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AQUINO VS ENRILE
Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of
a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino
and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer contained a common
and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger
against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state
of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger
against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the Presidents order.

Nature of the case: These (consolidated) cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having
been arrested and detained by the military by virtue of the President's Proclamation No. 1081, dated
September 21, 1972.
Facts: The petitioners were all arrested and detained by the military pursuant to the order of the Pres
Ferdinand Marcos even without any charge against them. The petitioners filed a petition for Habeas Corpuz
against then Minister if National Defence Juan Ponce Enrile. For his part, enrile asserted that the arrests
were all valid in accordance with Proclamation 1081.
Issue: Is the declaration of Martial Law valid? Corrolarily, is the petition for Habeas Corpus meritorious?
Holding: Yes on first; no on the second.
Rationale: The question of validity of Proclamation No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory
provision of the 1973 Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that "all proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of
the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after ... the ratification of this Constitution
..."
The political-or-justiciable question controversy indeed, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases
into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has become
moot and purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973. The question
propounded to the voters was: "Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires, can continue
in office beyond 1973. Do you want President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he
initiated under Martial Law?" The overwhelming majority of those who cast their ballots, including citizens
between 15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the proposal. The question was thereby removed from the
area of presidential power under the Constitution and transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself.
Whatever may be the nature of the exercise of that power by the President in the beginning whether or
not purely political and therefore non-justiciable this Court is precluded from applying its judicial
yardstick to the act of the sovereign.
implicit in a state of martial law is the suspension of the said privilege with respect to persons arrested or
detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation
of society and national survival take precedence. On this particular point, that is, that the proclamation of
martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to, the Court is
practically unanimous.
Dispositive: Petitions dismissed.

MMDA vs CRMB
Nature of the case: This is a Rule 45 petition seeking to overturn the CA decision which upheld the RTC
decision ordering the petitioners to Clean up and rehabilite Manila Bay.
FACTS: The controversy started when respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite in 1999 against several government agencies, for the
cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of
the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically the Philippine
Environment Code. Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to
the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
In 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Finding merit in the complaint, the Court
ordered defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and
restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact
recreation. The Court of Appeals Sustained the RTCs Decision
ISSUES: Whether or not pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning
of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
HOLDING: In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the
extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge
their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set
timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and
the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be
over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring
back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may
be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded
individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State,
through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision
specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them
cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean
and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
Dispositive: Petition denied.

Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013


posted in RESWRI2 cases by katcobing
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and
also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

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The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said
TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued
a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be
modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment as it would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning
the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the
validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise
the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul
protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was
not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of
the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and
violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause
of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family
as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue
delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time
so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it
may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by
favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones
defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention that by not allowing
mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic

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autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court
shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for
compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power
to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

PEOPLE VS JUMAWAN
The Supreme Court in the case of People vs Jumawan (GR 187495, 21 April 2014) En Banc Reyes J, affirmed
the conviction of a husband for marital rape, rejected the notion that a wife is a mans property, and
described the nature of the right of coition between spouses under our laws. A highlight of the Supreme
Courts reasoning is hereunder quoted:
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual
intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow
human being with dignity equal[120][Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article I: All human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.] to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to
violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the
Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet
irrational notions on marital activities[121][UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women, Article 4: States should condemn violence against women and should not invoke any custom,
tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination. States should
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against women xxx.]
that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code,[122][Article 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (Emphasis ours)] obligates
the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of
love, that are both spontaneous and mutual[123][See Tsai v. CA, 334 Phil. 294, 304 (1997).] and not the
kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty
and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in
the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the
hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each
others feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital
relationship.[124][Id. at 304.] When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance
a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its
lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels
aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wifes absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may
legally seek the courts intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential
marital obligation.[125][Refusal to have sexual intercourse must be rooted on psychological incapacity
which in tum must be established by the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability;
Baccay v. Baccay, G.R. No. 173138, December 1, 2010, 636 SCRA 350, 368-369; See also the Concurring
Opinion of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion in the case stating that: The failure to consummate the
marriage by itself, however, does not constitute as a ground to nullify the marriage. The spouses refusal
to have intimate sexual relations must be due to causes psychological in nature, i.e., the psychological
condition of the spouse renders [her] incapable of having intimate sexual relations with the other.xx x.

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636 SCRA 350, 375.] But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or
violently.
A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with
impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried woman.
[128][Supra note 92. 1 Hale, History of Pleas of the Crown, pp. 628-629 (1736), as cited in People v.
Liberta, Court of Appeals of New York, 474 N.E. 2D 567 (1984).] She can give or withhold her consent to a
sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she
refuses.
The ruling in People vs Jumawan (GR 187495, 21 April 2014) that a husband can be guilty of rape if he has
sexual intercourse with his wife without her consent is consistent with the rule that a spouses right to
have sexual intercourse with his wife cannot be enforced in Court. If the husband cannot use the courts to
compel a wife to have sexual intercourse with him, then surely the husband cannot use the existence of
the marital relationship per se to exculpate himself from criminal liability for rape.
The Supreme Court in People vs Jumawan (GR 187495, 21 April 2014) declared that [n]either can the
Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its
victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from the victims of non-marital rape.

A Review Of The Provisions Of Republic Ac 9344 Reveals That


Imprisonment Of Children In Conflict With The Law Is By No Means
Prohibited
March 12, 2015 by The Lawyer's Post
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:
Rosal, the accused, was only 17 year, 4 months and 2 days old when he killed Jayson with a knife, thus
Rosal was charged with Homicide. Finding merits in the prosecutions case, the Regional Trial Court
convicted him of Homicide and imposed the penalty of indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of four
years and one day of prision correcional as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum. When he appealed to the Court of Appeals, his sentence was modified in that he was sentenced
to six months and one day of prision correctional as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor,
as maximum. On motion for reconsideration, however, the Court of Appeals partially granted Rosals
appeal and imposed on him the penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. It remanded the case to the RTC to determine
whether or not Rosal is entitled to probation. Not satisfied with the ruling, Rosal appealed to the Supreme
Court. According to him, the CA should have suspended his sentence in accordance with Republic Act
9344; that he is entitled to probation or suspension of sentence, and the CA did not impose the correct
penalty.
The Supreme Court:
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide.
Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17
years, four months and 28 days old when he committed the homicide on March 30, 20 Per his birth
certificate, Rosals date of birth was November 2, 1982 [1] such minority was a privileged mitigating
circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor[2].
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the
penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional (i.e., six months and
one day to six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision mayor in its medium period
eight years and one day to 10 years -was proper because there were no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six
months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum.

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The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years and one
day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for
probation under Presidential Decree No. 968.
The petitioners insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No.
9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause
the Court to deliberately violate the law.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC[3] (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding principles in the
trial and judging in cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One of them is that found in Section 46
(2), in conjunction with Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be
limited to the minimum[4]. Consistent with this principle, the amended decision of the CA imposed the
ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On
its part, Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to reduce or
lower the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for
probation.
Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968[5], which disqualifies from probation an offender
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years, the petitioner could not
qualify for probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA to remand the case to the trial court
to determine if he was qualified for probation.
Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict
with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the child offender turns 21
years of age, pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. -If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child
in conflict with the law has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for homicide by the
RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible.
Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation of his rights as a child in
conflict with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and international agreements.
A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of children in
conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on
children in conflict with the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty;
imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the
imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and
(b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time. Thereby, the trial
and appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty
of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed as a last recourse after holding
him to be disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his
imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.
A survey of relevant international agreements[6] supports the course of action taken herein. The United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines[7]), the
United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and the United

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Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty[8][ are consistent in recognizing that
imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided it is imposed as a last resort and for the minimum
necessary period.
Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence,
may serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, in a manner consistent with the offender childs best interest. Such service of sentence will
be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the amended decision
promulgated on December 7, 2006 in C.A.- G.R. CR No. 29295, but DELETING the order to remand the
judgment to the trial court for implementation; and DIRECTS the Bureau of Corrections to commit the
petitioner for the service of his sentence in an agricultural camp or other training facilities under its
control, supervision and management, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 176102, November 26, 2014, ROSAL HUBILLA Y CARILLO, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

[1] Per his birth certificate, Rosals date of birth was November 2, 1982.
[2] Article 68, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
[3] Resolution dated November 24, 2009.
[4] Section 46 (2), A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. See also Sec. 5 (k) of RA
9344 which provides: Every child in conflict with the law shall have the following rights, including but not
limited to:
xxxx
(k) the right to have restrictions on his/her personal liberty limited to the minimum, and where discretion is
given by law to the judge to determine whether to impose fine or imprisonment, the imposition of fine
being preferred as the more appropriate penalty; (Emphasis Supplied)
[5] Establishing A Probation System, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes (July 24, 1976).
[6] The provisions of all these agreements are adopted by or incorporated in RA 9344, per Section 5.
[7] 19.1 of the Beijing Guidelines (November 29, 1985) provides: The placement of a juvenile in an
institution shall be a disposition of last resort and for the minimum necessary period. Also 17.1 (b) also
provides that: Restrictions on the personal liberty of the juvenile shall be imposed only after careful
consideration and shall be limited to the possible minimum.
[8] Fundamental Perspectives No. 2 states: Juveniles should only be deprived of their liberty in accordance
with the principles and procedures set forth in these Rules and in the United Nations standard minimum
rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules). Deprivation of the liberty of a juvenile
should be a disposition of last resort and for the minimum necessary period and should be limited to
exceptional cases. The length of the sanction should be determined by judicial authority, without
precluding the possibility of his or her early release.

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