Oto 01061
Oto 01061
Oto 01061
2001/061
HSE
IDM Engineering
Torridon House
73-75 Regent Quay
Aberdeen
AB11 5AR
United Kingdom
HSE BOOKS
ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A study has been undertaken on behalf of the HSE by IDM Engineering Ltd, to determine the
credible failure modes and their direct effects as associated with typical single and dual
completion gas lift designs as utilised in the UK North Sea. The study has been undertaken with
the understanding that both wellhead configurations would be analysed under normal operating
conditions. No consideration was given for any installation, workover or abandonment activities
in connection with the wells.
To ensure that a typical wellhead and tree arrangement was modelled, vendor information in the
form of general arrangement drawings and associated information was reviewed from various
manufacturers. A representative single and dual completion model was generated from this
information in conjunction with the expertise associated within the project team.
In order to identify the key components and seal arrangements that required consideration
during the FMECA, the primary gas path was charted for both representative models. Each
model was then broken up into zones to help facilitate the FMECA. Primary, secondary and
tertiary barriers (where appropriate) were then identified.
With the aid of zone specific drawings the FMECA was carried out for each representative
model. The FMECA was carried out up to the side pocket mandrels in the production tubing for
completeness, however, the main focus of the study was above the dual bore upper packer
separating the upper and lower A annulus.
The results of the FMECA for the single and dual completion model are detailed in Appendix F
& E respectively.
Both FMECAs highlighted failure modes with the potential to leak injection gas to the
atmosphere. Further leak sources were identified arising from component/sealing arrangement
failures. These failures could in turn, cause injection gas to leak into the B annulus and C
annulus (single completion only).
iii
iv
CONTENTS
1.
OBJECTIVE .............................................................................................................. 1
2.
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 2
2.1.
BACKGROUND ................................................................................................2
2.2.
GAS LIFT ..........................................................................................................2
2.3.
SINGLE AND DUAL COMPLETION GAS LIFT MODELS ..............................3
3.
REPRESENTATIVE MODELS................................................................................. 5
3.1.
MODEL DESCRIPTION ...................................................................................5
3.2.
OPERATING PARAMETERS ..........................................................................6
3.3.
MODEL BOUNDARIES ....................................................................................6
3.3.1.
3.3.2.
3.3.3.
4.
METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................... 8
4.1.
ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................8
4.2.
APPROACH......................................................................................................8
4.2.1.
4.2.2.
5.
RESULTS ............................................................................................................... 12
5.1.
DUAL COMPLETION FMECA .......................................................................12
5.2.
SINGLE COMPLETION FMECA ....................................................................12
6.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................................................................... 13
7.
REFERENCE LIST................................................................................................. 14
8.
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 16
9.
vi
1. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this study is to identify the failure modes that can lead to leakage of gas from
representative single and dual completion gas lift wells.
2. INTRODUCTION
2.1.
BACKGROUND
As part of normal offshore oil and gas operations gas can be injected into the production tubing
of a well to assist in the recovery of the hydrocarbon fluids. A normal feature of this process is
the mass of pressurised hydrocarbon gas that resides in the well annulus. The well annulus
differs from typical topside process plant in that it does not have a means to vent or blowdown
its inventory of gas in an emergency, only to contain the gas within the annulus its self. The
mass of pressurised gas is typically in the range of 0.5 to 12 metric tonnes. The gas represents a
considerable hazard to platform personnel through fire and explosion. Of ultimate interest is the
magnitude of this risk. It must be noted that the hazard is created as a function of injecting gas
into the well annulus. The hazard does not originate directly from the reservoir. Many
continuous gas lift wells, will cease to flow if the supply of compressed gas from topside
compression is lost.
This study has been commissioned to identify typical failure modes associated with typical gas
lift configurations. Ultimately a representative frequency of gas leakage from a typical gas lift
well can be established.
The purpose of this study is to develop a representative single and dual completion gas lift well
and to identify typical failure modes associated with the equipment that is used in the well
configuration.
Results from this report will be used in future studies to identify failure and/or leakage rates for
equipment used in these types of wells.
2.2.
GAS LIFT
Artificial lift is a commonly used methodology for enhancing reservoir recovery rates, gas lift
being by far the most utilised technique. The principle of gas lift is to simply supplement the
natural flow process of hydrocarbon fluids by adding additional gas into the produced fluid to
reduce the hydrostatic head component and hence, the back pressure on the formation.
There are essentially two different methods of gas lift, which are utilised offshore to enhance or
stimulate wells to ensure recover well fluids:
Continuous gas lift is essential for wells, which under normal operating conditions would not
flow. This is due to an ageing well which is off plateau, as a result the reservoir pressure having
dropped considerably and/or increased viscosity of the hydrocarbon fluids.
The injection gas is normally supplied in a closed loop system, the gas is fed from the gas
separation, compression and drying (if necessary) process facilities to the well as required.
The lift gas is normally injected down the annulus and into the production tubing through the
side pocket mandrels. In certain circumstances, the gas is supplied via annulus tubing into the
lower well annulus and injected into the production tubing string as before.
The other less common concept is the intermittent gas lift system. This is used to produce low
volumes of liquid (<350 stb/d) from wells with low Bottom Hole Flow Pressure (BHFP) (<0.1
psi/ft). In this case, the liquid is produced in slugs by periodically opening a motorized flowline
valve and allowing the gas accumulated in the annulus to suddenly expand through the side
pocket mandrels to surface, bringing the accumulated liquids with it. A standing valve is often
used to prevent the gas from flowing into the formation.
2.3.
The models used in this study will assume that continuous gas lift is required to maintain the
flow of hydrocarbons under normal operating conditions.
There are four basic configurations of gas lift well used in the UK sector of the North Sea,
principally:
Single Completion
Dual Completion
Single Tree Dual-String Completion
Concentric Completion
In the first, and simpler configuration (Figure 1), gas is routed through a wellhead annular valve
and into the A annulus. The gas passes through the annulus downhole safety valve (DHSV)
located in the dual bore upper packer. The lower packer prevents gas from flowing further down
the annulus. Gas is injected into the production tubing at various depths between upper and
lower packers via the side packer mandrels. In this configuration the A annulus is completely
filled with gas from the tubing hanger to the lower side pocket mandrel. There is a facility for
isolating the upper and lower A annulus by closing the annulus DHSV.
The more complex dual completion (Figure 2) routes the gas through an annulus wing valve
mounted on the Christmas tree, down through the upper and lower master valves, and into the
annulus pipe work via an in line DHSV, to a point directly below the dual bore upper packer.
Gas is injected into the production tubing at various depths between upper and lower packers
via the side pocket mandrels. In this configuration and, under normal operation only the lower
A annulus space between the upper and lower packers is filled with gas. The upper A
annulus contains completion fluid.
(1)
The single tree dual-string completion is essentially a hybrid between the single and dual
completion designs. Similarly to the dual completion, annulus tubing is utilised to inject the gas
into the lower well annulus below the dual bore upper packer. This removes the inventory of gas
that would normally reside under the tubing hanger in a typical single completion design. The
gas itself would still be injected via the A annulus.
(1)(2)
The concentric design, which also uses a single tress essentially, is a modified single
completion design. Lift gas is injected through the tubing spool and down the annulus created
by the addit ional casing string within the production casing.
In order to represent the most onerous circumstances offshore, the single and dual completions
models are considered further in this study.
3. REPRESENTATIVE MODELS
3.1.
MODEL DESCRIPTION
(7)
It is recognised that there are no standard representations of single or dual completion gas lift
wells. As a consequence there are many configurations in terms of well layout and equipment
design. Despite this, the general function of using gas to reduce the hydrostatic head on the
production tubing and promote a flow of well fluids remains the same. The variations in
configuration and design originate from three key areas.
1. Variability in basic design between the equipment manufacturers.
2. Variability of manufacturers design due to specification by operators.
3. Variability due to combining manufacturers equipment for the completion.
(4)
It is not the intent of this study to represent all permutations of well equipment and layout. It is
the intent to establish the associated failure modes with typical equipment configurations,
layouts and operating conditions.
To establish a representative model an industry-recognised standard has been applied to provide
a common guideline. We consider that the same standard would be applied to the majority of
completions found offshore. This results in a consistent link between a specific North Sea gas
lift well and the representative model of one.
The representative models for the single and dual completion models were developed from the
review of a variety of general arrangement drawings, taking into account the various
considerations discussed above.
Figure 1 represents a schematic of the single completion considered for this study, the following
features were considered:
Figure 2 represents a schematic of the dual completion considered for this study, the following
features were considered:
None active-wing valves on the tree have been included for both annulus and
production.
A compact wellhead design was considered as opposed to separate tubing spools.
9 5/8 casing is utilised for the production casing with a 7 liner downhole.
A VR plug was modelled in the A annulus to model a particular case where there is
maintenance of an annular valve.
Both the annulus and production wing valves and upper master valves are automated
(fail closed), and linked accordingly to the ESD system.
Tie down bolts have been utilised for the tubing hanger to tubing spool.
A dual bore upper packer is utlised to separate the upper and lower annulus.
API standard 6A (seventeenth edition) has been used as the basis in the development of the
representative models.
The primary gas paths for the dual completion and single completion were then determined, key
items providing boundaries for each zone were described using consistent terminology.
(8) to (13)
In order to facilitate the FMECA, the schematic drawings were split down into general
area zones (see glossary) were described by linking these items in pairs (Appendix A & B).
Drawings were then generated for each zone for the dual completion detailing all major
components identified in Appendix A to facilitate the FMECA (Appendix G). Only the
drawings of the major differences between the dual and single models were generated for the
single completion arrangement as a result of duplication of similar components (Appendix H).
In order to distinguish between the different types of polymeric/elastomeric sealing
arrangements, for each zone the seals were colour coded according to the following regime.
It should be noted that all metal to metal, threaded connections and components were
considered but not highlighted on the drawings in the same way as the sealing arrangements
above.
3.2.
The model considers dry gas composed of 95% Methane and the balance being a combination
of Ethane and Propane. Gas well entry temperature is assumed circa 82C with an entry
pressure of 1500 psi.
The model represents the normal continuous producing condition. Well intervention, work-over,
inspection, test, maintenance operations, and any non-normal well conditions, including
initiating events that do not originate from the well model, do not form part of this study.
3.3.
3.3.1.
MODEL BOUNDARIES
Dual Completion Model Boundaries
3.3.2.
3.3.3.
The boundaries include some downhole components. This was because all secondary and
tertiary barriers were considered. Failure of some primary barriers downhole, result in annulus
spaces around the wellhead becoming wetted by gas. Subsequent barrier failure can then result
in loss of containment topsides.
4. METHODOLOGY
4.1.
ASSUMPTIONS
The operator ensures suitable training and supervision (as appropriate) to all individuals
operating on or around the wellhead.
Maintenance brings the equipment into the As Good As New (AGAN) condition.
The requirements of DCR Well examination Legislation are being effectively applied.
The initial suitability of the equipment is correct in terms of its design limits, and
capability to withstand any reasonably foreseeable non-normal events.
All seals and containment components are suitable for typical gas lift tree ratings ie
(3,000, 5,000, 6000 psi etc).
Lockdown bolts are used rather than a lockdown ring for the tubing hanger on both
models.
(6)
4.2.
4.2.1.
The downhole safety valves utilised in the single and dual completions are considered
to be tubing retrievable and not wireline retrievable.
APPROACH
Initially the primary gas routing was established, from the point at which the gas enters the tree,
to a point where the gas and the well fluids leaves the tree.
The primary gas paths for the dual completion and single completion were then determined, key
items was described using a consistent terminology (Section 3).
General area zones were described by linking these items into pairs. In order to ensure that the
FMECA remains focused consideration has to be given to all sources of leakage; therefore there
was a degree of overlap when looking at each zone in turn. This is highlighted in the FMECA
results (Appendix E & F) in italics and ensures that there are no working joints (see glossary).
(14) to (18
Further examination of drawings was then undertaken to describe the primary, secondary
and tertiary barriers (see glossary) as described in Appendix A & B. Once the location of the
key mechanical joints and seals was complete, a description of each joint configuration and type
was made.
(3)(5)
Seal descriptions and details of the following segments are described in Appendix C & D
inclusive.
All elastomeric/polymeric seals were categorised into the following types as a result of sealing
arrangements being very different between manufacturers, even though the type of seal is
similar.
Compression
Parallel
Face
The preparation work was complete and the FMECA could commence.
4.2.2.
FMECA
(19)
The FMECA was conducted in general accordance with BS 5760 part 5 (1991). Taking each
zone in turn, the mechanical joints forming the barriers between the well fluids and atmosphere,
(primary, secondary and tertiary) were examined in terms of their configuration, components
and function. Using engineering knowledge and experience, the credible failure modes, their
causes and their effect where discussed and recorded as appropriate.
Sub system - The sub systems are the major component assemblies associated with each
zone. It is the sub systems that are subjected to the FMECA.
Function The function of each sub system is described in terms of its primary or foremost
role. There can be more than one function for each sub system.
Failure This provides an outline as to where the credible failures are likely to occur within
the sub system. This FMECA has focused on the mechanical joints and seal assemblies of the
sub systems. For example bonnet seal failure leads to one consideration as to the ways in
which the seal can fail.
Cause This outlines the most likely reasons leading to failure. There can be several effects
originating from a single cause. In the example of the bonnet seal then as one example, the
bolts may be incorrectly installed.
Effect Provides a description as to what is likely to occur to the mechanical joints and seal
assemblies if the cause manifests itself. In the example of bolts being incorrectly installed, there
may be several effects, depending upon either over tightening or under tightening the bolts.
Symptoms What evidence of the effect will exist? Would the symptom reveal the failure
immediately or over a period of time? Would it be visible or audible to an operator? Or would
the failure remain unrevealed perhaps for many years?
For example where a joint has been incorrectly made perhaps using wrong materia ls or
techniques, then it may remain undetected. The integrity of the joint is not to the design intent
and it may remain as a weak point that we are not aware of until failure occurs (if it occurs at
all).
Mitigation Prior to ranking the probability of occurrence, the normal or usual practices of
design, construction, installation, commissioning and operations need to be considered. Only the
primary mitigating factors are recorded. For example the use of ISO 9001 as a quality assurance
standard requires that many aspects of design, manufacture, inspection and test are considered
and formally managed. This does not guarantee that failures will not occur, but does provide
confidence that the probability of occurrence should be reduced. The integrity and effectiveness
of such standards, systems and procedures has not been considered.
4.2.2.2. Criticality Analysis
Using a qualitative approach, each failure consequence was ranked in terms of its local effect.
A single barrier primary seal failure that would result in a direct loss of containment is ranked as
a high criticality. Conversely, failure of a primary barrier that results in a secondary barrier
becoming wetted is considered to be less critical. The consequence is ranked at one of five
levels.
5 Full cross sectional area failure of a major barrier (seals or components) leading directly to
loss of containment.
4 Full cross sectional area failure of a minor barrier (seals or components) leading directly to
loss of containment.
3 Major seal failure, leading to loss of primary containment that should be detectable by an
operator or the F&G systems if a subsequent seal fails and containment is lost.
10
2 Part seal failure, leading to a loss of primary containment that is unlikely to be detectable by
an operator or the F&G systems if subsequent seals fail.
1 Minor Seal failure, (perished, weeping) leading to a loss of primary containment that would
wet the secondary barriers or cause a fugitive emission to atmosphere.
Using a qualitative approach, each failure was ranked in terms of its probability of occurrence,
when considering all assumptions of the model. The probability is ranked at one of five levels.
1 Highly improbable, not considered to be realistic.
2 Improbable, a rare one off event.
3 Possible, known to have occurred previously.
4 Probable, has been experienced on more than one occasion.
5 Frequent, is a normal or regular occurrence for the situation.
The criticality of each failure mode and effect was then detailed in the criticality section of
Figure 3 in the format consequence.probability. This enables the screening of the less critical
events and sets the seen for any future leak frequency analysis.
11
5. RESULTS
5.1.
The results of the FMECA for the dual completion model are detailed in Appendix E.
It can be noted that even though the dual completion zone drawings (Appendix G) cover zones
1 to 20, the FMECA only covered down to the side pocket mandrels in the production tubing.
This was carried out for completeness, the study was only concerned with any leakage in above
the dual bore upper packer. The results dictated that even though the original focus was purely
on the leakage of injection gas below the tubing hanger in the upper A annulus. There were
some expected failure modes leading to potential leaks to atmosphere from the xmas tree and
the wellhead configuration. Certain failure modes dictated leakage of injection gas into the B
annulus providing additional potential leak sources to atmosphere.
5.2.
The results of the FMECA for the single completion model are detailed in Appendix F.
It was noted that even though the equipment was simpler in construction than that of the dual
completion, there were obvious similarities in the designs. As a result of this only the zones,
which were significantly different between the two completion designs, were completed
(Appendix H). Similarly to the dual completion the FMECA only covered down to the side
pocket mandrels in the production tubing, again for completeness. The single completion
pressurises both the upper and lower annulus as a result of injecting directly into the A annulus
under normal operating conditions. The results highlighted that certain components/sealing
arrangements in the dual completion model were secondary barriers, in the single completion
model the same items became primary barriers. The same as the dual completion, there were
some expected failure modes leading to potential leaks to atmosphere from the xmas tree and
the wellhead configuration. Certain failure modes dictated that injection gas could not only leak
into the B annulus but also the C annulus providing additional potential leak sources to
atmosphere.
12
6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to acknowledge the individuals who contributed to this study:
Dr M Croft of The Robert Gordon University, Mr. J Da Costa of Hancoss Ltd. and
Mr H Hopper of Subsea Well Technology Ltd.
13
7. REFERENCE LIST
1. BLOWOUT RISK ANALYSIS OF GAS-LIFT COMPLETIONS
Society of Petroleum Engineers Paper
Report no.: SPE 20916, D D Grassick, P S Kallos, S Dean and S D J King, May 1992
2. DOWN HOLE SAFETY VALVE FOR CONCENTRIC COMPLETION
Society of Petroleum Engineers Paper
Report No,: SPE 16536/1, J L Geyelin., 1987
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF CORRECT RUNNING AND HANDLING PROCEDURES FOR
PREMIUM TUBULAR GOODS
Society of Petroleum Engineers Paper
Report No,: SPE 16107, D E Walstad and D W Crawford, March 1987
4. PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES OF DUAL-COMPLETION DESIGN IN ABU DHABI
Society of Petroleum En gineers Paper
Report No,: SPE 17983, R F Gabort & G J Ghnelm, February 1997
5. EVALUATION OF PREMIUM TAPERED THREADED CONNECTIONS USING
FINITE ELEMENT ANALYSIS AND FULL-SCALE TESTING
Society of Petroleum Engineers Paper
Report No,: SPE 23904, A Hilbert & I A Kalli, February 1992
6. RADICAL SOLUTIONS REQUIRED: COMPLETIONS WITHOUT PACKERS AND
DOWNHOLE SAFETY VALVES CAN BE SAFE
Society of Petroleum Engineers Paper
Report No,: SPE 56934, C J Durham & C A Oaveley, September 1999
7. RISK ANALYSIS OF SINGLE AND DUAL-STRING GAS-LIFT COMPLETIONS
Society of Petroleum Engineers Paper
Report No,: SPE 19281, D Grassick, P S Kallos, I J A Jardine & F J Doogan, 1990
8. Y BLOCK XMAS TREE & WELLHEAD LAYOUT, GAS LIFT SYSTEM
FMC
Drawing No.: SD-4333-65
9. XMAS TREE & WELLHEAD LAYOUT, GAS LIFT SYSTEM
FMC
Drawing No.: SD-4333-70
10. SECTIONAL LAYOUT PLATFORM, WELLHEAD AND TREE ASSEMBLY
FMC
Drawing No.: DL-0931
11. WELLHEAD DUAL COMPLETION
FMC
Drawing No.: SK-1587
14
15
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. COMPLETION DESIGN MANUAL
BP Exploration
Vol 1, & 2
2. BP Exploration, Forties Artificial Lift Project, Shallow Gas Lift Course, 1989.
3. IN SITU MACHINING AND REPAIR OF CAMERON FC STYLE XMAS TREES
Society of Petroleum Engineers
Drawing No.: SPE 19274/1, Bryne D, Terry Dr P
4. SHORT COURSE ON GAS LIFT PRINCIPLES AND EQUIPMENT.
Camco Training Department
Study Guide, 1991
5. COMPLETION PRODUCTS
Halliburton
Second Edition.
6. MSC DRILLING ENGINEERING, MODULE 9, COMPLETION TECHNOLOGY.
The Robert Gordon University
7. WELL ENGINEERING DISTANCE LEARNING PACKAGE WELLHEADS
Shell Expro
Version 1.00
8. WELL ENGINEERING DISTANCE LEARNING PACKAGE COMPLETIONS
Shell Expro
Version 1.00
9. WELL SERVICES CO-ORDINATOR COMPETENCE COURSE, MODULE 1
Shell Expro
Version 3, Jan 1996
10. PRODUCTION OPERATIONS WELL SERVICES GUIDE, ASPECTS OF WELL
COMPLETION DESIGN,
Shell International Exploration and Production B.V
Document No.: EP 95-1811, Vol 2, Nov 1995.
11. SPECIFICATION FOR WELLHEAD AND CHRISTMAS TREE EQUIPMENT
American Petroleum Institute
Document No.: API 6A 17th Ed , Nov 1999.
12. VAM CATALOG
Sumitomo Metals
No. 940
13. SUMITOMO PRODUCTS FOR THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRIES.
Sumitomo Metals
16
17
9. GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Term
Primary Barrier
Secondary Barrier
Tertiary Barrier
Zone
Working Joint
Description
Equipment or sealing arrangement providing
containment, which is in direct contact with either gas
or hydrocarbon fluids, under normal operating
conditions.
Equipment or sealing arrangement providing
containment, in the event of a primary barrier failure
under normal operating conditions.
Equipment or sealing arrangement providing
containment, in the event of a primary and secondary
barrie r failure under normal operating conditions.
Each model is broken down into discrete manageable
areas (zones) so that a detailed FMECA can be carried
out.
A joint or section, which defines the boundary of a
zone. If the joint or section is not included within the
adjacent zone, the FMECA would have not considered
all permutations.
18
10.
FIGURES
CONTENTS
Page
Figure 1 Single Completion Gas Lift Well Schematic .......................................................... 20
Figure 2 Dual Completion Gas Lift Well Schematic ............................................................ 21
Figure 3 Sample FMECA Worksheet.................................................................................. 22
19
20
21
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
22
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
APPENDIX A
PRIMARY GAS PATHS, WETTED CONTAINMENT ZONES,
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY BARRIERS DUAL COMPLETION
23
24
Tree cap
Production casing,
Production casing hanger seal to tubing spool,
Upper annulus tubing spool inner valve,
Upper annulus tubing spool outer valve,
Upper annulus tubing spool monitor and vent assembly,
25
B and C casing spool valves and associated equipment form tertiary barriers, and require
primary and secondary failures before being subjected to gas. This would require a triple
jeopardy event to realise a leak to the wellhead areas. These barriers are not considered
further.
Zone 1.6 1.7
Primary barrier components:
Annulus tubing
Annulus bore dual bore upper packer.
26
C annulus
Tertiary valve(s)
Secondary barrier components Not applicable gas already in annulus as function of gas lift.
Zone 1.12 1.13
Primary barrier components:
Production tubing,
Production bore dual bore upper packer
Secondary barrier components Not applicable gas already in annulus as function of gas lift.
Zone 1.13 1.14
Primary barrier components:
Production tubing,
Production downhole safety valve
27
28
Tree cap
29
APPENDIX B
PRIMARY GAS PATHS, WETTED CONTAINMENT ZONES,
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY BARRIERS SINGLE
COMPLETION
30
31
B Annulus Casing,
B Annulus Tubing Spool Valves,
Upper annulus tubing spool monitor and vent assembly,
B annulus tubing spool to casing hanger seal.
32
33
Tubing hanger,
Production bore,
Production lower master valve.
Tree Cap
34
APPENDIX C
SEAL DESCRIPTIONS DUAL COMPLETION
35
2.0
2.1
Connecting Pipework
Ring Gasket (compression, bolts)
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
2.0
2.1
Annulus Bore
Tree Block
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
4.0
4.1
4.2
4.3
36
4.4
4.5
5.0
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
6.0
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
Tree Cap
Tree Cap (parallel, screw cap)
Test Port (compression, screw threads)
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.1
2.1
Annulus Bore
Tree Body
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
37
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.0
2.1
2.2
Annulus Bore
Tree Body
Bore Sleeve (parallel, main fixing bolts for tree)
3.0
3.1
4.0
4.1
5.0
5.1
6.0
6.2
Tubing spool downhole chemical injection point packing gland & tertiary outer block
assembly
Packing Gland (tertiary seal - outer block assembly seal (compression, bolts), Gland to
Line Seal)
Gland to Tubing Spool Seal
7.0
7.1
8.0
8.2
Tubing spool downhole safety valve control packing gland & tertiary outlet block
assembly
Packing Gland (tertiary seal - outer block assembly seal (compression, bolts), Gland to
Line Seal)
Gland to Tubing Spool Seal
9.0
9.1
10.0
10.1
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control line upper packing gland
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control line upper packing gland (compression,
screw)
6.1
8.1
38
11.0
11.1
12.0
12.1
1.0
1.1
1.2
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
Production casing,
Production casing hanger seal to tubing spool,
Upper annulus tubing spool inner valve,
Upper annulus tubing spool outer valve,
Upper annulus tubing spool monitor and vent assembly,
VR plug & tertiary valve(s),
Tubing hanger seal to tubing spool,
Tubing spool downhole chemical injection line,
Tubing spool downhole safety valve control line,
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control line lower packing gland,
Tubing hanger downhole chemical injection line lower packing gland,
(Possible connection between tubing spool and casing spool).
B and C casing spool valves and associated equipment form tertiary barriers, and require
primary and secondary failures before being subjected to gas. This would require a triple
jeopardy event to realise a leak to the wellhead areas. These barriers are not considered further.
3.0
3.1
3.2
Production casing
Production Pipe
Premium Casing Threads
4.0
4.1
5.0
Upper annulus tubing spool inner valve (Manual) (open) well producing, open
valves to take a sample
Ring Gasket (compression, bolts)
5.1
39
5.2
5.3
5.4
6.0
6.1
6.2
7.0
7.1
8.0
8.1
9.0
9.1
10.0
10.1
11.0
11.1
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control line lower packing gland
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control line lower packing gland (compression,
screw)
12.0
12.1
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
40
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.0
2.1
2.2
Annulus Tubing
Annulus Tubing
Premium Tapered Tubing Connection
Annulus tubing,
Annulus bore dual bore upper packer,
Tubing spool downhole chemical injection line,
Dual bore upper packer chemical injection line upper packing gland.
1.0
1.1
1.2
Annulus Tubing
Annulus Tubing
Premium Tapered Tubin g Connection
2.0
2.1
2.2
4.0
4.1
Dual bore upper packer chemical injection line upper packing gland
Dual bore upper packer chemical injection point upper packing gland (compression,
screw)
1.0
1.1
1.2
2.0
2.1
41
2.2
2.3
3.0
3.1
3.2
4.0
4.1
4.2
1.0
1.1
1.2
2.0
2.1
2.2
Production tubing
Production Tubing
Premium Tapered Tubing Connection
Production tubing,
Production bore dual bore upper packer.
1.0
1.1
1.2
Production tubing
Tubing
Premium Tapered Tubing Connection
2.0
2.1
42
2.2
1.0
1.1
1.2
2.0
2.1
2.2
Production tubing
Tubing
Premium Tapered Tubing Connection
Production tubing,
Production downhole safety valve.
1.0
1.1
1.2
Production tubing
Tubing
Premium Tapered Tubing Connection
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
43
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.0
2.1
2.2
1.0
1.1
1.2
2.0
2.1
2.2
Production bore
Bore Sleeve (parallel, main fixing bolts for tree)
Tree Body
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
44
Tubing spool downhole safety valve control packing gland & tertiary outlet block
assembly,
Tubing spool to tubing hanger seal,
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control line upper packing gland,
Tubing hanger downhole chemical injection point upper packing gland,
Tubing spool downhole safety valve control line.
4.0
4.1
5.0
5.1
6.0
6.2
Tubing spool downhole chemical injection line packing gland & tertiary outer block
assembly
Packing Gland (tertiary seal - outer block assembly seal (compression, bolts), Gland to
Line Seal)
Gland to Tubing Spool Seal
7.0
7.1
8.0
8.2
Tubing spool downhole safety valve control packing gland & tertiary outlet block
assembly
Packing Gland (tertiary seal - outer block assembly seal (compression, bolts), Gland to
Line Seal)
Gland to Tubing Spool Seal
9.0
9.1
10.0
10.1
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control line upper packing gland
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control upper packing gland (compression,
screw)
11.0
11.1
12.0
12.1
6.1
8.1
1.0
1.1
1.2
45
1.3
2.0
2.1
Production bore
Tree Body
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
2.0
2.1
Production Bore
Tree Block
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
4.0
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
5.0
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
6.0
6.1
6.2
46
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.0
7.1
7.2
Tree cap.
Tree Cap
Tree Cap (parallel, screw cap)
Test Port (compression, screw threads)
47
APPENDIX D
SEAL DESCRIPTIONS SINGLE COMPLETION
48
1.0
1.1
1.2
2.0
2.1
Connecting Pipework
Ring Gasket (compression, bolts)
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.0
2.1
3.0
3.1
49
4.0
4.1
5.0
5.1
5.2
6.0
6.1
7.0
7.1
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control line lower packing gland (x2)
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control line lower packing gland (compression,
screw)
8.0
8.1
9.0
9.1
10.0
10.1
11.0
11.1
11.2
Production tubing
Production tubing
Premium tapered tubing connection
12.0
12.1
12.2
12.3
12.4
13.0
13.1
13.2
valves to take a
14.0
14.1
50
15.0
15.1
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control line upper packing gland
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control line upper packing gland (compression,
screw)
16.0
16.1
17.0
17.1
18.0
18.1
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control packing gland & tertiary block assembly
Packing Gland (tertiary seal - outer block assembly seal (compression, bolts), Gland to
Line Seal)
Gland to Tubing Spool Seal
18.2
19.0
19.1
19.2
Tubing hanger downhole chemical injection packing gland & tertiary block assembly
Packing Gland (tertiary seal - outer block assembly seal (compression, bolts), Gland to
Line Seal)
Gland to Tubing Spool Seal
20.0
20.1
21.0
21.1
1.0
1.1
1.2
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
3.0
3.1
3.2
Production tubing
Production Tubing
Premium Tapered Tubing Connection
B Annulus Casing,
B Annulus Tubing Spool Valves,
Upper annulus tubing spool monitor and vent assembly,
B annulus tubing spool to casing hanger seal.
51
4.0
4.1
4.2
5.0
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
B Annulus Tubing Spool Valves (Manual) (open) well producing, open valves to take
a sample
Ring Gasket (compression, bolts)
Bonnet Seal (compression, bolts)
Stem Seal (parallel, screw cap)
Grease fitting (compression, screw thread)
6.0
6.1
6.2
7.0
7.1
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
Annulus downhole safety valve in the dual bore packer (Fail Closed) - (open)
Valve Body
Valve piston / control line seal (parallel)
Premium Tapered Tubing Connection
2.0
2.1
2.2
3.0
3.1
3.2
4.0
4.1
4.2
5.0
5.1
5.2
52
1.0
1.1
1.2
2.0
2.1
2.2
3.0
3.1
3.2
1.0
1.1
1.2
2.0
2.1
2.2
53
1.0
1.1
1.2
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
54
2.0
2.1
2.2
Tubing hanger
Tubing Hanger Body
Premium Tapered Tubing Connection
Tubing hanger,
Production bore,
Production lower master valve.
1.0
1.1
1.2
Tubing hanger
Tubing Hanger Body
Premium Tapered Tubing Connection
2.0
2.1
2.2
Production bore
Bore Sleeve (parallel, main fixing bolts for tree)
Tree Body
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
4.0
4.1
5.0
5.1
6.0
Tubing spool downhole chemical injection point packing gland & tertiary outer block
assembly
Packing Gland (tertiary seal - outer block assembly seal (compression, bolts), Gland to
Line Seal)
Gland to Tubing Spool Seal
6.1
6.2
55
7.0
7.1
8.0
8.2
Tubing spool downhole safety valve control packing gland & tertiary outlet block
assembly
Packing Gland (tertia ry seal - outer block assembly seal (compression, bolts), Gland to
Line Seal)
Gland to Tubing Spool Seal
9.0
9.1
10.0
10.1
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control line upper packing gland
Tubing hanger downhole safety valve control line upper packing gland (compression,
screw)
11.0
11.1
12.0
12.1
8.1
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.0
2.1
Production bore
Tree Body
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
56
SWAB valve,
Chemical injection valve
Production wing valve
Production non-active wing valve.
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
2.0
2.1
Production Bore
Tree Block
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
4.0
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
5.0
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
7.0
7.1
7.2
Tree cap
Tree Cap
Tree Cap (parallel, screw cap)
Test Port (compression, screw threads)
57
APPENDIX E
58
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually leaking over
body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Tree has been operating
in excess of 6 months,
2.2
initial teething problems
have been ironed out.
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
N one
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Seal incorrectly
installed
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect
grade of bolt fitted
59
Sealing arrangement
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
Bolts installed
Seal distortion leading to individuals and
incorrectly - bonnet over Joint integrity reduced
2.3
progressive leakage.
appropriate supervision
tensioned
is available.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
properties similar to
None
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
60
Gas release
Possible detection by
plant operators and/or
F&G system
2.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
61
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Gas release
Possible detection by
plant operators and/or
F&G system
2.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
Dimensions, chemical
To contain the gas
and mechanical
2. Connecting Pipework within the tree on loss of Failure of Ring Gasket Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
- Primary Barrier
pressurisation in the
Seal
stores
actual specification,
upstream pipework.
therefore no immediate
effect.
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
None
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
62
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually leaking over
body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
63
None.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
CAUSE
EFFECT
Seal incorrectly
installed
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect
grade of bolt fitted
Employ competent
Bolts installed
Seal distortion leading to individuals and
2.3
incorrectly - bonnet over Joint integrity reduced
progressive leakage.
appropriate supervision
tensioned
is available.
FUNCTION
FAILURE
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
Sealing arrangement
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
64
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Seal incorrectly
specified
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
actual specification,
stores
therefore no immediate
effect.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Partial leak
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually leaking over
body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
65
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
Seal incorrectly
installed
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
CRITICALITY
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None.
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect
grade of bolt fitted
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
over tensioned
Employ competent
Seal distortion leading individuals and
Joint integrity reduced
2.3
to progressive leakage. appropriate supervision
is available.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
66
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Partial leak
To maintain annulus
pressure integrity
FAILURE
CAUSE
Manufacturing defect
67
Slag
inclusion/laminations,
Stress raisers and crack
cold laps and other
initiators
geometric imperfections
in the forged block.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
1.2
ISO quality systems in
place.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
CAUSE
EFFECT
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually leaking over
body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
FUNCTION
FAILURE
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
SYMPTOMS
None.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Seal incorrectly
installed
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
68
Sealing arrangement
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect
grade of bolt fitted
Employ competent
Bolts installed
Seal distortion leading to individuals and
2.3
incorrectly - bonnet over Joint integrity reduced
progressive leakage.
appropriate supervision
tensioned
is available.
CAUSE
EFFECT
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
69
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Partial leak
Pressure testing at
manufactures to ensure
integrity of gate/seat.
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
Maintenance and
inspection by
1.5
manufacturer including
periodic testing
offshore.
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Poor seal between seat Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
Gradually increasing
seal and valve body
stores
leak over time.
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually leaking over
body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
70
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.1
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
FUNCTION
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None.
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually leaking over
body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
Seal incorrectly
specified
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Seal incorrectly
installed
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
71
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect
grade of bolt fitted
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
Employ competent
Bolts installed
Seal distortion leading to individuals and
incorrectly - bonnet over Joint integrity reduced
2.3
appropriate supervision
progressive leakage.
tensioned
is available.
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
Provides isolation of
annulus from tree cap
4. Annulus SWAB
other than under any
Valve - Primary Barrier
well intervention
conditions
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
Sealing arrangement
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
72
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
None.
Employ competent
individuals and
1.1
appropriate supervision
is available.
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
entry point for chemical Failure of bonnet seal
Valve - Primary Barrier
injection
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually leaking over
body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
entry point for chemical Failure of bonnet seal
Valve - Primary Barrier
injection
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
entry point for chemical Failure of bonnet seal
Valve - Primary Barrier
injection
Seal incorrectly
specified
FUNCTION
FAILURE
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
entry point for chemical Failure of bonnet seal
Valve - Primary Barrier
injection
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None.
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Seal incorrectly
installed
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
entry point for chemical Failure of bonnet seal
Valve - Primary Barrier
injection
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
73
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
entry point for chemical Failure of bonnet seal
Valve - Primary Barrier
injection
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect
grade of bolt fitted
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
entry point for chemical Failure of bonnet seal
Valve - Primary Barrier
injection
Employ competent
Bolts installed
Seal distortion leading to individuals and
incorrectly - bonnet over Joint integrity reduced
2.3
progressive leakage.
appropriate supervision
tensioned
is available.
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
entry point for chemical Failure of bonnet seal
Valve - Primary Barrier
injection
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
Failure of Ring Gasket Bolts loosen off in
entry point for chemical
Valve - Primary Barrier
Seal
service
injection
To provide a controlled
Catastrophic failure of
Appropriate support for
5. Chemical Injection
Failure of Ring Gasket
Excessive vibration on
entry point for chemical
Fatigue failure of bolts one or more bolts after a
piping as per pipe stress 3.3
Valve - Primary Barrier
Seal
pipework
injection
period of time.
analysis.
To provide a controlled
Thermal/mechanical
Catastrophic failure of
Appropriate piping
5. Chemical Injection
Failure of Ring Gasket
Displacement from
entry point for chemical
gradients induce fatigue one or more bolts after a
design as per pipe stress 3.3
Valve - Primary Barrier
Seal
normal relative position
injection
on bolts
period of time.
analysis.
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
Failure of Ring Gasket Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
entry point for chemical
None
Valve - Primary Barrier
Seal
stores
actual specification,
injection
therefore no immediate
effect.
74
Gas release
Possible detection by
plant operators and/or
F&G system
2.3
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
Failure of Ring Gasket Seal incorrectly
entry point for chemical
Valve - Primary Barrier
Seal
specified
injection
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
Failure of Ring Gasket Seal incorrectly
entry point for chemical
Valve - Primary Barrier
Seal
specified
injection
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Tree has been operating
in excess of 6 months,
2.2
initial teething problems
have been ironed out.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
Failure of Ring Gasket Seal incorrectly
entry point for chemical
Valve - Primary Barrier
Seal
installed
injection
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
To provide a controlled
Bolts installed
5. Chemical Injection
Failure of Ring Gasket
entry point for chemical
incorrectly - bolts
Valve - Primary Barrier
Seal
injection
unevenly tensioned
Sealing arrangement
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
To provide a controlled
Bolts installed
5. Chemical Injection
Failure of Ring Gasket
entry point for chemical
incorrectly - incorrect
Valve - Primary Barrier
Seal
injection
grade of bolt fitted
Employ competent
To provide a controlled
Bolts installed
5. Chemical Injection
Failure of Ring Gasket
Seal distortion leading to individuals and
entry point for chemical
incorrectly - bonnet over Joint integrity reduced
2.3
Valve - Primary Barrier
Seal
progressive leakage.
appropriate supervision
injection
tensioned
is available.
75
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
To provide a controlled
Bolts installed
5. Chemical Injection
Failure of Ring Gasket
entry point for chemical
incorrectly - bonnet
Valve - Primary Barrier
Seal
injection
under tensioned
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
entry point for chemical Stem seal leakage
Valve - Primary Barrier
injection
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
entry point for chemical Stem seal leakage
Valve - Primary Barrier
injection
To provide a controlled
5. Chemical Injection
entry point for chemical Stem seal leakage
Valve - Primary Barrier
injection
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Pressure testing at
manufactures to ensure
integrity of gate/seat.
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
Maintenance and
inspection by
1.5
manufacturer including
periodic testing
offshore.
76
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually leaking over
body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.1
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
To provide a facility for
Poor seal between seat Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
Gradually increasing
injecting kill fluid into
seal and valve body
stores
actual specification,
leak over time.
the annulus.
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually leaking over
body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
77
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None.
Seal incorrectly
installed
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect
grade of bolt fitted
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
Employ competent
Bolts installed
Seal distortion leading to individuals and
incorrectly - bonnet over Joint integrity reduced
2.3
appropriate supervision
progressive leakage.
tensioned
is available.
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
78
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
To provide a facility for
Failure of Ring Gasket Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
injecting kill fluid into
None
Seal
stores
actual specification,
the annulus.
therefore no immediate
effect.
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Gas release
Possible detection by
plant operators and/or
F&G system
2.3
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
79
None
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Tree has been operating
in excess of 6 months,
2.2
initial teething problems
have been ironed out.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Effective seal not made Gas leakage around seal
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
Employ competent
To provide a facility for
Bolts installed
Failure of Ring Gasket
Seal distortion leading to individuals and
injecting kill fluid into
incorrectly - bonnet over Joint integrity reduced
2.3
appropriate supervision
Seal
progressive leakage.
the annulus.
tensioned
is available.
6. Annulus non-active
wing valve - Primary
Barrier
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Barrier
allow well intervention
activities
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
all tree cap seals are
Bolts loosen off in
primary barriers. Tree service
Cap Annulus Bore Seal
passing.
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Barrier
allow well intervention
activities
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
all tree cap seals are
Fatigue of bolts
primary barriers. Tree
Cap Annulus Bore Seal
passing.
Catastrophic failure of
Appropriate support for
Excessive vibration on
one or more bolts after a
piping as per pipe stress 3.3
pipework
period of time.
analysis.
80
Gas release
Possible detection by
plant operators and/or
F&G system
2.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Barrier
allow well intervention
activities
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
Thermal/mechanical
Catastrophic failure of
Appropriate piping
all tree cap seals are
Displacement from
gradients induce fatigue one or more bolts after a
design as per pipe stress 3.3
primary barriers. Tree
normal relative position
on bolts
period of time.
analysis.
Cap Annulus Bore Seal
passing.
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Barrier
allow well intervention
activities
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
all tree cap seals are
Wrong seal taken from
primary barriers. Tree stores
Cap Annulus Bore Seal
passing.
On failure of primary
To provide a removable barrier (gate on SWAB)
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Seal incorrectly
all tree cap seals are
Barrier
allow well intervention primary barriers. Tree specified
activities
Cap Annulus Bore Seal
passing.
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
allow well intervention
Barrier
activities
On failure of primary
To provide a removable barrier (gate on SWAB)
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
all tree cap seals are
Seal incorrectly
allow well intervention primary barriers. Tree installed
Barrier
activities
Cap Annulus Bore Seal
passing.
FUNCTION
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Barrier
allow well intervention
activities
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
all tree cap seals are
Seal incorrectly
primary barriers. Tree specified
Cap Annulus Bore Seal
passing.
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
properties similar to
None
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Effective seal not made Gas leakage around seal
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
Bolts installed
all tree cap seals are
incorrectly - bolts
primary barriers. Tree
unevenly tensioned
Cap Annulus Bore Seal
passing.
81
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Barrier
allow well intervention
activities
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
Bolts installed
all tree cap seals are
incorrectly - incorrect
primary barriers. Tree
grade of bolt fitted
Cap Annulus Bore Seal
passing.
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Barrier
allow well intervention
activities
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
Employ competent
Bolts installed
all tree cap seals are
Seal distortion leading to individuals and
incorrectly - bonnet over Joint integrity reduced
2.3
primary barriers. Tree
progressive leakage.
appropriate supervision
tensioned
Cap Annulus Bore Seal
is available.
passing.
On failure of primary
To provide a removable barrier (gate on SWAB)
Bolts installed
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
all tree cap seals are
incorrectly - bonnet
Barrier
allow well intervention primary barriers. Tree
under tensioned
activities
Cap Annulus Bore Seal
passing.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
allow well intervention
Barrier
activities
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
all tree cap seals are
Bolts loosen off in
primary barriers. Tree service
Cap Bonnet Seal
passing.
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
allow well intervention
Barrier
activities
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
all tree cap seals are
Fatigue of bolts
primary barriers. Tree
Cap Bonnet Seal
passing.
Catastrophic failure of
Appropriate support for
Excessive vibration on
one or more bolts after a
piping as per pipe stress 3.3
pipework
period of time.
analysis.
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
allow well intervention
Barrier
activities
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
Thermal/mechanical
Catastrophic failure of
Appropriate piping
all tree cap seals are
Displacement from
gradients induce fatigue one or more bolts after a
design as per pipe stress 3.3
primary barriers. Tree
normal relative position
on bolts
period of time.
analysis.
Cap Bonnet Seal
passing.
82
Gas release
Possible detection by
plant operators and/or
F&G system
2.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Barrier
allow well intervention
activities
On failure of primary
To provide a removable barrier (gate on SWAB)
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Seal incorrectly
all tree cap seals are
Barrier
allow well intervention primary barriers. Tree specified
activities
Cap Bonnet Seal
passing.
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
allow well intervention
Barrier
activities
On failure of primary
To provide a removable barrier (gate on SWAB)
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
all tree cap seals are
Seal incorrectly
allow well intervention primary barriers. Tree installed
Barrier
activities
Cap Bonnet Seal
passing.
EFFECT
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
all tree cap seals are
Wrong seal taken from
primary barriers. Tree stores
Cap Bonnet Seal
passing.
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
all tree cap seals are
Seal incorrectly
primary barriers. Tree specified
Cap Bonnet Seal
passing.
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
properties similar to
None
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Effective seal not made Gas leakage around seal
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
Bolts installed
all tree cap seals are
incorrectly - bolts
primary barriers. Tree
unevenly tensioned
Cap Bonnet Seal
passing.
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
allow well intervention
Barrier
activities
On failure of primary
To provide a removable barrier (gate on SWAB)
Bolts installed
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
all tree cap seals are
incorrectly - incorrect
Barrier
allow well intervention primary barriers. Tree
grade of bolt fitted
activities
Cap Bonnet Seal
passing.
83
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Barrier
allow well intervention
activities
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
Employ competent
Bolts installed
all tree cap seals are
Seal distortion leading to individuals and
incorrectly - bonnet over Joint integrity reduced
2.3
primary barriers. Tree
progressive leakage.
appropriate supervision
tensioned
Cap Bonnet Seal
is available.
passing.
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Barrier
allow well intervention
activities
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
Bolts installed
all tree cap seals are
incorrectly - bonnet
primary barriers. Tree
under tensioned
Cap Bonnet Seal
passing.
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Careful installation of
tree cap.
On failure of primary
To provide a removable
barrier (gate on SWAB)
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Damage of o-ring on
all tree cap seals are
Barrier
allow well intervention
installation of cap
primary barriers. Tree
activities
Cap Plug Seal passing.
On failure of primary
To provide a removable
barrier (gate on SWAB) Damage to polished
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
bore on installation of
all tree cap seals are
Barrier
allow well intervention
primary barriers. Tree tree cap
activities
Cap Plug Seal passing.
On failure of primary
To provide a removable
barrier (gate on SWAB)
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
all tree cap seals are
Incorrect o-ring used
Barrier
allow well intervention
primary barriers. Tree
activities
Cap Plug Seal passing.
Inadequate seal
2.4
Pressure test of tree cap
on tree assembly.
Inspect and dress
polished bore prior to
installation.
2.3
Pressure test of tree cap
on tree assembly.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
84
CRITICALITY
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
On failure of primary
To provide a removable
barrier (gate on SWAB)
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Ageing of o-ring prior
all tree cap seals are
Barrier
allow well intervention
to installation
primary barriers. Tree
activities
Cap Plug Seal passing.
SYMPTOMS
Gradual deteriation of
seal, causing increasing Gas leakage from the
leakage over a period of tree cap retainer ring.
time
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
On failure of primary
To provide a removable barrier (gate on SWAB)
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
all tree cap seals are
Thread cut out of
allow well intervention primary barriers. Test tolerance
Barrier
activities
Valve-Tree Cap crewed
seal interface passing.
Reduced thread to
thread contact surface
(seal maintained by
excessive PTFE for
example)
Degraded mechanical
joint, since joint relies
more on excessive
sealant than intimate
thread contact.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in 3.3
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
To provide a removable
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Barrier
allow well intervention
activities
On failure of primary
barrier (gate on SWAB)
Thread cut out of
all tree cap seals are
primary barriers. Test tolerance
Valve-Tree Cap crewed
seal interface passing.
Designers and
Component will only
manufacturers to have
Either male or female mate for a proportion of
ISO quality systems in 3.3
threads are cut oversize the threads (rather than
place. Offshore
full length engagement)
supervisors checks and
balances.
Excessive torque
required to install.
On failure of primary
To provide a removable barrier (gate on SWAB)
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
all tree cap seals are
Cross threads
Barrier
allow well intervention primary barriers. Test
activities
Valve-Tree Cap crewed
seal interface passing.
Ineffective seal
Fitting improperly
aligned.
Suitable pressure
testing.
Leaking joint.
85
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
On failure of primary
To provide a removable barrier (gate on SWAB)
all tree cap seals are
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Damaged threads
Barrier
allow well intervention primary barriers. Test
Valve-Tree Cap crewed
activities
seal interface passing.
SYMPTOMS
Joint difficult to make
up.
Excessive torque
required to install.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Improperly mated
threads
1.3
Fitting improperly
aligned.
Suitable pressure
testing.
Leaking joint
On failure of primary
To provide a removable
barrier (gate on SWAB)
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
Wear and Tear
all tree cap seals are
Barrier
allow well intervention
primary barriers. Valve
activities
Stem packing passing.
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
On failure of primary
To provide a removable
barrier (gate on SWAB)
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
all tree cap seals are
Packing not set correctly Loss of full seal
Barrier
allow well intervention
primary barriers. Valve
activities
Stem packing passing.
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
On failure of primary
To provide a removable
barrier (gate on SWAB)
7. Tree Cap - Secondary secondary barrier to
all tree cap seals are
Wrong packing fitted
Barrier
allow well intervention
primary barriers. Valve
activities
Stem packing passing.
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
86
2.4
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
CAUSE
EFFECT
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually leaking over
body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
actual specification,
stores
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
FUNCTION
FAILURE
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
SYMPTOMS
None.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Seal incorrectly
installed
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
87
Sealing arrangement
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect
grade of bolt fitted
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
over tensioned
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
Seal distortion leading individuals and
2.3
to progressive leakage. appropriate supervision
is available.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
88
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Partial leak
FUNCTION
To maintain annulus
pressure integrity
FAILURE
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Manufacturing defect
Slag
inclusion/laminations,
Stress raisers and crack
cold laps and other
initiators
geometric imperfections
in the forged block.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
1.2
ISO quality systems in
place.
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually leaking over
body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
89
None.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Seal incorrectly
installed
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
Sealing arrangement
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect
grade of bolt fitted
Employ competent
Bolts installed
Seal distortion leading to individuals and
incorrectly - bonnet over Joint integrity reduced
2.3
progressive leakage.
appropriate supervision
tensioned
is available.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
90
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Partial leak
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually leaking over
body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Seal incorrectly
installed
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
91
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect
grade of bolt fitted
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
over tensioned
Employ competent
Seal distortion leading individuals and
Joint integrity reduced
2.3
to progressive leakage. appropriate supervision
is available.
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
Sealing arrangement
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
92
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Partial leak
FUNCTION
To maintain annulus
pressure integrity
FAILURE
Manufacturing defect
Slag
inclusion/laminations,
Stress raisers and crack
cold laps and other
initiators
geometric imperfections
in the forged block.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
1.2
ISO quality systems in
place.
Confirmed by pressure
testing and established
installation procedures.
To maintain annulus
pressure integrity
During installation of
tree the seals become
damaged
2.3
Competent individuals
and appropriate
supervision
Confirmed by pressure
testing and established
installation procedures.
To maintain annulus
pressure integrity
Due to incorrect
Leakage into xmas
Potential leakage from
installation seals fail to tree/upper tubing hanger tied own bolts or tree
energise
cavity
body gasket.
2.3
Competent individuals
and appropriate
supervision
To provide a continuous
3. Annulus bore tubing
bore between the tree Annulus bore failure
hanger - Primary Barrier
and the annulus tubing
Manufacturing defect
93
Slag
inclusion/laminations,
Stress raisers and crack
cold laps and other
initiators
geometric imperfections
in the forged block.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
1.1
ISO quality systems in
place.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
To provide a sealed
3. Annulus bore tubing
mechanical joint
hanger - Primary Barrier
between components
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
To provide a sealed
3. Annulus bore tubing
mechanical joint
hanger - Primary Barrier
between components
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
To provide a sealed
3. Annulus bore tubing
mechanical joint
hanger - Primary Barrier
between components
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
94
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
To provide a sealed
3. Annulus bore tubing
mechanical joint
hanger - Primary Barrier
between components
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
To provide a sealed
3. Annulus bore tubing
mechanical joint
hanger - Primary Barrier
between components
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
Joint opens
'unzipping' of the thread
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
To provide a sealed
3. Annulus bore tubing
mechanical joint
hanger - Primary Barrier
between components
Failure of threaded
connection
Shearing of threads
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Thermal/mechanical
Catastrophic failure of
Appropriate piping
Leakage of gas around
Displacement from
gradients induce fatigue one or more bolts after a
design as per pipe stress 2.3
seal
normal relative position
on bolts
period of time.
analysis.
95
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Leakage of gas around Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
seal
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Tree has been operating
in excess of 6 months,
1.2
initial teething problems
have been ironed out.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Pump Labouring
(audible)
5. Tubing spool
downhole chemical
injection line Secondary Barrier
Rupture of chemical
Provide a conduit for
injection line - between Pipework damaged
chemical injection into
tubing spool and tree
during installation
production bore
cavity
Significant reduction or
Pressurisation of void
cessation of dosing rate
between tree and tubing
of chemicals.
spool with chemicals.
96
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
6. Tubing spool
downhole chemical
injection line packing
gland - Secondary
Barrier
Outer block assembly Tertiary Barrier
6. Tubing spool
downhole chemical
injection line packing
gland - Secondary
Barrier
Outer block assembly Tertiary Barrier
6. Tubing spool
downhole chemical
injection line packing
gland - Secondary
Barrier
Outer block assembly Tertiary Barrier
6. Tubing spool
downhole chemical
injection line packing
gland - Secondary
Barrier
Outer block assembly Tertiary Barrier
6. Tubing spool
downhole chemical
injection line packing
gland - Secondary
Barrier
Outer block assembly Tertiary Barrier
FUNCTION
To provide a seal
between the chemical
injection line and the
gland bore
To provide a seal
between the chemical
injection line and the
gland bore
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Ageing of seal
Gradual deteriation of
seal, causing increasing Leakage around seal
leakage over a period of increasing over time.
time
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Seal incorrectly
installed
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
To provide a seal
between the chemical
injection line and the
gland bore
To provide a seal
between the chemical
injection line and the
gland bore
To provide a seal
between the chemical
injection line and the
gland bore
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
97
None
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
6. Tubing spool
downhole chemical
injection line packing
gland - Secondary
Barrier
FUNCTION
FAILURE
To provide a seal
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
CAUSE
EFFECT
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Effective seal not made Gas leakage around seal
1.1
Seal incorrectly
installed
SYMPTOMS
6. Tubing spool
downhole chemical
injection line packing
gland - Secondary
Barrier
To provide a seal
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
6. Tubing spool
downhole chemical
injection line packing
gland - Secondary
Barrier
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
To provide a seal
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
To provide a seal
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
6. Tubing spool
downhole chemical
injection line packing
gland - Secondary
Barrier
None
6. Tubing spool
downhole chemical
injection line packing
gland - Secondary
Barrier
To provide a seal
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
Gradual deteriation of
seal, causing increasing Leakage around seal
leakage over a period of increasing over time.
time
Ageing of seal
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
98
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
To provide a secondary
barrier between the
Leakage around seal
casing spool and the tie
down bolts
8. Tubing spool
downhole safety valve
To provide a seal
control packing gland between the DHSV
Secondary Barrier
control line and the
gland bore
Outlet block assembly Tertiary Barrier
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Ageing of seal
Gradual deteriation of
seal, causing increasing Leakage around seal
leakage over a period of increasing over time.
time
Ageing of seal
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
8. Tubing spool
downhole safety valve
To provide a seal
control packing gland between the DHSV
Secondary Barrier
control line and the
gland bore
Outlet block assembly Tertiary Barrier
8. Tubing spool
downhole safety valve
To provide a seal
control packing gland between the DHSV
Secondary Barrier
control line and the
gland bore
Outlet block assembly Tertiary Barrier
8. Tubing spool
downhole safety valve
To provide a seal
control packing gland between the DHSV
Secondary Barrier
control line and the
gland bore
Outlet block assembly Tertiary Barrier
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
99
None
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
8. Tubing spool
downhole safety valve
To provide a seal
control packing gland between the DHSV
Secondary Barrier
control line and the
gland bore
Outlet block assembly Tertiary Barrier
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
Seal incorrectly
installed
8. Tubing spool
downhole safety valve
control packing gland - To provide a seal
Secondary Barrier
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
Outlet block assembly Tertiary Barrier
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Effective seal not made Gas leakage around seal
1.1
Gradual deteriation of
seal, causing increasing Leakage around seal
leakage over a period of increasing over time.
time
Ageing of seal
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
8. Tubing spool
downhole safety valve
control packing gland - To provide a seal
Secondary Barrier
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
Outlet block assembly Tertiary Barrier
8. Tubing spool
downhole safety valve
control packing gland - To provide a seal
Secondary Barrier
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
Outlet block assembly Tertiary Barrier
8. Tubing spool
downhole safety valve
control packing gland - To provide a seal
Secondary Barrier
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
Outlet block assembly Tertiary Barrier
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
100
None
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
8. Tubing spool
downhole safety valve
control packing gland - To provide a seal
Secondary Barrier
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
Outlet block assembly Tertiary Barrier
Seal incorrectly
installed
9. Tubing spool to
tubing hanger seal Secondary Barrier
To provide a seal
Leakage around seal
between the tubing
hanger and tubing spool
9. Tubing spool to
tubing hanger seal Secondary Barrier
To provide a seal
Leakage around seal
between the tubing
hanger and tubing spool
Seal incorrectly
installed
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Effective seal not made Gas leakage around seal
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Pressure build up in the Instrument monitor
upper A annulus.
facility on upper A
annulus.
Over a period of time
seal has compressed
1.3
Tertiary barriers
provided by annular
Pressure in upper A
valves, VR plug and
annulus monitored by
instrumentation fittings plant operators.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Effective seal not made Gas leakage around seal
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
9. Tubing spool to
tubing hanger seal Secondary Barrier
To provide a seal
Leakage around seal
between the tubing
hanger and tubing spool
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
9. Tubing spool to
tubing hanger seal Secondary Barrier
To provide a seal
between the tubing
Leakage around seal
hanger and tubing spool
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
9. Tubing spool to
tubing hanger seal Secondary Barrier
To provide a seal
between the tubing
Leakage around seal
hanger and tubing spool
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
101
None
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Tree has been operating
in excess of 6 months,
1.2
initial teething problems
have been ironed out.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
9. Tubing spool to
tubing hanger seal Secondary Barrier
To provide a seal
between the tubing
Leakage around seal
hanger and tubing spool
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Ageing of seal
Gradual deteriation of
seal, causing increasing Leakage around seal
leakage over a period of increasing over time.
time
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
Use of go/no go gauges
during manufacture.
No visible symptoms.
Loss of integrity of
Provide a seal between
packing gland body
the DHSV control line
Thread cut out of
thread causing trapped
and the tubing hanger
tolerance
pressure to leak into
body
upper annulus
Reduced thread to
thread contact surface
(seal maintained by
excessive PTFE for
example)
Degraded mechanical
joint, since joint relies
more on excessive
sealant than intimate
thread contact.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in 3.3
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
Loss of integrity of
Provide a seal between
packing gland body
the DHSV control line
Thread cut out of
thread causing trapped
and the tubing hanger
tolerance
pressure to leak into
body
upper annulus
Designers and
Component will only
manufacturers to have
Either male or female mate for a proportion of
ISO quality systems in 3.3
threads are cut oversize the threads (rather than
place. Offshore
full length engagement)
supervisors checks and
balances.
Loss of integrity of
Provide a seal between
packing gland body
the DHSV control line
thread causing trapped Cross threads
and the tubing hanger
pressure to leak into
body
upper annulus
Ineffective seal
1.3
Fitting improperly
aligned.
Leaking joint.
102
Suitable pressure
testing.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
Loss of integrity of
Provide a seal between
packing gland body
the DHSV control line
thread causing trapped Damaged threads
and the tubing hanger
pressure to leak into
body
upper annulus
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Joint difficult to make
up.
Excessive torque
required to install.
MITIGATION
Improperly mated
threads
1.3
Fitting improperly
aligned.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland
Leakage of gas into
compression fitting
Incorrect joint make-up
causing trapped pressure
upper A annulus
to leak into upper
annulus
CRITICALITY
Suitable pressure
testing.
Leaking joint
Pressure build up in the Instrument monitor
upper A annulus.
facility on upper A
annulus.
1.3
Tertiary barriers
provided by annular
Pressure in upper A
valves, VR plug and
annulus monitored by
instrumentation fittings plant operators.
Use of go/no go gauges
during manufacture.
No visible symptoms.
Loss of integrity of
Provide a seal between
packing gland body
the Chemical Injection
Thread cut out of
thread causing trapped
line and the tubing
tolerance
pressure to leak into
hanger body
upper annulus
Reduced thread to
thread contact surface
(seal maintained by
excessive PTFE for
example)
Degraded mechanical
joint, since joint relies
more on excessive
sealant than intimate
thread contact.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in 3.3
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
103
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Loss of integrity of
Provide a seal between
packing gland body
the Chemical Injection
Thread cut out of
thread causing trapped
line and the tubing
tolerance
pressure to leak into
hanger body
upper annulus
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Use of go/no go gauges
during manufacture.
Designers and
Component will only
manufacturers to have
Either male or female mate for a proportion of
ISO quality systems in 3.3
threads are cut oversize the threads (rather than
place. Offshore
full length engagement)
supervisors checks and
balances.
Loss of integrity of
Provide a seal between
packing gland body
the Chemical Injection
thread causing trapped Cross threads
line and the tubing
pressure to leak into
hanger body
upper annulus
Ineffective seal
Fitting improperly
aligned.
1.3
Suitable pressure
testing.
Leaking joint.
Joint difficult to make
up.
Loss of integrity of
Provide a seal between
packing gland body
the Chemical Injection
thread causing trapped Damaged threads
line and the tubing
pressure to leak into
hanger body
upper annulus
Excessive torque
required to install.
Improperly mated
threads
Loss of integrity of
packing gland
compression fitting
Leakage of gas into
Incorrect joint make-up
causing trapped pressure
upper A annulus
to leak into upper
annulus
104
Fitting improperly
aligned.
Suitable pressure
testing.
Leaking joint
Pressure build up in the Instrument monitor
upper A annulus.
facility on upper A
annulus.
1.3
Tertiary barriers
provided by annular
Pressure in upper A
valves, VR plug and
annulus monitored by
instrumentation fittings plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Pump Labouring
(audible)
To provide a continuous
1. Annulus bore tubing
bore between the tubing
hanger - Primary
Annulus bore failure
hanger and the annulus
Barrier
tubing
Manufacturing defect
Slag
inclusion/laminations,
Stress raisers and crack
cold laps and other
initiators
geometric imperfections
in the forged block.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
1.1
ISO quality systems in
place.
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
2.2
Ineffective seal
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
105
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
2.2
Ineffective seal
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
Joint opens
'unzipping' of the thread
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
106
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Failure of threaded
connection
Shearing of threads
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Manufacturing defect
Designers and
manufacturers to have
2.2
ISO quality systems in
place.
107
Designers and
manufacturers to have
2.2
ISO quality systems in
place.
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
108
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
Joint opens
'unzipping' of the thread
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Failure of threaded
connection
Shearing of threads
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Degradation of
Produce corrosion
components over time.
products which are a
source of debris and can
under certain situations
apply a pressure to
This less applicable to
mating surfaces
13% Cr Alloys.
Deep pits and cavities.
109
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Optimisation of material
design and selection
1.3
Injection of inhibitors
Optimisation of material
design and selection
4.3
Good corrosion
management strategy
and execution.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
Gas lift pressure leakage
into the B annulus,
consequently annular
valves on B annulus
become primary barrier.
Correct casing design
B annulus is rated to a
lower pressure than the
A annulus.
Gas lift pressure leakage
into the B annulus,
consequently annular
valves on B annulus
become primary barrier.
13% Cr steels
To protect the formation
B annulus is rated to a
Embrittlement during vulnerable to temper
to the top of the pay
Production casing split
lower pressure than the
manufacturing process Embrittlement under
zone and the 9 5/8"
or parted
A annulus.
(high alloy steels)
incorrect welding and
casing
heat treatment regimes.
Loss of ductility
resulting in a greater
sensitivity to cracking
under normal well
conditions (thermal
loading).
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
110
CRITICALITY
3.3
Design and
manufacturers quality
assurance in accordance
with ISO and
equivalent.
2.3
Plant operators would
monitor annulus
pressure.
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
111
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
Joint opens
'unzipping' of the thread
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
Failure of threaded
connection
Shearing of threads
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
4. Production casing
hanger seal to tubing
spool - Secondary
Barrier
To provide a seal
Leakage around seal
between the casing
hanger and casing spool
4. Production casing
hanger seal to tubing
spool - Secondary
Barrier
To provide a seal
between the casing
Leakage around seal
hanger and casing spool
Seal incorrectly
installed
3.3
Secondary barriers
Pressure in B annulus
provided by annular
monitored by plant
valves and
operators.
instrumentation fittings
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Effective seal not made Gas leakage around seal
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
112
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
4. Production casing
hanger seal to tubing
spool - Secondary
Barrier
FUNCTION
FAILURE
To provide a seal
between the casing
Leakage around seal
hanger and casing spool
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
4. Production casing
hanger seal to tubing
spool - Secondary
Barrier
To provide a seal
Leakage around seal
between the casing
hanger and casing spool
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
4. Production casing
hanger seal to tubing
spool - Secondary
Barrier
To provide a seal
between the casing
Leakage around seal
hanger and casing spool
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
4. Production casing
hanger seal to tubing
spool - Secondary
Barrier
To provide a seal
between the casing
Leakage around seal
hanger and casing spool
None
Ageing of seal
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Tree has been operating
in excess of 6 months,
1.2
initial teething problems
have been ironed out.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
To provide a facility to
5. Upper annulus tubing
isolate the A,B or C
Bonnet seal leakage
spool inner and outer
Seal incorrectly
annulus and with
(metal to metal joint) - 2
valves - Secondary
specified
instrumentation monitor valves
Barrier
annular pressures
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually leaking over
body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
113
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
To provide a facility to
5. Upper annulus tubing
isolate the A,B or C
Bonnet seal leakage
spool inner and outer
Wrong seal taken from
annulus and with
(metal to metal joint) - 2
valves - Secondary
stores
instrumentation monitor valves
Barrier
annular pressures
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
properties similar to
None
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
To provide a facility to
5. Upper annulus tubing
Bonnet seal leakage
isolate the A,B or C
spool inner and outer
Seal incorrectly
(metal to metal joint) - 2
annulus and with
valves - Secondary
specified
instrumentation monitor valves
Barrier
annular pressures
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
None.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
To provide a facility to
5. Upper annulus tubing
isolate the A,B or C
Bonnet seal leakage
spool inner and outer
Seal incorrectly
annulus and with
(metal to metal joint) - 2
valves - Secondary
installed
instrumentation monitor valves
Barrier
annular pressures
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
To provide a facility to
5. Upper annulus tubing
isolate the A,B or C
Bolts installed
Bonnet seal leakage
spool inner and outer
(metal to metal joint) - 2 incorrectly - bolts
annulus and with
valves - Secondary
instrumentation monitor valves
unevenly tensioned
Barrier
annular pressures
To provide a facility to
5. Upper annulus tubing
isolate the A,B or C
Bonnet seal leakage
Bolts installed
spool inner and outer
annulus and with
(metal to metal joint) - 2 incorrectly - incorrect
valves - Secondary
instrumentation monitor valves
grade of bolt fitted
Barrier
annular pressures
To provide a facility to
5. Upper annulus tubing
Employ competent
Bonnet seal leakage
Bolts installed
isolate the A,B or C
spool inner and outer
Seal distortion leading to individuals and
(metal to metal joint) - 2 incorrectly - bonnet over Joint integrity reduced
2.3
annulus and with
valves - Secondary
progressive leakage.
appropriate supervision
instrumentation monitor valves
tensioned
Barrier
is available.
annular pressures
114
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
To provide a facility to
5. Upper annulus tubing
isolate the A,B or C
Bonnet seal leakage
Bolts installed
spool inner and outer
annulus and with
(metal to metal joint) - 2 incorrectly - bonnet
valves - Secondary
instrumentation monitor valves
under tensioned
Barrier
annular pressures
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
To provide a facility to
5. Upper annulus tubing
isolate the A,B or C
spool inner and outer
Stem Seal Leak - 2
annulus and with
valves - Secondary
valves
instrumentation monitor
Barrier
annular pressures
To provide a facility to
5. Upper annulus tubing
isolate the A,B or C
spool inner and outer
Stem Seal Leak - 2
annulus and with
valves - Secondary
valves
instrumentation monitor
Barrier
annular pressures
To provide a facility to
5. Upper annulus tubing
isolate the A,B or C
spool inner and outer
Stem Seal Leak - 2
annulus and with
valves - Secondary
valves
instrumentation monitor
Barrier
annular pressures
To provide a facility to
5. Upper annulus tubing
isolate the A,B or C
Fitter backs off
spool inner and outer
annulus and with
Grease fitting Leakage assembly rather than
valves - Secondary
just the cap
instrumentation monitor
Barrier
annular pressures
To provide a facility to
5. Upper annulus tubing
isolate the A,B or C
spool inner and outer
annulus and with
Grease fitting Leakage
valves - Secondary
instrumentation monitor
Barrier
annular pressures
None.
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Partial leak
115
Employ competent
individuals and
1.1
appropriate supervision
is available.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
CAUSE
EFFECT
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually leaking over
body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
FUNCTION
FAILURE
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
SYMPTOMS
None.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Seal incorrectly
installed
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect
grade of bolt fitted
116
Sealing arrangement
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
Bolts installed
Seal distortion leading to individuals and
incorrectly - bonnet over Joint integrity reduced
2.3
progressive leakage.
appropriate supervision
tensioned
is available.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
properties similar to
None
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
117
Gas release
Possible detection by
plant operators and/or
F&G system
2.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
118
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Provides isolation in
7. VR plug - Secondary
A,B or C annulus to
Barrier
carry out maintenance
on annular valves and
Tertiary valve(s)
fittings.
Provides isolation in
7. VR plug - Secondary
A,B or C annulus to
Barrier
carry out maintenance
on annular valves and
Tertiary valve(s)
fittings.
Failure of threaded
connection
Misalignment during
installation
Provides isolation in
7. VR plug - Secondary
A,B or C annulus to
Barrier
carry out maintenance
on annular valves and
Tertiary valve(s)
fittings.
Failure of threaded
connection
119
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Ageing of seal
Gradual deteriation of
seal, causing increasing Leakage around seal
leakage over a period of increasing over time.
time
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification of
seal incompatible with
Gradually increasing
body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Tree has been operating
in excess of 6 months,
1.2
initial teething problems
have been ironed out.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Seal incorrectly
installed
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
120
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
CAUSE
EFFECT
9. Tubing spool
downhole chemical
injection line Secondary Barrier
Pipework damaged
during installation
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
11. Tubing hanger
thread causing trapped
Provide a seal between
downhole safety valve
pressure to leak into
the DHSV control line
Thread cut out of
control line lower
cavity between tree and
and the tubing hanger
tolerance
packing gland tubing hanger.
body
Secondary Barrier
On coincident failure of
upper packing gland.
FUNCTION
FAILURE
Pressurisation of void
between tubing hanger
and the dual bore upper
packer with chemicals.
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
Pressure build up in the
Instrument monitor
B annulus.
facility on B annulus.
3.3
Secondary barriers
Pressure in B annulus
provided by annular
monitored by plant
valves and
operators.
instrumentation fittings
Regular checks of pump
Pump Labouring
pressure and injection
(audible) - increased
rates by plant operators.
injection rate
1.2
Degraded mechanical
joint, since joint relies
more on excessive
sealant than intimate
thread contact.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in 3.3
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
121
CRITICALITY
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
11. Tubing hanger
thread causing trapped
Provide a seal between
downhole safety valve
pressure to leak into
the DHSV control line
Thread cut out of
control line lower
cavity between tree and
and the tubing hanger
tolerance
packing gland tubing hanger.
body
Secondary Barrier
On coincident failure of
upper packing gland.
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Use of go/no go gauges
during manufacture.
Designers and
Component will only
manufacturers to have
Either male or female mate for a proportion of
ISO quality systems in 3.3
threads are cut oversize the threads (rather than
place. Offshore
full length engagement)
supervisors checks and
balances.
Excessive torque
required to install.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
11. Tubing hanger
Provide a seal between
downhole safety valve
pressure to leak into
the DHSV control line
cavity between tree and Cross threads
control line lower
and the tubing hanger
tubing hanger.
packing gland body
Secondary Barrier
On coincident failure of
upper packing gland.
Ineffective seal
Fitting improperly
aligned.
1.3
Suitable pressure
testing.
Leaking joint.
Joint difficult to make
up.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
11. Tubing hanger
thread causing trapped
Provide a seal between
pressure to leak into
downhole safety valve
the DHSV control line
cavity between tree and Damaged threads
control line lower
and the tubing hanger
packing gland tubing hanger.
body
Secondary Barrier
On coincident failure of
upper packing gland.
Excessive torque
required to install.
Improperly mated
threads
1.3
Fitting improperly
aligned.
Leaking joint
122
Suitable pressure
testing.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
11. Tubing hanger
Provide a seal between
downhole safety valve
pressure to leak into
the DHSV control line
Leakage of gas into
cavity between tree and Incorrect joint make-up
control line lower
and the tubing hanger
upper A annulus
tubing hanger.
packing gland body
Secondary Barrier
On coincident failure of
upper packing gland.
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
Provide a seal between
pressure to leak into
the Chemical Injection
Thread cut out of
cavity between tubing
line and the tubing
tolerance
hanger and tree.
hanger body
On coincident failure of
upper packing gland.
No visible symptoms.
Reduced thread to
thread contact surface
(seal maintained by
excessive PTFE for
example)
Degraded mechanical
joint, since joint relies
more on excessive
sealant than intimate
thread contact.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in 3.3
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
Provide a seal between
pressure to leak into
the Chemical Injection
Thread cut out of
cavity between tubing
line and the tubing
tolerance
hanger and tree.
hanger body
On coincident failure of
upper packing gland.
Designers and
Component will only
manufacturers to have
Either male or female mate for a proportion of
ISO quality systems in 3.3
threads are cut oversize the threads (rather than
place. Offshore
full length engagement)
supervisors checks and
balances.
123
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
Provide a seal between
pressure to leak into
the Chemical Injection
cavity between tubing Cross threads
line and the tubing
hanger and tree.
hanger body
Ineffective seal
SYMPTOMS
Excessive torque
required to install.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Fitting improperly
aligned.
1.3
Suitable pressure
testing.
On coincident failure of
upper packing gland.
Leaking joint.
Joint difficult to make
up.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
Provide a seal between
pressure to leak into
the Chemical Injection
cavity between tubing Damaged threads
line and the tubing
hanger and tree.
hanger body
Excessive torque
required to install.
Improperly mated
threads
1.3
Fitting improperly
aligned.
On coincident failure of
upper packing gland.
Suitable pressure
testing.
Leaking joint
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
Provide a seal between
pressure to leak into
Leakage of gas into
the Chemical Injection
cavity between tubing Incorrect joint make-up cavity between tubing
line and the tubing
hanger and tree.
hanger and tree.
hanger body
On coincident failure of
upper packing gland.
124
1.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Manufacturing defect
Designers and
manufacturers to have
2.2
ISO quality systems in
place.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
2.2
ISO quality systems in
place.
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
125
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
Joint opens
'unzipping' of the thread
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
126
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Failure of threaded
connection
Shearing of threads
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
2. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
2. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
127
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
2. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
2. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
2. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
FUNCTION
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Jumping out or
Joint opens
'unzipping' of the thread
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
128
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
2. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
FUNCTION
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Shearing of threads
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Correct specification of
seals.
2. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
2. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
Manufacturers and
1.1
designers have a
A Annular valves
suitable quality
become tertiary barriers. assurance system in
accordance with ISO or
equivalent.
Gas leakage into upper
A annulus.
Correct specification of
seals.
Flapper closes if control
line ruptures
2.1
Periodic testing
A Annular valves
become tertiary barriers.
1. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
129
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
1. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
1. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
1. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
FUNCTION
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
2.2
Ineffective seal
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
2.2
Ineffective seal
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
130
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
1. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
1. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
FUNCTION
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
1. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
CRITICALITY
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Gas leakage into upper
A annulus.
MITIGATION
Failure of housing
sealing arrangement
A Annular valves
become tertiary
barriers.
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Correct specification of
seals.
1.1
Manufacturers and
designers have a
suitable quality
assurance system in
accordance with ISO or
equivalent.
1. Annulus downhole
safety valve - Primary
Barrier
To provide addition
barrier between lower
annulus and
tree/wellhead
131
Correct specification of
seals.
2.1
Periodic testing
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
Designers and
manufacturers to have
2.2
ISO quality systems in
place.
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
132
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
Joint opens
'unzipping' of the thread
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
133
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
Failure of threaded
connection
Shearing of threads
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
134
Designers and
manufacturers to have
2.2
ISO quality systems in
place.
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
135
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
Joint opens
'unzipping' of the thread
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
To provide a sealed
mechanical joint
between components
Failure of threaded
connection
Shearing of threads
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Incorrectly set
136
2.2
Pressure testing when
packer was originally
installed.
Periodic checks of upper
A annulus pressure.
2.2
Pressure testing when
packer was originally
installed.
Expansion and
Packer to be designed
Additional tensile loads contraction of annulus
for all reasonably
imposed on packer
tubing in the absence of
foreseeable events.
a slip joint.
2.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Deteriation of the
annulus upper bore
tubing stab seal
Expansion and
Additional tensile loads contraction of annulus
imposed on packer
tubing in the absence of
a slip joint.
Pump Labouring
(audible)
Rupture of chemical
3. Downhole chemical Provide a conduit for
injection line - between Pipework damaged
injection line chemical injection into
tubing hanger and dual during installation
Secondary Barrier
production bore
bore upper packer
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up
against the lower
Provide a seal between
chemical injection line
the Chemical Injection
Thread cut out of
packing gland.
line and the dual bore
tolerance
upper packer body
Coincident failure of
lower chemical injection
line packing gland in
order to leak into lower
annulus.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Periodic checks of upper
A annulus pressure.
2.2
Pressure testing when
packer was originally
installed.
Tubing stab to be
designed for all
2.3
reasonably foreseeable
events.
Regular checks of pump
pressure injection rates
by plant operators.
1.2
Competent fitters and
appropriate installation
procedures.
Use of go/no go gauges
during manufacture.
No visible symptoms.
Reduced thread to
thread contact surface
(seal maintained by
excessive PTFE for
example)
Degraded mechanical
joint, since joint relies
more on excessive
sealant than intimate
thread contact.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in 3.3
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
137
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up
against the lower
Provide a seal between
chemical injection line
the Chemical Injection
Thread cut out of
packing gland.
line and the dual bore
tolerance
upper packer body
Coincident failure of
lower chemical injection
line packing gland in
order to leak into lower
annulus.
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Use of go/no go gauges
during manufacture.
Designers and
Component will only
manufacturers to have
Either male or female mate for a proportion of
ISO quality systems in 3.3
threads are cut oversize the threads (rather than
place. Offshore
full length engagement)
supervisors checks and
balances.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up
against the lower
Provide a seal between
chemical injection line
the Chemical Injection
packing gland.
Cross threads
line and the dual bore
upper packer body
Coincident failure of
lower chemical injection
line packing gland in
order to leak into lower
annulus.
Excessive torque
required to install.
Ineffective seal
Fitting improperly
aligned.
1.3
Suitable pressure
testing.
Leaking joint.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up
against the lower
Provide a seal between
chemical injection line
the Chemical Injection
packing gland.
Damaged threads
line and the dual bore
upper packer body
Coincident failure of
lower chemical injection
line packing gland in
order to leak into lower
annulus.
Excessive torque
required to install.
Improperly mated
threads
1.3
Fitting improperly
aligned.
Leaking joint
138
Suitable pressure
testing.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up
against the lower
Provide a seal between
chemical injection line
the Chemical Injection
Leakage of gas into
packing gland.
Incorrect joint make-up
line and the dual bore
upper A annulus
upper packer body
Coincident failure of
lower chemical injection
line packing gland in
order to leak into lower
annulus.
SYMPTOMS
1.3
Tertiary barriers
provided by annular
valves, VR plug and
instrumentation fittings
Periodic checks of
upper A annulus
pressure.
Incorrectly set
CRITICALITY
MITIGATION
2.2
Pressure testing when
packer was originally
installed.
Periodic checks of
upper A annulus
pressure.
2.2
Pressure testing when
packer was originally
installed.
139
Expansion and
Packer to be designed
Additional tensile loads contraction of annulus
for all reasonably
imposed on packer
tubing in the absence of
foreseeable events.
a slip joint.
2.3
Periodic checks of
upper A annulus
pressure.
2.2
Pressure testing when
packer was originally
installed.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Expansion and
Additional tensile loads contraction of annulus
imposed on packer
tubing in the absence of
a slip joint.
Degradation of
Produce corrosion
components over time.
products which are a
Corrosion (where water source of debris and can
under certain situations
is present)
apply a pressure to
This less applicable to
mating surfaces
13% Cr Alloys.
Deep pits and cavities.
13% Cr steels
B annulus is rated to a
Embrittlement during vulnerable to temper
lower pressure than the
manufacturing process Embrittlement under
A annulus.
(high alloy steels)
incorrect welding and
heat treatment regimes.
Loss of ductility
resulting in a greater
sensitivity to cracking
under normal well
conditions (thermal
loading).
140
CRITICALITY
Tubing stab to be
designed for all
2.3
reasonably foreseeable
events.
Optimisation of material
design and selection
1.3
Injection of inhibitors
Optimisation of material
design and selection
MITIGATION
4.3
3.3
Design and
manufacturers quality
assurance in accordance
with ISO and
equivalent.
2.3
Plant operators would
monitor annulus
pressure.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
141
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
Joint opens
'unzipping' of the thread
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Failure of threaded
connection
Shearing of threads
2.2
Additional loading on
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
To provide a means of
3. Side Pocket Mandrels
Orifice valve fails to
injecting gas into the
(SPM) - Primary Barrier
open on demand
bore string
142
Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
plant operators.
Manufacturers and
designers quality
assurance scheme in
Gas is not injected at the Gas lift is not effective, accordance with ISO or
1.2
right level in the
if well is reliant on gas equivalent.
production string
lift well may not flow.
Orifice valves checked
before installation in
well.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
To provide a means of
3. Side Pocket Mandrels
Orifice valve fails to
injecting gas into the
(SPM) - Primary Barrier
open on demand
bore string
4. Chemical Injection
Line
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Provide a conduit to
Chemical injection line Operational loads
inject chemicals into the
rupture
exceeded
production tubing
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Manufacturers and
Gas lift is not effective,
designers quality
if well is reliant on gas
assurance scheme in
lift well may not flow.
accordance with ISO or
equivalent.
Gas is not injected into
1.2
the production string
Lower A annulus is
pressurised beyond
Orifice valves checked
normal operating
before installation in
conditions.
well.
SYMPTOMS
2.3
Chemical injection
Chemical injection line
pressure should be
pressurised with
monitored by competent
injection gas when not
individuals.
injecting chemicals.
4. Chemical Injection
Line
Provide a conduit to
Chemical injection line Operational loads
inject chemicals into the
rupture
exceeded
production tubing
Combination of
vibration and tension in
line due to slippage of
supports.
Fatigue
Pressure cyclic effects
from injecting.
143
Correct supporting
arrangement.
2.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
4. Chemical Injection
Line
Provide a conduit to
Chemical injection line Operational loads
inject chemicals into the
rupture
exceeded
production tubing
4. Chemical Injection
Line
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Provide a conduit to
Chemical injection line Operational loads
inject chemicals into the
rupture
exceeded
production tubing
Incorrect installation
Corrosion of fittings
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Joint leakage at either
dual bore upper packer
or connection to
production tubing.
Chemical injection
pipework and fittings
should be designed and
Chemical injection line constructed for all
subject to back pressure reasonably foreseeable
from injection gas under events.
normal chemical
2.3
injection activities.
Chemical injection
pressure will increase. Chemical injection
pressure should be
monitored by competent
individuals.
Chemical injection line
pressurised with
injection gas when not
injecting chemicals.
Due to residual liquids
from previous
operations.
144
2.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
4. Chemical Injection
Line
Upper chemical
injection line seal to
dual bore upper packer
takes lower A annulus
Lower seal between
Provide a conduit to
Deteriation of the lower Gas passing from lower pressure. Coincidental
chemical injection line
inject chemicals into the
chemical injection line annulus to upper
failure of upper
and dual bore upper
production tubing
seal
annulus
chemical injection line
packer
seal to dual bore upper
packer to upper A
annulus pressurise with
gas.
4. Chemical Injection
Line
4. Chemical Injection
Line
4. Chemical Injection
Line
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Expansion and
Additional tensile loads contraction of annulus
imposed on packer
tubing in the absence of
a slip joint.
145
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Tubing stab to be
designed for all
2.3
reasonably foreseeable
events.
Failure of upper
chemical injection line
seal to dual bore upper
packer to upper A
Periodic checks of upper
annulus pressurise with
A annulus pressure.
gas.
2.2
Pressure testing when
Failure of lower
packer was originally
chemical injection line
installed.
seal to dual bore upper
packer to upper A
annulus pressurise with
gas.
Expansion and
Additional tensile loads contraction of annulus
tubing in the absence of
imposed on packer
a slip joint.
Tubing stab to be
designed for all
2.3
reasonably foreseeable
events.
APPENDIX F
SINGLE COMPLETION FMECA RESULTS
146
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
CAUSE
EFFECT
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually leaking over
with body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
actual specification,
stores
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
FAILURE
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
SYMPTOMS
None.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Seal incorrectly
installed
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
147
Sealing arrangement
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect Joint integrity reduced None.
grade of bolt fitted
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
over tensioned
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
Seal distortion leading individuals and
Joint integrity reduced to progressive leakage. appropriate supervision 2.3
is available.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
148
Gas release
Possible detection by
plant operators and/or 2.3
F&G system
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
properties similar to
None
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually increasing
with body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work syst em etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
None
MITIGATION
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
149
CRITICALITY
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
2. Connecting
Pipework - Primary
Barrier
FAILURE
CAUSE
150
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Sealing arrangement
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
Seal distortion leading individuals and
Joint integrity reduced to progressive leakage.
2.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Gas release
Possible detection by
plant operators and/or 2.3
F&G system
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
2. Connecting
Pipework - Primary
Barrier
2. Connecting
Pipework - Primary
Barrier
2. Connecting
Pipework - Primary
Barrier
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
properties similar to
None
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
2. Connecting
Pipework - Primary
Barrier
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually increasing
with body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufact urers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
2. Connecting
Pipework - Primary
Barrier
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
151
SYMPTOMS
None
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
2. Connect ing
Pipework - Primary
Barrier
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
2. Connecting
Pipework - Primary
Barrier
2. Connecting
Pipework - Primary
Barrier
2. Connecting
Pipework - Primary
Barrier
2. Connecting
Pipework - Primary
Barrier
152
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision 3.3
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
Seal distortion leading individuals and
Joint integrity reduced to progressive leakage.
2.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from is available.
Joint integrity reduced
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually leaking over
with body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
actual specification,
stores
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
SYMPTOMS
None.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Seal incorrectly
installed
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
153
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced
unevenly energised
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect Joint integrity reduced None.
grade of bolt fitted
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
over tensioned
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
Seal distortion leading individuals and
Joint integrity reduced
2.3
to progressive leakage. appropriate supervision
is available.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
154
CRITICALITY
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Perform maintenance
Gas leaks from actuator and inspection in
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from actuator
accordance with
housing
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
155
Partial leak
Audible evidence of
gas release
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Audible evidence of
gas release
Seal incorrectly
specified
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually leaking over
with body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
156
None.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Seal incorrectly
installed
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect Joint integrity reduced None.
grade of bolt fitted
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
over tensioned
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Effective seal not made Gas leak around seal
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
157
Sealing arrangement
unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
Seal distortion leading individuals and
2.3
to progressive leakage. appropriate supervision
is available.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
2.4
manufacturers
requirements.
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
accordance with
2.4
manufacturers
requirements.
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
2.4
accordance with
manufacturers
requirements.
158
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Partial leak
2. Tubing spool to
tubing hanger seal Primary Barrier
2. Tubing spool to
tubing hanger seal Primary Barrier
To provide a seal
between the tubing
Leakage around seal
hanger and tubing spool
To provide a seal
between the tubing
Leakage around seal
hanger and tubing spool
Seal incorrectly
installed
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
159
1.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
2. Tubing spool to
tubing hanger seal Primary Barrier
FUNCTION
FAILURE
To provide a seal
Leakage around seal
between the tubing
hanger and tubing spool
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
actual specification,
stores
therefore no immediate
effect.
2. Tubing spool to
tubing hanger seal Primary Barrier
To provide a seal
between the tubing
Leakage around seal
hanger and tubing spool
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually increasing
with body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
2. Tubing spool to
tubing hanger seal Primary Barrier
To provide a seal
between the tubing
Leakage around seal
hanger and tubing spool
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
2. Tubing spool to
tubing hanger seal Primary Barrier
To provide a seal
between the tubing
Leakage around seal
hanger and tubing spool
None
Gradual determination
of seal, causing
Leakage around seal
increasing leakage over increasing over time.
a period of time
Ageing of seal
MITIGATION
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
160
CRITICALITY
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
3. Tubing spool to
Casing Hanger Seal Primary Barrier
3. Tubing spool to
Casing Hanger Seal Primary Barrier
To provide a seal
between the casing
Leakage around seal
hanger and casing spool
To provide a seal
between the casing
Leakage around seal
hanger and casing spool
Seal incorrectly
installed
3.3
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
3. Tubing spool to
Casing Hanger Seal Primary Barrier
3. Tubing spool to
Casing Hanger Seal Primary Barrier
To provide a seal
between the casing
Leakage around seal
hanger and casing spool
To provide a seal
between the casing
Leakage around seal
hanger and casing spool
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually increasing
with body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Seal incorrectly
specified
161
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
3. Tubing spool to
Casing Hanger Seal Primary Barrier
To provide a seal
between the casing
Leakage around seal
hanger and casing spool
3. Tubing spool to
Casing Hanger Seal Primary Barrier
FAILURE
To provide a seal
between the casing
Leakage around seal
hanger and casing spool
CAUSE
EFFECT
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
None
Ageing of seal
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
162
Ineffective seal
Secondary barriers
provided by tie down
bolt arrangement,
chemical injection
point, downhole safety
valve point, tubing
hanger to casing spool
seal.
None.
2.2
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
None.
2.2
None.
2.2
Ineffective seal
Secondary barriers
provided by tie down
bolt arrangement,
chemical injection
point, downhole safety
valve point, tubing
hanger to casing spool
seal.
163
Ineffective seal
Secondary barriers
provided by tie down
bolt arrangement,
chemical injection
point, downhole safety
valve point, tubing
hanger to casing spool
seal.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
2.2
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
'unzipping' of the threadJoint opens
164
Secondary barriers
provided by tie down
bolt arrangement,
chemical injection
point, downhole safety
valve point, tubing
hanger to casing spool
seal.
None.
2.2
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
To provide containment
5. Upper Well annulus - for hydrocarbon gas to
Casing Spool failure
Primary Barrier
be injected into
production bore
Failure of threaded
connection
Shearing of threads
Manufacturing defect
Slag
inclusion/laminations,
Stress raisers and crack cold laps and other
initiators
geometric
imperfections in the
forged block.
2.2
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in 1.2
place.
To provide a sealed
5. Upper Well annulus mechanical joint
Primary Barrier
between components
165
Ineffective seal
Secondary barriers
provided by tie down
bolt arrangement,
chemical injection
point, downhole safety
valve point, tubing
hanger to casing spool
seal.
None.
2.2
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
None.
2.2
None.
2.2
To provide a sealed
5. Upper Well annulus mechanical joint
Primary Barrier
between components
Ineffective seal
Secondary barriers
provided by tie down
bolt arrangement,
chemical injection
point, downhole safety
valve point, tubing
hanger to casing spool
seal.
To provide a sealed
5. Upper Well annulus mechanical joint
Primary Barrier
between components
166
Ineffective seal
Secondary barriers
provided by tie down
bolt arrangement,
chemical injection
point, downhole safety
valve point, tubing
hanger to casing spool
seal.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
To provide a sealed
5. Upper Well annulus mechanical joint
Primary Barrier
between components
2.2
To provide a sealed
5. Upper Well annulus mechanical joint
Primary Barrier
between components
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
'unzipping' of the threadJoint opens
167
Secondary barriers
provided by tie down
bolt arrangement,
chemical injection
point, downhole safety
valve point, tubing
hanger to casing spool
seal.
None.
2.2
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
To provide a sealed
5. Upper Well annulus mechanical joint
Primary Barrier
between components
To provide a
6. Tubing hanger body continuous bore
- Primary Barrier
between the tree and Production bore failure Manufacturing defect
the production tubing
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up to
7. Tubing hanger
Provide a seal between upper packing gland.
downhole safety valve
the DHSV control line
Thread cut out of
control line lower
and the tubing hanger Coincident failure of tolerance
packing gland (x2) body
upper packing gland
Primary Barrier
would lead to trapped
pressure leaking into
cavity between tubing
hanger and tree.
Failure of threaded
connection
Shearing of threads
Slag
inclusion/laminations,
Stress raisers and crack cold laps and other
initiators
geometric
imperfections in the
forged block.
2.2
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in 1.1
place.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in 3.3
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
168
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up to
7. Tubing hanger
Provide a seal between upper packing gland.
downhole safety valve
Thread cut out of
the DHSV control line
control line lower
and the tubing hanger Coincident failure of tolerance
packing gland (x2) body
upper packing gland
Primary Barrier
would lead to trapped
pressure leaking into
cavity between tubing
hanger and tree.
Designers and
Component will only
manufacturers to have
Either male or female mate for a proportion of
ISO quality systems in 3.3
threads are cut oversize the threads (rather than
place. Offshore
full length engagement)
supervisors checks and
balances.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up to
7. Tubing hanger
Provide a seal between upper packing gland.
downhole safety valve
the DHSV control line
control line lower
Cross threads
and the tubing hanger Coincident failure of
packing gland (x2) body
upper packing gland
Primary Barrier
would lead to trapped
pressure leaking into
cavity between tubing
hanger and tree.
Excessive torque
required to install.
Ineffective seal
Fitting improperly
aligned.
1.3
Suitable pressure
testing.
Leaking joint.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up to
7. Tubing hanger
Provide a seal between upper packing gland.
downhole safety valve
the DHSV control line
control line lower
Damaged threads
and the tubing hanger Coincident failure of
packing gland (x2) body
upper packing gland
Primary Barrier
would lead to trapped
pressure leaking into
cavity between tubing
hanger and tree.
Excessive torque
required to install.
Improperly mated
threads
1.3
Fitting improperly
aligned.
Leaking joint
169
Suitable pressure
testing.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up to
7. Tubing hanger
Provide a seal between upper packing gland.
Leakage of gas into
downhole safety valve
the DHSV control line
control line lower
Incorrect joint make-up cavity between tubing
and the tubing hanger Coincident failure of
packing gland (x2) hanger and tree.
body
upper packing gland
Primary Barrier
would lead to trapped
pressure leaking into
cavity between tubing
hanger and tree.
8. Tubing hanger
downhole chemical
injection line lower
packing gland Primary Barrier
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
None.
1.3
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up to
Provide a seal between upper packing gland.
the Chemical Injection
Thread cut out of
line and the tubing
Coincident failure of tolerance
hanger body
upper packing gland
would lead to trapped
pressure leaking into
cavity between tubing
hanger and tree.
No visible symptoms.
Reduced thread to
thread contact surface
(seal maintained by
Degraded mechanical
joint, since joint relies
excessive PTFE for
more on excessive
example)
sealant than intimate
thread contact.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in 3.3
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
170
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
8. Tubing hanger
downhole chemical
injection line lower
packing gland Primary Barrier
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up to
Provide a seal between upper packing gland.
Thread cut out of
the Chemical Injection
line and the tubing
Coincident failure of tolerance
hanger body
upper packing gland
would lead to trapped
pressure leaking into
cavity between tubing
hanger and tree.
Designers and
Component will only
manufacturers to have
Either male or female mate for a proportion of
ISO quality systems in 3.3
threads are cut oversize the threads (rather than
place. Offshore
full length engagement)
supervisors checks and
balances.
8. Tubing hanger
downhole chemical
injection line lower
packing gland Primary Barrier
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up to
Provide a seal between upper packing gland.
the Chemical Injection
Cross threads
line and the tubing
Coincident failure of
hanger body
upper packing gland
would lead to trapped
pressure leaking into
cavity between tubing
hanger and tree.
Excessive torque
required to install.
Ineffective seal
Fitting improperly
aligned.
1.3
Suitable pressure
testing.
Leaking joint.
8. Tubing hanger
downhole chemical
injection line lower
packing gland Primary Barrier
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up to
Provide a seal between upper packing gland.
the Chemical Injection
Damaged threads
line and the tubing
Coincident failure of
hanger body
upper packing gland
would lead to trapped
pressure leaking into
cavity between tubing
hanger and tree.
Excessive torque
required to install.
Improperly mated
threads
1.3
Fitting improperly
aligned.
Leaking joint
171
Suitable pressure
testing.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
8. Tubing hanger
downhole chemical
injection line lower
packing gland Primary Barrier
FUNCTION
FAILURE
EFFECT
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
pressure to leak up to
Provide a seal between upper packing gland.
Leakage of gas into
the Chemical Injection
Incorrect joint make-up cavity between tubing
line and the tubing
Coincident failure of
hanger and tree.
hanger body
upper packing gland
would lead to trapped
pressure leaking into
cavity between tubing
hanger and tree.
9. Tubing spool
Provide a conduit for Rupture of chemical
downhole chemical
chemical injection into injection line - below
injection line - Primary
production bore
tubing hanger
Barrier
CAUSE
Pipework damaged
during installation
172
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
None.
1.3
Pump Labouring
(audible) - increased
Pressurisation of void injection rate
between the tubing
hanger and the dual
bore upper packer with
Significant increase of
chemicals.
dosing rate of
chemicals.
Pressurisation of void
between the tubing
Pump Labouring
hanger and the dual
(audible) - increased
bore upper packer with injection rate
hydraulic fluid
Regular checks of
pump pressure and
injection rates by plant
operators.
1.2
Competent fitters and
appropriate installation
procedures.
Regular checks of
pump pressure and
injection rates by plant
operators.
1.2
Competent fitters and
appropriate installation
procedures.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
To provide a sealed
11. Production tubing mechanical joint
primary barrier
between components
To provide a sealed
11. Production tubing mechanical joint
primary barrier
between components
To provide a sealed
11. Production tubing mechanical joint
primary barrier
between components
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
173
Ineffective seal
Ineffective seal
Ineffective seal
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
To provide a sealed
11. Production tubing mechanical joint
primary barrier
between components
To provide a sealed
11. Production tubing mechanical joint
primary barrier
between components
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Failure of threaded
connection
To provide a sealed
11. Production tubing mechanical joint
primary barrier
between components
To provide a facility to
isolate the A,B or C
12. Annulus Tubing
annulus and with
Bonnet seal leakage
Spool Valves - Primary
instrumentation
(metal to metal joint)
Barrier
monitor annular
pressures
Failure of threaded
connection
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Jumping out or
Joint opens
'unzipping' of the thread
Shearing of threads
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually leaking over
with body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
174
Designers and
manufact urers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
To provide a facility to
isolate the A,B or C
12. Annulus Tubing
annulus and with
Bonnet seal leakage
Spool Valves - Primary instrumentation
(metal to metal joint)
Barrier
monitor annular
pressures
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
actual specification,
stores
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
To provide a facility to
isolate the A,B or C
12. Annulus Tubing
annulus and with
Bonnet seal leakage
Spool Valves - Primary
instrumentation
(metal to metal joint)
Barrier
monitor annular
pressures
Seal incorrectly
specified
To provide a facility to
isolate the A,B or C
12. Annulus Tubing
annulus and with
Bonnet seal leakage
Spool Valves - Primary
instrumentation
(metal to metal joint)
Barrier
monitor annular
pressures
Seal incorrectly
installed
To provide a facility to
isolate the A,B or C
12. Annulus Tubing
Bonnet seal leakage
Spool Valves - Primary annulus and with
(metal to metal joint)
instrumentation
Barrier
monitor annular
pressures
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
To provide a facility to
isolate the A,B or C
12. Annulus Tubing
annulus and with
Bonnet seal leakage
Spool Valves - Primary instrumentation
(metal to metal joint)
Barrier
monitor annular
pressures
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
SYMPTOMS
None.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Effective seal not made Gas leak around seal
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced unevenly energised
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect Joint integrity reduced None.
grade of bolt fitted
175
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
To provide a facility to
isolate the A,B or C
12. Annulus Tubing
Bonnet seal leakage
annulus and with
Spool Valves - Primary
instrumentation
(metal to metal joint)
Barrier
monitor annular
pressures
To provide a facility to
isolate the A,B or C
12. Annulus Tubing
annulus and with
Bonnet seal leakage
Spool Valves - Primary
instrumentation
(metal to metal joint)
Barrier
monitor annular
pressures
FUNCTION
FAILURE
To provide a facility to
isolate the A,B or C
12. Annulus Tubing
Spool Valves - Primary annulus and with
Stem Seal Leak
instrumentat ion
Barrier
monitor annular
pressures
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
over tensioned
Employ competent
Seal distortion leading individuals and
2.3
to progressive leakage. appropriate supervision
is available.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
To provide a facility to
isolate the A,B or C
12. Annulus Tubing
annulus and with
Spool Valves - Primary
Stem Seal Leak
instrumentation
Barrier
monitor annular
pressures
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from handle
accordance with
assembly
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
Gas leaks from handle and inspection in
accordance with
assembly
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from handle
accordance with
assembly
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
To provide a facility to
isolate the A,B or C
12. Annulus Tubing
annulus and with
Spool Valves - Primary
instrumentation
Barrier
monitor annular
pressures
MITIGATION
176
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
To provide a facility to
isolate the A,B or C
12. Annulus Tubing
Fitter backs off
annulus and with
Spool Valves - Primary
Grease fitting Leakage assembly rather than
instrumentation
Barrier
just the cap
monitor annular
pressures
To provide a facility to
isolate the A,B or C
12. Annulus Tubing
annulus and with
Spool Valves - Primary
Grease fitting Leakage
instrumentation
Barrier
monitor annular
pressures
CRITICALITY
Partial leak
Audible evidence of
gas release
Audible evidence of
gas release
None.
Employ competent
individuals and
1.1
appropriate supervision
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually leaking over
with body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
properties similar to
None
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
177
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
None.
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced unevenly energised
178
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision 3.3
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
Seal distortion leading individuals and
Joint integrity reduced to progressive leakage. appropriate supervision 2.3
is available.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
To provide a facility for
pressure monitoring
Failure of Ring Gasket Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
actual specification,
equipment to be linked Seal
stores
to the A annulus
therefore no immediate
effect.
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
179
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Gas release
Possible detection by
plant operators and/or 2.3
F&G system
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually increasing
with body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
None
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced unevenly energised
180
Emplo y competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision 3.3
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
To provide a secondary
14. Tubing hanger tie
barrier between the
down bolts and seals casing spool and the tie Leakage around seal
Secondary Barrier
down bolts
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
Seal distortion leading individuals and
Joint integrity reduced
2.3
to progressive leakage. appropriate supervision
is available.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from
Joint integrity reduced
is available.
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from handle
accordance with
assembly
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from handle
accordance with
assembly
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from handle
accordance with
assembly
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Ageing of seal
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
181
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
15. Tubing hanger
thread causing trapped
Provide a seal between
pressure to leak into
downhole safety valve
the DHSV control line cavity between tubing Thread cut out of
control line upper
and the tubing hanger
tolerance
packing gland hanger and tree.
body
Secondary Barrier
On coincident failure of
lower packing gland.
No visible symptoms.
Reduced thread to
thread contact surface
Degraded mechanical
(seal maintained by
excessive PTFE for
joint, since joint relies
example)
more on excessive
sealant than intimate
thread contact.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in 3.3
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
15. Tubing hanger
Provide a seal between pressure to leak into
downhole safety valve
the DHSV control line
Thread cut out of
control line upper
cavity between tubing
and the tubing hanger
tolerance
packing gland hanger and tree.
body
Secondary Barrier
On coincident failure of
lower packing gland.
Designers and
Component will only manufacturers to have
Either male or female mate for a proportion of ISO quality systems in
3.3
threads are cut oversize the threads (rather than
place. Offshore
full length engagement)
supervisors checks and
balances.
Excessive torque
required to install.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
15. Tubing hanger
thread causing trapped
Provide a seal between
downhole safety valve
pressure to leak into
the DHSV control line
control line upper
and the tubing hanger cavity between tubing Cross threads
packing gland hanger and tree.
body
Secondary Barrier
On coincident failure of
lower packing gland.
Ineffective seal
Fitting improperly
aligned.
1.3
Suitable pressure
testing.
Leaking joint.
182
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
15. Tubing hanger
Provide a seal between thread causing trapped
downhole safety valve
pressure to leak into
the DHSV control line
control line upper
cavity between tubing Damaged threads
and the tubing hanger
packing gland hanger and tree.
body
Secondary Barrier
On coincident failure of
lower packing gland.
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
Joint difficult to make
up.
Excessive torque
required to install.
CRITICALITY
Improperly mated
threads
1.3
Fitting improperly
aligned.
Suitable pressure
testing.
Leaking joint
Leakage of gas past
threaded connection
consequently
pressurising the cavity
between tree and tubing
hanger.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
15. Tubin g hanger
Provide a seal between thread causing trapped
Leakage of gas into
downhole safety valve
pressure to leak into
the DHSV control line
control line upper
cavity between tubing Incorrect joint make-up cavity between tubing
None.
and the tubing hanger
Secondary barriers
packing gland hanger and tree.
hanger and tree.
body
provided
by
tie
down
Secondary Barrier
bolt arrangement,
On coincident failure of
chemical injection
lower packing gland.
point, downhole safety
valve point, tubing
hanger to casing spool
seal.
183
1.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
Provide a seal between
pressure to leak into
the Chemical Injection cavity between tubing Thread cut out of
line and the tubing
tolerance
hanger and tree.
hanger body
No visible symptoms.
Reduced thread to
thread contact surface
Degraded mechanical
(seal maintained by
excessive PTFE for
joint, since joint relies
example)
more on excessive
sealant than intimate
thread contact.
On coincident failure of
lower packing gland.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in 3.3
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
Provide a seal between pressure to leak into
the Chemical Injection
Thread cut out of
cavity between tubing
line and the tubing
tolerance
hanger and tree.
hanger body
Designers and
Component will only manufacturers to have
Either male or female mate for a proportion of ISO quality systems in
3.3
threads are cut oversize the threads (rather than
place. Offshore
full length engagement)
supervisors checks and
balances.
On coincident failure of
lower packing gland.
Excessive torque
required to install.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
thread causing trapped
Provide a seal bet ween
pressure to leak into
the Chemical Injection
cavity between tubing Cross threads
line and the tubing
hanger and tree.
hanger body
Ineffective seal
Fitting improperly
aligned.
1.3
Suitable pressure
testing.
On coincident failure of
lower packing gland.
Leaking joint.
184
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
Provide a seal between thread causing trapped
pressure to leak into
the Chemical Injection
cavity between tubing Damaged threads
line and the tubing
hanger and tree.
hanger body
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
Joint difficult to make
up.
Excessive torque
required to install.
Improperly mated
threads
1.3
Fitting improperly
aligned.
On coincident failure of
lower packing gland.
CRITICALITY
Suitable pressure
testing.
Leaking joint
Leakage of gas past
threaded connection
consequently
pressurising the cavity
between tree and tubing
hanger.
Loss of integrity of
packing gland body
Provide a seal between thread causing trapped
Leakage of gas into
pressure to leak into
the Chemical Injection
cavity between tubing Incorrect joint make-up cavity between tubing
None.
line and the tubing
Secondary barriers
hanger and tree.
hanger and tree.
hanger body
provided by tie down
bolt arrangement,
On coincident failure of
chemical injection
lower packing gland.
point, downhole safety
valve point, tubing
hanger to casing spool
seal.
1.3
185
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Leakage of gas around Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
actual specification,
seal
stores
therefore no immediate
effect.
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually increasing
with body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Gradual determination
of seal, causing
Leakage around seal
increasing leakage over increasing over time.
a period of time
Ageing of seal
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
186
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
actual specification,
stores
therefore no immediate
effect.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually increasing
with body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Tertiary Barrier
Seal incorrectly
installed
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
187
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Gradual determination
Leakage around seal
of seal, causing
increasing leakage over increasing over time.
a period of time
Ageing of seal
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
Pressure test of
complete assembly .
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually increasing
with body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
188
None
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
To provide a seal
between the chemical
injection line and the
Outer block assembly - gland bore
Tertiary Barrier
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Seal incorrectly
installed
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriat e supervision
is available.
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Gradual determination
of seal, causing
Leakage around seal
increasing leakage over increasing over time.
a period of time
Ageing of seal
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
To provide a seal
between the chemical
Leakage around seal
injection line and the
Outer block assembly - gland bore
Tertiary Barrier
To provide a seal
between the chemical Leakage around seal
injection line and the
Outer block assembly - gland bore
Tertiary Barrier
Seal incorrectly
installed
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
actual specification,
stores
therefore no immediate
effect.
189
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FAILURE
To provide a seal
between the chemical Leakage around seal
injection line and the
Outer block assembly - gland bore
Tertiary Barrier
To provide a seal
between the chemical
Leakage around seal
injection line and the
Outer block assembly - gland bore
Tertiary Barrier
FUNCTION
To provide a seal
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
CAUSE
EFFECT
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually increasing
with body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
Seal incorrectly
installed
SYMPTOMS
None
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
To provide a seal
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
stores
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
190
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
19. Tubing spool
downhole chemical
injection line packing
gland - Secondary
Barrier
Outer block assembly Tertiary Barrier
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
To provide a seal
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually increasing
with body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
To provide a seal
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
To provide a seal
between the gland body Leakage around seal
and the tubing spool
SYMPTOMS
None
Gradual determination
of seal, causing
Leakage around seal
increasing leakage over increasing over time.
a period of time
Ageing of seal
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
Pump Labouring
(audible)
Rupture of chemical
Provide a conduit for
injection line - between Pipework damaged
chemical injection into
tubing spool and tree during installation
production bore
cavity
191
Regular checks of
pump pressure injection
rates by plant operators.
1.2
Competent fitters and
appropriate installation
procedures.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Pressurisation of void
Pump Labouring
between the tree and
(audible) - increased
tubing spool with
injection rate
hydraulic fluid
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Regular checks of
pump pressure and
injection rates by plant
operators.
1.2
Competent fitters and
appropriate installation
procedures.
To provide containment
1. Upper Well annulus - for hydrocarbon gas to
Casing Spool failure
Primary Barrier
be injected into
production bore
Slag
inclusion/laminations,
Stress raisers and crackcold laps and other
Manufacturing defect initiators
geometric
imperfections in the
forged block.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in 1.2
place.
To provide a sealed
1. Upper Well annulus mechanical joint
Primary Barrier
between components
192
Secondary barriers
provided by tie down
bolt arrangement,
chemical injection
point, downhole safety
valve point, tubing
hanger to casing spool
seal.
None.
2.2
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
To provide a sealed
1. Upper Well annulus mechanical joint
Primary Barrier
between components
Ineffective seal
Secondary barriers
provided by tie down
bolt arrangement,
chemical injection
point, downhole safety
valve point, tubing
hanger to casing spool
seal.
None.
2.2
To provide a sealed
1. Upper Well annulus mechanical joint
Primary Barrier
between components
193
Ineffective seal
Secondary barriers
provided by tie down
bolt arrangement,
chemical injection
point, downhole safety
valve point, tubing
hanger to casing spool
seal.
None.
2.2
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
To provide a sealed
1. Upper Well annulus mechanical joint
Primary Barrier
between components
2.2
To provide a sealed
1. Upper Well annulus mechanical joint
Primary Barrier
between components
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
'unzipping' of the
thread
Joint opens
194
Secondary barriers
provided by tie down
bolt arrangement,
chemical injection
point, downhole safety
valve point, tubing
hanger to casing spool
seal.
None.
2.2
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
To provide a sealed
1. Upper Well annulus mechanical joint
Primary Barrier
between components
Failure of threaded
connection
2. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
Ineffective seal
2.2
2. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
Ineffective seal
2.2
2. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
Ineffective seal
2.2
2. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
2.2
2. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
Joint opens
'unzipping' of the thread
2.2
2. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
Failure of threaded
connection
Shearing of threads
2.2
Shearing of threads
195
2.2
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Correct specification of
seals.
2. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
2. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
Failure of housing
sealing arrangement
To provide a sealed
3. Production tubing mechanical joint
primary barrier
between components
Upper A annulus
already pressurised
Correct specification of
seals.
with gas, therefore
pressure of gas
2.1
potentially higher than
hydrocarbon fluid
inhibiting the leak into Periodic testing
the upper A annulus.
196
Designers and
Stress raisers and crack
manufacturers to have
1.2
initiators
No credible effect,
ISO quality systems in
since gas pressure
place.
should be higher than
hydrocarbon fluids.
Ineffective seal
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
To provide a sealed
3. Production tubing mechanical joint
primary barrier
between components
To provide a sealed
3. Production tubing mechanical joint
primary barrier
between components
To provide a sealed
3. Production tubing mechanical joint
primary barrier
between components
To provide a sealed
3. Production tubing mechanical joint
primary barrier
between components
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Ineffective seal
Ineffective seal
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
Joint opens
'unzipping' of the thread
197
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Shearing of threads
To provide a sealed
3. Production tubing mechanical joint
primary barrier
between components
Produce corrosion
products which are a
To give additional
source of debris and
4. B Annulus Casing - protection to the
Production casing split Corrosion (where water
can under certain
secondary barrier
formation to the top of or parted
is present)
situations apply a
the pay zone.
pressure to mating
surfaces
Failure of threaded
connection
SYMPTOMS
To give additional
4. B Annulus Casing - protection to the
Production casing split Corrosion (where water
Localised corrosion
secondary barrier
is present)
formation to the top of or parted
the pay zone.
To give additional
4. B Annulus Casing - protection to the
Production casing split
Incorrect casing design Casing could part
secondary barrier
formation to the top of or parted
the pay zone.
1.3
This less applicable to
13% Cr Alloys.
Injection of inhibitors
Optimisation of
material design and
selection
C annulus is rated to a
lower pressure than the
B annulus.
198
CRITICALITY
Degradation of
Optimisation of
components over time. material design and
selection
MITIGATION
4.3
3.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Precipitation of
To give additional
Embrittlement during Chromium Carbides
4. B Annulus Casing - protection to the
Production casing split
manufacturing process under incorrect welding
secondary barrier
formation to the top of or parted
(high alloy steels)
and heat treatment
the pay zone.
regimes.
SYMPTOMS
Gas lift pressure
leakage into the C
annulus, consequently
annular valves on C
annulus become
primary barrier.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Design and
manufacturers quality
assurance in accordance
with ISO and
equivalent.
2.3
To provide a sealed
4. B Annulus Casing mechanical joint
secondary barrier
between components
To provide a sealed
4. B Annulus Casing mechanical joint
secondary barrier
between components
Ineffective seal
Ineffective seal
199
2.2
2.2
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
To provide a sealed
4. B Annulus Casing mechanical joint
secondary barrier
between components
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Ineffective seal
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
2.2
Pressure in B and C
annulus monitored by
C annulus is rated to a
lower pressure than the plant operators.
B annulus.
To provide a sealed
4. B Annulus Casing mechanical joint
secondary barrier
between components
2.2
Pressure in B and C
annulus monitored by
C annulus is rated to a
lower pressure than the plant operators.
B annulus.
To provide a sealed
4. B Annulus Casing mechanical joint
secondary barrier
between components
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
Joint opens
'unzipping' of the thread
200
2.2
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
To provide a sealed
4. B Annulus Casing mechanical joint
secondary barrier
between components
FAILURE
Failure of threaded
connection
CAUSE
EFFECT
Shearing of threads
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
2.2
Pressure in B and C
annulus monitored by
C annulus is rated to a
lower pressure than the plant operators.
B annulus.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
5. B Annulus Tubing
Spool Valves Secondary Barrier
To provide a facility to
isolate the B annulus
and with
Bonnet seal leakage
instrumentation
(metal to metal joint)
monitor annular
pressures
Seal incorrectly
specified
5. B Annulus Tubing
Spool Valves Secondary Barrier
To provide a facility to
isolate the B annulus
and with
Bonnet seal leakage
instrumentation
(metal to metal joint)
monitor annular
pressures
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
actual specification,
stores
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
5. B Annulus Tubing
Spool Valves Secondary Barrier
To provide a facility to
isolate the B annulus
and with
Bonnet seal leakage
(metal to metal joint)
instrumentation
monitor annular
pressures
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually leaking over
with body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
201
None.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
5. B Annulus Tubing
Spool Valves Secondary Barrier
To provide a facility to
isolate the B annulus
and with
Bonnet seal leakage
instrumentation
(metal to metal joint)
monitor annular
pressures
Seal incorrectly
installed
5. B Annulus Tubing
Spool Valves Secondary Barrier
To provide a facility to
isolate the B annulus
and with
Bonnet seal leakage
instrumentation
(metal to metal joint)
monitor annular
pressures
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bolts
unevenly tensioned
5. B Annulus Tubing
Spool Valves Secondary Barrier
To provide a facility to
isolate the B annulus
and with
Bonnet seal leakage
instrumentation
(metal to metal joint)
monitor annular
pressures
Bolts installed
incorrectly - incorrect Joint integrity reduced None.
grade of bolt fitted
5. B Annulus Tubing
Spool Valves Secondary Barrier
To provide a facility to
isolate the B annulus
Bonnet seal leakage
and with
(metal to metal joint)
instrumentation
monitor annular
pressures
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
over tensioned
5. B Annulus Tubing
Spool Valves Secondary Barrier
To provide a facility to
isolate the B annulus
and with
Bonnet seal leakage
instrumentation
(metal to metal joint)
monitor annular
pressures
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
Effective seal not made Gas leak around seal
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Bolts installed
incorrectly - bonnet
under tensioned
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision 3.3
is available.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
Seal distortion leading individuals and
Joint integrity reduced to progressive leakage.
2.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from is available.
Joint integrity reduced
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
202
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
5. B Annulus Tubing
Spool Valves Secondary Barrier
To provide a facility to
isolate the B annulus
and with
Stem Seal Leak
instrumentation
monitor annular
pressures
5. B Annulus Tubing
Spool Valves Secondary Barrier
To provide a facility to
isolate the B annulus
and with
Stem Seal Leak
instrumentation
monitor annular
pressures
5. B Annulus Tubing
Spool Valves Secondary Barrier
To provide a facility to
isolate the B annulus
and with
Stem Seal Leak
instrumentation
monitor annular
pressures
5. B Annulus Tubing
Spool Valves Secondary Barrier
To provide a facility to
isolat e the B annulus
Fitter backs off
and with
Grease fitting Leakage assembly rather than
instrumentation
just the cap
monitor annular
pressures
5. B Annulus Tubing
Spool Valves Secondary Barrier
To provide a facility to
isolate the B annulus
and with
Grease fitting Leakage
instrumentation
monitor annular
pressures
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Perform maintenance
Gas leaks from handle and inspection in
accordance with
assembly
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and in spection in
Gas leaks from handle
accordance with
assembly
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from handle
accordance with
assembly
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
Partial leak
Audible evidence of
gas release
Audible evidence of
gas release
None.
Employ competent
individuals and
1.1
appropriate supervision
is available.
203
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
6. Upper annulus tubing To provide a facility for
spool monitor and vent pressure monitoring
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
Failure of bonnet seal
None
actual specification,
assembly - Secondary equipment to be linked
stores
Barrier
to the B annulus
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually leaking over
with body causing
time
differential cell to be
setup.
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None.
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
204
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
Seal distortion leading individuals and
Joint integrity reduced to progressive leakage. appropriate supervision 2.3
is available.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriat e supervision
Instantaneous leak from is available.
Joint integrity reduced
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
205
Gas release
Possible detection by
plant operators and/or 2.3
F&G system
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
properties similar to
None
actual specification,
therefore no immediate
effect.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually increasing
with body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
2.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
None
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
2.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
206
Sealing arrangement
Joint integrity reduced unevenly energised
Employ competent
individuals and
3.3
appropriate supervision
is available.
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
3.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Employ competent
Seal distortion leading individuals and
Joint integrity reduced to progressive leakage. appropriate supervision 2.3
is available.
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
Instantaneous leak from is available.
Joint integrity reduced
2.3
bonnet
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
Perform maintenance
and inspection in
Gas leaks from handle
accordance with
assembly
manufacturers
requirements.
2.4
7. B annulus tubing
To provide a seal
spool to casing hanger between the casing
Leakage around seal
seal - Primary Barrier hanger and casing spool
207
3.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
7. B annulus tubing
To provide a seal
Leakage around seal
spool to casing hanger between the casing
seal - Primary Barrier hanger and casing spool
CAUSE
EFFECT
Seal incorrectly
installed
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Employ competent
individuals and
appropriate supervision
is available.
1.1
Pressure tested after
envelope broken.
7. B annulus tubing
To provide a seal
spool to casing hanger between the casing
Leakage around seal
seal - Primary Barrier hanger and casing spool
7. B annulus tubing
To provide a seal
spool to casing hanger between the casing
Leakage around seal
seal - Primary Barrier hanger and casing spool
7. B annulus tubing
To provide a seal
spool to casing hanger between the casing
Leakage around seal
seal - Primary Barrier hanger and casing spool
7. B annulus tubing
To provide a seal
spool to casing hanger between the casing
Leakage around seal
seal - Primary Barrier hanger and casing spool
Dimensions, chemical
and mechanical
Wrong seal taken from properties similar to
None
actual specification,
stores
therefore no immediate
effect.
Seal incorrectly
specified
Seal incorrectly
specified
Material specification
of seal incompatible
Gradually increasing
with body causing
leak over time.
differential cell to be
setup.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Seal incorrectly
specified in design
None
Ageing of seal
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
1.2
supervisors checks and
balances i.e. permit to
work system etc.
Designers and
manufacturers to have
ISO quality systems in
place. Offshore
supervisors checks and
balances.
2.2
Pressure test of
complete assembly.
208
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
1. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
2.2
1. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
Ineffective seal
2.2
1. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
Ineffective seal
2.2
1. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
2.2
1. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
'unzipping' of the
thread
Joint opens
2.2
1. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
Failure of threaded
connection
Shearing of threads
2.2
Correct specification of
seals.
1. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
Failure of housing
sealing arrangement
209
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
1. Annulus downhole
To provide addition
safety valve - Primary
barrier in A annulus
Barrier
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
Incorrectly set
Determination of the
packer sealing element None.
None.
To provide a conduit
3. Lower well annulus
for the gas to be
(9 5/8") - Primary
injected into the
Barrier
production string
None.
Produce corrosion
products which are a
source of debris and
Lower annulus casing Corrosion (where water
can under certain
split or parted
is present)
situations apply a
pressure to mating
surfaces
210
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Upper A annulus
Correct specification of
already pressurised
with gas, therefore
seals.
pressure of gas
2.1
potentially higher than
hydrocarbon fluid
inhibiting the leak into Periodic testing
the upper A annulus.
Periodic checks of
upper A annulus
pressure.
2.2
Pressure testing when
packer was originally
installed.
Periodic checks of
upper A annulus
pressure.
2.2
Pressure testing when
packer was originally
installed.
Periodic checks of
upper A annulus
pressure.
2.2
Pressure testing when
packer was originally
installed.
Degradation of
Optimisation of
components over time. material design and
selection
1.3
This less applicable to
13% Cr Alloys.
Injection of inhibitors
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
To provide a conduit
3. Lower well annulus
for the gas to be
(9 5 /8") - Primary
injected into the
Barrier
production string
FUNCTION
To provide a conduit
3. Lower well annulus
for the gas to be
(9 5/8") - Primary
injected into the
Barrier
production string
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
Optimisation of
Deep pits and cavities.
material design and
selection
If equipment is left for
an extended period of
Good corrosion
time full wall
management strategy
perforation can occur.
and execution.
Gas lift pressure
leakage into the B
annulus, consequently
annular valves on B
annulus become
primary barrier.
CRITICALITY
4.3
3.3
B annulus is rated to a
lower pressure than the
A annulus.
To provide a conduit
3. Lower well annulus
for the gas to be
(9 5/8") - Primary
injected into the
Barrier
production string
211
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
2.2
Additional loading on Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
plant operators.
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
plant operators.
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Ineffective seal
2.2
Additional loading on Pressure in upper A
the dual bore upper
annulus monitored by
packer (hydrostatic
plant operators.
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
212
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
2.2
Additional loading on Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
plant operators.
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Failure of threaded
connection
Jumping out or
Joint opens
'unzipping' of the thread
2.2
Additional loading on Pressure in upper A
annulus monitored by
the dual bore upper
packer (hydrostatic
plant operators.
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
Failure of threaded
connection
Shearing of threads
2.2
Additional loading on Pressure in upper A
the dual bore upper
annulus monitored by
packer (hydrostatic
plant operators.
head, weight of tubing
and gas lift pressure)
213
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
4. Side Pocket
Mandrels (SPM) Primary Barrier
To provide a means of
Orifice valve fails to
injecting gas into the
open on demand
bore string
4. Side Pocket
Mandrels (SPM) Primary Barrier
FAILURE
To provide a means of
Orifice valve fails to
injecting gas into the
open on demand
bore string
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Manufacturers and
designers quality
assurance scheme in
accordance with ISO or
Gas lift is not effective, equivalent.
1.2
if well is reliant on gas
lift well may not flow.
Orifice valves checked
before installation in
well.
Manufacturers and
Gas lift is not effective,
designers quality
if well is reliant on gas
assurance scheme in
lift well may not flow.
accordance with ISO or
equivalent.
1.2
Lower A annulus is
pressurised beyond
normal operating
conditions.
Chemical injection
pipework and fittings
should be designed and
constructed for all
reasonably foreseeable
events.
2.3
Chemical injection
Chemical injection line
pressure should be
pressurised with
monitored by
injection gas when not
competent individuals.
injecting chemicals.
Combination of
vibration and tension in
line due to slippage of
supports.
Fatigue
Pressure cyclic effects
from injecting.
214
Correct supporting
arrangement.
2.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Incorrect installation
Chemical injection
pipework and fittings
should be designed and
Chemical injection line constructed for all
subject to backpressure reasonably foreseeable
from injection gas
events.
under normal chemical
2.3
inject ion activities.
Chemical injection
pressure will increase. Chemical injection
pressure should be
monitored by
competent individuals.
Chemical injection line
pressurised with
injection gas when not
injecting chemicals.
Corrosion of fittings
215
Corrosion/materials
engineer to ensure
compatibility of
materials with
environment.
2.3
SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
FUNCTION
FAILURE
CAUSE
EFFECT
SYMPTOMS
MITIGATION
CRITICALITY
Upper chemical
Periodic checks of
injection line seal to
dual bore upper packer upper A annulus
takes lower A annulus pressure.
Gas passing from lower pressure. Coincidental
2.2
annulus to upper
failure of upper
annulus
chemical injection line
seal to dual bore upper Pressure testing when
packer was originally
packer to upper A
annulus pressurise with installed.
gas.
Failure of upper
chemical injection line
seal to dual bore upper
packer to upper A
Periodic checks of
annulus pressurise with upper A annulus
gas.
pressure.
Gas passing from lower
annulus to upper
annulus
2.2
Failure of lower
Pressure testing when
chemical injection line packer was originally
seal to dual bore upper installed.
packer to upper A
annulus pressurise with
gas.
216
APPENDIX G
DUAL COMPLETION MODEL DRAWINGS
217
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APPENDIX H
SINGLE COMPLETION MODEL DRAWINGS
239
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ISBN 0-7176-2244-4
OTO 2001/061
35.00
9 780717 622443