Today is Friday, July 17, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 139554

July 21, 2006

ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and FREDDIE
GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO, PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA PONCE-ENRILE POTENCIANO,
and DOREEN FERNANDEZ, respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 139565

July 21, 2006

BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO, PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA PONCE-ENRILE POTENCIANO,
and DOREEN FERNANDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and FREDDIE
GARCIA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) for the primary purpose of
propagating arts and culture in the Philippines.1 The CCP is to awaken the consciousness of the Filipino people to
their artistic and cultural heritage and encourage them to preserve, promote, enhance, and develop such heritage.2
PD 15 created a Board of Trustees ("Board") to govern the CCP. PD 15 mandates the Board to draw up programs
and projects that (1) cultivate and enhance public interest in, and appreciation of, Philippine art; (2) discover and
develop talents connected with Philippine cultural pursuits; (3) create opportunities for individual and national selfexpression in cultural affairs; and (4) encourage the organization of cultural groups and the staging of cultural
exhibitions.3 The Board administers and holds in trust real and personal properties of the CCP for the benefit of the
Filipino people.4 The Board invests income derived from its projects and operations in a Cultural Development Fund
set up to attain the CCP's objectives.5
The consolidated petitions in the case at bar stem from a quo warranto proceeding involving two sets of CCP
Boards. The controversy revolves on who between the contending groups, both claiming as the rightful trustees of
the CCP Board, has the legal right to hold office. The resolution of the issue boils down to the constitutionality of the
provision of PD 15 on the manner of filling vacancies in the Board.
The Case
Before us are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. In G.R. No. 139554, petitioners Armita B. Rufino ("Rufino"), Zenaida R. Tantoco ("Tantoco"),6 Lorenzo
Calma ("Calma"), Rafael Simpao, Jr. ("Simpao"), and Freddie Garcia ("Garcia"), represented by the Solicitor
General and collectively referred to as the Rufino group, seek to set aside the Decision7 dated 14 May 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50272 as well as the Resolution dated 3 August 1999 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

1) Declaring petitioners [the Endriga group] to have a clear right to their respective offices to which they were
elected by the CCP Board up to the expiration of their 4-year term,
2) Ousting respondents [the Rufino group], except respondent Zenaida R. Tantoco, from their respective
offices and excluding them therefrom, and
3) Dismissing the case against respondent Zenaida R. Tantoco.
SO ORDERED.8
In G.R. No. 139565, petitioners Baltazar N. Endriga ("Endriga"), Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo ("Lagdameo"), Patricia C.
Sison ("Sison"), Irma Ponce-Enrile Potenciano ("Potenciano"), and Doreen Fernandez ("Fernandez"), collectively
referred to as the Endriga group, assail the Resolution dated 3 August 1999 issued by the Court of Appeals in the
same case insofar as it denied their Motion for Immediate Execution of the Decision dated 14 May 1999.
The Antecedents
On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30) creating the Cultural
Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote
Philippine culture. The original founding trustees, who were all appointed by President Marcos, were Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos, Juan Ponce-Enrile, Andres Soriano, Jr., Antonio Madrigal, Father Horacio Dela Costa, S.J., I.P.
Soliongco, and Ernesto Rufino.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD 15,9 the CCP's
charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from the "pressure or
influence of politics."10 PD 15 increased the members of CCP's Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive
Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11.
After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino asked for the courtesy resignations
of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new trustees to the Board. Eventually, during the term of
President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A.
Cabili ("Cabili"), and Manuel T. Maosa ("Maosa").
On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a
term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. The seven new trustees
were:
1. Armita B. Rufino - President, vice Baltazar N. Endriga
2. Zenaida R. Tantoco - Member, vice Doreen Fernandez
3. Federico Pascual - Member, vice Lenora A. Cabili
4. Rafael Buenaventura - Member, vice Manuel T. Maosa
5. Lorenzo Calma - Member, vice Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo
6. Rafael Simpao, Jr. - Member, vice Patricia C. Sison
7. Freddie Garcia - Member, vice Irma Ponce-Enrile Potenciano
Except for Tantoco, the Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and assumed the performance of their
duties in early January 1999.
On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court questioning President
Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board. The Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b)
of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board "shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the
next regular meeting x x x." In case "only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee
acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP]." The Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP
Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the
ranking officers of the CCP.
The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was
vacant due to the expiration of Maosa's term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees, namely, Endriga,
Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, together with Cabili, Father Bernardo P. Perez ("Fr. Perez"), Eduardo De

los Angeles ("De los Angeles"), Ma. Cecilia Lazaro ("Lazaro"), and Gloria M. Angara ("Angara"). President Estrada
retained Fr. Perez, De los Angeles, Lazaro, and Angara as trustees.
Endriga's term was to expire on 26 July 1999, while the terms of Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, and Fernandez
were to expire on 6 February 1999. The Endriga group maintained that under the CCP Charter, the trustees' fixed
four-year term could only be terminated "by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause." Presidential
action was neither necessary nor justified since the CCP Board then still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the
statutory power to fill by election any vacancy in the Board.
The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the President. The
Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x
x."
The Court referred the Endriga group's petition to the Court of Appeals "for appropriate action" in observance of the
hierarchy of courts.
On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision under review granting the quo warranto petition. The
Court of Appeals declared the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees. On the other hand, the
appellate court's Decision ousted the Rufino group from the CCP Board.
In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the
power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer on the CCP
trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank and not
of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared
unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of
"officers lower in rank" than the appointing power.
On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group's motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
also denied the Endriga group's motion for immediate execution of the 14 May 1999 Decision.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
Meanwhile, Angara filed a Petition-in-Intervention before this Court alleging that although she was not named as a
respondent in the quo warranto petition, she has an interest in the case as the then incumbent CCP Board
Chairperson. Angara adopted the same position and offered the same arguments as the Rufino group.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that Section 6(b) of PD 15 providing for the manner of filling vacancies in the CCP Board
is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity. Section 6(b) of PD 15 mandates the remaining trustees to fill by election
vacancies in the CCP Board. Only when the Board is entirely vacant, which is not the situation in the present case,
may the President exercise his power to appoint.
The Court of Appeals stated that the legislative history of PD 15 shows a clear intent "to insulate the position of
trustee from the pressure or influence of politics by abandoning appointment by the President of the Philippines as
the mode of filling"11 vacancies in the CCP Board. The Court of Appeals held that until Section 6(b) of PD 15 is
declared unconstitutional in a proper case, it remains the law. The Court of Appeals also clarified that PD 15 vests
on the CCP Chairperson the power to appoint all officers, staff, and personnel of the CCP, subject to confirmation by
the Board.
The Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group's motion for reconsideration for failure to raise new issues except the
argument that Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals declined to rule on the
constitutionality of Section 6(b) of PD 15 since the Rufino group raised this issue for the first time in the motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals also held, "Nor may the President's constitutional and/or statutory power of
supervision and control over government corporations restrict or modify the application of the CCP Charter."12
The Court of Appeals, moreover, denied the Endriga group's motion for immediate execution of judgment on the
ground that the reasons submitted to justify execution pending appeal were not persuasive.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 139554, the Rufino group, through the Solicitor General, contends that the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error:
I

x x x in holding that it was "not actuated" to pass upon the constitutionality of Section 6(b) of PD 15 inasmuch
as the issue was raised for the first time in [Rufino et al.'s] motion for reconsideration;
II
x x x in not holding that Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional considering that:
A. x x x [it] is an invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the Constitution;
B. x x x [it] effectively deprives the President of his constitutional power of control and supervision over the
CCP;
III
x x x in declaring the provisions of PD 15 as clear and complete and in failing to apply the
executive/administrative construction x x x which has been consistently recognized and accepted since 1972;
IV
x x x in finding that [Endriga et al.] have a clear legal right to be the incumbent trustees and officers of the
CCP considering that:
A. Endriga et al. are estopped from instituting the quo warranto action since they recognized and benefited
from the administrative construction regarding the filling of vacancies in the CCP Board of Trustees x x x;
B. x x x [Endriga et al.'s] terms did not legally commence as [they] were not validly elected under PD 15;
C. assuming that [Endriga et al.] were validly elected, they lost their right to retain their offices because their
terms as trustees expired on 31 December 1998;
D. [Endriga et al.] assumed positions in conflict x x x with their offices in the CCP and were thus not entitled to
retain the same;
V
x x x in not dismissing the quo warranto petition for being moot x x x;
VI
x x x in holding that [Rufino et al.'s] prayer [that the] disputed offices [be declared] entirely as vacant is bereft
of basis and amounts to "an admission of their lack of right to the office they claim."13
In G.R. No. 139565, the Endriga group raises the following issue:
whether a writ of quo warranto involving a public office should be declared a self-executing judgment and
deemed immediately executory under Rule 39, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.14
The Court's Ruling
The petition in G.R. No. 139554 has merit.
The battle for CCP's leadership between the Rufino and Endriga groups dealt a blow to the country's artistic and
cultural activities. The highly publicized leadership row over the CCP created discord among management, artists,
scholars, employees, and even the public because of the public interest at stake.
Subsequently, the assumption to office of a new President in 2001 seemingly restored normalcy to the CCP
leadership. After then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the Presidency on 20 January 2001, the
Rufino group tendered their respective resignations on 24-29 January 2001 as trustees of the CCP Board. On 12
July 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed 11 trustees to the CCP Board with the corresponding positions
set opposite their names:
1. Baltazar N. Endriga - Chairman
2. Nestor O. Jardin - President
3. Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo - Member

4. Teresita O. Luz - Member

5. Irma P.E. Potenciano - Member
6. Eduardo D. De los Angeles - Member
7. Patricia C. Sison - Member
8. Benjamin H. Cervantes - Member
9. Sonia M. Roco - Member
10. Ruperto S. Nicdao, Jr. - Member
11. Lina F. Litton - Member
In its special meeting on 13 July 2001, the CCP Board elected these 11 newly-appointed trustees to the same
positions and as trustees of the CCP Board. In the same meeting, the Board also elected the Chairman and
President.
On 21 December 2001, the Solicitor General submitted to this Court a manifestation stating that the "election of the
trustees was made without prejudice to the resolution of the constitutional issues before this Honorable Court in
G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, x x x."15
The Issue of Mootness
We first consider the Rufino group's contention that the Endriga group's quo warranto suit should have been
dismissed for being moot. The Rufino group argued that when the Endriga group's terms subsequently expired,
there was no more actual controversy for the Court to decide.
For the Court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one that involves
a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution.16 The case must not
be moot or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by courts of justice.17 A case
becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.18
The purpose of the quo warranto petition was to oust the Rufino group from the CCP Board and to declare the
Endriga group as the rightful trustees of the CCP Board. It may appear that supervening events have rendered this
case moot with the resignation of the Rufino group as well as the expiration of the terms of the Endriga group based
on their appointments by then President Ramos. A "new" set of CCP trustees had been appointed by President
Macapagal-Arroyo and subsequently elected by the CCP Board.
However, there are times when the controversy is of such character that to prevent its recurrence, and to assure
respect for constitutional limitations, this Court must pass on the merits of a case. This is one such case.
The issues raised here are no longer just determinative of the respective rights of the contending parties. The issues
pertaining to circumstances personal to the Endriga group may have become stale. These issues are (1) whether
the Endriga group is estopped from bringing the quo warranto for they themselves were appointed by the incumbent
President; (2) whether they were validly elected by the remaining CCP trustees; (3) whether their terms expired on
31 December 1998 as specified in their appointment papers; and (4) whether they are entitled to immediate
execution of judgment.
However, the constitutional question that gave rise to these issues will continue to spawn the same controversy in
the future, unless the threshold constitutional question is resolved the validity of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 on
the manner of filling vacancies in the CCP Board. While the issues may be set aside in the meantime, they are
certain to recur every four years, especially when a new President assumes office, generating the same controversy
all over again. Thus, the issues raised here are capable of repetition, yet evading review if compromises are
resorted every time the same controversy erupts and the constitutionality of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is not
resolved.
The Court cannot refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 if only to prevent a
repeat of this regrettable controversy and to protect the CCP from being periodically wracked by internecine politics.
Every President who assumes office naturally wants to appoint his or her own trustees to the CCP Board. A frontal
clash will thus periodically arise between the President's constitutional power to appoint under Section 16, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution and the CCP trustees' power to elect their fellow trustees under Section 6(b) and (c) of PD
15.

This Court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brush aside procedural barriers19 and take cognizance of
constitutional issues due to their paramount importance. It is the Court's duty to apply the 1987 Constitution in
accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how the Legislature or the Executive would want it
interpreted.20 This Court has the final word on what the law means.21 The Court must assure respect for the
constitutional limitations embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
Interpreting Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
At the heart of the controversy is Section 6(b) of PD 15, as amended, which reads:
Board of Trustees. The governing powers and authority of the corporation shall be vested in, and exercised
by, a Board of eleven (11) Trustees who shall serve without compensation.
xxxx
(b) Vacancies in the Board of Trustees due to termination of term, resignation, incapacity, death or other
cause as may be provided in the By-laws, shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the
trustees held at the next regular meeting following occurrence of such vacancy. The elected trustee
shall then hold office for a complete term of four years unless sooner terminated by reason of resignation,
incapacity, death or other cause. Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving
trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the Center. Such officers shall be designated in the
Center's Code of By-Laws. Should for any reason the Board be left entirely vacant, the same shall be filled by
the President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the aforementioned ranking officers of the Center.
(Emphasis supplied)
Inextricably related to Section 6(b) is Section 6(c) which limits the terms of the trustees, as follows:
(c) No person may serve as trustee who is not a resident of the Philippines, of good moral standing in the
community and at least 25 years of age: Provided, That there shall always be a majority of the trustees who
are citizens of the Philippines. Trustees may not be reelected for more than two (2) consecutive terms.
(Emphasis supplied)
The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled
by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by
the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become
entirely vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by the President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the
same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, the remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect their fellow trustees for a
fixed four-year term. On the other hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to reelect fellow trustees for
more than two consecutive terms.
The Power of Appointment
The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the Legislature's authority to delegate the power to
appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads
of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may,
by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)
The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution provides
otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the
system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican government.22
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group
refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the

President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by
law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case involves the
interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the appointment of this fourth group
of officers.23
The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The
President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law
authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board
because the trustees fall under the third group of officers.
The Scope of the Appointment Power of the Heads of
Departments, Agencies, Commissions, or Boards
The original text of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as written in Resolution No. 51724 of the
Constitutional Commission, is almost a verbatim copy of the one found in the 1935 Constitution. Constitutional
Commissioner Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., explains the evolution of this provision and its import, thus:
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 16 x x x is a relic from the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, x
x x.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the provision was: "but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior
officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments." As already seen, it meant that,
while the general rule was that all presidential appointments needed confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, Congress could relax this rule by vesting the power to appoint "inferior officers" in "the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments." It also meant that while, generally,
appointing authority belongs to the President, Congress could let others share in such authority. And
the word "inferior" was understood to mean not petty or unimportant but lower in rank than those to
whom appointing authority could be given.
Under the 1973 Constitution, according to which the power of the President to appoint was not limited by any
other body, the provision read: "However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in members of the
Cabinet, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their
respective offices." No mention was made of the President. The premise was that the power to appoint
belonged to the President; but the Batasan could diffuse this authority by allowing it to be shared by
officers other than the President.
The 1987 provision also has the evident intent of allowing Congress to give to officers other than the
President the authority to appoint. To that extent therefore reference to the President is pointless. And by
using the word "alone," copying the tenor of the 1935 provision, it implies, it is submitted, that the general rule
in the 1935 Constitution of requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments had not been
changed. Thereby the picture has been blurred. This confused text, however, should be attributed to
oversight. Reference to the President must be ignored and the whole sentence must be read merely as
authority for Congress to vest appointing power in courts, in heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
or boards after the manner of the 1973 text.
Incidentally, the 1987 text, in order to eschew any pejorative connotation, avoids the phrase "inferior officers"
and translates it instead into "officers lower in rank," that is, lower in rank than the courts or the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.25 (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest the appointment of lowerranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The deliberations26 of the 1986
Constitutional Commission explain this intent beyond any doubt.27
The framers of the 1987 Constitution changed the qualifying word "inferior" to the less disparaging phrase "lower in
rank" purely for style. However, the clear intent remained that these inferior or lower in rank officers are the
subordinates of the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with
the power to appoint. The express language of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only one
conclusion the officers whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be

of lower rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint.
Congress May Vest the Authority to Appoint
Only in the Heads of the Named Offices
Further, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest "in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards" the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. Section 16 provides:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. (Emphasis supplied)
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary,
acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the
power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a
commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the
board. In the last three situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency,
commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers.
The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace.
Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power
to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise of such
legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other
members of the commission or board.
This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the Constitution
itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.28 The power to appoint conferred directly by the
Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc29 and on the Constitutional Commissions30 is also self-executing and
not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the "heads"
of the specified offices, and in no other person.31 The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions
or boards and not to their members, for several reasons.
First, a plain reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
shows that the word "heads" refers to all the offices succeeding that term, namely, the departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. This plain reading is consistent with other related provisions of the Constitution.
Second, agencies, like departments, have no collegial governing bodies but have only chief executives or heads of
agencies. Thus, the word "heads" applies to agencies. Any other interpretation is untenable.
Third, all commissions or boards have chief executives who are their heads. Since the Constitution speaks of
"heads" of offices, and all commissions or boards have chief executives or heads, the word "heads" could only refer
to the chief executives or heads of the commissions or boards.
Fourth, the counterpart provisions of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions uniformly refer to "heads" of offices. The 1935 Constitution limited the grant of the appointment power
only to "heads of departments."32 The 1973 Constitution expanded such grant to other officers, namely, "members
of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards x x x."33
If the 1973 Constitution intended to extend the grant to members of commissions or boards, it could have followed
the same language used for "members of the Cabinet" so as to state "members of commissions or boards."
Alternatively, the 1973 Constitution could have placed the words commissions and boards after the word "courts" so
as to state "members of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, commissions and boards." Instead, the 1973 Constitution used
"heads of agencies, commissions, and boards."
Fifth, the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions make a clear distinction whenever granting the power to appoint
lower-ranked officers to members of a collegial body or to the head of that collegial body. Thus, the 1935
Constitution speaks of vesting the power to appoint "in the courts, or in the heads of departments." Similarly, the
1973 Constitution speaks of "members of the Cabinet, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards."
Also, the 1987 Constitution speaks of vesting the power to appoint "in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards." This is consistent with Section 5(6), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
states that the "Supreme Court shall x x x [a]ppoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with
the Civil Service Law," making the Supreme Court en banc the appointing power. In sharp contrast, when the 1987

Constitution speaks of the power to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive branch, it vests the power "in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards."
In addition, the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that in the case of the constitutional commissions, the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers is vested in the commission as a body. Thus, Section 4, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution provides, "The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance
with law."
Sixth, the last clause of the pertinent sentence in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is an enumeration
of offices whose heads may be vested by law with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. This is clear from the
framers' deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE: On page 8, line 3, change the period (.) after "departments" to a comma (,) and add
AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS. This is just to complete the enumeration in the 1935 Constitution
from which this additional clause was taken.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
xxxx
MR. SUMULONG: We accept the amendment.
MR. ROMULO: The Committee has accepted the amendment, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to the addition of the words "AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR
BOARDS" on line 3, page 8? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved.34 (Italicization in
the original; boldfacing supplied)
As an enumeration of offices, what applies to the first office in the enumeration also applies to the succeeding
offices mentioned in the enumeration. Since the words "in the heads of" refer to "departments," the same words "in
the heads of" also refer to the other offices listed in the enumeration, namely, "agencies, commissions, or boards."
The Chairperson of the CCP Board is the Head of CCP
The head of the CCP is the Chairperson of its Board. PD 15 and its various amendments constitute the Chairperson
of the Board as the head of CCP. Thus, Section 8 of PD 15 provides:
Appointment of Personnel. The Chairman, with the confirmation of the Board, shall have the power to
appoint all officers, staff and personnel of the Center with such compensation as may be fixed by the Board,
who shall be residents of the Philippines. The Center may elect membership in the Government Service
Insurance System and if it so elects, its officers and employees who qualify shall have the same rights and
privileges as well as obligations as those enjoyed or borne by persons in the government service. Officials
and employees of the Center shall be exempt from the coverage of the Civil Service Law and Rules.
Section 3 of the Revised Rules and Regulations of the CCP recognizes that the head of the CCP is the Chairman of
its Board when it provides:
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD. The Board of Trustees shall elect a Chairman who must be one of its
members, and who shall be the presiding officer of the Board of Trustees, with power among others, to
appoint, within the compensation fixed by the Board, and subject to confirmation of the Board, remove,
discipline all officers and personnel of the Center, and to do such other acts and exercise such other powers
as may be determined by the Board of Trustees. The Chairman shall perform his duties and exercise his
powers as such until such time as the Board of Trustees, by a majority vote, shall elect another Chairman.
The Chairman shall be concurrently President, unless the Board otherwise elects another President.
Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the CCP who may be vested by law, under Section 16, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP.
Under PD 15, the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. Section 6 of PD 15, as amended,
states:
Board of Trustees. The governing powers and authority of the corporation shall be vested in, and exercised
by, a Board of eleven (11) Trustees who shall serve without compensation.

The CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 Repugnant to
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP
Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such
"heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." This excludes a situation where the appointing officer
appoints an officer equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to elect their
co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to "elect" and not "appoint" their
fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute cannot circumvent the
constitutional limitations on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the coworkers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public office has no constitutional basis.
Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their fellow
trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President's power to appoint.
This inherent conflict has spawned recurring controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees every time a new
President assumes office.
In the present case, the incumbent President appointed the Endriga group as trustees, while the remaining CCP
trustees elected the same Endriga group to the same positions. This has been the modus vivendi in filling
vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing the President to appoint and the CCP Board to elect the trustees. In effect,
there are two appointing powers over the same set of officers in the Executive branch. Each appointing
power insists on exercising its own power, even if the two powers are irreconcilable. The Court must put an end to
this recurring anomaly.
The President's Power of Control
There is another constitutional impediment to the implementation of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15. Under our
system of government, all Executive departments, bureaus, and offices are under the control of the President of the
Philippines. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied)
The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from
the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk.35 This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and
does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President's power of control over the
Executive branch.36
The 1987 Constitution has established three branches of government the Executive, Legislative and Judicial. In
addition, there are the independent constitutional bodies like the Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit,
Civil Service Commission, and the Ombudsman. Then there are the hybrid or quasi-judicial agencies,37 exercising
jurisdiction in specialized areas, that are under the Executive branch for administrative supervision purposes, but
whose decisions are reviewable by the courts. Lastly, there are the local government units, which under the
Constitution enjoy local autonomy38 subject only to limitations Congress may impose by law.39 Local government
units are subject to general supervision by the President.40
Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must
belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial body or local government unit.
Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and constitutional basis for its existence.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the
independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the
CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not placed
by law or order creating them under any specific department" falls "under the Office of the President."41
Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the President

necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the
President "shall have control of all executive x x x offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies
from the President's power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative,
judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.
The President's power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true
whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer
involving the exercise of discretion.42
In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the
Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one
President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive branch.43 Any office in the
Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any
legal or constitutional basis.
The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive branch outside the control
of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the
Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the
President of his constitutional power of control over "all the executive x x x offices." If the Legislature can do this with
the Executive branch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law
putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This will destroy the
system of checks and balances finely structured in the 1987 Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and
Judicial branches.
Of course, the President's power of control does not extend to quasi-judicial bodies whose proceedings and
decisions are judicial in nature and subject to judicial review, even as such quasi-judicial bodies may be under the
administrative supervision of the President. It also does not extend to local government units, which are merely
under the general supervision of the President.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board, runs
afoul with the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The intent of
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the
President.44 Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of
the President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.
Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x."45 This
provision does not free the CCP from the President's control, for if it does, then it would be unconstitutional. This
provision may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and undertaking activities, but
ultimately these policies and activities are all subject to the President's power of control.
The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President's control over the CCP in the guise of
insulating the CCP from the President's influence. By stating that the "President shall have control of all the
executive x x x offices," the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to control
all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 139554. We declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL Section 6(b) and (c)
of Presidential Decree No. 15, as amended, insofar as it authorizes the remaining trustees to fill by election
vacancies in the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines. In view of this ruling in G.R. No.
139554, we find it unnecessary to rule on G.R. No. 139565.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., J.J., concur.

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