet a schedule that enables, by not later than 2025
(i)
uranium operations in building 9212 to cease; and
(ii)
uranium operations in a new facility constructed under the project to begin.
Section 3119Production of Nuclear Warhead for Long-Range Standoff Weapon
(a) First Production Unit. The Secretary of Energy shall deliver a first production unit for a nuclear
warhead for the long-range standoff weapon by not later than September 30, 2025.
Unclassified
Chapter 2,
Sections 2.1.4, 2.4.1,
2.5.2
Classified
Chapter 2,
Section 2.6
FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, Pu L. 113-66

Sec. 3123 Identification of amounts required for uranium technology sustainment in budget
materials for fiscal year 2016
The Administrator for Nuclear for Nuclear Security shall include, in the budget justification materials
submitted to Congress in support of the budget of the President for fiscal year 2016 (as submitted to
Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code), specific identification, as a budgetary
line item, of the amounts required for uranium technology sustainment in support of the nuclear
weapons stockpile in a manner that minimizes the use of plant-directed research and development
funds for full-scale technology development past a technology readiness level of 5 (as defined in
Department of Energy Guide 413.34A (relating to technology readiness assessment).
NNSA Response
Unclassified
Chapter 8,
Section 8.1
Appendix B
Research, Development, Testing, and
Evaluation Subprograms
Chapter 3 discussed the Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) activities that
underpin stockpile stewardship. This appendix provides more-detailed information regarding the
subprograms of the various programs that are described in Section 3.5 of that chapter. All of these
subprograms help maintain the technical staff through challenging work that builds competencies that
are critical to stockpile stewardship and avoiding technological surprise.
B.1 Science Program

B.1.1 Advanced Certification Subprogram
The Advanced Certification subprogram focuses on enabling certification of the evolving stockpile in the
absence of nuclear testing. This subprogram develops tools and methods that support assessment
activities associated with the current stockpile as well as certification of future stockpile options for
safety and security. Advanced Certification provides a strong focal point for the key research,
development, testing, and evaluation deliverables that enable life-extension certification activities. The
subprogram integrates scientific and technological advances that are supported by the Science,
Engineering, ASC, and ICF Programs with input from studies to understand the impacts of aging
phenomena and design options on weapon performance; enhance the weapons certification process;
refine computational tools and methods; advance physical understanding of surety mechanisms;
understand failure modes; assess advanced manufacturing processes; and respond to technological
surprise and changes in stockpile requirements.
B.1.2 Primary Assessment Technologies Subprogram

The Primary Assessment Technologies subprogram provides capabilities for the annual assessment of
stockpile primaries, design and certification of life extension programs, improvements in primary safety
and security, and resolution of SFIs. A principal focus is continuing to develop predictive capabilities to
model boost, a process that is key to proper functioning of nuclear weapons. Another principal focus is
providing the capability to assess the impacts of plutonium aging and changes associated with stockpile
LEPs, such as the reuse of components and incorporation of safety improvements (e.g., the use of
insensitive high explosives rather than conventional high explosives). Primary Assessment Technologies
also helps provide the intelligence community with capabilities to assess foreign nuclear weapon
activities.
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page B-1
March 2015| Department of Energy
B.1.3 Dynamic Materials Properties Subprogram

The Dynamic Materials Properties subprogram develops and maintains the capabilities to inform
modern, physics-based models that describe and predict the behavior of weapon-related materials at
extreme conditions of pressure, temperature, stress, strain, and strain rates. This subprogram provides
the data and essential materials knowledge to address issues for the Annual Assessment of the
stockpile, to evaluate and model the effects of the aging of materials, and to evaluate the effects of
material replacement and pit reuse for LEP options. Materials include plutonium, uranium,
nonradioactive metals, high explosives, ceramics, polymers, foams, and gases. Surrogate materials are
studied to aid understanding and develop data without the use of special nuclear materials. Surrogates
are also used to develop and qualify advanced diagnostics prior to fielding nuclear materials. Dynamic
Materials Properties also develops new experimental techniques for providing data at extreme
conditions and compares that data with calculations of first principles theories for material behavior.
Dynamic materials experiments are conducted at a number of NNSA facilities, including PF-4, Z, LANSCE,
NIF, JASPER, and other laser and gun facilities as well as in small-scale laboratories to test and
characterize materials. This subprogram is closely coordinated with the other subprograms of the
Science Program as well as with the ASC, ICF, Engineering, and Directed Stockpile Work Programs and
with the DOD/DOE Joint Munitions Program.
B.1.4 Advanced Radiography Subprogram

In the absence of nuclear testing, predictive capabilities for stockpile stewardship rely on the
development of advanced platforms and diagnostics to enable reliable, repeatable experimental data.
The Advanced Radiography subprogram develops technologies and diagnostics, including sources,
targets, and imaging systems, to diagnose hydrodynamic and subcritical experiments at the Nevada
National Security Site as well as platforms and diagnostics for other dynamic materials experiments.
These technologies improve the quality and reliability of scientific results at DARHT at LANL, the FXR
radiographic facility at LLNL, Z, the Cygnus radiographic source at the Nevada National Security Sites
U1a Complex, and Proton Radiography (pRad) at LANSCE. A key focus of the subprogram is evaluating
methods to enhance capabilities for subcritical experiments with plutonium in order to measure the
final stages of a primary implosion.
B.1.5 Secondary Assessment Technologies Subprogram

The Secondary Assessment Technologies subprogram provides capabilities that increase confidence in
the assessment of secondary performance to enable a broad range of LEPs options and the resolution of
SFIs. A principal focus is to provide the scientific basis to quantify full system performance margins and
associated uncertainties. For stockpile systems, this assessment will enable the acceptance of existing
secondaries and other nuclear explosive package components for reuse, as well as development of the
qualification methodology for performance of remanufactured canned subassembly components.
Another focus is developing predictive capabilities to quantify weapon outputs and the interaction with
the environment of both stockpile and non-stockpile systems. Improved predictions of secondary
performance depend on the development, in conjunction with the ICF Program, of advanced
experimental platforms. Secondary Assessment Technologies has strong programmatic coupling to
other subprograms in the Science Program, e.g., to HED facilities supported by the Science and ICF
Programs (NIF, Omega, and Z), and to advanced computing platforms supported by the ASC Program.
Page B-2 | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
B.2 Advanced Simulation and Computing Program

B.2.1 Integrated Codes Subprogram
The Integrated Codes subprogram produces largescale, IDCs for physics and engineering stockpile
assessments to support design studies, maintenance analyses, LEPs, alterations, SFIs, and weapons
dismantlement activities. It also maintains selected legacy codes and is responsible for emerging and
specialized codes that support the weapons mission. The IDCs represent the repository of data from
experiments on NNSAs wide range of facilities and legacy underground nuclear tests, as well as the
accumulated experience of the Directed Stockpile Work program user community. Predictive capabilities
and national security missions will be achieved through the advances realized in these codes.
B.2.2 Physics and Engineering Models Subprogram

The Physics and Engineering Models subprogram develops microscopic and macroscopic models of
physics and material properties for special-purpose physics codes to investigate specific phenomena in
detail. The latter are used in cases for which experimental data are difficult or impossible to obtain. The
subprogram partners with the Integrated Codes subprogram to perform initial validation and
incorporate new models into IDCs. The subprogram also partners with the Verification and Validation
subprogram on final assessment of models in IDCs. Extensive integration occurs between the
subprogram and experiments executed by the Science, ICF, and Engineering Programs.
B.2.3 Verification and Validation Subprogram

The Verification and Validation subprogram is a bridge between the modeling and development
community and the Directed Stockpile Work Program user community. It brings these communities
together to evaluate the capability of IDCs and provide a predictive capability for applications.
Verification activities demonstrate that the weapons codes are correctly solving equations related to the
physics and engineering models. Validation activities ensure that the codes are solving the correct
equations, i.e., that the models themselves are correct. Together, these subprogram activities provide a
technically rigorous, credible foundation for computational science and engineering calculations by
developing and implementing tools that provide confidence in simulations of highconsequence nuclear
stockpile problems. The subprogram also develops and implements uncertainty quantification
methodologies to support quantification of margins and uncertainties for weapon assessment.
B.2.4 Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation Subprogram

The Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation subprogram was created to help develop
advanced computing technologies to support stockpile stewardship and to mitigate the effects of these
new computer technologies on IDCs. Market and technology forces are disrupting the computing
ecosystem in a manner that is not conducive to scientific computing. These changes, such as multi-core
chips and unbalanced memory capacity and bandwidth, will impact the full spectrum of high
performance computing (HPC). As a result, the continued viability of the current generation of NNSAs
IDCs, produced during an era of relative stability in HPC technologies, is being threatened. The
subprogram addresses the need to adapt current IDCs and build new IDCs that are attuned to the
emerging technologies, engage in codesign ventures with industry to evolve operating systems and
other support software, and work with HPC vendors to deploy technologies that are useful for stockpile
stewardship.
B.2.5 Computational Systems and Software Environment Subprogram

The Computational Systems and Software Environment subprogram builds integrated, balanced, and
scalable computational capabilities. The complexity and scale of weapons simulations require the ASC
Program to lead the mainstream HPC community by investing in and influencing the evolution of
computing environments. The subprogram provides the stability to ensure productive system use and
protect NNSAs investment in secure simulation codes. Within the next decade, enhanced predictive
capabilities, delivery of quantified margins and uncertainties, and achievement of Directed Stockpile
Work deliverables will demand exascale computing. This subprogram will continue to provide for
acquisition and implementation of commodity technology class systems, such as the trilaboratory
Commodity Technology Systems, as well as advanced technology systems, such as Cielo and Sequoia
(current systems) and Trinity and Sierra (future systems).
B.2.6 Facility Operations and User Support Subprogram

The Facility Operations and User Support subprogram provides the physical facility and operational
support for production computing, storage, and services to enable effective use of the ASC Programs
trilaboratory (LANL, LLNL, SNL) computing resources. Designers, analysts, and code and model
developers provide the functional and operational requirements. The scope of operations includes
planning, integration, and deployment; continued product support; procurement of equipment and
media; quality and reliability activities; and collaborations. The subprogram covers physical space,
power, and local- and wide-area networking. The user support functions include computer center
hotline and help desk services, account management, webbased system documentation, system status
information tools, user training, trouble ticketing systems, and application analyst support at the three
national security laboratories.
B.3 Engineering Program

B.3.1 Enhanced Surety Subprogram
The Enhanced Surety subprogram develops state-of-the-art technologies to incorporate into stockpile
weapon systems for advanced safety, security, use control, and integrated surety and explores visionary
leading-edge technologies for these purposes. Enhanced Surety develops and matures viable
technology insertion options that improve safety (by preventing accidental detonation), security (by
expanding and strengthening physical protection boundaries), and use control (by permitting use of
nuclear weapons only when authorized).
B.3.2 Weapon Systems Engineering Assessment Technology

Subprogram
The Weapon Systems Engineering Assessment Technology subprogram develops the diagnostics,
hardware engineering assessment tools, methodologies, test data, and engineering analysis used to
maintain appropriate performance and safety margins through the life cycle of the stockpile. The
subprogram provides the linkage between capabilities in engineering sciences, computational
simulation, test and evaluation, and weapon system qualification. This subprogram has been crucial to
the transformation of weapon assessment and qualification via testing according to a framework based
on validated predictive capabilities that involve multiple, complex physics models and environments.
B.3.3 Nuclear Survivability Subprogram

The Nuclear Survivability subprogram provides tools and technologies to design and qualify components
or subsystems to meet requirements for radiation, space, and other hostile environments. Activities
include providing nuclear warhead output and experimental capabilities to determine survivability by
developing and validating models and experimental survivability assessment tools for nuclear
components; assuring that stockpile-to-target-sequence requirements for x-ray effects can be met with
adequate confidence and cost-effectiveness; and developing approaches, technologies, and
infrastructure for the qualification of microelectronics, microsystems, and other non-nuclear
components.
B.3.4 Enhanced Surveillance Subprogram

The Enhanced Surveillance subprogram assesses the impact of material behavior changes on weapon
performance and safety. This joint science and engineering effort provides material, component, and
subsystem lifetime assessments and develops predictive capabilities for early identification and
assessment of stockpile aging issues. The subprogram identifies aging issues with sufficient lead time to
ensure NNSA has the refurbishment capability and capacity in place when required. Typically, the
lifetime assessments include efforts to understand basic aging mechanisms and interactions of materials
in components, assemblies, and subassemblies. Accelerated aging experiments are used to obtain data
beyond that available from traditional stockpile surveillance. Experiments are also used to validate
broader, age-aware models developed to support lifetime assessments and predictions pertinent to
LEPs. In addition, the subprogram provides new or improved diagnostic techniques and technologies to
detect and quantify aging degradation and other potential defects in the stockpile. The capabilities and
knowledge gained are applied to assess and develop candidate replacement materials (through separate
technology and component maturation program efforts) for future stockpile insertion.
B.4 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield

Program
B.4.1 Ignition Subprogram
Demonstration of thermonuclear ignition in the laboratory, including its development as a platform in a
regime that is not accessible in any other way, will provide the means to address key weapons issues
and validate the simulation codes that are used to assess and certify the stockpile. Ignition remains a
major goal for NNSA and DOE. The Ignition subprogram supports research activities to optimize
prospects for achieving ignition at NIF, as well as development of and applications for robust ignition,
advanced ignition, and burning plasma platforms. Experiments on NNSAs HED facilities are supported
by detailed theoretical designs and two- and three-dimensional simulations of ignition targets. The
near-term emphasis is on developing the physics understanding to improve the target designs and
demonstrate ignition. In the longer term, advanced ignition concepts may provide higher yield and/or
gain compared to current indirect-drive concepts. The subprogram also develops advanced
experimental capabilities to create and study matter under extreme conditions that approach those in
nuclear explosions.
B.4.2 Support of Other Stockpile Programs Subprogram

HED physics and weapon-relevant experiments at ICFs suite of facilities are essential to assess and
certify the stockpile and validate models and simulation codes to provide knowledge relevant to nuclear
weapons performance. The Support of Other Stockpile Programs subprogram leverages the experience
of ICF researchers to execute these nuclear-weapons-relevant experiments. This expertise includes the
development of laser, target, platform, and diagnostic capabilities at NIF, Omega, Z, and supporting
facilities. In experiments for the Science and Directed Stockpile Work Programs and other stockpile
program elements the focus is on material properties, hydrodynamics, and radiation transport.
B.4.3 Diagnostics, Cryogenics, and Experimental Support Subprogram

Science-based weapons assessment and certification require advanced experimental capabilities and
diagnostics to create and study matter under extreme conditions. The subprogram develops and
deploys specialized technologies needed to execute experiments on ICF facilities for ignition, national
security, and fundamental science applications. Efforts of the subprogram include the design and
engineering of a complex array of diagnostic and measurement systems and associated information
technology subsystems for data acquisition, storage, retrieval, visualization, and analysis. A major
activity in FY 2016 is implementing a cost-effective National HED Diagnostics Plan to develop the
highest-priority diagnostics for national security applications.
B.4.4 Pulsed Power Inertial Confinement Fusion Subprogram

This technical effort advances the science of magnetically driven implosions as a means to achieve HED
for Stockpile Stewardship Program applications and as a promising path to nuclear-weapons-relevant
physics environments and high fusion yield. A mixture of focused and integrated experiments are
addressing key physics uncertainties and improving the design of targets for the Magnetized Liner
Inertial Fusion approach to fusion ignition. Specific activities include experiments on Z, at Omega, and
NIF; designing and building targets; improving simulation tools; and developing the diagnostic and
capability infrastructure to study magnetically driven implosions. An objective of the Pulsed Power
Inertial Confinement Fusion subprogram is to determine the requirements for an advanced pulsedpower driver that would achieve robust ignition and single-shot high yield.
B.4.5 Joint Program in High Energy Density Laboratory Plasmas

Subprogram
This joint program with the DOE Office of Science supports NNSAs stockpile stewardship mission by
conducting HED physics research and strengthens NNSAs RDT&E activities. The subprogram provides
support for external users at Omega through the National Laser Users Facility Program and a joint
solicitation with the Office of Science for High Energy Density Laboratory Plasmas research at
universities and DOE laboratories. It includes some support for Stockpile Stewardship Academic
Alliances activities and other university programs related to High Energy Density Laboratory Plasmas
research. It also supports academic programs to steward the study of laboratory HED plasma physics,
maintain a cadre of qualified HED researchers, and develop the next generation of stockpile stewards for
the future.
B.4.6 Facility Operations and Target Production Subprogram

The Facility Operations and Target Production subprogram provides infrastructure and operations
support of ICF HED facilities to conduct experiments for stockpile assessment and certification as well as
broader goals for NNSAs Stockpile Stewardship Program. It supports the experimental operation of NIF,
Omega, and Z and the fabrication of sophisticated targets related to weapons physics experiments and
ICF experiments, as well as the operation of the Trident facility at LANL, ICF external reviews, and facility
users meetings.
Appendix C
Exascale Computing
This appendix outlines the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program plan for developing a
usable exascale1 computing system (that is, a computing system that has a hundred-fold increase in
sustained application code performance over todays computing systems) for stockpile stewardship.
This plan is an update to the approach outlined in the FY 2015 SSMP (Chapter 3, Section 3.7.2, and
Appendix F) and is being submitted in coordination with the DOE Office of Sciences Advanced Scientific
Computing Research (ASCR) program, which partners with NNSA in exascale computing activities.
C.1
Introduction
The computational simulation capability provided by ASC is a key integrating element used for weapon
physics and engineering assessments of the Nations stockpile. The IDCs, including the models,
algorithms, and related physical databases developed for these codes, embody much of the
experimental data obtained by NNSA since the 1992 nuclear test moratorium, as well as legacy
underground nuclear test data and the accumulated experience of the DSW Program. The IDCs are a
principal tool used across the stockpile for design studies, maintenance analyses, qualification, Annual
Assessment Reports, LEPs, alterations, modifications, SFIs, warhead safety assessments, and weapons
dismantlement.
The current predictive capability of IDCs is a result of both scientific and engineering advances and the
extraordinary increases in computing capability over the past decades. While IDCs support most of
todays missions, they will need to be more predictive to support future missions. Aging of weapon
components, advanced and additive manufacturing techniques, and changes resulting from alterations
and LEPs are moving the stockpile further from the data collected in underground nuclear tests.
Predictive capability is currently limited by approximations in the physics models, the inability to
resolve critical geometric and physics features at very small length scales, and the need to quantify
margins and uncertainties. Making progress on these limitations requires NNSA to move beyond
today's computer systems to usable exascale computing systems, which will remove the need for some
approximations, allow simulations to run at substantially smaller length scales, and enable more
accurate quantification of margins and uncertainties.
The historical trend in raw computing performance improvement suggests that an exascale system
could be built by 2018. However, a series of reports over the last five years indicate that the resulting
system would require more than 200 megawatts of power (resulting in estimated energy costs of
$200 million to $300 million per year), would have an extremely high failure rate because of the very
large number of components (causing simulations to stop after only 10 or 20 minutes of computation),
would have limited memory per computing processor (dramatically reducing the effectiveness of
todays stockpile stewardship codes), and would be extremely difficult to program (requiring new
1
18
An exascale computer would perform at least 10 floating point operations per second, which is more than 50 times faster
than the petascale-class computers that are currently the backbone of NNSAs computing resources. Petascale computers
15
perform at least 10 floating point operations per second.
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page C-1
algorithms and programming techniques) [see Section C.11, 1-6]. Consequently, exascale solutions built
from off-the-shelf components are not expected to be viable for stockpile stewardship applications in
the next decade.
Developing usable exascale computing capabilities for stockpile stewardship requires a research,
development, and engineering effort that will:
develop computing systems that provide a hundred-fold increase in sustained application code
performance over current ASC systems;
reduce power requirements to a factor of ten below recent projections; and
address high failure rate problems, memory per processor issues, and programming challenges.
These challenges are already present in today's quickly evolving computer systems. To partially address
these challenges, ASC has started an Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation (ATDM)
subprogram, mentioned in Chapter 3 and Appendix B. ATDM will mitigate the impact of computing
technology changes to IDCs by beginning to rewrite the IDCs for next-generation systems and by
engaging early with computer hardware vendors to work on application performance solutions of
critical importance to the stockpile stewardship mission. ATDM is expected to address some of the
most pressing issues for stockpile stewardship associated with next-generation computing
architectures.
This plan will be executed in close collaboration with DOEs ASCR. Each organization will contribute in
their primary areas of expertise: ASC in applied development and total system engineering, and ASCR in
long-lead-time R&D of enabling technologies. Collaborative teams comprised of a mix of DOE
laboratories, small and large HPC vendors, and universities selected through peer review processes will
conduct research, development, and engineering. Within the Federal Government, DOE will coordinate
with other organizations that have historically made major investments in developing and deploying
HPC, such as the National Security Agency, National Science Foundation, DOD, and Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency.
To meet the needs of the weapons program, NNSA must continue to acquire advanced systems at a
strategically determined schedule, which is funded through established core program funds. These
funds amount to between $40 million and $100 million annually (averaging $65 million). Developing
and adapting the IDCs to next-generation exascale computer architectures is part of ASCs core mission
and would continue to be funded outside of a national exascale initiative.
The details of the plan for achieving exascale computing, including background information, technical
challenges, exascale requirements, approach and strategy, current activities, management, budget and
major milestones, risk management, and the relationship to the National Strategic Computing Initiative,
are presented in the remainder of this appendix.
C.2
Background
Computer hardware and architectures are evolving rapidly because of market pressures created by
mobile computing devices and other consumer electronics that are not focused on HPC. Because of
physical limits, it is no longer economically feasible for manufacturers to continue the historic trend of
making computer circuits faster as component sizes shrink. The industry is responding by incorporating
more processing cores on a single chip, resulting in multi-core chips. This is driving an unprecedented
degree of parallelism, that is, many cores running together in parallel to complete a single
computation. In addition, the historically slow improvement of memory systems relative to the fast
Page C-2 | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
improvement of computing speed has resulted in memory systems becoming primary drivers in cost
and power consumption. For example, the fact that Sequoia, ASCs highest-performing computer
system, has many more computing cores than Cielo, ASCs previous highest-performing system, gives
Sequoia significantly greater capacity to perform stockpile work. However, each core runs the current
IDCs two to five times more slowly because of the difficulty of adapting the IDCs to the higher degree of
on-chip parallelism, the slower speed of the individual cores, and the reduced capacity of the memory
system per core. All of these causes for reduced performance were a consequence of cost and power
considerations.
The decline in code performance on new systems like Sequoia is a clear indicator that issues associated
with next-generation computing systems that are on the path to exascale must be addressed. Current
challenges are only expected to get worse by continuing many-core system and hierarchical memory
trends. These challenges are being partially addressed through the new ATDM subprogram within ASC,
but can only be fully addressed within the next decade by an enhanced effort to achieve capable
exascale computing.
C.3
Technical Challenges
Pursuing increased capabilities on the path to exascale will be difficult. Impediments to advancing HPC
capabilities include the need for significant changes, both in the underlying hardware architecture of
these systems and the many layers of software required to use them. To address these challenges,
researchers must work together to design and develop the needed architectures, storage, operating
systems, languages, libraries, and application software. Over the last eight years, a series of workshops,
advisory committee studies, vendor technology surveys, and studies by various Federal agencies [see
Section C.11, 1-16] have documented the following major challenges:
Energy Challenge. Science and engineering applications, like the stockpile IDCs, require
relatively large amounts of memory per computing core, and memory systems, specifically data
movement, will soon dominate the energy budget. Based on current technology, scaling
today's systems to an exascale level would consume more than a gigawatt of power, roughly
half the output of Hoover Dam. Reducing the power requirement by a factor of at least
ten below current projections for such systems will require significant effort.
Memory and Storage Challenge. Memory density is doubling every three years compared to
processor logic, which is doubling every two years. Today, it takes about ten times more energy
to bring two numbers from memory into the processor than it takes to perform the subsequent
arithmetic operation. By 2020, this ratio is expected to reach 50 times, making data movement
very expensive compared to calculations. System vendors must develop, to the extent
required, memory and storage architectures that are energy efficient and provide high-rate
access to high capacity memory. To limit demands on the memory systems, application codes
must be implemented with new approaches that focus less on limiting computation (as they
historically have) and more on limiting data movement.
Resilience Challenge. Today's highest-performing ASC system has approximately 1.5 million
computing cores. Because of physical and economic constraints, the speed of each computing
core is unlikely to change in the future, which means that an exascale system could have as
many as 1 billion cores. An immediate consequence is that the frequency of errors for the
overall system will increase dramatically, while timely identification and correction of errors
will become much more difficult. HPC vendors must deliver a more fault-tolerant hardware and
software infrastructure that will enable applications to develop ways to cope with these errors.
Parallelism Challenge. To make effective use of the unprecedented levels of parallelism that
will be present in exascale systems, the mathematical models, numerical methods, and
software implementations all require new conceptual and programming paradigms. Nextgeneration systems must be designed to provide efficient exploitation of this concurrency and
must provide the appropriate tools for application developers.
C.4
Usable Exascale System Requirements
The system characteristics to meet the technical challenges discussed above are listed in Table C1
below.
Table C1. Proposed usable exascale system requirements compared to the latest ASC system
January 2015 (ASC)
Proposed Exascale Targets
System peak performance
20 petaflops
> 1,000 petaflops (code performance

100 times that of current ASC systems)
System power
8 megawatts
~20 megawatts
System memory
1.6 petabytes
> 64 petabytes
Storage
15 petabytes
500 to 1,000 petabytes
I/O aggregate bandwidth
0.3 terabytes/second
60 terabytes/second
Job Mean Time To Interruption
25 hours
25 hours (with resiliency techniques)
ASC = Advanced Simulation and Computing Program

I/O = input/output
Code performance that executes actions 100 times faster than on current ASC systems is very
significant. This requirement involves substantially more than delivering new computer hardware. A
revamped software stack, including an operating system, programming models, libraries, and both
modified and new IDCs, must be developed and delivered to leverage the new computer hardware. The
IDCs, together with the underlying software and hardware stacks, must cope with the large number of
interruptions expected on an exascale system, must execute efficiently with the delivered memory, and
must use the unprecedented degree of parallelism.
C.5
Approach and Strategy
Historically, the HPC industry delivered new leading-edge systems every four to five years. However,
usable exascale capabilities will require more than incremental improvements to current technologies.
A usable exascale system will be much more difficult to achieve than previous generations of
computing systems; however, these barriers can be overcome by adapting and augmenting past ASC
and ASCR strategies. Those strategies have included research programs at universities, vendorlaboratory partnerships, development of hardware prototype systems (test beds), and strategic system
acquisitions. Because of the complexity of exascale computing, these past strategies must be
augmented by new efforts. The key thrusts of the new strategic approach are outlined below. Each
thrust must be closely integrated with the other thrusts, as appropriate.
C.5.1 System Integration Research, Development, and Engineering

Computer processor vendors make substantial investments in well-defined technology paths. For HPC,
they rely on partnerships and collaborations with system integrators and application developers to
achieve the full potential of their technologies. As a result, HPC system integrators have significant
experience in managing multiple partners on complex projects. The strength and depth of these
partnerships will be critical to meeting the technical challenges that were discussed in Section C.3.
C.5.2 Hardware and Software Technology Research and Development

Hardware Technology. This activity will support cross-cutting research projects in industry,
laboratories, and academia that are aimed at early-stage technology development to reduce the
technical risks associated with exascale technologies that can meet mission application needs. These
technologies include the processor, its memory subsystem, network interfaces, and the
interconnection network. Software components specific to these hardware technologies, such as
compilers or operating systems for the specific processors, must also be developed.
Software Technology. To achieve the full potential of exascale computing, a software stack must be
developed that includes new programming models and metrics to evaluate system status, with a focus
on new and revised implementations of applications. The scope of the software effort will span the
spectrum of operating systems, runtimes for scheduling, memory management, file systems, and
performance monitoring, as well as power management, resilience, computational libraries, compilers,
programming models, and application frameworks. The software technology effort will not focus solely
on exascale systems. Scalability, programmability, resilience, and code portability must be enabled to
have the greatest impact on future HPC systems at any scale.
C.5.3 Exascale Co-Design

Given the challenges of achieving usable exascale computing, application code developers must
recognize the trends and opportunities of emerging architecture designs and technologies; at the same
time, platform providers must gain deeper understanding of the intended uses of the computers. This
system-level design process between application developers and hardware developers is referred to as
the co-design process. The co-design process seeks to ensure that future architectures are well suited
to the target applications so that stockpile IDCs can take advantage of the emerging computer
architectures. Through ASC and ASCR investments, some Co-Design Centers already have begun and
will continue to perform exploratory research to co-design hardware and architecture, software stacks,
and numerical methods and algorithms for mission applications, as well as to use co-design to
determine technical tradeoffs in the design of exascale hardware, system software, and application
codes.
C.6
Current Activities
ASC is currently collaborating with ASCR to address exascale challenges through the following activities:
System Integration Research, Development and Engineering. The ASC computing strategy [see
Section C.11, 17] describes an ongoing acquisition plan for advanced technology and commodity
technology systems. The advanced technology systems are expected to meet the mission requirements
of the most challenging engineering and physics simulations for the stockpile. These systems are
carefully designed to integrate new technologies that provide benefits beyond those available in
existing commodity offerings. ASC plans to acquire new advanced technology computing platforms
every two and a half years by replacing older systems once every five years at LANL and LLNL. The
advanced technology platforms are harbingers and potentially prototypes of exascale architectures and
will force IDCs to adapt to the new technology. Although important, these acquisitions and adaptive
techniques are not sufficient to achieve a usable exascale system for stockpile stewardship. Focused
hardware and software technology R&D and exascale co-design activities are also needed.
Hardware and Software Technology R&D. To ensure that exascale computing platforms will be
suitable for evolving IDCs, directed vendor R&D is needed. Starting in FY 2012, DOE has awarded
contracts to HPC vendors to address critical hardware and software technologies. These contracts,
executed in collaboration with ASCR, are part of the DesignForward and FastForward programs and
will continue through FY 2017. The FastForward program focuses on the long-lead-time R&D for
exascale node and memory architectures. The DesignForward program focuses on exascale system
networking technologies, conceptual design, and engineering issues. Together, the programs seek to
maximize efficiencies in energy and concurrency while increasing the performance and reliability of key
applications for both ASC and ASCR. The goal is to begin addressing the technologies most likely to
impact HPC system performance over the next two to ten years.
Activities in ASCs ATDM subprogram address the need to explore the IDC transformations necessary
for current and future disruptive2 computer technologies. In FY 2015, each of the three NNSA
national security laboratories began to develop a new IDC code to investigate new programming
techniques. During this initial year, milestones will be achieved to identify the most promising program
structures and to develop interfaces for input/output staging technologies. Subsequent-year
milestones and other activities within ATDM have been designed to build upon each other to illuminate
future architectural paths up to and including exascale for IDCs. The key long-term milestones are
discussed in the next section.
A complementary effort to these IDC R&D activities is the creation of a viable software environment for
next-generation codes. The needs and gaps identified in a milestone for a pre-exascale environment in
FY 2015 will be incorporated as tasks in the ASC Implementation Plans that cover the FY 2016 FYNSP.
These efforts in programming environments and tools, data analysis, input/output systems, networks
and interconnects, and system monitoring will not fully support exascale computing, but they will be
necessary as the HPC technology ultimately evolves to exascale.
Exascale Co-Design. The unifying foundation for all of these endeavors is co-design. The ASC trilaboratory (LANL, LLNL, and SNL) co-design project began in 2012. The project members have
completed a series of milestones since 2013. An important project activity is to interact with vendors,
in particular those under the DesignForward and FastForward program contracts. Key communication
vehicles for these interactions are the small proxy applications developed and supported by the codesign project teams to represent the computational or communication features of the IDCs. The proxy
applications are used during deep dives held at vendor sites. The goal of the proxy applications and
these deep dives is to influence vendor hardware and software capabilities and gain a deeper
understanding of the architectural trends and their implications for the ASC code base. Enabled by
these interactions, in FY 2014, ASC completed a milestone to study application performance on a set of
emerging technologies. In FY 2015, ASC is focusing on developing ways to improve IDC performance on
these technologies while retaining portability to future ASC computing systems.
These computer technologies are termed disruptive because they disrupt the computing ecosystem in a manner that is not
conducive to scientific computing.
C.7
Collaborative Management
As discussed in the introduction, ASC is partnering with DOEs ASCR to address exascale computing
challenges.3 ASCR is driving advances in science through the use of increasing HPC capabilities.
Recognizing the strengths and synergies available through collaboration, ASC and ASCR have
committed to joint planning and execution of several projects to tackle a common set of problems and
achieve common objectives. This joint collaboration will eliminate duplication, focus the vendor
community, decrease costs by increasing acquisition volumes, and improve solutions through the
broad, combined experience and strengths of the two programs.
The approach is a single strategy to enable multiple missions. Joint activities include FastForward,
DesignForward, HPC system procurement, and exascale planning. Shared co-design efforts have been
selected for their broad impact on DOE mission applications. However, each mission area (ASC and
ASCR) will continue to have its own unique challenges that must be addressed for full utilization of
exascale resources. The development of new algorithms and approaches for applications will continue
to be funded through ASCs Integrated Codes and ATDM subprograms, and ASCRs Scientific Discovery
through Advanced Computing program will be funded through its Computer Science and Facilities
portfolio. Budget authority for the current advanced technologies work, which is congruent with the
path to exascale, continues to reside within the respective ASC and ASCR Programs.
C.8
Budget and Major Milestones
With the exception of platform acquisitions, funding for NNSAs advanced technologies work, which is
congruent with the path to exascale, is through ATDM. This subprogram provides for development of
new solutions to partially address the exascale technical challenges and to mitigate the risk that ASC
codes will not run effectively on future HPC platforms. The activities in each year are scheduled to be
consistent with the available funding. The budget also covers the ASC contributions to FastForward and
DesignForward program contracts for stimulating HPC-specific technologies.
IDCs must fully use future exascale systems for stockpile calculations. The requirement in Table C1
that IDC code performance be 100 times faster on an exascale system than on current ASC systems
presents one of the greatest challenges to achieving usable exascale computing. In addition to the
strategy outlined in Sections C.5 and C.7, ASC will tackle this challenge by adapting existing IDCs to new
computing architectures and developing next-generation IDCs with fundamentally different
infrastructures that are specifically designed for future computing architectures. ASC has developed
several key milestones to ensure its code performance objective is achieved. These milestones
represent advances in codes and computing systems to achieve a viable path to exascale, but provide
enough technology that the codes have historically counted on to allow a smooth transition.
The NNSA Office of Defense Programs and the DOE Office of Science established a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in
April 2011 to coordinate exascale computing activities. Under this MOU, the responsibility for an exascale initiative would be
shared by the DOE Under Secretary for Science and the NNSA Administrator. A DOE Exascale Joint Coordination Group,
established and led by the Director of ASC and the Director of ASCR, would ensure accountability of the Federal funds used,
clarify lines of authority and reporting, and leverage existing infrastructure and resources.
System Readiness Milestone (FY 2017). Deliver the Advanced Technology System (ATS)-1 (Trinity,
at LANL) for production use.
System Readiness Milestone (FY 2019). Deliver ATS-2 (Sierra, at LLNL) for production use.
Code Performance Milestone (FY 2019). Demonstrate agile code development by running a single
simulation (one for each laboratory) that is relevant to stockpile stewardship on at least 50 percent of
the Knights Landing portion (composed of next-generation hardware) of ATS-1 within two years of the
system's readiness for production simulations on the classified network.
Code Assessment Milestone (FY 2019). Evaluate both existing and next-generation IDCs for accuracy,
efficiency, and scalability of the simulation results on the ATS-1 and ATS-2 computing platforms.
simulation (per laboratory) relevant to stockpile stewardship on at least 50 percent of ATS-2 within
two years of the system's readiness for production simulations on the classified network. In addition,
demonstrate that a single simulation can achieve significantly better performance than the same
simulation on previous ASC platforms.
System Readiness Milestone (FY 2021). Deliver ATS-3 for production use.
simulation (per laboratory) relevant to stockpile stewardship on at least 50 percent of ATS-3 within
two years of the system's readiness for production simulations on the classified network. In addition,
demonstrate that a single simulation can achieve significantly better performance than the same
simulation on previous ASC platforms.
In addition to the milestones outlined above, ASC is a key part of virtually every PCF pegpost
(see Chapter 3, Figure 32, in the FY 2015 SSMP and Chapter 3, Figure 32, in this FY 2016 SSMP).
Those pegposts will put additional focus on delivering effective platforms and codes to meet the needs
of the stockpile.
The purpose of ATDM and the milestones described above is not to deliver a working exascale
platform, but instead to help guide and develop advanced computing technologies for next-generation
platforms and to mitigate the effects of these new technologies on the IDCs. As such, ATS-3, which will
be ready for production use in FY 2021, is not expected to be an exascale system. However, to the
degree that future budgets allow, NNSA participation in the (see Section C.10) may allow deployment
of a usable exascale system within the next decade.
C.9
Risk Management
Key programmatic risks and associated mitigation approaches related to achieving exascale computing
are identified in Table C2.
Table C2. Risks in achieving exascale computing
Risk
Mitigation Strategy
Exascale platform architecture is not

usable by IDCs or does not deliver desired
performance improvements for IDCs.
Develop proxy applications for IDCs and follow proven processes for
co-design. Develop new IDCs with fundamentally different
infrastructures for future computing technologies. Track success per
baseline metrics and interim target values throughout the project.
Exascale platform uses too much power.
Increase the likelihood that required technological breakthroughs and

advances will occur by funding multiple potential technologies.
Exascale platform is unreliable.
Invest in robust, multi-layered approaches (hardware, operating

systems, system software infrastructure, application codes, etc.) to
manage or resolve faults.
Exascale platform architecture departs

significantly from expected designs after
investment in R&D of software, tools, and
algorithms based on expected designs.
Develop clearly defined communication channels with vendors and

use those channels to communicate regularly and effectively to
ensure that participants are well informed regarding the evolving
architectures and new directions.
Software environments do not satisfy IDC

needs.
Determine workload requirements by developing proxy applications.

Engage vendors, ASCR laboratories, and universities to encourage
development of software environments that meet proxy application
requirements.
Proxy applications do not sufficiently

represent full IDC requirements.
Obtain hardware prototype systems (test beds) and regularly test and
determine differences between proxy application performance and
IDC performance. Identify weaknesses and modify proxy applications,
IDCs, and/or metrics appropriately.
Key algorithms that do not scale may not

have timely, suitable alternatives.
Invest in early exploratory algorithms research and in multiple

research paths for the most critical algorithms.
Vendor default
Engage multiple vendors in research, development, and acquisitions.
ASCR = Office of Science Advanced Scientific Computing Research

IDC = Integrated Design Codes
R&D = research and development
C.10 Conclusion
The computational simulation capability that ASC provides in the form of IDCs is a key integrating
element for weapon physics and engineering assessments of the Nations stockpile. Although the
current predictive capability of IDCs is sufficient for todays mission, issues such as aging, advanced and
additive manufacturing, and other changes to the stockpile will require IDCs to be more predictive. A
critical element for improved predictive capability is next-generation computing, specifically exascale
computing.
However, developing a usable exascale computing system is a tremendous challenge. Driven by market
forces in consumer electronics and faced with physical limitations in microprocessors, the computing
industry is driving toward immensely complex computer architectures composed of massive, multi-core
processors with inadequate memory systems. NNSAs ASC is navigating this complex landscape by
working aggressively with computer vendors and co-designing hardware, software, and IDCs and by
developing software technologies to mitigate the impact on IDCs. ASC is making steady progress.
When the NSCI is funded, this progress will accelerate substantially and will increase the clout of HPC
within the marketplace by providing trickle-down benefits for both the nuclear security enterprise
and the desktop computer user community.
NNSAs plan to address these challenges, as outlined in this appendix, is being and will continue to be
executed in close collaboration with DOEs ASCR to leverage the strengths of each organization.
C.11 References
1. Top Ten Exascale Research Challenges, DOE ASCAC Subcommittee Report (February 10, 2014).
2. Technical Challenges of Exascale Computing, JASON Report JSR-12-310 (April 2013).
3. Report of the Task Force on High Performance Computing of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
(August 10, 2014).
4. The Future of Computing Performance, Game Over or Next Level, National Research Council of the
National Academies Report (2011).
5. Exascale Software Study: Software Challenges in Extreme Scale Systems, DARPA
(September 14, 2009).
6. Exascale Computing Study: Technology Challenges in Achieving Exascale Systems, DARPA Technical
Report (2008).
7. Modeling and Simulation at the Exascale for Energy and the Environment Town Hall Meetings
Report, Workshop report from the Grand Challenges Series of Workshops, Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory (April 17-18, 2007).
8. Challenges in the Climate Change Science and the Role of Computing at the Extreme Scale,
Workshop report from the Grand Challenges Series of Workshops, Washington, D.C.,
November 6-7, 2008.
9. Challenges for the Understanding the Quantum Universe and the Role of Computing at the Extreme
Scale Workshop report from the Grand Challenges Series of Workshops, Menlo Park, CA
(December 9-11, 2008).
10. Forefront Questions in Nuclear Science and the Role of Computing at the Extreme Scale, Workshop
report from the Grand Challenges Series of Workshops, Washington, D.C. (January 26-28, 2009).
11. Fusion Energy Sciences and the Role of Computing at the Extreme Scale, Fusion Energy Workshop
report from one of the Grand Challenges Series of Workshops, Washington, D.C.
(March 18-20, 2009).
12. Science-Based Nuclear Energy Systems Enabled by Advanced Modeling and Simulation at the
Extreme Scale, Workshop report from the Grand Challenges Series of Workshops, Washington, D.C.
(May 11-12, 2009).
13. Opportunities in Biology at the Extreme Scale of Computing, Workshop report from the Grand
Challenges Series of Workshops, Chicago, IL (August 17-19, 2009).
14. Scientific Grand Challenges in National Security: The Role of Computing at the Extreme Scale, NNSA
workshop report from the Grand Challenges Series of workshops, Washington, D.C.
(October 6-8, 2009).
15. Architectures and Technology for Extreme Scale Computing Workshop report from the Grand
Challenge Series of Workshops, San Diego, CA (December 8-10, 2009).
16. Cross-cutting Technologies for Computing at the Exascale, Workshop report from Grand Challenge
Series of Workshops, Washington, D.C. (February 2-4, 2010).
17. J.A. Ang, P.J. Henning, T.T. Hoang, R. Neely, Advanced Simulation and Computing: Computing
Strategy (2013).
18. Preliminary Conceptual Design for an Exascale Computing Initiative, Meeting of Advanced Scientific
Advisory Committee (November 21, 2014) (http://science.energy.gov/ascr/ascac/meetings/
november-2014).
Appendix D
Workforce and Site-Specific Information
NNSA has enhanced this years workforce appendix by including a brief primer on the eight nuclear
security enterprise sites. NNSA has three national security laboratories (LLNL, LANL, and SNL), four
nuclear weapons production facilities (NSC, Pantex, SRS, and Y-12), and the test site (Nevada National
Security Site). These sites, spread across the Nation, possess the expert workforce and advanced
capabilities that provide the Nations nuclear deterrent. Specific information is included in this appendix
to familiarize stakeholders and the public with each sites mission, mission capabilities, FY 2016 budget
request, physical infrastructure,1 and workforce.
The Secretary of Energy formed the National Laboratory Operations Board (LOB) in 2013, as an agency
priority goal, to restructure the relationships and interactions between the Department, the DOE
national laboratories, and sites to ensure the continued status as world-class research institutions best
able to achieve DOEs mission, maximize the impact of Federal R&D investment, accelerate the transfer
of technology into the private and Government sectors, and better respond to opportunities and
challenges. In support of this goal, DOE has established the National Laboratory Policy Council to
address high-level policy challenges and develop initiatives to build and focus the laboratory system on
Detailed information about NNSAs approach to planning and management of physical infrastructure can be found in
Chapter 4, Revitalize Physical Infrastructure.
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-1
critical economic, research, and national security priorities. In addition, the National Laboratory
Operations Board (LOB) has been created to address operational and administrative issues.
A Working Group of the LOB was developed to assess how the infrastructure is meeting the mission
related needs of the DOE/NNSA complex. One of the highest priorities identified by the LOB was the
need to revitalize general purpose infrastructure. An integrated plan to conduct a site-wide assessment
of general purpose infrastructure across all DOE national security laboratories and NNSA nuclear
weapons production facilities was conducted; for the first time, common standards and an enterprisewide approach was used. The assessments provided a detailed, uniform analysis of facilities and other
infrastructure and provided information for decisions on future investments. This assessment included
qualitative ratings of asset conditions as adequate, substandard, or inadequate. The LOB assessments
provide a holistic view of the DOE infrastructure, in addition to the traditional metric of Deferred
(DM)/Replacement Value (RPV), by going beyond physical condition and considering the suitability of
the facility for its current mission. The findings from these assessments are included for each site in
Appendix D.
With respect to the workforce, NNSA and its M&O partners developed a new methodology for analyzing
the FY 2016 SSMP data collection that, as in previous years, is based on the Common Occupational
Classification System (COCS). This new methodology has the following advantages:
It reflects a common understanding of the data across the eight NNSA sites.
It provides a much simpler process that is supported across the eight sites.
It leverages established procedures and functions.
It more closely aligns with the way historical data have routinely been collected by the sites.
It allows accurate, consistent, and timely response to congressional legislation.
With the exception of SRS and the Nevada National Security Site,2 the data represent NNSAs total site
headcount information (as opposed to calculated full-time equivalent [FTE]) information for permanent
career employees3 to better reflect the total site effort for the assigned mission scope.
The data in this SSMP do not include about 5,000 staff who support the DOE Environmental Management part of the Savannah
River Site or about 290 Centerra-Nevada service contractors who provide security at the Nevada National Security Site.
3
For consistency across the M&O sites, headcount numbers only include permanent career employees and do not include
students, post-doctoral scholars, or temporary or contract employees.
Page D-2 | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
D.1 National Nuclear Security Administration

D.1.1 Federal Workforce
Notes:
Includes all NNSA (Federal Salaries and Expenses [formerly known as the Office of the Administrator] and STA)
employees, except Naval Reactors.
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2015 capped the total number of Federal employees under
Federal Salaries and Expenses at 1,690 FTEs by October 2015. The total headcount of 2,144 includes 1,587 under
Federal Salaries and Expenses and 557 in STA.
NNSA is pursuing a moderate recruitment effort focused on its most urgent needs, which include entry-level and some
student hiring. Rather than creating a one size fits all program for entry-level and student hiring, line managers are
being empowered with a robust set of choices.
Recent workforce planning activities recommended that NNSA's out-year growth should focus on acquisitions
occupations, where benchmarks demonstrate a need and oversight, as well as planning for Defense Programs.
Figure D1. Federal total headcount
Notes:
The ages of NNSA employees is skewed toward the high end, especially considering that the average retirement age is
about 54 years.
The data set includes approximately 319 nuclear materials couriers who are, on average, younger than the rest of the
workforce.
Ninety-two percent of this courier workforce is 26 to 45 years old, causing the data to be skewed to the left.
Challenges associated with an aging workforce have been identified and are addressed in the same manner as for
years of service challenges.
Figure D2. Federal employees by age
Notes:
The NNSA Federal workforce has a bimodal distribution, with large numbers of employees in the youngest and oldest
age ranges and fewer in the mid-range. This presents some risk because of an experience gap in the valley between
the two peaks. On the left side of the bimodal distribution, 802 experienced employees have 6 to 15 years of service,
which represents an opportunity to manage the risk through knowledge transfer and mentoring.
NNSA will use knowledge-capture techniques and processes to record, understand, and transfer the invaluable
experience and knowledge of its aging workforce.
NNSA recognizes the need for effective leadership, performance measures, and management consistency as well as an
increased focus on training at the entry, middle, and executive levels and an increased flexibility and adaptability
among its current staff.
Figure D3. Federal employees by years of service
Notes:
NNSA, like many other Federal agencies, has experienced staff reductions caused by budget shortfalls over the past
two years. NNSA severely constrained and froze hiring to cope with funding uncertainties (sequestration and
continuing resolutions in FY 2013 and FY 2014) and to address skills mix issues.
The NDAA for FY 2015 capped the total number of Federal employees under Federal Salaries and Expenses at
1,690 FTEs by October 2015, excluding STA and the Office of Naval Reactors.
The NDAA 1,690-FTE cap represents a 12.3 percent reduction from the previous FY 2010 target of 1,926. This
downward trend in the cap is constraining the workforce and yet offers an opportunity to reshape the Federal
workforces oversight and program management roles. (The Federal staff as of October 2014 totaled 1,587 FTEs under
Federal Salaries and Expenses, which is below the 1.690 cap for October 2015.)
Figure D4. Change in last two fiscal years for Federal employees
(end of FY 2012 to end of FY 2014)
Notes:
To address the challenges presented by the retirement of highly experienced personnel, NNSA will use knowledgecapture processes and techniques to interview, record, and transfer the invaluable experience and knowledge of the
late-career workforce.
Figure D5. Age of Federal employees who left service

Notes:
The loss of employees with less than 10 years of experience, coupled with the loss of employees with 20+ years of
service from retirement, must be addressed to maintain a viable workforce.
Figure D6. Years of service of Federal employees who left service

Notes:
Less than 50 percent of the total Federal employee population is in the advanced-career stage. Only 14 percent is in
the early-career stage. In FY 2010 a hiring spike caused an upward trend in these statistics, but the overall trend has
since been downward.
Figure D7. Federal employees trends by career stage
Notes:
The rate of retirement has increased in the last two years and should remain slightly higher in the coming years,
thereby creating a unique opportunity to reshape the workforce.
Figure D8. Federal employment separation trends
Notes:
The staff in Federal Salaries and Expenses as of October 2014 totaled 1,587, which was below the authorized level of
1,690, thereby creating an opportunity to hire 103 new staff.
Figure D9. Total projected Federal workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP
D.2 National Security Laboratories

D.2.1 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
D.2.1.1 Mission
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is located in Livermore, California, where it was founded
by the University of California in 1952. DOE sponsors LLNL as a Federally Funded Research and
Development Center (FFRDC) to provide
special
long-term
research
and
development needs for the nuclear
stockpile and a broad range of other
national security capabilities integral to
the mission and operation of the
Department.
LLNL is managed by
Lawrence Livermore National Security,
LLC.
LLNL is committed to strengthening the
Nations security through development
and application of world-class science
and technology to:
enhance the Nations defense;
reduce the global threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction; and
respond with vision, quality, integrity, and technical excellence to scientific issues of national
importance.
While LLNLs defining responsibility is ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nations
nuclear deterrent, its science and engineering capabilities are being applied to achieve breakthroughs
against a broad range of threats to national security and global stability in the areas of counterterrorism
and nonproliferation, defense and intelligence, energy and environmental security.
Locations: Main site, Livermore, California (Site 200); Experimental Test Site, Tracy, California (Site 300)
Total employees: 5,290
Type: Multi-program national security laboratory
Web site: www.llnl.gov
Contract Operator: Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC
Responsible Field Office: Livermore Field Office
D.2.1.2 Funding
FY 2016 Site Funding by Source
FY 2016 FYNSP for Weapons Activities
(Total LLNL FY 2016 Request $1,184.2 M)
($1,008.6 M)
D.2.1.3 Mission Capabilities

LLNL is an NNSA Center of Excellence for Nuclear Design and Engineering with core competencies in high
explosives (HE) R&D, high energy density (HED) physics, and high performance computing (HPC). NNSA
has recently announced LLNL as the lead laboratory for the W80-4 (formerly the cruise missile warhead)
and W78-1 LEPs.
LLNL has unique capabilities that relate to design and development of stockpile systems, including:
design, certification, testing, and surveillance of the nuclear stockpile;
reliability assessments and certification of stockpile weapons;
plutonium R&D;
tritium operations and R&D;
HE R&D;
HED physics;
HPC;
destructive and nondestructive surveillance evaluations on pits to evaluate their reliability;
advanced materials;
nuclear counterterrorism; and
nuclear nonproliferation.
LLNL has several NNSA flagship facilities such as NIF, CFF, the Superblock, the Livermore Computing
Center, and HEAF.
These experimental and computational capabilities enable scientific and engineering staff to conduct
research, design, and development of nuclear weapons; provide safety, security, and reliability
assessments and certification of stockpile weapons; develop and evaluate analytical and simulation
tools; design and test advanced technology concepts and prototypes including 3D advanced
manufacturing capabilities; and conduct R&D in the areas of plutonium, tritium, HE, and environmental
and hydrodynamic testing. The capabilities also support work in homeland security, energy, and
environmental bioscience, and biotechnology areas.
D.2.1.4 Revitalizing Physical Infrastructure

LLNL is located about 50 miles east of San Francisco at the outskirts of the City of Livermore in Alameda
County. It has been in operation since 1952 on the 1-square-mile site at Livermore (Site 200), with the
addition in 1955 of the 7,000-acre remote test site (Site 300), located 17 miles east of Livermore.
LLNLs current infrastructure consists of 490 buildings and
trailers, with an additional 146 other structures and
facilities. The structures combined at both sites occupy
approximately 6.96 million gross square feet (gsf). The
infrastructure portfolio includes 29 mission-critical facilities
and key NNSA flagship programmatic research facilities such
as NIF, HEAF, the High Performance Computing Center,
and CFF.
NNSA Real Property

LLNL Ten-Year Site Plan FY 2014
7,727 acres (owned)
490 Buildings/trailers
6,363,217 gsf active and operational
566,869 gsf nonoperational
29,932 gsf leased
Replacement plant value: $6,836,994,531
Deferred maintenance: $484,529,077
Many of LLNLs permanent facilities are reaching their end

of life and therefore require refurbishment, modernization, or replacement. Targeted infrastructure
reinvestment is being made to meet mission deliverables, sustain mission-supportive RDT&E excellence,
and support LLNLs special multidisciplinary capabilities.
LLNL has been able to sustain nearly 100 percent availability of its mission-critical and missiondependent facilities that are managed under the RTBF Program. Future funding projections will balance
modernization and reinvestment in this aging infrastructure.
With future investments, LLNL will continue to focus on real property sustainment, major system
replacement, and modernization and consolidation with associated demolition of antiquated and
unused facilities. With a balanced investment portfolio, the deferred maintenance backlog will continue
to decrease and will therefore enhance LLNLs ability to accomplish its mission.
Age of General Purpose Infrastructure
Figure D10. LLNL age of facility assets in Site 200, Livermore, California
Facility Conditions and Deferred Maintenance

LLNL has a strategy to manage its deferred maintenance through effective facility management
practices, including an aggressive internal reinvestment program. A key element of this strategy is an
annual prioritization process to focus limited funding on the most important maintenance replacements.
The deferred maintenance, as reported in the LLNL Ten-Year Site Plan FY 2014 FY 2023, is currently
$484,529,077.
FYNSP Period
LLNL Project Name
FY15
Electrical Infrastructure Upgrade

Emergency Operations Center
FY16 FY17
FY18
Outyear (Planning) Period

FY19
FY20
FY21-25
Anticipated Capital Investments
FY26-30
FY31-35
FY36-40
Utility Distribution Systems
Site 300 Nuclear Security Infrastructure Stabilization

Seismic Risk Mitigation Project
Network Intelligence Research Facility

Building 256 Network Communication Data Center
Weapons Engineering Science and Technology
NEP Engineering & Materials Complex Replacement

Radiochemistry Laboratory Revitalization
HE Research and Development
Materials Science Modernization

HE Special Facility Equipment
Nuclear Security Applications Laboratory
Sustainable Supercomputing and Analysis Center
Supercomputing and Analysis Complex Modernization
HEDP Precision Targets and Diagnostic Facility
HE = High Explosives
HEDP = High Energy Density Physics
NEP = Nuclear Explosives Package
Project Key
Total Project Costs $10M - $100M
Project Delayed from SSMP 2015
Projects may not be affordable if preceding projects proceed at high cost estimates
Total Project Costs > $500M
Project CD-4 accelerated from SSMP 2015
Figure D11. Laboratory Operating Board rating for LLNL facility assets in Site 200,
Livermore, California
D.2.1.5 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Workforce
Notes:
The LLNL population has a large fraction of scientists and engineers engaged in RDT&E.
Figure D12. LLNL total headcount
Notes:
The LLNL workforce overall average age is 50.5 years old with a median age of 52 years old.
About 60 percent of the population is over 50 years old.
Given the aging demographics at LLNL, succession planning is critical for knowledge preservation.
Figure D13. LLNL employees by age
Notes:
The laboratory average for years of service is 17.4.
About 36 percent of the population has over 21 years of service.
Figure D14. LLNL employees by years of service
Notes:
Three-quarters of the net workforce reduction resulted from retirements.
The remaining workforce reduction was caused by other factors, including a Security Organization
restructuring and a self-select voluntary separation plan.
There was a spike in early retirements in FY 2013. Replacements were not hired because of the decline in
the budget.
Figure D15. Change in last two fiscal years at LLNL

Notes:
A large fraction of the staff between 30 and 50 years of age retired early during the voluntary phase of the
workforce reduction plan.
A high percentage of younger, early-career staff also voluntarily left service during this period.
Figure D16. Age of LLNL employees who left service

Notes:
A large fraction of the late-career employees left LLNL.
A high percentage of early career staff also voluntarily left service during this period.
Figure D17. Years of service of LLNL employees who left service

Notes:
LLNL scientific and technical population decreased by more than 30 percent in the last decade.
The biggest change in the population was during FY 2008, when LLNL went through a contract transition to
Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC from the University of California. This resulted in a 16.4 percent
workforce reduction.
In FY 2013 LLNL experienced another significant decrease of 10.2 percent caused by a restructuring in the
Security Organization and the self-select voluntary separation plan (SSVSP).
The LLNL aging population is also a concern; 55 percent are over 50 years old.
The LLNL strategy for knowledge preservation and succession planning is critical.
Figure D18. LLNL trends by career stage
Notes:
The separations in FY 2008 were caused by the contract transition from the University of California to
Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC and the associated Involuntary Separation Program. The
increase in FY 2013 was caused by the Security Restructuring and the self-select voluntary separation plan.
Figure D19. LLNL employment separation trends
Notes:
The LLNL workforce is projected to grow slightly over the FYNSP period to meet the laboratory missions and
anticipated scope increase associated with the W80-4 LEP nuclear design and certification activities.
Figure D20. Total projected LLNL workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP
D.2.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory

D.2.2.1 Mission
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), founded in 1943 during World War II as Project Y, served as a
secret facility to perform scientific research necessary to develop the first nuclear weapon. The site was
chosen because the area was remote and provided controlled access and safety for testing purposes.
The Manhattan Projects research and development efforts, which were previously spread throughout
the Nation, became centralized at LANL. In 1945, the worlds first nuclear device was detonated
200 miles south of LANL.
LANL conducts research, design, and
development of nuclear weapons;
designs and tests advanced technology
concepts; provides safety, security,
and reliability assessments and
certification of stockpile weapons;
maintains production capabilities for
plutonium components (i.e., pits) for
delivery
to
the
stockpile;
manufactures
nuclear
weapon
detonators for the stockpile; conducts
plutonium, tritium, surrogate material,
HE R&D, hydrodynamic experiments, and environmental testing; and stores Category I/II1 quantities of
SNM. LANL also conducts destructive and nondestructive surveillance evaluations on pits to assess their
reliability.
In addition to nuclear weapons stewardship, LANLs mission includes nuclear nonproliferation and
counterterrorism, particle accelerator development, health physics, fusion power research, and
supercomputing capabilities. Notably, in the field of health research, LANL recently made breakthroughs
on a potential HIV/AIDS vaccine and cancer detection and treatment technologies.
Location: Los Alamos, New Mexico
Web site: www.lanl.gov
Contract Operator: Los Alamos National Security, LLC
Responsible Field Office: Los Alamos Field Office
DOE Order 474.2, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, Attachment 2, Page 3 provides the Graded
Safeguards Table that must be used when determining the categorization and attractiveness level of accountable
nuclear material. DOE provides additional information at https://www.directives.doe.gov/directives-documents/400series/0474.2-BOrder-AdmChg2.
D.2.2.2 Funding
(Total LANL FY 2016 Request = $2,141.0 M)
($1,616.9 M)

Following the end of World War II, LANL expanded operations while continuing to provide significant
contributions to the Nations science and defense programs. A unique array of facilities and
infrastructure was built during the Cold War to accommodate weapons science R&D. Many of those
unique facilities are now obsolete and are planned for either upgrade, refurbishment, or replacement to
sustain LANLs core capabilities which include:
design, certification, testing, experiments, surveillance, and the RDT&E base;
plutonium;
tritium;
HE;
non-nuclear components;
accountability, storage, protection, handling, and disposition of SNM;
enabling infrastructure; and
counterterrorism and counterproliferation.

LANL is engaged in revitalizing key infrastructure to continue to
fulfill its diverse, complex, and evolving national security
missions. Highlights of LANLs revitalization of its physical
infrastructure include the following:
Plutonium Strategy. LANL developed a plutonium

strategy that has been approved by NNSA and endorsed
by the Nuclear Weapons Council. This strategy was
developed following deferral of the CMRR-NF project in
FY 2012. LANL is currently pursuing an infrastructure
approach that transfers capabilities from the CMR
Building and will reduce operational risks in PF-4. The
strategy to terminate operations in the CMR Building
NNSA Real Property

LANL Ten-Year Site Plan FY 2014
(End of FY 2012 FIMS Reporting)
28,116 Acres (leased/owned)1

1,063 Buildings/trailers
2

2
471,622 gsf leased
Replacement plant value:
3
$14,058,722,390
Deferred maintenance: $1,190,514,1002
1. Per FY 2012 FIMS Snapshot
2. DOE-owned real property (buildings, trailers,
other structures)
3. DOE-owned real property and leased
facilities
includes (1) maximizing the use of RLUOB by installing additional equipment and (2) repurposing
underused laboratory space in PF-4. A future step may include constructing modular additions
to the TA-55 facility network. LANL has initiated steps 1 and 2, and has been directed by NNSA
to initiate DOE Acquisition Decision Milestone, CD-0, Approve Mission Need.
TA-55 Reinvestment Project II. This project will revitalize aging mechanical, safety, facility
controls, and other systems.
Transuranic Waste Facility. The Transuranic Waste Facility project will provide a replacement
facility to stage, characterize, and certify newly generated transuranic waste as a result of the
closure of TA-54, Area G.
Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility Project. This project will replace radioactive liquid
waste treatment capabilities at TA-50. The final design for this low-level-waste capability was
completed, and the project is in construction.
Electrical Infrastructure Upgrades. This project will replace the TA-3 substation and expand
electrical distribution systems for mission loads at TA-3 and the Metropolis Center. CD-1 was
attained; the CD-2/3 package for the project is in preparation for capital funding in FY 2016.
Energetic Materials Characterization Facility. The Energetic Materials Characterization Facility

(EMCF) provides reliable and efficient infrastructure to conduct energetic material research,
development, and analysis that is critical to current and future needs in stockpile surveillance,
surety, safety, the LEPs and other, broader national security needs. The Energetic Materials
Characterization Facility will result in an enduring, modern capability able to address a broad
range of questions, needs and applications including analysis of unique HE-driven reactions.
Additionally, the Energetic Materials Characterization Facility will result in decreased deferred
maintenance and cost savings related to consolidation and higher-efficiency facilities.
LANL will continue to take substantial steps to streamline its operations, modernize its infrastructure,
and fulfill its vision of being the premier national security laboratory. In addition, further revitalization is
being planned for LANLs other technical areas to support the increasing core capability workload.
Preconceptual planning is being conducted for a signature science facility, Matter-Radiation Interactions
in Extremes (MaRIE).
FYNSP Period
LANL Project Name
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18

FY19
FY20
FY21-25
FY26-30

FY31-35
FY36-40
CMRR-NF
RLUOB Equipment Installation II
PF-4 Equipment Installation
Slow Ramp of Equipment Install
Plutonium Modules
Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility Low Level
Transuranic Liquid Waste Facility
TA-55 Reinvestment Project
Phase 2
Phase 3
Substation Replacement TA-3
Energetic Materials Characterization
MaRIE (Science Tool)
Central Steam Plant & Distribution System

Los Alamos Canyon Bridge Upgrade
Fire Station Replacement for older 1 and 5
Weapons Manufacturing Support
Electrical Transmission and Distribution Upgrades

Obsolete Office/Light Laboratory Building
Multi-Purpose Office Building
Receiving and Distribution Center Replacement
CMRR-NF = Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility
MaRIE = Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes
PF-4 = Plutonium Facility
RLUOB = Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building
TA = Technical Area
Project Key
Project Delayed
from SSMP 2015
Project CD-4accelerated from SSMP 2015
Age of Assets and General Purpose Infrastructure
Figure D21. LANL age of facility assets in TA-3, Los Alamos, New Mexico
Condition of Assets and Deferred Maintenance

LANL is currently conducting mission work in facilities that were constructed in virtually every decade,
including the Manhattan Project and the Cold War eras. Overall, LANLs facilities are rated as
adequate, based on the ratio of the sites deferred maintenance backlog to the replacement plant
value. Facilities that support mainly Defense Programs missions are in better condition, with an overall
rating of good. Targeted reinvestment in Defense Programs assets through the RTBF Program over
the last decade has helped maintain these structures to ensure they are fully capable of supporting the
current mission needs. However, consolidation planning, footprint reduction, and recapitalization
programs should be accelerated to outpace facility aging and degradation in the face of infrastructure
budget reductions.
As with all the older sites, aged facilities and funding constraints have resulted in a substantial backlog of
maintenance. The estimate for deferred maintenance, as reported in the LANL Ten-Year Site Plan
FY 2014 FY 2023, is currently $1,190,514,100. Roughly 72 percent of the deferred maintenance
captured in the FIMS is within facilities and utility systems that will endure into the foreseeable future
for LANL missions36 percent in facilities and 36 percent in utility systems. It is important for the site
to prioritize and perform corrective maintenance based on the needs of the programs. Urgent
maintenance tied to safety and security does not get deferred. However, 28 percent of the deferred
maintenance is within facilities that are awaiting funds for demolition or facilities that are not intended
for continued use.
Figure D22. Laboratory Operating Board rating for LANL facility assets in TA-3,
Los Alamos, New Mexico
D.2.2.5 Los Alamos National Laboratory Workforce
Notes:
The LANL total site headcount is spread across five main directorates, including the Weapons Program; Global
Security; Science Technology and Engineering; Operations; and Capital Projects.
The Weapons Program, Global Security, and Science Technology and Engineering directorates benefit from
significant leveraging of scientific capabilities and expertise. Ultimately, this leveraging provides synergy among
capabilities and results in a greater work capacity with fewer people.
Figure D23. LANL total headcount
Notes:
Retirement-eligible, for an employee with a pension, is defined as an employee at least 50 years of age who has
at least 5 years of LANL service. For those without a pension, it is defined as 59.5 years of age.
The current age distribution indicates that LANL should pursue normal replacement hiring for the next several
years with an increase in five to ten years to replace the largest current distribution of employees who will
become retirement-eligible in the next five to seven years.
Figure D24. LANL employees by age
Notes:
This distribution reflects a portion of the outcome of the 2012 Voluntary Separation Program.
The primary focus is to retain the employees with 10 to 15 years of service to provide a sufficient future
population for mentoring and critical skills development.
Figure D25. LANL employees by years of service
Notes:
An additional eight individuals left career positions to take temporary positions elsewhere at LANL. Those
individuals do not appear here as terminated, but also do not appear in the 2014 headcount because they no
longer qualify.
The overall decrease results from restaffing in critical skills areas after completion of the 2012 Voluntary
Separation Program.
A key goal for retention is preventing voluntary separations from exceeding retirements. This goal, if successful,
would retain more early and mid-career employees for the future.
A primary challenge to acquiring and retaining younger employees is the perceived lack of appeal of Northern
New Mexico as a vibrant place to live.
Figure D26. Change in last two fiscal years at LANL

Notes:
Involuntary separations and retirements reflect a portion of the 2012 Voluntary Separation Program outcome.
Figure D27. Age of LANL employees who left service

Notes:
Data support the concern that greater numbers of newer employees are voluntarily separating. Contributing
factors include concerns about longevity in observance of and reaction to the 2012 Voluntary Separation
Program, as well as national trends in the restructuring and reduction of benefits that may discourage younger
employees from remaining with one employer for an entire career.
Figure D28. Years of service of LANL employees who left service

Notes:
Two events are reflected by the inflection points in the dataone in 2008 and the other in 2012. In both cases,
these points represent a voluntary termination incentive plan designed to reduce the headcount to meet reduced
budget allocations.
The continued downward pressure in the budget makes it more difficult to hire a diverse group of early-career
employees to provide continuity as the advanced career employees retire.
In addition, the data show mid-career numbers are continuing to fall and the early-career numbers are barely
being maintained. Since the contract change in 2006, mid-career numbers had the most significant downward
shift. Some of the shift relates to the ability to retain mid-career employees who have concerns about contract
uncertainty.
Figure D29. LANL trends by career stage
Notes:
The uncertainty leading up to June 2006, when Los Alamos National Security, LLC assumed responsibility for the
LANL contract, drove the retirement rates to a level higher than normal. Two separation incentivesone in 2008
and one in 2012mainly attracted retirement-eligible staff.
Figure D30. LANL employment separation trends
Notes:
LANL plans for and manages workforce types and numbers based on actual, current-year funding, projected
funding and scope through the FYNSP, and its workforce demographics and skill analyses to ensure continuity of
essential skills for stockpile stewardship.
The following are two funding scenarios:
If actual funding is below projection, LANL may have to take short-term actionat a costto achieve
affordability, such as the FY 2012 Voluntary Separation Program.
If actual funding is higher than projected, LANL must have action plans to ensure the workforce and/or staff
augmentation contracts will be sufficient to meet the scope associated with the increased funding.
In cases where actual funding received was significantly lower, LANL has historically implemented the following
strategies to minimize involuntary workforce reductions:
Determining whether the funding shortage can be resolved through efficiencies.
Conducting internal reviews of avoidable costs and deferred procurements during the period of lower-thanexpected funding.
In the 2012 time frame, after experiencing a significant funding shortfall, LANL formally instituted the Laboratory
Integrated Stewardship Council to evaluate staffing and procurement proposals. In summary, to avoid the
impacts when actual funding falls below projections, LANL executes an internal system to first mitigate the
reduction before reducing the headcount.
Figure D31. Total projected LANL workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP
D.2.3 Sandia National Laboratories

D.2.3.1 Mission
Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) began in 1945 as Z Division, the ordnance design, testing, and
assembly arm of Project Y (which after World War II became Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory).
Z Division was renamed Sandia Laboratory in 1948 and, in 1949, Sandia Corporation was established as
an AT&T subsidiary to manage the
laboratory through a no-fee contract.
In 1956, a second site was opened in
Californias Livermore Valley.
In
1979, Congress designated Sandia
Laboratory as a DOE national
laboratory. SNL has been operated
by Lockheed Martin (or its
predecessor) since 1993.
As a
national security laboratory and a
Federally Funded Research and
Development Center (FFRDC), SNL
accomplishes tasks integral to the
mission and operation of its
sponsoring agencies by:
anticipating and resolving emerging national security challenges,

innovating and discovering new technologies to strengthen the Nations technological
superiority,
creating value through products and services that solve national security challenges, and
informing the national debate where technology policy is critical to preserving national security
SNLs mission includes the design, development, qualification, testing, certification, and systems
integration of all components required to safe, arm, fuze, and fire a weapon to military specifications.
SNLs mission also includes production agency responsibilities for weapon components including NGs
and trusted radiation-hardened integrated circuits. SNLs relationship as an FFRDC, with DOE as the
sponsoring agency, creates an environment that supports its fields of expertise and enables it to
maintain objectivity and independence and to be familiar with the broader missions of all its sponsors.
SNL provides solutions to existing problems and emerging threats, drawing from its deep science and
engineering experience to anticipate, innovate, create, and inform policy debate for decision makers.
Locations: Albuquerque, NM; Livermore, California; Tonopah Test Range, Nevada; Kauai, Hawaii
Web site: www.sandia.gov
Contract Operator: Lockheed Martin Corporation
Responsible Field Office: Sandia Field Office
D.2.3.2 Funding
(Total SNL FY 2016 Request = $1,885.0 M)
($1,591.6 M)

As a multidisciplinary national security laboratory and FFRDC, SNL accomplishes tasks that are integral to
national security. Its eight key missions are as follows:
Maintain a safe, secure stockpile and effective nuclear deterrent now and into the future.
Reduce global nuclear dangers.
Provide nuclear assessments and warning.
Enable the United States to defend and dominate in cyberspace.
Maintain U.S. defense technological superiority through synergistic defense products.
Reduce global chemical and biological dangers.
Ensure a secure and sustainable energy future.
Maintain U.S. defense technological superiority through leveraged defense.
Within the context of its nuclear weapon mission, SNL is uniquely responsible for the systems
engineering and integration of stockpile weapons and for design, development, certification,
sustainment, and retirement of the non-nuclear components. Core capabilities include the following.
Stockpile Management. Design and produce non-nuclear components; conduct surety

assessments and surveillance evaluations; maintain the stockpile through alterations,
modifications, and LEPs; qualify and certify non-nuclear components and systems; and
disassemble, characterize, and dispose of specific weapon components.
Stockpile Stewardship. These RDT&E efforts include: (1) analyzing options to extend the life of
stockpile weapons; (2) conducting radiation effects tests in support of system certification;
(3) characterizing weapons-related materials and developing and validating models for material
properties; and (4) developing and using experimental facilities, diagnostics, analytic models,
and computational tools to provide an improved predictive understanding of the effects of
aging, changes in manufacturing processes and technologies, material substitution, and extreme
environments on the performance of weapons and weapon subsystems without underground
nuclear testing.
Complementing and underpinning these core capabilities are the following additional competencies:
High-reliability engineering
Sensors and sensing systems
Cyber technology
Reverse engineering
Microscale and nanoscale electronics and systems
Natural and engineered materials
Pathfinder technologies
NNSA Real Property
Safety, risk, and vulnerability analysis
HE and energetic materials research and development
In addition to its direct mission work for NNSA, SNL has the
largest Strategic Partnership Program budget in the nuclear
security enterprise, at around $1 billion annually. SNL
leverages its capabilities and resources across programs to
optimize the deployment of resources in order to maintain a
stable workforce.

SNLs vision for general purpose infrastructure is to provide a
smaller, safer, more secure, and less expensive infrastructure
that leverages the scientific and technical capabilities of the
workforce and meets national security requirements. SNL
analyzes trade-offs to ensure each new investment:
represents optimal use of land and capital,
improves synergy of campus and community,
provides capacity and agility to meet SNLs missions

and support strategic planning,
maximizes efficiency and effectiveness and minimizes

long-term operations and maintenance,
contributes to a strong and vital intellectual and

research community,
enhances the quality of the environment and the

quality of life for those employed at SNL, and
preserves and enhances the legacy of landscape and

architecture.
Mission-essential facilities include laboratories, an array of

specialized test facilities, and manufacturing space for
microelectronics, neutron generators, and power sources.
Several mission-dependent laboratory and office buildings
SNL Ten-Year Site Plan FY 2014
Albuquerque, New Mexico

13,758 Acres
242 Other structures and facilities
5,756,928 gsf
Replacement Plant Value: $3,992,949,007
Deferred Maintenance: $345,947,735
Livermore, California
410 Acres
885,994 gsf
Replacement plant value: $920,882,282
Tonapah Test Range (TTR), Nevada
179,200 Acres
120,925 gsf
Kauai Test Facility (KTF) and Maui, Hawaii
133 Acres
61,778 gsf
Leases
1 Other structure and facility
394,316 gsf
SNL Total
193,501 Acres
7,217,928 gsf
house programmatic assets for non-nuclear design, engineering, R&D, systems engineering, and other
functions. Scientific facilities include reactors, pulsed-power devices, material characterization, and
computational modeling and simulation capabilities housed in specialized facilities that, taken as a
whole, support investigation into and certification of weapons without underground nuclear testing.
SNL continues to experience growth in its nuclear weapon and other mission areas. Recent acceleration
of the B61-12 and W88 Alt 370 LEPs, coupled with strong growth in workload projections for SNLs
Defense Systems and Assessments programs,1 has placed considerable pressure on already constricted
available office and laboratory space. SNL is working closely with NNSA and DOE as they develop policy
and guidance to implement the Office of Management and Budgets Freeze the Footprint directive.
The manner in which this directive is implemented can have a significant impact on SNLs ability and
plans to ensure future building investments, specifically through construction of new space, renovation
of existing space, and decontamination and demolition.
FYNSP Period
SNL Project Name
FY15
FY16
FY17
Weapons Engineering Facility
FY18

FY19
FY20
FY21-25
FY26-30
FY31-35
FY36-40
Rad Hard Foundry
Gravity Weapons Certification, SNL/TTR
Research Reactor Facility
Modern Threat Abeyance Center

Consolidated Environmental Test Facility
Technical Area IV District Chilled Water

Site Wide Storm Drain Improvements
Mission Support Science and Technology Laboratory
Robust Secure Communications Laboratory
Tonapah Test Range Infrastructure

Technical Area III and Remote Area
Mission Support Consolidation
Project Key
During the next ten years, SNLs highest priorities for new or revitalized facilities to support its NNSA
mission requirements are as follows:
Plan, design, and construct the Weapons Engineering Facility to colocate core nuclear weapons
organizations in modern facilities and dispose of a building that is at the end of its service life.
Complete the SNL Silicon Fabrication Revitalization initiative to replace and modernize facilities
and capital equipment in the MESA Complex that directly support LEPs and alterations.
Plan, design, and construct the Emergency Operations and Response Center in a modern facility
that houses emergency operations and supports both local and national response teams.
Plan, design, and construct the Rad Hard Foundry facility to replace the current facility, which is
operating with aging, outdated infrastructure and production equipment nearing obsolescence.
A replacement facility is needed by 2027 to ensure an uninterrupted ability to manufacture
radiation-hardened silicon circuits to meet LEP and stockpile requirements.
The seven main programs in this area involve integrated military systems, proliferation assessments, defensive information
technologies, remote sensing and verification, science and technology products for DOD, sensing solutions for space missions,
and surveillance and reconnaissance related to nonproliferation.
Several other projects are proposed over the next 25 years. These include modernizing and replacing
RDT&E facilities and sustaining core capabilities in support of the nuclear weapons mission, as well as
other infrastructure projects that underpin core mission areas and capabilities.
Figure D32. SNL age of facility assets in TA-1, Albuquerque, New Mexico

SNLs Facilities Management and Operations Center manages the physical infrastructure by identifying
key facilities and infrastructure and focusing resources on the most critical systems and equipment. The
maintenance management program establishes activities, processes, and associated performance
measures to ensure DOE/NNSA property is in a fit-for-mission-use condition that promotes
operational safety, worker health, environmental compliance, property preservation, facility
performance, and overall cost-effectiveness. SNLs methodology for conducting a condition assessment
survey has undergone a major restructure in the last two years to ensure better alignment with
requirements in DOE Order 430.1B and a more accurate representation of the condition of assets.
Using these strategies, SNL has, to date, kept mission-dependent and mission-support facilities
operating reliably. However, in the current budget-constrained environment, some assets are not being
maintained at optimal levels, and preventive maintenance and predictive maintenance have been
reduced. As a result, the risk that failures in the infrastructure will affect operational reliability is
growing over time.
The total deferred maintenance estimate, as reported in the SNL Ten-Year Site Plan FY 2014 FY 2023, is
$527,346,274.
Figure D33. Laboratory Operating Board rating for SNL facility assets in TA-1,
Albuquerque, New Mexico
D.2.3.5 Sandia National Laboratories Workforce
Notes:
Approximately 60 percent of SNLs headcount is aligned with technical duties and responsibilities ranging
from R&D to applied engineering to operations.
SNL uses a systems integration approach to workforce assignments. Team members are matrixed to
support key mission areas, including the Work for Others Program.
Figure D34. SNL total headcount
Notes:
The average age of the employee population is 46.4 years. A large proportion of the population is aged
56 and above (23.8 percent). Approximately 11 percent of the population is aged 30 or less. The
remaining 64 percent is between the ages of 31 and 55.
About one-fifth (21.2 percent) of SNLs employees are retirement eligible, with 23 percent of engineers
and 18 percent of scientists eligible to retire.
A trend toward hiring more experienced professionals to meet skill gaps over the past several years has
lessened the bimodal distribution of the employees by age. While the bimodal distribution is not extreme,
there are categories in which this is more pronounced, i.e., engineers and, to a lesser extent, scientists
and professional administrators. SNL is taking this into account as it plans for mentoring and knowledge
transfer through a Knowledge Development Program.
The FY 2015 and FY 2016 hiring projections reflect a continuing mix of hires between experienced and
new college graduates to meet skill gaps. SNL is experiencing some problems in attracting and hiring
personnel in the STEM fields because of increased competition from the private sector. SNL is monitoring
this issue and adjusting its recruiting strategies accordingly.
Figure D35. SNL employees by age
Notes:
Approximately 70 percent of personnel have 15 or less years of service. Approximately 36 percent have
less than five years of service. These numbers reflect the hiring of more than 4,250 new regular
employees over the past five years (FY 2010 through FY 2014).
The mix of both experienced and new college graduates assures that the necessary skills and capabilities
are present to support SNLs mission work. Strong hiring over the past five years ensures that a
substantial percentage of employees are in earlier phases of their careers to replace those in later career
phases. However, this will require an increased focus on knowledge transfer and training programs.
Figure D36. SNL employees by years of service
Notes:
A net change of 753 staff reflects strong hiring efforts over the past two years. Most of this growth is
attributable to growing mission scope related to stockpile modernization through LEP activities.
Figure D37. Change in last two fiscal years at SNL

Notes:
Voluntary separations as a percentage of total separated employees are trending higher and are clustered
in the younger age groups. Early separations, ages 21 to 35, are approximately 2.3 percent.
Figure D38. Age of SNL employees who left service

Notes:
Of the voluntary separations, 67 percent of personnel had less than 5 years of service, and 98 percent
were employees who had less than 15 years of experience. This turnover may reflect the external
demand for skills and highly competitive value propositions in other companies.
Figure D39. Years of service of SNL employees who left service

Notes:
The shift in workforce composition reflects SNL's workforce strategy of maintaining a mix of
approximately 60 percent mid-to-late career and 40 percent early-career employees to support mission
needs.
Figure D40. SNL trends by career stage
Notes:
Over the past ten years, voluntary separations have totaled 1,598; the highest number occurred in
FY 2014. As a percentage of population at the beginning of FY 2012, the voluntary separation rate ran
from 1.2 percent to 2.3 percent over the two-year period.
Retirements were higher in FY 2011 and FY 2012 because of changes made in retiree medical care
benefits, which encouraged some employees to leave early and thereby reduced retirements in FY 2013
and FY 2014. Retirements are expected to increase in FY 2015 and beyond.
Figure D41. SNL employment separation trends
Notes:
SNLs total workforce is held constant from FY 2017 to the end of the FYNSP. With SNLs current
understanding of out-year scope and resulting workload, as well as the assumption that budgets will
remain flat, SNL will monitor workload fluctuations and manage the workforce as required through
leveraging across programs, cross-training within programs, and strategic hiring. Beyond the FYNSP, SNL's
best estimate of workload suggests a continued flat trend for the workforce.
Figure D42. Total projected SNL workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP
D.3 Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities

D.3.1 National Security Campus at Kansas City
D.3.1.1 Mission
The original site for the Kansas City Plant was built in 1942 to assemble World War II airplane engines.
In 1949, the Atomic Energy Commission assumed responsibility for the facility and directed the mission
of the plant to manufacture non-nuclear weapon system components. In 2013 to 2014, the Kansas City
Plant relocated its operations to a new
leased site, where its mission continues
to be manufacturing a wide array of
sophisticated, non-nuclear mechanical,
electronic, and engineered material
components to ensure the safety and
security of the Nations weapon
systems. This new site, the National
Security Campus (NSC), houses
approximately 2,600 employees and is
one of the first LEED1 Gold-certified
manufacturing campuses in the
country.
Locations: Kansas City, Missouri; Albuquerque, New Mexico
Type: Multi-program nuclear weapons production facility
Web site: www.kcp.com
Contract Operator: Honeywell Federal Manufacturing &Technologies
Responsible Field Office: Kansas City Field Office
LEED [Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design] is a set of ratings developed by the U.S. Green Building Council for the
design, construction, operation, and maintenance of green buildings.
D.3.1.2 Funding
(Total NSC FY 2016 Request = $624.4 M)
($603.0 M)

NSC is responsible for approximately 40 technologies and over 1,000 unique product families, including
AF&F devices, safing devices, microcircuits, machined parts, polymers, plastics, and other engineered
materials. NSCs capabilities support stockpile management and research, development, testing, and
evaluation (RDT&E) activities ranging from heavy industrial machinery to sophisticated electronic
devices and associated support equipment and tooling. NSC supports the Directed Stockpile Work
Program by delivering products and services for both fielded weapons systems and those being
modernized via LEPs, alterations, and modifications. The work scope for legacy systems includes
management, production, processing, and delivery of hardware for LLC exchanges and flight test
systems, surveillance testing of components and materials, and maintenance and repair of weapons
systems. NSC also supports advanced science initiatives through the activities of the Advanced
Manufacturing Development and Engineering Programs. NSCs core capabilities include:
calibration and metrology;
analytical science and failure analysis services;
support of significant finding investigations;
development and qualification of manufacturing processes;
production builds;
procurement of war reserve production material;
fabrication and qualification of tools, fixtures, gauges, and test equipment;
enhanced aging studies of components and materials;
development of new and improved surveillance testing capabilities; and
annual state-of-health and post-mortem testing of components and materials.

For more than 60 years, the Kansas City Plant provided the nuclear security enterprise with unique nonnuclear component production, testing, and facilities infrastructure support. The costs to maintain and
reconfigure that site in a responsive manner became excessive relative to the costs of the primary
production mission. A smaller, more-flexible site was required to reduce maintenance costs, security,
and other support areas. In response to this need, the non-nuclear production operations were recently
relocated to a new, smaller, leased site in Kansas City, now known as the NSC, as part of the Kansas City
Responsive Infrastructure Manufacturing and Sourcing (KCRIMS) project. The new site reduced the
operating footprint from 3.1 million square feet to
NNSA Real Property
1.5 million square feet, is LEED Gold-certified, and is saving
Kansas City Plant
NNSA approximately $100 million in operating costs
FY
2014
FY 2023 Ten-Year Site Plan

annually.
As part of the KCRIMS project, maintenance and repair
activities at the old site were restricted to only those
necessary for environmental, safety, and production
during the relocation period. This approach is consistent
with the Defense Programs strategy to reduce investment
in facilities planned for disposition. It is envisioned that
the DOEs authority for transfer of property pursuant to
the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013,
Section 3143, will be used to transfer the real property of
the old site to a nonfederal entity for redevelopment. As a
result,
approximately
$225 million
in
deferred
maintenance will no longer be required.
NSC does not have any projects on the Integrated Project
List (IPL) at this time.
Bannister Federal Complex (historical)
136.1 Acres (permitted/owned)

38 Buildings owned
150 gsf nonoperational
231,233 gsf General Services
Administration (GSA)-assigned and
186 gsf leased
(owned)
(no longer required)
National Security Campus (current)
- Acres: N/A
- 5 Buildings GSA Assigned
- 1,509,950 gsf GSA Assigned
The new NSC site consists of five leased buildings. Building 1 provides office and administrative space,
Building 2 is the production factory; Building 3 is the special products production space; Building 4 is the
National Secure Manufacturing Center facility that supports a host of Work for Others Program activities
for other Government agencies; and Building 5 is the Central Utilities Plant for the campus.
The new NSC was designed with unallocated white space that could be configured to support new and
emerging programs and missions. Based on future weapons activity and weapons manufacturing
requirements, product development, mission assignments, and production strategy, a general plant
project will prepare white space for this capability and capacity expansion. The execution of this effort
will occur in both embedded white space (within current factory environments) and adjacent white
space (unfinished areas adjacent to current factory areas) that are more flexible and can be configured
to the required size, shape, and environmental specifications.
Operations in Albuquerque include refurbishment and fabrication for the Office of Secure
Transportation, the Office of Emergency Response, and engineering, technical support, information
technology, training, field support, and small-scale production services for Defense Programs, the
national security laboratories, and other Government agencies. These operations were recently
relocated from Kirtland Air Force Base permitted property (NC-135 site) to three privately held, leased
properties (Air Park, Alamo, and Craddock). The disposition of the NC-135 site will be completed by the
end of FY 2015 with site closure and return to Kirtland Air Force Base.
Figure D43. NSC age of facility assets in Bannister Road Facility,

Kansas City, Missouri (historical)
Figure D44. NSC age of facility assets in Botts Road Facility,

Kansas City, Missouri (current)
Figure D45. Laboratory Operating Board rating for NSC facility assets in Bannister Road,
Kansas City, Missouri (historical)
Figure D46. Laboratory Operating Board rating for NSC facility assets in Botts Road,
Kansas City, Missouri (current)
D.3.1.5 National Security Campus (Kansas City) Workforce
Notes:
The NSC closed out fiscal year 2014 with a total headcount of 2,587.
About 40 percent of the staff hold technical positions that directly support the non-nuclear
manufacturing mission and about 20 percent of the staff provide the manufacturing labor.
Figure D47. NCS total headcount
Notes:
The distribution of the staff by age is bimodal, with most of the workforce being in their 50s and the next
highest group being in their late 20s. This is reflective of recent hiring to support emerging programs
such as the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 370 and to replace ongoing attrition of certain key skills and
positions.
Twenty-seven percent of the engineering staff are in their 20s, and 41 percent are age 50 or older. For
the production operators, over 67 percent are age 50 or older, while only 9 percent are in their 20s.
The average age of the workforce is 47.8 years of age and over 43 percent of the workforce is eligible to
retire under the current benefits system.
Figure D48. NSC employees by age
Notes:
The distribution of employees by years of service is also bimodal, which is again reflective of recent
hiring to support emerging programs.
Over 30 percent of the employees have 5 years or less experience; nearly 38 percent of the employees
have more than 25 years of service.
Among engineers, 45 percent have 5 years or less experience, while nearly 30 percent have more than
25 years of service.
For the production operators, over 51 percent have more than 25 years of experience with Honeywell,
while only 9 percent have 5 years or less.
Figure D49. NSC employees by years of service
Notes:
NSC had a net decrease of 249 employees since the last SSMP reporting period (FY 2013 and FY 2014).
The 325 newly hired employees were offset by 187 voluntary separations, 126 involuntary separations,
and 261 retirements.
Much of this attrition was planned for and controlled as part of the Kansas City Responsive Infrastructure
Manufacturing and Sourcing (KCRIMS) project, which relocated operations from a Government-owned
facility to a leased commercial facility.
Reductions in the labor and crafts categories accounted for 26 percent of the involuntary separations
and 23 percent of all separations over the reporting period.
Figure D50. Change in last two fiscal years at NSC

Notes:
A total of 574 employees left NSC during FYs 2013 and 2014, either by voluntary separation, involuntary
separation, or through retirement. Most separating employees older than 50 years were retiring,
accounting for more than 32 percent of all separations for the reporting period.
In that same age group (greater than 50 years old), nearly 78 percent of the voluntary separations were
part of the voluntary component of the staff reduction program.
A troubling trend is that separations of staff less than 40 years of age account for over 28 percent of all
separations and nearly half of all voluntary separations.
Figure D51. Age of NSC employees who left service

Notes:
574 employees left service during the reporting period of FY 2013 through FY 2014; 38 percent of those
who left having 5 years or less service, and 34 percent who left having more than 30 years of experience,
with 65 percent of those leaving through retirement.
Figure D52. Years of service of NSC employees who left service

Notes:
Mid-career employees (those between 35 and 50 years of age) have steadily decreased over the analysis
period as they have left for other career opportunities or progressed to the advanced-career (more than
50 years of age) group. The number of employees in the advanced-career group is beginning to decline
as retirements increase and fewer mid-career employees advance in age to take their place.
The crafts and laborers workforce is trending downward as fewer of these employees are required for
facility maintenance in the leased National Security Campus facility. The engineering headcount is
trending upward as NSC prepares to support the emerging weapons modernization through LEPs.
Figure D53. NSC trends by career stage
Notes:
Employee separations have trended up over the last three fiscal years, largely driven by both the KCRIMS
plan for increased efficiencies and the resulting requirement for fewer workers for facility maintenance.
For instance, there was an increase in the retirement rate in FY 2006, with nearly 45 percent of the
retirements by bargaining unit employees, even though only 33 percent of all employees that year were
represented by the union.
Figure D54. NSC employment separation trends
Notes:
NSC projects its workforce needs will remain fairly steady over the FYNSP period. Slight increases in the
number of engineers and operators will be required as development work begins on the W80-4 and
IW-1. This is in addition to the B61 LEP, W88 Alt 370, and W87 AFA development and production work.
Figure D55. Total projected NSC workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP
D.3.2 Pantex Plant

D.3.2.1 Mission
First authorized for construction in 1942, Pantex, located 17 miles northeast of Amarillo, Texas, was
used to load artillery and bombs during World War II. In 1951, Pantexs mission shifted to support Cold
War nuclear capabilities. Pantexs mission includes four core areas: national security, nuclear explosive
operations, nuclear material operations,
and HE operations. Pantex is NNSAs
High Explosive Center of Excellence. It
is the only NNSA site authorized to
assemble or disassemble nuclear
weapons and has cradle-to-grave
responsibilities for HE production. As a
collaborative partner with the national
security laboratories, Pantex provides
capabilities to transition HE R&D from
bench scale to production scale. In
addition, Pantex collaborates and
provides capabilities to DOD, the
United Kingdom, universities (e.g., West
Texas A&M and Texas Tech), and commercial vendors. Pantex also supports global nonproliferation
activities.
Location: Amarillo, Texas
Type: Single-program nuclear weapons production facility
Web site: www.pantex.com
Contract Operator: Consolidated Nuclear Security (CNS), LLC
Responsible Field Office: NNSA Production Office
D.3.2.2 Funding
(Total Pantex FY 2016 Request = $626.1 M)
($616.2 M)

Pantexs mission capabilities include manufacture of specialty explosives; fabrication and testing of HE
components; assembly, disassembly, refurbishment, maintenance, and surveillance of weapons and
weapon components; dismantlement of retired weapons; sanitization and disposal of components from
dismantled weapons; interim staging and storage of nuclear components from dismantled weapons; pit
requalification; pit surveillance; and pit packaging (including container surveillances and recertification).
Pantexs specific capabilities are:
HE;
weapon assembly, disassembly, inspection and rebuild;
SNM accountability, interim storage, protection, handling, and disposition;
surveillance of weapons components;
surveillance and requalification capabilities for pits;
assembly and post-mortem analysis of joint test assemblies;
assembly, disassembly, and analysis of testbed units;
radiography and nondestructive evaluation of weapon components; and
electrical and mechanical tests of weapon components.

Pantex resides on 17,512 acres leased or owned by DOE.
Pantex operations near its southern boundary required DOE to
lease approximately 5,800 acres from Texas Tech between the
plant and U.S. Highway 60, primarily as safety and security
buffer areas.
Pantex has 52 mission-critical facilities;
385 mission-dependent, non-critical facilities; and 180 nonmission-dependent facilities; 233 of the mission-dependent,
non-critical facilities directly sustain capabilities and mission
operations in mission-critical facilities.
FYNSP Period
Pantex Project Name
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
NNSA Real Property

Pantex Plant Ten-Year Site Plan
FY2014-FY 2023
17,512 Acres (leased/owned)

Buildings/trailers
84,754 gsf leased
Replacement plant value: $4.08 billion
Deferred maintenance: $351 million

FY19
FY20
FY21-25
FY26-30
FY31-35
FY36-40
High Explosive Pressing Facility

HE Science, Technology & Engineering
HE Component Fabrication and Qualification
Zone 11 High Pressure Fire Loop
Production Support Fire Suppression Lead-ins
Material Staging Facility
12-037 New Facility

High Explosive Packaging & Staging
High Explosive Formulation
Non-Destructive Evaluation Facility
Inert Manufacturing Facility
Infrastructure Consolidation Project

12-079 Inert Storage Refurbishment
12-005 Shops Replacement

Fire Department Vehicle Storage and Training Facility
12-064 Replacement (Weapons A/D)
11-051/11-051A/12-188 Replacement (laboratory facilities)
12-026 East Refurbishment and 12-026 Replacement
HE = High Explosive
Project Key

The physical infrastructure, established during the Cold War, has exceeded its original design lifetimes.
Infrastructure is being recapitalized to maintain functionality and efficiency and for right-sizing to
provide capabilities to execute life-extension activities, dismantle surplus weapons, manage surplus
fissile materials, manufacture explosive components, and conduct other nuclear-securityrelated
activities.
Figure D56. Pantex age of facility assets in Amarillo, Texas

Systematic life-cycle replacements in the nuclear production bays and cells will reduce the risk to
operability and ensure capacities exist to meet projected workload schedules. The initial focus will be
on replacing the Flame Detection System, Radiation Alarm Monitoring System, and fire protection lead
ins. Because of obsolescence, failures of the Flame Detection System and Radiation Alarm Monitoring
System continue to impact production. Eventually, failure to address these systems and equipment will
render the production bays and cells inoperable. Advances in technology are accelerating the need to
replace those systems. The lack of replacement parts and supported software is decreasing system
maintainability and reliability.
Category I SNM storage and weapon staging are consolidated and adjoined with the weapon assembly
area to achieve modern, efficient, secure, and effective operations at a lower cost. A new facility will
provide the capability and capacity for safe and efficient staging of weapons and weapon components
while enhancing the sites security posture at a reduced infrastructure cost. That facility will support the
consolidation of Pantex and reduce the future recapitalization mortgage related to Zone 4 West and the
associated PIDAS replacement. Environmental testing capabilities for SNM components (to be relocated
from LANL as directed by the Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement Record of Decision) will support surveillance and LEP requirements. Comprehensive
nondestructive diagnostics for evaluating weapons and weapon components, as well as reacceptance
and refurbishment, are mature and responsive and therefore minimize overall costs while supporting
the increased surveillance demands.
The deferred maintenance backlog as reported in the Pantex Plant Ten-Year Site Plan FY 2014 FY 2023
was $351 million.
Figure D57. Laboratory Operating Board rating for Pantex facility assets in Amarillo, Texas
D.3.2.5 Pantex Plant Workforce
Notes:
The site is supported by three primary funding areas: Directed Stockpile Work, RTBF, and Security.
Figure D58. Pantex total headcount
Notes:
As illustrated in the graph, a significant percentage of the population is eligible for retirement. There are no
distinct gaps in age groups, which may correlate to experience and development of next-generation
expertise.
Figure D59. Pantex employees by age
Notes:
Years of service range broadly a significant population of the site has between 1 and 15 years of service.
Figure D60. Pantex employees by years of service
Notes:
The number of voluntary terminations increased slightly because of a voluntary separation package that was
offered prior to the advent of the Consolidated Nuclear Security contract.
Figure D61. Change in last two fiscal years at Pantex

Notes:
The distribution of employees leaving the site does not present any significant challenges or concerns.
Figure D62. Age of Pantex employees who left service

Notes:
Attrition rates are highest for new employees with zero to five years of service.
Figure D63. Years of service of Pantex employees who left service

Notes:
The trend in the divergence of the early- and mid-career workforce from the advanced-career workforce is
being monitored to ensure sufficient maturation of the workforce.
Figure D64. Pantex trends by career stage
Notes:
Separation trends do not present specific concerns or challenges.
Figure D65. Pantex employment separation trends
Notes:
With the new contract in place for the operations of Pantex and Y-12, cost efficiencies and workforce
optimization will be realized through systems and operational integration and other planned cost savings
initiatives. This is reflected in the workforce projections for both Pantex and Y-12.
The total estimated number of FTEs needed to support the work is 3,248. The current plant population is
3,111 with approximately 150 open requisitions, mostly for engineers, authorization-basis personnel,
production technicians, and quality assurance technicians.
Technicians are being filled quickly from the local market. Engineers and authorization-basis positions are
being recruited from job fairs and universities. Internal realignment is used in some cases to fill critical
vacancies. Pantex attrition is 6.3 percent overall.
Crafts, technicians, and administrative positions have lower attrition at 5 percent, while engineers and
authorization-basis positions have much-higher attrition at over 10 percent. This is an ongoing concern as
oil, gas, and other technologies are all competing for the limited market of engineers. Desperate
competitors often offer large bonuses to lure engineers away from Pantex.
Based on current hiring and termination statistics, Pantex anticipates gaps in engineering, authorizationbasis, information technology, risk management, tooling, tester design, explosives technology, and fire
protection positions in the next ten years.
Pantex is working closely with area universities to provide engineering curricula to help fill the pipeline for
engineers for years to come.
Pantex currently attracts engineers and IT professionals from Texas Tech; West Texas A&M; the University of
Texas, El Paso; the University of Oklahoma, New Mexico Tech; the University of New Mexico; and other
academic institutions in surrounding states. Fire-protection engineers are typically recruited from Oklahoma
State University. HE technology professionals are typically recruited from New Mexico Tech.
Figure D66. Total projected Pantex workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP
D.3.3 Savannah River Site

D.3.3.1 Mission
With land spanning Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties in South Carolina, work at SRS dates back to
the 1950s and the Cold War. SRS, which has been operational since 1952, is the only domestic site
producing tritium and GTS components for the
Nations nuclear stockpile. The Savannah River
Tritium Enterprise (SRTE)1 is the NNSA Center of
Excellence Involving Large Quantities of Tritium.
Its five tritium-related missions are of critical
concern to NNSA for maintaining a safe, secure,
and effective stockpile, as well as supporting
nuclear nonproliferation, as described below.
Tritium Supply. Recycle tritium from

the reservoirs of existing warheads and
extract the tritium from target rods
irradiated in Tennessee Valley Authority reactors.
Stockpile Maintenance.
exchanges.
Stockpile Evaluation. Conduct surveillance of GTSs to support annual stockpile certification.
Helium-3 Recovery. Recover, purify, and bottle helium-3, a decay product of tritium used in
instrumentation for neutron detectors.
GTS/Tritium R&D. In partnership with the national security laboratories, DOEs Savannah River
National Laboratory (SRNL) scientists conduct R&D to support new GTS designs for alterations,
modifications, and LEPs, and to enhance gas processing in the Tritium Plant. SRNL also
participates in addressing emergent stockpile issues such as corrosion, contamination, and other
unexpected phenomena that may affect weapon performance.
Replenish the tritium in GTSs to support the schedule for LLC
Tritium operations are supported by and tightly integrated with the colocated SRNLa unique
arrangement in the nuclear security enterprise that contributes to the United States world leadership
position in tritium science and technology. SRNLs tritium-related capabilities, knowledge, and expertise
are also applied to support global nuclear nonproliferation stakeholders such as the DOE Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, DODs Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Department of
Homeland Security, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Location: Aiken, South Carolina

Total employees (tritium-related operations only): 426 direct plus support (see Section D.7.5
Workforce)
Type: Multi-program site DOEs Office of Environmental Management is the site landlord;
NNSA is a tenant
Web sites: www.srs.gov, www.savannahrivernuclearsolutions.com
Savannah River Tritium Enterprise is the collective term for the facilities, capabilities, people, and expertise at SRS related to
tritium, and the SRTE umbrella extends beyond the Tritium area to include vital mission-support functions.
Contract Operator: Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS), LLC

(Fluor, Honeywell, Huntington Ingalls Industries)
Responsible Field Office: Savannah River Field Office
D.3.3.2 Funding
(Total SRS FY 2016 Request = $2,095.2 M)

($244.2 M)

SRTE has unique capabilities that relate to LLCs and the broader national security mission of reducing
global nuclear security threats for the United States and its allies. These capabilities include:
producing and replenishing GTSs for stockpile weapons;
environmental conditioning and surveillance testing;
evaluation of GTS components and materials for

integrity in tritium service;
purifying and recycling tritium from War Reserve

reservoirs;
receiving, storing, and extracting tritium from target

rods irradiated in nuclear reactors;
recovering, purifying, and bottling helium-3, a decay

product of tritium;
R&D supporting new GTS designs (ensuring the

capability to process them) and enhancement of tritium
gas processes; and
knowledge and expertise gained from GTS and tritium

R&D that is leveraged to support global nuclear
nonproliferation efforts.
Examples of the SRS Role in Ensuring a

Safe, Secure, and Effective Deterrent
SRTE collects surveillance data to certify
stockpile reliability by environmentally
conditioning and testing tritium gas transfer
systems to simulate forces that would be
experienced during weapon deployment to
verify operability.
SRTE performs metallographic evaluations
and burst tests to obtain data on reservoir
integrity that lead to improved design
options for alterations, modifications, and
life extension programs.
SRTE provides gas transfer systems to DOD
for Joint Test Assembly flight tests.

SRTEs enduring tritium-related missions are currently
executed in a mix of Cold War-legacy and modern production
facilities that are located within a 29-acre area (called the
H Area) of the 310-square-mile SRS. These include two
legacy facilities, the H-Area Old Manufacturing facility and the
Reservoir Reclamation Facility, and three modern production
facilities, the HANM facility, the Materials Testing Facility, and
the Tritium Extraction Facility. NNSAs strategy to revitalize
SRTE infrastructure is to relocate and right-size the remaining
operational functions from the two aged and inefficient
facilities to the newer production facilities via the TRIM
Program and to recapitalize and sustain the enduring
facilities. The TRIM Program consists of one line-item project
and a suite of capital equipment and general plant projects.
Two additional line-item projects and steady annual funding
for minor construction projects are needed to recapitalize and
sustain the enduring production facilities. The three line-item
projects shown below are from the Integrated Project List in
Chapter 4.
FYNSP Period
SRS Project Name
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
Key points about the TRIM Program

Significantly reduces cost, footprint, energy
usage, and deferred maintenance.
TRIM savings will enable investments to
address SRTEs primary mission risks:
- The deteriorating infrastructure
- An increasingly retirement-eligible
workforce
It is important to fully fund the TRIM
Program through to completion in FY 2022:
- Enables closure of costly legacy facilities
and avoids the high cost to recapitalize
them.
- Available project funding has already
been shifted to support the enduring
facilities.
The TRIM Program does not sustain any
enduring facilities.

FY19
FY20
FY21-25
FY26-30

FY31-35
FY36-40
Tritium Production Capability

HANM Risk Reduction
H-Area New Manufacturing Chiller EPA Compliance
EPA = U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
HANM = H Area New Manufacturing (facility)
Project Key

In addition to the above mission-critical facilities, SRTE has 47 mission-dependent assets and eight assets
that are not mission dependent. These include five office buildings constructed from 1984 to 2013, two
training facilities constructed in 2000 and 2013, five storage
NNSA Real Property
facilities constructed in 1970 to 2011, and eight service
Savannah River Field Office
buildings built in 1969 to 2011. One office building is being
FY 2014-2023 Ten-Year Site Plan
repurposed as storage, and two warehouses will be
29 Acres (owned)
repurposed as production facilities under the TRIM Program.
Three facilities are designated as excess in the DOE FIMS.
SRTE has general-purpose equipment that performs key
functions within mission-critical facilities. Specific examples
requiring line item project support for sustainment (due to
obsolescence issues) include refrigeration systems and safetysignificant glove box oxygen monitors.
304,171 gsf active and operational

0 gsf leased
Replacement plant value: $1.9B
Deferred maintenance: $97M
Figure D67. SRS age of facility assets in H Area (Tritium), Aiken, South Carolina
Key to Understanding SRTEs Unique Facilities and Infrastructure

Infrastructure is commonly understood to mean buildings, utilities, etc., and SRTE has these. However, it is
important to recognize that SRTEs buildings are fully integrated with the process equipment and active
confinement and ventilation systems. There is, in essence, an infrastructure within the infrastructure,
i.e., glove boxes, monitoring systems, distributed control systems, etc. that must be sustained to ensure
mission continuity. This extra complexity is also required to keep workers and the public safe from the
inherently high hazards associated with processing tritium, i.e., radioactive hydrogen gas, which is extremely
flammable and explosive and can be readily assimilated into the human body.
Conditions of Assets and Deferred Maintenance

Deferred maintenance in the tritium facilities at SRS, as reported in the Savannah River Field Office
FY 2014 FY 2023 Ten Year Site Plan, in the tritium facilities at SRS is currently $97 million, $91.6 million
of which is associated with mission-critical production facilities. This is significantly increasing mission
risk due to the potential loss of facility availability and the cost of safely maintaining facilities that are
outdated, costly to operate, and inefficient. Completion of the TRIM Program will be helpful in this
respect by allowing SRS to vacate the two legacy facilities, which collectively have almost $40 million in
deferred maintenance. The remainder of the deferred maintenance is in the three modern production
facilities: $47.2 million in HANM, $3.4 million in the Materials Testing Facility, and $2.1 million in the
Helium-3 Byproduct Recovery Facility.
Figure D68. Laboratory Operating Board rating for SRS facility assets in H Area (Tritium),
Aiken, South Carolina
Perspective
Because of tritiums radioactive decay rate, SRTEs core missions will endure as long as nuclear weapons
are needed. SRTE is front line to the warfighter because on-time delivery of LLCs is required to maintain
stockpile readiness. Therefore, maintaining SRTEs facilities and infrastructure in a continual state of
readiness to execute missions is one of NNSAs highest priorities.
D.3.3.5 Savannah River Site Workforce
Notes:
SRS is managed by the DOE Office of Environmental Management and performs limited NNSA activities.
The Defense Programs scope resides in SRTE, and this group is managed as a severable entity within the
M&O contract. About 8 percent (426) of the 5,258 personnel that make up the total M&O workforce at
SRS are dedicated to SRTEs defense missions; the other 92 percent (4,832) primarily support the Office of
Environmental Management.
Beyond the SRTE Defense Programs mission, SRS provides significant support for many parts of NNSA and
additional national security mission space. More than half of the SRNL budget supports this NNSA and
national security scope.
SRTEs mission success highly depends on vital M&O support services that are acquired on an as-needed
basis. For example, in FY 2014, 260 SRNL personnel supported tritium-related missions, of which 65
(25 percent) were full time and 195 (75 percent) were part time. Overall, in FY 2014, M&O support services
consisted of the equivalent of 849 full-time heads in addition to the 426 tritium staff, making a total of
1,275. NNSAs SRTE also pays its share of an indirect allocation of M&O staff to maintain roads, steam, fire,
water, medical, etc.
The majority of the workforce within SRTE has been relatively stable over the last three years. However,
two pockets of instability exist: (1) as the workforce continues to age SRTE has experienced an uptick in
retirement, and (2) the geographical area where the site is located is in the hub of the commercial nuclear
power renaissance, posing considerable local competition for talent. Some employees have taken
opportunities with other nuclear partners that offer higher levels of pay. While attrition has increased in
the last few years, attrition rates remain relatively low compared to commercial standards.
SRTE is still staffed appropriately at this point to support all mission needs. Its focus will be on how to
attract and retain a workforce in advance of the continued escalation in retirements of a very experienced
workforce.
Figure D69. SRS total headcount
Notes:
The SRTE group will be facing an uptick in retirements over the next ten years.
SRTE employees average 50.2 years of age, and approximately 50 percent of the population are between
the ages of 51 to 60.
Based on age demographics and retirement eligibility, SRTE must have plans in place to address workforce
replacements as its experienced employees retire or leave the workforce.
Approximately 50 percent of the SRTE workforce will be fully retirement eligible by the year 2018.
SRS has seen a significant increase in younger employees; the number of employees in the 20 to 30-yearold age group doubled between 2010 and 2014, primarily as a result of pipeline funding from the
Component Manufacturing Development.
SRTE has increased college recruiting and has built relationships with local universities and technical
schools.
Figure D70. SRS employees by age
Notes:
SRTE is an organization with an extremely experienced workforce. Currently almost 63 percent of its
workforce has 21 to 30 years of experience.
Figure D71. SRS employees by years of service
Notes:
During the reporting period, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, the M&O Contractor for SRS, experienced
two workforce restructuring actions. During these actions, many employees elected retirement.
Because the NNSA budgets were not as severely impacted as the DOE Office of Environmental
Management budgets, SRTE was able to continue hiring employees during this time. SRTE was fortunate
enough to continue hiring pipeline production operators and engineers through the Readiness Program as
a way to ensure future continuity of operations.
Figure D72. Change in last two fiscal years at SRS

Notes:
By far, the largest workforce impact was the departure of those employees who elected to retire during the
workforce restructuring efforts.
Figure D73. Age of SRS employees who left service

Notes:
The trend of concern is the number of employees who left in the zero to five-year category (eight voluntary
and two involuntary). This is attributed to employees finding other opportunities outside of the site.
Figure D74. Years of service of SRS employees who left service

Notes:
Because of changes in how the SRTE personnel were captured in the human resources system, the data
cannot be captured accurately prior to 2008.
This chart further illustrates the demographic issues that SRTE has experienced because a significant
percentage of its employees are in the advanced-career category.
Figure D75. SRS trends by career stage
Notes:
As mentioned previously, between workforce restructuring and increasing retirement eligibility among the
workforce, SRTE continues to experience a rise in attrition.
SRTE forecasts its future attrition based on historical data and workforce retirement eligibility.
Figure D76. SRS employment separation trends
Notes:
SRTE does not expect significant workforce growth over the next five years outside of identified needs to
cover TRIM Program project execution. Most of that TRIM workforce will be temporary.
SRTEs larger challenge will be replacing attrition, as the expected increase in retirements will occur over
this same time period.
Figure D77. Total projected SRS workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP
D.3.4 Y-12 National Security Complex

D.3.4.1 Mission
Dating back to World War II, Y-12, originally known as the Electromagnetic Separation Plant, has
supported the nuclear security enterprise since its construction in 1943 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. After
separating the uranium for the Little Boy bomb, Y-12 continued with its uranium work and expanded
its capabilities, facilities, and know-how to meet current and future needs. Today the primary Y-12
missions are maintaining a safe, secure,
and effective U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile; providing safe and effective
nuclear propulsion systems for the
Navy; and reducing the global threat
posed by nuclear proliferation and
terrorism. Y-12 is the Nations only
source
for
enriched
uranium
components for nuclear weapons. Y-12
manufactures uranium components for
nuclear weapons, cases, and other
weapons components and evaluates
and tests these components.
In
addition, Y-12 serves as the main
storage facility for Category I/II quantities of HEU; conducts dismantlement, storage, and disposition of
HEU; and supplies HEU for use in naval reactors.
Location: Oak Ridge, TN
Type: Multi-program nuclear weapons production facility
Web site: www.y12.doe.gov
Contract Operator: Consolidated Nuclear Security (CNS), LLC
Responsible Field Office: NNSA Production Office Y-12
D.3.4.2 Funding
(Total Y-12 FY 2016 Request = $1,375.1 M)
($1,283.6 M)

Since 1943, Y-12 has played a key role in strengthening U.S. national security. Y-12 is a leader in nuclear
technology and materials, security and consequence management, manufacturing, and technical
services. Its expertise in nuclear technologies is also used in support of nonproliferation, homeland
security, and other national security objectives. These areas of expertise are indispensable to the
nuclear security enterprise and the Nations nuclear capabilities.
The core capabilities of Y-12 include:
uranium and other special materials;1

SNM accountability, storage, protection, handling, and disposition;
enabling infrastructure;
counterterrorism and counterproliferation; and
support of other missions and programs.

Most of Y12s missioncritical facilities are more than
NNSA Real Property
60 years old. To address this situation, Y12 has been
Y-12 Ten-Year Site Plan for FYs 2014-2023
consolidating its operations, modernizing its facilities and
3,018 Acres (owned)
infrastructure, and reducing its legacy footprint for more
than a decade to assure mission capability and minimize life 4,023,132 gsf active and operational
cycle operating costs. These actions are consistent with and
1,123,080 gsf nonoperational
supportive of the NNSA enterprise transformation planning.
772,141 gsf leased
Through modernization projects, deferred maintenance
Replacement plant value: $ 8,743.9M
reduction, enhanced security measures, technology
Deferred maintenance: $ 510M
enhancements, infrastructure reduction, and innovative
business practices, Y12 is focused on providing responsive, cost-effective capabilities to a broad range
of national security customers.
The strategy for uranium and lithium are presented in Chapter 4, Sections 4.3.3.1 and 4.3.3.2, respectively.

FYNSP Period
Y-12 Project Name
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18

FY19
FY20
FY21-25
FY26-30

FY31-35
FY36-40
Uranium Processing Facility

Electrical Infrastructure for Nuclear Operations (Risk Reduction II)
Lithium Production Facility

Fire Station
PIDAS Reduction
PIDAS 150->80 acres
9215 Capability Replacement

Applied Technologies Laboratory
PIDAS = Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System
Project Key
Figure D78. Y-12 age of facility assets in Oak Ridge, Tennessee
PIDAS 80->20 acres

Missioncritical operations are scattered across multiple 40 to 60yearold facilities. The facilities are
oversized, contain technologically obsolete equipment of low reliability, and require excessive
maintenance to maintain minimum capability. Much of the critical infrastructure is approaching or
beyond the expected design life. Projections beyond 2020 reveal that, with planned construction
activities, the condition of missioncritical infrastructure will improve, especially when the Uranium
Processing Facility and the Lithium Production Capability Project are operational. Continued investment
in equipment and facility improvements for the aging missioncritical infrastructure is necessary to
prevent the decline in condition for specific facilities.
The estimate for deferred maintenance is $510 million as reported in the Y-12 Ten-Year Site Plan for
FY 2014 to 2023. Excess, nonoperational facilities awaiting deactivation and demolition represent
$102 million of that amount.
Figure D79. Laboratory Operating Board rating for Y-12 facility assets in Oak Ridge, Tennessee
Taking into consideration the condition of Y-12 assets, the goals and objectives of U.S. nuclear
deterrence strategy, and additional national security mission capability requirements, the following four
major elements define the planned physical infrastructure improvement strategy at Y12 over the
planning horizon.
Replacement and Revitalization of Mission Capability. The mission capability challenges for
Y-12 lie primarily with uranium and lithium. The Uranium Processing Facility will replace most of
the HEU production functions currently performed in Building 9212. The uranium strategy also
includes upgrades and technologically advanced capabilities for the existing Buildings 9204-2E
and 9215. A Lithium Production Capability Project is planned to replace the lithium production
functions now performed in Building 9204-2.
Security Downsizing and Consolidation. Y-12 continues to pursue opportunities to reduce the
size of its Protected Area. Currently, opportunities exist to reduce the Protected Area from
150 acres to 80 acres. In addition, activities continue to consolidate SNM into fewer areas.
Coordination of security projects and Defense Programs projects is being pursued to complete
these consolidations, as well as downsizing.
Continued Operation of Enduring Facilities. In addition to facility replacement, Y12 is actively

consolidating functions into fewer existing facilities and reducing the operating footprint. A
number of enduring facilities must remain operational through the long term. The
categorization of a facility as enduring is a factor in prioritizing repairs and maintenance.
Facility assessments, facility risk-reduction initiatives, deferred maintenance analyses, and
funding prioritization ensure these facilities continue to operate. Under the current Uranium
Processing Facility plans, Buildings 9204-2E and 9215 will remain vital enduring facilities. While
buildings like 9212 are not considered enduring, the critical nature of their functions demands
appropriate risk reduction.
Deactivation and Demolition of Legacy Facilities. Since 2002, Y12 has demolished more than
1.4 million square feet of excess facilities. The NNSA Facilities Disposition Plan will identify and
evaluate excess assets, prioritize their disposition, and propose the budget resources required
for their disposition. This NNSA initiative, in concert with the DOE Office of Environmental
Management deactivation and demolition program, is vital to future site management. Without
a commitment to eliminate excess facilities, Y-12 and other NNSA sites will continue to use
limited resources to safely maintain those facilities that no longer have a mission use.
D.3.4.5 Y-12 National Security Complex Workforce
Notes:
The laborers category at Y-12 includes the security guard force, making it one of the largest groups.
The security guard force (563 personnel) was transitioned to the M&O payroll on October 29, 2012.
Figure D80. Y-12 total headcount
Notes:
Y-12 is steadily replacing its aging workforce.
The average age is 49 years old; 49 percent are age 50 or below, and 40 percent are eligible to retire.
Figure D81. Y-12 employees by age
Notes:
The average length of service at Y-12 is 14 years; 50.5 percent of employees have less than 10 years of
service.
Figure D82. Y-12 employees by years of service
Notes:
A total of 563 security guard force employees were transitioned to the M&O payroll and began work as
Y-12 employees on October 29, 2012.
A Voluntary Separation Program, normal retirements, and involuntary separations offset the increase
associated with the security guard force.
Figure D83. Change in last two fiscal years

Notes:
There are no perceived irregularities with the separation data. Some 77 percent of the terminations
were employees aged 51 and above. The group with the largest number of terminations was the 61 to
65 age band. A Voluntary Separation Incentive Program was offered on April 24, 2014, with
terminations effective no later than June 30, 2014. The Voluntary Separation Incentive Program resulted
in 105 terminations; in addition there were 7 involuntary reductions in force during FY 2014.
Figure D84. Age of Y-12 employees who left service

Notes:
Most voluntary separations are employees with less than five years of service.
Most retirees leave with 36 to 40 years of service.
Figure D85. Years of service of Y-12 employees who left service

Notes:
Most voluntary terminations are employees with less than 5 years of service; most retirees who leave
have between 36 and 40 years of service.
Figure D86. Y-12 trends by career stage
Notes:
In FY 2008, a Voluntary Separation Incentive Program was offered that accounted for the high number of
retirements that year.
Effective July 1, 2014, Consolidated Nuclear Security became the new managing contractor for both Y-12
and Pantex. A Voluntary Separation Incentive Program was offered in April 2014 with terminations
effective no later than June 30, 2014. The Voluntary Separation Incentive Program at Y-12 resulted in
105 terminations by way of voluntary separations, and there were 7 involuntary reductions in staff
during FY 2014.
Figure D87. Y-12 employment separation trends
Notes:
With the new contract in place for the operations of Pantex and Y-12, cost efficiencies and workforce
optimization will be realized through systems and operational integration and other planned cost
savings initiatives. This is reflected in the workforce projections for both Pantex and Y-12.
Figure D88. Total projected Y-12 workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP
D.4 The Test Site

D.4.1 Nevada National Security Site
D.4.1.1 Mission
The Nevada National Security Site is host to a suite of key national security missions including helping to
ensure a safe, effective, and reliable stockpile; ensuring compliance with treaty obligations; and
protecting the homeland. Within these missions are a wide range of activities that include:
planning and executing subcritical
experiments
and
developing
experimental platforms and diagnostic
systems for defense experimentation
and stockpile stewardship;
supporting homeland defense through
chemical,
biological,
radiological,
nuclear, and explosive threat reduction,
treaties and monitoring, and cyber
security (e.g., global security); and
conducting waste and restoration
programs (environmental and waste
management).
The Nevada National Security Site supports stockpile stewardship via plutonium and surrogate
subcritical experiment execution, data capture and post processing, diagnostic R&D, and reanalysis of
legacy underground test data. These activities support LANL and LLNL pit reuse options by building the
science base and also increase the understanding of the performance of all weapon systems. Scaled
subcritical experiments with plutonium and surrogates at U1a1 provide a principal linkage to both scaled
and full-scale hydrodynamic tests at other firing sites and to legacy underground nuclear test data. The
subcritical experiments enhance predictive capability, challenge next-generation weapon designers, and
build confidence in assessing the stockpile and certifying weapons modernized through LEPs. As one of
the most useful multi-disciplinary technical activities, subcritical experiments enhance the competency
of the Nevada National Security Site and national security enterprise workforce in the formality of
underground and nuclear operations as part of test readiness.
Location: Las Vegas, Nevada

Additional Operating Capabilities: Support for offices at LANL, LLNL, and SNL; the Remote
Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base and Andrews Air Force Base; and the Special
Technologies Laboratory in Santa Barbara, California
Type: Multi-program test site
Web site: www.nv.energy.gov
Contract Operator: National Security Technologies (NSTec), LLC
The U1a Complex, a Hazard Category 3 nuclear operation, is the only U.S. location authorized to conduct subcritical
experiments with both HE and weapons-relevant quantities of plutonium.
D.4.1.2 Responsible Field Office: Nevada Field Office Funding

(Total NNSS FY 2016 Request = $397.1 M)

($245.2 M)

This section summarizes the Nevada National Security Sites key experimental facilities that directly
support ongoing assessments of the Nations nuclear weapons stockpile. These facilities provide
platforms for complex experiments with HE, SNM, and advanced diagnostic technologies.
The 100,000 square-foot Device Assembly Facility is a Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility that
supports nuclear weapon experimental capabilities. The Device Assembly Facility is one of two
facilities in the nuclear security enterprise that allows colocation of HE and SNM, permits staging
of large quantities of SNM in independent buildings, and provides the backbone to support
various missions at the Nevada National Security Site. For stockpile stewardship, its glove box,
downdraft table, and radiography capabilities support assembly of SNM targets for JASPER, as
well as SNM and HE packages for subcritical experiments at U1a. The Device Assembly Facility
also hosts the National Criticality Experiments Research Center, which is a unique asset that
supports a mix of critical and subcritical benchmark quality experiments, as well as detector
development, inspector and first responder and criticality safety training, and handling of
damaged nuclear weapons.
Subcritical experiments at U1a, which are Hazard Category 3 nuclear operations, focus on early
explosion-time hydrodynamic (fluid-like flow) characterization of plutonium and its surrogates in
weapon-relevant geometries. The data are critical to the mission of the national security
laboratories to maintain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile. The Nevada National Security
Site, LLNL, LANL, and SNL plan to enhance the U1a to enable well-diagnosed, early- and latetime radiographic and neutron reactivity measurements during hydrodynamic tests. The new
data will facilitate assessing the effects of aging and manufacturing processes on stockpile
weapons. The goal is to have these enhancements in place to support options for the B61-12
first production unit, the development phase of the W80-4 (the cruise missile warhead
replacement), and IWs. These programmatic infrastructure investments will improve the
understanding of the explosion life cycle of weapon primaries and the capability to certify
modernized weapons.
The JASPER facility at the Nevada National Security Site is a two-stage light gas gun for studying
the behavior of plutonium and other materials at high pressures, temperatures, and strain rates.
Experiments on both plutonium and surrogates are conducted at this Hazard Category 3 nuclear
facility. The JASPER experiments study weapon-related and other national security materials of
various compositions, manufacturing processes, surface preparation, ages, and phases under
weapon-like conditions and extreme states. The precision data obtained enable the calibration
of nuclear weapons design codes.
The Nevada National Security Site also includes a variety of administrative, R&D, mixed
laboratory, calibration, and diagnostic development facilities that support Directed Stockpile
Work and other national security missions.

The Nevada National Security Site is a unique national asset
because of its remote location and physical characteristics,
along with its history and ongoing execution of high-technology,
high-hazard, and high-security operations and capabilities. That
existing infrastructure investment will be lost if some of the
funding support is not increased.
The Nevada National Security Site has created a strategic
framework to increase the understanding of the current and
future infrastructure conditions and mission risk. The following
three approved or proposed capital construction projects (also
shown in Chapter 4, Figure 44) are integral to that strategic
framework and represent steps toward revitalizing the Nevada
National Security Sites critical infrastructure.
NNSA Real Property

Fiscal Year 2014 NNSA/NFO
Nevada Field Office Ten-Year Site Plan
868,492 Acres: (leased/owned)

462 Buildings/trailers:
(leased/owned/permitted)
179,368 gsf leased
(total assets)
Deferred maintenance: $ 211,843,438
(total assets)
New 138-kV Power Transmission Corridor. This approved project replaces the primary wood
pole transmission line to provide power to the majority of the site via steel towers.
Water Supply and Distribution Systems Upgrades. This proposed project replaces elements of
the water supply and distribution systems to the critical forward-area facilities.
Consolidated Mission Support Facility. This proposed project will be a centerpiece of site plans
to combine targeted investments with the continued enhanced use of the newest facilities and
support systems in one centralized, consolidated complex supporting the forward area.
FYNSP Period
Nevada National Security Site Project Name
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18

FY19
FY20
FY21-25
New 138kV Power Transmission Event Corridor

Consolidated Mission Support Facility
Water Supply and Distribution System
Project Key
FY26-30

FY31-35
FY36-40

A majority of the Nevada National Security Site facilities and infrastructure were built before 1990.
Many of these have already reached the end of their useful lives, both structurally and technologically.
Figure D89. NNSS age of facility assets in Mercury, Nevada
Facility Conditions and Deferred Maintenance

The current estimate for deferred maintenance at the Nevada National Security Site, as reported in the
Fiscal Year 2014 NNSA/NFO [Nevada Field Office] Ten-Year Site Plan, is $211,843,438 (total assets).
Deferred maintenance will continue to increase as preventive maintenance resources decrease and
more facilities are classified for shutdown or allowed to run to failure as part of controlled degradation.
Sixty-three percent of the building square footage is over 30 years old. This situation is
exacerbated by a large number of temporary buildings that have been kept in operation for
decades beyond their expected life.
A large percentage of the utilities need major rehabilitation or replacement. Many elements in
the electrical, water, and communications areas are rated as poor.
The 138-kV wood pole transmission system, the backbone for providing electric power at the
Nevada National Security Site, is over 50 years old and 20 years past its expected useful life.
A significant portion of the road system is substandard. The estimated 1401 miles of the Nevada
National Security Site roadways represent the entire spectrum of rural roadway construction.
Most paved roadways were constructed prior to 1965. Approximately 106 miles of roadway is
mission-dependent.
Parts of the telecommunications and information technology infrastructure are technologically

outdated and seriously degraded by age, weather, and maintenance issues.
The trunked radio system, which is essential to continued Nevada National Security Site
operations, is beyond its useful life and is beginning to experience outages that impact mission
accomplishment, safety, and security.
Figure D90. Laboratory Operating Board rating for NNSS facility assets in Mercury, Nevada
D.4.1.5 Nevada National Security Site Workforce
Notes:
Crafts, laborers, and operators are all in represented positions (covered under collective bargaining
agreements).
Of the total employee population, 27.5 percent occupy technical positions.
Professional administrators includes Information technology, accounting and finance, human resources,
procurement, property, maintenance, facilities, project controls, security, operations specialists, pilots, quality
assurance, quality control, non-management medical personnel, etc.
Site security is provided by approximately 290 Centerra-Nevada contractors; these personnel are not included
in the total headcount of 2,133 detailed above.
Figure D91. NNSS total headcount
Notes:
Because retirement eligibility varies for each union, bargaining employees age 65 and over are considered
eligible for retirement in the analysis of the data.
Non-bargaining employees are eligible to retire at age 55, with at least ten years of credited service. However,
the actual average age at retirement has been above the full retirement age (65) for several years.
Figure D92. NNSS employees by age
Notes:
In some cases, Service includes credited service at other DOE sites and/or with the parent company
(i.e., National Security Technologies).
Of the Nevada National Security site employee population, 52 percent have less than ten years of service.
Figure D93. NNSS employees by years of service
Notes:
Involuntary includes 43 employees who were approved to participate in National Security Technologies SelfSelect Voluntary Separation Program in December 2012 because their positions were eliminated, just as in an
involuntary layoff.
Figure D94. Change in last two fiscal years

Notes:
With an average age at NSTec of 51, a higher percentage of older employees separating from the company is
to be expected.
Figure D95. Age of NNSS employees who left service

Notes:
Bargaining employees who were Laid Off - Short Call < 6 months were included in this data. National Security
Technologies tracks the number of employees who leave within two years of being hired on the monthly
dashboard.
Figure D96. Years of service of NNSS employees who left service

Notes:
With early career and advanced career (red) populations remaining basically stable, the decreases in overall
headcount have come from the mid-career population (blue).
Figure D97. NNSS trends by career stage
Notes:
The July 2006 contract change influenced the number of voluntary departures during that year.
In FY 2008 NSTec conducted both a voluntary and involuntary layoff (both are included in the involuntary
numbers).
In 2012 "Involuntary" includes 43 employees who were approved to participate in National Security
Technologies Self-Select Voluntary Separation Program because the positions were eliminated, just as in an
involuntary layoff.
Figure D98. NNSS employment separation trends
Notes:
Based on the FY 2015 Continuing Resolution, National Security Technologies will reduce the technical
workforce that supports Defense Programs over the FYNSP.
National Security Technologies projects that the workforce will be decreased by 24 engineers, 22 scientists,
35 technicians, and 190 other personnel. The guidance given for the remainder of the FYNSP period will bring
more reductions until FY 2018 because of the decrease in Program Readiness funding.
Figure D99. Total projected NNSS workforce needs by COCS over FYNSP
Appendix E
Glossary
3+2 StrategyThe strategy to reduce the size of the stockpile, increase interoperability, reduce the
number of warhead types, and provide flexibility to reduce the risk of geopolitical surprise.
Alteration (Alt)Limited scope changes that typically affect the assembly, testing, maintenance, and/or
storage of weapons. An Alt may address identified defects and component obsolescence, but does not
change a weapon's operational capabilities.
Annual Assessment ProcessThe authoritative method for DOD and NNSA to evaluate the safety,
reliability, performance, and military effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile. This annual
process is a principal factor in the Nations ability to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent without
nuclear explosive testing. The Directors of the three DOE national security laboratories are required to
complete annual assessments, and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command provides a separate
assessment of the military effectiveness of the stockpile. These assessments also include a
determination as to whether it is necessary to conduct an underground nuclear test to resolve any
identified issues. The Secretaries of Energy and Defense are required to submit these reports unaltered
to the President, along with any conclusions the Secretaries consider appropriate.
B61-12A life extension program that will enable the consolidation of four families of the B61 bomb
into one and will improve both the safety and security of the oldest weapon system in the U.S. arsenal.
BoostThe process that increases the yield of nuclear weapons through fusion reactions.
Canned Subassembly (CSA)A subassembly consisting of the secondary and other parts, hermetically
sealed in a metal container.
ComponentAn assembly or any combination of parts, subassemblies, and assemblies mounted
together in manufacture, assembly, maintenance, or rebuild.
Component Maturation Framework (CMF)One of three frameworks that defines highlevel activities
to be executed by Defense Programs. CMF identifies components to be matured and ensures the best
technologies and manufacturing processes are available on timely schedules to supply components to
meet life extension program requirements.
Conventional High Explosive (CHE)A high explosive that detonates when given sufficient stimulus via
a high-pressure shock. Stimuli from severe accident environments such as those involving impact, fire,
or electrical discharge may also initiate a CHE. See also Insensitive High Explosive (IHE).
Co-designAn inclusive process to develop designs that encourages all participants to find solutions
within the context of the total system, rather than based on individual areas of expertise and interest.
Cruise MissileGuided missile, the major portion of whose flight path to its target is conducted at
approximately constant velocity; a cruise missile depends on the dynamic reaction of air for lift and on
propulsion forces to balance drag.
Design AgencySee National Security Laboratory.
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-1
Enterprise Mission Essential Task List-based (EMETL) ProgramImplements a standardized,

comprehensive list of tasks required for members of protective forces to accomplish their security
mission effectively. The EMETL serves as a direct link between mission accomplishment and training,
while also providing common operating language for protective force programs across the nuclear
Equation of StateThe mathematical relationship that describes the state of a material under a given
set of physical conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure, volume, internal energy).
Essential SkillsThose skills required to accomplish the NNSA mission. The particular skills are related
to the scientific, technical, engineering, operations, business, and professional disciplines. They are
characterized by uniqueness, high market demand, the time to acquire and maintain proficiency, and
the difficulty in recruiting and retaining individuals with those skills.
Exascale ComputingComputing systems that are capable of at least a thousand petaflops or a
quintillion (1018) floating point operations per second.
First Production UnitFirst completed item of a weapon system delivered to a user (e.g., DOD).
FissionProcess whereby the nucleus of a particular heavy element splits into (generally) two nuclei of
lighter elements, with the release of substantial amounts of energy.
FLoating point Operations Per Second (FLOPS, or flops)The number of arithmetic operations
performed on real numbers in a second; used as a measure of the performance of a computer system.
Full-Time Equivalent (FTE)A calculation based on the total hours worked divided by the maximum
compensable hours in a work year.
FusionProcess whereby the nuclei of two lightweight elements, especially those of the isotopes of
hydrogen (namely, deuterium and tritium) combine to form the nucleus of a heavier element with the
release of substantial amounts of energy and a high energy neutron.
Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP)A detailed description of the program elements (and
the associated projects, activities, and construction projects) covering the fiscal year for which the
annual budget is submitted and at least four succeeding fiscal years.
High Explosives (HE)Materials that detonate, with the resulting components of the chemical
reactions propagating at supersonic speeds. High explosives are used in the main charge of the primary
of a nuclear weapon to compress the fissile material and initiate the chain of events leading to nuclear
yield. See also Conventional High Explosive (CHE) and Insensitive High Explosive (IHE).
High Performance Computing (HPC)Computational task requiring more than one computer. An HPC
system is created by aggregating multiple computers and connecting them together.
Hostile EnvironmentExternal conditions (i.e., intense x-ray and gamma-ray radiation, blast waves, and
neutrons) generated by the output from defensive weapons and from fratricide.
IgnitionThe point at which a nuclear fusion reaction becomes self-sustaining and no longer requires
constant input energy to continue.
Insensitive High Explosive (IHE)A high explosive that requires a significantly stronger shock stimulus
level than a conventional high explosive (CHE) to detonate. A warhead with IHE is much safer than one
with CHE because stimuli from almost all credible accident scenarios or unauthorized attempts to
activate the weapon will not cause the IHE to detonate.
Page E-2 | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
Integrated Design Code (IDC)A simulation code that contains multiple physics and engineering
models that have been validated experimentally or computationally; such a code is used to simulate,
understand, and predict the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear components and systems of a nuclear
weapon under normal, abnormal, and hostile conditions.
Integrated Project List (IPL)A nuclear security enterprise-wide chronological project list that includes
both approved and proposed construction projects. Near-term projects that have been approved
(usually within the FYNSP) are of higher priority and in more advanced stages of development.
Proposed projects are pre-conceptual, have not been fully scoped, and are shown in chronological
order. Rough orders of magnitude for the total project cost and schedule are indicated for both
approved and proposed projects. This project list is re-evaluated each budget year, and priorities shift
based on mission need and funding availability.
Interoperable Warhead (IW)A warhead that has a common nuclear explosive package, is integrated
with systems that maximize the use of common and adaptable non-nuclear components, and can be
deployed on multiple delivery platforms.
Life CycleThe series of stages through which a component, system, or weapon passes from the time it
is initially developed until it is consumed, disposed of, or altered in order to extend its lifetime.
Life Extension Program (LEP)Modifications that refurbish warheads by replacing aged components
with the intent of extending the service life of the weapon. LEPs can extend the life of a warhead
20-30 years, while increasing safety, improving security, and addressing defects.
Limited Life Component (LLC)A weapon component or subsystem whose performance degrades with
age and must be replaced.
Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL)A measurement system to assess the maturity level of a given
technology, component or system from a manufacturing perspective that includes ten levels, where
MRL 1 is the lowest (the basic manufacturing implications are identified) and where MRL 10 is the
highest (the full rate production is demonstrated and lean production practices are in place).
Mixed Oxide (MOX)Reactor fuel made with a physical blend of different fissionable materials, such as
uranium dioxide and plutonium dioxide.
ModernizationChanges to nuclear weapons or to infrastructure because of aging, unavailability of
replacement parts, or the need to enhance safety, security, and operational design features.
Modification (Mod)A more comprehensive modernization program that changes the operational
capabilities of the weapon. A Mod may enhance weapons' margins against failure, increase safety,
improve security, extend limited life component life cycles, and/or address identified defects and
component obsolescence
National Security LaboratoryThe term national security laboratory refers to Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, or Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
NodeA computational end point in a computer network that typically includes one or more central
processing units (CPUs), memory, and a connection to a network.
Non-Nuclear ComponentsParts or assemblies specially designed for use in nuclear weapons or for use
in nuclear weapons training; such components are not available commercially (e.g., radiation-hardened
electronic circuits or arming, fuzing, and firing components) and do not contain special nuclear
material.
Nuclear Explosive Package (NEP)An assembly containing fissionable and/or fusionable materials as
well as the main charge high-explosive parts or propellants capable of producing a nuclear detonation.
Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS)The U.S. Governments national
level system to track and account for domestically held sources and special nuclear material and the
imports and exports of those materials to and from the United States. NNSA uses NMMSS to track
both Government and commercial inventories of these materials through an interagency agreement
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Nuclear Security EnterpriseThe term nuclear security enterprise means the physical facilities,
technology, and human capital of the national security laboratories, the nuclear weapons production
facilities, and the Nevada National Security Site.
Nuclear Weapons CouncilThe Nuclear Weapons Council operates as a joint activity of DOD and DOE.
The Council members are the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics;
the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security of DOE; the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command. The
Council (1) prepares the annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum, (2) develops nuclear
weapons stockpile options and costs of such options and alternatives, (3) coordinates and approves
programming and budget matters pertaining to nuclear weapons programs; (4) identifies options for
cost-effective schedules for nuclear weapons production; (5) considers safety, security, and control
issues for existing weapons and proposed new weapon programs; (6) ensures adequate consideration
for design, performance, and cost tradeoffs of all new proposed nuclear weapons programs;
(7) provides specific guidance to NNSA on priorities for production, surveillance, research, and
construction related to nuclear weapons; (8) coordinates and approves DOE activities to study,
develop, produce, and retire nuclear warheads; (9) prepares and transmits comments on annual
proposals for budget levels of nuclear weapons research to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy;
(10) coordinates and approves annual NNSA budget proposals; and (11) provides broad guidance and
comments regarding priorities and budget levels for research on improved conventional weapons and
transmits such guidance and comments to the Secretary of Defense before preparation of the annual
DOD budget request.
Nuclear Weapons Production FacilityThe term nuclear weapons production facility means any of the
following: National Security Campus, Pantex Plant, Y-12 National Security Complex, or Savannah River
Site.
OutyearsYears that succeed the five-year period of the Future Years Nuclear Security Program.
PetaFLOPS or petaflops1015 floating point operations per second (See Floating point Operations
Per Second).
Phase 6.x ProcessAn expanded subset of the Quantity Production and Stockpile phase (Phase 6) of
the Joint Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Process. The Phase 6.x Process provides a framework to conduct
and manage life extension activities for existing weapons.
PrimaryA fission device that is the initial source of nuclear energy, coupled to the secondary stage.
Predictive Capability Framework (PCF)One of three frameworks that defines highlevel activities to be
executed by Defense Programs. The PCF identifies the complex set of interlinked analytical,
computational, and experimental activities needed for stockpile assessment, the evaluation of some
surveillance data, and the coordination of related efforts.
Production Facility or Production AgencySee Nuclear Weapons Production Facility.
Safeguards Transporter (SGT)A highly specialized trailer specifically designed to safeguard and
transport nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials while in transit.
SecondaryThe portion of a warhead that provides additional energy release for the detonation of a
nuclear weapon; it is activated by the energy from the primary.
Significant Finding Investigation (SFI)A formal investigation by a committee, chaired by the
appropriate design agency (i.e., a national security laboratory), to determine the cause and impact of a
reported anomaly and to recommend corrective actions as appropriate.
Special Access Program (SAP)Program encompassing security protocols that provide highly classified
information with safeguards and access restrictions exceeding those for regular access to classified
information.
Strategic Partnership Program (SPP)Previously known as Work for Others, the Strategic Partnership
Program is fully-reimbursed research undertaken by a DOE national laboratory, facility, production
facility, or site (e.g., Sandia National Laboratories, the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, or
the National Security Campus) for a client other than DOE or the Department of Homeland Security.
SubcriticalThe state of a given fission system when specified conditions are such that a less than
critical mass of fissionable material is present.
SuretyWhen referring to a nuclear weapon, surety is the assurance that the weapon will operate
safely, securely, and effectively if deliberately activated and that no accidents, incidents, or
unauthorized weapon detonations will occur. The factors that can contribute to that assurance include
the validation of models for weapon performance based on experiments and simulations, materiel
(that is, equipment and supplies of a military force), personnel, and execution of appropriately
designed procedures.
SurveillanceActivities involved in making sure nuclear weapons continue to meet established safety,
security, and reliability standards.
SustainmentA program to continually modify and maintain a set of nuclear weapon systems.
Systems Integration Framework (SIF)A new framework in FY 2015 that is being developed to
complement the Component Maturation Framework (CMF) and the Predictive Capability Framework
(PCF) and bridge the gap between the CMF and the Phase 6.x Process.
Technical Basis for Stockpile Transformation Planning (TBSTP)An NNSA classified document that
establishes the needs of the overall technology development to ensure the safety, effectiveness, and
enhancement of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
Technology Readiness Level (TRL)A measurement system to assess the maturity level of a particular
technology that includes nine levels, where TRL 1 is the lowest (the associated scientific research is
beginning) and where TRL 9 is the highest (a technology has been proven through successful
operation).
Test ReadinessPreparedness to conduct an underground nuclear test if required to ensure the safety
and effectiveness of the stockpile or if directed by the President for policy reasons.
TractorA modified and armored tractor that is employed to transport the specialized Safeguards
Transporter trailer.
TritiumA radioactive isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus contains two neutrons and one proton; it is
produced in nuclear reactors by the action of neutrons on lithium nuclei.
Verification and Validation (V&V)Verification provides evidence of the correctness of computer codes
in solving pertinent equations; validation assesses the adequacy of physical models to represent reality.
W76-1 LEPA life extension program for the W76 submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead,
delivered by a U.S. Navy Trident II.
W78An intercontinental ballistic missile warhead, delivered by the U.S. Air Force Minute Man III
LGM-30.
W80-4 LEPA life extension program for the W80 cruise missile, delivered by the U.S. Air Force B-52
bomber.
W88A submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead, delivered by a U.S. Navy Trident II D5 Fleet
Ballistic Missile.
W88 Alt 370An alteration of the W88 submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead to replace the
arming, fuzing, and firing components.
WarheadPart of a missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket, or other munitions that contains either the
nuclear or thermonuclear system intended to inflict damage.
Work for Others (WFO)See Strategic Partnership Program (SPP).
DOE/NA-0029
A Report to Congress
Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

March 2015
U.S. Department of Energy

1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585

FY2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

FY2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

FY2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Fiscal Year 2016

National Nuclear Security Administration

Department of Energy | March 2015

Administrators Letter of Transmittal

The Honorable Thad Cochran

The Honorable Barbara Mikulski

The Honorable John McCain

Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page i

Department of Energy | March 2015

The Honorable Jack Reed

The Honorable Lamar Alexander

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

The Honorable Jeff Sessions

The Honorable Joe Donnelly

The Honorable Harold Rogers

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

The Honorable Adam Smith

The Honorable Mike Simpson

The Honorable Marcy Kaptur

The Honorable Mike Rogers

The Honorable Jim Cooper

Page ii | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Department of Energy | March 2015

Message from the Secretary

March 2015 | Department of Energy

This page left blank intentionally.

Page iv | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Department of Energy | March 2015

Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page v

March 2015 | Department of Energy

Page vi | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Department of Energy | March 2015

Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship

March 2015 | Department of Energy

Program Details.................................................................................................................................... 2-19

Chapter 3 Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Activities ................................................................ 3-1

Department of Energy | March 2015

Chapter 5 Secure Transportation Asset .............................................................................................................. 5-1

Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page ix

March 2015 | Department of Energy

Page x | Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Department of Energy | March 2015

Appendix C Exascale Computing ......................................................................................................................... C-1

Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page xi

March 2015 | Department of Energy

Department of Energy | March 2015

March 2015 | Department of Energy

Federal total headcount ..................................................................................................................... D-3

Department of Energy | March 2015

NSC employees by age ..................................................................................................................... D-45

Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page xv

March 2015 | Department of Energy

Department of Energy | March 2015

Current U.S. nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems ..........................................................1-4

Specifications of Most Recent Advanced Computing Technology System Procurements ..................3-10

Infrastructure management strategy to sustain National Nuclear Security Administration

Essential skills for the nuclear security enterprise ................................................................................7-8

March 2015 | Department of Energy

This page left blank intentionally.