NORIEL R. MONTIERRO vs. RICKMERS MARINE AGENCY PHILS.

,
INC., G.R. No. 210634, January 14, 2015
Noriel R. Montierro vs Rickmers Marine Agency
The procedure is as follows: when a seafarer sustains a workrelated illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness
for work shall be determined by the company-designated
physician. The physician has 120 days, or 240 days, if
validly extended, to make the assessment. If the physician
appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the
company-designated physician, the opinion of a third doctor
may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer,
whose decision shall be final and binding on them.

240 DAYS
BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. vs CARLOS L. FLORES, JR., G.R. No. 207639,
July 1, 2015
Be that as it may, the CA is nevertheless correct in holding that respondent
is deemed to be suffering from a permanent total disability. Records reveal
that after respondent was repatriated on April 18, 2009, he underwent
continuous medical care from the company-designated physician. He was
even given an interim disability rating of Grade 7 (moderate residual or
disorder) on July 17, 2009 and thereafter, went through further tests and
procedures. However, after October 12, 2009, respondent's treatment
stopped without him recovering from his ailment. Notably, the companydesignated physician neither issued to respondent a fit-to-work certification
nor a final disability rating on or before December 14, 2009, the 240th day
since respondent's repatriation. Case law instructs that, if after the lapse of
the 240-day period, the seafarer is still incapacitated to perform his usual
sea duties and the company-designated physician had not yet declared him
fit to work or permanently disabled, whether total or permanent, the
conclusive presumption that the seafarer is totally and permanently disabled
arises. Perforce, it is but proper to hold that respondent was permanently
and totally disabled, and hence, entitled to the corresponding benefits stated
under the CBA.
totally and permanently disabled no need to undergo third opinion ;
conclusive presumption ; Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC. 240 days
;
Al O. Eyana vs. Philippine Transmarine G.R. No. 193468, January 28, 2015

In

addition, that it was by operation of law that brought forth the

conclusive presumption that Munar is totally and permanently disabled,
there is no legal compulsion for him to observe the procedure prescribed
under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC. A seafarers compliance with such
procedure presupposes that the company-designated physician came up
with an assessment as to his fitness or unfitness to work before the
expiration of the 120-day or 240-day periods. Alternatively put, absent a
certification from the company-designated physician, the seafarer had
nothing to contest and the law steps in to conclusively characterize his
disability as total and permanent. Al O. Eyana vs. Philippine Transmarine
Al O. Eyana vs. Philippine Transmarine G.R. No. 193468, January 28, 2015

In Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, likewise involving a seafarer who had
sustained a spinal injury and had lost two-thirds of his trunks lifting power,
the Court is emphatic that:
Indeed, under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or
disabilities that are classified as Grade 1 may be considered as total
and permanent. However, if those injuries or disabilities with a
disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would
incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a
period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for
further medical treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation,
totally and permanently disabled. xxx.
Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to
arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarers fitness to work or
permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should
he fail to do so and the seafarers medical condition remains
unresolved, the seafarer s
hall be deemed totally and permanently
disabled.
Al O. Eyana vs. Philippine Transmarine G.R. No. 193468, January 28, 2015

In Seagull Maritime Corporation v. Dee, the Court declared that:

Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn
wages in the same kind of work or work of a similar nature that he was
trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a
person of his mentality and attainment can do. It does not mean state
of absolute helplessness but inability to do substantially all material
acts necessary to the prosecution of a gainful occupation without
serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to life.

In disability compensation, it is not the injury per se which is

compensated but the incapacity to work.
Although private respondents injury was undeniably confined to his
left foot only, we cannot close our eyes, as petitioners would like us to,
to the inescapable impact of private respondents injury on his
capacity to work as a seaman. In their desire to escape liability from
private respondents rightful claim, petitioners denigrated the fact that
even if private respondent insists on continuing to work as a seaman,
no profit minded employer will hire him. His injury erased all these
possibilities.
Al O. Eyana vs. Philippine Transmarine G.R. No. 193468, January 28, 2015

The petitioner cannot thus be faulted that he opted for physical therapy
instead of surgery. If indeed surgery was the only way for the petitioner to
be able to fully recover from his injury, he should have been categorically
informed of such fact and warned of the consequences of his choice. The
petitioner did not refuse treatment. He just availed of an option presented to
him. Besides, even if he underwent surgery, there is likewise no assurance of
full recovery.
Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. vs. Arnel G. Dela Torre G.R. No. 214132,
Febaruary 18, 2015

The respondent underwent several physical therapy sessions, and finally

on March 10, 2011 the company-designated physician assessed him with a
Grade 11 disability for slight rigidity or one-third loss of motion or lifting
power of trunk. Nonetheless, he was informed of the assessment only in May
2011, or more than 240 days since the accident.
Xxx

xxx

xxx

It was held in Kestrel that the POEA SEC provides merely for the basic or
minimal acceptable terms of a seafarers employment contract, thus, in the
assessment of whether his injury is partial and permanent, the same must
be so characterized not only under the Schedule of Disabilities in Section 32
of the POEA SEC, but also under the relevant provisions of the Labor Code
and the AREC implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code. According to
Kestrel, while the seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he must not be
precluded from earning doing the same work he had before his injury or
disability or that he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness
or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful employment for more than
120 or 240 days, as may be the case, then he shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled.

Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. vs. Arnel G. Dela Torre G.R. No. 214132,
Febaruary 18, 2015

Thus,

that the respondent required therapy beyond 240 days and

remained unable to perform his customary work during this time rendered
unnecessary any further need by him to secure his own doctors opinion or
that of a neutral third doctor to determine the extent of his permanent
disability.
It is expressly provided in Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code that a
temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than [120] days,
except as otherwise provided in the Rules, shall be deemed total and
permanent. Section 2(b), Rule VII of the AREC, likewise provides that a
disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the
employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous
period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided under Rule X of
these Rules.
As to sickness allowance, Section 2(a), Rule X of the AREC, referred to in
Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, reads:
Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement (a) The income benefit shall be paid
beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or
sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where
such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days
but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for
temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare
the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous
temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss
or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.
For its part, the POEA SEC for seafarers provides in Paragraph 3 of Section
20(B) thereof that:
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is
entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed
by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed
one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment
medical examination by a company-designated physician within three
working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to
do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is
deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory
reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the
above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third
doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The
third doctors decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. vs. Arnel G. Dela Torre G.R. No. 214132,
Febaruary 18, 2015

In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,15 the Court ruled that it is of

no consequence that the seafarer recovered from his illness or injury, for
what is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for
more than 120 days, and this constitutes total permanent disability:
Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent
was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001. Nonetheless, this
information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent
was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. It is of no
consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years. The law
does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is
that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days
which constitutes permanent total disability. An award of a total and
permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the
benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time
when he is unable to work.
Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. vs. Arnel G. Dela Torre G.R. No. 214132,
Febaruary 18, 2015

Thus,

that the respondent required therapy beyond 240 days and

remained unable to perform his customary work during this time rendered
unnecessary any further need by him to secure his own doctors opinion or
that of a neutral third doctor to determine the extent of his permanent
disability.

WORK RELATION
Pedrol Libang, Jr. vs Indochina Ship Management Inc., Mr. Miguel Santos and
Majestic Carriers, Inc. G.R. No. 189863, September 17, 2014

What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct

[causal connection]. It is sufficient that the hypothesis on which the
seamans claim is based is probable. Probability, not [certainty] is the
touchstone. (Azucena Salalima vs. ECC and SSS, G.R. No. 146360, May 20,
2004). It is not also far[-]fetched that [Libang] may have been required to
work for long hours as cook of an ocean-going vessel and thus, his exposure
to harmful chemicals increased. Therefore, there is reasonable basis to
conclude that the nature of [Libangs] work as cook contributed, even to

small degree, to the development of his illness. (Heirs of the Late R/O
Reynaldo Aniban vs. NLRC, 282 SCRA 377).
Pedrol Libang, Jr. vs Indochina Ship Management Inc., Mr. Miguel Santos and
Majestic Carriers, Inc. G.R. No. 189863, September 17, 2014

In Xavier Ramos v. BPI Family Savings Bank, and/or Alfonso L. Salcedo,

Jr.,34 the Court explained that grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment
that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered grave, the
discretionary authority must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
by or to act at all in contemplation of law. In labor disputes, the NLRCs
findings are said to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when its
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence.35 Substantial
evidence pertains to such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion
Pedrol Libang, Jr. vs Indochina Ship Management Inc., Mr. Miguel Santos and
Majestic Carriers, Inc. G.R. No. 189863, September 17, 2014

The CA rejected the NLRCs decision upon finding that Libangs disability
was based solely on a medical certificate issued by Dr. Vicaldo. There was,
however, no dispute that Libang suffered from hypertension, diabetes
mellitus type 2 and small pontine infarct, as this was indicated in the medical
certificates that were issued by the company-designated physician, Dr. Lim,
on August 2, 200338 and August 13, 2003.39 In his affidavit dated July 16,
2004, Dr. Lim again confirmed that Libang was diagnosed to have
hypertension, right middle cerebral artery infarct vs. brainstem infarct and
diabetes mellitus 2. Libang was even said to be under his medical care and
treatment from April 10, 2003 to January 5, 2004.40 In none of these
issuances, however, did Dr. Lim indicate a complete evaluation of Libangs
illnesses and an assessment of his disability or fitness to work.
Rather than making a full assessment of Libangs health condition, disability
or fitness, Dr. Lim only reasoned in his medical certificate dated August 13,
2003 that [Libangs] hypertension could be pre-existing and that it [was]
difficult to say whether [his diabetes mellitus and small pontine infarct] are
pre-existing or not.41 His assessment was evidently uncertain and the
extent of his examination for a proper medical diagnosis was incomplete. The
alleged concealment by Libang of his hypertension during his preemployment medical examination was also unsubstantiated, but was a mere
hearsay purportedly relayed to Dr. Lim by one Dr. Aileen Corbilla, his coattending physician.42 A categorical statement from Dr. Lim that Libangs
illnesses were pre-existing and non-work-related was made only in his
affidavit dated July 16, 2004, or after the subject labor complaint had been

filed. Still, Dr. Lim gave no explanation for his statement that Libangs
illnesses were not work-related.
Pedrol Libang, Jr. vs Indochina Ship Management Inc., Mr. Miguel Santos and
Majestic Carriers, Inc. G.R. No. 189863, September 17, 2014

Clearly, there was a breach by Dr. Lim of his obligation as the companydesignated physician. Although Libang repeatedly argued that Dr. Lim failed
to give an assessment of his illness, herein respondents and Dr. Lim failed to
explain and justify such failure. In Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, the
Court emphasized that the company-designated physician is expected to
arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarers fitness or permanent
disability within the 120 or 240 days, as the case may be; otherwise, he shall
be deemed totally and permanently disabled. The Court shall, nonetheless,
not make such a declaration in this case because by Libangs plea for a
reinstatement of the labor tribunals rulings, he was of the position that his
disability was not total and permanent.
Pedrol Libang, Jr. vs Indochina Ship Management Inc., Mr. Miguel Santos and
Majestic Carriers, Inc. G.R. No. 189863, September 17, 2014

Given the failure of Dr. Lim to fully evaluate Libangs illness, disability or
fitness to work, the seafarer was justified in seeking the medical expertise of
his physician of choice. The NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
considering Dr. Vicaldos assessment. As against an incomplete evaluation by
Dr. Lim, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Vicaldo included a
determination of the disability grade that applied to Libangs condition.
Pedrol Libang, Jr. vs Indochina Ship Management Inc., Mr. Miguel Santos and
Majestic Carriers, Inc. G.R. No. 189863, September 17, 2014

The respondents could not be allowed to benefit from their physician's

inaction or refusal to disclose the results of the diagnostic tests performed
upon Libang, the extent of the patient's illnesses, and the effect of the
severity of these illnesses on his fitness or disability. The respondents even
failed to sufficiently dispute the finding of the LA and NLRC that Libang's
illnesses had resulted in a Grade VI disability.
All told, the labor tribunals acted reasonably when they relied upon the
findings of Dr. Vicaldo. The CA then erred in holding that the NLRC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing its resolutions that favored Libang.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/april2007/165156.htm
company vs. personal physician

work relation; pre existing; congenital disease; work- aggravated;

compensable
DOHLE-PHILMAN MANNING AGENCY, INC. vs HEIRS OF ADRES G. GAZZINGAN,
G.R. No. 199568

It must also be pointed out that Gazzingan was in good health and fit to

work when he was engaged by petitioners to work on board the vessel M/V
Gloria. His PEME showed essentially normal findings with no hypertension
and without any heart problems. It was only while rendering duty that he
experienced symptoms. This is supported by a medical report issued by
Cartagena de Indias Hospital in Colombia stating that Gazzingan suffered
intense chest and back pains, shortness of breath and a slightly elevated
blood pressure while performing his duties. Therefore, even assuming that
Gazzingan had a pre-existing condition, as alleged by petitioners, this does
not totally negate the probability and the possibility that his aortic dissection
was aggravated by his work conditions. The stress caused by his job actively
contributed to the progression and aggravation of his illness. In
compensation cases, [i]t is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage
between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a
rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the
establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition
he might have had.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/june2015/199568.pdf
Bengson case link work-relation case:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/oct2014/gr_198528_2014.html
There is no doubt the illness which brought about the death of the
seafarer was acquired during the term of employment. Since his PreEmployment Medical Examination clears him as FIT AS FOR SEA
DUTY from the records it is shown that he was complaining of
pain
October 30, 2012 Five(5) months into his contract and serving
at the ship. He was medically repatriated on November 10, 2012
for the same reason.
As to the question of what is work related illness, the POEA-SEC set out the
conditions under Section 32(A) to be present.
32-A for an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to
be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied.
1. Seafarer's work must involve the risk described therein

2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarers exposure to the

described risks
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such
other factors necessary to contract it.
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer
duties
seven

The above mentioned conditions are satisfied in this case. The Seafarers
as an Ordinary Seaman involve working two four hour watches a day,
days a week. His duties include but not limited to
1. Upkeep Painting, cleaning, and polishing of ship brightwork; the
collection and disposal of garbage; maintenance and repair of
various types of equipment.
2. Cargo Handling ropes and wires; storing and securing of items;
assisting with the movement of cargo on and off the ship.
3. Lookout Standing watch both in port and at sea.
4. Other Duties - Assisting with any aspect of the ship's operation and
maintenance that the superior Seamen or Officers feel is necessary.

It is clear that any if not all of the said duties performed by the seafarer
contributed to
him contracting Gastrointestinal TB.Pathology of the
illness shows that Gastrointestinal TB
or Tuberculous enteritis can
result from swallowing of infected sputum, ingestion of
contaminated food, hematogenous spread, and direct
extension from adjacent organs.
Since the Pre-Employment record of the seafarer shows that cleared as fit to
work 5 months before he started feeling pain. A logical connection can
therefore be made that the illness was contracted while he was
performing his duties. There could only be one logical conclusion, that the
disease was contracted during the seafarers performance of his duties and is
therefore, work related.
It is wise to remember that in several cases the Supreme court has upheld
the ruling in GSIS v. Emmanuel Catupay stating that;
GSIS v. Emmanuel Cantupay G.R. No. 168862, April 30, 2008.
What the law requires is a reasonable work connection and not a
direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the
workmen's claim is based is probable. Probability, not the ultimate
degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.
Albeit, Gastrointestinal TB is not listed as an occupational disease under
Section 32-A of the Amended POEA-SEC. Nonetheless, section(B), Paragraph
(4) of the said contract states that those illnesses not listed in section
32-A of this contract are DISPUTABLY PRESUMED as work related.

This places upon the employer the burden to overcome the statutory
presumption. Hence, unless contrary evidence is presented by the seafarers
employer/s, this disputable presumption stands (Fil-star maritime corporation
v Rosete, G.R. No. 192686, November 23, 2011, 662 SCRA 247, 255.)
Work relation; Causal connection; no necessary to prove certainty;
Xxx it is not necessary that Taok prove with certainty that it was his
work that caused his illness. As he displayed no signs of having
any cardiovascular disease prior to being employed, it would
suffice that there was evidence that he manifested the
symptoms of his medical condition during his employment to
show the probability of a causal relationship. (C.F. SHARP CREW
MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. vs. JOEL D. TAOK, ,G.R. No. 193679,
July 18, 2012)
Permanent total disability
Camorals treatment extended beyond 120 days and although
the maximum cure was attained, both the company doctor and
Camorals private doctor agreed that in his condition he could
no longer return to his job as ice carver. Significantly, the
companys neuro-spine surgeon, Dr. Sih, in her letter-bulletin
particularly noted that considering the patients nature of work
(entailing heavy weight lifting), he is assessed to be disabled/not fit to
go back to work. Camorals own physician, Dr. Catapang, found that
he continued to complain and suffer from neck pain despite
continuous therapy, and the pain is made worse by neck
rotation, something that obviously cannot be prevented in a
manual occupation, and he concluded that Camoral has lost his
pre-injury capacity and is UNFIT to work back at his previous
occupation as a seafarer.(Maunlad tansport vs Camoral G.R. No.
211454 February 11, 2015)
DOHLE-PHILMAN MANNING AGENCY, INC., DOHLE (IOM) LIMITED vs HEIRS
OF NDRES G. GAZZINGAN G.R. No. 199568, June 17, 2015
SUMMARY:
In this case the supreme court awarded disability benefits to a seafarer who was ill
with a congenital disease which symptoms manifested onboard and caused his
repatriation. After a short period of treatment he died of the illness. They racitionate
that although his illness was preexisting his work has contributed or aggravated to a
degree to his illness. What is more interesting is the ruling of the supreme court
modifying the award of the labor arbiter for Death benefits of $50,000 to $60,000
US because his illness had incapacitated him from acquiring gainful employment
within 120 days.

Salient portions of the ruling:

Gazzingans work as a messman is not confined mainly to serving food and
beverages to all officers and crew; he was likewise tasked to assist the chief
cook/chef steward, and thus performed most if not all the duties in the ships
steward department.

In the performance of his duties, he

is bound to suffer chest and back pains, which
could have caused or aggravated his illness . As aptly
observed by the CA, Gazzingans strenuous duties caused him to suffer physical
stress which exposed him to injuries. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that
Gazzingans employment has contributed to some degree to the development of his
disease.

Gazzingan was in good health

and fit to work when he was engaged by
petitioners to work on board the vessel M/V Gloria.
His PEME showed essentially normal findings with
no hypertension and without any heart problems.
It must also be pointed out that

It was only while rendering duty that he experienced symptoms. This is supported
by a medical report issued by Cartagena de Indias Hospital in Colombia stating that
Gazzingan suffered intense chest and back pains, shortness of breath and a slightly

Therefore, even
assuming that Gazzingan had a pre-existing
condition, as alleged by petitioners, this
does not totally negate the probability and
the possibility that his aortic dissection was
aggravated by his work conditions. The stress caused
elevated blood pressure while performing his duties.

by his job actively contributed to the progression and aggravation of his illness. In
compensation cases, [i]t is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between
the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to
conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very
least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had.39 More
importantly, the 2000 POEA-SEC has created a presumption of compensability for
those illnesses which are not listed as an occupational disease. Section 20 (B),
paragraph (4) states that those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract
are disputably presumed as work-related. Concomitant with this presumption is
the burden placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease and only
a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required to
establish compensability of illnesses not included in the list of occupational
diseases. As discussed above, a causal link was established between Gazzingans
employment and his ailment. In view thereof, the presumption now operates in
favor of respondents and the burden is shifted to the petitioners to overcome the

statutory presumption. However, in the case at bench, petitioners failed to

discharge such burden as will be discussed below.

Port employment Three days reporting

Notably, the post-employment medical examination has two (2) requisites:

(1) it is done by a company-designated physician, (2) within three (3)
working days upon the seafarers return. The only exception thereto is
physical incapacity of the seafarer to undergo said post-employment medical
examination, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same
period is deemed as compliance. The law specifically declares that failure to
comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in the
seafarers forfeiture of his right to claim benefits thereunder. Clearly, the
three-day period from return of the seafarer or sign-off from the vessel,
whether to undergo a post-employment medical examination or report the
seafarers physical incapacity, should always be complied with to determine
whether the injury or illness is work-related.
Exception to 3-days reporting Post-employment as reiterated in the recent
case of Nicanor Ceriola vs Naess Shipping Philippines G.R. No. 193101 April
20, 2015;

In

Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Remo, we carved another

exception, not found in the law, i.e. when the employer refuses to refer the
seafarer to a company-designated physician: What if the seafarer reported to
his employer but despite his request for a post-employment medical
examination, the employer, who is mandated to provide this service under
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96, did not do so? Would the absence
of a post-employment medical examination be taken against the seafarer?
Both parties in this case admitted that Lutero was confined in a hospital in
Dubai for almost one week due to atrial fibrillation and congestive heart
failure. Undeniably, Lutero suffered a heart ailment while under the employ
of petitioners.
This fact is duly established.
Respondent has also
consistently asserted that 2-3 days immediately after his repatriation on April
19, 1999, Lutero reported to the office of Interorient, requesting the required
post-employment medical examination. However, it appears that, instead of
heeding Lutero's request, Interorient conveniently prioritized the execution of
the Acknowledgment and Undertaking which were purportedly notarized on
April 20, 1999, thus leaving Lutero in the cold. In their pleadings, petitioners
never traversed this assertion and did not meet this issue head-on. This selfserving act of petitioners should not be condoned at the expense of our
seafarers.
Therefore, the absence of a post-employment medical
examination cannot be used to defeat respondents claim since the failure to

subject the seafarer to this requirement was not due to the seafarers fault
but to the inadvertence or deliberate refusal of petitioners. (Emphasis
supplied)
failure to disproce the presumption of work-relatedness:
JEBSENS MARITIME, INC., ESTANISLAO SANTIAGO, AND/OR HAPAGLLOYD AKTIENGESELL SCHAFT, v. ELENO A. BABOL G.R. No. 204076,
December 04, 2013
As a general rule, the principle of work-relation requires that
the disease in question must be one of those listed as an
occupational disease under Sec. 32-A of the POEA-SEC.
Nevertheless, should it be not classified as occupational in
nature, Section 20 (B) paragraph 4 of the POEA-SEC15 provides
that such diseases are disputably presumed as work-related.
In this case, it is undisputed that NPC afflicted respondent while
on board the petitioners vessel. As a non-occupational disease,
it has the disputable presumption of being work-related. This
presumption obviously works in the seafarers favor. Hence,

unless contrary evidence is presented by the

employers, the work-relatedness of the
disease must be sustained.
In this wise, the petitioners, as employers ,

failed to
disprove the presumption of NPCs workrelatedness. They primarily relied on the medical report
issued by Dr. Co Pea. The report, however, failed to make a
categorical statement confirming the total absence of work
relation.