South Asian Studies

A Research Journal of South Asian Studies

Vol. 24, No.2, July-December 2009, pp. 250-256

The Rann of Kutch and its Aftermath

Lubna Abid Ali
Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad

ABSTRACT
The brief armed encounter between small contingents of Indian and Pakistani armies in
April 1965 resulted in what was generally perceived to be a victory for the latter. It was as a
kind of an easy victory, which had earlier surprised the Chinese in the NEFA war in 1962.
The overall lack of Indian preparedness for an armed defence of the disputed areas on both
occasions convinced the Pakistani ruling elite that the fear of Indian military might was
based on an exaggerated view. The incident of Rann of Kutch was therefore, one of the
major determining factors in the eventual choice of Pakistani government to go for a
military solution to Kashmir issue. This study is an attempt to explore some of the
questions related to the issue of Rann of Kutch, like what was the historical origin of the
conflict and where did it lead India and Pakistan in legal and political terms after
independence? What led to the armed clash between two countries and what was its
outcome? What perceptions did the two countries develop in the aftermath about their
respective military capabilities? How did Rann of Kutch episode influence the strategic
thinking of both countries on the eve of September 1965 war? The crux is that if there was
no Rann of Kutch, the war if at all had taken place would have taken a different course.

KEY WORDS: Indo-Pakistan strategic thinking; Impossibility of military

solution, Kashmir dispute, Territory.

The territory of Kutch consists of an area of 8,461 square miles in the region of 24
parallel in the South-West of Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent. This peninsular tract
of land is surrounded by Indus towards west and Indian Ocean and Gulf of Kutch
in South. Its northern and southern flanks are marked by semi-deserts and desert
wilderness. The Rann on the other hand, resembles a dried salt lake and is situated
in the North-East of Kutch. During the rainy season, it becomes a land locked sea.
However, when water recedes after the monsoons, the surface becomes hard and
dried up. Bhuj is the capital of the state (Raikes, 1954: 3). The Imperial Gazetteer
of India states the following:
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The Rann of Kutch resembles a dried up sea except a stray
bird, an occasional caravan, no sign of life breaks the desolate
loneliness (Imperial Gazette of India, 1908:85).
The peculiar topography of the area supported Pakistans claim that the Rann
comprised landlocked sea. Under international law, the boundary must run
through its middle. The Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1908, 1909 and 1928 showed
the Rann as part of the sea. The demarcation of Western portion of Sindh-Kutch
boundary ran through the middle of the disputed territory.
At the time of independence in 1947, Pakistan was under the control of Rann,
till India occupied a part of Northern Rann in 1956 by force. The topography and
historical background of the area illustrates that Pakistan had a convincing case in
claiming the areas, along the 24th parallel and also some area roughly south of the
parallel. As these areas were formerly under the control and administration of
Sindh, the case of Pakistan was based on the Resolution of the Government of
Bombay, which administered Sindh at that time1.
The resolution defined the boundary in western area, which had been the
subject of claims and counter-claims and also clearly indicated the rest of the
boundary of Sindh. The boundary of Sindh was clearly delineated on the map and
no attempt was made then or afterwards to challenge it2.
Indian authorities were fully aware about the strategic value of the territory of
Rann of Kutch. Just after the creation of the state of Pakistan, India started
developing a major naval base at Kandiala in the Gulf of Kutch and got it
connected with Rajhistan through rail and road links inside India. Navanagar Air
Base was also developed close to Karachi which was then the capital of Pakistan.
In addition, Indians started building an army garrison station just in the south of
the 24th parallel at Khavada.
The reports of oil and possible mineral deposits in the region further
accelerated Indian average into the area. At that time, Pakistani authorities failed
to calculate the strategic vulnerability of Pakistan. In case of hostilities between
the two neighbours, it was the only territory on the borders of West Pakistan, from
where the joint operations of the army, navy and air force could be launched with
strength. India could thus drive a powerful wedge between Northern and Southern
Sindh, cut off Karachi and a portion of Sindh from the rest of the country and
deprive a truncated Pakistan of all its sea routes (Ahmad, 1971: 9).
Similarly from the military point of view, it was possible for India to launch
large scale mechanized operations in the Thar-desert. The topographical
conditions helped in supporting such operations for deep thrusts and it was also
possible to seize maximum territory for bargaining purposes. The strategic
location of Rann of Kutch forced the two belligerent neighbours to attach great
importance to it. However, actual clash occurred between India and Pakistan due
to Indias claim to Kanjar Kot and to Gullu Talao in January 1965. Gullu Talao
located between Chad bet and Vingi while Kangar Kot being a ruined fort near
Ding.
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Indian army started obstructing the patrols of Sindh Rangers as well as the
customs personnel. Despite Pakistans protests, India established new posts in
this area, creating a new de facto boundary along Customs Track on Pakistani
side of the border. Later, Indian intentions were confirmed by Indian Prime
Minister, Bahadur Shastri, Indian Home Minister Mr. Gulzar and Indian Defence
Minister, Mr. Chavan, as they paid visits to the area and gave green signal to the
exercise Arrow Head.
This exercise, carried out by the Indian armed forces involved the use of
several destroyers and frigates, including the aircraft carrier Vikranth in the Gulf
of Kutch. On 2nd March, 1965, it was discovered that 31-Indian Infantry Brigade
had moved into Bhuj Island to reinforce 112-Indian Brigade. This additional
Indian army build up caused grave apprehensions among Indus Rangers of
Pakistan, whose total strength in the area did not exceed one battalion.
The local Indus Rangers parties were not strong enough to check Indian
forward thrust in the area. On 14th March 1965, India established a new post called
Sardar Post, about three miles south of Kanjar Kot. On 16 March, 1965, GOC 8
Division, Major General Tikka Khan, visited the Headquarters of 51-Brigade and
the forwarded areas and ordered 6-Brigade at Quetta to be prepared to move
forward to the general area of Umar kot (Ahmad, 1971: 35).
In the meantime, Indians had started moving forward with deeper thrusts into
Pakistani side at the territory. One company of Indian troops moved from Vigikot
to North-West of Dira, a point of junction of Mara and Ding lakes. On the night of
4th and 5th April, Pakistans military command realized the gravity of the situation
and Commander 51-Brigade, Brigadier Muhammad Azhar finally issued orders on
5 April 1965 to retailiate, if the Indians advanced any further in order to stop
violations of border area under its control.
This move was followed by 8-infantry Division under Operation Desert
Hawk on 7 April to meet any aggression along Pakistani borders. Finally, tense
situation on both sides of the border was escalated into an actual conflict between
the hostile forces. First encounter took place on 10 April, 1965. Indian troops
suffered heavy causalities at Sardar Kot. Pakistan also captured twenty one Indian
soldiers including Major Karnail Singh. Therefore, first encounter between the
armed forces of India and Pakistan along the borer of the Rann of Kutch resulted
in military defeat for the former (Ahmad, 1971: 37).
There was a grim reaction in India over it. Indian Home Minister in a virulent
speech in Lok Sabha on 11 April described the Sardar post incident as a challenge
to nation and exhorted Indian people to harness all their energies in conflict and to
think of nothing else now (Ahmad, 1971: 61).
The Indian Prime Minister Shastri, vowed in the Lock Sabha
to take action against Pakistan when the time and
circumstances are ripe (Dawn, 1965, April 13).

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However, the Indian threat did not go unnoticed in Pakistan. As a rejoinder
Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then foreign Minister of Pakistan issued a statement
on 15 April, 1965 in which he declared that:
The Rann of Kutch situation is the latest example of Indian
chauvinism and warned India that if it persisted in the use of
force, it alone would be responsible for the consequence,
which must follow (Dawn, 1965, April 18).
In Pakistan, the military top brass anticipated Indians intentions, not to
withdraw from Rann during the coming monsoons. The conviction got further
strengthened because of Indian supplies by air and sea to support their forces in
the northern half of Rann. Therefore, Major General Tikka Khan, Commander 8Division, assessed the operational situation at that time and was convinced of no
reason for Pakistan to remain on the defensive. He began to outline the tactical
contingency plan and conceived what is known as the Plan Alpha, modified by
the recommendation of Brigadier Iftikhar Khan Janjua. The move that was started
on 26 April, culminated in the capture of Biar Bet and Sera Bet (Ahmad, 1971:
68).
At this critical juncture of military success, the political considerations of
Ayub Khan came into action. His critics think that it was an opportunity which
would have been capitalized for pushing the Indians away from strategically
sensitive area, i.e., the northern half of Rann. However, Ayub Khan did not allow
such an offensive. Therefore, the planned objectives of General Tikka Khan for
the Rann of Kutch were obstructed by the command at the highest level. An
analysis of the military supported the view point of these critics. For example, it
was claimed that:
Indians had crossed over the inlet from the sea having
constructed a causeway, with empty 44- gallon drums and
Pakistan could block their only route of return by destroying
the causeway. Ayub disallowed this action and the
commander was told to consolidate this position and not to
purse the enemy any further (Gauhar, 1993: 309).
The damage control gestures by Ayub pointed towards the possibility of
having a political settlement of the conflict. Pakistan, though victorious, proposed
the ceasefire. This fact clearly points out the non-aggressive designs of Pakistan.
If Pakistan wanted to commit aggression, it would have chosen a better area rather
than mud flats of Rann of Kutch and also a better time, probably a time when
Indian forces were defeated at the hands of Chinese in 1962.
The move for a ceasefire came through the good offices of the then British
Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson. On his behalf, the then British High
Commissioner in Pakistan, Sir Maurice James played an important role in
persuading Ayub to agree to a ceasefire because he could see that Indians were
deeply upset over the set back, they had received in the Rann. He made more than

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one trip to New Delhi and finally told Ayub on 1st May that a solution could be
reached without a war.
His continuous efforts bore fruit and Pakistan decided not to cash its military
superiority in dispute of Kutch and accepted mediation efforts by Britain and
United Nations. Finally, the ceasefire came into effect between India and Pakistan
on 6 June, 1965. However, the official agreement for ending the hostilities and
initiating a negotiated settlement of dispute was signed by India and Pakistan on
30 June, 1965.
Ayub Khan came under severe criticism for accepting the ceasefire from
senior army circles, from the foreign office officials, as well as from the articulate
sections of population in general. Army was disappointed over the fact that despite
the innumerable sacrifices and valour of the Pakistani troops which forced Indian
troops to withdraw their retreat, had not been translated into a military victory.
While analyzing the war of 1965, Altaf Gauhar for example, noted that
Ayubs judgment got impaired by the perceived military superiority of Pakistani
forces in Rann of Kutch. It confirmed his old prejudice against Hindu not having
stomach for a fight which turned into a belief and had the decisive effect on the
course of future events (Gauhar 1993: 312). This analysis is, also, endorsed by
Asghar Khan in the following words:
Rann of Kutch encounter reinforced Ayub Khans rising
faith in our inherent strength.And increased faith in military
superiority of our forces (Khan, 1978).
Such feelings were prevalent not only in Ayubs mind but also in the minds of
the commanders of Pakistani Army, both on the front and on the base. They held
similar notions and generally subscribed to the view that the battles against the
Indians by and large had been easy victories. However, the scenario was different
in India. The agreement for withdrawal was met with considerable criticism all
over the country. Various political parties of opposition sought to gain popular
favour by condemning Shastri Government. Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpaye of Jan Sangh
condemned the agreement in Rajya Sabha for being thoroughly dishonorable.
The three-men Tribunal was to consist of one nominee, each from Pakistan
and India, as well as a Chairman. The Government of India nominated
Ambassador Ales beer, a Judge of the constitutional court of Yugoslavia and the
Government of Pakistan had nominated Ambassador Nasrolah Entezam from Iran
and former President of General Assembly of the United Nations.
With regard to the nomination of Chairman, there was disagreement between
India and Pakistan. Therefore, the secretary General of United Nations took
initiative and appointed judge Gunnar Legergren, the president of court of Appeal
for Western Sweden as Chairman of the Tribunal. The Indian case was
represented by Mr. Daphtary as the leading counsel while Pakistani case was
represented by Justice Manzur Qadir, as leading counsel. Pakistan pleaded that
according to the available evidence, boundary line between Singh and Kutch

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should be drawn through the middle of Rann. The chairman gave his decision in
the following words:
In respect of those sectors of Rann in relation to which no specific evidence in
way of display of Sindh authority or merely trivial or isolated evidence of such a
character, supports Pakistans claim, I pronounce in favour of territory. However,
in respect of sectors where a continuous and for the region intensive Singh
activity, meeting with no effective opposition from Kutch side, is established, I am
of the opinion that Pakistan has made out a better and superior title (Rizvi, 1986:
126).
The refers to a marginal area south of Rahim Ki Bazar, including Pirol Valo
Kun, as well as to Dhara Banni and Chhad Bet, which on most maps appear as an
extension of the mainland of Sindh these findings concern the true extent of
sovereignty on the eve of independence. I do not find that the evidence presented
by parties in relation to the post independence period is of such a character as to
have changed the position existing on the eve of Independence (Ahmad, 1971:
117, 118).
Mr. Nasrollah Entezam, the nominee of Pakistan, concurred with the opinion
of Chairman in these words:
In any early stage, I considered that Pakistan had made out a
clear title to the northern half of the area, shown in the Survey
Maps as Rann. I have now the advantage of reading opinion
of the learned Chairman and in the light of it; I concur in and
endorse the judgment of the learned Chairman (Ahmed,
1971).
Indian nominee, Mr. Alex Beer, dissented from the opinion of Chairman in
these words:
the instances cited by India regarding display of authority
by Kutch confirm the boundary as recognized by two
neighbours and depicted in official maps. On all above
grounds, respectfully dissenting from the opinion of my two
colleagues, I find that the boundary between India and
Pakistan in the West Pakistan/Gujrat borders area, lies along
the northern edge of Great Rann as shown in the latest
authoritative map of this area (Ahmad, 1971).
In the period following Indo Pakistan conflict in Rann of Kutch in AprilJune 1965, Indian and Pakistani forces did not withdraw their troops. Instead, they
remained amassed all along the frontiers. Keeping in view this fact; Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, the then foreign minister of Pakistan, while talking to the news reporters in
Singapore stated that we are always prepared to talk. But you cannot do so under
the shadow of bayonets (Dawn, 1965, April 16).
India looked at Rann of Kutch conflict through a different perspective. It
rightly judged Pakistans commitment to keep a conflict limited in scope and not
to let it escalate into an international war between two countries. On its part, India
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seemed to be firm on disallowing another Rann of Kutch and using the option of
internationalizing a conflict if and when it emerged.

Notes
1.
2.

Resolution of the Government of Bombay No. 1129, 24 February, 1914.

Letter of the permanent representative of India to the President of the
Security Council. S/6321, 3 May, 1965, p.9.

References
(1965, April 13). Dawn.
(1965, April 16). Dawn.
(1965, April 18). Dawn.
Ahmad, Saeed. (1971). Indo-Pak Clash in Rann of Kutch. Rawalpindi: Army Education
Press, GHQ.
Bartholomew, J.G. (1928). The Map of the Indian Empire. India: Published by Secretary of
State for Indian Council.
Gauhar, Altaf. (1993). Ayub Khan: Pakistans First Military Ruler. Lahore; Sange-e-Meel
Publications.
His Majestys Secretary of State for Indian Council. Imperial Gazette of India. (1909). X1.
London: Oxford Univ. Press.
Khan, Asghar (1978). The First Round. Lahore: Tabeir Publishing House.
Raikes, S.N. (1954). Memories on the Kutch States. Pakistan: Government Printing Press.
Rizvi, Hassan Askari. (1986). The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1974-86. Lahore:
Progressive Publishers.

Biographical Note
Dr. Lubna Abid Ali is Chairperson, Department of International Relations at
Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.
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