1 Aguinaldo v. Aquino III

10/1/2019 G.R. No. 224302 | Aguinaldo v.
Aquino III
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 224302. November 29, 2016.]
HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, HON. REYNALDO A.

ALHAMBRA, HON. DANILO S. CRUZ, HON. BENJAMIN T.
POZON, HON. SALVADOR V. TIMBANG, JR., and the
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), petitioners,
vs. HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C.
AQUINO III, HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, HON. MICHAEL FREDERICK L. MUSNGI, HON. MA.
GERALDINE FAITH A. ECONG, HON. DANILO S.
SANDOVAL, HON. WILHELMINA B. JORGE-WAGAN, HON.
ROSANA FE ROMERO-MAGLAYA, HON. MERIANTHE
PACITA M. ZURAEK, HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, and HON.
VICTORIA C. FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J : p
Before this Court is a Petition for Quo Warranto under Rule 66 and
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 with Application for Issuance of
Injunctive Writs 1 filed by petitioners Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo (Aguinaldo)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Muntinlupa City, Branch 207; Judge
Reynaldo A. Alhambra (Alhambra) of RTC, Manila, Branch 53; Judge
Danilo S. Cruz (D. Cruz) of RTC, Pasig City, Branch 152; Judge Benjamin
T. Pozon (Pozon) of RTC, Makati City, Branch 139; Judge Salvador V.
Timbang, Jr. (Timbang) of RTC, Las Piñas City, Branch 253; and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondents former
President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Aquino), Executive Secretary
Paquito N. Ochoa (Ochoa), Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Michael
Frederick L. Musngi (Musngi), Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Ma.
Geraldine Faith A. Econg (Econg), Atty. Danilo S. Sandoval (Sandoval),
Atty. Wilhelmina B. Jorge-Wagan (Jorge-Wagan), Atty. Rosana Fe
Romero-Maglaya (Romero-Maglaya), Atty. Merianthe Pacita M. Zuraek
(Zuraek), Atty. Elmo M. Alameda (Alameda), and Atty. Victoria C.
Fernandez-Bernardo (Fernandez-Bernardo). The Petition assails President
Aquino's appointment of respondents Musngi and Econg as Associate
Justices of the Sandiganbayan. 2
https://cdasiaonline.com/jurisprudences/62277/print 1/56
10/1/2019 G.R. No. 224302 | Aguinaldo v. Aquino III
IFACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On June 11, 1978, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos)
issued Presidential Decree No. 1486, creating a special court called the
Sandiganbayan, composed of a Presiding Judge and eight Associate
Judges to be appointed by the President, which shall have jurisdiction over
criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other
offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations. 3 A few months later, on
December 10, 1978, President Marcos also issued Presidential Decree No.
1606, 4 which elevated the rank of the members of the Sandiganbayan
from Judges to Justices, co-equal in rank with the Justices of the Court of
Appeals; and provided that the Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions
of three Justices each. 5 Republic Act No. 7975 6 was approved into law on
March 30, 1995 and it increased the composition of the Sandiganbayan
from nine to fifteen Justices who would sit in five divisions of three
members each. Republic Act No. 10660, 7 recently enacted on April 16,
2015, created two more divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three Justices
each, thereby resulting in six vacant positions.
On July 20, 2015, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in
the Philippine Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted on the JBC
website an announcement calling for applications or recommendations for
the six newly created positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
8 After screening and selection of applicants, the JBC submitted to
President Aquino six shortlists contained in six separate letters, all dated
October 26, 2015, which read:
1) For the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
Your Excellency: CAIHTE
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, the

Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the
following nominations for the vacancy for the SIXTEENTH
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SANDIGANBAYAN, with their
respective votes:
1. AGUINALDO, PHILIP A. - 5 votes
2. ALHAMBRA, REYNALDO A. - 5 votes
3. CRUZ, DANILO S. - 5 votes
4. POZON, BENJAMIN T. - 5 votes
5. SANDOVAL, DANILO S. - 5 votes
6. TIMBANG, SALVADOR JR. - 5 votes 9
Your Excellency:
following nominations for the vacancy for the SEVENTEENTH

respective votes:
1. CORPUS-MAÑALAC, MARYANN E. - 6 votes
2. MENDOZA-ARCEGA, MARIA THERESA V. - 6 votes
3. QUIMBO, RODOLFO NOEL S. - 6 votes
4. DIZON, MA. ANTONIA EDITA CLARIDADES - 5 votes
5. SORIANO, ANDRES BARTOLOME - 5 votes 10
Your Excellency:
following nominations for the vacancy for the EIGHTEENTH
respective votes:
1. BAGUIO, CELSO O. - 5 votes
2. DE GUZMAN-ALVAREZ, MA. TERESA E. - 5 votes
3. FERNANDEZ, BERNELITO R. - 5 votes
4. PANGANIBAN, ELVIRA DE CASTRO - 5 votes
5. SAGUN, FERNANDO JR. T. - 5 votes
6. TRESPESES, ZALDY V. - 5 votes 11
Your Excellency:
following nominations for the vacancy for the NINETEENTH
respective votes:
1. GUANZON, FRANCES V. - 6 votes
2. MACARAIG-GUILLEN, MARISSA - 6 votes
3. CRUZ, REYNALDO P. - 5 votes
4. PAUIG, VILMA T. - 5 votes
5. RAMOS, RENAN E. - 5 votes
6. ROXAS, RUBEN REYNALDO G. - 5 votes 12
Your Excellency:
following nominations for the vacancy for the TWENTIETH
respective votes.
1. MIRANDA, KARL B. - 6 votes
2. ATAL-PAÑO, PERPETUA - 5 votes
3. BUNYI-MEDINA, THELMA - 5 votes
4. CORTEZ, LUISITO G. - 5 votes

5. FIEL-MACARAIG, GERALDINE C. - 5 votes
6. QUIMPO-SALE, ANGELENE MARY W. - 5 votes
7. JACINTO, BAYANI H. - 4 votes 13
6) For the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
Your Excellency:
following nominations for the vacancy for the TWENTY-FIRST
respective votes:
1. JORGE-WAGAN, WILHELMINA B. - 6 votes
2. ECONG, GERALDINE FAITH A. - 5 votes
3. ROMERO-MAGLAYA, ROSANNA FE - 5 votes
4. ZURAEK, MERIANTHE PACITA M. - 5 votes
5. ALAMEDA, ELMO M. - 4 votes
6. FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, VICTORIA C. - 4 votes
7. MUSNGI, MICHAEL FREDERICK L. - 4 votes 14
President Aquino issued on January 20, 2015 the appointment
papers for the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, namely: (1)
respondent Musngi; (2) Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz (R. Cruz); (3) respondent
Econg; (4) Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega (Mendoza-Arcega);
(5) Justice Karl B. Miranda (Miranda); and (6) Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses
(Trespeses). The appointment papers were transmitted on January 25,
2016 to the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, who took their
oaths of office on the same day all at the Supreme Court Dignitaries
Lounge. Respondent Econg, with Justices Mendoza-Arcega and
Trespeses, took their oaths of office before Supreme Court Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Sereno); while respondent Musngi, with
Justices R. Cruz and Miranda, took their oaths of office before Supreme
Court Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza). 15 DETACa
Arguments of the Petitioners

Petitioners Aguinaldo, Alhambra, D. Cruz, Pozon, and Timbang
(Aguinaldo, et al.), were all nominees in the shortlist for the 16th
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. They assert that they possess the legal
standing or locus standi to file the instant Petition since they suffered a
direct injury from President Aquino's failure to appoint any of them as the
16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Petitioner IBP avers that it comes before this Court through a
taxpayer's suit, by which taxpayers may assail an alleged illegal official
action where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed,
deflected to an improper use, or wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. Petitioner IBP also maintains that it has
locus standi considering that the present Petition involves an issue of

transcendental importance to the people as a whole, an assertion of a
public right, and a subject matter of public interest. Lastly, petitioner IBP
contends that as the association of all lawyers in the country, with the
fundamental purpose of safeguarding the administration of justice, it has a
direct interest in the validity of the appointments of the members of the
Judiciary.
Petitioners base their instant Petition on the following arguments:
PRESIDENT AQUINO VIOLATED SECTION 9, ARTICLE
VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IN THAT:
(A) HE DID NOT APPOINT ANYONE FROM THE
SHORTLIST SUBMITTED BY THE JBC FOR THE VACANCY FOR
POSITION OF THE 16TH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN; AND
(B) HE APPOINTED UNDERSECRETARY MUSNGI
AND JUDGE ECONG AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN TO THE VACANCY FOR THE POSITION OF
21ST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
(C) THE APPOINTMENTS MADE WERE NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE SHORTLISTS SUBMITTED BY THE
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL FOR EACH VACANCY, THUS
AFFECTING THE ORDER OF SENIORITY OF THE ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES. 16
According to petitioners, the JBC was created under the 1987
Constitution to reduce the politicization of the appointments to the
Judiciary, i.e., "to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary from the
political pressure and partisan activities." 17 HEITAD
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution contains the mandate

of the JBC, as well as the limitation on the President's appointing power to
the Judiciary, thus:
Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of
lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
It is the function of the JBC to search, screen, and select nominees
recommended for appointment to the Judiciary. It shall prepare a list with at
least three qualified nominees for a particular vacancy in the Judiciary to
be submitted to the President, who, in turn, shall appoint from the shortlist
for said specific vacancy. Petitioners emphasize that Article VIII, Section 9
of the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous as to the mandate of
the JBC to submit a shortlist of nominees to the President for "every
vacancy" to the Judiciary, as well as the limitation on the President's

authority to appoint members of the Judiciary from among the nominees
named in the shortlist submitted by the JBC.
In this case, the JBC submitted six separate lists, with five to seven
nominees each, for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, particularly,
for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Associate Justices.
Petitioners contend that only nominees for the position of the 16th
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice may be appointed as the 16th
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the same goes for the nominees for
each of the vacancies for the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. However, on January 20, 2016,
President Aquino issued the appointment papers for the six new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, to wit:
VACANCY IN THE PERSON BAR CODE SHORTLIS
SANDIGANBAYAN APPOINTED NO. FOR
16th Associate Justice Michael Frederick L. PNOY019445 21st Associate Ju

Musngi
17th Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz PNOY019446 19th Associate Ju
18th Associate Justice Geraldine Faith A. Econg PNOY019447 21st Associate Ju
19th Associate Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza- PNOY019448 17th Associate Ju
Arcega
20th Associate Justice Karl B. Miranda PNOY019449 20th Associate Ju
21st Associate Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses PNOY019450 18th Associate Ju
Petitioners observe the following infirmities in President Aquino's
appointments:
a. Michael Frederick L. Musngi, nominated for the
vacancy of the 21st Associate Justice, was appointed
as the 16th Associate Justice;
b. Reynaldo P. Cruz, nominated for the vacancy of the
19th Associate Justice, was appointed as the 17th
Associate Justice;
c. Geraldine Faith A. Econg, also nominated for the
vacancy of the 21st Associate Justice, but was
appointed as the 18th Associate Justice;
d. Maria Theresa V. Mendoza[-Arcega], nominated for the
vacancy of the 17th Associate Justice, but was
appointed as the 19th Associate Justice;
e. Zaldy V. Trespeses, nominated for the vacancy of the
18th Associate Justice, but was appointed as the 21st
Associate Justice.
60. Only the appointment of Karl B. Miranda as the 20th
Associate Justice is in accordance with his nomination. 18
Petitioners insist that President Aquino could only choose one

nominee from each of the six separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for
each specific vacancy, and no other; and any appointment made in
deviation of this procedure is a violation of the Constitution. Hence,
petitioners pray, among other reliefs, that the appointments of respondents
Musngi and Econg, who belonged to the same shortlist for the position of
21st Associate Justice, be declared null and void for these were made in
violation of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution. ATICcS
Arguments of the Respondents

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Office of
the President (OP), filed a Comment, 19 seeking the dismissal of the
Petition on procedural and substantive grounds.
On matters of procedure, the OSG argues, as follows:
First, President Aquino should be dropped as a respondent in the
instant case on the ground of his immunity from suit.
Second, petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. cannot institute an action for
quo warranto because usurpation of public office, position, or franchise is a
public wrong, and not a private injury. Hence, only the State can file such
an action through the Solicitor General or public prosecutor, under
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 66 20 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, an
individual may commence an action for quo warranto in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 66 21 of the Rules of Court if he/she claims entitlement to a
public office or position. However, for said individual's action for quo
warranto to prosper, he/she must prove that he/she suffered a direct injury
as a result of the usurpation of public office or position; and that he/she has
a clear right, and not merely a preferential right, to the contested office or
position. Herein petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. have failed to show that they
are entitled to the positions now being held by respondents Musngi and
Econg, as the inclusion of petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. in the shortlist for
the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice had only given them the
possibility, not the certainty, of appointment to the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., as nominees, only had an expectant right
because their appointment to the Sandiganbayan would still be dependent
upon the President's discretionary appointing power.
Third, petitioner IBP can only institute the certiorari and prohibition
case, but not the action for quo warranto against respondents Musngi and
Econg because it cannot comply with the direct injury requirement for the
latter. Petitioner IBP justifies its locus standi to file the petition for certiorari
and prohibition by invoking the exercise by this Court of its expanded
power of judicial review and seeking to oust respondents Musngi and
Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices based on the alleged
unconstitutionality of their appointments, and not on a claim of usurpation
of a public office. Yet, based on Topacio v. Ong, 22 a petition for certiorari or
prohibition is a collateral attack on a public officer's title, which cannot be

permitted. Title to a public office can only be contested directly in a quo
warranto proceeding.
Moreover, it is the JBC, not petitioner IBP, which has legal standing
to file the present suit, as the dispute here is between the JBC and the OP.
The fundamental question in this case is "whether the JBC can corral the
discretion of the President to appoint, a core constitutional prerogative, by
designating qualified nominees within specific, artificial numerical
categories and forcing the President to appoint in accordance with those
artificial numerical categories." The Court, though, is barred from deciding
said question because the JBC is not a party herein.
Fourth, petitioners have erroneously included Jorge-Wagan,
Romero-Maglaya, Zuraek, Alameda, and Fernandez-Bernardo (Jorge-
Wagan, et al.) as unwilling co-petitioners in the Petition at bar. Apart from
the fact that Jorge-Wagan, et al. do not claim entitlement to the positions
occupied by respondents Musngi and Econg, non-appointed nominees for
the positions of 16th and 21st Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan
cannot simultaneously claim right to assume two vacancies in said special
court.
And fifth, petitioners disregarded the hierarchy of courts by directly
filing the instant Petition for Quo warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition
before this Court. Even in cases where the Court is vested with original
concurrent jurisdiction, it remains a court of last resort, not a court of first
instance.
The OSG next addresses the substantive issues.
The OSG submits that the core argument of petitioners stems from
their erroneous premise that there are existing numerical positions in the
Sandiganbayan: the 1st being the Presiding Justice, and the succeeding
2nd to the 21st being the Associate Justices. It is the assertion of the OSG
that the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice and 20
Associate Justices, without any numerical designations. Presidential
Decree No. 1606 and its amendments do not mention vacancies for the
positions of "2nd Associate Justice," "3rd Associate Justice," etc. There are
no such items in the Judiciary because such numerical designations are
only used to refer to the seniority or order of precedence of Associate
Justices in collegiate courts such as the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Court of Tax Appeals, and Sandiganbayan.
The OSG further contends that the power to determine the order of
precedence of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan is reposed in
the President, as part of his constitutional power to appoint. Citing Section
1, third paragraph of Presidential Decree No. 1606 23 and Rule II, Section 1
of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, 24 the OSG explains
that the order of precedence of the Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan shall be according to the order of their appointments, that
is, according to the dates of their respective commissions, or, when two or
more commissions bear the same date, according to the order in which
their commissions had been issued by the President. It is the averment of
the OSG that the constitutional power of the JBC to recommend nominees
for appointment to the Judiciary does not include the power to determine
their seniority. President Aquino correctly disregarded the order of
precedence in the shortlists submitted by the JBC and exercised his
statutory power to determine the seniority of the appointed Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices. TIADCc
The OSG interprets Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution

differently from petitioners. According to the OSG, said provision neither
requires nor allows the JBC to cluster nominees for every vacancy in the
Judiciary; it only mandates that for every vacancy, the JBC shall present at
least three nominees, among whom the President shall appoint a member
of the Judiciary. As a result, if there are six vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice, the JBC shall present, for the President's consideration,
at least 18 nominees for said vacancies. In the case at bar, the JBC
submitted 37 nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan; and
from said pool of 37 nominees, the President appointed the six
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, in faithful compliance with the
Constitution.
It is also the position of the OSG that the President has the absolute
discretion to determine who is best suited for appointment among all the
qualified nominees. The very narrow reading of Article VIII, Section 9 of the
1987 Constitution proposed by petitioners unreasonably restricts the
President's choices to only a few nominees even when the JBC recognized
37 nominees qualified for the position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
This gives the JBC, apart from its power to recommend qualified
nominees, the power to dictate upon the President which among the
qualified nominees should be contending for a particular vacancy. By
dividing nominees into groups and artificially designating each group a
numerical value, the JBC creates a substantive qualification to various
judicial posts, which potentially impairs the President's prerogatives in
appointing members of the Judiciary.
The OSG additionally points out that the JBC made a categorical
finding that respondents Musngi and Econg were "suitably best" for
appointment as Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The functions of the
16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice are no different from those of the
17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, or 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. Since
respondents Musngi and Econg were indubitably qualified and obtained
sufficient votes, it was the ministerial duty of the JBC to include them as
nominees for any of the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan presented for
the President's final consideration.
Furthermore, the OSG alleges that it is highly unjust to remove

respondents Musngi and Econg from their current positions on the sole
ground that the nominees were divided into six groups. The JBC
announced "the opening/reopening, for application or recommendation" of
"[s]ix (6) newly-created positions of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan." Respondents Musngi and Econg applied for the vacancy
of "Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan." In its announcements for
interview, the JBC stated that it would be interviewing applicants for "six (6)
newly created positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan." It was
only on October 26, 2015, the date of submission of the shortlists, when
the nominees had been clustered into six groups. The OSG notes that
there are no JBC rules on the division of nominees in cases where there
are several vacancies in a collegiate court. In this case, the OSG observes
that there were no measurable standards or parameters for dividing the 37
nominees into the six groups. The clustering of nominees was not based
on the number of votes the nominees had garnered. The nominees were
not evenly distributed among the six groups, i.e., there were five nominees
for 17th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; six nominees for 16th, 18th,
and 19th Sandiganbayan Associate Justices; and seven nominees for the
20th and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
The OSG then refers to several examples demonstrating that the
previous practice of the JBC was to submit only one shortlist for several
vacancies in a collegiate court.
The other respondents had likewise filed their respective Comments
or Manifestations:
1) In respondent Fernandez-Bernardo's Comment, 25 she
recognizes the legal, substantial, and paramount significance of the ruling
of the Court on the interpretation and application of Article VIII, Section 9 of
the 1987 Constitution, which will serve as a judicial precedent for the
guidance of the Executive and Legislative Departments, the JBC, the
Bench, and the Bar.
2) Respondent Musngi states in his Manifestation 26 that he will
no longer file a separate Comment and that he adopts all the averments,
issues, arguments, discussions, and reliefs in the Comment of the OSG.
3) In her Comment, 27 respondent Jorge-Wagan maintains that
she is not the proper party to assail the validity of the appointment of the
16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice as she was nominated for the 21st
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; and that she is also not the proper party
to seek the nullification of the appointments of respondents Musngi and
Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. Not being a proper party-in-
interest, respondent Jorge-Wagan argues that she cannot be considered
an "unwilling co-plaintiff."
4) Respondent Romero-Maglaya makes the following averments

in her Manifestation/Comment: 28 that she should not have been impleaded
as a respondent or an unwilling co-plaintiff in the instant Petition because
her rights as a nominee for judicial appointment were not violated; that she
had no claim of entitlement to the position of Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice; and that she had no participation in the alleged violation of the
Constitution or exercise of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
5) Respondent Econg manifests in her Comment 29 that while
she is adopting in toto the arguments in the Comment of the OSG, she is
also making certain factual clarifications and additional procedural and
substantive averments.
Respondent Econg clarifies that her real name is Geraldine Faith A.
Econg, and not Ma. Geraldine Faith A. Econg.
Respondent Econg believes that the present Petition is really for quo
warranto because it seeks to declare null and void the respective
appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg. Respondent Econg,
however, asseverates that petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. have no clear,
unquestionable franchise to the Office of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan simply because they had been included in the shortlist
submitted for the President's consideration. Nomination is not equivalent to
appointment and the removal of respondents Musngi and Econg will not
automatically grant petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. the right to the Office of
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al.,
except for petitioner Alhambra, are even uncertain about their right to the
position/s of 16th and/or 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice/s as they
have also applied for the position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice in
lieu of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos, who
eventually retired on July 22, 2016. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that petitioners' alternative remedy of certiorari is proper,
respondent Econg contends that petitioners only had 60 days to file such a
petition from January 20, 2016, the date she and respondent Musngi were
appointed. Petitioners belatedly filed their Petition before the Court on May
17, 2016.
Respondent Econg also raises the concern that if the Court affirms
the petitioners' position that there are no valid appointments for the 16th
and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, the seniority or order of
precedence among the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices will be
adversely affected. Respondent Econg avers that there was only one list of
nominees for the six vacant positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice,
considering that: (a) the announcement of the opening for
application/recommendation was for the six newly-created positions of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; (b) respondent Econg's application was
for the six newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice;

and (c) the announcement of the public interview of candidates was for the
six newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Thus, respondent Econg prays for, among other reliefs, the dismissal
of the instant Petition for Quo Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for
lack of merit, and the declaration that the appointments of respondents
Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices are valid. SDAaTC
6) In respondent Sandoval's Comment, 30 he avows that he opts

not to join the petitioners as he subscribes to the principle that the heart
and core of the President's power to appoint is the freedom to choose. The
power to appoint rests on the President and the President alone.
Respondent Sandoval has already accepted the fact that he was not
appointed despite being nominated by the JBC for the position of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and he is looking forward to another
opportunity to apply for a higher position in the Judiciary.
Respondents Zuraek and Almeda have not filed their comments
despite notice and are deemed to have waived their right to do so.
On November 26, 2016, the JBC belatedly filed a Motion for
Intervention in the Petition at bar, or more than six months from the filing of
the herein Petition on May 17, 2016 and after Chief Justice Sereno, the
Chairperson of the JBC herself, administered the oath of office of
respondent Econg, whose appointment is now being questioned for having
been done in disregard of the clustering of nominees by the JBC.
II
The Ruling of the Court
The Court takes cognizance of the
present Petition despite several
procedural infirmities given the
transcendental importance of the
constitutional issue raised herein.
The Petition at bar is for (a) Quo Warranto under Rule 66 of the
Revised Rules of Court; and (b) Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of
the same Rules.
Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court particularly identifies who can
file a special civil action of Quo Warranto, to wit:
RULE 66
Quo Warranto
Sec. 1. Action by Government against individuals. — An
action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may
be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully

holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by
the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his
office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the
Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority so to act.
Sec. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor
must commence action. — The Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or
when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe
that any case specified in the preceding section can be established
by proof, must commence such action.
Sec. 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may
commence action with permission of court. — The Solicitor General
or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which
the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request
and upon the relation of another person; but in such case the officer
bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs
of the action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the
court by the person at whose request and upon whose relation the
same is brought.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. When an individual may commence such an
action. — A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may
bring an action therefor in his own name.
In Topacio v. Ong, 31 the Court pronounced that:
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust
the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who
is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or
exercised the public office, and may be commenced by the Solicitor
General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any
person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. acEHCD
Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back

to the 1905 case of Acosta v. Flor, reiterated in the recent 2008
case of Feliciano v. Villasin, that for a quo warranto petition to be
successful, the private person suing must show a clear right
to the contested office. In fact, not even a mere preferential
right to be appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal
ground to proceed with the action. (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted.)
Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., as nominees for the 16th

Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, did not have a clear right to said
position, and therefore not proper parties to a quo warranto proceeding.
Being included in the list of nominees had given them only the possibility,
but not the certainty, of being appointed to the position, given the
discretionary power of the President in making judicial appointments. It is
for this same reason that respondents Jorge-Wagan, et al., nominees for
the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, may not be impleaded as
respondents or unwilling plaintiffs in a quo warranto proceeding. Neither
can the IBP initiate a quo warranto proceeding to oust respondents Musngi
and Econg from their currents posts as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices
for the IBP does not qualify under Rule 66, Section 5 of the Revised Rules
of Court as an individual claiming to be entitled to the positions in question.
Nevertheless, the Court takes in consideration the fact that the
present Petition is also for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which alleges that President Aquino violated
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution and committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his appointment
of respondents Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution vests upon the Court
the expanded power of judicial review, thus:
Article VIII
Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
The Court recognized in Jardeleza v. Sereno (Jardeleza Decision) 32
that a "petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any
branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions." SDHTEC
In opposing the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the

OSG cites Topacio in which the Court declares that title to a public office
may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it
cannot be assailed collaterally, such as by certiorari and prohibition. 33
However, Topacio is not on all fours with the instant case. In Topacio, the
writs of certiorari and prohibition were sought against Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong on the ground that he lacked the
qualification of Filipino citizenship for said position. In contrast, the present
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition puts under scrutiny, not any
disqualification on the part of respondents Musngi and Econg, but the act
of President Aquino in appointing respondents Musngi and Econg as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices without regard for the clustering of
nominees into six separate shortlists by the JBC, which allegedly violated
the Constitution and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. This would not be the first time that the Court,
in the exercise of its expanded power of judicial review, takes cognizance
of a petition for certiorari that challenges a presidential appointment for
being unconstitutional or for having been done in grave abuse of
discretion. As the Court held in Funa v. Villar: 34
Anent the aforestated posture of the OSG, there is no
serious disagreement as to the propriety of the availment of
certiorari as a medium to inquire on whether the assailed
appointment of respondent Villar as COA Chairman infringed the
constitution or was infected with grave abuse of discretion. For
under the expanded concept of judicial review under the 1987
Constitution, the corrective hand of certiorari may be invoked not
only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government." "Grave abuse of discretion" denotes:
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other
words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law.
We find the remedy of certiorari applicable to the instant
case in view of the allegation that then President Macapagal-Arroyo
exercised her appointing power in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted.) AScHCD
Even so, the Court finds it proper to drop President Aquino as

respondent taking into account that when this Petition was filed on May 17,
2016, he was still then the incumbent President who enjoyed immunity
from suit. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved in the
system of government of this country, even though not expressly reserved
in the 1987 Constitution. 35 The President is granted the privilege of
immunity from suit "to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of
the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention." 36 It is sufficient
that former Executive Secretary Ochoa is named as respondent herein as

he was then the head of the OP and was in-charge of releasing
presidential appointments, including those to the Judiciary. 37
Since the Petition at bar involves a question of constitutionality, the
Court must determine the locus standi or legal standing of petitioners to file
the same. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the
case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged; while "interest" refers to material interest, an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree or act assailed, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The
interest of the plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to
vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. 38
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 39 the Court acknowledged
exceptional circumstances which justified liberality and relaxation of the
rules on legal standing:
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the
category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer." In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In
other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
"citizen" or "taxpayer."
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and
"taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid
down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a
taxpayer's suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a
citizen's suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere
instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme
Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public
right, however . . . the people are the real parties. . . It is at least the
right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a
public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer's suits, Terr v.
Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an
action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his
injury cannot be denied." AcICHD
xxx xxx xxx
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the

requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the
exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency
Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan, where the "transcendental
importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such
liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec,
this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-
reaching implications" of the petition notwithstanding its categorical
statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit.
Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been
observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and
civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the
petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed
to sue under the principle of "transcendental importance." Pertinent
are the following cases:
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the
constitutional right to information and the equitable
diffusion of natural resources are matters of
transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner
with locus standi;
(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v.
Zamora, wherein the Court held that "given the
transcendental importance of the issues involved, the
Court may relax the standing requirements and allow
the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to
the parties seeking judicial review" of the Visiting
Forces Agreement;
(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary, while the
Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in
their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that
"Balikatan 02-01" involves the exercise of Congress'
taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling in
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, that in
cases of transcendental importance, the cases must
be settled promptly and definitely and standing
requirements may be relaxed.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from
the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided
that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal

disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest
in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that
the issues raised are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives
as legislators.
While neither petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. nor petitioner IBP have
legal standing to file a petition for quo warranto, they have legal standing to
institute a petition for certiorari. TAIaHE
The clustering of nominees by the JBC, which the President, for

justifiable reasons, did not follow, could have caused all nominees direct
injury, thus, vesting them with personal and substantial interest, as the
clustering limited their opportunity to be considered for appointment to only
one of the six vacant positions for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
instead of all the six vacant positions to which the JBC found them as
qualified for appointment. This is the far-reaching adverse consequence to
petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. that they have missed. More importantly, for a
complete resolution of this Petition, the Court must inevitably address the
issue of the validity of the clustering of nominees by the JBC for
simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts, insofar as it seriously impacts
on the constitutional power of the President to appoint members of the
Judiciary, which will be explained below.
One of the fundamental purposes of the IBP is to improve the
administration of justice. 40 As the association of all lawyers in the country,
petitioner IBP has an interest in ensuring the validity of the appointments to
the Judiciary. It is recognized that the administration of justice is primarily a
joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer. 41 Definitely, lawyers cannot
effectively discharge their duties if they entertain doubts, or worse, had lost
their faith in judges and/or justices. It is clearly imperative for the IBP to
prevent that situation from happening by exercising vigilance and ensuring
that the judicial appointment process remains transparent and credible.
Given that the constitutional issue in the Petition at bar is of
transcendental importance and of public interest, and for the above-
mentioned reasons, the Court shall accord petitioners the legal standing to
sue.
The instant Petition fundamentally challenges President Aquino's
appointment of respondents Musngi and Econg as the 16th and 18th
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. Petitioners contend that only one of
them should have been appointed as both of them were included in one
cluster of nominees for the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The
Petition presents for resolution of the Court the issue of whether President
Aquino violated Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution and gravely
abused his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when
he disregarded the clustering by the JBC of the nominees for each specific
vacant position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The issue is of
paramount importance for it affects the validity of appointments to
collegiate courts and, ultimately, the administration of justice, for if there
are questions as to the right of the appointee to his position as
judge/justice, then doubts shall likewise shadow all his acts as such. This
will indubitably undermine the faith of the public in the judicial system.
Since at hand is a constitutional issue of first impression, which will likely
arise again when there are simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts, it
is imperative for the Court to already resolve the same for the guidance of
the Bench and Bar, and the general public as well.
The OSG also prays for the dismissal of this Petition on the
additional ground that petitioners, by coming directly before this Court,
violated the hierarchy of courts. Relevant to this matter are the following
pronouncements of the Court in Querubin v. Commission on Elections: 42
cDHAES
Notwithstanding the non-exclusivity of the original jurisdiction

over applications for the issuance of writs of certiorari, however, the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that recourse must first be
made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction
with a higher court. The rationale behind the principle is explained
in Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion in the following wise:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the
policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that
the policy is not to be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of the policy is
designed to shield the Court from having to deal with
causes that are also well within the competence of the
lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal
with the more fundamental and more essential tasks
that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court
may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when
absolutely necessary or when serious and important
reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.
Petitioners do not have the absolute and unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which an application for certiorari
will be directed. Indeed, referral to the Supreme Court as the court
of last resort will simply be empty rhetoric if party-litigants are able
to flout judicial hierarchy at will. The Court reserves the direct
invocation of its jurisdiction only when there are special and

important reasons clearly and especially set out in the petition that
would justify the same.
In the leading case of The Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec,
the Court enumerated the specific instances when direct resort to
this Court is allowed, to wit:
(a) When there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time;
(b) When the issues involved are of transcendental
importance;
(c) Cases of first impression;
(d) When the constitutional issues raised are best decided
by this Court;
(e) When the time element presented in this case cannot
be ignored;
(f) When the petition reviews the act of a constitutional
organ;
(g) When there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law;
(h) When public welfare and the advancement of public
policy so dictates, or when demanded by the broader
interest of justice;
(i) When the orders complained of are patent nullities; and
(j) When appeal is considered as clearly an inappropriate
remedy. (Citations omitted.)
Inasmuch as the Petition at bar involves a constitutional question of
transcendental importance and of first impression and demanded by the
broader interest of justice, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion,
resolves to exercise primary jurisdiction over the same.
Lastly, respondent Econg opposes the Petition at bar for being filed
out of time. According to respondent Econg, the 60-day period for
petitioners to file this Petition commenced on January 20, 2016, the date
she and her co-respondent Musngi were appointed by President Aquino.
Based on respondent Econg's argument, the 60-day period ended on
March 20, 2016, Sunday, so petitioners only had until March 21, 2016,
Monday, to timely file the Petition. For their part, petitioners aver that after
learning of the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the media, they obtained copies
of the shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th to the 21st Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices on March 22, 2016. Counting the 60-day period from
March 22, 2016, petitioners allege that they had until May 21, 2016 to file
their Petition.
Rule 65, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that
certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the
judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is
inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. The
question though is when said 60-day period began to run in this case. The
Court refers to its ruling in Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President. 43 In
said case, the Court declared that appointment is a process. For an
appointment to be valid, complete, and effective, four elements must
always concur, to wit: "(1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise
of authority, (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the
transmittal, (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment, and (4) receipt
of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications." The Court expounded on the importance of the last
element as follows:
Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment.
Assuming office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the
appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a
public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office. ASEcHI
Javier v. Reyes is instructive in showing how acceptance is

indispensable to complete an appointment. On 7 November 1967,
petitioner Isidro M. Javier (Javier) was appointed by then Mayor
Victorino B. Aldaba as the Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan. The
Municipal Council confirmed and approved Javier's appointment on
the same date. Javier took his oath of office on 8 November 1967,
and subsequently discharged the rights, prerogatives, and duties of
the office. On 3 January 1968, while the approval of Javier's
appointment was pending with the CSC, respondent Purificacion C.
Reyes (Reyes), as the new mayor of Malolos, sent to the CSC a
letter to recall Javier's appointment. Reyes also designated Police
Lt. Romualdo F. Clemente as Officer-in-Charge of the police
department. The CSC approved Javier's appointment as permanent
on 2 May 1968, and even directed Reyes to reinstate Javier.
Reyes, on the other hand, pointed to the appointment of Bayani
Bernardo as Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan on 4 September
1967. This Court ruled that Javier's appointment prevailed over that
of Bernardo. It cannot be said that Bernardo accepted his
appointment because he never assumed office or took his oath.
Excluding the act of acceptance from the appointment
process leads us to the very evil which we seek to avoid (i.e.,
antedating of appointments). Excluding the act of acceptance will
only provide more occasions to honor the Constitutional provision in
the breach. The inclusion of acceptance by the appointee as an
integral part of the entire appointment process prevents the abuse
of the Presidential power to appoint. It is relatively easy to antedate
appointment papers and make it appear that they were issued prior
to the appointment ban, but it is more difficult to simulate the entire
appointment process up until acceptance by the appointee. 44
(Citations omitted.)
The records show that on January 25, 2016, the appointment papers
were transmitted to and received by the six newly-appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, including respondents Musngi and
Econg, who, on the same day, already took their oaths of office. Therefore,
pursuant to Velicaria-Garafil, the appointment process became complete
and effective on January 25, 2016. If the Court is to count the 60-day
reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari from January 25, 2016,
it expired on March 25, 2016. The present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition was filed on May 17, 2016.
Just like any rule, however, there are recognized exceptions to the
strict observance of the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari, viz.:
(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying
within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial
justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13)
exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances. There should be an effort, though, on the part of the party
invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for
his/her failure to comply with the rules. 45
The peculiar circumstances of this case, plus the importance of the
issues involved herein, justify the relaxation of the 60-day period for the
filing of this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Indeed, the official act
assailed by petitioners is the appointment by President Aquino of
respondents Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices,
which was completed on January 25, 2016 when said respondents took
their oaths of office. Yet, petitioners could not have sought remedy from the
Court at that point. As basis for petitioners' opposition to the said
appointments, they needed to see and secure copies of the shortlists for
the 16th to the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. It was only after
petitioners obtained copies of all six shortlists on March 22, 2016 that
petitioners would have been able to confirm that no one from the shortlist
for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was appointed to any of the
six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; and that respondents
Musngi and Econg, both in the shortlist for the 21st Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice, were appointed as the 16th and 18th Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, respectively. In addition, respondent Econg is not
unjustly prejudiced by the delay, but will even benefit from the Court
resolving once and for all the questions on her right to the position of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
The Court reiterates that there can be no valid objection to its
discretion to waive one or some procedural requirements if only to remove
any impediment to address and resolve the constitutional question of
transcendental importance raised in this Petition, the same having far-
reaching implications insofar as the administration of justice is concerned.
46 ITAaHc
President Aquino did not violate the

Constitution or commit grave abuse
of discretion in disregarding the
clustering of nominees into six
separate shortlists for the six
vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice.
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he
Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared
by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy."
The appointment process for the Judiciary seems simple enough if
there is only one vacancy to consider at a time. The power of the President
to appoint members of the Judiciary is beyond question, subject to the
limitation that the President can only appoint from a list of at least three
nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. However, the
controversy in this case arose because by virtue of Republic Act No.
10660, creating two new divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three
members each, there were six simultaneous vacancies for Associate
Justice of said collegiate court; and that the JBC submitted six separate
shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th to the 21st Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices.
On one hand, petitioners assert that President Aquino's power to
appoint is limited to each shortlist submitted by the JBC. President Aquino
should have appointed the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from the
nominees in the shortlist for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice,
the 17th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from the nominees in the
shortlist for the 17th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and so on and so
forth. By totally overlooking the nominees for the 16th Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice and appointing respondents Musngi and Econg, who
were both nominees for the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, as the
16th and 18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, respectively, President

Aquino violated the 1987 Constitution and committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that President Aquino
acted in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and well-within his
discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he
disregarded the clustering of nominees by the JBC into six separate
shortlists and collectively considered all 37 nominees named in said
shortlists for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
The primordial question then for resolution of the Court is whether
President Aquino, under the circumstances, was limited to appoint only
from the nominees in the shortlist submitted by the JBC for each specific
vacancy. cSaATC
The Court answers in the negative.

The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal
function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. 47 It is a body,
representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process,
intended to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of
political pressure and partisan activities. 48 The extent of the role of the
JBC in recommending appointees vis-à-vis the power of the President to
appoint members of the Judiciary was discussed during the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) on July 10, 1986, thus:
MR. RODRIGO:
Let me go to another point then.
On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about
appointments of members of the Supreme Court and of judges
of lower courts. At present it is the President who appoints
them. If there is a Commission on Appointments, then it is the
President with the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. In this proposal, we would like to establish a
new office, a sort of a board composed of seven members,
called the Judicial and Bar Council. And while the President
will still appoint the members of the judiciary, he will be limited
to the recommendees of this Council.
MR. CONCEPCION:
That is correct.
MR. RODRIGO:
And the Council will, whenever there is a vacancy, recommend
three.
MR. CONCEPCION:
At least three for every vacancy.
MR. RODRIGO:
And the President cannot appoint anybody outside of the three
recommendees.
MR. CONCEPCION:
Nomination by the Council would be one of the qualifications for
appointment. 49
It is apparent from the aforequoted CONCOM deliberations that
nomination by the JBC shall be a qualification for appointment to the
Judiciary, but this only means that the President cannot appoint an
individual who is not nominated by the JBC. It cannot be disputed herein
that respondents Musngi and Econg were indeed nominated by the JBC
and, hence, qualified to be appointed as Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices.
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC
cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the
latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth
appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in
the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the
appointment is valid. On this score, the Court finds herein that President
Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice from each of the six shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially
when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists encroached on
President Aquino's power to appoint members of the Judiciary from all
those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same positions
of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Moreover, in the case at bar, there were six simultaneous vacancies
for the position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the JBC cannot,
by clustering of the nominees, designate a numerical order of seniority of
the prospective appointees. The Sandiganbayan, a collegiate court, is
composed of a Presiding Justice and 20 Associate Justices divided into
seven divisions, with three members each. The numerical order of the
seniority or order of preference of the 20 Associate Justices is determined
pursuant to law by the date and order of their commission or appointment
by the President. cHDAIS
This is clear under Section 1, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree

No. 1606, which reads:
Sec. 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications;
tenure; removal and compensation. — . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his
commission and the other Justices shall have precedence
according to the dates of their respective commissions, or, when
the commissions of two or more of them shall bear the same date,
according to the order in which their commissions have been
issued by the President.
Consistent with the foregoing, Rule II, Section 1 (b) of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan similarly provides:
Sec. 1. Composition of the Court and Rule on
Precedence. —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Rule on Precedence — The Presiding Justice shall
enjoy precedence over the other members of the Sandiganbayan in
all official functions. The Associate Justices shall have precedence
according to the order of their appointments.
Apropos herein is the following ruling of the Court in Re: Seniority
Among the Four (4) Most Recent Appointments to the Position of
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, 50 which involved the Court of
Appeals, another collegiate court:
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the
date the commission has been signed by the President (which is
the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of the
appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members
of the Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of
BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the earlier the
date of the commission of an appointee, the more senior
he/she is over the other subsequent appointees. It is only
when the appointments of two or more appointees bear the
same date that the order of issuance of the appointments by
the President becomes material. This provision of statutory law
(Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246) controls
over the provisions of the 2009 IRCA which gives premium to the
order of appointments as transmitted to this Court. Rules
implementing a particular law cannot override but must give way to
the law they seek to implement. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, based on law, rules, and jurisprudence, the numerical
order of the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices cannot be determined until
their actual appointment by the President.
It bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint
members of a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to
determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed
members by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members'
appointment or commission papers. By already designating the numerical
order of the vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the seniority or
order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even
before their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating
unto itself a vital part of the President's power of appointment.
There is also a legal ground why the simultaneous vacant positions

of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice should not each be assigned a
specific number by the JBC. The Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
positions were created without any distinction as to rank in seniority or
order of preference in the collegiate court. The President appoints his
choice nominee to the post of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, but not to
a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice position with an identified rank, which
is automatically determined by the order of issuance of appointment by the
President. The appointment does not specifically pertain to the 16th, 17th,
18th, 19th, 20th, or 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, because the
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice's ranking is temporary and changes
every time a vacancy occurs in said collegiate court. In fact, by the end of
2016, there will be two more vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice. 51 These vacancies will surely cause movement in the ranking
within the Sandiganbayan. At the time of his/her appointment, a
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice might be ranked 16th, but because of
the two vacancies occurring in the court, the same Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice may eventually be higher ranked. ISHCcT
Furthermore, the JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six

clusters, one for every vacancy, could influence the appointment process
beyond its constitutional mandate of recommending qualified nominees to
the President. Clustering impinges upon the President's power of
appointment, as well as restricts the chances for appointment of the
qualified nominees, because (1) the President's option for every vacancy is
limited to the five to seven nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the
President has appointed from one cluster, then he is proscribed from
considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other
vacancies. The said limitations are utterly without legal basis and in
contravention of the President's appointing power.
To recall, the JBC invited applications and recommendations and
conducted interviews for the "six newly created positions of Associate
Justice of the Sandiganbayan." Applicants, including respondents Musngi
and Econg, applied for the vacancy for "Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan." Throughout the application process before the JBC, the
six newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice were not
specifically identified and differentiated from one another for the simple
reason that there was really no legal justification to do so. The
requirements and qualifications, as well as the power, duties, and
responsibilities are the same for all the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
If an individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is also
qualified for all the other vacancies. It was only at the end of the process
that the JBC precipitously clustered the 37 qualified nominees into six
separate shortlists for each of the six vacant positions.
The Court notes that the clustering of nominees is a totally new

practice of the JBC. Previously, the JBC submitted only one shortlist for
two or more vacancies in a collegiate court. Worth reproducing below are
the examples cited by the OSG:
77. For instance, in June 2011, there were 2 vacancies
for Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Out of 30 candidates,
the JBC submitted to the President only 1 short list of 6 nominees.
Based on this short list, President Aquino appointed Associate
Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes, and Estela Perlas-Bernabe. DHITCc
78. In January 2012, there were 3 vacancies for

Associate Justice of the CA. Out of sixty-three (63) candidates, the
JBC prepared only 1 short list of 13 nominees for these 3
vacancies. Based on this short list, President Aquino appointed
Associate Justices Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, Renato C.
Francisco, and Jhosep Y. Lopez.
79. In June 2012, there were 3 vacancies for Associate
Justice of the CA. Out of 53 candidates, the JBC submitted to the
President only 1 short list of 14 nominees who obtained the
required number of votes. Based on this short list, President Aquino
appointed Associate Justices Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, Oscar V.
Badelies, and Marie Christine Azcarraga Jacob. 52
Additionally, in 1995, when Republic Act No. 7975 increased the
divisions in the Sandiganbayan from three to five, which similarly created
six simultaneous vacant positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, the
JBC, with then Supreme Court Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa as
Chairman, submitted a single list of nominees from which former President
Fidel V. Ramos subsequently chose his six appointees. Reproduced in full
below was the nomination submitted by the JBC on said occasion:
July 17, 1997
HIS EXCELLENCY
PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS
Malacañan, Manila
Dear Mr. President:
Pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 9 of the
Constitution, the Judicial and Bar Council has the honor to submit
the nominations (in alphabetical order) for six (6) positions of
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, per the JBC Minutes of
July 9 and 16, 1997:
1. Asuncion, Elvi John S.
2. Badoy Jr., Anacleto D.
3. Castañeda Jr., Catalino D.
4. De Castro, Teresita Leonardo
5. Fineza, Antonio J.
6. Flores, Alfredo C.
7. Gustilo, Alfredo J.
8. Hernandez, Jose R.
9. Ilarde, Ricardo M.
10. Laggui, Pedro N.
11. Lee Jr., German G.
12. Legaspi, Godofredo L.
13. Makasiar, Ramon P.
14. Mallillin, Hesiquio R.
15. Martinez, Wilfredo C.
16. Mirasol, Teodulo E.
17. Nario, Narciso S.
18. Navarro, Flordelis Ozaeta
19. Ortile, Senecio D.
20. Pineda, Ernesto L.
21. Ponferrada, Bernardo T.
22. Quimsing, Godofredo P.
23. Rivera, Candido V.
24. Rosario Jr., Eriberto U.
25. Salonga, Josefina Guevara
26. Sultan, Justo M.
27. Umali, Mariano M.
Their respective curriculum vitae are hereto attached.
Once more, on November 23, 2009, the JBC, then headed by
Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Puno), submitted to former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) a single list of
nominees for two vacant positions of Supreme Court Associate Justice,
from which President Macapagal-Arroyo ultimately appointed Associate
Justices Jose P. Perez and Jose C. Mendoza. The letter of nomination of
the JBC reads: cEaSHC
November 23, 2009

Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Malacañang Palace
Manila
Your Excellency:
Pursuant to Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, the
Judicial and Bar Council has the honor to submit nominations for
two (2) positions of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (vice
Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Hon. Minita V. Chico-Nazario),

per the JBC Minutes of even date, to wit:
1. Abdulwahid, Hakim S. - 6 votes
2. Mendoza, Jose C. - 6 votes
3. Perez, Jose P. - 5 votes
4. Villaruz, Francisco, Jr. H.- 5 votes
5. De Leon, Magdangal M. - 4 votes
6. Tijam, Noel G. - 4 votes
And, as mentioned by the OSG, the JBC, during the Chairmanship
of Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, submitted to President
Aquino on June 21, 2011 just one list of nominees for two vacant positions
of Supreme Court Associate Justice, from which President Aquino
eventually appointed Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Estela
M. Perlas-Bernabe. Such list is fully quoted hereunder:
June 21, 2011
His Excellency
President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III
Malacañang Palace
Manila
Your Excellency:
Judicial and Bar Council has the honor to submit nominations for
the two (2) positions of ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SUPREME
COURT, per the JBC Minutes of even date, as follows:
Reyes, Jose, Jr. C. - 7 votes
Robles, Rodolfo D. - 7 votes
De Leon, Magdangal M. - 6 votes
Reyes, Bienvenido L. - 6 votes
Bernabe, Estela Perlas - 5 votes
Dimaampao, Japar B. - 5 votes
There is no explanation for the shift in practice by the JBC, which
impaired the power of the President to appoint under the 1987 Constitution
and his statutory authority to determine seniority in a collegiate court. The
clustering by the JBC of the qualified nominees for the six vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice appears to have been done arbitrarily,
there being no clear basis, standards, or guidelines for the same. The
number of nominees was not even equally distributed among the clusters.
In view of the foregoing, President Aquino validly exercised his
discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he
disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the
vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices. President Aquino merely maintained the well-

established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential
constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list.
This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which
requires the President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees
submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. To meet the minimum
requirement under said constitutional provision of three nominees per
vacancy, there should at least be 18 nominees from the JBC for the six
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; but the minimum
requirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC submitted for the
President's consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees. All the six newly
appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of
nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg,
as well as the other four new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid
and do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
The ruling of the Court in this case shall similarly apply to the
situation wherein there are closely successive vacancies in a collegiate
court, to which the President shall make appointments on the same
occasion, regardless of whether the JBC carried out combined or separate
application process/es for the vacancies. The President is not bound by
the clustering of nominees by the JBC and may consider as one the
separate shortlists of nominees concurrently submitted by the JBC. As the
Court already ratiocinated herein, the requirements and qualifications, as
well as the power, duties, and responsibilities are the same for all the
vacant posts in a collegiate court; and if an individual is found to be
qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is also qualified for all the other
vacancies. It is worthy of note that the JBC, in previous instances of closely
successive vacancies in collegiate courts, such as the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court, faithfully observed the practice of submitting only
a single list of nominees for all the available vacancies, with at least three
nominees for every vacancy, from which the President made his
appointments on the same occasion. This is in keeping with the
constitutional provisions on the President's exclusive power to appoint
members of the Judiciary and the mandate of the JBC to recommend
qualified nominees for appointment to the Judiciary. CTIEac
The Court denies the Motion for

Intervention of the JBC in this
Petition.
In its Motion for Intervention, the JBC echoes the arguments of the
OSG in the latter's Comment that the dispute is between the JBC and the
OP and it cannot be decided by the Court since the JBC is not a party,
much less, a complaining party in this case. The JBC asserts that it has
legal interest in the matter of litigation because it will be adversely affected
by the judgment or decision in the present case, having submitted the

controverted shortlists of nominees to the OP. The JBC likewise claims that
its intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties in the case. The JBC, thus, prays that it be
allowed to intervene in the instant case and to submit its complaint-in-
intervention within 30 days from receipt of notice allowing its intervention.
Intervening in a case is not a matter of right but of sound discretion
of the Court. 53 The allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention
rests on the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the
appropriate circumstances. It is not an absolute right. The statutory rules or
conditions for the right of intervention must be shown. The procedure to
secure the right to intervene is to a great extent fixed by the statute or rule,
and intervention can, as a rule, be secured only in accordance with the
terms of the applicable provision. 54
It bears to point out that petitioners did not name the JBC as a
respondent in this case because petitioners precisely wanted the shortlists
submitted by the JBC upheld; they were on the same side. Petitioners
already presented the arguments for the constitutionality of and strict
adherence by the President to the separate shortlists submitted by the JBC
for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Significantly, not one of the parties moved, and not even the Court motu
proprio ordered, to implead the JBC as an indispensable party herein.
The JBC avers in its Motion for Intervention that it has a legal
interest in the Petition at bar and its intervention will not unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties in the case.
The Court is unconvinced.
The instant Petition was filed before this Court on May 17, 2016, yet,
the JBC filed its Motion for Intervention only on November 26, 2016, more
than six months later, and even praying for an additional 30-day period
from notice to submit its complaint-in-intervention. Therefore, allowing the
intervention will undoubtedly delay the resolution of the case; and further
delay in the resolution of this case will only perpetuate the doubts on the
legitimacy of the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, to the detriment of said court, in
particular, and the entire justice system, in general. What is more, unless
promptly resolved by the Court, the instant case is capable of repetition
given the forthcoming vacancies in collegiate courts, particularly, the
Supreme Court.
Even if the intervention of the JBC will evidently cause delay in the
resolution of this case and prejudice to the original parties herein, are there
compelling substantive grounds to still allow the intervention of the JBC?
The JBC, through its own fault, did not provide the Court with a way to
make such a determination. The Revised Rules of Court explicitly requires
that the pleading-in-intervention already be attached to the motion for
intervention. 55 The JBC could have already argued the merits of its case in
its complaint-in-intervention. However, the JBC not only failed to attach its
complaint-in-intervention to its Motion for Intervention, but it also did not
provide any explanation for such failure.
The Court can reasonably assume, as well, that the JBC is well-
aware of President Aquino's appointment of the six Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, including respondents Musngi and Econg, on January
20, 2015. The six newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices all
took their oaths of office on January 25, 2016 at the Supreme Court
Dignitaries Lounge. Respondent Econg, with Justices Mendoza-Arcega
and Trespeses, took their oaths of office before Chief Justice Sereno, who
is also the Chairperson of the JBC; while respondent Musngi, with Justices
R. Cruz and Miranda, took their oaths of office before Supreme Court
Associate Justice Jardeleza on the same occasion and at the same venue.
Despite its knowledge of the appointment and assumption of office of
respondents Musngi and Econg in January 2016, the JBC did not take any
action to challenge the same on the ground that President Aquino
appointed respondents Musngi and Econg in disregard of the clustering of
nominees by the JBC through the separate shortlists for the six vacancies
for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The silence of the JBC all this while,
for a period of eleven (11) months, can already be deemed as
acquiescence to President Aquino's appointment of respondents Musngi
and Econg.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Motion for
Intervention of the JBC.
There are several other new rules
and practices adopted by the JBC
which the Court takes cognizance of
as a separate administrative matter.
The Court takes cognizance of several other matters covered by the
new rules and practices adopted by the JBC.
Item No. 1: The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the JBC
promulgated on September 20, 2016 JBC No. 2016-1, "The Revised Rules
of the Judicial and Bar Council" (Revised JBC Rules), to take effect on
October 24, 2016. Notably, the Revised JBC Rules explicitly states among
its Whereas clauses:
WHEREAS, the President of the Philippines may appoint
only one from the list of at least three nominees for every vacancy
officially transmitted by the Council to the Office of the President[.]
This is an obvious attempt by the JBC to institutionalize through the
Revised JBC Rules its newly-introduced practice of clustering nominees for
simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts. The timing likewise is
disturbing as the instant case is pending resolution by this Court and with
existing and upcoming vacancies in several collegiate courts, i.e., the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, and even this Court. As the Court
has categorically declared herein, the clustering by the JBC of nominees
for simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts constitute undue limitation
on and impairment of the power of the President to appoint members of
the Judiciary under the 1987 Constitution. It also deprives qualified
nominees equal opportunity to be considered for all vacancies, not just a
specific one. Incorporating such Whereas clause into the Revised JBC
Rules will not serve to legitimize an unconstitutional and unfair practice.
Accordingly, such Whereas clause shall not bind the President pursuant to
the pronouncements of the Court in the present Petition.
Item No. 2: The same Revised JBC Rules deleted a significant part
of JBC-009, the former JBC Rules, specifically, Rule 8, Section 1, which
provided:
Sec. 1. Due weight and regard to the recommendees of
the Supreme Court. — In every case involving an appointment to a
seat in the Supreme Court, the Council shall give due weight and
regard to the recommendees of the Supreme Court. For this
purpose, the Council shall submit to the Court a list of candidates
for any vacancy in the Court with an executive summary of its
evaluation and assessment of each of them, together with all
relevant records concerning the candidates from whom the Court
may base the selection of its recommendees. SCaITA
The deletion of this provision will likewise institutionalize the

elimination by Chief Justice Sereno of the voting by the Supreme Court
Justices on who among the applicants to the Supreme Court they believe
are most deserving.
Through Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009, the JBC had accorded
through the years due weight and regard to the recommendees of the
Supreme Court for the vacancies in said Court. The JBC had consistently
complied with said rule and furnished the Court in prior years with the list of
candidates for vacancies in the Court, together with an executive summary
of the evaluation and assessment of each candidate by the JBC and all
relevant documents concerning the candidates, for the incumbent Justices'
consideration, but stopped doing so ever since Chief Justice Sereno
became the Chairperson of the JBC. Although the JBC was not bound by
the list of recommendees of the Court, the JBC at least took the list under
advisement. The deletion of the foregoing provision from the Revised JBC
Rules formally institutionalizes Chief Justice Sereno's unilateral decision to
abandon a well-established rule, procedure, and practice observed by the
Court, and completely precludes the incumbent Supreme Court Justices
from expressing their views on the qualifications of the applicants to the
vacancies in the Supreme Court.
The Court calls attention to the fact that the JBC, in JBC-009 and the
Revised JBC Rules, invites the public to give any comment or opposition
against the applicants to the Judiciary.
According to Rule 1, Section 9 of JBC-009:

Sec. 9. Publication of list of applicants. — The list of
applicants or recommendees which the Council shall consider in a
given time shall be published once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines and once in a newspaper of local
circulation in the province or city where the vacancy is located. The
publication shall invite the public to inform the Council within
the period fixed therein of any complaint or derogatory
information against the applicant. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
A similar provision can be found in the Revised JBC Rules as Rule
1, Section 8:
Sec. 8. Publication of List of Applicants. — The list of
applicants who meet the minimum qualifications and the Council's
evaluative criteria prescribed in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 3 of these
Rules, which the Council shall consider in a given time, shall be
published once in two newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.
The publication shall inform the public that any
complaint or opposition against applicants may be filed with
the secretariat of the Council. A copy of the list shall likewise be
posted in the JBC website. (Emphasis supplied.)
Yet, Chief Justice Sereno, without consulting the Court en banc, has
done away with the settled practice of seeking the views of the incumbent
Justices on the applicants to the vacant positions in the Supreme Court.
To recall, Chief Justice Sereno had previously disregarded Rule 8,
Section 1 of JBC-009, during the nomination process for the vacancy of
Supreme Court Associate Justice following the retirement of Associate
Justice Roberto A. Abad on May 22, 2014. As Associate Justice Arturo D.
Brion narrated in his Separate Concurring Opinion in the Jardeleza
Decision: 56
[Of particular note in this regard is this Court's own
experience when it failed to vote for its recommendees for the
position vacated by retired Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad,
because of a letter dated May 29, 2014 from the Chief Justice
representing to the Court that "several Justices" requested that the
Court do away with the voting for Court recommendees, as
provided in Section 1, Rule 8 of JBC-009. When subsequently
confronted on who these Justices were, the Chief Justice failed to
name anyone. As a result, applicants who could have been
recommended by the Court (Jardeleza, among them), missed their
chance to be nominees.] 57
The Supreme Court Justices were also not given the opportunity to
know the applicants to the succeeding vacant position in the Court (to
which Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa was eventually
appointed) as Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009 was again not followed.

Item No. 3: The JBC currently has no incumbent Supreme Court
Associate Justice as consultant. By practice, since the creation of the JBC,
the two (2) most senior Supreme Court Associate Justices had acted as
consultants of the JBC. From 1987 until 2016, the following Associate
Justices of this Court, during their incumbency, served as JBC consultants:
Supreme Court Associate Justices as Period
JBC Consultants
Pedro L. Yap+ December 10, 1987 to April 13, 1988

Marcelo B. Fernan+ January 5, 1988 to June 29, 1988
Andres R. Narvasa May 6, 1988 to December 5, 1991
Leo M. Medialdea+ July 21, 1988 to November 4, 1992
Ameurfina M. Herrera January 16, 1992 to March 30, 1992
Josue N. Bellosillo December 21, 1993 to November 13, 2003
Jose C. Vitug November 20, 2003 to July 14, 2004
Artemio V. Panganiban July 21, 2004 to December 19, 2005
Leonardo A. Quisumbing January 1, 2006 to November 5, 2009
Consuelo Y. Santiago December 11, 2006 to October 4, 2009
Renato C. Corona November 6, 2009 to May 16, 2010
Antonio T. Carpio October 5, 2009 to May 16, 2010
September 10, 2012 to January 28, 2014
Presbiterio J. Velasco, Jr. June 4, 2012 to August 23, 2012
September 10, 2012 to [August 2016]
Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro June 4, 2012 to August 23, 2012
[February 1, 2014] to [August 2016] 58
Without notice, warning, or explanation to the Supreme Court En
Banc, Chief Justice Sereno recently unceremoniously relieved Supreme
Court Associate Justices Presbiterio J. Velasco, Jr. and Teresita J.
Leonardo-de Castro as JBC consultants, and in their stead, the Chief
Justice appointed retired Chief Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Artemio V.
Panganiban, and Reynato S. Puno as JBC consultants. The experience
and wisdom of the three retired Chief Justices are undisputed. However,
practicality and prudence also dictate that incumbent Associate Justices of
the Court should be retained as JBC consultants since their interest in the
Judiciary is real, actual, and direct. Incumbent Associate Justices of the
Court are aware of the present state, needs, and concerns of the Judiciary,
and consultants from the Court, even if they have no right to vote, have
served, from the organization of the JBC, as the only link to the supervisory
authority of the Court over the JBC under the 1987 Constitution. Moreover,
Hon. Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez already sits as a regular member of the
JBC representing the Retired Supreme Court Justices, pursuant to Article
VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, which expressly describes the
composition of the JBC, as follows: aTHCSE
Sec. 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created

under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector. (Emphasis supplied.)
These changes in settled rules and practices recently adopted by the
JBC under Chief Justice Sereno are disconcerting. There appears to be a
systematic move by the JBC, under Chief Justice Sereno to arrogate to
itself more power and influence than it is actually granted by the
Constitution and this Court, and at the same time, to ease out the Court
from any legitimate participation in the nomination process for vacancies in
the Judiciary, specifically, in the Supreme Court. This behooves the Court,
through the exercise of its power of supervision over the JBC, to take a
closer look into the new rules and practices of the JBC and ensure that
these are in accord with the 1987 Constitution, the pertinent laws, and the
governmental policies of transparency and accountability in the nomination
process for vacancies in the Judiciary.
Article VIII, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution gives the JBC the
principal function of "recommending appointees to the Judiciary," but it also
explicitly states that the JBC shall be "under the supervision of the Court"
and that "[i]t may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme
Court may assign to it."
Book IV, Chapter 7, Section 38 (2) of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as The Administrative Code of the Philippines, defines
supervision as follows:
Sec. 38. Definition of Administrative Relationship. —
Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws
defining the special relationships of particular agencies,
administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Administrative Supervision. — (a) Administrative
supervision which shall govern the administrative relationship
between a department or its equivalent and regulatory agencies or
other agencies as may be provided by law, shall be limited to the
authority of the department or its equivalent to generally oversee
the operations of such agencies and to insure that they are
managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without
interference with day-to-day activities; or require the submission of
reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance
evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies,
standards and guidelines of the department; to take such action as
may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions,
including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of

maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget proposals
of such agencies but may not increase or add to them;
(b) Such authority shall not, however, extend to: (1)
appointments and other personnel actions in accordance with the
decentralization of personnel functions under the Code, except
when appeal is made from an action of the appointing authority, in
which case the appeal shall be initially sent to the department or its
equivalent, subject to appeal in accordance with law; (2) contracts
entered into by the agency in the pursuit of its objectives, the
review of which and other procedures related thereto shall be
governed by appropriate laws, rules and regulations; and (3) the
power to review, reverse, revise, or modify the decisions of
regulatory agencies in the exercise of their regulatory or quasi-
judicial functions; and
(c) Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in
the specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies,
the word "supervision" shall encompass administrative supervision
as defined in this paragraph.
The Court also provided the following definition of supervision in the
Jardeleza Decision: 59
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the
definition and scope of supervision. It is the power of oversight, or
the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It
ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a
government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising
officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not
lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the
work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may
not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have
no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are
followed. (Citation omitted.)cAaDHT
"Supervision" is differentiated from "control," thus:

Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of
mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over such body. Officers in control lay down the
rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is
discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision
does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it
that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such
rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If
the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done
to conform to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own
manner for the doing of the act. 60 (Citations omitted.)
The Court had recognized that "[s]upervision is not a meaningless
thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least
implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the
power real and effective." 61
In the exercise of its power of supervision over the JBC, the Court
shall take up the aforementioned Item Nos. 2 and 3 as a separate
administrative matter and direct the JBC to file its comment on the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DISMISSES the
instant Petition for Quo Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of
merit. The Court DECLARES the clustering of nominees by the Judicial
and Bar Council UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the appointments of
respondents Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and
Geraldine Faith A. Econg, together with the four other newly-appointed
Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, as VALID. The Court further
DENIES the Motion for Intervention of the Judicial and Bar Council in the
present Petition, but ORDERS the Clerk of Court En Banc to docket as a
separate administrative matter the new rules and practices of the Judicial
and Bar Council which the Court took cognizance of in the preceding
discussion as Item No. 2: the deletion or non-inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1,
or the Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8, Section 1
of JBC-009; and Item No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court as consultants of the Judicial and Bar
Council, referred to in pages 35 to 40 of this Decision. The Court finally
DIRECTS the Judicial and Bar Council to file its comment on said Item
Nos. 2 and 3 within thirty (30) days from notice.
SO ORDERED. IDSEAH
Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and

Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, * C.J., took no part.
Carpio, ** Velasco, Jr., Perlas-Bernabe and Caguioa, JJ., join the
concurring opinion of Justice Leonen.
Leonen, J., in the result. See separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
LEONEN, J., concurring:
I concur in the result in so far as finding that the respondents did not
gravely abuse their discretion in making appointments to the
Sandiganbayan, considering that all six vacancies were opened for the first
time. I disagree that we make findings as to whether the Judicial and Bar
Council gravely abused its discretion considering that they were not
impleaded and made party to this case. Even for the Judicial and Bar
Council, a modicum of fairness requires that we should have heard them
and considered their arguments before we proceed to exercise any degree
of supervision as they exercise their constitutionally mandated duties.
I also disagree with the expanded concept of supervision implied by
the main opinion. I, thus, welcome that the matters relating to the rules of
the Judicial and Bar Council is to be separately docketed so the issues are
fully and more precisely ventilated with the participation of all parties
concerned.
This is a "Petition for Quo Warranto under Rule 66 and Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 with Application for Issuance of Injunctive
Writs." 1 The Petition assails President Aquino's appointment of
respondents Hon. Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Hon. Ma. Geraldine
Faith A. Econg as Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan. 2
Petitioners posit that President Aquino violated Article VIII, Section 9
of the 1987 Constitution in that:
"(a) He did not appoint anyone from the shortlist submitted by
the Judicial and Bar Council for the vacancy for position of the 16th
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan; and
(b) He appointed Undersecretary Musngi and Judge Econg as
Associate Justices of Sandiganbayan to the vacancy for the
position of 21st Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan;
(c) The appointments made were not in accordance with the
shortlists submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council for each
vacancy, thus affecting the order of seniority of the Associate
Justices. 3
Prior to the existence of the Judicial and Bar Council, the executive
and legislative branches of the government had the exclusive prerogative
of appointing members of the Judiciary, subject only to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. However, such an appointment process
was highly susceptible to political pressure and partisan activities,
prompting the need for a separate, competent, and independent body to
recommend nominees to the judiciary to the President. 4
The creation of a Judicial and Bar Council was proposed by former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion during the deliberations in the drafting
of the 1987 Constitution. The Committee on Justice of the Constitutional
Commission "felt neither the President nor the Commission on
Appointments would have the time to carefully study the qualifications of

every candidate, especially with respect to their probity and sense of
morality." 5 aCIHcD
Commissioner Rene Sarmiento echoed this sentiment, stressing that

"the creation of the Council is a step towards achieving judicial
independence." 6 Thus, the Judicial and Bar Council was created under the
1987 Constitution and it was intended to be a fully independent
constitutional body functioning as a check on the President's power of
appointment. Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department
xxx xxx xxx
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by
the President for a term of four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years,
and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex
officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such
emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations
for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such
other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
The Judicial and Bar Council is mandated to recommend appointees
to the judiciary "and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially
transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or
judge in the judiciary." 7 In carrying out its main function, the Judicial and
Bar Council is given the authority to set standards or criteria in choosing its
nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary. 8 Nonetheless, this authority
does not give the Judicial and Bar Council unbridled license to act in
performing its duties. 9
I.
This Court exercises the powers of supervision only through judicial
review over the Judicial and Bar Council and only when there is grave
abuse of discretion.
Nothing in the Constitution diminishes the fully independent
character of the Judicial and Bar Council. It is a separate constitutional
organ with the same autonomy as the House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Angara v. Electoral
Commission 10 emphasizes that the Electoral Commission is "a
constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to
it by the Constitution." 11 The grant of power to the Electoral Commission is
intended to be "complete and unimpaired." 12 The rules it promulgates
cannot be subject to the review and approval of the legislature because
doing so would render ineffective the grant of power to the Electoral
Commission:
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative
power as an express prohibition in the Constitution . . . If we
concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that
said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral
Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down
the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power
to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission
in such case would be invested with the power to determine
contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to
the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the
purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this
authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority
would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from
time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the
Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking
cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary
means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever
the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than
that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution.
The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in
procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the
Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission,
and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional

grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted. 13
(Emphasis supplied)
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council 14 explains that the Judicial and
Bar Council was created to address the clamor to rid the process of
appointments to the judiciary from political pressure and partisan activities.
15 In our dissent in Jardeleza v. Sereno, 16 we emphasized that the Judicial
and Bar Council is a fully independent constitutional body, which functions

as a check on the President's power of appointment, and called for judicial
restraint.
By constitutional design, this court should wisely resist
temptations to participate, directly or indirectly, in the nomination
and appointment process of any of its members. In reality,
nomination to this court carries with it the political and personal
pressures from the supporters of strong contenders. This court is
wisely shaded from these stresses. We know that the quality of the
rule of law is reduced when any member of this court succumbs to
pressure. cHaCAS
The separation of powers inherent in our Constitution is a

rational check against abuse and the monopolization of all legal
powers. We should not nullify any act of any constitutional organ
unless there is grave abuse of discretion. The breach of a
constitutional provision should be clearly shown and the necessity
for the declaration of nullity should be compelling. Any doubt should
trigger judicial restraint, not intervention. Doubts should be resolved
in deference to the wisdom and prerogative of co-equal
constitutional organs. 17
Nonetheless, the independent character of the Judicial and Bar
Council as a constitutional body does not remove it from the Court's
jurisdiction when the assailed acts involve grave abuse of discretion.
Judicial review is the mechanism provided by the Constitution to
settle actual controversies and to determine whether there has been grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. 18 The expanded power of judicial review gives the court the
authority to strike down acts of all government instrumentalities that are
contrary to the Constitution. Angara v. Electoral Commission 19 points out
that judicial review is not an assertion of the superiority of the judiciary over
other departments, rather, it is the judiciary's promotion of the superiority of
the Constitution:
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government.
Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers?
The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate

an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved
in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power
of judicial review under the Constitution. 20
-align: center;text-indent: 0pt;margin-left: 9pt;margin-top: 6pt;margin-bottom: 6pt;margin-right:
9pt;"> II
In this case, there was no reason to cluster the applicants for the
Sandiganbayan vacancies.
There could be reasons to cluster shortlists. For instance, there are
Regional Trial Courts that perform functions different from other trial courts.
There are Metropolitan Trial Courts, the dockets of which would be
different from other Metropolitan Trial Courts. Also, there can be vacancies
that become available before other vacancies in the same appellate court.
However, when the law creates new vacancies at the same time,
there can be no reasonable basis to cluster nominees.
The Sandiganbayan, a collegial court, was conceived as an anti-
graft court under the 1973 Constitution. Article XIII, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution provides:
Section 5. The National Assembly shall create a special court, to be
known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over
criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and
such other offenses committed by public officers and employees,
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office as may be determined by law.
On June 11, 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1486 created the
Sandiganbayan. Section 1 of P.D. No 1486 provided that the
Sandiganbayan shall be "composed of a Presiding Judge and eight (8)
Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President and shall be
subject to the same inhibitions and/or disqualifications as judges of courts
of first instance."
On December 10, 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 21 elevated
the Sandiganbayan to the level of the Court of Appeals.
Presidential Decree No. 1606 then underwent the following
amendments: (1) Republic Act No. 7975 22 expanded the Sandiganbayan
to five divisions; (2) Republic Act No. 8249 23 provided that the
Sandiganbayan shall be composed of "a presiding justice and fourteen
associate justices who shall be appointed by the President"; 24 and (3) On
April 16, 2016, Republic Act No. 10660 25 expanded the Sandiganbayan
from five divisions to "seven (7) divisions of three (3) members each." 26 At
present, the Sandiganbayan is composed of one Presiding Justice and
twenty Associate Justices. 27
After screening the applicants for the newly created positions of
Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, the Judicial and Bar Council
submitted six shortlists contained in six separate letters, all dated October
26, 2015, to then-President Aquino. The letters read:
Your Excellency:
following nominations for the vacancy for the SIXTEENTH
respective votes:
1. AGUINALDO, PHILIP A. - 5 votes
2. ALHAMBRA, REYNALDO A.- 5 votes
3. CRUZ, DANILO S. - 5 votes
4. POZON, BENJAMIN T. - 5 votes
5. SANDOVAL, DANILO S. - 5 votes
6. TIMBANG, SALVADOR JR. - 5 votes
Your Excellency:
following nominations for the vacancy for the SEVENTEENTH
respective votes: DACcIH
1. CORPUS-MAÑALAC, MARYANNE E. - 6 votes

2. MENDOZA-ARCEGA, MARIA THERESA V. - 6 votes
3. QUIMBO, RODOLFO NOEL S. - 6 votes
4. DIZON, MA. ANTONIA EDITA CLARIDADES - 5 votes
5. SORIANO, ANDRES BARTOLOME - 5 votes
Your Excellency:
following nominations for the vacancy for the EIGHTEENTH
respective votes:
1. BAGUIO, CELSO O. - 5 votes
DE GUZMAN-ALVAREZ, MA. TERESA

2. - 5 votes
E.
3. FERNANDEZ, BERNELITO R. - 5 votes
4. PANGANIBAN, ELVIRA DE CASTRO - 5 votes
5. SAGUN, FERNANDO JR. T. - 5 votes
6. TRESPESES, ZALDY V. - 5 votes
Your Excellency:
following nominations for the vacancy for the NINETEENTH
respective votes:
1. GUANZON, FRANCES V. - 6 votes
2. MACARAIG-GUILLEN, MARISSA - 6 votes
3. CRUZ, REYNALDO P. - 5 votes
4. PAUIG, VILMA T. - 5 votes
5. RAMOS, RENAN E. - 5 votes
6. ROXAS, RUBEN REYNALDO G. - 5 votes
Your Excellency:
following nominations for the vacancy for the TWENTIETH
respective votes:
1. MIRANDA, KARL B. - 6 votes
2. ATAL-PAÑO, PERPETUA - 5 votes
3. BUNYI-MEDINA, THELMA - 5 votes
4. CORTEZ, LUISITO G. - 5 votes
5. FIEL-MACARAIG, GERALDINE C. - 5 votes
6. QUIMPO-SALE, ANGELENE MARY W. - 5 votes
7. JACINTO, BAYANI H. - 4 votes
6) For the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
Your Excellency:
following nominations for the vacancy for the TWENTY-FIRST
respective votes:
1. JORGE-WAGA, WILHELMINA B. - 6 votes
2. ECONG, GERALDINE FAITH A. - 5 votes
3. ROMERO-MAGLAYA, ROSANNA FE - 5 votes
4. ZURAEK, MERIANTHE PACITA M. - 5 votes
5. ALAMEDA, ELMO M. - 4 votes

FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, VICTORIA
6. - 4 votes
C.
7. MUSNGI, MICHAEL FREDERICK L. - 4 votes 28
As a collegial court, the members of the Sandiganbayan equally
share power and sit in divisions of three members each. The numerical
designation of each division only pertains to the seniority or order of
precedence based on the date of appointment. The Rule on Precedence is
in place primarily for the orderly functioning of the Sandiganbayan, as
reflected in Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan:
Section 1. Composition of the Court and Rule on Precedence.
—
(a) Composition — The Sandiganbayan is composed of a
Presiding Justice and fourteen (14) Associate Justices
appointed by the President of the Philippines.
(b) Rules on Precedence — The Presiding Justice shall enjoy
precedence over other members of the Sandiganbayan in all
official functions. The Associate Justices shall have
precedence according to the order of their appointments.
(c) The Rule on Precedence shall apply:
1) In the seating arrangement;
2) In the choice of office space, facilities and equipment,
transportation, and cottages;
(d) The Rule on Precedence shall not be observed:
1) In social and other non-official functions.
2) To justify any variation in the assignment of cases,
amount of compensation, allowances or other forms of
remuneration.
In single courts like the regional trial courts or municipal trial courts,
each branch carries its own station code and acts separately and
independently from other co-equal branches. The Sandiganbayan divisions
do not possess similar station codes because there is no discernible
difference between the divisions, and decisions are made not by one
justice alone, but by a majority or all of the members sitting in a division or
en banc. This reinforces the collegial nature of the Sandiganbayan, which
is characterized by the equal sharing of authority among the members.
Additionally, in single courts, applicants may apply per available
vacancy, thus, it is common to see the same applicant in several shortlists
for vacancies in different single courts. However, applicants in collegial
courts apply only once, even if there are multiple vacancies, because there
are no substantial differences among divisions in a collegial court that
would justify the creation of separate shortlists or clusters per vacancy.
Applicants to a single court are rightly sent to the President in a

shortlist, with as many shortlists as there are vacancies in single courts, as
each single court is deemed separate and independent, with a distinct
station code to differentiate it from the other single courts. This is not the
case with collegial bodies and the different divisions are not given their
own station codes.
The Judicial and Bar Council may have acted in excess of its
constitutional mandate to recommend nominees to the President when it
clustered the Sandiganbayan applicants, in six separate groups,
purportedly to account for each newly created division. There seems to be
no rational basis in the positioning of the applicants in their respective
clusters, with some of the shortlists containing five names, while others
having six, and two clusters even containing as many as seven names. HSCATc
In Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, 29 this Court upheld the

Judicial and Bar Council's policy of requiring at least five years of
experience from judges of first level courts before they can be considered
for promotion to second-level courts. This Court ruled that the assailed
policy was part of the Judicial and Bar Council's authority to set the
standards or criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the
judiciary, making it valid and constitutional:
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the
JBC merely exercised its discretion in accordance with the
constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the
Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence. "To ensure the fulfilment of these standards in every
member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen
aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the
nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably
best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is
shielded from the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the
undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible
or disqualified." 30
However, to the respondents it appeared that the Judicial and Bar
Council's act of clustering the applicants to the Sandiganbayan was not
part of its authority in setting standards or criteria. Thus, they did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when they considered that there was no
rational basis to cluster the applicants in light of the collegial nature of the
Sandiganbayan. Unlike in Villanueva, where the imposition of five years
experience as an additional requirement was held to be a relevant way to
determine the competence of an applicant, no such relevance or rationality
can be attached to the Judicial and Bar Council's act of clustering the
Sandiganbayan applicants instead of coming up with a single shortlist, as
the Judicial and Bar Council has always done in the past.
President Aquino did not commit grave abuse of discretion in

disregarding the shortlists submitted to him by the Judicial and Bar Council
and treating all six shortlists as one shortlist from which he can choose the
new Sandiganbayan justices.
III.
The Judicial and Bar Council is not mandated to submit its revised
internal rules to the Supreme Court for approval. The question as to
whether the Judicial and Bar Council must submit its existing rules to the
Supreme Court was not raised as an issue in this case.
As a constitutional body, the Judicial and Bar Council is fully
independent to discharge its principal function, as shown by Administrative
Matter No. 03-11-16-SC or Resolution Strengthening the Role and
Capacity of the Judicial and Bar Council and Establishing the Offices
Therein.
The composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is meant to reflect
the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, hence, the Judicial
and Bar Council is composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chair, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector. 31
The Court goes beyond its constitutional role when its actions border
on control. The varied composition of the Judicial and Bar Council shows
that it is a unique body with members coming not only from the judiciary,
but also from the executive, legislative, academe, and the private sector.
There is therefore no basis for this Court to act as if it has the same power
of control and supervision over the Secretary of Justice, a representative of
Congress, or a member of the private sector, as it does over members of
the judiciary.
The exercise of this Court's power of judicial review over the Judicial
and Bar Council must always be balanced with the Judicial and Bar
Council's independent nature. The Court's authority over the Judicial and
Bar Council should, thus, be considered as primarily administrative, with
the Chief Justice, as the ex-officio Chair, exercising overall administrative
authority in the execution of the Judicial and Bar Council's mandate. 32
Book IV, Chapter 7, Section 38 (2) of the Administrative Code,
defines administrative supervision as follows:
Sec. 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. — Unless
otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the
special relationships of particular agencies, administrative
relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Administrative Supervision. — (a) Administrative

supervision which shall govern the administrative relationship
between a department or its equivalent and regulatory agencies or
other agencies as may be provided by law, shall be limited to the
authority of the department or its equivalent to generally oversee
the operations of such agencies and to insure that they are
managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without
interference with day-to-day activities; or require the submission of
reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance
evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies,
standards and guidelines of the department; to take such action as
may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions,
including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of
maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget proposals
of such agencies but may not increase or add to them;
(b) Such authority shall not, however, extend to: (1)
appointments and other personnel actions in accordance with the
decentralization of personnel functions under the Code, except
when appeal is made from an action of the appointing authority, in
which case the appeal shall be initially sent to the department or its
equivalent, subject to appeal in accordance with law; (2) contracts
entered into by the agency in the pursuit of its objectives, the
review of which and other procedures related thereto shall be
governed by appropriate laws, rules and regulations; and (3) the
power to review, reverse, revise, or modify the decisions of
regulatory agencies in the exercise of their regulatory or quasi-
judicial functions; and
(c) Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the
specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies, the
word "supervision" shall encompass administrative supervision as
defined in this paragraph. (Emphasis supplied) IDTSEH
This Court's power of judicial review is only to ensure that rules are
followed, but with neither the power to lay down such rules nor the
discretion to modify or replace them. 33
The internal rules of the Judicial and Bar Council are necessary and
incidental to the function conferred to it by the Constitution. The
Constitution has provided the qualifications of the members of the judiciary,
but has given the Judicial and Bar Council the latitude to promulgate its
own set of rules and procedures to effectively ensure its mandate. This
Court cannot meddle in the Judicial and Bar Council's internal rules and
policies precisely because doing so would be an unconstitutional affront to
the Judicial and Bar Council's independence.
This Court may exercise its expanded jurisdiction under judicial
review, but certain conditions must first be met before this Court can
exercise this power:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of

judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. 34
The rationale for the conditions for the exercise of the power of
judicial review is to prevent courts from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements, and for this Court to be satisfied that the case does not
present a hypothetical injury or claim contingent upon some event that has
not and indeed may never transpire. 35
Thus, the vetting by this Court of the Judicial and Bar Council's
internal rules do not fall under the power of judicial review as there is no
justiciable controversy in the absence of clashing legal rights.
Be that as it may, if the majority of this Court insists on ruling that the
Judicial and Bar Council committed grave abuse of discretion in revising its
internal rules and regulations to effectively ensure its constitutional
mandate, then the Judicial and Bar Council MUST be afforded due process
and must be either impleaded or be allowed to comment on the petition.
Denying the Judicial and Bar Council the basic courtesy of due
process is to seriously fail to guarantee the fundamental tenets of the rule
of law and equity to everyone. DaIAcC
ACCORDINGLY, with these qualifications, I vote to DISMISS the

petition.
Footnotes
* No part.
** Senior Associate Justice presided over the proceedings.
1. Rollo, pp. 3-40.
2. Respondents Sandoval, Jorge-Wagan, Romero-Maglaya, Zuraek,
Alameda, and Fernandez-Bernardo are sued as unwilling co-plaintiffs
pursuant to Rule 3, Section 10 of the Revised Rules of Court.
3. 1973 Constitution, Article XIII, Section 5.
4. Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating a Special Court to be
Known as "Sandiganbayan" and for Other Purposes.
5. Presidential Decree No. 1606, Section 3.
6. An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the

Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No.
1606, as Amended.
7. An Act Strengthening Further the Functional and Structural
Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Further Amending Presidential
Decree No. 1606, As Amended, and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
8. Rollo, p. 13.
9. Id. at 51.
10. Id. at 55.
11. Id. at 57.
12. Id. at 59.
13. Id. at 61.
14. Id. at 53.
15. Id. at 72.
16. Id. at 15-16.
17. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173, 188 (2012).
18. Rollo, p. 22.
19. Id. at 65-93.
20. Sec. 2. When Solicitor General or Public Prosecutor Must Commence
Action. — The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by
the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he
has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding
section can be established by proof, must commence such action.
Sec. 3. When Solicitor General or Public Prosecutor May Commence
Action with Permission of Court. — The Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which the action is to
be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the
relation of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may
first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in an
amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at
whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought.
21. Sec. 5. When an Individual May Commence Such an Action. — A
person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in
his own name.
22. 595 Phil. 491, 503 (2008).
23. Sec. 1. . . . . The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his
commission and the other Justices shall have precedence according to
the dates of their respective commissions, or, when the commissions of
two or more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in
which their commissions have been issued by the President.
24. Sec. 1. Composition of the Court and Rule on Precedence. —
(a) Composition — The Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice
and fourteen (14) Associate Justices appointed by the President of the
Philippines.
(b) Rule on Precedence — The Presiding Justice shall enjoy precedence
over the other members of the Sandiganbayan in all official functions.
The Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the order of
their appointments.
(c) The Rule on Precedence shall apply:
1) In the seating arrangement;
2) In the choice of office space, facilities and equipment, transportation
and cottages.
(d) The Rule on Precedence shall not be observed:
1) In social and other non-official functions.
2) To justify any variation in the assignment of cases, amount of
compensation, allowances or other forms of remuneration.
25. Rollo, p. 117.
26. Id. at 122-125.
27. Id. at 126-127.
28. Id. at 128C-131.
29. Id. at 132-144.
30. Id. at 177-179.
31. Supra note 22 at 504.
32. G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014, 733 SCRA 279, 328.
33. Topacio v. Ong, supra note 22 at 503.
34. 686 Phil. 571, 586-587 (2012).
35. Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 686 Phil. 536, 552 (2012).
36. Soliven v. Makasiar, 249 Phil. 394, 400 (1988).
37. See Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, 553 Phil. 331 (2007).
38. Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 296-A Phil.
595, 603 (1993).
39. 522 Phil. 705, 756-760 (2006).
40. Rules of Court, Rule 139-A.
Sec. 2. Purposes. — The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar

shall be to elevate the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
41. The Officers and Members of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter v.
Pamintuan, 485 Phil. 473, 496 (2004).
42. G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015.
43. G.R. Nos. 203372, 206290, 209138 & 212030, June 16, 2015, 758
SCRA 414, 450.
44. Id. at 466-467.
45. Labao v. Flores, 649 Phil. 213, 222-223 (2010).
46. Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers v. Lim, G.R. Nos. 187836 &
187916, November 25, 2014, 742 SCRA 1, 73-74.
47. 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 8 (5).
48. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 485-486 (2013).
49. Record of the Constitutional Commission, 1986, Volume I, pp. 444-
445.
50. 646 Phil. 1, 11 (2010).
51. Per JBC Announcement dated July 7, 2016: . . . .
2. Two positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice (vice Justice
Napoleon E. Inoturan, whose approved optional retirement is effective 1
August 2016, and vice Justice Jose R. Hernandez, who will compulsorily
retire on 22 November 2016)[.]
52. Rollo, pp. 87-88.
53. Tanjuatco v. Gako, Jr., 601 Phil. 193, 207 (2009).
54. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Estanislao
Miñoza, 656 Phil. 537, 549 (2011).
55. Rule 19, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that, "The
motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment
by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached
to the motion and served on the original parties."
56. Jardeleza v. Sereno, supra note 32.
57. Id. at 391.
58. http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php/about-the-jbc/jbc-officials, Last
visited October 15, 2016.
59. Jardeleza v. Sereno, supra note 32 at 326, citing Drilon v. Lim, G.R.
No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135, 142.
60. Bito-onon v. Yap Fernandez, 403 Phil. 693, 702-703 (2001).
61. Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62, 77 (1939).

LEONEN, J., concurring:
1. Rollo, p. 3.
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id.
4. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173, 188 (2012) [Per J.
Mendoza, En Banc].
5. 1 RECORDS, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, PROCEEDINGS
AND DEBATES, JOURNAL NO. 29 (1986).
6. Id.
7. Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/april2015/211833.pdf> 7 [Per J. Reyes, En
Banc].
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
11. Id. at 175.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 175-176.
14. 691 Phil. 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
15. Id. at 188.
16. Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No.
213181, August 19, 2014, 733 SCRA 279, 435-497 [Per J. Mendoza, En
Banc].
17. Id. at 437.
18. CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1 states:
Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
19. 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
20. Id. at 158.
21. Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating a Special Court to be

Known as "Sandiganbayan" and for Other Purposes (1978).
22. An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of
the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No.
1606, as Amended (1995).
23. An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended,
Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes (1997).
24. Rep. Act No. 8249, sec. 1.
25. An Act Strengthening Further the Functional and Structural
Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Further Amending Presidential
Decree No. 1606, As Amended, and Appropriating Funds Therefor
(2015).
26. Rep. Act No. 10660, sec. 1.
27. See Sandiganbayan <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/about.html> (last
visited December 1, 2016).
28. Ponencia, pp. 3-4.
29. Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/april2015/211833.pdf> [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
30. Id. citing Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014,
733 SCRA 279, 329 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
31. CONST., art. VIII, sec. 8 (1).
32. Adm. Matter No. 03-11-16-SC, sec. 4 (a).
33. Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014, 733 SCRA
279, 326 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
34. Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 892 (2003)
[Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc], citing Angara v. Electoral Commission,
63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
35. Separate Opinion of J. Nachura in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar
Council, 629 Phil. 629, 723-724 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc],
citing Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, 271 Conn.
540, 570, 858 A. 2d 709 (2004).

1 Aguinaldo v. Aquino III

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10/1/2019 G.R. No. 224302 | Aguinaldo v.

[G.R. No. 224302. November 29, 2016.]

HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, HON. REYNALDO A.

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, the

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SANDIGANBAYAN, with their

4. CORTEZ, LUISITO G. - 5 votes

Arguments of the Petitioners

locus standi considering that the present Petition involves an issue of

Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution contains the mandate

vacancy" to the Judiciary, as well as the limitation on the President's

16th Associate Justice Michael Frederick L. PNOY019445 21st Associate Ju

Petitioners insist that President Aquino could only choose one

Arguments of the Respondents

prohibition is a collateral attack on a public officer's title, which cannot be

The OSG interprets Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution

Furthermore, the OSG alleges that it is highly unjust to remove

4) Respondent Romero-Maglaya makes the following averments

for the six newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice;

6) In respondent Sandoval's Comment, 30 he avows that he opts

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully

Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back

Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., as nominees for the 16th

In opposing the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the

Even so, the Court finds it proper to drop President Aquino as

that former Executive Secretary Ochoa is named as respondent herein as

xxx xxx xxx

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal

The clustering of nominees by the JBC, which the President, for

Notwithstanding the non-exclusivity of the original jurisdiction

invocation of its jurisdiction only when there are special and

Javier v. Reyes is instructive in showing how acceptance is

President Aquino did not violate the

16th and 18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, respectively, President

The Court answers in the negative.

This is clear under Section 1, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree

There is also a legal ground why the simultaneous vacant positions

Furthermore, the JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six

The Court notes that the clustering of nominees is a totally new

78. In January 2012, there were 3 vacancies for

November 23, 2009

Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Hon. Minita V. Chico-Nazario),

Associate Justices. President Aquino merely maintained the well-

The Court denies the Motion for

by the judgment or decision in the present case, having submitted the

The deletion of this provision will likewise institutionalize the

According to Rule 1, Section 9 of JBC-009:

appointed) as Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009 was again not followed.

Pedro L. Yap+ December 10, 1987 to April 13, 1988

Sec. 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created

including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of

"Supervision" is differentiated from "control," thus:

Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and

Appointments would have the time to carefully study the qualifications of

Commissioner Rene Sarmiento echoed this sentiment, stressing that

and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional

and Bar Council is a fully independent constitutional body, which functions

The separation of powers inherent in our Constitution is a

over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate